

Preventing the Recurrence of Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from the Middle East

by

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ABSTRACT

How can governments prevent ethnic conflict from recurring? This study attempts to answer this question by examining communal relations in the Middle East. The cases examined include countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, which have suffered seemingly intractable conflicts, as well as states such as Morocco, where different ethnic groups live together in apparent harmony. Israel, Syria, and Iran also are examined, as these countries demonstrate instances of both continuing and resolved conflicts. This dissertation pays particular attention to policy options--such as using force, granting material or civic benefits, assimilating individuals into a new identity, and mediating conflicts--available to governments. The result is a handbook on what policies work best, when and how they work, and their advantages and disadvantages.

This thesis concludes that lasting communal peace requires a state willing to and capable of enforcing order: a task that typically requires strong and skilled police and intelligence apparatus. Without being assured that violence will be punished, attempts to use gentler means of reconciliation, such as promising to respect minority rights or allowing elections, will fail. In these circumstances, groups will take up arms to defend themselves. The provision of security alone, however, is not sufficient for lasting peace. Groups must also receive some say in decision making and control over resources to offset the resentment that a strong police and intelligence force often engender

Attempts to nation-build or otherwise change the identity of individuals are extremely difficult, but not impossible, to accomplish. A high level of force is required to impose a new identity on peoples previously involved in an ethnic conflict, as the violence typically hardens communal identities. Not surprisingly, attempts to nation-build often backfire and lead to sustained violence.

Outside powers have only a limited impact on the long-term resolution of communal conflict and indeed usually worsen violence. Outside intervention often alarms groups, making them fear for their status in society, their physical safety, or both. Attempts to play the "honest broker" usually backfire and further polarize a nation. Foreign states often inadvertently work against assimilationist policies by promoting a culture or identity in opposition to that promoted by a government.

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Chapter I: Introduction

In an era when different peoples seem perpetually at war, it is peace and harmony that need explanation. Some scholars and statesmen argue that peace will almost never last after a bloody communal conflict. These pessimists note that the memory of conflict leaves communal groups highly sensitive to their security, making them likely to take up arms again. Furthermore, regimes often mistreat losers in communal conflicts. This mistreatment, combined with the memory of violence, keeps communal groups mistrustful of one another and reduces communal cooperation. If peace will never return to these states, perhaps they should be declared failures and new states with better borders installed in their place.¹

Pessimists, however, overstate their case. Communal conflict is a common event in history, but so too is lasting communal peace. Sectarian, tribal, and ethnic conflicts plagued Western Europe, and ancient texts from *The Iliad* to the Bible indicate the prevalence of communal warfare.² Many of these conflicts, however, are resolved and forgotten. The ancestors of Visigoths no longer trample across Spain, and the sons of strong-greaved Achaeans do not endlessly besiege Phrygians at Troy. Peoples often have put the past behind them,

¹ For one recent argument along these lines, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20:4 (Spring 1996). Because of the likelihood of future conflict, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera argue that Bosnia should be partitioned. "When Peace Means War," *The New Republic* (December 18, 1995). Jeffrey Herbst, while not endorsing partition per se, makes a persuasive argument for experimenting with new forms of sovereignty because of endemic conflict. Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 120-144.

² For the best description of such pre-national conflicts in history, see Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwood, 1986).

learning to live together in peace and at times even in harmony.

How can the recurrence of violent ethnic conflict be prevented? This dissertation seeks to answer this question, focusing specifically on the policies governments should use if they seek to prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. It seeks to answer these questions: What strategies can a government use to end violent ethnic conflict in the long-term? Under what conditions do these strategies work best? What are the limits to the various strategies? How do outside powers affect government strategies? Are there communal conflicts that governments cannot solve? To answer these questions, this dissertation identifies plausible hypotheses as to the causes of ethnic conflict and proposes theories as to how these causes might be overcome by government policies. These proposed solutions are tested by examining both resolved and continuing ethnic conflicts in the Middle East in six countries: Israel, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran.

The durable and bloody nature of ethnic conflict around the globe gives this question special importance today. Of the 35 internal conflicts raging in 1995, roughly 24 were ethnic or sectarian.³ These conflicts have claimed millions of lives, produced tens of millions of refugees, and caused billions of dollars in damage since their inception.⁴ The tragedy threatens to become even greater if past conflicts that appear resolved ignite again. The former Yugoslavia, Burundi, Rwanda, Iraq, Sudan, and the Caucasus are but a few of the many lands that endure conflicts that

³ This observation is based on the figures compiled in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 4-6.

⁴ The growth of democracy is also imperiled by ethnic divisions. Trust, fairness, and a willingness to surrender power--all of which are necessary for democracy--are difficult to generate in the climate of fear that accompanies ethnic conflict. Lebanon, once the Arab world's most democratic state, is but one example of a case where representative institutions could not handle communal strains.

academics and government officials once considered resolved. Hundreds of thousands of people have died when these conflicts flared anew. To avoid future tragedies, scholars must learn what, if anything, can be done to prevent these conflicts from recurring.⁵

The failure to understand how to prevent violent ethnic conflicts from recurring has resulted in disaster after disaster. Government decrees of national unity typically have led to fears among minorities that their unique identities would be swallowed up by the nation-state. Efforts to promote local government institutions often worsened conflict by allowing communal groups to gain the resources necessary to fight a sustained and bloody conflict. Foreign interventions, such as the Western powers' pressure on the Ottoman empire in the 19th century to stop mistreating its Armenian population, inadvertently contributed to mass killings that far exceeded the original problem. In short, even well-intentioned governments have made grievous mistakes because leaders have not understood what, if any, specific conditions were necessary for their policies to succeed.

A Confused Debate

The academic community has yet to address adequately the question of how to construct a lasting ethnic peace. Most attempts to develop theories have used ideas drawn from international

⁵ As discussed later in this dissertation, the successful resolution of an ethnic conflict is defined solely in terms of a lack of casualties. Thus, a peaceful country that is presided over by a repressive, brutal dictatorship is defined as a "success" even though this is hardly an ideal type of government. This dissertation also ignores other values, such as cultural diversity, fairness, and civil liberties, when weighing the success or failure of communal peace. Although a complete study of how to improve ethnic relations would examine all these factors, the first step toward understanding the question of how to prevent conflict from recurring is to examine a country's death toll or lack thereof.

relations or from single country studies and have not tested them across a variety of cases.

Furthermore, many theories focus only on existing conflicts, ignoring those seemingly intractable conflicts that have stopped.

Several bodies of literature, however, are relevant to the question of how ethnic peace can be maintained in the long-term. Four schools of thought in particular offer partial insights into the question of long-term ethnic peace: counter-insurgency, democratic institutionalism, identity formation, and conflict resolution. Each school, however, fails to capture many of the complex factors that determine whether peace will be maintained for many years.

Counter-insurgency studies take into account the importance of force when assessing the end of an ethnic conflict.⁶ As this school reveals, political violence can often be prevented by the proper use of strong police and military forces, which affect both the desire and the ability of political opponents to organize and spread their message. This school, however, focuses on the immediate resolution of the conflict and does not assess the importance of force in the long-term. Furthermore, it does not explore the important question of whether the use of force in the short-

⁶ The term control is derived from the work of Ian Lustick, who applies this approach in his study of Israel. See "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control," *World Politics* 31:3 (1979). For works that note the importance of force with regard to ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35:1 (Spring 1993); James Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war," *International Organization* 49:3 (1995); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Barbara Walter, *The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994); David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75; and *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties*, Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). For an assessment on the general role of anarchy in domestic politics as compared with international relations, see Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies* 17 (January 1991), pp. 67-86.

term engenders resentment in the long-term. Indeed, the very counterinsurgency strategies that can end a conflict in the short-term may lead to the recurrence of conflict unless coupled with strategies designed to counter the deeper political problems that spawned conflict in the first place.

A second school--democratic institutionalism--examines how power-sharing and democratic practices might end ethnic conflict. Arend Lijphart's work on consociational democracies, Ted Gurr's advocacy of autonomy, and Donald Horowitz' efforts to explore the use of incentives, including electoral adjustments, to discourage ethnic advocacy, are typical of this school.⁷ Sammy Smooha and Theodore Hanf typify this approach:

...since partition can only work in selected cases, the main avenue for managing conflicts in deeply divided societies is democracy. The choice of the specific brand of democracy (ethnic, consociational, and liberal) depends on the prevalence of certain circumstances.⁸

Although this school highlights several useful approaches to ending ethnic conflict, it often does not provide a detailed description of the conditions under which certain policies do and do not work. Furthermore, this school tends to ignore the many instances of where ethnic peace is preserved but the government in question is non-democratic.

⁷ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Arend. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁸ Sammy Smooha and Theodore Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol 33:1-2 (January 1992), p. 45. See also Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 290, where Gurr notes that Western democracies have devised successful strategies for accommodation that blend civil rights, cultural recognition programs, and economic assistance.

A third school of thought relevant to the question of long-term ethnic peace is the work being done on ethnic identity formation. Anthony Smith emphasizes that ethnic group identities are exceptionally durable and that it takes a change in the myths, memories, and symbols of a people to change identity.⁹ Chaim Kaufmann contends that in ethnic wars hypernationalist mobilization rhetoric and atrocities "harden" ethnic identities.¹⁰ David Laitin, on the other hand, argues that individuals often belong to different but overlapping groups and draw on identities as necessary for social action; the specifics of this identity can change readily under new circumstances.¹¹ These scholars do not focus specifically on how identity change relates to conflict resolution, but their work--which suggest different views on whether the very character of the individuals fighting can be altered--offers an interesting way to approach conflict resolution that is particularly relevant to long-term conflict resolution analysis.

The fourth approach, the conflict resolution school, focuses on the short-term resolution of conflict, participant bargaining strategies, and misperceptions that hinder negotiations. Works on negotiations focus on the role of mediators and the negotiating process, usually espousing a

⁹ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰ Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," p. 137.

¹¹ See David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict" in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and "Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Nationality in Estonia and Bashkortostan" (University of Strathclyde, 1995). Other scholars that endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) and Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

game-theory approach. Although leading works try to address many of the preconditions necessary for conflict termination, they usually do not see ethnic conflict resolution as a puzzle that differs from interstate conflict.¹² In recent years, however, a small but growing literature has emerged on why internal wars, unlike interstate wars, are not likely to be resolved by negotiation.¹³ These works add the important insight that the requirements of peace may shift before and after a conflict has broken out and that many of the costs and risks of conflict are often obscure to the participants.

Conflict resolution works, however, suffer from many deficiencies when exploring the

¹² For a good sampling of this literature, see *On the Endings of Wars*, S. Albert and E. Lucks, eds. (Port Washington: Kennikat Press Corp., 1988); Richard Haass, *Conflicts Unending* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); A. J. P. Taylor, *How Wars End* (London: H. Hamilton, 1985); *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Steven Spiegel, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). An extensive bibliography of confidence-building measures can be found in Michael Krepon *et al.* *A Handbook on Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security* (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993). The collection of essays in "How Wars End, *The Annals* 392 (November 1970) is heavily conditioned by the U.S. experience in Vietnam and focuses on issues such as the relationship between force and bargaining, misunderstanding in signalling, public demands for peace, and the dangers of balance of power politics.

¹³ For a survey, see I. W. Zartman, *Resolving Regional Conflicts* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991); Stephen Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); and Roy Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press, 1993). These authors assert that negotiations are difficult to introduce and execute because internal wars tend to be fought over goals and principles that are hard to compromise and that settlements leave parties vulnerable to bad faith from other parties. Stephen J. Cimbala, in *Controlling and Ending Conflict* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), notes the importance of working with former enemies; however, the collection of essays in that book is almost exclusively based on lessons from the Cold War as to how to resolve conflict, ignoring that states often have different means to manage internal conflict. Other recent works on this issue include Virginia Page Fortna, "Success and Failure in Southern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola," in Donald C. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995) and Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *American Political Science Review*, 89:3, pp. 681-687.

question of why ethnic conflict does not recur. They do not look at whether the disputes they explore remain resolved in the long-term, nor do they examine disputes that are not resolved by negotiation.¹⁴ Moreover, most of these works are speculative pieces that do not rigorously test the theories they present beyond anecdotal evidence.¹⁵ Finally, those works that draw lessons from interstate war often ignore that the end of ethnic conflict usually requires once-warring neighbors to live side-by-side and that in ethnic conflict at least one side must lay down its arms and accept government protection, thus leaving it vulnerable should the agreement collapse.¹⁶

Competing Explanations Advanced

From these four schools of thought, I cull four "families" of strategies for ending ethnic conflict in the long-term. The first family, what I will call "control," focuses on impairing ethnic organization and mobilization through the use or the threat of force. If groups cannot organize, or if leaders cannot lead, then preventing widespread ethnic conflict is easier. Control has four variants: "police," "selective," "massive," and "divide and rule." Police control is simply the use

¹⁴ Works with this weakness include D. Lax and J. Sebenius, *The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and R. Fisher and W. Ury, *Getting to Yes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981). This gap, of course, does not invalidate these works; rather, it suggests areas that need further exploration.

¹⁵ Licklider is careful to note the question of why civil war does not start up again but then devotes only a few pages to exploring the nature of the peace and type of polity that favors it. Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End," in *Stopping the Killing*. I.W. Zartman, in his chapter in the same volume, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," asserts that the key is to change the payoff structure for both the government and rebels to make continued conflict the worst option; again, however, he does not explore how a government can do this.

¹⁶ See Walter, *The Resolution of Civil Wars* for a criticism along these lines.

of force to stop violence, comparable to the role played by urban police forces in Western cities today. Selective control is the use of force or the threat of force to impede ethnic organization. Examples of selective control include outlawing political activity, harassing potentially violent activists, or muzzling the media. Massive control involves targeting both activists and non-activists. An example of massive control would include deportations on a wide scale or the use of terror to intimidate an ethnic group. Divide-and-rule policies involve the use of administrative changes or the provision of selective benefits to promote divisions within a group, thus weakening its ability to organize and mobilize.

The second family, "accommodation," turns control on its head. Rather than punish a group for organizing, it appeases a group by giving it the right to participate in the political system, local autonomy, patronage for its leaders, or other privileges that take the urgency out of ethnic causes. Three variants of accommodation include co-optation, devolution, and participation. Co-optation is the provision of selective benefits to ethnic leaders to gain their goodwill. Devolution involves giving communities more rights and control over local spending and decisionmaking. Participation allows individuals to take part in the selection of leaders and the formation of policy but does not guarantee their group control over any particular issue area.

The third family, "identity change," notes that attempts to transform an individual's identity can impair group efforts to organize for conflict. Individual identity can change to embrace a larger national group. For example, Bretons in France today are considered Frenchmen despite having had a distinct identity of their own in the past. Identity can also involve forced assimilation into the dominant ethnic group or the creation of a new minority identity (Chinese Americans becoming Asian Americans). By changing identity, governments

may help groups overcome historic rivalries and other longstanding sources of division.

The fourth and final family focuses on the negotiation of the conflict itself--what I call the "mediation" family. This approach explores the concessions made and the trust developed during the mediation process to see whether they affect future ethnic relations. Strategies involving mediation include "track one" talks, "track two" trust exercises, and confidence-building measures (CBMs). Track one involves the use of third parties to act as mediators in formal negotiations. Track two exercises consist of informal meetings where different ideas can be aired "off the record" and individuals can come to know one another. Finally, confidence-building measures involve the use of tit-for-tat concessions to ensure agreements are honored.

All four families of strategies can function concurrently. The Iranian government under Reza Shah, for example, tried to control ethnic leaders while assimilating minorities into a Persian identity.¹⁷ Similarly, French colonial officials in Syria used their good offices to mediate

¹⁷ Other authors use different breakdowns of the four families I examine. For example, Theodore Hanf notes six forms of ethnic conflict regulation: partition, domination, assimilation, syncretism, and cultural autonomy system. See "Reducing Conflict through Cultural Autonomy," in *State and Nation in Multiethnic Societies*, Uri Ra'anan, Maria Mesner, Keither Armes, and Katin Martin, eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994). Neil Nevitte and Charles Kennedy note nine categories: subjection, isolation (where primary loyalty is the subcommunity), cultural assimilation, avoidance (the use of coercion to insulate the state), displacement (transfer an ethnic group), buffering (the use of intermediaries for social interaction), protection (legal safeguards for minorities), redistribution (economic resources for political support), and power sharing. "The Analysis of Policies of Ethnic Preference in Developing States," in *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986), pp. 39-49. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle offer--but do not test--six solutions: colonial rule, delegation of decisionmaking to the local level, power sharing democracies that try to include all groups in the political system, a restricted scope of government in general, the creation of homogenous societies, or the use of internal enemies to create unity. See *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus: Merrill, 1972), pp. 213-216. Joseph Rothschild proposes five strategies: assimilation, pluralism (participation) cantonization/federalism, secession, and domination. See *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 74-76.

disputes while granting the groups involved large degrees of autonomy and other "accommodationist" measures.

Table IA: Regimes and the Strategies They Used to Manage Ethnic Relations

Country and Regime	Control				Accommodation			Identity Change			Mediation		
	Police	Selective	Massive	Divide and Rule	Participation	Co-opt	Devolve	National Identity	Dominant Ethnic Group Identity	New Minority Identity	Track One	Track Two	CBM
Morocco (Sherifian)							✓				✓		
Morocco (French Protectorate)		✓		✓		✓	✓			✓	✓		
Morocco (Istiqlal)								✓					
Morocco (Current Monarchy)		✓				✓		✓					
Palestine (Mandate)	✓				✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	
Israel (Military Government)		✓		✓		✓		✓*					
Israel (Current Government)**	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓							
Syria (French)		✓		✓		✓							
Syria (Ba'ath)			✓			✓		✓					
Lebanon (Grand Compromise)						✓	✓						
Iraq (British Mandate)	✓			✓		✓	✓						
Iraq (post-war Hashemite Monarchy)		✓				✓	✓						
Iraq (Ba'ath)			✓						✓				
Iran (Pahlavi)			✓			✓			✓				

* The Israeli Military government engaged in a limited attempt to downplay the "Arab" component of Israeli Arabs' identities and tried to foster loyalty to the Israeli state.

** The level of control in the current Israeli government has gradually fallen from selective control to police control.

Countries and regimes in **bold** are ethnic relations successes. Some regimes, such as the British in Iraq and the French in Syria, achieved only limited successes. Others, such as Pahlavi Iran, achieved lasting peace between some communal groups (e.g. Persians and Bakhtiyaris) but not between others (e.g. Persians and Kurds).

Three Types of Conflict

The above four families of government strategies to prevent conflict from recurring need to be examined in light of scholarship on the causes of ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflict can occur for a variety of reasons, ranging from concerns for communal safety to personal squabbles among leaders. In the Middle East, however, three causes of ethnic conflict stand out for their virulence and for their frequency. The first cause of conflict is the "ethnic security dilemma."¹⁸ This concept, drawn from the work of Barry Posen, examines ethnic conflict as a function of group members' concerns about their safety. Just as states in the international environment often arm and go to war for defensive reasons, so too do ethnic groups mobilize and war out of fear that a failure to do so will leave them vulnerable. The second cause of conflict is ethnic status concerns. Groups want more than security: they seek to be recognized by other groups and institutions as equals in the community. The lack of such recognition can lead to tension and eventually to violence. The third cause of conflict important in the Middle East is a desire for hegemony. Certain groups do not just want security and social recognition: they seek dominance. These groups are willing to use force to impose their language, culture, and institutions on other groups. Throughout this dissertation, these three causes are used to illustrate many of my findings on how to craft an ethnic peace.

Not surprisingly, these three types of conflict require different solutions. For example, ensuring a group's safety might dampen conflicts stemming from the security dilemma, but this safety will do little to satisfy a group's status concerns or appease a hegemonic group. Thus, governments must use a variety of strategies to solve or reduce these different types of conflict.

¹⁸ Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict."

Answers Offered

As I began this study, it quickly became clear that no single family of strategies explained the development of ethnic peace in all countries or even in a single country. Moreover, the strategies often responsible for the initial peace at times differed from those that preserved it over the years. Furthermore, while I do not believe all or even most conflicts are inevitable, clearly factors ranging from geography to levels of socio-economic development played a role in all the conflicts and influenced the effectiveness of the various strategies. Thus, what I have tried to identify is the following:

- o How various families of strategies (i.e. control, accommodation, identity change, and mediation) work in practice.
- o The types of ethnic conflicts (i.e. the security dilemma, status, and hegemony) influenced by each family.
- o The advantages and disadvantages of each of the various families of strategies and the conditions that affect their implementation.
- o How outside powers affect government attempts to preserve peace.

I conclude that control is an extremely effective device for countering hegemonic ambitions and dampening the ethnic security dilemma. By providing an atmosphere of security, control can reduce the need for groups to take defense into their own hands and can deter hegemonic groups from using force to subordinate rivals. Control further impedes groups with a hegemonic agenda by preventing ethnic leaders from mobilizing their followers and discouraging

individuals from participating in ethnic political activity.¹⁹ One often overlooked benefit of control is that it reassures the dominant group, thus reducing incentives for it to lash out at subordinate groups. Over the long-term, by preventing collective action with control, governments can impose new administrative structures or encourage a new, more peaceful ethos to develop despite group resistance.

A high level of control is necessary when a hegemonic group dominates the state. In the short-term at least, hegemonic policies engender tremendous resistance, and governments must be able to compel other groups to follow the wishes of the hegemonic group in order to subordinate their cultures and ways of life. Without sufficient force, subordinate group protests over status and security will erupt into violence.

Control, however, has several disadvantages that limit its effectiveness in preventing the recurrence of communal conflict. First and foremost, control inspires resentment and can lead individuals to fear for their groups' status in society. Thus, conflicts over status can arise even as control reduces the likelihood of conflicts over security. Control also is hard to implement. Governments with few resources cannot muster the force necessary to use control, and even strong governments must create a large "on the ground" presence to be sure that control is targeted properly.

¹⁹ Control can make the cost of resistance too high for most individuals vis-a-vis the likely benefits even though the group as a whole might receive a net benefit from resisting. In the paper I will discuss how force produces two, often contradictory effects: fear and anger. Anger can mobilize a group and lead them to violence, while fear will lead individuals to avoid potentially offensive behavior. The key for the successful use of violence is to have fear outweigh anger. This concept of collective action is derived from Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 (1965)). For work applying this to violent organization, see Edward Muller and Karl Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," *American Political Science Review* 80:2 (June 1986).

The three accommodation strategies examined in this dissertation--participation, co-optation, and devolution--act quite differently in resolving ethnic conflict. Participation, when successful, provides individuals with a stake in the system that leads them to believe that the system respects their group's status. Moreover, this stake tends to make groups more pragmatic and moderate with respect to ethnic cooperation. Participation, however, has several problems. Participation is extremely difficult to enact in an atmosphere of ethnic hostility. If regimes are not careful, elections will simply polarize groups. Indeed, successful participation appears to require either multiple ethnic groups or splits in the majority, both of which allow minority groups to gain a greater voice in decisionmaking.

The devolution of a specified range of authority and resources to a group represents an alternative to participation. When successful, devolution helps groups satisfy their status concerns by ensuring that a portion of decisionmaking is reserved for the group and that certain areas, such as language and religion, are inviolate. Devolution, however, does not end the ethnic security dilemma or counter hegemonic groups. Indeed, if either of these causes are active, devolution can worsen conflict by increasing a group's ability to organize and use violence.

Co-optation generally is effective in limiting ethnic conflict, but by itself it cannot end it entirely. Co-optation usually convinces elites not to use violence. This strengthens the voices of moderation in a community and creates divisions between leaders and followers, weakening the community as a whole. Moreover, the mere presence of a group's leaders among the elite reduce group status concerns to an extent.

Co-optation, like participation and devolution, suffers from several problems. Co-optation's greatest problem is that it is less effective when new elites are emerging. For example,

if education programs produce rival sets of leaders, elite competition often develops, and rivals might try to generate ethnic hostility to gain popularity. In such situations, the government may co-opt the wrong people or may not have sufficient resources to co-opt the many emerging elites. Co-optation also is hindered when communities have strong, autonomous institutions. If leaders do not depend entirely on the government for their survival, they have less incentive to follow the government's lead.

Identity change strategies can interfere with an ethnic group's attempts to organize and lower its numerical strength, both of which make it easier for the government to enforce peace. Identity change fosters common bonds among previously-different ethnic groups. Successful changes in identity blur distinctions between "us" and "them," making it difficult for radicals to stir up violence as former enemies become ethnic kinsmen.

However, most attempts at changing identity examined in this dissertation failed and several actually worsened conflict. Attempts to impose a new identity, particularly the identity of a previous rival, led to tremendous resentment among the affected population. Groups saw the imposition of a rival identity as an attempt to subordinate them and at times as a threat to their very survival. Not surprisingly, this resentment often caused violence. Identity change policies also disadvantage traditional political and cultural elites, who lose their status and influence if their followers assume a new identity.

Identity change policies are hard to carry out. In several cases the dominant group did not accept non-dominant group members who tried to assimilate as equals even as the government urged the non-dominant group to shed its previous identity. Identity change is also hard to accomplish if a group has a strong intellectual and cultural tradition, which preserves group unity

in the face of pressure to change. Finally, identity change is particularly difficult to carry out after a bloody ethnic conflict, as the bloodshed fosters a sense of group solidarity and identity.

Mediation in general was not an important source of ethnic peace in the cases examined in this dissertation.²⁰ In one case--the French Protectorate government in Morocco--mediation did provide groups with a useful means of redress for status concerns. In general, however, mediation efforts suffered due to a lack of enforcement, leading both sides to bargain in bad faith. Moreover, mediation during hegemonic conflict often convinced the parties involved that the other was hostile rather than easing tension.

Meddlesome outside powers often disrupt government policies designed to manage ethnic conflict. Foreign powers hinder control policies by aiding an ethnic group with weapons or a haven. Outside powers also can destroy inter-communal trust, reducing the likelihood that devolution and participation will work to reduce conflict. Foreign powers and populations abroad are particularly disruptive with regard to identity change policies. They can preserve a culture or an identity outside the reach of the state, thus maintaining a rival identity to the one preferred by the state. Outside actors also upset mediated solutions by discrediting negotiators and increasing concerns about non-compliance.

Outside intervention is critical, however, when a government is too weak to implement policies such as control or accommodation or when a government is a party to a conflict.

Outside powers can replace the state as an enforcer of peace. In addition, they can impose a

²⁰ This is not to say that mediation is always ineffective. In India and Malaysia, for example, groups have mediated conflict without bloodshed, suggesting this solution remains a possible source of lasting peace. However, the Middle East cases examined in this study suggest its explanatory power is at best limited in that region.

power-sharing system or other political framework that recognizes the status of a country's communal groups. In theory, outside powers can also coerce states that refuse to pursue policies that will lead to ethnic peace. The Middle East, however, offers no examples of such benign coercion.

Methodology

This dissertation examines the relationship between the termination of ethnic conflict (the dependent variable) and various government strategies to manage ethnic relations (the independent variables). Although by necessity this dissertation explores the characteristics and aspirations of various communal groups, the primary agent examined is the government. Most of the governments examined in this study acted as somewhat neutral third parties, arbitrating among their countries' major communal groups. In several cases, however, one group had "captured" the government, and that group dictated the policies the government pursued.

Several methodological tools are used in this dissertation to test whether various strategies can lead to lasting ethnic peace. They include the "method of difference," congruence testing, and process tracing.

The "Method of Difference" is the basis for much of my case selection. I focus on the similarity in the basic setting of many ethnic conflicts--the previous presence of an ethnic conflict and a common geographic area--and seek to account for the different outcomes found today. For example, in the Middle East, Berber and Arab tribes once warred in Morocco; Kurds and Arabs contested control over parts of Iraq; and Arabs and Jews fought over the right to make the Palestine Mandate their homeland. Yet though all these groups shared similar reasons for

fighting, the Kurds today continue to fight while neither the Arabs and Jews within Israel nor Arabs and Berbers in Morocco still war. As a possible explanation for these different outcomes, I examine and test different "strategies" to resolve ethnic conflict. I treat these strategies, which I derive from the four "families" I described above, as theories--cause-effect relationships that have observable predictions.

The dependent variable--the prevention of an ethnic conflict from recurring--is not constant.²¹ By examining the cases of Iraq and Lebanon--cases of continued conflict--I can better determine the causal impact of the independent variables than if I looked only at resolved conflicts. Furthermore, within many of the "successes" I examine are periods of failure. Although both Israel and Morocco are peaceful today, Jews and Palestinian Arabs fought bitterly from 1936-1939 as well as in 1948, and Moroccan Arabs and Berbers fought regularly before French colonization and almost fought following independence.

Congruence testing is an important part of my methodology.²² Congruence testing is intended to systematize the historic information gathered from different cases in order to draw sound inferences.²³ For each strategy I infer predictions of events that we should observe if the

²¹ I should note at the outset that the selection of the dependent variable--the lack of ethnic conflict--may be affected by certain "solutions"--particularly democratization--which may be impossible if ethnic conflict levels are high. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 108 for more on the importance of variability in the dependent variable.

²² Congruence testing "defines and standardizes the data requirements of the case studies ... by formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case ...". Alexander J. George and Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decisionmaking," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1985), p. 41.

²³ King, Keohane, and Verba, p. 46.

strategy works to produce ethnic peace. For example, if a policy of control indeed leads to ethnic peace, we should expect to see a correlation between the implementation of effective control and a decline in the recurrence of ethnic conflict across the cases surveyed. Explicitly comparing the various theories across a variety of cases and specifying a theory's predictions in advance can help reduce the subjectivity inherent in the case study method.²⁴

Process tracing is another important part of my attempt to explore causation. Process tracing goes beyond simple correlation (e.g. did outcome X follow the enactment of policy Y) and attempts to determine how policy Y might have caused outcome X. By getting inside cases and learning the attitudes of many of the chief actors through interviews and reading their written statements, I hope to demonstrate that the correlations I draw between ethnic peace and various policies in fact reflect causation. In order to carry out process tracing, I use data from secondary sources, government archives, and interviews to discover whether the strategies in question caused the behavior I observed.

Methodological Barriers

Despite using multiple cases, this study faces several potential methodological problems: endogeneity, the selection of intervening variables, and generalizeability. None of these problems is fatal, but each needs to be examined and the limits they pose should be noted at the outset of this dissertation.

²⁴ All the theory's predictions need not be fulfilled for the theory to have value. Incomplete records, particularly with regard to historical popular attitudes, will be one source of problems. Other predictions may not pan out because they require special conditions that are not present in the case being tested. See Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Volume I: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War* (Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

The first problem, endogeneity (that the values of the explanatory variables are at times a consequence of the dependent variable),²⁵ is common when solutions are examined by focusing on correlation. For example, if long-term ethnic peace is a requirement for a democratic government, this could lead a researcher to (perhaps wrongly) conclude that a democratic government *causes* long-term ethnic peace when in fact the causality runs the other way.

To avoid this problem, I rely only partially on correlation and also use interviews and memoirs to study the attitudes of those directly involved. By uncovering the motivations of the actors, I hope to minimize problems with endogeneity. Using the example above, ethnic leaders might reveal in interviews that they did not feel the need to fight given that democracy offered them a means of redressing their grievances--a revelation that suggests that democratic government led to ethnic peace. However, if the interviews revealed that another cause led the leaders to avoid violence--such as a fear of going to jail--this would suggest that peace could occur without democratic government. Furthermore, by testing a variety of alternative strategies that might cause ethnic peace, I hope to minimize any bias inherent in my approach.

The second methodological problem, the selection of intervening variables, is particularly important. Certain strategies may not be available to certain regimes, and certain regime or ethnic group characteristics may make generally sound strategies ineffective. A regime barely clinging to power, for example, may not be able to field an effective police force.²⁶ A regime

²⁵ See King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 185-196 for a discussion of this problem.

²⁶ Rachel Bronson notes that strong states with significant economic resources are less likely to have internal conflicts and are better able to prevent pernicious regional interventions. See "Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 205.

governing many ethnic groups may fear the spread of ethnic dissent from one group to another, thus limiting its options.²⁷ Furthermore, the social organization of the various ethnic groups, their level of geographic concentration, and even the historical era all shape policy effectiveness.²⁸ There is no solution to this problem other than care and attention to detail. In each study, I make every effort to identify potential non-manipulable variables and call the reader's attention to them.

The third methodological problem is related to the second: how to generalize when the cases vary tremendously. Colonial Morocco and modern Iraq differ in many ways that may limit their comparison. Furthermore, the Middle East, like other distinct regions of the world, may at times be *sui generis*. For example, the Middle East is home to many clan-based, relatively feudal social orders as opposed to nation-based groups: a difference that may make nationalism and other troublesome problems easier to overcome in the Middle East than in other parts of the world. As with the other methodological barriers, I believe that by carefully specifying conditions and variables I can draw sound theoretical insights from the comparisons I make. I hope that by carefully specifying my conditions, students of other geographic areas will be better able to test and refine my conclusions in their own work.

²⁷ Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 322.

²⁸ Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 16; Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," p. 137; and Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," p. 312. Levine notes that secessionist attempts are particularly likely to be volatile when the state fears that secessionism in one region will spread to other regions.

Case Selection Criteria: Why Study the Middle East?²⁹

In addition to my deep personal interest in the politics and peoples of the Middle East, I find that the region is a fruitful place for the study of ethnic relations for several reasons:

- o First, the Middle East contains a wide range of ethnic groups with strong ethnic identities. Arabs, Jews, Kurds, Persians, Berbers, and other communal groups have their own languages, political leaderships, and political cultures. Without this range, my conclusions might mistake the characteristics of a particular culture as a universal issue in ethnic relations.
- o Second, the Middle East is home to both resolved and unresolved conflicts. This variance enables me to learn from both successes and failures when studying various strategies to prevent the recurrence of ethnic conflict.
- o Third, outside powers played a major role in many Middle Eastern ethnic conflicts. Thus, study of this region should produce insights into one of my key questions: what can outside powers do to affect ethnic conflict.
- o Fourth, states in the Middle East employed a wide variety of policies to manage ethnic

²⁹ Academic work on the Middle East either focuses only on ethnic relations within one country, ignoring general theory, or stresses interreligious conflict. Most of the literature in Middle East studies focuses on differences between Muslims and non-Muslims--particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict--and ignores ethnic differences in Muslim societies. This emphasis on sectarian conflict has led to the neglect of religiously homogenous but ethnically diverse countries like Morocco and Iran. Examples of works that do explore the ethnic diversity of the Arab world include *Arabs and Berbers*, E. Gellner and C. Micaud, eds. (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1972.); *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, M. Esman and I. Rabinovich, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); A. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London: Oxford, 1947); and *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, P. Houry and J. Kostiner, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). These works, however, do not try to relate Middle Eastern ethnic issues to broader ones of ethnic conflict termination or derive general lessons from the specific cases they explore.

relations. Moreover, at times different regimes within the same states tried different policies. These attempts expand the number of potential cases for me to examine. Furthermore, the range of regimes in the Middle East includes both strong and weak central governments, which some scholars posit as a key determinant of managing political turmoil.³⁰

- o Fifth, in elaborating my theories, I have drawn on both Western history and on the studies of scholars studying non-Arab and non-Muslim regions. I believe my work may add to their developed theories and benefit by employing ideas already tested in other parts of the world.

This dissertation is primarily intended to add to the field of ethnic relations and conflict resolution, not Middle East studies. I have not tried to provide the definitive history of ethnic relations in the Middle East for this century. Instead, I have selectively focused on part of this history in order to shed light into ethnic relations in general. However, because ethnicity in the Middle East is often a neglected issue, I believe my work adds to the regional literature as well as general theoretical topics.

To test the effectiveness of various government strategies to create lasting peace, I examine ethnic relations in six Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria. The ethnic groups of these countries are involved in a range of conflicts, from tribal fighting between Berbers and Arabs to sectarian disputes in Lebanon. Furthermore, the regimes of these countries range from modern and traditional authoritarian regimes in Iraq and Morocco

³⁰ For example, see Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa," p. 213.

to democracy in Israel. Finally, these countries exhibit a wide variety of outcomes. Not only are peace and continued warfare found among this set of cases, but so are hardened ethnic identities and ones (such as Berber) that at best have only loose identification.³¹

³¹ Readers familiar with the Middle East, and with Middle Eastern languages, will note that my renderings of common names and places are often not exact. In general, I have followed several principles: First, if a name, place, or term has a conventional and widely used spelling in English, I continue it even though it may have a more accurate French, Hebrew, Persian, or Arabic rendering. Thus, I use "Damascus" rather than the literal "*dimašq*." For less familiar place names, where no English equivalent is commonly used, I try to follow the U.S. government transliteration. If this is not available, I rely on that of area experts who write in English. Second, where the area expert may care about the precise word I initially give it in the foreign language in parentheses and then revert to English usage rather than confuse the lay reader with a large number of foreign words. Thus I use the word *clan* for the Arabic word *hamula* when discussing social structure in Palestine. Third, for place names that vary in time, I follow the term used at the time in question whenever possible. Thus, when discussing Israel I refer to it as "the Palestine Mandate area" when discussing the period of 1917 to 1948; as "Israel" when discussing the post-1948 area; and "the area in what was to become Palestine" when discussing the Ottoman empire. Fourth, whenever an author writes in English I use his or her preferred spelling of their name. This results in anomalies (Mohammed, for example, has several different spellings) but I prefer these differences in order to preserve the citation intact and respect the preferences of the author. The above approach was influenced by Janet Abu-Lughod's approach in *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), which I believe offers the best combination of accuracy and reader convenience.

Table IB: Regimes and Ethnic Groups Examined in this Study

Country and Regime	Ethnic Groups Examined	Success	Failure
Morocco (Sherifian)	Arabs and Berbers		xx
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Arabs and Berbers	xx	
Morocco (Istiqlal)	Arabs and Berbers		xx
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	Arabs and Berbers	xx	
Palestine (Mandate)	Arabs (Muslim, Christian, and Druze) and Jews		xx
Israel (Military Government)	Arabs and Jews	xx	
Israel (Current Government)	Arabs and Jews	xx	
Syria (French Mandate)	Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawis	xx*	
Syria (Ba'ath)	Alawis, Kurds, Druze, and Muslims		xx
Lebanon (National Pact)	Christians, Shi'a, Sunni, and Druze		xx**
Iraq (British Mandate)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims	xx	
Iraq (post-war Hashemite Monarchy)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims	xx	
Iraq (Ba'ath)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims		xx
Iran (Pahlavi)	Persians, Kurds, Bakhtiyaris	xx***	xx***

*In Syria, peace generally continued through the end of the colonial period, with the exception of the Druze Revolt in the late 1920s.

**Lebanon was peaceful for over 40 years until a bitter civil war broke out in 1975. The collapse of the peace is examined in this dissertation.

***Iran's continued fighting with its Kurdish population is an ethnic relations failure, but its successful pacification and assimilation of its Bakhtiyari population is an ethnic relations success.

Definitions

To avoid confusion, I define several important terms related to both my independent and dependent variables below:

An *ethnic group* is a group of people bound together by a belief of common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, language, and history.³² Somewhat arbitrarily, I will also define an ethnic group as one that numbers--or had numbered--over 10,000 people. Examples of ethnic groups are Kurds (a common language, perceptions of a shared history) and Jews (belief in common ancestry reinforced by a common religion and history). Large tribal groups, such as the Aith Waryaghar tribal confederation in the Rif mountains in Morocco or the Bakhtiyari tribe of the Zagros area in Iran fall under this category as well.

An *ethnic conflict* is a violent conflict between ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and government forces that consist of one or more different ethnic groups. For the purposes of my study, ethnic conflicts are those that result in more than 100 deaths in a year (it need not be every year). There are two formats for conflict: group-group conflict, with the government

³² Such ties are difficult to test empirically. For example, two Somalis who share a belief in a common ancestor and thus believe they are distinct from others who do not share that ancestor would be part of the same ethnic group even if this ancestor never existed. Two blood brothers, who for reasons of adoption do not see themselves as kin, would not be of the same ethnicity. Religion, language, and history will be the factors used for data collection. Needless to say, all of these are imperfect fits. One can have Catholics who do not see themselves as having blood ties or English speakers who do not see themselves as part of the same national family, etc. Rather, these are observable characteristics to show perceived bonds on which data are gathered. This definition is loosely based on that of Max Weber, who defines an ethnic group as "human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of members of colonization and migration ... it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists." Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 389. Weber astutely notes that ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation.

acting as a third party of some kind (e.g. Hindu-Muslim riots in India) and group-government conflict, where the government is an active party on behalf of one ethnic group (e.g. Kurdish rebellions against the Arab central government in Baghdad). Ethnic conflict, according to my usage, also embraces sectarian conflict. Shi'a and Sunnis in Iraq, for example, fought along lines of religion that conveyed group distinctiveness. Given the definition of an ethnic group used above, intertribal warfare also falls into this category. In this study, I examine all these types of conflict even though, as we shall see, their solutions are often quite different.

I consider an ethnic conflict successfully terminated when deaths fall below 100 per year for a minimum of twenty years. My definition of successful termination ignores such wrongs as oppression, discrimination, and nonlethal violence. Although these tragedies certainly are important, I nevertheless maintain that theories should be able to explain the termination of the most egregious conflicts, where killing is involved, before proceeding to explain rises and declines in ethnic prejudice and tension. In addition, oppression and other wrongs may even foster ethnic peace--an assertion I wish to explore in my work.

Deeply divided societies are ones where the leading social groups are different in culture, separate in institutions, unequal in power or privileges, or disagree on fundamental issues.³³ Pluralism--when political power is dispersed among many social groups--does not explain stability in such societies: no cross-cutting loyalties exist to foster cooperation. Similarly, a melting pot model, wherein different groups gradually lose their particularist identities and join a

³³ Smootha and Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies," p. 26.

common national identity, does not explain stability as social divisions limit assimilation.³⁴

Tribe. A tribe is a group of persons forming a community claiming descent from a common ancestor that acts collectively for administrative or economic purposes.³⁵ Like the definition of ethnic group, a tribe is unified by perceived rather than real bonds. Neither the ancestor nor the descent need be real. Self-awareness is also important--the tribal community must be perceived by its members. A tribe, unlike an ethnic group, is by definition a social organization (i.e. used for economic and/or administrative purposes). For my purposes, a tribe that is over 10,000 people and has a sentiment of group distinctiveness would be an ethnic group; however, an ethnic group that does not function as a social organization or does not claim descent from a common ancestor would not be a tribe.

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation has 13 chapters. In the second chapter, I examine three of the leading

³⁴ Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies" p. 327.

³⁵ *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* (complete text), Vol II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 3400 (349). I am deliberately excluding one *OED* definition: "A race of people; now applied especially to a primary aggregate of people in a primitive or barbarous condition ..." as the tribal groups I examine may be prosperous and "modern" in the material sense of the term. This definition combines the classic definition of E.E. Evans-Pritchard ("a tribe is the largest community which considers that disputes between its members should be settled by arbitration") and that of Morocco expert John Waterbury ("a tribe is above all a mechanism by which a number of segments collectively exploit a sector of strategic resources"). The Pritchard definition is quoted in Robin Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1973), p. xii while Waterbury's is given in *Commander of the Faithful* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 54. However, unlike either of these definitions, I specifically note the subjective character of a tribe. Tribal consciousness is formed primarily by common political experiences and not by common descent. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 394.

causes of ethnic conflict and illustrate their importance on the cases of Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. The intent of this chapter is not to prove definitively what causes ethnic conflict but rather to lay out what factors are manipulable with regard to ethnic conflict that governments and outside powers might take advantage of as they try to prevent conflict from recurring. In the third chapter, I develop the hypotheses that will guide the remainder of this study. I describe in detail the four families of strategies that governments use to manage ethnic relations and spell out how they might lead to continued ethnic peace.

In chapters four through nine, I explore ethnic relations in Israel, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. Within each country are several "cases" with regard to strategies for resolving ethnic conflict. For example, in Morocco the French, the Istiqlal, and King Mohammed V all used different policies to manage Arab-Berber relations. For each case I give a brief history of important events and then focus attention on the policies the government used to manage ethnic relations. I also describe the level of ethnic violence during the time in question and note important social changes that affect both the chance of ethnic conflict and the likelihood of strategies to end conflict. At the end of each case I will note how and why various policies succeeded and failed, the necessary conditions for them to function effectively, and limits to their impact.

Chapter ten reviews one aspect of these six cases: the role of outside powers. It lays out how outside powers affected the causes of ethnic conflict examined in chapter two and how outsiders helped or hindered the policies governments used to resolve conflict. It also notes what outsiders can do when a government is too weak or unwilling to impose policies that might prevent conflict from recurring.

In chapters eleven and twelve I closely examine each of the four families I described in chapter three and attempt to apply the lessons learned. Chapter eleven compares the predictions made in chapter three with the data from the case study chapters, attempting to determine exactly how the various families work in practice. Chapter twelve then explores the advantages and disadvantages of each family of strategies and notes the conditions that make each family more or less effective.

Chapter thirteen concludes this dissertation by summarizing my observations, noting their implications for both ethnic relations theory and concerned policymakers, and suggesting areas for further research. In the conclusion, I argue that communal peace is often possible after a civil war, even after conflicts as bloody as the one that plagued Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. I also contend, however, that not all communal conflicts can be resolved, using Iraq today to illustrate my argument.

Chapter II: Causes of Ethnic Conflict

To discover how to prevent ethnic conflicts from recurring, it is useful to briefly examine what causes conflicts to begin in the first place. Understanding the causes of ethnic conflict serves several purposes when investigating how governments can craft a lasting ethnic peace. First, it helps us understand the causal mechanisms involved when determining how ethnic peace comes about. For example, the security dilemma theory of ethnic conflict contends that a weak government contributes to ethnic conflict by leading groups to take their defense into their own hands. With this contention in mind, it is convincing to argue that efforts to disarm ethnic groups or to create a police force might be effective in ending ethnic conflict in the long-term since both efforts strengthen the government vis-a-vis potentially warlike ethnic groups. Second, understanding the causes of conflict helps us understand why certain policies only work under certain conditions. For example, strengthening the police might alleviate group security concerns, but it may do little to reduce a group's fears of being overwhelmed by another culture. Thus, some solutions may be effective under certain circumstances but ineffective in others. Third, understanding the causes of ethnic conflict helps us as we compare cases, as it will highlight how apparently dissimilar policies may have similar effects. For example, the ethnic security dilemma might be mitigated by providing security to groups by controlling certain types of violent behavior or by changing a group's identity to embrace a new national one. Both policies are highly different, yet both lessen a group's incentive to organize for the use of

violence.³⁶

This chapter examines three theories of the causes of ethnic conflict: the ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, and hegemonic ambitions. The chapter describes what each theory argues and the necessary conditions for the cause to function. It follows this description with a section identifying the characteristics of this type of ethnic conflict. It then illustrates the importance of these causes in the Middle East by describing three longstanding ethnic conflicts-- Lebanon for the security dilemma, Iraq for status concerns, and Iran for hegemonic conflict. The chapter concludes by briefly noting several other theories of the causes of ethnic conflict and explaining why I think they are not as robust as the three I have chosen to describe in detail below.

This chapter does not rigorously test the three theories. Rather, it relies on the examples presented and on the work of the scholars who created the theory to demonstrate both its importance and its soundness. The cases studies used to illustrate these theories, however, are "plausibility probes" and thus constitute at least preliminary tests for the theories.³⁷

³⁶ A comparison can be made with an effort to control forest fires. To understand how to prevent forest fires, it is not necessary to know the causes of them. Certain means (water, depriving the fire area of oxygen, etc.) are effective regardless of whether fire fighters know exactly why these tools work. Yet such knowledge is extremely useful. For example, the tools needed to prevent an accidental forest fire (e.g. posting signs regarding the use of campfires during a dry season) and arson (identifying and punishing arsonists) are quite different. Indeed, using the same tools may be counterproductive when used in different situations. For example, an arsonist may light more fires if she knows it is a dry season, making the posting of signs counterproductive. Thus, knowing the causes of fires gives us a better understanding of the tools needed to prevent them and the conditions under which certain tools work best.

³⁷ In subsequent chapters I test various strategies to determine how well they end ethnic conflict in part on the basis of how they affect the causes identified in this chapter. This research, by showing that certain solutions affect the mechanics of each of these causes, also strengthens the case that these causes are indeed important sources of ethnic conflict.

Theory and Case Selection Criteria

Ethnic groups fight for many reasons, ranging from financial motives to cultures that glorify war and the blood feud. Three causes of conflict stand out, however, both for their frequency and for their virulence. The first cause is the "ethnic security dilemma," a concept borrowed from international relations, that posits that groups war due to a lack of sovereign authority that can ensure a group's security. Although this cause is particularly important when explaining conflicts where governments are weak, it has explanatory power for all cases where groups feel threatened. The second cause is a group's "status" concerns. According to this theory, ethnic conflict occurs as an outgrowth of group fears of being overwhelmed, both in material and cultural ways, by other groups. The specific concern with regard to "status" is cultural, not physical, survival. Groups fighting over status issues worry that their way of life and institutions will be overwhelmed, or made subordinate to, that of their neighbors. The third cause is a desire of one or several groups for hegemony. A hegemonic group is not satisfied with the survival of its own way of life and institutions: it seeks to have these become dominant. Dominant groups often seek state sanction for their superiority (i.e. having their language be the official language, their religion the official religion, etc.) and the subjugation of rival groups (a lesser economic and social position). These three causes are reinforcing, and all are usually found in the bloodiest and most enduring of conflicts.

I develop the security dilemma, status, and hegemonic theories in depth for several reasons. First, these theories are the best explanations of ethnic conflict that persists in the Middle East today. As the examples I use make clear, ethnic conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran--three of the bloodiest cases in recent Middle East history--can be explained by these three

theories to a large degree. Second, these three theories are applicable outside the Middle East. Two of them--the security dilemma and status issues--were developed by scholars working on ethnic conflicts outside the Middle East. Although the third theory, ethnic hegemony, is one I formally develop myself, in its most basic form (i.e. some groups just want to be in charge) it is widely cited by scholars, journalists, and statesmen writing about ethnic conflict around the world.

I have chosen recent ethnic conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran to illustrate the importance of the above three theories for several reasons. First, they are both the most enduring and most recent cases of ethnic conflict in the Middle East. Thus, they fit the basis of this study well--they are examples of recurring ethnic conflict. Second, the three cases offer a range of government types, external meddling, and ethnic groups. Theories that can explain conflict in these three cases are likely to be more robust than theories that cannot account for these important variables.

The Ethnic Security Dilemma

The security dilemma approach to ethnic conflict explores the often self-defeating nature of groups' attempts to ensure their security under conditions of anarchy. As long as groups care about survival and have no strong government to protect them from rivals, they will seek power to preserve themselves. This quest for power to ensure security, however, often continues to the point that it threatens other groups, which in turn seek more power for themselves. Hence the dilemma: seeking to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.

The concept of anarchy--defined as a lack of sovereign authority rather than as simple lawlessness--is long familiar to students of international relations. But anarchy is also a particularly fruitful concept for understanding domestic politics.³⁸ If there is no central government to enforce order, social groups, like states in the international system, are forced to rely on their own resources for survival. Just as international anarchy produces certain patterns of behavior among states, so too does domestic anarchy produce similar behavior among sub-state actors such as ethnic groups.

It is time to reapply anarchy to the analysis of domestic politics. Afghanistan, Liberia, and Lebanon are but a few recent examples of states whose governments exist in name only. In these countries no sovereign authority exists and basic governing functions--particularly the use of violence--are controlled by non-state actors. Barry Posen's article assessing the sources of ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia begins the process of reapplying anarchy to domestic politics. In his article, Posen uses the Realist international relations concept of the security dilemma to explain domestic strife in states where order has

³⁸ According to the Realist international relations paradigm, states act under conditions of anarchy where no higher authority exists to ensure peaceful behavior or to keep the law. Leading works of Realism relevant to ethnic conflict include Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978), and Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). In general, anarchy has not been considered relevant to domestic politics since, on a domestic level, governments act as the necessary higher authority to enforce laws and ensure individual protection. Yet the concept of anarchy itself stems from classic works on domestic politics. Thomas Hobbes, one of the most famous purveyors of the term, argued for the need of a sovereign to serve as a Leviathan who would enforce the law in a nasty and brutish world.

broken down.³⁹ I use Posen's arguments and approach in fleshing out the security dilemma approach to ethnic conflict in this section.

A simple example illustrates the security dilemma concept. Suppose I do not like the looks of my new neighbor. If I am confident of police protection, then I am likely to grimace and bear it since I have no reason to fear for my life. However, if the police are ineffectual (or worse, if they are non-existent or allied with my neighbor), then I may buy a gun to protect myself. Better safe than sorry, after all. My new neighbor, however, sees me with a gun and buys one to defend himself against his obviously paranoid neighbor. Thus, rather than two unarmed neighbors glaring at each other through the blinds, we are now two armed neighbors, fidgeting with our pistols while nervously eyeing each other. My quest for security has made me less secure.

Stretching this example to cases of ethnic conflict is relatively simple. Again, suppose members of my ethnic group do not trust members of a neighboring ethnic group. This lack of trust could stem from simple prejudice, cooperation with a colonizing outsider, or past warfare. If there is no government to prevent a small band of gunmen from the rival ethnic group from terrorizing my ethnic group, simple prudence might dictate arming and training in self-defense. This effort, however, can easily provoke a spiral as the neighboring ethnic group arms and trains in response. Thus, both ethnic groups are less secure. In fact, both groups' suspicions of the other may have been confirmed by the mobilization, which suggests aggressive intentions.

