Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

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Abstract

A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution paves the way for further changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems. Under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions, we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness. The explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision-making: (1) a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society; (2) efficiency-enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender. Finally, we apply this framework to the analysis of the dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.

Keywords: commitment, constitutions, dynamic coalition formation, political economy, stability, voting.

JEL Classification: D71, D74, C71.

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1 Introduction

Consider the problem of a society choosing its constitution. Naturally, the current rewards from adopting a specific constitution will influence this decision. Yet, as long as the members of the society are forward-looking and patient, the future implications of the constitution may be even more important. For example, a constitution that encourages economic activity and benefits the majority of the population may nonetheless lead to future instability or leave room for a minority to seize political control. If so, the society—or the majority of its members—may rationally shy away from adopting such a constitution. Many problems in political economy, club theory, coalition formation, organizational economics, and industrial organization have a structure resembling this example of constitutional choice.

We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of dynamic collective decisions. Consider a society consisting of a finite number of infinitely-lived individuals. It starts in a particular state. A state in our framework represents both economic and political arrangements. In particular, it determines stage payoffs (for example, by shaping economic allocations) and also how the society can determine its future states (e.g., which subsets of individuals can change the economic allocations and political rules; see Examples 1 and 2). Our focus is on dynamic equilibria when individuals are sufficiently forward-looking. Under natural acyclicity assumptions which rule out Condorcet-type cycles, we prove the existence and characterize the structure of (dynamically) stable states. An equilibrium is represented by a mapping \( \phi \) which designates the dynamically stable state \( \phi(s_0) \) as a function of the initial state \( s_0 \). We show that the set of dynamically stable states is largely independent of the details of agenda-setting and voting protocols.

Although our main focus is the noncooperative analysis of the environment outlined above, it is both convenient and instructive to start with an axiomatic characterization of stable states. This characterization relies on the observation that sufficiently forward-looking individuals do not wish to support change towards a state (constitution) that might ultimately lead to another, less preferred state (our stability axiom). We also introduce two other natural axioms ensuring that individuals do not support changes that give them lower utility. We characterize the set of mappings, \( \Phi \), that are consistent with these three axioms recursively and provide conditions under which there exists a unique member of \( \Phi \) (Theorem 1). We show that even when \( \Phi \) is not a singleton, the sets of stable states defined by any two \( \phi_1, \phi_2 \in \Phi \) are identical.

Our main results are given in Theorem 2. Under the assumptions that (i) agents have a
discount factor sufficiently close to 1, and (ii) there are (small) transaction costs from changing states, the equilibria of our dynamic game for any agenda-setting and voting protocol corresponds to some $\phi \in \Phi$. Conversely, for any $\phi \in \Phi$, there exists a protocol such that the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium is represented by $\phi$.

Both high discount factors and transaction costs are assumed to enable a sharp characterization of the structure of stable states, though they are also reasonable in many relevant applications.\(^1\) The high discount factor assumption is motivated by situations in which a new state, involving a different configuration of political power, can be immediately changed by those who have power (which is itself a consequence of lack of commitment in political decisions discussed below). We also believe that most major changes in political rules and organizational forms involve transaction costs.\(^2\) We should add, however, that the payoff implications of these transaction costs are small in our setup precisely because the discount factor is high (and thus, in equilibrium, discounted payoffs are approximately equal to what they would have been without the transaction cost; see below).

At the center of our approach is the natural lack of commitment in dynamic decision-making problems—those that gain additional decision-making power as a result of a reform cannot commit to refraining from further choices that would hurt the initial set of decision-makers. This lack of commitment leads to two intuitive results. First, a particular social arrangement (constitution, coalition, or club) is made stable not by the absence of a powerful set of players that prefer another alternative, but because of the absence of an alternative stable arrangement that is preferred by a sufficiently powerful constituency. To understand why certain social arrangements are stable, we must thus study the instabilities that changes away from these arrangements would unleash. Second, dynamically stable states can be inefficient—i.e., they may be Pareto dominated by the payoffs in another state (see Theorem 3).

Our final result, Theorem 4, provides sufficient conditions for the acyclicity assumptions

\(^1\) These assumptions ensure that agents compare different paths putting a sufficiently large weight on payoffs in the final state that will ultimately emerge and persist rather than on payoffs in transitory states along these paths. Since we impose relatively few restrictions on protocols and preferences (in particular, no “cardinal” comparisons between payoffs in different states), cycles in the dynamic game cannot be ruled out without sufficiently forward-looking agents and without transaction costs (see Examples 3, 4 and 5 in Appendix B).

\(^2\) One example illustrating the plausibility of transaction costs in the context of political change comes from the emergence of democracy, studied, among others, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006a) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004). These works assume that while commitment to policies is not feasible, political institutions, such as democracy or voting rights, cannot be immediately reversed or totally disregarded once introduced (otherwise, democracy would have no value over and above a promise to implement certain policies). The most plausible reason for this is that there are transaction costs in changing political institutions (e.g., once given, voting rights cannot be taken back without incurring some costs).
(used in Theorems 1 and 2) to hold when states belong to an ordered set (e.g., a subset of $\mathbb{R}$). In particular, it shows that these results apply when (static) preferences satisfy a single-crossing property or are single-peaked (and some mild assumptions on the structure of winning coalitions are satisfied). These properties are satisfied in the majority of models of static or dynamic political economy as illustrated by the various applications discussed in Appendix B. Theorem 4 shows that our main results are both applicable in a wide variety of environments and typically easy to apply; also, Theorems 1 and 2 apply in a range of situations in which states do not belong to an ordered set.

Below, we provide two simple examples that illustrate main insights of our theoretical model. We start with a classic example that illustrates the tension between payoffs and political power that is present in more general form throughout our analysis. We then provide a more substantive example, to which we return in Section 6.

**Example 1** Consider a society that consists of two social groups, $E$, the elite, and $M$, the middle class. There are three states with different payoffs and distribution of political power: (1) absolutist monarchy $a$, in which $E$ rules, with no political rights for $M$; (2) constitutional monarchy $c$, in which $M$ has greater security and is willing to invest; (3) democracy $d$, where $M$ becomes more influential and privileges of $E$ disappear. Stage payoffs satisfy

$$w_E(d) < w_E(a) < w_E(c), \text{ and } w_M(a) < w_M(c) < w_M(d).$$

This implies that $E$ has higher payoff under constitutional monarchy than under absolutist monarchy (e.g., because greater investments by $M$ increase tax revenues). On the other hand, $M$ prefers democracy to constitutional monarchy and is least well-off under absolutist monarchy. Both parties discount the stage payoffs at rate $\beta \in (0,1)$. States $a, c,$ and $d$ not only determine payoffs, but also specify decision rules. In absolutist monarchy, $E$ decides which regime will prevail tomorrow; in both $c$ and $d$, $M$ decides next period’s regime.

Using our notation, $d$ is a dynamically stable state, and $\phi(d) = d$. In contrast, $c$ is not a dynamically stable state, since starting from $c$, there will be a transition to $d$ and thus, $\phi(c) = d$. Therefore, if, starting in state $a$, $E$ chooses a transition to $c$, this will lead to $d$ in the following period, and thus give $E$ a discounted payoff of

$$U_E(\text{reform}) = w_E(c) + \beta \frac{w_E(d)}{1 - \beta}.$$
If \( E \) decides to stay in \( a \) forever, its payoff is \( U_E (\text{no reform}) = w_E (a) / (1 - \beta) \). If \( \beta \) is sufficiently small, then \( U_E (\text{no reform}) < U_E (\text{reform}) \), and reform takes place. However, when players are sufficiently forward looking (\( \beta \) is large), then \( U_E (\text{no reform}) > U_E (\text{reform}) \). In this case, \( \phi (a) = a \). This example illustrates both of our main results. First, state \( a \) is made stable by the instability of another state, \( c \), which is preferred by those who are powerful in \( a \). Second, both \( E \) and \( M \) would be strictly better off in \( c \) than in \( a \), so the stable state starting from \( a \) is Pareto inefficient. It also illustrates that the set of stable states is larger when players are forward-looking (when \( \beta \) is small, only \( d \) is stable; when \( \beta \) is large, both \( a \) and \( d \) are stable).

**Example 2** Consider the choice of how inclusive society should be towards different political and social views. A central issue facing most countries with significant Muslim populations is what types of political, social and economic rights to give to religious and secular groups. At one end, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran deprive secular groups of all kinds of social and legal rights. At the other end, Turkey, Syria, Algeria, and several European countries with Muslim minorities have at times restricted participation of religious individuals in political and social life. Both types of bans appear to be motivated, at least in part, by dynamic considerations. Saudi Arabia and Iran are concerned that giving rights to non-religious groups would weaken their regimes, while in Turkey bans on Islamist practices and parties have been motivated by the so-called “slippery slope” argument that giving rights to religious groups would ultimately reduce the rights of secular groups.\(^3\) Some commentators interpret the developments in Turkey following greater inclusiveness towards religious groups and parties as supporting the predictions of this slippery slope argument.

To capture these issues in the simplest possible way, consider a society consisting of \( N \) individuals ranked in ascending order of religiosity. A state \( s \) consists of the set of individuals \( Z \) who currently have the right to political participation and a policy \( \rho \) which determines tolerance to secularism and religiosity. Individuals receive utility from their income and from policy \( \rho \). Suppose that the larger is the set of individuals with the right to political participation, the greater are net incomes (e.g., because the society functions more cooperatively or individuals with rights feel more secure and undertake greater investments or are less likely to rebel). We fix a political rule, e.g., majority or supermajority rule, which determines who can choose both \( \rho \) and the set of individuals who will have the right to political participation in the next period.

\(^3\)On “slippery slope” arguments, see Schauer (1985), and on the conflict between religious and secular groups, see Roy (2009) and Rabasa and Larrabee (2008).
This is a highly complex and, in our view, interesting social situation. It captures the “slippery slope” argument as giving rights to previously-excluded religious individuals has short-run economic benefits but could later deprive secular individuals of their political rights. Moreover, both the high discount factor and transaction costs assumptions appear plausible in this context.\footnote{For example, in Turkey the first religious local administration in Istanbul quickly moved to restrict the ability of certain restaurants to serve alcohol (though ultimately the most extreme measures were not successful), which is consistent with frequent choices of actions and thus high discount factors. Furthermore, even minor constitutional changes led to significant conflict and gridlocks, with potential economic and social costs, which is consistent with significant transaction costs.}

In Section 6, we apply our general results to the study of this environment.

This example also enables us to investigate the question: can we change the constitution so as to give the right to political participation while at the same time ban certain policies and certain future constitutional changes? This issue can be analyzed within our framework by introducing constitutions that require unanimity for certain types of changes (see also Barberà and Jackson, 2004). Such constitutions guarantee Pareto efficiency. However, our analysis highlights the reasons why constitutions that stipulate such unanimity rules may not be credible, e.g., when a certain supermajority has sufficient de facto political power to challenge the unanimity clause.

Roberts (1999) and Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) can be viewed as major precursors to our paper. Roberts (1999) studies dynamic voting in clubs in a society with $N$ individuals, where voting is by majority rule, individuals are ordered according to “single-crossing” preferences, and only clubs of the form $\{1, 2, \ldots, k\}$ for different values of $k$ are allowed. Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) study a dynamic game of club formation in which any member of the club can unilaterally admit a new agent.\footnote{Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) study a model of voting by quotas, so that a club admits a new member if sufficiently many current members (more than the quota) vote in favor. This implies that there may be many outcomes of voting at a given voting stage, while our assumptions impose that, at each voting stage, there is always a unique status quo and a unique alternative.} Lagunoff (2006), who constructs a general model of political reform and relates reform to the time-inconsistency of induced social rules, is another precursor. Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000, 2006) and Lizzeri and Persico’s (2004) analyses of franchise extension and Barberà and Jackson’s (2004) model of constitutional stability are also related and can be cast as applications of our general framework.

Two other closely related papers are Chwe (1994) and Gomes and Jehiel (2005). Chwe provides a model where payoffs are determined by states and transitions from one state to another are governed by exogenous rules to analyze the relationship between two distinct notions from cooperative game theory, consistent and stable sets. However, in Chwe’s setup, neither a nonco-
operative analysis nor characterization results are possible. Gomes and Jehiel study a related environment with side payments. They show that a player may sacrifice his instantaneous payoff to improve his bargaining position for the future, and that the equilibrium may be inefficient when the discount factor is small. In contrast, in our game Pareto dominated outcomes are not only possible in general, but may emerge as unique equilibria and are more likely when discount factors are close to 1. We also provide a full set of characterization (and uniqueness) results, which are not present in Gomes and Jehiel (and in fact, with side payments, we suspect that such results are not possible). Finally, in our paper a dynamically stable state depends on the initial state, while in Gomes and Jehiel, as the discount factor tends to 1, there is “ergodicity” (the ultimate distribution of states does not depend on the initial state).

Finally, our work is also related to the literatures on noncooperative coalition formation and club theory. An important difference between our approach and the previous literature on coalition formation is that, motivated by political settings, we assume that the majority (or supermajority) of the members of the society can impose their will on those players who are not a part of the majority. This contrasts with the positive externalities and free-rider problems studied by the previous literature. In addition, most of these works assume the possibility of binding commitments (Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999), while we suppose that players have no commitment power.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general environment. Section 3 presents our axiomatic analysis. In Section 4, we prove the existence of a (pure-strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game for any agenda setting and voting protocol and establish the equivalence between these equilibria and the axiomatic characterization in Section 3. Section 5 applies our results when states belong to an ordered set, while Section 6 uses our results to study the dynamics of political rights discussed in Example 2. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains main proofs; additional proofs, applications, and examples are presented in Appendix B, which is available online.

6 The link between Chwe’s consistent sets and our dynamically stable states is discussed in Appendix B.
8 Other related works include: Burkart and Wallner (2000) who develop an incomplete contracts theory of club enlargement; Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) who show that the requirement of a majority consent for admission to a jurisdiction may be no more restrictive than an unrestricted right to migrate; Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) who study the problem of EU enlargement; and Bordignon and Brusco (2003) who study the role of “enhanced cooperation agreements” in EU enlargement.
2 Environment

There is a finite set of players \( \mathcal{I} \). Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by \( t \) (\( t \geq 1 \)). There is a finite set of states which we denote by \( \mathcal{S} \). Throughout the paper, \( |X| \) denotes the number of elements of set \( X \), so \( |\mathcal{I}| \) and \( |\mathcal{S}| \) denote the number of individuals and states, respectively. States represent both different institutions affecting players’ payoffs, and the distribution of political power and the procedures for decision-making (e.g., sizes and identities of ruling coalitions, the degree of supermajority, or the weights or powers of different agents). Although our game is one of non-transferable utility, a limited amount of transfers can be incorporated by allowing multiple (but still a finite number of) states that have the same procedure for decision-making, but different payoffs across players.

The initial state is denoted by \( s_0 \in \mathcal{S} \). This state may be a part of the description of the game or chosen by Nature from \( \mathcal{S} \) at random. For any \( t \geq 1 \), the state \( s_t \in \mathcal{S} \) is determined endogenously. A nonempty set \( X \subset \mathcal{I} \) is called a coalition, and we denote the set of coalitions by \( \mathcal{C} \). Each state \( s \in \mathcal{S} \) is characterized by a pair \( (\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{W}_s) \). Here, for each state \( s \in \mathcal{S} \), \( w_i(s) \) is a (strictly) positive stage payoff assigned to individual \( i \in \mathcal{I} \). Political institutions in state \( s \) are described by the set of winning coalitions in state \( s \), \( \mathcal{W}_s \), a (possibly empty) subset of \( \mathcal{C} \). This allows us to summarize different political procedures, such as weighted majority or supermajority rules, in an economical way. For example, if in state \( s \) a majority is required for decision-making, \( \mathcal{W}_s \) includes all subsets of \( \mathcal{I} \) that form a majority; if in state \( s \) individual \( i \) is a dictator, \( \mathcal{W}_s \) contains all coalitions that include \( i \).\(^9\) Since \( \mathcal{W}_s \) is a function of the state, the procedure for decision-making can vary across states.\(^10\)

Throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumption.

Assumption 1 (Winning Coalitions) For any state \( s \in \mathcal{S} \), \( \mathcal{W}_s \subset \mathcal{C} \) satisfies:

(a) If \( X, Y \in \mathcal{C} \), \( X \subset Y \), and \( X \in \mathcal{W}_s \) then \( Y \in \mathcal{W}_s \).

(b) If \( X, Y \in \mathcal{W}_s \), then \( X \cap Y \neq \emptyset \).

Part (a) simply states that if some coalition \( X \) is winning in state \( s \), then increasing the size of the coalition will not reverse this. Part (b) rules out the possibility that two disjoint coalitions

\(^9\)Political rules summarized by the \( \mathcal{W}_s \)'s do not specify certain institutional details, such as who makes proposals, how voting takes place and so on. These are specified by the agenda-setting and voting protocols of our dynamic game. We will show that these only have a limited effect on equilibrium outcomes, justifying our focus on \( \mathcal{W}_s \) as a representation of “political rules”.

\(^10\)Our environment allows for the case where some states, say \( s \) and \( s' \), provide the same payoffs for all players but have different sets of winning coalitions.
are winning in the same state. If $\mathcal{W}_s = \emptyset$, state $s$ is *exogenously stable*. None of our existence or characterization results depend on whether there is an exogenously stable state.

We introduce the following binary relations on $\mathcal{S}$. For $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$, we write

$$x \sim y \iff \forall i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(x) = w_i(y).$$

(1)

In this case we call states $x$ and $y$ payoff-equivalent, or simply equivalent. More important for our purposes is the binary relation $\succeq_z$. For any $z \in \mathcal{S}$, $\succeq_z$ is defined by

$$y \succeq_z x \iff \{ i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(y) \geq w_i(x) \} \in \mathcal{W}_z.$$

(2)

Intuitively, $y \succeq_z x$ means that there exists a coalition of players that is winning (in $z$) with each of its members weakly preferring $y$ to $x$. Note three important features about $\succeq_z$. First, it contains information about stage payoffs only. In particular, $w_i(y) \geq w_i(x)$ does not mean that individual $i$ prefers a switch to state $y$ rather than $x$. Whether or not he does so depends on the continuation payoffs following such a switch. Second, the relation $\succeq_z$ does not presume any type of coordination or collective decision-making among the members of the coalition in question. It simply records the existence of such a coalition. Third, the relation $\succeq_z$ is conditioned on $z$ since whether the coalition of players weakly preferring $y$ to $x$ is winning depends on the set of winning coalitions, which is state dependent. With a slight abuse of terminology, if (2) holds, we say that $y$ is *weakly preferred* to $x$ in $z$. In light of the preceding comments, this neither means that all individuals prefer $y$ to $x$, nor that there will necessarily be a transition from state $x$ to $y$—it simply designates that there exists a winning coalition of players, each obtaining a greater stage payoff in $y$ than in $x$. Relation $\succ_z$ is defined similarly by

$$y \succ_z x \iff \{ i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(y) > w_i(x) \} \in \mathcal{W}_z.$$

(3)

If (3) holds, we say that $y$ is *strictly preferred* to $x$ in $z$.

The next assumption puts some joint restrictions on payoff functions and winning coalitions.

**Assumption 2 (Preferences)** Payoffs $\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}, s \in \mathcal{S}}$ satisfy the following properties:

(a) For any sequence of states $s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k$ in $\mathcal{S}$,

$$s_{j+1} \succ_{s_j} s_j \text{ for all } 1 \leq j \leq k - 1 \implies s_1 \not\succ_{s_k} s_k.$$

\[11\] Relation $\sim$ defines equivalence classes; if $x \sim y$ and $y \sim z$, then $x \sim z$. In contrast, the binary relations $\succeq_z$ and $\succ_z$ need not even be transitive. Nevertheless, for any $x, z \in \mathcal{S}$, we have $x \not\succ_z x$, and whenever $\mathcal{W}_z$ is nonempty, we also have $x \succeq_z x$. From Assumption 1 we have that for any $x, y, z \in \mathcal{S}$, $y \succeq_z x$ implies $x \not\succ_z y$, and similarly $y \succeq_z x$ implies $x \not\succ_z y$. 

8
(b) For any sequence of states \( s, s_1, \ldots, s_k \) in \( S \) with \( s_j \succ s \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq k \) and \( s_j \sim s_l \) for \( 1 \leq j < l \leq k \),

\[ s_{j+1} \succeq_s s_j \text{ for all } 1 \leq j \leq k-1 \implies s_1 \nprec_s s_k. \]

Moreover, if for \( x, y, s \in S \) we have \( x \succ s \) and \( y \succ s \), then \( y \succ s \).

Assumption 2 plays a major role in our analysis and ensures “acyclicity” (but is weaker than “transitivity”). Part (a) rules out cycles of the form \( y \succ_x x, z \succ_y y, x \succ_z z \)—that is, a cycle such that in each state, a winning coalition of players strictly prefers the next state. Part (b) rules out cycles of the form \( y \succeq_x x, x \succeq_z z, z \succeq_y y \) (unless the states \( x, y, \) and \( z \) are payoff-equivalent). As such, it also rules out any cycles of the form \( y \succ_x x, z \succ_y y, x \succ_z z \).\(^{12}\) It also imposes an additional requirement which may be interpreted as “partial transitivity”.\(^{13}\)

Although Assumptions 1 and 2 rule out several interesting environments, they are natural given our interest in obtaining general characterization results. More importantly, they are satisfied in most dynamic political economy models (see Theorem 4 and applications discussed in Appendix B). In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, we obtain additional uniqueness results by imposing the following (stronger) requirement.

