Explanation, Extrapolation, and Existence

Stephen Yablo
MIT
yablo@mit.edu

April 16, 2012

Abstract

Colyvan [2010] raises two problems for “easy road” nominalism about mathematical objects. The first is that a theory’s mathematical commitments may run too deep to permit the extraction of nominalistic content. Taking the math out is, or could be, like taking the hobbits out of Lord of the Rings. I agree with the “could be,” but not (or not yet) the “is.” A notion of logical subtraction is developed that supports the possibility, questioned by Colyvan, of bracketing a theory’s mathematical aspects to obtain, as remainder, what it says “mathematics aside.” The other problem concerns explanation. Several grades of mathematical involvement in physical explanation are distinguished, by analogy with Quine’s three grades of modal involvement. The first two grades plausibly obtain, but they do not require mathematical objects. The third grade is likelier to require mathematical objects. But it is not clear from Colyvan’s example that the third grade really obtains.

1 How math helps

Quine bases his case for platonism on the role that mathematics plays in natural science. Nominalists do not deny this role. They argue that math can play it without being true—or, if this is different, without being TRUE in a sense that requires the existence of mathematical objects. It’s a two-stage argument, in most cases. The nominalist begins by identifying a certain something as “math’s contribution.” She then tries to show that a theory’s truth-value is beside the point when it comes to contributing in the specified way.

But there is a suppressed premise here, to the effect that math does not also contribute in other ways, which do require it to be true. This is where Colyvan sees a problem (Colyvan [2010]). Nominalists have been overlooking, or underestimating, the role math plays in (i)
fixing physical contents, and (ii) explaining physical outcomes. They make the first mistake when they assume that a theory’s nominalistic content can be obtained simply by skimming the mathematical froth off the top. They make the second mistake when they neglect the possibility of physical phenomena obtaining for partly mathematical reasons.

2 Theft vs honest Field work

Neither mistake can be pinned on Field, Colyvan thinks. He specifies $T$’s nominalistic content directly, by way of an explicitly formulated nominalistic sub-theory of $T$; it is not the result of some obscure de-mathification process. And far from overlooking the possibility of math playing a descriptive or explanatory role, he considers and rejects it.\footnote{[T]here may be observations that we want to formulate that we don’t see how to formulate without reference to numbers, or there may be explanations that we want to state that we can’t see how to state without reference to numbers...if such circumstances do arise, then we will have to genuinely accept numerical theory if we are not to reduce our ability to formulate our observations or our explanations....My own view is that such circumstances do not arise’ (Field [1989], pp.161-2, italics added). This interesting passage anticipates the main themes of Colyvan’s paper.} Colyvan’s concern is with post-Fieldian nominalists who, as he sees it, are oblivious to, or cavalier about, the full range of what math can do.

Nominalists have not ignored the possibility of multiple contributions. Math is mainly a theoretical-juice extractor for Field, but expressive and explanatory contributions come in for consideration as well (as just noted). He calls attention to the use of mathematical methods in logic, seeking to account for it, too, ‘without assuming the truth of the mathematics that is being applied’ (Field [1984], p.95). Math’s role in (re)configuring information structure—this is the term used by linguists for the ways a given truth-conditional content can be organized and displayed—are stressed by Hofweber and Yablo.\footnote{Hofweber [2005], Yablo [1998, 2005]. See also Gaifman et al. [1990]. As Colyvan says on p.286, I am more of an anti-platonist than a nominalist (Yablo [2009]).} A kind of “clutch plate” function is pointed out by Maddy. Researchers may not know what in a theory is supposed to be true, as opposed to playing a placeholder or bookkeeping role. Is that four-dimensional manifold a bona fide spatiotemporal entity, or just a way of representing distances? If the first, which of its properties (density, continuity) are supposed to really belong to this entity, and which are posited for some other reason? Framing the theory mathematically enables us to postpone this decision until we feel ready to make it.\footnote{See Maddy [1997]. She cites a remark of Einstein’s: ‘Adhering to the continuum originates with me not in a prejudice, but arises out of the fact that I have been unable to think up anything organic to take its place’ (quoted at p.151). Godfrey-Smith makes a related observation in his work on model-based science (Godfrey-Smith [2009]).}
### 3 Two roads

That nominalists have not been blind to these issues doesn’t mean that they have noticed, or properly appreciated, the contributions highlighted by Colyvan. Is he right that the easy road bends back toward the hard one, when we bear those contributions in mind? Let’s first remind ourselves of what the roads are.

The hard road is the one mapped out by Field in *Science Without Numbers* (Field [1980]). It begins by splitting a scientific theory $T$ into nominalistic and mathematical subtheories $N$ and $M$. One shows that $T$ is conservative over $N$, in the sense that any nominalistic consequence of $T$ is provable already from $N$. ‘Conservative over’ being a relation on theories, we are to think of $N$ as linguistic in nature—as made up of sentences—rather than as the proposition $N$—a set of models or worlds, perhaps—that the sentences express.

The easy roads have been multiplying, and I would not want to attempt a full survey. I will focus on Melia’s *way of the weasel* and Yablo’s *hermeneutic trail*. Both employ a strategy of ‘saying less with more.’ Both have us quasi-asserting $T$ to really assert $T$’s nominalistic content $N$. Both construe $N$ on the model of ‘what $T$ says about the physical world.’ Both claim it as an advantage of this approach that it does not require us to formulate a nominalistic theory $N$ over which $T$ is conservative. One simply repeats the original theory $T$, on the understanding that one is vouching only for what it says where the physical world is concerned.

