**An Elementary Theory of Global Supply Chains**

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An Elementary Theory of Global Supply Chains
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ABSTRACT

This paper develops an elementary theory of global supply chains. We consider a world economy with an arbitrary number of countries, one factor of production, a continuum of intermediate goods, and one final good. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize in later stages of production. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations. Using this simple theoretical framework, we offer a first look at how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations.

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“One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.” Adam Smith (1776)

1 Introduction

Most production processes consist of a large number of sequential stages. In this regard the production of pins in late eighteenth century England is no different from today’s production of tee-shirts, cars, computers, or semiconductors. Today, however, production processes increasingly involve global supply chains spanning multiple countries, with each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence, a phenomenon which Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) refer to as vertical specialization.

This worldwide phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention among policy makers, business leaders, and trade economists alike. On the academic side of this debate, a large literature has emerged to investigate how the possibility to fragment production processes across borders may affect the volume, pattern, and consequences of international trade; see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Yi (2003), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In this paper, we propose to take a first look at a distinct, but equally important question: Conditional on production processes being fragmented across borders, how does technological change, either global or local, affect different countries participating in the same supply chain? In other words, how does vertical specialization shape the interdependence of nations?

From a theoretical standpoint, this is not an easy question. General equilibrium models with an arbitrary number of goods and countries—with or without sequential production—rarely provide sharp and intuitive comparative static predictions.1 In order to make progress, we therefore start by proposing a simple theory of trade with sequential production. We consider a world economy with multiple countries, one factor of production (labor), and one final good. Production is sequential and subject to mistakes, as in Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993). Production of the final good requires a continuum of intermediate stages. At each of these stages, production of one unit of an intermediate good requires one unit of labor and one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage. Mistakes occur along the supply chain at a constant Poisson rate, which is an exogenous technological characteristic.

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1Ethier (1984) offers a review of theoretical results in high-dimensional trade models.
of a country. When a mistake occurs at some stage, the intermediate good is entirely lost. By these stark assumptions, we aim to capture the more general idea that because of less skilled workers, worse infrastructure, or inferior contractual enforcement, both costly defects and delays in production are more likely in some countries than in others.

Section 3 describes the properties of the free trade equilibrium in our basic environment. Although our model allows for any finite number of countries and a continuum of stages, the unique free trade equilibrium is fully characterized by a simple system of first-order nonlinear difference equations. This system can be solved recursively by first determining the assignment of countries to different stages of production and then computing the wages and export prices sustaining that allocation as an equilibrium outcome. In our model, the free trade equilibrium always exhibits vertical specialization: countries with a lower probability of making mistakes, at all stages, specialize in later stages of production, where mistakes are more costly. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.

Using this simple model, the rest of our paper offers a comprehensive exploration of how technological change, either global or local, affects different countries participating in the same global supply chain. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of global technological change. We investigate how an increase in the length of production processes, which we refer to as an increase in “complexity,” and a uniform decrease in failure rates worldwide, which we refer to as “standardization,” may affect the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution. Building solely on the idea that labor markets must clear both before and after a given technological change, we demonstrate that although both an increase in complexity and standardization lead all countries to “move up” the supply chain, they have opposite effects on inequality between nations. While an increase in complexity increases inequality around the world, standardization benefits poor countries disproportionately more. According to our model, standardization may even lead to a welfare loss in the most technologically advanced country, a strong form of immiserizing growth.

Section 5 focuses on how local technological change may spill over, through terms-of-trade effects, to other countries participating in the same supply chain. We consider two forms of local technological change: (i) labor-augmenting technical progress, which is isomorphic to population growth; and (ii) a decrease in a country’s failure rate, which we refer to as “routinization.” In a world with sequential production, we show that local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom, depending on the nature of technological changes, all countries either move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in inequality between nations. At the top of the chain, by contrast, local technological progress always leads all countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological
change, inequality between nations may either fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top.

Section 6 demonstrates how more realistic features of global supply chains may easily be incorporated into our simple theoretical framework. Our first extension introduces “coordination costs” across countries. Among other things, we demonstrate that a decrease in coordination costs may lead to “overshooting”: more stages of production may be off-shored to a small country at intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly free trade. Our second extension allows for the existence of multiple parts, each produced sequentially and then assembled, with equal productivity in each country, into a unique final good using labor. In this environment, we show that the poorest countries tend to specialize in assembly, while the richest countries tend to specialize in the later stages of the most complex parts. Our final extension allows for heterogeneity in failure rates across different stages. In this generalized version of our model, we provide sufficient conditions under which our cross-sectional predictions remain unchanged.

Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from the literature on hierarchies in closed-economy (and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Important contributions include Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), Sobel (1992), Kremer (1993), Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). As in Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993), we focus on an environment in which production is sequential and subject to mistakes, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy setup. Models of hierarchies have been applied to the study of international trade issues before, but with very different goals in mind. For instance, Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) use the knowledge economy model developed by Garicano (2000) to study the matching of agents with heterogeneous abilities across borders and its consequences for within-country inequality. Instead, countries are populated by homogeneous workers in our model.²

In terms of techniques, our paper is also related to a growing literature using assignment or matching models in an international context; see, for example, Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), Yeaple (2005), Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007), Blanchard and Willmann (2010), Nocke and Yeaple (2008), Costinot (2009), and Costinot and Vogel (2010). Here, like in some of our earlier work, we exploit the fact that the assignment of countries to stages of production exhibits positive assortative matching—i.e., more productive countries are assigned to later stages of production—in order to generate strong and intuitive comparative static predictions in an environment with a large number of goods and countries.

In terms of focus, our paper is motivated by the recent literature documenting the impor-

²Other examples of trade papers using hierarchy models to study within-country inequality include Kremer and Maskin (2006), Sly (2010), Monte (2010), and Sampson (2010).
tance of vertical specialization in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds on the influential work of Hummels, Rappoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005). Our focus on how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations is also related to the work of Kose and Yi (2001, 2006), Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008), and Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009) who study how production sharing affects the transmission of shocks at business cycle frequency.

On the theoretical side, the literature on fragmentation is large and diverse; see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) for a recent overview. Among existing papers, our theoretical framework is most closely related to Dixit and Grossman (1982), Sanyal (1983), Yi (2003, 2010), Harms, Lorz, and Urban (2009), and Baldwin and Venables (2010) who also develop trade models with sequential production. None of these papers, however, investigate how technological change, either global or local, may differentially impact countries located at different stages of the same supply chain. This is the main focus of our analysis.

2 Basic Environment

We consider a world economy with multiple countries, indexed by $c \in C \equiv \{1, ..., C\}$, one factor of production, labor, and one final good. Labor is inelastically supplied and immobile across countries. $L_c$ and $w_c$ denote the endowment of labor and wage in country $c$, respectively. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. To produce the final good, a continuum of stages $s \in S \equiv (0, S]$ must be performed. At each stage, producing one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage and one unit of labor. For expositional purposes, we assume that “intermediate good 0” is in infinite supply and has zero price.3 “Intermediate good $S$” corresponds to the unique final good mentioned before.

Mistakes occur along the supply chain at a constant Poisson rate, $\lambda_c > 0$, which is an exogenous technological characteristic of a country. It measures total factor productivity (TFP) at any given stage of the production process. When a mistake occurs on a unit of intermediate good at some stage, that intermediate good is entirely lost. Formally, if a firm from country $c$ combines $q(s)$ units of intermediate good $s$ with $q(s)ds$ units of labor, its output of intermediate good $s + ds$ is given by

$$q(s + ds) = (1 - \lambda_c ds) q(s).$$

3Alternatively, one could assume that “intermediate good 0” can be produced using labor only. In this situation, the price of “intermediate good 0” would also be zero since only a measure zero of workers would be required to perform this measure-zero set of stages. Assuming that “intermediate good 0” is in infinite supply allows us to avoid discussions of which country should produce this good. Such considerations are irrelevant for any of our results.
Note that letting $q'(s) \equiv [q(s + ds) - q(s)] / ds$, Equation (1) can be written as $q'(s)/q(s) = -\lambda_c$. In other words, moving along the supply chain in country $c$, potential units of the final good get destroyed at a constant rate, $\lambda_c$.

For technical reasons, we further assume that if a firm produces intermediate good $s + ds$, then it necessarily produces a positive measure of intermediate goods around that stage.\footnote{Formally, for any intermediate good $s + ds$, we assume the existence of $s_2 \geq s + ds > s_1$ such that if $q(s + ds) > 0$, then $q(s') > 0$ for all $s' \in (s_1, s_2]$.} This implies that each unit of the final good is produced by a finite, though possibly arbitrarily large number of firms. Countries are ordered such that $\lambda_c$ is strictly decreasing in $c$. Thus countries with a higher index $c$ have higher total factor productivity. All markets are perfectly competitive and all goods are freely traded. $p(s)$ denotes the world price of intermediate good $s$. We use the final good as our numeraire, $p(S) = 1$.

### 3 Free Trade Equilibrium

#### 3.1 Definition

In a free trade equilibrium, all firms maximize their profits taking world prices as given and all markets clear. Profit maximization requires that for all $c \in C$,

$$
\begin{align*}
    p(s + ds) &\leq (1 + \lambda_c ds) p(s) + w_c ds, \\
    p(s + ds) & = (1 + \lambda_c ds) p(s) + w_c ds, \text{ if } Q_c(s') > 0 \text{ for all } s' \in (s, s + ds],
\end{align*}
$$

where $Q_c(s')$ denotes total output at stage $s'$ in country $c$. Condition (2) states that the price of intermediate good $s + ds$ must be weakly less than its unit cost of production, with equality if intermediate good $s + ds$ is actually produced by a firm from country $c$. To see this, note that the production of one unit of intermediate good $s + ds$ requires $1/(1 - \lambda_c ds)$ units of intermediate good $s$ as well as labor for all intermediate stages in $(s, s + ds]$. Thus the unit cost of production of intermediate good $s + ds$ is given by $[p(s) + w_c ds] / (1 - \lambda_c ds)$. Since $ds$ is infinitesimal, this is equal to $(1 + \lambda_c ds)p(s) + w_c ds$.

Good and labor market clearing further require that

$$
\begin{align*}
    \sum_{c=1}^C Q_c(s_2) - \sum_{c=1}^C Q_c(s_1) &= -\int_{s_1}^{s_2} \sum_{c=1}^C \lambda_c Q_c(s) \, ds, \text{ for all } s_1 \leq s_2, \quad (3) \\
    \int_0^S Q_c(s) \, ds &= L_c, \text{ for all } c \in C, \quad (4)
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (3) states that the change in the world supply of intermediate goods between stages $s_1$ and $s_2$ must be equal to the amount of intermediate goods lost due to mistakes in
all countries between these two stages. Equation (4) states that the total amount of labor used across all stages must be equal to the total supply of labor in country \( c \). In the rest of this paper, we formally define a free trade equilibrium as follows.

**Definition 1** A free trade equilibrium corresponds to output levels \( Q_c(\cdot) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \) for all \( c \in \mathcal{C} \), wages \( w_c \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) for all \( c \in \mathcal{C} \), and intermediate good prices \( p(\cdot) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \) such that conditions (2)-(4) hold.

### 3.2 Existence and Uniqueness

We first characterize the pattern of international specialization in any free trade equilibrium.

**Lemma 1** In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages \( S_0 \equiv 0 < S_1 < \ldots < S_C = S \) such that for all \( s \in S \) and \( c \in \mathcal{C} \), \( Q_c(s) > 0 \) if and only if \( s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c] \).

According to Lemma 1, there is vertical specialization in any free trade equilibrium with more productive countries producing and exporting at later stages of production. The formal proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in the appendix.\(^5\) The intuition behind Lemma 1 can be understood in two ways. One possibility is to look at Lemma 1 through the lens of the hierarchy literature; see e.g. Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Garicano (2000). Since countries that are producing at later stages can leverage their productivity on larger amounts of inputs, efficiency requires countries to be more productive at the top. Another possibility is to note that since new intermediate goods require both intermediate goods produced in previous stages and labor, prices must be increasing along the supply chain. Thus intermediate goods produced at later stages are less labor intensive, which makes them relatively cheaper to produce in countries with higher wages. In our model these are the countries with higher TFP at all stages. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.\(^6\)

We refer to the vector \((S_1, \ldots, S_C)\) as the “pattern of vertical specialization” and denote by \( Q_c \equiv Q_c(S_c) \) the total amount of intermediate good \( S_c \) produced and exported by country

\(^5\)A result similar to Lemma 1 in an environment with a discrete number of stages can also be found in Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993).

\(^6\)In his early work on fragmentation, Jones (1980) pointed out that if some factors of production are internationally mobile, then absolute advantage may affect the pattern of international specialization. The basic idea is that if physical capital is perfectly mobile and one country has an absolute advantage in producing capital services, then it will specialize in capital intensive goods. The logic of our results is very different and intimately related to the sequential nature of production. Mathematically, a simple way to understand why sequential production processes make absolute productivity differences a source of comparative advantage is to consider the cumulative amount of labor necessary to produce all stages from 0 to \( s \leq S \) for a potential unit of the final good. By equation (1), this is equal to \( e^{\lambda c s} \) which is log-supermodular in \((\lambda, s)\). This is the exact same form of complementarity that determines the pattern of international specialization in standard Ricardian models; see Costinot (2009).
c. Using the previous notation, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels can be jointly characterized as follows.

**Lemma 2** In any free trade equilibrium, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels satisfy the following system of first-order non-linear difference equations:

\[
S_c = S_{c-1} - \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_c} \right) \ln \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_c L_c}{Q_{c-1}} \right), \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C},
\]
\[
Q_c = e^{-\lambda_c(S_c - S_{c-1})} Q_{c-1}, \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C},
\]

with boundary conditions \( S_0 = 0 \) and \( S_C = S \).

Lemma 2 derives from the goods and labor market clearing conditions (3) and (4). Equation (5) reflects the fact that the exogenous supply of labor in country \( c \) must equal the amount of labor demanded to perform all stages from \( S_{c-1} \) to \( S_c \). This amount of labor depends both on the rate of mistakes \( \lambda_c \) as well as the total amount \( Q_{c-1} \) of intermediate good \( S_{c-1} \) imported from country \( c - 1 \). Equation (6) reflects the fact that intermediate goods get lost at a constant rate at each stage when produced in country \( c \).

In the rest of this paper, we refer to the vector of wages \( (w_1, ..., w_C) \) as the “world income distribution” and to \( p_c \equiv p(S_c) \) as the price of country \( c \)’s exports (which is also the price of country \( c + 1 \)’s imports under free trade). Let \( N_c \equiv S_c - S_{c-1} \) denote the measure of stages performed by country \( c \) within the supply chain. In the next lemma, we show that the measures of stages being performed in all countries \( (N_1, ..., N_C) \) entirely summarize how changes in the pattern of vertical specialization affect the world income distribution.