**Assumption 3 (Comparability)** For \( x, y, s \in S \) such that \( x \succ_s s, y \succ_s s, \) and \( x \sim y, \) either \( y \succ_s x \) or \( x \succ_s y \).

Assumption 3 means that if two states \( x \) and \( y \) are strictly preferred to \( s \) (in \( s \)), and they are not equivalent, then \( x \) and \( y \) are \( \succ_s \)-comparable. This assumption is not necessary for our main results but is sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium.

## 3 Axiomatic Characterization

Before specifying the details of agenda-setting and voting protocols, we provide an abstract characterization of stable states. This axiomatic analysis has two purposes. First, it illustrates that the key economic forces that arise in the context of dynamic collective decision-making are largely independent of the details of agenda-setting and voting protocols. Second, the results in this section are a preparation for the characterization of the equilibrium of the dynamic game.

\(^{12}\) Neither part of Assumption 2 is implied by the other. Examples 6 and 7 in Appendix B illustrate the types of cycles that can arise when either 2(a) or 2(b) fails.

\(^{13}\) Transitivity would require that for any \( s, x, y, \) and \( z, y \succ_x x, x \succ_z z \) implies \( y \succ_z z \). Instead, our condition imposes this only when \( z = s \).
introduced in the next section. In particular, our main result, Theorem 2, will make use of this axiomatic characterization.

The key economic insight enabling an axiomatic characterization is that with sufficiently forward-looking behavior, an individual should not wish to transit to a state that will ultimately lead to another state that gives her lower utility. This basic insight enables a tight characterization of (axiomatically) stable states.

More formally, our axiomatic characterization determines a set of mappings $\Phi$ such that for any $\phi \in \Phi$, $\phi : S \to S$ assigns an axiomatically stable state $s^\infty \in S$ to each initial state $s_0 \in S$. We impose the following three natural axioms on $\phi$.

**Axiom 1 (Desirability)** If $x, y \in S$ are such that $y = \phi(x)$, then either $y = x$ or $y \succeq_x x$.

**Axiom 2 (Stability)** If $x, y \in S$ are such that $y = \phi(x)$, then $y = \phi(y)$.

**Axiom 3 (Rationality)** If $x, y, z \in S$ are such that $z \succeq_x x$, $z = \phi(z)$, and $z \succ_x y$, then $y \neq \phi(x)$.

All three axioms are natural in light of what we have discussed above. Axiom 1 requires that the society should not permanently move from state $x$ to another state $y$ unless there is a winning coalition that supports this transition. Axiom 2 encapsulates the stability notion discussed above; if some state is not dynamically stable, it cannot be the ultimate stable state for any initial state. Axiom 3 imposes the reasonable requirement that if there exists a stable state $z$ preferred to both $x$ and $y$ by winning coalitions in state $x$, then $\phi$ should not pick $y$ in $x$.\footnote{Assumption 2b guarantees that if $y \succ_x x$ and $z \succ_x y$, then $z \succ_x x$. Thus if Axiom 1 is satisfied, then the requirement $z \succ_x x$ may be dropped in Axiom 3. We do not do this since the current form of Axiom 3 is weaker and also better captures the idea of “group rationality”.

We next define the set $\Phi$ formally and state the relationship between axiomatically stable states and $\Phi$.

**Definition 1 (Axiomatically Stable States)** Let $\Phi \equiv \{\phi : S \to S : \phi$ satisfies Axioms 1–3$\}$. A state $s \in S$ is (axiomatically) stable if $\phi(s) = s$ for some $\phi \in \Phi$. The set of stable states (fixed points) for mapping $\phi \in \Phi$ is $D_\phi = \{s \in S : \phi(s) = s\}$ and the set of all stable states is $D = \{s \in S : \phi(s) = s$ for some $\phi \in \Phi\}$.\footnote{Assumption 2b guarantees that if $y \succ_x x$ and $z \succ_x y$, then $z \succ_x x$. Thus if Axiom 1 is satisfied, then the requirement $z \succ_x x$ may be dropped in Axiom 3. We do not do this since the current form of Axiom 3 is weaker and also better captures the idea of “group rationality”.

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The next theorem establishes the existence of stable states and paves the way for Theorem 2, which establishes the equivalence between equilibria of the dynamic game (defined in Section 4 below) and stable sets of mappings $\phi \in \Phi$. A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.\footnote{This theorem may be proved under weaker assumptions. Part (b) of Assumption 2 may be substituted by the following condition: \textit{For any sequence of states} $s, s_1, \ldots, s_k$ \textit{in} $S$ \textit{with} $s_j \succ_s s$ \textit{for} $1 \leq j \leq k$, \textit{then} $s_j \succ_s s_{j+1}$ \textit{for all} $1 \leq j \leq k - 1$ \textit{would imply} $s_1 \not\succ_s s_k$.}

**Theorem 1 (Axiomatic Characterization of Stable States)** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:

1. The set $\Phi$ is non-empty. That is, there exists a mapping $\phi$ satisfying Axioms 1–3.

2. Any $\phi \in \Phi$ can be recursively constructed as follows. Order the states as $\{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|}\}$ such that for any $1 \leq j < l \leq |S|$, $\mu_l \not\succ_{\mu_j} \mu_j$. Let $\phi(\mu_1) = \mu_1$. For each $k = 2, \ldots, |S|$, define

$$M_k = \{s \in \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{k-1}\} : s \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \text{ and } \phi(s) = s\}. \quad (4)$$

Then

$$\phi(\mu_k) = \begin{cases} 
\mu_k & \text{if } M_k = \emptyset \\
M_k \cap \{z \in M_k : z \succ_{\mu_k} s\} & \text{if } M_k \neq \emptyset
\end{cases}. \quad (5)$$

(If there exist more than one $s \in M_k$ such that $z \in M_k$ with $z \succ_{\mu_k} s$, pick any of these; this corresponds to multiple $\phi$ functions).

3. The stable sets of any two mappings $\phi_1, \phi_2 \in \Phi$ coincide, i.e., $D_{\phi_1} = D_{\phi_2} = D$.

4. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then for any two mappings $\phi_1$ and $\phi_2$ in $\Phi$, $\phi_1(s) \sim \phi_2(s)$ for all $s \in S$.

Theorem 1 provides a simple recursive characterization of the set of mappings $\Phi$ that satisfy Axioms 1–3. Intuitively, Assumption 2(a) ensures that there exists some state $\mu_1 \in S$ such that there does not exist another $s \in S$ with $s \succ_{\mu_1} \mu_1$. Taking $\mu_1$ as base, we order the states as $\{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|}\}$ according to relation $\not\succ_{\mu_j}$ as indicated in part 2 of the theorem. Then, we recursively construct the set of states $M_k \subset S$, $k = 2, \ldots, |S|$, that includes stable states that are preferred to state $\mu_k$ (that is, states $s$ such that $\phi(s) = s$ and $s \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k$). When the set $M_k$ is empty, there exists no stable state that is preferred to $\mu_k$ (in $\mu_k$) by members of a winning coalition. In this case, we have $\phi(\mu_k) = \mu_k$. When $M_k$ is nonempty, there exists such a stable state and thus $\phi(\mu_k) = s$ for some such $s$. In addition to its recursive (and thus easy-to-construct) nature, this characterization is useful as it highlights the fundamental property of stable states emphasized in the Introduction: a state $\mu_k$ is made stable precisely by the absence of winning coalitions in
\( \mu_k \) favoring a transition to another stable state (i.e., by the fact that \( M_k = \emptyset \)). This insight plays an important role in applications.

Part 3 of Theorem 1 shows that the set of stable states \( D \) does not depend on the specific \( \phi \) chosen from \( \Phi \). For two different maps \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) in \( \Phi \), it is possible that \( \phi_1(s_0) \neq \phi_2(s_0) \) for some initial state \( s_0 \), but the ranges of these mappings are the same. These ranges, and thus the set of stable states \( D \), are uniquely determined by preferences and the structure of winning coalitions.\(^{16}\) Finally, part 4 shows that when Assumption 3 holds, any stable states resulting from an initial state must be payoff-equivalent. In other words, if \( s_1 = \phi_1(s_0) \) and \( s_2 = \phi(s_0) \), then \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) might differ in terms of the structure of winning coalitions, but they must give the same payoffs to each individual.

We have motivated the analysis leading up to Theorem 1 with the argument that, when agents are sufficiently forward-looking, only axiomatically stable states should be observed (at least in the “long run”, i.e., for \( t \geq T \) for some finite \( T \)). The analysis of the dynamic game introduced in the next section substantiates this interpretation.

### 4 Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States

We now describe the extensive-form game capturing dynamic interactions in the environment of Section 2 and characterize Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE) of this game. The main result is the equivalence between the MPE of this game and the set \( \Phi \) in Theorem 1.

We first specify preferences and introduce transaction costs of changing states. At each date \( t \), individual \( i \) maximizes discounted utility

\[
U_i(t) = (1 - \beta) \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau-t} u_i(\tau),
\]

where \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is a common discount factor. We also impose:

**Assumption 4 (Payoffs)** The stage payoffs in (6) are given by

\[
u_i(t) = \begin{cases} w_i(s_t) & \text{if } s_t = s_{t-1} \\ \bar{w}_i & \text{if } s_t \neq s_{t-1} \end{cases}
\]

For each \( i \in I \) and any state \( x \in S \), we have

\[
\bar{w}_i < w_i(x).
\]

\(^{16}\)In Appendix B, we relate the set \( D \) to two concepts from cooperative game theory, von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stable set and Chwe’s largest consistent set. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, both sets coincide with \( D \).
Assumption 4 introduces a “transaction cost” of state transitions: in any period in which there is a transition, each player obtains a lower payoff than she would have done without the transition. Given our normalization \( w_i(s) > 0 \), Assumption 4 is satisfied, e.g., if \( \bar{w}_i = 0 \) for all \( i \). Since we focus on the case of \( \beta \) close to 1, this transaction cost has little effect on discounted payoffs.\(^{17}\) In particular, once (and if) a dynamically stable state \( s \) is reached, individuals receive \( w_i(s) \) at each date thereafter. Substantively, this transaction cost is introduced to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy MPE.\(^{18}\)

We next specify: (1) a protocol for a sequence of agenda-setters and proposals in each state; and (2) a protocol for voting over proposals. Voting is sequential and is described below; the exact sequence in which votes are cast will not matter.\(^{19}\) We represent the protocol for agenda-setting using a sequence of mappings, \( \{\pi_s\}_{s \in S} \), and refer to it simply as a protocol. Let \( K_s \) be a natural number for each \( s \in S \). Then, \( \pi_s \) is defined as a mapping

\[
\pi_s : \{1, \ldots, K_s\} \to I \cup S
\]

for each state \( s \in S \). Thus, each \( \pi_s \) specifies a finite sequence of elements from \( I \cup S \), and determines the sequence of agenda-setters and proposals (here \( K_s \) is the length of this sequence for state \( s \)). If \( \pi_s(k) \in I \), then it denotes an agenda-setter who will make a proposal from the set of states \( S \). Alternatively, if \( \pi_s(k) \in S \), then it directly corresponds to an exogenously-specified proposal over which individuals vote. Therefore, the extensive-form game is general enough to include both proposals for a change to a new state initiated by agenda-setters and exogenous proposals. We make the following assumption on \( \{\pi_s\}_{s \in S} \):

**Assumption 5 (Protocols)** For each \( s \in S \), one (or both) of the following two conditions holds:

(a) For any state \( z \in S \setminus \{s\} \), there exists \( k : 1 \leq k \leq K_s \) such that \( \pi_s(k) = z \).

(b) For any player \( i \in I \) there exists \( k : 1 \leq k \leq K_s \) such that \( \pi_s(k) = i \).

\(^{17}\)More precisely, define \( \bar{\tau} = \max_{i \in I, x \in S} |w_i(x) - \bar{w}_i| \), which is a natural measure of the size of transaction costs. Then for any \( \bar{\tau} \), there exists \( \beta_0 < 1 \) such that Theorem 2 holds for \( \beta > \beta_0 \). This fact, which is proved in Appendix B, implies that payoffs from the game considered here are arbitrarily close to an environment without transaction costs.

\(^{18}\)Examples 4 and 5 in Appendix B demonstrate that if the transaction cost is removed from (7), a (pure-strategy) equilibrium may fail to exist or may include cycles. While these possibilities are potentially interesting, they appear to be non-robust. Alternative game forms (e.g., those that assume a small cost of voting) lead to results similar to what we derive with the current specification.

\(^{19}\)The assumption of sequential voting allows us to focus on Markov Perfect equilibria without further refinements that are typically required to rule out counterintuitive voting equilibria. Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2009) suggest an equilibrium refinement, Markov Trembling-Hand Perfect equilibrium, which implies identical equilibrium behavior for games with simultaneous voting and corresponding games with sequential voting.
This assumption implies that either sequence $\pi_s$ contains all possible states other than the “status quo” $s$ as proposals or it allows all possible agenda-setters to eventually make a proposal before the voting round ends. We assume that protocol $\pi_s$ is fixed for each state $s$; different states might have the same payoffs and winning coalitions under different protocols.

In the beginning, at $t = 0$, state $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$ is determined (either as part of the description of the environment or randomly). Subsequently (for $t \geq 1$), the timing of events is as follows:

1. Period $t$ begins with state $s_{t-1}$ inherited from the previous period.
2. For $k = 1, \ldots, K_{s_{t-1}}$, the $k$th proposal $P_{k,t}$ is determined as follows. If $\pi_{s_{t-1}}(k) \in \mathcal{S}$, then $P_{k,t} = \pi_{s_{t-1}}(k)$. If $\pi_{s_{t-1}}(k) \in \mathcal{I}$, then player $\pi_{s_{t-1}}(k)$ chooses $P_{k,t} \in \mathcal{S}$.
3. If $P_{k,t} \neq s_{t-1}$, then there is sequential voting between $P_{k,t}$ and $s_{t-1}$ (we will show that the sequence of voters has no effect on the equilibrium outcome). Each player votes yes (for $P_{k,t}$) or no (for $s_{t-1}$). Let $Y_{k,t}$ denote the set of players who voted yes. If $Y_{k,t} \in \mathcal{W}_{s_{t-1}}$, then alternative $P_{k,t}$ is accepted; otherwise (if $Y_{k,t} \notin \mathcal{W}_{s_{t-1}}$), it is rejected. If $P_{k,t} = s_{t-1}$, there is no voting and we adopt the convention that in this case $P_{k,t}$ is rejected.
4. If $P_{k,t}$ is accepted, then a transition to state $s_t = P_{k,t}$ takes place, and the period ends. If $P_{k,t}$ is rejected or if there is no voting because $P_{k,t} = s_{t-1}$ and $k < K_{s_{t-1}}$, then the game moves to step 2 with $k$ increased by 1; if $k = K_{s_{t-1}}$, the next state is $s_t = s_{t-1}$, and the period ends.
5. In the end of the period, each player receives stage payoff $u_i(t)$.

A MPE is defined in the standard fashion as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) where strategies are functions of “payoff-relevant states” only. Here payoff-relevant states are different from the states $s \in \mathcal{S}$ described above, since the proposal under consideration, as well as votes already cast, are also payoff relevant for the continuation game (see Appendix B for a formal definition). Any Markovian strategy profile $\sigma$ in the dynamic game defines a transition mapping on $\mathcal{S}$, $s \mapsto s^\sigma$, where $s_t = s_{t-1}^\sigma$ is the next period’s state given state $s_{t-1}$. In what follows, we use the terms MPE and equilibrium interchangeably. Next, we define dynamically stable states.

**Definition 2 (Dynamically Stable States)** State $s^\infty \in \mathcal{S}$ is a dynamically stable state if there exist an initial state $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, a set of protocols $\{\pi_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$, an MPE strategy profile $\sigma$, and $T < \infty$ such that along the equilibrium path we have $s_t = s^\infty$ for all $t \geq T$.

Put differently, $s^\infty$ is a dynamically stable state if it is reached in some finite time $T$ and is repeated thereafter—$s_t = s^\infty$ for all $t \geq T$. Our objective is (i) to determine whether dynamically stable states exist in the dynamic game described above and to characterize them.
as a function of the initial state $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, and (ii) to establish the equivalence between dynamically and axiomatically stable states characterized in the previous section.

We consider situations in which $\beta$ is greater than some threshold $\beta_0 \in (0,1)$ derived as an explicit function of payoffs in Appendix A. The main result of the paper is summarized in the following theorem.

**Theorem 2 (Characterization of Dynamically Stable States)** Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5 hold. Then there exists $\beta_0 \in (0,1)$ such that for all $\beta > \beta_0$, the following is true.

1. For any $\phi \in \Phi$ there exists a set of protocols $\{\pi_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ and a pure-strategy MPE $\sigma$ of the game such that for any $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, $s_t^\sigma = \phi(s_0)$ for any $t \geq 1$; that is, the game reaches $\phi(s_0)$ after one period and stays in this state thereafter. Therefore, for each $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, $s = \phi(s_0)$ is a dynamically stable state.

2. Moreover, for any set of protocols $\{\pi_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ there exists a pure-strategy MPE. Any such MPE $\sigma$ has the property that there exists $\phi \in \Phi$ such that for any initial state $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, $s_t^\sigma = \phi(s_0)$ for all $t \geq 1$. Therefore, all dynamically stable states are axiomatically stable.

3. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then the MPE is essentially unique: For any set of protocols $\{\pi_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$, any pure-strategy MPE $\sigma$, any initial state $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, and any $\phi \in \Phi$, $s_0^\sigma \sim \phi(s_0)$.

Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 2 state that the set of dynamically stable states and the set of stable states $\mathcal{D}$ defined by axiomatic characterization in Theorem 1 coincide; any mapping $\phi \in \Phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3 is the outcome of a pure-strategy MPE and any such MPE implements the outcome of some $\phi \in \Phi$. An important implication is that the recursive characterization of axiomatically stable states in (5) can be used to calculate dynamically stable states.

The equivalence of the results of Theorems 1 and 2 is intuitive. Had players been shortsighted (impatient), they would care mostly about the payoffs in the next state or the next few states that would arise along the equilibrium path. However, when players are sufficiently patient ($\beta > \beta_0$), they care more about payoffs in the ultimate state than the payoffs along the transitional states. Consequently, winning coalitions are not willing to move to a state that is not (axiomatically) stable according to Theorem 1.

The proof of Theorem 2 is technically involved, but the idea is intuitive. For a given mapping $\phi \in \Phi$, we conjecture the continuation payoffs from accepting a particular alternative $z$ in state $s$. We construct an MPE in the truncated game starting in state $s$ in period $t$ with terminal payoffs given by the continuation payoffs. We then show that transitions are given by $\phi$, and
the continuation payoffs are as conjectured. Conversely, if $\sigma$ is a MPE, we show that transitions starting from any state $s$ will eventually converge to some state $\psi(s)$, and then use Assumption 2(b) to show that any equilibrium path must lead to a state that is payoff-equivalent to $\psi(s)$. Finally, we verify that mapping $\psi(s)$ satisfies Axioms 1–3.

As illustrated by Example 1 in the Introduction, there is a tension between distribution of payoffs in a state and distribution of political power in the same state. Sometimes, Pareto improving transitions are impossible without changing the balance of political power. The next theorem clarifies the conditions under which Pareto efficiency will arise.

**Theorem 3 (Pareto Efficiency)** Suppose that for every two states $x$ and $y$ there is a state $z$ such that $\{w_i(z)\}_{i \in I} = \{w_i(y)\}_{i \in I}$ and $W_z \subset W_x$, and no state is exogenously stable (i.e., $W_s \neq \emptyset$ for each $s \in S$). Then, every (axiomatically or dynamically) stable state is Pareto efficient. Otherwise, stable states may be Pareto inefficient.

The positive result is that whenever the political environment is such that the current decision-makers can alter the economic allocation without giving up political power (which is captured here by the fact that a transition from $x$ to $z$ achieves the same payoffs as a transition to $y$ without reallocating power to other groups), only Pareto efficient states are stable.

5 Ordered States and Agents

Theorems 1 and 2 provide a complete characterization of axiomatically and dynamically stable states as a function of the initial state $s_0 \in S$ provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. While the former is a very natural assumption and easy to check, Assumption 2 may be somewhat more difficult to verify. In this section, we show that when the sets of states $S$ and agents $I$ admit a linear order according to which individual stage payoffs satisfy single-crossing or single-peakedness properties (and the set of winning coalitions $\{W_s\}_{s \in S}$ satisfies some natural additional conditions), Assumption 2 is satisfied. This result enables more straightforward application of our main theorems in a wide variety of circumstances.

In a number of applications, the set of states $S$ has a natural order, so that any two states $x$ and $y$ can be ranked. When such an order exists, we can take, without loss of any generality, $S$ to be a subset of $\mathbb{R}$. Similarly, let $I \subset \mathbb{R}$. Given these orders on the set of states and the set
of individuals, we introduce certain standard restrictions on preferences. All of the following restrictions and definitions refer to stage payoffs and are thus easy to verify.