This claimed advantage is what Colyvan calls into question. The easy approach ‘cannot succeed without presupposing the success of Field’s nominalisation program—or something like it’ (Colyvan [2010], p. 287).

Colyvan does not clearly explain what ‘something like it’ means here. On one reading, he is claiming that easy-roaders, no less than Field, must find for each viable physical theory $T$ a nominalistic subtheory $N$ that captures its nominalistic content. This seems too strong. Colyvan concedes the possibility of essential metaphors in science. This is tantamount, in the present context, to accepting that there can be $T$’s that are not amenable to the kind of nominalistic paraphrase that is provided by $N$.

Is it that easy-roaders are committed to $T$ having a nominalistic content in the first place? This seems too weak. Nominalistic content is not an unwanted commitment of the view under discussion; it is an essential part of that view. The easy road is easy because $N$ is not held hostage to the existence of a theory $N$ that expresses it. A commitment that is not unwanted might still be objectionable, of course. My point is just that a commitment

---

4 This is rough; see Field [1980], pp. 10-14 for details.

5 Many believe that metaphors without literal translation can carry descriptive content. For the purposes of the present debate, I will grant this and instead press the point in terms of explanation. Indeed, I think a better case can be made in terms of explanation since it is very common among scientific realists, at least, to take explanations to be ontologically committing’ (Colyvan [2010], p. 301).
to nominalistic content is not a commitment to ‘something like’ Field’s program. The point of contention between two views should not be billed as an overlooked point of agreement between them.

I said that the easy road is meant to take us straight to \( N \), with no detour through any nominalistic theory \( N \). I did not say how this is supposed to work. I used to conceive \( N \) as made up of all and only worlds whose physical character is such as to make \( T \) pretense-worthy in a certain metaphorical make-believe game.\textsuperscript{6} But that way of putting it is apt to be misunderstood. ‘Pretense’ sounds like making as if you believe, when you don’t—and all I meant by it is being as if you believe, without regard to whether the belief is true. The construction in those earlier papers can, however, be replayed in the key of weaseling. Tactical, assertorically inert, presuppositions take the place of mathematical make-believe.\textsuperscript{7} The problem of specifying \( N \) becomes an instance of the general problem of scaling a stronger hypothesis back to a weaker one.\textsuperscript{8}

This general problem can be approached in two ways. Melia approaches it \textit{negatively}, by way of assumptions-taken-back-at-the-end.\textsuperscript{9} But a positive approach is possible too, in which we look for the part of our statement that concerns some salient subject matter.\textsuperscript{10} \( N \) on the negative approach is the \textit{remainder} when we subtract from \( T \) its mathematical component \( M \). \( N \) on the positive approach is the part of \( T \) that concerns the \textit{physical}.\textsuperscript{11}

Now we come to Colyvan’s objections. One, directed at Melia, concerns \( T \)’s nominalistic content. Why think that \( N \) is well-defined, absent a theory \( N \) such \( N \) is the set of \( N \)-worlds? Colyvan’s other objection, directed primarily at me, is this: supposing that \( N \) is well-defined, how can it do the same explanatory work as \( T \), given that \( T \)’s mathematical bits may well be explanatorily essential?

## 4 Nominalistic content

Start with weaseling’s ability to deliver a determinate content.\textsuperscript{12} Colyvan asks why there should be anything worthwhile left, when \( T \)’s mathematical implications are taken back at the end. Not only do we lack a well-defined general notion of logical remainder, we know of cases where there is definitely no such thing as \( A \)’s surplus content vis a vis a weaker

\textsuperscript{6}In the papers discussed by Colyvan.
\textsuperscript{7}“Assertoric inertia” is Larry Horn’s term (Horn [2002], Horn [2011]). See also Abbott [2000].
\textsuperscript{8}Yablo [2006], Yablo [ms]. For a linguistic perspective, see Von Fintel [1993] and Gajewski [(ms].
\textsuperscript{9}But see footnote 9 of Melia [2000].
\textsuperscript{10}I follow Lewis [1988] in treating subject matters \( m \) as equivalence relations on worlds. Worlds are equivalent where the \textit{number of stars} is concerned iff they have equally many stars. Worlds are equivalent where the physical is concerned iff they are physically indiscernible. \( S \) is true about \( m \) if it can be made true, \textit{period}, without changing how matters stand with respect to \( m \).
\textsuperscript{11}The part of \( S \) about \( m \) is a proposition true in \( w \) just if \( S \) is true about \( m \) in \( w \).
\textsuperscript{12}This section is a ‘friend of the court’ brief. Melia may see things differently.
hypothesis \( B \). Suppose \( A \) is *Lord of the Rings* and \( B \) states the existence of hobbits. One looks in vain for an \( R \) that is suitably independent of \( B \) and such that \( A \) is equivalent to \( B \& R \). Try to subtract *The tomato is red* from *The tomato is scarlet* (Searle and Körner [1959], Woods [1967], Kraemer [1986]). Try to subtract *Someone is thirsty* from *I’m thirsty*, or *I swam* from *I swam three laps*.

Wittgenstein suggests an example in this neighborhood. What is left, if we subtract from a man’s raising his arm the fact of that arm going up (Wittgenstein [1953], para. 621, Jaeger [1973], Hudson [1975])? The usual answer is: his trying to raise it. But someone’s trying to raise an arm that does in fact go up does not imply that they raised it—the arm might have been blown up by some lucky gust of wind—and it would seem a natural condition on \( A-B \) that it should combine with \( B \) to imply \( A \). Is \( A-B \) his trying effectively to raise it? Not that either, for his effectively trying to raise his arm entails all by itself that the arm goes up. \( A-B \) should not imply \( A \) all by itself, but only when combined with \( B \).

