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DISCUSSION NOTE

Recursive misrepresentations: A reply to Levinson (2013)

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Levinson 2013 (L13) argues against the idea that ‘recursion, and especially recursive center-embedding, might be the core domain-specific property of language’ (p. 159), citing crosslinguistic grammatical data and specific corpus studies. L13 offers an alternative: language inherits its recursive properties ‘from the action domain’ (p. 159). We argue that L13’s claims are at best unwarranted and can in many instances be shown to be false. L13’s reasoning is similarly flawed—in particular, the presumption that center-embedding can stand proxy for embedding (and clausal embedding can stand proxy for recursion). Thus, no support remains for its conclusions. Furthermore, though these conclusions are pitched as relevant to specific claims that have been published about the role of syntactic recursion, L13 misrepresents these claims. Consequently, even an empirically supported, better-reasoned version of L13 would not bear on the questions it claims to address.

Keywords: recursion, center-embedding, embedding, subordination, parataxis, discourse, statistics

Citing crosslinguistic grammatical data and specific corpus studies, Stephen C. Levinson (Levinson 2013, henceforth L13) argues against the idea that ‘recursion, and especially recursive center-embedding, might be the core domain-specific property of language’ (p. 159). On the basis of ‘facts from interactive language use’, L13 offers an alternative conjecture: that language inherits its recursive properties ‘from the action domain’ (p. 159). In this reply, we do not take any particular stand on the ‘core domain-specific properties of language’ or L13’s conjecture about the cognitive roots of recursion. We write instead to express our concern at the pervasive misrepresentations of fact and faulty reasoning presented in L13 in support of its claims. L13’s argument can be summarized as follows.

(i) Crosslinguistic peripherality of embedding: ‘[M]any languages … show little evidence of indefinite embedding’ (p. 151). A response to this fact that views embedding as part of a ‘“toolkit” whose tools may not be all deployed … fits ill with the claim … that “recursion” (understood as embedding) may be the one crucial domain-specific feature of linguistic ability’ (p. 152).

(ii) Rarity and shallowness of center-embedding: Corpus studies have shown that degree 2 center-embedding ‘occurs vanishingly rarely in spoken language syntax’ (p. 155), and degree 3 center-embedding is hardly observed at all. These conclusions converge with the well-known psycholinguistic observation that ‘after degree 2 embedding, performance rapidly degrades to a point where degree 3 embeddings hardly occur’ (p. 154).

(iii) Ubiquity and limitlessness of center-embedding in interactive discourse: ‘Whether or not languages have clear syntactic embedding, however, they always seem to make use of “pragmatic embedding” ’ (p. 157)—‘embeddings in interactive discourse that have the same basic properties exhibited in sen-

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tential syntax, but that are distributed over two (or more) speakers’ (p. 154), with no depth limitation.

(iv) Conclusions: Points (i) and (ii) cast doubt on the claim that ‘a core element of language design is indefinite embedding of the kind produced by a context-free grammar’ (p. 157). Points (i)–(iii), taken together, suggest that ‘recursion’ understood propositionally ... is not so much a universal property of grammar as a property of human psychology, most evident in language use’ (with possible evolutionary roots in the ‘action domain’), which languages have a limited option of recruiting for use in sentence syntax.

We begin by summarizing our empirical and logical concerns about points (i)–(iii), arguing that L13’s grammatical, statistical, and formal claims are at best unwarranted and are in many instances demonstrably false. Similarly flawed is L13’s reasoning, particularly the presumption that center-embedding can serve as a proxy for embedding in general (and that clausal embedding can stand proxy for recursion in general). If our concerns are justified, no support remains for the conclusions summarized in point (iv). Furthermore, as we discuss in the concluding section, though these conclusions are pitched as relevant to specific published claims about the role of syntactic recursion, L13 misrepresents these claims. As a result, even an empirically supported, better-reasoned version of L13 would not bear on the questions it claims to address.

1. Point (i): CROSILINGUISTIC PERIPHERALITY OF EMBEDDING. L13’s first example of a language without recursive clausal embedding is Pirahã. While acknowledging the possibility that Pirahã permits clausal embedding (Everett 1986, 1987, contra Everett 2005), L13 describes as ‘not in doubt’ the claim ‘that embedding is very limited, and at most seems capped at one level deep’ (p. 151). No evidence is cited for these assertions. In fact, an example of possible double embedding is cited in Everett’s own grammatical sketch (Everett 1986:260, ex. 226, though with complications noted in Nevins et al. 2007:27, n. 38). No attempts to elicit multiple levels of embedding have been reported in the literature, no substantial corpora of Pirahã texts have been published, and none are cited by L13. So the claim described by L13 as ‘not in doubt’ is actually utterly unverified.

