Login

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

Show full item record




Title: Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
Other Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Issue Date: 1991
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63849
Other Identifiers: maintainingreput00fude
Series/Report no.: Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 589

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
maintainingreput00fude.pdf 1.784Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record

Search DSpace@MIT


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Links