Implications cannot be relied on in general to be detachable from their impliers. If a theory’s nominalistic content is \( T \) stripped of its mathematical implications, then nominalistic contents cannot be assumed to exist. Why would \( M \) be any more detachable from \( T \) than a tomato’s redness is detachable from its particular shade of red, or the existence of hobbits is detachable from *Lord of the Rings*? These are good questions. But, on the one hand, it is not clear the easy-roader has to answer them. Subtraction might not be the only way of scaling a content back (section 4.1). And on the other hand, it’s not clear that she can’t answer them. Subtraction is not quite as chancy an affair as we have been led to believe (section 4.2).

4.1 The high road

The easy road divides into sub-roads, corresponding to the two forms of weaseling distinguished earlier. One way to cut \( A \) back (the low road) is to strip away an unwanted implication \( B \). Colyvan has raised doubts about this approach. But he does not consider the high-road strategy of carving out the part of \( A \) that concerns some pertinent subject matter \( m \).

Could this, too, be ill-defined? Lewis comes very close to defining it. A hypothesis is wholly about \( m \), according to Lewis, if its truth-value never differs between \( m \)-equivalent worlds. The property of being wholly about \( m \) is closed under conjunction, so if we let \( A/m \) be the conjunction of those of \( A \)’s consequences that are wholly about \( m \), \( A/m \) will be wholly about \( m \) as well. This makes \( A/m \) a natural candidate for the role of “what \( A \) says about \( m \).”

\( A \) has definite implications for \( m \) just to the extent that \( A/m \) is evaluable in arbitrarily given worlds. Evaluation proceeds as follows: \( A/m \) is false in \( w \) if \( A \)’s falsity there is guaranteed already by \( w \)’s \( m \)-condition. (As *The number of goblins > 0* is false, whether there are
numbers or not, thanks to the nonexistence of goblins.) It is true in \(w\) if \(A\) is true there as far as \(w\)’s m-condition is concerned. (The number of goblins = 0 is false, if it is, not for goblin-ish reasons, but because there aren’t any numbers.) \(A/m\) is true (false) in the worlds that can (cannot) be \(A\)-ified with no change in how matters stand m-wise. Let \(T\) be Newtonian mechanics. The part of \(T\) that concerns the physical is the proposition \(T/p\) that is true in \(w\) if (i) Newtonian mechanics is true outright in \(w\), or (ii) it is true there but for the absence of mathematical objects. The test, again, is whether, to turn \(w\) into a world where \(T\) is true outright, one needs to tamper with \(w\)’s physical condition.

Another Lewisian notion may be helpful here. Two subject matters are orthogonal, he says, when the state of things with respect to one puts no constraints on the state of things where the other is concerned. The number of cats is orthogonal to the number of dogs, since the size of the cat population puts no obstacles in the way of there being so and so many dogs, or vice versa. The nominalist assumes that how matters stand physically is orthogonal to whether mathematical objects exist. Take any world you like—it’s physical condition neither demands nor precludes the existence of mathematical objects.\(^{13}\)

This might be thought to conflict with the modally inflexible, necessary-or-impossible, character of pure abstracta. But, insistence on this special character has been weakening of late. Quineans in particular should think of numbers (the way they do of electrons) as existing just where they pull their weight.\(^ {14}\) Even if numbers are necessary (impossible), moreover, that doesn’t mean they’re demanded (precluded) by how matters stand physically. The physical on the face of it no more demands the existence of functions than Socrates demands the existence of \{Socrates\} (Fine [1994], Dorr [2010]). It’s enough for us if nominalistic worlds are “relatively” possible—possible where their physical contents are concerned.

The metaphysical issue of whether physical circumstances demand mathematical objects is to be distinguished from the representational issue of what it takes to state those physical circumstances. Numbers and functions might indeed be indispensable for this purpose. But so what? There might be no way of charting the color relations among paint chips, except with the Munsell color system. But the relations do not themselves depend on Munsell. To argue from color relations to the existence of a representation scheme would be absurd.

And yet people do seem to want to argue this way, when it comes mathematical representation. Steiner imagines a platonist thinking as follows: ‘We cannot say what the world would be like without numbers, because describing any thinkable experience (except for utter emptiness) presupposes their existence’ (Steiner [1978], 19-20; the formulation is Morgenbesser’s). This will seem to bear on the metaphysical issue only if one slides (as Steiner does not) from “we cannot say-without-numbers what a physically complex world would be like” to “we cannot say what a physically complex world-without-numbers would be like.” Berkeley’s whole philosophy is based on this kind of slide. To go from we can’t imagine-

\(^{13}\)From orthogonality it follows that any nominalistic hypothesis implied by \(T\) is implied already by \(T\)’s nominalistic content. This might be considered another kind of conservativeness (Yablo [2002], section V).

\(^{14}\)Field [1993], Hellman [1989], Hale and Wright [1996], Tennant [1997], Colyvan [2000, 2003], Rosen [2006].
without-numbers a complex world to we can’t imagine a complex world lacking in numbers is like going from we can’t imagine a tree non-perceptually to we can’t imagine unperceived trees.\footnote{I am not trying to respond here to the “heavy-duty platonist” who thinks “the truth of $T$ at $w$ depends on the obtaining there of some fundamental relations between concrete and mathematical entitiesrelations which do not supervene on the totality of facts either about the concrete realm or about the narrowly mathematical relations” that $T$ appeals to (Dorr [2010], p8). See Dorr for a careful, enlightening discussion of this and related matters.}

### 4.2 The low road

Now let me say a word on behalf of the low road— the one that has us ‘taking things back at the end’. I agree with Colyvan that it is not always passable. But it is not always impassable, either. Logical subtraction \textit{sometimes} yields a well-defined remainder, surely. \textit{Snow is cold and white - Snow is cold = Snow is white}, I assume. For a generalization to be lawlike is what remains of its being a law, when we bracket whether the generalization is true. Triangles are similar if they are congruent, except they need not be the same size.