**Lemma 3** In any free trade equilibrium, the world income distribution and export prices satisfy the following system of first-order linear difference equations:

\[
w_{c+1} = w_c + (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) p_c, \text{ for all } c < C,
\]
\[
p_c = e^{\lambda_c N_c} p_{c-1} + \left( e^{\lambda_c N_c} - 1 \right) \left( w_c / \lambda_c \right), \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C},
\]

with boundary conditions \( p_0 = 0 \) and \( p_C = 1 \).

Lemma 3 derives from the zero-profit condition (2). Equation (7) reflects the fact that for the “cutoff” good, \( S_c \), the unit cost of production in country \( c \), \( (1 + \lambda_c ds) p_c + w_c ds \), must be equal to the unit cost of production in country \( c + 1 \), \( (1 + \lambda_{c+1} ds) p_c + w_{c+1} ds \). Equation (8) directly derives from the zero-profit condition (2) and the definition of \( N_c \) and \( p_c \). It illustrates the fact that the price of the last intermediate good produced by country \( c \) depends on the price of the intermediate good imported from country \( c - 1 \) as well as the total labor cost in country \( c \).
Combining Lemmas 1-3, we can establish the existence of a unique free trade equilibrium and characterize its main properties.

**Proposition 1** There exists a unique free trade equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels are given by equations (5) and (6), and the world income distribution and export prices are given by equations (7) and (8).

The proof of Proposition 1 formally proceeds in two steps. First, we use Lemma 2 to construct the unique pattern of vertical specialization and vector of export levels. In equations (5) and (6), we have one degree of freedom, $Q_0$, which corresponds to total input used at the initial stage of production. Since $S_C$ is decreasing in $Q_0$, it can be set to satisfy the final boundary condition $S_C = S$. Once $(S_1, ..., S_C)$ and $(Q_0, ..., Q_{C-1})$ have been determined, all other output levels can be computed using equation (1) and Lemma 1. Second, we use Lemma 3 together with the equilibrium measure of stages computed before, $(N_1, ..., N_C)$, to characterize the unique world income distribution and vector of export prices. In equations (7) and (8), we still have one degree of freedom, $w_1$. Given the monotonicity of $p_C$ in $w_1$, it can be used to satisfy the other final boundary condition, $p_C = 1$. Finally, once $(w_1, ..., w_C)$ and $(p_1, ..., p_C)$ have been determined, all other prices can be computed using the zero-profit condition (2) and Lemma 1.

### 3.3 Discussion

As a first step towards analyzing how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations, we have provided a full characterization of free trade equilibria in a simple trade model with sequential production. Before turning to our comparative static exercises, we briefly discuss the cross-sectional implications that have emerged from this characterization.

First, since rich countries specialize in later stages of production while poor countries specialize in earlier stages, our model implies that rich countries tend to trade relatively more with other rich countries (from whom they import their intermediates and to whom they export their output) while poor countries tend to trade relatively more with other poor countries, as documented by Hallak (2010). Second, since intermediate goods produced in later stages have higher prices and countries producing in these stages have higher wages, our model implies that rich countries both tend to import goods with higher unit values, as documented by Hallak (2006), and to export goods with higher unit values, as documented by Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), and Hallak and Schott (2010).

Following Linder (1961), the two previous stylized facts have traditionally been rationalized using non-homothetic preferences; see e.g. Markusen (1986), Flam and Helpman (1987), Bergstrand (1990), Stokey (1991), Murphy and Shleifer (1997) Matsuyama (2000),
Fieler (2010), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009). The common starting point of the previous papers is that rich countries’ preferences are skewed towards high quality goods, so they tend to import goods with higher unit values. Under the assumption that rich countries are also relatively better at producing high quality goods, these models can further explain why rich countries tend to export goods with higher unit values and why countries with similar levels of GDP per capita tend to trade more with each other.\footnote{In Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009), such predictions are obtained in the absence of any exogenous relative productivity differences. In their model, a higher relative demand for high-quality goods translates into a higher relative supply of these goods through a “home-market” effect.}

The complementary explanation offered by our elementary theory of global supply chains is based purely on supply considerations. According to our model, countries with similar per-capita incomes are more likely to trade with one another because they specialize in nearby regions of the same supply chain. Similarly, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita tend to have higher unit values of imports and exports because they specialize in higher stages in the supply chain, for which inputs and outputs are more costly. Note that our supply-side explanation also suggests new testable implications. Since our model only applies to sectors characterized by sequential production and vertical specialization, if our theoretical explanation is empirically relevant, one would therefore expect “Linder effects”—i.e. the extent of trade between countries with similar levels of GDP per capita—to be higher, all else equal, in sectors in which production processes are vertically fragmented across borders in practice.

The previous cross-sectional predictions, of course, should be interpreted with caution. Our theory is admittedly very stylized. In Section 6, we will discuss how the previous results may be affected (or not) by the introduction of more realistic features of global supply chains.

4 Global Technological Change

Many technological innovations, from the discovery of electricity to the internet, have impacted production processes worldwide. Our first series of comparative static exercises focuses on the impact of global technological changes on different countries participating in the same supply chain. Our goal is to investigate how an increase in the length of production processes, perhaps associated with the development of higher quality goods, as well as a uniform decrease in failure rates worldwide, perhaps due to the standardization of production processes, may affect the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution.
4.1 Definitions

It is useful to introduce first some formal definitions describing the changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution in which we will be interested.

**Definition 2** Let \((S'_0, ..., S'_C)\) denote the pattern of vertical specialization in a counterfactual free trade equilibrium. A country \(c \in C\) is moving up (resp. down) the supply chain relative to the initial free trade equilibrium if \(S'_c \geq S_c\) and \(S'_{c-1} \geq S_{c-1}\) (resp. \(S'_c \leq S_c\) and \(S'_{c-1} \leq S_{c-1}\)).

According to Definition 2, a country is moving up or down the supply chain if we can rank the set of stages that it performs in the initial and counterfactual free trade equilibria in terms of the strong set order. Among other things, this simple mathematical notion will allow us to formalize a major concern of policy makers and business leaders in developed countries, namely the fact that China and other developing countries are “moving up the value chain;” see e.g. OECD (2007).

**Definition 3** Let \((w'_1, ..., w'_c)\) denote the world income distribution in a counterfactual free trade equilibrium. Inequality is increasing (resp. decreasing) among a given group \(\{c_1, ..., c_n\}\) of adjacent countries if \(w'_{c+1}/w'_c \geq w_{c+1}/w_c\) (resp. \(w'_{c+1}/w'_c \leq w_{c+1}/w_c\)) for all \(c_1 \leq c \leq c_{n-1}\).

According to Definition 3, inequality is increasing (resp. decreasing) within a given group of adjacent countries, if for any pair of countries within that group, the relative wage of the richer country is increasing (resp. decreasing). Since wages correspond to GDP per capita in our model, this property offers a simple way to conceptualize changes in the world income distribution.

4.2 Increase in complexity

At the end of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith famously noted that making a pin was divided into about 18 distinct operations. Today, as mentioned by Levine (2010), making a Boeing 747 requires more than 6,000,000 parts, each of them requiring many more operations. In this section we analyze the consequences of an increase in the measure of stages \(S\) necessary to produce a final good, which we simply refer to as an “increase in complexity.”

Our approach, like in subsequent sections, proceeds in two steps. We characterize first the changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and second the associated changes in the world income distribution. Our first comparative static results can be stated as follows.

8For expositional purposes, we abstract from any utility gains that may be associated with the production of more complex goods in practice. Our analytical results on the pattern of vertical specialization and the inequality between nations do not depend on this simplification. But it should be clear that changes in real wages, which will necessarily decrease after an increase in complexity, crucially depend on it.
Proposition 2 An increase in complexity leads all countries to move up the supply chain and increases inequality between countries around the world.

The changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution associated with an increase in complexity are illustrated in Figure 1. The broad intuition behind changes in the pattern of vertical specialization is simple. An increase in complexity tends to decrease total output at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this decrease in output levels must be accompanied by an increase in the measure $N_c$ of stages performed in all countries. Proceeding by iteration from the bottom of the supply chain, we can then show that this change in $N_c$ can only occur if all countries move up.

The logic behind the changes in the world income distribution is more subtle. From Lemma 3, we know that relative wages satisfy

$$\frac{w_{c+1}}{w_c} = 1 + \frac{\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}}{(w_c/p_c)}, \text{ for all } c < C. \tag{9}$$

Thus, $w_{c+1}/w_c$ is decreasing in the labor intensity, $w_c/p_c$, of country $c$’s export. From the first part of Proposition 2, we also know that countries: (i) are performing more stages, which tends to increase export prices (for a given price of imported inputs); and (ii) are moving up into higher stages, which tend to have higher export prices (for a given schedule.
of prices). Both effects tend to raise the price of intermediate goods that are being traded, and in turn, to decrease their labor intensity. This explains why inequality between nations increases. This effect is reminiscent of the mechanism underlying terms-of-trade effects in a Ricardian model; see e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) and Krugman (1986).

From an economic standpoint, equation (9) captures the basic idea that the wage of country \( c + 1 \) should increase relative to the wage of country \( c \) if and only if \( c + 1 \) moves into sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. In our model, since country \( c + 1 \) has a higher wage, these are the sectors with lower labor intensities. In a standard Ricardian model, these would be the sectors in which country \( c + 1 \) is relatively more productive instead.

There is, however, one important difference between our model with sequential production and a standard Ricardian model. In our model, the pattern of comparative advantage depends on endogenous differences in labor intensity across stages. In a standard Ricardian model, the same pattern only depends on exogenous productivity differences. As we will see in Section 5.1, this subtle distinction may lead to very different predictions about the consequences of technological change on inequality between nations.\(^9\)

### 4.3 Standardization

In most industries, production processes become more standardized as goods mature over time. In order to study the potential implications of this particular type of technological change within our theoretical framework, we now consider a uniform decrease in failure rates from \( \lambda_c \) to \( \lambda'_c \equiv \beta \lambda_c \) for all \( c \in C \), with \( \beta < 1 \), which we simply refer to as “standardization.” The consequences of standardization on the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution can be described as follows.

**Proposition 3** Standardization leads all countries to move up the supply chain and decreases inequality between countries around the world.

The consequences of standardization are illustrated in Figure 2. For a given pattern of vertical specialization, standardization tends to raise total output—and, therefore, the demand for labor—at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this increase in output levels must be partially offset by a reduction of output at earlier stages of production. Hence, poor countries must increase the measure of stages that they perform, pushing all countries up the supply chain.

\(^9\)While the previous results emphasize the consequences of an increase in the complexity of production processes on inequality between nations, it is worth pointing out that Proposition 2 also provides microtheoretical foundations for a novel form of skill-biased technological change within nations. In a world with sequential production, our results demonstrate that the introduction of new stages of production tend to benefit skilled workers disproportionately more, even if new stages are not skill-biased per se.
Like in our first comparative static exercise, the logic behind the changes in the world income distribution is more subtle. The direct effect of standardization on relative wages is to decrease inequality: in the extreme case in which $\beta = 0$, having a lower rate of mistakes $\lambda_c$ does not provide any benefit. There is, however, an indirect, general equilibrium effect associated with changes in the pattern of vertical specialization. To establish that the direct effect necessarily dominates the indirect one, the basic idea behind our proof is to normalize the measures of stages performed and export prices by $\beta$. Under this normalization, standardization is equivalent to a reduction in complexity: because both tend to reduce output lost to mistakes, they both require countries to move down the (normalized) supply chain, which leads to a fall in inequality between countries.\footnote{Formally, while $N_c$ rises for poor countries and falls for rich countries, $\beta N_c$ falls for all countries. Hence, whereas all countries move up the chain, they move down the normalized chain. Under this normalization, countries: (i) are performing fewer stages, and (ii) are moving down into lower stages. Both effects tend to lower the normalized price $\bar{p}_c$ of intermediate goods that are being traded, and in turn, to increase their labor intensity. This explains why inequality between nations decreases.}

It is interesting to note that while standardization and an increase in complexity both cause all countries to move up the supply chain, they have opposite effects on inequality between nations.

The previous comparative static results are reminiscent of Vernon’s (1966) “product cycle hypothesis;” see also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Antràs (2005). In our model, as a particular production process becomes more standardized, less productive countries start performing a broader set of stages. As this happens, our analysis demonstrates that inequal-
ity between nations decreases around the world. Figure 2 also illustrates that although the direct effect of standardization is to increase output in all countries, welfare may fall in the most technologically advanced countries through a terms-of-trade deterioration. This is reminiscent of Bhagwati’s (1958) “immiserizing growth.” Two key differences, however, need to be highlighted. First, standardization proportionately increases TFP in all countries in the global supply chain, whereas Bhagwati’s (1958) immiserizing growth occurs in response to an outward shift in the production possibility frontier in one country. Second, standardization proportionately increases TFP at all stages of production, whereas Bhagwati’s (1958) immiserizing growth occurs in response to an outward shift in the export sector. In our model, it is the sequential nature of production that makes uniform TFP growth endogenously act as export-biased technological change in the more technologically advanced countries.  

5 Local Technological Change

Two of the major changes in today’s world economy are: (i) the increased fragmentation of the production process, which Baldwin (2006) refers to as the “Great Unbundling;” and (ii) the rise of China and other developing countries, such as India and Brazil. While both phenomena have been studied separately, we know very little about their interaction. The goal of this section is to use our elementary theory of global supply chains to shed light on this issue. To do so, our second series of comparative static exercises focuses on the impact of labor-augmenting technical progress and routinization in one country and describes how they “spill over” to other countries in the same supply chain through terms-of-trade effects.

5.1 Labor-augmenting technical progress

We first study the impact of labor-augmenting technical progress, which is isomorphic to an increase in the total endowment of labor, $L_{c_0}$, of a given country $c_0$. Following the same two-step logic as in Section 4, the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress can be described as follows.

**Proposition 4** Labor-augmenting technical progress in country $c_0$ leads all countries $c < c_0$ to move down the supply chain and all countries $c > c_0$ to move up. This decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{1, ..., c_0\}$, increases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_0, ..., c_1\}$, and decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_1, ..., C\}$, with $c_1 \in \{c_0 + 1, ..., C\}$.

11 Like in Bhagwati’s original paper, however, it should be clear that immiserizing growth arises in this environment because of strong complementarities between goods. In our model, producing one unit of intermediate good always requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage and one unit of labor. This explains why technological changes may have large (and adverse) terms-of-trade effects.
Figure 3: Consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress in country 3.

The spillover effects associated with labor-augmenting technical progress are illustrated in Figure 3. The broad intuition behind changing patterns of specialization is simple. An increase in the supply of labor (in efficiency units) in one country tends to raise total output at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this increase in output levels must be accompanied by a decrease in the measure of stages $N_c$ performed in each country $c \neq c_0$. Proceeding by iteration from the bottom and the top of the supply chain, we can then show that this change in $N_c$ can only occur if all countries below $c_0$ move down and all countries above $c_0$ move up. Finally, since the total measure of stages must remain constant, the measure of stages $N_{c_0}$ performed in country $c_0$ must increase.