**Definition 3 (Single-Crossing and Single-Peakedness)** Given $\mathcal{I} \subset \mathbb{R}$, $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathbb{R}$, and $\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}, s \in \mathcal{S}}$, the single-crossing condition holds if for any $i, j \in \mathcal{I}$ and $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $i < j$ and $x < y$, $w_i(y) > w_i(x)$ implies $w_j(y) > w_j(x)$ and $w_j(y) < w_j(x)$ implies $w_i(y) < w_i(x)$.

Given $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathbb{R}$ and $\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}, s \in \mathcal{S}}$, preferences are single-peaked if for any $i \in \mathcal{I}$ there exists a state $x_i$ such that for any $y, z \in \mathcal{S}$, $y < z \leq x_i$ or $x_i \geq z > y$ implies $w_i(y) \leq w_i(z)$.

We next introduce a generalization of the notion of the “median voter” to more general political institutions (e.g., those involving supermajority rules within the society or a club).

**Definition 4 (Quasi-Median Voter)** Given $\mathcal{I} \subset \mathbb{R}$ and $\{W_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$, player $i \in \mathcal{I}$ is a quasi-median voter (in state $s$) if for any $X \in W_s$ such that $X = \{j \in \mathcal{I} : a \leq j \leq b\}$ for some $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ we have $i \in X$.

Denote the set of quasi-median voters in state $s$ by $M_s$. Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 4 shows that, provided that Assumption 1 is satisfied, this set is nonempty.

**Definition 5 (Monotonic Median Voter Property)** Given $\mathcal{I} \subset \mathbb{R}$ and $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathbb{R}$, the set of winning coalitions $\{W_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ has monotonic median voter property if for each $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$ satisfying $x < y$ there exist $i \in M_x, j \in M_y$ such that $i \leq j$.

The last definition is general enough to encompass majority and supermajority voting as well as those voting rules that apply to a subset of players (such as club members or those that are part of a restricted franchise). Finally, we also impose the following weak genericity assumption.

**Assumption 6 (Weak Genericity)** Preferences $\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}, s \in \mathcal{S}}$ and the set of winning coalitions $\{W_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ are such that for any $x, y, z \in \mathcal{S}$, $x \succeq_z y$ implies $x \succeq_y z$ or $x \simeq y$.

Assumption 6 is satisfied if no player is indifferent between any two states (though it does not rule out such indifferences). Next, we present the main result of this section.

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20Rothstein (1990) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) study another restriction, order-restricted preferences. As Gans and Smart (1996) show, this notion is equivalent to single-crossing and is thus covered by our framework.
Theorem 4 (Characterization with Ordered States) For any \( I \subset \mathbb{R}, S \subset \mathbb{R} \), preferences \( \{w_i(s)\}_{i \in I, s \in S} \), and winning coalitions \( \{W_s\}_{s \in S} \) satisfying Assumption 1 and Assumption 6:

1. If single-crossing condition and monotonic median voter property hold, then Assumption 2 is satisfied and thus Theorems 1 and 2 apply.

2. If preferences are single-peaked and for any \( x, y \in S \) and any \( X \in W_x, Y \in W_y \) we have \( X \cap Y \neq \emptyset \), then Assumption 2 is satisfied and thus Theorems 1 and 2 apply.

Part 2 of Theorem 4 requires a stronger condition than the monotonic median voter property. Because this condition implies the monotonic median voter property, part 1 of the theorem continues to be true under the hypothesis of part 2. However, the converse is not true.

6 Application

In this section, we apply our results to the dynamics of political rights discussed in Example 2 in the Introduction. Consider a society \( I = \{1, \ldots, n\} \) consisting of \( n \) groups (or individuals) ranked in ascending order of religiosity, so that 1 is most secular and \( n \) is most religious. There is a one-dimensional policy space indexed by \( \rho \in R = \{\rho^1, \ldots, \rho^r\} \), where higher \( \rho \) corresponds to greater tolerance towards religiosity and less tolerance towards non-religious individuals.

In each period \( t \), the set of individuals who have the right to political participation is \( Z_t \), a connected subset of \( I \). We assume that at each date, political decisions are made by \( \alpha \)-(super)majorities (i.e., coalitions of at least \( \alpha |Z_t| \) members). These decisions include the determination of which subset of the society will have the right for political participation in the next period (i.e., the subset \( Z_{t+1} \)) and the next period’s religiosity policy \( \rho_{t+1} \). The state can thus be represented by \( s = (\rho, Z) \) where \( \rho \in R \) and \( Z \) is a connected subset of \( I \).

We assume that each individual cares about the policy towards religiosity \( \rho \) and also about the extent of political participation in society. For example, higher political participation may increase income or the amount of public goods, or decrease political instability. Since these effects are likely to affect all players equally, we assume that preferences over states are given by

\[
 w_i(s) = v_i(\rho) + V(Z),
\]

where \( V(Z) \) is any function, and \( v_i(\rho) \) satisfies the strict increasing differences condition:

\[
 v_i(\rho) - v_j(\rho) \text{ is strictly increasing in } \rho \text{ whenever } i > j.
\]
This condition implies, in particular, that the sequence of ideal policies of agents, \(\{\hat{\rho}(i)\}_{i=1}^{n}\), is (weakly) monotonically increasing. It is satisfied, for example, if individuals had quadratic utility function \(v_i(\rho) = -(\rho - \hat{\rho}_i)^2\).

Since an \(\alpha\)-(super)majority in \(Z\) chooses the religiosity policy for the next period, \(\rho\), it is natural that this policy choice is between \(\hat{\rho}_{\min M_Z}\) and \(\hat{\rho}_{\max M_Z}\), where, as before, \(M_Z\) is the set of quasi-median voters. Formally, the set of states \(\mathcal{S}\) consists of all pairs \((\rho, Z)\), where \(Z\) is a connected subset of \(\mathcal{I}\) and \(\hat{\rho}_{\min M_Z} \leq \rho \leq \hat{\rho}_{\max M_Z}\).

This example specifies a rich and highly complex social situation. Granting political participation to previously-excluded religious [resp., secular] individuals will have short-run economic benefits, but could unleash a political process that might later on deprive secular [resp., religious] individuals of their political rights. The richness of the environment results from the fact that individuals with political rights are simultaneously choosing a policy \(\rho\) and the subset of the society \(Z\) that will have political rights in the future. Despite this, the tools and insights developed so far can be applied to derive a sharp characterization of the structure of equilibria.

We first establish that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, so that the dynamic equilibrium in this environment can be characterized by applying Theorems 1 and 2. To simplify the exposition of the results, we assume that \(w_i(s) \neq w_i(s')\) for any \(i \in \mathcal{I}\) and \(s \neq s'\), which ensures that Assumption 6 holds. Thus, we can use \(\phi(s_0)\) to denote the state, both axiomatically and dynamically stable, that corresponds to initial state \(s_0\).

**Proposition 1**  
1. For any degree of (super)majority \(\alpha\), Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and thus Theorems 1 and 2 apply in this environment. In particular, there exists \(\beta_0 < 1\) such that for any discount factor \(\beta > \beta_0\), an equilibrium exists.

2. Assume \(V(Z)\) to be (strictly) increasing (whenever \(Z \neq Z', Z \subset Z'\) implies \(V(Z) \neq V(Z')\)). Then for any initial state \(s_0\), \(\phi(s_0) = s = (Z, \rho)\) with \(Z\) containing at least one of the extreme players, 1 or \(n\).

To prove the first part, we enumerate the states \(\{s_1, \ldots, s_{|\mathcal{S}|}\}\) so that \(\rho(s)\) is weakly increasing. We then establish that strict increasing differences and monotonic median voter properties hold, and use Theorem 4.\(^{21}\) The second part of Proposition 1 shows that when \(V\) is an increasing function, stable states provide political rights to at least one of the extreme members of

\(^{21}\)However, note that the original environment is not ordered and this theorem could not have been applied directly; we can only apply it after undertaking this enumeration.
the society. Intuitively, this holds because the threat to the current set of individuals holding power comes either from greater religiosity or greater secularism. Thus, there will necessarily be expansion towards the less threatening side.

This result does not rule out that political rights will be given to everybody in society. The next proposition studies this question. In what follows, we assume that $V(Z)$ is strictly increasing and $v_i(\rho)$ is single-peaked for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$.

**Proposition 2** Define $A \equiv V(\mathcal{I}) - \max_{i \in \mathcal{I}} V(\mathcal{I} \setminus \{i\})$ and $A_i \equiv V(\mathcal{I}) - V(\{i\})$.

1. Suppose $v_1(\hat{\rho}(1)) - v_1(\hat{\rho}(\min M_\mathcal{I})) < A$ and $v_n(\hat{\rho}(n)) - v_n(\hat{\rho}(\max M_\mathcal{I})) < A$. Then for any initial state $s$, $Z(\phi(s)) = \mathcal{I}$.

2. Suppose $v_1(\hat{\rho}(1)) - v_1(\hat{\rho}(\min M_\mathcal{I})) > A_1$ and $v_n(\hat{\rho}(n)) - v_n(\hat{\rho}(\max M_\mathcal{I})) > A_n$. There exists $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that if the initial state $s_0$ satisfies $|Z(s_0)| \leq k$, then: (i) when $Z_0$ includes the middle player (or at least one of the two middle players if $n$ is even), $Z(\phi(s_0)) = \mathcal{I}$, and (ii) when $Z_0$ includes one of the extreme players, $Z(\phi(s_0)) \neq \mathcal{I}$.

3. If $\alpha > \frac{n-1}{n}$, i.e., the rule is unanimity, then for any initial state $s_0$, $Z(\phi(s_0)) = \mathcal{I}$.

The first part of this proposition shows that if utility gains from greater political participation are sufficiently large (sufficient to compensate extremists for a change in policies towards religiosity), then political participation is granted to all parties. More interestingly, the second part shows that when these gains are not sufficiently large, political participation is granted to all if political power initially rests with moderates and not granted if it rests with one of the extremes.

The third part asserts that if the decision rule is unanimity, then political rights can be extended to all individuals because the status quo religious policy may be preserved in this case. Intuitively, unanimity guarantees that political power will not shift to extremists of the opposite conviction and thus enables expansion of political participation.\textsuperscript{22} This final result raises the question of whether the groups that are currently powerful can introduce a unanimity clause into the current constitution or set of rules in order to cement their political power even as reforms are implemented. While this may be feasible under certain circumstances, we believe that it is in

\textsuperscript{22}This is similar to the general result in Theorem 3, which shows that when a policy may be changed without undermining the power of currently powerful players, equilibria are necessarily Pareto efficient. (Recall that only states with full participation are Pareto efficient in this application).
general not possible to grant political participation to new groups and individuals but effectively
take away their ability to implement significant future policy changes by introducing unanimity
clauses or other restrictions. (One reason is that this would go against the spirit of current
allocation of political power determining current policy choices and reforms.)

Finally, we consider an even richer environment where individuals also choose the degree of
(super)majority rule \( \alpha \). In particular, now a state is \( s = (\rho, Z, \alpha) \), with \( \alpha \in \mathcal{A} \), where \( \mathcal{A} \subset \left[ \frac{1}{2}, 1 \right] \)
is a finite set. Then, since \( \mathcal{A} \) is a finite set, our previous results yield the following proposition.

**Proposition 3**  
1. In this environment, Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and thus Theorems 1 and 2 apply.

2. Suppose that \( \mathcal{A} \) contains \( \alpha > \frac{n-1}{n} \). Then for any equilibrium and for any state \( s_0 \),
\( Z(\phi(s_0)) = I \).

This proposition demonstrates the applicability of our results in the environment in which
the degree of supermajority necessary for future decisions is also a collective choice. Again,
whenever unanimity can be imposed, full participation is guaranteed. Intuitively, they can
make any (and every) individual a veto player, preventing future policy changes. We should,
however, reiterate at this point that this result does not imply that changing the decision rule
to unanimity is always or often feasible. In many relevant situations, including those mentioned
in the Introduction and several we discuss in Appendix B, it is a hardwired feature that future
decisions will be made by a (weighted) majority of those who participate in future decision
making, and their ability to change policies and laws cannot be restricted by past unanimity
clauses or constitutional requirements.\(^{23}\) Along these lines, for example, those worried about the
“slippery slope” of giving more rights to religious groups in Turkey fear that any constitutional
guarantees can be changed in the future.

7 Conclusion

A central feature of collective decision-making in many social situations, such as societies choosing
their constitutions or institutions, leaders building political coalitions, countries joining in-
ternational unions, or private clubs deciding on their membership, is that the rules that govern
regulations and procedures for future decision-making, and inclusion and exclusion of members

\(^{23}\)See Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) for an example.
are made by the current members and under the current regulations. This feature implies that
dynamic collective decisions must recognize the impact of current decisions on future choices.

We developed a framework for a systematic study of this class of problems. We provided
both an axiomatic and a noncooperative characterization of stable states and showed that the
set of (dynamically) stable states can be computed recursively. This recursive characterization
highlights that a particular state \( s \) is stable if no other stable state makes a winning coalition
(in \( s \)) better off. This implies that stable states need not be Pareto efficient; there may exist a
state that provides higher payoffs to all individuals, but is itself not stable.

Our analysis relies on several substantive and technical assumptions. Substantive assump-
tions, such as a minimum amount of acyclicity, are essential for our approach. Others, the
technical ones, are adopted for convenience and can be relaxed, though often at the cost of fur-
ther complication. Among possible extensions, most interesting might be to introduce stochastic
elements so that the set of feasible transitions or the distribution of powers stochastically vary
over time, and to include capital-like state variables so that some subcomponents of the state
have autonomous dynamics.

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Appendix A

Proof of Theorem 1

(Part 1) We first construct, by induction, a sequence of states \(\{\mu_1, ..., \mu_{|S|}\}\) such that

\[
\text{if } 1 \leq j < l \leq |S|, \text{ then } \mu_l \not\succ \mu_j, \quad (A1)
\]

Assumption 2(a) implies that for any nonempty collection of states \(Q \subseteq S\), there exists \(z \in Q\) such that for any \(x \in Q\), \(x \not\succ z\). Applying this result to \(S\), we obtain \(\mu_1\). Now, suppose we have defined \(\mu_j\) for all \(j < k - 1\), where \(k \leq |S|\). Applying the same result to the collection of states \(S \setminus \{\mu_1, ..., \mu_{k-1}\}\), we conclude that there exists \(\mu_k\) satisfying (A1) for each \(k\).

The second step is to construct, again by induction, a candidate mapping \(\phi: S \to S\). For \(k = 1\), let \(\phi(\mu_k) = \mu_k\). Suppose we have defined \(\phi(\mu_j)\) for all \(j < k - 1\) where \(2 \leq k \leq |S|\). Define the collection of states \(M_k\) as in (4). This is the subset of states for which \(\phi\) has already been defined and which satisfy \(\phi(s) = s\) and are preferred to \(\mu_k\) within \(\mu_k\). If \(M_k\) is empty, then we define \(\phi(\mu_k) = \mu_k\). If \(M_k\) is nonempty, then take \(\phi(\mu_k) = z \in M_k\) such that

\[
s \not\succ_{\mu_k} z \text{ for any } s \in M_k\]

(applying Assumption 2(b) to \(M_k\), we get that there exists \(z \in M_k\) such that \(s \not\succ_{\mu_k} z\), and thus \(s \not\succ_{\mu_k} z\), for all \(s \in M_k\)). Proceeding inductively for all \(2 \leq k \leq |S|\), we obtain \(\phi\) as in (5).

To complete the proof, we need to verify that mapping \(\phi\) in (5) satisfies Axioms 1–3. This is straightforward for Axioms 1 and 2. In particular, by construction, either \(\phi(\mu_k) = \mu_k\) (in that case these axioms trivially hold), or \(\phi(\mu_k)\) is an element of \(M_k\). In the latter case, \(\phi(\mu_k) \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k\) and \(\phi(\phi(\mu_k)) = \phi(\mu_k)\) by (4). To check Axiom 3, suppose that for some state \(\mu_k\) there exists \(y\) such that \(y \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k\), \(y = \phi(z)\), and \(y \succ_{\mu_k} \phi(\mu_k)\). Then \(y \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k\), combined with condition (A1), implies that \(y \in \{\mu_1, ..., \mu_{k-1}\}\), and therefore \(y \in M_k\). But then \(y \not\succ_{\mu_k} \phi(\mu_k)\) contradicts (A2). This means that such \(y\) does not exist, and therefore Axiom 3 is satisfied.
(Part 2) This statement is equivalent to the following: if, given a sequence \( \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|}\} \) with the property (A1), \( \phi(\mu_k) \) does not satisfy (5) for some \( k \); then \( \phi \) does not satisfy Axioms 1–3. Suppose first that \( \phi(\mu_k) \) is not given by (5) at \( k = 1 \). Then \( \phi(\mu_1) \neq \mu_1 \), so \( \phi(\mu_1) = \mu_l \) for \( l > 1 \). In this case, \( \phi \) does not satisfy Axiom 1, because \( \mu_l \not\succ_{\mu_1} \mu_1 \) by (A1). Now, let \( k > 1 \) be the smallest \( k \) for which \( \phi(\mu_k) \) is not given by (5). Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that Axioms 1–3 hold. Then \( M_k \) in (4) is well-defined, and either \( M_k = \emptyset \) or \( M_k \neq \emptyset \). If \( M_k = \emptyset \) and \( \phi(\mu_k) \) is not given by (5), then \( \phi(\mu_k) \neq \mu_k \). Then, Axioms 1 and 2 imply \( \phi(\mu_k) \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \) and \( \phi(\phi(\mu_k)) = \phi(\mu_k) \). Since \( M_k = \emptyset \), we must have that \( \phi(\mu_k) = \mu_l \) for \( l > k \), but in this case \( \phi(\mu_k) \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \) contradicts (A1). This contradiction implies that \( \phi \) violates either Axiom 1 or Axiom 2 (or both). If \( M_k \neq \emptyset \), then consider \( \mu_1 = \phi(\mu_k) \). If \( l > k \), then Axiom 1 is violated. If \( l = k \), then \( \phi \) violates Axiom 3 (to see this, take any \( z \in M_k \neq \emptyset \) and observe that \( z \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k, z \succ_{\mu_k} \phi(\mu_k) \) and \( \phi(z) = z \)). If \( l < k \), then Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 imply \( \phi(\mu_k) \in M_k \). Then, since \( \phi(\mu_k) \) is not given by (5), there exists some \( y \in M_k \) such that \( y \succ_{\mu_k} \phi(\mu_k) \). But in this case \( \phi \) violates Axiom 3, since \( y \succ_{\mu_k} \phi(\mu_k), y \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \), and \( \phi(y) = y \). We have obtained contradictions in all possible cases.

(Part 3) Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \( D_{\phi_1} \neq D_{\phi_2} \). Then \( \exists k : 1 \leq k \leq |S| \) such that \( \mu_j \in D_{\phi_1} \iff \mu_j \in D_{\phi_2} \) for all \( j < k \), but either \( \mu_k \in D_{\phi_1} \) and \( \mu_k \notin D_{\phi_2} \), or \( \mu_k \notin D_{\phi_1} \) and \( \mu_k \in D_{\phi_2} \). Without loss of generality, assume that \( \mu_k \in D_{\phi_1} \) and \( \mu_k \notin D_{\phi_2} \). Then part 2 implies that \( \phi_2(\mu_k) = \mu_l \) for some \( l < k \). Applying Axioms 1 and 2 to mapping \( \phi_2 \), we obtain \( \mu_l \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \) and \( \phi_2(\mu_l) = \mu_l \); the latter implies that \( \mu_l \in D_{\phi_2} \). Since, by hypothesis, \( \mu_j \in D_{\phi_1} \iff \mu_j \in D_{\phi_2} \) for all \( j < k \), we have \( \mu_l \in D_{\phi_1} \). Therefore, \( \mu_l \succ_{\mu_k} \mu_k \), \( \mu_l \succ_{\mu_k} \phi_1(\mu_k) \) (because \( \phi_1(\mu_k) = \mu_k \)), and \( \phi_1(\mu_l) = \mu_l \), but this violates Axiom 3 for mapping \( \phi_1 \).

(Part 4) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some state \( s \), \( \phi_1(s) \sim \phi_2(s) \). Part 3 of this Theorem implies that \( \phi_1(s) = s \iff \phi_2(s) = s \); since \( \phi_1(s) \sim \phi_2(s) \), we must have that \( \phi_1(s) \neq s \neq \phi_2(s) \). Axiom 1 then implies \( \phi_1(s) \succ_s s, \phi_2(s) \succ_s s \), and Assumption 3 implies that either \( \phi_1(s) \succ_s \phi_2(s) \) or \( \phi_2(s) \succ_s \phi_1(s) \). Without loss of generality, suppose that the former is the case. Then for \( y = \phi_2(s) \) there exists \( z = \phi_1(s) \) such that \( z \succ_s y, z \succ_s s \), and \( \phi_2(z) = z \) (the latter holds because \( \phi_1(s) = s \) by Axiom 2, and then \( \phi_2(s) = s \) by part 3 of this Theorem). Then we can apply Axiom 3 to \( \phi_2 \) and \( s \) and conclude that \( \phi_2(s) \neq y \), a contradiction. ■

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Proof of Theorem 2

(Part 1) Assume $\beta$ satisfies the following conditions:

\[ \text{for any } i \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and } x, y \in \mathcal{S}, \quad w_i(x) < w_i(y) \text{ implies } w_i(x) < \left(1 - \beta |\mathcal{S}|\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta |\mathcal{S}| w_i(y). \]  

(A3)

To prove part 2, we will also need the following conditions:

\[ \text{for any } i \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and } x, y, z \in \mathcal{S}, \quad w_i(x) < w_i(y) \text{ implies } \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} (w_i(z) - (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i) + \beta w_i(x) < w_i(y). \]  

(A4)

In total, there is a finite number of conditions in (A3) and (A4). Therefore, there exists $\beta_0 \in (0, 1)$ such that for all $\beta > \beta_0$, (A3) and (A4) hold.