L13 claims next that ‘Australian languages provide a wealth of better-documented cases’ of languages ‘lacking evidence of indefinite recursion’ (p. 151), citing Hale’s (1976) famous paper on the Warlpiri ‘adjoined relative clause’ as a locus classicus. Hale, however, made no such claim. Far from arguing that such clauses are ‘juxtaposed’ (L13:151) or instantiate ‘parataxis’ (L13:153), Hale repeatedly identifies them as ‘subordinate’ throughout his paper and gives no reason to doubt this label. The point of interest for Hale was not their status as embedded clauses, but rather his claim that they are embedded at the clause level, even when they appear to modify a nominal within the clause. Hale additionally notes that center-embedding—a topic to which we return shortly—is possible for the infinitival variant of the adjoined relative clause (though not for its finite counterpart; see Hale 1982 and Hale et al. 1995 for further evidence of non-finite clausal embedding in Warlpiri).1

He also notes the possibility of multiple subordination of adjoined finite relative clauses.

Furthermore, even if the adjoined relative were to turn out to be juxtaposed or paratactic after all (i.e. even if Hale were wrong and L13 right about this construction), later research on Warlpiri, uncited by L13, offers clear examples of clausal embedding. In 3, for example, the dependent clause (marked with the dependent complementizer kuja) is clearly a constituent of the matrix clause, since it is interpreted in the scope of the matrix intensional predicate ‘disbelieve’. See Legate 2011 for further discussion.

L13 follows its discussion of Warlpiri with a consideration of Nordlinger’s (2006) analysis of similar constructions in Wambaya (Nordlinger 1998). L13 claims that it is ‘a completely live issue as to whether we are dealing with structural dependence or parataxis’ (p. 151)—despite the fact that Nordlinger’s central point in the cited discussion is the contention that constructions in Wambaya that resemble adjoined relative clauses are ‘clearly subordinate’ (2006:7). L13 dismisses her arguments as follows: ‘Nordlinger argues that the “subordinate” construal may be forced by prosody, but as Hale noted, there is often a pause between clauses of these types in Australian languages generally’ (pp. 151–52). In fact, L13 has misrepresented both Nordlinger’s and Hale’s claims.

Though Hale (1976) did observe a ‘characteristic falling-rising intonation … followed almost invariably by a pause’ in clause-initial adjoined relatives in Warlpiri and some other Australian languages, he went on to note that this tendency is not found when the adjoined relative follows the main clause: ‘when the main clause precedes the subordi-

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2 Hale himself offered relevant examples of subordination in the part of his paper devoted to the adjoined relative clause in Kaytetye [Kaititj], which he analyzed in much the same terms as Warlpiri. In the following example, for instance, the dependent clause (marked with the dependent complementizer clitic ar) is clearly a constituent of the matrix clause since it serves as the host for the matrix second-position clitic n ‘you’.

(i) [Agir-ar ampwari-nhi-wal] n api-n. kangaroo-comp die-PST-DIR you NOM go-IMP

‘Go up to the kangaroo that died.’ (Hale 1976:100, ex. 51)

3 Nordlinger 2006 also contains excellent corrective discussion regarding the treatment and portrayal of the ‘adjoined relative clause’ in Australian languages more generally.
nate clause, the intonation over both clauses is more often falling, and the pause between
them, if any, is brief’ (1976:78). Far from showing that adjoined relatives are indepen-
dent sentences or instances of parataxis,4 the distribution of this prosodic pattern actually
provided Hale with an argument that the adjoined relative is base-generated as a right sis-
ter to the main clause, and appears in initial position only as the result of an optional
‘transformational rule which positions them to the left of the main clause and Chomsky-
adojins them to the top-most S-node’—thus ‘account[ing] for the prevailing tendency to
pause between a preposed subordinate clause and the main clause since, after preposing
[but not before], the former would be removed from the latter by two S-nodes’ (Hale

For Wambaya, the disambiguating prosody to which Nordlinger refers is the
‘fall–rise intonation’ (2006:17) characteristic of subordination, which crucially disap-
ppears under a coordination construal.5 Furthermore, Nordlinger provides independent
arguments from word-order distinctions for subordination in Wambaya. In particular,
though the order of coordinate clauses mirrors the temporal ordering of the described
events, and adverbial clauses may precede or follow the main clause, the finite clausal
object of a matrix speech/perception predicate obligatorily follows the matrix, as in

(4) Didima irri ngaya [nganku ngiy-a ngirra
tell 3PL.A(NPST) 3SG.F.OBL this.II.ERG 3SG.F.A-PST steal
bungmanya-nka gijilulu],
old.woman.II-DAT money.IV(acc)
‘They told her (that) she’d stolen the old woman’s money.’
(Nordlinger 2006:18)

