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A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

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A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

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Author: Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
Other Contributors: Theory of Computation
Advisor: Silvio Micali
Date Issued: 2012-09-07
Abstract:
We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72584
Series/Report no.: MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028
Keywords: Knightian Auctions, Probabilistic Mechanisms, Social Welfare

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