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A decentralized incentive mechanism for company-wide energy consumption reduction

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dc.contributor.advisor Georgia Perakis. en_US
dc.contributor.author Wang, Jingxi, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-24T20:23:18Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-24T20:23:18Z
dc.date.copyright 2010 en_US
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61897
dc.description Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computation for Design and Optimization Program, 2010. en_US
dc.description Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-85). en_US
dc.description.abstract This thesis proposes a decentralized reward-based incentive mechanism to address the problem of noncomplying subsidiaries when the parent company wish to meet its targeted energy consumption level. Besides its effectiveness in ensuring compliance, the proposed mechanism is advantageous as it is able to induce the optimal subsidiary behavior that maximizes the company profit given a carefully chosen reward allocation scheme. In addition, when the company is willing to trade part of its profit for an operationally simple mechanism, simple uniform allocation scheme is highly effective when the subsidiaries exhibit certain degree of symmetry. The results above are drawn from our investigation on a more general model: Cournot competition under a joint constraint. For this model, we study the equilibrium behavior under free competition and compare the profit and total surplus achieved with the corresponding values when different levels of coordination are introduced in the market (i.e., the Monopoly market and the society-wide coordinated market). We establish tight upper bounds for the profit and total surplus loss due to lack of coordination as functions of various market characteristics (i.e., number of firms, intensity of competition and asymmetry between firms). en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Jingxi Wang. en_US
dc.format.extent 85 p. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 en_US
dc.subject Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.title A decentralized incentive mechanism for company-wide energy consumption reduction en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree S.M. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 706817655 en_US


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