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A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

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dc.contributor.advisor Silvio Micali
dc.contributor.author Chiesa, Alessandro en_US
dc.contributor.author Micali, Silvio en_US
dc.contributor.author Zhu, Zeyuan Allen en_US
dc.contributor.other Theory of Computation en
dc.date.accessioned 2012-09-07T22:15:03Z
dc.date.available 2012-09-07T22:15:03Z
dc.date.issued 2012-09-07
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72584
dc.description.abstract We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one. en_US
dc.format.extent 19 p. en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028
dc.subject Knightian Auctions en_US
dc.subject Probabilistic Mechanisms en_US
dc.subject Social Welfare en_US
dc.title A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions en_US


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