³⁹ Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." Horowitz also notes that "unranked ethnic systems resemble the international system" but does not develop this analogy directly. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 187. He does, however, note the importance of ethnic domination and suppression as a motivating force for groups to seek power.

The security dilemma can also come into play where sovereign authority is weak or where the central government is a party to conflict.⁴⁰ When sovereign authority is weak--as it was in many traditional monarchies before colonialism--groups on the periphery could not rely on the government for their security. Indeed, many functions of modern government, such as tax collecting and law enforcement, were done by tribes or private officials. Throughout much of the Middle East, governments relied on local officials for armies rather than the other way around. For example, in the 19th century the central governments in both Qajar Iran and Sherifian Morocco frequently supplemented their small military forces with tribal levies. When this is the case, groups have had to rely on their own resources for self-defense. Male members of the tribe typically were proficient in warfare, and an almost constant low-level conflict kept fear strong.

Another situation where the security dilemma plays a role is when the government is a party to ethnic conflict. Under these circumstances, one group not only cannot rely on the government to prevent violence but rather must immediately defend itself or risk defeat and slaughter. In Ba'athist Iraq, Kurds in the north rightly considered the government to be "captured" by Arab nationalists, intent on using the power of the state to Arabize the country. Under these circumstances, the Kurds perceived the army and the police as part of a hostile ethnic camp rather than an impartial arbiter. Again, the group's effort to defend itself can create a spiral of hostility. If the government seeks to assure its monopoly on violence, it may try to crush any ethnic dissent, leading ethnic groups to take up arms in defense, thus prompting an even harsher government crackdown.

⁴⁰ Brown also notes the importance of weak central government as a cause of internal conflict in "Introduction," p. 14.

Necessary Conditions for the Security Dilemma to Function

As the above examples make clear, a necessary condition for the security dilemma to operate among groups is that they must have a reason to fear one another or at least be uncertain about another group's intentions. After all, in theory I might welcome an armed neighbor if I believed he or she would enhance my security against unsavory elements. In Lebanon, for example, Sunni Muslim groups did not fear the increasingly armed Palestinian presence in the country, as they believed that the Palestinians would enhance their security in the event of a conflict.

What is the source of this anxiety? Posen attributes the existence of this pre-existing fear to historical quarrels. If past violence was widespread, as it was in the case of the Balkans, then groups will be quicker to arm. On the other hand, if groups see their neighbors as peaceful, they will be less likely to shoot first and ask questions later. As another source of fear I would add a group's concern about its status being degraded (a concern I describe in the "status" section below): a group may fear that another group will overwhelm it culturally or economically, thus leading to the possibility of a security dilemma situation existing. A third source of fear can develop when ethnic groups live in multiple states. In these circumstances, groups may worry that another government may support the ethnic group in their country.

A second necessary condition for the security dilemma to function is the existence of a weak or biased central government. If the central government is strong and does not take the side of one particular ethnic group, then no group need fear for its security as the government will swiftly punish any violence. If the government is weak, however, or if it actively champions the cause of one ethnic group, then other ethnic groups must rely on themselves for their own

security.

A third necessary condition for the security dilemma to function is incomplete information. If groups are not certain of other groups' intentions and capabilities, they often assume the worst, particularly under conditions of anarchy. However, if communication between the groups flows easily, this can prevent a spiral of fear and reaction from developing.

Ethnic Conflict: An Offense-Dominant Situation

Offense dominance--a situation where conquest is relatively easy--makes a security dilemma particularly intense.⁴¹ To return to our inter-personal example, if my neighbor and I live in fortresses and have only knives with which to attack each other, clearly we would not have to lie awake at night worrying about each other. After all, the alarms in my fortress would give me plenty of warning time if my neighbor chose to attack me, and for him to hurt me with his knife he would have to get near me. However, if my neighbor and I both live in tents on the prairie and are armed with machine guns, clearly whoever shoots first has a good chance of killing his or her opponent before he or she could respond. The second situation, where offense is relatively easy, would be offense dominant.

⁴¹ The importance of offense dominance is drawn from the work of Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," and from Van Evera, *Causes of War*. There are several reasons that Van Evera lists as to why offense dominance leads to war that I believe do not apply to ethnic conflict. One condition is secrecy. Although governments and ethnic groups may seek secrecy, the nature of ethnic conflict--which involves widespread mobilization (often through propaganda) and encouraging individuals to turn on their ethnic neighbors--is hard to conceal. Another condition that is less relevant to ethnic conflict situations is the possibility of arms races. Groups have a tremendous incentive to arm and strike first, but this falls under windows of opportunity. In ethnic conflict, few groups go beyond personal arms, grenades, land mines, and mortars.

Offense is relatively cheap and easy in ethnic conflict.⁴² Since the "defenders" in these cases often are unarmed civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, a few men with guns have a tremendous military advantage. Small bands of gunmen thus can easily create vast hordes of refugees. The military training required for such operations is minimal, and the weapons involved (usually personal arms) are inexpensive and widely available. Because even small forces can wreak great havoc, groups have an incentive to go on the offensive and wipe out another group's forces before it can arm and train, encouraging preemptive strikes in the event of a crisis. Such "windows" are especially likely if one group is better armed and better organized but fears that a numerically superior opponent will soon arm and organize itself.

Because of offense-dominance, ethnic groups must be highly sensitive to other ethnic groups' efforts to arm and mobilize. Even groups that do not seek to harm their neighbors have an incentive to mobilize and strike first before their opponent does the same to them. This is particularly so when sovereignty collapses, leaving all groups surprisingly vulnerable.

The security dilemma is more intense when offensive and defensive military forces cannot be distinguished, reducing groups' ability to signal their defensive intent. Any buildup for defensive purposes could really signal an offensive buildup. Again using the inter-personal example, if I bought a whistle instead of a gun (a whistle would help me summon the police but would not physically harm my neighbor), my neighbor might not be alarmed, but I would be

⁴² As Van Evera notes in *Causes of War*, offense and defense dominance are relative terms. Following his analysis, offense dominance denotes that offense is relatively easy compared with defense although far from easy in the absolute sense. Van Evera suggests several measures for the offense-defense balance: the relative cost of maintaining offensive and defensive forces; the probability of equal cost offensive forces overcoming defensive forces; the ratio of losses when equal cost offensive and defensive forces clash. All these factors suggest that ethnic conflict is a highly offense-dominant situation.

more secure. This whistle would be a defensive weapon. A pistol, however, could be used for either offense or defense. With a pistol I could defend myself against a neighbor's attack or attack my neighbor--the nature of the weapon reveals nothing about my intentions.

On an inter-group level, more defense for one ethnic group in the form of guns and training can often look like more offense to a nervous ethnic rival, leading that rival to arm and mobilize in turn. Unfortunately, guns and mortars--the basic types of weapons used in ethnic conflict--can be used both to invade a neighbors territory or to defend one's own home, making it difficult to distinguish offensive and defensive intentions. Moreover, whether the purpose of military training and popular mobilization, both of which are needed to form effective militias, is offensive or defensive also is impossible to distinguish. Finally, as Posen notes, the quantity and commitment of soldiers affect offensive military operations as much as any weapons system. People themselves are thus potential offensive weapons, and efforts to mobilize one's groups through propaganda and training can unwittingly signal offensive intent.

A second reason the security dilemma is intense in ethnic conflict is the existence of ethnic group members living outside the group's homeland. Such individuals are nightmares for defenders, who must worry about fifth columns within their ranks. Furthermore, concern about the well being of ethnic compatriots in distant areas often is a major cause of aggression. Thus, there is an incentive both for offensive operations to liberate besieged compatriots and an incentive for "ethnic cleansing" to wipe out potentially hostile pockets before they have a chance to arm and strike. To return to our (increasingly violent) neighborhood, if I am trying to protect my son, who lives a block away, as well as myself it is not enough for me to have a secure home. I must have the ability to act a block away, which calls for offensive capabilities. Thus, self-

defense requires potentially threatening offense. Similarly, if I suspect a boarder in my home will help my neighbor get in the locked door, it might be best for me to expel the boarder. Thus, I must move simultaneously to purify my home while extending my reach to help my beleaguered compatriots.

Characteristics of Ethnic Security Dilemma Behavior

Groups in conflict operating under the security dilemma exhibit certain constant features. First, conflict often begins because groups perceive themselves to be physically threatened, either now or in the future. Thus, if the government or an outside power can ensure a group's protection, it should not feel compelled to arm. However, when this authority disappears as it did in the former Yugoslavia, groups will consider taking up arms. Similarly, groups also arm simply because rival groups are mobilizing or if the government itself becomes an intense security threat.

A second characteristic is that noncombatants are quickly dragged into a general conflict as groups try to make captured areas ethnically homogenous. The settlements of rival ethnic groups in another group's territory represent dangerous islands of potential traitors who, given arms and minimal training, represent a serious military threat. "Cleansing" such areas, from a military point of view, is logical. Therefore, small bands of gunmen have an incentive to drive away or kill civilians in order to produce ethnically homogenous areas.

The ethnic security dilemma leads to conflict spirals--a third characteristic. Dominant groups usually strike first, either because they are threatened by a potential rivals' mobilization or because they want to prevent such a mobilization from occurring at all. Better organized groups

may see "windows" of opportunity to attack their rivals before they grow in power.⁴³ Other groups that have no desire for change are dragged in merely to protect themselves in an increasingly dangerous environment. A violent outrage committed by one group, or even a few individuals of that group, can trigger and rationalize a far worse outrage in response.⁴⁴

Under offense-dominant conditions, negotiation is not likely to work--a fourth characteristic. Groups are likely to shoot first and ask questions later as the risks of losing an offensive advantage are high. Were defense dominant, taking time to carefully evaluate situations would be less risky.⁴⁵ Similarly, diplomatic agreements are more likely to be violated as groups have a tremendous incentive to strike first and fear for their survival if betrayed, leading to bad faith situations. Finally, verification and compromise are both harder under offense dominance as small changes can easily upset the military balance.⁴⁶

A fifth characteristic is that moderate voices are discredited. Atrocities, real and

⁴³ See Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9:1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107 for more information on this concept.

⁴⁴ Peter H. Merkl, "Approaches to the Study of Political Violence," in *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, Peter H. Merkl, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 47.

⁴⁵ Going back to the earlier example comparing life on the prairie with machine guns versus a fortress with knives, in the latter situation there is more time to send envoys back and forth and otherwise study one's opponent; in the former you must act or risk death.

⁴⁶ Several factors might mitigate the security dilemma. The belief in a secure second strike capability will convince groups that their defense will withstand an attack. Better communication among groups will reduce the possibility that defensive action will be mistaken for offensive action. Similarly, military professionals might decrease the concerns of ignorant policymakers by recognizing military standard operating procedures. For one argument along these lines, see Paul Davis, "Institutional Factors in War Termination," in *Controlling and Ending Ethnic Conflict*, p.178.

exaggerated, discredit those advocating peaceful solutions. Even those who reject an exclusive ethnic identity and see themselves as cosmopolitan fear sanctions both from their own people and from the enemy, which seldom distinguishes the assimilated from the non-assimilated.⁴⁷

A sixth characteristic is the need for force to resolve conflict. For relatively equal groups to disarm and refrain from offensive action, they must be confident of their security. Such confidence is not likely if memories of bloodshed are fresh. However, if there is a strong power willing to punish aggressors, then groups have more to fear from violence, leading them to put down their arms. Thus, if the security dilemma is intense, a Leviathan is necessary in the form of a dominant group or strong outside power for peace to be established.

Box IIA: The Ethnic Security Dilemma

Necessary Conditions

- o Fear and Uncertainty
- o Weak or biased central government
- o Incomplete information

Common Characteristics

- o Groups perceive themselves to be threatened
- o Non-combatants are often dragged into the conflict
- o Conflict spirals are likely
- o More dangerous when offense is dominant
- o Moderates are easily discredited
- o Force is needed to resolve conflict

Outside Powers and the Security

Dilemma

Outside powers can help guarantee a group's security or (more frequently) threaten it. Some scholars argue that at least some measure of international sponsorship is necessary for an ethnic movement to succeed in becoming a successful national movement.⁴⁸ If outside powers are

⁴⁷ Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," pp. 142-144.

⁴⁸ Abraham Ashkenasi, "Social-Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the Near East," in *Political Violence and Terror*, p. 314.

sympathetic to the aspirations and fears of an ethnic group and can guarantee the group's security, they should be welcomed by that group as potential allies. For example in Lebanon the Maronites welcomed invasions by Ba'athist Syria and Zionist Israel--hardly ideological or ethnic kinsmen--because both these groups threatened the power of local ethnic rivals. Thus, if the security dilemma is intense nationalist appeals against an outsider will be ineffective.

Outside powers, however, can trigger the security dilemma by threatening groups' future security. This is particularly likely if an outside power has historic ties to one group in particular. Similarly, outside powers can threaten the security of a majority in a country by threatening to make it a minority. For example, in Iraq the largest communal group is Iraqi Shi'a. Attempts by various governments to promulgate Arab nationalism, which would tie Iraq to the Sunni heartland of the Arab world, were met with suspicion and anger by the Shi'a community because it threatened to make them into a minority. Similarly, the Maronites were the last holdout to the *de facto* domination of Lebanon by Syria.

Lebanon: An Illustrative Example

Students of Middle East history and politics will immediately recognize the security dilemma as an important analytic tool for understanding ethnic politics in the Middle East. I will briefly describe the conflict in Lebanon to illustrate the usefulness of this concept.

For many years Lebanon was the Middle East's showcase of accommodation and prosperity. Until 1975, Lebanon was the wealthiest, most modern, and most democratic country in the Middle East excepting Israel. In 1975, however, Lebanon began a 15 year slide into faction-ridden chaos.

The conflict between Lebanese Maronites, Druze, Sunnis, and Shias (a conflict which at times included even smaller ethnic groups such as Greek Orthodox Christians or Lebanese Alawites) illustrates the analytic value of the security dilemma. The security dilemma approach explains the difficulty of peaceful change, the timing of the collapse, the identity of the groups involved, the nature of the fighting, the problems with negotiation, and the role of outside powers.⁴⁹ The security dilemma also is particularly insightful on the question of the violence that has plagued Lebanon, resulting in half a million casualties.

An Intense Security Dilemma

Lebanon meets the necessary conditions for the security dilemma--mutual fear and a weak government--to operate and fits the conditions for it to be particularly intense. Offense was dominant in Lebanon due to low technology weapons that make offense and defence indistinguishable; the relative ease of offensive operations; and the large number of ethnic group members who lived outside their ethnic homelands.

Lebanon has a long history of violence among persecuted minorities, leading all groups to be concerned about their security. Within Lebanon are over 16 communities, including Armenian Catholic, Assyrian and Chaldean Catholic, Greek Catholic, Maronite Catholic, Roman Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Protestant, Bahai, Jew, Alawite, Druze, Shi'a, and Sunni, all of which claim the ultimate loyalty of their

⁴⁹ Of course, like all conflicts the events in Lebanon are too complex to be explained entirely by one theory. Clearly a variety of factors led to the Lebanese breakdown, and any theory would be hard pressed to incorporate the impact of variables ranging from individual quests for power and the legacy of colonialism that are important parts of Lebanon's sad recent history.

members.⁵⁰ Many of these groups fled to Lebanon to avoid persecution, bringing with them memories of violence. Shias, Druze, Maronites, and Armenians have at times all fought with one another in the past.⁵¹ In 1845, vicious fighting broke out between Maronites and Druze, culminating in massacres in 1858 that left 11,000 Maronites dead and resulted in French intervention.⁵² Since then, both groups naturally have been highly sensitive to their security.

The Lebanese government was not able to provide security for its citizens--the second necessary condition for the security dilemma to operate. After 1967, the debility of the government became apparent to all concerned. Palestinian fighters began launching attacks on Israel out of Lebanon, roughly half of which involved cross-border attacks by rockets or mortars rather than infiltration.⁵³ Maronite officers led the Lebanese army into clashes with Palestinian commandos but, by 1969, the army was forced to retreat and give the PLO *de facto* military autonomy in the so-called Cairo Agreement. At the same time, a change of government among the Maronite factions in 1970 resulted in purges of the army and intelligence services, reducing information on Palestinian commandos.⁵⁴

Like ethnic violence everywhere, offensive and defensive weapons were not

⁵⁰ Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon: Fire and Embers* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 5.

⁵¹ Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Andre Deutsch: London, 1990), pp. 55-70.

⁵² Hiro, *Lebanon*, pp. 2-3. Interestingly, the new political system established by the Ottomans under European pressure had a leader who was not Lebanese to ensure peace. For more information on the history of Lebanon relations to European powers, see Matti Moosa, *The Maronites in History* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 286.

⁵³ Don Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (London: Westview Press, 1990), p. 56.

⁵⁴ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 13.

distinguishable in the Lebanese conflict. Most of the weaponry used consisted of relatively simple weapons such as rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars. All can be used either to attack or to defend. Furthermore, given the potential offensive nature of mobilization, it is not surprising that Lebanese Maronites were alarmed when Palestinian guerrilla groups residing in Lebanon in the late 1960s and 1970s attempted to mobilize Lebanese Muslims.

The widely-dispersed communities of Lebanon also heightened the need for offensive strategies and doctrines. Geographically, Lebanon contains numerous pockets of ethnicities, all of which live in potentially vulnerable enclaves. The Maronite canton is contiguous with neither Israel nor Syria--its two chief sponsors; the two Shia cantons, on the other hand, are contiguous with Israel and Syria. The two Sunni cantons are heavily urban and laden with Palestinian refugees. The more important Sunni canton is surrounded by hostile Shi'as, Maronites, and Druze.⁵⁵ All groups have brethren dispersed into other enclaves. For example, Christians in Zahle are surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as in the south and north respectively; the Druze enclave south of Beirut surrounds a Christian enclave and is in turn surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as; Sunnis around Sidon are surrounded by Druze and Shia's. Protecting these enclaves in the event of hostile action is difficult; thus, the stranded group's brethren need a rapid offensive military capability to help their kin avoid a horrible end. The fate of the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shattila refugee camps is a grim reminder of the fate of groups unable to protect themselves.

⁵⁵ Leonard Binder, "Introduction," to Augustus Richard Norton: *Amal and the Shia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. viii.

Lebanon and the Characteristics of an Ethnic Security Dilemma

The actual progress of the Lebanese civil war fit the security dilemma model well. As expected under the first characteristic of the security dilemma, the conflict began largely because the Maronite Christians believed they would not be safe if they waited to act against their rivals. Their Shi'a and Sunni rivals began to arm and train in response to the Maronite's provocative actions.

The unsteady compromise embodied in Lebanon's unwritten 1943 "grand compromise"--which divided the state's positions and patronage among the leading ethnic groups--began to collapse as Palestinian activity increased in Lebanon. Before 1967, the Palestinian presence numbered around 180,000, most of whom were workers, fishermen, and peasants. By 1969, however, the number had risen to 235,000 and by 1982 it reached 375,000.⁵⁶ These latter refugees were increasingly politicized and well-armed, particularly after Black September in 1970 when Jordan expelled the PLO. The Lebanese state was aware of this problem but could do little.

The presence of the Palestinians mobilized and alarmed all parties, creating a new security threat that made compromise difficult and over time further polarized Lebanon. The Maronite Catholic Phalangists, the leading grouping of Maronites, saw the Palestinians as outsiders and intruders that might ally with Lebanon's Sunni Muslim community. They were concerned that the armed Palestinians would support the Lebanese Muslims and strip the Christians of their power.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 25.

⁵⁷ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 10.

These fears were heightened by demographic changes in Lebanon that threatened to overturn the institutional Maronite dominance. Lebanon's Muslim community was growing faster than its Christian community. Within the Muslim community, the Shi'ite sect was growing far more rapidly than the Sunni sect and became Lebanon's largest group. Demands for political reform, particularly common among the Sunnis, alarmed the Maronite Christians. As expected when the security dilemma operates, the Maronites believed they had to act soon or they would be overwhelmed by superior numbers. This led them to begin preparing for conflict.

Increasing attacks on Israel by the Palestinians led to harsh Israeli responses, which further highlighted the Lebanese government's weakness and raised the threat felt by groups in Lebanon. In 1968, Israeli forces raided the Beirut airport and killed several Palestinian leaders. After the murder of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympic games, Moshe Dayan announced that Israel would not just retaliate but would preempt Palestinian military action, striking Lebanon at will.⁵⁸ Between 1968 and 1974, Israeli violations of Lebanese territory averaged 1.4 incidents a day.⁵⁹ By 1974, Israel was regularly patrolling Lebanon and bombing PLO camps, with the government of Lebanon powerless to stop it.⁶⁰

As the army's inability to shield Lebanon from Palestinians and Israelis became apparent, the major ethnic groups began to enlarge their party militias. The Palestinians had upset the integral Lebanese balance of power. In order to increase their control over and influence in Lebanon, the Palestinian began to train radical Lebanese militias. In 1973, leftist and Nasserite

⁵⁸ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 61.

⁵⁹ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 67.

⁶⁰ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 18.

Lebanese militias fought alongside the Palestinians against the Lebanese army, leading all Lebanese groups to prepare for a clash, gather arms, and seek foreign allies for funding and supplies.⁶¹ By 1974, even the formerly quiescent Shi'a had set up training camps in the Beqaa as the fighting spread, alleging that the army was not protecting southern Shia's from Israeli attacks.⁶²

Sensing a potential window of vulnerability, the better-organized and more fearful Christians were the first to develop militias in response to Palestinian activity. Both the Phalange and Chamoun's National Liberal Party began building large militias in the late 1960s.⁶³ In 1969 Tony Franjeh formed a third Maronite militia, the Giants Brigade. By 1973, both militias numbered roughly 6,000 fighters, one third the size of the Lebanese army, and were attacking Palestinians on their own.⁶⁴

Once the civil war erupted, several other small Maronite militia groups sprang up, such as the Guardians of the Cedars and The Organization. As the violence mounted, the overall size of the militias increased. By the late 1970s, the Maronite militias were larger than the Lebanese army.⁶⁵

The Sunni Arabs, for their part, were not well organized. Because they saw themselves as

⁶¹ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 14.

⁶² Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 16.

⁶³ Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon: 1970-85* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 36 notes that militia growth was particularly strong in the 1970s.

⁶⁴ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 23.

⁶⁵ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 59.

part of the larger Arab world, they did not have the same degree of fear that characterizes persecuted minorities. Moreover, politicized Sunnis often shared the pan-Arab doctrine espoused by many Palestinian and leftist groups, which functioned as *de facto* Sunni militias.⁶⁶

As expected, the conflict quickly turned into a battle against civilians, the second characteristic of the security dilemma. By the end of 1975, both sides routinely killed civilians when they conquered a rival's territory.⁶⁷ Groups feared that civilians would become militiamen who would later fight.

The timing of the group's mobilization followed a conflict spiral, the third security dilemma characteristic. Early violence pitted Druze and Sunni leftists under the aegis of the PLO against the Maronites. Given their past bloodshed, the Druze and Maronites were naturally suspicious of each other. As each group increased their participation, other militias formed and joined the fray. What is especially revealing is that the Shi'a plurality of Lebanon did not participate in the initial fighting as a group even though they were the most disadvantaged by Lebanon's gerrymandered political system. Fear, not a demand for equality, drove the fighters.

The timing of Shia mobilization and arming strongly suggests that fears of violence played a key role. Amal--the chief Shi'a militia--was formed in 1974, the same year that Palestinian and Israeli violence was high and that other groups in Lebanon formed militias. Palestinian attacks on Israel in particular had angered the Shi'a population, which bore the brunt of Israeli retaliation. After Operation Litani in 1978, Amal grew tremendously as villagers

⁶⁶ Norton, *Amal and the Shia*, p.136.

⁶⁷ *Lebanon: A Country Study* (American University Press, 1991), pp. 190-191.

sought protection against the Palestinians, whose presence would bring Israeli wrath.⁶⁸ Shi'a attitudes toward the Israeli invasion of 1982 illustrates Shi'a motivation. Many Shi'a initially welcomed the Israeli invasion since it drove out foreign forces, leading them to think that their security would be enhanced. For a time, the Israeli Defense Forces and Amal even cooperated together against the Palestinians. However, as it became clear that Israel itself would not leave, tension mounted and the Shi'as mobilized in huge numbers.⁶⁹

As time went on, hope for the resolution of conflict vanished. No single militia could impose its will on Lebanon, yet each possessed the capacity to subvert stability. By the end, leaders of the sects saw the situation as a zero sum game. As Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt noted in 1985, "I want a Lebanon according to my way and not theirs ... I have said: 'Either kill or be killed.'"⁷⁰

In general, groups in Lebanon shot before they asked questions. As anticipated by the fourth characteristic of the security dilemma, mutual suspicion prevailed, and groups feared that diplomacy was merely a cover for military preparation. Cease fires and other negotiations often did not last long enough for a public announcement to be made.

Moderate voices soon were drowned out by extremists--the fifth security dilemma characteristic. Members of the National Assembly who had once represented their communities now found themselves powerful compared with the militia leaders. The constant violence, often directed against moderates, further discredited those advocating peace.

⁶⁸ Norton, *Amal and the Shia*, p. 50.

⁶⁹ Norton, *Amal and the Shia*, pp. 84-86.

⁷⁰ Norton, *Amal and the Shia*, p. 136.

The Role of Outside Powers in Lebanon

The security dilemma approach also incorporates the importance of outside powers, which for many years provoked security fears yet prevented the emergence of a dominant authority. Factions and parties could not squash splinter movements easily as each splinter could find backing from a foreign power that opposed the dominant group. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, and Israel--all of which armed and financed various militias--actively worked against outcomes that did not favor their interests.

Lebanese factions welcomed outside interference if it relieved their security fears. The Maronites welcomed the June 1976 Syrian invasion and the 1982 Israeli invasion even though both decreased their overall clout in Lebanon. Leftist Lebanese groups and the Palestinians, for their part, sought broader Arab intervention, since the Syrians posed a threat to their security.⁷¹

The conflict in Lebanon died down dramatically after the Syrians asserted their power in 1990, the sixth characteristic of the security dilemma. The Syrians conducted a massive push into Lebanon in 1990 and physically overwhelmed lingering resistance. On May 22, 1991 the Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-Operation, and Co-ordination was signed between Lebanon and Syria. This treaty accepted the *Pax Syriana* in Lebanon. Once the Syrians established order and security--at the point of a gun--groups were not compelled to arm to protect themselves. Indeed, arming risked endangering a group's security, for it brought Damascus' wrath.

Conclusion

As the Lebanese example makes clear, the security dilemma is useful for understanding

⁷¹ Hiro, *Lebanon*, pp. 41-42.

ethnic conflict. The security dilemma explains the importance of memories of recent bloodshed and the danger of a weak government that lacks a police or military capable of ensuring security for its ethnically-diverse communities. It also sheds insight into the timing of the initial conflict, the identity of the participants, the problems of spiralling, the fragility of ethnic cooperation, and the importance of outside intervention.

Status Concerns and Ethnic Conflict

Fears of bloodshed and survival are not the only things that bring ethnic groups into conflict. A frequent cause of ethnic rivalry that often leads to violence is the struggle over relative group status and position in society. Which group's history is the nation's history? What language will be used for government and for schools? Who should administer a community, better-educated aliens or members of the indigenous ethnic group? Although the answers to these "status" questions seldom determine the life or death of an individual ethnic group member, they do touch on fundamental human issues of worth and belonging. For the purposes of this study, status will be defined as elite and mass demands for government recognition of their ethnic group as a legitimate social group.

Status causes conflict when one distinguishable group blocks another's quest for recognition or social legitimacy.⁷² As Isaiah Berlin notes:

⁷² As Myron Weiner notes, "nativism tends to be associated with a blockage to social mobility for the native population by a culturally distinguishable migrant population." *Sons of the Soil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 293. Status should not be confused with a quest for equality. Many groups do not seek an even playing field, but rather seek one tilted in their favor. As Horowitz and Weiner note, backward groups feel weak vis-a-vis advanced groups and often deride their own groups' intelligence, initiative, or labor ethic. Thus, backward groups, particularly ones whose dominant position may be threatened, may seek

What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of their class or nation, or colour or race) as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it ... and not to be ruled, educated or guided.⁷³

Such recognition, however, is not always accorded. Nationalists seek to glorify the dominant identity and try to play down rival claims to a state's history. Liberals note that individuals, not communities, deserve recognition. And ideologues of all stripes (Marxist, Islamic, Fascist) exalt rival social categories.

Questions of group worth easily become political. As groups struggle for legitimacy, recognition, and status, they often see other groups as rivals or as obstacles. Designating one group's language as "official," for example, reduces the importance of other languages. Promises of including all groups in decision-making can result in struggles over the composition of a parliament or the civil service.

Struggles for group legitimacy are particularly important among elites or potential elites. It is they who are the standard bearers of ethnic politics, and it is they who will receive the positions that benefit from and display group worth.⁷⁴ Two distinct types of elites are important

"protection" against advanced groups or a guaranteed share of resources and status positions. See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 167 and Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, pp. 47, 113, and 167.

⁷³ Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 156.

⁷⁴ A distinction should be drawn between elites of backward groups and non-elites. Horowitz notes that many groups are content to accept their backward status, consoling themselves that another group's success requires morally disreputable behavior. Their elites, however, often push the group to change their behavior. Thus, group members receive two different messages: early socialization that endorses a certain ethos, and criticism from their elite that rejects this ethos. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 174-175. This contention suggests that stopping elite efforts to push change can head off status as a source of ethnic conflict.

in cases of ethnic conflict: political and cultural elites. The first are leaders concerned with decision-making, whether tribal sheikhs or parliament representatives. The second are intellectuals, poets, and other individuals who help create, sustain, and transmit a cultural identity. Political elites may or may not care about ethnic issues, while cultural elites invariably do. Both, however, often share an interest in promoting a group's status as it can enhance their position against ethnic rivals.

Group status concerns include but go beyond the classic formulation of politics as "who gets what." Indeed, individual economic well-being is usually considered a tool or symbolic of a group's status in society in general rather than valued strictly for material reasons. Thus, perceived discrimination along economic or political lines can trigger conflict by inciting status concerns.⁷⁵ At times even a relatively wealthy group may feel that its status in society is not sufficiently recognized. The Basques in Spain, for example, are wealthier than their Castillian neighbors and resent their corresponding lack of social status.

Status concerns differ from those of the security dilemma in that groups fear cultural or social domination rather than "just" survival. Once a conflict begins, however, status concerns and security fears often become interwoven. Group fears of cultural extinction are reinforced by the security fears generated by actual violence. A great many backward groups in particular fear extinction and subordination.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," p. 317.

⁷⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 176.

Necessary conditions

For elite status to be a source of conflict, groups must be able to compare their relative positions. When groups are relatively self-contained--as many were before colonialism brought them into direct contact with one another--worth could be determined by different standards.⁷⁷ For it is competition that leads to conflict. As Weiner notes: "Inequalities, real or perceived, are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnic conflict; there must also be competition for control over or access to economic wealth, political power, or social status."⁷⁸ Four complementary (and often concurrent) events bring groups into positions where they can compare their status: migration, modernization, colonization, and education.

Migration. Migration often creates a "compulsion for change" among ethnic groups.⁷⁹ Migrants bring new skills, a different ethos, and a different attitude toward education that often gives them better access to high-paying, high-status positions. These attributes can bring previously peaceful ethnic groups into a violent rivalry with migrants.

Modernization. Modernization is not a cause of ethnic conflict per se, but it often acts as a spur to status concerns. Like migration, modernization brings previously isolated groups into contact. As Weiner notes, modernization provides incentives for mobility and nurtures the growth of ethnic identification and cohesion. The development process also undermines the existing ethnic division of labor. Industrial expansion creates new job opportunities; irrigation changes the property and value of land; universal education offers access to higher status jobs

⁷⁷ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁸ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, p. 7.

⁷⁹ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, pp. 353-54.

previously unavailable to the poor; an expanded bureaucracy opens up the state as a forum for employment; and the political process at times permits competition for public office.⁸⁰

Modernization also can cause migration as new opportunities open up due to new employment or easier transportation. Thus, the composition of a region can change due to the migration fostered by modernization. Protecting one's traditional space and opportunities from migrants thus becomes a preoccupation of the local population.⁸¹

Colonialism. Colonial powers frequently redistribute political resources, often leading subordinate groups into greater power, thus raising the potential for competition. Colonial powers often favored non-advanced ethnic groups either due to racial or religious stereotypes, perceived religious bonds, or a deliberate effort to undermine the traditional elite. Some groups became favored through chance proximity to the colonial capital or to religious missions, a key source of educational opportunities.⁸² Finally, colonial use of "indirect rule"--where traditional ruling authorities acted as colonial proxies--often strengthened the idea that the ethnic group was a valid basis for administration.⁸³ Ethnic groups in Syria under the French mandate felt the impact of such favoritism. The French worked with the backward Alawite religious sect, giving them greater access to education and the military. This power led the Alawites to seek a redistribution of overall economic and social power in their favor.

Colonialism often expanded the range of political, social, and economic activity of all

⁸⁰ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, pp. 9-10.

⁸¹ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, p. 3.

⁸² Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 151-154.

⁸³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 150.

groups while providing common set of social aspirations. Thus, it often transformed an unranked system (where groups do not see themselves as part of the same social hierarchy as other groups) into a ranked one.⁸⁴ The advances in communication and transportation under colonialism further increased ethnic group members' awareness of their cultural uniqueness.⁸⁵

The post-colonial phase is particularly ripe for conflict. After the colonial power departs, a host of status-related questions arise regarding the official language, religion, and the composition of the government. Furthermore, as Weiner notes, "In the post-colonial phase those who come to exercise governmental authority often belong to the subordinate economic group in the economic division of labor, especially when power shifts to those who are the most numerous."⁸⁶

Education. The expansion of education creates a new class of individuals who claim a certain status in society that differs from that based on land, wealth, or parentage. As Weiner notes with regard to India, middle class nativism tends to emerge where the local population has produced its own educated class that seeks jobs held by migrants. This is particularly true when unemployment is high for middle class jobs, exacerbating competition.⁸⁷ Moreover, within an ethnic community education can produce rival elites, thus creating competition that makes it harder to control the community and prevent conflict.

⁸⁴ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 149-166.

⁸⁵ As Walker Connor points out, these advances also make the ethnic group member more aware of ethnic brethren formerly separated by distance. See Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?" *World Politics* 24 (April 1972), p. 329.

⁸⁶ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, p. 9.

⁸⁷ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, p. 285.

Characteristics of Status Conflict

Like the security dilemma, ethnic conflicts over status concerns exhibit common characteristics. First, conflict is particularly likely between "advanced" and "backward" groups.⁸⁸ The advanced groups in general tend to be more tied to the modern sector of the economy. Backward groups will strive to ensure their "fair share" in society and in government, and they fear being overwhelmed by the advanced group. Alternately (and less commonly), an advanced group will turn to violence because it believes it "deserves" a greater share of society's perks and status positions due to its advanced position.

A second characteristic of status conflicts is that groups favored by colonial powers-- those who have a disproportionate share of perks and status positions--will seek a continuation of that rule if its termination will threaten their social position. Conversely, groups not favored by colonial powers should be pro-nationalist. Note that the group does not have to be advanced to be a favored group, but rather it should see the colonial power as a means of keeping an immediate rival out of power.

A third characteristic is that conflict is particularly likely when central authority collapses. Just as the collapse of a regime can raise security fears, so too can it raise status concerns. Will a group's language remain inviolable? Will its cultural institutions be undermined in a new regime? The uncertainties inherent in a regime change fuels group anxiety, raising the question of who will rule and creating fears that a ranked system will develop with one group subordinate

⁸⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 148. I will follow Horowitz' definition of advanced groups as those groups distinguishable by being disproportionately educated, represented in the civil service, or wealthy.

and another superordinate.⁸⁹

A fourth characteristic is that symbols are particularly important. Citizenship, official languages, distinctive dress, and recognition of a group's "special position" in the state are issues of concern, and of conflict, for ethnic groups.⁹⁰

Education is a particularly important symbol. As education is often a source of new elites, particularly in a modernizing country, access to and control of the education system should be an important issue for all parties. Furthermore, education itself conveys symbolic benefits such as language, history, and group values.

A fifth characteristic is that modernization, education, migration, and colonialism, which transform an unranked system into a ranked one, are likely to initially increase conflict. The nature of ethnic evaluation changes when groups become aware of one another, particularly if they have a common standard for group evaluation. Thus, conflict should increase as the scope of competition and the degree of ranking increases.

Sixth, growth in ethnic militancy can stem from rival nationalism, particularly if the rival nationalism is made up of a single rival ethnic group. Because a goal of nationalist movements is usually to control the nation-state, the existence of one nationalist movement can spark status concerns of rivals, leading them to form their own nationalist movements.

⁸⁹ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 188.

⁹⁰ Language is a particularly important factors in many modern nationalist movements, as it contains a culture's memories and it is a key part of economic and political success. Edward Sagarin and James Moneymaker, "Language and Nationalist, Separatist, and Secessionist Movements," in *Ethnic Autonomy--Comparative Dynamics*, Raymond Hall, ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 19-20.

Box IIB: Status Conflicts

Necessary Conditions

- o Groups must be able to compare their relative positions

Conflict Characteristics

- o Conflict more likely between advanced and backward groups
 - o Favored groups seek to preserve the status quo
 - o Conflict is likely when authority collapses
 - o Symbols are important issues in conflict
 - o Rival nationalisms can inspire ethnic militancy
-

Iraq: An Illustrative Example

Status is an important source of conflict throughout the Middle East and around the world. The behavior of Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish populations illustrate how status concerns contributed to lasting conflict in Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds and Shi'as have resisted the control of the Sunni central government since the Iraqi state's creation following the

collapse of the Ottoman empire after World War I. This resistance often took the form of violence. Between the British mandate, which began in Iraq in 1922, and the 1968 Ba'athist coup, roughly 40 local or national uprisings occurred.⁹¹ Almost every Iraqi regime promulgated a pan-Arab doctrine and deliberately scorned Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish peoples.⁹²

Shi'a and Kurdish problems grew after the Ba'ath party took power after 1968. The pan-Arab identity promoted by the Ba'ath has hindered the development of a strong national identity

⁹¹ Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 467.

⁹² This was true even in the days of the British Mandate and the British-influenced monarchy that followed. Phebe Marr reports that of the 57 men who held cabinet posts between 1920 and 1936, at most four were Shi'a or Kurd. Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 68.

that incorporates Kurds and Shi'as, both of which consider Arab nationalism an alien doctrine.⁹³ The Kurds were in a state of almost constant rebellion until 1975, when the central government subdued them after Iran sealed its border. In the 1970s, Shi'a opposition to the regime grew, and Shi'a religious activists formed several organizations devoted to overthrowing the Ba'ath regime and putting in place an Islamic republic. In the 1980s the Kurds rebelled again seeking autonomy. In 1991, following Operation Desert Storm, both the Shi'a and the Kurds rebelled.

The rebellions resulted in staggering casualties and massive population transfers. The Kurdish war that ended in 1975 resulted in roughly 30,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees. In the Anfal campaigns of the late 1980s, perhaps 200,000 Kurds died and 1.5 million people had been forcibly resettled. Following Desert Storm, perhaps another 1.5 million Kurds fled into Turkey or Iran and another 20,000 were killed by Iraqi forces while hundreds of thousands of Shi'as fled or were killed as well.⁹⁴

What is the source of all this bloodshed? The demands of both the Shi'a and the Kurds are simple, yet they conflict with the ideology of the Sunni Arabs who dominate the Iraqi government. Both groups seek official recognition of and respect for their cultures and interests.

Iraqi Kurds in particular seek to have their separate culture affirmed. Jalal Talabani, leader of the Kurdish PUK faction, asserts that the goal of Iraqi Kurds is "recognition of the right

⁹³ Not surprisingly, given that pan-Arabism theoretically could include Iraqi Shi'a, it has been resisted the most by Iraqi Kurds.

⁹⁴ David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 338-339, 359-361, and 372-373.

of the Kurdish people to a real and genuine autonomy with an Independent Iraqi Republic."⁹⁵ This desire for affirmation, whether in the form of greater autonomy, recognition as a national minority, or separate institutions, has been a constant in the Iraqi Kurdish struggle against Baghdad. In 1935, Iraqi Kurdish chiefs sought the official use of the Kurdish language, representation in the National Assembly, and development of Kurdish areas.⁹⁶ At this time, these chiefs did not fear that the government sought to destroy their communities. Rather, they feared that their culture and their leaders would be subordinate. In 1945, the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa only surrendered to the monarchy after being assured that a Kurd would be put in charge of the Ministry for Kurdish affairs and that Kurdish areas would be granted a high degree of autonomy and local privileges.⁹⁷ In 1963, the Kurds sought autonomy over Kurdish areas, the creation of a separate Kurdish armed forces, and a major share of national oil revenue.⁹⁸ Dana Adams Schmidt, a reporter who travelled in northern Iraq in the early 1960s, argues that the Kurds were fighting because their cultural rights were not respected. He notes that the Sunni Arab government shut down Kurdish schools and replaced Kurdish officials and police with Arabs.⁹⁹ In general, the Kurds sought freedom over virtually all matters except foreign affairs,

⁹⁵ See "Revolution in Kurdistan: The Essential Documents of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan," PUK Publications, No. 1 (1976).

⁹⁶ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 287.

⁹⁷ Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development* (Unpublished dissertation, Syracuse University, 1960), p. 677.

⁹⁸ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 314.

⁹⁹ Dana Adams Schmidt, *Journey Among Brave Men* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964), p. 6.

finance, and national defense.

The central government in Baghdad did not accept Kurdish demands for recognition. Although the government of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and his fellow Free Officers considered giving the Kurds autonomy when they took power in 1958, Abd al-Salam Arif and other Arab nationalists opposed this attempt because they wanted to take Iraq into the United Arab Republic.¹⁰⁰ On more pragmatic grounds, many government officials wanted absolute control over Iraq's oil reserves, much of which are located in Kurdish areas. Attempts at Arab unity by the central government were especially troubling for the Kurds, as would be expected from an status perspective. When Iraq, Syria, and Egypt agreed to form a (never implemented) Federal Arab Republic in April 1963, neither the Kurds nor their rights were mentioned.

Like the Kurds, the Shi'a sought assurances about their role in Iraq. When Iraq first was formed the Shi'a sought to have more Shi'a students sent abroad, investment in Shi'a areas, and proportionate distribution of government-controlled religious endowment funds among Shi'a and Sunni institutions.¹⁰¹ After the government gave parliamentary seats allocated to Shi'a tribal leaders to Sunni townsmen, tribal unrest began, leading the government to bomb villages to insurgent tribes.¹⁰² In 1935, the Shi'a demanded equal representation in the cabinet and the civil service, Shi'a judges in Shi'a areas, and more Shi'a religion in schools.¹⁰³ Like the Kurds, the Shi'a were particularly suspicious of pan-Arab doctrines that came to the fore after 1958. The

¹⁰⁰ McDowall, *Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 303.

¹⁰¹ Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994), p. 119.

¹⁰² Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 123.

¹⁰³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 66.

Iraqi Shi'a recognized that they would cease to be a majority were the pan-Arab agenda adopted. In the 1970s, the Shi'a began agitating along Islamist lines. The agitation only stopped when the Shi'a religious leadership was brutally repressed, with many leaders being executed while others were deported.

Equally significant is that the Shi'a did not revolt during the period of the restored monarchy, which lasted from 1941 until the Revolution of 1958. The government led by Nuri al-Said allowed Shi'a to join the bureaucracy and army, gave them access to education, and supported their inclusion in the modernization of the country. A large number of government figures and other elites were Shi'a, a percentage that declined dramatically beginning in the early 1960s.¹⁰⁴ Peace reigned in this period.

Iraq and the Characteristics of Status Conflict

The Iraqi illustrates the six characteristics common to status struggles outlined earlier. First, conflict in Iraq occurred primarily between the "backward" Kurds and the "advanced" Sunnis. The Sunnis had greater access to modern education, the administration, and the armed services under the Ottomans, giving them an advantage vis-a-vis the Shi'as and the Kurds when a new regime came to power. Under the British and Arab nationalist regimes, however, education continued to spread, leading to the creation of new elites from backward groups. Furthermore, British colonization placed the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs in the same political unit, thus giving them common aspirations for power and status that result in competition. Elites in particular sought to have their positions recognized, a key cause of conflict.

¹⁰⁴ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 125-128 and 282-283.

Second, both the Kurds and Shi'a preferred the continuation of British rule to independence, which they knew would result in Arab Sunni domination.¹⁰⁵ As Gertrude Bell, a leading British Arabist who helped administer Iraq during the early Mandate period, notes, the tribal peoples of Iraq, both Shi'a and Kurd, wanted a British rather than an Arab Amir because they knew that the British will govern according to the custom of the country.¹⁰⁶ Although Shi'a religious leaders initially opposed the British as infidels, the overwhelming number of Shi'a tribes and non-religious Shi'a elites preferred British rule.¹⁰⁷ As one leading Shi'a observed:

We know we are uneducated and so cannot at present take our proper share in the public services. What we want is British control, to save us from Sunni domination, until our sons are educated; then we, who are the real majority, will take our proper place in the government of our country and shall not want British control, but merely advice as you are giving it now.¹⁰⁸

Third, conflict sprang up repeatedly when central authority collapsed, as this ushered in a "free for all" that led groups to fear for their relative status as well as their security. The Kurds revolted after each collapse of central authority, and Shi'a demonstrations and unrest at times increased during periods of regime change. When the Ottoman empire collapsed, Shi'a tribes

¹⁰⁵ What was true for the Shi'a and Kurds was especially so for smaller minority groups such as the Assyrians. On the eve of the transfer of power from the British to an Arab government, the Assyrian troops mutinied in Iraq. Ronald Sempill Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1935), pp. 112-114. Like the Kurds, the Assyrians essentially sought to be a *millet* (an Ottoman term for an autonomous religious enclave). The Assyrians wanted to keep their rifles, own language in schools, and have a guarantee deputy in parliament. See Stafford, p. 117.

¹⁰⁶ *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, Vol. II, Lady Bell, ed. (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1927), pp. 463-464.

¹⁰⁷ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, pp. 60-62, 71.

¹⁰⁸ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 117.

rebelled and Shaykh Mahmud led the Kurds in revolt, in part due to fears of Arab domination.¹⁰⁹ The Barzani Rebellion of 1931-32 came in anticipation of independence from British rule in 1932 as did a series of tribal revolts among southern Shi'as.¹¹⁰ When the Ba'ath took power for the first time in 1963, the Kurds again demanded autonomy, as they would do throughout the turbulent sixties, when regimes changed hands several times until 1968. When Saddam Husayn's regime appeared on the edge of collapse in 1991 following Operation Desert Storm, both the Kurds and the Shi'as rose up in revolt. Over time, security and status concerns became interwoven, with the Kurds in particular seeing a regime collapse as a chance to improve their status in any new government and an opportunity to improve their defensive position vis-a-vis a hostile Sunni regime in Baghdad.

Fourth, symbols proved particularly important. Both Kurds and Shi'as opposed Sunni Arab attempts to have Iraq become a standard bearer for Arab nationalism. Education, a key symbolic benefit, was especially troublesome. Education texts in Iraq following the 1958 Revolution were heavily pan-Arab. Little stress was given to the region's history or culture; loyalty to the broader Arab world was promoted.¹¹¹ Prominent among the demands of both the Shi'a and the Kurds was a call for more local control over and content in education.

Fifth, colonialism increased social ranking, and thus the potential for conflict. Under the British Mandate, the imperial power favored certain minorities, such as the Armenians. Moreover, British education and government practices brought the countries' ethnic groups into

¹⁰⁹ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p. 509.

¹¹⁰ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 55.

¹¹¹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 147.

one governing and social structure. Groups began to strive for the same status and power positions, while before their social hierarchies were independent of one another.

Sixth, nationalist sentiment was inspired by other nationalities. In the Kurdish case, nationalism among Armenians, Turks, Arabs, and Persians led to the formation of their own nationalist movement.¹¹² For the Sunni Arabs, nationalism gained strength after 1908, when the Young Turk capture of power led to the Turkification of the Ottoman Empire.

The Iraqi Kurdish case also illustrates how the security dilemma can reinforce status concerns. With each wave of fighting over status, security and vulnerability fears have intensified, impeding negotiations. By the late 1960s, Iraqi central government assurances with regard to status were less important to many Kurds than demands for security. In the Kurdish case, so much blood has been spilled that good faith bargaining is almost impossible. Past violence reinforces fears that group status concerns will be ignored; similarly, attempts to impose a dominant Arab culture has reinforced group survival concerns.

Conclusions

Status concerns and the security dilemma should not be seen as rival theories. They complement and reinforce each other: groups that fear their physical survival also are likely to fear economic displacement or losing out on status issues. Similarly, groups in a strong economic position or politically part of a nation's core are likely to feel more secure militarily.

¹¹² Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p. 846.

Hegemonic Ambitions and Ethnic Conflict

The ethnic security dilemma and status concerns are primarily defensive in nature. That is to say, the fundamental sources of conflict behind these theories--personal insecurity and cultural defense--can be satisfied in harmony with other ethnic groups. An unarmed populace where everyone can speak his language and worship as she pleases could conceivably satisfy all a country's ethnic groups if status concerns and the ethnic security dilemma were the only sources of ethnic conflict. But not all ethnic groups are satisfied with security and cultural survival. Some prefer dominance. For members of hegemonic groups, their language must be the only official language; their religion must be followed by all citizens; and their institutions must be enshrined in government and society. Hegemonic beliefs can come from many sources, ranging from culture to ideology.¹¹³

Hegemony causes conflict in two fundamental ways. First, groups often strive for preeminence by attacking, intimidating, and destroying other ethnic groups. Castillians in Spain during the Franco era, descendants of American slaves in Liberia, and chauvinistic Hindus in India are but a few examples of groups that used force in their attempts to ensure communal hegemony. The cause of conflict--the will to dominance--is readily apparent. When other ethnic groups will not accept their subordinate position, the hegemonic group takes to arms. The second way hegemonic groups cause conflict is that they incite the defensive concerns of other groups, thus promoting security dilemmas and status concerns. In Turkey, for example, the

¹¹³ Thus Hitler noted that the Aryan was the carrier of cultural development destined to overthrow inferior cultures--an attitude common among many hegemonic ethnic group leaders. See Adolph Hitler, "Mein Kampf," p. 231 in *The Nationalism Reader*, Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay, eds. (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995).

Turks desire to promote Turkish identity, language, and culture to the exclusion of all others has led to conflict with Turkey's Kurdish population (until recently referred to by Turkish officials as "mountain Turks"), which sought to preserve its traditions and way of life. Although the Kurds may have "begun" the conflict in the sense that they take up arms or kill a Turkish official, from their point of view the first blow was struck by the laws that degrade Kurdish identity.

Hegemonic conflict is perhaps the most difficult type of conflict to solve. Either other groups must subordinate their own status and security concerns or the hegemonic group must change its ambitions--both of which are difficult undertakings. Yet hegemonic groups can coexist with other groups. During the Ottoman empire, for example, many non-Muslim communities accepted the second-class but protected status of *dhimmi* without repeated risings or violence. Furthermore, once-hegemonic groups can be gentled. Today the Germans and the Castilians now readily accept other ethnic groups as their equals.

Necessary conditions for hegemony

For hegemonic conflict to occur, the hegemonic group must assert that it merits--and can achieve--political and social domination. In general, hegemonic conflict occurs when a group is numerically superior, considers itself more socially advanced, or both although minorities and backward groups have at times asserted their primacy. Groups without a plausible claim to domination, even when they have a feeling of superiority, generally do not assert their hegemonic claims. Overseas Chinese, for example, have proven highly adaptable to the position of a lower-status minority despite their immense cultural pride.¹¹⁴ Similarly, throughout history Jews have

¹¹⁴ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 1985, p. 138.

accepted subordinate minority positions, again despite a group perception of superiority.

Hegemonic Conflict Characteristics

Hegemonic conflicts evince four common characteristics: attitudes of superiority on the part of the hegemonic group, attempts to subordinate other groups, resentment on the part of the subordinated group, and an important role for intellectuals and cultural elites.

Attitudes of superiority. Hegemonic beliefs can inspire three varieties of attitudes, all of which can inspire conflict. The first is the right to rule. Even when hegemonic groups do not desire to kill or assimilate other groups, they do believe that decision-making power should be in their hands exclusively. Other groups may continue their lives with little change except for surrendering political power, a paternalism that often inspires resentment among the dominated groups and leads to conflict. The second attitude hegemonic beliefs can inspire is the right to assimilate others and impose the dominant group's way of life. A certain language, set of laws, or way of life is proposed as an ideal that other ethnic groups must adopt. The French in Algeria, for example, expounded on their *mission civilisatrice* to justify transforming Algerians into Frenchmen. Language, national symbols, and perceptions of history are particularly important parts of such an assimilation effort. A third attitude is the right to kill or mistreat other groups on the grounds of their supposed inferiority. A hegemonic group may feel no compunction about slaughtering other groups as they do not consider them on the same level of humanity.¹¹⁵ Such

¹¹⁵ As Bradford's *History of the Plymouth Plantation* notes, the Puritan Minister Mather in 1637 gave thanks to God for the massacring of Native Americans in their villages. Similarly, one settler in the American West noted about an 1871 expedition: "In the cave with the meat were some Indian children. Kingsley could not bear to kill children with his 56 calibre rifle. 'It tore them up so bad'. So he did it with his 38 calibre Smith and Wesson revolver." See W. C.

actions reflect not fear but contempt.

