Advanced Search

iJam: Jamming Oneself for Secure Wireless Communication

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Dina Katabi Katabi, Dina en_US Gollakota, Shyamnath en_US
dc.contributor.other Networks & Mobile Systems en 2010-06-07T19:15:07Z 2010-06-07T19:15:07Z 2010-06-07
dc.description.abstract Wireless is inherently less secure than wired networks because of its broadcast nature. Attacks that simply snoop on the wireless medium successfully defeat the security of even 802.11 networks using the most recent security standards (WPA2-PSK). In this paper we ask the following question: Can we prevent this kind of eavesdropping from happening? If so, we can potentially defeat the entire class of attacks that rely on snooping. This paper presents iJam, a PHY-layer protocol for OFDM-based wireless systems. iJam ensures that an eavesdropper cannot successfully demodulate a wireless signal not intended for it. To achieve this iJam strategically introduces interference that prevents an eavesdropper from decoding the data, while allowing the intended receiver to decode it. iJam exploits the properties of 802.11â s OFDM signals to ensure that an eavesdropper cannot even tell which parts of the signal are jammed. We implement iJam and evaluate it in a testbed of GNURadios with an 802.11-like physical layer. We show that iJam makes the data bits at the adversary look random, i.e., the BER becomes close to 50%, whereas the receiver can perfectly decode the data. en_US
dc.format.extent 13 p. en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CSAIL-TR-2010-028
dc.subject Physical Layer Security en_US
dc.title iJam: Jamming Oneself for Secure Wireless Communication en_US

Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2010 ... 454.1Kb PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record