Blanket skepticism about logical remainders is no more reasonable than blanket acceptance. The problem is that it is not obvious how to tell the good and bad cases apart. We need a way of distinguishing

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bs which are perfectly \textit{inextricable} from $A$ (\textit{scarlet – red})
\item Bs which are perfectly \textit{extricable} from $A$ (\textit{congruent – same-sized})
\item Bs which are \textit{somewhat} extricable from $A$ (\textit{action – bodily movement})
\end{enumerate}

Perfect \textit{inextricability} is, I take it, the case where $A-B$ defined only on $B$-worlds. It is clear enough which \textit{red} things have what-scarlet-adds-to-red (the scarlet ones). The question of which \textit{non}-red things exemplify scarlet’s incremental content—which of them fail to be scarlet only because they fail to be red—makes little sense. $B$ is perfectly \textit{extricable} from $A$ if $A-B$ is equally evaluable, and on the same basis, whether $B$ is true or false. Same-sizedness is perfectly extricable from congruence, because figures of different sizes can be assessed for similarity just as easily as figures of the same size.

Partial extricability is the case where $A-B$ is evaluable in some $\neg B$-worlds but not others. Suppose Bert is dead. Then \textit{Bert raises his arm – It goes up} is false. He falls short of raising his arm for reasons well in excess of the fact that his arm does not go up. If Bert is alive, however, and attempts unsuccessfully to raise his arm, then \textit{Bert raises his arm – His arm goes up} is most likely unevaluable. Attempting to raise one’s arm is not enough to make up the difference between raising it and its going up, for a reason already mentioned; the attempt does not combine with the arm going up to imply that Bert raises his arm. The
next section tries to cash this “make up the difference” metaphor out. As we’ve just in effect seen, \(C\) makes up the difference between \(B\) and \(A\) only if it implies the material conditional \(B \supset A\). I tried to raise my arm falls short because it does not imply \(My\ arm\ went\ up \supset I\ raised\ it\).

5 Value added

Extricability turns on this question: how is \(A-B\) to be evaluated in worlds where \(B\) is false? It’s a technical question, which calls for a technical solution. It begins with a theory of “incremental truth” and “incremental falsity.” A rule is then provided for evaluating \(A-B\) on the basis of \(A\)’s incremental truth-value with respect to \(B\).

Consider the relation between \(p&q\) and \(q\), in a world where \(p\) is false. There is a clear sense in which \(p&q\) adds falsity to \(q\)—it commits a further offense against truth beyond any committed already by \(q\). Similarly \(p&q\) adds truth to \(q\) if \(p\) is true—\(p&q\) is true where, and insofar as, it reaches beyond \(q\).

Value-addedness makes intuitive sense, but we need a definition. The easy part is as follows: if \(B\) is true in \(w\), then \(A\) adds truth or falsity according to whether \(A\) is itself true in \(w\) or false there. What if \(B\) is false in \(w\)? \(A\) adds truth to \(B\) in \(w\) if \(B \supset A\) has there a certain kind of truthmaker—what I’ll call a targeted truthmaker. A targeted truthmaker for \(B \supset A\) is a fact that (as far as possible) rules out the combination of \(B\)-true with \(A\)-false as such, that is,

1. without ruling \(B\) out (= implying \(\neg B\)), and
2. without ruling \(A\) in (= implying \(A\)).

Now, (ii) is implicit in the very idea of a truthmaker. \(T\) cannot be considered “that in virtue of which” \(S\) is true if it is overloaded with extra detail—detail in whose absence we’d still have a condition implying \(S\). Call that the proportionality requirement on truthmakers. A proportional truthmaker for \(B \supset A\) must take the fullest possible advantage of \(B\); \(T\) can imply \(A\), only if there is no advantage there to be taken. (ii) is thus automatic, and we focus on (i). What (i) tells us is that a targeted truthmaker for \(B \supset A\) (\(B \supset \neg A\)) is one that does not rule \(B\) out. \(T\) must be \(B\)-compatible, or, as I’ll usually put it, \(B\)-friendly.

1. \(A\) adds truth to \(B\) in \(w\) iff \(B \supset A\) has in \(w\) a \(B\)-friendly truthmaker
2. \(A\) adds falsity to \(B\) in \(w\) iff \(B \supset \neg A\) has in \(w\) for a \(B\)-friendly truthmaker.

\(^{16}\) \(B \supset \neg A\) is equivalent to \(\neg A\), since \(A\) implies \(B\).
The official reason why \( p \& q \) adds truth to \( q \) in the case where \( p \) is true is this: \( q \supset p \& q \) has a \( q \)-friendly truthmaker in the fact that \( p \). \( p \& q \) adds falsity, when \( p \) is false, because \( q \supset \neg (p \& q) \) has a \( q \)-friendly truthmaker in the fact that \( \neg p \).

