Using U.S. Leverage to Abate Conflicts That Harm U.S. Security

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THE PRUDENT USE OF POWER
IN AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Edited by
Stephen Van Evera and Sidharth Shah

THE TOBIN PROJECT
iv. Using U.S. Leverage to Abate Conflicts That Harm U.S. Security

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Al-Qaeda exploits wars that involve Muslims to sustain its power. It features these wars in its propaganda, and uses them as occasions to recruit and train new fighters, raise money, and network with other extremist groups. For these reasons wars that involve Muslims are a tonic for al-Qaeda and a threat to U.S. efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. Conflicts that do not involve Muslims can also help al-Qaeda by causing states to quarrel among themselves instead of cooperating to defeat al-Qaeda, or cooperating to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that al-Qaeda seeks to acquire.

Hence the U.S. has a major interest in preventing, abating, or ending many international and civil conflicts. Peacemaking should therefore be a key U.S. weapon in the war on al-Qaeda. Accordingly, the U.S. government should consider ways to develop more capacity for peacemaking. Specifically, the U.S. should seek ways to translate its vast military and economic power into peaceful conduct by others. America’s military and economic strength gives it large power to shape others’ conduct. U.S. policy thinking should focus on finding ways to apply this leverage to prevent or dampen conflicts that involve Muslims or that otherwise harm U.S. security.

I. War Begets Terror

Al-Qaeda arose as a byproduct of five wars in the Middle East and South Asia, and is now sustained by four current conflicts. Without these wars al-Qaeda would likely not exist—a fact that highlights the U.S. interest in ending current conflicts and preventing new ones.

The Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 to 1989 was the petri dish in which the Egyptian Muslim brothers led by Ayman al-Zawahiri and Saudi Islamist radicals led by Osama bin Laden combined to form al-Qaeda, and the place where they first gained combat experience. The India-Pakistan conflict (1947–) led Pakistan in 1994 to create and aid the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan viewed as a tool
to forestall the possible growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan. The ruinous Afghan civil wars of 1989 to 1996 persuaded many Afghans to accept barbaric Taliban rule in 1996 as the only alternative to the chaos of war. And the war between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan Northern Alliance from 1996 to 2001 led the Afghan Taliban to grant safe haven to al-Qaeda, in exchange for al-Qaeda’s help against the Northern Alliance.

These four wars led to the founding of al-Qaeda, motivated others to create and support its Afghan Taliban allies, and motivated the Afghan Taliban to ally with al-Qaeda. The Persian Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991 also fueled al-Qaeda’s growth by drawing U.S. troops into the Arabian peninsula—a deployment that al-Qaeda propagandists decried as a sacrilege—and by providing al-Qaeda a grievance against the Saudi regime.

The U.S. unwisely did little to abate or prevent these conflicts. Since 1947 the U.S. has sometimes moved to dampen crises between India and Pakistan but never pushed hard for an India-Pakistan peace settlement. It helped sustain the civil war in Afghanistan for three years after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in February 1989 by continuing to support rebels seeking to overthrow the Najibullah regime. Then, when the Najibullah regime was ousted in 1992, the U.S. abruptly disengaged from Afghanistan without trying to reconcile the Afghan factions that overthrew Najibullah. Instead the U.S. callously left them to war viciously among themselves. In retrospect the U.S. would have been better served by working to limit or end these conflicts.

Four current conflicts continue to complicate U.S. efforts to defeat al-Qaeda and stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction today. Together these conflicts pose a prime obstacle to U.S. efforts against the threat of WMD terrorism:

1. Pakistan’s conflict with India causes Pakistan to fear the possible growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan. This leads Pakistan to continue aiding the Taliban insurgency against Afghanistan’s Karzai government. The Taliban insurgency now threatens the survival of the Karzai government, raising the risk that Taliban leaders who were once allied to al-Qaeda, and who remain ideologically friendly to al-Qaeda, could return to power in Afghanistan.

2. Russia has fractious relations with states on its near periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia. (Russian relations with Ukraine have lately improved but remain unsettled and could deteriorate again.) These conflicts are irritants in the U.S.-Russian relationship, as the U.S. has allowed itself to be drawn into the quarrel on the side of the near periphery states. Important U.S.-Russian cooperation on other key issues has suffered as a result. This includes U.S.-Russian cooperation to stem nuclear programs
in Iran and North Korea, to lock down loose nuclear weapons and nuclear materials worldwide, to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to stem global warming. All these problems are made harder to solve by U.S.-Russian friction over Russia’s relations with its near neighbors.