The final Australian language mentioned by L13 is Kayardild (Evans 1995), where the
existence of clausal embedding is beyond dispute, since case morphology is assigned to
subordinate clauses and is affixed to the subconstituents of such clauses outside their
other morphology (Kayardild being famous for CASE STACKING). The literature does in-
deed claim, as L13 states, that Kayardild disallows multiple levels of clausal embed-
ding—but L13 also accepts Evans’s morphological explanation for this observation: the
morphology assigned to the subconstituents of a subordinate clause is both obligatory
and ‘terminal’. A second level of subordination would yield patterns of affixation that the
morphology would block. If Kayardild has subordinate clauses, and there is an inde-
pendent morphological explanation for those constructions in which subordination is
blocked, it is hard to see why the language was even discussed as an example of the sup-
posed crosslinguistic peripherality of clausal embedding.6

4 As Richard Kayne notes (p.c.), if parataxis is viewed as a form of coordination (and coordination obeys
the principles that govern syntactic structure more generally; cf. Munn 1993, Zwart 2005, among others), it is
a species of embedding, rather than an alternative to it.

5 Nordlinger cautions that this claim about intonation is a ‘purely impressionistic observation [which]
needs to be verified by proper prosodic analysis’ (2006:17, n. 15), but in any case does not describe any
‘pause’. As far as we can tell, the sole mention of ‘pause’ occurs elsewhere (2006:19, n. 16), where the ab-
sence of a pause is cited as support for the claim that an entirely different construction (which superficially
resembles the adjoined relative) should be analyzed as an embedded complement question.

6 Round (2013:189–201) proposes an alternative to Evans’s (1995) analysis of the Kayardild inflectional
system that does not constrain embedding as Evans’s analysis does. We do not decide between Round’s and
Evans’s proposals here, but if Round’s alternative should turn out to be on the right track, Kayardild might
then be the single language identified appropriately in L13 as requiring a syntactic restriction on unbounded
recursive clausal embedding.
Finally, L13 asserts that ‘languages with very limited morphology often offer no
clear evidence for subordination at all’ (p. 152), referring the reader to ‘Englebretson
2003 on Indonesian’ for a relevant example. We note first that Englebretson (2003) is
describing a particular variety spoken in Yogyakarta, on the basis of a corpus of con-
versation containing only 36,265 words. Subordination in other varieties of Indonesian
and Malay is well documented, much studied, and beyond dispute; see, among many
Yogyakarta corpus, we do in fact find subordination. Example 5, for instance, includes
a relative clause introduced by the relative complementizer yang.

(5) Kamu kan pernah lihat pencopet [yang di=KoperasiPemuda] itu?
2sg prt ever see pickpocket rel at co-op youth that
‘Have you ever seen that pickpocket on the Koperasi Pemuda [bus line]?’
(Englebretson 2003:15)

Englebretson appears to have been cited by L13 because of his claim that ‘comple-
mentation…does not exist in this language variety’ (2003:1), where complementation
is defined as ‘a clause which serves as the subject or object of another clause’
(2003:22). This is a significantly narrower claim than L13’s claim of ‘no clear evidence
for subordination at all’ (p. 152). Yet even this narrower claim is not accurate. Despite
setting remarkably stringent criteria for identifying subordination,7 Englebretson ac-
knowledges the existence of a number of unambiguous clausal arguments—including
6, in which the subordinate clause is marked as an argument of mengata- ‘say’ by the
applicative suffix -kan. Note additionally that the subordinate declarative clause has a
relative clause further embedded within it, thus providing what L13 would call an in-
stance of degree 2 embedding (a point of particular relevance to L13, to which we re-
turn below).

(6) saya lebih ingin, me- lebih suka untuk mengata-kan [silahkan-lah
1sg more want (truncated) more like PURP AT.WORD APPL go.ahead PRT
keluarga itu menentu-kan … cara berhubungan yang paling baik
family that DEM AT.certain APPL way MID.connect REL most good
bagi mereka berdua gitu lho].
for 3PL MID.TWO thus PRT
‘I prefer to say: let the family go ahead and determine the best way of re-
lating for the two of them.’
(Englebretson 2003:87)

The remaining language cited as one of ‘many languages that show little evidence of
indefinite embedding’ is Amele (p. 151, n. 4). To illustrate its supposed absence of em-
bedding, L13 refers the reader to a WALS article by Comrie and Kuteva (2008), which
presents a single sentence from that language in support of a specific claim about rela-
tivization.8 In fact, however, Roberts’s (1987) grammar of Amele reveals that the lan-

7 It is not enough for Englebretson for a clause to form a single intonational unit with an appropriate matrix
predicate, even in the default predicate-complement word order; instead, the clause must be unambiguously
morphologically marked as an argument of the verb, which for this variety of Indonesian means either in-
dexed by an applicative morpheme or promoted to subject (‘trigger’) position of a passive verb. He then con-
siders it noteworthy (2003:88) that only eleven of the 263 potential clausal arguments he identifies in the
corpus succeed in meeting these conditions.