2. \( A-B \) is true in \( w \) iff \( A \) adds truth to \( B \) in \( w \) (and no falsity).
\[ A-B \text{ is false in } w \text{ iff } A \text{ adds falsity to } B \text{ in } w \text{ (and no truth)} \]

I said above that \( B \) is more or less extricable from \( A \) according to how often \( A-B \) is evaluable in worlds where \( B \) is false. How often that occurs depends on how often \( A \) adds “just truth,” or “just falsity,” to \( B \) in such worlds. How often it does that depends on how often one, but not the other, of \( B \supset A, \) \( B \supset \neg A \) has a \( B \)-friendly truthmaker in \( w \).\(^{17}\)

Whether triangles are congruent-if-the-same-size turns entirely on their shapes—on whether, for instance, both are equilateral or only one is. But now, equilaterality-facts, and shape-facts more generally, obtain just as easily in worlds where the size facts are different. This is why \( \text{They are the same size} \) is so highly extricable from \( \text{They are congruent} \).

What about \( \text{Tom is scarlet} \) and \( \text{Tom is red} \) (Tom is the aforementioned tomato)? The latter is extricable just to the extent that \( \text{Tom is red} \supset \text{Tom is scarlet} \) is true in Tom-is-red-worlds for reasons that obtain just as easily when Tom is not red. As is familiar, there is no (natural, non-disjunctive) property independent of redness that combines with it to yield the property of being scarlet. The reason Tom is scarlet-if-red, in red-worlds, is that Tom is scarlet; the reason it’s unscarlet-if-red, in red-worlds, is that it’s (say) crimson. These are the truth makers. They cannot obtain in worlds where Tom is not red; so its being red is highly \textit{inextricable} from its being scarlet.

That leaves \( I \text{ raised my arm} \) and \( My \text{ arm went up} \). \( \text{It went up} \) is extricable just to the extent that \( \text{It went up} \supset \text{I raised it} \) (\( \text{It went up} \supset \text{I did not raise it} \)) is true in arm-up worlds for reasons that can obtain when my arm is not up. What might these reasons be? \textit{Trying} to raise my arm has the virtue of holding also in arm-down worlds, but it doesn’t suffice for \( \text{It went up} \supset \text{I raised it} \) (since, again, I could have tried ineffectively at the same time as the wind blew my arm up). Trying \textit{effectively} has the virtue of sufficing for the conditional, but it does not hold in any arm-down worlds. Truthmakers for \( \text{My arm went up} \supset \text{I did not raise it} \) can hold, however, in arm-down worlds. Paralysis does not require my arm to be up, as a thing’s property of being scarlet requires it to be red. \( \text{My arm goes up} \) is thus partly extricable from my raising it.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\)“Just one of,” because an \( A \) that adds truth to \( B \) is not automatically debarred from adding falsity.

(1) \( \text{Snow is hot or black} \supset \text{Snow is hot} \) has a hot-or-black-compatible truth maker in the fact that snow is white. \( \text{Snow is hot or black} \supset \text{Snow is not hot} \) has one in the fact that snow is cold. (2) I own three birds, imagine. Alice and Bert are are cockatoos, Cleo is a parakeet. \( \text{Both my birds are cockatoos} \) adds truth to \( \text{I have two birds} \) because of Alice and Bert; it adds falsity because of Cleo.

\(^{18}\)The remainder is \textit{false} in some arm-down worlds, but not, as far as I can see, true in any such worlds. An example of partial extricability where the remainder can also be true in \( \neg B \)-worlds might be this. Plantinga
6 The (in)extricability of mathematics

The rate of star formation has been exponentially decreasing for many billions of years. Let $T$ be a definite hypothesis along these lines, say: the number of new stars in the $n$th millennium after redshift 2 ($>10$ billion years ago) is proportional to $k/2^n$ for some suitable $k$. Writing #$\!(n)$ for the number of new stars in the $n$th millennium, the hypothesis is that

$$T \quad #\!(n) = k/2^n, \text{ for some suitable integer } k.$$

Its mathematical component is something like

$$M \quad \text{Numbers exist with all the expected properties.}$$

To determine how extricable $M$ is from $T$, we ask how common it is, in the numberless part of logical space, for $T$ to add just truth, or just falsity, to $M$. $T$ adds just truth, in a numberless world, if each millennium sees in twice as many new stars as the next. This ensures a number-friendly truthmaker for $M \supset T$, and precludes one for $M \supset \neg T$, which is what it means for $T$ to add just truth. A millennium introducing more than twice as many new stars as its successor (or fewer than twice as many) ensures a number-friendly truthmaker for $M \supset \neg T$ and precludes one for $M \supset T$. $T$ adds just falsity in such worlds. $T$-$M$ is evaluable, then, in worlds where each millennium sees in twice as many as, over twice as many as, or fewer than twice as many stars, as the one that follows. “Twice as many, over twice as many, fewer than twice as many”—these exhaust the possibilities. $M$ is thus highly extricable from $T$, leaving behind a well-defined remainder.

Redacting a theory’s mathematical aspects is not, in super-simple cases anyway, like writing the hobbits out of Lord of the Rings. Sophisticated theories may be thought different in this respect. Suppose that $T$ is quantum mechanics, and let $M$ say there are infinite dimensional vector spaces (Hilbert spaces) with the expected properties. What could $T$-$M$ be? Quantum mechanical states are not only played by vectors, one might think, there is nothing else for them to be but vectors. We are unable to frame any positive notion of what $T$ asks of a world, leaving aside the Hilbert spaces.