Subordination of rival cultures. The hegemonic group actively seeks to subordinate rival cultures--a goal that is indicated in the policies it favors and actions it takes toward rival groups. This is the distinction (often blurred in reality) between hegemonic conflict and conflict stemming from the security dilemma or status concerns. Even when a group's security is ensured and it is free to practice its religion, speak its language, or otherwise assured its cultural survival, it will still engage in conflict with other groups if its superior position is not acknowledged. For example, after World War I the Turks in Turkey dominated government and society, controlled the army and the police, and outnumbered other ethnic groups. Despite this security and social status, they used violence to subordinate minorities such as the Kurds.

Rhetoric of Resentment. For conflict to occur, groups must resist the hegemonic group. Among groups resisting hegemonic groups, a rhetoric of resentment--usually inspired by status or security concerns--is common. The Kurds in Turkey, for example, regularly voiced complaints about their status and security as a result of the hegemonic designs of the Turks.

The Importance of Intellectuals. Teachers, writers, artists, historians, and other individuals who help form and transmit cultural identity play a vital role in hegemonic conflicts. These individuals can create a durable culture that can resist hegemony or accept their subordinate position and help meld the dominant and non-dominant cultures. Because of this importance, these elites are often targets of the hegemonic group and important leaders of resistance to it. Even if these groups do not engage in overtly political behavior, their cultural

Macleod, *The American Indian Frontier*, p. 487 as quoted in Martin Wight, *International Theory* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 63.

activity makes them a target for punishment.

Potential for Foreign Power Interference

Like the security dilemma and status disputes, outside powers can affect hegemonic conflicts in a variety of ways. First, foreign powers can make hegemony unfeasible by providing arms or military support to another ethnic group--an occurrence similar in influence on hegemonic conflict as it is on the security dilemma. A second influence that foreign powers can have is to prevent the achievement of cultural hegemony. In Iran, for example, Kurdish reading materials and history have come across the border from Iraq and from Turkey, strengthening ethnic consciousness and identity.

Box IIC: Hegemonic Conflict

Necessary Conditions

- o Existence of a group with hegemonic ambitions that believes it can achieve dominance

Conflict Characteristics

- o Attitudes of superiority among the hegemonic group
- o Attempts to subordinate rival cultures
- o Resentment by rival cultures
- o Important role played by intellectuals

Iran: An Illustrative Example

Persian history and culture are immediately identified with Iran even though Iran barely has a Persian majority. Iran is 51 percent Persian, 25 percent Azerbaijani, 9 percent Kurdish, 8 percent Gilaki and Mazandarani, 2 Percent Lur, 1 percent Baluch, 1 percent Arab, and contains small pockets of other ethnic and tribal groups.

Although 95 percent of Iran's citizens are Shi'a Muslims, Sunni Muslims compose 4 percent of the population. Despite this demographic diversity, Persian language and culture dominate Iran's

schools, and Persian Shi'a fill most leading positions in society. For most of this century, Iran's Pahlavi rulers have tried to impose Persian culture and identity on Iran's ethnic mosaic. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, this emphasis shifted from Iran's Persian nature to one an emphasis on the Shi'a sect of Islam.

Minority groups resented and have opposed these imposed Persian and Sunni identities. Resentment is particularly high among the Kurds. Both the Pahlavis and the clerical regime have tried to assimilate the Kurds, as non-Persians or Sunni Muslims, into the dominant culture. However, whenever the state's repressive apparatus eased up--such as when the Iranian state collapsed in 1941 and in 1979--the Kurds organized for greater rights and autonomy. These Kurdish attempts to resist hegemony eventually led to violence.

The Kurds differ from their Persian neighbors in their religion, language, and way of life. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school, though large numbers of Kurds are Shi'a or members of other sects of Islam.¹¹⁶ Linguistically, Kurdish differs considerably from Persian, and Kurdish dialects are strongly influenced by Turkish and Arabic as well as Persian.¹¹⁷ In

¹¹⁶ Ramesh Farzanfar, *Ethnic Groups and the State: Azaris, Kurds, and Baluch of Iran* (MIT: unpublished dissertation, 1992), p. 60.

¹¹⁷ Kurdish is not one language, and there is no *lingua franca* among Kurds. There are two major Kurdish vernaculars: the Kurmanji group and the Pahlawani, both of which have two major branches. Within these groups are scores of dialects and subdialects. The relationship between the vernacular is comparable to that between Italian and French. A plurality of Iranian Kurds speak Sorani, one of the principle languages of the Kurmanji group. See Mehrdad R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook* (Washington: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1992), pp. 167-177; Kurdish nationalists have tried to preserve and develop language and use it as proof of their ethnic identity; governments, in turn, have tried to suppress it. However, variations within Kurdish have prevented it from being a unified standard. For example, the northern language of Kurmanji and the central language Sorani differ from each other as much as English and German. See Philip Kreyenbroek, "On the Kurdish Language," in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 68-74.

general, the Kurds found their identity, security, and livelihood in the tribe and had little contact with Iran's urban areas, which were the center of Persian culture.

The Kurds have a limited "high" culture. Books appeared describing Kurdish notables as early as 1597; in the late 17th century, the Kurdish epic poem *Mem u Zin*--the national epic of the Kurds--of Ahmad-i Khani lamented that the Kurds are not under their own strong leadership.¹¹⁸ Ala ad-Din Sajjadi, in his history of Kurdish literature, lists 212 Kurdish poets and discusses 24 at length.¹¹⁹ Kurdish culture is meager compared to Iranian culture, however, and most Kurdish intellectuals in Iran have looked to Tehran for sustenance. Even many ardent Kurdish nationalists find it easier to express abstract ideas in Turkish, Arabic, or Persian. Although Iran has discouraged Kurdish literary activity, so too has the attraction of Persian literature.¹²⁰

The Persian Quest for Hegemony

Under Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son Mohammed Shah, the Iranian government sought to emphasize Persian culture and rally Iran's disparate tribal and ethnic groups under the Persian

¹¹⁸ "If only there were harmony among us,
if we were to obey a single one of us
he would reduce to vassalage
Turks, Arabs, Persians, all of them
We would perfect our religion, our state,
and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom..."

As quoted in Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), p. 267.

¹¹⁹ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p. 53.

¹²⁰ Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 67; Kr. yenbroek, "On the Kurdish Language," p. 74; Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p. 67.

banner. The Pahlavi effort built on literally thousands of years of efforts to distinguish Persian culture from that around it. Persians have long regarded themselves as a superior people: in their writings, they divided their region into Iranian and Turanian (Turkic) peoples, a division comparable to the Greek and Barbarian distinction of Periclean Athens.¹²¹ Neighboring Arabs are uncultured nomads, and Turks are crass and boorish.¹²²

Reza Shah tried to create a new Persian identity that reflected both his admiration for the West and Persian chauvinism. Using fascist Germany as a model, he set up the Society of Public Guidance to instill a national consciousness through journals, textbooks, papers, and radio. In the same vein, he played up Persian culture, renaming the country Iran to emphasize its Aryan heritage.¹²³ When introducing unpopular Western innovations, such as the unveiling of women, he used fines and the threat of unemployment to compel obedience.

Reza Shah tried to undermine Kurdish culture through a highly repressive form of assimilation that promoted Persian identity while undermining Kurdish culture. Under the Society for Public Guidance, all non-Persian ethnic identities and cultural expressions were forbidden, including radio broadcasts, textbooks and publications. Reza Shah forbade the use of Kurdish in public speech and education and imposed a European dress-code.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Graham Fuller, *The "Center of the Universe"* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 17.

¹²² Fuller, *The "Center of the Universe"*, pp. 18-19.

¹²³ M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 106 and Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 143-144.

¹²⁴ Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1992), p. 13.

Destroying Kurdish Resistance

Reza Shah used the centralized state to crush Kurdish resistance. In 1924, Reza Shah defeated Ismail Agha Simko, an ambitious Kurdish chief nicknamed "the cannibal" who had exercised tenuous authority over much of Iranian Kurdistan from 1920 to 1924. Simko himself was known for his atrocities, particularly against minorities in the Kurdish regions such as the Assyrians and Armenians.¹²⁵

Upon defeating Simko, Reza Shah did not pursue the policy of balancing and accommodation used by the Qajar Shahs, who ruled Iran in the 19th century. As the British Military Attache in Iran at the time reported:

[Reza Shah's policy] ...is a complete break with the traditional policy of the past, and is to establish complete political and military control over all parts of Persia and to effect the disarmament of the entire civil population. The tribal system of the country forms the greatest obstacle to the fulfillment of this policy.¹²⁶

Concurrent with this repression was a theoretical guarantee of equal rights, but in reality the Kurds had no redress for Reza Shah's harsh measures.¹²⁷

Reza Shah tried unsuccessfully to destroy the traditional Kurdish leadership. He recruited

¹²⁵ Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 57; Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p. 12. Simko fought a large number of other minorities and other Kurdish tribes. He revolted again along with several other tribal leaders in 1926 and was again defeated; he was finally captured and executed in 1930.

¹²⁶ As quoted in David Brooks, "The Enemy Within: Limitations on Leadership in the Bakhtiyari" in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, Richard Tapper, ed. (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1983), p. 340.

¹²⁷ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p. 710; Patricia Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics*, Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 174-176.

the civil administration from other parts of the country in order to weaken local notables. Those who openly opposed him were executed, poisoned, or exiled. He also deported several Kurdish tribes to the Fars province in the late 1920s.¹²⁸ However, to administer the Kurdish areas effectively, the local police and administration still had to work with the local notables.

In 1926, Reza Shah introduced land titles, thus strengthening the power of local tribal leaders. These titles, however, came at a price. Leaders now were tied to the land and to the state, and though their power increased vis-a-vis their fellow tribesmen, it weakened vis-a-vis the central government.¹²⁹

Reza Shah abdicated after Allied powers invaded Iran in 1941. During the interregnum between his fall and the consolidation of power by his son and successor Mohammed Shah, the Kurds seized the opportunity to regain the rights they had lost. Protected from royal forces by the Soviet army, Kurds in the Mahabad region decided to form their own republic, which received limited Soviet support.¹³⁰ The Mahabad Republic lasted from January 22, 1946 until December 17 of the same year. During this time, Kurdish was the official language, and Kurdish

¹²⁸ Izady, p. 107.

¹²⁹ When Reza's Shah's son and successor Mohammed Shah initiated land reform in the 1960s, it further weakened the power of local notables. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems," in *The Kurds*, p. 43; Fereshteh Koochi-Kamali, "The development of nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan," in *The Kurds*, p. 172; Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, p. 35.

¹³⁰ Whether the Mahabad Republic was Soviet sponsored remains a matter of debate. In general, however, it seems clear that the Soviets had ties to many of the leaders and encouraged the Republic's formation, but that the leader--Qazi Mohammed--and his agenda was a traditionalist nationalist one, not a Communist approach. For more on Mahabad, see William Eagleton Jr., *The Kurdish Republic of 1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Archie Roosevelt Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 1947).

periodicals and literature flourished.¹³¹

Outside powers enabled the Kurds to form the Mahabad Republic. Although the Soviet Union did not control the Republic, Soviet troops stationed in Iran did prevent the central government from crushing the Republic at its birth, and Moscow gave it limited diplomatic support as well.¹³²

The Mahabad Republic was limited in power and in popular support. It only controlled a small area--roughly one third of Iranian Kurdistan--and it sought autonomy, not independence. The demands of Mahabad's leader Qazi Mohammed, a conservative Kurdish notable, and the newly-formed Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) included self government in local affairs, autonomy within the Iranian state, the use of the Kurdish language, local administration by officers of Kurdish origin, and the use of all government revenues derived from Kurdistan to be spent in Kurdistan.¹³³ However, Reza Shah's policy succeeded to a point even after his fall. Most Kurdish tribes did not support the Mahabad revolt in 1946 for fear of jeopardizing their relationship with Tehran.¹³⁴ Indeed, other tribes served as the vanguard for the invading Persian army that captured Mahabad.

Traditional ethnic rivalries and anti-Soviet sentiment also limited Mahabad's appeal. In 1946, most traditional Kurdish leaders did not support the Mahabad Republic, in part because it

¹³¹ Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p.23.

¹³² Some observers argue that if Iran had relinquished its claim to the region, the Soviet Union would have incorporated the republic into the Soviet Union. See Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 65.

¹³³ Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p.20.

¹³⁴ David McDowall, "The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review," in *The Kurds*, p. 22.

was associated in the Kurdish mind with the despised Azeris, who were forming their own autonomous republic at the same time. In the words of Haj Baba Shaikh, the Premier of the Mahabad Republic, "The Kurds would rather be ruled by Tehran than be dominated by Tabriz."¹³⁵

Cultural repression accompanied the fall of Mahabad. The Iranian government closed local printing presses, banned the teaching of Kurdish, disarmed hostile tribe members, and burned Kurdish books. They also hanged the leaders of the Mahabad government and supporting tribes.¹³⁶

After crushing the Mahabad Republic, Mohammed Shah generally followed the policy outlines of his father toward minorities, though he often tried to cloak his brutality toward minorities. In general, the new Shah used pensions and high status positions in the government to coopt potential opposition. For example, he left the landholdings of the Kurdish Jaf tribal leaders untouched during the "White Revolution," a program that included major land reforms. Later, such tribal leaders were the only Kurds who did not join the revolutionary forces.¹³⁷ Those who refused to be coopted were repressed by SAVAK.¹³⁸ The Kurds, however, were denied their fair share of resources under the Shah while receiving more than their share of repression.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 159.

¹³⁶ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 69.

¹³⁷ Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p. 29.

¹³⁸ Martin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 24-39.

¹³⁹ Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," p. 184.

Although roughly three percent of Iranians were born in Kurdistan, they represented less than one percent of the national elite in the 1960s.¹⁴⁰

Social Change under the Pahlavis: A Tool of Hegemony

Key social changes under both Shahs, such as the development of infrastructure and the establishment of an education system, facilitated Persian hegemony. Similarly, development spending in Kurdish areas was limited, in part to keep the region weak.

Reza Shah developed the infrastructure in remote areas, but he did so selectively to further central government power at the expense of outlying regions. He built a network of communications that connected Kurdish areas to important trade centers and the capital, but left intra-Kurdish communication underdeveloped.¹⁴¹ Thus, infrastructure development served to refocus Kurdish trade on the Persian center and helped Reza Shah send troops to the area to enforce his will but did not strengthen Kurdish collective action capabilities.

Reza Shah, in a policy continued by his son Mohammed, also used education to further hegemony. For Reza Shah, education was a means to integrate citizens into society, making them loyal citizens devoted to their Shah and state. Education transmitted Persian identity: textbooks were standard throughout Iran, and a special emphasis was put on knowledge of

¹⁴⁰ Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 384 and Farzanfar, *Ethnic Groups and the State*, pp. 385-386. Farzanfar's later data (from 1976) suggest that few technocrats and government elites were of Kurdish origin as a percentage of population.

¹⁴¹ Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, p. 20.

Persian.¹⁴² Between the beginning and end of Reza Shah's reign, the number of students in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 59,339 to 315,355--a jump from less than half of one percent of the population to 2.5 percent of the total population. By 1940, 12 times as much money was spent on education as in 1925.

Education, however, had only a limited effect on the Kurds. Although all education was in Persian, most Kurdish rural and tribal areas were the last to be touched by the Shah's education programs and thus were affected less than other parts of Iran.¹⁴³ Although the literacy rate of Iranian Kurds went from 14.3 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1976, the Persian rate in 1976 was 66.1 percent.

Social spending indicators suggest a deliberate neglect of Kurdish areas. In the central provinces, 80.7 percent of Iranian households had electricity in 1976 and 74.9 percent had indoor plumbing; in Kurdistan, these figures were 19.5 percent and 12 percent respectively. Under Reza Shah, health care in Kurdistan was worse than any other part of the country. The Kurds also got little in the way of factories or plants.¹⁴⁴

The Shi'a Quest for Hegemony

After the 1979 Islamic revolution, hegemonic ambitions continued to characterize Iran's leaders, but the nature of the hegemony desired changed from Persian culture to Shi'ism. Thus,

¹⁴² David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 91-92 and 96.

¹⁴³ Farzanfar, *Ethnic Groups and the State*, pp. 225-230.

¹⁴⁴ Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p. 7; Farzanfar, *Ethnic Groups and the State*, p. 265; and Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 109.

religious minorities such as Jews, Bahai's, and Sunni Muslims found themselves subordinated while ethnic minorities who endorsed Shi'ism in theory had no limits to their advancement. The Kurds, however, did not share the Islamic Republic's emphasis on religion over ethnicity, particularly since the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. The Khomeini government refused to recognize Kurdish autonomy, in part due to its religious credo of Islamic unity. In addition, the government feared that giving the Kurds autonomy would spark a demonstration effect among Iran's Azeris, Baluch, and Turkomen peoples.¹⁴⁵

The Iranian revolution brought with it hopes in the Kurdish areas of greater autonomy and concerns about even greater repression, kindled in part by resentment over their treatment during the Shah's time and in part by fears that the clerical regime would subordinate their culture and religion. After the 1979 revolution, almost all Kurds supported the nationalist cause. It appears that far more Kurds supported autonomy after the fall of the Shah in 1979 than after the fall of his father in 1941, suggesting that Pahlavi's heavy-handed policies inspired considerable resentment. In the elections following the revolution, the nationalist Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) won an overwhelming victory even though it did not have a strong network or considerable support outside a few areas in Iran.¹⁴⁶

As Kurdish demands for more autonomy were not met, Kurds rose in revolt, seizing both the cities and the countryside. Kurds took over the local police and army, and several traditional

¹⁴⁵ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 73; Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," p. 186. Izady reports that only 5-7 percent of the total Kurdish population is Shiite, for a total of no more than 1 to 1.5 million. Most of these live in Iran, but even there they remain a minority (*The Kurds*, pp. 132-133.).

¹⁴⁶ Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, p. 37; Bruinessen, "Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems," p. 56.

leaders worked with the KDPI to press for a large degree of autonomy.¹⁴⁷ Support from Iraq, which included arms and a safe haven, helped the Kurds initially, but Iran's successes in the Iran-Iraq war soon reduced the impact of this support.

When Kurdish areas fell to the army, blood flowed. Although Judge Khalkali, "the hanging judge," executed over 70 Kurdish leaders, this revolt could not be crushed by targeting elites. The regime brutally suppressed the Kurds, killing women and children in often-gruesome manners. By 1984, when the revolt in the countryside ended, up to 28,000 Kurds had died.¹⁴⁸

After subjugating the Kurds, the clerical government eased up on its treatment of Kurdish culture and made token gestures of accommodation. In 1984, it legalized publications in Kurdish. There is now a Kurdish literary magazine and works on Kurdish culture and history. In addition, education in Kurdish is now permitted.¹⁴⁹

A Strained Peace

Today, the Kurdish areas witness an uneasy peace. Armed Kurdish rebels perhaps number only a few hundred and they do not pose a serious threat to the integrity of the Iranian

¹⁴⁷ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 70. Menashri reports that the Kurds were willing to yield on issues such as foreign policy and finance but were adamant in their demand for local administration. Furthermore, as Tehran proved increasingly intransigent and blood began to flow, the Kurdish demands increased. David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990), p. 90.

¹⁴⁸ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 77 claims the figure of around 27,500. Other observers, however, offer a much lower figure, Izady, for example, claims only around 1,000-2,000 Kurds died during this period (*The Kurds*, p. 69).

¹⁴⁹ Kreyenbroek, "On the Kurdish Language," in *The Kurds*, p. 81.

state.¹⁵⁰ The Kurdish people, however, are not assimilated nor do they think the government represents their interests. Socioeconomic distinctions also separate the Kurds from other Iranians: Kurds remain the least literate of the major Iranian nationalities and the least urbanized.¹⁵¹ Schools continue to use only Persian, but publication in other languages is now permitted.

To this day the regime vigilantly guards against any possibilities of Kurdish military or political resistance. Indeed, the Iranian regime was allegedly behind the death of KDPI-head Dr. Abdulrahman Qassemlou in Vienna in 1989 and another Kurdish nationalist leader in Cyprus during the same year. Iranian Kurdistan remains under heavy military rule and reports of arrests, torture, and "disappearances" are common.

Some assimilation has occurred, but most Iranian Kurds still are aware of their distinct ethnicity.¹⁵² Several Iranian national figures in literature, art, politics, administration, and the armed forces have Kurdish tribal surnames. Still, unlike tribal groups such as the Bakhtiyaris which gradually faded into the Persian majority, the percentage of the Kurdish population appears to have remained roughly static in terms of overall population.¹⁵³ For the most part, assimilation that has occurred is due to broader social changes, particularly the end of the security threat to individuals that came with pacification.

¹⁵⁰ Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 210.

¹⁵¹ Izady, *The Kurds*, pp. 122 and 179.

¹⁵² Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 110.

¹⁵³ Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 117.

Foreign power interference

Foreign powers played an important role in the Kurdish insurgency. At different times, the Iranian Kurds have received assistance from the Iraq, Turkey, and the Soviet Union. The Kurds also were affected culturally by their Iraqi brethren. A majority of Iraqi Kurds speak and write in the Sorani dialect as do a plurality of Iranian Kurds. Most of this century's Kurdish literary works have been published in Sorani; much of this was produced in Iraq with central government approval.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, Iranian Kurds at times looked for political leadership from the Kurds of Iraq despite occasional sentiments of cultural superiority to their Iraqi brethren.¹⁵⁵ Thus, the presence of Kurdish peoples abroad hindered regime efforts to subdue the Kurds militarily, destroy their culture, or crush their leadership.

Conclusions

The Iranian case suggests both how a hegemonic group can inspire a lasting conflict and the difficulties involved in imposing hegemony. The Persian (and later Shi'a) desire for dominance created lasting hostility among the Kurds.

The Kurds, while tenacious fighters, might be susceptible to peace if the Persians/Shi'a did not seek hegemony. In negotiations, Kurdish leaders pressed for autonomy rather than independence. Furthermore, the Kurds remain divided amongst themselves and thus might welcome outsiders if they did not challenge traditional prerogatives.

¹⁵⁴ Izady, *The Kurds*, pp. 177-178. Iraq had a universal education system that at times used the medium of Kurdish in Kurdish regions.

¹⁵⁵ Izady, *The Kurds*, pp. 207-208.

The constant fighting and repression appears to have "hardened" Kurdish identity. The Kurdish intelligentsia is far more active today than at any time in history, discovering older poems and developing the Kurdish language. Furthermore, the atrocities of war have politicized many previously non-political individuals. Kurdish nationalism is far stronger today than in was a generation ago. Thus, far from making Kurds into Persians, the regimes' policies seem to have strengthened Kurdish identity.

The Iranian Kurds and the Characteristics of Hegemonic Conflict

The Iranian case neatly illustrates the characteristics of entitlement conflict. First, the Persians obviously evince attitudes of superiority, particularly vis-a-vis the Kurds. Historically, the Persians have long fought with and resisted any Turkish influence, a battle evident in their literature as well as official history texts. The Kurds, with their tribal and rural ways, represent almost the antithesis of the sophisticated Persian ideal. Furthermore, all Iranian governments have promoted attitudes of superiority, playing up Persian and Shi'a achievements in an attempt to gain regime legitimacy along nationalist and religious lines.

A second characteristic of hegemonic conflict--attempts to subordinate rival cultures--also is evident in Iran. The Persians were not content only with boasting about their heritage--the government actively sought to denigrate other cultures. This effort was particularly strong with regard to the Kurds. Similarly, the clerical regime has proclaimed Shi'ism--not Islam--to be Iran's official religion and has shunned many Sunni Kurdish leaders.

Kurdish resentment of the Shi'a Persian community, a third characteristics of hegemonic conflict, also is clear. Time and time again the Kurds have risen up when the central government

was weak. Moreover, the Kurds in general have shown constant support for Kurdish leaders, both tribal and modern urban intellectuals, rather than assimilate into the Persian majority. This resentment has grown as years of conflict and repression have hardened Kurdish ethnic identity.

Particularly important in the Kurdish conflict is the role of Kurdish intellectuals and government efforts to silence them--the fourth characteristic of hegemonic conflict. Kurdish intellectuals felt the brunt of government efforts to assimilate the Kurds and thus played a major role in the founding of important anti-government political organizations such as the KDPI. The Iranian regime has recognized the importance of Kurdish intellectuals and has sought to prevent them from disseminating their ideas.

Table IIA: Cases Examined and the Type of Conflict that Occurred

Country and Regime	Ethnic Groups Involved	Category of Conflict
Morocco (Sherifian)	Arabs and Berbers	Security Dilemma
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Arabs and Berbers	No conflict
Morocco (Istiqlal)	Arabs and Berbers	Status and Hegemony
Morocco (Current Sultanate)	Arabs and Berbers	No conflict
Palestine (Mandate)	Arabs (Muslim, Christian, and Druze) and Jews	Hegemony and Security Dilemma
Israel (Military Government)	Arabs and Jews	No Conflict
Israel (Current Government)	Arabs and Jews	No Conflict
Syria (French Mandate)	Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawis	Limited Status
Syria (Asad)	Alawis, Kurds, Druze, and Muslims	Status
Lebanon (National Pact)	Christians, Shi'a, Sunni, and Druze, others	Security Dilemma, Limited Status
Iraq (British Mandate)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims	Limited Status
Iraq (post-war Hashemite Monarchy)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims	No communal conflict
Iraq (Ba'ath)	Shi'a, Kurds, Sunni Muslims	Hegemony
Iran (Pahlavi)	Persians, Kurds, Bakhtiyaris only	Hegemony with Kurds; no conflict with Bakhtiyaris

What Hypotheses on the Causes of Conflict Are Omitted and Why

There are several commonly-cited hypotheses on the causes of ethnic conflict that this dissertation does not examine because others have shown them to be unsatisfying, of narrow applicability, or not relevant to the Middle East. They include the belief that groups fight because of irreconcilable differences among cultures; that ancient hatreds are the source of conflicts; that ethnic conflict is a function of modernization; and that economic interest is at the heart of ethnic conflict. All these causes may be correct in part, and indeed both the security dilemma and the status theory draw on parts of these theories. Nevertheless, in their pure form they are not satisfying, as examples from the Middle East show.

Irreconcilable Differences among Cultures. A common folk theory for ethnic conflict is that certain cultures war due to cultural differences. Although there are many assertions that cultural differences cause conflict, this theory has little support.¹⁵⁶ Many ethnic conflicts occur between "similar" cultures while far more different cultures live together in harmony. Tribal conflict, which was endemic to the Middle East, occurred among highly-similar groups who usually spoke the same language and shared the same religion. The "narcissism of little

¹⁵⁶ Proponents of the view that cultural differences lead to conflict include Talcott Parsons, "Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tensions," in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robert M. MacIver, eds., *Approaches to National Unity* (New York: Harper, 1945), 182-99 and M.G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965);

Several leading works in the field, however, suggest that the degree of difference itself is seldom a basis of conflict. Myron Weiner's work on India, for example, that it is group competition that leads to conflict; similar groups with middle classes that compete are far more prone to conflict than dissimilar groups that have well-defined economic niches. Donald Horowitz points out that in the Philippines ethnic prejudice is strongest among the middle class of various groups, suggesting that despite this similarity in condition (i.e. Westernized and more educated than most Filipinos) tension can be greater. See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 139.

differences" indeed seems more compelling as a source of conflict than large cultural gaps.

The irreconcilable differences approach ignores that identity issues are sources of conflict only when social value is attached to these differences. Although the facts of ethnicity are certainly tangible--the Kurds do not speak Arabic as their first language nor do the Arabs speak Kurdish--the difference imputed to them is constructed. The conflict in the Sudan illustrates this point neatly. Northern Sudanese look African, including in their skin color, yet consider themselves racially to be Arabs. And indeed, to all Sudanese they look "Arab" even though to outsiders both northern and southern Sudanese look black.¹⁵⁷ Thus, this theory is not satisfying as it does not explain which differences cause conflict and which do not.

Such differences, however, might affect how well various strategies to end ethnic conflict work even if they do not explain the source of conflict in the first place. Creating a common identity, for example, is easier among groups that speak the same language or practice the same religion.

Ancient hatreds. The belief that conflict is the result of eternal disputes is an often-cited source of conflict, particularly among journalists and politicians.¹⁵⁸ And, of course, history and memories of injustice are powerful sources of lasting resentment. Ancient hatreds, however, contribute to conflict but by themselves do not explain it. Memories of mistreatment and hatred are commonly found in security dilemma conflicts and often provoke status fears when a historic

¹⁵⁷ Francis M. Deng, "Blood Brothers," *The Brookings Review* (1995), pp. 12-16.

¹⁵⁸ President Bush, for example, explained the war in Bosnia as a product of "age-old animosities." As quoted in Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in Michael E. Brown, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 79.

rival gains power. However, by itself ancient hatreds do not always provoke conflict. Angles and Saxons, for example, live together in harmony as do Czechs and Slovaks. Nor does this theory explain when conflict is likely to break out. Even the former Yugoslavia witnessed over 40 years of peace before self-destructing.

Ethnic conflict is a product of modernization. Several scholars have argued that modernization--which brings with it social upheavals, mass politics, and political competition--is the source of ethnic conflict.¹⁵⁹ This hypothesis in its simplest form is easily disproven by the lack of ethnic conflict in many modernizing states and the existence of ethnic conflict before modernization. Morocco, for example, has steadily modernized for the last fifty years but has not spawned ethnic conflict. In fact, large tribal confederations in Morocco regularly warred long before modernization took place there.¹⁶⁰ A better question is under what circumstances does modernization produce ethnic conflict? This question, however, is in part answered by Horowitz with his advocacy of status as a major cause of ethnic conflict--an approach I examined in depth in this chapter.

Ethnic conflict as ethnic competition. Perhaps the most commonly-cited hypothesis omitted is that of the rational choice school: that ethnic conflict can be explained as a rational

¹⁵⁹ For scholars who assert the danger of modernization with regard to ethnic conflict, see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); Paul Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity* 3 (September 1976); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970). Walker Connor provides a detailed analysis of modernization's impact on nation-building in "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?"

¹⁶⁰ Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* gives an excellent study of such pre-national ethnic conflicts.

competition for the cluster of modern goods, including land, markets, and jobs. Modernity, as defined by new forms of wealth, education, and urbanization creates a new form of status--one for which groups will compete. As Bates argues, "Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity."¹⁶¹ Because modernization occurs at different rates among groups, conflict is likely as groups constantly seek to determine who gets what.

My reasons for not exploring this are twofold. First, in its most coherent form--that expressed by Bates--this school is explaining ethnic competition more than ethnic conflict. Bates' argument is very persuasive, but it is not intended to explain bloodshed, which is often "irrational" in terms of economic gain. Second, this study implicitly accepts part of this school's approach, that the creation of a new stratification system by colonialism is extremely important in explaining ethnic conflict --a theme taken up in my discussion of status as a cause of ethnic conflict. Extracting goods is only one part of status, however.¹⁶²

Economic interest. A number of theories exist that explain ethnic conflict as part of a rational conflict for material goods and wealth, relegating various conflicts around the world to a competition for resources. This approach, however, does not offer insight into one of the basic truths of ethnicity: that it unites rich and poor members of an ethnic group in common purpose. Furthermore, it fails to explain why individuals in the group repeatedly persist in behavior that

¹⁶¹ Robert Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in D. Rothchild & V. Olorunsola, *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, eds. (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 471.

¹⁶² Bates defines ethnic competition as the striving by ethnic groups for scarce and valued goods. Bates makes the point that modernity creates a new stratification system on page 462.

they know will leave them worse off in material terms. Jews under the Palestine Mandate, for example, sought to import Jewish labor, which would compete directly with them, in part to aid in their fight against the Arabs. Finally, this approach ignores that many ethnic conflicts are over symbolic issues such as language or group status rather than just money.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ Horowitz explores these theories and their faults on pages 134-135 in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

Chapter III: Government Strategies to Foster Ethnic Peace

Introduction

This chapter introduces a number of hypotheses about how various government policies might prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. These hypotheses are based on the actual strategies governments in the Middle East and elsewhere have used to manage ethnic relations and prevent the recurrence of conflict. Thus, the chapter details the universe of strategies that governments use, not the ones that I necessarily see as the ideal solutions to preventing the recurrence of ethnic conflict.

I describe the various strategies as ideal types for the sake of clarity. These strategies are grouped into four "families": "control," "accommodation," "identity change," and "mediation." Within each family are several "strategies," which are specific policies designed to prevent ethnic conflict. For each family, I describe how the strategies within it might lead to ethnic peace in the long-term. In order to test the strategies, I derive empirical statements from them that we should observe if they are valid. In subsequent chapters, when I examine ethnic relations in the Middle East, I use these predictions to test the soundness and range of the strategies in question. In general, when discussing each of the four families I try to describe how the strategies affect the causes of ethnic conflict discussed in Chapter II.

Family One: Control and Ethnic Peace

For sustained ethnic conflict to take place on a large scale, ethnic groups must organize. Individuals must coordinate their activities, obtain arms, and otherwise work together to fight

effectively. If a government can interfere with or discourage ethnic organization, then it can prevent or at least limit ethnic violence.¹⁶⁴ Efforts to prevent organization through the use of force, whether implicit or explicit, are referred to as "control" in this dissertation.

Ways to prevent or discourage organization vary tremendously. Two important questions, however, distinguish various types of control: "Who is affected?" and "What activity is punishable?" By looking at these two distinctions, the Middle East cases suggest four general ways that control is used to resolve ethnic conflict. The first is "police control," which involves providing groups with security by punishing the use of violence after the fact, similar to the role played by police forces in Western governments. The second type of control is "selective control." Selective control is far more proactive than police control and involves repressing leaders and those seeking to organize along ethnic lines to use violence. The third type of control is "massive control," which involves the systematic and widespread use of force to repress any expression of ethnic activity, violent or not. The fourth type of control is "divide-and-rule." Unlike the first three types of control, divide-and-rule hinders organization by promoting internal divisions rather than by using punishment.

¹⁶⁴ See Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* and Muller and Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action." Other works noting the relationship between violent resistance and force include Gordon Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution," *Public Choice* 11 (Fall 1971) and Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Revolution in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), chap. 6.

Some scholars argue more modern societies are more vulnerable to effective control. In modern societies, it is easier for tyrants to dominate the coercive resources. Saddam Husayn's Iraq and Hafez al-Assad's Syria, for example, have intelligence and security apparati of which earlier rulers only dreamed. More modern societies also are particularly vulnerable to coercion because their wealth can easily be held hostage; the threat of collaborating or starving is thus highly effective. Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security* 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 142-145.

The target of each strategy varies.¹⁶⁵ Police control only affects those engaging in violence; selective control focuses on preventing ethnic organization in general and thus pays particular attention to potential activists; and massive control targets all forms of ethnic activity. The distinction between selective control and police control can best be understood in the difference between "denial" (weakening the target group to the point where it cannot cause problems) and "deterrence" (persuading the target group that the cost of making trouble is too high). Selective control relies on denial, while police control relies on deterrence. Divide-and-rule focuses particular attention on cleavages and actors at the sub-ethnic level. Tribe, sect, and region often become important as the government searches for possible sources of division that might prevent the group from acting as one corporate entity.

The means for each strategy varies as well. Police control relies on jailing or silencing those involved in violence; selective control often involves censorship or limits on free assembly

		Who is Affected?	
		<u>Activists only</u>	<u>All group members</u>
Type of Activity Targeted?	Violence only	XXX	Police control
	Organization in general	Selective control	Massive control

As we can see from the above chart, I have not included a category of "violent activists only." This is chiefly due to the definition I use of activist, which automatically includes those who use violence. Thus, any attempt to crack down on ethnic violence (i.e. police control) automatically involves activists and, indeed, cannot avoid doing so.

¹⁶⁵

as well as more draconian punishments for those involved in violence; and massive control often includes the killing of members of an ethnic group simply for not actively supporting the government. Divide-and-rule often involves administrative changes or other attempts to recognize and strengthen a component of a group.

Strategy IA: Police Control

Police control is the use of force to put down violence along ethnic lines and to provide security for all individuals from ethnic violence. Police control is found to some degree in all functioning states, including all Western democracies. In the United States, for example, it is permissible to demonstrate for the rights of your ethnic group or to march in a parade on Saint Patrick's day. One cannot legally use force, however, as part of any ethnic rights or solidarity campaign.

In short, police control is distinguishable from other types of control by its widely-accepted legitimate nature. All states maintain a coercive arm to prevent violence. Indeed, part of Max Weber's definition of government is a legitimate monopoly on violence. Even in the most benign liberal democracies there are laws--backed up by coercion--against organizing to use violence against fellow citizens.

Police control is not just directed against minorities. It also prevents the majority group from attacking the minority group. Radicals within the majority group, for whatever reason, may seek to provoke or put down the rival minority group, and preventing such harassment is an important part of providing a secure overall environment.

Police control paradoxically eases fears about other groups using force. If no group can

arm without suffering from control, then no group need arm in self-defense. Thus, successful police control removes a necessary condition for the security dilemma to function. This relaxation in fear can foster social change in the long-term. For example, if peace is widespread, individuals in the group can leave their tribe or home and pursue work elsewhere, a decision that in the past would have left the tribe vulnerable to military pressure from rival groups and left the individual vulnerable to attacks if he left his secure home.

Strategy IB: Selective Control¹⁶⁶

Selective control is the use of force against ethnic group leaders and those suspected of engaging in ethnic political activity. The intention of selective control is to prevent ethnic political organization that has the potential to produce violence.¹⁶⁷ Selective control is the most common way Middle Eastern governments manage ethnic differences and attempt to prevent ethnic violence. Just to stay in power almost all Middle Eastern governments have highly-developed intelligence, police, and security services. Television images of bludgeoned Palestinians and imprisoned Bahraini Shi'a highlight a sad truth about the regularity of the use of force in the Middle East. Such visible violence is just the tip of the iceberg. Police harassment,

¹⁶⁶ For a policy related to ethnic conflict resolution to be classed as selective control, it must target ethnic leaders, ethnic organizations, or expressions of ethnic sentiment. Thus, a government that arrested labor leaders but left ethnic parties free to organize would not be using a policy of selective control for my purposes even though it undoubtedly is repressive in the conventional sense of the word.

¹⁶⁷ Selective control is a harsh version of co-optation. Where co-optation reduces the benefits elites would gain by organizing against the government by granting elites privileges and status, selective control raises the costs of such action by presenting the possibility of imprisonment or death.

press censorship, and limits to assembly also are used regularly to ensure citizens, including potential ethnic dissidents, do not resist the government. Unlike police control, selective control is not accepted throughout the world as legitimate.

Selective control tries to make a violent contest for power or gain unthinkable or unworkable through the use and threat of force.¹⁶⁸ Group attempts to act as a collectivity become more difficult as individuals within the group fear for their safety if they organize along ethnic lines.¹⁶⁹ Selective control is directed at those individuals involved in politics and their immediate supporters. Such control at low levels might involve censorship, police harassment, or laws prohibiting organized ethnic political activity. At higher levels it includes imprisonment, murder, or exile. Selective control does not involve control against ethnic group members not involved (or suspected of being involved) in ethnic political activity.

An important determinant of the effectiveness of selective control is the accuracy of the control. Do the measures to deter or punish individuals considering the use of violence actually affect radicals? If such control targets innocent bystanders or apolitical individuals, then it is likely to drive these once-passive people to turn against the government.¹⁷⁰ In Iran, for example, the blanket control of all Kurdish cultural activity made the Kurds as a whole highly-politicized and very hostile to the regime.

¹⁶⁸ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Cases Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 21.

¹⁶⁹ This concept of collective action is derived from Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*.

¹⁷⁰ For more on this concept, see Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 55-69

Iraq under Mohammed Shah used selective control to prevent ethnic organization in general. The Shah actively monitored potential dissidents and directed SAVAK, his secret police, to imprison or torture those who threatened his regime. Ethnic groups in Iran did not have the right to organize to press for political rights or even to bolster their ethnic identity.

Strategy IC: Massive Control

Massive control involves the use of force against ethnic group members regardless of ethnic political activity. Mere membership in the ethnic group is enough to merit the heavy hand of the state. Low levels of massive control might be limited to legal discrimination against all members of the ethnic group while high levels would be characterized by widespread random terror in the form of random extra-legal killings and torture. Unlike police control or selective control, those targeted are not necessarily involved directly in using violence or engaging in politics. For example, in Iraq in the late 1980s the Ba'athist government systematically used collective punishment to discourage Kurds from supporting guerrilla forces. The intention was to discourage guerrilla activity by destroying potential havens and raising the "costs" for the Kurds in general of such activity.¹⁷¹

Massive violence, however, can easily produce a backlash. If harsh enough, it creates a security dilemma situation between the ethnic group and the government, which becomes a

¹⁷¹ Selective control and police control can be subsets of massive control. For example, the Iraqi campaign against the Kurds included an extremely vigorous campaign against the Kurdish leadership, including assassination attempts at figures in exile. Yet massive control does not necessarily involve police control. The Ba'athist regime in Iraq, for example, was quite content to allow, or even encourage, rival Kurdish tribal forces to war against one another as this internecine fighting weakened the Kurds' ability to resist Baghdad.

source of future violence.

Strategy ID: Divide and Rule

Another way to control a communal group is to play up internal divisions. In Israel, members of the Druze sect of Islam live peacefully next to their Jewish neighbors. Arab nationalists and Palestinian nationalists both claim Israeli Druzes as part of "their" people, but the Israeli government has encouraged the Druze to maintain a separate identity, which has limited Druze enthusiasm for Palestinian causes. It is not that Druzes do not feel any sympathy for Arab and Palestinian issues, but rather their level of political loyalty is to their sect. By helping make the level of ethnic identification more restrictive, the Israeli government has divided the ranks of potential ethnic opponents.¹⁷²

A divide-and-rule strategy attempts to weaken an ethnic or national group by appealing to its component parts as corporate groups. Divide-and-rule looks for divisions within the group, whether based on religion, tribe, region, or an ascriptive feature, and uses a system of rewards to separate group members. This tactic of dividing a group to rule it is hardly new: Since history began rulers have tried to stay on top by playing one group against the other. In ethnic conflict, however, this tactic can be particularly effective as it changes the number of groups and the strength of each one.

Divide-and-rule's impact is on the components of the group and their propensity to organize. Like accommodation (discussed below), divide-and-rule can include political,

¹⁷² However, in the Golan Heights area, which was controlled by Syria until 1967, Druze villages consider themselves "Arab" as well as Druze and have resisted Israeli efforts to reduce their loyalty to Arab causes.

economic, or symbolic benefits that affect a sub-group's contentment with their position in society. For example, in Israel the Druze are granted control of their own religious establishment (a symbolic benefit), better access to government patronage, and disproportionate political representation. The intended effect of these benefits is to prevent the Druze from working with the broader Arab Muslim community, who are granted fewer benefits. Thus, if an individual Druze chooses to identify himself with the broader community, he jeopardizes the benefits he gains from being considered a Druze rather than an Arab Muslim.

Divide-and-rule policies affect status concerns by granting a portion of the group its share of political, economic, and symbolic perks. Although Arabs in Israel often are treated poorly, Druzes on the whole are accorded a considerable measure of respect. Thus, individuals and elites among the Druze have less incentive to use violence. Elites in particular are likely to be affected by divide-and-rule tactics. If the elites of a smaller ethnic group (such as the Druze in Israel) were to join the larger community (Palestinian Arab Muslims), they may lose their elite positions.

Control and the Causes of Ethnic Conflict

All four variants of control attempt to interfere with ethnic organization at some level. Such interference can encourage ethnic peace in two ways. First, it raises the "costs" for individuals who seek to use violence to advance their ends.¹⁷³ Elites fear to lead, and the populace fears to follow. Even those few individuals who do not fear the regime are less able to

¹⁷³ As Leites and Wolf argue in *Rebellion and Authority*, the key to ending internal disputes is not winning the hearts and minds of the populace, but coercing the behavior you seek.

communicate with one another and thus organize effectively. While police control's impact is limited to those who would engage in violence, selective control makes the costs for activists of any sort particularly high.¹⁷⁴

The second impact of selective and police control is that they end the ethnic security dilemma and reduce concerns about hegemony. As long as no group can use violence without risking punishment, fears that another group will mobilize can be reduced. Thus, "defensive" measures to improve group security do not spiral out of control. For example, in Iran today Bakhtiyaris and Qashqai tribal members might worry that old feuds could reignite, but as long as both sides are confident that the government will punish those who break the peace, neither needs to arm for self defense. Therefore, neither group will arm and alarm its neighbors. Perhaps even more importantly, ethnic conflict within the group--between rival tribes, clans, or sects, for example--now also does not assume a violent form. Violence is no longer employed as these smaller groups strive for power and pre-eminence.

Selective control has a particularly strong impact on political elites. It is elite decisions and actions that often turn volatile situations into violent confrontations.¹⁷⁵ By changing the concerns of elites, the government can often prevent them from organizing despite widespread popular disgruntlement.

Massive control, however, does not end the ethnic security dilemma or reduce concerns about hegemony. Massive control creates a security worry from the government itself. Only the

¹⁷⁴ Thus, collective actions become insurmountable when control is high. Organizations and close-knit communities, however, can reward resisters and punish collaborators, making collective action easier. See Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," pp. 146-148.

¹⁷⁵ Brown, "Introduction," *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 23.

target of fear changes. The use of massive control often leads groups to conclude that the government seeks to subordinate their culture and destroy their way of life.

Divide-and-rule policies reduce security fears. The logic is simple: if only part of a group is fighting, the group as a whole is weaker. Moreover, divide-and-rule tactics can change the nature of the security dilemma. Who fears whom can be affected by divide-and-rule tactics as potential friends become enemies and vice-versa.

Solving the security dilemma can lead to tremendous social change. Because control makes inter-group and intra-group violence unlikely, individuals can disarm and change their way of life (such as emigrating to work abroad or settling down to farm) without fear of depriving their tribe or sect of needed manpower or exposing themselves as individuals to the depredations of rival groups.

Sedentarization and migration in turn produce dramatic changes in the social structure over time. Sedentarization gives rise to new rituals, new forms of status, and new leaders.¹⁷⁶ For example, sedentarization among the Baluch people of eastern Iran reduced their glorification of the warrior, decreased the importance of lineage solidarity, and lessened their insular orientation.¹⁷⁷ A sedentary life also decreases corporate identity. Although tribes and ethnic groups may war as unified bodies, when they farm smaller units become more prominent.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 32.

¹⁷⁷ Philip Salzman, "Processes of Sedentarization Among the Nomads of Baluchistan," in *When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization As Adaptation and Response*, Philip Salzman, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 108.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Montagne, *The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organization* (London: Frank Cass, 1931), p. 36.

Moreover, when a tribe settles down the interest of the landlord and the peasants often diverge sharply, thus breaking up older bonds.

Like sedentarization, emigration weakens collective action capabilities. Even voluntary emigration causes a collective action problem for dissidents since "voice" (i.e. protest) is less likely if "exit" is an option and if the constant movement of peoples interferes with their organization.¹⁷⁹ The many Berbers who left their traditional homes to greener pastures elsewhere in Morocco and Europe might otherwise have pressed the government for a greater share of resources or fought with other groups for the same reason.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, the Bakhtiyari and Kurds who left their home areas no longer will add to the tribe's corporate strength and identity.

Selective and massive control, unlike police control, interfere with ethnic organization in general, including attempts to pursue peaceful change. Police control would not stop an ethnic group from using an economic boycott or forming a political party to oppose the government, but selective and massive control would make such attempts less effective as it would interfere with

¹⁷⁹ For the impact of emigration, I am using the framework of Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981 (1970)), where exit is an option to voice. When exit is unavailable, voice is the only reaction. (p. 33). However, too rapid an exit paralyzes the chances of voice producing reform. (p. 51.). For example, efforts to foment unrest against Castro probably were weakened by the mass exodus of the Cuban middle class to the United States after the revolution.

¹⁸⁰ Emigration and sedentarization may also produce subtle long-term changes in identity. Dispersing a people may result in a change in identity as social institutions and ethnic enclaves are broken up. Geography often shapes social and economic organization--it is hard to maintain a transhumant existence in a city--and a new location may give rise to new elites and new rhythms of daily life. The ideal mate now no longer is defined by his ability to feud but rather his ability to gain status or money from ties to the government or overseas job. See John Waterbury, "Tribalism, Trade, and Politics" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers* (London: Duckworth and Co., 1972), p. 237 for an example of such a change.

group organization and, at times, outlaw attempts at peaceful opposition. Selective and massive control may also encourage political alignments based on factors other than ethnicity; if ethnicity is not an option for dividing up patronage and power, individuals may find another principle for forming factions.¹⁸¹

Selective and massive control, however, can create status concerns on the part of the repressed group. When a group's organizations are weakened, or when group members are attacked, a group is naturally concerned for its status in society. This is particularly true when one ethnic group is singled out by the government or if the control comes at the hand of a rival group.

A high level of control is necessary, however, to ensure the position of hegemonic groups. Because groups in general will seek at least equal status and security, efforts to make one group dominant will set off these fears, creating the need for a higher level of force to prevent violence.

Predictions

Governments that use control strategies believe the explanation for lasting ethnic peace is due to the government's ability to repress ethnic group members and thus deter group members from turning to violence. To the extent that this is the case, we should be able to infer predictions regarding the relationship between control and peace. That is to say, if peace occurs it should do so because of the impact of control along specific areas rather than just coincide with

¹⁸¹ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 599 notes that by promoting nonethnic cleavages ethnic conflict can be reduced.

the adaptation of the policy by the government.

Predictions: General Form

1. The more control discourages ethnic organization that could be violent, the less likely ethnic violence is to recur. When a group is less organized, it should be less able to carry out violence effectively. With regard to divide-and-rule, the proliferation of identities should interfere with attempts to mobilize the entire group.

2. If the government can prevent ethnic violence from occurring on a small scale, this should reduce the ethnic security dilemma and prevent hegemonic groups from provoking others. Public attitudes should reflect the importance of such security. When one group dominates the government, however, that group should be less likely to take up arms for self-defense, but its rivals should be more likely to do so as their security and status might be jeopardized.

3. When elites are discouraged from organizing, conflict is less likely even if the elites' followers favor conflict. Interviews and memoirs of elites should reflect that control influenced their decision to seek peaceful solutions.

4. When political elites are stronger and more identifiable, policies to repress them will meet with greater success as it will enable them to control their followers without fear of rival elites taking their places. If rival elites can easily take the place of current elites, control must be wider in scale and thus risks creating a security dilemma between the government and the ethnic group in question (see prediction number five).

5. Massive violence is likely to fail in the long-term because it will create a security dilemma between the government and the ethnic group in question.

The Importance of Outside Support

Outside support can limit the effectiveness of control. Outside powers or peoples may give resisters a haven or provide them with arms, training, or other support.¹⁸² As a result, the police and the army may not be able to prevent ethnic groups from warring against one another as they do not have a monopoly on violence. Furthermore, the mere existence of outside powers bent on encouraging ethnic violence will make the security dilemma particularly hard to extinguish. Thus, the above predictions are less likely to hold if and when outside governments support ethnic political activity.

Family Two: Accommodation

Interfering with ethnic organization through the use of control is not the only way to prevent ethnic violence. An alternative is to prevent a group from seeking to organize in the first place by satisfying its goals. Such attempts to "accommodate" group interests are the second family of strategies this dissertation examines.

Accommodation is frequently cited as the source of several ethnic relations successes. Michael Brown, for example, notes that ethnic reconciliation frequently involves an overarching political and legal framework involving more local autonomy and more explicit minority rights.¹⁸³ Arend Lijphart attributes ethnic peace in the Netherlands and Switzerland to

¹⁸² Gurr and Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, p. 85. As Horowitz notes, whether a secessionist movement forms is a domestic question; whether it succeeds is an international one. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 230.

¹⁸³ Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, p. 13.

consociational democracy, a form of accommodation that involves devolving power to local communities and cooperation among the communities' elites in decisionmaking.¹⁸⁴ Ladun Anise notes that peaceful national integration in West Africa is dependent upon the institutional incorporation of distributive justice, for both political and economic resources.¹⁸⁵ Richard Sterling contends that "Only a policy that promotes equality in politics and development opportunity for all ethnic groups can avoid the internal dimensions that must lead to separatist activity and foreign intervention."¹⁸⁶

Accommodation achieves this success by quelling fears among both minorities and the majority group that they will not receive their fair share of power. Like control, accommodation affects individual incentives to organize along ethnic lines. However, rather than make the price of organizing higher as control does, accommodation reduces the rewards for organizing. By giving groups a large piece of the pie to begin with, they have less to gain by using violence to strive for more.

There are a tremendous variety of ways to accommodate a group. Three common strategies include "devolving" power to local government, allowing groups to "participate" in the selection of decisionmakers, and "co-opting" a group's elite with status and wealth. I detail each

¹⁸⁴ Even Lebanon, despite having fallen into a bloody civil war, has been cited as a consociational success for the 30 years before 1975. See Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 149.

