12

SELF-DEFEATING LEADER BEHAVIOR

WHY LEADERS MISUSE THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE

Roderick M. Kramer
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

"Yet have I in me something dangerous, which let thy wisdom fear?"
  Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark

Few concepts in the social sciences are invoked with the same ease or employed so readily to explain so many social and institutional outcomes as *power*. The concept of power has been used to explain, for example, how organizational resources are allocated (Pfeffer, 1992), how decisions are made (Neustadt, 1990), the control of attention (Fiske, 1993), behavioral disinhibition (Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003), and the resolution of conflict (Boulding, 1966, 1989), to name just a few important processes and outcomes. The concept of power is routinely used, moreover, not only to explain why such outcomes do happen, but also why they don't. Russell's (1938) observation that power is a "fundamental concept" in the social sciences remains as true today as it was when he first uttered it.

As March (1994) noted, most conceptions of power reflect "the intuitive notion of struggle, with outcomes determined by the relative strength of contending forces" (140). Wrong's (1979) definition is representative of this tradition, characterizing power as the "capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others" (2). Along similar lines, Blau (1964) proposed that actors possess power when they can "induce others to accede to wishes by rewarding them for doing so" (115). As these definitions make clear, social scientists have long presumed an intimate relationship between power and influence (French & Raven, 1959; McClelland, 1975): the effective use of social influence helps individuals obtain power. Power, in turn, facilitates social influence because powerful social actors possess more resources that can be brought to bear on solving their problems (Pfeffer, 1992).

Drawing on these distinctions, effective social influence can be defined as the process of successfully inducing change in other people's attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, values, and behaviors by means of one's own behavioral tactics. Thus defined, the use of effective influence tactics has been the subject of considerable prior theory and research (see, e.g., Cialdini, 1988; Kramer & Neale, 1998; Levine, 2003; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1992, 2001; Zimbardo, Ebbesen & Maslach, 1977 for more comprehensive treatments of the social psychological literature on effective influence).

Given these presumed linkages between power and effective influence, it is hardly surprising that leadership theorists have given considerable attention to the study of how leaders use their power and social influence to achieve their goals. The distinguished presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (1990) characterized power in terms of "personal influence of an effective sort" (ix). Subsequent studies have reinforced this view and deepened our understanding of the important relationship between power and influence (see, e.g., Caro, 2002; Gergen, 2000; Kellerman, 1994). These case studies document, in particular, the intimate relationship between the skillful use of social influence by leaders and the accomplishment of difficult institutional goals.

From the standpoint of such accounts, *self-defeating influence behavior by leaders*—influence behavior that proves counter-productive or self-destructive—represents a rather provocative and puzzling phenomenon. "If self-preservation and the pursuit of self-interest are essential features of rational behavior," as Baumeister & Scher (1988) proposed, then self-defeating influence behaviors must be counted among the hallmarks of leader irrationality.

Self-defeating influence behavior by experienced and successful leaders is particularly puzzling because, on prima facie grounds, one might argue such behavior should be rather unlikely. After all, when political novices use influence processes ineptly, it is easy to discount their mistakes as reflecting simply lack

of sophistication or requisite experience. Their mistakes can be attributed, for example, to naive misperceptions or miscalculations that taint their influence attempts. When experienced and politically savvy leaders make such mistakes, however, there is often a more perplexing and paradoxical quality to their actions. Because they are seasoned and proven influence professionals, we might expect powerful leaders to be adept at sizing up influence situations and at finding the right (i.e., the most effective) influence strategies to use in a situation.

However, as recent social, corporate, and political scandals have amply documented, even the most savvy and experienced leaders

"Self-defeating influence behavior by experienced and successful leaders is particularly puzzling because, on prima facie grounds, one might argue such behavior should be rather unlikely."

are capable of shooting themselves in the proverbial foot (Kramer, 2003a). Indeed, when we examine the recurrent and persistent self-defeating behavior of a political virtuoso such as President Clinton, to use just one recent example, many of us have asked, "What was he thinking? How could he have been so stupid?" (see Maraniss, 1998, for a particularly compelling analysis). What accounts for the stunning ability of some leaders to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory?

Surprisingly, the study of self-defeating influence behavior by leaders has received relatively little systematic attention from social psychologists. A primary aim of the present paper, accordingly, is to address this gap in our understanding. In particular, I examine some of the possible determinants and dynamics of self-defeating influence behaviors by leaders. The paper is organized as follows. First, I offer a definition of self-defeating influence behavior. Second, I identify some of the different forms that self-defeating influence behaviors take. I then present a social cognitive model of self-defeating influence behavior. According to this model, leaders can be conceptualized as strategic actors who monitor or audit their influence transactions with the aim of realizing their aims or objectives. I then examine some social cognitive processes that lead this auditing process astray, fostering misperception and miscalculation. I next consider some of the psychological and social dynamics that contribute to the persistence of self-defeating influence behaviors. Again, the persistence of such behavior seems puzzling: if experienced leaders receive feedback that their influence attempts are failing, why do they not change their course of action? Why do they persist in their path to folly? I close the paper by discussing briefly some of the implications of the framework for our understanding of self-defeating influence behavior.

CONCEPTUALIZING SELF-DEFEATING INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR

Historically, the scholarly study of self-defeating behavior has stood at the intersection of social psychology and clinical psychology (e.g., Berglas & Baumeister, 1993). Baumeister & Scher (1988) provided one of the first comprehensive literature reviews. They defined self-defeating behavior as "any deliberate or intentional behavior that has clear, definitely or probably negative effects on the self or on the self's projects" (3). They go on to posit that the behavior "must be intentional, although harm to self did not have to be the intended or primary goal of the action" (3).

Much of the initial research in this area focused on motivated forms of self-defeating behavior. Baumeister and Scher characterized these as *deliberate or primary self-destructive behaviors*. An assumption behind this early emphasis was that decision makers' willingness to engage in, and persist with, obviously self-destructive behaviors suggests they must have some sort of psychological investment or stake in the negative outcomes or failure those behaviors were producing (e.g., Berglas & Baumeister, 1993;

1996). As Baumeister & Scher (1988) noted in their careful assessment of such research, however, the evidence that people deliberately engage in behavior that harms the self in a foreseeable and desired way is actually quite thin. Consequently, they concluded, the range of normal adult self-defeating behaviors they examined simply "does not conform to the pattern of deliberate self-destruction" (7).

A more fruitful approach, therefore, seemed to pursue psychological and social processes that might impel even normal, ordinary decision makers to unintentionally engage in, and persist with, self-defeating modes of judgment and action. Thus, the second category of self-defeating behavior Baumeister and Scher addressed involves situations where decision makers do not desire, intend, or foresee the harmful or self-destructive consequences of their acts. This category includes situations where a decision maker "seeks some positive goal, but uses a technique or strategy that impairs the chances of success.... The focus is neither on normal behaviors that occasionally turn out badly, nor on isolated accidents or mishaps. Rather, it is on *systematic behavior patterns that ... lead reliably to self-harmful outcomes*" (Baumeister & Scher, 1988, 12, italics added). It is this category of self-defeating leader behavior with which this paper is particularly concerned.