8 Comrie and Kuteva’s example involves subject relativization (the topic of their article), and the relative
clause is characterized as ‘the same as an unmarked simple (declarative) clause’. A more careful reading of
Roberts’s (1987:49–56) description of Amele relative clauses, however, indicates that this identity with un-
marked simple declaratives is an accident of the example chosen. Relative clauses differ from declarative
languages shows a number of constructions that are good candidates for embedded clauses, including center-embedding of sentential complements.

Naus 3SG 1PL today go-1PL-FUT Q NMLZ ask-1SG-3SG.REM.PST
‘Naus asked me whether we would go today.’ (Roberts 1987:48)

Strikingly, Roberts even offers an example of two-level center-embedding in Amele (characterized as ‘clumsy’ but ‘grammatical’).9

(8) Naus ija [Duwe [cabi haun wele cehe-i-a ec]
Naus 1SG Duwe garden new already plant-3SG-TODAY.PST NMLZ
say-3SG.REM.PST NMLZ. say-1SG-3SG.REMPST
‘Naus told me that Duwe had said she had already planted her new
garden.’ (Roberts 1987:17)

In sum, none of the languages cited in L13 provide support for its claim that clausal embedding is crosslinguistically peripheral.

2. Point (ii): rarity and shallowness of center-embedding. L13 summarizes its crosslinguistic findings as a demonstration ‘that parataxis can be hard to distinguish from embedding, especially since an embedding-like construal is likely to be driven by the pragmatics even when there is no syntactic motivation for it’ (p. 153). As we have seen, this conclusion does not withstand basic scrutiny of L13’s own sources. Every language discussed by L13 shows evidence of clausal embedding, and in the sole example where clausal embedding actually does appear to be limited to a single level (Kayardild), L13’s own source provides an independent reason for this limitation (though see n. 6).

Of course, the evidence relevant to the question of embedding varies from language to language. Evidence for embedding can be found, for example, in the use of complementizers not available in matrix clauses, selection of clause types by higher predicates, semantic opacity and scope phenomena, dependent mood, sequence of tense, long-distance movement, quantifier binding, constraints on anaphora, and characteristic prosody. Which tests are relevant in a given language depends on other properties of the language: its lexical resources, morphological peculiarities, prosodic patterns, and so on. Wherever possible, a researcher hopes that evidence from more than one relevant factor will converge on the same conclusion.

Center-embedding can also test for subordination. If we find a putative subordinate clause sandwiched between elements of a matrix clause, no obvious analysis in terms of parataxis or juxtaposition can explain the observed order.10 Nonetheless, center-embedding clauses in that the relativized noun must be initial in a relative clause, whereas declarative clauses show unmarked 5 IO DO V ordering (Roberts 1987:70). As a consequence, the unmarked and relativized positions happen to coincide for subject relatives. In addition, relative clauses are optionally marked with the ‘subordinating demonstrative conjunction eu “that” which follows the relative clause’ (Roberts 1987:49). Comrie and Kuteva’s example omits this optional marker.

9 Example 8 is elicited data. Roberts (1987) notes that in recorded texts, the nominalizing particle ec is typically absent and the speech verb ‘say’ is elided, leaving only the agreement suffixes associated with this embedding verb. No such option is discussed for embedded questions, which is why we reproduce an embedded question to illustrate center-embedding in 7.

10 See, for example, the discussion by Nevins and colleagues (2009:375) of a center-embedded complement clause in Pirahã (ex. 23) noted by Everett (1986:278, ex. 290).
ding enjoys no special pride of place in linguistic analysis, but is just one of many phenomena that can demonstrate clausal subordination in the languages of the world.

Nonetheless, L13, after summarizing its supposed demonstration ‘that parataxis can be hard to distinguish from embedding’, declares: ‘these difficulties are circumvented if instead of focusing on edge-recursion we focus on center-embedding’ (p. 153). It then proceeds to a discussion of processing problems posed by center-embedding and the alleged rarity of center-embedding in language use—as if special facts about center-embedding can stand proxy for facts about clausal embedding in general. Taken together, L13’s crosslinguistic claims, psycholinguistic observations, and claims about language use are presented as preparation for the claim that embedding is limited or peripheral in sentential syntax, but ‘is exhibited in a much more fulsome way outside of sentential syntax’ (p. 149).

