

Strategic Consequences of being unsympathetic: For-profit companies benefit more than individuals from focusing on responsibility

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Abstract

Previous research has found that consumers ascribe mental states to for-profit companies that enable them to elicit anger more easily than sympathy. The current paper applies these findings to demonstrate how this evaluative asymmetry in consumer perceptions favors different strategies for individuals and companies managing conflicts and crises. First, it is shown that the mental states consumers ascribe to for-profit companies enable them to elicit anger *and admiration* more easily than sympathy. Second, due to their ability to elicit anger more easily than sympathy, it is found that in conflicts between for-profit companies and individuals, companies are evaluated more favorably when they focus attention on which side perpetrated the most harm, while individuals are evaluated more favorably when they focus on which side was most victimized. Third, due to their ability to elicit admiration more easily than sympathy, it is found that for-profit companies derive greater benefits than individuals do from proactively taking

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Companies should focus on responsibility responsibility to resolve crises rather than deflecting responsibility through claims of victimhood. Discussion focuses on marketing applications for companies managing conflicts and crises.

Keywords: Social Marketing; Corporate Reputation; Crisis Management; Corporate Social Responsibility; Ethics

Introduction

In 1997, the automobile journalist Robert Collins drove the new Mercedes A-Class car through the ‘moose test’, in which a vehicle is tested on its ability to swerve to evade a suddenly appearing object in the road. Famously, the car flipped. In the weeks that followed, Mercedes was pilloried in the press. Initially, Mercedes responded by denying the legitimacy of the road test. The company claimed that the road conditions and test parameters were unrealistic and that it was being unfairly targeted and victimized over a problem that did not exist. There was truth to Mercedes’ claim – the moose test forces the driver to maintain speed rather than break, and to swerve at high speed – both of which are suboptimal actions to take in that situation. But in spite of the recognized problems with the test, public backlash to Mercedes was fierce, and the company’s stock fell. After three weeks, Mercedes recanted. They admitted the A-class had a safety issue, suspended all existing orders, recalled the cars that had already shipped, and then spent three months modifying the chassis and adding an electronic stability system years ahead of its time. For the next decade, the A-class became one of the best-selling cars ever made (Diermeier, 2011). Today, the Mercedes A-class is seen as a classic example of crisis management failure followed by success. But why did Mercedes’ initial claim of

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victimhood fail? And why did their subsequent actions to take responsibility succeed?

Suppose an individual entrepreneur had claimed to be the victim of an unfair test. Would the public response have been the same? And if not, what implications are there for companies and individuals managing conflicts and crises?

There is a rich literature suggesting that companies are sometimes better served to manage a conflict or crisis by taking ownership of the situation and being proactive in response to it rather than by claiming to be a victim or otherwise deflecting responsibility (Diermeier, 2011; Alpaslan, Green, & Mitroff, 2009; Waddock & Smith, 2000; Sheaffer & Mano-Negrin, 2003). Proactive responsibility is tied to early detection of crises and cooperation with consumers, both of which can minimize damage (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Meanwhile, openly investigating transgressions, expressing remorse, supporting punishment, and effectively working to ensure no further wrongdoing all serve to restore trust and legitimacy, which ultimately leads to long-term value (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Heinze, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2014; Jordan, Diermeier, & Galinsky, 2012). From this perspective, there is nothing especially unique about a company that favors taking proactive responsibility; it is simply the superior response. The same principles should apply to individuals in identical situations, and as such, companies and individuals should make identical choices.

However, recent research has suggested that for-profit companies may suffer from a selective disadvantage in eliciting sympathy as victims (Rai & Diermeier, 2015; Cooley et al, 2017). According to these streams of research, in order to feel sympathy for an actor, or to attribute blame to them, people must perceive the actor as having a mind (Gray et al., 2007; Waytz et al., 2010). In particular, people must see the actor as having

