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Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions

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dc.contributor.author Joskow, Paul L. en_US
dc.contributor.author Schmalensee, Richard en_US
dc.contributor.author Bailey, Elizabeth M. en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-12-16T00:01:43Z
dc.date.available 2009-12-16T00:01:43Z
dc.date.issued 1996 en_US
dc.identifier 96007 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50221
dc.description.abstract Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and the Acid Rain Division of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. en_US
dc.format.extent 34 p., [12] p. of plates en_US
dc.publisher MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 96-007WP. en_US
dc.title Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 35721634 en_US


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