Pick any $\phi \in \Phi$ and any $s_0 \in \mathcal{S}$. We construct a MPE of the game such that for each period $t \geq 1$, $s_t = \phi(s_{t-1})$. For $i \in \mathcal{I}$ and $s, q \in \mathcal{S}$, let

\[ V_i(s, q) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (1 - \beta) w_i(s) & \text{if } s = q \\ (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i & \text{if } s \neq q \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \beta w_i(\phi(q)) & \text{if } \phi(q) = q \\ \beta (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^2 w_i(\phi(q)) & \text{if } \phi(q) \neq q \end{array} \right\}. \]  

(A5)

In the equilibrium we construct below, $V_i(s, q)$ will be the continuation payoff of $i$ as a function of the current state $s$ and the accepted proposal $q$. In the remainder, we drop time indices.

For each $s \in \mathcal{S}$, take $K_s \geq |\mathcal{S}| - 1$. Take $\pi_s(\cdot)$ such that Assumption 5 holds, and if $\phi(s) \neq s$, then $\pi_s(K_s) = \phi(s)$. Consider strategy profile $\sigma^*$ constructed as follows: Each $i \in \mathcal{I}$ votes for proposal $P_k$ (says yes) if and only if:

(i) either $k = K_s$ (we are at the last stage of voting), $P_{K_s} = \phi(s)$ and $V_i(s, \phi(s)) > V_i(s, s)$;

(ii) or $V_i(s, P_k) > V_i(s, \phi(s))$.

In addition, if $\pi_s(k) \in \mathcal{I}$ for some $k$, this player chooses proposal $P_k$ arbitrarily.

The strategy profile $\sigma^*$ is Markovian. We will show that it is an MPE in three steps.

First, we show that under the strategy profile $\sigma^*$, there is a transition to $\phi(s)$ if $\phi(s) \neq s$ and no transition if $\phi(s) = s$. Suppose that $\phi(s) \neq s$, then Axiom 1 implies that

\[ X_s \equiv \{ i : w_i(\phi(s)) > w_i(s) \} \in \mathcal{W}_s. \]

Now, (A3) and $\beta > \beta_0$ imply that for all $i \in X_s$, we have

\[ V_i(s, \phi(s)) = (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i + \beta w_i(\phi(s)) > (1 - \beta) w_i(s) + \beta (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^2 w_i(\phi(s)) = V_i(s, s). \]
Consequently, if \( \phi(s) \neq s \), then under \( \sigma^* \), there is transition to \( \phi(s) \) if stage \( K_s \) is reached.

Let us now show that there exist no \( X'_s \in \mathcal{W}_s \) and \( P_k \in \mathcal{S} \) such that \( V_i(s, P_k) > V_i(s, \phi(s)) \) for all \( i \in X'_s \), i.e., the set of players for whom \( V_i(s, P_k) > V_i(s, \phi(s)) \) is not a winning coalition in \( s \). To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists such a \( X'_s \) and \( P_k \). Then, since \( P_k \neq s \) and \( \phi(\phi(s)) = \phi(s) \), we would have that for all \( i \in X'_s \),

\[
w_i(\phi(P_k)) > (1 - \beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta w_i(\phi(P_k)) \geq V_i(s, P_k) > V_i(s, \phi(s)) \geq (1 - \beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta w_i(\phi(s)),
\]

and thus, by (A3),

\[
w_i(\phi(P_k)) > w_i(\phi(s)) \text{ for all } i \in X'_s.
\]

So, \( X'_s \in \mathcal{W}_s \) implies \( \phi(P_k) \succ_s \phi(s) \), which, given that \( \phi(s) \succ_s s \), yields \( \phi(P_k) \succ_s s \) by Assumption 2(b). But \( \phi(P_k) \succ_s \phi(s) \), \( \phi(P_k) \succ_s s \), and \( \phi(\phi(P_k)) = \phi(P_k) \) contradicts Axiom 3. Therefore, the set of players with \( V_i(s, P_k) > V_i(s, \phi(s)) \) does not form a winning coalition in \( s \). This means that under \( \sigma^* \), no proposal is accepted if \( \phi(s) = s \), and if \( \phi(s) \neq s \), then no proposal is accepted in all stages but the last one, and in the last stage \( P_{K_s} = \phi(s) \) is accepted.

Second, we verify that given \( \sigma^* \), continuation payoffs after acceptance of proposal \( q \) are given by (A5). If proposal \( q \neq s \) is accepted, then there is an immediate transition to \( q \), while if no proposal is accepted, then each player \( i \) receives stage utility \((1 - \beta) w_i(s)\). In the next period, there is a transition (to \( \phi(q) \)) under \( \sigma^* \) if and only if \( \phi(q) \neq q \), and after that there are no transitions along the equilibrium path. Hence, the continuation payoffs are given by (A5).

Third, we show that there are no profitable deviations from \( \sigma^* \) at any stage. For an agenda-setter, this holds because no proposal that he can make is accepted. For a voter, notice that since continuation strategies are Markovian, it is always a best response to vote for the option that the player (weakly) prefers, and this is what profile \( \sigma^* \) prescribes. Indeed, if \( \phi(s) \neq s \), then in the last voting stage, each player \( i \) compares continuation payoff \( V_i(s, \phi(s)) \) if the proposal is accepted and \( V_i(s, s) \) if it is rejected. In all other voting stages, player \( i \) receives \( V_i(s, P_k) \) if proposal \( P_k \) is accepted and \( V_i(s, \phi(s)) \) if it is rejected (because \( \phi(s) \) will be eventually accepted if \( \phi(s) \neq s \) and no proposal is accepted if \( \phi(s) = s \)). Therefore, there are no profitable deviations from \( \sigma^* \) given the continuation payoffs in (A1). Thus, \( \sigma^* \) is a best response to itself at every voting stage for any \( s \in \mathcal{S} \), and thus \( \sigma^* \) is a MPE of the entire game.

(Part 2) We first prove that an MPE exists, and then that any MPE has the stated properties. We first construct a mapping \( \phi \) satisfying Axioms 1-3. Take a sequence of states
\[ \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|}\} \] satisfying (A1). Then, follow the procedure described in Theorem 1. First, we set \( \phi(\mu_1) = \mu_1 \). If for \( l \geq 2 \) we have \( \mathcal{M}_l = \emptyset \), then \( \phi(\mu_l) = \mu_l \); otherwise, define \( Z_l \subseteq \mathcal{M}_l \) by

\[
Z_l = \{ z \in \mathcal{M}_l : \forall s \in \mathcal{M}_l : s \sim z \Rightarrow s \not\approx_{\mu_l} z \}.
\]

Then \( Z_l \neq \emptyset \), as we can apply Assumption 2(b) to \( \mathcal{M}_l \). Choose a particular element of \( Z_l \) as \( \phi(\mu_l) \) as follows. Let \( Y_{\mu_l} \) be the set of stages of protocol \( \pi_{\mu_l} \) such that for any stage \( j \in Y_{\mu_l} \), \( \pi_{\mu_l}(j) \in \mathcal{S} \) implies \( \pi_{\mu_l}(j) \in Z_l \), and \( \pi_{\mu_l} \in \mathcal{I} \) implies that for some \( z \in Z_l : w_i(z) > w_i(\mu_l) \), where \( i = \pi_{\mu_l}(j) \). By Assumption 5, \( Y_{\mu_l} \) is nonempty; let \( k_{\mu_l}^* \) be the last stage from \( Y_{\mu_l} \). If \( \pi_{\mu_l}(k_{\mu_l}^*) \in \mathcal{S} \), then let \( \phi(\mu_l) = \pi_{\mu_l}(k_{\mu_l}^*) \), while if \( \pi_{\mu_l}(k_{\mu_l}^*) \in \mathcal{I} \), then let \( \phi(\mu_l) \) be any element \( z \in Z_l \) such that \( w_i(z) > w_i(\mu_l) \) for \( i = \pi_{\mu_l}(j) \). Proceeding inductively by \( l \), we get mapping \( \phi \).

We now construct an equilibrium which implements \( \phi \) and in which continuation payoff of player \( i \) if the current state is \( s \) and proposal \( q \) is accepted, \( V_i(s, q) \), is given by (A5), and if no alternative is accepted, each player \( i \) receives \( V_i(s, s) \). Given these continuation payoffs, each period can be viewed as a finite (truncated) game with terminal payoffs given by \( V_i(s, q) \). We construct an MPE \( \sigma' \) of this truncated game by backward induction.

Case (i): \( \phi(s) \neq s \). Given any current states \( s \), consider the stage \( k_s^* \) defined above in the construction of mapping \( \phi \). If \( k_s^* \) is not the last stage, then for stages from \( K_s \) down to \( k_s^* + 1 \) we do the following. Suppose that in the last stage, the voting is over the alternative \( s' \). Comparing payoffs as in the proof of part 1, we see that in a SPE, \( s' \) must be accepted if and only if \( s' = \phi(s) \) and rejected otherwise. But by definition of \( Y_s \), \( s' \) may be voted only if nominated by some player \( i \). Proceeding backward to the agenda-setting stage, we notice that such player \( i \) must have \( w_i(\phi(s)) \leq w_i(s) \), and then he strictly prefers to stay in \( s \), which means that nominating \( s' = \phi(s) \) is not his best action. By not nominating \( \phi(s) \) if the game reached the last stage \( K_s \) he ensures that the next state is \( s \). We can apply the same reasoning to all voting stages up to \( k_s^* + 1 \), and get an SPE in the subgame starting from stage \( k_s^* + 1 \) where no proposal is accepted and \( s \) is implemented.

Consider now stage \( k_s^* \). By the same reasoning, only \( \phi(s) \) may be accepted if nominated. At this stage, it either happens automatically according to the protocol or, if \( \pi_s(k_s^*) = i \in \mathcal{I} \), then \( i \)'s best response is to nominate \( \phi(s) \): if \( i \) does not, then \( s \) persists for an extra period. Hence, in a subgame that starts at stage \( k_s^* \), there is a SPE where \( \phi(s) \) is accepted.

If \( k_s^* \neq 1 \), we proceed with backward induction. At stage \( k_s^* - 1 \), no proposal other than \( \phi(s) \) may be accepted, and we can choose voting strategies such that \( \phi(s) \) is rejected at this
stage (it is later accepted at stage $k_s^*$). If at this stage the agenda-setter is some player $i$, he is indifferent, and we pick any action. Proceeding backward, we finish constructing a SPE $\sigma'$ of this truncated game if the current state is $s$ for the case $\phi(s) \neq s$.

Case (ii): $\phi(s) = s$. Take the last voting stage, and suppose that some proposal $s' \neq s$ is considered. For a player $i$ to vote for $s'$, $w_i(\phi(s')) > w_i(s)$ must hold. However, since $\phi(s) = s$, such players do not form a winning coalition. Consequently, we can choose voting strategies so that a transition to another state will not be supported. Consequently, at the agenda-setting stage, any action may be chosen, as none of his proposals may be accepted. We can use backward induction to construct a strategy profile $\sigma'$ where no proposal is accepted.

Note that in both cases, we can choose $\sigma'$ to be Markovian by choosing the same actions in equivalent subgames for any player who is indifferent. Having done so for all $s \in S$, we get a Markovian strategy profile $\sigma$. But given that in this strategy profile all transitions are one-stage, the payoffs are indeed given by (A5), and therefore there is no profitable one-shot deviation (otherwise, $\sigma'$ would not be a SPE for some $s$). This shows that $\sigma$ is a MPE.

Our next step is to establish the properties that any MPE satisfies. Take any set of protocols $\{\pi_s(\cdot)\}_{s \in S}$ and any pure-strategy MPE $\sigma$. For any state $s$, the proposal $q$ that is accepted along the equilibrium path is well-defined (let $q = s$ if all proposals are rejected) and define $\chi(s) = q$.

First, note that $\chi : S \rightarrow S$ has “no cycles”: if $\chi(s) \neq s$ then for any $n \geq 1$, $\chi^n(s) \neq s$ (where $\chi^2(s) \equiv \chi(\chi(s))$ etc.). This can be established by contradiction. Suppose there exists $n$ such that $\chi^n(s) = s$, but $\chi(s) \neq s$. Denote by $J_s \subset \{1, \ldots, K_s\}$ the set of voting stages in state $s$ where a proposal $P_{k'}$ made along the equilibrium path is accepted. By definition of $\chi$, the first voting stage in $J_s$ leads to $\chi(s)$. Two cases are possible.

Case (i): for every $k \in J_s$, $\chi^{n+1}(P_k) \neq \chi^n(P_k)$ for all $n$. Then consider the last voting stage $k' \in J_s$. If $P_{k'}$ is accepted, each player $i$ receives $\bar{w}_i$, and if $P_{k'}$ is rejected, $i$ gets $(1 - \beta) w_i(s) + \beta \bar{w}_i > \bar{w}_i$. But $P_{k'}$ cannot be accepted in a MPE, yielding the desired contradiction.

Case (ii): for some $k \in J_s$, $\chi^{n+1}(P_k) = \chi^n(P_k)$ for some $n$. Denote the set of such $k$ by $J'_s \subset J_s$; clearly, the first stage in $J_s$ is not in $J'_s$. Let $k'$ be the first stage in $J'_s$; then $\chi^{n+1}(P_{k'}) = \chi^n(P_{k'})$ for all $n \geq |S| - 1$. Consider the stage $k''$ in $J_s$ that precedes $k'$. Accepting the proposal made at $k''$, $P_{k''}$, gives $\bar{w}_i$ to each player $i$, while rejecting it yields at least $\left(1 - \beta |S|\right) \bar{w}_i + \beta |S| w_i(\chi^{|S|}(P_{k''})) > \bar{w}_i$. Therefore, proposal $P_{k''}$ cannot be accepted in any MPE, which yields a contradiction and establishes the “no cycle” result.

This “no cycle” result in turn implies that $\chi^n(s) = \chi^{|S|-1}(s)$ for all $n \geq |S| - 1$. Define
\[ \psi(s) = \chi^{\lfloor S \rfloor - 1}(s), \] and, with the convention that \( \chi^0(s) \equiv s, \)

\[ m(s) = \min \{ n \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} : \chi^n(s) = \psi(s) \} , \quad (A6) \]

Evidently, \( 0 \leq m(s) \leq |S| - 1, \) and \( m(s) = 0 \) if and only if \( \psi(s) = \chi(s) = s. \) Moreover,

\[ \psi(\psi(s)) = \chi(\psi(s)) = \psi(\chi(s)) = \psi(s) \quad (A7) \]

for any state \( s, \) as follows from the definition of mapping \( \psi. \) Finally, define

\[ \tilde{V}_i(s) = \begin{cases} (1 - \beta) w_i(s) & \text{if } \chi(s) = s \\ (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i & \text{if } \chi(s) \neq s \end{cases} , \quad (A8) \]

which is the equilibrium payment of player \( i \) if the equilibrium proposal \( \chi(s) \) is accepted, and, slightly abusing the notation \( \tilde{V}_i \)

\[ \tilde{V}_i(s, q) = \begin{cases} (1 - \beta) w_i(s) & \text{if } s = q \\ (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_i & \text{if } s \neq q \end{cases} + \beta \tilde{V}_i(q) . \quad (A9) \]

Clearly, \( \tilde{V}_i(s, q) \) gives the continuation payoff of player \( i \) if in state \( s \) alternative \( q \) is accepted, and equilibrium play (according to \( \sigma \)) follows. We now prove an auxiliary result; then we will prove that \( \psi(s) \) satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, then that \( \chi(s) = \psi(s) \) (which implies \( s_t = \chi(s_0) \) for all \( t \geq 1 \)), and finally that \( \psi \) satisfies Axiom 3.

\textbf{Proof that if proposals } \( P_{k_j} \) \text{ and } \( P_{k_l}, \ j < l, \) \text{ are proposed and accepted in state } s, \text{ then } \( \psi(P_{k_j}) \sim \psi(P_{k_l}) \) \text{ and } \( m(P_{k_j}) \leq m(P_{k_l}) \). \text{ We only need to consider the case where } \chi(s) \neq s, \text{ and thus } m(s) \geq 1. \text{ For each state } s \text{ take the set of voting stages } J \text{ such that for each } k \in J, \text{ the proposal } P_k \text{ is accepted. Let } J = \{k_1, \ldots, k_{|J|}\}, \text{ where } k_j < k_l \text{ for } j < l \text{ (we drop index } s \text{ for convenience); then } J \neq \emptyset. \text{ In equilibrium, proposal } P_{k_1} \text{ is accepted, so } \chi(s) = P_{k_1} \text{ and } \psi(P_{k_1}) = \psi(s). \text{ Since each } P_{k_i} \text{ for } 1 \leq l \leq |J| \text{ is accepted in this equilibrium, then } 1 \leq l < |J|, \text{ } \tilde{V}_i(s, P_{k_l}) \geq \tilde{V}_i(s, P_{k_{l+1}}) \text{ for a winning coalition in } s. \text{ For such players,}

\[ \left(1 - \beta^{m(P_{k_l})+1}\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^{m(P_{k_l})+1} w_i(\psi(P_{k_l})) \geq \left(1 - \beta^{m(P_{k_{l+1}})+1}\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^{m(P_{k_{l+1}})+1} w_i(\psi(P_{k_{l+1}})) , \quad (A10) \]

and therefore, from (A3), \( w_i(\psi(P_{k_l})) \geq w_i(\psi(P_{k_{l+1}})); \) this implies \( \psi(P_{k_l}) \succeq \psi(P_{k_{l+1}}). \) We also have that \( \tilde{V}_i(s, P_{k_{j+1}}) \geq \tilde{V}_i(s, s) \text{ for a winning coalition in } s, \) and for such players,

\[ \left(1 - \beta^{m(P_{k_{j+1}})+1}\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^{m(P_{k_{j+1}})+1} w_i(\psi(P_{k_{j+1}})) \]

\[ \geq (1 - \beta) w_i(s) + \beta \left(1 - \beta^{m(s)}\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^{m(s)} w_i(\psi(s)) \]

\[ > \left(1 - \beta^{m(s)+1}\right) \tilde{w}_i + \beta^{m(s)+1} w_i(\psi(s)) . \quad (A11) \]
From (A3), we get \( w_i \left( \psi \left( P_{k,j} \right) \right) \geq w_i (\psi (s)) = w_i (P_{k_1}) \); therefore, \( \psi \left( P_{k,j} \right) \succeq_s \psi (P_{k_1}) \). Assumption 2(b) now implies that \( \psi \left( P_{k_j} \right) \sim \psi (P_{k_1}) \) for all \( 1 \leq j < l \leq |J| \). Now (A10) implies that \( m(P_{k_i}) \leq m(P_{k_{i+1}}) \) for all \( 1 \leq l \leq |J| - 1 \), which proves the auxiliary result.

**Proof that \( \psi \) satisfies Axiom 1.** Suppose \( \psi (s) \neq s \), so the auxiliary result applies. For a winning coalition of players in \( s, \bar{V}_i(s,P_{k,j}) \geq \bar{V}_i(s,s) \). The previous auxiliary result implies \( \psi \left( P_{k,j} \right) = \psi (s) \) and \( m(P_{k_1}) \leq m \left( P_{k_{i+1}} \right) = m(s) - 1 \), and then the first inequality in (A11), together with (A3), implies \( w_i (\psi (s)) > w_i (s) \). We have thus proved that for any \( s \in S \) such that \( \psi (s) \neq s \), \( \psi (s) \succ_s s \), and therefore Axiom 1 holds.

**Proof that \( \psi \) satisfies Axiom 2** is straightforward as \( \psi (\psi (s)) = \psi (s) \) from (A7).

**Proof that \( \chi (s) = \psi (s) \).** If \( \psi (s) = s \), then \( \chi (s) = s = \psi (s) \) due to the “no cycle” result. Let us prove that if \( \psi (s) \neq s \), then transition to state \( \psi (s) \) takes place in one step, i.e., that \( \psi (s) = \chi (s) \) (or, equivalently, in (A6) \( m(s) = 1 \) whenever \( \chi (s) \neq s \)). Consider two cases.

Case (i): \( \psi (s) = P_{k,j} \) for some \( j : 1 \leq j \leq |J| \). In this case, \( m(P_{k_j}) = 0 \) since Axiom 2 is proven to hold. But we proved that \( m(P_{k_i}) \) is weakly increasing in \( l \), therefore, \( m(\chi (s)) = m(P_{k_1}) = 0 \), and therefore \( m(s) = 1 \).