FORMS OF SELF-DEFEATING INFLUENCE BEHAVIORS

In their review of the literature, Baumeister & Scher (1988) identified several forms of self-defeating behaviors that might impair leaders' social influence behaviors. The first is *irrational persistence* or perseveration. As Baumeister & Scher (1988) noted, "Although persistence is often regarded as a virtue, misguided persistence can waste time and resources and therefore defeat one's chance of success at superordinate goals" (12). One classic example of such counter-productive perseverance in leadership was Lyndon Johnson's persistence in simultaneously pursuing the prosecution of the Vietnam War and the attainment of his Great Society goals. His unwillingness to make the necessary, even if difficult, trade-offs between "guns and butter" ultimately compromised the successful pursuit of both programs. Equally importantly, it defeated his often-stated goal of being remembered as one of the greatest and most beloved U.S. Presidents (Kearns-Goodwin, 1976).

A second category of self-defeating behavior identified by Baumeister & Scher (1988) that might impair a leader's effectiveness as an influence agent is *choking under pressure*. As its name suggests, individuals choke under pressure when they select a coping strategy that they are unable to carry out successfully in a situation where performing well is vitally important. Many journalists and political commentators have noted the recurrent and almost uncanny ability of Dan Quayle to choke under pressure when confronted with difficult or embarrassing questions: his speech slows and his gaze freezes, giving the impression of a deer caught in the high beams of an onrushing pick-up truck.

Counterproductive bargaining strategies constitute another important category of self-defeating behaviors and one directly related to ineffective influence in leadership contexts. Leaders use bargaining as a way of dealing with the diverse preferences of their opponents and constituents. Counterproductive bargaining strategies arise when leaders' strategic choices about how to influence those opponents or constituents are based on various misperceptions of either the bargaining situation and/or the nature of one's opponent. For example, bargainers can misperceive the payoff structure or bargaining range in a situation. A classic example is the tendency to perceive the situation as more zero sum than it really is, resulting in an inability to find integrative or win-win solutions (Thompson, 1988). Alternatively, bargainers can underestimate the cooperativeness or trustworthiness of their opponents, resulting in

adoption of overly harsh influence strategies that produce reactance and retaliation from their opponents or resistance from their constituents (Bendor, Kramer & Stout, 1991).

Baumeister & Scher (1988) discuss a final category of self-defeating behavior, *ineffective ingratiation strategies*. Such behaviors entail "misjudging how the target of an influence attempt will interpret and respond to one's behavior. The person overestimates the likelihood of positive response to flattery or doing a favor" (15). For example, an influence agent might attempt to use ingratiation to curry favor, only to discover that his or her target devalues the effort, attributing not positive but negative qualities to the agent. A famous instance in leadership occurred when President Richard Nixon decided to surprise some protestors encamped in Washington to oppose the Vietnam War in the middle of the night. Nixon wandered among the group of protestors, trying to engage them in friendly banter about surfing and football. Rather than winning them over, however, he only caused them to feel more estranged from his leadership and policies.

> "Self-handicapping involves arranging the circumstances surrounding one's performance to provide a plausible attribution for lack of success."

Self-handicapping behavior is another form of behavior that can prove self-defeating in the long-run, even though it is effective from the standpoint of promoting short-term goals (e.g., protection of the individual's self-esteem). Self-handicapping involves arranging the circumstances surrounding one's performance to provide a plausible attribution for lack of success. Classic examples include drinking heavily before an important presentation or failing to get enough sleep before an important exam (see Jones & Berglas, 1999, for a fuller exposition).

As such examples make clear, when applied to leadership, a leader's influence behaviors can be self-defeating or counter-productive in several different ways. First, influence behaviors that are intended to advance a chosen goal can unintentionally backfire, undermining achievement of that goal. In a related way, leaders may try to employ a variety of impression management attempts that can fail to produce their intended effects (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Ginzel, Kramer & Sutton, 1993; Sutton & Kramer, 1986). Also, influence behaviors aimed at reducing or resolving identified problems can make them worse rather than better. For example, conflict resolution attempts can lead to escalation of conflict rather than reduction of conflict (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Finally, influence attempts intended to generate constructive change can instead produce reactance, hardening resistance rather than softening it (Kramer, Pradhah-Shah & Woerner, 1995).

To summarize, extant research on self-defeating behavior has identified numerous forms such behavior takes. Given the obvious undesirability of such outcomes, it behooves us to have a better understanding of why self-defeating influence behaviors by leaders seem to be both common and persistent. In the next section, I present one framework for beginning to think about this issue.

LEADER JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING IN INFLUENCE SITUATIONS: THE INTUITIVE SOCIAL AUDITOR MODEL

As noted above, one of the primary aims of the present paper is to isolate some of the prominent forms of self-defeating influence behavior in which leaders engage. A second aim is to identify some of the determinants and dynamics that contribute to the emergence and persistence of such behaviors. To achieve these aims, it will be useful to begin by describing a framework that I have found helpful for organizing theory and research on these two questions. I characterize this framework as the *intuitive*

social auditor model because it assumes that leaders (and other influence agents) are social information processors who pay close attention to their environments in an effort to monitor the causes and consequences of their actions. In much the same way that a vigilant bookkeeper might keep track of his or her economic transactions, so, the model posits, do leaders keep track of or audit their influence experiences in the hope of becoming more effective in pursuing their objectives.

"Leaders often care not only about whether they get what they want in a negotiation, but also about their personal identities and images."

The essential features of the intuitive social auditor model are as follows. First, the model assumes that leaders, as influence agents, are intentionally rational social actors. In other words, it is assumed that leaders' strategic choices regarding which influence behaviors to use in a given situation are driven, in part, by what are—from their perspective—reasonable assessments and prudent calculative considerations. In particular, they reflect leaders' a priori beliefs regarding the efficacy of different influence strategies and tactics, presumably based on their prior experience in such situations. Thus, if they use hard influence tactics such as ultimatums when trying to achieve their goals it is because they believe that such tactics are necessary or sufficient; conversely, if they use "soft power" forms of influence, such as ingratiation and conciliation, it is because they believe the effects of such soft influence attempts will be positive (Nye, 2004).

The intuitive social auditor framework emphasizes that leaders' strategic choices about influence tactics reflect a variety of social and relational considerations. In particular, it is assumed that leaders care not only about the efficacy of a given influence strategy or tactic with respect to obtaining a specific material outcome (e.g., a better payoff in a contentious negotiation), but also its self-relevant implications. For example, leaders often care not only about whether they get what they want in a negotiation, but also about their personal identities and images (i.e., how they come across, or look). Thus, their strategic choices in influence situations serve the purpose both of advancing their material goals and enabling them to affirm central and cherished personal identities. A leader's personal identity, from this perspective, encompasses the "sense of continuity, integration, identification, and differentiation constructed by the person not in relation to a community and its culture, but in relation to the self and its projects" (Hitlin, 2003, 121).