Changes in the pattern of vertical specialization naturally translate into changes in the world income distribution. As in Section 4.2, countries at the bottom of the chain are moving down into lower stages and are performing fewer stages. Both effects tend to decrease inequality between nations at the bottom of the chain. The non-monotonic effects on inequality at the top of the chain reflect two conflicting forces. On the one hand, countries are moving up, which tends to increase the price of intermediate goods traded in that region of the supply chain, and in turn, to decrease their labor intensity. On the other hand, countries are performing fewer stages, which tends to reduce the price of their exports and increase
their labor intensity.\textsuperscript{12}

The previous non-monotonic effects stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of standard Ricardian models and illustrate nicely the importance of modeling the sequential nature of production for understanding the consequences of technological changes in developing and developed countries on their trading partners worldwide. To see this, consider a Ricardian model without sequential production in which there is a ladder of countries with poor countries at the bottom and rich countries at the top. Krugman (1986) is a well-known example. In such an environment, if foreign labor-augmenting technical progress leads the richest countries to move up, inequality among these countries necessarily increases. The reason is simple. On the one hand, the relative wage of two adjacent countries is equal to their relative productivity in the “cutoff” sector. On the other hand, richer countries are relatively more productive in sectors higher up the ladder (otherwise they would not be specializing in these sectors in equilibrium). By contrast, Proposition 4 predicts that as the richest countries move up, inequality may decrease at the very top of the chain. This counterintuitive result derives from the fact that the pattern of comparative advantage in a model with sequential production is not exogenously given, but depends instead on endogenous factor prices. This subtle distinction breaks the monotonic relationship between the pattern of international specialization and inequality between nations. Although later stages are necessarily less labor intensive in a given equilibrium, the labor intensity of later stages in the new equilibrium may be higher than the labor intensity of earlier stages in the initial equilibrium. At the top of the chain, poorer countries may therefore benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production.

\section*{5.2 Routinization}

We now turn our attention to the consequences of a decrease in the failure rate $\lambda_{c_0}$ of a given country $c_0$, which we refer to as “routinization.” For simplicity we restrict ourselves to a small change in $\lambda_{c_0}$, in the sense that it does not affect the ranking of countries in terms of failure rates. The consequences of routinization can be described as follows.

\textbf{Proposition 5} Routinization in country $c_0$ leads all countries move up the supply chain, increases inequality among countries $c \in \{1, \ldots, c_0\}$, decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_0, c_0 + 1\}$, increases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, c_1\}$, and decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_1, \ldots, C\}$, with $c_1 \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, C\}$.

The spillover effects associated with routinization are illustrated in Figure 4. According to Proposition 5, all countries move up the supply chain. In this respect, the consequences

\textsuperscript{12}Note that since $c_1 \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, C\}$, the third group of countries, $\{c_1, \ldots, C - 1\}$, is non-empty if $c_1 < C$, but empty if $c_1 = C$. We have encountered both cases in our simulations.
Figure 4: Consequences of routinization in country 3.

of routinization are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress at the top of the chain, but the exact opposite at the bottom.

To understand this result, consider first countries located at the top of the chain. Since total output of the final good must rise in response to a lower failure rate in country $c_0$, countries at the top of the chain must perform fewer stages for labor markets to clear. By a simple iterative argument, these countries must therefore move further up the supply chain, just like in Proposition 4. At the top of the chain, the consequences of routinization for inequality are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress. The non-monotonicity—with inequality rising among countries $c \in \{c_0 + 1, ..., c_1\}$ and decreasing among countries $c \in \{c_1, ..., C\}$—arises from the same two conflicting forces: countries move up the chain but produce fewer stages.

At the bottom of the chain, the broad intuition behind the opposite effects of labor-augmenting technical progress and routinization for changes in the pattern of specialization can be understood as follows. Holding the pattern of vertical specialization fixed, labor-augmenting technical progress in country $c_0$ increases the total labor supply of countries $c \geq c_0$, but leaves their labor demand unchanged. Thus labor market clearing requires countries at the bottom of the chain to reduce the number of stages they perform, to move down the chain, and to increase their output, thereby offsetting the excess labor supply at the top. By contrast, routinization in country $c_0$ increases the total labor demand of countries
\( c \geq c_0 \) (since country \( c_0 \) now produces more output at each stage), but leaves their labor supply unchanged. As a result, countries at the bottom of the chain now need to increase the number of stages they perform, to move up the chain, and to reduce their output in order to offset the excess labor demand at the top. The consequences for inequality follow from the same logic as in the previous section.\(^{13}\)

Our goal in this section was to take a first stab at exploring theoretically the relationship between vertical specialization and the recent emergence of developing countries like China. A key insight that emerges from our analysis is that because of sequential production, local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological changes, countries may move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of the chain, by contrast, local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within that region may fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top. In fact, as Figure 4 illustrates, the most technologically advanced countries may be the only ones losing as all countries move up around the world.

6 Extensions

Our elementary theory of global supply chains is special along several dimensions. First, all intermediate goods are freely traded. Second, production is purely sequential. Third, stages of production are identical in all dimensions except the order in which they are performed. In this section we demonstrate how more realistic features of global supply chains may be easily incorporated into our theoretical framework.

6.1 Coordination Costs

An important insight of the recent trade literature is that changes in trade costs affect the pattern and consequences of international trade not only by affecting final goods trade, but also by affecting the extent of production fragmentation across borders; see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Yi (2003), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). We now discuss how

\(^{13}\)The only difference is that in the middle of the chain, inequality decreases among countries \( c \in \{c_0, c_0 + 1\} \) because of the direct effect of a reduction in \( \lambda_{c_0} \), which tends to decrease inequality between \( c_0 \) and \( c_0 + 1 \), as seen in equation (9). This force was absent from our previous comparative static exercise since labor endowments (in efficiency units) did not directly affect zero profit conditions.
the introduction of trading frictions in our simple environment would affect the geographic structure of global supply chains, and in turn, the interdependence of nations.

A natural way to introduce trading frictions in our model is to assume that the likelihood of a defect in the final good is increasing in the number of times the intermediate goods used in its production have crossed a border. We refer to such costs, which are distinct from standard iceberg trade costs, as “coordination costs.” Formally, if the production of one unit of the final good in a given country involves \( n \) international transactions—i.e. export and import at stages \( 0 < s_1 \leq s_2 \leq ... \leq s_n < S \)—then the final good is worthless with probability \( 1 - \delta^n \in [0, 1] \). The case considered in Section 2 corresponds to \( \delta = 1 \). Like in Section 2, we assume that the final good is freely traded and use it as our numeraire. Finally, we assume that all international transactions are perfectly observable by all firms so that two units of the same intermediate good \( s \) may, in principle, command two different prices if their production requires a different number of international transactions. Accordingly, competitive equilibria remain Pareto optimal in the presence of coordination costs.

The analysis of this generalized version of our model is considerably simplified by the fact that, in spite of coordination costs, a weaker version of vertical specialization must still hold in any competitive equilibrium. Let \( C^u(s) \) denote the country in which stage \( s \) has been performed for the production of a given unit \( u \). Using the previous notation, the pattern of international specialization can be characterized as follows.

**Lemma 4** In any competitive equilibrium, the allocation of stages to countries, \( C^u : S \to C \), is increasing in \( s \) for all \( u \in [0, Q^w \equiv \sum_{c \in C} Q_c(S)] \).

According to Lemma 4, for any unit of the final good, production must still involve vertical specialization, with less productive countries specializing in earlier stages of production. This result is weaker, however, than the one derived in Section 2 in that it does not require \( C^u(\cdot) \) to be the same for all units. This should be intuitive. Consider the extreme case in which coordination costs are infinitely large. In this situation all countries will remain under autarky in a competitive equilibrium. Thus the same stages of production will be performed in different countries. In the presence of coordination costs, one can therefore only expect vertical specialization to hold within each supply chain, whether or not all chains are identical, which is what Lemma 4 establishes. Armed with Lemma 4, we can characterize competitive equilibria using the same approach as in Section 2. The only difference is that we now need to guess first the structure of the equilibrium (e.g. some units are produced entirely in country 1, whereas all other units are produced jointly in all countries) and then verify ex post that our guess is correct.

Figure 5 illustrates how the structure of competitive equilibria varies with the magnitude
of coordination costs in the two-country case.\textsuperscript{14} There are three distinct regions. For sufficiently high coordination costs, all stages are being performed in both countries and there is no trade. Conversely, for low enough coordination costs, the pattern of vertical specialization is the same as under free trade. In this region, reductions in coordination costs have no effect on the pattern of specialization, but raise wages in all countries. The most interesting case arises when coordination costs are in an intermediate range. In this region, the large country (country 2) is incompletely specialized, whereas the small country (country 1) is completely specialized in a subset of stages. As can easily be shown analytically, the set of stages that are being offshore to the small country is necessarily increasing in the level of coordination costs over that range. Hence starting from autarky and decreasing coordination costs, there will be “overshooting:” a broader set of stages will be performed in the poor country at intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly free trade. This pattern of overshooting does not arise from coordination failures, heterogeneity in trade costs, or the imperfect tradability of the final good, as discussed in Baldwin and Venables (2010). It simply reflects the fact that in a perfectly competitive model with sequential production and trading frictions, a sufficiently large set of stages must be performed in the small country for firms to find it profitable to fragment production across borders. Accordingly, the larger the coordination costs, the larger the set of stages being performed in the small country!

\textsuperscript{14}Details about the construction of these competitive equilibria are available upon request.
Figure 5 also illustrates that sequential production does not hinder the ability of smaller countries to benefit from international trade. On the contrary, smaller countries tend to benefit more from freer trade. In the above example, a decrease in coordination costs either only benefits the small country (for intermediate levels of coordination costs) or affects real wages in both countries in the same proportional manner (for low enough coordination costs). Finally, Figure 5 highlights that how many stages of the production process are being offshore to a poor country may be a very poor indicator of the interdependence of nations. Here, when the measure of stages being offshore is the largest, the rich country is completely insulated from (small) technological shocks in the poor country.

6.2 Simultaneous Production of Multiple Parts and Assembly

Most production processes are neither purely sequential, as assumed in Section 2, nor purely simultaneous, as assumed in most of the existing literature. Producing an aircraft, for example, requires multiple parts, e.g. an engine, seats, and windows. These parts are produced simultaneously before being assembled, but each of these parts requires a large number of sequential stages, e.g. extraction of raw materials, refining, and manufacturing.\footnote{Manufacturing itself, of course, requires a large number of sequential stages.}

With this in mind, we turn to a generalization of our original model in which there are multiple supply chains, indexed by \( n \in \mathcal{N} \equiv \{1, \ldots, N\} \), each associated with the production of a part. We allow supply chains to differ in terms of their complexity, \( S^n \), but for simplicity, we require failure rates to be constant across chains and given by \( \lambda_c \), as in Section 2. Hence countries do not have a comparative advantage in particular parts. Parts are ordered such that \( S^n \) is weakly increasing in \( n \). So parts with a higher index \( n \) are more complex.

Parts are assembled into a unique final good using labor. Formally, the output \( Y_c \) of the final good in country \( c \) is given by

\[
Y_c = F \left( X_{c}^{1}, \ldots, X_{c}^{N}, A_c \right),
\]

where \( F(\cdot) \) is a production function with constant returns to scale, \( X_{c}^{n} \) is the amount of part \( n \) used in the production of the final good in country \( c \), and \( A_c \leq L_c \) corresponds to the amount of labor used for assembly in country \( c \). Note that the production function \( F(\cdot) \) is assumed to be identical across countries, thereby capturing the idea that assembly is sufficiently standardized for mistakes in this activity to be equally unlikely in all countries. Note also that by relabelling each part \( n \) as a distinct final good and the production function \( F(\cdot) \) as a utility function, with \( F(\cdot) \) independent of \( A_c \), this section can also be interpreted as a multi-sector extension of our baseline framework.\footnote{More generally, one could interpret the present model as a multi-sector economy with one “outside” sector.}
In this generalized version of our model, the pattern of international specialization still takes a very simple form, as the next lemma demonstrates.

**Lemma 5** In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages \( S_0 \equiv 0 \leq S_1 \leq \ldots \leq S_C = S^N \) such that for all \( n \in \mathcal{N} \), \( s \in [0, S^n] \), and \( c \in \mathcal{C} \), \( Q_c^n(s) > 0 \) if and only if \( s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c] \). Furthermore, if country \( c \) is engaged in parts production, \( A_c < L_c \), then all countries \( c' > c \) are only involved in parts production, \( A_{c'} = 0 \).

Lemma 5 imposes three restrictions on the pattern of international specialization. First, the poorest countries tend to specialize in assembly, while the richest countries tend to specialize in parts production. This directly derives from the higher relative productivity of the poorest countries in assembly. Second, amongst the countries that produce parts, richer countries produce and export at later stages of production. This result also held in Section 3, and the intuition is unchanged. Third, whereas middle-income countries tend to produce all parts, the richest countries tend to specialize in only the most complex ones. Intuitively, even the final stage \( S^n \) of a simple part is sufficiently labor intensive that high-wage, high-productivity countries are less competitive at that stage. Viewed through the lens of the hierarchy literature, the final output of a simple chain does not embody a large enough amount of inputs to merit, from an efficiency standpoint, leveraging the productivity of the most productive countries.

Compared to the simple model analyzed in Section 3, the present model suggests additional cross-sectional predictions. Here, trade is more likely to be concentrated among countries with similar levels of GDP per capita if exports and imports tend to occur along the supply chain associated with particular parts rather than at the top between “part producers” and “assemblers.” Accordingly, one should expect trade to be more concentrated among countries with similar levels of GDP per capita in industries in which the production process consists of very complex parts.

While cross-sectional predictions are potentially distinct from those of our simple model, the logic underlying the interdependence of nations is very similar. Since we still have vertical specialization in equilibrium, the free trade equilibrium remains characterized by a simple system of non-linear difference equations, akin to the ones presented in Lemmas 2 and 3. It therefore remains fairly easy to analyze the consequences of technological change. The key difference between the present environment and the one considered in Sections 4 and 5 is that the amount of labor allocated to vertical supply chains is now an endogenous variable that depends on the amount of labor necessary for assembly.

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*good, that can be produced one-to-one from labor in all countries, and multiple “sequential” goods, whose production is as described in Section 2. Under this interpretation, \( A_c \) would simply be the amount of labor allocated to the outside good in country \( c \).*
6.3 Heterogeneous Stages of Production

In order to focus attention in the simplest possible way on the novel aspects of an environment with sequential production, we have assumed that stages of production only differ in one dimension: the order in which they are performed. In practice, stages of production often differ greatly in terms of factor intensity, with some stages being much more skill-intensive than others. To capture such considerations within our simple theoretical framework, we now allow failure rates to be an exogenous characteristic of both a stage and a country.

