| dc.description.abstract | The range and quantity of government activity has grown exponentially over the course of this century. In response, an "institutional Presidency" has developed. Today’s President is at the locus of a network of relationships designed to increase his capacity to influence the flow of events.
This paper examines a small sample of those relationships: His relationship with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a division of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that reviews regulations. OIRA was one of the key instruments used by the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations to limit regulation. The operational question of this paper is: What happened to the OIRA-White House relationship when there was a change in party and policy preferences in the White House in 1993? That is, how does a relatively pro-regulatory White House use OIRA?
To answer this question, this paper examines panel data on the policy preferences and social interaction patterns of OIRA members, time series data on the disposition of reviewed regulations, and structured interviews with members of OIRA. Analysis of these data indicates that the review process institutionalizes conflict between the OMB and agencies, resulting in appeals to the President when actors believe that the President will support their views. Thus, the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations economized on their limited ability to monitor the Executive Branch by focusing their attention and political support on members of OIRA with compatible viewpoints. | en |