But L13’s shift from general properties of clausal subordination to specific claims about center-embedding is illegitimate. The field has known since Chomsky & Miller 1963a,b that certain types of degree 2 center-embedding (specifically, self-embedding) present special processing difficulties not characteristic of other instances of embedding—but this fact holds of languages and constructions where there is no difficulty distinguishing parataxis from embedding, such as English relative clauses. Likewise, if it should turn out that certain center-embedded structures are rare, no conclusions can be drawn about embedding as a whole unless other clauses whose embedded status is beyond doubt are also rare to a similar degree. L13’s decision to ‘focus on center-embedding’ as a means of clarifying the true status of all clausal embedding is therefore misleading.

Once again, there are also factual problems. Though the processing difficulties posed by degree 2 center-embedding are uncontroversial, L13 makes the further claim that they are specially restricted in production as well, calling attention to the supposedly remarkable rarity of multiply center-embedding clauses in naturally occurring texts. L13 cites Karlsson (2007), who gathered statistics from corpora in seven European languages. According to L13’s description of Karlsson’s findings, degree 2 center-embedding is said to occur ‘vanishingly rarely in spoken language syntax’ (p. 155), and no examples of degree 3 were observed in the corpora—facts taken to support L13’s claim that there is something peripheral about syntactic embedding.

Corpus statistics, however, must always be evaluated against a baseline before it can be concluded that the relative rarity of a given phenomenon requires special explanation. Neither L13 nor Karlsson provides such an evaluation. In recent work, however, Bader (2012; see also Trotzke, Bader, & Frazier 2013) provides a first step toward the proper assessment of quantitative data concerning embedding. His results are both instructive and cautionary in the context of L13. Using German corpus data, he argues that the low frequency of multiple center-embedding follows from processing considerations and does not require a special grammatical constraint.

In German, relative clauses may be center-embedded or extraposed. The extraposition option avoids the disruption of syntactic dependency for well-known and independently motivated processing reasons (Hawkins 1994, 2004). Both embedded and extraposed relative clauses may contain a noun phrase that introduces another relative clause. This lower relative clause may itself be either extraposed or embedded within the higher relative clause. These combinations produce four different structures: EXTRAPosed WITHin EXTRAPosed, CENTER-EMBEDded WITHin EXTRAPosed, EXTRAPosed WITHin CENTER-EMBEDded, and CENTER-EMBEDded WITHin CENTER-
Bader estimated the frequencies of these structures in a very large German corpus of ninety-two million sentences. Of these, 2,157 sentences contain a relative clause within a relative clause, including twenty-three that contain three or more relative clauses. Within the 2,157, 423 are doubly center-embedded relative clauses (instances of embedded-in-embedded). On average, then, double center-embedding occurs at a frequency of just above 4.6 per million sentences, a figure that one might indeed be tempted to describe informally as ‘vanishingly rare’.

Crucially, however, though the frequency of double center-embedding in Bader’s corpus is subjectively low, it is close to its expected frequency under the traditional assumption that the grammar and processing factors are independent (cf. Chomsky & Miller 1963a,b). For each of the two relative clauses, the grammar allows for two options, center-embedding or extraposition, and processing preferences, which have been

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11 Bader considers instances of these structures found within embedded clauses, such as the naturally occurring examples below (Bader 2012:20, also cited in Trotzke et al. 2013:7–9). (Underscores indicate depth of embedding.) Note that the final structure is an instance of degree 2 center-embedding.

(i) Extraposed within extraposed

Grundlegend ist hier die Annahme, dass es keine allgemeingültige Definition gibt, die die Lieder beschreibt, die sich für den Einsatz im Unterricht eignen.

‘Basically here is the assumption that there is no generally accepted definition describing the songs that may be suited for use in class.’ (deWaC1/27201; http://www.diplomarbeiten24.de)

(ii) Extraposed within center-embedded

Ihr werdet bemerkt haben, dass Völker, die in Ländern leben, in denen ein besseres Verständnis von Leben und Tod herrscht, den Weggang eines geliebten Menschen oftmals zelebrieren.

‘You will have realized that peoples who live in countries where there exists a better understanding of life and death often celebrate the passing away of a beloved person.’

(deWaC-1/27569; http://www.das-gibt-s doch-nicht.de)

(iii) Center-embedded within extraposed

Hector Sanchez ist davon überzeugt, daß der Geist von Tom Donovan zurückgekehrt ist, der vor zehn Jahren während einer Explosion, die Annie, Dan und er versehentlich ausgelöst hatten, ums Leben kam.

‘Hector Sanchez is convinced that the ghost of Tom Donovan has returned, who was killed in an explosion that was accidentally caused by Annie, Dan and himself.’

(deWaC2/45707; http://www.epguides.de)

(iv) Center-embedded within center-embedded

Internationalen Studien belegen, dass Medizinstudenten, denen identische Krankenakten, international studies prove that medical students to whom identical patients’ files die nur in Bezug auf Alter und Geschlecht variiieren, vorgelegt werden, unterschiedlich decide

‘International studies show that medical students decide unequally if they are confronted with patients’ files that only differ with respect to age and gender.’