¹⁸⁵ Ladun Anise, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa: Some Theoretical Considerations," in Raymond Hall, ed., *Ethnic Autonomy: comparative dynamics, the Americas, Europe, and the developing world* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 340.

¹⁸⁶ Richard W. Sterling, "Ethnic Separatism in the International System," in *Ethnic Autonomy*, p. 425.

strategy below.

Strategy IIA: Devolution

Devolution involves the handing down of power and responsibility to the ethnic group in question. Powers can range from control over a school's curriculum to power over local economic and political decisionmaking. The Swiss system, which guarantees certain powers to local cantons, relies heavily on devolution to ensure that each ethnic group is well-represented in decisionmaking.

Iraq provides an example of attempted devolution in the Middle East. In 1974, after over a decade of warfare, the Iraqi regime began a policy of accommodating its Kurdish minority with grants of political power and development spending in an attempt to quell the Kurdish rebellion. The goal of this policy was to assure the Kurds that their interests were represented. The plan stated that Kurdistan would be autonomous and that the region would be governed by an elected legislative council, whose members would be Kurds. A massive campaign of economic support was to be given in the region for schools, industrial projects, and infrastructure.¹⁸⁷

The Iraqi effort to devolve power to its Kurdish minority was only the latest attempt in the Middle East to manage ethnic conflict by giving a group limited grants of power. Most Middle Eastern countries have attempted some form of devolution this century. Lebanon used an ambitious form of power-sharing among its many peoples from 1943 to 1975. Under colonial rule, Syria, Morocco, Palestine, and Iraq all devolved power to their minorities by giving them at

¹⁸⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 234-35. These measures, perhaps because they were accompanied by bloody deportations and imprisonments, failed to end Kurdish opposition, which flared up again in March 1976.

least limited local autonomy. Before the colonial powers of the West came to the region, the Ottoman rulers and their local proxies often granted tribes *de facto* autonomy due to their inability to exercise strong control over their activities. The motives of all these governments varied considerably, but the intention of the policy was the same: appeasing an ethnic group by giving it a share of power.

Forms of Devolution¹⁸⁸

Devolution takes three general forms: political, economic, or symbolic.¹⁸⁹ Needless to say, these forms can be, and usually are, combined into one policy. I present them as distinct categories in order to better illustrate the potential range of devolution.

Political devolution ensures that a group's interests are represented in decision-making. As Robert Dahl notes, minorities are likely to resist strict majority rule and majority decisions.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ One type of devolution--autonomy--has attracted considerable attention among scholars. Autonomy is a maximal form of accommodation, devolving almost total control over taxes, police, and schools to local government or to local leaders. Autonomy has been used throughout the world. Ted Gurr notes several cases of successful autonomy: the Basques in Spain, the Miskitos in Nicaragua, the Nagas and Tripuras in India, and the Chittagong Hills peoples in Bangladesh. See Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 301. In the Middle East, autonomy as a form of ethnic regulation was particularly common in the pre-colonial era, when the central government or Ottoman rulers could command only the nominal allegiance of their far away and well-armed subjects. For example, under the Qajar Shahs at the turn of the century, many Iranian tribal groups such as the Bakhtiyaris and Qashqais had such a high degree of local autonomy that British representatives seeking oil concessions in the area often dealt directly with tribal leaders, bypassing the central government in Tehran almost entirely. Similarly, in pre-colonial Morocco much of the country never was under more than the most nominal sovereignty of the Sultan.

¹⁸⁹ Symbolic concerns includes issues of cultural preservation, such as the preservation and glorification of one's language, distinctive dress, or other non-material issues.

¹⁹⁰ Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 161.

In ethnically-divided societies, a "winner-take-all" system threatens the status of minorities who have no hope of gaining an electoral majority, relegating them to the fate of second class citizens.¹⁹¹ Political devolution tries to quiet this fear by ensuring these groups a voice in decision-making. Political devolution often requires bureaucracies to incorporate minority members into the decisionmaking or else devolves power from the central government to the ethnic group.

Devolution may also include symbolic benefits to reassure an ethnic group that the government is committed to respecting and preserving its culture. Symbolic forms of devolution include the official recognition of an ethnic group's language, keeping local laws and customs intact, and providing spheres where the state does not interfere such as allowing distinctive dress at home or in public spaces. For example, under President Qasim in 1958 the Iraqi Constitution described Kurds and Arabs as partners and guaranteed the rights of each group. Symbolic devolution is often used to reassure majorities as well as minorities, particularly when minorities have a dominant social position.

When devolution takes an economic form, a certain portion of the country's wealth--or opportunities to create wealth--are allotted to the ethnic group.¹⁹² Economic devolution includes outright cash grants, business preferences in the form of license quotas, or public works that

¹⁹¹ Several scholars have noted that in polarized societies, majority-rule elections merely become a census whereby the most numerous ethnic group invariably wins, thus perverting the intent of democracy. See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 291-333 and Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Richard D. Heffner, ed. (New York: Penguin Press, 1984 (1956)), pp. 113-115 for a discussion of these problems.

¹⁹² David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, p. 56.

disproportionately benefit one group. In Lebanon until 1975, for example, communities were represented in public sector employment according to a formula based on the 1932 census.¹⁹³

Education is a particularly important issue in devolution. Groups and the government often consider education the key to economic success and political advancement. Thus, all ethnic groups, including majority ones, will seek to ensure access to or preferential treatment in education. Furthermore, education is often the key to preserving or strengthening symbolic benefits. Language, history, and a shared perspective can be transmitted through education, making it an important source of change throughout the developing world.¹⁹⁴ Thus education can strengthen traditional identities or weaken it by emphasizing alternative identities.

Any of the above forms of devolution can be implemented without specific laws. In the Southern Philippines, for example, Muslims are preferred for bank loans, scholarships, government employment, and university admissions, all without formal acknowledgement.¹⁹⁵ The much-famed National Pact of Lebanon--a 1943 agreement that allocated Lebanon's political spoils according to the 1932 census and ensured the rights of the major communities--was unwritten. Traditional monarchs such as the Qajar Shahs of Iran or Morocco's King Hassan II have systematically granted communities special favors without any formal agreement.

¹⁹³ Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 372.

¹⁹⁴ For an insightful survey of education and cultural promulgation in the Middle East, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Influence on Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness* (MIT: unpublished dissertation, 1996). For a general discussion of how the spread of literacy and education affect society, see *Education and Political Development*, James Coleman, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Carlo M. Cipolla, *Literacy and Development in the West* (Penguin Books, 1969).

¹⁹⁵ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 655.

Strategy IIB: Participation

Canada, Spain, and England all are home to highly-political ethnic movements. Many Quebecois, Basques, Catalans, and Scots seek a greater share of government resources, more autonomy, and assurances that their distinct cultures will flourish. Their ambitions in many ways appear similar to those of Kurds, Palestinian Arabs, and other minorities in the Middle East. Yet in general violence by ethnic groups in Western democracies is extremely rare despite the contentious nature of political debates in these countries.¹⁹⁶ The success of many Western liberal democracies in managing peaceful ethnic relations has led scholars to examine whether allowing groups to participate in the political system leads them to eschew violence in favor of democratic change.

Despite the apparent promise of participatory systems in maintaining ethnic peace in the West, in general democracy is rare in divided societies.¹⁹⁷ Both James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville, in their analyses of American democracy, note a problem faced by minorities: the "tyranny of the majority."¹⁹⁸ Such a tyranny can exist in polarized societies when groups vote only for individuals of their ethnic group. Thus democratic elections become simply another means of excluding minorities from power. Furthermore, as several scholars have noted, a large amount of subcultural pluralism--i.e. the presence of many minorities with different ways of life

¹⁹⁶ Although the Basque separatist movement ETA has received considerable attention for its violent activity, the number of deaths it is responsible for each year falls well below the threshold of 50 that I have established for my work. The Catalans, Quebecois, and Scots all have strong cultural movements that have gained varying degrees of autonomy without violence.

¹⁹⁷ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 681.

¹⁹⁸ James Madison, "Number 10," in *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Signet, 1961), pp. 77-84.

and fundamental beliefs--can lead participatory systems to dissolve into a civil war or an authoritarian regime.¹⁹⁹ Attempts to build participatory systems have foundered on a lack of trust among communities, a tendency of ethnic groups to adopt maximal positions vis-a-vis one another, and weak political institutions.

Despite these problems, many scholars remain optimistic about the potential of democracy in resolving ethnic conflict. As Sammy Smooha and Theodore Hanf argue:

Liberal democracy fosters civility, a common domain of values, institutions, and identity, at the expense of communalism. It equates nationalism with citizenship and the state with civil society. All citizens, irrespective of their national or ethnic origin, are considered equal nationals.²⁰⁰

If a participatory system is as effective as these advocates claim, it is worthy of study even if the conditions necessary for it to function are rare in highly-divided societies.

A policy of participation gives ethnic group members the opportunity to join in the selection of the political elite, the attainment of economic success, or the capture of status positions without limitations stemming from their ethnic background. Participation defuses ethnic movements driven by a hope for equality.²⁰¹ Participation, unlike devolution, gives a group access to the entire spectrum of a state's decision-making apparatus, but it does not ensure

¹⁹⁹ Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 254.

²⁰⁰ Smooha and Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies," p. 33.

²⁰¹ McGarry and O'Leary, "The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," p. 13. These authors see the quest for participation as a source of ethnic self-determination movements. Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff note that people resent and react against discriminatory behavior, often violently. See *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, p. 83.

that a group will control any particular part of it.²⁰² As Dahl notes, broadening participation does not necessarily make a political leadership more representative, but it is more likely to do so.²⁰³

In an ideal participatory system, individuals are free to communicate with their fellow citizens and, when the government is weighing the opinions of its people, there is no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference expressed.²⁰⁴ Using Dahl's criteria as a guide, the above ideal of participation is found in institutional guarantees to join organizations, vote in fair elections, express oneself freely, have one's leaders compete for support in elections, and have access to information.²⁰⁵ I judge the degree of participation offered by a regime by the level to which it provides complete and equal access to the above institutional guarantees.²⁰⁶

In the Middle East, only two countries qualify as having participatory systems--Israel and Turkey--and both of these countries in general have a weak participatory system for their ethnic minorities. In Israel, Palestinians living within Israel's pre-1967 borders can vote and elect

²⁰² One way of assessing distinctions among the impact of accommodation, assimilation, and participation would be a case where the group in question did not gain in status, politics, or financially (i.e. the effect really was accommodation) or join the mainstream (an assimilation effect) but nevertheless refrained from conflict.

²⁰³ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 22-23.

²⁰⁴ These characteristics are taken from Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 1-2.

²⁰⁵ These are listed in Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 3.

²⁰⁶ Again using Dahl's criteria (*Polyarchy*, p. 5), two dimensions will be examined: the degree of public contestation and the right to participate. A high degree of public contestation will provide for a variety of opinions and policy options to voters; a wide franchise will enable as many people as possible to express their preference. I will examine this access to participation on both a local and national level.

members to the Israeli Parliament, but until recently they could not realistically aspire to even approaching the summit of political power as no major Israeli political party will form a governing coalition with Palestinian elected officials.²⁰⁷ In Turkey, at times the Kurds have been allowed to participate in elections and decision-making, but certain issues, such as a high level of Kurdish autonomy, are illegal to discuss. Moreover, for both Palestinians and Kurds, their respective governments have at times placed severe limits on their ability to associate and communicate.

A problem for the strategy of participation is how to induce groups to participate in the first place. As the very act of participation can imply accepting the system's legitimacy, radicals within the group often oppose the idea of elections. And when radicals boycott elections, those who participate risk being labelled traitors. In Palestine under the British Mandate, for example, Palestinian Arabs successfully prevented the establishment of elected councils by boycotting the elections and ostracizing those who participated. Another problem is that participation requires trust among the various ethnic groups. Potential losers must be confident both that they have a chance to succeed in a future election and that the winner will not use the power gained from the election to rig the system or otherwise subordinate the loser.²⁰⁸ When ethnic tension is high, this trust is often missing.

Consociational democracy is another much-touted form of participation. Consociational

²⁰⁷ "Confronting Israel's Demons," Amos Elon, *New York Review of Books* (December 1995). Elon notes, however, that the Rabin government relied on Arab support in a *de facto* way in order to gain Parliament support for the peace plans; Peres' government is doing that today.

²⁰⁸ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 15-50.

democracies combine participation with a high level of devolution, dispersing the points of political power, lowering the stakes in any individual contest and helping each group obtain a share in the system.²⁰⁹ Arend Lijphart has identified four characteristics of consociational democracy: a grand coalition of the political leadership of all significant segments of society; a mutual veto that requires agreement among leaders; proportional representation of major groups in decisionmaking bodies and the civil service; and a high degree of subcultural autonomy.²¹⁰ Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland all are examples of consociational successes. Failures of consociationalism include Malaysia, Cyprus (from 1960 to 1963, ending in civil war), and Nigeria, which ended in military rule. In the Middle East, only Lebanon has attempted a consociational democracy.

Proportional representation is also praised as a useful tool for ethnic peace. Alicia Levine notes that a proportional representation system assures minority group influence even when the group in question is geographically dispersed, in part because a proportional representation system is more likely to produce coalitions that cut across ethnic lines.²¹¹ Frank Swaelen, the President of the Belgian Senate, noted that the British "winner take all" system would not work in Belgium, which needs consensus and input from even extreme opinions.²¹²

²⁰⁹ McGarry and O'Leary, "The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," p. 30.

²¹⁰ See Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 25-44.

²¹¹ Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," pp. 333-334.

²¹² Richard Lewis, "The Example of Belgium," Occasional Paper No. 96-01.2 (Duke Center for International Studies, April 1996), p. 17.

Strategy IIC: Co-optation

Co-optation is a strategy that takes advantage of elite influence to prevent ethnic violence. Co-optation involves buying off elites with benefits, whether in the form of wealth or power over their communities, to ensure their loyalty to the central government. There is no regime in the Middle East that does not attempt at least minimal levels of co-optation when dealing with minority ethnic groups. The presence of co-optation is indicated by attempts to identify the elite components of society and grant key members wealth, social status, or power.

In most societies, particularly those with wide disparities of wealth and power, a small segment of the population is disproportionately influential in politics. An implicit acknowledgement of the disproportionate influence of certain groups on politics is reflected in terms such as "the Establishment" in the United States, "the Muscat Mafia" to describe Oman's economic elite, and "the Sudairi seven," which refers to the influence of the children of one of Saudi King Abd al-Aziz' favorite wives. The views of these elites are crucial to political stability. Elites are likely to be knowledgeable about political life and able to influence political outcomes.²¹³ Furthermore, political elites are the ones who often trigger internal conflict.²¹⁴ If governments can win these elites to their side and prevent them from encouraging conflict, fighting may be mitigated despite widespread hostility on the part of the population at large.

Elites are particularly important in the Middle East. In part this is due to the authoritarian

²¹³ Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 131 notes this for the views of activists regarding the proper political system. In *Democracy and Its Critics*, p. 261 he notes the importance of political activists in the stability of a system.

²¹⁴ Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 571.

(both modern and traditional) nature of most Middle Eastern political systems, which restricts participation in decision-making to a chosen few. Another reason for the importance of elites is the high level of stratification of Middle Eastern societies and the limited education of many citizens. The middle class is weak in much of the Middle East.²¹⁵ This social stratification has encouraged the development of a patronage system focused on landlords or key business leaders. Limits on modern educational opportunities have allowed those with the wealth or influence to gain access to modern education to ensure their power by gaining prestigious and influential spots in the civil service and government.²¹⁶

Middle Eastern elites consist of business, military, bureaucratic, intellectual, tribal, religious, and political leaders.²¹⁷ In short, they are individuals who command disproportionate power due to their ability to convince, buy, or force others to do their bidding. Military elites have been particularly important in much of the Middle East. Israel, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan,

²¹⁵ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 51; Alan Richards and John Waterbury *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 101-101.

²¹⁶ Alan Richards and John Waterbury point out that it is important to note that the penetration of the state has dramatically changed the economy and society of the Middle East in recent years. *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 331. Thus, the identity of the elites have also changed somewhat. These authors also note that landlords control access to land, protect clients physically, provide them with agricultural inputs and credit, and help pay for marriages and funerals. The clients, in turn, fight or vote for him as needed. As the bureaucratic state has grown, the patron is increasingly likely one who can broker state resources--a license, a place in school, or a job in the civil service (p. 333).

²¹⁷ C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) identifies business, military, intellectual, political, and bureaucratic leaders as particularly important. A quick survey of Middle Eastern politics makes apparent the importance of religious and tribal leaders.

Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have all at times had military figures among their prominent leaders. In many traditional monarchies, the ruling family itself has taken on military leadership roles, in part to forestall any coup attempt. In recent years, religious figures have become more important.

Ethnic leaders form an important component of Middle Eastern elites. The violence and instability that has characterized Middle Eastern politics has reinforced the importance of ethnic groups in elite politics. Parties, unions, and other formal associations have not proven effective in protecting members from death, imprisonment, or exile during regime changes. Thus, leaders often retreat into tribes, ethnic groups, and religious sects for organizational support.²¹⁸

Once leaders are co-opted by the central government, their job and status often change dramatically. Leaders go from independent spokesmen to government functionaries. Thus, the leader becomes a force in favor of regime goals rather than that of the ethnic group. The intent is to use a group's leaders to control the group as a whole, or at least prevent it from acting against central government wishes.

Although co-optation works directly with a group's elites to satisfy their concerns, it also may please those not co-opted. The ethnic populace at large may derive reflected glory from those in elite positions, thus reducing their fears of dominance.

The reality of co-optation seldom lives up to the ideal. This shortfall is due both to the failure of the regime and resistance on the part of elites. Regimes often fail to identify potentially destabilizing elites. Examples of such lapses include the Shah's failure to co-opt large numbers of

²¹⁸ Richards and Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 331. Furthermore, families will often place offspring in several domains--business, the clergy, the military--in order to ensure that they are protected in all eventualities.

the clerical class in Iran and King Farouk's ignorance of military dissent in Egypt.

At times, regime resources are not sufficient to win the loyalty of potential elites. There are only so many senior military, civil service, or commercial positions for any society, and by giving a portion of these positions to individuals from a certain group or class the regime may alienate the group's traditional rivals or other aspirants for the same positions. This shortage has been particularly acute in recent years, as widespread education has expanded the number of potential elites throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the rising standard of living in many countries has led to an expectation of prosperity and status, making the price of buying off potential elites much higher.

Ideology and conflicting self-interest also has come into play in limiting the effectiveness of co-optation. Many individuals are considered unworthy of cooperation with the regime due to their dissenting ethnic background or radical political ideas. Pan-Arab enthusiasts in Baghdad, for example, refused to accept Iraqi Kurds into the ranks of the nation's leaders due to prejudice against their background. Moreover, many potential elites are eager to gain the plums of patronage that come with co-optation yet bear no loyalty to the regime. Thus, they remain candidates for coup-plotting and unrest.

Accommodation and the Causes of Ethnic Conflict

All three strategies of accommodation affect status concerns by ensuring that at least some portion of a group's aspirations are fulfilled. Accommodation assures groups that certain functions of government (local administration, policing, education, etc.) will be--or at least have the possibility of being--in their hands or the hands of their leaders and thus will be used to their

group's advantage.²¹⁹ By gaining economic or status positions, a group and its leaders have less to fear about losing ground to a competing minority group.²²⁰ In short, accommodation helps mitigate fears of majority rule: that a government of the majority will be for the majority only.

Accommodation's impact is particularly strong on political elites. Elites are the ones who "manage" a group's accommodation, whether it takes the form of co-optation, devolution, or participation.²²¹ Furthermore, it is usually elites who take advantage of many of the preferences granted under an accommodation system, such as political office, university education, civil service employment, or other high-end benefits.

The impact of accommodation is greater in highly-centralized states. As Loeffler notes in his piece on the Boir Ahmadi tribe in Iran, after the growth of bureaucracy:

land is contracted for cash by government, fruits get sprayed, crops fertilized, animals fed, beehives set up, carpets woven, goods sold, babies born, populations controlled, women organized, religion taught, and diseases cured--all by the intervention of the government²²²

As the state becomes a source of economic benefits and social organization, the benefits of working with it increase.

The very fact of participation affects the ethnic security dilemma even if all the groups

²¹⁹ Devolution also disperses conflict by proliferating the points of power. By scattering power among institutions or different individuals, lower level units become targets for ethnic politics. The stakes of each contest are lowered simply by having more contests to compete. See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 598. Furthermore, when groups are accommodated at the sub-ethnic level, such as the tribe or the canton, they have fewer incentives to unite and form a large ethnic group.

²²⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 599.

²²¹ Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, p. 261.

²²² R. Loeffler as quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 439.

participating do not directly control the security forces. First, groups have a means to redress grievances other than force, thus giving them the option of using ballots instead of bullets to effect change. Second, leaders have an incentive to quell violence or else they will face angry voters. As Dahl notes:

...if the freed Negroes had been allowed to participate in the system of public contestation in the South, they could not have been subjected to systematic control by coercion and terror ... It was only by excluding them forcibly from the polyarchy that the system of coercion and terror could be maintained in the South.²²³

Certain forms of accommodation are more likely to result in true powersharing in highly-divided societies. Proportional representation systems and ones with a high degree of federalism provide local ethnic groups with more control than a "winner take all" system, where a majority group can dominate the entire government.²²⁴ In theory, these mechanisms reduce incentives for conflict by giving groups and their leaders more power with respect to fundamental concerns such as education, taxation, and law and order. Moreover, they create more jobs and status positions for local officials and develop a means for minority groups to communicate with the central government.²²⁵ Proportional representation also is more likely to produce coalitions--and cross-cutting alliances--while federalism creates more intra-group competition, thus limiting their ability to organize for violence.²²⁶

Accommodation, however, often goes against the desires of hegemonic groups, thus

²²³ Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 29.

²²⁴ Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," p. 312.

²²⁵ Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," p. 331.

²²⁶ Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," pp. 332-334.

preventing it from being implemented effectively. The same blandishments used to accommodate groups--giving them wealth or status positions or ensuring them rights--are the very ones desired by the hegemonic group. In theory, it is possible for a hegemonic group to monopolize most but not all of society's resources and for other groups to accept this, but this balance is uneasy.

Predictions: General Form

1. The more accommodationist the national political system, the fewer the instances of ethnic conflict such as ethnic riots or demonstrations. If groups are indeed content due to devolution, co-optation or participation, violent political action will not be necessary.²²⁷ Groups assured their share of power and perks should be less active in promoting ethnic conflict. Increases in "the stake in the system" (i.e. the scope of participation, co-optation, or devolution) should correlate inversely with the level of conflict.²²⁸

2. Accommodation is likely to result in splits between radicals and moderates. Under a policy of accommodation, individuals have fewer incentives to fight the central government. Accommodation can divide ethnic group members with maximal demands from their less committed brethren.²²⁹

²²⁷ Violent rhetoric, however, may continue without falsifying this prediction, but it too probably should diminish. If groups are given more benefits, they should fight less, and vice-versa.

²²⁸ Spurious correlation may be likely here, however, as increases in participation often coincide with decreases in control, which may lead to increased ethnic conflict.

²²⁹ Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 302-303 notes that offers of autonomy can split a resistance and, perhaps more importantly, undercut international support for a resistance movement.

3. After accommodation sets in, groups should voice fewer concerns about status. With a basic part of their status and stake in the system ensured, group fears as to being excluded or dominated should lessen. Public opinion and discourse should reflect this.

4. Elites of former belligerent groups should note the importance of accommodation in persuading them to stop fighting. Such an attitude should be reflected in elite rhetoric, their memoirs, and in interviews.

The Importance of Outside Powers

Just as outside powers and groups can interfere with government efforts to control ethnic groups, so too can they interfere with attempts to accommodate them. Outside powers can give a government more resources in the form of financial aid or investment, thus enabling it to better accommodate groups. Interference is particularly likely if the accommodation effort involves balancing the concerns of a hegemonic group with a non-hegemonic one. The hegemonic group might see in outside powers an example of greater control and status. The minority or non-dominant group, for its part, might see the fate of other, better treated groups outside the country as a reason for them to be treated better, and thus upset the balance between hegemony and status.

Family Three: Identity Change

Ethnic identity is not written in stone. Jewish immigrants to Israel, for example,

Donald Horowitz also argues for the importance of separating moderates and radicals in "Making Moderation Pay," in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Joseph Montville, ed. (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451-476.

subordinate their ethnic differences by giving their loyalty to the Israeli nation state. Immigrants from dozens of countries, many of whom initially spoke different languages and practiced highly-different forms of religion, see themselves as part of the same "Israeli" political group rather than as Moroccan Jews, Polish Jews, or Ethiopian Jews. Governments can influence the very nature of identity by appealing to a broader identity, such as the assimilation of Jews from around the world into an Israeli identity.

Identity change strategies focus on the manipulable elements of ethnic identity. As David Laitin notes in his works on Nigeria and on the former Soviet Union, governments and ethnic elites can alter ethnic identity by providing individuals with incentives to organize along new lines. For example, Laitin notes the formation of a new, "Russian-speaking" (as opposed to Russian) identity in the Baltics composed of Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, and other minorities who have an incentive to unite to preserve their status positions against the titular inhabitants of the Baltic republics.²³⁰ Assimilation does not just affect the rules by which individuals and groups search for status, security, and resources; rather, it tries to change the identity and preferences of the players themselves. As Arline and William McCord note, "For a separatist movement to emerge, people must first be convinced that they share something in common against an enemy."²³¹

Changing a group's identity is a historically popular but understudied solution to the problem of ethnic conflict. A large number of political leaders have engaged in "nation-building"

²³⁰ See Laitin, "Identity in Formation."

²³¹ Arline McCord and William McCord, "Ethnic Autonomy: A Socio-Historical Synthesis," in *Ethnic Autonomy*, p. 427.

in an attempt to fuse formerly disparate and rival peoples into one nation complete with a shared history and language. Their goal is to create a population that perceives its interdependence and mutual identity to the point that traditional rivalries melt away or at least do not assume a violent form due to the common bond of nationality.²³²

The European experience is replete with cases of changed identities. In 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the era of the nation-state, many states that exist today were collections of dialect groups that had little in common with their neighbors. For example, France (which had a far more cohesive identity historically than many other European states) had to transform a region of French, Celtic, German, Flemish, Basque, Spanish, and Italian speakers--to say nothing of dialects--into the ethnically homogenous France of today.²³³ When Italy was unified in 1880, only a small portion of the population spoke standard Italian; as Massimo d'Azeglio famously observed: "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians."²³⁴

Such nation-building has been especially common in the Third World during the decolonization period. States existed after colonial governments relinquished power, but the peoples living in them did not always consider themselves to be one nation.²³⁵ D'Azeglio's

²³² Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 7.

²³³ See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) for a riveting account of this transformation.

²³⁴ As quoted in David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," p. 44.

²³⁵ For leading academic works on themes assimilation and nation-building, see Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*; Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds. *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Charles Tilly, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

observation could be made for much of the Middle East after decolonization, or even today.

Most governments in the Middle East are struggling to create a loyalty to the nation-state that transcends the loyalty to one's tribe, ethnic group, or religious sect. Throughout the Arab Middle East, nationalist leaders followed tried to homogenize their societies by promoting Arab history, values, and identities. Mustafa Kemal, who later took the name Ataturk ("Father of Turks"), attempted to weld the Assyrians, Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds in his new nation state by promoting Turkish identity. In Iran, Reza Shah sought to construct a new nation by assimilating Azeris, Bakhtiyaris, Kurds, Qashqai, Arabs, and other minorities into the dominant Persian identity. Israel has stressed a common language and ideology for its many Jewish immigrant groups, who might otherwise be divided by their countries of origin.²³⁶

The prospect of a unified national identity appeals to many scholars and statesmen who seek to end longstanding conflicts.²³⁷ Francis Deng, for example, cites the establishment of a

²³⁶ One major assimilationist school ties assimilation and modernization. As Karl Deutsch noted, "... it seems likely from the experience of ethnic minorities in other parts of the world that the process of partial modernization will draw many of the most gifted and energetic individuals into the cities or the growing sectors of the economy away from their former minority or tribal groups, leaving these traditional groups weaker, more stagnant, and easier to govern." See Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in *Nation-Building*, pp. 4-5, fn. 1. Although Walker Connor provides an extensive critique of this school, the general theme--that modern times spell the end for primordial attachments--remains a common folk theory. For Connor's critique, see "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?"

²³⁷ On the problems and challenges facing nations after decolonization, two essays--"After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States," and "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,"--by Clifford Geertz are particularly thought provoking. See *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 234-310. Ted Gurr notes in *Minorities at Risk* (p. 309) that assimilation is resisted by minorities who do not want it and by some majorities that fear others. He does not, however, provide a description of when such resistance is likely.

common identity as a means of ending the long conflict in the Sudan.²³⁸ Similarly, Ronald Reagan expressed his befuddlement at the conflict in Lebanon, exclaiming, "I don't understand why they don't all get along--they're all Lebanese."

Identity change policies usually involve a combination of legal changes abolishing ethnic status, regulations requiring certain types of dress, and schooling in a common language with a common curriculum. These measures are often coupled with select incentives, such as better educational or career opportunities, to encourage individuals to abandon their traditional identity in the hope of a better future.²³⁹ Furthermore, identity change policies try to foster or impose a common set of symbols and myths that will unify formerly diverse peoples. New identities are promoted by creating "catch all" parties that unite individuals of different religions, tribal groups, and languages.²⁴⁰

The occurrence of identity change might be indicated by an increase in intermarriage, a decrease in ethnic enclaves, a decline in support for ethnic political parties, a decrease in newspaper readership in the ethnic language, matriculation to the same schools, similar jobs, membership in the same multi-ethnic civic organizations, and a switch from traditional leaders to ones of the new, dominant ethnic group. Other indicators are changes in a people's national

²³⁸ See Francis Deng, *War of Visions* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995) for his presentation a new basis for common identity as one of three possible solutions to the conflict in the Sudan.

²³⁹ Laitin, in his essay "Hegemony and Religious Conflict," notes that in Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. Thus, of the multiple identities individuals had, they were given incentives to stress certain ones in order go gain British recognition and patronage.

²⁴⁰ McGarry and O'Leary, "The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict,"p. 17.

myths and history, self-identification, and local names.

A shared language is a particularly important indicator of identity change. Although a distinct language is not a necessary condition for being a separate nation, it is through language that history, national myths, and political realities are passed on for generations. Indeed, many peoples base their claim to nationhood on a distinct language.²⁴¹ If the central government can control the language used by an ethnic group, it may be able to limit or direct much of the information they receive on their identity.

Forms of Identity Change

Identity change policies integrate ethnic groups into another identity.²⁴² What this identity is, however, can vary. In general, three different types of identity can be promoted: assimilation into a majority identity; assimilation into a new, national identity; and assimilation into another minority identity. In Iran, Reza Shah tried to promote a nationalist identity by glorifying the culture and heritage of the Persian majority. In Algeria, on the other hand, the nationalist movement rallied support among both Berbers and Arabs by demanding "*l'Algerie algerienne*"--an Algerian Algeria, a term that was inclusive of both Arabs and Berbers and stressed their common values.²⁴³ Finally, in the United States, government policies have encouraged ethnic

²⁴¹ Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 395.

²⁴² The merger of groups into a new identity is often called the "Jacobin model" after the French success in transforming Celtic, German, Flemish, Basque, Spanish and Italian speakers into the ethnically homogenous France of today. Gurr describes assimilation as giving people the incentives to subordinate or abandon their communal identities. See *Minorities at Risk*, p. 308.

²⁴³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 200-201.

groups such as Mexican-Americans and Cuban-Americans to declare themselves to be part of an "Hispanic" identity. Thus, a new minority has been formed.

The type of identity groups assimilate into often is crucial to the success of assimilation. Newer identities carry less historical baggage with them, but they often have less emotional pull. Furthermore, minorities will be hesitant to assimilate into lower status ethnic groups while higher-status ethnic group members may often resist "polluting" their ranks with lower-status individuals.

Identity Change and the Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Identity change policies affect the ethnic security dilemma and hegemony concerns by altering the character of the parties involved. If assimilation succeeds, the mutual fear necessary for the security dilemma to hold is absent.²⁴⁴ For example, if the Bakhtiyari and Qashqai tribes both identify with the majority community of Persian Iran, neither group has to worry about the history of warfare that plagued these two tribes. Their common identity as Iranians will give them a common perspective as to whom is the enemy.

Identity change policies attempt to bypass group status concerns by appealing directly to the individuals who compose the group. Assimilation gives individuals an incentive to subordinate or abandon their communal identity.²⁴⁵ Assimilation allows group members to

²⁴⁴ The converse of this is that inaccurate histories and mythologies of conflict can often create a history of conflict where none existed or exacerbate perceptions of enmity. See Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War" *International Security* 18:4 (Spring 1994) for an elaboration of this argument.

²⁴⁵ Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 308.

achieve their social status goals as individuals by letting them partake in the mainstream's share of resources, education, and leading social and political positions. Assimilating individuals recognize that their best hope of advancement lies with changing their political identity to join the leading side rather than with fighting a rival. The group, however, will not have its status claims recognized as a group per se.

In general, identity change policies are particularly likely when hegemonic groups control the state. Hegemonic groups attempt to expand their power and influence by forcing others to adopt their ways. In fact, the very policies of identity change (requiring a certain language or teaching a certain history) often are the very symbols of authority that reassure a hegemonic group of its control. Like the security dilemma and status causes, conflict over hegemony is less likely when identity change succeeds simply because the very issues of domination and subordination become meaningless when groups share a common identity.

Predictions: General Form

1. Identity change occurs. In order to be declared an effective means of resolving ethnic conflict, identity change policies must actually change identities. Groups should see themselves as part of another group or identity for this prediction to hold true. The use of policies to change identities should precede and correlate with the adoption of another identity.

2. Identity change, when successfully implemented, should interfere with ethnic organization. Interviews and survey data should suggest that groups assimilating do not consider themselves as part of one group with regard to political action. As a distinct national myth is adopted, a new language spoken, or a distinct religion practiced, rallying along traditional lines is

harder. Maintaining an image of a rival group as an enemy is more difficult if one is slowly adopting the customs, language, and indeed name of that rival group. Those assimilating should not be hostile to this ethnic group, and even those not assimilating might be more sympathetic towards their formal rivals as their ethnic brethren slowly join their rivals.

Outside Powers and Identity Change

Outside powers can act as the guardian of a minority or non-dominant group's identity. This is particularly likely when the non-dominant group has cultural ties to outside groups. In the Israeli Arab's case, for example, preventing them from learning about Arab history or literature proved difficult as a vast canon of information was readily available outside Israel's borders. Outside powers can help preserve an identity deliberately, by fostering a group's traditional culture and way of life. Such preservation can also happen by accident, however, whenever an outside power allows the traditional language and culture to flourish.

Family Four: Mediation and Ethnic Peace

The success of the Palestinian-Israeli talks regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip surprised many observers. Doubters have long noted that neither party trusts the other enough for any assurances to have meaning. Yet today former enemies appear to be partners against extremists of all sorts. In El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua mediation has also played a role in ending civil conflicts.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶ Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 342.

Such cooperation took many years to build. It developed in private gatherings where Israelis and Palestinians have come together on a one-to one basis. The good offices of third parties such as the United States further strengthened it. Finally, the accords themselves--which called for tit-for-tat concessions (e.g. an Israeli pullout from Jericho if Palestinian violence was under control)--helped foster mutual confidence.

Mediation theory proposes an interesting possibility for the long-term resolution of ethnic conflict: The negotiation process itself, rather than the details of the settlement, is what leads to a lasting peace. The process serves four purposes: it allows groups to make difficult concessions, it dispels misconceptions about a rival group and its intentions, it builds trust among the individuals involved, and it minimizes the possibility that groups will not fulfill their agreements.

The mediation family offers three strategies to examine: "track one" (formal talks where a third party acts as an honest broker), "track two" (informal gatherings where trial balloons may be floated and prejudices overcome), and "confidence building" (a form of implementation involving alternating reciprocal concessions that tries to minimize the chances of defection). Each is detailed below.

Strategy IVA: Track One Diplomacy

The first type of mediation, which I will call "Track one" diplomacy, refers to inter-group contact on an official level with a third party present.²⁴⁷ The Camp David accords are a classic

²⁴⁷ As Stephen Stedman notes, "The ability of a would-be mediator is an independent variable that affects the success or failure of negotiation." See *Peacemaking in Civil Wars*, p. 24. Herbert Kelman, on the other hand, notes the dangers of an active mediator. Kelman argues that the third

example of such a negotiation on an interstate level.

I.W. Zartman and Saadia Touval note three roles a third party mediator can play: communicating the parties' positions to each other; formulating innovative solutions to the conflict; or manipulating either or both sides' preferences with threats or side payments.²⁴⁸ A fourth role is that a mediator may solve conflict by allowing both groups to make concessions more easily. Groups can use the sponsor to make face-saving concessions that would be domestically unpalatable if made to the rival ethnic group. Sponsors also provide a neutral place to meet and allow talking at a distance.²⁴⁹

Unlike the other strategies I discuss, track one diplomacy does not directly affect security dilemma, hegemonic, or status concerns. Rather, it stresses that solutions to overcome problems require the good offices of third parties.

Strategy IVB: Track Two Diplomacy

"Track two" diplomacy refers to unofficial exchanges between groups. The Oslo accords

party role is not to propose or impose solutions, but rather to encourage a process of negotiations and joint problem solving to evolve. The third party should play an indirect role: it should ensure confidentiality; point to convergences and divergences between parties; and identify how the participants reflect the community as a whole. If the solution arises out of the parties themselves, it is more likely to serve their fundamental needs. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," in *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 65, 78, and 85.

²⁴⁸ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics," *Journal of Social Issues* 41:2, 1985, pp. 39-41.

²⁴⁹ The mediator's actions, however, are conditioned by the mediator's own interests, which go far beyond a disinterested desire to end the conflict.

between the Israelis and Palestinians, the 1946-1947 meetings between Jewish leaders and King Abdullah of Jordan, and the Kilometer 101 talks between Israel and Egypt all provided the parties involved a chance to gauge the others' reactions to various proposals in an atmosphere conducive to imaginative solutions.²⁵⁰ Only when solutions were hammered out in these informal settings were more formal negotiations initiated.

Track two negotiations allow group leaders to test the waters and learn more about the other group's goals. As Herbert Kelman argues, the binding nature of official negotiations often makes it harder for parties to discover and explore each other's basic concerns, priorities, and limits.²⁵¹ Since the negotiations are not official, groups will be more willing to try innovative solutions. Thus, it improves the chances of satisfying peace by allowing groups to float trial balloons and otherwise go "off the record" to propose imaginative solutions.

Furthermore, such negotiations allow participants to build trust. Often it is the private talks that allow groups to penetrate the other's perspective, a key to success.²⁵² Indeed, Kelman argues that the prenegotiation process becomes one of "interactive problem solving," the goal of which is to change participants' perspectives toward one another and the conflict and to transfer these changes to the policy process.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ For descriptions of the Kilometer 101 talks and the Jewish-Abdullah talks see William Quandt, *Peace Process* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1988).

²⁵¹ Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," p. 66.

²⁵² Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," p. 75.

²⁵³ Herbert C. Kelman, "A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace," *Perspectives on Behavioral Science*, Richard Jessor, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp.

Track two "Process" solutions work by changing individuals. As Kelman claims, "Much of what happens in diplomacy takes place at an interpersonal level--whether in the meetings of ambassadors with governments to which they are accredited, or in negotiating sessions, or at summit conferences."²⁵⁴ By sharing perspectives in the negotiation process, each participant becomes sensitized to the other's historical preoccupations, areas of vulnerability, and cultural expectations.²⁵⁵ The mediation process helps all individuals to better understand one another's motives and interests and to curtail and adjust their own. It also provides an opportunity to demonstrate good faith.²⁵⁶ These changes then spill over into group relations at large. Over time, groups view one another with less suspicion and more understanding, with lasting peace as the outcome.

Track two process solutions mitigate the security dilemma by promoting transparency, mutual understanding, and mutual reassurance. As Kelman notes, "Mutual reassurance is a central element of conflict resolution, particularly in existential conflicts where the parties see their group identity, their people's security, their very existence as a nation to be at stake."²⁵⁷ Much of the reasoning behind the security dilemma is a question of perspective. Does another group's mobilization or arming threaten my security? By promoting transparency, potential

262-263.

²⁵⁴ Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," p. 68.

²⁵⁵ Kelman, "A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace," p. 270.

²⁵⁶ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 238.

²⁵⁷ Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," p. 87.

threatening "offensive" gestures can be understood in the context of a people's security needs rather than seen as an immediate threat. Similarly, by promoting trust individuals are less likely to preemptively arm and mobilize, thus avoiding a spiral. Ideally, a mediation session will lead both parties to moderate their perceptions of the other.²⁵⁸

Strategy IVC: Confidence Building

The third type of negotiation--what I will call "confidence building"--involves reciprocal concessions among ethnic groups when they implement an accord. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians are an excellent example of this approach. Trust is built by making each concession conditional on fulfillment of the previous concession. For example, Israel did not allow self-government in Jericho unless the Palestinian leadership ensures peace in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian leadership, in turn, only agreed to ensure peace in Gaza if Israeli soldiers left. This back-and-forth process reduces fears of cheating on both sides. A detailed agreement can reduce both parties' fear that the other side will renege or exploit any peace.²⁵⁹

Confidence building measures affect initial security dilemma concerns. By using a back-and-forth process, groups can disarm when, and only when, they are confident that their former opponents will not attack them. A high level of transparency can reduce threat perceptions.²⁶⁰ Like "track one" diplomacy, confidence building measures also improve the chances that any

²⁵⁸ Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," pp 354-360.

²⁵⁹ Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," p. 354.

²⁶⁰ Joanna Spear, "Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, p. 403.

successful accord will be implemented properly.

Limited Applicability?

Mediation is almost nonexistent if the solution to a conflict is imposed rather than cooperative. However, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts, like most civil wars, end in victory by one side, not a negotiated settlement. Only 20 percent of civil wars reached successful settlement at the bargaining table between 1940 and 1990.²⁶¹ In general, domestic entities almost always fought on and rejected negotiation of the conflict itself.²⁶²

Scholars in the "mediation" school are aware of this limitation. Zartman accepts this implicitly in his definition of negotiation, which states that both parties must have power over the other.²⁶³ Similarly, Kelman notes that his "interactive problem solving" approach works best in long-standing conflicts where both parties have similar interests but they seem unable to enter

²⁶¹ Walter, *The Resolution of Civil Wars*. Walter is taking her data primarily from the Singer and Small data set, which does not code for smaller ethnic conflicts, the vast majority of which are not resolved through negotiation. Stedman, in *Peacemaking in Civil Wars* notes that from 1900 to 1980, 85 percent of civil wars were terminated with one side winning (pp. 4-9).

²⁶² Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," notes that civil wars are more difficult to negotiate an end to than interstate conflict for four reasons: 1. they require at least one party to disarm, thus creating a potential security dilemma and window of vulnerability for that party; 2. civil wars are often "total wars" where one side seeks the other's elimination; 3. leaders of factions often seek complete victories and are not willing to compromise; and 4. the rhetoric of total war increases both sides' risks and fears, leading to a confusion about an opponent's aims (p. 343).

²⁶³ I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," in *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications*, I. William Zartman, ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 70.

into negotiations. In other words, realities have changed but psychological obstacles have not.²⁶⁴

Thus, unless both groups agree on common interests, this school may not be relevant.

For several strategies of mediation, however, this limitation is less daunting than it seems for testing purposes. Many Middle Eastern conflicts had periods where they were negotiated. In the Middle East colonial powers often encouraged ethnic groups to negotiate their differences. The Jewish-Palestinian Arab dispute was subject to elaborate negotiations until 1948; the French and British governments of Lebanon and Iraq constantly negotiated with ethnic groups; the French helped mediate disputes among ethnic groups in Syria; and various Iranian regimes at times negotiated with Kurdish groups.²⁶⁵ These cases, however, generally represent strategies one and two detailed above and do not include "confidence building."

Another limitation of this family of strategies is that it too relies on the substance of an agreement as a necessary condition for success but does not spell out what this substance is. As Kelman notes, for the conflict to be resolved in the long-term, the agreement must satisfy the basic needs of both parties.²⁶⁶ Similarly, Zartman posits the importance of a "hurting stalemate."

²⁶⁴ Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," p. 95.

²⁶⁵ For testing purposes these instances of negotiation are in many ways "easy" tests, as the number of people who were politically active often was quite limited, thus making it easier for the trust and confidence built by negotiations to spread.

²⁶⁶ Kelman, "A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace," p. 268. One key concession--not a necessary one but a suggestive one--is the recognition of the other's nationhood. Kelman notes that this concession introduces a moral commitment that backs up material concessions and provides reassurance to both parties. Recognizing nationhood falls short of recognizing the other side's right to independence, but it does suggest certain rights such as that of choosing their own representatives and at least a limited degree of self-determination. See Kelman, "Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood: How to Create Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXII/1:85 (1992), pp. 29-31.

Thus, the mediation family requires substantive conditions to apply as well as negotiations--in short, it is as much about necessary conditions for other strategies to succeed as it is a solution in and of itself.

Predictions: General Form²⁶⁷

1. Decisionmakers and other elites should cite the importance of the form of negotiation (be it Track One, Track Two, or Confidence Building) in why they do not feel the need to return to violence. We should be able to trace the changes in perspective of various elites to the time of mediation. Elites should report (in interviews, memoirs, or speeches) that important learning occurred or that suspicion was overcome during or because of the negotiations. In their memoirs, public statements, or interviews decisionmakers should cite the negotiation process as an important factor in lasting peace.

2. Imposed solutions are less stable than negotiated ones. If mediation is an importance source of peace, groups that have terms dictated to them will not gain an understanding of the other group (or vice-versa) nor will they increase their trust of the other group. Negotiated solutions, on the other hand, allow for confidence building and mutual understanding to take place.

3. The necessary but not sufficient condition prediction: other strategies, to succeed, require mediation. Mediation by itself may not result in ethnic peace, but without the various

²⁶⁷ Because of measurement difficulties, I do not explore the importance of a skilled mediator. An inexperienced or foolish mediator will not be able to point out areas of convergence and focus the talks (as Kelman would argue) or to propose solutions or induce groups to negotiation (as Stedman would argue).

types of mediation it is possible that other strategies will fail. This prediction represents a weaker version of this family, essentially arguing that mediation is necessary for long-term peace but will not, by itself, cause it.

To clarify where the above-described families and strategies fit the cases examined in this study, I again present the chart from the Introduction that notes the regimes examined in this study and the strategies they used.

Table IA: Regimes and the Strategies They Used to Manage Ethnic Relations

Country and Regime	Control				Accommodation			Identity Change			Mediation		
	Police	Selective	Massive	Divide and Rule	Participation	Co-opt	Devolve	National identity	Dominant Ethnic Group Identity	New Minority Identity	Track One	Track Two	CBM
Morocco (Sherifian)							✓				✓		
Morocco (French Protectorate)		✓		✓		✓	✓			✓	✓		
Morocco (Istiqlal)									✓				
Morocco (Current Monarchy)		✓				✓		✓					
Palestine (Mandate)	✓				✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	
Israel (Military Government)		✓		✓		✓		✓*					
Israel (Current Government)**	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓							
Syria (French)		✓		✓		✓							
Syria (Ba'ath)			✓			✓		✓					
Lebanon (Grand Compromise)						✓	✓						
Iraq (British Mandate)	✓			✓		✓	✓						
Iraq (post-war Hashemite Monarchy)		✓				✓	✓						
Iraq (Ba'ath)			✓						✓				
Iran (Pahlavi)			✓			✓			✓				

* The Israeli Military government engaged in a limited attempt to downplay the "Arab" component of Israeli Arabs' identities and tried to foster loyalty to the Israeli state.

** The level of control in the current Israeli government has gradually fallen from selective control to police control.

Countries and regimes in **bold** are ethnic relations successes. Some regimes, such as the British in Iraq and the French in Syria, achieved only limited successes. Others, such as Pahlavi Iran, achieved lasting peace between some communal groups (e.g. Persians and Bakhtiari) but not between others (e.g. Persians and Kurds).

Chapter IV: Arabs and Jews in Israel

The clash between Arabs and Jews in what was Palestine seemed inevitable. The modern, Jewish immigrants came to Palestine determined to establish a viable Jewish state, while the area's Arab natives sought to ensure their dominance. Two groups with distinct languages, cultures, institutions, and goals both sought possession of the same land. Neither was content with coexistence as equals. That these groups clashed during the period of British rule is not surprising.²⁶⁸

The real mystery is why Arabs and Jews living within the Israeli state have not clashed since Israel's founding. After the 1947-1948 wars, most Palestinian Arabs left the new state of Israel.²⁶⁹ Those who remained were hostile to, and suspected by, their Jewish neighbors.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ I do not use the terms "Palestinian Arab" and "Israeli Arab" interchangeably. The former I use when writing about the Mandate period to refer to all Arabs living within Palestine and, after the Mandate period, to refer to Arabs living outside Israel's borders but inside the former Mandate's borders (or claiming descent from this group). I use the term "Israeli Arab" to distinguish those Arabs living within Israel from their brethren across the Green Line in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Similarly, I use the term "Jewish" to describe Jewish inhabitants of the Mandate but use the term "Israeli Jews" during the statehood period. I use the term "Israeli Arab"--the most commonly used term to describe the Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948--for consistency and clarity rather than other labels such as "Palestinian Israeli," "Palestinian," or "Arab." Such a use may be objectionable to those who espouse Palestinian solidarity regardless of national boundaries, but it is useful for analytic purposes to be able to distinguish within the community.

²⁶⁹ The relative percentage of Israeli Arabs in the population has fluctuated since 1948, but in general Jewish immigration has offset the higher Arab birthrate, keeping the total percentage between 15 and 18 percent of the population. Today, most Israeli Arabs are Israeli by birth, having been born and educated in Israel.

²⁷⁰ These Arabs represent a large segment of Israel's population--today Jews are roughly 82 percent of the total population. *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993* (Jerusalem: Hemed Press,

Although Jewish authorities admitted Israeli Arabs into the same state, the two groups did not form one "Israeli" community. As Sammy Smooha and John Hofman note, "The two groups exhibit pervasive cultural differences. They differ in all basic values, such as ethnic origin, religion, language, nationality, and family structure."²⁷¹ Israeli Arabs and Jews have their own media, schools, social clubs, sports teams, and other cultural organizations. In a predominantly middle class society, Israeli Arabs are largely working class.

Assimilation is prevented by laws, by the attitudes of both communities, and by physical separation. By law, Arabs and Jews belong to separate religious communities, which have full authority over marriage, divorce, and inheritance--a derogation of power than helps ensure endogamy. Opinion polls indicate that both communities strongly reject the idea of intermarriage.²⁷² Israeli Arabs also are territorially concentrated in three areas within Israel, which has further reduced their contact with their Jewish countrymen. Roughly 65 percent of Israeli Arabs live in the Galilee, another 25 percent live in the Little Triangle (the eastern margin of the Nablus mountains, from Wadi 'Ara to Ras al-'Ayn in the south), and another 10 percent, mostly of Bedouin origin, live in the Negev.

Events outside Israel and official ideology further strain relations and divide the communities. The strong irredentism of Israel's Arab neighbors exacerbates tension between the

1993), p. 3.

²⁷¹ Sammy Smooha and John E. Hofman, "Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel," *Middle East Review* 9:2 (Winter 1976/77), p. 7.

²⁷² Smooha and Hofman, "Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel," p. 7.

communities within Israel.²⁷³ Furthermore, Israeli Jews resent the Israeli Arabs' identification with the Palestinian cause and the broader Arab world, seeing it as proof that Israeli Arabs are not loyal to the Jewish state. Many Israeli Arabs, for their part, object to Israel's *raison d'etre*--the ingathering of Jews in a Jewish state--while Israeli slogans--"redemption of the land" (*geulat haaretz*) or the "Judaization of the Galilee" (*Yehud ha-Galil*) similarly are considered exclusive by minorities.²⁷⁴

Given this level of communal division, the absence of violence following the establishment of the State of Israel is surprising. Despite Israeli fears, wars between Arab states and Israel, and uprisings among ethnic kinsmen in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli Arabs have not chosen to use violence to advance their cause. Although relations are hardly warm, they could easily be far worse.

The source of this surprising peace is the riddle this chapter explores. This chapter begins with an overview of the history leading up to the dramatic Palestinian Arab-Jewish clashes of the late 1930s. It then examines the violence of the 1930s, paying particular attention to whether the causes discussed in Chapter II are present. Following this discussion, it describes the policies used by the British mandate government and details the lessons learned from their failure to prevent ethnic violence. The chapter proceeds to explore Arab-Jewish relations in the state of Israel. It describes government policies, attitudes toward violence, and the social changes that occurred within the Israeli Arab community both during and after the period of military

²⁷³ Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 5.

²⁷⁴ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 6; Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 2.

government in Israel, which ended in 1966. It also notes the role that outside powers played in exacerbating the conflict. After each discussion of the strategies of each of the three governments--the British government, the military government, and the post-military government--it spells out what the outcomes teach us about the strategies for ending ethnic conflict outlined in Chapter III.