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agentic mental states, which refer to abilities to think, know, and intend, as well as *experiential* mental states, which refer to abilities to feel and experience emotions and sensations such as pain and joy (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012). People readily ascribe these mental states to other human beings, and previous research has found that consumers do spontaneously anthropomorphize organizations by ascribing minds and personalities to them (Aaker, 1997; Fournier, 1998; Mark & Pearson, 2001; Waytz & Young, 2012; Kervyn et al., 2012). However, the kind of mind consumers ascribe to organizations differs from that which they ascribe to other human beings. In particular, while consumers are willing to ascribe agentic mental states to for-profit companies, they tend not to ascribe experiential mental states to them (Knobe and Prinz, 2008; Rai & Diermeier, 2015; Cooley et al., 2017). This distinction is critical for moral judgment because whereas agentic mental states are necessary for eliciting anger following transgression, experiential mental states are necessary for eliciting sympathy following victimization (Gray & Wegner, 2009). Rai and Diermeier (2015) found that this unique combination of being perceived as having agency but not experience causes for-profit companies to elicit anger for their transgressions just as individuals do, while failing to elicit sympathy when they have been victimized to the same extent as individuals.

Importantly, these lines of research do not imply that all organizations are interpreted the same. For instance, Aaker et al. (2010) found that consumers perceive for-profit companies as interpersonally cold and untrustworthy compared to non-profit organizations. Kervyn et al. (2012) argued that different brands are evaluated based on their abilities and intentions relative to each other. Brands that are perceived to have bad intentions and low ability elicit relatively more contempt, brands perceived to have good

Companies should focus on responsibility intentions but low ability elicit relatively more pity, brands perceived to have bad intentions but high ability elicit relatively more envy, and brands perceived to have good intentions and high ability elicit relatively more admiration when compared to other brands. When several kinds of actors, including for-profit companies, non-profit organizations, and individuals, are measured on their capacities for agency and experience, it has been found that organizations differ on these dimensions, and that for-profit companies are ascribed very little experience. However, while for-profit companies are seen as having equivalent levels of agency and eliciting similar amounts of anger to human beings, even organizations imbued with the most experience are seen as having far less experience and elicit far less sympathy than a human being (Rai & Diermeier, 2015). This pattern of results suggests that while organizations may differ from each other in the mental states ascribed to them, there may be greater limits to the extent to which organizations, and for-profit companies in particular, can be perceived as capable of experience and worthy of sympathy.

Overview of Hypotheses

The present article examines how differences in how for-profit companies and individuals are perceived affect the strategies they should adopt during conflicts and crises in order to be evaluated most favorably by consumers and stakeholders.

First, previous research has found that the same agentic mental states that drive feelings of anger for transgressions also drive feelings of admiration for virtuous behavior in individuals (Gray & Wegner, 2009). This suggests that for-profit companies may elicit anger *and admiration* to the same extent as individuals due to the presence of agency,

Companies should focus on responsibility while maintaining a selective disadvantage in eliciting sympathy due to a lack of experience. To examine this question, Experiment 1 investigates whether for-profit companies elicit admiration for socially responsible behavior to the same extent as individuals.

In so doing, we also test between two competing hypotheses for why for-profit companies elicit less sympathy than individuals. Previous results are consistent with an explanation in which for-profit companies fail to elicit sympathy due to a perceived lack of experience, but they are also consistent with a negativity bias toward for-profit companies driven by anger toward them, which would also cause them to elicit anger but not sympathy. These two accounts make competing predictions regarding consumers' willingness to express admiration toward for-profit companies. If for-profit companies elicit anger but not sympathy to the same extent as individuals because of a generalized negativity bias toward companies, then consumers should also be less willing to express admiration toward for-profit companies for virtuous behavior to the same extent as individuals. In contrast, if for-profit companies elicit anger but not sympathy to the same extent as individuals because consumers ascribe agentic but not experiential states to companies, then companies should elicit admiration to the same extent as individuals, while still receiving little sympathy as victims.

H1: Consumers ascribe agency but not experience to companies. The presence of agency causes companies to elicit admiration for virtue and anger for transgression to the same extent as individuals. In contrast, their relative lack of experience causes companies to elicit significantly less sympathy.

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Experiments 2 and 3 examine how this asymmetry between anger and admiration on the one hand, and sympathy on the other, informs strategy during conflicts and crises. In particular, in most real-world cases, a company's role in a conflict or crisis is ambiguous— it reflects elements of both transgression and victimization, and the actors affected may differ. Experiments 2 and 3 examine how for-profit companies and individuals that focus on claiming victimhood and deflecting responsibility fare against for-profit companies and individuals that focus on harms committed and accepting responsibility.