Case (ii): \( \psi (s) = P_{k,j} \) does not hold for any \( j \). This implies that \( m(P_{k_1}) \geq 1 \) and \( \psi (s) \neq \chi (s) \). Suppose that at some stage \( k \), the proposal \( P_k = \psi (s) \) is made (not necessarily on equilibrium path). Then if it accepted, each player \( i \) will get \( \bar{V}_i(s,P_k) = (1-\beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta w_i (\psi (s)) \), and if it is rejected, he will receive

\[
\bar{V}_i(s,x) \leq (1-\beta) w_i (s) + \beta (1-\beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta^2 w_i (\psi (s))
\]

for some \( x \) such that \( \psi (x) = \psi (s) \). Any player with \( w_i (\psi (s)) > w_i (s) \) must, given (A3), have \( \bar{V}_i(s,P_k) > \bar{V}_i(s,x) \). Since \( \psi (s) \succ_s s \) (Axiom 1), proposal \( P_k = \psi (s) \) will be accepted.

By Assumption 5, either every proposal will be made exogenously at some stage \( k \), or each player will become agenda-setter. In the first case, \( k \in J \), but in the case under consideration \( \psi (s) = P_{k,j} \) does not hold for any \( j \), contradiction. In the second case, if a player \( i \) such that \( w_i (\psi (s)) > w_i (s) \) is the agenda-setter at stage \( k \), then he cannot propose \( P_k = \psi (s) \) in equilibrium, as it will be accepted, and we again get to a contradiction. However, proposing \( P_k = \psi (s) \) will yield \( \bar{V}_i(s,P_k) \) whereas making the equilibrium proposal will yield \( \bar{V}_i(s,x) \). For player \( i \), \( \bar{V}_i(s,P_k) > \bar{V}_i(s,x) \) as we proved earlier, thus he has a profitable deviation. This cannot happen in equilibrium, which proves that \( \chi (s) = \psi (s) \) for all \( s \in S \).

**Proof that \( \psi \) satisfies Axiom 3.** Suppose that Axiom 3 does not hold. This implies that
there exist states $s, z \in S$ such that $\psi(z) = z$, $z \succ_s s$ (which implies $z \neq s$), and $z \succ_s \psi(s)$ (which implies $\psi(z) \sim \psi(s)$). As before, suppose that at some stage $k$, the proposal $P_k = z$ is made (not necessarily on equilibrium path). If it is accepted, each player $i$ will get $V_i(s, z) = (1 - \beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta z_i$, and if it is rejected, this player will get $V_i(s, x) = (1 - \beta) w_i(s) + \beta (1 - \beta) \bar{w}_i + \beta^2 z_i(\psi(s))$

for some $x$ such that $\psi(x) = \psi(s)$. Now, (A4) implies that $V_i(s, z) > V_i(s, x)$ whenever $w_i(z) > w_i(\psi(s))$, i.e., for a winning coalition in $s$. Therefore, proposal $P_k = z$ will be accepted.

Since $\psi(z) \sim \psi(s)$, it must be that $z$ is never proposed along the equilibrium path. By Assumption 5, this is only possible if each player becomes the agenda-setter at some stage $k$.

When a player with $w_i(z) > w_i(\psi(s))$ becomes the agenda-setter, proposing $z$ is a profitable deviation for him. This cannot happen in equilibrium, and this contradiction establishes that $\psi$ satisfies Axiom 3. This completes the proof of part 2 of the Theorem.

(Part 3) This result immediately follows from Theorem 1 and part 2 of this Theorem. ■

Proof of Theorem 3

Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that stable state $s \in S$ is Pareto inefficient. This means that for some $x \in S$, $w_i(x) > w_i(s)$ for all $i \in I$. By hypothesis, there is $y \in S$ such that $W_y \subset W_s$ and $w_i(y) = w_i(x) > w_i(s)$ for all $i \in I$. Take a mapping $\phi \in \Phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3.

Consider two cases. If $\phi(y) = y$, then from $\phi(s) = s$ and $y \succ_s s$ we get $y \succ_s \phi(s)$, $\phi$ violates Axiom 3 (if there is $z$ such that $\phi(y) = y$, $y \succ_s s$, and $y \succ_s z$, then $z \neq \phi(s)$). If $\phi(y) \neq y$, then Axiom 1 implies $w_i(\phi(y)) > w_i(y) > w_i(s)$ for a winning coalition in $y$, which is a winning coalition in $s$, and thus $\phi(y) \succ_s s$ and $\phi(y) \succ_s \phi(s)$. Axiom 2 guarantees that $\phi(\phi(y)) = \phi(y)$. Again, we conclude that $\phi$ violates Axiom 3. ■

Proof of Theorem 4

The next lemma, proved in Appendix B, characterizes properties of quasi-median voters. Recall that $M_s$ denotes the set of quasi-median voters in state $s$.

**Lemma 1** Given $I \subset \mathbb{R}$, $S \subset \mathbb{R}$, payoff functions $\{w_i(s)\}_{i \in I, s \in S}$, and winning coalitions $\{W_s\}_{s \in S}$ satisfying Assumption 1, the following are true.

1. For each $s$, the set $M_s$ is nonempty.
2. If the single-crossing property in Definition 3 holds, then for any states \( x, y, z \in S \),
\[ x \succ z y \text{ if and only if for all } i \in M_z, w_i(x) > w_i(y), \text{ and } \]
\[ x \succeq z y \text{ if and only if for all } i \in M_z, w_i(x) \geq w_i(y). \]

3. If monotonic median voter condition in Definition 5 holds, then there is a nondecreasing sequence \( \{m_s\}_{s \in S} \) of players such that \( m_s \in M_s \) for all \( s \in S \).

**Proof of Theorem 4. (Part 1)** We start with Assumption 2(a). Suppose that there is a cycle \( s_1, \ldots, s_l \) such that \( s_{k+1} \succ_{s_k} s_k \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq l-1 \) and \( s_1 \succ_{s_l} s_l \). Take a monotonic sequence of median voters \( \{m_s\}_{s \in S} \). Recall that \( m_s \) is part of any connected winning coalition in \( s \), therefore, if for some \( x \) and \( z \), \( x \succ z \), then \( w_{m_z}(z) > w_z(x) \). Now for each \( s \in S \) consider an alternative set of winning coalitions where \( m_s \) is the dictator, i.e., \( W'_s = \{X \in C : m_s \in X\} \).

Denoting the induced relation between states by \( \succ' \), we have that if \( x \succ z \), then \( x \succ'_z z \). Consequently, if there was a cycle \( s_1, \ldots, s_l \) such that \( s_{k+1} \succ_{s_k} s_k \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq l-1 \) and \( s_1 \succ_{s_l} s_l \), then we have \( s_{k+1} \succ'_{s_k} s_k \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq l-1 \) and \( s_1 \succ'_{s_l} s_l \); therefore, a cycle for \( \succ' \) exists. Now take the shortest cycle for \( \succ' \) (which need not be a cycle for \( \succ \)). Without loss of generality, suppose that \( s_2 \) is the lowest state (so \( s_2 \leq s_1 \) and \( s_2 \leq s_3 \)); then \( m_{s_2} \leq m_{s_1} \) and \( m_{s_2} \leq m_{s_3} \). Since \( s_3 \succ_{s_2} s_2 \) and \( s_2 \succ_{s_1} s_1 \), we have \( w_{m_{s_2}}(s_3) > w_{m_{s_2}}(s_2) \) and \( w_{m_{s_1}}(s_2) > w_{m_{s_1}}(s_1) \). But \( s_2 \leq s_3 \) and \( m_{s_2} \leq m_{s_1} \), hence, \( w_{m_{s_2}}(s_3) - w_{m_{s_2}}(s_2) > 0 \) implies \( w_{m_{s_1}}(s_3) - w_{m_{s_1}}(s_2) > 0 \). Combining this with \( w_{m_{s_1}}(s_2) > w_{m_{s_1}}(s_1) \), we conclude that \( w_{m_{s_1}}(s_3) > w_{m_{s_1}}(s_1) \). But then \( s_3 \succ_{s_1} s_1 \), since \( m_{s_1} \) is the dictator in \( s_1 \). This implies that \( s_2 \) may be skipped in the cycle, contradicting the assumption that \( \{s_k\}_{k=1}^l \) is the shortest cycle.

To verify Assumption 2(b), take any \( s \in S \) and some \( m_s \in M_s \). Suppose there is a cycle \( s_1, \ldots, s_l \) such that \( s_{k+1} \succeq_s s_k \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq l-1 \), \( s_1 \succeq_s s_l \), and \( s_j \sim_s s_k \) for \( 1 \leq j < k \leq l \). Without loss of generality, assume that state \( s_l \) maximizes the payoff of \( m_s \) among states \( s_1, \ldots, s_l \). Then \( w_{m_s}(s_l) \geq w_{m_s}(s_1) \), and Assumption 6 implies \( w_{m_s}(s_l) > w_{m_s}(s_1) \). But then, by Lemma 1, \( s_1 \not\succ_{s_l} s_l \), and this contradicts the existence of a cycle. Finally, if \( x, y \in S \) are such that \( x \succ_s s \) and \( y \succ_s x \), then for any \( i \in M_s \) we have \( w_i(y) > w_i(x) > w_i(s) \), which, in turn, implies \( y \succ_s s \).

This shows that Assumption 2(b) holds and completes the proof of part 1.\(^{24}\)

**Part 2**\(^{25}\) Let \( W = \bigcup_{s \in S} W'_s \); then \( W \), as a set of winning coalitions, satisfies Assumption 1. Let \( \succ^{*} \) be given by \( x \succ^{*} y \) if and only if \( \{i \in I : w_i(x) > w_i(y)\} \in W \). Since preferences are

\(^{24}\)This result can also be derived using Theorem 4.6 in Austin-Smith and Banks (1999).

\(^{25}\)We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this simpler proof of part 2 of Theorem 4.
satisfies Axioms 1–3. This proves that $Z$ is transitive, and hence acyclic. Clearly, a cycle in Assumption 2(a) would also be a cycle for $\succ^*$; given Assumption 6, so would a cycle in Assumption 2(b). Hence, such cycles do not exist. Finally, Theorem 4.1 in Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) suggests that the preference relation $\succ_s$ is transitive, and so $x \succ_s y$ and $y \succ_s x$ imply $y \succ_s x$.

Proofs of Propositions in Section 6

Proof of Proposition 1. (Part 1) Since $\alpha > \frac{1}{2}$ is the rule for all states, Assumption 1 is satisfied. Enumerate all states as $s_1, \ldots, s_m$ (where $m = |S|$) such that $\rho(s_k)$ is weakly increasing in $k$ (the order of states with the same $\rho$ may be arbitrary). With this order, $T$ and $S$ satisfy the single-crossing condition as in Definition 3. Indeed, if $s_k < s_l$ and $i < j$, then

$$
(w_j(s_l) - w_j(s_k)) - (w_i(s_l) - w_i(s_k)) = (v_j(\rho(s_l)) - v_j(\rho(s_k))) - (v_i(\rho(s_l)) - v_i(\rho(s_k))) \geq 0,
$$

because $\rho(s_k) \leq \rho(s_l)$ and $v$ satisfies the strict increasing differences condition. Now construct a nondecreasing sequence of quasi-median voters; this would prove that Monotonic median voter property holds. For state $s_k$, take $m_{s_k}$ such that $\hat{\rho}_{m_{s_k}} \leq \rho(s_k) < \hat{\rho}_{m_{s_k}+1}$ if $\rho(s_k) < \hat{\rho}_n$, and let $m_{s_k} = n$ otherwise. Then $m_{s_k}$ is determined uniquely for each state $s_k$, is weakly increasing, and is a quasi-median voter in state $s_k$ by the assumption on feasible religious policies $\rho$. We can now apply part 1 of Theorem 4 to show that Assumption 2 is satisfied and Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 apply.

(Part 2) Suppose that some state $s$ with $1, n \notin Z(s)$ is stable. Suppose $Z(s) = [a, b]$ and let $Z' = [a - 1, b + 1]$. Then $\min M_{Z'} \leq \min M_Z \leq \max M_Z \leq \max M_{Z'}$, and thus $s' = (\rho(s), Z')$ is a feasible state. By the assumption on $V(Z)$, $s'$ Pareto dominates $s$. Take a mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3 and let $x = \phi(s')$. Then Axiom 1 implies that $w_i(\phi(s')) \geq w_i(s') > w_i(s)$ for a winning coalition in $s'$, and thus, by Lemma 1, for all $i \in M_{s'}$. Therefore, this holds for all $i \in M_s$, and thus for a winning coalition in $s$. Since $\phi(\phi(s')) = \phi(s')$, we get a violation of Axiom 3. This proves that $s$ is not stable, and either 1 or $n$ should be part of $Z(s)$ for any stable state $s$. Hence, starting from any $s_0$, at least one of these players will be given political participation.

Proof of Proposition 2. (Part 1) Notice that any state $x$ with $Z(x) = T$ is stable, as any $\phi$ with $\phi(x) \neq x$ would violate Axiom 1. Indeed, since $\hat{\rho}_{\min M_T} \leq \rho(x) \leq \hat{\rho}_{\max M_T}$ and
preferences are single-peaked, quasi-median voter \( \min M_I \) would be worse off from any state \( y \) with \( \rho(y) > \rho(x) \), and \( \max M_I \) would be worse off if \( \rho(y) < \rho(x) \). Now suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some \( s \) such that \( Z(s) \neq I \), \( \phi(s) = s \). Consider the following cases. Case (i): \( \rho(s) < \hat{\rho}_{\min M_I} \). Take \( x = (\hat{\rho}_{\min M_I}, I) \); by hypothesis, \( w_i(x) > w_i(s) \), and thus

\[
   w_i(x) = v_1(\hat{\rho}_{\min M_I}) + V(I) > v_1(\hat{\rho}_1) + V(s) \geq v_1(s) + V(s) = w_i(s).
\]

Since \( \rho(x) > \rho(s) \), this implies \( w_i(x) > w_i(s) \) for all \( i \in I \). But we proved that \( x \) is stable, and then \( \phi(s) = s \) violates Axiom 3. Case (ii): \( \hat{\rho}_{\min M_I} \leq \rho(s) \leq \hat{\rho}_{\max M_I} \). Take \( x = (\rho(s), I) \) and notice that \( w_i(x) > w_i(s) \) for all \( i \in I \). Since we earlier proved that \( \phi(x) = x \), we immediately get a contradiction to Axiom 3. Case (iii): \( \rho(s) > \hat{\rho}_{\max M_I} \). This case is completely analogous to case (i). In all cases, \( \phi(s) = s \) leads to a contradiction.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** (Part 1) The proof follows that of part 1 of Proposition 1. (Part 2) Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for some \( s \), \( \phi(s) = x \) such that \( Z(x) \neq I \). By Axiom 1, \( w_i(x) > w_i(s) \) for all \( i \in I \). Consider \( y = (\rho(x), I) \); the unanimity rule ensures that \( y \) is feasible for any \( \rho(x) \). As shown earlier, \( \phi(y) = y \), and \( w_i(y) > w_i(x) > w_i(s) \) for every player \( i \in I \). But then \( \phi(s) = x \) violates Axiom 3, a contradiction.
Appendix B for “Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs” (Not For Publication)

Examples, Applications and Additional Results

Definition of MPE

Consider a general $n$-person infinite-stage game, where each individual can take an action at every stage. Let the action profile of each individual be $a_i = (a_i^1, a_i^2, \ldots)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, with $a_i^t \in A_i^t$ and $a_i \in A_i = \prod_{t=1}^{\infty} A_i^t$. Let $h^t = (a^1, \ldots, a^t)$ be the history of play up to stage $t$ (not including stage $t$), where $a^s = (a^s_1, \ldots, a^s_n)$, so $h^0$ is the history at the beginning of the game, and let $H^t$ be the set of histories $h^t$ for $t : 0 \leq t \leq T - 1$.

We denote the set of all potential histories up to date $t$ by

$$H_t = \bigcup_{s=0}^{t} H^s.$$  

Let $t$-continuation action profiles be $a_{i,t} = (a_i^t, a_i^{t+1}, \ldots)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, with the set of continuation action profiles for player $i$ denoted by $A_{i,t}$. Symmetrically, define $t$-truncated action profiles as $a_{i,-t} = (a_i^1, a_i^2, \ldots, a_i^{t-1})$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, with the set of $t$-truncated action profiles for player $i$ denoted by $A_{i,-t}$. We also use the standard notation $a_i$ and $a_{-i}$ to denote the action profiles for player $i$ and the action profiles of all other players (similarly, $A_i$ and $A_{-i}$). The payoff functions for the players depend only on actions, i.e., player $i$’s payoff is given by $u_i (a^1, \ldots, a^n)$.

A pure strategy for player $i$ is

$$\sigma_i : H_\infty \rightarrow A_i.$$  

A $t$-continuation strategy for player $i$ (corresponding to strategy $\sigma^i$) specifies plays only after time $t$ (including time $t$), i.e.,

$$\sigma_{i,t} : H_\infty \setminus H_{t-2} \rightarrow A_{i,t},$$  

where $H_\infty \setminus H_{t-2}$ is the set of histories starting at time $t$.

We then have:

**Definition 6 (Markovian Strategies)** A continuation strategy $\sigma_{i,t}$ is **Markovian** if

$$\sigma_{i,t} (h_{t-1}) = \sigma_{i,t} (\tilde{h}_{\tau-1})$$

for all $\tau \geq t$, whenever $h_{t-1}, \tilde{h}_{\tau-1} \in H_\infty$ are such that for any $a_{i,t}, \tilde{a}_{i,\tau} \in A_{i,t}$ and any $a_{-i,t} \in A_{-i,t}$,

$$u_i (a_{i,t}, a_{-i,t} \mid h_{t-1}) \geq u_i (\tilde{a}_{i,\tau}, a_{-i,t} \mid \tilde{h}_{\tau-1})$$
implies
\[ u_i\left(a_{i,t}, a_{-i,t} \mid h_{t-1}\right) \geq u_i\left(\hat{a}_{i,\tau}, a_{-i,\tau} \mid \hat{h}_{\tau-1}\right). \]

Markov perfect equilibria in pure strategies are defined formally as follows:

**Definition 7 (MPE)** A pure strategy profile \( \hat{\sigma} = (\hat{\sigma}_1, \ldots, \hat{\sigma}_n) \) is **Markov perfect equilibrium** (MPE) (in pure strategies) if each strategy \( \hat{\sigma}_i \) is Markovian and

\[ u_i(\hat{\sigma}_i, \hat{\sigma}_{-i}) \geq u_i(\hat{\sigma}_i, \hat{\sigma}_{-i}) \quad \text{for all} \quad \sigma_i \in \Sigma_i \quad \text{and for all} \quad i = 1, \ldots, n. \]

**Examples**

**Example 3 (Nonexistence if \( \beta \) is not close to 1)** There are 4 players, \( \mathcal{I} = \{1, 2\} \), and 4 states, \( S = \{A, B, C, D\} \). Players’ preferences are given by:

- \( w_1(A, B, C, D) = (90, 70, 60, 5) \)
- \( w_2(A, B, C, D) = (5, 50, 40, 30) \)
- \( w_3(A, B, C, D) = (25, 50, 40, 30) \)
- \( w_4(A, B, C, D) = (25, 25, 40, 30) \)

Winning coalitions are defined as follows: in states \( A, B, C \), player 1 is the dictator, while in state \( D \), players 2, 3, 4 make decisions by majority voting. It is straightforward to show that Assumptions 1, 2. (The only condition to be checked is that Assumption 2(b) holds for state \( s = D \), and this follows from the fact that \( B \succ_D D, C \succ_D D \), but \( A \not\succ_D B \) and \( A \succ_D C \).) Suppose, however, that the discount factor \( \beta \) is not close to 1, say, \( \beta = 1/2 \); there are either no transaction costs or small transaction costs. The protocol at any state is \( \pi = (A, B, C, D) \) (with the current state skipped).

Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies. Given that player 1 is the dictator in states \( A, B, C \), we immediately get that if the game is at state \( A \), no transition will happen, and if the game is at either \( B \) or \( C \), then there will be an immediate transition to \( A \). Consider now what will happen if the state is \( D \). Consider all four possibilities: no transition, transition to \( A \), transition to \( B \), and transition to \( C \).

If there is no transition in equilibrium and alternative \( C \) is voted, it will be accepted as players 3 and 4 will support it (even though they prefer \( C \), but not \( A \) where \( C \) ultimately leads, to \( D \), they still prefer the path from \( C \) to \( A \) to staying in \( D \). This also means that it will be proposed along the equilibrium path. Hence, \( D \) cannot be stable.

If there is transition to \( A \) in equilibrium, then consider the last voting where, if reached on or off the equilibrium path, \( A \) will be proposed. All of the players 2, 3, 4 will prefer to vote.
against this alternative, as any other transition, as well as staying in $D$, will lead to a higher payoff for each of them. Hence, transition to $A$ cannot happen in equilibrium.