The model assumes further that leaders are highly motivated in most situations to affirm not only their actual positive personal identities—identities they have already established and articulated to themselves—but also those ideal identities they hope to develop and are still striving to achieve (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). Leader identities, as with other forms of social identity, are socially constructed or negotiated (Swann, 1987).

The model assumes also that leaders' strategic choices are social decisions in another important way. If strategic choices have important implications for how leaders perceive themselves, they also have important *self-presentational implications* in terms of how various audiences view them as well (Ginzel, Kramer & Sutton, 1993; Sutton & Kramer, 1986). Some choices have identity-enhancing implications for leaders; others pose identity threats. For example, the failure to be perceived as having acted decisively when constituents expect resolute action can be enormously distressing to a leader who is trying to impress, please, or placate those audiences (e.g., Bush and the "Wimp Factor"). Consequently, leaders are assumed to pay close attention to the self-presentational implications of their influence behaviors and to use their influence behaviors to advance their self-presentational goals. Thus, leaders can use their strategic choices not only to advance their endogenous goals in a given situation (e.g., improving their power or bargaining position in a negotiation), but also for exogenous social gains (e.g., to improve their social standing or

reputation within a group) as a tough negotiator (Kramer & Carnevale, 2001). It is assumed also that strategic choices are socially expressive acts that enable leaders to affirm, for example, their loyalty or commitment to a group. In short, strategic choices about social influence constitute complex, multi-purpose social decisions.

The social auditor model assumes that leaders, having made a cognitive choice as to which influence tactic to use, will try to successfully enact that tactic through their actual behaviors. It is important to note that strategic *choice* (the cognitive selection of an intended influence tactic) is different from the effective *enactment* of that choice. Strategic choices reflect leaders' goals, intentions, aspirations, hopes and expectations (Greenhalgh & Kramer, 1986). Enactments reflect the often harsher realities of a skillful or flawed execution. For example, a leader can decide (and intend) to use a given tactic, but can be incompetent in the implementation of that tactic. Indeed, many of the more interesting examples of self-defeating influence behavior are those which arise when leaders' cognitive assessments of the situation seem to be perfectly accurate and their strategic choice for that situation valid, yet their execution clumsy or inept. For instance, former U.S. President Richard Nixon often expressed privately the desire to inspire the American people: he claimed in private he wanted "to lift the spirit" of the American people, and to set an inspiring tone of public service. At one point, he even proclaimed to himself that the "major goal" of his administration was to provide "moral leadership" (Reeves, 2001, 25). His ability to successfully implement that goal, however, was obviously limited. Similarly, a leader can render an astute political assessment of a situation, but fail to pull the right (behavioral) rabbit out of the hat. The journalist Theodore White (1995) once quipped that, "Teddy [Kennedy] had all the correct instincts, but he lived by very few of them" (6).

Regardless of their a priori aims or intentions, leaders' influence behaviors produce consequences. From the standpoint of understanding how leaders perceive and misperceive influence situations, it is, of course, the perceived consequences of their actions that carry the freight when it comes to leaders' attempts to make sense of what's going on. Thus, leaders' interpretations, or construals and misconstruals, of their influence behaviors and the resulting effects are most important in terms of driving their subsequent behavior.

The intuitive auditor model assumes that leaders, like all social perceivers, are serial social information processors whose attention is captured by, among other things, those outcomes they expect, find salient, feel comfortable seeing, etc. (Gilovich, 1991). However, attention can be claimed by those outcomes that violate expectancies or are seen as particularly novel or unexpected (Weick, 1993). Moreover, leaders often pay as much attention to things that don't happen—and draw inferences from them—as things that do happen (Kramer, 1995, 2004). In addition, the model assumes differences in leaders' social intelligence (Gardner, 1995): some leaders are assumed to be fairly mindful and discerning, others less discriminating in their assessments of situations or of others. Interpretations may be accurate or inaccurate. Some interpretations may reflect considerable cognitive complexity, as decision makers appreciate the roles nuance and chance played in the outcomes; other interpretations may be quite simplistic. Thus, vigilance is a complex state.

Regardless of their veridicality or complexity, leaders' interpretations inform their assessments of subsequent attempts to exert influence in the same situation or in similar-seeming situations.

To summarize, the intuitive social auditor model posits a set of generic cognitive processes that guides leaders' perceptions, judgments, and actions in influence situations. It portrays a leader's sense-making process as one of moving through cycles of anticipation, action, and interpretation. Therefore, the intuitive social auditor framework represents one variant of a more general class of experiential learning-cycle

models described by March (1994). Such models posit a dynamic interplay between decision makers' psychological states (expectations, interpretative categories, etc.), the behaviors those states support (exploration, inhibition, etc.), and the vagaries of the contexts in which their learning occurs (their richness, stability, etc.).

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTUITIVE SOCIAL AUDITOR'S MODEL

From the pragmatic standpoint of helping us assess the state of our current knowledge about self-defeating influence processes, such a model is useful in several ways. First, it suggests several points of special vulnerability in the sensemaking and learning process that leaders confront. For example, it is clear that leaders can, from erroneous assumptions and interpretations, misperceive and misjudge influence situations. These misperceptions and misjudgments are important because they directly affect leaders' strategic choices regarding which influence behaviors to use in a given situation. Thus, strategic choices can backfire badly, as when a leader opts to use a conciliatory or soft influence tactic when the target disparages weakness and timidity. When President Kennedy first encountered Premier Nikita Khruschev in Vienna early in his presidency, he felt a reasonable dialogue about political realities would help establish common ground between them and the beginning of a constructive working relationship. He tried to engage Khruschev in an intellectual debate regarding the respective political philosophies of their countries and their merits. By all accounts, that intent backfired badly as Khruschev lectured Kennedy on the historical roots and justification for Marxism and, in the end, concluded that Kennedy was a young, inexperienced, tentative, and unsteady leader (Reeves, 1933; Dallek, 2003).

Second, even if predicated on a prudent and circumspect assessment of a given situation, leaders' influence behaviors can be poorly executed. Thus, leaders may intend to employ an influence tactic with a constructive aim in mind only to see it backfire or fail. Based on his decades of experience influencing Washington politicians, Lyndon Johnson believed that the most effective way to influence Ho Chi Mingh was to treat the conflict in Vietnam as essentially a bargaining problem, the solution to which required simply locating the right balance of "carrots and sticks" that would bring Mingh to the bargaining table. Unfortunately, Johnson completely misread Ho's own construal of the situation and also resolved not to negotiate with his enemies.