The Ottoman Period: a Prelude to Conflict

Palestine did not exist as an independent entity in the Ottoman Empire, and the term "Palestinian" had no meaning to the area's native inhabitants beyond an uncertain geographic descriptor in use since at least Roman times.²⁷⁵ During the Ottoman era, the territory that became Palestine was divided into two provinces (*vilayet*)--the province of Beirut, which included Acre and Nablus in Northern Palestine, and the province of Damascus, which included the rest of Palestine. In the 1880s, the Ottomans detached the central zone from the province of Damascus and made it into the autonomous district (*sanjak*) of Jerusalem, an area that at the time roughly three quarters of Palestine's population.²⁷⁶ The region's population eked out a primarily through subsistence agriculture. Cultural and political life centered on near Damascus. Indeed the area that became the Palestine Mandate was a backwater by well as by world standards.

²⁷⁵ David McDowall, *The Palestinians: The Road to Nationhood* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1993), p. 3.

²⁷⁶ The term Arab, when applied to the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine, is a generic term covering people of mixed ancestry who use Arabic as their mother tongue. Palestinian Arabs differ in their descent and culture from nomadic Arabs living east of the Jordan.

High level of autonomy

For most of their rule, the Ottomans allowed the Palestine area, and much of the Arab world, considerable autonomy. Although the Ottomans theoretically ruled Palestine, local notables--particularly landowning urban elites--dominated its political life.²⁷⁷ Notable landowning families from Damascus filled the ranks of officialdom, with their economic and political positions reinforcing each other.²⁷⁸

Clans (*hamulas*) dominated the region's social structure. These extended families helped protect the villagers from the ravages of war, bedouin raids, and blood feuds. Clans also filled important economic functions, serving as a safety net for families in lean times and as an economic unit to exploit agricultural production. Clans often owned village land rather than individual families.²⁷⁹

Religious differences divided the Palestinian community. For most of the later Ottoman period, the three districts from which Palestine was formed contained roughly 600,000 people, roughly 10 percent of whom were Christians while most of the rest were Sunni Muslims.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 1.

²⁷⁸ In the Palestine area, families from Nablus, Acre, and Jaffa filled the imperial foreign service, and the Husayni and Nashashibi clans dominated Jerusalem politics. See Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustrations of a Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 26.

²⁷⁹ Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 17.

²⁸⁰ The Christian community itself contained several large and many small sects. The largest Christian sects were the Orthodox and Greek Catholic sects, followed by the Roman Catholic sect. Also present were members of the Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, and Protestant sects.

Under the Ottomans, all Muslims regardless of ethnicity shared full rights of citizens although Turks clearly held a dominant position. The Ottomans granted non-Muslim religious communities semi-autonomous status (*millet*s) in areas such as civil law and personal status, but non-Muslim minorities often bore special tax burdens and informal limits on their rise to positions of influence.²⁸¹

Violence against religious minorities was rare in what became Palestine, particularly when compared to sectarian violence in Europe or in the neighboring area around Lebanon.²⁸² Jews living in Palestine, who numbered around 12,000 before Zionist settlers began arriving in 1882, generally lived peace with their Muslim and Christian neighbors. These Jews spoke Arabic and did not compete with Christian or Muslim merchants or landowners.²⁸³ The Christians, who increasingly tended to be concentrated in commercial families or absentee landlords, also generally lived in peace with both the government and Muslim elites.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ Ironically, the Muslim community's dominance during the Ottoman era made it less prepared for the future challenges of the Mandate. Because the Muslims never were an autonomous community under the Ottomans, they were not organized along communal lines and resented efforts to be treated as a communal group.

²⁸² ~~Bedouin raids and other sporadic violence against all settled areas--Jewish and non-Jewish--~~ were extremely common. Between 1886 and 1914, at least 8 out of the 40 Jewish colonies were attacked. Actual fatalities in this time, however, were low and Arab farms and villages also suffered from violence. See Michael Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion: The Story of a Palestinian Family in Israel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), pp. 20-21; McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 11.

²⁸³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Secretary of State for the Colonies (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, July 1937), p. 12. This commission is also known as the Peel Commission.

²⁸⁴ The Druze are a schismatic sect of Islam. They trace their origin back to the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi'Amr Allah, who pronounced himself the manifestation of divinity. See Gabriel Ben-Dor, *The Druzes in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 40. The Druze sect

Although Turkish might did little with regard to day-to-day harassment, it generally limited large-scale violence in Palestine.²⁸⁵ As the Peel Commission primly noted:

It is right to recognize also that the rule of the Turk before the War was, in the matter of law and order, extremely effective. The *Vali* in Beirut retained in his own hands the portfolio of internal security. The Courts may have been corrupt; dishonesty may have pervaded public finance; the methods employed for the prevention or detection of crime may have been antiquated and, like Turkish penology, repugnant to modern ideas; but the evildoer did not prosper. Sedition, banditry or robbery were put down with a firm hand.²⁸⁶

Despite this communal peace in Palestine, the religious communities there remained distinct and suspicious of one another. As one traveller of the time noted:

Moslem boys do not generally play with Christians and even the Christian children are divided among themselves. Those belonging to the Greek Church have their street games apart from those who belong to the Latin Church and they only unite to persecute the poor little Jews.²⁸⁷

The local Muslim population regularly subjected Jews in 19th century Palestine to oppression and extortion and at times forced them to wear distinctive dress and pay special taxes.²⁸⁸ Thus, in

also was allowed considerable autonomy by the Ottomans. Unlike Lebanese Druzes, however, Palestinian Druzes were not recognized as a formal religious community.

²⁸⁵ Ethnic violence occurred when the Ottoman's firm had was not present. Between 1831 and 1840 the Palestine area was controlled by the Egyptian government of Mohammed Ali. In 1834, when Arabs in the Palestine area rose against the forces of Egyptian leader Mohammed Ali, who sought to impose conscription on the area, peasants in Jerusalem turned upon local Jewish and Christian populations, looting and raping. See Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 8.

²⁸⁶ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 152.

²⁸⁷ M.E. Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine* (London, 1866), p. 190 as quoted in Ran Greenstein, *Genealogies of Conflict: Class, Identity and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1995), p. 77.

²⁸⁸ Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government & the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), p. 4.

summary it is fair to characterize the Palestine area under the Ottomans as home to highly-divided yet peaceful communities.

Social Changes under the Ottomans

In the late Ottoman period, three significant trends began that shaped ethnic relations in Palestine: growing regional modernization and exposure to the West, the development of Arab nationalism, and the start of Jewish immigration.

From 1839 to 1876, the Ottoman government pushed reforms to try to revive its moribund empire and stop its decline vis-a-vis its Western neighbors. The government tried to improve trade and the rule of law throughout the empire. In the 1860s, exposure to the world market increased, and Palestinian farming moved toward specialty crops.²⁸⁹ The Ottomans also tried to create a common identity based on equality before the law, removing legal restrictions on non-Muslims in their empire.²⁹⁰

Concurrent with this reform period was growing exposure to the West.²⁹¹ As Ottoman power gradually eroded, the Ottoman government accepted Western penetration of the region around greater Syria. European consuls and missionaries established themselves in the region, and Arab Christian merchants began to play the role of middlemen with Europe. By the eve of

²⁸⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 12-13.

²⁹⁰ Greenstein, *Genealogies of Conflict*, p. 73.

²⁹¹ When Palestine was briefly occupied by the Egyptian government of Mohammed Ali between 1831 and 1840, he too encouraged the introduction of European schools and culture in the Syria region. See John Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine* (London: The Cresset Press, 1946), p. 22.

World War I, shipping lines and a telegraph network connected Palestine to Europe. Leading Arab families sent their children to foreign schools, and many farmers sold their goods to European markets.²⁹² A gradual increase in urban life accompanied these social changes. Jaffa's population was 2,500 in the beginning of the 19th century; by World War I 50,000 people lived there.²⁹³

Despite this increasing exposure to the West, Palestine was hardly modern under the Ottomans. No important urban industries existed, and professional classes were small.²⁹⁴ No all-weather roads and only one rail line existed.²⁹⁵ Few Palestinians graduated from high school, and only in the late Ottoman period did missionary schools spread to offer modern education.²⁹⁶

Arab nationalism in many ways grew up in the shadow of Turkish nationalism, particularly after 1908. In general, in the 19th century few educated Arabs supported movements calling for Arab independence from the Ottoman empire. After the Young Turks took power in 1908, however, they sought to increase Turkish influence throughout the Ottoman empire and replaced many non-Turk government officials with Turks. This Turkification policy led to resentment among Arab elites. Many Arab nationalist leaders were young elites who had expected to succeed their fathers or uncles into prominent positions but were excluded in favor of

²⁹² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 25.

²⁹³ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 45.

²⁹⁴ Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, p. 59.

²⁹⁵ Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, p. 62.

²⁹⁶ Sami Khalil Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978), pp. 9-12

Turks.²⁹⁷

The first two major Zionist pushes also occurred under the Ottomans. Beginning in 1882, the First Aliyah (as the first settlement of Jewish immigrants was later known), largely failed in that it did not establish independent Jewish settlements. The settlers subsisted through donations from Jews abroad and relied on European consuls for protection. By the century's end, only 21 new Jewish settlements existed with roughly 4,500 inhabitants.²⁹⁸

The Second Aliyah, from 1904-1914, brought about more dramatic changes and had a lasting impact on Palestine. The Second Aliyah was a back-to-the-land movement, and the theme of economic autarky--"the conquest of labor"--was repeatedly pronounced.²⁹⁹ By 1914, over 80,000 Jews lived in Palestine--up from 12,000 in 1845. Furthermore, unlike the older Jewish community in Palestine, the Jewish immigrants did not seek to settle in or merge with Arab society.³⁰⁰ Many later Israeli Jewish leaders arrived in Palestine during this period.

Tension between Arabs and Jews began to rise as the settlers arrived, but relations remained non-violent. Jewish land purchases occasionally displaced Arab workers, and Jews also brought new technologies (mechanical power, a better type of plow, etc.), which gave them a competitive edge, particularly over isolated peasants who did not adopt their new techniques.³⁰¹

²⁹⁷ Philip S. Khoury, *Urban notables and Arab nationalism: The politics of Damascus, 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 69.

²⁹⁸ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 20-21.

²⁹⁹ Greenstein, *Genealogies of Conflict*, p. 43.

³⁰⁰ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 13.

³⁰¹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 22-23.

Yet despite this growing economic competition, communal relations remained peaceful if strained.

Much of this lack of violence can be attributed to the small Jewish presence in Palestine and the assured position of Muslims and Arabs in Ottoman society. Although growing Turkification was inciting Arab nationalism, the Jews were not seen as a significant threat to Arab status as they had no chance of gaining political power. Ottoman rule assured the dominance of Muslims. Competition for status and other entitlement concerns came in the form of Arab-Turk competition. The Jews were not a factor.

Case IVA: The British Mandate

Ethnic conflict between Arabs and Jews began in Palestine with the coming of the British. The British occupied the Palestine area in 1917 and were formally awarded guardianship of the region at the San Remo conference in 1920--a decision confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922. The very promise embedded in the British Mandate over Palestine--eventual self-rule--proved a challenge for peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews. For both Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers, communal conflict was as much about the shape of a post-British government as about the concerns of the day. Who would rule at the end of the Mandate? Would Jews become dominant in their new National Home, or would the Muslim Arabs retain their political and social superiority? Two hegemonic groups sought control over the state, and both rightly feared that failing to gain political power might jeopardize even basic status issues such as language and government support for their community. Over time, the sporadic violence resulting from this contest for dominance made communal security concerns a reason for fighting

as well.

The reasons behind the British entry into Palestine are entangled with the British' aims of World War I. In order to secure their control of the Suez Canal, the British drove the Ottomans out of much of the Levant region. Coinciding with this local military campaign was a broader effort to win over world Jewry to the British cause.³⁰² To this end, in 1917 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Rothchild declaring, "His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people"--a letter subsequently known as the Balfour Declaration.³⁰³ At the same time, Britain at least tacitly promised several Arab leaders that, in exchange for their cooperation against the Ottomans, the British would support Arab self-rule.³⁰⁴ Thus, British military success led to the expectation among Jews that the British government would help them create a Jewish state while Arab nationalists saw it as the first step toward Arab self-rule in the region. The British, however, believed that their promises to both groups were sufficiently ambiguous to permit them tremendous latitude.³⁰⁵

³⁰² Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), p. 9.

³⁰³ *Official Documents, Pledges, and Resolutions on Palestine* (The Palestine Arab Refugee Office: New York, 1959), p. 12. The letter also states that "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." See also the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 22.

³⁰⁴ Arab nationalists in particular claim that the "Hussein-McMahon correspondence" and British wartime propaganda implicitly made this promise. See *Official Documents, Pledges, and Resolutions on Palestine*, pp. 1-10 for a reprint of much of the correspondence and p. 12 for an example of British propaganda.

³⁰⁵ British policymakers perceived the Palestine area as an important strategic location. Possessing Palestine helped the British ensure control over the East Bank of the Suez Canal.

Under the British, relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were tense and punctuated with violence. Violence began in 1920 and continued sporadically for fifteen years. The violence culminated in 1936 with the "Arab revolt," which lasted until the eve of World War II. Initial clashes occurred because Arabs and Jews competed to be dominant, but over time the violence itself led to a spiral that was only ended after massive British military intervention and thousands of Arab deaths.

The British tried, and failed, to prevent conflict through a combination of co-optation, devolution, and police control. The British also tried and failed to establish participatory institutions and to use their good offices to mediate the conflict. Although violence broke out repeatedly, not all these policies can be declared failures. Some, particularly co-optation, proved effective in limiting conflict. In the end, however, the combined British policies failed to dissuade radicals from organizing and indeed inadvertently strengthened the radical cause. Lack of personal security, outside agitation, and the impermanent nature of the Mandate itself destroyed any hopes for a lasting peace between Jews and Arabs.

This section first describes the policies the British used to manage ethnic relations. It follows this description by cataloguing ethnic violence during the Mandate. It then explores the sources of this violence. It concludes by noting what the British experience tells us about the limits of various strategies to end ethnic violence.

After the oil fields of Persia and Iraq became increasingly important to the overall British supply, Palestine became an important regional basing and transit point, particularly after Iraq and Egypt became independent in 1932 and 1936 respectively. Finally, when Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935, the importance of Palestine as a port for the British Navy to project power in the region increased. See J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), pp. 21 and 26.

**Box IVA: British Palestine:
An Ethnic Relations Failure**

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Hegemonic
- o Status
- o Security Dilemma

Primary Policies Used:

- o Devolution
- o Co-optation
- o Police control

Secondary Policies Used:

- o Track one mediation
- o Track two mediation
- o Participation (never implemented)

Role of Outside Powers:

- o Provided military support to combatants
- o Raised aspirations of both groups
- o Interfered with British implementation

Important Intervening Variables:

- o Divisions within the Arab community
 - o Transient nature of Mandate system
-

British Policies

To manage ethnic relations, the British devolved considerable power to the Arab and Jewish communities, co-opted their leaders, and tried to guarantee minimal security. At the same time, the British tried to mediate the dispute between Arabs and Jews using their good offices to settle problems and establish participatory institutions. Although these efforts failed to prevent violence, they offer valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of various strategies.

Upon taking power, the British devolved considerable power to both the Arab and Jewish communities. The text of the Mandate itself reads almost as a manifesto of

communal power-sharing, explicitly noting that local autonomy should be encouraged whenever possible.³⁰⁶ British officials took care to consult with local leaders on almost all issues affecting their communities and used both Hebrew and Arabic as official languages. Jewish or Muslim

³⁰⁶ For the text of the Mandate, see *Official Documents, Pledges, and Resolutions on Palestine*, p. 29. Article 3 calls for encouraging local autonomy.

tribunals, not civil courts, determined cases regarding religious law and personal status.

As part of this devolution effort, the British organized institutions among the Arab Muslims as part of an effort to placate their fears that their way of life would be overwhelmed. Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, officially recognized the Muslim community as a corporate body and in December 1921 established the Supreme Muslim Council to appoint religious judges and supervise religious property and monies (the *awqaf*) without any direct British say over how these monies were spent. As another gesture of British goodwill, in 1921 Samuel appointed the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, as the head of the Supreme Moslem Council even though he had been implicated in the violence of 1920.

In addition to devolving power to local communities, the British also tried to mediate disputes between the two sides by using their good offices to bring the two communities into dialogue--an example of "track one" mediation. The intent was to increase communal understanding and help the communities work out compromises. Samuel adopted a gradualist approach, trying to keep both Arab and Jewish confidence simultaneously.³⁰⁷ After he left, British officials constantly consulted with Jewish community leaders, in London and in Palestine, as well as local Arab officials in an attempt to manage differences between the communities.

In general the British used a light hand with control even after violence flared up. After violence broke out in the early 1920s, the British built up the local police presence but did not try to target individual leaders to prevent them from organizing. For the most part, Arab spokesmen and leaders operated freely under the British. Arabic newspapers and societies flourished, and a

³⁰⁷ Neil Caplan, "The Yishuv, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Arab Question in Palestine, 1921-1925," in *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel*, Elie Kedouri and Sylvia G. Haim, eds. (Totawa: Frank Cass, 1982), p. 5.

daily paper first appeared in 1929.³⁰⁸ In part the British employed this strategy due to domestic concerns about spending too much on colonial security.³⁰⁹

The composition of the police and the military forces was intended as a sensible compromise between local authority and British control, following the British goal of ruling with the aid of the local population. Initially, when the British had trouble imposing order in the early 1920s, they created a special British gendarmerie. By 1926, however, they disbanded the gendarmerie, and 10 of the 29 British district officers serving in 1920 had been replaced by Arab and Jewish Palestinians.³¹⁰ Most of the civil police and the Trans-Jordan Frontier force were Arabs, the majority of whom were Muslims.³¹¹

When violence by Arabs broke out, Samuel tried to appease Arab concerns while improving overall security. Samuel did not harshly punish those involved in the bloody riots of 1921, and he also tried to put past violence behind him by granting amnesty to the Arabs and (fewer) Jews arrested for participating in the April 1920 violence--including suspected leaders such as Haj Amin al-Husseini and 'Aref al-'Aref. Under Samuel, the British government issued conciliatory statements saying it would protect Arab interests and spoke out against mass Jewish immigration.³¹² Samuel also noted that Israel would be a Jewish home, but that it would not be

³⁰⁸ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 58.

³⁰⁹ Correspondence with academic expert, April 1996.

³¹⁰ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 54.

³¹¹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 187.

³¹² Caplan, "The Yishuv, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Arab Question in Palestine, 1921-1925," p. 10.

as Jewish as England is English--a fine attempt to satisfy status concerns without granting either group hegemony.³¹³

The British also tried to co-opt the Arab leadership. In order to reconcile Muslims to the Mandate, the British appointed influential Muslim community leaders to positions of authority.³¹⁴

As part of the devolution policy, Arab officials coordinated local projects, mediated disputes, and served as government representatives for taxation, security, and social aid. The British made many notable family members district officers, and educated Arabs of the upper classes steadily joined the British administration.³¹⁵ Even potentially hostile leaders were co-opted. For example, despite Hajj Amin al-Husseini's history of supporting violence, the British appointed him to head the Supreme Muslim Council in the hope of gaining control over him.³¹⁶ Similarly, the Arab nationalist leader 'Aref al-'Aref became a government District Officer.³¹⁷

Co-optation was a logical strategy given the nature of Arab society in Palestine. A handful of individuals from the economic and social elite of Arab society dominated the Arab community.³¹⁸ Furthermore, for the technical aid and economic development necessary to resist

³¹³ Caplan, "The Yishuv, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Arab Question in Palestine," p. 22.

³¹⁴ Ylana N. Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 49.

³¹⁵ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 125; Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 29.

³¹⁶ Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, p. 38.

³¹⁷ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 93.

³¹⁸ An indication of the narrow nature of the Arab leadership is in the membership of the Arab Higher Committee, the coordinating body of the 1936-1939 Arab revolt. Of the 32 committee members, all but four were drawn from the ranks of the upper class, and most of these lived in cities. The peasant class--the vast majority of the population--was not represented in the

Jewish competition, the community needed British government help. This help, however, came at the price of loyalty to traditional elites, through whom the British ruled.³¹⁹ When group demands conflicted, the British tried to balance the needs of the two communities. As the Peel Commission, which reviewed the situation in Palestine for the British government in the 1930s, noted:

We doubt, indeed, if anywhere else the principle of impartiality between different sections of a community has been so strictly applied. The Government of Palestine might also be described as government by arithmetic. And the worst of it is that the more strictly and widely it operates, the more it nourishes the spirit of antagonism between the races.³²⁰

For example, when a dispute rose over whether to put "Eretz Israel" or "Palestina" on the local stamp, the British proposed putting on both--an answer that satisfied neither community.³²¹

When hiring for the civil service, the British government tried to keep Jewish and Arab employment in accordance with their respective populations.³²² The British gave Jews public work contracts in Jewish areas and Arabs contracts in Arab areas.

A good measure of the fairness of the British balancing act is the complaints it drew from both sides. Jews protested strongly against British efforts to limit Jewish immigration, while

Committee at all. Furthermore, within the elite a few great families dominated politics. The al-Husseini family was pre-eminent, and their lesser rival was the Nashashibi clan; 25 out of 32 Arab Higher Committee members came from these two groups. See Taysir N. Nashif, *The Palestine Arab and Jewish Political Leaderships: A Comparative Study* (New York: Asia Publishing House, Inc., 1979), pp. 25-54.

³¹⁹ Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948*, p. xi.

³²⁰ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 139

³²¹ Greenstein, *Genealogies of Conflict*, p. 210.

³²² Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 168.

Arabs complained that Jews were flooding the country.³²³ Similarly, Arabs protested against land transfers to Jews, while Zionist organizations complained that the British impeded their efforts to gain land. Rather than gain goodwill for their even-handedness, British mediation efforts were perceived as vacillation and heightened both Jewish and Arab apprehension.³²⁴

Samuel also tried without success to establish participatory institutions to unite the two communities also failed. In the early 1920s, Samuel tried to establish a Legislative Council that would oversee local decisions. The Council, which was to have had a Muslim and Arab plurality but a large enough British presence to prevent it from taking anti-Jewish measures, never came into being.³²⁵ The Palestine Arab executive boycotted the elections and denounced those who participated as traitors. The great majority of Arabs refused to vote.³²⁶ The Arabs wanted hegemony, not a solution that gave both communities an equal say in decisionmaking. Thus, efforts to legitimate government actions through participation failed as those who served as local representatives were painted as British dupes and not respected in their communities. The British reduced incentives to participate further by working with traditional leaders who boycotted the elections.

In general, the British continued trying to use co-optation, devolution, and police control

³²³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission)*, p. 367.

³²⁴ McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 18.

³²⁵ Caplan, "The Yishuv, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Arab Question in Palestine" p. 33. The initial membership was to consist of 10 government officials, 8 Muslim Arabs, 2 Christian Arabs, and 2 Jews, with the High Commissioner presiding over the body.

³²⁶ *Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission)*, p. 56; of the 1397 votes cast, 1172 were cast by Jews. See Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 124.

after Samuel left Palestine. Before the massive violence of the Arab revolt, the British did not substantially increase their police or military presence in Palestine. Similarly, even as tension picked up in the 1930s, the British tried to work through community leaders and community institutions to solve problems rather than take direct control. In an attempt to placate leaders, the government increased the number of patronage positions by appointing many new district officers and other government officials to quiet discontent, particularly among educated Muslims.³²⁷

As violence increased in the 1930s, officials from the two communities met privately in an attempt to prevent or limit violence--an instance of Track Two negotiation. Zionist leaders met with notables from the Arab community, ranging from nationalist figures to religious leaders. The British tried to encourage these meetings in the hopes of defusing tension.

In 1935, the British again tried to form a Legislative Council but this time the Zionists opposed it. The demographic balance had changed to the point that Jews in their hope for hegemony now rejected a system that would freeze the status quo. The British parliament, under pressure from Zionist organizations, criticized the Council, which led to the proposal being quashed. The Zionists opposed the Council because they saw it as a vehicle for Arab dominance since the Arabs outnumbered the Jews--a view that was correct in that Arabs supported the Council primarily because they believed they could use it to impose their wishes on the Jewish minority.³²⁸

³²⁷ Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, p. 53. Miller notes that although these figures often were younger, they were backed by the elders of an important clan (p. 58).

³²⁸ Michael J. Cohen, "Secret Diplomacy and Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-39", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 8 (1977), p. 380.

Impact of British Policies

Devolution policies weakened Britain's hold on Palestine. Both the Jews and the Arabs exploited British tolerance of local organizations to build their own institutions independent of the Mandate authority. Zionists used their control over Jewish education to produce a cadre of nationalistic youth who fervently embraced Zionism.³²⁹ Moreover, the British worked directly with groups such as the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, whose goals were tied to the creation of a Jewish state.

Although the Arabs did not organize as effectively as the Jews, large numbers of Arab organizations did develop during the Mandate. Arabs founded a wide number of organizations ranging from scout troops to political parties that were dedicated to fighting Zionism. The Mufti used the Supreme Moslem Council to build a political machine, influencing the hiring of a wide variety of religious and judicial figures.³³⁰ The Arab press remained independent of the government and repeatedly printed inflammatory articles claiming that the government was deliberately trying to flood the country with Jews.³³¹ Arab education, controlled largely by the British, was not nationalistic in its curriculum, but Arab teachers often espoused nationalism in the classroom.³³²

³²⁹ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 42. By 1925, Jewish leaders had erected a complete framework of Jewish primary, secondary, and technical schools--a network bolstered by Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Jewish schools taught Hebrew at all levels, and nearly all Jewish children attended schools. The curriculum was highly nationalistic. See *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 491 and Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 57.

³³⁰ *The Anglo-Palestine Year Book* (London: Anglo-Palestine Publications Ltd., 1948), p. 36.

³³¹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 83.

³³² Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 17.

High levels of local autonomy limited the British government's influence in the daily life of its subjects. Three bodies laid claim to political allegiance in Palestine: the Mandatory government, the Arab Higher Council, and the Jewish Agency. Even among Jewish and Arab government officials it became clear that communal loyalty was ahead of loyalty to the government.³³³

This lack of influence inhibited British ability to control the Mandate communities or even anticipate events. The British only had a small presence on the ground in Palestine for most of the Mandate. More importantly, a high level of devolution meant that communities accepted central government desires if, and only if, their community organizations sanctioned it.

Although co-optation by itself failed to end violence, it did limit it initially. Arab elites, in part because of co-optation, seldom supported ethnic violence. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, for example, who was later demonized as the main mover behind the violence of the Arab revolt, did not seek to stir up religious dissident until June 1936, after the Arab revolt was underway.³³⁴ Earlier, he had refused to support Sheikh Izz a-din al-Qassam's efforts to proclaim a national revolt or defy British authorities.³³⁵ Similarly, he denied radicals money and positions until the

³³³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 159. In an effort to increase Jewish loyalty to the Yishuv rather than to the British, Jewish police, postal, and railway workers all received funds from the Yishuv as well as the British. One result was intelligence penetration of the government by all the Jewish community. As the head of the Palestine CID noted, "Secrecy was an unknown factor in Palestine ... To seal a document or label it 'Secret and Confidential' only provoked curiosity." See Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 203.

³³⁴ Taysir Ibara, *Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni: Mufti of Jerusalem* (Princeton: The Kingdon Press, 1985), p. 147; Wasserstein notes that Hajj Amin was only appointed Grand Mufti in 1921 *after* he ensured peace in Jerusalem (*The British in Palestine*, p. 100).

³³⁵ Shai Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine, 1929-1939: The Case of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and His Movement," in *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and*

revolt began in earnest and often tried to work with the British to prevent disorder.³³⁶

Other co-opted elites generally opposed violence. 'Aref al-'Aref kept Arab disturbances in his district to a minimum during the revolt despite considering himself an ardent nationalist.³³⁷

George Antonius, a Christian Arab who was a leading nationalist intellectual, tried to calm crowds during the 1929 riots and later was denounced by the Arab press as a "prop of the mandate."³³⁸ Ruhi Bey 'Abd al-Hadi, a member of a powerful landowning family who became the District Officer in Jerusalem, served as a liaison between the Arab and Jewish communities and warned the government when trouble was likely.³³⁹

The demands of administration at times conflicted with the need to co-opt Muslim Arabs. Christian Arabs were disproportionately educated and "modern"--as a result, they held far more government positions than did Muslims despite being a numerical minority.³⁴⁰ As a result government co-opted too few Muslims.

British efforts to balance the communities failed. Because the stakes were so high and violence was rampant, neither group could afford to trust the government. The government's willingness to work with many of the supposed instigators of violence heightened community doubts about British willingness to prevent violence. Furthermore, British efforts to conciliate

Israel, pp. 75-76; Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 47.

³³⁶ Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 30 and p. 69.

³³⁷ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 183.

³³⁸ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 188.

³³⁹ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, pp. 190-191.

³⁴⁰ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, pp. 168-169.

the Arabs in the aftermath of violence--such as their occasional suspensions of immigration--increased the status of those advocating violence as an answer to their problem. The Jews could not accept a British policy of working with, rather than punishing, those involved in communal violence.³⁴¹ The anti-Semitism of many Mandate officials further eroded Jewish faith in the government.³⁴² Writing in 1937, the Peel Commission notes: "It [The Mandate] has now been tried for 17 years, and at the end the Arabs, taken as a whole, are more hostile to the Jews and much more hostile to the Government than they were at the beginning."³⁴³

The private meetings between Jews and Arabs also failed to improve relations. As Michael Cohen notes:

... although various proposals for the future of Palestine were actively considered, it must be concluded that neither the Zionist nor the Palestinian Arab leaders were at the time prepared, or able to make sacrifices which alone might have led to the peaceful coexistence between the two peoples.³⁴⁴

Indeed, both Jews and Arabs involved in the meeting came to recognize that confrontation was inevitable unless one party was to accept the other's domination. Several leaders such as Ben Gurion claimed that these unsuccessful British mediation efforts led them to believe that violence was inevitable.³⁴⁵

³⁴¹ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 65.

³⁴² Correspondence with academic expert, April 1996.

³⁴³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 140.

³⁴⁴ Cohen, "Secret Diplomacy and Rebellion in Palestine," p. 404.

³⁴⁵ Cohen, "Secret Diplomacy and Rebellion in Palestine," pp. 403-405.

Changes in the Social Structure

Palestine changed dramatically during the years of British rule. Although many of the transformations that occurred under the British were not intended to affect ethnic relations, some of them inflamed ethnic tension. Furthermore, many British-inspired reforms led to changes in the social structure of Palestine that undermined the effectiveness of British strategies to manage ethnic relations.

With the mandatory government came improvements in the health, welfare, and infrastructure of Palestine. The British introduced modern government, overhauled the legal system, expanded education, built clinics, laid roads, and improved local communications.³⁴⁶ Jerusalem received a clean water supply. In general, government spending benefitted Arab areas more than Jewish areas.³⁴⁷ Although these measures improved the Arab quality of life, they also made Arabs and Jews more aware of each other and placed them into direct competition for government resources.³⁴⁸ This growing awareness exacerbated entitlement concerns.

Dramatic population growth compounded the impact of the above changes. From 1922 to 1936, the rate of population growth among Palestinians was the fastest in the world. This

³⁴⁶ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 23.

³⁴⁷ Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission), p. 45.

³⁴⁸ Despite these improvements, the Arab community in Palestine was still early in the transition from a traditional to a modern culture. In 1936, 85 percent of Arab peasants were illiterate. Moreover, the Arab community had a rigid class system composed of Muslim landowners, middle class Christian Arabs, peasants and a small working class, and the bedouin. Contacts among and mobility within these echelons was limited. In 1942, only 35 percent of Arab agricultural products were sold at the market. See Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 35; Abraham Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences* (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 23.

growth, combined with skyrocketing land prices from an increase in demand by Jewish settlers, led to greater Arab debt and migration, as Palestinians were less able to support themselves on the land.³⁴⁹ By the Mandate's end, roughly half of Palestinian Arabs worked outside of agriculture.³⁵⁰

Jewish immigrants came in waves, depending on the economic and, particularly in the 1930s, the political climate in both Palestine and Europe. In the late 1920s, Palestine was in an economic trough, and few immigrants came. In fact, 2,713 Jews arrived in Palestine in 1927, but 5,071 left.³⁵¹ As Nazi persecution increased in the late 1930s, however, thousands of German Jews joined those leaving for Palestine.

³⁴⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 28.

³⁵⁰ The migration to the urban coastal centers that began under the Ottomans continued under the British. By 1922, almost a quarter of the population of Palestine lived along the coastal strip from Jaffa to Haifa. Christian Arabs were particularly urban: over 80 percent lived in cities while only 27 percent of Muslims did. See Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 47-48.

³⁵¹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 62.

Box IVB: Jewish Immigrants to Palestine under the Mandate

1920	5,514	1934	42,359
1921	9,149	1935	61,854
1922	7,844	1936	29,727
1923	7,421	1937	10,536
1924	12,856	1938	12,868
1925	33,801	1939	27,561
1926	13,801	1940	10,445
1927	2,713	1941	3,839
1928	2,178	1942	3,581
1929	5,249	1943	8,558
1930	4,944	1944	14,491
1931	4,075	1945	13,156
1932	9,553	1946	17,761
1933	30,327		

Sources: *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration; Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission)*, p. 279.

The Jewish immigrants were far more modern, young, and skilled than their Arab neighbors. Around 85 percent of Palestinian Jews were less than 45 years old in the late 1930s.³⁵² A high proportion were highly-educated, and all were very conscious of their national mission.³⁵³

In many ways Jewish immigration benefitted Arabs economically--it was the competition for social prominence that led to hostility. Arab land owners benefited from skyrocketing land prices; merchants found their business increased; town workers had

higher wages; and many peasants found jobs in Jewish agricultural settlements or in towns.³⁵⁴

Palestinian Arabs lacked the surplus capital to cultivate their land more intensively or develop local industries, and Zionist Jews filled this niche.³⁵⁵

³⁵² Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 28.

³⁵³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 49.

³⁵⁴ Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, p. 78.

³⁵⁵ *Palestine Partition Commission Report* (London: Colonial Office, October 1938), p. 30. The Partition Commission is at times referred to as the Woodhead Commission. See also W. F. Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930s," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6:3, 1977, p. 28.

Nor did Jews displace large numbers of Palestinian peasants. As late as 1946, Jews owned only about seven percent of the area's land. Jews purchased roughly 89 percent of their land from absentee Arab landlords.³⁵⁶ Despite this relative lack of displacement, fear was widespread that Jews were eating up the land.³⁵⁷

Table IVA: Land and Population

	1919	1921	1931	1936	1946
Jewish population	57,000	72,000	172,000	384,078	608,225
Arab population	533,000	551,000	784,891	916,061	1,237,334
Percent area of Palestine claimed by the Jewish population	2.04	2.08	4.6	5.4	7.0

Source: Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 47.

Education expanded considerably for Arabs under the British, leading to growing political awareness and a new set of cultural elites. Between 1920 and 1945, the number of Arab students in elementary education increased from 16,442 to 81,042, and the overall number of Arab public and private schools went from 587 in 1925 to 749 in 1943.³⁵⁸ By 1946, one third of all school age Arab children were in schools. This increase in education resulted in a growing intelligentsia, particularly among leading families.³⁵⁹ At the beginning of the Arab Revolt, 14

³⁵⁶ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 69.

³⁵⁷ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 70.

³⁵⁸ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 15; Elia T. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 65.

³⁵⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 54; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 56.

Arab newspapers were being published, and every village had someone who would read to the illiterate.³⁶⁰

The above trends in modernization, migration, education, and colonization all brought Arabs and Jews into greater contact and increased competition. These social changes brought with them psychological and personal dislocation. As Migdal and Kimmerling note: "For both poorer city dwellers and the fellaheen [peasants], the new commercial culture was problematic, offering glimpses of a life that could not be shared, bringing dislocation and distress along with ice-cream."³⁶¹

This disruption increased the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Social changes affected not only the propensity for ethnic conflict but also the effectiveness of British policies. The growing political awareness brought by education and migration undermined the leadership of co-opted traditional elites. In 1932, young Arab nationalists founded the Istiqlal Party. Although its base was small, it was the first party created that tried to go beyond traditional extended family alliances. At the same time, literary groups, sports clubs, and other associations began forming that were urban in character and opposed to the domination of traditional landowners.³⁶² All these groups challenged the traditional leadership, accusing them of not being sufficiently opposed to Zionism.³⁶³ By the mid-1930s, elites who traditionally led the Arab community were

³⁶⁰ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 56.

³⁶¹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 58-59.

³⁶² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 101.

³⁶³ Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 66.

losing control over the nationalist movement.³⁶⁴ Increasingly they faced a choice: endorse nationalist rhetoric and goals or else lose influence to leaders who would.

Violence under the Mandate

British policies failed to prevent ethnic violence in Palestine. Violence broke out several times from 1920 to 1935 before it exploded in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Although the deaths of the 1930s dwarfed the numbers killed in the 1920s, the number of people involved in the earlier violence was large. Thousands of rioters participated in the violence during the 1920s, and the riots quickly spread outside their original urban base and raged throughout the countryside.³⁶⁵

In April 1920, an Arab religious procession in Jerusalem turned violent, resulting in the death of five Jews and the wounding of 211 more. In putting down the riots, the British killed four Arabs and wounded 32 others.³⁶⁶ The demonstration occurred despite a British ban on political demonstrations. The religious leader of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, whose anti-Zionist speech may have led to the violence, had used a religious celebration to avoid the ban.³⁶⁷

In May 1921, a doctrinal quarrel among demonstrating leftist Jewish groups led to wild rumors among the Arabs that Jews were organizing to attack. In response to these fears, Arabs

³⁶⁴ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 92.

³⁶⁵ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 206; *The Palestine Diary Volume One, 1914-1945*, Robert John and Sami Hadawi, eds. (New York: New World Press, 1970), p. 207.

³⁶⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 77.

³⁶⁷ Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 16.

attacked Jews in Jaffa and in various colonies in the Ramleh area, killing 47 Jews and wounding 146, while police and military suppression of the riots led to the death of 48 Arabs and the wounding of 7...³⁶⁸

In 1929, in a dispute over whether Jews could erect a partition at the Western Wall, demonstrations by Jews and Arab counterdemonstrations spilled into murder.³⁶⁹ Excited Arab mobs stormed into Hebron, where a large non-Zionist Jewish community lived, and killed over 60 Jews there and injured 50 others.³⁷⁰ At Safad, rioting Arabs killed 45 Jews, and marauding Arab bands destroyed six Jewish colonies. There was little violent retaliation by Jews. When the British finally restored peace, over 133 Jews had been killed and 339 wounded; 116 Arabs were

³⁶⁸ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 51; Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 103.

³⁶⁹ Jews believe the Western (or Wailing) Wall to be sacred as it is a remnant of the Temple of Herod, which was built on the site of the Temple of Solomon. The Wall also is the western wall of Haram al-Sharif, the rectangular area that encloses the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Muslims believe that the prophet Mohammed was transported from Mecca to Jerusalem and ascended to heaven from this area.

Ottoman authorities restricted Jewish access to the Wall and forbade them from bringing with them partitions, which religious Jews wanted to separate men and women. The British, seeking to preserve what seemed a stable status quo, continued this arrangement. Each year, Jews would try to bring stools or forbidden appurtenances to the wall and the government would order the Jews to desist after protests from the Muslims. On Yom Kippur in 1928, Jewish attempts to erect a partition at the Wall--a modest change similar to past provocations--led Arab nationalists to claim that Jews sought to take possession of the entire al-Aqsa mosque area. The Mufti of Jerusalem and other Arab leaders launched a vast propaganda campaign and harassed Jewish worshippers, leading to Jewish demonstrations, which then resulted in Muslim counterdemonstrations. The role of the Mufti is ambiguous. Although the Mufti later tried to calm the crowds before the riots, he did rouse the people in the first place. See Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, pp. 227-237 for a description of the events leading up to the violence.

³⁷⁰ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 67.

killed and 232 wounded, mostly by police and army troops trying to restore order.³⁷¹

Even times of relative tranquility were tense. Between 1930 and 1933, body counts were low, but marauding Arab bands murdered several Jews and destroyed Jewish property.³⁷²

Starting in the 1930s, the focus of the violence changed. The British, not the Jews, became the target of growing anger. In October 1933, riots in Jaffa led to the deaths of 15 to 26 rioters but the Mandate authority, not the Jews, was the target of the riots.³⁷³

Not surprisingly, the violence further polarized the already divided communities. As Ann Lesch notes, "Any violent Arab reaction to Jewish immigration and settlement only served to tighten the cohesion of the Jewish community and to accelerate its military preparations and political determination."³⁷⁴ The violence led Jewish merchants to move to Jewish areas, and even older, non-Zionist Jewish communities joined ranks with the Zionist ones. Both communal groups organized reciprocal boycotts, further dividing them.³⁷⁵

The violence also isolated moderates on both sides, including those working with the

³⁷¹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 68; *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration*, Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty's Government presented in 1947 to the United Nations Special Committees on Palestine (British Information Services: New York, 1947), p. 10.

³⁷² *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 80.

³⁷³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 84. Lesch gives the lower death figure of 15. See Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 215. The shift in the target of Arab violence in the 1930s from the Jewish settlers to the British is logical when using the entitlement approach to understanding ethnic conflict. The British were the true threat to Arab interests, for they controlled the rate of immigration and their police and troops would put down Arab efforts to resist Zionism by force.

³⁷⁴ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 47.

³⁷⁵ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 70.

government. In 1933, a Zionist Revisionist (a movement whose members sought to "revise" the Mandate to include Transjordan as part of the Jewish Home) terrorist killed Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, a leading member of the Jewish Agency, because he considered him too conciliatory toward the Arabs.³⁷⁶ New Arab political movements, both Muslim and secular, appeared and criticized traditional elites for working with authorities. Even Jewish and Arab government officials did not espouse toleration. Arab teachers used their positions to inculcate nationalist ideas, and officials of both communities refused to support government policies of which their communities did not approve.³⁷⁷

Jews complained that they were not adequately represented in the police and armed forces, a concern that led them to form their own militias after violence broke out. From the beginning, Zionists felt that the pro-nationalist mood of the Arab-dominated civil police made them unreliable in times of communal tension--a perception reinforced when many Arab civil police members joined rioters during times of violence.³⁷⁸ The Jewish Agency complained about the low numbers of Jews in the border patrol and urged the British to hire Jews and non-Jews in equal numbers for the police force.³⁷⁹ The 1920 violence led the Jews to develop their militia,

³⁷⁶ *The Palestine Diary*, p. 249

³⁷⁷ Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, pp. 129-132.

³⁷⁸ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, pp. 63-64 and p. 101.

³⁷⁹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 197 and *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine* (Jerusalem: 1939), p. 18. The Peel Commission notes that the civil police in 1926 contained 1,028 Moslems, 267 Christians, and 212 Jews while the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force had 611 Moslems, 96 Christians, and 37 Jews (p. 187). Since that time, the percentage of Jews in the force steadily increased--by the end of 1936 1,902 Arabs and 484 Jews were in the Police (p. 192).

the *Haganah*. Continued violence in Jerusalem and Jaffa accelerated the *Haganah's* growth, and by 1936 the *Haganah* had 10,000 men with 40,000 more available for rapid mobilization.³⁸⁰

In general Jewish paramilitary groups practiced self-restraint, focusing on community self-defense rather than on offensive action against the British or the Arabs. However, the Etzel (Irgun Zvai Leumi), which was founded in 1937, criticized this policy of restraint and indulged in terror against Arabs, British, and leftist Jewish figures. After the Arab revolt *Haganah* branches also developed an offensive doctrine, targeting Arab villages that supported guerrilla operations.³⁸¹

Jewish efforts to arm and defend themselves alarmed the Arab community. The arming of Jewish soldiers in the Jewish battalions of the British army in 1921 alarmed Arabs, who saw it as part of a plot to drive them from the land.³⁸² Similarly, the Arab press hailed the discovery of secret arms shipments in 1922, 1933, and 1935 as proof that the Jews were arming on a large scale.³⁸³

The Arab Revolt

The scope and scale of the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 went far beyond the sporadic communal violence of the previous years. From 3,000 to 5,000 Arabs died in the revolt, up to

³⁸⁰ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 47.

³⁸¹ Ashkenasi, "Social-Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the Near East," in *Political Violence and Terror*, pp. 321-323.

³⁸² Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 102.

³⁸³ *Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission)*, p. 88.

15,000 were wounded, and over 6,000 were arrested. At least a quarter of Arab casualties were inflicted by other Arabs.³⁸⁴ Hundreds of Jews were killed, almost all by Arabs. Large numbers of Arabs went abroad or fled to safety within Palestine; Jaffa's population reportedly shrank from roughly 75,000 to under 5,000 residents.³⁸⁵ Moreover, the revolt damaged large areas of property and devastated the local economy.³⁸⁶

A relatively minor disturbance set off the revolt, but the disturbances occurred against a backdrop of great Arab fear over Jewish immigration and land purchases. On April 19, 1936 Arab bandits, who may have been religiously-motivated, murdered two Jews. Jewish protests led to counterdemonstrations by Arabs. As in 1921, rumors that Jewish mobs killed several Arabs led Arab mobs in turn to murder three Jews.³⁸⁷ Largely spontaneously, Arab merchants declared a general strike. Various local groups, known as National Committees, sprang up and pushed Arab leaders to form an executive committee to lead the revolt. Compelled by this pressure from below, Arab leaders formed the Supreme Arab Committee, known as the Arab Higher Committee, on April 25 under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husseini.³⁸⁸ By May work and trade in the Arab sector had come to a standstill, and persistent low-level violence (sniping, the

³⁸⁴ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 112; Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 123; Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 85.

³⁸⁵ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 127.

³⁸⁶ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 112. Profits from citriculture, for example, shrank 90 percent between 1935 and 1938.

³⁸⁷ Several sources claim that a Jewish mob killed two Arabs near the Jewish town of Petah Tiqva, but the accuracy of this report is still debated.

³⁸⁸ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 96.

derailing of trains, etc.) was rampant. During this time, the British allowed Arab organizations, such as the Arab Higher Committee, to operate freely.

In response to the violence, the British stepped up their security presence and, in an effort to placate Arab sentiment, appointed a Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate possible solutions to the dispute. By September, over 20,000 British troops were in Palestine. A lull in the revolt occurred as both sides waited for the commission to report. When the Commission recommended partition--and thus formal recognition of a permanent Jewish home in Palestine--violence sprang up immediately as the Arabs felt outraged by the British betrayal. In response, the British declared martial law and outlawed Arab parties; many leading Arabs were arrested or fled into exile.³⁸⁹ As the violence continued, the British High Commissioner authorized arrests, deportations, curfews, and collective punishments.³⁹⁰

Ironically, the British crackdown on the official leadership worsened the violence. With the demise of the relatively moderate urban leadership in 1937, leadership of the revolt spread to the countryside, where it met with tremendous success. By the summer of 1938, perhaps 15,000 peasants had joined the revolt.

Despite having a coordinating body in the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab revolt was in reality a mass of separate struggles. In urban areas, local clubs, committees, and labor societies had more control over violence than the official leadership.³⁹¹ In rural areas, clan

³⁸⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 106.

³⁹⁰ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 69.

³⁹¹ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 117.

rivalries and other traditional disputes prevented coordinated resistance.³⁹² The exile or arrest of national leaders further increased the relative power of local figures while hindering overall unity.

As in the past, violence further polarized the two communities and isolated moderates within them. Jewish efforts to develop an autarchic economy had met with little success until the Arab boycott of 1936 forced this vision to become reality.³⁹³ Arabs who sold land to Jews were denounced in the press and in the mosques as traitors.³⁹⁴ Rebels often attacked village headmen and others who worked with the British and attacked other Arabs they did not consider properly nationalist.³⁹⁵ By 1937, much of the Palestinian Arabs' fury was directed against privileged Arabs, who had lost their ability to dispense patronage because they had cut their ties to the British.³⁹⁶ These attacks on more conciliatory Arabs led to some leading Arab families to form their own militias that worked with the British army and Jewish groups against those in revolt.³⁹⁷

Religious splits within the Arab community also hindered the resistance. To motivate

³⁹² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 108-111. The clan-based organization of Arab society both helped and hindered Arab strength. On the one hand, the clan structure enable leaders to mobilize large numbers of people and spread views quickly. On the other hand, it hindered overall efforts at unity. See Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 82.

³⁹³ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 59; Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, p. 12.

³⁹⁴ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 87.

³⁹⁵ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 136; Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 115.

³⁹⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 96; Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion," p. 42. In 1939, for example, Arab attacks killed 94 Jews and 37 British but also 414 Arabs.

³⁹⁷ Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine," p. 83; Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 119.

peasants to join the revolt (as well as strengthen his position as the leader of the Arab cause), Hajj Amin al-Husseini portrayed the dispute in religious as well as national terms. Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who died in battle with police, became a symbol of national martyrdom. This rhetoric, however, alienated many Christian Arabs and led to a decline in Muslim-Christian cooperation.³⁹⁸

The Mandatory government's decision to allow the Jewish community to expand its defense establishment and its police force strengthened the Yishuv's ability to protect itself. As the revolt spread, the British and the *Haganah* worked together to defend Zionist settlements and government installations. Future Jewish military leaders such as Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan gained their first military experience during the revolt. The British also trained Jews as supplemental police. By 1939, the Jewish Constabulary numbered 18,600.³⁹⁹ This cooperation during the Arab Revolt paved the way for future cooperation during World War II. The British trained roughly 43,000 Palestinian Jews, the vast majority of whom were screened by the Jewish Agency for loyalty to the Zionist cause.⁴⁰⁰

Support by neighboring Arab states made the revolt harder for the British to contain.

³⁹⁸ Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine," p. 55. The Christian Arabs were without traditional leaders as the religious leadership of the local Greek Orthodox Church was mainly of Greek origin and thus did not support Arab nationalism (see Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 54). For an interesting biography of al-Qassam, see S. Abdallah Schleifer, "The Life and Thought of 'Izz-Id-Din al-Qassam," in *Arab-Israeli Relations: Historical Background and Origins of the Conflict*, Ian S. Lustick, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 325.

³⁹⁹ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 93 and p. 109; Kimmerling and Migdal give a smaller figure of 15,000 Jews under arms (*Palestinians*, p. 96).

⁴⁰⁰ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 128.

Money and arms flowed from Arab nationalists outside Palestine, particularly those in Syria, to rebel fighters. The most respected military leader of the rebellion was Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Syrian who volunteered to fight.⁴⁰¹ Outside states and groups also distributed nationalist propaganda.

The Arab revolt was a major factor in the Jewish success in the 1947-1948 civil war. The violence led the Jews to begin preparing in earnest for a military struggle against Arabs in the future.⁴⁰² By the revolt's end, Palestinian Arabs were exhausted by the effort of rebellion, torn by internal divisions, and disarmed by the British. The Jews, on the other hand, were increasingly armed, organized, and unified.⁴⁰³

Reasons for Conflict

The causes of the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine follow the themes outlined in Chapter II. The initial conflict focused on hegemonic issues--which group would rule, which culture would dominate, who would control key economic resources--but, over time, the violence led security dilemma concerns to come to the fore. Furthermore, the conflict threatened to jeopardize the positions of those who only sought a minimal level of group status. This section focuses primarily on the motivations of the Palestinian Arabs, as they instigated

⁴⁰¹ Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion," p. 41.

⁴⁰² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 97.

⁴⁰³ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 97; Nafez Abdullah Nazzal, "The Zionist Occupation of Western Galilee, 1948," in *Triumph and Catastrophe: The War of 1948, Israeli Independence, and the Refugee Problem*, Ian S. Lustick, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 198.

most of the violence.

The British entry into Palestine raised expectations among Arabs as well as Jews. Arabs in Palestine hoped that the Mandate would lead to an independent Arab state there, while the Jews took the Balfour Declaration as a British commitment to the establishment of a Jewish state in the Mandate area. Neither group was content with coexistence. Because of the impending transfer of power, both groups prepared for conflict. The rate of Jewish immigration, Jewish land purchases, differences between modern Jews and traditional Arabs, and other causes added fuel to the flames, but the Mandate itself had lighted the fire by raising the question of who will rule.⁴⁰⁴ Indeed, the Arab Revolt was preceded in 1935 by another British attempt to create a Legislative Council that would be a forerunner to an independent government in Palestine. The failure of this step (due to Zionist lobbying in London) convinced many Arabs that an Arab state controlled by Arabs would never come about and discredited moderate voices who advocated cooperating with the British.⁴⁰⁵

Arab grievances concerning the Mandate ranged considerably, but they can be summed up as a synthesis of a desire for their own state and fears about their community's status and physical safety vis-a-vis the incoming Jews. When the Mandate began, the Arabs constituted 92 percent of the population and owned 98 percent of the land, but Jewish immigration and land purchases threatened this dominance. Even as early as 1918 Arabs feared that Jews would

⁴⁰⁴ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 77; *The Palestine Diary*, p. 268.

⁴⁰⁵ Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion," p. 30.

eventually own all the land and banish them.⁴⁰⁶ Arabs regularly complained about Jewish land purchases, the use of Hebrew as an official language, the exclusion of Arabs from senior posts, and the lack of funds for Arab education.⁴⁰⁷ The Shaw Commission report notes that many Muslims feared that Jews would seek to rebuild the Temple and thus remove the Muslim holy sites.⁴⁰⁸ The Commission also noted that "The Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrants not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future."⁴⁰⁹ In short, the Arabs feared for their status.

