| dc.contributor.author | Joskow, Paul L. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Schmalensee, Richard | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Bailey, Elizabeth M. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.other | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-12-16T00:01:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-12-16T00:01:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1996 | en_US |
| dc.identifier | 96007 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50221 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices. | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and the Acid Rain Division of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 34 p., [12] p. of plates | en_US |
| dc.publisher | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 96-007WP. | en_US |
| dc.title | Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
| dc.identifier.oclc | 35721634 | en_US |