Third, in any influence situation, there is considerable room for a misconstrual of the efficacy of an influence attempt. Leaders can draw erroneous inferences regarding the efficacy of their actions. They can believe they were effective when they were not. And even if efficacious, leaders can be mistaken about the reasons for their effectiveness. They may, for example, attribute their success to their social perceptiveness or political skill when, in fact, non-self relevant causes played a major determining role. Probably the most famous example is, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's return from his meeting with Adolf Hitler, believing that a genuine rapport and constructive relationship between the two leaders had been established.

METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE STUDY OF SELF-DEFEATING INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR BY LEADERS

Having discussed the theoretical issues at some length, at this point I will provide an overview of some of the methodological considerations that social scientists have taken to the study of self-defeating influence behavior.

One major approach has been the laboratory experiment. Experimental studies of self-defeating behavior present a number of obvious advantages. First, researchers can create convincing laboratory analogues that preserve the essential features of real-world situations and yet allow them to remove extraneous causal influences that might otherwise inject unwanted noise into the interpretation process. For example, Rothbart & Hallmark (1988) developed a compelling laboratory paradigm for studying counter-productive influence behavior in intergroup contexts. In particular, they developed a procedure for evaluating differences in decision makers' perceptions of the efficacy of coercive versus conciliatory acts as a function of the ingroup versus outgroup status of the intended target. Along related lines, Pradhan-Shah, Woerner, and I developed a laboratory paradigm for studying the relationship between the salience of negotiators' social identities and their use of self-defeating ultimatum behaviors in a mixed-motive conflict (Kramer, Pradhan-Shah & Woerner, 1995).

Computer simulation is another approach that has been employed to study ineffective influence behaviors. In computer simulations, researchers create artificial social actors or agents who employ precisely-specified influence strategies. These agents can then be paired against other agents using other strategies. By systematically pitting strategies against each other and examining the joint outcomes they produce, the comparative efficacy of different influence strategies can be precisely evaluated and calibrated. Perhaps the best-known studies with this methodology are simulations comparing the efficacy of different influence tactics for eliciting cooperative responses from other social actors (Axelrod, 1987). Using a computer simulation, for example, Bendor, Stout, and I examined the comparative efficacy of variations on a tactic known as Tit-for-Tat for eliciting and sustaining cooperative exchanges in a noisy n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game (Bendor, Kramer & Stout, 1991). We were able to document some counter-intuitive trade-offs between generosity (giving others the benefit of the doubt) and defense competitiveness (assuming the worst about one's opponents).

A third methodological approach is to examine self-defeating influence behaviors in the context of real-world situations. This approach includes the use of archival case materials to trace the antecedents and consequences of self-defeating influence behaviors. Caro's idiographic studies of the uses and misuses of influence by Lyndon Johnson (Caro, 2003) are perhaps the prototype of such studies. Other studies have used archival case studies comparatively, examining how different U.S. Presidents use and misuse influence when pursuing their politics (e.g., Gergen, 2000; Kellerman, 1984, Kramer, 1995, 1998; Neustadt, 1990).

A fourth method for studying both effective and ineffective influence behavior is more ethnographic and entails the direct observation of influence situations in field settings. As numerous studies have shown (Cialdini, 1988; Levine, 2003), researchers can learn a great deal about the efficacy and lack of efficacy of influence tactics by observing their use and misuse in real-world situations in real time. With this approach, Elsbach and I investigated some of the determinants of effective and ineffective influence attempts by Hollywood screenwriters and agents as they attempt to "pitch" screenplay ideas to studio executives and producers (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003). In particular, we examined the mistakes novice pitchers made when trying to persuade executives to whom they were pitching that they themselves or their ideas were creative.

Each of these methodologies provides one avenue for learning more about the antecedents and consequences of self-defeating influence behavior. No one methodology, it should be noted, is perfect. Each has familiar advantages and disadvantages, manifested as trade-offs with respect to the internal versus external validity of the results they produce (Cambell & Fiske, 1959). Accordingly, a multi-method approach that provides convergent validity for propositions is essential. As Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest (1966) once suggested, "If a [theoretical] proposition can survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed in it" (3).

Up to this point in this paper, I have described a social cognitive model for thinking about the processes associated with self-defeating influence behaviors. I have also summarized some of the methodologies that have been used to investigate such processes. I turn next to reviewing some evidence regarding the determinants of self-defeating influence that has emerged from research employing those methods.

SOME DETERMINANTS OF SELF-DEFEATING INFLUENCE BEHAVIORS

A large body of social-cognitive (Gilovich, 1991) and decision-making (Dawes, 2001) research has illustrated how misperception and judgmental bias can contribute to the misconstrual and misevaluation of social situations. Research on the social cognitive determinants of self-defeating influence behavior has followed this lead, focusing on how our intuitive social auditor sometimes gets into trouble in influence situations. Although a complete and exhaustive review of this empirical evidence is beyond the scope of the present chapter, some illustrative examples will help provide a flavor of the kinds of variables that recent research has examined.

The Shadow of the Past: How History Sometimes Hurts

When leaders try to decide which influence strategy or tactic to use when endeavoring to influence another party, they are likely to search for informative or salient past situations and experiences for guidanceThey look for previous examples of effective influence that might be successfully applied again. Conversely, in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, they are likely to look for mistakes they and other leaders have made.

In their systematic examination of the role such historical analogies have played in leader judgment and decision making, Neustadt & May (1986) argued that contemporary leaders often compare their current situation with situations faced by earlier leaders in similar-seeming circumstances. For example, when President Kennedy was trying to decide how much toughness and resolve to display to the Soviets over the Berlin crisis, he compared the situation he faced with Khruschev to British decisions with respect to Hitler's increasingly bold gestures in Europe. (The British analogy, it should be noted, may have been especially salient to President Kennedy because he had written at length about the dangers of complacency and inaction in his best-selling book, *Why England Slept*.)

Although analogies can be informative in terms of providing useful points of comparison and raising important caveats, they can also mislead a leader by providing false assurance or fueling unrealistic optimism. An archival study of President Lyndon Johnson's decisions about how tough to be with Ho Chi Mingh in the escalating conflict in Vietnam found more than a dozen references by the President to analogies between his situation and situations faced by previous Presidents, including references to Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy (Kramer, 1995, 1998). For example, when not only his critics but also his advisors and friends suggested Lyndon Johnson might be perceived as a greater president if he were to bring an end to what had become an enormously unpopular conflict, Johnson retorted:

> Everything I know about history proves this absolutely wrong. It was our lack of strength and our failure to show stamina, our hesitancy and vacillation ... that caused all our problems before World War I, World War II, and Korea.... You see, I deeply believe we are quarantining aggressors over there .... just like FDR [did] with Hitler, just

like Wilson [did] with the Kaiser. You've simply got to see this thing in historical perspective (cited in Kearns-Goodwin, 1976, 313).