Suppose that there is transition to state $B$. Then again, players 2 and 4 would prefer to stay in $D$, even though this may mean transiting to $B$ in the next period. Voting against $B$ will, however, lead to voting on $C$, so we need to verify that $C$ will be rejected at this voting. Accepting $C$ will lead to $C$ and then to $A$, while rejecting will lead to $D$, and then (as transition to $B$ happens in equilibrium) to $B$ and then to $A$. The latter is preferred by players 2 and 3, which means that $C$ will be rejected if $B$ is rejected. Consequently, players 2 and 4 are better off voting against $B$, which means that transition to $B$ may not happen in equilibrium.

Finally, suppose that transition to state $C$ happens in equilibrium. If so, when alternative $B$ is voted, players 2 and 3 will support $B$, as they prefer to transit to $A$ through $B$ rather than through $C$. This implies that transition to $C$ cannot happen in equilibrium either. In all cases, we have reached a contradiction, which means that there is no pure-strategy MPE in this case.

**Example 4 (Nonexistence without Transaction Costs)** In this example, we show that a MPE in pure strategies may fail to exist if we assume away the transaction cost. There are 8 states $S = \{A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H\}$ and 7 players. The set of winning coalitions are: $\mathcal{W}_A = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : |\{1, 2, 3\} \cap X| \geq 2\}$ (i.e., majority voting between 1, 2, 3), $\mathcal{W}_B = \{4\}$, $\mathcal{W}_D = \{5\}$, $\mathcal{W}_F = \{6\}$, $\mathcal{W}_C = \mathcal{W}_E = \mathcal{W}_G = \mathcal{W}_H = \{7\}$ (here, $[i]$ denotes the set of winning coalitions where $i$ is the dictator, so $[i] = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : i \in X\}$). The payoffs are as follows: $w_1(\cdot) = (0, 30, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 1)$, $w_2(\cdot) = (0, 0, 0, 30, 0, 20, 0, 1)$, $w_3(\cdot) = (0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 1)$, $w_4(\cdot) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$, $w_5(\cdot) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)$, $w_6(\cdot) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)$, $w_7(\cdot) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$. It is straightforward to show that Assumptions 1, 2 are satisfied (it is helpful to notice that the only state $s$ that satisfies $s \succ_A A$ is $s = H$).

Evidently, state $H$ is stable (dictator 7 will never deviate), and similarly any of the states $E, F, G$ will immediately lead to $H$. It is also evident that $B$ will immediately lead to $C$, because $C$ is the only state where dictator 4 receives a positive utility; similarly, $D$ immediately leads to $E$ and $F$ immediately leads to $G$. Let us prove that no move from state $A$ can form a pure-strategy equilibrium. First, it is impossible to stay in $A$: players 1, 2, 3 would rather deviate and move to $B$, which would then lead to $C$ and only then to $H$. Moving to $H$ immediately is not possible in an equilibrium either: Then players 1 and 3 would rather deviate and move to $B$, which would then lead to $C$ and only then to $H$,
since the average payoff of this path would be higher for each of these players (recall that the
discount factor is close to 1).

Let us consider possible moves to $B$ and $C$ (the moves to $D, E, F, G$ are considered similarly).
If the state were to change to $C$, then players 1 and 2 would rather deviate and move to $D$ (and
then to $E$, followed by $H$). Finally, if the state were to change to $B$, then 2 and 3 could deviate
to $F$, so as to follow the path to $G$ and $H$ after that; this is better for these players than
moving to $B$, followed by $C$ and $H$. So, without imposing a transaction cost it is possible that
a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist.

Example 5 (Cycles without Transaction Costs) In this example, we show that in the
absence of transaction cost, an equilibrium may involve a cycle even though Assumptions 1, 2 hold.
There are 6 players, $I = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$, and 3 states, $S = \{A, B, C\}$. Players’
preferences are given by $w_1(A, B, C) = (5, 10, 4)$, $w_2(A, B, C) = (5, 4, 10)$, $w_3(A, B, C) =
(4, 5, 10)$, $w_4(A, B, C) = (10, 5, 4)$, $w_5(A, B, C) = (10, 4, 5)$, $w_6(A, B, C) = (4, 10, 5)$, and winning coalitions are defined by $W_A = \{X \in C : 1, 2 \in X\}$, $W_B = \{X \in C : 3, 4 \in X\}$, $W_C =
\{X \in C : 5, 6 \in X\}$. Then one can see that there is an equilibrium which involves moving from
state $A$ to state $B$, from $B$ to $C$, and from $C$ to $A$. To see this, because of the symmetry it
suffices to see that the players will not deviate if the current state is $A$. The alternatives are to
stay in $A$ or move to $C$. But staying in $A$ hurts both player 1 and player 2 (for player 2 who
dislikes state $B$ this is true because it postpones the move to $C$, the state that he likes best,
while for player 1 this is evident). At the same time, moving to $C$ hurts player 1, because state
$C$ is the worst of the three states for him not only in terms of stage payoff, but also in terms
of discounted present value (if the cycle continues, as it should due to the one-stage deviation
principle). So, this cycle constitutes a (Markov Perfect) equilibrium.

It is also easy to see that in this example, Assumptions 1, 2 are satisfied: in fact, there are
no two states $s, s_0 \in \{A, B, C\}$ such that $s \succ_{s_0} s_0$. Finally, notice that the aforementioned cycle
is not the only equilibrium. In particular, the cycle in the opposite direction may also arise in
an equilibrium (this holds because of symmetry), and situation where all three states are stable
is also possible (indeed, if $B$ and $C$ are stable, then players 1 will always block transition from
$A$ to $C$ whereas player 2 will always block transition from $A$ to $B$).
Example 6 (Nonexistence without Assumption 2(a)) There are 3 players, \( I = \{1, 2, 3\} \), and 3 states, \( S = \{A, B, C\} \). Players’ preferences satisfy \( w_1(A) > w_1(B) > w_1(C) \), \( w_2(B) > w_2(C) > w_2(A) \), and \( w_3(C) > w_3(A) > w_3(B) \) (for example, \( w_1(A, B, C) = (10, 8, 5) \), \( w_2(A, B, C) = (5, 10, 8) \), \( w_3(A, B, C) = (8, 5, 10) \)). Winning coalitions are given by \( W_A = \{X \in C : 3 \in X\} \), \( W_B = \{X \in C : 1 \in X\} \), \( W_A = \{X \in C : 2 \in X\} \) (in other words, states \( A, B, C \) have dictators 1, 2, 3, respectively). We then have \( A >_B B, B >_C C, C >_A A \), so Assumption 2(a) is violated.

It is easy to see that there are no dynamically stable states in the dynamic game in this case. To see this, suppose that state \( A \) is dynamically stable, then state \( B \) is not, since player 1 would enforce transition to \( A \). Therefore, state \( C \) is stable: player 2, who is the dictator in \( C \), knows that a transition to \( B \) will lead to \( A \), which is worse than \( C \). However, then player 3, knowing that \( C \) is stable, will have an incentive to move from \( A \) to \( C \). In equilibrium this deviation should not be profitable, but it is; hence, there is no equilibrium where \( A \) is stable. Now, given the transaction costs, there is no MPE in pure strategies, since if no state is dynamically stable, the players would benefit from blocking every single transition in every single state.

Let us now formally show that there is no mapping \( \phi \) that satisfies Axioms 1–3. Assume that there is such mapping \( \phi \). By Axiom 2, there is a stable state (for any state \( s \), \( \phi(s) \) is stable). Without loss of generality, suppose that \( A \) is such a state: \( \phi(A) = A \). Then state \( C \) is not stable: if it were, we would obtain a contradiction with Axiom 3, since \( C >_A A \). If \( C \) is not stable, then either \( \phi(C) = A \) or \( \phi(C) = B \). The first is impossible by Axiom 1, since player 2, who is a member of any winning coalition in \( C \), has \( w_2(C) > w_2(A) \). Therefore, \( \phi(C) = B \), and by Axiom 2, \( \phi(B) = B \). But we have \( A >_B B \) and \( \phi(A) = A \); this means, by Axiom 3, that \( \phi(B) = B \) cannot hold. This contradiction shows that with these preferences, there is no mapping \( \phi \) that satisfies Axioms 1–3.

Example 7 (Nonexistence without Assumption 2(b)) There are 3 players, \( I = \{1, 2, 3\} \), and 4 states, \( S = \{A, B, C, D\} \). Players’ preferences satisfy \( w_1(A) > w_1(B) > w_1(C) > w_1(D) \), \( w_2(B) > w_2(C) > w_2(A) > w_2(D) \), and \( w_3(C) > w_3(A) > w_3(B) > w_3(D) \) (for example, \( w_1(A, B, C, D) = (10, 8, 5, 4) \), \( w_2(A, B, C, D) = (5, 10, 8, 4) \), \( w_3(A, B, C, D) = (8, 5, 10, 4) \)). Winning coalitions are given by \( W_A = W_B = W_C = \{I\} = \{\{1, 2, 3\}\}, W_D = \{\{1\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}, \{1, 2, 3\}\} \) (in other words, in states \( A, B, C \) there is unanimity
voting rule, while in state $D$ there is majority voting rule). We then have $A \succ_D D$, $A \succ_D D$, $A \succ_D D$ and $A \succ_D B$, $B \succ_D C$, $C \succ_D A$, so Assumption 2(b) is violated. Assume, in addition, that $K_D = 3$, and $\pi_D(1) = C$, $\pi_D(2) = B$, $\pi_D(3) = A$.

In this case, states $A, B, C$ are dynamically stable: evidently, player who receives 10 (1, 2, 3, respectively) will block transition to any other state. Consider state $D$; it is easy to see that it is not dynamically stable. Indeed, if it were, then all three players would be better off from transition to either of the three other states $A, B, C$, so they must vote for any such proposal in equilibrium. Now that it is not dynamically stable, we must have that some of proposals $C, B, A$ are accepted in equilibrium. Suppose that $A$ is accepted, then $B$ may not be accepted (because two players, 1 and 3, strictly prefer $A$ to $B$), and therefore $C$ must be accepted (because two players, 2 and 3, strictly prefer $C$ to $A$). But then $A$ may not be accepted, as players 2 and 3 would prefer to have it rejected so that $C$ is accepted in the next period, and thus $A$ must be rejected in the equilibrium. This contradicts our assertion that $A$ is accepted, and we would obtain a similar contradiction if we assumed that some other proposal is accepted. Hence, there is no MPE in pure strategies in this case.

We now show that there is no mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3. Assume that there is such mapping $\phi$. Since for each of the states $A, B, C$ there is no state that is preferred to it by all three players, then Axiom 1 implies that $\phi(A) = A$, $\phi(B) = B$, and $\phi(C) = C$. Consider state $D$. If $\phi(D) = D$, this would violate Axiom 3, since, for instance, state $A$ satisfies $A \succ_D D$ and $\phi(A) = A$. Hence, $\phi(D) \neq D$; without loss of generality assume $\phi(D) = A$. But then state $C$ satisfies $C \succ_D A$, $C \succ_D D$, and $\phi(C) = C$. By Axiom 3 we cannot have $\phi(D) = A$. This contradiction proves that there does not exist mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3.

Example 8 (Multiple Equilibria without Assumption 3) There are 2 players, $I = \{1, 2\}$, and 3 states, $S = \{A, B, C\}$. Players’ preferences satisfy $w_1(A) > w_1(B) > w_1(C)$, $w_2(B) > w_2(A) > w_2(C)$ (for example, $w_1(A, B, C) = (5, 3, 1)$, $w_2(A, B, C) = (3, 5, 1)$). Winning coalitions are given by $W_A = W_B = W_C = \{I\} = \{\{1, 2\}\}$ (in other words, there is a unanimity voting rule in all states $A, B, C$). Then Assumptions 1 and 2(a,b) are satisfied, while Assumption 3 is violated (both $A$ and $B$ are preferred to $C$, but neither $A \succ_C B$ nor $B \succ_C A$).

One can easily see that in this case there exist two mappings, $\phi_1$ and $\phi_2$, which satisfy Axioms 1–3. Let $\phi_1(A) = \phi_1(C) = A$ and $\phi_1(B) = B$. Let $\phi_2(A) = A$ and $\phi_2(B) = \phi_2(C) = B$. 

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Mappings \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) differ in only that the first one maps state \( C \) to state \( A \), and the second one maps state \( C \) to state \( A \). It is straightforward to verify that \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) satisfy Axioms 1–3, and also that no other mapping satisfies these Axioms. Note that the sets of stable states under these two mappings satisfy \( D_{\phi_1} = \{A, B\} = D_{\phi_2} \), as they should according to Theorem 1.

Proof of Lemma 1

(Part 1) Let \( b \) be such that \( B = \{j \in I : -\infty < j \leq b\} \in \mathcal{W}_s \) and \( \{j \in I : -\infty < j < b\} \notin \mathcal{W}_s \). Intuitively, such \( B \) is the “leftmost” winning coalition. Similarly, let \( a \) be such that \( A = \{j \in I : a \leq j < \infty\} \in \mathcal{W}_s \) and \( \{j \in I : a < j < \infty\} \notin \mathcal{W}_s \), so that \( A \) is the “rightmost” winning coalition. Assumption 1 implies that \( Z = A \cap B \neq \emptyset \). Since all quasi-median voters must be both in \( A \) and \( B \), we also have \( M_s \subset Z \). Next, we show that \( Z \subset M_s \) is also true. To obtain a contradiction, assume the opposite. Then for some “connected” coalition \( X = \{j \in I : x \leq j \leq y\} \in \mathcal{W}_s \) the inclusion \( Z \subset X \) does not hold. Then, evidently, either the lowest or the highest quasi-median voter is not in \( X \). Suppose, without loss of generality, the latter is the case. Since \( X \) is winning, coalition \( Y = \{j \in I : -\infty < j \leq y\} \) (where \( y \) is the highest player in \( X \)) is winning, and therefore \( Z \subset Y \). But this implies that the highest quasi-median voter is neither in \( X \) nor in \( Y \), which is impossible and thus yields a contradiction. This proves that \( M_s = Z \neq \emptyset \).

(Part 2) Consider the case \( x \geq y \) (the case \( x < y \) is treated similarly). Suppose \( x \succ_z y \). Then \( \{i \in I : w_i(x) > w_i(y)\} \in \mathcal{W}_z \) (is winning in \( z \)). But by SC, this coalition is connected, and therefore includes all players from \( M_z \). Conversely, suppose that \( w_i(x) > w_i(y) \) for all \( i \in M_z \). Now SC implies that the same inequality holds for player \( j \) whenever \( j \geq i \in M_z \). Part 1 of the Lemma implies that \( \{j \in I : \exists i \in M_z \text{ such that } j \geq i\} \in \mathcal{W}_z \). This establishes that \( w_i(x) > w_i(y) \) for all \( i \in M_z \) implies \( x \succ_z y \), and completes the proof for this case. The proof of the results for the \( \succ \) relation is analogous.

(Part 3) By part 1 of this Lemma, the set \( M_s \) is nonempty for each \( s \in S \). Let

\[
m_s = \max_{x \in S : x \leq s} \min_{m \in M_x} m. \tag{B1}
\]

Evidently, if \( x < y \), then \( m_x \leq m_y \). Moreover, \( m_s \in M_s \). To prove this last statement, assume the opposite; then \( m_s = \min_{m \in M_s} m \) for some \( x < s \). Since we assumed \( m_s \notin M_s \), then either \( m_s \in M_x \) is less than all elements in \( M_s \) or greater than all elements in \( M_s \). In the first case,
\( m_s < \min_{m \in M_s} m_i \), which violates the definition of \( m_s \) in (B1). In the second case, we find that \( M_s \) lies to the left of \( M_x \), violating the monotonic median voter property. This contradiction proves that \( m_s \in M_s \) for all \( s \in S \). Since the sequence (B1) is increasing, part 3 follows. ■

**Transaction Cost and Discount Factor**

In the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A, the two conditions that the discount factor \( \beta \) has to satisfy are given by (A3) and (A4). Recall that in footnote 17, we defined \( \bar{\varepsilon} = \max_{i \in I, x \in S} |w_i(x) - \tilde{w}_i| \). Suppose that \( \bar{\varepsilon} \) increases, which means that at least for one individual \( i \), payoff during transition, \( \tilde{w}_i \), decreases. This makes both (A3) and (A4) harder to satisfy for a given \( \beta \), but both conditions hold for some higher \( \beta \). Consequently, for any \( \bar{\varepsilon} \) there exists \( \beta_0 < 1 \) such that for \( \beta > \beta_0 \), Theorem 2 holds. This also implies that for any \( \bar{\varepsilon} > 0 \), as \( \beta \to 1 \), discounted payoffs are independent of transaction costs (i.e., do not depend on \( \bar{\varepsilon} \)).

**Additional Applications**

We now illustrate how the characterization results provided in Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied in a number of political economy environments considered in the literature. We show that in some of these environments we can simply appeal to Theorem 4. Nevertheless, we will also see that the conditions in Theorem 4 are more restrictive than those stipulated in Theorems 1 and 2. Thus, when Theorem 4 does not apply, Theorems 1 and 2 may still be applied directly.

**Voting in Clubs**

Following Roberts (1999), suppose that there are \( N \) states of the form \( s_k = \{1, \ldots, k\} \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq N \). Roberts (1999) imposes the following strict increasing differences condition:

\[
\text{for all } l > k \text{ and } j > i, \quad w_j(s_l) - w_j(s_k) > w_i(s_l) - w_i(s_k), \tag{B2}
\]

and considers two voting rules: majority voting within a club (where in club \( s_k \) one needs more than \( k/2 \) votes for a change in club size) or median voter rule (where the agreement of individual \( (k + 1)/2 \) if \( k \) is odd or \( k/2 \) and \( k/2 + 1 \) if \( k \) is even are needed). These two voting rules lead to corresponding equilibrium notions, which Roberts calls Markov Voting Equilibrium and Median Voter Equilibrium, respectively. He establishes the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria with both notions and shows that they both lead to the same set of stable clubs.
It is straightforward to verify that the environment introduced in Roberts (1999) is a special case of our environment, and his two voting rules are special cases of the general voting rules allowed in our framework. In particular, let us first weaken Roberts’s strict increasing differences property to single-crossing, in particular, let us assume that

\[
\text{for all } l > k \text{ and } j > i, \quad w_i(s_l) > w_i(s_k) \iff w_j(s_l) > w_j(s_k), \quad \text{and (B3)} \\
w_j(s_k) > w_j(s_l) \iff w_i(s_k) > w_i(s_l).
\]

Clearly, (B2) implies (B3) (but not vice versa). In addition, Roberts’s two voting rules can be represented by the following sets of winning coalitions:

\[
W_{maj}^{sk} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : |X \cap s_k| > k/2\}, \quad \text{and} \\
W_{med}^{sk} = \begin{cases} 
\{X \in \mathcal{C} : (k+1)/2 \in X\} & \text{if } k \text{ is odd;} \\
\{X \in \mathcal{C} : \{k/2, k/2 + 1\} \subseteq X\} & \text{if } k \text{ is even.}
\end{cases}
\]

Clearly, both \(\{W_{maj}^{sk}\}_{k=1}^N\) and \(\{W_{med}^{sk}\}_{k=1}^N\) satisfy Assumption 1 as well as the monotonic median voter property in Definition 5. Let us also assume that Assumption 6 holds. In this case, this can be guaranteed by assuming that \(w_i(s) \neq w_i(s')\) for any \(i \in \mathcal{I}\) and any \(s, s' \in \mathcal{S}\) (though a weaker condition would also be sufficient). Then, it is clear that Theorem 4 from the previous section applies to Roberts’s model and establishes the existence of a pure-strategy MPE and characterizes the structure of stable clubs. It is important, however, to emphasize that while our model nests Roberts’ environment as a special case, the characterization of MPE is obtained here, unlike Roberts’s paper, only under the assumption of transaction costs and a sufficiently large discount factor.

It can also be verified that Theorem 4 applies with considerably more general voting rules (e.g., with different degrees of supermajority rule in each club). The following set of winning coalitions nests various majority and supermajority rules: for each \(k\), let the degree of supermajority in club \(s_k\) be \(l_k\) where \(k/2 < l_k \leq k\) and define the set a winning coalitions as:

\[
W_{sk}^{lk} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : |X \cap s_k| \geq l\}
\]

Then, a relatively straightforward application of Theorem 4 establishes the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** In the voting in clubs model, with winning coalitions given by either \(W_{maj}^{sk}\), \(W_{med}^{sk}\), or \(W_{sk}^{lk}\), where \(k/2 < l_k \leq k\) for all \(k\), the following results hold.
(i) The monotonic median voters property in Definition 5 is satisfied.

(ii) Suppose that preferences satisfy (B3) and Assumption 6. Then Assumptions 2(a,b) hold and thus the characterization of MPE and stable states in Theorems 1 and 2 applies.

(iii) Moreover, if only odd-sized clubs are allowed, then in the case of majority or median voter rules Assumption 3 also holds and thus the dynamically stable state (club) is uniquely determined (up to payoff-equivalence) as a function of the initial state (club).

Proof. (Part 1) Take \( m_{sk} = (k + 1)/2 \) if \( k \) is odd and \( m_s = k/2 \) if \( k \) is even. Evidently, for any of the rules \( \mathcal{W}_s^{maj} \), \( \mathcal{W}_s^{med} \), or \( \mathcal{W}_s^{l_k} \) where \( k/2 < l_k \leq k \) for all \( k \), \( m_{sk} \) is a quasi-median voter and, moreover, the sequence \( \{m_{sk}\}_{k=1}^N \) is monotonically increasing.