For most of the Mandate, Jews feared for their status and safety should the Mandate end. Jewish leaders recognized that their community's physical survival would be threatened if the British withdrew. Jewish leaders dismissed Arab promises of respect for the rights of Jews already in Palestine, noting that the hostile rhetoric of many Arab leaders far outweighed the few conciliatory statements they issued.

The political success of Arab communities outside the Mandate increased the aspirations of Palestinian Arabs. The creation of Arab states (or promises thereof) in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt heightened Palestinian Arab expectations of national recognition. Palestinian Arabs believed that they, unlike Syria and Iraq, were not provisionally recognized as independent states because of the Jewish National Home.⁴¹⁰ Jewish lobbying efforts in London to block independence for the

⁴⁰⁶ Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, p. 34.

⁴⁰⁷ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 365.

⁴⁰⁸ Noted in the *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 78.

⁴⁰⁹ *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration*, p. 10.

⁴¹⁰ *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration*, p. 5.

Mandate (independence would lead to a Palestinian Arab-majority state) confirmed this suspicion.

A compromise solution was difficult. Many Arabs noted that they would resist any partition plan with violence regardless of the details--the idea of partition, not any specific losses associated with it, challenged their claim to primacy.⁴¹¹ Landowning families and merchants in particular feared Jewish nationalism now that it had British backing, leading them to begin building a rival nationalist movement.⁴¹²

Symbolic issues proved as important as well as material ones. The Western Wall riots of 1929, for example, were sparked by an apparently trivial Jewish desire to put up a screen to separate male and female worshippers. Official languages were a constant bone of contention. The 1930s dispute arose over whether to put "Eretz Israel" or "Palestina" on the local stamp illustrates how even small issues carried great symbolic weight.

Immigration proved a focal point of conflict. From 1930 to 1938, Palestine was the largest overseas center of immigration, in both proportionate and absolute terms.⁴¹³ Palestinian Arabs came to see Jewish immigration not only as a menace to their well-being but also as a harbinger of future Jewish political dominance.⁴¹⁴ The Shaw Commission of 1930, which

⁴¹¹ *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p.232.

⁴¹² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 74-77.

⁴¹³ *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, p. 279. In that time period, Palestine absorbed some 182,000 emigrants compared with only 30,000 by the United States and 64,000 by Brazil.

⁴¹⁴ Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: a photographic history of the Palestinians, 1876-1948* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), p. 86.

investigated the Western Wall riots, claimed the riots' causes were the social and economic problems generated by Jewish immigration.⁴¹⁵

Zionist rhetoric reinforced Arab fears. Zionists spoke openly in the 1920s about bringing millions of Jews to Palestine. Militant Zionist Revisionists demonstrations were particularly frightening for Arabs. Even relative moderates such as Ben-Gurion refused to negotiate on schemes that would limit Jewish immigration, and Ben-Gurion at times made claims to Transjordan in talks with Arab leaders such as George Antonius.⁴¹⁶

The primary goal of the Zionists was to outnumber the local population, own the local land, and eventually assume power. The Zionist Executive summed up this viewpoint in what was meant to be a conciliatory statement: "the Jewish people remain ready to co-operate with the Arabs for the general welfare of the country, but they can consider neither the imposition of minority status nor any arbitrary limitation of their inalienable right to return to their homeland."⁴¹⁷ This demographic dominance would then be followed by an attempt to gain self-governing institutions.⁴¹⁸ As one early Zionist noted: "We must be the majority. And when we are the majority, we will pick up arms and ensure our independence."⁴¹⁹

Finally, the Zionist policy of Hebrew labor, which sought to replace Arab workers with

⁴¹⁵ Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948*, p. 9.

⁴¹⁶ Cohen, "Secret Diplomacy and Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939," pp. 381-383.

⁴¹⁷ *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, pp. 20-21.

⁴¹⁸ Hurewitz, p. 21.

⁴¹⁹ As quoted in McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 8.

Jewish workers in every sector of the economy, alarmed Arab workers. Histadrut (the Jewish Labor Federation) pickets of Jewish companies that hired Arabs reinforced this alarm as did the Jewish National Fund's policy that the land it controlled could only be worked by Jews.⁴²⁰

This effort to "win the census" and control the land alarmed local Palestinians, who feared being displaced from their historic position as well as their homes. Nor was this fear unfounded. As Rabbi Yizhak Reeief noted in 1883: "We will tell the Arabs: Move away. If they refuse, if they forcibly object, we will force them to move. We will hit them on their heads and force them to move."⁴²¹ This hostile rhetoric also helped Arab notables and peasants forge ties, as both feared being subsumed under waves of migrants.⁴²²

Arab Christians were concerned about Zionism for both idealistic and economic reasons yet, unlike Arab Muslims, seldom turned to violence. Christian merchants resented Jewish competition in professions and skilled trades. Moreover, the Christian community generally approved of Arab nationalism--which put their status on par with that of their Muslim neighbors.⁴²³ Finally Christians worried that Jews were taking their place as a leading minority.⁴²⁴ Yet while Christians actively opposed Zionism politically, they were not involved in violence frequently--a difference we will explore in the following section. However, it should be

⁴²⁰ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939*, p. 16 and p. 114; McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 10.

⁴²¹ As quoted in McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 9.

⁴²² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 32.

⁴²³ Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 61.

⁴²⁴ *The Palestine Diary*, p. 269.

noted that the Christians, as a minority, did not seek hegemony and thus were more easily satisfied.

When political action was limited to Arab elites, cooperation between Muslims and Christians worked well, but once mass-based politics began communal groups became suspicious of each other. Muslim-Christian Associations, formed by leading urban families to struggle against Zionism, were the vanguard of the anti-Jewish struggle in the early 1920s. Christians, however, feared the Islamic overtones of the growing nationalist movement.⁴²⁵ Muslim hegemony was little better than Jewish hegemony. Muslims, for their part, resented the disproportionate Christian presence in the bureaucracy, and scattered attacks against Arab Christians by Muslims during the revolt were common.⁴²⁶ Thus, by the end of the Arab revolt Christian participation in Arab nationalist activities diminished dramatically.⁴²⁷

Once violence began, it dominated the concerns of all communities. Jewish radical groups led by Jabotinsky prepared for violence and regularly retaliated against Arab assaults by the late 1930s.⁴²⁸ Arabs, in turn, feared that the Jews were arming. Rumors of Jewish violence often preceded Arab violence. Both sides pressed the British to help their cause initially and then, when the British were not sufficiently responsive, took security into their own hands.

⁴²⁵ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 52-53.

⁴²⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 102.

⁴²⁷ Al-Hout argues that Christians represented 23 percent of the nationalist elite in the early 1920s but only 14.7 percent after the Arab revolt. See Bayan Nuweihid Al-Hout, "The Palestinian Political Elite during the Mandatory Period," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9:1, 1979, p. 91.

⁴²⁸ *The Palestine Diary*, p. 278.

As this violence grew, the conflict assumed many characteristics of the security dilemma model. Arabs talked about striking the Jews before being overrun by future immigrants. Each act of violence led the other side to arm and to prepare for more violence, creating a cycle of mutual suspicion. Within the Arab community, stable alliances proved impossible when the violence spread as each sub-group (local clans, the Christian residents, etc.) feared for its own security. Outside powers exacerbated the conflict, providing a haven for Arab guerrillas and a source of arms for all parties. Furthermore, as expected under the security dilemma, only the infusion of massive force by the British quelled the revolt.

The offense-dominant problems inherent in ethnic conflict plagued British attempts to secure peace. The isolated position of many Jewish settlements forced the manpower-scarce British to arm and train settlers for self-defense. This British policy undermined British claims to non-partisanship and alarmed the Arab population.⁴²⁹ Similarly, efforts to arm for self defense were invariably seen as an indicator of aggressive intentions.

Outside Powers and the Mandate

Understanding relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine is impossible without understanding the role that outside powers played in the dispute. Outside powers affected both sides' security perceptions and their status concerns. Furthermore, outside influences limited the British administration's ability to prevent violence in Palestine.

Both the Arab and Jewish national movements owe their existence to events outside of

⁴²⁹ *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 200; Kimmerling and Migdal note that in 1929 the Mandate released 587 rifles to isolated Jewish settlements.

Palestine. Zionism came into being because of anti-Semitism in Europe, and it gained strength as pogroms and German persecution made the position of Jews in Europe desperate. Persecution in Europe made Jews in Palestine highly-sensitive to their security and unwilling to compromise on what was, in reality, a life-and-death issue: immigration.⁴³⁰ Similarly, Ottoman nationalism shaped Arab nationalism. Indeed, outside powers initially played a major role in determining exactly what Palestinian Arabs were fighting for. It was not until Faysal's fall in Syria in 1920 that Palestinian Arabs began to focus on an independent Palestine.⁴³¹

Outside communities contributed to ethnic violence by exacerbating security concerns and raising political expectations. As the Peel Commission noted:

If at the moment [1925] Palestine could have been so cut off from the rest of the world by some cataclysm of nature that all approach to it or communication with it from outside became impossible, then perhaps the two peoples confronting each other within its narrow borders might have been forced to make the best of it and learn to live in harmony together. As it was, the Jewish community in Palestine could not be freed from its association with the hopes and fears and sufferings of Jews elsewhere, nor could the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs be secluded from those of the Arab world around it.⁴³²

A military commission noted that a major cause of the 1920 violence was agitation by Zionists outside Palestine and Arab nationalists in Syria.⁴³³ Zionists in Europe and elsewhere stirred up fears among the Palestinian Arab community by calling for massive Jewish immigration and

⁴³⁰ Nor was immigration only an issue affecting Jews. Tension rose in part because the overseas emigration of Palestinians was checked by postwar restrictions on immigration. Young males could not find employment in the Turkish army as before, resulting in a surplus of labor. *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 44.

⁴³¹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 82.

⁴³² *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Commission), p. 61.

⁴³³ *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration*, p. 3.

Jewish self-rule in Palestine. Arab nationalists abroad were a source of arms and anti-Zionist propaganda.

International lobbying of the government in London also undermined local British efforts to balance the concerns of the communities, particularly those of the Arabs. In the early 1930s, a commission led by Sir John Hope-Simpson produced a white paper calling for curbing Jewish immigration, but Prime Minister MacDonald overruled this in response to Zionist lobbying in London.⁴³⁴ British parliament debates in 1930 and in 1935 both overturned what had been British concessions to Arab nationalists, undermining Arab moderates who argued that the British would respect Arab concerns. Arab heads-of-state also lobbied the British on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs, claiming that unrest in Palestine threatened stability elsewhere in the Middle East. For both Arabs and Jews, the possibility that people outside Palestine might change bitterly-negotiated policies undermined their faith in the negotiation process itself.⁴³⁵

Independence for other Arab powers increased Palestinian aspirations. In Iraq, Arab nationalists in 1930 gained formal recognition for their government, inspiring Arab nationalists everywhere.⁴³⁶ In 1935, nationalist agitation in Egypt and Syria led to both countries being granted recognition. Palestinian Arabs, for their part, saw their ethnic brethren in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq gaining political independence while they were not, largely because of the Jewish National Home in their midst.

Both communities tried to draw support from brethren abroad. In the Western Wall

⁴³⁴ *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration*, 13.

⁴³⁵ Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion," p. 25.

⁴³⁶ *Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission)*, p. 60.

dispute of 1929, for example, Jewish leaders played up Muslim harassment to draw funds and support from Jews overseas. Similarly, the Mufti tried to publicize the issue in the Arab and Muslim worlds for the same reason.⁴³⁷ Both Arabs and Jews received arms and weapons from abroad.⁴³⁸ Palestinian Arabs fighters also received a haven in Syria and even occasional volunteers from the broader Arab world.

Ironically, the Palestinians' proximity to other Arabs weakened their ability to resist the Zionists in 1948. The Jews, recognizing that they were a minority both in Palestine and in the region at large, began preparing carefully for an armed struggle they knew would come. Palestinian leaders, however, were more haphazard, confident that their Arab neighbors and larger numbers would lead them to triumph in their struggle. As late as 1948, the Arab League decided that it, not local Palestinians, would defend the Palestinian cause. Although this bolstered the potential strength of the Palestinians, in reality it undercut their effort as each member state's ambitions differed from that of the Palestinian nationalists.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, pp. 36-39.

⁴³⁸ Leftist Jews also received training arm arms in Austria, Germany, and Russia. See Ashkenasi, "Social-Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the Near East," p. 320.

⁴³⁹ The role of outside Arab states was not completely negative. In the Arab revolt outside Arab powers helped bring about an end to the violence by collaborating with the British to convince Palestinian leaders to accept British compromise measures in 1939. See Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 135. For works that provide a useful understanding of the Arab states' political goals during the War of Independence in Israel, see Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan* and Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli confrontation, 1948-1967* (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

Important Intervening Variables

Divisions within the Arab community helped British co-optation efforts and decreased the Arab community's ability to organize for violence. Many Arabs had only a nominal ethnic sentiment, particularly at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum and in rural areas. Thus, the most effective means of mobilizing them was Islam--a symbol that for centuries appealed to Muslims of all classes. The use of religious imagery, however, led many Christian and Druze Arabs to withdraw or temper their support for the Arab cause when it was most needed.

The unusual nature of the Mandate system hindered British efforts to accommodate both the Arab and the Jewish communities. On the one hand, the Mandate system--because of its finite nature--threatened the rights and privileges that accommodation provided. Who knew whether the right to use one's language or have one's own religious courts would outlast the colonial power's presence? On the other hand, the finite nature of the Mandate system led both groups to scheme to improve their position once the British left, creating mutual suspicions among both parties.

Lessons Learned from the British Mandate Period

As noted above, British mandate officials used a variety of policy instruments to manage ethnic relations after the violence of 1920. Mandate officials devolved power to ethnic communities, provided "police" protection to ensure security, tried to co-opt community (particularly Arab) leaders, used their good offices to mediate the conflict, encouraged private meetings between Arabs and Jews, and attempted to establish participatory institutions. That these policies failed to prevent the tremendous explosion in violence of the Arab revolt is clear.

What can we learn from this experience?

Family One: Control

Police Control. Police control did not prevent violence under the British. Police control neither prevented a security dilemma situation from developing between Arabs and Jews nor deterred hegemonic individuals from using violence to further their agendas. The biggest problem with police control under the Mandate was that it did not prevent ethnic groups from organizing. Both Arabs and Jews regularly formed militias, armed themselves, and prepared for warfare despite the presence of police control. Groups were not ensured of their security because they knew the British would act only after violence had occurred. This delay encouraged groups to organize for self-defense. Nor could the British isolate Palestine from the rest of the world. Arms and settlers came in, upsetting any attempts by the British to preserve the status quo.

Hegemonic ambitions also led groups to prepare for violence. Both Arabs and Jews sought more than security: they wanted pre-eminence. Radicals on both sides regularly engaged in violence in order to strike fear into their rivals' camps. Thus, simply ensuring groups' security was not enough to bring about peace. Groups had to be prevented from organizing, but the minimal British use of control did little to accomplish this.

A good case, however, can be made that the British did not effectively implement police control for two reasons. First, in their haste to accommodate communities, the British undercut the purpose of control by releasing malefactors on both sides. Second, the British ability to enforce peace was limited by British unwillingness to have a large security presence on the ground. Budget restrictions led to a policy of minimal government. A small security presence,

however, prevented the British from learning about violence before it occurred and otherwise deterring troublemakers. As a result, the expectation of punishment decreased.

However, an equally strong case can be made that the Arab areas of Palestine were relatively easy locations to conduct counter-insurgency operations given the traditional social structure there. The lack of industrialization and the family-oriented social structure hindered Arab efforts to unify against the Jews. Paramilitary organization based on such traditional structures, which lack modern organizational techniques, are not likely to succeed. Cooperation between traditional and more modern elements is particularly difficult.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, while the British certainly did not implement police control in an ideal way, they also did not face an extremely difficult area of police operations.

Family Two: Accommodation

The British relied heavily on accommodation policies to manage ethnic relations in the Mandate. They tried all three variants of accommodation--co-optation, devolution, and participation--in their unsuccessful attempt to foster peace in Palestine.

Co-optation. Co-optation proved effective in separating Arab elites from the Arab populace, but by itself it could not guarantee peace. As the actions of Arab elites such as Hajj Amin al-Husseini and 'Aref al-'Aref suggest, co-optation can even lead hostile elites to work against violence. Yet the conflict of 1936 demonstrates that a policy of working with elites only is not sufficient to guarantee peace.

⁴⁴⁰ Ashkenasi, "Social-Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the Near East," pp. 331-332.

Co-optation is a particularly difficult strategy when the social order is changing rapidly. Determining whom to co-opt becomes particularly difficult during times of social change. Under the Mandate, rising cultural elites, many of whom formed new political movements, criticized traditional elites as "sell outs" to gain influence in the community. To avoid this charge, traditional elites competed for popular support, which often went to the most extreme position, particularly when security dilemma and entitlement fears are strong as they were under the Mandate. Even when traditional elites retained popular support, government influence over their activities became limited, as they were forced to respond first and foremost to community pressures.

Co-optation is harder when elites and the community as a whole have strong organizations independent of the government or when the government lacks suitable candidates for co-optation who are also suitable administrators. The British government did not penetrate much of Arab society; core institutions such as mosques, farms, and commerce remained independent of the British. Furthermore, thanks to the policy of devolution, Arab political resources and organization often were independent of British influence. Thus, when the revolt came, the Arabs were better organized and had more resources on which to draw than they did before the British came to power. The necessities of government also often constrained co-optation. To administer the country the British were forced to employ more Christians than Muslims due to their higher levels of education, thus limiting the scale and effectiveness of co-optation.

Despite all these problems, co-optation probably helped keep the peace for several years. Co-optation kept open bridges from the government to important leaders and families who

otherwise would have joined the nationalist opposition more actively. The government had regular contacts with important families such as the Husseinis and the Nashishibis and dissuaded them from actively supporting violent nationalist activity for many years. Co-optation thus formed a link between the government and the governed. While peace did not prevail in Palestine, many years of the Mandate did not witness tremendous bloodshed, in part because the government could react to community concerns.

Co-optation also weakened the opposition tremendously. Arab political elites generally did not lead the Arab revolt, which made it an incoherent--and unsuccessful--mass movement rather than an organized revolution. Christians in particular were more satisfied with the Mandate than the Muslims in part because they received a greater share of leadership positions. This may explain why Christian elites, while active politically against Zionism, generally did not organize for violence.

Devolution. Devolution served to strengthen community divisions under the Palestine Mandate and actually intensified conflict in the long-term. Because devolution left groups free to organize, relative autonomy turned into a shield for political activism and preparation for violence. Both communities used the very organizations through which the British administered (such as the Supreme Muslim Council and the Jewish Agency) to mobilize their followers and organize for violence. The independent press, organizations such as scouts and religious councils, and other institutions all were used to isolate those opposing violence.

The examples of neighboring Arab powers further highlighted the deficiencies of devolution. Because neighboring Arab territories were gaining their independence, the Arab community did not consider the level of devolution sufficient. Indeed, the idea of the Mandate

came to be seen as demeaning by the Arab community, particularly when Arabs elsewhere acquired self-rule.⁴⁴¹

The Mandate appeared particularly susceptible to problems with devolution for two reasons. First, its finite duration meant that the best organized community would in the best position to take power after it ended. Both Arabs and Jews had the potential to become dominant if they played their cards right. Second, because the Mandate system left open the question of the post-independence division of spoils, groups never received assurance about their place in the system. Both sides worried that once the British left, their ability to worship freely, speak their language of choice, and be physically safe be in jeopardy. Thus, we may tentatively conclude that if a groups' gains may be imperilled easily, they will not be satisfied by devolution.

Participation. Participation never got off the ground under the Mandate. Despite the best efforts of Samuel and other British administrators, Arab community leaders did not take part in the system, believing that by so doing they would legitimate a Jewish presence in Palestine. This failure illustrates several problems with a strategy of participation. First, and most obviously, to use participation effectively people must participate. When people can be prevented by radicals from voting, as they were under the Mandate, participation is not likely to work to end ethnic conflict. Second, elites have little incentive to foster participation when the governing system itself does not depend on participatory institutions. Under the British, the Mandate authority still worked through traditional elites even as it attempted to set up participatory institutions. As the power and benefits of elites were ensured through the traditional system, they had little incentive to embrace change.

⁴⁴¹ Correspondence with academic expert, April 1996.

Family Four: Mediation

Mediation was not the primary policy used by the British in Palestine. Nevertheless, they did try to use their good offices to bring Arab and Jewish communities together and encouraged private meetings in the hopes that an atmosphere of trust would develop.

Track One. The British attempt to broker talks to prevent violence failed completely. British mediators were highly skilled, but substantive issues of hegemony and security proved too difficult to solve. In fact, individuals involved in the violence on both sides cited the British mediation effort as a reason behind their decision to prepare for violence. Both sides feared the British would not protect them or heed their interests.

The Palestine Mandate case is an uncertain test for mediation theory. Mediation, after all, cannot solve what may have been an insoluble problem. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews would be happy with a compromise solution that gave the other superior, or even equal status. Both felt the land was theirs by right.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the presence of an honest broker often cannot guarantee peace for several reasons. First, external forces hampered the mediation effort. Zionist lobbying in London, and pressure from Arab leaders outside Palestine undermined the local British effort to negotiate solutions to the conflict. Outsiders also encouraged maximal demands on both sides. Second, when security concerns are high and radicals can organize, concessions and mediation merely made the government look weak. The appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, for example, made it appear to the Jews that the British were rewarding aggression. Similarly, it demonstrated to Arabs that violence was an effective way to influence the government. Third, if one or both groups are hegemonic, then mediation can be counterproductive. Greater

transparency and mutual understanding will increase perceptions that compromise is impossible.

Track two mediation. During the Arab Revolt, and at times during the 1930s, Zionist and Palestinian leaders met in private to discuss their differences. Such talks, however, only worsened relations as they confirmed what both parties suspected: that no mutually satisfactory compromise was possible. Records of the meetings between Arabs and Jews during the riots indicate that leaders of both sides recognized that the other could not make sacrifices necessary for peaceful coexistence. As in Track One mediation, the knowledge and understanding gained during the talks only confirmed to both sides that the other was bent on dominance.

Case IVB: The Military Government

After the wars of 1947-1949, which cemented the transformation of the Palestine Mandate into the state of Israel, violent conflict between Jews and Palestinians living within Israel's boundaries stopped. Despite the fears of Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs were not a fifth column during Arab-Israeli wars nor did they support Palestinian terrorists. In fact, many Israeli Arabs participated in voluntary war work.

This mysterious passivity is especially surprising given the relationship between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews. After 1949, Israeli Arabs feared for their security, worried about their status, and felt neglected by the government--all potential sources of conflict. The violence of the Mandate period, the civil war preceding statehood, and even the early years of the military government led Israeli Arabs to fear for their security. Nor were Israeli Arabs well represented in elite positions or in government. The Jewish government had expropriated at least some of the land from over half of the Israeli Arab families. In general, the treatment of the Israeli Arabs by

the Israeli government, when compared to the British government, was far worse with regard to consulting with the community, allowing its members to organize, and respecting Arab culture. Yet despite all these problems, violence did not break out.

This section first describes the enormous changes in the Israeli Arab community wrought by the 1947-1949 wars. Following this discussion, it lays out the various policies used by the Israeli government to manage relations with the Israeli Arab community during the time of military rule, which ended in 1966. It then notes how these policies produced little violence despite high levels of communal tension. As in the past section, various social changes occurring in Israel are examined for their effect on ethnic relations. Finally, the section concludes by drawing lessons learned from the time of the military government.

Box IVC: Israel under the Military Government: An Ethnic Relations Success

Primary Policies Used

- o Selective control
- o Co-optation
- o Divide-and-rule

Secondary Policies Used

- o Participation (limited)
- o Identity change

Role of Outside Powers

- o Heightened Jewish security fears

Important Intervening Variables

- o Radically altered Arab demographics
-

A New Demographic Balance

In 1949 the Palestinians in the new state of Israel found themselves strangers in a familiar land. Perhaps as many as 750,000 Palestinian Arabs of a pre-war population of 900,000 had left or were driven out of

Israel.⁴⁴² Almost the entire Palestinian Arab elite were among those who had fled.⁴⁴³ Of those Palestinians who remained, from one sixth to one half were internal refugees, separated from their homes and their land.⁴⁴⁴ Arab cities in particular were devastated. Jaffa's Mandate population of 70,000 Arabs shrank to fewer than 3,600; Haifa's went from 71,200 to 2,900; and the Arab communities of Tiberias and Safad disappeared completely.⁴⁴⁵ Thus, in 1948 the new Israeli Arab found themselves a much smaller and much weaker community.

Israeli Arabs were (and remain) geographically concentrated in three areas. In 1948, around 90,000 lived in central or western Galilee; 31,000 lived in the "Little Triangle," and 13,000, most of whom were bedouin, lived in the Negev. The remaining 30,000 or so were scattered in mixed cities or in Jewish areas. Of those who remained, 71 percent were Arab

⁴⁴² Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 147; Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 28. Benny Morris, in his analysis of an Israeli Defense Force report on the subject of Arab refugees, persuasively argues that roughly 70 percent of the Palestinians who left Israel did so because of Israeli Defense Forces or dissident Jewish organization military operations. See Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948," in *Triumph and Catastrophe*, pp. 181-185.

⁴⁴³ This exodus almost certainly created a "selection effect"--i.e. violent individuals left the new state for fear of punishment, making the remaining population unusually passive.

⁴⁴⁴ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 160; Aziz Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 12; Majid al-Haj notes that internal refugees, unlike typical refugees, are not likely to be completely displaced from their former social context. See "The Arab Internal Refugees in Israel: The Emergence of a Minority within the Minority," in *Palestinians Under Israeli Rule*, Ian Lustick, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 1.

⁴⁴⁵ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49; Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. 24.

Muslims, 21 percent were Christians, and 9 percent were Circassian and Druze.⁴⁴⁶ Christian Arabs were far more likely to be urban than Muslim Arabs.

For Israeli Jews, the new state came at enormous costs. Over 6,000 Jews died in the fighting for independence. Even after the armistice, Arab infiltrators murdered dozens of Jews, and the neighboring Arab states never renounced their aggressive intentions.⁴⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, a siege mentality developed.⁴⁴⁸ Typifying this sentiment, the new Minister of Education in 1950 declared, "Military training must become an inseparable part of education. 'All Israel--soldiers!' this must be [our] slogan ..."⁴⁴⁹

The practical problem of absorbing a flood of new citizens complicated this insecurity. Between 1948 and 1951, over 650,000 Jewish immigrants entered Israel, doubling the country's Jewish population.⁴⁵⁰ To absorb these returning kinsmen, the Jewish leadership sought to put Arab resources at the disposal of Jewish authorities.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁶ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49. The Muslim percentage of the Israeli Arab population has increased to roughly 78 percent today due to a higher rate of natural increase among the Muslim population than the Christian population. The largest Christian sects are the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox sects. See Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy: Patterns of Ethnic Inequality* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 18.

⁴⁴⁷ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 54.

⁴⁴⁸ See Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism* (London: Paladin Grafton, 1988) for an excellent description of this mentality.

⁴⁴⁹ As quoted in Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 41.

⁴⁵⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 44.

⁴⁵¹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 45.

The new Israeli government confiscated huge amounts of Palestinian land.⁴⁵² Under the Absentee Property Act of 1950, the government took roughly 40 percent of the Israeli Arabs' land.⁴⁵³ Indeed, the law transferred not just land, but a person's entire property. The Custodian of Absentees' Property even seized Islamic endowment property. In 1958, the Knesset passed the Law of Prescription, which demanded that land ownership be proven for 50 years for it to be immune from government seizure. The Ottomans and the British, however, never registered Arab land, leaving almost all Arab land vulnerable.⁴⁵⁴ Furthermore, much of the Arab cultivators' land had been owned by the state (classed as *miri* land) but was used by peasants; the Israeli government confiscated this land and gave it to Jews.⁴⁵⁵ Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and 1953, 350 were on land classified as "abandoned." Nearly 200,000 Jews obtained housing by moving into abandoned Arab villages; by 1954, one third of Israel's Jewish population lived on absentee property.⁴⁵⁶ As a result of all these

⁴⁵² This transfer of land was not a deliberate part of an ethnic control policy. In general, the transfer policy derived from government attempts to settle incoming Jews, calm fears about national security, and give Jews priority in each domain.

⁴⁵³ The 1950 law decreed that the property of those who left the country for whatever reason went to the government. However, an absentee included internal refugees; i.e. those who fled from one village to another within Israel.

⁴⁵⁴ Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, translated by Meric Dobson (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 59-77. Jiryis notes that 1/16 of the total area of Palestine was under religious endowment control in 1936, and this property was transferred to the government. Although land confiscated was paid for, the prices reflected old land values that were well under later prices. McDowall contends that as late as 1925 75 percent of the land in Palestine was not registered. See *The Palestinians*, p. 7.

⁴⁵⁵ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 40.

⁴⁵⁶ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 56 and p. 58.

expropriations, Arab villages often lost more than two thirds of their land, and much of the land that remained in their hands was of poor quality.⁴⁵⁷

Even where Israeli Arabs had land, the state limited their water and electricity quotas and excluded them from marketing, credit, and purchasing cooperatives. As a result, many Arab peasants left agriculture to become unskilled workers.⁴⁵⁸ By 1966, Arab land ownership per head was one sixteenth of what it was under the Mandate.⁴⁵⁹

Symbolic changes inherent in switching from a colonial state to a Jewish national home compounded these demographic and material losses for Israeli Arabs. The civic life of the new state--Independence Day, the Sabbath, Jewish festivals, and other official events--held little meaning for Israeli Arabs, or even reminded them of their loss of dominance. Furthermore, the Israeli stamp on their passports made them pariahs in the rest of the Arab world. As one Israeli Arab community leader noted, "It is difficult to explain the shock our community felt after the War. Overnight, it seemed, we had lost everything."⁴⁶⁰

Government Policies

To manage the Palestinian Arab community, the Israeli government used a combination of selective control, co-optation, and divide-and-rule strategies. This combination of policies

⁴⁵⁷ Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities*, p. 26.

⁴⁵⁸ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 161.

⁴⁵⁹ Amina Minns and Nadia Hijab, *Citizens Apart: A Portrait of Palestinians in Israel* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 30.

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Israeli Arab community leader, September 1996.

prevented Israeli Arabs from organizing independently of the government and reassured Israeli Jews as to their security and status.

The new Israeli government immediately placed Arab areas under military rule. Although the use of military government had its origins in British laws enacted during times of unrest, the Israelis used these laws despite the lack of violence in the Israeli Arab population, justifying their decision as a preemptive security measure.⁴⁶¹ Prime Minister Ben Gurion and other Israeli leaders cited internal subversion and aid to foreign infiltrators as possible dangers that might happen were military government abolished.

The military government laws were an attempt to use selective control to prevent any hostile Israeli Arab political activity. Although they placed limits on the use of violence to terrorize a subject population, they allowed censorship, the restriction of free movement, and administrative detention. The military government also had the power to deprive individuals of their possessions, control contacts among suspected dissidents, require regular check-ins at a police station, and expel people. The government also maintained an active intelligence presence in Israeli Arab areas.

The military government sought to prevent Arabs from organizing and to weaken them as a community. The government appointed village headmen and used them as information sources, not as community representatives.⁴⁶² Although Arab members of the Knesset existed, they were entirely co-opted by the Mapai (which later became the Labor party) government; for

⁴⁶¹ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p.3. Jiryis notes that Jewish lawyers vociferously opposed these same laws under the British, comparing them to Nazi laws (pp. 4-5.).

⁴⁶² Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, p. 48.

example, Arab members of the Knesset repeatedly voted against abolishing military government, which was widely loathed by Israeli Arabs.⁴⁶³ Israeli Arabs were under a strict curfew, and granting of work permits was often conditional on informing on those politically active in the village, particularly those who were considering violence.⁴⁶⁴ In one secret government memorandum leaked to the press, the Ministry of Interior proposed maintaining a covert presence among the Israeli Arab population and suppressing agitators.⁴⁶⁵

Although the Israeli system promised nominal rights and equality for Arabs, the Mapai government did not enforce the laws protecting Israeli Arab rights. Israeli courts were not willing to interfere on security matters--which by definition included almost anything concerned with the military government--and many of the laws passed to prevent discrimination were not enforced with regard to the Arabs.⁴⁶⁶

Israeli Jews also attempted to inhibit the development of Israeli Arab culture. The

⁴⁶³ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, p. 53.

⁴⁶⁴ Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*, pp. 126-127.

⁴⁶⁵ Many scholars argue that the government consciously moved to prevent economic advancement by the Palestinian Arab population. This view has some merit. The same memorandum cited here also calls for "intensifying economic discrimination in order to deprive Arabs of the "social and economic security that relieves the individual and the family of day-to-day pressures, [and] grants them, consciously or subconsciously, leisure for 'social nationalist' thought." I disagree, however, that this proposal became policy. Although the Israeli government certainly did not promote Arab development aggressively, it did not actively hinder it. Israeli Arabs could enter most professions and the government expanded education. In fact, the standard of living for Israeli Arabs steadily rose since 1948. Had the Israeli government indeed followed this policy, selective taxation and other monetary punishments probably would have been used to prevent Israeli Arab economic development.

⁴⁶⁶ David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 83.

government often prohibited writers and poets from publishing their work. At times it even arrested or imprisoned them. However, the exposure of Israeli Arabs to Arab culture outside Israel (radio broadcasts from Arab countries, writings from the West Bank, etc.) limited the effectiveness of these measures.

The military government also actively co-opted traditional Arab leaders and potential cultural elites. The government offered activist students high-paying positions in the Histadrut and state agencies.⁴⁶⁷ The government paid particular attention to giving Arab intellectuals a role in the civil service and tried to play them off against traditional elites to weaken the independence of both.⁴⁵⁸

The social organization of Israeli Arabs facilitated Israeli Jewish co-optation. Many Israeli Arabs, conditioned by years of Ottoman and British rule, cooperated readily with the ruling officials.⁴⁶⁹ The clan system also helped the Israeli government. If the clan elders could be persuaded to support a party, they usually could deliver the votes of all the clan members.⁴⁷⁰ Non-clan Arab elites lacked independent bases of support, making it easier to co-opt them.⁴⁷¹ This economic weakness initially reinforced the clan structure, as individuals had to fall back on their families for economic security.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁷ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 167.

⁴⁶⁸ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 219.

⁴⁶⁹ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, p. 48.

⁴⁷⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 61.

⁴⁷¹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 79.

⁴⁷² Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 156-171. Lustick also notes that not until the 1960s did the government stop sanctioning pay differences for the same job (188).

Rewards to cooperative individuals ranged from seats in local government to smaller favors such as making farm machinery available or allowing relatives to visit. Individuals selected to sit on the Municipal Councils, for example, influenced tax collection, infrastructure development, the appointment of school administrators, and the granting of permits.⁴⁷³ Pro-government merchants would not have to reapply for licenses to keep their stores open. Clan elders who supported the government would be given work vouchers to dispense, and Bedouin sheikhs gained the authority to charge fees for registering births and marriages. More important than any specific award, the co-opted official gained access to Jewish officials that could help him get things done.⁴⁷⁴

Those co-opted, in turn, ensured political stability. Clan elders, for fear of jeopardizing ties to the authorities, prevented younger clan members from demonstrating against the government and also informed on individuals hostile to the government.⁴⁷⁵ By appointing elites to positions of influence, the Israeli government changed the basis of elite strength from community support to the ability to gain resources from the government. This furthered the ability of elites to dispense patronage, but it came at the price of political independence.

Most Israeli Arabs did not gain much from the government--only the leaders were co-opted. The Israeli Arab standard of living was far lower than that of Israeli Jews during the time of military government. Discrimination against Israeli Arabs was common. In 1961, only 1

⁴⁷³ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 121.

⁴⁷⁴ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 204-206.

⁴⁷⁵ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 222-224.

percent of Israeli civil servants were Arabs, while Arabs were 11 percent of the population.⁴⁷⁶ In the 1950s and 1960s, only 408 housing units were built for the Arab sector.⁴⁷⁷

Economic dependence on Jews or on the Israeli state reinforced 'he Israeli Arabs' political dependence and made co-optation easier. Almost half of all Arab university graduates from 1961 to 1971--a natural source of community leaders--became high school teachers and thus depended on the Ministry of Education for their livelihoods.⁴⁷⁸ For Arabs to work for public institutions and for many private enterprises they needed authorization from the Security Forces, an authorization that came with an implicit promise to cooperate politically. The underdeveloped nature of the economy also made economic blacklists potent.⁴⁷⁹

Over time, Israeli Arabs became increasingly dependent on the Jewish economy. Fewer Arabs as a percentage of the population held white collar jobs, academic positions, or were members of the professions.⁴⁸⁰ In part because government and Jewish institutions did not invest in Arab areas, infrastructure was lacking in Arab areas, and Arab farmers and firms were at a competitive disadvantage. State regulations, administrative policies, and lack of action combined to prevent the development of an Arab economy.⁴⁸¹ As a result, many Arabs became workers on Jewish concerns in agriculture or as urban wage-earners.

⁴⁷⁶ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 141.

⁴⁷⁷ Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population*, p. 17.

⁴⁷⁸ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 21.

⁴⁷⁹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 194; Fouzi el-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978), p. 59.

⁴⁸⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 161-162.

⁴⁸¹ Lewin-Epstein Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, p. 45.

The extent of Jewish penetration of Arab society was far greater than that of the British.

As Sharif Kanaana notes:

In this society the Jew, unlike the Britisher, is not only a soldier, he is the whole society, and he controls every aspect of the villager's everyday life. The Jew is the police officer, the tax collector, the nurse, the doctor, the lawyer, the taxi driver, the office clerk, the bank teller, the employer, the seller, the buyer of the crops, the political leader, the governor; he is everything, and always he is in a position of power and control, and he is hard to understand and to deal with, he is a stranger with strange ways.⁴⁸²

This penetration made it easier for the Israeli government to influence Israeli Arab behavior.

Under the military government, Israeli officials tried to split off the Druze, Christian, and Bedouin communities from the larger Arab one. The government gave Christians greater privileges to divide them from Muslims and allowed Druze and Bedouin communities greater freedom of movement than other Arabs.⁴⁸³ Furthermore, the government allowed members of both the Druze and Bedouin communities to join the army--a key concession because military service came with a host of economic benefits and was a symbol of civic inclusion.⁴⁸⁴ The government also fractured communities internally. The military government divided the Bedouin into 41 tribal factions and organized the Arab village population by clan.⁴⁸⁵

Druze in particular were culled from the Arab flock. In 1957, the government recognized the Druze as an independent Muslim religious community with their own religious courts and

⁴⁸² Sharif Kanaana, *Socio-Cultural and Psychological Adjustment of the Arab Minority in Israel* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1976), pp. 61-62.

⁴⁸³ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁴ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 22.

⁴⁸⁵ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 83.

officials. Druze were not allowed to list "Arab" rather than "Druze" on their identity card.⁴⁸⁶ Until recently, Druze villages were given disproportionate financial assistance--three times as much as was spent on Muslim or Christian Arabs.⁴⁸⁷ Druze found it relatively easy to find work in Israel and hold high positions in the Army, the Histadrut, and the Ministry of Education. Despite the traditional Druze culture of autonomy, they became increasingly dependent on the Israeli state.⁴⁸⁸ This brought into being a Druze leadership that would not exist were the community classed as part of the broader Muslim community. As one Druze community member noted: "our leaders would have far less influence and independence had the Jews lost the war of 1948."⁴⁸⁹

Government education policy attempted to downplay Arab identity. The military administration appointed new teachers and paid their salaries, and political rather than pedagogic criteria were the key to hiring and firing at all levels.⁴⁹⁰ The Ministry of Education dictated budgets, curricula, teaching appointments, and textbooks. Schools downplayed Arab history and other themes that might unite Arabs.⁴⁹¹ Indeed, as late as 1975 Arab high schools devoted more

⁴⁸⁶ Ben-Dor, *The Druzes in Israel*, p. 101.

⁴⁸⁷ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 133 and p. 210.

⁴⁸⁸ This manipulation, however, was aided by natural splits and resentment within the Palestinian community. Young Druze had even tried to join the Haganah during the days of the Mandate. See Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 144.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Druze community leader, September 1996.

⁴⁹⁰ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 64.

⁴⁹¹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 135.

hours to studying Hebrew literature than Arabic literature.⁴⁹²

Political Parties under the Military Government

Political parties reinforced selective control (and to a lesser extent co-optation) by interfering with independent Israeli Arab political organization. Thus, political parties in Israel did not fulfill traditional functions of parties such as articulating demands or helping interest groups be heard in decision-making. Although Israeli Arabs participated in the political process in large numbers, this did not result in true influence on decisionmaking.

The military government worked against the formation of independent Arab political movements, and Zionist political parties did not seek to create lasting institutions to keep Arabs politically active.⁴⁹³ When Israeli Arabs tried to form their own political movements, government authorities would take away members' travel permits and at times expel leaders.⁴⁹⁴ Zionist political parties usually had separate Arab lists, which facilitated clientism rather than political mobilization.

The fate of the Al-Ard (the Land) movement is instructive. Al-Ard, which called for equal rights for Arabs and Jews and the return of expropriated land among other issues, had an Arab nationalist philosophy. Its rhetoric reflected sympathy for Nasser. In 1961 the group formed around a newspaper of the same name, which the military government quickly closed down. In 1964, the group registered in the Journalists' League. The authorities then declared the

⁴⁹² Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, pp. 81-82.

⁴⁹³ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 112.

⁴⁹⁴ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 126.

group illegal on security grounds, jailed several leaders, placed others under house arrest, and made membership punishable by imprisonment.⁴⁹⁵

The Israeli government also prevented the formation of independent institutions (sport clubs, youth groups, writers clubs, etc.) that might take on a political role. Whenever such a group would arise, Israeli Jewish institutions such as the Histadrut would offer a rival to it while authorities would suppress the original independent group or harass group members.⁴⁹⁶ For example, attempts to form an Arab Sports Club to include youth from the Galilee and the Little Triangle led the government to arrest its organizers and close the village where they tried to meet.⁴⁹⁷ At the same time, the Histadrut began to form sports clubs for Israeli Arabs. Until the 1967, *Al-Yawm* (the Day) was the only Arabic newspaper published, and it came out under the aegis of the Histadrut.⁴⁹⁸

The Israeli elective system served to facilitate control, not representation, by intensifying clan rivalries. The government drew electoral lists from rival clans, and each clan was given different ballots so the military authorities would know how they voted.⁴⁹⁹ Frightened at the prospect of one clan forming an exclusive alliance with the military administration, elders of other clans sought their own connections with authorities. The Military Administration then based its patronage on which clan cooperated most, with cooperation being measured by the

⁴⁹⁵ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 130-140; Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 128.

⁴⁹⁶ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 81.

⁴⁹⁷ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 128.

⁴⁹⁸ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 22.

⁴⁹⁹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 138.

clans' willingness to inform of dissidents, sell land, and deliver votes.⁵⁰⁰

Given that patronage was based on support for the government, it is not surprising that ruling parties, particularly the Mapai and the National Religious Party, gained most Israeli Arab votes during the military government period. These parties controlled the patronage gates and the levers of the military government. Without the approval of the Mapai Party, no Arab civil servant would be appointed or help would be extended to an Arab area.⁵⁰¹ The Ministry of Religion used its powers to appoint prayer leaders and religious court officials to reward government supporters. As the Ministry was often controlled by religious parties, Arab villages at times voted to support Jewish religious parties.

The military government also tried to use Israeli Arabs to advance the interests of the ruling Mapai Party. Allegiance to the Mapai party became a test of loyalty to the state--the government would use special ballots for a village to determine who was cooperating (i.e. voting for Mapai) and who was not.⁵⁰² The military government officials tried to ostracize families that supported Mapai's political rivals by denying them travel permits, subjecting them to frequent interrogations, or harassing their friends and families.⁵⁰³ The military authorities even harassed Jewish members of rival parties such as the leftist Mapam who worked to support Israeli Arabs.⁵⁰⁴ Villages that did not support Mapai were denied roads, schools, and infrastructure

⁵⁰⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 138.

⁵⁰¹ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 49

⁵⁰² Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 52.

⁵⁰³ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 24.

⁵⁰⁴ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 146.

development.⁵⁰⁵

Several Jewish-origin parties, particularly the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah), played a major role in Israeli Arab political and cultural life but did not affect national politics directly. Rakah gave Arab intellectuals newspapers to write in and expressed Arab grievances.⁵⁰⁶ By 1957, Rakah virtually became the spokesman for disaffected Israeli Arabs.⁵⁰⁷ Over time, Rakah developed an impressive infrastructure of local committees, mayors, youth groups, work camps, and publications.⁵⁰⁸ Rakah and its various "front" organizations (such as the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils and the Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands) initially focused on local issues such as education, planning, water, and sanitation.⁵⁰⁹ Rakah, as it became dominated by Israeli Arabs, became a pariah to Israeli Jews. Zionist parties would not ally with it in parliament for fear of being labelled "soft" on Arabs.

Policies with regard to Jews

The government sought to assuage Jewish fears about security and to satisfy demands for

⁵⁰⁵ Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*, p. 132.

⁵⁰⁶ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 39.

⁵⁰⁷ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 125. The United Labor Party (Mapam), accepted Israeli Arabs as equal members and briefly encouraged Israeli Arab literary journals, but soon lost support due to its commitment to Zionism.

⁵⁰⁸ Ian Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," in *The Elections in Israel--1988*, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 115.

⁵⁰⁹ Elie Rekhess, "The Politicization of Israel's Arabs," in *Every Sixth Israeli: Relations Between the Jewish Majority and the Arab Minority in Israel*, Alouph Hareven, ed. (Jerusalem: Daf-Chen Press, 1983), pp. 140-141.

Jewish hegemony. In general, Jewish institutions remained of and for Jews. Muslim and Christian Arabs, for example, were not allowed to join the army, which was a major source of material benefits (public assistance programs, jobs, etc.) as well as a symbol of national identity. Jewish institutions originally founded to create a Jewish state--the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the World Zionist Organization--after 1948 worked to expand Jewish immigration and land ownership.⁵¹⁰ These institutions often had budgets comparable to the Israeli government, and all of it was spent exclusively on Jews. Indeed, their internal constitutions pledged the organizations to work only for the welfare of Jews. Most government ministries had separate "Arab departments," but these often operated without budgets and without policies.⁵¹¹ The Histadrut owned thousands of firms and factors, but not one was located in an Arab village. Of the 18 members of the Histadrut Central Committee then, none were Arab.⁵¹² Israeli leaders denied even token efforts to demonstrate binationalism. For example, in 1958 Prime Minister Ben Gurion refused to accept an identity because it was *also* printed in Arabic.⁵¹³

The government also employed a strong security presence in Israeli Arab areas to reassure

⁵¹⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 89. The World Zionist Organization (WZO) was founded in 1897 as the official organizational body of Zionism; the Jewish Agency was the Jewish organization that worked with the British government under the mandate. The WZO functioned as the Jewish Agency until 1929. In that year the two split, with the WZO focusing on Diaspora Jews although the two continued to work closely together. In 1942 they merged again but in 1970 they separated along previous lines.

⁵¹¹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 91.

⁵¹² Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 96.

⁵¹³ Anton Shamma, "Diary," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 33.

the Jewish community as well as prevent subversion. As one Israeli expert noted: "Even then many people in government realized that the Arabs were peaceful. But no government could be seen as soft on this issue as most Jews still considered these Arabs to be enemies."⁵¹⁴

Limited Violence but Mutual Suspicion

Almost no violence against Jews by Israeli Arabs occurred during the time of the military government, and the few attempts at subversion were quickly discovered and prevented. At the same time, however, the military government's harsh hand engendered resentment among Israeli Arabs.

The Israeli policy of undermining the Arab community proved successful as Israeli Arabs formed neither an effective interest group nor a viable identity. In 1954, Moshe Karen, the Arab-affairs editor for *Haaretz* wrote:

...the Arabs who live in our State are almost the opposite of a pressure group; they constitute a group which has at its disposal almost no means of exerting pressure. Anyone who is aware of the decisive importance, in a system such as ours, of having access to means of exerting pressure in order to obtain some favor or satisfy some demand, will easily understand how not having access to such means of pressure influences the status of such a group and the likelihood that its needs will be met.⁵¹⁵

The lack of independent institutions also hindered Israeli Arab efforts to create a strong identity. In 1966, the rank order of identities for Israeli Arabs polled was "Israeli" and "Israeli Arab" ahead of "Arab" or "Palestinian."⁵¹⁶ Clan identities also remained strong.

⁵¹⁴ Interview with Israeli academic, September 1996.

⁵¹⁵ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 115.

⁵¹⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 170.

The military government's heavy-handed methods inspired limited resentment among Israeli Arabs. Sabri Jiryis notes that the great majority of Israeli Arabs who actually became involved in violence were young men who were badly treated by the military government, which reaped the whirlwind of its policies. The vast majority of Israeli Arabs, however, became resigned to Israel's existence and even those who opposed it did not do so actively.⁵¹⁷

Despite the lack of violence, both communities remained hostile to the other. Though politically quiescent, Israeli Arabs did not support the established order. One survey taken at the end of military government indicated that over half of Israeli Arabs would prefer to live in an Arab state over Israel. Press articles by Israeli Arabs suggested high levels of resentment over land expropriations, economic discrimination, and restrictions on education.⁵¹⁸ Israeli Arab intellectuals and poets were particularly critical of the state.

Israeli Jews, for their part, remained highly suspicious of Israeli Arabs. As one Israeli official noted, "You have to remember that for decades before 1948 our Arab neighbors were our enemies. Declaring that these Arabs were now Israelis did not dispel this feeling immediately."⁵¹⁹ Uri Loubrani, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs, even declared that Israeli Arabs were the "sworn and everlasting enemies" of the state.⁵²⁰ The Chief of the North Command, who headed the military government, once called the Arabs of Galilee, "a cancer in

⁵¹⁷ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 38-40.

⁵¹⁸ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 8-12.

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Israeli government official, September 1996.

⁵²⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 68.

the heart of the nation."⁵²¹ Israeli Arabs were encouraged to accept Jewish dominance and learn Jewish ways, but this encouragement was not reciprocated. In Jewish schools, English was taught as the second language; Arabic or French were offered as a third.⁵²²

In general, outright violence by Jews against Arabs under the military government was rare. Secure in their dominant position, Jews did not use violence against Israeli Arabs even though most Jews wanted them to remain subordinate or to leave Israel. Interviews indicate that many Jews considered (and still consider) the police and the army to be "theirs": should the Arabs use violence, Jews, in a sense, have already armed and mobilized.

The brutal exception to this peace was the Kafr Qasim killings. On the eve of the 1956 war, Israeli soldiers killed almost 50 Israeli Arabs returning to their village from work, who were violating a last-minute curfew that they did not know was imposed.⁵²³ Sabri Jiryis, quoting official Israeli government reports of the incident, contends that the Israeli Army killed 47 Israeli Arabs. Although the officers and soldiers involved were punished, the Israeli Arab population believed the penalties were too light.⁵²⁴ In general, however, violence against Israeli Arabs was rare despite the high level of Jewish suspicion of the community as a whole.

Fears of violence, however, dominated Arab concerns. Fouzi el-Asmar, an Arab intellectual, writes of the pervasive atmosphere of violence and intimidation during his

⁵²¹ Shamma, "Diary," p. 30.

⁵²² Kanaana, *Socio-Cultural and Psychological Adjustment of the Arab Minority in Israel*, p. 69.

⁵²³ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, p. 101.

⁵²⁴ Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, p. 110.

childhood.⁵²⁵ The Kfar Qasim massacre reinforced this fear and underscored the discord between the two communities.⁵²⁶ As one Israeli Arab community leader noted, "growing up, I heard constant stories about beatings and random violence. The killings only confirmed this perception."⁵²⁷ Similarly, the security services succeeded in convincing Israeli Arabs that they knew all through informers, thus dividing the Arab community.⁵²⁸

Social Changes

Like the time of the Mandate, the era of military rule witnessed important changes in Arab society that affected ethnic relations in Israel. The most important impact of these changes was the expansion of education. Increased education created a newly-educated Arab élite that challenged the position of traditional elites--a development whose influence was felt at the end of military rule. In 1946 only 30 percent of school-age Israeli Arabs attended school; by 1955 this figure was 59 percent; by 1965 it was 75 percent and it was 82 percent by 1973.⁵²⁹ The great majority of Israeli Arabs became literate in both Arabic and Hebrew.⁵³⁰

Despite these educational advances, deficiencies in education engendered resentment. Israeli Arab schools were overwhelmed; throughout the 1950s perhaps 70 percent of Israeli Arab

⁵²⁵ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, pp. 1-11.

⁵²⁶ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 86.

⁵²⁷ Interview with Israeli Arab community leader, September 1997.

⁵²⁸ El-Asmar, *To Be an Arab in Israel*, p. 3.

⁵²⁹ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 20.