Formally, we assume that mistakes occur at a Poisson rate, $\lambda_c(s)$, where $\lambda_c(s)$ is: (i) strictly decreasing in $c$, (ii) continuous and weakly increasing in $s$, and (iii) weakly submodular in $(s, c)$. This last restriction captures the idea that more efficient countries also tend to be the countries with a comparative advantage in later stages of production. Accordingly, one can now think of $s$ as a measure of skill intensity in the sense that higher stages are associated with higher relative productivity in countries with more skilled workers, i.e. those with lower failure rates at all stages.

As we demonstrate in the appendix, the pattern of international specialization in this generalized version of our model is still characterized by Lemma 1. Our cross-sectional predictions are therefore unchanged: there is vertical specialization in any free trade equilibrium, with more productive countries specializing in later stages of production. The intuition is simple. Absent any comparative advantage across stages, we know that more productive countries specialize in later stages of production. When $\lambda_c(s)$ is submodular, the previous pattern of international specialization is simply reinforced by the comparative advantage of more productive countries in later stages.

The basic forces that determine the interdependence of nations remain the same as in Sections 4 and 5. In particular, one can still show analytically that labor-augmenting technical progress in country $c_0$ still leads all countries $c < c_0$ to move down the supply chain and all countries $c > c_0$ to move up, just like in Proposition 4. The analysis of the consequences of technological change for the world income distribution, however, is more involved as changes in the measures of stages performed in each country are no longer sufficient to predict how changes in the pattern of vertical specialization affect inequality between nations.

7 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have developed an elementary theory of global supply chains. The key feature of our theory is that production is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize in later stages of production. Because of the sequential nature of production,
absolute productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.

Using this simple theoretical framework, we have taken a first step towards analyzing how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations. Among other things, we have shown that local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological changes, countries may move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of the chain, by contrast, local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within that region may fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top.

Although we have emphasized the consequences of vertical specialization for the interdependence of nations, we believe that our general results also have useful applications outside of international trade. Sequential production processes are pervasive in practice. They may involve workers of different skills, as emphasized in the labor and organizations literature. They may also involve firms of different productivity, as in the industrial organization literature. Whatever the particular context may be, our theoretical analysis may help shed a new light on how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence between different actors of a given supply chain.
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A Proofs (I): Free Trade Equilibrium

Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed in four steps.

Step 1: \( p(\cdot) \) is continuous.

Consider a stage \( s_0 \in (0, S] \). By equations (3) and (4), we know that there must be at least one country, call it \( c_0 \), producing intermediate good \( s_0 \). By assumption, this country must also be producing all intermediate goods \( s \in (s_0 - ds, s_0] \). Thus condition (2) implies

\[
p(s_0) = (1 + \lambda_{c_0} ds) p(s_0 - ds) + w_{c_0} ds,
\]

Taking the limit of the previous expression as \( ds \) goes to zero, we get

\[
p(s_0) = \lim_{s \to s_0^+} p(s).
\] (10)

This already establishes the continuity of \( p(\cdot) \) at \( S \). Now consider \( s_0 \in (0, S) \). By the same logic, there must be at least one country, call it \( c_0 \) again, producing all intermediate goods \( s \in (s_0, s_0 + ds] \).

Condition (2) therefore also implies

\[
p(s_0 + ds) = (1 + \lambda_{c_0} ds) p(s_0) + w_{c_0} ds,
\]

Taking the limit of the previous expression as \( ds \) goes to zero, we then get

\[
\lim_{s \to s_0^+} p(s) = p(s_0) \quad .
\] (11)

The continuity of \( p(\cdot) \) at \( s_0 \in (0, S) \) directly derives from equations (10) and (11).

Step 2: \( p(\cdot) \) is strictly increasing.

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a pair of stages, \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), such that \( s_1 < s_2 \) and \( p(s_1) \geq p(s_2) \). Since \( p(\cdot) \) is continuous, there must also exist a stage \( s_0 \in (s_1, s_2] \) and an \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that \( p(s) \geq p(s_0) \) for all \( s \in (s_0 - \varepsilon, s_0] \). As in Step 1, we know that there must be at least one country, call it \( c_0 \), producing intermediate good \( s_0 \). This, in turn, requires

\[
p(s_0) = (1 + \lambda_{c_0} ds) p(s_0 - ds) + w_{c_0} ds > p(s_0 - ds) \quad .
\]

For \( ds \) small enough, the previous inequality contradicts \( p(s) \geq p(s_0) \) for all \( s \in (s_0 - \varepsilon, s_0] \).

Step 3: If \( c_2 > c_1 \), then \( w_{c_2} > w_{c_1} \).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, \( c_2 > c_1 \), such that \( w_{c_2} \leq w_{c_1} \). In a free trade equilibrium, equations (3) and (4) require country \( c_1 \) to produce at least one intermediate good in \((0, 1)\), call it \( s_1 \). By equation (1), this country must also be producing all intermediate goods \( s \in (s_1 - ds, s_1] \). Thus condition (2) implies

\[
p(s_1) = (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_1} ds,
\] (12)

\[
p(s_1) \leq (1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_2} ds,
\] (13)

Since \( \lambda_{c_2} < \lambda_{c_1} \), equation (12) and inequality (13) imply \( w_{c_2} > w_{c_1} \), which contradicts \( w_{c_2} \leq w_{c_1} \).
Step 4: If \( c_2 > c_1 \) and \( Q_{c_1} (s_1) > 0 \), then \( Q_{c_2} (s) = 0 \) for all \( s < s_1 \).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, \( c_2 > c_1 \), and two intermediate goods, \( s_1 > s_2 > 0 \), such that \( c_1 \) produces \( s_1 \) and \( c_2 \) produces \( s_2 \). By equation (1), \( c_1 \) produces all intermediate goods \( s \in (s_1 - ds, s_1] \), whereas \( c_2 \) produces all intermediate goods \( s \in (s_2 - ds, s_2] \). Thus condition (2) implies

\[
\begin{align*}
p (s_1) &= (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) p (s_1 - ds) + w_{c_1} ds, \\
p (s_2) &= (1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) p (s_2 - ds) + w_{c_2} ds, \\
p (s_1) &\leq (1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) p (s_1 - ds) + w_{c_2} ds, \\
p (s_2) &\leq (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) p (s_2 - ds) + w_{c_1} ds.
\end{align*}
\]

Combining the four previous expressions, we get

\[
\begin{align*}
(1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) [p (s_1 - ds) - p (s_2 - ds)] w_{c_1} \\
\geq (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) [p (s_1 - ds) - p (s_2 - ds)] w_{c_2}
\end{align*}
\]

which can be rearranged as

\[
(1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) w_{c_1} \geq (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) w_{c_2}.
\]

By Step 2, we know that \( p (s_1 - ds) - p (s_2 - ds) > 0 \). Thus the previous inequality implies

\[
(1 + \lambda_{c_2} ds) w_{c_1} \geq (1 + \lambda_{c_1} ds) w_{c_2}.
\]

Since \( \lambda_{c_2} < \lambda_{c_1} \), inequality (14) implies \( w_{c_1} > w_{c_2} \), which contradicts Step 3.

To conclude the proof of Lemma 1, let us define \( S_c = \sup \{ s \in S \mid Q_c (s) > 0 \} \) for all \( c \in C \). By equation Step 4, we must have \( S_0 = 0 < S_1 < \ldots < S_C = 1 \), and for all \( s \in S \) and \( c \in C \), \( Q_c (s) > 0 \) if \( S_{c-1} < s < S_c \) and \( Q_c (s) = 0 \) if \( s < S_{c-1} \) or \( s > S_c \). Since \( Q_c (s) > 0 \) requires \( Q_c (s') > 0 \) for all \( s' \in (s - ds, s] \), we must also have \( Q_c (S_c) > 0 \) and \( Q_c (S_{c-1}) = 0 \) for all \( c \in C \). Thus \( Q_c (s) > 0 \) if and only if \( s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c] \). Finally, by equations (3) and (4), country \( C \) must produce stage 1, so that \( S_C = 1 \). QED. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. We first consider equation (6). Lemma 1 and equation (3) imply

\[
Q_c (s_2) - Q_c (s_1) = -\lambda_c \int_{s_1}^{s_2} Q_c (s) ds, \text{ for all } s_1, s_2 \in (S_{c-1}, S_c].
\]

Taking the derivative of the previous expression with respect to \( s_2 \), we get

\[
dQ_c (s) / ds = -\lambda_c Q_c (s), \text{ for all } s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c].
\]

The solution of the previous differential equation must satisfy

\[
Q_c (S_c) = e^{-\lambda_c (S_c - S_{c-1})} \lim_{s \rightarrow S_{c-1}^+} Q_c (s).
\]
Lemma 1 and equation (3) also imply
\[ Q_c (S_{c-1} + ds) - Q_{c-1} (S_{c-1} - ds) = - \left[ \lambda_c \lim_{s \to S_{c-1}^+} Q_c (s) + \lambda_{c-1} Q_{c-1} (S_{c-1} - ds) \right] ds. \]

Taking the limit of the previous expression as \( ds \) goes to zero, we get
\[ \lim_{s \to S_{c-1}^+} Q_c (s) = \lim_{s \to S_{c-1}^-} Q_{c-1} (s) = Q_{c-1} (S_{c-1}). \quad (17) \]

Equation (6) derives from equations (16) and (17) and the definition of \( Q_c \equiv Q_c (S_c) \).

Let us now turn to equation (5). By Lemma 1 and equation (4), we know that
\[ \int_{S_{c-1}}^{S_c} Q_c (s) ds = L_c, \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}. \quad (18) \]

By equations (15) and (17), we also know that
\[ \int_{S_{c-1}}^{S_c} Q_c (s) ds = \frac{1}{\lambda_c} [Q_{c-1} (S_{c-1}) - Q_c (S_c)]. \quad (19) \]

Equations (18) and (19) imply
\[ L_c = \frac{1}{\lambda_c} [Q_{c-1} (S_{c-1}) - Q_c (S_c)], \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}. \quad (20) \]

Equation (5) derives from equations (6) and (20) and the definition of \( Q_c \equiv Q_c (S_c) \). The boundary conditions \( S_0 = 0 \) and \( S_C = 1 \) have already been established in the proof of Lemma 1. QED. ■

**Proof of Lemma 3.** We first consider equation (7). Lemma 1 and condition (2) imply
\[
\begin{align*}
& p (S_c + ds) - (1 + \lambda_c ds) p (S_c) - w_{c+1} ds \quad \geq \quad p (S_c + ds) - (1 + \lambda_c ds) p (S_c) - w_c ds, \\
& p (S_c) - (1 + \lambda_c ds) p (S_c - ds) - w_c ds \quad \geq \quad p (S_c) - (1 + \lambda_{c+1} ds) p (S_c - ds) - w_{c+1} ds.
\end{align*}
\]

After simplifications, the two previous inequalities can be rearranged as
\[ (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) p (S_c) \geq w_{c+1} - w_c \geq (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) p (S_c - ds). \]

Since \( p \) is continuous, taking the limit of the above chain of inequalities as \( ds \) goes to zero we get
\[ w_{c+1} - w_c = (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) p (S_c), \text{ for all } s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c]. \]

which is equivalent to equation (7) by the definition of \( p_c \equiv p (S_c) \).

Let us now turn to equation (8). Lemma 1 and condition (2) imply
\[ p (s + ds) = (1 + \lambda_c ds) p (s) + w_c ds \]
Taking the limit of the previous expression as $ds$ goes to zero, we get

$$dp(s)/ds = \lambda_c p(s) + w_c, \text{ for all } s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c).$$

The solution of the previous differential equation must satisfy

$$p(S_c) = e^{\lambda_c(S_c - S_{c-1})} \lim_{s \to S_{c-1}^+} p(S_{c-1}) + \left[ e^{\lambda_c(S_c - S_{c-1})} - 1 \right] (w_c/\lambda_c),$$

which is equivalent to equation (8) by the continuity of $p(\cdot)$ and the definitions of $N_c \equiv S_c - S_{c-1}$ and $p_c \equiv p(S_c)$. The boundary conditions derive from the fact that $p_0 = p(S_0) = p(0) = 0$ and $p_C = p(S_C) = p(1) = 1$. QED.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** We proceed in four steps.

**Step 1:** $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ satisfy equations (5) and (6) if and only if

$$S_c = S_0 + \sum_{c'=1}^C \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{c'}} \right) \ln \left[ \frac{Q_0 - \sum_{c''=1}^{c-1} \lambda_{c''} L_{c''}}{Q_0 - \sum_{c''=1}^{c-1} \lambda_{c''} L_{c''}} \right], \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}, \quad (21)$$

$$Q_c = Q_0 - \sum_{c'=1}^C \lambda_{c'} L_{c'}, \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}. \quad (22)$$

Let us first show that if $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ satisfy equations (5) and (6), then they satisfy equations (21) and (22). Consider equation (22). Equations (5) and (6) imply

$$Q_c = Q_{c-1} - \lambda_c L_c, \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C},$$

By iteration we therefore have

$$Q_c = Q_0 - \sum_{c'=1}^C \lambda_{c'} L_{c'}, \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}.$$

Now consider equation (21). Starting from equation (5) and iterating we get

$$S_c = S_0 - \sum_{c'=1}^C \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{c'}} \right) \ln \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_{c'} L_{c'}}{Q_{c-1}} \right), \text{ for all } c \in \mathcal{C}.$$

Equation (21) directly derives from the previous expression and equation (22). It is a matter of simple algebra to check that if $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ satisfy equations (21) and (22), then they satisfy equations (5) and (6).

**Step 2:** There exists a unique pair of vectors $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ satisfying equations (5) and (6) and the boundary conditions: $S_0 = 0$ and $S_C = 1$.

Let $Q_0 \equiv \sum_{c=1}^C \lambda_c L_c$. By Step 1, if $Q_0 \leq Q_0$, then there does not exist a pair of vectors $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ that satisfy equations (5) and (6). Otherwise $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ and $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ would also satisfy equations (21) and (22), which cannot be the case if $Q_0 \leq Q_0$. Now consider $Q_0 > Q_0$. From equation (21), it is easy to check that $\partial S_C/\partial Q_0 < 0$ for all $Q_0 > Q_0$; $\lim_{Q_0 \to Q_0^+} S_C = +\infty$; and $\lim_{Q_0 \to +\infty} S_C = S_0$. Thus conditional on having set $S_0 = 0$, there exists a unique $Q_0 > Q_0$ such that $(S_0, \ldots, S_C)$ and $(Q_0, \ldots, Q_C)$ satisfy equations (21) and (22) and $S_C = S$. Step 2 derives from Step 1 and the previous observation.
**Step 3:** For any \((N_1, ..., N_C)\), there exists a unique pair of vectors \((w_1, ..., w_C)\) and \((p_0, ..., p_C)\) satisfying equations (7) and (8) and the boundary conditions: \(p_0 = 0\) and \(p_C = 1\).