3. The Israel-Palestine conflict supplies al-Qaeda with a compelling propaganda opportunity—a bloody shirt that al-Qaeda waves with great success to mobilize support.³

4. The Iraq civil war (2003–) has abated but still smolders, and it threatens to escalate again. It ties down thousands of U.S. troops, supplies al-Qaeda with fodder for effective anti-American propaganda, and sustains the risk that al-Qaeda could regain a refuge in Iraq by cutting a deal with one side in the conflict (like al-Qaeda’s deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s). There is also the danger that other states could be drawn into the conflict—a development that would benefit extremists in the region, including al-Qaeda.

Peace is therefore a key weapon against al-Qaeda and the WMD terrorism threat. More peace will bring less terrorism and reduce the spread of WMD.

II. Translating U.S. Leverage into Peace

Despite its current economic woes the U.S. remains the world’s sole superpower. U.S. military and economic strength is unmatched in the world, far surpassing the power of all parties involved in the four conflicts, mentioned above, which sustain al-Qaeda and impede progress against WMD terror. How can the U.S. use its power to persuade the belligerents in these conflicts to behave more peacefully?

Lesser states and nonstate actors often bend when great powers apply carrots and sticks. Israel, Britain, and France stopped their war on Egypt and withdrew from the Sinai in 1956 in response to arm twisting by the Eisenhower administration. West Germany agreed to abandon its nuclear ambitions in the early 1960s in response to U.S. assurances and threats—assurances that the U.S. would continue to protect Germany if it cooperated, and threats to end U.S. protection if it did not.⁴ Taiwan and South Korea likewise ended their nuclear programs in the 1970s and 1980s in response to U.S. promises to protect them if they complied and to punish them otherwise. The governments of emerging states in Eastern Europe agreed to respect the rights of their ethnic minorities after 1989, under threat by the European Union that it would otherwise withhold economic relations. The Nicaraguan Sandinistas agreed to elections in 1990 and to leave power when they lost those elections under U.S. military pressure. The Serbs halted their war on Bosnia in 1995 under threat of continued U.S. aid to
the Bosniaks and Croats, and U.S. air attack. Other examples abound. Threats and inducements deftly applied can often turn ships of state in new directions.

Three types of leverage bear mention. They are: (1) Using threats or inducements to broker neutralization agreements—that is, agreements ensuring that a state will behave with benign neutrality toward its neighbors. Such agreements can calm the fears of neighbors who may otherwise attack the state to forestall its possible attack on them. (2) Using threats or inducements to persuade adversaries to refrain from using force or committing other belligerent acts against one another. This cannot end conflicts but can limit or abate them. And (3) using threats or inducements to persuade adversaries to settle their conflict by peace agreement.

The U.S. should apply these tactics to help to abate four current conflicts: Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, Russia-Ukraine-Georgia, Israel-Palestine, and Iraq.

III. Dampening Conflicts in South Asia

Public discussion of U.S. options in Afghanistan focuses on debating the size and duration of U.S. troop deployments to Afghanistan, the rules of engagement for those forces, and possible means to raise the legitimacy of the Karzai government. These are important questions, but the problem of Pakistani support for the Taliban must also be addressed. Even a more legitimate Afghan government supported indefinitely by U.S. troops probably cannot defeat the Taliban as long as Pakistan sustains the Taliban with safe haven and material support.

In principal the U.S. could address the problem of Pakistani support for the Taliban with either threats or inducements aimed at Pakistan. However, the threat option has large downsides. Its clearest downside lies in the danger that Pakistan may not comply, leaving the U.S. in a confrontation with a Pakistani government whose cooperation it needs in the wider effort against al-Qaeda.

A more promising approach would seek to remove Pakistan’s motive for supporting the Afghan Taliban. As noted above, Pakistan backs the Afghan Taliban because it fears that otherwise Afghanistan will fall under Indian influence or control. Pakistan would then face the hazard of a two-front conflict involving danger of a direct Indian attack from the east, and a stab in the back by a pro-India Afghanistan from the north and west. Pakistani strategists see the Afghan Taliban as friendly agents who avert this two-front threat by steering Afghanistan away from alignment with India. (Pakistan’s fear of an Afghan-Indian alliance is overblown, but this is how the Pakistanis see things.)

