Advanced Search
DSpace@MIT

Not by reasons alone

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Richard Holton. en_US
dc.contributor.author Manne, Kate (Kate Alice) en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-01-30T17:02:52Z
dc.date.available 2012-01-30T17:02:52Z
dc.date.copyright 2011 en_US
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68915
dc.description Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2011. en_US
dc.description Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-130). en_US
dc.description.abstract My thesis is a sustained argument that the practical reason is not a suitable master concept in ethics, let alone the only ethical notion we need. In Chapter One, I defend the idea that desires have irreducible and pervasive normative significance. More particularly, I defend reasons internalism - the claim that desires are a necessary condition on practical reasons - by developing a new version of this thesis. In this version, desires serve to veto practical reasons, which are in turn grounded in objective values. I argue that this compatibilist picture provides an account of self-interested reasons which is intuitively superior to its purely objectivist rivals. In Chapter Two, I argue that evaluative notions are distinct from prescriptive notions, which reasons talk is meant to encode. According to my account, it is partly constitutive of wickedness (an evaluative notion) that the wicked person lacks moral reasons - understood as the basis for potentially apt prescriptions - to mend his ways. For some people, I suggest, are deaf to moral instructions in something close to a literal sense. I argue on this basis that the distinction between evaluative and prescriptive 'oughts,' and the attendant possibility of iterating them, vindicates internalism about moral reasons too. A solution to Chisholm's paradox is a welcome fringe benefit. In Chapter Three, I begin to develop an alternative to prevailing reasons-based conceptions of ethics, by focusing on social relationships, such as friendship. I argue that agents can behave decently by being guided by implicitly normative concepts like friendship, which contain codes of conduct like "Friends help each other out," and "You don't snitch on your friends." Such 'do's and don'ts' and the corresponding concepts enable agents to behave well instinctively, even when they believe they have no reason to do so. I argue further that recognizing who someone is - i.e., the social relationship in which they stand to you - can be action-guiding and even mandating. I argue that this kind of social awareness is a viable alternative to positing intuitive responsiveness to reasons, and defend the idea that it underwrites a form of practical necessity worthy of the name. en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Kate Manne. en_US
dc.format.extent 130 p. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 en_US
dc.subject Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.title Not by reasons alone en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree Ph.D. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 773615380 en_US


Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
773615380.pdf 8.346Mb PDF Preview, non-printable (open to all)
773615380-MIT.pdf 8.345Mb PDF Full printable version (MIT only)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

MIT-Mirage