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Auction design and favoritism

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dc.contributor.author Laffont, Jean-Jacques en_US
dc.contributor.author Tirole, Jean en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-12-15T23:53:10Z
dc.date.available 2009-12-15T23:53:10Z
dc.date.issued 1989 en_US
dc.identifier 90-012 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50145
dc.description.abstract The theory of auctions has ignored the fact that often auction designers, not the principal, design auctions. In a multi attribute auction, the auction designer may bias his subjective evaluation of quality or distort the relative weights of the various attributes to favor a specific bidder, an ancient concern in the procurement of weapons, in the auctioning of government contracts and in the purchase of electricity by regulated power companies. The paper analyzes the steps to be taken to reduce the possibility of favoritism. It is first shown that in the absence of favoritism, quality differentials among firms are more likely to be ignored if the auction designer has imperfect information about the firm's costs. Second, if the auction designer may collude with only one bidder, the other bidders should be chosen if they are as least as efficient as the former bidder, and no hard information about quality differentials is released by the auction designer that would justify fair discrimination in favor of the former bidder. Last, if the auction designer can collude with any bidder, the optimal auction tends to a symmetric auction in which quality differentials are ignored. The possibility of favoritism reduces the auction designer's discretion and makes the selection process focus on non-manipulable (monetary) dimensions of bids. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Supported by the Pew Charitable Trust, the Ford Foundation, and the MIT Energy Lab. en_US
dc.format.extent 18, [23] p en_US
dc.publisher MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy Policy Research) ; MIT-CEPR 90-012. en_US
dc.title Auction design and favoritism en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 28596072 en_US


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