For any \((N_1, ..., N_C), w_1, \) and \(p_0\), there trivially exists a unique pair of vectors \((w_2, ..., w_C)\) and \((p_1, ..., p_C)\) that satisfy equations (7) and (8). Thus taking \((N_1, ..., N_C)\) as given and having set \(p_0 = 0\), we only need to check that there exists a unique \(w_1\) such that \(p_C = 1\). To do so, we first establish that \(p_C\) is strictly increasing in \(w_1\). We proceed by iteration. By equation (8), we know that \(p_1\) is strictly increasing in \(w_1\). Thus by equation (7), \(w_2\) must be strictly increasing in \(w_1\) as well. Now suppose that \(p_{c-1}\) and \(w_c\) are strictly increasing in \(w_1\) for \(c < C\). Then \(p_c\) must be strictly increasing in \(w_1\), by equation (8), \(w_{c+1}\) must be strictly increasing in \(w_1\), by equation (7). At this point we have established, by iteration, that \(p_{c-1}\) and \(w_C\) are strictly increasing in \(w_1\). Combining this observation with equation (8), we obtain that \(p_C\) is strictly increasing in \(w_1\). To conclude, let us note that, by equations (7) and (8), we also have \(\lim_{w_1 \to 0} p_C = 0\) and \(\lim_{w_1 \to +\infty} p_C = +\infty\). Since \(p_C\) is strictly increasing in \(w_1\), there therefore exists a unique \(w_1\) such that \(p_C = 1\).

Steps 1-3 imply the existence and uniqueness of \((S_0, ..., S_C)\), \((Q_0, ..., Q_C)\), \((w_1, ..., w_C)\), and \((p_0, ..., p_C)\) that satisfy equations (5)-(8) with boundary conditions \(S_0 = 0\), \(S_C = 1\), \(p_0 = 0\), and \(p_C = 1\). Now consider the following output levels and intermediate good prices

\[
Q_c(s) = e^{-\lambda_c(s-S_{c-1})}Q_{c-1}, \text{ for all } s \in \{S_{c-1}, S_c\},
\]

\[
p(s) = e^{\lambda_c(s-S_{c-1})}p_{c-1} + \left[ e^{\lambda_c(s-S_{c-1})} - 1 \right] \left( \frac{w_c}{\lambda_c} \right), \text{ for all } s \in \{S_{c-1}, S_c\}.
\]

By construction, \([Q_1(\cdot), ..., Q_C(\cdot)], (w_1, ..., w_C)\), and \(p(\cdot)\) satisfy conditions (2)-(4). Thus a free trade equilibrium exists. Since \((S_0, ..., S_C)\), \((Q_0, ..., Q_C)\), \((w_1, ..., w_C)\), and \((p_0, ..., p_C)\) are unique, the free trade equilibrium is unique as well by Lemmas 1-3.

**QED.**

### B Proofs (II): Global Technological Change

**Proof of Proposition 2.** We decompose the proof of Proposition 2 into three parts. First, we show that an increase in \(S\) increases the measure of stages \(N_c\) performed in all countries. Second, we show that an increase in \(S\) leads all countries to move up the supply chain. Third, we show that an increase in \(S\) increase inequality between countries around the world.

**Part I:** If \(S' > S\), then \(N'_c > N_c\) for all \(c \in C\).

We first show that \(N'_1 > N_1\) by contradiction. Suppose that \(N'_1 \leq N_1\). By equation (5), equation (6) and the definition of \(N_c \equiv S_C - S_{c-1}\), we know that

\[
N_c = -\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_c} \right) \ln \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\lambda_c L_c}{\lambda_c - 1 L_{c-1}} \right) \left( e^{\lambda_c - 1 S_{c-1}} - 1 \right) \right], \text{ for all } c > 1,
\]

According to equation (23), we have \(\partial N_c/\partial N_{c-1} > 0\). Thus by iteration, \(N'_1 \leq N_1\) implies \(N'_c \leq N_c\) for all countries \(c \in C\). This further implies \(\sum_{c=1}^C N'_c = S'_C - S_0 \leq S_C - S_0 = \sum_{c=1}^C N_c\), which contradicts \(S'_C - S'_0 > S_C - S_0\) by Lemma 2. Starting from \(N'_1 > N_1\), we can then use equation (23) again to show by iteration that \(N'_c > N_c\) for all \(c \in C\). This completes the proof of Part I.

**Part II:** If \(S' > S\), then \(S'_c > S_c\) for all \(c \in C\).

We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2 and Part I, we know that \(S'_1 = N'_1 > S_1 = N_1\). Thus \(S'_c > S_c\) is satisfied for \(c = 1\). Let us now show that if \(S'_c > S_c\) for \(1 \leq c < C\), then \(S'_{c+1} > S_{c+1}\). By...
definition, we know that \( S'_{c+1} = S'_c + N'_{c+1} \) and \( S_{c+1} = S_c + N_{c+1} \). By Part I, we also know that \( N'_{c+1} > N_{c+1} \). Thus \( S'_{c} > S_c \) implies \( S'_{c+1} > S_{c+1} \). This concludes the proof of Part II.

**Part III: If** \( S' > S \), **then** \((w_{c+1}/w_c)'> (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) **for all** \( c < C \).

The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1:** If \( N'_1 > N_1 \), **then** \((w_2/w_1)'> (w_2/w_1)\).

Since \( p_0 = 0 \), we know from equations \((7)\) and \((8)\) that

\[
\frac{w_2}{w_1} = 1 + \frac{1}{\lambda_1} \left( \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 \right) \left( e^{\lambda_1 N_1} - 1 \right).
\]

Combining equation \((24)\) and \( N'_1 > N_1 \), we obtain \((w_2/w_1)'> (w_2/w_1)\). This completes the proof of Step 1.

**Step 2:** For any country \( 1 < c < C \), if \( N'_c > N_c \) and \((w_c/w_{c-1})'> (w_c/w_{c-1})\), then \((w_{c+1}/w_c)'> (w_{c+1}/w_c)\).

Consider a country \( 1 < c < C \). Equations \((7)\) and \((8)\) imply

\[
\frac{w_{c+1}}{w_c} = 1 + \left( \lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1} \right) \left[ \left( \frac{e^{\lambda_c N_c}}{\lambda_c} - 1 \right) + e^{\lambda_c N_c} \left( \frac{w_{c-1}}{w_c} \right) \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right) \right]
\]

By equation \((7)\), we also know that

\[
\frac{w_c}{w_{c-1}} = 1 + \left( \lambda_{c-1} - \lambda_c \right) \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right),
\]

which further implies

\[
\left( \frac{w_{c-1}}{w_c} \right) \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right) = \frac{(p_{c-1}/w_{c-1})}{1 + \left( \lambda_{c-1} - \lambda_c \right) \left( p_{c-1}/w_{c-1} \right)}.
\]

Since \((w_c/w_{c-1})'> (w_c/w_{c-1})\) and \( \lambda_{c-1} > \lambda_c \), equation \((26)\) immediately implies

\[
\left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right)' > \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right).
\]

Combining this observation with equation \((27)\)—the right-hand side of which is increasing in \((p_{c-1}/w_{c-1})\)—we obtain

\[
\left( \frac{w_{c-1}}{w_c} \right)' \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right)' > \left( \frac{w_{c-1}}{w_c} \right) \left( \frac{p_{c-1}}{w_{c-1}} \right).
\]

To conclude, note that \( N'_c > N_c \) implies \( e^{\lambda_c N'_c} > e^{\lambda_c N_c} \). Thus equation \((25)\) and inequality \((28)\) imply \((w_{c+1}/w_c)' > (w_{c+1}/w_c)\). This completes the proof of Step 2. Combining Part I with Steps 1 and 2, it is then easy to establish Part III by iteration. QED.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We decompose the proof of Proposition 3 into three parts. First, we show that a decrease in \( \beta \) increases the measure of stages \( N_c \) performed by all countries \( c < c_1 \) and decreases the measure of stages \( N_c \) performed by all countries \( c \geq c_1 \), with \( 1 < c_1 \leq C \). Second,
we show that a decrease in $\beta$ leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in $\beta$ decreases inequality between countries around the world.

**Part I:** If $\beta' < \beta$, then there exists $1 < c_1 \leq C$ such that $N_c' > N_c$ if and only if $c < c_1$.

Equation (5), equation (6), and the definition of $N_c$ imply

$$N_c = -\left(\frac{1}{\beta c}\right) \ln \left[ 1 - \left(\frac{\lambda_c L_c}{\lambda_{c-1} L_{c-1}}\right) \left( e^{\lambda_{c-1} N_{c-1}} - 1 \right) \right], \text{ for all } c > 1,$$

where $\partial N_c / \partial N_c - 1 > 0$ and $\partial N_c / \partial c > 0$. Since $\beta' < \beta$, equation (29) implies that if $N_{c-1}' < N_{c-1}$ for $c > 1$, then $N_c' > N_c$. This further implies the existence of $1 \leq c_1 \leq C + 1$ such that $N_c' > N_c$ if and only if $c < c_1$. To conclude the proof of Part I, note that if $c_1 = 1$, then $\sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c' = S_C - S'_C - S_C = S_0 = \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c$, which contradicts $S_C' - S_0' = S_C - S_0$ by Lemma 2. Similarly, if $c_1 = C + 1$, then $\sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c' = S_C' - S_0' > S_C - S_0 = C_{c-1} N_c$, which also contradicts $S_C' - S_0' = S_C - S_0$ by Lemma 2. This completes the proof of Part I.

**Part II:** If $\beta' < \beta$, then $S_c' \geq S_c$ for all $c \in C$.

We first show by iteration that $S_c' > S_c$ if $c < c_1$. By Lemma 2 and Part I, we know that $S_c' = N_c' > S_1 = N_1$. Thus $S_c' > S_c$ is satisfied for $c = 1$. Let us now show that if $S_{c'}' > S_c$ for $1 < c$, then $S_{c+1}' > S_{c+1}$. By definition, we know that $S_{c+1}' = S'_c + N_{c+1}'$ and $S_{c+1} = S_c + N_{c+1}$. By Part I, we also know that $N_{c+1}' > N_{c+1}$ if $c < c_1$. Thus $S_{c+1}' > S_{c+1}$ for $1 < c$, which establishes that $S_c' > S_c$ if $c < c_1$. To conclude the proof of Part II, we first show by iteration that $S_c' \geq S_c$ if $c > c_1$. By Lemma 2, we know that $S_C' = S_C = S$. Thus $S_c' \geq S_c$ is satisfied for $c = C$. Let us now show that if $S_c' \geq S_c$ for $1 < c < C$, then $S_{c-1}' \geq S_{c-1}$. By definition, we know that $S_{c-1}' = S'_c - N_c'$ and $S_{c-1} = S_c - N_c$. By Part I, we also know that $N_c' \leq N_c$ if $c > c_1$. This establishes that $S_c' \geq S_c$ if $c > c_1$, which completes the proof of Part II.

**Part III:** If $\beta' < \beta$, then $(w_{c+1} / w_c)' < (w_{c+1} / w_c)$ for all $c < C$.

Throughout this part of the proof, we let $\tilde{N}_c = \beta N_c$ and $\tilde{p}_c = \beta p_c$. The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1:** If $\beta' < \beta$, then $\tilde{N}_c' < \tilde{N}_c$ for all countries $c \in C$.

The proof is similar to Part I of the proof of Proposition 2. We first show that $\tilde{N}_c' < \tilde{N}_1$ by contradiction. Suppose that $\tilde{N}_c' \geq \tilde{N}_1$. By equation (5), equation (6) and the definition of $\tilde{N}_c$, we know that

$$\tilde{N}_c = -\left(\frac{1}{\lambda c}\right) \ln \left[ 1 - \left(\frac{\lambda c L_c}{\lambda_{c-1} L_{c-1}}\right) \left( e^{\lambda_{c-1} \tilde{N}_{c-1}} - 1 \right) \right], \text{ for all } c > 1,$$

where $\partial \tilde{N}_c / \partial \tilde{N}_{c-1} > 0$. Thus by iteration, $\tilde{N}_c' \geq \tilde{N}_1$ implies $\tilde{N}_c' \geq \tilde{N}_c$ for all countries $c \in C$. This implies $\beta' \left( \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c' \right) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} \tilde{N}_c' \geq \sum_{c=1}^{C} \tilde{N}_c = \beta \left( \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c \right)$. Since $\beta' < \beta$, this further implies $\sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c' = S_C' - S_0' > S_C - S_0 = \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c$, which contradicts $S_C' - S_0' = S_C - S_0$ by Lemma 2. Starting from $\tilde{N}_1' < \tilde{N}_1$, we can now use equation (30) to show by iteration that $\tilde{N}_c' < \tilde{N}_c$ for all $c \in C$. This completes the proof of Step 1.

**Step 2:** If $\tilde{N}_c' < \tilde{N}_c$ for all countries $c \in C$, then $(w_{c+1} / w_c)' < (w_{c+1} / w_c)$ for all $c < C$. 

Equations (7) and (8) can be rearranged as

\[
\begin{align*}
  w_{c+1} &= w_c + (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) \tilde{p}_c, \text{ for all } c < C, \\
  \tilde{p}_c &= e^{\lambda_c \bar{N}_c} \tilde{p}_{c-1} + \left( e^{\lambda_c \bar{N}_c} - 1 \right) \left( w_c / \lambda_c \right), \text{ for all } c \in C.
\end{align*}
\]

Following the exact same strategy as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2, it is then easy to show by iteration that \( (w_{c+1} / w_c)' < (w_{c+1} / w_c) \) for all \( c < C \). Part II directly follows from Steps 1 and 2. QED.

C Proofs (III): Local Technological Change

**Proof of Proposition 4.** We decompose the proof of Proposition 4 into three parts. First, we show that an increase in \( L_{c_0} \) increases the measure of stages performed in country \( c_0 \) and decreases the measure of stages performed in any other country. Second, we show that an increase in \( L_{c_0} \) leads all countries all countries \( c < c_0 \) to move down and all countries \( c > c_0 \) move up. Third, we show that an increase in \( L_{c_0} \) decreases inequality among countries \( c \in \{1, \ldots, c_0\} \), increases inequality among countries \( c \in \{c_0, \ldots, c_1\} \), and decreases inequality among countries \( c \in \{c_1, \ldots, C\} \), with \( c_1 \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, C\} \).

**Part I:** If \( L'_{c_0} > L_{c_0} \), then \( N'_{c_0} > N_{c_0} \) and \( N'_c < N_c \) for all \( c \neq c_0 \).

Like in our previous proofs, we will repeatedly use the following relationship

\[
N_c = -\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_c} \right) \ln \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\lambda_c L_c}{\lambda_{c-1} L_{c-1}} \right) \left( e^{\lambda_{c-1} N_{c-1}} - 1 \right) \right], \text{ for all } c > 1,
\]

where \( \partial N_c / \partial N_{c-1} > 0 \) and \( \partial N_c / \partial L_c > 0 \). The proof of Part I proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1:** If \( L'_{c_0} > L_{c_0} \), then \( N'_c < N_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \).