The U.S. could dispel Pakistan’s two-front fear by guaranteeing the strict neutrality of Afghanistan in all present and future conflicts between Pakistan and India. Specifically, Afghanistan would agree to have no formal or informal alliances with India; no military cooperation or coordination with India; no
military assistance from India; no outsized Indian consulates or military advisory
groups on Afghan soil; and no Afghan military deployments against Pakistan
in times of India-Pakistan tension or crisis beyond what Afghanistan might
normally deploy on its Pakistani border. In exchange Pakistan would halt sup-
port for the Afghan Taliban insurgency and steer them toward peace. Pakistan
would likely accept this bargain, as its motive for backing the Taliban would
then be erased by the assurance of Afghan neutrality.

The U.S. would act as guarantor of the agreement. The U.S. could also seek
agreement from Afghanistan’s neighbors, and from India, not to undermine
Afghan neutrality.

Neutrality agreements have been successfully used in the past to calm conflicts
by removing states from the international chessboard. Examples include the 1831
Five Power Treaty to guarantee Belgian neutrality; treaties to ensure Russian,
Austro-Hungarian, Italian and German neutrality under various scenarios in
the 1880s; and agreements to guarantee Austrian and Finnish neutrality in the
Cold War. Specifically:

- After Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830 some European
  powers feared that another power (France) might move to control the
  new Belgian state and use its assets against them. Such thinking raised
  the risk of a conflict among the powers for control of Belgium. To avert
  this danger the European powers agreed in 1831 to guarantee that
  Belgium would be forever neutral. This agreement, the Five Power Treaty,
  lasted until Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. For eighty-three
  years a struggle among the powers to control Belgium was averted by its
  agreed neutrality.

- German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck brokered three overlapping alli-
  ances in the 1880s that featured neutrality agreements as a key element.
  In the 1881 Dreikaiserbund agreement Germany, Austria-Hungary and
  Russia promised benevolent neutrality to one another should any of the
  three be at war with a fourth great power. In the 1882 Triple Alliance,
  Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made the same promise of neutrality
  to one other. And in the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty, Russia and Germany
  promised benevolent neutrality should the other be involved in war with
  another great power, except for wars stemming from German aggression
  against France or Russian aggression against Austria-Hungary. These
  treaties helped keep Europe at peace by defusing states’ fears of being
  attacked, which dampened their impulse to forestall others’ attacks by
  launching preventive or preemptive war against them.

- The neutrality of Austria in the Cold War was agreed by a 1955 Soviet-
  Austrian accord in which Austria agreed not to join NATO, and the
Soviet Union agreed to recognize Austrian independence and withdraw all Soviet troops from Austria. This arrangement ended Soviet-American competition for control of Austria, pacifying that front in the Cold War.7

- A less formal Soviet-Finnish Cold War understanding saw Finland accept Soviet demands that it agree not to join NATO, in return for Soviet acceptance of Finnish autonomy in its domestic affairs.

Thus we see that neutralization agreements have been effective means for calming international conflict in the past. The Afghan maelstrom seems an ideal case for the same cure. Afghanistan’s Karzai government will quickly accept neutralization, as (contrary to Pakistan’s exaggerated fears) there is no strong constituency in Afghanistan for joining the India-Pakistan conflict. Afghanistan’s neighbors are also likely to cooperate with Afghan neutralization. Most important, India should agree to its own nonalignment with Afghanistan because it gives up little by agreeing (as Afghanistan is unlikely to align with India in any case) and India would gain by helping its U.S. ally address the problem of Islamic extremism in South Asia.

In short, the U.S. could help solve its Afghanistan riddle by arranging the agreed neutrality of Afghanistan. Such a move could well persuade Pakistan to pull the plug on its Taliban allies. And without Pakistani support the Afghan Taliban would be far weaker than it is now.

The U.S. could also diminish Pakistan’s motive to support the Afghan Taliban if it could find ways to abate or end the India-Pakistan conflict, since Pakistan’s fear of India is what drives its desire to control Afghanistan. Two steps might be considered. First, the U.S. could make clear to both India and Pakistan that it will help the attacked party while ending any help to the attacker if either attacks the other. If the U.S. managed to make this threat credibly, both sides would be better deterred from attacking the other from fear of losing U.S. support and provoking U.S. opposition. They also could breathe easier knowing that their opponent would face U.S. opposition if it attacked, and is therefore unlikely to attack; so each would see less need to forestall the other’s potential attack by striking the other first.