As he said on another occasion, "I read all about Lincoln and his problems, yet Lincoln persevered and history rewarded him for his perseverance" (Kearns-Goodwin, 314). More recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, contemplating his own political difficulties, sought reassurance in the past as well:

> I've been reading a book about the Civil War and Ulysses Grant–and I'm not going to compare the two, don't get me wrong, and don't anybody rush off and say he doesn't get the difference between Iraq and the Civil War ... [but] the fact of the matter is, the casualties were high, the same kinds of concerns that we're expressing here were expressed then ... [the people then] were despairing, they were hopeful, they were concerned, they were combative ... the carnage was horrendous, *and it was worth it* (Bumiller, 2004, A12, italics added).

Leader Identity and Self-Presentational Concerns

As noted earlier, the use of influence strategies can have significant identity-relevant implications. Specifically, influence attempts that are perceived as successful constitute important identity-enhancing opportunities for leaders, especially when they enable leaders to project valued or desired identities through their decisions. Kennedy's conduct during the Cuban Missile Crisis was widely perceived as an enormous success at the time. Kennedy had deftly navigated the crisis, seemingly without blinking or backing down. He had displayed, in short, precisely the sort of resolve that he had been accused of lacking during the earlier Bay of Pigs fiasco. We now know that the actual influence behaviors that characterized Kennedy's actions—many of which were "off-stage" and unknown to the American people for several decades—were quite different. While the public posture was one of toughness and resolve, the private actions were more flexible, accommodative, and reciprocative: Kennedy evinced a willingness to bargain so that both U.S. and Soviet objectives were furthered and interests protected. Our reassessment of the true lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates, moreover, how easy it is for leaders with incomplete information to draw erroneous or misleading conclusions from past crises and conflicts: they can be seriously mistaken about what worked and why.

Influence attempts can also pose significant identity-threatening predicaments for leaders, especially when they seem to violate leader or audience expectations. For example, Ronald Reagan's initial attempts to influence Gorbachev during the Iceland Arms Control talks were widely viewed initially as a dramatic failure. However, through skillful impression management, Reagan and his team of advisors and aides were able to transform this apparent failure of influence into a stunning diplomatic triumph (see Sutton & Kramer, 1986, for a fuller account and analysis).

In emphasizing the psychological importance of such consequences, March (1994) noted that, "Decision makers can violate a logic of consequences and be considered stupid or naïve, *but if they violate the moral obligations of identity, they will be condemned as lacking in elementary virtue*" (65, italics added). Violating the perceived obligations of identity creates an identity-threatening predicament.

Self-Enhancing Cognitive Illusions in Influence Situations

When leaders select a given influence strategy, it is reasonable to assume that they believe the use of that strategy will, more likely than not, move them closer to achieving their aims. The definition of self-defeating influence presented earlier, in fact, presupposes that leaders' behaviors are intentionally adaptive, and

emphasizes the unintended and unforeseen consequences of one's influence behaviors. This raises the question, "What psychological factors might inadvertently affect a leader's judgments regarding the efficacy or probability of success of a given influence strategy?" Certainly near the top of our list should be those various well-documented cognitive illusions that influence individuals' risk assessment and risk-taking behavior. Many studies have shown, for example, that decision makers maintain a variety of positive illusions about themselves and their behaviors. These cognitive illusions include overly positive self-evaluations, unrealistic optimism, exaggerated perceptions of control, and illusions of personal invulnerability (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In an experimental investigation of the role positive illusions played in negotiation situations, Newton, Pommerenek, and I showed that negotiators in a good mood tended to overestimate how well they had done in extracting value from the other party (Kramer, Newton & Pommerenke, 1993).

Social Contextual Factors That Contribute to Self-Defeating Influence Behaviors

Although the primary focus of this analysis is on social cognitive factors that contribute to leaders' self-defeating influence behaviors, it is important to note that there are many social contextual and organizational factors that can contribute to such behaviors. For example, role embeddedness can constrain leaders' strategic choices. Leaders are expected, after all, to enact the role they've assumed. Such perceived role requirements can make it difficult for leaders to change their behavior, even when that behavior is recognized as counter-productive (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek & Rosenthal, 1964). Leaders' interpretations of what their role requires, for example, can force them to draw a distinction between what they would like to do personally (e.g., end a costly conflict) and what they believe a role dictates (e.g., a U.S. President can never afford to show weakness or vacillation). Lyndon Johnson repeatedly voiced a strong antipathy toward the war in Vietnam and a deep personal anguish over the loss of American lives in that conflict. Yet, in the role of President, he felt he had a moral obligation to honor U.S. treaty commitments around the globe. Perceived role constraints can be reinforced also by historical and institutional imperatives that dictate compliance with past traditions and requirements.

The structure and organization of advice given to a leader can also influence the options he or she perceives as available. The key role presidential advisors play in helping presidents select their influence strategies is amply documented (Barrett, 1993; Berman, 1982; George, 1980). To the extent advisors help broaden the range of options leaders consider and provide richer data for decision, such advisors can play a critical role in improving the quality of the decision-making process. However, to the extent leaders engage in homosocial reproduction when selecting advisors—selecting those who think and act like them—the range and quality of inputs can be sharply curtailed (Janis, 1983, 1989; Kramer, 1998). Advisors often trim their views to placate or please leaders. A helpful illustration of this tendency emerges in one of the early Nixon tapes. When Richard Nixon was discussing the likely reaction of the public to the Watergate break-in, he predicted:

> My view is ... that in terms of the reaction of people ... I think the country doesn't give much of a shit about it other than the ones we've already bugged ... most people around the country think that this is routine, that everybody's trying to bug everybody else ... Look, breaking and entering and so forth, without accomplishing it, is not a hell of a lot of crime (reported in Kutler, 1997, 54-55).

Nixon's aides were more than willing to aid and abet such misperception. In a meeting with aide Charles Colson, Nixon speculated, "They [the public] don't give a shit about repression and bugging and all the rest." To which Colson replied helpfully, "I think they expect it. As I've said to you, they think political parties do this all the time." "They do, they certainly do," chimes in Nixon. Colson embellishes, "They

think that companies do this. You know, there have been marvelous stories written about industrial espionage." Nixon adds eagerly, "Sure, sure, sure. Well, they do." Colson then adds, "How Henry J. Ford sends agents into General Motors to get the designs. People just sort of expect this.... " "Governments do it. We all know that," agrees Nixon (reported in Kutler, 59).