Let us first establish that \( Q'_C > Q_C \). By Lemma 1, we know that \( Q'_C \equiv Q'_C (1) = \sum_{c=1}^C Q'_c (1) \). By the First Welfare Theorem, we also know that the allocation in a free trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Thus \( Q'_C \) must be the maximum output level of the final good attainable given the new resource and technological constraints, i.e.,

\[
Q'_C = \arg \max_{Q_1(\cdot), \ldots, Q_C(\cdot)} \sum_{c=1}^C \tilde{Q}_c (1),
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
  \sum_{c=1}^C \tilde{Q}_c (s_2) - \sum_{c=1}^C \tilde{Q}_c (s_1) &\leq -\int_{s_1}^{s_2} \sum_{c=1}^C \lambda_c \tilde{Q}_c (s) \, ds, \text{ for all } s_1 \leq s_2, \\
  \int_0^S \tilde{Q}_c (s) \, ds &\leq L'_c, \text{ for all } c \in C,
\end{align*}
\]

(33) and (34)

where \( L'_{c_0} > L_{c_0} \) and \( L'_c = L_c \) for all \( c \neq c_0 \). Now consider \( \tilde{Q}_1 (\cdot), \ldots, \tilde{Q}_C (\cdot) \) such that

\[
\tilde{Q}_{c_0} (s) \equiv Q_{c_0} (s) + \left( \frac{\lambda_{c_0} e^{-\lambda_{c_0} s}}{1 - e^{-\lambda_{c_0} S}} \right) (L'_{c_0} - L_{c_0}), \text{ for all } s \in S,
\]

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and
\[ \tilde{Q}_c(s) \equiv Q_c(s), \text{ for all } s \in S \text{ and } c \neq c_0. \]

Since \( Q_1(\cdot), \ldots, Q_C(\cdot) \) satisfies the initial resource and technological constraints, as described by conditions (3) and (4), \( \tilde{Q}_1(\cdot), \ldots, \tilde{Q}_C(\cdot) \) must satisfy, by construction, the new resource and technological constraints, as described by conditions (33) and (34). Since \( L'_c > L_c \), we must also have
\[ \tilde{Q}_c(1) + \tilde{Q}_C(1) = \left( \frac{\lambda c_0 e^{-\lambda c_0 S}}{1 - e^{-\lambda c_0 S}} \right) (L'_c - L_c) + Q_C > Q_C. \]

Since \( Q'_C \geq \tilde{Q}_c(1) + \tilde{Q}_C(1) \), the previous inequality implies \( Q'_C > Q_C \). By equation (5), equation (6), and the definition of \( N_c \), we also know that
\[ N_c = \left( \frac{1}{\lambda c} \right) \ln \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda C L c}{Q_C} \right). \]

Thus if \( C > c_0 \), \( Q'_C > Q_C \) and \( L'_c = L_c \) imply \( N'_C < N_C \). To conclude the proof of Step 1, note that if \( N'_C < N_C \) for \( c > c_0 + 1 \), then \( L'_{c-1} = L_{c-1} \) and equation (23) imply \( N'_{c-1} < N_{c-1} \). Thus by iteration, \( N'_c < N_C \) for all \( c > c_0 \).

**Step 2: If \( L'_c > L_c \), then \( N'_c < N_C \) for all \( c < c_0 \).**

We first show by contradiction that if \( L'_c > L_c \) and \( c_0 > 1 \), then \( N'_1 < N_1 \). Suppose that \( N'_1 \geq N_1 \). Since \( L'_c = L_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \), we can use equation (23)—the fact that \( \partial N_c / \partial N_{c-1} > 0 \)—to establish by iteration that \( N'_c \geq N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Since \( L'_c > L_c \) and \( L'_{c-1} = L_{c-1} \), we can further use equation (23)—the facts that \( \partial N_c / \partial N_{c-1} > 0 \) and that \( \partial N_c / \partial L_c > 0 \)—to establish that \( N'_c > N_c \). To show that \( N'_c > N_{c+1} \), we use the two following relationships
\[ Q_{c-1} = \frac{c L c}{1 - e^{-\lambda c N c}} \text{ for all } c \in C \quad \text{(35)} \]
\[ Q_c = \frac{c L c e^{-\lambda c N c}}{1 - e^{-\lambda c N_c}} \text{ for all } c \in C. \quad \text{(36)} \]

Equation (35) derives from equation (5) and the definition of \( N_c \equiv S_C - S_{c-1} \). Equation (36) further uses equation (6). Since \( N'_c - N_{c-1} \) and \( L'_c - L_{c-1} = L_{c-1} \), equation (36)—in particular, the fact that \( \partial Q_c / \partial N_c < 0 \)—implies \( Q'_c < 0 < Q_c \). Since \( Q'_c < Q_c \) and \( N'_c > N_c \), equation (6) implies \( Q'_c < Q_c \). Finally, since \( Q'_c < Q_c \) and \( L'_c = L_{c+1} \), equation (35)—in particular, the fact that \( \partial Q_{c-1} / \partial N_c < 0 \)—implies \( N'_c > N_{c+1} \). Since \( N'_c > N_{c+1} \), and \( L'_c = L_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \), we can further use equation (23)—in particular, the fact that \( \partial N_c / \partial N_{c-1} > 0 \)—to establish by iteration that \( N'_c > N_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \). This implies \( \sum_{c=1}^{C} N'_c = S'_C - S'_0 > S_C - S_0 = \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c \), which contradicts \( S'_C - S'_0 > S_C - S_0 = 1 \) by Lemma 2. At this point, we have established that if \( L'_c > L_c \) and \( c_0 > 1 \), then \( N'_c < N_1 \). To conclude the proof of Step 2, note that if \( N'_c < N_c \) for \( c < c_0 - 1 \), then \( L'_{c+1} = L_{c+1} \) and equation (23) imply \( N'_{c+1} < N_{c+1} \). Thus by iteration, \( N'_c < N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Part I directly derives from Step 1, Step 2, and the fact that \( \sum_{c=1}^{C} N'_c = \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c = 1 \), by Lemma 2.

**Part II: If \( L'_c > L_c \), then \( S'_c \leq S_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \) and \( S'_c \geq S_c \) for all \( c \geq c_0 \).**

The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1: If \( L'_c > L_c \), then \( S'_c \geq S_c \) for all \( c \geq c_0 \).**
We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that \( S' C = S C = S \). Thus \( S' c \geq S c \) is satisfied for \( c = C \). Let us now show that if \( S' k = S c \) and \( c > c_0 \), then \( S' c_{0-1} \geq S c_{0-1} \). Since \( c > c_0 \), \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \) and Part I imply \( N' c < N c \). Combining this observation with \( S' c \geq S c \) and the definition of \( N c \equiv S c - S c_{0-1} \), we obtain \( S' c_{0-1} \geq S c_{0-1} \). This completes the proof of Step 1.

### Step 2: If \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \), then \( S' c_{0-1} \leq S c_{0-1} \) for all \( c \leq c_0 \).

We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that \( S' c = S c = S \). Thus \( S' c_{0-1} \leq S c_{0-1} \) is satisfied for \( c = 1 \). Let us now show that if \( S' c_{0-1} \leq S c_{0-1} \) and \( c < c_0 \), then \( S' c \leq S c \). Since \( c < c_0 \), \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \) and Part I imply \( N' c < N c \). Combining this observation with \( S' c_{0-1} \leq S c_{0-1} \) and the definition of \( N c \equiv S c - S c_{0-1} \), we obtain \( S' c \leq S c \). This completes the proof of Step 2. Part II directly follows from Steps 1 and 2.

### Part III: If \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \), then there exists \( c_0 + 1 \leq c_1 \leq C \) such that \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( 1 \leq c < c_0 \); \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \geq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c_0 \leq c < c_1 \); and \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c_1 \leq c < C \).

The proof of Part III proceeds in three steps.

### Step 1: If \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \), then \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c < c_0 \).

By Part I, we know that \( N' c < N c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Thus we can use the same argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c < c_0 \).

### Step 2: If \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \), then there exists \( c_0 \leq c_1 \leq C \) such that \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \geq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c_0 \leq c < c_1 \) and \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( c_1 \leq c < C \).

By Part I, we also know that \( N' c > N c \) for all \( c > c_0 \). Thus we can again use the same argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if there exists \( \bar{c} \geq c_0 \) such that \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\), then \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\) for all \( \bar{c} \leq c < C \). To conclude the proof of Step 2, let us just define \( c_1 \equiv \inf \{c \geq c_0 | (w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\} \). By construction, \((w_{c+1}/w_c)\) rises for all \( c_0 \leq c < c_1 \) and falls for all \( c_1 \leq c < C \). In order to complete the proof of Part III, the only thing left to show is that \( c_1 > c_0 \), which is what we establish in our final step.

### Step 3: If \( L' c_0 > L c_0 \) and \( c_0 \neq C \), then \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \geq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that \((w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c)\). Then for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), there must also exist \( L c_0 \leq L c_0 \leq L c_0 \) such that \(|L c_0 - L c_0| < \varepsilon \) and

\[
(w_{c+1}/w_c) \leq (w_{c+1}/w_c), \tag{37}
\]

where \((\tilde{w}_1, ..., \tilde{w}_C)\) and \((\tilde{w}_1', ..., \tilde{w}_C')\) denote the world income distribution if labor endowments in country \( c_0 \) are equal to \( L c_0 \) and \( L c_0 \), respectively. For \(|L c_0 - L c_0| \) small enough, Lemma 2 implies

\[
\tilde{S}_1 < \tilde{S}_1 < \tilde{S}_2 < ... < \tilde{S}_c_{0-1} < \tilde{S}_c_0 < \tilde{S}_c_0 < \tilde{S}_c_0 < \tilde{S}_c_0 + 1 < ... \tag{38}
\]

where \((\tilde{S}_1, ..., \tilde{S}_C)\) and \((\tilde{S}_1', ..., \tilde{S}_C')\) denote the pattern of vertical specialization if labor endowments in country \( c_0 \) are equal to \( L c_0 \) and \( L c_0 \), respectively. First, note that for any \( c < c_0 - 1 \), since
\[ \tilde{S}_c' < \tilde{S}_c < \tilde{S}_{c+1}' < \tilde{S}_{c+1}, \] condition (2) implies that

\[
\frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_{c+1}')}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} = \frac{e^{\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_{c+1}'-\tilde{S}_c)}}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} + \frac{e^{\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_{c+1}'-\tilde{S}_{c+1})} - 1}{\lambda_{c+1}},
\]

where \( \tilde{p} (\cdot) \) and \( \tilde{p}' (\cdot) \) denote the schedule of prices if labor endowments in country \( c_0 \) are equal to \( \tilde{L}_{c_0} \) and \( \tilde{L}'_{c_0} \), respectively. Since \( \tilde{S}_{c+1}' > \tilde{S}_c \), the two previous equations further imply that for any \( c < c_0 - 1 \),

\[
\frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_{c+1})}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \Rightarrow \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_{c+1}')}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}'_{c+1})}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}}. \tag{39}
\]

Second, note that for any \( c < c_0 \), since \( \tilde{S}_{c-1} < \tilde{S}_c' < \tilde{S}_c \), condition (2) also implies that

\[
\frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c}, \tag{40}
\]

\[
\frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c} \tag{41}
\]

Let us now show that if \( \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \), then

\[
\frac{e^{\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')}}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \geq \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')}}{\tilde{w}_c} \geq \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')}}{\tilde{w}_c} - 1 \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \right). \tag{42}
\]

We start with inequality (42), which can be rearranged as

\[
e^{\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')} \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c} \geq e^{\lambda_c(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')} \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c}. \tag{43}
\]

By equation (7), we know that

\[
e^{\lambda_c(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')} \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} = \frac{\tilde{p}(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c} \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \right), \tag{44}
\]

\[
e^{\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_c-\tilde{S}_c')} \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c} = \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \frac{\tilde{p}'(\tilde{S}_c')}{\tilde{w}_c} \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \right). \tag{45}
\]
Under the assumption that $\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_{c}^t\right) / \tilde{w}_{c}^t \geq \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_{c}^t\right) / \tilde{w}_{c}$, equations (44) and (45) imply

$$e^{\lambda c+1(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} \frac{\tilde{w}_{c+1}^t}{\tilde{w}_{c}} \frac{\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right)}{\tilde{w}_{c}^t} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}(\tilde{S}_c^t)}{\tilde{w}_{c}} \frac{\tilde{w}_{c}}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right)$$

where the second inequality also uses the fact that $\tilde{S}_c^t < \tilde{S}_c$. Thus inequality (42) holds. Let us now consider inequality (43), which can be rearranged as

$$\frac{\lambda_c \left(e^{\lambda c+1(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right)}{\lambda_{c+1} \left(e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right)} \geq \frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (46)

Since $\tilde{S}_{c-1} < \tilde{S}_c^t$ for any $c < c_0$, condition (2) implies $\tilde{p}_c\left(\tilde{S}_c\right) / \tilde{w}_c \geq \left[e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_{c-1})} - 1\right] / \lambda_c > \left[e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right] / \lambda_c$. Combining the previous inequality with equation (7), we obtain

$$\frac{\tilde{w}_c}{\tilde{w}_{c+1}} = \frac{1}{1 + (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) \frac{\tilde{p}(\tilde{S}_c)}{\tilde{w}_c}} < \frac{\lambda_c}{\lambda_c + (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) \left[e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right]}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (47)

By inequalities (46) and (47), a sufficient condition for inequality (43) to hold is

$$\frac{\lambda_c \left[e^{\lambda c+1(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right]}{\lambda_{c+1} \left[e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right]} \geq \frac{\lambda_c}{\lambda_c + (\lambda_c - \lambda_{c+1}) \left[e^{\lambda c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)} - 1\right]}.$$

which can be rearranged as $\lambda_c \left[1 - e^{-\lambda_c(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)}\right] \geq \lambda_{c+1} \left[1 - e^{-\lambda_{c+1}(\tilde{S}_c - \tilde{S}_c^t)}\right]$. The previous inequality necessarily holds since $f(x) \equiv \frac{x}{1-e^{-x}}$ is increasing in $x$ for $t > 0$. At this point, we have established that inequalities (42) and (43) hold if $\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right) / \tilde{w}_c^t \geq \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right) / \tilde{w}_c$. Combining this observation with equations (40) and (41), we further have that for any $c < c_0$,

$$\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right) / \tilde{w}_c^t \geq \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_c^t\right) / \tilde{w}_c \Rightarrow \tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_c\right) / \tilde{w}_c \geq \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_c\right) / \tilde{w}_c+1.$$

(48)

Since $\tilde{p}'(0) = \tilde{p}(0) = 0$, we know that $\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_0^t\right) / \tilde{w}_0^t \geq \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_0\right) / \tilde{w}_1$. Thus we can use implications (39) and (48) to establish, by iteration, that

$$\frac{\tilde{p}'\left(\tilde{S}_{c_0+1}\right)}{\tilde{w}_{c_0+1}} \geq \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{S}_{c_0-1}\right)}{\tilde{w}_{c_0}}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (49)
Since $\bar{S}_c < \bar{S}^t_c$, we know from condition (2) that

\[
\frac{\bar{p}'(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}'_c} = \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\bar{S}_c - \bar{S}^t_{c-1})}\bar{p}'(\bar{S}^t_{c-1})}{\bar{w}'_c} + \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\bar{S}_c - \bar{S}^t_{c-1})} - 1}{\lambda_c},
\]

(50)

\[
\frac{\bar{p}(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}_c} = \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\bar{S}_c - \bar{S}^t_{c-1})}\bar{p}(\bar{S}^t_{c-1})}{\bar{w}_c} + \frac{e^{\lambda_c(\bar{S}_c - \bar{S}^t_{c-1})} - 1}{\lambda_c}.
\]

(51)

Inequality (49) and equations (50) and (51) imply $\frac{\bar{p}'(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}'_c} \geq \frac{\bar{p}(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}_c}$. Finally, since $\bar{S}_c < \bar{S}^t_c$, we also know that $\frac{\bar{p}'(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}'_c} > \frac{\bar{p}(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}_c}$. Combining these two observations, we get $\frac{\bar{p}'(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}'_c} > \frac{\bar{p}(\bar{S}_c)}{\bar{w}_c}$. Together with equation (7), the previous inequality implies $(\bar{w}_{c_0+1}/\bar{w}_{c_0}) > (\bar{w}_{c_0+1}/\bar{w}_{c_0})$, which contradicts inequality (37). Thus $(w_{c_0+1}/w_{c_0}) > (w_{c_0+1}/w_{c_0})$, which implies $c_1 \equiv \inf \{ c \geq c_0 | (w_{c_0+1}/w_{c_0}) > (w_{c_0+1}/w_{c_0}) > c_0$. As mentioned above, Part III directly follows from Steps 1-3. QED.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** We decompose the proof of Proposition 5 into three parts. First, we show that a decrease in $\lambda_c$ increases the measure of stages $N_c$ performed in all countries $c < c_0$ and decreases the measure of stages $N_c$ performed in all countries $c > c_0$. Second, we show that a decrease in $\lambda_c$ leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in $\lambda_c$ increases inequality among countries $c \in \{1, \ldots, c_0\}$, decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_0, c_0 + 1\}$, increases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, c_1\}$, and decreases inequality among countries $c \in \{c_1, \ldots, C\}$, with $c_1 \in \{c_0 + 1, \ldots, C\}$.