(Part 2) In all cases \( \mathcal{W}_s^{maj} \), \( \mathcal{W}_s^{med} \), or \( \mathcal{W}_s^{l_k} \) where \( k/2 < l_k \leq k \), Assumption 1 trivially holds. From part 1 it follows that Theorem 4 (part 1) is applicable, so Assumption 2(a,b) holds.

(Part 3) In an odd-sized club \( s_k \), median voter is a single person \( (k + 1)/2 \), and in the case of majority voting, we have \( s_l \succ s_k \) if and only if \( w_{(k+1)/2} (s_l) > w_{(k+1)/2} (s_k) \) because of the single-crossing condition. In either case, if \( s_l \) and \( s_j \) are two different clubs, player \( (k + 1)/2 \) is not indifferent between them by Assumption 6. This implies that either \( s_l \succ s_k \) or \( s_j \succ s_k \) for any \( s_j \) and \( s_l \), which completes the proof.

This proposition shows that a sharp characterization of dynamics of clubs and the set of stable clubs can be obtained easily by applying Theorem 4 to Roberts’s original model or to various generalizations. Another generalization, not stated in Proposition 4, is to allow for a richer set of clubs. For example, the feasible set of clubs can also be taken to be of the form of \( \{k-n, \ldots, k, \ldots, k+n\} \cap I \) for a fixed \( n \) (and different values of \( k \)). It is also noteworthy that the approach in Roberts’s paper is considerably more difficult and restrictive (though Roberts also establishes the existence of mixed-strategy MPE for any \( \beta \)). Therefore, this application illustrates the usefulness of the general characterization results presented in this paper.

Inefficient Inertia and Lack of Reform

We now provide a more detailed example capturing the main trade-offs discussed as motivation in the Introduction. Consider a society consisting of \( N \) individuals and a set of finite states \( S \). We start with \( s_0 = a \) corresponding to absolutist monarchy, where individual \( E \) holds power. More formally, \( \mathcal{W}_a = \{ X \in C : E \in X \} \). Suppose that for all \( x \in S \setminus \{a\} \), we have that \( I \setminus \{E\} \in \mathcal{W}_x \), that is, all players except \( E \) together form a winning coalition. Moreover, there exists a state,
"democracy," \(d \in \mathcal{S}\) such that \(\phi(x) = d\) for all \(x \in \mathcal{S} \setminus \{a\}\). In other words, starting with any regime other that absolutist monarchy, we will eventually end up with democracy. Suppose also that there exists \(y \in \mathcal{S}\) such that \(w_i(y) > w_i(a)\), meaning that all individuals are better off in state \(y\) than in absolutist monarchy, \(a\). In fact, the gap between the payoffs in state \(y\) and those in \(a\) could be arbitrarily large. It is then straightforward to verify that Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied in this game.

To understand economic interactions in the most straightforward manner, consider the extensive-form game described in Section 4. It is then clear that for \(\beta\) sufficiently large, \(E\) will not accept any reforms away from \(a\), since these will lead to state \(d\) and thus \(\phi(a) = a\).

This example illustrates the potential (and potentially large) inefficiencies that can arise in games of dynamic collective decision-making and emphasizes that commitment problems are at the heart of these inefficiencies. If the society could collectively commit to stay in some state \(y \neq d\), then these inefficiencies could be partially avoided. And yet such a commitment is not possible, since once state \(y\) is reached, \(E\) can no longer block the transition to \(d\).

We can take this line of argument even further. Suppose again that the initial state is \(s_0 = a\), where \(\mathcal{W}_a = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : E \in X\}\). To start with, suppose that there is only one other agent, \(P\), representing the poor, and two other states, \(d_1\), democracy with limited redistribution, and \(d_2\), democracy with extensive redistribution. Suppose \(\mathcal{W}_{d_1} = \mathcal{W}_{d_2} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : P \in X\}\) and

\[
w_E(d_2) < w_E(a) < w_E(d_1) \quad \text{and} \quad w_P(a) < w_P(d_1) < w_P(d_2),
\]

so that \(P\) prefers "extensive" redistribution. Given the fact that \(\mathcal{W}_{d_1} = \mathcal{W}_{d_2} = \{\{P\}, \{E, P\}\}\), once democracy is established, the poor can implement extensive redistribution. Anticipating this, \(E\) will resist democratization.

Now consider an additional social group, \(M\), representing the middle class, and suppose that the middle class is sufficiently numerous so that \(\mathcal{W}_{d_1} = \mathcal{W}_{d_2} = \{\{M, P\}, \{E, M, P\}\}\). The middle class is also opposed to extensive redistribution, so \(w_M(a) < w_M(d_2) < w_M(d_1)\). This implies that once state \(d_1\) emerges, there no longer exists a winning coalition to force extensive redistribution. Now anticipating this, \(E\) will be happy to establish democracy (extend the franchise). Thus, this example illustrates how the presence of an additional powerful player, such as the middle class, can have a moderating effect on political conflict and enable institutional reform that might otherwise be impossible (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a, for examples in which the middle class may have played such a role in the process of democratization).
Coalition Formation in Nondemocracies

As mentioned above, Theorems 1 and 2 can be directly applied in situations where the set of states does not admit a (linear) order. We now illustrate one such example using a modification of the game of dynamic coalition formation in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008).

Suppose that each state determines the ruling coalition in a society and thus the set of states \( S \) coincides with the set of coalitions \( C \). Members of the ruling coalition determine the composition of the ruling coalition in the next period. A transition to any coalition in \( C \) is allowed, which highlights that the set of states does not admit a complete order (one could define a partial order over states, though this is not particular useful for the analysis here).\(^{26}\)

Each agent \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) is assigned a positive number \( \gamma_i \), which we interpret as “political influence” or “political power.” For any coalition \( X \in C \), let \( \gamma_X = \sum_{j \in X} \gamma_j \). Suppose also that payoffs are given by

\[
  w_i(X) = \begin{cases} 
    \gamma_i/\gamma_X & \text{if } i \in X \\
    0 & \text{if } i \notin X
  \end{cases} \tag{B4}
\]

for any \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) and any \( X \in C \equiv S \).\(^{27}\) The restriction to (B4) here is just for simplicity. Also, take any \( \alpha \in [1/2, 1) \) as a measure of the extent of supermajority requirement. Define the set of winning coalitions as

\[
  \mathcal{W}_X = \left\{ Y \in C : \sum_{j \in Y \cap X} \gamma_j > \alpha \sum_{j \in X} \gamma_j \right\}. \tag{B5}
\]

Clearly, this corresponds to weighted \( \alpha \)-majority voting among members of the incumbent coalition \( X \) (with \( \alpha = 1/2 \) corresponding to simple majority). In addition, suppose that the following simple genericity assumption holds:

\[
  \gamma_X = \gamma_Y \text{ only if } X = Y. \tag{B6}
\]

The following proposition can now be established.

\(^{26}\) In Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008), not all transitions are allowed. In particular, the focus is on a game of “eliminations” from ruling coalitions in nondemocracies, so that once a particular individual is eliminated, he can no longer be part of future ruling coalitions (either because he is “killed,” permanently exiled, or is permanently excluded from politics by other means). In Appendix B, we allow for restrictions on feasible transitions and show how Proposition 5 can be generalized to cover the case of political eliminations considered in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008).

\(^{27}\) This is a special case of the payoff structure in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008), where we allowed for any payoff function satisfying the following three properties: (1) if \( i \in X \) and \( i \notin Y \), then \( w_i(X) > w_i(Y) \); (2) if \( i \in X \) and \( i \notin Y \), then \( w_i(X) > w_i(Y) \) if and only if \( \gamma_i/\gamma_X > \gamma_i/\gamma_Y \); and (3) \( i \notin X \) and \( i \notin Y \), then \( w_i(X) = w_i(Y) \). The form in (B4) is adopted to simplify the discussion here.
Proposition 5  Consider the environment in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). Then there exists an arbitrarily small perturbation of payoffs such that Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), and 3 are satisfied. Then Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 apply and characterize the stable states.

Proof. Let us perturb players’ payoffs so that if \( i \notin X \), then \( w_i (X) = \varepsilon \gamma_X \) where \( \varepsilon > 0 \) is small. Assumption 1 immediately follows from (B5) and that \( \alpha \geq 1/2 \). To prove that Assumption 2(a) holds, it suffices to notice that \( Y \succ_X X \) is impossible if \( \gamma_Y > \gamma_X \), so any cycle would break at the least powerful coalition in it (which is unique because of genericity). Similarly, to prove that Assumption 2(b) holds, notice that if a \( \succeq \)-cycle exists, it is by genericity a \( \succ \)-cycle. But if \( Y \succ_X X \) and \( Z \succ_X X \), then \( \gamma_Y > \gamma_Z \) implies \( Z \succ_X Y \), and thus \( Y \not\succ_X Z \): indeed, all players in \( Z \) prefer \( Z \) to \( Y \), and they form a winning coalition in \( X \), for if they did not, \( Z \succ_X X \) would be impossible. Again, this means that any cycle would break at the least powerful coalition in it. Now, take \( Y \succ_X X \) and \( Z \not\succ_X X \). This implies \( \alpha \gamma_X < \gamma_Y < \gamma_X \) and either \( \gamma_Z < \alpha \gamma_X \) or \( \gamma_Z > \gamma_X \). If \( \gamma_Z < \alpha \gamma_X \), all players who are not in \( Z \) prefer \( Y \) to \( Z \): this is obviously true for the part that belongs to \( Y \), while if a player is neither in \( Y \) nor in \( Z \), this is true because of the perturbation we made, for in this case \( \gamma_Y > \alpha \gamma_X \geq \gamma_Z \). Since players in \( Z \) do not form a winning coalition in this case, we have \( Z \not\succ_X Y \). Consider the second case where \( \gamma_Z > \gamma_X \); then all players in \( Y \) prefer \( Y \) to \( Z \), since \( \gamma_Y < \gamma_Z \). This means that \( Y \succ_X Z \) and thus \( Z \not\succ_X Y \).

One can similarly show that Assumption 3 holds: if \( Y \succ_X X \) and \( Z \succ_X X \), then, by genericity, \( X \sim Y \) implies \( \gamma_Y \neq \gamma_Z \). Without loss of generality, \( \gamma_Y > \gamma_Z \), and in this case \( Z \succ_X Y \). This completes the proof.

The Structure of Elite Clubs

In this subsection, we briefly discuss another example of dynamic club formation, which allows a simple explicit characterization. Suppose there are \( N \) individuals \( 1, 2, \ldots, N \) and \( N \) states \( s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_N \), where \( s_k = \{1, 2, \ldots, k\} \). Preferences are such that for any \( n_0 = n_1 < j \leq n_2 < n_3 \),

\[
  w_k (s_{n_0}) = w_k (s_{n_1}) < w_k (s_{n_3}) < w_k (s_{n_2}) .
\]  

(B7)

These preferences imply that each player \( k \) wants to be part of the club, but conditional on being in the club, he prefers to be in a smaller (more “elite”) one. In addition, a player is indifferent between two clubs he is not part of. Suppose that decisions are made by a simple majority rule of the club members, so that winning coalitions are given by

\[
  \mathcal{W}_{s_k} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : |X \cap s_k| > k/2\} .
\]  

(B8)
It is straightforward to verify that this environment satisfies Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), and 3. Hence, we can use Theorems 1 and 2 to characterize the set of stable states and the unique outcome mapping. First, notice that state $s_1$ is stable. This club only includes player 1, who is thus the dictator, and who likes this state best, and thus by Axiom 1 we must have $\phi(s_1) = s_1$. In state $s_2$, a consensus of players 1 and 2 is needed for a change. But $s_2$ is the best state for player 2, so $\phi(s_2) = s_2$. In state $s_3$, the situation is different: state $s_2$ is stable and is preferred to $s_3$ by both 1 and 2 (and is the only such state), so $\phi(s_3) = s_2$. Proceeding inductively, we can show that club $s_j$ is stable if and only if $j = 2^n$ for $n \in \mathbb{Z}_+$, and the unique mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3 is

$$\phi(s_k) = s_{2^{\lfloor \log_2 k \rfloor}},$$

where $\lfloor x \rfloor$ denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to $x \in \mathbb{R}$. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.

**Proposition 6** In the elite club example considered above with preferences given by (B7) and set of winning coalitions given by (B8), the following results hold.

1. Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), and 3 hold.

2. If, instead of (B7), for $n_0 < n_1 < k \leq n_2 < n_3$ we have $w_k(s_{n_0}) < w_k(s_{n_1}) < w_k(s_{n_2}) < w_k(s_{n_3})$, then single-crossing condition is satisfied (and monotonic median voter property is always satisfied in this example).

3. Club $s_k$ is stable if and only if $k = 2^n$ for $n \in \mathbb{Z}_+$.

4. The unique mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3 is given by (B9).

**Proof. (Part 1)** Assumption 1 holds in each club $s_k$, because the voting rule is simple majority. To show that Assumption 2(a) holds, we notice that it is impossible to have $s_l \succ s_k s_k$ for $l > k$, because all members of $s_k$ prefer $s_k$ to $s_l$. Therefore, any cycle that we hypothesize to exist will break at its smallest club. To show that Assumption 2(b) holds, take any club $s = s_k$. The set of clubs $\{s_l\}$ that satisfy $s_l \succeq s_k s_k$ is the set of clubs that satisfy $k/2 < l < k$. Hence, for any

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28 Alternatively, one could consider a slight variation where a player who does not belong to either of any two clubs prefers the larger of the two. In this case, Theorem 4 can also be applied. In particular, with this variation, the single-crossing condition is satisfied (if $w_i(s_y) > w_i(s_x)$ for $y > x$ and $j > i$, then $i \notin x$ and thus, $j \notin x$, and $w_j(s_y) > w_j(s_x)$); conversely, $w_i(s_{y}) < w_i(s_{x})$ means $j \in s_y$, thus $i \in s_y$, and therefore $w_i(s_y) < w_i(s_x))$. The monotonic median voter condition holds as well (one can choose quasi-median voter in state $s_j$ to be $[(j + 1)/2] \in M_{s_j}$; this sequence is weakly increasing in $j$).
clubs $s_l$, $s_m$ with $l < m$ that satisfy $s_l \succeq_{s_k} s_k$ and $s_m \succeq_{s_k} s_k$ we have $s_l \succ_{s_k} s_m$: indeed, players $i \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ which form a simple majority will prefer $s_l$ to $s_m$, as they are included in both clubs, but prefer the smaller one. Therefore, $s_m \not\succeq_{s_k} s_l$ is impossible for $l < m$. Let us now take $s_l \succ_{s_k} s_k$ and $s_m \not\succeq_{s_k} s_k$. This means $k/2 < l \leq k$, and either $m \leq k/2$ or $m \geq k$. If $m \leq k/2$, then the set of members of club $s_k$ who prefer $s_m$ to $s_l$ is $\{1, \ldots, m\}$: those who belong to $s_l$ but not to $s_m$ prefer $s_l$, while those who do not belong to either of $s_m$ and $s_l$ are indifferent. So, players only players in $s_m$ may strictly prefer $s_m$ to $s_l$. But they do not constitute at least half of the club in $s_k$, so $s_m \not\succ_{s_k} s_l$. Consider the second case, $m \geq k$. But then all players in $s_l$ (i.e., a majority) will prefer $s_l$ to $s_m$, and therefore $s_m \not\succ_{s_k} s_l$. We have proved that Assumption 3 holds.

Finally, to show that Assumption 3 holds, take $s = s_k$, $s_l$ and $s_m$ such that $s_l \succ_{s_k} s_k$, $s_m \succ_{s_k} s_k$, and $s_l \sim s_m$. Without loss of generality assume $l < m$. But then $s_l \succ_{s_k} s_m$, since all players from $s_l$ prefer $s_l$, and they form a majority in $s_k$. This proves that Assumption 3 holds.

**(Part 2)** Monotonic median voter property holds, since we can take $m_{s_k}$ to be player $k/2$ if $k$ is even and $(k+1)/2$ is odd; clearly, $\{m_{s_k}\}_{k=1}^N$ is an increasing sequence of quasi-median voters. To show that the single-crossing condition holds, take $i, j \in I$ such that $i < j$ and $s_k, s_l \in \mathcal{S}$ with $k < l$. Suppose $w_i(s_l) > w_i(s_k)$. This is possible if $i \in s_l$ but $i \not\in s_k$ or $i \not\in s_k, s_l$. In either case, $i \not\in s_k$, and therefore $j \not\in s_k$. But then $w_j(s_l) > w_j(s_k)$. Suppose now that $w_j(s_l) < w_j(s_k)$; this means that $j \in s_k, s_l$. But then $i \in s_k, s_l$, and therefore $w_i(s_l) < w_i(s_k)$. This establishes that the single-crossing condition holds.

**(Part 3)** Notice that it is never possible that $s_l \succ_{s_k} s_k$ if $k < l$. We can therefore start with smaller clubs. Club $s_1$ is stable and $1 = 2^0$. Suppose we proved the statement for $j < k$ and now consider club $s_k$. If $\log_2 k \notin \mathbb{Z}$, then club $s_j$ for $j = 2^{|\log_2 k|}$ is stable and contains more than half members of $s_k$. Hence, $s_k$ is unstable. Conversely, if $\log_2 k \in \mathbb{Z}$, then the only clubs we know to be stable do not contain more than $k/2$ members, so $s_k$ is stable. This proves the induction step.

**(Part 4)** If $\log_2 k \in \mathbb{Z}$, then $2^{|\log_2 k|} = k$, and the statement follows from part 3. If $\log_2 k \notin \mathbb{Z}$, then $s_{2^{|\log_2 k|}}$ is the only club which is preferred to $s_k$ by a majority (other stable clubs are either larger than $s_k$ or at least twice as small as $s_{2^{|\log_2 k|}}$, i.e., more than two times smaller than $s_k$). The result follows. ■

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Stable Voting Rules and Constitutions

Another interesting model that can be analyzed using Theorem 4 is Barbera and Jackson’s (2004) model of self-stable constitutions. In addition, our analysis shows how more farsighted decision-makers can be easily incorporated into Barbera and Jackson’s model.

Motivated by Barbera and Jackson’s model, let us introduce a somewhat more general framework. The society takes the form of $\mathcal{I} = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ and each state now directly corresponds to a “constitution” represented by a pair $(a, b)$, where $a$ and $b$ are integers between 1 and $N$. The utility from being in state $(a, b)$ is fully determined by $a$, so that each player $i$ receives utility

$$w_i[(a, b)] = w_i(a). \quad (B10)$$

In contrast, the set of winning coalitions needed to change the state is determined by $b \in \mathbb{Z}_+$:

$$\mathcal{W}_{(a,b)} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : |X| \geq b\} \quad (B11)$$

(so $b$ may be interpreted as the degree of supermajority).

In Barbera and Jackson’s model, individuals differ according to the probability with which they will support a proposal for a specific reform away from the status quo. The parameter $a$ determines the (super)majority necessary for implementing the reform. The parameter $b$, on the other hand, is the (super)majority necessary (before individual preferences are realized) for changing the voting rule $a$. Expected utility is calculated before these preferences are realized and defines $w_i[(a, b)]$. Ranking individuals according to the probability with which they will support the reform, Barbera and Jackson show that individual preferences satisfy (strict) single-crossing and are (weakly) single-peaked.

For our analysis here, let us consider any situation in which preferences and winning coalitions satisfy (B10) and (B11). It turns out to be convenient to reorder all pairs $(a, b)$ on the real line as follows: if $(a, b)$ and $(a', b')$ satisfy $a < a'$, then $(a, b)$ is located on the left of $(a', b')$, and we write $(a, b) < (a', b')$; the ordering of states with the same $a$ is unimportant. Suppose that $w_i(a)$, and thus $w_i[(a, b)]$, satisfies the single-crossing condition in Definition 3. This enables us to apply Theorem 4 to any problem that can be cast in these terms, including the original Barbera and Jackson model.

Let us next follow Barbera and Jackson in distinguishing between two cases. In the case of constitutions, any combination $(a, b)$ is allowed, while in the case of voting rules, only the subset of states where $a = b$ is considered (then $a = b$ is the voting rule); in both cases it is natural
to assume \( b > N/2 \). Barbera and Jackson call a voting rule or a constitution \((a, b)\) self-stable if there is no alternative voting rule \((a', b')\) with \( a' = b' \) (or, respectively, constitution \((a', b')\)) such that \((a', b')\) is preferred to \((a, b)\) by at least \( b \) players. The following proposition states the relation between self-stable constitutions and dynamically stable sets.

**Proposition 7** Consider the above-described environment and assume that preferences satisfy single-crossing condition and Assumption 6 holds. Then:

1. Assumptions 1, 2(a,b) are satisfied.

2. There exist mappings \( \phi_v \) for the case of voting rules \((a = b)\) and \( \phi_c \) for the case of constitutions that satisfy Axioms 1–3.

3. The set of self-stable constitutions coincides with the set of dynamically stable states.

**Proof. (Part 1)** Assumption 1 follows from \( b > N/2 \). Therefore, Theorem 4 applies and Assumption 2(a,b) are satisfied.

(Part 2) By part 1, Theorem 1 is applicable. The result immediately follows.