OFTEN WRONG, NEVER IN DOUBT: PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS THAT SUSTAIN SELF-DEFEATING INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR

I have described a variety of ways in which leaders are prone to use self-defeating forms of social influence in trying to achieve their objectives. As shown above, the decision by a leader to use a form of influence likely to prove self-defeating is often predicated on an initial misperception of a situation or miscalculation of the efficacy of an influence tactic selected for it. Such misperceptions and miscalculation are understandable. However, even if we can understand the initial reasons leaders might adopt a self-defeating influence strategy, it's harder to comprehend why they sometimes persist in the use of such counter-productive or ineffective strategies. All else being equal, it might seem that the various judgmental distortions and sources of misperception and miscalculation described thus far would be difficult for experienced and savvy leaders to sustain. After all, we might expect leaders, as highly motivated influence agents, to remain vigilant regarding the consequences of their actions and attentive to any indications that their efforts are not succeeding. Similarly, we might expect them to change to a new influence tactic when presented with feedback that the old one isn't succeeding. Yet, if anything, the evidence suggests that leaders sometimes persist on a chosen course of action, upping the ante and sometimes digging themselves into even deeper difficulties. The persistence of such self-defeating behavioral propensities invites consideration of some of the dynamics that create and sustain self-defeating influence behaviors.

Difficulties in Generating Diagnostic Experience

As with any form of learning, learning about the efficacy of one's influence behaviors requires amassing relevant evidence and extracting reasonable inferences from that evidence. Obviously, any systematic bias in the generation of such data creates the possibility of errors in calibrating the efficacy of one's action.

Consider, for example, the difficulty someone might have in discerning the efficacy of particularly tough-minded, coercive influence tactics. To the extent that individuals believe a priori that such actions are necessary (and sufficient), they are likely to invoke those tactics pre-emptively whenever the situation seems to call for them. Moreover, if they produce any discernible benefit in such situations, leaders are likely to note the evidence of their efficacy and conclude that their pre-emptive actions were entirely justified. An instructive parallel can be found in research on the dynamics of the development and persistence of hostile behavior among aggressive children. Such children, research has shown, tend to approach their social interactions pre-offended. In other words, they enter social transactions already expecting the worse from other people they encounter. Therefore they are pre-emptively prepared to defend themselves to the assaults they expect and even believe are inevitable, given others' presumed hostility. Ironically, however, because they assume others' hostility, they end up eliciting it through their own defensive behaviors. In much the same fashion as these overly aggressive boys, the overly competitive or aggressive leader is primed for the prospect of resistance or conflict and is therefore vigilant to detecting signs of it. Because the leader's behavior is grounded in presumptive competitiveness or hostility, it elicits the very sort of unproductive social interactions that reinforce mutual hostility and wariness. Thus, the competitive leader's pessimistic expectations—predicated on dubious assumptions—serve as a founda-

"Leaders may fail to appreciate fully or discern accurately the extent to which their own behavior, ironically, elicits reactions from others that justify their dubious presumptions about human nature in the first place."

tion for an equally questionable set of influence strategies for dealing with them.

Gilovich (1991) has suggested another reason people are able to sustain beliefs in questionable assumptions about the world, which has relevance to understanding why leaders might sustain untenable beliefs in the effectiveness of their ineffective influence behaviors. Gilovich notes that because a person thinks initially that his or her orientation towards others is valid or effective, that person is likely to use that orientation only when encountering similar-seeming situations. As a consequence, the person never learns what may have happened if he or she had a different orientation toward the situation or taken another approach. In other words, the individual cannot, or, more accurately, simply does not, assess the true appropriateness of the orientation or the efficacy of the approach it seems to dictate. This pattern of dysfunctional social interaction can be aided and abetted, he goes on to argue, by a self-fulfilling prophecy. Like people who believe that the only way to get ahead is to be competitive or to come on strong when dealing with others, such individuals will consistently push too aggressively for what they want. "The occasional success," Gilovich notes, "will 'prove' the wisdom of the rule, *and the individual will never learn how effective he might have been had a different strategy been employed*" (153, italics added). Because of their focus on influencing the other, moreover, leaders may fail to appreciate fully or discern accurately the extent to which their own behavior, ironically, elicits reactions from others that justify their dubious presumptions about human nature in the first place.

We might draw an instructive analogy, in this regard, with the experience of freeway drivers who are either much faster or much slower than other drivers around them. Consider first the case of the extremely fast, impatient, driver pressed for time. For such individuals, the daily experience on the freeway is one of persistent annoyance and frustration, as seemingly countless slow, incompetent drivers are continually in their way. Each press of the pedal and each lane change generates yet another interaction with yet another foolishly slow driver, hindering impatient drivers from reaching their destination more quickly. Over time, such fast and impatient drivers are likely to develop a view of the world as populated by incompetent and inconsiderate drivers. On average, after all, their experience is that people around them are overly cautious and stupid; from their reference point of efficient and prudent driving speeds, it is the other drivers who are out of touch and in the way.

Consider, on the other hand, the experience of the very slow and extremely cautious driver navigating on the same freeways. From the standpoint of these drivers, other people on the freeway always seem to be in a hurry—aggressively honking and rudely passing the slow driver. The world of the slow driver is a world populated by reckless, angry, and impatient people, people who don't understand the laws of physics when it comes to safe braking distances, the limits of human reflexes, and so forth. Their experience is also one of comparative friction and frustration, as they experience the rude gestures and annoying looks from passing drivers.

In both instances, however, only the very simple fact that these social actors remain out of synch with others in their world leads to their self-generated and self-sustaining theories regarding others' basic hostility, unreliability, incompetence, or stupidity. Also, because of the positive illusions that social perceivers sustain about themselves as better-than-average drivers, they are unlikely to realize fully how their own

behavior may elicit some of the behavior from other drivers that they find so annoying. Thus, fast and reckless drivers may unintentionally elicit greater caution and slowing down of cars around them, while the slow driver may actually cause people to speed up in order to get around them.

Difficulties Leaders Confront in Learning From Their Influence Experiences

Not only might leaders encounter substantial difficulties in generating diagnostic, representative samples of experience from which to learn, they also face formidable difficulties when trying to draw appropriate inferences from the data they do generate. Self-serving construals of influence situations, for example, can seriously impede learning the efficacy of one's social influence attempts. Numerous case studies and experiments have demonstrated, for example, how the biased construals of social interactions lead to self-serving interpretations that justify a person's own harsh or punitive actions (Jervis, 1976; Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Plous, 1985). These studies demonstrate that people tend to fit received information, especially when it is ambiguous or inconclusive, into their pre-existing stereotypes and categories.