(deWaC2/23755; http://www.das-parlament.de)

12 Of these 423, seventy-two were missing a VP. On the missing VP effect, see Frazier 1985 and subsequent work. Bader’s statistical analysis considers these separately.
independently established in psycholinguistic studies, result in the latter option being chosen more frequently. Absent any additional constraint on multiple center-embedding, we expect that this choice will be made independently by language users for each relative clause in each example—both the higher and the lower. If there were an additional constraint against multiple center-embedding, we would expect the choices between center-embedding and extraposition to be interdependent—if the higher relative clause is embedded, then the lower relative clause should not be. Bader’s study shows that the relative ratio of center-embedding versus extraposition for the lower relative clause is largely constant whether the higher relative clause is itself center-embedded or extraposed, indicating that the choices are made independently. The rarity of double center-embedding is thus the result of repeated application of a less preferable syntactic option; there is no motivation for an additional constraint disfavoring multiple center-embedding. The moral for our overall discussion is that, absent such principled comparisons of the sort undertaken by Bader, the significance that L13 attaches to the subjective ‘rarity’ of multiple center-embedding is at best premature and most likely misplaced.

Furthermore, even if a more principled application of statistics were to show that multiple center-embedding is unexpectedly rare in some corpus, such a finding would not ‘undermine the idea that natural languages are not regular and necessarily context-free or higher’ (p. 154). Nor would it support L13’s assertion that ‘it remains an interesting question whether treating, say, English as regular (with large numbers of simple rules) is more complex than treating it as context-free (with fewer, more complex rules; see Perfors et al. 2010)’ (p. 154).

In fact, there is now broad consensus that a variety of syntactic models (including tree-adjoining grammar, combinatorial categorial grammar, minimalist grammar, and others) converge on the ‘mildly context-sensitive’ class, which appears to have the appropriate descriptive power for natural language syntax (Joshi 1985). The inadequacy of regular language has been known for decades. Furthermore, L13 seems to suggest that regular grammars may be in effect sufficient despite being less powerful than context-free grammars, since center-embedding structures are very rare. But the paper that L13 cites in support of this claim (Perfors et al. 2010) shows no such result. In that study, the authors considered three handcrafted context-free grammars: one contained recursive rules, one contained only depth-limited nonrecursive rules, and the third contained a mixture of both. A Bayesian analysis of a small child-directed English corpus showed that the grammar with a mixture of recursive and nonrecursive rules has the highest posterior probability and is thus favored. But all three grammars under consideration are context-free, and regular language is not mentioned at all—so it is a misinterpretation of Perfors and colleagues (2010) to suggest that they favor regular languages. In a related earlier study, three of the same authors (Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier 2006) did compare a regular grammar with a context-free grammar (see Berwick et al. 2011 for further discussion). They found, however, that the context-free grammar is favored even when one only considers very simple child-directed English, where each utterance averages only 2.6 words.

13 If anything, Bader finds that the lower relative clause is center-embedded slightly more frequently when the higher relative clause is center-embedded versus when the higher relative clause is extraposed.

14 The result pertains to the weak generative capacity of grammars, in the sense that the grammars under study generate an equivalent set of strings. These formal models of grammar, however, have different mechanisms for string generation, resulting in different syntactic structures. Such strong generative properties have more direct empirical consequences for linguistic analysis. Nevertheless, the weak convergence result is notable, suggesting a necessary condition on the adequacy of all syntactic theories.
and no utterance contains center-embedding or remotely complex structures. In sum, L13’s ‘interesting question’ about the descriptive adequacy of regular language was settled long ago in the formal studies of grammar—and is also refuted from an empirical and quantitative perspective by the very paper that L13 cites.

3. Point (iii): ubiquity and limitlessness of center-embedding in interactive discourse. As its pièce de résistance, L13 presents the following claim: that ‘[t]here are [center] embeddings in interactive discourse that have the same basic properties exhibited in sentential syntax, but that are distributed over two (or more) speakers … [with] no parallel limit on embedding’ (p. 154). The dialogue in 9, for example, is described as an instance of degree 1 center-embedding.

(9) A: May I have a bottle of Mich?
     B: Are you twenty-one?
     A: No.
     B: No. (p. 154, ex. 12)

L13 describes this interaction uncontroversially as one in which ‘the second question leaves the first unanswered until a preliminary question is addressed’ (p. 155). L13 then proceeds to describe the interaction as ‘a nested dependency just as in The boy the horse kicked has a broken leg’ and proposes to account for it with a context-free grammar that generates recursive center-embedding (p. 155).