Experiment 2 investigates the asymmetry between anger and sympathy in conflicts between individuals, who should be seen as capable of both transgression and victimization, and for-profit companies, who should be seen as more capable of transgression than victimization. Conflicts necessarily involve questions of which and how much each party has transgressed and which and how much each party has been victimized. If there is an evaluative asymmetry between transgression and victimization for companies, then when companies are in conflicts with individuals, companies may actually receive more support from consumers by focusing attention on issues of blame, rather than on issues of victimization, since both parties are capable of eliciting anger but individuals are more capable of eliciting sympathy. In contrast, individuals may receive more support from consumers if they focus attention on issues of victimization rather than on issues of blame. Experiment 2 tests this hypothesis by shifting the framing of a conflict between a for-profit company and an individual to focus either on which party transgressed or on which party was victimized.

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H2: When a for-profit company is involved in a conflict with an individual, companies will receive more support when observers focus on which side transgressed in the conflict rather than on which side was victimized. This is because companies and individuals are seen as equally capable of transgression, but individuals are seen as more capable of being victims.

Experiment 3 investigates the asymmetry between admiration and sympathy by examining the efficacy of competing strategies during reputational crises for individuals and for-profit companies. Specifically, when faced with a reputational crisis, for-profit companies and individuals may face two broad categories of strategies; they may deny wrongdoing and claim to be a victim of external forces, or they may accept responsibility and take proactive steps toward resolving the crisis (Kim et al., 2006). Individuals may have flexibility to respond to crises with either approach because they are seen as capable of both claiming victimhood and earning admiration for taking responsibility. In contrast, for-profit companies may lack response flexibility – their selective disadvantage at being seen as victims may restrict them, such that they must accept responsibility and work to resolve a crisis. Experiment 3 tests this hypothesis by manipulating whether individuals and for-profit companies respond to a reputational crisis by deflecting responsibility and claiming victimhood or by proactively taking responsibility for a crisis.

H3: When faced with a reputational crisis, responses by for-profit companies and individuals will interact such that the benefit to companies for responding to crisis proactively will be significantly greater than for individuals, who will experience a reduced benefit to engaging in proactive response rather than denial.

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Overview of Experiments

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were approved by an Institutional Review Board. Participants in all experiments were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk website. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. All participants were drawn from the United States. The IP addresses of participants' computers were recorded to ensure that they did not participate in the study multiple times. Participants in all experiments reported demographic information including their political orientation, age, sex, ethnicity, and education level. Although women expressed less support for violence than men overall, no consistent meaningful interactions were predicted or found between the demographic variables and analyses of interest, and so those analyses are not reported in the paper. Participants in all experiments were assigned to conditions randomly, and more were recruited than necessary in order to account for participants who exited the experiment before beginning, resulting in some non-equal cells. No data were excluded from the analyses reported.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 aimed to examine whether for-profit companies receive equal levels of admiration as individuals for positive actions and anger for negative actions, while receiving less sympathy as victims.

Method. Experiment 1 employed a 2 (actor) by 3 (action) between-subjects design ($N = 245$ [86 women]). Each participant read one scenario, which was either about an individual or a company. Depending on condition, the individual or the company either

Companies should focus on responsibility engaged in a virtuous behavior, a transgression, or was a victim of crime. In the virtuous behavior scenario, participants read about a company or an individual providing disaster relief following a hurricane ('man' is placed in parentheses where it was used instead of 'large multi-national company', depending on condition).

There was a large multi-national company (man) that was quite successful. Recently, a devastating hurricane left many people without food and shelter. The company (man) immediately decided to donate an extremely large amount of its (his) profits toward helping the people affected by the hurricane.

Participants were asked to rate how much admiration they had for the company or man on a five point Likert scale ranging from "not admirable at all" to "extremely admirable". Participants were then asked to rate the extent to which they believed the company or man was "capable of having intentions and goals" on a five point likert scale ranging from "not capable at all" to "extremely capable". Participants' ratings of capacities for intention and goals were used to assess the perceived agency of the actors (Gray & Wegner, 2009).