⁵³⁰ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 168.

teachers were not qualified.⁵³¹ Furthermore, the government did not strongly enforce compulsory education among the Arab population, particularly among Arab females.⁵³² The government did not found schools for teachers until 1958 and did not enroll large numbers until the late 1960s. Instruction in Hebrew--necessary for both career opportunities and university admission--was of low quality, and class size was large.⁵³³ Until the late 1970s only an extremely small number of Israeli Arabs attended agricultural and vocational schools and far fewer as a percentage of the population attended post-secondary institutions.⁵³⁴

Education had a profound affect on Israeli Arabs. The new educated class became active in trying to preserve and create a distinct identity for Israeli Arabs, thus hindering government efforts to subsume them under a dominant Israeli identity. Moreover, the new cultural elites provided new ideas that were a source of unity that extended across clan or sect, traditional dividing lines in Arab society.

Role of Outside Powers

In many ways Israeli Jews maintain a minority mentality despite their demographic dominance in Israel. Due to pre-immigration experiences and the perception that Israel is "outnumbered" in the Arab world, Israeli Jews feel vulnerable. Furthermore, Israeli Arabs are an

⁵³¹ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 18.

⁵³² Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 20. In the 1970s Mar'i estimates that perhaps 82 percent of Israeli Arabs of school age actually attended compared with 99 percent of Israeli Jews.

⁵³³ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, pp. 22-24.

⁵³⁴ *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, p. 634 and p. 642.

"enemy-affiliated" minority. Israeli Arabs, for their part, at times feel like a majority because of their ties to the broader Arab world, a perception that makes them even more strongly aware of their subordinate status.⁵³⁵

Outside powers have strengthened both communities. World Jewry provided tremendous material and political support for the new state. The Arab states, on the other hand, have encouraged Palestinian and Israeli Arabs to dream of regaining their land. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf states have refused to allow Palestinian Arabs to gain citizenship, thus keeping alive their hopes of recovering Palestine as much as Arab nonrecognition of Israel does.⁵³⁶ The Arab states also provided a source of books, poems, and other cultural materials that strengthened the Israeli Arabs' separate identity.

Outside powers also limited the options available to the Israeli government. Ben Gurion, for example, recognized that expelling Israeli Arabs was impossible since Israel depended on the goodwill of the United States and world Jewry, which would oppose such a measure.⁵³⁷

Outside powers played a major role both in the imposition of military government and in the one instance of significant violence--the Kafr Qasim massacre of 1956. The hostility of Israel's Arab neighbors, and their active support for subversion within Israel, contributed to popular support for military government. Despite military government control, the prospect of war increased Israeli Jewish security fears. Indeed, the Kafr Qasim massacre, which occurred on

⁵³⁵ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. xii.

⁵³⁶ Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 7.

⁵³⁷ Reinhard Wiemer, "Zionism and the Arabs after the Establishment of the State of Israel," in *Palestinians over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), Alexander Scholch, ed., p. 36.

the eve of the Suez War, cannot be understood without examining the international context. The Israeli government, fearing subversion, had hastily imposed draconian security restrictions on the Israeli Arab community. The haste brought about by the impending war led to sloppiness and exaggerated fear by the Israeli Jews.

Lessons Learned

Under the military government, the Israelis combined policies of selective repression, divide-and-rule tactics, and co-optation to prevent violence. Together, these policies hindered Arab efforts to organize politically. What does the experience of the military government tell us about managing ethnic relations?

Two caveats must be noted before comparing the Mandate with the period of Israeli military government. First, the Israeli Arabs were more likely to recognize that cooperation rather than resistance would be the most productive path after 1948 since, as a numerical minority, they had no chance of "winning the census." Thus, Israeli Arabs knew they must settle for less in terms of overall status. Hegemony, in particular, was out of the question. Second, the lessons of the past violence during the civil war made them recognize that their own security would be jeopardized by arming for violence.

Important Intervening Variables

The time of the military government was unusual for several reasons. First, the war of independence had led to tremendous demographic changes in the Israeli Arab community. Second, the Israeli Arab community that remained was highly fractured along clan and religious

lines. Third, the penetration of the society by the Israeli state gave the military government more control over the lives of Israel's Arab citizens than was typical before or after in Israel.

The incredible demographic changes in the Israeli Arab community in 1948 almost certainly helped the Israeli government's efforts to control the Arab community. Almost the entire Israeli Arab elite had fled, and those who remained were disorganized, poor, and shocked by the 1948 conflict.

Another factor shaping ethnic relations was the segmented nature of Israeli Arab society. The government did not have to create divisions among clans, between the Bedouin and the city dwellers, or between the Druze and the mainstream Muslim communities. It merely had to reinforce them. Thus, it was easier for the government to use divide-and-rule tactics. These same divisions also enabled the military government to manipulate elections and use them as a device to control the Israeli Arab community.

The greater penetration of Arab society under the military government as compared to the Mandate facilitated selective control. The military government, with its ties to every clan and village, knew who potential radicals were and also had tremendous leverage over the population as a whole. The Israeli Arabs' economic dependence--in general the poorest of the poor remained in Palestine and many of these had their land and houses taken away--made selective control easier. Israeli Arabs had no independent resources on which to fall back and had to concentrate on simple survival.

The centralized nature of the Israeli state--unlike that of the Mandate--made co-optation particularly effective. Because most economic and social activity was independent of the British administration, not cooperating with it did affect the lives of the Israeli Arabs. Not cooperating

with the military government, however, would prevent an individual from getting a job, building a house, or other daily activities.

Family One: Control

Selective control. Selective control prevented Israeli Arabs from organizing. Any attempts by Israeli Arabs to form political parties or independent organizations of any sort met with quick punishment. Organizing for violence was particularly difficult as the lack of a basic infrastructure of institutions, which had existed under the Mandate, prevented Arabs from coordinating their activities. The only organization allowed was that which facilitated Israeli Jewish control, such as clan organization or that done through Israeli Jewish political parties.

Selective control also reassured the Israeli Jewish community. Interviews suggest that because Jews knew the government was actively trying to prevent Israeli Arabs from organizing or arming, they had no need to arm themselves. This reassurance was particularly important given that outside powers sought to incite Israeli Arabs to rebel.

Selective control engendered resentment, but not enough to cause violence. A few Israeli Arabs did turn to subversion as a result of military rule, but the coercive and intelligence apparatus set up as part of selective control easily subdued them. Interviews and secondary sources suggest that Israeli Arabs lived in fear of these institutions of control and avoided any political activity as a result.

Divide and Rule. Divide-and-rule tactics weakened the Israeli Arab community and fragmented it into separate identities. Like selective control, it prevented ethnic organization. Rival clans and religious groups spied on one another and voted for Jewish rather than Arab

parties in order to gain the government's favor. Once a system was created, the elites of the new minorities had a tremendous incentive to continue the system, as their status was linked with the preservation of communal differences. Druzes and Bedouins often worked with the military government to the point of joining the military and the police. Similarly, rival clans worked against each other--and weakened the Arab community's influence as a bloc--to curry favor with the military authorities.

Family Two: Accommodation

Co-optation. Co-optation proved particularly effective during military rule. Co-optation under the military government, unlike co-optation under the Mandate, reduced the independence of Arab elites and tied them more firmly to the government. Elites depended entirely on the government for their position of influence. As a result, Israeli Arab political elites reinforced Jewish dominance rather than undermined it: some elites even supported the continuation of the military government rule over the Arabs despite its unpopularity among Arabs in general.

However, the era of the military government was an easy case for co-optation for two reasons. First, the Israeli Arab elite of the Mandate had fled, leaving the community without strong leaders who had widespread independent support. Second, the widespread poverty of the Israeli Arab community left both elites and their supporters highly dependent on the Israeli government.

Co-optation works well with selective control by bolstering the strength of moderate voices and weakening ethnic organization. Co-optation provides rewards for cooperation while selective control provides disincentives for resistance. Under the Mandate, elites could be

"outbid" by radicals who sought popular support because the radicals could promise greater benefits. Under military government, however, voices demanding violence or demanding resistance to the Israeli government were not heard due to censorship or arrests, making it easier for elites to cooperate with the government. Because neither violence nor political opposition was an option, the Israeli Arab masses had no choice but to support co-opted leaders even when their own benefits were small. Furthermore, the combination of selective control and co-optation reduced the independence of Israeli Arab civil society, preventing any form of autonomous organization from threatening the government's control.

Participation. Elections and parties during the time of Military Government do not constitute true participation as defined in Chapter III: Israeli Arabs did not have a realistic chance of influencing national decisionmaking or even of expressing their views on a variety of issues. Elections, in fact, reinforced Israeli Jewish dominance of the Arab community by establishing patronage networks that bolstered co-opted Israeli Arab elites. Not surprisingly, these mock elections did little to relieve ethnic grievances and led many Israeli Arabs over time to stop voting or to cast their ballots for pariah parties, such as the Communists, as a means of expressing their frustration with the political system.

Family Three: Identity Change

The Israeli government unsuccessfully tried to downplay the "Arab" identity of Israeli Arabs. Through education, propaganda, and the suppression of cultural elites, military government officials tried to reduce the Israeli Arabs' exposure to Arab culture and history and foster a sense of Israeli identity. This policy had some initial success. Because almost the entire

intelligentsia (and indeed, most literate Israeli Arabs) had fled in 1948, the Israeli Arab population initially had few leaders to articulate a different identity. Polls indicated that even as late as 1966 some Israeli Arabs accepted an Israeli identity.

This attempt to change the identity of Israeli Arabs, however, failed in the long-run. The failure occurred in large part because most Israeli Jews did not embrace their Arab neighbors, thus reducing any sentiment of shared identity. Propaganda from Israel's Arab neighbors also reinforced the "Arab" nature of Israeli Arab identity. Support for an Arab identity increased at the end of the military government period, when Israeli Arabs developed a strong intelligentsia capable of articulating a case for Arab unity.

Case IVC: The Post-Military Government Era

The late 1960s marked a turning point for the Israeli Arab community. From this time through the present, Israeli Arabs gradually increased their participation in Israeli society and politics while the level of control gradually fell. Although at first Israeli Arab activism took the form of supporting parties that rejected Zionism, Israeli Arabs became increasingly pragmatic in their voting choices. After the Labor party lost power in 1977, Israeli Jewish parties began recognizing the political importance of Israeli Arabs--a change that enabled Israeli Arabs to use their votes to gain better treatment for themselves. By the late 1980s the Israeli Arab community had become a stronger, more self-confident minority in Israel that used the democratic process to press for more rights and privileges. During this time, Israeli Jews increasingly recognized that Israeli Arabs were loyal citizens who did not support violence.

Box IV D: Israel after the Military Government: An Ethnic Relations Success

Primary Policies Used:

- o Police control
- o Participation

Secondary Policies Used:

- o Co-optation
- o Divide-and-rule

Role of Outside Powers:

- o Limited (reinforced Jewish security fears)
- o Strengthened Israeli Arab identity

Important Intervening Variables:

- o Proportional representation system
-

Several events in the late 1960s led to dramatic changes in the daily lives of Israeli Arabs. Military government ended in 1966, thus greatly expanding the range of civil liberties enjoyed by Israeli Arabs. The 1967 war quickly followed the end of military government. These two events brought Israeli Arabs into contact with Palestinians on the West Bank and Jordan, simultaneously increasing Israeli Arab awareness of other communities while allowing them the mobility to experience it firsthand. Exposure

to West Bank Palestinians strengthened Israeli Arabs' distinct identities and made them less content with their status in Israel. These events, when coupled with dramatic increases in education, led to the formation of a new Arab society.

Changes in the Jewish community, not Israeli Arab activism, led to the end of military government. Three changes contributed to the decision to end military rule: Israeli Arab political passivity; border tranquility, which further quieted Israeli Jewish fears about Israeli Arab subversion; and the Israeli Jewish public's devotion to democratic values.⁵³⁸ Together, these combined to reduce public perceptions of a security risk and raise concerns that Israel would be

⁵³⁸ Yochanon Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel," *American Journal of Sociology* (May 1971), p. 1030.

embarrassed during a time when minorities elsewhere were gaining more rights.

This section first describes the spread of participation during the post-military government period and analyzes Israeli Arab voting behavior. It then discusses how this increased participation improved the status of Israeli Arabs, paying particular attention to how it affected their attitude towards violence, and how Israeli Jewish attitudes toward their Arab neighbors began to change. As before, the section notes how social changes and outside powers affected communal relations in Israel. Furthermore, it also examines how Israeli Arab identity has changed over the years. Finally, this section concludes by noting what this section teaches us about the strategies outlined in Chapter III.

A Slow Transition

The transformation of the Israeli Arabs from a powerless community to a self-confident one took decades. The military government had left the Israeli Arab population weak and disorganized. No independent political institutions existed, and political elites remained co-opted. Economically, Israeli Arabs were concentrated in lower-paying jobs such as construction and farming and held few administrative or professional positions.⁵³⁹

Although the level of control fell after the end of military government, the Israeli government continued attempts to co-opt Arab leaders, divide the Arab community, and selectively punish those who did not cooperate with authorities. The government hoped to integrate Israeli Arabs into the life of the state by encouraging "positive" elements and

⁵³⁹ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 123.

suppressing potential dissidents.⁵⁴⁰ Over time, however, both the scope and scale of participation spread, and electoral politics became the major means for Israeli Arabs to express their grievances.

The Israeli government continued trying to co-opt leading Arabs after the end of military government and control Arab political activity. A 1973 government report noted that the government regularly provided cooperative Arabs with personal benefits.⁵⁴¹ One Israeli Arab noted that control policies remained in effect at the beginning of the military government:

Despite the end of military government, it remained obvious that even basic types of political activity--organizing your own parties, choosing your leaders, etc.--were prohibited. Although free movement was now guaranteed, arrests and harassment remained common.⁵⁴²

The state remained the source of patronage, and it received loyalty in exchange. Muslim religious functionaries (religious judges, prayer leaders, etc.) remained civil servants because the Muslim religious endowment was controlled by the government.⁵⁴³ Israeli Arab teachers were still constantly criticized for selling out even though many were active nationalists, in part because they were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to the state of Israel.⁵⁴⁴ Similarly, Arab institutions not under the government's control were denied resources. Even large and important Israeli Arab organizations such as the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Governments-

⁵⁴⁰ Sabri Jiryis, "The Arabs in Israel, 1973-79," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8:4, p. 32.

⁵⁴¹ Shammās, "Diary," pp. 38-39.

⁵⁴² Interview with Israeli Arab academic, August 1996.

⁵⁴³ Atallah Mansour, "On Integration, Equality, and Coexistence," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 92.

⁵⁴⁴ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, pp. 37-38.

-an organization of elected local Israeli officials and other Israeli Arab notables--for example, had no staff and operates without even an office.⁵⁴⁵

The Israeli government also continued to use divide-and-rule tactics to prevent the formation of a united Arab front. Israeli officials discouraged the formation of a Palestinian identity and sought to reinforce particularist religious, regional, and clan loyalties.⁵⁴⁶ The government still gave preferential treatment to certain Arab subcommunities, such as the Druze, Circassians, and Christians--in 1976, for example, the government separated Druze education from Arab education in order "to emphasize Druze tradition and history."⁵⁴⁷ Within the Muslim community, the government provided benefits to cooperative villages with regard to development spending.⁵⁴⁸

The Spread of Participation

Divisions within the Jewish community allowed Israeli Arabs to assume a greater political role in the 1970s. During the time of the military government, the Labor party could count on steady Israeli Arab support due to its monopoly on power. Disaffected Israeli Arabs voted for the Communist party, Rakah, or for other non-mainstream parties as a protest, since their votes for mainstream parties had little hope of changing conditions for Israeli Arabs. When

⁵⁴⁵ Mansour, "On Integration, Equality, and Coexistence," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 94.

⁵⁴⁶ Mahmoud Mi'ari, "Traditionalism and Political Identity of Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* XXII:1-2, 1987, p. 34.

⁵⁴⁷ McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 48.

⁵⁴⁸ Shammas, "Diary," pp. 38-39.

Likud's narrow electoral victory in 1977 broke Labor's hold on power, however, Israeli Arabs began to take on a greater role.

As a result of Likud's victory, the Labor Party became more responsive to Israeli Arabs, smaller parties stepped up their competition for the Israeli Arab vote, and former protest parties such as Rakah moderated their stances and began to be players in the political arena. The narrowness of Likud's victory led all parties to compete more heavily for Arab votes.⁵⁴⁹ Labor soon had to meet the needs of its Israeli Arab constituents or else it risked losing more Israeli Arabs to protest votes. More dovish Jewish parties were willing to ally with Arabs, and voting for them promised results for Israeli Arabs. Even former pariahs such as Rakah increasingly became key political players--a change due both to the needs of Israeli Jewish parties and greater pragmatism on Rakah's part.⁵⁵⁰

As a result of this party competition, Israel Arabs began to influence national politics. For example, the Israeli Jewish community was split between those favoring the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and those hoping to use it to negotiate with Arab states and Palestinians for peace. Israeli Arabs tilted the balance to favor those Jews who opposed annexation.⁵⁵¹

Voting Patterns

Even after the end of military government, Israeli Arabs mostly voted for the Labor party

⁵⁴⁹ Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 9.; *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 12.

⁵⁵⁰ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 124.

⁵⁵¹ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," pp. 118-119.

and its allies because they could deliver government patronage. The Labor and National Religious Parties controlled the Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Religious Affairs, and Interior as well as the Arab Department of the Histadrut. Therefore, these bodies controlled much of the funding and many of the jobs that went to the Israeli Arab community.⁵⁵² Not surprisingly, the Labor Party won 53 percent of the Israeli Arab vote from 1949 to 1973.⁵⁵³

During this time, Israeli Arabs had no major role in decisionmaking. In 1971, almost 30 percent of Arab villages had no local councils, compared with 1 percent of Jewish villages.⁵⁵⁴ In 1976, of the 1,860 officials in Israeli government and non-government major institutions, only 26 were Arabs, and almost half of these were employed in religious courts. Clans dominated politics until 1977, and the major parties had almost no Arabs on their guiding committees.⁵⁵⁵

This lack of influence made Israeli Arabs highly cynical about politics, and they began voting for "pariah" parties such as Rakah as a protest. Because the ending of military government did not correspond with material improvements or status positions--and Labor's hold on power seemed secure--Israel Arabs increasingly rejected mainstream parties.⁵⁵⁶ From 1965 to 1977, Israeli Arabs increasingly voted for Rakah to express their discontent with

⁵⁵² Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 117.

⁵⁵³ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 228.

⁵⁵⁴ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 135.

⁵⁵⁵ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 40.

⁵⁵⁶ Israeli Arab areas also faced regular discrimination in basic services such as water, electricity, health, and sport centers. Arab areas were often given a tenth of what Jewish areas received from the central government. See Shulamit Alonia, "Discrimination Against Arab Settlements," *Yediot Ahronot*, October 10, 1975.

discrimination.⁵⁵⁷ Rakah gained popularity because it is non-Zionist; this non-Zionism, however, made it an outcast with the mainstream Israeli parties, who would not ally with it in the Israeli parliament.⁵⁵⁸ Rakah gained only 10 percent of the Israeli Arab vote in 1959, but in 1977 it received over 50 percent.⁵⁵⁹ Furthermore, in the early 1970s, more radical Israeli Arabs formed Abna' al-Balad (Sons of the Village), which grew out of the Al Ard movement. Abna' al-Balad rejected Zionism more openly than Rakah and had an aggressive Arab nationalist agenda. It also rejected electoral participation and tried to discourage Israeli Arabs from voting.⁵⁶⁰

The greatest act of Israeli Arab resistance to authority occurred in 1976. On March 30, 1976 a strike led by the National Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands, a Rakah front, turned violent. Police killed six Arabs and arrested and injured hundreds of others.⁵⁶¹ To this day, many Israeli Arabs commemorate the day as the holiday Land Day. What is notable to an outsider, however, is not the scope of the violence in 1976 but rather how limited it was. Given the past violence of the Arab revolt, and the future violence of the *intifada*, the Land Day violence of 1976 pales by comparison.

The Land Day protest in 1976, however, coincided with the end of Labor's electoral

⁵⁵⁷ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 118; Jiryis, "The Arabs in Israel," p. 37.

⁵⁵⁸ Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 3. Mapam, despite allowing Israeli Arabs full membership in the party, lost popularity because of its Zionist ideology and ties to other Zionist institutions.

⁵⁵⁹ Avraham Burg, "A Statistical Portrait," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 20.

⁵⁶⁰ Jiryis, "The Arabs in Israel," p. 41.

⁵⁶¹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 177.

dominance. In a sense, Israeli Arabs were at a crossroads. On the one hand, they could continue down the path of outsider politics, supporting Rakah and continuing violent protests such as the Land Day demonstration. On the other hand, Labor's defeat enabled them to use the democratic system to improve their position.

Israeli Arabs chose to work with the system, not against it. Since the end of the 1970s, Israeli Arabs have used their votes to gain influence, not to protest.⁵⁶² Rakah, recognizing that it was not appealing to the pragmatic concerns of Israeli Arabs, began to organize more for electoral politics rather than as a vehicle for protest. In 1977, Rakah established the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE or *Hadash*) to reduce the stigma associated with the name Rakah.

Rakah, however, did worse in the 1980s than the 1970s as rival Arab parties emerged and as the value of voting for sympathetic Zionist parties increased. In 1981, Israeli Arabs increased their votes to Labor as the lesser of two evils, because Likud favored using harsher policies against Arabs in general--the first increase in Labor's percentage of the Israeli Arab vote in decades.⁵⁶³ In 1984, the Progressive List for Peace (PLP)--which had an agenda similar to Rakah but deemphasized Communism--became a major rival to Rakah.⁵⁶⁴ The PLP's success can also be seen as an indication of the growing tolerance among Israeli officials--one of the party's

⁵⁶² Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs, p. 118.

⁵⁶³ Ian Lustick, "Creeping Binationalism within the Green Line," *New Outlook* 31:7 (July 1988), p. 16.

⁵⁶⁴ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs, p. 117.

founders was a founder of the previously-banned Al-Ard movement.⁵⁶⁵

Over time, however, Israeli Arabs increasingly voted for small, dovish parties that were clearly committed to Arab interests but were also able to ally with Zionist parties. Support for traditional Zionist parties fell in 1984.⁵⁶⁶ Voting for parties allying with liberal and dovish Israeli parties also represented a shift from seeking patronage to seeking a chance to gain a voice on national matters.⁵⁶⁷

At the end of the 1980s, the Israeli Arabs came into their own politically. By 1984, the Israeli Zionist parties' "gentlemen's agreement" not to ally with Israeli Arab parties began breaking down.⁵⁶⁸ In 1984, Labor did not put a separate Arab list out and gave Arab politicians a realistic place on the overall ticket. Labor also supported government participation by Arab-dominated groups such as the Progressive List for Peace.⁵⁶⁹ Other parties focused on the support of components of the overall Israeli Arab vote--some put a Druze high on their list, others a Bedouin leader.⁵⁷⁰ In 1988, the first strictly Arab party came into existence when an Arab

⁵⁶⁵ Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Stephen Sharot, *Ethnicity, religion and class in Israeli society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 16.

⁵⁶⁶ This shift in Israeli Arab voting was recognized by those opposed to Israeli Arab causes. Because Israeli Arab participation as pragmatists hurts overall conservative strength, they have tried to brand Israeli Arabs as dangerous enemies in order to discredit their Jewish allies. Ariel Sharon, for example, claimed that Israeli Arabs were a strong force in the *intifada*. See Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 126.

⁵⁶⁷ Unlike the Labor, Likud, and religious parties, the leftist Zionist parties are not likely to control important ministries. See Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 120.

⁵⁶⁸ Lustick, "Creeping Binationalism within the Green Line," p. 15.

⁵⁶⁹ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 127.

⁵⁷⁰ Lustick, "Creeping Binationalism within the Green Line," p. 17.

Knesset Member of the Labor Party, Abdul Wahab Darawshe, broke off from the Labor Party in protest and formed the Democratic Arab Party.⁵⁷¹ Islamic parties also have developed within Israel, particularly within the Little Triangle area.

The success of Israeli Arabs in joining Israel's political life on an independent basis can be illustrated by comparing their failed effort in 1980 to form a country-wide Arab political party and Darawshe's 1988 success in doing so. In 1980, Prime Minister Begin crushed efforts by the mayors of the largest Arab towns and villages to form a political party--the Congress of the Arab Masses--to work for Israeli Arab rights. This control occurred without resistance from other parties, primarily because the Labor party feared being labelled "Arab lovers" to the Israeli Jewish population more than they feared losing Arab political support. In 1988, Darawshe formed his own political party, which had an almost identical political platform to the Congress of Arab Masses, with little opposition.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷¹ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 97.

⁵⁷² Over time, Darawshe's party has grown in influence while rivals such as the Progressive List for Peace have fallen. In 1993, for example, the Arab Democratic Party of Darawshe remained the only all-Arab party to hold Knesset seats in parliament; four Israeli-Arabs sat in parliament for Jewish parties and two more for the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, the remnant of Rakah.

Table IVB: The Vote in Arab Localities: 1955-88

Year	Rakah/ Hadash (DFPE)	Israeli Communist Party (Maki)	PLP	ADP (Darawshe)	Minority lists (generally affiliated with Labor)	Labor ⁵⁷³ and affiliates	Other	Total
1955	---	15.6	---	---	57.9	20.7	5.8	100
1959	---	11.3	---	---	58.6	19.9	10.2	100
1961	---	22.5	---	---	45.5	24.9	7.1	100
1965	23.5	0.6	---	---	42.9	21.6	11.4	100
1969	29.4	0.7	---	---	40.6	13.3	16.0	100
1973	36.9	---	---	---	36.0	10.0	17.1	100
1977	50.7	---	---	---	21.5	8.7	19.1	100
1981	37.9	---	---	---	13.4	26.2	22.5	100
1984	33.0	---	18.3	---	---	23.0	25.7	100
1988	33.0	---	14.1	11.2	---	20.4	21.3	100

Sources: Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities*, p. 56; Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 116; *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, pp. 576-581.

This realism of Israeli Arab political parties is honed by the constant knowledge that greater selective control awaits those who are intransigent. As one Israeli Arab politician noted: "We are under no illusions as to our position in Israel as a whole. If violence happened, the Jewish parties would band together against us. The rights we have worked for decades to achieve could vanish instantly."⁵⁷⁴ After several Israeli Arab students endorsed the PLO's use of violence in the early 1970s, Israeli officials, including then Foreign Minister Dayan, made threats

⁵⁷³ The Labor party was initially know as the Mapai party. In the 1965 election, Ben Gurion and other officials split off from Mapai to form their own party, Rafi, which reunited with Mapai under Levi Eshkol following the 1967 wa-

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with Israeli Arab political party official, September 1996.

reminding Israeli Arabs of the fate of the Palestinians in 1948.⁵⁷⁵ Even religious militants learned this lesson. After years of being harassed by the secret police, fundamentalist Israeli Arab leaders shifted from clandestine political activity to calls for greater attention to routine patronage and greater rights.⁵⁷⁶ Religious militants even called for "two states"--a policy that would have been heresy for their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza who support only the return of Israel to Muslim rule.⁵⁷⁷ Since entering the political arena, Muslim parties in Israel have stayed completely within the law, making painstaking efforts to do so, even while they expand contacts with Islamic militants elsewhere.⁵⁷⁸ As Sheikh Abdallah Darwish, a leader of the Islamic movement among Israeli Arabs, noted with regard to Islamic movements in the Occupied Territories, "Identification -- yes; violence -- no."⁵⁷⁹

A major debate arose in the Islamic political movement over whether to participate in national elections. But in the end, like the Arab nationalists before them, the Islamic movement joined the political process. Islamic activists always supported participation in municipal elections, but many activists viewed participation in national elections as endorsing the Israeli system's legitimacy--a *de facto* way of pledging allegiance to the state of Israel and to its Jewish symbols. In 1988, the movement decided not to participate in Knesset elections independently

⁵⁷⁵ Jiryis, "The Arabs in Israel," p. 35.

⁵⁷⁶ The Islamic movement is a major factor in local politics--in 1994, 5 out of 50 Arab mayors and local council heads were from the Islamist group. See McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 59.

⁵⁷⁷ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 180.

⁵⁷⁸ Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. 60.

⁵⁷⁹ As quoted in Elie Rekhess, "Red lines and realities," *The Jerusalem Post*, February 3, 1993.

and remained neutral on whether members should vote. However, in September 1991 some leaders of the movement decided to enter the elections on an independent list, but the movement as a whole rejected the decision, electing instead to participate as individuals and help consolidate the Arab vote.⁵⁸⁰ In subsequent elections, however, militants on the West Bank and Gaza urged religious groups in Israel to vote and so sway the Israeli government toward a more favorable disposition toward the Occupied Territories.⁵⁸¹ As one expert noted, "the Islamists have learned what other ideological parties learned when they faced political reality from a position of weakness: either remain pure and irrelevant or compromise and make a difference."⁵⁸²

Israeli Arab levels of participation have remained at high levels since 1948, suggesting general acceptance of the political process. Although participation of eligible voters declined from the 1960s to 1981--going from 87.8 percent in 1965 to 70 percent in 1981--it rebounded to 76 percent in 1988, suggesting that Israeli Arabs were eager to capitalize on influence they would gain by voting.⁵⁸³ This increase in participation occurred despite occasional calls by Arab nationalists to boycott the Knesset elections.

In addition to participating in elections, Israeli Arabs also began to form their own political institutions independent of Israeli authorities. In 1971, Arab students founded the

⁵⁸⁰ Elie Rekhess, "To vote or not to vote," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 12, 1992.

⁵⁸¹ This trend toward realism has paid off for Israeli Arab Islamists. In 1996, Abdel Malik Dahamshe won the Islamist movement a Knesset seat.

⁵⁸² U.S. government expert interview, August 1996.

⁵⁸³ *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv; Burg, "A Statistical Portrait," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 20.

National Union of Arab University Graduates, and in 1975 an Israel-wide organization for Arab university students was founded.⁵⁸⁴ In the last fifteen years, Israeli Arabs formed dozens of voluntary associations in areas such as education, youth, and health.⁵⁸⁵ As recently as 1987 less than half of Israeli Arab localities had elected authorities, while today this proportion has risen to two thirds.⁵⁸⁶ New organizations such as the Committee for the Defense of Arab lands, and the Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Councils--both of which were founded with the backing of Israeli Arab intellectuals--are considered by a majority of Israeli Arabs to be representative, unlike the old party lists under the military government.⁵⁸⁷

Again, this formation of independent institutions compares favorably to the situation of Israeli Arabs in the early 1970s. For example, when a Rakah-affiliated group took control of a local council in 1974 and used it to criticize the government in general, the authorities withheld development funding from the village and, when this failed to stop the complaints, disbanded the local council and replaced it with a council of clan elders.⁵⁸⁸ The government denied many Arab

⁵⁸⁴ Elie Rekhess, "Israeli Arab Intelligentsia," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 11 (Spring 1979), p. 60.

⁵⁸⁵ Minns and Hijab, *Citizens Apart*, p. 58. Examples of such associations include the Arab Association for Human Rights, the Galilee Society for Health Research and Services, and the Galilee Center for Social Research. See McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 60.

⁵⁸⁶ McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 56.

⁵⁸⁷ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 117; Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 114. The National Committee of Arab Mayors and Local Council Chairman also includes Israeli Arab members of the Knesset, Histadrut members, and other important Israeli Arab officials.

⁵⁸⁸ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 142.

student groups official recognition and often searched and interrogated members.⁵⁸⁹

Despite this surge in Israeli Arab influence, Israeli democracy remains unequal for Arabs and Jews. Institutional protections of minority rights are weak, particularly when security concerns can be invoked to justify human rights violations.⁵⁹⁰ Nor do most Israeli Jews favor an equal society. Over two thirds of Israeli Jews believe that the state of Israel should prefer Jews to Arabs in general; 72.3 percent of Jews reject equal admission to universities; 74.2 percent reject equal admission to public workplaces; and 85.9 percent reject Arab inclusion in senior government posts.⁵⁹¹ Furthermore, although Israeli Arabs can participate in politics as individuals, they are shut out from much of the symbolic life of the state. Israel's national symbols and history are at best ambivalent symbols for Israeli Arabs.⁵⁹² As one Israeli Arab cultural leader noted: "We live in better homes and are less harassed than in the past, but we can hardly be said to be two nations living together in peace. Rather, there is one nation and one group unsure of its role."⁵⁹³

⁵⁸⁹ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 144.

⁵⁹⁰ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 18.

⁵⁹¹ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, pp. 139-140.

⁵⁹² Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State," *American Political Science Review* 86:2 (June 1992), p. 433.

⁵⁹³ Interview with Israeli Arab cultural activist, September 1996.

Social Changes

Social changes after the end of military government, like social changes during the years of the military government and under the Mandate, hindered the effectiveness of certain policies, particularly co-optation. Education improvements, a rise in the Israeli Arab standard of living, and a decline in clan loyalty undermined the status of traditional elites, making it harder for the government to rule through a chosen few.

The Arab standard of living had risen dramatically since 1948. Particularly after 1975, government transfer payments and high levels of employment helped produce a significant drop in poverty among Israeli Arabs.⁵⁹⁴ One result of this increase is that simple economic pressures--limits on promotion or the threat of a firing--no longer are life or death issues for many Israeli Arabs.

The development of the educational system has created a new group of educated elites, reducing the influence of traditional family and clan networks by creating a new standard for leadership. The median number of years in school for Israeli Arab youth rose from 1.2 years in 1961 to 9.0 in 1990.⁵⁹⁵ By the 1980s, roughly 95 percent of school-age Israeli Arab children attended school compared with only 63 percent in 1954; in absolute numbers, the total number of Arab primary school students went from 9,991 in 1948 to 139,220 in 1988.⁵⁹⁶ In 1960, there

⁵⁹⁴ Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population*, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁹⁵ *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1991* (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1991), Table XXII/1, p. 603.

⁵⁹⁶ Rafael Israeli, "Arabs in Israel: The Surge of a New Identity," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 172; Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities*, p. 35; Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 151.

were only 350 Arab university graduates in Israel, but by 1988 there were 10,000.⁵⁹⁷ As a result, Israeli Arabs today now have a small intellectual elite and a sizeable middle class.⁵⁹⁸

As education spread, and traditional means of wealth and status broke down, non-traditional elites emerged who opposed the co-opted traditional elites. The new elite drew their power from their educational achievements, not their clan prestige or family connections.⁵⁹⁹ Furthermore, these new elites often criticized co-opted Israeli Arabs. The basis of their criticism was the backward Israeli Arab condition in general and the traditional leaders' lack of education. The Israeli Arab intellectual Anton Shammas sums up their sentiment when he derides "positive" Arab leaders who cooperate with the government: "'Positive' in this connection is an Arab dignitary lacking personality and emotions, barely able to spell his own name, whom I am expected to vote into the Knesset or find myself classified as a negative and destructive element."⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁷ Minns and Hijab, *Citizens Apart*, p. 65.

⁵⁹⁸ Arabs are caught on the horns of a dilemma with regard to educational policies that emphasize Arab identity. To succeed in Israel, they need to learn Hebrew and about Jewish culture; yet in so doing less time will be spent on Arabic and Arab culture. The education system also is designed to foster different goals in the Arab and Jewish communities. Arab and Druze classes, for example, stress how Israel is the homeland for all peoples; the curriculum for Israeli Jews stresses the Jewish nature of Israel. Arab schools teach the shared culture of mankind; Jewish schools stress the history of the Jewish people. See Saad Sarsour, "Arab Education in a Jewish State--Major Dilemmas," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 116. and Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 71. Michael Gorkin, in his interesting story of a multi-generational family that lives in the village of Kufr Qara, makes it clear how educational opportunities have changed village life. Although the traditional family is still important, many young people in the village use their education to secure other livelihoods. See *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*.

⁵⁹⁹ Rekhess, "Israeli Arab Intelligentsia," p. 43.

⁶⁰⁰ As quoted in Shammas, "Diary," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 42.

Gradually, the Arab labor force has shifted from farming to wage-earning, further reducing the importance of traditional elites. In 1960 48.4 percent of Israeli Arabs were employed in agriculture, while in 1990 that figure had shrunk to 6.3 percent.⁶⁰¹ As cultivatable land was expropriated to Judaize the Galilee, relative opportunities and wages in the cities increased. Furthermore, discriminatory government pricing policies made it harder for Israeli Arab farmers to compete with their Jewish counterparts. Finally, low-status peasants went to the city to escape their subordinate social position.⁶⁰²

When Labor fell into opposition, and with it the clan-based patronage networks, the process was further accelerated.⁶⁰³ In 1976, less than half of Israeli Arabs saw extended family loyalty as detrimental to their well-being; by the mid-1980s over two thirds thought it should be abolished.⁶⁰⁴ Smoocha reports that as a basis of identification family is falling while nationality and citizenship are rising.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰¹ Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, p. 25.

⁶⁰² Mar'i, *Arab Education in Israel*, p. 6. In 1961, almost 80 percent of Israeli Arabs lived in localities with populations of less than 10,000 people; in 1990 only 43 percent did. See Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, p. 31.

⁶⁰³ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, pp. 171-173.

⁶⁰⁴ Smoocha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 45.

⁶⁰⁵ Sammy Smoocha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel* (University of Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1984), p. 47.

Table IVC: Mean Characteristics of Economically Active Labor Force of Non-Jewish Israelis

	Druze	Moslems	Christians
Yearly Income (Shekels)	24147.7	19153.9	23864.9
Percent in Professional Occupations	2.5	3.3	6.9
Percent in Major Cities	6.5	24.0	30.3
Percent with Academic Degree	4.0	6.5	11.4

Source: Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, p. 19.

Wide disparities remain between Arabs and Jews despite these improvements. Israeli Arabs remain disproportionately poor, rural, and uneducated.⁶⁰⁶ Israeli Arab infant mortality is twice that of Israeli Jews.⁶⁰⁷ Furthermore, Israeli Arabs generally are in less-skilled and more manual economic niches. Israel Arabs account for almost 30 percent of the construction and agriculture labor forces--almost twice their percentage of population.⁶⁰⁸ In 1992, unemployment among Israeli Arabs was 12.3 percent, 3 percentage points higher than that of the Israeli Jewish population.⁶⁰⁹ Although education disparities between Hebrew and Arab education are falling, they still remain large, and even well-educated Israeli Arabs find that jobs that utilize their skills

⁶⁰⁶ Smootha and Hofman, "Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel," p. 8.

⁶⁰⁷ *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, p. 4.

⁶⁰⁸ Burg, "The Arabs of Israel: A Statistical Portrait," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, p. 21.

⁶⁰⁹ *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, p. 361.

are hard to find.⁶¹⁰

The Role of Outside powers

Outside forces have had a tremendous influence on ethnic relations in Israel since the end of military government. Israeli Jews feared that outside powers (particularly Egypt, Syria, and the PLO) would use Israeli Arabs as commandos. While the threat from outside states diminished after the Israeli-Egyptian peace, fears of subversion--particularly after the *intifada* broke out--increased. This led to increased suspicion of the Israeli Arab community. Yet the influence of outside powers did not lead to widespread violence. Although Israeli Jewish rhetoric did become more hostile to Israeli Arabs during times of crisis, no repeat of the Kafr Qasim massacre occurred.

Isolated incidents gave credence to Jewish fears. The revival of the Palestine Liberation Organization after the 1967 war inspired several Israeli Arabs to organize to use violence against Israeli Jews and the Israeli state. An Israeli Arab student was convicted in 1968 of sheltering a member of *Fatah*; Israeli Arab students at Hebrew University were among those arrested for planning to blow up its campus cafeteria; an Arab lawyer was arrested in 1971 for organizing a terrorist network; and in 1972 a student was arrested for belonging to *Fatah* and planning terrorist actions. Yet considering the range of possible actions and the number of possible

⁶¹⁰ Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, p. 149; The average number of pupils per class, for example, has fallen in Arab schools in recent years, but it still remains significantly higher than that of Hebrew schools. See *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, p. 646.

recruits, hostile activities--which almost never produced actual violence--were rare.⁶¹¹

Outside influences at times even favored peace. Islamist participation in elections, for example, was increased by support from militants outside Israel's borders.

Impact of New Policies

Israeli Arabs are better off today than they have been in the past. In general, there is less daily surveillance, less political interference, and less harassment of Israeli Arabs than twenty years ago.⁶¹² Over the years, Israeli Arabs have increasingly joined the labor market on equal terms as well as such important institutions as the Histadrut and Jewish political parties. Furthermore, they increasingly use the same public facilities (beaches, cinemas, parks) as do Israeli Jews.⁶¹³

Starting in the 1980s, the government began making major progress on Israeli Arab issues as a result of their growing influence in government. The average ratio of Jewish locality budgets to Arab locality budgets was 13:1 in the 1970s, and this shrank to 2.5 to 1 in the 1980s.⁶¹⁴ Israeli Arab villages no longer have structures demolished without villagers first having their say, certain hostile Jewish officials were forced to resign, and even a bit of land expropriated from Arab villages in Galilee was returned. In 1985, the Israeli Knesset enacted a

⁶¹¹ Rekhess, "Israeli Arab Intelligentsia," p. 63.

⁶¹² Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 15.

⁶¹³ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, pp. 8-9.

⁶¹⁴ McDowall, *The Palestinians*, p. 59.

law to exclude parties that seek to negate Israel's democratic character and incite racism--a law used to prevent the participation of the anti-Arab religious party Kach.⁶¹⁵ As never before, Israel's Arabs are becoming masters of their own fate. In 1988, over 75 percent of Israeli Arabs surveyed thought the political struggle of Israeli Arabs was proceeding well.⁶¹⁶

If anything, the 1990s show even more dramatic improvements in the status of Israeli Arabs. In 1992, the Israeli government depended on Israeli Arab Knesset members to survive; as a result, the Labor Party signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Arab DFPE and ADP parties committing itself to work for greater Arab-Jew equality, to close municipal budget gaps, to eliminate education and housing disparities, and to improve religious endowment property. The government also almost tripled development spending on Israeli Arabs, committed itself to absorbing Israeli Arab graduates into the civil service, provided child assistance that previously had been reserved for families who served in the army, appointed several Israeli Arabs as government officials, and admitted publicly that past policies toward Israeli Arabs were mistaken.⁶¹⁷ Israeli Jewish politicians began courting Israeli Arabs in person.⁶¹⁸ In 1993 ADP leader Darawshe even demanded an Arab minister for the state government.⁶¹⁹

Economic gaps between Arabs and Jews in Israel are significantly narrower than they

⁶¹⁵ Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship," p. 439.

⁶¹⁶ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 137.

⁶¹⁷ Elie Rekhess, "Israel's Arab Citizens and the Peace Process," *Israel under Rabin*, Robert O. Freedman, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 191-192.

⁶¹⁸ Lustick, "Creeping Binationalism within the Green Line," p. 18; David Rudge, "Rabin campaigns in Arab village," *The Jerusalem Post*, May 27, 1992.

⁶¹⁹ "Time for Arab-Israeli Minister, Leader Says," *Reuters*, November 13, 1993.

were 40 years ago. As late as 1973, Arab per capita income was roughly half that of Israeli Jews.⁶²⁰ Since then, overall gross household income has increased vis-a-vis the Jewish population. Today, by some reckonings, Israeli Arabs have a higher level of family income than Jewish families originating from Asia and Africa.⁶²¹

Israeli Arabs' status in absolute terms has improved dramatically, particularly for Israeli Arab elites. Most of these elites live in private, high-standard houses, have the full range of modern municipal services, and are well educated. Moreover, they increasingly enjoy a free press, the right to run for office, and freedom of movement and association. In 1995, Ali Abeer Yihya was named the first Israeli-Arab ambassador.⁶²²

Although increased participation has led to greater Israeli Arab influence in Israel, it has not led to greater Israeli Arab unity. Israeli Arabs still do not have nation-wide leaders. Internal factionalism is so deep that no Israeli Arab received more than 11 percent of support among Israeli Arabs as the first choice as the preferred leader.⁶²³ Even though Darawshe formed a nation-wide political party, he is not supported by most local leaders or Islamic figures.⁶²⁴

Resistance to the idea of Israel itself has declined. In 1967, 20 percent of Israeli Arabs

⁶²⁰ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*, p. 127.

⁶²¹ Yosef Goell, "A Zigzag Attitude To Arab Equality," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 9, 1990; Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 38.

⁶²² *The Jerusalem Post*, September 14, 1995.

⁶²³ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 121.

⁶²⁴ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs, p. 127.

surveyed denied Israel's right to exist; in 1980 this number was down to 7 percent.⁶²⁵ Even more radical Arabs have decreased their support for the use of violence.⁶²⁶ Unlike the time of the Military Government, most Israeli Arabs do not want to move--even to a Palestinian state. As one expert noted:

Israeli Arabs are not fools. They look at their Arab neighbors and see the unemployment and the drab conditions. In the old days, they looked abroad for intellectual leadership. Yet more and more today they find themselves better educated--and part of a open system that allows them to develop their thoughts. Some even look at the authoritarian tendencies of the new Palestinian state and shudder.⁶²⁷

While Israeli Arab willingness to work with the system has increased, so too have Israeli Arab demands. In the 1970s, Israeli Arabs called for non-discrimination and civil rights; in the 1980s, they demanded their share of political power.⁶²⁸ Increasingly Israeli Arabs support a higher level of communal autonomy within Israeli.⁶²⁹

Attitudes toward Violence

Israeli Arabs, convinced by years of dominance that Jews will retain ultimate control of Israeli government and society, have become pragmatic in their objectives.⁶³⁰ Gone are the days

⁶²⁵ Smoocha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 209.

⁶²⁶ Smoocha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 210.

⁶²⁷ Interview with Israeli Arab academic, September 1996.

⁶²⁸ Lustick, "Creeping Binationalism within the Green Line," p. 14.

⁶²⁹ Rekhess, "Israel's Arab Citizens and the Peace Process," p. 199.

⁶³⁰ Smoocha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 16.

when Arabs sought hegemony--today they appear content with recognition of their status and attention to their concerns. Israeli Arabs seek an equal playing field in areas such as jobs and university admissions.⁶³¹ Most Israeli Arabs favor political parties that, while representing Israeli Arab interests, can work with Jewish parties and promote limited reform.⁶³²

Opinion surveys suggested that few Israeli Arabs see violence as productive, and most support the moderation of their political leaders. Over 55 percent of Israeli Arabs believe that elections and other democratic means are improving their situation.⁶³³ Since the 1970s there has been a steady decline in support for unlicensed demonstrations.⁶³⁴ Over 70 percent of Israeli Arabs are against the use of force as part of political action, and a majority oppose unlicensed demonstrations. Interviews of Israeli Arab political elites, including leaders of former pariah parties such as Rakah suggest that they see their role as influencing Israeli Jewish public opinion and, when trying to help Palestinians across the Green Line, doing so within the system of Israeli politics.⁶³⁵

⁶³¹ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 150.

⁶³² Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 101.

⁶³³ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, pp. 126-127. Indeed, the number of Jews who believe that democratic tactics will improve the lot of Israeli Arabs is only 37 percent.

⁶³⁴ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, pp. 132-133.

⁶³⁵ Marda Dunskey, "Standing on the Green Line," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 16, 1989. An Israeli Arab leader noted to me in an interview that he felt his first task was to educate Israeli Jews as to the problems of the Israeli Arab community. Interview with Israeli Arab political official, August 1996.

Even the *intifada* never led to large-scale violence among Israeli Arabs. Israeli Arabs supported the *intifada*, but the uprising did not substantially change their political behavior.⁶³⁶ In the first year of the revolt, Israeli Arabs organized general strikes, held rallies and demonstrations, and issued protests.⁶³⁷ At times Israeli Arabs threw stones and even Molotov cocktails in demonstrations supporting the *intifada*, but Israeli Arab organizations such as the National Committee immediately denounced the violence and worked to isolate those supporting it.⁶³⁸ In the first year of the revolt the Israeli secret police detected 93 sabotage rings; only four were within the Green Line.⁶³⁹ As Smootha notes: "They have not joined the Intifadeh because, unlike their brethren across the Green Line, they do not endure occupation, do not seek liberation, and can wage a democratic struggle."⁶⁴⁰ One Israeli Arab noted, "There is a difference between players and fans. We are the fans. Our goal is to live in Israel with equal rights, while the aim of the residents in the West Bank is to form a separate state."⁶⁴¹ The *intifada* increased activism, but not militancy. Endorsement of the use of strikes went from 63 percent in 1976 to

⁶³⁶ Lustick, "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs," p. 115.

⁶³⁷ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv. The polling done by Smootha was carried out at the height of the *intifada*, suggesting its conclusions are particularly robust.

⁶³⁸ Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*, p. 92; Violence, though not murder, did briefly increase during the early years of the *intifada*. In 1987, just before the uprising, 60 terror-related acts of sabotage were perpetrated in Israel, but by 1989 that number had risen to 208. See Yosef Goell, "Israel's Arabs: A linking of fates," *The Jerusalem Post*, October 4, 1991.

⁶³⁹ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv.

⁶⁴⁰ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, pp. xvii-xviii.

⁶⁴¹ Migdal and Kimmerling, *Palestinians*, p. 182.

74 percent in 1988.⁶⁴² At the same time, however, support for violence actually declined, going from 18.5 percent in 1976 to just 8 percent in 1988.⁶⁴³

Communal tension remains high but has not resulted in widespread violence.⁶⁴⁴ Roughly two thirds of Israeli Arabs feel they are discriminated against frequently.⁶⁴⁵ Anti-Arab legislation is routinely proposed, though rarely passed, in the Knesset; after a terrorist attacks Arabs have been beaten on the streets.⁶⁴⁶ Personal humiliations of Israeli Arabs are common--Israeli Arabs, for example, are often forced to pay in cash while Jews can write checks.⁶⁴⁷ As one leading Israeli Arab noted:

It is hard for me to tell other Arabs that we have achieved so much when so much is lacking. Look around you at this [Arab] village and you will see the poverty. Go ask the Jews you meet what they think of Arabs, and many will admit that they wish we would just go away.⁶⁴⁸

Israeli Arabs do not appear to fear massive communal violence, though they regularly complain of sporadic hostility and attacks. Every Israeli Arab interviewed noted that they worried about verbal or physical abuse, particularly during times of tension between Jews and

⁶⁴² Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv.

⁶⁴³ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv.

⁶⁴⁴ Muslim militants appear to be attracting the most bitter Israeli Arabs--in Galed three Israeli soldiers were axed to death by Israeli Islamic fanatics. See Rekhess, "To vote or not to vote."

⁶⁴⁵ Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. 50.

⁶⁴⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p. 182.

⁶⁴⁷ Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*, p. 97.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with Israeli Arab cultural leader, September 1996.

Arabs in the Occupied Territories. Yet none expected a return of massive communal violence.

Jewish Attitudes and Concerns

Despite decades of peace, Israeli Jews still mistrust Israeli Arabs. Survey data suggest that Israeli Jews attribute far more extreme attitudes to Israeli Arabs than are indeed present.⁶⁴⁹ Most Israeli Jews believe every Arab hates Jews, and the vast majority believe Arabs in Israel cannot be trusted.⁶⁵⁰ Furthermore, over 80 percent of Israeli Jews believe Israeli Arabs threaten national security to at least some degree.⁶⁵¹ As one expert noted, "there is a common belief that Arabs in Israel are only loyal to the state because we are strong and the PLO and its allies are weak. Many Israelis fear that should Israel be threatened, the Israeli Arabs would defect."⁶⁵² Jews see Israeli Arab support for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as proof that Israeli Arabs cannot be trusted; Israeli Arab leaders' attempts to gain PLO blessing for their electoral campaigns only reinforced this fear.⁶⁵³ Ironically, the *intifada* heightened Jewish suspicions of Israeli Arabs even though Israeli Arabs did not take an active part in it.⁶⁵⁴

Jews still support discrimination and favor a system that ensures their control. Most Jews surveyed believe Jews should receive preferences regarding work, housing, and acceptance to

⁶⁴⁹ Alouph Harven, "The Arabs of Israel: A Jewish Problem," in *Every Sixth Israeli*, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁵⁰ Smoocha, *The Orientation and the Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, p. 78.

⁶⁵¹ *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 79.

⁶⁵² Interview with Israeli academic expert, August 1996.

⁶⁵³ Goell, "Israel's Arabs: A linking of fates."

⁶⁵⁴ Smoocha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 5.

higher education. Support for preferences to army veterans also remains strong.⁶⁵⁵ In a 1988 poll, 65 percent of Jews agreed that the largest group will rule and that other groups should accept what it decides--a view shared by only 17 percent of Israeli Arabs.⁶⁵⁶

Despite this high level of mistrust, Israeli Jews, like Israeli Arabs, are also moving away from extreme attitudes. In March 1978, Jewish students at Haifa University prevented Israeli Arab students from holding a conference on the situation of Israeli Arabs on the grounds that "this is an Israeli university and not a *Fath* [the leading PLO grouping] training camp."⁶⁵⁷ Today, however, such conferences are commonplace. Support for Israeli Arabs living in Israel either as a national minority or as a minority with full civil rights is increasing, while support for extreme views such as expulsion is decreasing.⁶⁵⁸ In the 1980s, opposition dropped for the use of general strikes by Arabs and support for an increase in surveillance of Israeli Arabs also fell.⁶⁵⁹ Israeli Jews increasingly are willing to accept an Arab superior in a job, have an Arab friend, or endorse the idea that Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel.⁶⁶⁰ In general, Israeli Arabs are far more in favor of mixed neighborhoods and schools than are Israeli Jews, but both groups are moving in

⁶⁵⁵ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, pp. 139-140; Ben-Rafael and Sharot, *Ethnicity, religion, and class in Israeli society*, p. 235.