**Part I:** If $\lambda'_c < \lambda_c$, then $N'_c > N_c$ for all $c < c_0$ and $N'_c < N_c$ for all $c > c_0$. Like in our previous proofs, we will repeatedly use the following relationship

\[
N_c = -\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_c} \right) \ln \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\lambda_c L_c}{\lambda_{c-1} L_{c-1}} \right) \left( e^{\lambda_{c-1} N_{c-1}} - 1 \right) \right], \text{ for all } c > 1,
\]

(23)

where $\partial N_c/\partial N_{c-1} > 0$, $\partial N_c/\partial \lambda_{c-1} > 0$, and $\partial N_c/\partial \lambda_c > 0$. The proof of Part I proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1:** If $\lambda'_c < \lambda_c$, then $N'_c < N_c$ for all $c > c_0$.

Let us first establish that $Q'_c > Q_C$. By the same argument as in Step 1 of Proposition 4, $Q'_c$ must be such that

\[
Q'_c = \arg \max_{Q_1(\cdot), \ldots, Q_C(\cdot)} \sum_{c=1}^C Q_c \left( S \right),
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{c=1}^C Q_c \left( s_2 \right) - \sum_{c=1}^C Q_c \left( s_1 \right) \leq -\int_{s_1}^{s_2} \sum_{c=1}^C \lambda'_c Q_c \left( s \right) ds, \text{ for all } s_1 \leq s_2,
\]

(52)

\[
\int_0^s Q_c \left( s \right) ds \leq L_c, \text{ for all } c \in C,
\]

(53)
where \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \) and \( \lambda'_c = \lambda_c \) for all \( c \neq c_0 \). Now consider \( \tilde{Q}_1(\cdot), \ldots, \tilde{Q}_C(\cdot) \) such that

\[
\tilde{Q}_{c_0}(s) \equiv e^{-(\lambda_{c_0} - \lambda'_{c_0})(S_{c_0} - s)} Q_{c_0}(s) + \frac{\lambda'_{c_0} e^{-\lambda'_{c_0} s}}{1 - e^{-\lambda'_{c_0} s}} \int_{S_{c_0-1}}^{S_{c_0}} \left[ 1 - e^{-(\lambda_{c_0} - \lambda'_{c_0})(S_{c_0}-t)} \right] Q_{c_0}(t) \, dt, \text{ for all } s \in \mathcal{S},
\]

and

\[
\tilde{Q}_c(s) \equiv Q_c(s), \text{ for all } s \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } c \neq c_0.
\]

Since \( Q_1(\cdot), \ldots, Q_C(\cdot) \) satisfy the initial resource and technological constraints, as described by equations (3) and (4), \( \tilde{Q}_1(\cdot), \ldots, \tilde{Q}_C(\cdot) \) must satisfy, by construction, the new resource and technological constraints, as described by equations (52) and (53). Since \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), we must also have

\[
\tilde{Q}_{c_0}(1) + \tilde{Q}_C(1) = \frac{\lambda_{c_0} e^{-\lambda_{c_0} 1}}{1 - e^{-\lambda_{c_0} 1}} \int_{S_{c_0-1}}^{S_{c_0}} \left[ 1 - e^{-(\lambda_{c_0} - \lambda'_{c_0})(S_{c_0}-t)} \right] Q_{c_0}(t) \, dt + Q_C > Q_C.
\]

Since \( Q'_C \geq \tilde{Q}_{c_0}(1) + \tilde{Q}_C(1) \), the previous inequality implies \( Q'_C > Q_C \). Combining this observation with equation (36) and the fact that \( c_0 \neq C \), which implies \( \lambda'_C = \lambda_C \), we get \( N'_C < N_C \). To conclude the proof of Step 1, note that if \( N'_c < N_c \) for \( c > c_0 + 1 \), then \( \lambda'_{c-1} = \lambda_{c-1} \) and equation (23)—the fact that \( \partial N_c/\partial N_{c-1} > 0 \)—implies \( N'_{c-1} < N_{c-1} \). Thus by iteration, \( N'_c < N_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \).

**Step 2:** If \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), then \( N'_c > N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \).

We first show by contradiction that if \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \) and \( c_0 > 1 \), then \( N'_1 > N_1 \). Suppose that \( N'_1 \leq N_1 \). Since \( \lambda'_c = \lambda_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \), we can use equation (23)—the fact that \( \partial N_c/\partial N_{c-1} > 0 \) —to establish by iteration that \( N'_c \leq N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Since \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), \( \lambda'_{c_0-1} = \lambda_{c_0-1} \), and \( N'_{c_0-1} \leq N_{c_0-1} \), we can use equation (23)—the facts that \( \partial N_c/\partial N_{c-1} > 0 \) and \( \partial N_c/\partial \lambda_c > 0 \)—to establish that \( N'_{c_0} < N_{c_0} \). By Step 1, we also know that \( N'_c < N_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \). This implies \( \sum_{c=1}^{C} N'_c = S'_c - S'_0 < S_C - S_0 = \sum_{c=1}^{C} N_c \), which contradicts \( S'_C - S'_0 = S_C - S_0 = 1 \) by Lemma 2. At this point, we have established that if \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \) and \( c_0 > 1 \), then \( N'_1 > N_1 \). To conclude the proof of Step 2, note that if \( N'_c > N_c \) for \( c < c_0 - 1 \), then \( \lambda'_c = \lambda_c \), \( \lambda'_{c+1} = \lambda_{c+1} \), and equation (23) imply \( N'_{c+1} > N_{c+1} \). Thus by iteration, \( N'_c > N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Part I directly derives from Steps 1 and 2.

**Part II:** If \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), then \( S'_c \geq S_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \).

The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.

**Step 1:** If \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), then \( S'_c \geq S_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \).

The proof is identical to the proof of Step 1 Part II of Proposition 4 and omitted.

**Step 2:** If \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \), then \( S'_{c-1} \geq S_{c-1} \) for all \( c \leq c_0 \).

We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that \( S'_0 = S_0 = 0 \). Thus \( S'_{c-1} \geq S_{c-1} \) is satisfied for \( c = 1 \). Let us now show that if \( S'_{c-1} \geq S_{c-1} \) and \( c < c_0 \), then \( S'_c \geq S_c \). Since \( c < c_0 \), \( \lambda'_{c_0} < \lambda_{c_0} \) and Part I imply \( N'_c > N_c \). Combining this observation with \( S'_{c-1} \geq S_{c-1} \) and the definition of \( N_c = S_c - S_{c-1} \), we obtain \( S'_c \geq S_c \). This completes the proof of Step 2. Part II directly derives from Steps 1 and 2.
Part III: If \( \lambda'_c < \lambda_c \), then there exist \( c_0 < c_1 \leq C \) such that \( (w_{c+1}/w_c)' \geq w_{c+1}/w_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \); 
\[ (w_{c+1}/w_c)'' \leq w_{c+1}/w_c; \] 
\( (w_{c+1}/w_c)' \geq w_{c+1}/w_c \) for all \( c < c_1 \); and \( (w_{c+1}/w_c)' \leq w_{c+1}/w_c \) for all \( c_1 \leq c < C \).

The proof of Part III proceeds in four steps.

**Step 1:** If \( \lambda'_c < \lambda_c \), then \( (w_{c+1}/w_c)' > (w_{c+1}/w_c) \) for all \( c < c_0 \).

By Part I, we know that \( N'_e > N_c \) for all \( c < c_0 \). Thus we can use the same argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that \( (w_{c+1}/w_c)' > (w_{c+1}/w_c) \) for all \( c < c_0 \).

**Step 2:** If \( \lambda'_c < \lambda_c \) and \( c_0 > 1 \), then \( S'_c - S'_{c_0-1} < \frac{\lambda'_c}{\lambda_c} (S'_c - S'_{c_0-1}) \).

In the proof of Step 2, we let \( Q'(s) \) and \( p'(s) \), denote the output at stage \( s \) and the price of stage \( s \) if the failure rate in country \( c_0 \) is equal to \( \lambda'_c \). From Equation (36), we have

\[ Q_1 = \frac{\lambda_1 L_1 e^{-\lambda_1 N_1}}{1 - e^{-\lambda_1 N_1}}. \]

Similarly, we have

\[ Q'(S_1) = \frac{\lambda_1 L_1 e^{-\lambda_1 N'_1}}{1 - e^{-\lambda_1 N'_1}}, \]

where \( L_1 \) is the population in county 1 employed in producing goods \((0, S_1)\) when the failure rate of country \( c_0 \) is \( \lambda'_c \). The two previous equations, together with \( N'_1 > N_1 \) and \( L_1 < L_1 \), therefore, imply \( Q'(S_1) < Q_1 \). Assume that \( Q'(S_c) < Q_c \) holds for some \( 1 \leq c \leq c_0 - 2 \). Since \( c + 1 < c_0 \),

\[
Q_{c+1} = e^{-\lambda_{c+1} N_{c+1}} Q_c \\
> e^{-\lambda_{c+1} (S_{c+1} - S'_c + S'_{c-1} - S_c)} Q'(S_c) \\
\geq e^{-\lambda_c (S'_c - S_c)} e^{-\lambda_{c+1} (S_{c+1} - S'_c)} Q'(S_c) \\
= e^{-\lambda_{c+1} (S_{c+1} - S'_c)} Q'(S'_c) \\
= Q'(S_{c+1}).
\]

Therefore, by iteration,

\[ Q'(S_c) < Q_c \text{ for all } 1 \leq c \leq c_0 - 1. \] (54)

By equation (54), which implies \( Q'(S_{c_0-1}) < Q_{c_0-1} \), and equation (1), we have

\[
Q'_{c_0} = e^{-\lambda_{c_0} (S'_{c_0} - S'_{c_0-1}) - \lambda_{c_0-1} (S'_{c_0-1} - S_{c_0-1})} Q'(S_{c_0-1}) \\
< e^{-\lambda_{c_0} (S'_{c_0} - S'_{c_0-1}) - \lambda_{c_0-1} (S'_{c_0-1} - S_{c_0-1})} Q_{c_0-1}. \] (55)

Equation (6) implies

\[ Q_{c_0} = e^{-\lambda_{c_0} (S_{c_0} - S_{c_0-1})} Q_{c_0-1}. \] (56)

By the proof of Part I of Proposition 5, we have \( N'_{c_0+1} < N_{c_0+1} \). Equation (35) and \( N'_{c_0+1} < N_{c_0+1} \) imply \( Q'_{c_0} > Q_{c_0} \). Equation (55), equation (56), and \( Q'_{c_0} > Q_{c_0} \) imply

\[ e^{-\lambda_{c_0} (S'_{c_0} - S'_{c_0-1}) - \lambda_{c_0-1} (S'_{c_0-1} - S_{c_0-1})} > e^{-\lambda_{c_0} (S_{c_0} - S_{c_0-1})}. \]
which implies
\[
S'_{c0} - S'_{c0-1} < \frac{\lambda'_{c0}}{\lambda_{c0}} (S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}) - \frac{\lambda_{c0-1} - \lambda_{c0}}{\lambda'_{c0}} (S_{c0-1} - S_{c0-1}) \leq \frac{\lambda_{c0}}{\lambda_{c0}} (S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}),
\]
concluding the proof of Step 2.

**Step 3:** If \( \lambda'_{c0} < \lambda_{c0} \) and \( c_0 < C \), then \( (w_{c0+1}/w_{c0})' \leq w_{c0+1}/w_{c0} \).

By Part II, there exists, \( \Lambda \), a small neighborhood of \( \lambda_{c0} \), such that if the failure rate in country \( c_0 \) is equal to \( \lambda'_{c0} \in \Lambda \) and \( \lambda'_{c0} < \lambda_{c0} \), the following sequence of inequalities holds:
\[
S_1 < S'_1 < S_2 < S'_2 < \ldots < S_{c0-1} < S'_{c0-1} < S_{c0} < S'_c < S_{c0+1} < \ldots,
\]
where \( (S'_1, \ldots, S'_C) \) denote the pattern of vertical specialization if the failure rate in country \( c_0 \) is equal to \( \lambda'_{c0} \). In exactly the same way as we have proceeded in Part III of Proposition 4, one can show by iteration that
\[
\frac{p'(S'_{c0-1})}{w'_{c0}} \leq \frac{p(S'_{c0-1})}{w_{c0}}.
\]

Notice that the fact that failure rate in country \( c_0 \) falls from \( \lambda_{c0} \) to \( \lambda'_{c0} \) only loosens the inequality.

