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Tacit collusion in a dynamic duopoly with indivisible production and cumulative capacity constraints

dc.contributor.authorLoury, Glenn C.en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-10T04:06:19Z
dc.date.available2011-06-10T04:06:19Z
dc.date.issued1990en_US
dc.identifiertacitcollusionin00louren_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64225
dc.descriptionMay 1990. -- June 1990.--3rd prelim. pageen_US
dc.descriptionSeries numbering changed by hand on t.p. by the Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherCambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 557en_US
dc.titleTacit collusion in a dynamic duopoly with indivisible production and cumulative capacity constraintsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc22302937en_US
dc.identifier.aleph000454241en_US


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