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Market power in a storable-good market : theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading

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dc.contributor.author Liski, Matti en_US
dc.contributor.author Montero, Juan-Pablo en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-04-03T17:07:02Z
dc.date.available 2009-04-03T17:07:02Z
dc.date.issued 2005 en_US
dc.identifier 2005-016 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45046
dc.description.abstract We consider a market for storable pollution permits in which a large agent and a fringe of small agents gradually consume a stock of permits until they reach a long-run emissions limit. The subgame-perfect equilibrium exhibits no market power unless the large agent's share of the initial stock of permits exceeds a critical level. We then apply our theoretical results to a global market for carbon dioxide emissions and the existing US market for sulfur dioxide emissions. We characterize competitive permit allocation profiles for the carbon market and find no evidence of market power in the sulfur market. en_US
dc.format.extent 36, [8] p en_US
dc.publisher MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 05-016WP. en_US
dc.title Market power in a storable-good market : theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 68719714 en_US


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