Equations (9) and (2) imply
\[
\frac{w'_{c0+1}}{w'_{c0}} - 1 = (\lambda'_{c0} - \lambda_{c0+1}) \left[ \frac{p(S'_{c0-1})}{w_{c0}} e^{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1})} + \frac{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}) - 1}{\lambda'_{c0}} \right].
\]

From Step 2, we therefore have
\[
\frac{w'_{c0+1}}{w'_{c0}} - 1 < (\lambda'_{c0} - \lambda_{c0+1}) \left[ \frac{p(S'_{c0-1})}{w_{c0}} e^{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1})} + \frac{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}) - 1}{\lambda'_{c0}} \right]. \quad (57)
\]

Equation (57) and \( \lambda'_{c0} < \lambda_{c0} \) imply
\[
\frac{w'_{c0+1}}{w'_{c0}} - 1 < (\lambda_{c0} - \lambda_{c0+1}) \left[ \frac{p(S'_{c0-1})}{w_{c0}} e^{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1})} + \frac{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}) - 1}{\lambda_{c0}} \right]. \quad (58)
\]

Equations (9) and (2) imply
\[
\frac{w_{c0+1}}{w_{c0}} - 1 = (\lambda_{c0} - \lambda_{c0+1}) \left[ \frac{p(S'_{c0-1})}{w_{c0}} e^{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1})} + \frac{\lambda_{c0}(S_{c0} - S'_{c0-1}) - 1}{\lambda_{c0}} \right]. \quad (59)
\]

Finally, equations (58) and (59) imply \( w'_{c0+1}/w'_{c0} < w_{c0+1}/w_{c0} \).

**Step 4:** If \( \lambda'_{c0} < \lambda_{c0} \), then there exists \( c_0 < c_1 \leq C \) such that \( (w_{c+1}/w_{c})' \geq w_{c+1}/w_{c} \) for all \( c_0 < c < c_1 \); and \( (w_{c+1}/w_{c})' \leq w_{c+1}/w_{c} \) for all \( c_1 \leq c < C \).

By Part I, we also know that \( N'_c > N_c \) for all \( c > c_0 \). Thus we can again use the same argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if there exists \( \bar{c} > c_0 \) such that \( (w_{\bar{c}+1}/w_{\bar{c}})' < (w_{\bar{c}+1}/w_{\bar{c}}) \), then \( (w_{\bar{c}+1}/w_{\bar{c}})' < (w_{c+1}/w_{c})' \) for all \( \bar{c} \leq c < C \). To conclude the proof
of Step 4, let us just define \( c_1 \equiv \inf \{ c > c_0 \mid (w_{c+1}/w_c) < (w_{c+1}/w_c) \} \). By construction, \( w_{c+1}/w_c \) rises for all \( c_0 < c < c_1 \) and falls for all \( c_1 < c < C \). This concludes the proof of Part III. QED.

D Proofs (IV): Extensions

Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 1, we already know that Lemma 4 is true if \( \delta = 1 \). In the rest of this proof we therefore assume that \( \delta < 1 \). We proceed in two steps.

Step 1: In any competitive equilibrium, \( C^u \) is a step-function for all \( u \in [0, Q^W] \).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that \( C^u \) is not a step-function. In this case, the number of international transactions associated with the production of that particular unit must be infinite. Thus the cost of producing that unit must be infinite as well, which is incompatible with zero profits.

Step 2: In any competitive equilibrium, \( C^u \) is increasing in \( s \) for all \( u \in [0, Q^W] \).

Let us start by computing the expected cost of producing a given unit \( u \). By Step 1, we know that there must be a sequence of countries \( \{ c_1^u, ..., c_n^u \} \) and stages \( \{ s_1^u, ..., s_n^u \} \) such that: (i) \( c_k^u \neq c_{k+1}^u \) for all \( k = 1, ..., n-1 \); (ii) \( s_0^u = 0 < s_1^u < ... < s_{n-1}^u < s_n^u = S \); and (iii) \( C^u(s) = c_k^u \) for all \( s \in (s_{k-1}^u, s_k^u) \). Let \( p_k^u \) denote the cost of producing that unit up to stage \( s_k^u \). By the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 3, we know that \( \{ p_1^u, ..., p_n^u \} \) satisfy

\[
p_k^u = e^{\lambda c_k^u N_k^u} p_{k-1}^u + \left( e^{\lambda c_k^u N_k^u} - 1 \right) \left( w_{c_k^u}/\lambda c_k^u \right),
\]

where \( N_k^u \equiv s_k^u - s_{k-1}^u \). Using the previous expression and iterating, it is then easy to check that the expected cost of producing unit \( u \) is given by

\[
\tilde{p}_n^u = \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^n \left[ \prod_{k' > k} e^{\lambda c_{k'}^u N_{k'}^u} \left( e^{\lambda c_k^u N_k^u} - 1 \right) \left( w_{c_k^u}/\lambda c_k^u \right) \right] \right\} / \delta^n.
\]

The rest of our proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that \( C^u \) is not weakly increasing. Then there must exist \( k_0 \in \{ 1, ..., n-1 \} \) and \( c > c' \) such that \( c_{k_0}^u = c \) and \( c_{k_0+1}^u = c' \). Suppose, in addition, that \( N_{k_0}^u = s_{k_0}^u - s_{k_0-1}^u \leq s_{k_0+1}^u - s_{k_0}^u = N_{k_0+1}^u \). The other case can be treated in a similar manner. Now consider an alternative allocation of stages to countries, \( \tilde{C}^u \), in which country \( c' \) produces all stages from \( s_{k_0-1}^u \) to \( s_{k_0}^u \) and \( c \) produces all stages from \( s_{k_0+1}^u - N_{k_0}^u \) to \( s_{k_0+1}^u \). The rest of the allocation of stages to countries is the same as in \( C^u \). Let \( \tilde{p}_n^u \) denote the expect unit cost of the final good associated with \( \tilde{C}^u \):

\[
\tilde{p}_n^u = \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{k_0-1} \left[ \prod_{k' > k} e^{\lambda c_{k'}^u N_{k'}^u} \right] \left( e^{\lambda c_{k_0}^u N_{k_0}^u} - 1 \right) \left( w_{c_{k_0}^u}/\lambda c_{k_0}^u \right) + \left[ \prod_{k' > k_0+1} e^{\lambda c_{k'}^u N_{k'}^u} \right] \left( e^{\lambda c_{k_0}^u N_{k_0}^u} - 1 \right) (w_{c'}/\lambda c') + \prod_{k' > k_0+1} e^{\lambda c_{k'}^u N_{k'}^u} \left( e^{\lambda c_{k_0}^u N_{k_0}^u} - 1 \right) (w_{c'}/\lambda c') + \sum_{k > k_0+1} \left[ \prod_{k' > k} e^{\lambda c_{k'}^u N_{k'}^u} \right] \left( e^{\lambda c_{k_0}^u N_{k_0}^u} - 1 \right) \left( w_{c_{k_0}^u}/\lambda c_{k_0}^u \right) \right\} / \delta^n.
\]

where, by construction, we must have \( \tilde{n} \leq n \). Under perfect competition, we know that unit costs
of production must be minimized. Thus we must have \( \tilde{p}_n^u \geq p_n^u \). Since \( \tilde{n} \leq n \), this further requires

\[
\left[ e^{\lambda c_0 N_c^u} \left( \prod_{k' > k_0 + 1} e^{\lambda w_k N_c^u} \right) \right] \frac{w_c}{\lambda c_0} - 1) + \left[ e^{\lambda w_k N_c^u} \right] \left( e^{\lambda c_0 N_c^u} - 1 \right) \frac{w_c}{\lambda c_0},
\]

which simplifies into \( w_c \gamma \geq (\lambda c_0 / \lambda c) w_c > w_c \). But if the previous inequality holds, then starting from the allocation \( C^u \), the cost of producing unit \( u \) could be strictly lowered by performing all tasks in \( (s^u_{k_0 - 1}, s^u_{k_0 + 1}) \) in country \( c \): it reduces the rate of mistakes, it reduces wages, and it reduces the number of international transactions. Since unit costs must be minimized in any competitive equilibrium, we have established, by contradiction, that \( C^u \) is increasing in \( s \) for all \( u \in [0, Q^W] \).

QED.

**Proof of Lemma 5.** We proceed in two steps.

**Step 1:** In any free trade equilibrium, if \( A_c < L_c \), then \( A_{c'} = 0 \) for all \( c' > c \).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist \( c' > c \) such that \( A_{c'} > 0 \) and \( A_c < L_c \). Since the production function for the final good, \( F \), is identical across countries, zero profits in the final good sector and \( A_{c'} > 0 \) require \( w_{c'} \geq w_c \). Since \( \lambda_{c'} < \lambda_c \), the unit cost of production of any intermediate good in any chain is then lower in country \( c' \) than in country \( c \), thereby contradicting \( A_c < L_c \).

**Step 2:** In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages \( S_0 \equiv 0 \leq S_1 \leq ... \leq S_C = S \) such that for all \( n \in N \), \( s \in S \), and \( c \in C \), \( Q^n_c (s) > 0 \) if and only if \( s \in (S_{c-1}, S_c] \).

Using the same argument as in Lemma 1, one can easily show that for all \( n \in \mathcal{N} \), there exist \( S_0^n \equiv 0 \leq S_1^n \leq ... \leq S_C^n = S \) such that for all \( s \in S \) and \( c \in C \), \( Q^n_c (s) > 0 \) if and only if \( s \in (S_{c-1}^n, S_c^n] \). Let us now show that for all \( n, n' \in \mathcal{N} \) and \( c \in C \), \( S_c^n = S_{c'}^{n'} \). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that there exist \( n, n', c \) such that \( S_c^n < S_{c'}^{n'} \). Let \( c_1 \equiv \inf \{ c \in C | S_c^n < S_{c'}^{n'} \} \), \( c_2 \equiv \inf \{ c' \geq c_1 | S_{c'}^{n'} > S_c^{n'} \} \), and \( \Delta \equiv \min \{ S_{c_1}^{n'} - S_c^n, S_{c_2}^{n'} - S_{c'}^{n'} \} \). By construction, \( c_1 \) produces all intermediate goods \( s \in (S_c^n, S_{c_1}^{n'} + \Delta] \) in chain \( n \), whereas \( c_2 \) produces all intermediate goods \( s \in (S_c^{n'}, S_{c_2}^{n'} + \Delta] \) in chain \( n' \). Thus for all \( \delta \in (0, \Delta] \), condition (2) implies

\[
\begin{align*}
\rho^{n'} (S_c^n + \delta) &= e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} \rho^n (S_c^n) + (e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} - 1) (w_{c_1} / \lambda_{c_1}), \\
\rho^n (S_c^n + \delta) &= e^{\lambda c_2 \delta} \rho^n (S_c^n) + (e^{\lambda c_2 \delta} - 1) (w_{c_2} / \lambda_{c_2}), \\
\rho^{n'} (S_{c'}^{n'} + \delta) &\leq e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} \rho^{n'} (S_{c'}^{n'}) + (e^{\lambda c_2 \delta} - 1) (w_{c_2} / \lambda_{c_2}), \\
\rho^n (S_{c'}^{n'} + \delta) &\leq e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} \rho^n (S_{c'}^{n'}) + (e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} - 1) (w_{c_1} / \lambda_{c_1}),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \rho^n (\cdot) \) and \( \rho^{n'} (\cdot) \) represent the price of intermediate goods in chains \( n \) and \( n' \), respectively. By definition of \( c_1 \), we know that \( \rho^n (S_c^n) = p_c \). Thus the four previous conditions imply

\[
e^{\lambda c_1 \delta} (p_c + w_{c_1} / \lambda_{c_1}) - e^{\lambda c_2 \delta} (p_c + w_{c_2} / \lambda_{c_2}) + (w_{c_2} / \lambda_{c_2}) - (w_{c_1} / \lambda_{c_1}) = 0.
\]

Since the previous equation holds for all \( \delta \in (0, \Delta] \), \( \lambda_{c_1} \neq \lambda_{c_2} \) implies \( p_c + w_{c_1} / \lambda_{c_1} = p_c + w_{c_2} / \lambda_{c_2} = 0 \), which contradicts \( w_{c_1}, w_{c_2} > 0 \).

Lemma 5 follows directly from Steps 1 and 2. QED.
Proof of Lemma 1 with heterogeneous stages. Following the exact same strategy as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can easily show that \( p(\cdot) \) is continuous and strictly increasing in \( s \) and that \( w_c \) is strictly increasing in \( c \). Let us now show that if \( c_2 > c_1 \) and \( Q_{c_1}(s_1) > 0 \), then \( Q_{c_2}(s) = 0 \) for all \( s < s_1 \). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, \( c_2 > c_1 \), and two intermediate goods, \( s_1 > s_2 > 0 \), such that \( c_1 \) produces \( s_1 \) and \( c_2 \) produces \( s_2 \). Profit maximization now requires

\[
\begin{align*}
p(s_1) &= [1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_1) \, ds] \, p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_1} \, ds, \\
p(s_2) &= [1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_2) \, ds] \, p(s_2 - ds) + w_{c_2} \, ds, \\
p(s_1) &\leq [1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) \, ds] \, p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_2} \, ds, \\
p(s_2) &\leq [1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \, ds] \, p(s_2 - ds) + w_{c_1} \, ds.
\end{align*}
\]

Combining the four previous expressions, we get

\[
\{[1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) \, ds] \, p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_2} \, ds\} \{[1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \, ds] \, p(s_2 - ds) + w_{c_1} \, ds\} 
\geq \quad [[1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_1) \, ds] \, p(s_1 - ds) + w_{c_1} \, ds], \\
\]

which can be rearranged as

\[
\begin{align*}
&[1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) \, ds] \, [p(s_1 - ds) - p(s_2 - ds)] \, w_{c_1} \\
&\geq [1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \, ds] \, [p(s_1 - ds) - p(s_2 - ds)] \, w_{c_2} \\
&+ [\lambda_{c_1}(s_1) + \lambda_{c_2}(s_2) - \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) - \lambda_{c_1}(s_2)] \, p(s_2 - ds) \, p(s_1 - ds)
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( \lambda_c(s) \) is weakly submodular in \((s,c)\), \( c_2 > c_1 \) and \( s_1 > s_2 \) imply \( \lambda_{c_1}(s_1) + \lambda_{c_2}(s_2) - \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) - \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \geq 0 \). Thus the previous inequality implies

\[
\begin{align*}
&[1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) \, ds] \, [p(s_1 - ds) - p(s_2 - ds)] \, w_{c_1} \\
&\geq [1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \, ds] \, [p(s_1 - ds) - p(s_2 - ds)] \, w_{c_2}
\end{align*}
\] (60)

Since \( p(s) \) is strictly increasing in \( s \), we know that \( p(s_1 - ds) - p(s_2 - ds) > 0 \). Thus inequality (60) further implies

\[
[1 + \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) \, ds] \, w_{c_1} \geq [1 + \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \, ds] \, w_{c_2}.
\] (61)

Finally, since \( \lambda_c(s) \) is strictly decreasing in \( c \) and weakly increasing in \( s \), \( c_2 > c_1 \) and \( s_1 > s_2 \) imply \( \lambda_{c_2}(s_1) < \lambda_{c_1}(s_2) \). Inequality (61) therefore implies \( w_{c_1} > w_{c_2} \), which contradicts \( w_c \) strictly increasing in \( c \). The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and omitted. QED. ■