This would be a problem, if we were taking a top-down approach, evaluating $T$-$M$ in $w$ on the basis of some prior idea of what it says. But our approach is pointwise and bottom-up. What $T$-$M$ “says”—the proposition it expresses—is given by its changing truth-values as we vary $w$. These truth-values are as specified in 2: the proposition is true in worlds where $T$ defines warrant for believing that $p$ as what knowing that $p$ adds to the fact that $p$ (Plantinga [1993]). My belief that the world is not about to end is warranted even if I am wrong, and the world is (as a matter of pure quantum mechanical happenstance) about to end. The belief falls short of knowledge, I am speculating, just in that one respect. A fact obtains that implies the following: $I$ was right $\supset I$ knew.
adds (only) truth to \( M \), and false in worlds where \( T \) adds (only) falsity to \( M \). Doubts about the extricability of \( M \) from \( T \) have thus got to be doubts about the workability of such a procedure in nominalistic worlds. Running this through the definition of adding truth, they are doubts that \( M \supset T \) can have a non-trivial truthmaker in such worlds.\(^{19}\) \( M \supset T \) can, on this view, have a nontrivial truthmaker only in platonistic worlds.

The skeptic has no objection, I take it, to facts holding in Hilbert-space-containing worlds which necessitate \( T \). What she can’t make sense of is facts holding in non-Hilbert–space-containing worlds which combine with the assumption of Hilbert spaces to necessitate \( T \). This puzzles me. What is the difference supposed to be between (i) \( T \)’s truth-value in a \( w \) which contains Hilbert spaces, and (ii) \( T \)’s truth-value in a physically indiscernible \( w' \) that is only assumed to contain them? I appreciate that \( w' \) may not be conceivable in purely physical terms. But that is not required; \( w' \) is conceived as a world which is physically just like a world \( w \) in which \( T \) is true and has nothing else going on in it. We’re given that \( T \) is true in \( w \). Somehow, though, it is supposed to be inapplicable to a world \( w' \) whose differences with \( w \) have been imagined away.

This is puzzling enough that I am led to suspect that the skeptic’s objection arises earlier, with the idea of physically indiscernible worlds only one of which has mathematical objects. I agree that a non-mathematical \( T \)-world is in some very good sense beyond our comprehension. But we must be careful not to confuse “we can’t-say-without-mathematical objects what \( w \) would be like” with “we can’t say (even with mathematical objects) what a non-mathematical \( w \) would be like.” Running these two together is the Berkeley fallacy again. Material objects are presented in imagination in a sensible garb; that doesn’t mean they can’t exist unperceived (Williams [1966], Peacocke [1985]). Gabriel and Lucifer do not have to exist for behavior to be describable as angelic or diabolical. The skeptic maintains that it’s different with mathematical objects. Hilbert spaces must really exist in worlds that are not imaginable except in terms of Hilbert spaces. This may be true in the end. But the argument for it should not be Berkeley’s argument.

7 Mathematical explanation

Ptolemy sought to account for retrograde motion in terms of crystalline spheres and epicycles. One of the reasons his account proved to be worthless is that crystalline spheres and epicycles do not exist. A state of affairs has got to obtain, it seems, before it can account for anything. The explanation given today of retrograde motion is different; it appeals to the mathematics of angular velocity. But that doesn’t mean we can ignore the constraint that sunk Ptolemy. The mathematics involved must be true, to be explanatory. If, as the nominalist thinks, it is not true, then our present-day explanation is worthless too. That it does not seem to be worthless suggests the nominalist has made a mistake somewhere.

\(^{19}\)Unless \( M \supset \neg T \) does as well—a qualification that will be taken as understood. A trivial truthmaker for \( M \supset T \) is one that is inconsistent with \( M \) and hence also \( T \).
7.1 Grades of Mathematical Involvement

Quine started out doubtful of abstract ontology, as he was doubtful about ‘real’ (non-verbal, de re, Aristotelian) necessity. He reversed himself on ontology, but held his ground on modality. His strategy there was to distinguish three grades of modal involvement.\(^{20}\) The first two grades (involving sentential predicates and operators) are quasi-legitimate, for Quine, but they fail to establish real necessity. The third (involving non-trivial quantification into modal contexts) would establish real necessity, were it not illegitimate.

I propose to distinguish, in a similar way, three grades of mathematical involvement in physical explanation. It will sharpen the comparison to force our explanations into a fixed format: outcome \(E\) is explained as arising out of circumstances \(C\) by way of a generalization \(G\) that links them.

Math helps *descriptively* to the extent that we need it to specify \(C\) or \(E\), or to formulate \(G\). \(E\) might be the sinusoidal oscillation of a stressed spring. \(G\) might be Hooke’s law, which states the restorative force as as a function of how far the spring is stretched or compressed.

Math helps *structurally* if it’s needed to run the explanation at the right level of generality.\(^{21}\) What it is about a square peg that allows it to slip into a round hole? The peg’s microphysical make-up involves too much unneeded detail; it would still have fit, had it been made of copper. The peg fits if and because the sides are less than \(\sqrt{2}\) times as long as the radius of the hole (Putnam [1995]).

Math helps *substantively*, if it provides the covering generalization \(G\). Honeycomb divides into hexagonal cells, it is said, because the hexagon is the shape that tiles the plane most efficiently, providing the most coverage with the least perimeter. Why has no one on a round-trip tour through Königsberg ever managed to cross each of the town’s bridges exactly once? Königsberg has a land mass reachable by any of three bridges, which gives the associated graph a vertex of odd degree, which was shown by Euler to make a no-doubling-back tour impossible.\(^{22}\)

That is the hierarchy; let’s now try our hand at applying it. Here is a silly example to begin with. Certain numbers of tiles are never seen on the floors of rectangular rooms. One finds rooms with 18 tiles but not 19, 36 but not 37, 70 but not 71.\(^{23}\) The outcome in need of explanation is that certain bunches of tiles, depending somehow on their cardinality, are not the right sort to cover rectangular floors. To say it precisely, a rectangular floor can’t be covered with the \(X\)s (\(X\) ranging over bunches of tiles) if the number of \(X\)s is 19, or 37, or 71,

\(^{20}\)Quine [1966]

\(^{21}\)Math’s structural contributions are interestingly discussed in Pérez-Carballo [ms], with reference especially to the Könisberg bridge puzzle.