One particularly interesting form of biased construal is the self-serving punctuation of social interactions. There is evidence that the parties involved in social interactions do not perceive their interactions as smooth, continuous causal streams. Instead, they punctuate causal episodes into discriminable "chunks" that help them make sense of what is happening (Swann, Pelham & Roberts, 1987). Thus, two actors engaged in an acrimonious mutual-influence attempt are likely to punctuate the conflict differently, making each seem to him– or herself virtuous and simply responding to the offensive or objectionable acts of the other. Consider the case, of the leader who suspects others around him or her aren't trustworthy when it comes to responding to positive forms of social influence, yet are clever at feigning cooperativeness and trustworthiness. Because of the leader's presumption that the others lack trustworthiness or have the willingness to cooperate, the perceived diagnostic value of any particular social cue or bit of observed behavior is, from the outset, suspect. As Weick (1993) noted in this regard, when a perceiver recognizes that social cues are potentially corruptible, it is easy to assume that they are in actuality corrupted. He cites, as an illustration, the historical example of an incident on the day before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: An American naval attaché had informed Washington that he did not believe a surprise attack by the Japanese was imminent, and to justify his prediction, he cited the "fact" that the Japanese fleet was still stationed at its home base. The clear and compelling evidence for this conclusion, he noted, was that large crowds of sailors could be observed happily and casually strolling the streets of Tokyo. Without sailors, the fleet obviously could not have sailed. If the sailors were still in port, therefore, so was the fleet. What the attaché did not know—and, more importantly, failed to even imagine--was that these "sailors" were in actuality Japanese soldiers disguised as sailors. They had been ordered to pose as sailors and stroll the streets to conceal the fact that the Japanese fleet had, in fact, left port and was already on its way to Pearl Harbor. From the perspective of the suspicious, wary, skeptical and pessimistic social perceiver, of course, the attaché's experience provides dramatic proof of what happens when individuals allow themselves to relax their assumptions. In a world presumed to be sinister, innocence regarding others' trustworthiness can have fatal consequences. In such a world, social cues are always corrupted, always in a predictably dangerous direction.

In elaborating the implications of this incident, Weick noted that the very desire of the attaché to find a fool-proof cue regarding Japanese intentions made him more vulnerable to manipulation regarding the nature of those intentions. Weick reasoned that, "the very fact that the observer finds himself looking to a particular bit of evidence as an incorruptible check on what is or might be corruptible, is the very rea-

son he should be suspicious of this evidence" (172). After all, the best evidence for the observer is also the best evidence for the deceiver to tamper with or manipulate. As a consequence, Weick observes, "when the situation seems to be exactly what it appears to be" a likely alternative is that "the situation has been completely faked" (173).

Ironically, for the skeptical social perceiver even the complete absence of any evidence or cues at all can be construed as a portent that something is amiss. Dawes (1988) provided a helpful illustration of this possibility in his discussion of the debate over the necessity of internment of Japanese-Americans at the beginning of the Second World War. The question, of course, was the danger posed to national security by the presence of a sizable contingent of Japanese-Americans in the United States. Where would their loyalties lie? Could they be trusted? When the then-Governor of California Earl Warren testified before a congressional hearing regarding internment, one of his interrogators noted that absolutely no evidence of espionage or sabotage on the part of any Japanese-Americans had been presented or was available to the committee. Thus, there was absolutely no objective evidence of danger. Warren's response as to how best to interpret this absence of evidence is revealing: "I take the view that this lack [of evidence] is the most *ominous sign* in our whole situation. It convinces me *more than perhaps any other factor* that the sabotage we are to get, the Fifth Column activities we are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed" (251, italics added). He then went on to add, "I believe we are just being lulled into a false sense of security" (251).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A primary purpose of this paper is to identify an important area of influence research where further theory and empirical evidence is greatly needed. As the examples provided throughout this paper make clear, the costs of misguided or ineffective influence attempts can be substantial. In that spirit, this paper lays some theoretical grounds and conceptual foundations for further research on self-defeating social influence. The intuitive social auditor model is intended to provide a descriptive platform to stimulate further research in this area. As noted earlier, one distinct advantage of the framework is that it identifies points of special weakness or vulnerability for misdirected influence. In that respect, it helps us understand how and why it might be that even politically savvy, experienced and otherwise intelligent leaders may embark on self-destructive courses of action.

Additionally, the paper identifies a variety of methodological approaches that may be used in further study of self-defeating influence behaviors, ranging from traditional experimental techniques favored by social psychologists to other more ethnographic and comparative approaches. A comprehensive understanding of failed social influence behavior obviously benefits from a multiple methods approach.

Given the enormously serious consequences that arise when powerful leaders embark on and persist with self-defeating influence behaviors in pursuing their objectives, it is imperative that we develop a better understanding of the forms, dynamics, and remedies for such behaviors. At the moment of greatest tension during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a message in which he worried, "The harder you and I pull, the tighter this knot [of war] will become. And a time may come when this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it." A more thorough understanding of the causes and dynamics of self-defeating influence behaviors may help leaders untie such knots—and thereby avoid catastrophic error.

REFERENCES

Axelrod, R. 1997. *The Complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of competition and collaboration.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barrett, D.M. 1993 *Uncertain warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam advisors.* Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press.

Baumeister, R.F. & Scher, S.J. 1988. Self-defeating behavior patterns among normal individuals: Review and analysis of common self-destructive tendencies. *Psychological Bulletin,* 104, 3-22.

Bendor, J., Kramer, R.M. & Stout, S. 1991. When in doubt: Cooperation in the noisy prisoner's dilemma. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 35, 691-719.

Berglas, S. & Baumeister, R.F. 1993. *Your own worst enemy: Understanding the paradox of self-defeating behavior* New York: Basic Books.

Berman, L. 1982. *Planning a tragedy: The Americanization of the war in Vietnam.* New York: Norton.

Blau, P.M. 1964. *Exchange and power in social life.* New York: Wiley and Sons.

Boulding, K.B. 1966. *Conflict and defense.* New York: Harper & Row.

_____. 1989. *Three faces of power.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Brockner, J. & Rubin, J. 1985. *Entrapment in escalating conflicts.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Bumiller, E. 2004, May 12. Stolid Rumsfeld soldiers on, but weighs ability to serve. *New York Times,* A12.

Burns, J.M. 1978. *Leadership.* New York: Harper & Row.

Campbell, D.T. & Fiske, D.W. 1959. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. *Psychological Bulletin,* 56, 81-105.

Caro, R.A. 2002. *Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson.* New York: Alfred Knopf.

_____. 1982. *The Path to power: The Years of Lyndon Johnson.* New York: Vintage Books.

Cialdini, R.B. 1988. *Science and practice* (3rd ed.). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Dallek, R. 2003. *An Unfinished life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963.* New York: Little, Brown.

Dawes, R.M. 2001. *Everyday irrationality: How pseudo-scientists, lunatics and the rest of us systematically fail to think rationally.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

_____. 1988. *Rational choice in an uncertain world.* New York: Wiley.

Elsbach, K.D. & Kramer, R.M. 1996. Members' responses to organizational identity threats: Encountering and countering the Business Week rankings. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 41, 442-476.

_____. 2003. Assessing creativity in Hollywood pitch meetings: A Dual process model of creativity judgment. *Academy of Management Journal,* 46(3), 283-301.

Emerson, R.M. 1962. Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review,* 27, 31-40.

Fiske, S.T. 1993. Controlling other people: The Impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist,* 48, 621-628.

French, J.R.P, Jr. & Raven, B. 1959. The Bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power,* (pp. 150-167). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.

Galinsky, A., Gruenfeld, D.H. & Magee, J. 2003. From power to action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 85, 453-466.