The transgressor and victim scenarios were drawn from Rai and Diermeier (2015). In the transgressor condition, participants read about a company or a man being caught for selling customer information without permission, after which they rated how angry they were at the actor as well as the extent to which they felt the actor was capable of having intentions and goals. In the victim condition, participants read about a company or a man having their electronic security breached in a way that resulted in bankruptcy but did not harm customers, after which they rated how much sympathy they felt for the

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actor as well as the extent to which they felt the actor was capable of experiencing pain and suffering. Ratings of capacities for pain and suffering were used to assess perceived 'experiential' mental states, such as abilities to feel emotions and have sensations (Gray & Wegner, 2009).

Manipulation check. A manipulation check study was conducted to determine if people interpret the word 'companies' as referring to for-profit organizations rather than non-profit organizations. Participants (N=98) were asked "when you hear the word 'company' what kind of organization do you think of?" and presented with the choice of either a 'for-profit organization' or a 'non-profit organization'. 96 out of 98 participants chose 'for-profit organization' ($p < .001$). While these data do not reveal the specific companies that participants may have thought of when rating companies in our experiments, they do suggest that participants in our experiments believed they were answering questions about for-profit companies.

Results of Experiment 1. Companies elicited significantly less sympathy ($M = 2.78$, $SD = 1.16$) than individuals ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.00$) when they were victims, $t(74) = 6.48$, $p < .001$, but no significant differences in anger were found between companies ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .95$) and individuals ($M = 3.59$, $SD = .97$) for transgressions, $t(82) = 1.54$, $p = .129$, nor were any significant differences in admiration found between companies ($M = 4.73$, $SD = .50$) and individuals ($M = 4.80$, $SD = .51$) when they engaged in virtuous behavior, $t(83) = .71$, $p = .481$. The interaction among sympathy, anger, and admiration for companies and individuals was significant, $F(2, 239) = 20.80$, $p < .001$.

Individuals ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 0.54$, $n = 41$) were seen as more capable of pain and

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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Experiment 2

Experiment 1 demonstrates that for-profit companies suffer from a selective difficulty in eliciting sympathy compared to eliciting anger or admiration. Experiments 2 and 3 examine some of the applications and strategic consequences of this phenomenon in the context of managing conflicts and crises. Experiment 2 examines whether focusing consumers' attention on which party is at fault as opposed to which party has been victimized in a dispute between a company and an individual may lead to differential support for the two sides. Specifically, it is hypothesized that because for-profit companies have a selective difficulty in eliciting sympathy as victims, then they will receive relatively more support when attention is focused on who is at fault, while

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individuals will receive relatively more support when attention is focused on who has
been victimized.

Method. Experiment 2 employed a between-subjects design (N = 189 [88 women]). All participants began the experiment by reading the following statement: “Recently, a company and a person filed lawsuits against each other. Both the company and the person alleged wrongdoing by the other side and demanded monetary compensation.” In one condition, participants were presented with two questions asking about the extent to which companies and individuals are capable of being victims. In regard to companies, participants were asked “To what extent is a company capable of being a victim that has the ability to experience pain and suffering and is deserving of sympathy?” Participants then answered the same question about a person. The order of questions was counterbalanced. In the other condition, participants were presented with two questions asking about the extent to which companies and individuals are capable of being villains that have the ability to have intentions and goals and are deserving of blame for actions. Participants responded to these questions on a five point Likert scale ranging from “not capable at all” to “completely capable”. The victim and villain questions served as the framing manipulation for the experiment; they were intended to focus participants on either the extent to which the two parties had been victimized or the extent to which the two parties were at fault.

Following the framing manipulation, all participants were presented with two questions measuring the extent to which they would support a company and a person in a conflict like the one described. Participants responded on a five point Likert scale ranging from “no support at all” to “complete support”. Thus, every participant provided a

Companies should focus on responsibility response both for their support of a company and for their support of an individual in a conflict like the one described, allowing for comparison of their levels of support toward the two kinds of actors. If individuals are more likely than companies to be seen as victims, but equally likely to be seen as transgressors, then participants should support individuals to a greater degree after being asked about which party is capable of being a victim than after being asked about which party is capable of being a villain.

