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Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments
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Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments
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Author:
Ansolabehere, Stephen
Citable URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64383
Other Contributors:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Advisor:
Publisher:
Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Date Issued:
2003
Description:
July 2003
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64383
Other Identifiers:
votingweightsfor00anso
Related To:
Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network
Series/Report no.:
Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 03-24
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