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A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking

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Show simple item record Liski, Matti en_US Montero, Juan-Pablo en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. en_US 2009-04-03T17:05:59Z 2009-04-03T17:05:59Z 2004 en_US
dc.identifier 2004-005 en_US
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and a competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations. We find, for example, that if the large firm enjoys a dominant position in the after-banking market, this position gets extended to the market during the banking period regardless of the allocation of the stock (bank) of permits. en_US
dc.format.extent 18 p en_US
dc.publisher MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 04-005WP. en_US
dc.title A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 58677853 en_US

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