Results. Because support for both parties may have been affected by whether participants were thinking about them as victims or as villains, a difference score was calculated for each participant's responses to the two support items, yielding a single measure of relative support toward companies versus individuals. The relative support measure enables us to infer the extent to which one party would be favored over another in a conflict between the two depending on how the conflict is framed. When the conflict was framed around which party was capable of being victimized, participants expressed significantly more relative support toward individuals ($M = 1.40$, $SD = 1.20$) than when the same conflict was framed around which party was capable of being blameworthy ($M = .55$, $SD = .87$), $t(187) = 5.61$, $p < .001$, $d = .81$. These results indicate that individuals have a stronger advantage over for-profit companies when conflicts are framed around issues of victimization, because the difference in levels of support directed toward individuals compared to companies is greater when the conflict is framed around capacities to be victims capable of pain and deserving of sympathy than when the same conflict is framed around capacities to be villains capable of intentions and deserving of blame.

Experiment 3

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Experiment 2 demonstrated that the selective difficulty for-profit companies have in eliciting sympathy has strategic consequences for whether disputes between companies and individuals should be framed around issues of blame or victimization. Experiment 3 examines whether there are strategic consequences in the context of positive behavior by for-profit companies as well. Specifically, it is hypothesized that because companies have a selective difficulty in eliciting sympathy as victims, they will benefit relatively more than individuals do by taking responsibility for crises and working to resolve them rather than attempting to deflect blame and claim victimhood.

Method. Experiment 3 employed a 2 (actor) by 2 (response) between-subjects design (N = 201 [77 women]). Each participant read one scenario. One scenario involved an individual entrepreneur and the other scenario involved a company. One scenario involved the actor deflecting responsibility and claiming to be a victim while the other scenario involved the actor accepting responsibility and working to resolve the crisis. All scenarios focused on how a company or entrepreneur responded to a data security breach that resulted in the theft of customers' personal information: "Recently, data hackers breached the security of a successful company (entrepreneur), resulting in the theft of customers' personal information." Participants in the 'deflecting responsibility' condition read: "The company (entrepreneur) has responded by claiming to be the victim of a crime and asking for sympathy." In contrast, participants in the 'taking responsibility' condition read: "The company (entrepreneur) has responded by greatly improving its (his) data security to ensure the protection of customer data." Participants were then asked about the extent to which they would be willing to support the company or entrepreneur on a five point likert scale ranging from "not at all" to "completely". If companies are capable

Companies should focus on responsibility of eliciting admiration for virtuous behavior, but less capable of eliciting sympathy as victims, then they should elicit equal levels of support as individuals when they take responsibility to resolve the problem, but less support than individuals when they attempt to deflect responsibility as victims.

Results. A two-way ANOVA found a main effect of response type, such that companies and individuals who responded by taking responsibility ($M = 3.27$, $SD = .88$) received more support than companies and individuals who responded by claiming to be victims ($M = 2.63$, $SD = .84$), $F(1, 199) = 27.29$, $p < .001$. A main effect was also found for actor type, such that companies ($M = 2.72$, $SD = .81$) received less support than individuals ($M = 3.18$, $SD = .92$), $F(1, 199) = 14.10$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the interaction between response type and actor type was significant, $F(1, 197) = 5.23$, $p = .023$, $\eta^2 = .026$, indicating that individuals ($M = 3.00$, $SD = .94$) received significantly more support than companies ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .75$) when they responded as victims ($t = 4.37$, $p < .001$), but that individuals ($M = 3.36$, $SD = .94$) and companies ($M = 3.18$, $SD = .87$) received nearly identical levels of support when they responded to a crisis by taking responsibility (see figure 2).

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

General Discussion

Across three experiments, an evaluative asymmetry in how people judge for-profit companies is found that has applications for how for-profit companies and individuals should manage conflicts and crises. Experiment 1 demonstrated that for-profit companies have a selective disadvantage in eliciting sympathy as victims, but they can

Companies should focus on responsibility elicit anger for transgressions and admiration for virtuous behavior. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the ability of for-profit companies to elicit anger more so than sympathy reduces support for companies when conflicts with individuals are framed around issues of victimization rather than issues of transgression. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the ability of for-profit companies to elicit admiration more so than sympathy causes companies to face stronger pressure to take responsibility for crises, because unlike individuals, companies lack the flexibility to respond as victims and still receive support from consumers.