Gardner, H. 1995. *Leading minds: An Anatomy of leadership.* New York: Basic Books.

George, A. 1980. *Presidential decisionmaking in foreign policy: The Effective use of information and advice.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Gergen, D. 2000. *Eyewitness to power: The Essence of leadership from Nixon to Clinton.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Gilovich, T. 1991. *How we know what isn't so: The Fallibility of human reason in everyday life.* New York: Free Press.

Ginzel, L.E., Kramer, R.M. & Sutton, R.I. 1993. Organizational impression management as a reciprocal influence process: The Neglected role of the organizational audience. In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior,* 15, 227-266. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Greenhalgh, L. & Kramer, R.M. 1986. Strategic choice in conflicts: The importance of relationships. In R.L. Kahn & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Organizations and nation-states: New perspectives on conflict and cooperation* (pp.181-220). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Herring, G.C. 1993. The Reluctant warrior: Lyndon Johnson as Commander in Chief. In D.L. Anderson (Ed.), *Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975* (pp. 87-112). Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

Hitlin, S. 2003. Values as the core of personal identity: Drawing links between two theories of the self. *Social Psychology Quarterly,* 66, 118-137.

Hoffman, J. 1995. *Theodore H. White and journalism as illusion.* Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press.

Janis, I.L. 1983. *Groupthink* (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

_____. 1989. *Crucial decisions.* New York: Free Press.

Jervis, R. 1976. *Perception and misperception in international politics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jones, E.E. & Berglas, S. 1999. Control of the attributions about the self through self-handicapping strategies: The Appeal of alcohol and the role of underachievement. In R. Baumeister (Ed.), *The Self in social psychology* (pp. 430-435). New York: Psychology Press.

Kahn, R.L. & Kramer, R.M. 1986. Untying the knot: De-escalatory processes in international conflict. In R.L. Kahn & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Organizations and nation-states: New perspectives on conflict and cooperation* (pp.139-180). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Kahn, R.L., Wolfe, D.M., Quinn, R.P., Snoek, J.D. & Rosenthal, R.A. 1964. *Organizational stress: Studies in role conflict and ambiguity.* New York: Wiley.

Kearns-Goodwin, D. 1976. *Lyndon Johnson and the American dream.* New York: New American Library.

Kellerman, B. 1994. *The Political presidency: Practice of leadership from Kennedy through Reagan.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D.H. & Anderson, C. 2003. Power, approach and inhibition. *Psychological Review,* 110, 265-284.

Kramer, R.M. 1995. In Dubious battle: Heightened accountability, dysphoric cognition and self-defeating bargaining behavior. In R.M. Kramer & D.M. Messick (Eds.), *Negotiation as a social process* (pp. 95-120). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

_____. 2003a. The Harder they fall. *Harvard Business Review,* 81, 58-68.

_____. 2003b. The Imperatives of identity: The Role of identity in leader judgment and decision making. In D. van Knippenberg & M.A. Hogg (Eds.), *Leadership and power: Identity processes in groups and organizations* (pp. 184-196). London: Sage Publications.

_____. 2004. Perceptions of conspiracy. In D.M. Messick & R.M. Kramer (Eds.), *The Psychology of leadership.* Mahwah, NJ: Earlbaum.

_____. 1998. Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time? *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 73, 236-271.

Kramer, R.M. & Carnevale, P.G. 2001. Trust and distrust in intergroup negotiations. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook in social psychology: Vol. 4, Intergroup processes* (pp. 431-450). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Kramer, R.M. & Hanna, B.A. 1998. Under the influence. In R.M. Kramer & M.A. Neale (Eds.), *Power and influence in organizations* pp. 145-180. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kramer, R.M. & Neale, M.A. 1998. *Power and influence in organizations.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Kramer, R.M., Newton, E. & Pommerenke, P. 1993. Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 56, 110-133.

Kramer, R.M., Pommerenke, P. & Newton, E. 1993. The Social context of negotiation: Effects of social identity and accountability on negotiator judgment and decision making. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 37, 633-654.

Kramer, R.M., Pradhan-Shah, P. & Woerner, S.L. 1995. Why ultimatums fail: Social identity and moralistic aggression in coercive bargaining. In R.M. Kramer & D.M. Messick (Eds.), *Negotiation as a social process* (pp. 285-308). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Kutler, S.I. 1997. *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon tapes.* New York: Free Press.

Levine, R. 2003. *The Power of persuasion: How we're bought and sold.* New York: John Wiley.

Lord, C.G., Ross, L. & Lepper, M.R. 1979. Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The Effects of prior theories on subsequent considered evidence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 55, 396-409.

Maraniss, D. 1998. *The Clinton enigma.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

March, J.G. 1994. *A Primer on decision making.* New York: Free Press.

McClelland, D.C. 1975. *Power: The Inner experience.* New York: Irvington.

Neustadt, R.E. 1990. *Presidential power and the modern presidents: The Politics of leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan.* New York: Free Press.

Neustadt, R.E. & May, E.R. 1986. *Thinking in time: The Uses of history for decision makers.* New York: Free Press.

Nye, J. 2004. *Soft power.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Pfeffer, J. 1981. Management as symbolic action. In L. L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior,* 3, 1-52. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

_____. 1992. *Managing with power.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Plous, S. 1985. Perceptual illusions and military realities: The Nuclear arms race. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 29, 363-389.

Pratkanis, A. & Aronson, E. 1992, 2001. *The Age of propaganda: The Everyday use and abuse of persuasion.* New York: W. B. Freeman.

Pruitt, D.G. & Rubin, J.Z. 1986. *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement.* New York: Random House.

Reeves, R. 1993. *President Kennedy: Profile of power.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

_____. 2001. *President Nixon: Alone in the White House.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Russell, B. 1938. *Power: A New social analysis.* London: Allen & Unwin.

Sutton & Kramer, R.M. 1990. Transforming failure into success: Spin control in the Iceland Arms Control Talks. In R.L. Kahn & M. Zald (Eds.), *Organizations and nation-states* (pp. 221-248). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Swann, W.B. 1987. Identity negotiation: Where two roads meet. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 53, 1038-1051.

_____. 1996. *Self-traps: The Elusive quest for higher self-esteem.* San Francisco: Freeman.

Pelham, B.W. & Roberts, D.C. 1987. Causal chunking: Memory and inference in ongoing interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 53, 858-865.

Thompson, L. 1998. *The mind and heart of the negotiator.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Webb, E.J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R.D. & Sechrest, L. 1966. *Unobtrusive measures: Nonreactive research in the social sciences.* New York: Rand McNally.

Weick, K.E. 1993. Sensemaking in organizations. In J.K. Murnighan (Ed.), *Social psychology in organizations: Advances in theory and practice* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Wrong, D.H. 1979. *Power: Its forms, bases, and uses.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Zimbardo, P.G., Ebbesen, E.B. & Maslach, C. 1977. *Influencing attitudes and changing behavior.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.