\(^{22}\)The honeycomb and bridge examples are from Pincock [2007].

\(^{23}\)Tiles are one-foot squares, assume; floors have integral dimensions; “rooms” are at least two feet wide; and so on.
or etc. This is first grade involvement; we are using numbers to pick out the phenomenon that puzzles us.

The second grade is reached when we realize that the unsuitable bunches of tiles have something in common; they are prime in number. This makes sense, on reflection, since a floor that is \( m \) tiles wide and \( n \) tiles long \( (m, n > 1) \) will require \( m \times n \) tiles in all. A prime number of tiles will not do, because prime numbers do not factorize in the way required. This is the explanatorily relevant feature and it is mathematical in nature, which is what second-grade involvement requires. Is there third-grade involvement? It might seem not, since the relevant generalization—prime numbers cannot be non-trivially factorized—is just the definition of ‘prime.’ But let’s not bother ourselves about that. The primes could equally have been defined as the numbers that divide \( a \times b \) only if they divide \( a \) or \( b \). The non-factorizability property then becomes a theorem.

Colyvan’s example is more realistic and more interesting. The Kirkwod gaps are gaps in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter.

The explanation for the existence and location of these gaps is mathematical and involves the eigenvalues of the local region of the solar system (including Jupiter). The basic idea is that the system has certain resonances and as a consequence some orbits are unstable. Any object initially heading into such an orbit, as a result of regular close encounters with other bodies (most notably Jupiter), will be dragged off to an orbit on either side of its initial orbit. An eigenanalysis delivers a mathematical explanation of both the existence and location of these unstable orbits (Colyvan [2010], 302).

There is first-grade involvement here, because the unstable orbits have periods a certain fraction of Jupiter’s; the fractions are identified mathematically as the eigenvalues of an operator. There is second-grade involvement too, because the fractional relation is explanatorily relevant. An asteroid that circles the sun three times, for each revolution of Jupiter’s, will thereby be drawn into repeated interactions with Jupiter of a type to eventually pull it off course.

First-grade involvement does not make much of a case for platonism. Once it is granted that ‘metaphors without literal translation can carry descriptive content’ (301), the nominalist is home free; she will say that the weight of the explanation is borne by the nominalistic descriptive content, not the platonistic packaging. Colyvan’s focus is, at any rate, on second-grade

---

24 He says the following, however: ‘when a piece of language is delivering an explanation, either that piece of language must be interpreted literally or the non-literal reading of the language in question stands proxy for the real explanation. Moreover, in the latter case, the metaphor in question must clearly deliver and identify the real explanation’ (Colyvan [2010], 301). I don’t see how to reconcile this with the concession in the text. Suppose a fact \( F \) that explains \( E \) is the descriptive content of sentence \( S \). Then ‘\( E \) because \( S^\prime \)’ says that \( E \) is the case on account of \( F \). Since it is is the case on account of \( F \) how can this fail to constitute an explanation of \( E \), and whence the further demand (I assume it’s further) that \( S \) ‘must clearly deliver and identify the real explanation.’
involvement. The Kirkwood gap mathematics must be accepted as true, because a unitary physical explanation is not possible:

Each asteroid... will have its own complicated, contingent story about the gravitational forces and collisions that [it] has experienced. Such causal explanations are ... piecemeal and do not tell the whole story. [They] do not explain why no asteroid can maintain a stable orbit in the Kirkwood gaps. The explanation of this important astronomical fact is provided by the mathematics of eigenvalues (that is, basic functional analysis) (p. 303).

Colyvan suggests it is a problem for nominalism if what the orbits have in common, by virtue of which they’re unstable, is mathematical rather than physical. He doesn’t say why it’s a problem, however. The nominalist rejects mathematical ontology, not mathematical typology. Why should she not agree that math enables the scientist to carve physical phenomena at the explanatory joints? (A lot of it was created for just that purpose.)

The Kirkwood gap might be compared in this respect with the ‘Armstrong gap’ — the fact that certain numbers of tiles are never seen on rectangular floors.25 What Colyvan says about the first applies equally to the second. “Every bunch of tiles will have its own complicated, contingent story about the forces and collisions that it has experienced. Such causal explanations are piecemeal and do not tell the whole story. They do not explain why no rectangular floor can be covered by tiles in the Armstrong gap. The explanation of that fact is provided by the mathematics of multiplication.”

Tiles fall into the Armstrong gap, says our imagined platonist, when and because the number of them is prime. Numbers had better exist, lest the gap go unexplained. The answer to this is that we can explain it without numbers; tiles fall into the gap when and because there are primely many of them. Primeness comes in, not as a feature of numbers, but as a principle of unity tying together certain concrete pluralities.26 “Primely many” is not wonderful English, it’s true. “An eigenvalue-y interference-making fraction of the orbital period of Jupiter” is not English at all. But the point either way is the same. Metaphysical distinctions should not be made to depend on where exactly the line falls between good, borderline, and unacceptable English.