(Part 3) By definition, a constitution \((a, b)\) is self-stable if \( |i \in I : w_i(a') > w_i(a)| < b \) for all feasible \( a' \). But this is equivalent to \((a', b') \not\succ_{(a,b)} (a, b)\) for all \((a, b)\). By (5) we obtain that \( \phi_c[(a, b)] = (a, b)\), i.e., \((a, b)\) is \( \phi_c \)-stable. Hence, a self-stable constitution is a dynamically stable state.

Vice versa, take any dynamically stable state \((a, b)\). Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \((a, b)\) is not a self-stable constitution; let us prove that then \( \phi_c[(a, b)] \neq (a, b)\). Consider the set of constitutions \( Q = \{(a', b')\} \) such that \((a', b') \succ_{(a,b)} (a, b)\); since \((a, b)\) is not self-stable, this set is nonempty. Note that if \((a', b') \in Q\), then \((a', N) \in Q\) (because the second part of the pair of rules does not enter the utility directly). Now take some player \( i \) and \((a', b') \in Q\) that is most preferred by \( i \) among the states within \( Q \) (or one of such states if there are several of these). Consider state \((a', N) \in Q\). First, since it lies in \( Q\), \((a', N) \succ_{(a,b)} (a, b)\). Second, this state is \( \phi_c \)-stable: indeed, if it were not the case, we would have some other \((a'', b'') \succ_{(a',N)} (a', N)\). This means that each player prefers \((a'', b'')\) to \((a', N)\), which of course implies that at least \( a \) players prefer \((a'', b'')\) to \((a, b)\), so \((a'', b'') \in Q\). But there is player \( i \) who at least weakly prefers \((a', b')\) (and therefore \((a', N)\), which is the same as far as immediate payoffs are concerned) to any other element in \( Q \). This means that such \((a'', b'')\) does not exist, and state \((a', N)\) is stable. Axiom
3 then implies that $\phi_c(a, b)$ cannot equal $(a, b)$, since state $(a', N)$ is $\phi_c$-stable and is preferred to $(a, b)$. This completes the proof.

**Coalition Formation in Democracy**

We next briefly discuss how similar issues arise in the context of coalition formation in democracies, for example, in coalition formation in legislative bargaining.\(^{29}\)

Suppose that there are three parties in the parliament, 1, 2, 3, and any two of them would be sufficient to form a government. Suppose that party 1 has more seats than party 2, which in turn has more seats than party 3. The initial state is $\emptyset$, and all coalitions are possible states. Since any two parties are sufficient to form a government, we have $W_\emptyset = W_s = \{(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (1, 2, 3)\}$ for all $s$. First, suppose that all governments are equally strong and a party with a greater share of seats in the parliament will be more influential in the coalition government. Consequently, $w_3(\emptyset) < w_3((1, 2)) < w_3((1, 2, 3)) < w_3((1, 3)) < w_3((2, 3))$; other payoffs are defined similarly. In this case, it can be verified that $\phi(\emptyset) = \{2, 3\}$: indeed, neither party 2 nor party 3 wishes to form a coalition with party 1, because party 1’s influence in the coalition government would be too strong. The equilibrium in this example then coincides with the minimum winning coalition.

However, as emphasized in the Introduction, the dynamics of coalition formation does not necessarily lead to minimum winning coalitions. To illustrate this, suppose that governments that have a greater number of seats in the parliament are stronger, so that $w_2(\emptyset) < w_2((1, 3)) < w_2((1, 2, 3)) < w_2((2, 3))$. That is, party 2 receives a higher payoff even though it is a junior partner in the coalition $(1, 2)$, because this coalition is sufficiently powerful. We might then expect that $(1, 2)$ may indeed arise as the equilibrium coalition, that is, $\phi(\emptyset) = \{1, 2\}$. Nevertheless, whether this will be the case depends on the continuation game after coalition $(1, 2)$ is formed. Suppose, for example, that after the coalition $(1, 2)$ forms, party 1, by virtue of its greater number of seats, can sideline party 2 and rule by itself. Let us introduced the shorthand symbol “$\rightarrow$” to denote such a feasible transition, so that we have $(1, 2) \rightarrow \{1\}$ (which naturally presumes that $W_{(1, 2)} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : 1 \in X\}$). Similarly, starting from the coalition $(2, 3)$, party 2 can also do the same, so that $W_{(2, 3)} = \{X \in \mathcal{C} : 2 \in X\}$ and $(2, 3) \rightarrow \{2\}$. However, it is

\(^{29}\)See, for example, Baron and Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron (1991), Jackson and Moselle (2002), and Norman (2002) for models of legislative bargaining. The recent paper by Diermeier and Fong (2008) that studies legislative bargaining as a dynamic game without commitment also raises a range of issues related to our general framework here.
also reasonable to suppose that once party 2 starts ruling by itself, then party 1 can regain power by virtue of its greater seat share, that is, $W_{[2]} = \{ C \in C : 1 \in C \}$ and thus $\{ 2 \} \rightarrow \{ 1 \}$. In this case, the analysis in this paper immediately shows that $\phi(\emptyset) = \{ 2, 3 \}$, that is, the coalition $\{ 2, 3 \}$ emerges as the dynamically stable state.

What makes $\{ 2, 3 \}$ dynamically stable in this case is the fact that $\{ 2 \}$ is not dynamically stable itself. This example therefore reiterates, in the context of coalition formation in democracies, the insight that the instability of states that can be reached from a state $s$ contributes to the stability of state $s$.

**Concessions in Civil War**

Let us briefly consider an application of the ideas in this paper to the analysis of civil wars. This example can also be used to illustrate how similar issues arise in the context of international wars (see, e.g., Fearon, 1996, 2004, Powell, 1998). Suppose that a government, $G$, is engaged in a civil war with a rebel group, $R$. The civil war state is denoted by $c$. The government can initiate peace and transition to state $p$, so that $W_c = \{ C \in C : G \in C \}$. However, using the shorthand “$\rightarrow$” introduced in subsection 7, we now have $p \rightarrow r$, where $r$ denotes a state in which the rebel group becomes strong and sufficiently influential in domestic politics. Moreover, $W_p = \{ X \in C : R \in X \}$, and naturally, $w_R(r) > w_R(p)$. If $w_G(r) < w_G(c)$, there will be no peace and $\phi(c) = c$ despite the fact that we may also have $w_G(p) > w_G(c)$. The reasoning for why civil war may continue in this case is similar to that for inefficient inertia discussed above.

As an interesting modification, suppose next that the rebel group $R$ can first disarm partially, in particular, $c \rightarrow d$, where $d$ denotes the state of partial disarmament. Moreover, $d \rightarrow dp$, where the state $dp$ involves peace with the rebels that have partially disarmed. Suppose that $W_{dp} = \{ \{ G, R \} \}$, meaning that once they have partially disarmed, the rebels can no longer become dominant in domestic politics. In this case, provided that $w_G(dp) > w_G(d)$, we have $\phi(c) = dp$. Therefore, the ability of the rebel group to make a concession changes the set of dynamically stable states. This example therefore shows how the role of concessions can also be introduced into this framework in a natural way.

**Taxation and Public Good Provision**

In many applications preferences are defined over economic allocations, which are themselves determined endogenously as a function of political rules. Our main results can also be applied
in such environments. Here we illustrate this by providing an example of taxation and public good provision. Suppose there are \( N \) individuals \( 1, 2, \ldots, N \) and \( N \) states \( s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_N \), where \( s_k = \{1, 2, \ldots, k\} \). We assume that decisions on transitions are made by an absolute majority rule of individuals who are enfranchised, so that winning coalitions take the form

\[
W_{s_k} = \{X \in C : |X \cap s_k| > k/2\}.
\]

We also assume that the payoff of individual \( i \) is given by

\[
w_i(s_j) = \mathbb{E} \left[ (1 - \tau_{s_j}) A_i + G_{s_j} \right],
\]

where \( A_i \) is individual \( i \)'s productivity (we assume \( A_i > A_j \) for \( i < j \), so that lower-ranked individuals are more productive), \( \mathbb{E} \) denotes the expectations operator, and \( \tau_{s_j} \) is the tax rate determined when the voting franchises \( s_j \). When an odd number of individuals are allowed to vote, the tax rate is determined by the median. When there is an even number of voters, each of two median voters gets to set the tax rate with equal probability. The expectations in (B12) is included because of the uncertainty of the identity of the median voter in this case. Finally, \( G_{s_j} = h \left( \sum_{l=1}^{k} \tau_{s_j} A_l \right) \) is the public good provided through taxation, where \( h \) is an increasing concave function.

For the single-crossing property, we require that for any \( i < j \in \mathcal{I} \) and for any \( s_l, s_{l+1} \in \mathcal{S} \),

\[
w_j(s_{l+1}) > w_j(s_l) \Rightarrow w_i(s_{l+1}) > w_i(s_l) \quad \text{and} \quad w_i(s_{l+1}) < w_i(s_l) \Rightarrow w_j(s_{l+1}) < w_j(s_l).
\]

Denoting the equilibrium taxes in states \( s_l \) and \( s_{l+1} \) by \( \tau_{s_{l+1}} \) and \( \tau_{s_l} \), the following condition is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure this:

\[
\mathbb{E} \left( 1 - \tau_{s_{l+1}} \right) A_j - \mathbb{E} \left( 1 - \tau_{s_l} \right) A_j > \mathbb{E} \left( 1 - \tau_{s_{l+1}} \right) A_i - \mathbb{E} \left( 1 - \tau_{s_l} \right) A_i,
\]

since the equilibrium levels of public goods, \( G_{s_l} \) and \( G_{s_{l+1}} \), cancel out from both sides. Therefore,

\[
\mathbb{E} \tau_{s_{l+1}} > \mathbb{E} \tau_{s_l}
\]

is sufficient for single-crossing. Note that individual \( i \), when determining the tax rate in \( s_l \), would maximize \( (1 - \tau) A_i + h \left( \tau \sum_{m=1}^{l} A_m \right) \). This implies that individual \( i \) would choose \( \tau_i \) such that

\[
A_i = h' \left( \tau_i \sum_{m=1}^{l} A_m \right) \sum_{m=1}^{l} A_m.
\]
From the concavity of $h$ it follows that for $i < j$, $\tau_i > \tau_j$. Now consider a switch from $s_i$ to $s_{i+1}$. Then, with probability 1/2, the tax is set by the same individual (then the tax rate is the same in $s_{i+1}$ as in $s_i$), and with probability 1/2, by a less productive individual (then the tax rate is greater in $s_{i+1}$ than in $s_i$). Therefore, (B13) holds and we can apply Theorem 4 to characterize the dynamically stable states in this society. More interestingly, these results can also be extended to situations where public goods [taxes] are made available differentially to [imposed on] those who have voting rights (club members).

The Relationship Between $\mathcal{D}$, von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set, and Chwe’s Largest Consistent Set

The following definitions are from Chwe (1994) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).

**Definition 8 (Consistent Sets)** For any $x, y \in S$ and any $X \in \mathcal{C}$, define relation $\rightarrow_X$ by $x \rightarrow_X y$ if and only if either $x = y$ or $x \neq y$ and $X \in \mathcal{W}_x$.

**Definition 9**

1. We say that state $x$ is **directly dominated** by $y$ (and write $x < y$) if there exists $X \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $x \rightarrow_X y$ and $x \prec_X y$, where we write $x \prec_X y$ as a shorthand for $w_i(x) < w_i(y)$ for all $i \in X$.

2. We say that state $x$ is **indirectly dominated** by $y$ (and write $x \preceq y$) if there exist $x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_m \in S$ such that $x_0 = x$ and $x_m = y$ and $X_0, X_1, \ldots, X_{m-1} \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $x_j \rightarrow_{s_j} x_{j+1}$ and $x_j \prec_{s_j} y$ for $j = 0, 1, \ldots, m - 1$.

3. A set $S \subseteq S$ is called **consistent** if $x \in S$ if and only if $\forall y \in S, \forall X \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $x \rightarrow_X y$ there exists $z \in S$, where $y = z$ or $y \preceq z$, such that $x \not\prec_X z$.

**Definition 10 (von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Stable Set)** A set of states $X \subset S$ is **von Neumann-Morgenstern stable** if it satisfies the following properties:

1. **(Internal stability)** For any $x, y \in X$ we have $y \not\prec_X x$;

2. **(External stability)** For any $x \in S \setminus X$ there exists $y \in X$ such that $y \succ_X x$.

**Proposition 8** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:

1. The set of stable states $\mathcal{D}$ is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set;
2. $\mathcal{D}$ is the largest consistent set;

3. Any consistent set is either $\mathcal{D}$ or any subset of the set of exogenously stable states (and vice versa, all such sets are consistent).

**Proof.** We take the sequence of states $\{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|}\}$ satisfying (A1). Suppose that set of states $\mathcal{X}$ is von Neumann-Morgenstern stable; let us prove that $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{D}$. Clearly, $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{X}$, since $\mu_k \not\succ_i \mu_1$ for any state $\mu_k$. Now suppose that we have proved that $\mathcal{X} \cap \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{k-1}\} = \mathcal{D} \cap \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{k-1}\}$ for some $k \geq 2$; let us prove that $\mu_k \in \mathcal{X}$ if and only if $\mu_k \in \mathcal{D}$. From Theorem 1 it follows that it suffices to prove that $\mu_k \in \mathcal{X}$ if and only if $\mathcal{M}_k = \emptyset$. Suppose first that $\mathcal{M}_k \neq \emptyset$; then, since $\mathcal{M}_k = \mathcal{X} \cap \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{k-1}\}$ by construction, we have that $\mu_l \succeq_k \mu_k$ for some $l < k$ such that $\mu_l \in \mathcal{X}$. Hence, if $\mu_k \in \mathcal{X}$, then internal stability property would be violated, and therefore $\mu_k \notin \mathcal{X}$. Now consider the case where $\mathcal{M}_k = \emptyset$. This means that $\mathcal{X} \cap \{\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{k-1}\} = \emptyset$, and therefore there does not exist $\mu_l \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $l < k$ and $\mu_l \succeq_k \mu_k$. But by (A1), $\mu_l \not\succ_k \mu_k$ whenever $l > k$. Hence, for any $\mu_l \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $l \neq k$ we have $\mu_l \not\succ_k \mu_k$, and therefore $\mu_k \in \mathcal{X}$, for otherwise external stability condition would be violated. This proves the induction step, and therefore completes the proof that $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{D}$.

**(Part 2)** It is obvious that for any $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$, $x < y$ implies $x \ll y$. In our setup, however, the opposite is also true, so $x < y$ if and only if $x \ll y$. To see this, suppose that $x \ll y$; take a sequence of states and a sequence of coalitions as in Definition 8. Let $k \geq 0$ be lowest number such that $x_{k+1} \neq x$. This means that $x \rightarrow_{X_k} x_{k+1}$ (because $x_k = x$) and $\forall \iota \in X_k : w_x(\iota) < w_y(\iota)$. By definition, $x < y$; note also that $X_k \in \mathcal{W}_x$, since $x \neq x_{k+1}$.

To show that set $\mathcal{D}$ is consistent, consider some mapping $\phi$ that satisfies Axioms 1–3. Take any $x \in \mathcal{D}$, and then take any $y \in \mathcal{S}$ and any $X \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $x \rightarrow_X y$. Let $z = \phi(y)$; then, as follows from Axiom 1, either $z = y$ or $y \ll z$. Now consider two possibilities: $x = y$ and $x \neq y$. In the first case, $x = y \in \mathcal{D}$, so $z = y = x$. Since $X$ is nonempty, property $\exists \iota \in X : w_x(\iota) \geq w_z(\iota)$ is satisfied. Now suppose that $x \neq y$; then $X \in \mathcal{W}_x$. On the other hand, $z \in \mathcal{D}$. But it is impossible that $z \succeq_x x$, since both $x$ and $z$ are stable (otherwise, Axiom 1 would be violated for mapping $\phi$), hence, in this case, $\exists \iota \in X : w_x(\iota) \geq w_z(\iota)$, too.

Now take some $x \notin \mathcal{D}$. We need to show that there exist $y \in \mathcal{S}$ and $X \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $x \rightarrow_X y$ and for any $z \in \mathcal{D}$ which satisfies that either $z = y$ or $y \ll z$, we necessarily have $\forall \iota \in X : w_x(\iota) < w_z(\iota)$. Take $y = \phi(x)$ and $X = \{\iota \in \mathcal{T} : w_x(\iota) < w_y(\iota)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x$; then $x \rightarrow_X y$. Note that it is impossible that for some $z \in \mathcal{D}$ we have $y \ll z$, for then $y < z$, and therefore
\( z \succ_{y} y \), which would violate Axiom 1. Therefore, any \( z \in \mathcal{D} \) such that either \( z = y \) or \( y \ll z \) must satisfy \( z = y \). But then, by our choice of \( X \), we have \( \forall i \in X : w_i (x) < w_i (z) \). This proves that \( \mathcal{D} \) is indeed a consistent set.

To show that \( \mathcal{D} \) is the largest consistent set, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the largest consistent set is \( S \neq \mathcal{D} \). Since \( \mathcal{D} \) is consistent, we must have \( \mathcal{D} \subset S \). Consider sequence \( \{ \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{|S|} \} \) satisfying (A1), and among all states in \( S \setminus \mathcal{D} \neq \emptyset \) pick state \( x = \mu_k \in S \setminus \mathcal{D} \) with the smallest number, i.e., such that if \( \mu_l \in S \setminus \mathcal{D} \), then \( l \geq k \). We now show that, according to the definition of a consistent set, \( x \notin S \), which would contradict the assertion that state \( S \) is consistent. Take some mapping \( \phi \) that satisfies Axioms 1–3. Now let \( y = \phi (x) \in \mathcal{D} \) and \( X = \{ i \in I : w_i (x) < w_i (y) \} \in \mathcal{W}_x \); then \( x \rightarrow_X y \) and, since \( x \notin \mathcal{D} \), \( y \neq x \), which by (A1) implies that \( y = \mu_l \) for \( l < k \). Now if for some \( z \in S \) we have \( y \ll z \), then \( y < z \), and hence \( z \succ_{y} y \), which implies \( z = \mu_j \) for some \( j < l < k \). But then \( z \notin S \setminus \mathcal{D} \), and therefore \( z \in \mathcal{D} \). However, it is impossible that \( y, z \in \mathcal{D} \) and \( z \succ_{y} y \), as this would violate Axiom 1. Therefore, if for some \( z \in S \) either \( z = y \) or \( y \ll z \), then in fact \( z = y \). But for such \( z \), we do have \( \forall i \in X : w_i (x) < w_i (z) \), by construction of \( X \). We get a contradiction, since by definition of a consistent set \( x \notin S \), while we picked \( x \in S \setminus \mathcal{D} \). This proves that \( \mathcal{D} \) is the largest consistent set.

(Part 3) By part 2, if \( S \) is a consistent set, then \( S \subset \mathcal{D} \). Suppose that \( S \neq \mathcal{D} \), but \( S \) includes a state which is not exogenously stable. Suppose \( x \in S \) is not exogenously stable and \( y \in \mathcal{D} \setminus S \); then \( x \rightarrow_X y \) for some \( X \in \mathcal{W}_x \). Since \( x \in S \), there exists \( z \in S \) where either \( z = y \) or \( y \ll z \), such that \( \exists i \in X : w_i (x) \geq w_i (z) \). But \( y \in \mathcal{D} \setminus S \), and hence \( y \ll z \), which implies, as before, \( y < z \) and \( z \succ_{y} y \). However, this is impossible, since \( y, z \in \mathcal{D} \). This contradiction proves that if \( S \neq \mathcal{D} \), \( S \) may not include any state which is not exogenously stable.

Consider, however, any \( S \) which consists of exogenously stable states only. Take any \( x \in S \). If \( y \in S \) and \( X \in \mathcal{C} \) are such that \( x \rightarrow_X y \), then \( x = y \). In that case, we can take \( z = y \in S \) and find that condition \( \exists i \in X : w_i (x) \geq w_i (z) \) trivially holds. Now take any \( x \notin S \). Consider two possibilities. If state \( x \) is exogenously stable, then take \( X = I \) and \( y = x \); then \( x \rightarrow_X y \). If for some \( z \in S \) we had \( y \ll z \), then, in particular, \( y \rightarrow_Y z \) for some \( Y \in \mathcal{C} \), which is incompatible with \( z \neq y \); at the same time, \( z = y \) is impossible, as \( z \in S \) and \( y = x \notin S \). This means that for this \( y \) there does not exist \( z \in S \) such that either \( z = y \) or \( y \ll z \), and therefore \( x = y \) should not be in \( S \). Finally, suppose that \( x \) is not exogenously stable. Again, consider mapping \( \phi \) satisfying Axioms 1–3 and take \( y = \phi (x) \) and \( X = \{ i \in I : w_i (x) < w_i (y) \} \in \mathcal{W}_x \); then \( x \rightarrow_X y \). By the same reasoning as before, if for some \( z \in S \) either \( z = y \) or \( y \ll z \), then \( z = y \), because
$y \ll z$ would imply $z \succ_y y$ for $y, z \in \mathcal{D}$. But for such $z$, we have $\forall i \in X : w_i(x) < w_i(z)$ by construction of $X$. This proves that $S$ is indeed a consistent set, which completes the proof. ■

**Additional References**