(10) Q&A → Q (Q&A) A

Strikingly, no evidence is offered for the claim that interactions like 9 are governed by a rule such as 10. Example 9 does indeed contain two question-answer pairs that are both temporally nested and informationally connected, but temporal nesting and informational connectedness do not in and of themselves argue for a center-embedded structure. For one thing, the absence of one or another property makes no difference to the well-formedness of discourses that differ minimally from 9. The very natural discourse in 11, for example, has the same temporal nesting as 9 but lacks informational connectedness. The equally natural discourse in 12 has informational connectedness but the question-answer pairs are interdigitated, rather than nested.

(11) A: Do you carry Michelob?
     B: [sees A has a wet umbrella] Is it still raining?
     A: Yes, unfortunately.
     B: It’s over there, near the plastic cups.

(12) A: Where are my keys?
     B: Oh, are you ready to leave now?
     They’re on the kitchen table.
     A: Yes, I’m ready to leave.

Does a center-embedded structure underlie temporally nested sets of question-answer pairs such as 9, licensed by a dedicated embedding rule of discourse syntax? In light of the temporal and informational variants seen in 11 and 12, and the absence of any evidence or argumentation to the contrary, it seems equally plausible to attribute these discourse possibilities to a general human capacity for conversational multitasking. People can carry on more than one conversation at once, even with the same person. If a secondary conversation is initiated by a speaker in order to gain information crucial to an already initiated conversation (as is the case in 9), the result will, of course, be a temporally nested structure, since the secondary question is prompted by the primary question, and the secondary answer is crucial to formulation of the primary an-
answer. But we need not appeal to a recursive grammatical rule to explain the temporal sequencing of question-answer pairs under such circumstances—just a general multitasking capacity that fails to forbid nesting, put to use by speakers with specific informational needs best met by nesting.

We are not claiming that there is no structure underlying discourse, nor do we dismiss the possibility that future research might show that a rule such as 10 plays a role in example 9 after all. Our objection is not theoretical but methodological. As discussed at the beginning of the previous section, claims about embedding at the sentence level are tested in a variety of ways, just like any claim about any type of syntactic constituency. Similar rigor is required in the analysis of formal grammars (at the level of weak generative capacity; see n. 14). While the language $A^*B^n$ could be attributed to a context-free grammar, one needs to deploy mathematical tools such as the pumping lemma to prove that it must be, and that no finite-state grammar can be sufficient. We should demand no less from claims at the discourse level. Though L13 hails as ‘very surprising’ the claim that ‘[t]here are embeddings in interactive discourse that have the same basic properties exhibited in sentential syntax’ (p. 154), L13 fails to offer even one ‘basic property’ of sentential embedding that holds of the discourses discussed by L13 (and offers no discourse-specific arguments either).

In fact, we do know of one consideration that might ultimately provide support for a center-embedding analysis of 9, but its implications for L13 are not positive. In particular, it is not at all obvious to us that temporal nesting of question-answer pairs is in fact free from depth limitations, as L13 claims. Consider the following pragmatically plausible extension of example 9, which L13 would analyze as an instance of degree 2 embedding at the discourse level.

13 A: May I have a bottle of Mich?
   B: Are you twenty-one?
      A: Is that the drinking age around here?
      B: Yes.
      A: No.
      B: No.

This interaction strikes us as decidedly odd. We find it almost impossible to keep track of which question is answered by the two final utterances. The acceptability of the interaction improves dramatically when information is added to the final two answers that makes it clear which question is being answered by each utterance.

14 A: May I have a bottle of Mich?
   B: Are you twenty-one?
      A: Is that the drinking age around here?
      B: Yes.
      A: Unfortunately, I’m not twenty-one yet.
      B: Sorry, I can’t sell you a beer.

In light of 12, the source of the unacceptability of 13 might be ambiguity between a nested and interdigitated parse of the interaction, but we might also be observing the ameliorable processing difficulty that is the hallmark property of center-(self-)embedding past degree 2 (Chomsky & Miller 1963b:467). If that is so, L13’s analysis of 11 as center-embedding will be supported, but at the cost of L13’s central claim: that discourse-level center-embedding is free of the constraints that limit its sentence-internal counterpart. By asserting as fact a similarity between discourse grammar and sentence grammar (center-embedding) and a difference (constraints on center-embedding), with-
out proper evidence for either the similarity or the difference, L13 has done its cause no favor.\footnote{L13 does not present any examples of discourse embedding that illustrate rule 10 for cases more complex than example 9. A single example (p. 155, ex. 14) is claimed to illustrate degree 2 embedding, but despite a diagram that appears to center-embed an interaction resembling 9 in a larger discourse constituent, the larger constituent does not instantiate 10 at all, as simple inspection will make clear. (Both the question and its answer appear to the left of the smaller constituent, and what appears to the right is a stage direction for an action undertaken as a consequence of the discourse as a whole.) L13’s other examples of supposed center-embedding stray even farther from 10 and minimal pairs with 9, counting repairs and repetitions as instances of recursive embedding and subordinating certain question-answer pairs with no obvious motivation. Remarkably, L13 includes a supposed example of interdigitation (p. 159, ex. 22), citing it as support for the claim that discourse syntax mirrors sentence syntax (which we have argued is exactly backward; see our discussion of 12) on the grounds that ‘cross-serial dependencies’ have also been noted in sentence syntax. Since L13’s example merely consists of two connected utterances by speaker A punctuated by a ‘what?’ and a ‘wow’ from speaker B (with no obvious connection between the ‘what’ and ‘wow’), we see no reason to accept this analysis in any case.}