A precedent for this approach lies in President George H. W. Bush’s successful efforts to dampen the 1990 Kashmir Crisis between India and Pakistan. In that crisis Bush dispatched then-Deputy National Security Advisor (and current Secretary of Defense) Robert Gates to South Asia to warn both Pakistan and India that the U.S. would withdraw support from the more aggressive side if war broke out. To the Pakistanis Gates explained that the U.S. would “have to stop providing military support or any kind of support to whichever side initiates things.” To the Indians Gates then explained that he had told the
Pakistanis “not to expect any help from the Americans if they started a war,” and he firmly conveyed a similar message to India.8

The U.S. could also try to encourage India and Pakistan to agree to a final settlement of their long conflict. Specifically, it could frame an Obama Plan that defines a just and reasonable final-status settlement to the India-Pakistan conflict, and use threats and inducements to persuade both sides to accept it. The outlines of that plan are fairly clear.9 India and Pakistan have at times seemed ready to make peace themselves in recent years. Tensions between India and Pakistan arising from the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack preclude peace in the short term, but such an approach should be considered when conditions are ripe.

Such an India-Pakistan peace would lessen four U.S. security problems. First, it would ease Pakistan’s fears of a war with India, which would calm Pakistan’s fear that Afghanistan might take India’s side in such a war, which would reduce Pakistan’s motive to aid the Afghan Taliban. Second, it would remove Pakistan’s motive for supporting Punjabi terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that are friendly with al-Qaeda. Pakistan sustains these groups to attack India, especially in Kashmir, but these groups also give al-Qaeda ideological and material support. At long last an India-Pakistan peace might bring Pakistan to dismantle these al-Qaeda allies.

Third, an India-Pakistan peace would allow Pakistan to remove military units from its eastern frontier with India (where Pakistan’s forces are now concentrated) and redirect them against al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban forces in Pakistan’s northwest. And fourth, India-Pakistan peace would allow Pakistan to reconfigure its army, now structured for armored war with India, toward a counterinsurgency posture appropriate for combating al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and Afghan Taliban elements in Pakistan, should Pakistan opt to take them on (perhaps in line with the Afghan neutralization scheme outlined above, should it be accepted). As a result Pakistan could bring far more force to bear against al-Qaeda, its Pakistan Taliban allies, and perhaps even its Afghan Taliban allies. Given these benefits, India-Pakistan peace is worth pursuing despite the odds against it.

IV. Harmonizing Russia with its Near Neighbors

During the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations NATO was extended to include former Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe plus the Baltic states. The Bush administration later proposed to further extend NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia. Russian leaders responded by declaring that they view NATO’s approach to their borders as a threat to their national security, and have threatened to disrupt this NATO approach, perhaps by stirring up
civil war in Ukraine. Important Russian-American cooperation on other issues has been limited by this dispute.

A solution lies in the agreed neutralization of states on Russia’s periphery. Russia would agree to respect the domestic independence of these states; while these states would agree not to join NATO or another alliance that did not include Russia. NATO would join the agreement as a concurring party. Such a settlement would give all parties what they say they most desire. Russia would secure its frontiers, while its neighbors would ensure their own control of their domestic order. The U.S. and Russia could then get on with the important business of defeating al-Qaeda, halting the spread of WMD, and addressing climate change.

V. Dampening the Israel-Palestine Conflict

To prepare the ground for Israeli-Palestinian peace the Obama administration should propose a final status peace plan similar to President Bill Clinton’s December 2000 Mideast peace plan (known as the Clinton Parameters or Clinton Plan), and direct threats and inducements (mostly the latter) to both sides to persuade them to agree. This would strengthen forces on both sides that favor peace on reasonable terms, while pushing opponents of peace onto the defensive. It could thereby break the logjam and finally move the parties toward peace.

Polls have long shown that most Israelis and about half of all Palestinians favor peace on the terms like those framed in the Clinton plan. What has been missing is U.S. leadership to pull them over the line.

Clear U.S. willingness to apply pressure for peace would help moderate Israeli and Palestinian leaders make concessions, by making clear that the U.S. would give their opponents an incentive to reciprocate their concessions. In recent times moderates on both sides have held back from offering concessions from fear of being hung out to dry—exposed as willing to concede, with no results to show for their concessions. U.S. pressure would counter this fear.