This brings us to the hoped-for third grade of mathematical involvement, in which the explanatory connection is mathematical. The orbits are unoccupied, one may think, because the corresponding orbital periods are eigenvalues of a certain vector operator. One can see how the argument from third-grade involvement is supposed to go. Suppose a mathematical generalization packs explanatory punch, or “carries some of the explanatory load” (300). Then we have to treat it as true, or we lose the explanation. If a generalization is true, and it concerns certain objects, then the objects exist.

25Armstrong is a tile company.
26Rayo [2002]
This sounds somewhat plausible, I admit. But the nominalist is not going to give up just yet. Questions can be raised at each stage. I will present them dogmatically, not because the platonist has no hope of answering them, but to indicate what remains to be done before his argument is complete.

*Does the generalization pack explanatory punch?* Punch in this case would be: the Kirkwood orbits are unoccupied because a vector operator squishes or stretches certain vectors by such and such an amount. The nominalist will reject this claim. The reason those orbits are unoccupied, in her view, is that they’re unstable. Algebra helps us to identify the unstable orbits. But the reason they are unoccupied is to do with constructive interference. Again, bees make hexagonal cells because it’s an efficient use of their energy, and to that extent adaptive. Geometry helps us to see what efficient behavior would be in this context, but not why the behavior occurs. Graph theory helps us identify the topographical layouts permitting an Eulerian round trip tour. But what does the explaining, in any particular case, are the facts (to do with the town’s physical structure) that make the graph-theoretic result applicable.

*Is it the right kind of explanation?* Hempel, Salmon, and others, have argued that explanations are not all of the same kind. A hypothesis is ontically explanatory if it tells us why, objectively speaking, the outcome occurs. It is epistemically explanatory if accepting it makes the outcome less surprising, or puts one in a better position to understand it. Euler’s result may indeed be explanatory in the epistemic sense. But so are Boyle’s law, the Bohr model of the atom, and so on. These have something right about them, but they do not paint an entirely faithful picture of reality. A hypothesis need not be true to set us on the road to appropriate expectations.

*Is it the right kind of truth (i.e., mathematical)?* Not all mathematical theories are of the same kind, and this bears on what we are doing when we call a mathematical statement true. Philosophers tend to focus on (quasi-)categorical theories, such as arithmetic, the theory of the continuum, and set theory. There are also algebraic theories, however, like group theory, graph theory, and Boolean algebra. Truth in a categorical theory like arithmetic can be understood as truth in the theory’s intended model, which is unique up to isomorphism. Euler’s result is not even a candidate for truth in this sense, for the theory has no intended models; it applies to whatever satisfies the axioms. What did Euler discover, then? He discovered *logical* truths to the effect that anything with the structural features postulated in the axioms (Königsberg, for example) has thus and such other features as well.

*Is the right kind of truth existence-implying?* The line between arithmetical truths and falsehoods is fairly clear. There is no agreement, however, on what qualifies a statement to

---

27I am indebted here to Brad Skow.

28It is modally explanatory if it shows why no other outcome was possible.

29Along with empirical facts about the relevance of this sort of logical truth to real-world problems. “What separates a person who knows a lot of mathematics from a person who knows only a little mathematics is not that the former knows many claims [of the sort] that mathematicians commonly provide proofs of...[it is] knowledge of a purely logical sort” (Field, “Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge?”)
be put on that side of the line—in particular, on what it is about the truths that makes them true. Their distinguishing feature to the if-thenist is logical; they follow from the axioms. Their distinguishing feature to some recent structuralists is modal: they hold in all possible ω-sequences (Hellman [1989]). Arithmetical truths on another model are are like laws of nature; they say how numbers are supposed to behave, qua numbers, whether the kind is instantiated or not. The platonist may think that the second alternative would rob arithmetical truths of their explanatory punch. But it is not clear why that would be. What would the real existence of numbers add explanation-wise to the truth about numbers as such?

One can stipulate, of course, that mathematical truth, properly so-called, does require the existence of mathematical objects. Nominalists are bound to reject mathematical truth in that sense. But that doesn’t mean they are bound to reject (what we are forced, given the stipulation, to call) mathematical correctness. And indeed they do not reject it. The usual strategy is to associate each mathematical S with a non-ontologically-loaded S* such that S is correct iff S* is true. I have been emphasizing the version that takes S* to be logically true, but that is far from the only possibility.

Our stipulation has the result that grade-three mathematical involvement in physical explanation entails the existence of mathematical objects. Just for that reason, though, it will be harder to establish the existence of grade-three involvement than initially seemed. One has to show that the explaining is done by S rather than some closely related S*. To complete his argument against easy-road nominalism, Colyvan must show that S’s explanatory role cannot equally well be played by a substitute that focuses more on the Sosein of mathematical objects than their Sein. He ends by saying, ‘The debate over platonism and nominalism would be genuinely advanced by a better understanding of explanation – especially those explanations that have mathematics playing the leading role’ (304). This is true, and Colyvan is right to press the issue. A better understanding is also needed, however, of what it is for mathematics to play the lead role in an explanation.

Stephen Yablo
MIT, 77 Massachusetts Ave,
Cambridge, MA USA
yablo@mit.edu

---

30 A body not subject to any force remains at rest or in uniform motion does not depend for its lawfulness on objects like that existing. There is even the possibility of a law that is uninstantiated because it obtains.

31 For ideas about the form S* might take, see Rayo [2002], Linnebo and Rayo [to appear], Yablo [2002], Yablo [2005], Hellman [1989], Correia [2006], Azzouni [2004], and Hofweber [2005].

32 Thanks to Alejandro Pérez-Carballo, Agustín Rayo, Mark Colyvan, and Brad Skow for extremely helpful advice and comments.
References


Alejandro Pérez-Carballo. Structuring logical space. ms.


