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Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

dc.contributor.authorHendricks, Kennethen_US
dc.contributor.authorPinkse, Jorisen_US
dc.contributor.authorPorter, Robert H.en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09T05:34:55Z
dc.date.available2011-06-09T05:34:55Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifierempiricalimplica00henden_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529
dc.descriptionOctober, 1999en_US
dc.descriptionAugust, 1999--Added t.pen_US
dc.publisherCambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-19en_US
dc.titleEmpirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc45199033en_US
dc.identifier.aleph000951352en_US


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