U.S. suasion for peace would also compel extremists on both sides to moderate their goals or risk losing support from their communities. Today extremists on both sides—Hamas on the Palestinian side, and the Israeli settler movement and its Likud allies on the Israeli side—pay no political price for depriving their communities of peace, because they can claim that their radical actions are not preventing peace, as there would be no peace even if they behaved better. Hamas used this argument with success in its victorious 2005-to-2006 election campaign. The U.S. can prevent this game by making clear that it will lead the region to peace unless the radicals disrupt it. It will then be clear to Palestinians
that Hamas really is preventing peace. Hamas will then be forced to moderate or lose support.

An Obama/Clinton Mideast peace plan would also help educate publics on both sides about the concessions that peace will require. Elites on both sides (especially the Palestinian side) have misled their publics to underestimate the concessions that peace will require. U.S. endorsement of terms like those that both sides accepted (albeit with reservations) in 2000 to 2001 will trigger discussions that will help restore realism in both communities on the need to make painful concessions.

Peace is impossible between Israel and the Palestinians in the short term. The split between Fatah and Hamas must first be healed, and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Israeli government must first be reshuffled to expel its pro-settler elements and incorporate more moderate elements. But these are not insuperable obstacles. Moreover, an Obama/Clinton plan will help overcome them. The promulgation of an Obama/Clinton plan will put pressure on Hamas extremists to explain to the Palestinian community why they refuse a union with Fatah that could bring a positive peace, and will likewise force Netanyahu to explain to Israelis why he persists with a government that includes extremists and so cannot make peace when a just peace is finally available. Extremists on both sides will be put on the defensive. Their ability to veto peace will be weakened, perhaps sufficiently to allow peacemaking to proceed.

VI. Peace for Iraq

Regarding Iraq, the U.S. should frame a grand bargain that defines how to resolve the major outstanding issues that continue to divide the main Iraqi factions. These issues are: how to distribute power between the Iraqi federal government and provincial governments; whether and how to share power in the Iraqi central government among Iraqi political factions; where to locate provincial borders; how to share control of the Iraqi national army and other national security services among Iraqi factions; how to share ownership of oil and oil revenues among Iraqi regions and factions; whether to allow provincial governments to organize local militias and police; and how to define Iraqi national identity (how strongly Arab should it be?).

The U.S. has been in Iraq long enough to know what formulas on these issues are most acceptable to the various Iraqi factions. It should frame these formulas and use positive and negative inducements to persuade the Iraqi factions to accept them.

The George W. Bush administration unwisely confined itself to mediating and cajoling the factions in Iraq. The Obama administration has so far pursued
the same impotent policy. Instead the Obama team should move more forcefully to persuade Iraqis to settle their differences. The U.S. has vast leverage on the parties, including strong economic tools, powerful military forces in the region, and the capacity to arm and train the military forces of Iraqi factions that cooperate with U.S. policies. The U.S. could shape the outcome of an Iraqi civil war by arming and aiding one or another Iraqi faction. Hence no faction can dominate Iraq against U.S. wishes. The U.S. should harness this leverage to persuade the Iraqi factions to make the concessions that peace requires.

The U.S.-endorsed peace terms should reflect the principle that power and assets in Iraq shall be shared equally based on population. The U.S. government should then make clear that it will favor with assistance those who endorse these parameters and help foster a peace that embodies them, and that it will punish those who refuse to endorse these parameters, or obstruct progress toward a peace settlement that embodies them, by aiding their opponents.

Such a policy would leave all Iraqi factions better deterred from reaching for total dominion in Iraq. It would also leave them more secure in knowing that other factions could not achieve dominion (as the U.S. would not allow it), and that other factions therefore might no longer try to gain dominion. Hence all factions would be more willing to take the risks that agreeing to peace involves. All would be both deterred and reassured, hence more inclined toward peaceful conduct.

This approach to peace in Iraq finds precedent in Syria’s successful effort to coerce Lebanon’s factions to end their civil war in 1989 by compelling the factions to cooperate with a power-sharing arrangement framed by Syria. It also finds precedent in successful U.S. efforts to coerce the combatants in Bosnia, especially the Serbs, to end the Bosnian war in 1995. To do this the U.S. made clear that it would not permit Serb dominion in Bosnia. Eventually the U.S. armed the Croats and bombed the Serbs to compel them to accept an outcome premised on sharing power, and the Serbs complied.