Broadly, these findings support and extend previous research on the mental states people ascribe to for-profit companies by isolating the selective difficulty they have in eliciting sympathy compared to anger and admiration, and by demonstrating some of the applications and strategic consequences of these attributional biases. Specifically, these findings suggest that for CEOs and others responsible for reputation management who often must choose between competing strategies, the victim role for companies is unavailable since consumers tend not to feel sympathy for them. Moreover, claims of victimhood may backfire if companies are involved in conflicts with individuals, whom the public is much more willing to ascribe victimhood to. At the same time, if companies are seen as capable of eliciting admiration for virtuous behavior, but less capable of eliciting sympathy as victims, then that elucidates a possible solution to the mystery of Mercedes, while also providing a roadmap for companies navigating reputational crises. Specifically, the relative benefits to taking responsibility for crises may be greater for for-profit companies, because whereas individuals have the flexibility to ask for sympathy as victims or to be proactive in response to a reputational challenge, for-profit companies

Companies should focus on responsibility have no choice but to take responsibility for a crisis, just as Mercedes did when they recalled the A-class. Although taking responsibility benefited both individual entrepreneurs and for-profit companies in Experiment 3, such actions do not occur in a vacuum in the real world. Responding proactively may carry huge financial costs (recall that Mercedes suspended sales and installed a state of the art electronic stability system without raising costs!). Thus, it is critical for large companies to understand that the reputational benefit to taking responsibility is worth the cost for them in a way that may not be true to the same extent for an individual entrepreneur. While for-profit companies may desire to focus on both their own victimization and an individual's transgression, they must make choices about how to allocate limited resources, and these findings suggest that money spent on claiming to be a victim is not money well spent.

Our results also raise a number of interesting questions. First, while it appears that people may have difficulty mapping concepts such as pain and victimhood from people to companies (Feyerabend, 1993), it is unclear why people have greater difficulty mapping experiential concepts to companies compared to agentic concepts. Is it due to a lack of bodily features for organizations (Knobe & Prinz, 2008), a heavier emphasis on agentic rather than experiential features of jobs within companies (Phelan, Arico, & Nichols, 2013), or an evolutionary bias toward detecting agency where none exists (Barrett, 2000)? Second, what other kinds of organizations will experience difficulty eliciting sympathy as victims, but still be able to elicit anger and admiration? Will small family-owned businesses demonstrate a pattern more like a large retail company, or will they appear more like an individual? Third, in the same way that focusing on an individual victim can enhance altruism toward a group of victims (Small & Loewenstein,

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2003; Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Slovic, 2007), can for-profit companies elicit more sympathy when there is a 'human face' to the organization? In particular, will companies that have charismatic leaders who embody their brands be more capable of being seen as victims than companies that do not, thus providing greater flexibility in how these companies respond to crises, without incurring any greater blame for transgression? Fourth, in our experiments, people had no prior information or relationships with the companies being evaluated. To what extent can strong relationships between consumers and brands alleviate the selective disadvantage companies have in being seen as victims and shift their strategic choices during crises (Escalas & Bettman, 2003; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2008)? Future research should address these questions.

Until then, whether it is Target responding to a data breach or the music industry fighting digital piracy, companies must avoid portraying themselves as victims. This is not always an easy decision for leaders. They may feel innocent and, perhaps, even a little sorry for themselves, as Mercedes did following the 'moose test'. But companies must understand that hardly anybody else shares their view, and let that insight guide their strategy.

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
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Companies should focus on responsibility

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Figure 1. Mean ratings of emotional reactions to actions of individuals and companies and their mental states



Note: Mean ratings of anger directed toward humans and companies as villains and their perceived levels of agency, mean ratings of sympathy directed toward humans and companies as victims and their perceived levels of experience, and mean ratings of praise directed toward humans and companies as heroes and their perceived levels of agency. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.

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Figure 2. Mean ratings of support as a function of actor and response types



Note: Mean ratings of support directed toward individual entrepreneurs and companies when they respond as victims and when they respond by taking responsibility. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.