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Laissez faire, collective control or nationalization of the global commons

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Title: Laissez faire, collective control or nationalization of the global commons
Author: Eckaus, Richard S.
Other Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
Publisher: MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Issue Date: 1992
Abstract: The use of the atmosphere as a dumping place for greenhouse gases has been a matter of laissez faire. Proposals for international agreement to restrict the rate of such emissions are, in effect, proposals for collectively determined controls. The alternative proposed here is, "nationalization," which would give each country a share in the global carrying capacity and allow each country to determine the timing and best use of its share. The advantage of nationalization of the global commons is that it would allow each country to determine its own path toward its allocated accumulation level, rather than having that path determined by international negotiations or an international authority. There is a prima facie case that, in general, countries can make better decisions for their own welfare than can international authorities. The allocation of shares in global carrying capacity according to the population size of each country, with debits for previous accountable emissions would be a means of achieving international equity. If the allocation were based on populations in some post World War Ii year, say, 1950, it would recognize the fact that most developing countries became responsible for their own economies only after achieving independence from colonial rule. This rule would also carry an implicit penalty for high growth rates of population and emissions since 1950.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50197
Other Identifiers: 92014
Series/Report no.: MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 92-014WP.

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