VII. Using Leverage for Peace: Feasibility

To recap, I have suggested three ways the U.S. might use its leverage to limit or end conflict between or within other states: (1) to use threats or inducements to foster neutrality agreements that calm conflicts; (2) to use threats or inducements to dissuade adversaries from using force or taking other belligerent steps against each other; and (3) to use threats or inducements to persuade adversaries to agree to a peace settlement.

Are these remedies practical? We know from experience that the first remedy, neutralization, is quite feasible. Neutrality agreements have often been used
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...to dampen conflicts in the past, with marked success. More questions arise about the feasibility of the second and third remedies. Possible problems include these:

- Both remedies require a flexible U.S. policy that directs U.S. support to whichever belligerent behaves better, and shifts support from one belligerent to another when their behavior changes. But the U.S. government is often too rigid for this. Instead, it sorts the world into good guys and bad guys, and then treats them as permanent friends and permanent enemies. It is not clear that Washington is capable of learning the more complicated habits of mind that these remedies require.

- Both remedies presuppose that the U.S. can be a fair broker. They fail if the U.S. pursues an unjust peace. But past U.S. policies have sometimes been tainted by prejudice or ideology, or captured by foreign lobbies (like the China lobby of the 1950s, or today’s Israel/Likud lobby, Cuba lobby, Taiwan lobby, Georgia lobby, and others) that seek their own parochial goals without regard to justice. Remedies two and three—using threats or inducements to elicit peaceful conduct or agreement to a peace settlement—requires that these influences on U.S. policy be kept at bay.

- Persuading adversaries to agree to peace terms requires that Washington officials agree on a U.S. peace proposal. But achieving this agreement in Washington would often be challenging, partly because the belligerents will mobilize opposing lobbies in Washington to promote their case, creating policy gridlock.

- Persuading adversaries to agree to peace presupposes that the U.S. government has deep knowledge of the goals and perceptions of the belligerents. But this condition is often unmet. The U.S. State Department has been starved of resources for many years, leaving it short of expertise. American popular culture is insular; as a result most Americans know little of the wider world, so expertise is often lacking outside government as well. Hence Americans may be the wrong people to attempt difficult social engineering in faraway lands. Using threats or inducements to persuade others to agree to peace terms may be feasible in principle, but Americans may be the wrong people to try it.

These objections warn that efforts at muscular peacemaking may not succeed. But the U.S. should try it nevertheless. The United States has a large national security interest in peace, and should run risks to pursue it, including the risk that muscular peacemaking might fail. The cost of pushing for peace without success is small, while the benefit of success is large. Hence the U.S. should apply its leverage for peace despite the fact that success is hardly assured.
Notes

1 This argument is derived from the work of Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda making, recruitment network building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists. She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of U.S. counterterror policy.

2 The Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s largest intelligence service, created the Taliban in the 1990s and covertly gives it important help today. This covert help includes training, funding, munitions, other supplies, and sanctuary in Pakistan. The ISI also exerts important control over Taliban political and military policy. See Matt Waldman, The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents (LSE Destin Development Studies Institute, Discussion Paper 18, June 2010).


6 See Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe, 179–86, 201–02 (see note 5).


9 The most plausible outline for a settlement would have Pakistan agree to accept the line of control as the international border; in exchange, India would agree to stop stealing elections in Indian Kashmir and grant it greater autonomy.

As he left office in fall 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert revealed his belief that Israel should make peace on terms like those of the Clinton Plan. Specifically he argued that Israel should withdraw from “almost all” of the West Bank, and should share Jerusalem with the Palestinians. See Uri Avnery’s column “Summing Up,” October 4, 2008, available at http://middleeast.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/55507. But Olmert feared to state these positions while serving as prime minister. U.S. pressure for peace might have allowed him to lead Israel toward these goals while in office, as he could have had greater confidence that his steps toward compromise would bring reciprocal results from the Palestinians, knowing that the U.S. would apply leverage to persuade the Palestinians to reciprocate.

Arguing that outside powers can dampen civil conflicts by extending security assurances to belligerents who agree to peace is Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 335–364. This argument is explored further in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).


Some also argue that a peace imposed by outsiders will not endure because the belligerents have not freely agreed to it, will therefore not embrace it, and will return to war once they are free to do so. I am not persuaded by this hypothesis but agree that it needs research.