4. Point (iv): conclusions. But what is L13’s cause? L13 has claimed that sentential embedding is crosslinguistically limited and that center-embedding ‘occurs vanishingly rarely in spoken language syntax’ (p. 155), while center-embedding at the discourse level is ubiquitous, unconstrained, and common. We have argued that L13 is wrong on all of these points: its crosslinguistic claims misrepresent the facts; the move from embedding to center-embedding is logically illegitimate; there is nothing self-evidently surprising about the frequency with which center-embedding occurs in texts; and the claims about embedding in discourse are completely unsupported. Still, suppose L13’s empirical claims had turned out to be accurate. What broader conclusions would be warranted?

L13 offers the beginning of its answer in the very first paragraph: that its conclusions will bear on the well-known proposal by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002, henceforth HCF) ‘that the sole feature of language that may be domain-specific is the recursive nature of syntax’. ‘The aim of this short report’, L13 continues, ‘is not to engage in further commentary, but rather to clarify that there is one central sense of the term recursion—namely embedding …—that clearly is not exclusive to syntax, and that is exhibited in a much more fulsome way outside of sentential syntax’ (p. 149). In its concluding section, however, L13 states its conclusions more strongly: ‘The idea that recursion, and especially recursive center-embedding, might be the core domain-specific property of language is rather directly undercut by the facts from interactive language use’ (p. 159).

We would draw a very different conclusion. If the organization of discourse parallels the organization of syntactic structure as strongly as L13 suggests, we would conclude that the core rule responsible for syntactic structure (e.g. Merge) extends beyond the sentence level—that is, that the ‘faculty of language—narrow sense’ (to use HCF’s terminology) controls some aspects of discourse. Far from undercutting the idea that recursion ‘might be the core domain-specific property of language’, such a discovery would be interesting in its own right, but entirely orthogonal to HCF’s proposal.

Needless to say, if it were true that sentence-internal clausal embedding is more constrained than its discourse-level counterpart, figuring out the reasons for this could be an interesting topic for syntactic research. As noted by Nevins and colleagues (2009:366) in a similar context, ‘although Merge may in principle combine any two lexical items or phrases an unbounded number of times, not every imaginable instance of Merge is acceptable in actual languages. There are many restrictions on Merge that
constrain the repertoire of structures that individual languages allow … These restrictions, and the laws that underlie them, form a continuing topic of syntactic research and debate’. HCF’s claim concerned the human capacity to recursively combine words and phrases into larger units. Though English clausal embedding provides a convenient, standard illustration of this capacity, there are countless other ways that the same point can be made. If we were attempting to illustrate this capacity with Kayardild examples, for instance, we would not be able to demonstrate syntactic recursion with clausal embedding, but any evidence for any kind of hierarchical syntactic structure in the language would do just as well. That is why ‘the metaphor of universal grammar as a “toolkit” whose tools may not be all deployed’ (L13:152) is apt, and L13’s claim that it ‘fits ill’ with HCF’s conjecture is misguided. While it is conceivable that an investigation of specific restrictions on clausal embedding might turn out to bear on deeper issues of the sort discussed by HCF, there is no reason to expect it to.

L13 makes a further claim, which strikes us as potentially interesting. If sentential embedding is found at the discourse level, perhaps it is in some fashion evolutionarily connected to the human ‘action-planning system in general’, a system that ‘needs to be able to hold a stack of subgoals, and check them off one by one’ (p. 158). Perhaps. But this proposal is pure speculation: an intriguing start for a future research program, but unsupported (for now) by evidence or argument.

Far be it from us to condemn speculation in linguistics. From speculations grow useful theories, from which may grow specific hypotheses about the puzzles of human language. HCF’s proposal about syntactic recursion is itself a speculation of this sort, no more or less worthy in principle than L13’s claims about the ‘action domain’. We do believe, however, that a speculation like L13’s, if advanced on the basis of misrepresentations, mischaracterizations, and confusion about basic issues, is not off to a good start.

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