⁶⁵⁶ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 115.

⁶⁵⁷ From *Ha'aretz*, March 30, 1978 as quoted in Rekhess, "Israeli Arab Intelligentsia," p. 56.

⁶⁵⁸ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 112.

⁶⁵⁹ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 240.

⁶⁶⁰ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 214.

this direction.⁶⁶¹

On a political level, cooperation is now widespread. Since the 1977 elections, Israeli Arabs have been increasingly recognized by Israeli Jews as a key part of the left-leaning alliance. As one Labor party official commented: "Arabs are constituents like any others. As long as they accept the Jewish nature of the Israeli state, we will work with them. We will even work for them."

One important factor behind Israeli Jews' more charitable attitudes toward Israeli Arabs stems from the Jews' control of the police and the military. As one Israeli expert noted, "Jews in general know that the police are their police. Should violence break out between Arabs and Jews, they know the police will side with them."⁶⁶²

Ambivalent Identity

The Israeli Arab identity is betwixt and between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab identities. Israeli policies have not brought Arabs and Jews into one common identity, and the divisions between the two communities remain strong. As Ben-Rafael and Sharot note:

Contacts between Arabs and Jews are quite frequent at interpersonal levels, at work and in public facilities, but close personal contacts are rare; dating is taboo and there are very few intermarriages. The majority on both sides discourage intimate contact, and Arabs who have moved into Jewish neighborhoods have sometimes been repulsed or made to

⁶⁶¹ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, pp. 89. Intermarriage, however, remains anathema to both communities. Family pressure against intermarriage is extremely strong, and few mixed marriages ever occur. See Gorkin, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion*, pp. 237-241.

⁶⁶² Interview with Israeli government official, August 1996.

feel uncomfortable.⁶⁶³

If anything, Israeli Arabs have over time have shifted toward the identification with the Palestinian cause. In 1976, 57.5 percent of Israeli Arabs saw themselves as Palestinians; in 1988 this figure was up to 67 percent.⁶⁶⁴

Yet this identification with the Palestinian cause should not be confused with a desire to change their status.⁶⁶⁵ As Israeli Arab writer Atallah Mansour notes about the West Bank Palestinians, "the gap between us and them has never closed. They are, for most of us, foreigners ... We feel solidarity with them, but we don't think like them."⁶⁶⁶ Only 7.5 percent of Israeli Arabs surveyed in 1988 would move to a Palestinian state--in contrast to a majority of Israeli Arabs who wanted to leave under the Military Government. Israeli Arabs in many ways define themselves in opposition to Palestinian Arabs across the Green Line. Differences in citizenship, form of government, position in the marketplace, educational system, knowledge of Hebrew, and other markers separate the two communities.⁶⁶⁷ Most Israeli Arabs believe it matters whether their employer knows if they are from the Occupied Territories or from Israel. Furthermore, many Israeli Arabs see West Bank Arabs as economic competition.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶³ Ben-Rafael and Sharot, *Ethnicity, religion, and class in Israeli society*, p. 235.

⁶⁶⁴ *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xv.

⁶⁶⁵ Some writers, both Israeli and Palestinian, argue that Israeli Arabs are becoming Palestinian. See Mi'ari, "Traditionalism and Political Identity of Arabs in Israel," p. 41.

⁶⁶⁶ Dunsky, "Standing on the Green Line."

⁶⁶⁷ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 13.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibrahim Dakkak, "Survey of the Attitudes of Palestinian Wage-Earners on Both Sides of the 1949 Armistice Line," in *Palestinians over the Green Line*, pp. 128-130.

Israeli Arabs are forming their own identity that mixes both Israeli and Palestinian strains. Many Israeli Arabs surveyed do not feel "Israeli" when meeting Israeli Arabs or Israeli Jews, but do feel "Israeli" when meeting Palestinians outside Israel.⁶⁶⁹ As Smootha notes:

Israel's Arabs are at once Israeli and Palestinian. They are Israeli in citizenship, which firmly links their rights, duties, and future to Israel; in their incorporation into various Israeli institutions, such as the economy, the political parties, the media, and the Histadrut; in their noticeable bilingualism and biculturalism; in their daily contacts with Jews; and in their acceptance of Israel as a state and of their being part of it. Yet they are no less Palestinian in their ethnic and national origin; in their Arabic language and culture; and in their rejection of Zionism and of the Jewish views on the Palestinian issue.⁶⁷⁰

Israeli Jews serve as a "reference group" for Israeli Arabs; they have similar attitudes regarding status, the importance of education, and standard of living, and the Israeli Arabs are adopting Jewish habits of consumption.⁶⁷¹

The self-definition of Israeli Arabs reflects this new identity. The most common self-definition for Israeli Arabs is either "Palestinian in Israel" or "Israeli Palestinian." Although this implies a rejection of "Israeli Arab" identity--that preferred by the Jewish government--at the

⁶⁶⁹ John E. Hofman and Nadim Rouhana, "Young Arabs in Israel: Some Aspects of a Conflicted Social Identity," *The Journal of Social Psychology* 99 (1976), p. 81.

⁶⁷⁰ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 75. See also Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. xvii.

⁶⁷¹ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Values in a Divided Society*, p. 39; Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 10. Although factors such as moral values are hard to quantify, Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews have similar attitudes regarding the value of hard work, education, and experience; moreover, over time Israeli Arab attitudes toward family loyalty have moved toward that of the Jewish population (though the gap remains large). See Smootha *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 31; Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 20; and Smootha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, p. 23.

same time it is also a rejection of "Palestinian Arab" or "Palestinian" and recognizes the Israeli component of their identity.⁶⁷² Few Israeli Jews, however, openly recognize the Palestinian national component in Israeli Arab identity.⁶⁷³

Jerusalem Arabs, who in many ways are between Israeli Arabs and West Bank Arabs in terms of rights and privileges, exquisitely reflect this identity ambivalence. Jerusalem's Arabs generally have rejected the option of becoming Israeli citizens, and less than one fifth vote in local elections; yet informal cooperation in the form of accepting Israeli social services and paying taxes is high.⁶⁷⁴ Despite being well-organized with a strong social structure--indeed Jerusalem Arabs are the intifada's intellectual center-- Jerusalem Arabs have tempered their opposition to Israel after being granted privileges.⁶⁷⁵

The Israeli government also has succeeded in strengthening communal divisions within the Israeli Arab population. For example, only 2.7 percent of Israeli Druze reject Israel's right to exist, while 21.4 percent of non-Bedouin Muslims do.⁶⁷⁶ Less than 10 percent of Druze consider themselves to be Palestinian, almost half the Christians reject the label Palestinian in favor of

⁶⁷² Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 80.

⁶⁷³ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 83.

⁶⁷⁴ Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. vii and p. 97.

⁶⁷⁵ Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. 118. Violence in Jerusalem has been limited. Many incidents in Jerusalem would be ignored on the West Bank. In fact, most of the perpetrators have been Arabs or Jews from outside the city. See Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences*, p. 83.

⁶⁷⁶ Smootha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, p. 51.

Israeli, and many Bedouin also reject the term Palestinian when describing themselves.⁶⁷⁷

Similarly, the Druze and Bedouin are far more likely than other Arabs to see their future as being "separate but equal" in Israel.

Important Intervening Variables

The Israeli government system, which relies on proportional representation to fill the cabinet, aided the efforts of Israeli Arabs to improve their status. The proportional representation system magnified the importance of small groups and encouraged the formation of political alliances across interest and ethnicity. The proportional representation system also aided divide-and-rule attempts. Proportional representation, which favors small parties, further discouraged subcomponents of the Israeli Arab community to unite under one banner. Small parties have worked with Druze and Bedouin leaders in an effort to gain part of the Israeli Arab vote.

Lessons Learned

The post-military government treatment of Israeli Arabs is revealing about many strategies for preventing ethnic violence.

Family One: Control

The level of control of the Israeli Arab community gradually declined, but the government still actively monitored the community to prevent radicals from organizing.

⁶⁷⁷ Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society*, p. 89.

Although groups that threatened to organize for violence would be crushed by the state, by the late 1980s Israeli Arabs who organized for political rights within the system operated relatively freely--a dramatic change from the stifling political atmosphere of previous decades. Despite this decline in control, violence was rare.

The previous lack of violence among Israeli Arabs was one essential requirement for the reduction in control. Israeli Jews, even though dominant in society, needed to be assured of the loyalty of the Israeli Arab population. Furthermore, interviews indicate that Israeli Arabs were aware that any violent organization will lead to swift control. Muslim groups that might have supported violence were harassed by Israeli police and intelligence services. The constant atmosphere of suspicion made it clear to Israeli Arabs that political participation would be tolerated if, and only if, their loyalty to a Jewish state was assured.

The current Israeli government continued to use divide-and-rule policies with regard to the Druzes, Bedouins, and Christians, but it no longer actively played up clan divisions among the Muslim community. As under the military government, divide-and-rule has given Druzes, Bedouins, and Christians a different attitude toward the government. Polls and interviews suggest that individuals from these communities, particularly their leaders, were more likely to favor working with the Israeli government and were less likely to identify with Arabs and Muslims outside of Israel.

Family Two: Accommodation

The post-military government relied initially on co-optation to satisfy the Israeli Arab community, but soon participation became the dominant policy.

Participation. Participation proved effective in channeling the increasing activism of the Israeli Arab community. Participation, while at times restricted for Israeli Arabs, nevertheless induced Israeli Arabs to use the Israeli political system, not to reject it, in their struggle for rights. Polls and interviews indicate that Israeli Arabs believe that they can use the political system to improve their condition. As this belief has increased in recent years, support for violence has fallen. Moderate voices thus gained credibility. In interviews, Israeli Arabs regularly referred to elected officials as their leaders.

The expectation of control was necessary for Israeli Jews to accept Israeli Arab participation. Both Jews and Israeli Arabs knew that any resort to violence would lead to a crackdown--a knowledge that led both groups to moderate their earlier views. Indeed, Israeli Arabs recognized that violence would not work from the start when they voted and otherwise endorsed participation.

Successful participation strengthened Israeli Arab moderates, but to be successful participation requires the possibility of influencing decisionmaking, not just the freedom to pull a lever in a voting booth. The increase in political participation after the Likud victory in 1977 led political parties such as Rakah to moderate their behavior and gave Israeli Arabs hope that the system would work for them. Israeli Arabs in the past, however, did not see participation as beneficial because their favored parties were shunned by mainstream Zionist parties. The Land Day demonstrations, which marked a rare use of violence, suggests that radicals may have been gaining the upper hand in the Israeli Arab community. As the benefits of participation changed, so too did Israeli Arab attitudes toward it.

Participation interfered with both control and co-optation strategies. Elites today remain

favorable to, if critical of, the Jewish government, in part because they recognized that having a voice in the system made a difference. Moreover, as participation spread, Israeli Arabs organized more than ever before, to the point of having their own parties and institutions. The Jewish authorities had to choose between a participatory system and the use of control.

Co-optation. The impact of co-optation declined due to social changes and the increase in participation. As new elites emerged in large numbers, it became difficult for the government to co-opt all of them. Similarly, when rival groups of elites emerge the populace can choose among them, making it harder for the government to ensure control by satisfying only a few Israeli Arabs. Compounding this problem was the growth of participation, which undermined the influence of those identified too closely with policies not favorable to Israeli Arabs. Rival elites, under participation, had a voice and thus could challenge traditional elites. The key became what could leaders deliver, and for this they needed political contacts.

Family Three: Identity Change

Creating a New Minority. The Israeli government's efforts to foster an Israeli identity among its Arab population succeeded in preventing Israeli Arab solidarity with Palestinians elsewhere or Arabs in general, but it failed to convince Israeli Arabs to embrace an exclusively Israeli identity. The self-identified distinction between Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli Arabs suggests that Israeli efforts to change Palestinian identity were successful to a point. Interviews and polls suggest that the greater rights and privileges enjoyed by Israeli Arabs--not government propaganda in the schools--made them more favorable toward an Israeli identity. These changes in identity decreased the potential for violence by reducing Israeli Arab

solidarity with the sufferings of Palestinians elsewhere. Israeli Arabs, however, do not see themselves only as Israelis. They feel excluded from the polity and recognize that they are not equal partners in the state.

Jerusalem Arabs represent a particularly interesting case. Jerusalem Arabs include much of the Palestinian elite, and thus their attitudes might be expected to be tied to the status of the entire community. Yet their growing distance from West Bank and Gaza Palestinians suggests that the material and legal benefits of being Israelis affect their self-identification as well.

Conclusions

Israel's progress from almost constant communal fighting during the British Mandate to peaceful, if tense, communal relations today demonstrates the strong impact that government policies can have on ethnic relations. Although the Palestinian exodus of 1948 made the Israeli government's task far easier, the subsequent 50 years of communal peace between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews represents an impressive ethnic relations success. This peace is particularly remarkable given the threat felt by the Jewish population from neighboring Arab states and from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

To maintain peace, a high degree of control was necessary initially. Over time, however, both Jews and Arabs have slowly reconciled to each other's presence in the state--a reconciliation aided in large part by both sides' knowledge that any Israeli Arab violence would be futile. Israel remains a state primarily of and for Jews, but the civil rights and economic positions of its Arab citizens have steadily improved. Today, Jews see Israeli Arabs less and less as an enemy within and more and more as an accepted minority nation, while the Arabs increasingly reject violence.

Chapter V: Arabs and Berbers in Morocco

Like Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, Berbers and Arabs in Morocco are a success story of ethnic relations. The tribal anarchy of the 19th century gave way to a durable coexistence during the period of the French protectorate, which lasted from 1912-1956. According to many theories of ethnic conflict, violence should have erupted after the French left, but Morocco remained peaceful. Thus, for many reasons Morocco offers a useful illustration of how a government can craft ethnic peace.

The conquest of Morocco by French troops changed ethnic relations in Morocco forever. At the turn of the century, tribal warfare was a way of life. In most of Morocco, the Berber areas in particular resisted the Arab central government's encroachment, and the tribes in that area fought with one another incessantly. The coming of the French ended this state of constant warfare. Under the French, violent resistance met with quick punishment. However, Berber groups were allowed, and even encouraged, to keep their traditional ways and leadership as long as they cooperated with the French authorities. The French also worked with traditional leaders, giving them administrative power and subventions to satisfy them. This combination of carrot and stick ended the Berbers' violent resistance to central authority and internal feuding. During this period, Berber groups also gradually became more and more dependent on the centralized government.

When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, an Arab nationalist-dominated government led by the Istiqlal Party tried to assimilate the Berbers into the dominant Arab identity, creating tension that led to small-scale Berber uprisings. Because the Arab nationalists

did not have the power to coerce the Berbers, they were forced to abandon their assimilationist campaign in the face of widespread hostility. The King, Mohammed V, subsequently worked with the Berbers to ensure them their share of power and perquisites, but at the same time he was careful to suppress any violent dissent and inhibit autonomous ethnic organization. The King's policy led to ethnic peace in Morocco and his son, Hassan II, has continued it successfully. Education and migration have strengthened Berber-Arab relations as a common language spread and perceptions of a shared history grew. Thus, a common identity is also developing that may make ethnic peace even more durable. Although cultural activism is increasing among Berbers today, ethnic violence appears a thing of the past.

The key to this success is the steps taken during the period of French rule in Morocco. The French solved the ethnic security dilemma. In the short-term, they punished violence, disarmed individuals, and prevented hostile political activity, all of which led to a sense of security in the countryside. At the same time, by respecting both Berber and Arab culture, minimizing interference in the daily life of Moroccans, and co-opting tribal leaders and urban notables, the French minimized ethnic status concerns. Over time, the Berbers became politically dependent on the French-dominated government, which appointed their leaders and shaped their politics. The post-French monarchy maintained the peace in part by following the French model. King Mohammed V and his successor, Hassan II, have been careful to repress or co-opt any independent political activity and ensure that organization takes place under the aegis of the government.

This chapter will first describe the culture and historical background of Arabs and Berbers in Morocco. It will then examine ethnic relations in Morocco this century under four

regimes: "Sherifian" Morocco of the early 20th century; the French protectorate government that replaced it; the brief rule of the nationalist Istiqlal party following independence in 1956; and the current monarchy founded by Mohammed V and continued by his son Hassan II. As in Chapter IV, this chapter will draw lessons learned from the experience of each regime.

Box VA: A Brief Chronology of Events in Morocco

- 1830. French invade and begin to occupy Algeria
- 1844. Moroccan army defeated by the French at Isly
- 1860. Morocco defeated in war with Spain
- 1906. Algeciras conference gives France wide authority to intervene in Morocco's affairs.
- 1908. Moulay 'Abd el-Hafid replaces his brother 'Abd el-Aziz as King.
- 1911. "Agadir incident" paves way for further French influence in Morocco.
- 1912. King Moulay Hafid signs the Treaty of Fez, establishing a French protectorate, and abdicates in favor of his brother Moulay Youssef ben Hassan.
Hubert Lyautey becomes Resident General
- 1913. Spanish given a Protectorate in the north
- 1921. Crushing defeat of Spanish by tribal followers of 'Abd el-Krim.
- 1925. Lyautey replaced by Theodore Steeg as Resident General
- 1926. Followers of 'Abd el-Krim defeated by combined French and Spanish forces.
Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef becomes King after the death of his father, Moulay Youssef ben Hassan.
- 1929. Steeg replaced as Resident General by Lucien Saint.
- 1930. Berber *zahir* signed declaring the primacy of customary law in Berber areas.
- 1933. Saint replaced as Resident General by Henri Ponsot, who was soon succeeded by Marcel Peyrouton.
- 1936. General Charles Nogues, a protege of Lyautey, becomes Resident General.
- 1943. Istiqlal (Independence) party founded.
- 1946. Labonne becomes Resident General; succeeded by General Juine, who is succeeded by General Guillaume
- 1953. King Mohammed exiled for his sympathies with the Istiqlal. The King becomes a nationalist hero and does not return until 1955.
- 1954. F. Lacoste replaces Guillame as Resident General
- 1955. Grandval replaces Lacoste as Resident General
- 1956. Boyer de Latour du Moulin replaces Grandval as Resident General.
- 1956-57. Independence and reunification of Morocco.
- 1958-59. Rebellions in Berber parts of the northeast crushed by monarchy troops.
- 1961. Hassan II, son of Mohammed, becomes King on his father's death.
- 1962. Parliament established.
- 1965. Parliament suspended.
- 1970. New constitution and elections
- 1975. King successfully rallies opposition parties and large numbers of Moroccans to press his claim to the Western Sahara, culminating in the "Green March."

An Overview of Moroccan Berbers and Arabs⁶⁷⁸

The Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of Morocco and today are Morocco's largest minority, comprising roughly 40 percent of the total population of 20 million.⁶⁷⁹ The Berbers trace their descent from the Capsian culture of prehistoric North Africa, but centuries of invasion, particularly the seventh century wave of Arab migration, have made them subject to racial admixture.⁶⁸⁰ Almost all Berbers are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki rite like their Arab neighbors, yet unorthodox practices such as saint-worship are extremely common, particularly in rural areas, and tribal law often supersedes Islamic law on many issues. The major Berber concentrations are in the Rif, Middle Atlas, High Atlas, and Anti-Atlas mountains.⁶⁸¹

Although language differences have separated Berbers from each other and their Arab neighbors, these differences are gradually subsiding. The Berber language is divided into several

⁶⁷⁸ Throughout this dissertation, I use the term "Berber" rather than "Imazighen" (free men in Tamazight), which some Berber activists prefer. They argue that the term Berber, which derives from the Greek word meaning barbarian, is derogatory. I continue to use the term given its commonly accepted usage.

⁶⁷⁹ The exact percentage of Berbers in Morocco today is not clear. Intermarriage throughout the years allowed many Moroccans to claim both Berber and Arab as their heritage. Moreover, the higher status of Arabs for many years led many Berbers to Arabize their names as part of a social climbing effort. The 40 percent figure is a rough estimate of those who speak Berber as their first language.

⁶⁸⁰ Following the Arab conquest of the Maghreb area, Berbers often joined revolts in the name of Islam in protest of Arab domination. These revolts often found religious expression in the dissident Kharijite creed, which held then governing should be in the hands of the best Muslim regardless of race. See Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp. 83-88.

⁶⁸¹ *World Directory of Minorities*, Minority Rights Group, ed. (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), p. 184. Berbers and Arabs often are hard to differentiate today. Many Berbers speak Arabic, and some Arabs living near Berber communities know Berber. Ethnic identification also has been blurred by common ties of town, region, and religion.

different dialects, which are not always mutually intelligible. Until recently, Berber languages lacked the unifying vehicle of a written form; its three principal dialect groups are Tarifit (spoken in the Rif mountain area of the north), Tamazight (spoken in the Atlas Mountains), and Tashilhit (spoken in the Souss area of the south). Education and constant migration to the cities, however, have led to a growing knowledge of Arabic. At least half the Berbers also speak Arabic, but this knowledge is far more common among Berber men, particularly those in the cities.⁶⁸²

Historically, Berbers were seldom politically unified. The Berber population was long organized entirely on a tribal basis.⁶⁸³ Alan Scham estimates that there were 600 tribes in Morocco when the French protectorate began in 1912.⁶⁸⁴ Berber society was organized in small political units, taking the form of cantons in the sense of being bounded by a single high valley.⁶⁸⁵ David Hart and other anthropologists argue that the Berbers embody E.E. Evans-Pritchard's "segmentary lineage" concept--where at each level of blood relation there are oppositions that inhibit overall unity. For example, one collection of brothers and cousins may unite to fight against more distantly related cousins over grazing rights or access to water. These foes, however, will unite to fight against a rival clan which poses a threat to all the individuals of the area; these clans may unite to fight a rival tribe or outside threat. When the threat is gone,

⁶⁸² *Morocco: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 114.

⁶⁸³ *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 123.

⁶⁸⁴ Alan Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco: Protectorate Administration, 1912-1925* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 118.

⁶⁸⁵ Montagne, *The Berbers*, p. 20. Loosely speaking, there are four levels of organization in traditional tribal society: the tribal confederation consisting of several tribes; the tribe; the canton, consisting of a smaller geographic area; and the village. Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, p. 86.

fighting among small units will recur. Compounding this divisive tribal structure was an individualistic ethos that led individuals and families to leave their canton when they were not satisfied with local leaders or conditions. Ernst Gellner sums up their motto as embodied in their principle of segmentation: "Divide that ye be not ruled."⁶⁸⁶

Although unity was rare, cooperation was not completely absent from Berber society. The tribesmen have strong self-identification as Muslims and, throughout history, leaders on a national level were religious reformers or leaders who had a religious presence due to their supposed descent from the Prophet Mohammed. On more mundane issues, Berbers cooperated to dig irrigation ditches and obtain salt deposits.⁶⁸⁷ Nevertheless, Berbers have never functioned as an ethnically-unified people.⁶⁸⁸

Arab society in Morocco was a blend of tribal and urban cultures. Arabs came to Morocco as Islam began to spread in the seventh and eighth centuries. Some Arab areas were organized along tribal lines and shared a warrior ethos, a segmentary lineage structure, and heterodox religious practices with their Berber neighbors. Except for the language they spoke, they were indistinguishable from the Berbers. Coexisting with, and indeed depending on, these tribes were settled Arabs in towns and villages. Arabs in these areas often were skilled tradesmen whose culture had been enriched by the learning of Jews and Muslims who formerly lived in Spain.

⁶⁸⁶ Ernest Gellner, *The Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 41.

⁶⁸⁷ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, p. 46. Montagne, p. 51.

⁶⁸⁸ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 3.

Berber relations with their Arab neighbors and the Arab central government were uneasy at best. Many Berbers looked down on the settled Arabs and were despised in turn. Most Berbers continually resisted domination by the Arab central government, and even the Sultans who were able to subdue them did not succeed in keeping them under control for long. Many Arabs in Morocco today, however, are of the same original stock as Berbers as centuries of living side-by-side has led to considerable intermarriage.

Morocco in general remained peripheral to Arab and later Ottoman Kingdoms. Tribal resistance in the mountains hindered efforts by far-off governments to pacify Morocco.⁶⁸⁹ Although under the nominal sovereignty of distant rulers, in reality local leaders dominated politics with little interference from Caliphs in the eastern Muslim world.

The Arab Alawite dynasty, whose leaders claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed, nominally has ruled Morocco since Mulay Rashid took power in 1666. His successors defended their power against pretenders from their own family and struggled to maintain control in the face of tribal revolts and European incursions. The period from 1666 to 1912 is known as "Sherifian" Morocco, a term that comes from Mulay Rashid's supposed descent from the Prophet Mohammed. In the late 19th and early 20th century, both France and Spain expanded their influence in Morocco. Years of encroachment on Moroccan territory and central government authority culminated in the Treaty of Fez in 1912, which preserved the religious status and traditional prestige of the monarch but made Morocco a French protectorate. The treaty gave the French control over the royal court and foreign relations and ceded parts of Morocco to Spain as

⁶⁸⁹ Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, p. 23.

well.⁶⁹⁰

Morocco gained its independence in 1956. The nationalist movement was led by the Istiqlal (independence) party, whose leadership consisted of young urban intellectuals and middle-class Moroccans.⁶⁹¹ The Istiqlal initially worked with the sympathetic King, who became a nationalist hero in his own right when he defied French authority and was sent into exile. Upon independence, the Istiqlal sought for Morocco to be a constitutional monarchy but the King, Mohammed V, used his personal popularity, divisions within the Istiqlal, and the Berber tribes' resentment of the urban Arab Istiqlal leadership to consolidate his position. Today, the monarchy appears solidly entrenched under Mohammed V's son, Hassan II.

Case VA: Sherifian Morocco

Efforts by the pre-colonial Arab central government in Morocco to accommodate Berber tribes failed to end the endemic internal ethnic quarrelling of Berber tribesmen with one another, with their neighbors, and with the central government. Accommodation took a minimalist form of devolution--*de facto* autonomy--rather than elaborate sinecures or public spending. Independent of the government were holy men (*agurram*), who tried to mediate conflicts and otherwise bring tribes together. They too failed to bring a lasting peace to Morocco or permanently end the disputes they mediated.

The primary problem with both mediation and devolution was the lack of security for the

⁶⁹⁰ For the best account of this period, see Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1869-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

⁶⁹¹ *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 57.

parties involved. Thus, when Berber tribes gained resources from devolution they used them to build up strength for conflict. Mediation suffered from a similar problem. Negotiated solutions seldom survived into the long-term as the holy men could not enforce them.

Box VB: Sherifian Morocco: An Ethnic Relations Failure

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Security Dilemma
- o Hegemony (occasional tribal attempts at dominance)

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Devolution (autonomy)

Secondary Strategies Used:

- o Mediation

Intervening Variables

- o Extremely weak central government

Role of Outside Powers

- o Limited (French discredited last Sherifian regimes)

An Overview of Sherifian Morocco

Before the French completed pacifying Morocco in 1933, most Berber areas in Morocco were in a state of dissidence, constantly resisting central government encroachment.⁶⁹² The Berbers had close to complete autonomy (the highest degree of devolution), yet violence was widespread. As Al-Hajj Muhammad notes in Munson's oral history of a Moroccan family, tribes from different Berber tribal regions

lived a life of violence:

This [the mid-19th century] was a time of violence in the hills of the Jbala [a Berber tribal region of Morocco stretching from the River Sebou up to the Mediterranean]. Muslim killed Muslim for the slightest reason: a cow, a goat, a piece of land or a woman ... If we did this today, there would be no Muslims left in Morocco. In those days, the *qayyids* [local leaders] did not care if the Jbala killed each other so long as they paid their taxes. Two men would argue as the

⁶⁹² Most scholars note the perpetual division between the areas controlled by the *makhzan*, or royal court, and the areas that resisted the *makhzan* encroachment, which took its name from the Arabic word for dissidence, *siba*. The neatness of this division is a subject of considerable debate. See Edmund Burke's essay in *Arabs and Berbers* for an excellent overview of this issue.

fqih would wake the village by the call to the dawn prayer. And by the sunset prayer, all the men in the village would be shooting at each other. But the Jbala never killed the way the Rifis [a neighboring Berber tribal region] used to kill. The Rifi would kill his own brother over an onion.⁶⁹³

The central government never established control over many Berber areas before colonization. Being poor, Berber areas often were not worth the expense of a punitive military expedition to punish nonpayment of taxes, and the fierce resistance put up by local tribes further discouraged the government.⁶⁹⁴

Intra-tribal fighting was even more common than fighting against the government. Berber society approached a Hobbesian state of chaos. For example, in the Rif Berber region in western Morocco, conflict was so rampant that Rifians customarily "declared peace" rather than declared war. House-to-house fighting was common, and each family dwelling usually contained a pillbox to defend against one's neighbors. Individuals of the tribe were discouraged from leaving and seeking their fortune as farmers or tradesmen since the tribe needed enough able men to defend itself against other tribes and the individual might be vulnerable unless he had a tribe to protect him.⁶⁹⁵ Indeed, conflict in general was an important part of tribal culture. Warfare was

⁶⁹³ Henry Munson, Jr., *The House of Si Abd Allah* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 61.

⁶⁹⁴ David Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1976), p. 351. At times, Sultans such as Mulay Sulaiman in the early 19th century sent out expeditions to punish and tax gather in Berber area, but these areas never were consolidated under the Sultan's control.

⁶⁹⁵ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 381 and David Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 23. Rupert Furneaux, *Abdel Krim: Emir of the Rif* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1976), p. 24 observes that the Berbers of the Rif region had five freedoms: to quarrel, to hate, to fear, to kill, and to die. The warrior ethos can be found in the key Berber institutions, almost all of which center around feuding, and Berber constitutive myths. The myths generally contain legends

an important social ritual, and prowess at arms a supreme source of social recognition.

Conflict in general focused on security issues, but economic and status issues often exacerbated disputes. The segmentary lineage structure of the tribal areas provided an archetype of ruthless balance-of-power politics, with leaders and tribes rising and falling in a whirlpool of constantly shifting alliances. Disputes over pasturage, particularly in lean years, and personal rivalries also led to conflict.

Berbers did not identify themselves as Berbers despite their distinctiveness from their Arab neighbors. Society was organized along a tribal basis, and Berbers also felt duties and obligations as Muslims, but there is little evidence of a pan-tribal ethnic sentiment. Berber tribes at times warred with one another or with Arab tribes, but such conflict depended more on proximity and resource competition than ethnicity. *De facto* differences nevertheless separated Arabs and Berbers. In general the Berber areas were not subject to the Sultan's authority, while the Arab areas were. Language and tribal law also made the Berbers distinct from their neighbors.⁶⁹⁶

Although the Berbers constantly warred with royal forces, they did not reject the monarch completely, considering him a holy figure worthy of religious obedience. The Sultan's descent from the prophet gave him supernatural status among the Berbers even when they rejected his

about ancestors' and their deeds against other tribes. See David Hart, *Daddy 'Atta and His Forty Grandsons: The Sociopolitical Organization of the Ait 'Atta of Southern Morocco* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

⁶⁹⁶ This division raises the important question of whether Morocco was indeed a state, much less a nation state, before colonization. Central authority in Morocco was nominal, but the Sultan did consider himself--and was considered by outside powers--to be the ruler of what is now Morocco. Berber tribes, however, felt no political loyalty to the Sultanate.

secular authority. Even mountain Berbers whom the royal government never subdued considered the Sultan a person to be respected and feared.⁶⁹⁷ The Sultan in theory appointed the heads of many tribes, but in reality he merely gave his seal of approval to already established local leaders.⁶⁹⁸

De facto autonomy strengthened the traditional order, ethnic organizations, and the traditional terms of identification but did not lessen ethnic conflict. The traditional order, unfortunately, was not peaceful. Feuding, warfare, and resource competition were ingrained parts of the Berber way of life. Because accommodation-as-autonomy did not reduce group competition or ensure group security, it left life-or-death questions of pasturage, irrigation, and housing to be decided by the strongest. Furthermore, given the nature of tribal organization, even personal issues such as theft or adultery could spark massive tribal conflicts. When the government attempted to buy allies or play off tribal rivals against each other or against rival tribes, it added a new source of funds to bolster tribal independence. Autonomy did, however, affect who fought whom. Because the government did not try to extend its influence into the affairs of remote Berber areas, the tribes there seldom fought with the Sultan's forces. For example, the Arab government and the Rifian Berbers engaged in relatively little conflict even though the Rif area was plagued with violence.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁷ Montagne, *The Berbers*, p. 71.

⁶⁹⁸ Kenneth J. Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844-1934* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. 88.

⁶⁹⁹ Within the anarchy of traditional Berber life lay a measure of freedom. Within the Berber tribes, members participated fully in tribal decisions. Hart notes that Berber leaders led by consensus and that individuals frequently left a particular tribal subunit if dissatisfied with its policy. The ability to vote with your feet gave individual members considerable influence, and

Holy men (*agurram*) were one of the few sources of peace among the Berber tribes, but the peace they brokered often lasted little more than a few days.⁷⁰⁰ Held in respect by all the tribes, the holy men served as mediators. Through their intercession long-standing blood feuds often halted, thus allowing vital functions such as farming or pasturage to take place. Furthermore, when outside (particularly non-Muslim) groups threatened, the holy men tried to rally the tribes to take joint action to defend Islam's patrimony. The holy men, however, could not forge a lasting peace. Because they could not enforce the truces they brokered, their decisions often were discarded.

The years leading up to the French protectorate were particularly violent. As the French and other colonial powers increased their meddling in Morocco--the French seizure of the Touat oasis in north-central Sahara was the first loss of Moroccan territory to any Christian power in recent years--the prestige of the Sultan and court diminished. Efforts by Sultan Abd el-Aziz (1894-1908) to work with the West to reform Morocco further increased domestic discontent. Toward the end of the sharifian period, the French and Spanish governments had discredited the Sultan completely. Each concession Morocco made to France or Spain--whether in the form of territory, trading rights, or simply symbolic obedience--decreased the respect tribal groups felt for the Sultan. Such proof of the state's weakness increased tribal unrest, as the tribes took matters into their own hands in order to defend themselves and expel the invaders from Muslim lands.⁷⁰¹

the segmentary tribal structure preserved a degree of equality.

⁷⁰⁰ See Gellner's *Saints of the Atlas* for an excellent description of the roles and missions of the *agurram*.

⁷⁰¹ William A. Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 22.

The Role of Outside Powers

Outside powers contributed to the above problems by discrediting what little central government authority existed in Morocco. When the French and Spanish governments began consolidating their position in Morocco at the turn of the century, they sent troops into Morocco and demanded the government's obedience. This display highlighted the Sultan's weakness. The ability of the Sultan to impose any order, even on tribes long dominated by the court, became questionable. As a result, even hitherto loyal and non-violent tribes joined in revolts and engaged in tribal warfare.

Lessons Learned from Sherifian Morocco

The Sherifian government in Morocco used accommodation in the form of devolution to manage ethnic relations. Concurrent with this were third party (holy men) efforts to foster peace among the tribes through their good offices--track one mediation. The Moroccan experience illustrates problems with granting autonomy when no force is employed. It also suggests limits to mediation, which failed to produce lasting peace. Finally, it highlights the dangers that outside powers can pose to ethnic peace even when they do not directly aid the belligerents.

Family Two: Accommodation

Devolution. The maximal form of devolution used by Sherifian Morocco--*de facto* autonomy--failed to produce ethnic peace and indeed contributed to the violence. Devolution proved highly effective in preventing status issues from arising as a source of conflict, but by itself it did not interfere with the ethnic security dilemma. Although autonomy represents an

extremely high level of devolution, violence remained rampant in Morocco, suggesting that there is no direct correlation between devolution and violence. In fact, it suggests that even if devolution is at all effective, at high levels it may still produce violence. The Berbers constantly sought to take advantage of state weaknesses, and government efforts to meddle often increased conflict between groups as it played them off against one another. Traditional Berber institutions encouraged feuding and indeed depended on it to maintain themselves.

Devolution failed to prevent violence because the security dilemma continued unabated. The Berber tribes had *de facto* autonomy at the turn of the century, but they did not hesitate to war with one another or internally. Because not even modest "police control" was attempted against inter-tribal warfare, tribes had no disincentive to refrain from violence or reassurance that others would do so. Devolving power to local leaders also allowed them to build up their forces, thus expanding the scope of violence. Because groups did not feel secure, they used the devolution of power to build up their own capacity for violence.

Devolution also did nothing to counter hegemonic groups. In fact, individuals and groups that used violence and engaged in warfare gained in status in Sherifian Morocco.

Autonomy did, however, quiet status concerns. By granting *de facto* autonomy to the Berber tribes, they did not see the government as a threat to their way of life. Questions of their tribe's position in society, language, or other status issues did not arise as a source of conflict.

Family Four: Mediation

Track One Mediation. The use of third party mediators in Morocco failed to result in lasting ethnic peace. The holy men facilitated the creation of peace in the short-term. By being

an honest broker, they were able to create compromises and end violence when all parties had enough of killing. This success suggests the importance of mediators and their good offices for creating an initial peace. The holy men, however, had no ability to impose peace. Thus, the peace they negotiated had to be self-supporting (and thus in the interest of all parties). A change in circumstances (an increase in relative tribal manpower, a bad drought that creates a need for new grazing lands, etc.) could easily lead to conflict. Because such changes happened constantly, conflict regularly recurred.

Important Intervening Variables

The weakness of the Sherifian central government limited its ability to manage ethnic conflict effectively. The primary problem with the devolution and mediation strategies was the lack of government force, which prevented it from ensuring groups' security. The Sherifian government, of course, did not have the resources to impose its will on the countryside. Although many of the above points note that the lack of force left security dilemma problems unchecked, it is important to recognize that even low levels of police control may have been impossible for the government. In fact, from the government's point of view the constant tribal quarrelling was far preferable to the likely alternative: the tribes united against the Sultanate. For the government's purposes, autonomy provided neither governability nor fewer deaths, but it did distract potential rivals.

Case VB: Morocco under the French

Colonial Morocco represents a rare long-term ethnic conflict resolution success. During

the French protectorate era, violent conflict within, between, and by ethnic groups diminished in Morocco. Violence did erupt toward the end of the colonial period, but it was political violence directed against the French occupiers, not conflict along ethnic lines. Unlike the British, who brought ethnic conflict in their wake when taking power in Palestine, the French occupiers pacified Morocco's fractious tribes and left a legacy of ethnic peace.

To accomplish this monumental task, the French used a variety of policies to manage ethnic relations. First and foremost, the French established order in the country by using a strong control policy. The French also used accommodation, devolving power to local elites and co-opting many of them to serve the French administration. In addition to control and accommodation, colonial officials tried to play up Berber and tribal identities to weaken Moroccan nationalism in general. Aiding the French effort was a lack of outside power involvement: the French, and the French alone, influenced events in their protectorate.

The French protectorate case demonstrates the effectiveness of balancing control policies with accommodationist ones. Selective control after pacification quelled unrest and ended the ethnic security dilemma. Continued peace allowed the colonial government to lessen the level of control to police control while still keeping the peace. Devolution offset the resentment control engendered, reduced group status concerns, and led to more positive feelings about the government in general. Co-optation played a major role in satisfying key political elites, reducing their desire and ability to organize against the government. Thus, under the French fear of other groups fell and concerns about group status lessened. Moreover, those still dissatisfied with the government found it much harder to organize to use violence.

Box VC: The French in Morocco: An Ethnic Relations Success

Types of Ethnic Conflict Solved :

- o Security Dilemma
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Selective Control
- o Co-optation
- o Devolution

Secondary Strategies Used:

- o Police control
- o Divide-and-rule
- o Mediation (track one)

Intervening Variables:

- o Segmented tribal group
- o Geographically concentrated ethnic groups
- o Low level of ethnic consciousness

Role of Outside Powers:

- o None
-

The French Protectorate under

Lyautey

The French pacification of the Berber areas of dissidence in the name of the Sultan changed Morocco forever. When the French formally established their protectorate over Morocco, the country was in rebellion against the Sultan and the French colonial power. Many of the tribes had risen to "liberate" the Sultan from foreign control, and urban areas were in turmoil.⁷⁰² Using their superior resources and organization--and the support of defeated tribes--the French gradually subdued the rebellious tribes and brought them under the monarch's (and, more

importantly, their own) administration.

To pacify the primarily-Berber area of dissidence, the French employed a strategy of divide-and-conquer. The French conquest of the Ait 'Atta--the last tribe to submit to their authority--in southern Morocco is instructive. The French worked with a neighboring Berber leader, El Glaoui, and his followers to defeat the Ait 'Atta confederation militarily in 1919. The

⁷⁰² William A. Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 41-43.

French gave Glaoui financial and logistical backing in his campaign, keeping their own direct involvement limited.⁷⁰³ Over the next ten years, the French worked with El Glaoui and with some 'Atta subtribes to subdue those 'Atta tribal components led by 'Assu u-Ba Slam who would not submit. At each step of the conquest, the French worked with rivals of the rebels. This policy of slow conquest worked. By 1933, all of Morocco was nominally under the monarch's control, a situation without precedent since medieval times.

Marshall Louis-Herbert Gonzalve Lyautey, who oversaw the French effort in Morocco, skillfully mixed the use of force and the promise of future benefits. Under Lyautey, the army's pacification effort went hand-in-hand with efforts to allow those conquered to see the benefits of occupation.⁷⁰⁴ The French built roads, improved irrigation, and founded hospitals after their conquest. As Robin Bidwell notes, "the tribes were defeated with the minimum of bloodshed and an immediate effort was made by the conferring of material benefits to compensate them for their loss of their independence."⁷⁰⁵

Lyautey relied more on the threat of force than actual violence to have his way: "Display force in order to avoid using it" was one of his mottos. He tried to maintain a highly visible French military presence and impress the tribes with France's ability to use force, but even when revolts broke out he dealt leniently with revolt participants. Lyautey believed that collective

⁷⁰³ David Hart, *The Ait 'Atta of Southern Morocco: Daily Life & Recent History* (Cambridge: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1984), pp. 165-66.

⁷⁰⁴ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 9; Edmund Burke III, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria, 1912-1925," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9:2 (May 1973), p. 177.

⁷⁰⁵ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 47.

punishment sowed new hatred.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, the Marshall focused on deterrence, using a visible troop presence to dissuade groups from engaging in violence and developing an impressive intelligence network to preempt any potential violence.⁷⁰⁷ As a result of this restraint, the French government avoided much of the resentment that a bloody pacification might have engendered.

The French initially combined pacification with devolution and co-optation--a combination that won them allies rather than causing lasting resentment. Lyautey recognized that the traditional tribes would do their utmost to defend their way of life and resolved to work with it rather than against it. Lyautey's credo summarizes his intentions: "Do not offend a single tradition, do not change a single habit."⁷⁰⁸ Co-optation and devolution were policies that allowed France to put themselves on the side of the traditional way of life. Upon victory, the French worked with traditional leaders and did not change customs, demanding only submission to the monarch's court, which they dominated. For example, the French allowed the final defenders under 'Assu u-Ba Slam to retain their customary law, and they even let these Ait 'Atta keep their weapons, offering them a full amnesty without any fines. Often newly-submitted tribes fought for the French against other tribes with French arms the day after submission.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁶ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 42 and *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 45.

⁷⁰⁷ The clearest instance of Lyautey's deterrence approach occurred during the First World War, when the situation in Europe led to a major withdrawal of French troops from Morocco. Rather than withdraw his troops to the coast, which was more defensible, Lyautey continued pressing the attack and moving forward in order to maintain an aura of determination and invincibility.

⁷⁰⁸ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, pp. 6-35; Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, p. 42; and *Morocco: A Country Study*, pp. 45-48.

⁷⁰⁹ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 15. Hart, *The Ait 'Atta of Southern Morocco*, pp. 173-176, 182. Typical terms of submission included a moderate fine, the confiscation of

After the French consolidated power, Lyautey tried to minimize French penetration, devolving power in many areas to the monarch or to tribal leaders. Lyautey believed that such indirect rule was both more effective and less costly than direct French oversight.⁷¹⁰ Lyautey's goal was to improve conditions in Morocco without disorienting change that involved forced breaks with the past.⁷¹¹ In an effort to reduce any stigma associated with Christian dominance, the French gave the King authority over "Muslim affairs"--religious justice, state property, and religious property.⁷¹² With regard to criminal cases, Muslim religious judges retained their status as did tribal urban leaders.⁷¹³ In the south, Lyautey ruled through the *grands caids*--the local Berber leaders such as Haida ou Mouis, Madani and Thami el-Glaoui, Abdesselem M'Toungui, and El Hadj Taieb Ben Mohamed el-Goundafi.⁷¹⁴ Under Lyautey, *Service des Affaires Indigenes* (SAI) officials--the French officials assigned with administering the protectorate--allowed local tribal leaders tremendous latitude.⁷¹⁵

Perhaps most importantly, Lyautey also tried to restrict the *colon* presence. He forbade

some arms, acceptance of the administration and taxation of the monarch's court, collaboration against dissidents, and help in public works projects. See Bidwell, p. 37.

⁷¹⁰ For an excellent overview of the often contradictory views of Lyautey on France's colonial mission, see Barnett Singer, "Lyautey: An Interpretation of the Man and French Imperialism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991), pp. 131-157.

⁷¹¹ *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 45. David Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco: two case studies," in *Arabs and Berbers*, p. 54. Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, p. 21.

⁷¹² Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 49.

⁷¹³ Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 108.

⁷¹⁴ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 94.

⁷¹⁵ Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 29.

Europeans to enter mosques. Unless native customs and laws harmed European interests, they were left alone. Lyautey also pressed the central government in Paris to restrict the immigration of French settlers to Morocco.

To further minimize resentment, Lyautey also devolved symbolic benefits to the local population. He gave local leaders all due ceremony when meeting with them, and loyal leaders also received symbolic honors, such as membership in the legion of honor.⁷¹⁶ He also pressed for Moroccan representatives to be present at Versailles and at the League of Nations, put the Moroccan flag on major buildings, played the Moroccan anthem constantly, and promoted academic research on Morocco's past to stimulate pride.

Co-optation played a major role in the French control over Morocco. Lyautey believed that local leaders should serve as intermediaries between the French protectorate and the rural population. In a letter to his sister, he wrote that he intended to use traditional leaders to ensure French control: "... remind ourselves that in all human society there is a ruling class ... Enlist this ruling class in our service."⁷¹⁷ To this end, Lyautey tried to minimize the use of colonial officials in administration.⁷¹⁸ Thus, Lyautey and his successors often recruited tribal leaders as local leaders after they surrendered. For example, Assu u-Ba Slam was made the local leader from 1933 until 1960 despite leading the opposition to the French pacification campaign. In the city,

⁷¹⁶ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 168; Singer, "Lyautey," p. 137.

⁷¹⁷ Quoted in Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 6.

⁷¹⁸ In rural areas, the local French official provided information to the military command, oversaw local government and justice, supervised the collection of taxes, instituted economic improvements, and monitored native leaders. See Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 50.

the government used local elites to rule. The French created municipal commissions to run urban areas, which drew their membership from leading merchant and landowning families and oversaw areas ranging from public works to health.⁷¹⁹

As a result of this indirect rule, much of the resentment that might have arisen from French control was transferred to coethnics, who enforced French laws. When force was required--such as during an early campaign to put down a pretender to the King's throne--Lyautey tried to use rival tribes such as El Glaoui's and Haida's people rather than French forces.⁷²⁰ Local administrators also shared the blame for unpopular measures such as taxes or punishments.

Local French personnel were responsible for organizing the indirect rule system. Under Lyautey, their function was to manage local authorities, not rule directly. The SAI officials oversaw judicial proceedings, taxation, the recruitment of native officials, and public works projects.⁷²¹ A crucial SAI function was intelligence. SAI officials provided political information on tribal politics to the central government.⁷²² SAI officials were required to know their areas of administration well and were responsible for anticipating trouble in their regions.

The indirect rule policy, which preserved the prominence of traditional elites, masked the

⁷¹⁹ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, pp. 115-116.

⁷²⁰ One French newspaper bragged that the Pretender El-Hiba was defeated "without a single drop of French blood being shed." See Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 99.

⁷²¹ Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 1. The SAI official's priorities reflect France's goals of domination and paternalistic benevolence: the first goal of an SAI officer was to ensure the area's tranquility; his next goal was to ensure France's pre-eminence; and his final goal was to improve the area's standard of living (pp. 85-86).

⁷²² Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 27.

dramatic changes in the Moroccan power structure that occurred during the French reign. A major change initiated by the French was to restructure local administration, which led local leaders to rely more on the French than on the tribe for support. Although this restructuring did not directly change daily routines--Berber tribes still spoke the same language, followed the same way of life, and worked with the same leaders--it altered the process by which these rhythms were preserved.

The French retained the shell of the old organization but dramatically altered the function and independence of the individuals within it. Traditionally, in many Berber areas of dissidence, tribal assemblies chose the local leader and the tribe used force to defend its way of life. Under the French, the colonial government appointed the local leader and forbade the use of force. Often the local leader's appointment occurred with the consultation and concurrence of the tribal assembly, but by eliminating the threat of removal from below, the tribal leader became dependent on the central administration, not his supposed followers, for authority. The French also used monetary payments to promote loyalty to the Protectorate government.⁷²³ These French actions strengthened the tribal leader vis-a-vis his tribe, but they weakened the tribe's strength in relation to the central government.

Colonial politics, of course, became a major factor in tribal politics. The French often encouraged the promotion of favored local council members and removed leaders they considered too independent.⁷²⁴ The French rewarded loyal leaders by ignoring their exactions

⁷²³ Singer, "Lyautey," p. 136.

⁷²⁴ Perkins, *Quids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 96.

and misdeeds, providing direct financial support, and issuing declarations of support.⁷²⁵ This change of power lessened the overall quality of administration. To be effective, local figures required popular support, but active collaboration with the French often led them to lose touch with their followers.

In addition to helping manage indirect rule, French officials tried to mediate disputes--an example of track one negotiation. Like the holy men in the past, the French colonial officers tried to mediate long-standing disputes and prevent blood feuds from erupting. Again, the French retained the shell of the old system of mediation and institutionalized arbitration of the holy men, but their arbitration carried with it the possibility of force.⁷²⁶ These mediation efforts often succeeded. The 'Ait Atta confederation and the Berbers loyal to El Glaoui, for example, still had disputes over pasturage and irrigation (not to mention countless personal squabbles), but widespread feuding did not break out as these tribes turned to the new administrative system to redress their grievances.

French Policy after Lyautey

The success of Lyautey's policies is suggested by the decline in the level of force used to keep the peace in Morocco. After the pacification of Morocco, the level of control declined, and the level of force used approached police control. The number of troops stationed in Morocco fell dramatically after the initial pacification campaign ended. In fact, by World War II many

⁷²⁵ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, pp. 88-94.

⁷²⁶ Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 109. This awareness of French force had implications for all SAI "suggestions," which ranged from which local official to appoint to the best means to wipe out plagues of locusts.

Moroccan troops were fighting with the French in Europe. During the period after pacification ended, almost no communal violence occurred.

Despite this drop in force, French policy became more disruptive after Lyautey left the scene in 1925. In effect, the degree of devolution and co-optation lessened due to the growing number of *colons* and administrative problems.

The *colons* desired more land and power in Morocco. The French government increased the transfer of land to French *colons* and allowed far more of them to settle in Morocco. As a result, many tribesmen became agricultural laborers for the *colons*.⁷²⁷ French settlers also interrupted the process of elite co-optation and the devolution of local power in order to ensure their own status positions and coercive power.⁷²⁸ For example, settlers insisted on dominating local administrative positions to the exclusion of many newly-educated Moroccans.

For much of Morocco, administration by locals became nominal at most. In the cities, Moroccans gradually disappeared from many municipal councils.⁷²⁹ Only in Fez did the elected native municipal council really administer the city. Local pashas presided over other councils,

⁷²⁷ This shift continued after independence when the new government took over these farms. See *Morocco: A Country Study*, pp. 124-125.

⁷²⁸ This problem is particularly common in failed attempts to incorporate territory into the core of a nation. Ian Lustick, *State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985), p. 8. Lustick argues that settlers stymie integration for four reasons: they serve as a conduit of information to the metropole and thus are in a position to foster hostile impressions of the native population; they are a natural recruiting pool for local administration; they care more about metropolitan policies than natives, and a better able to influence them; and they in general are politically flexible (p. 8 i).

⁷²⁹ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 134.

but French members of the council and the French city manager made the important decisions.⁷³⁰

The change in French policy away from devolution was in part inspired by a lack of competent administrators. Although many Moroccans proved eager collaborators, few had the ability, education, or inclination to become administrators in the French manner.⁷³¹ Many traditional leaders proved to be poor administrators, unaccustomed to working with modern bureaucracies.⁷³² Thus the French increasingly relied on their own officials in the field, further diminishing local authority.⁷³³ The problem of administration was exacerbated by the Catch-22 inherent in colonialism: to be effective, local figures had to have popular support, which often was undermined by active collaboration with the French.

To offset the increasing unpopularity of the colonial government, Lyautey's initial policy of minimal penetration gradually became one of divide-and-rule. In general, the French tried to use rival families or tribal leaders in overlapping positions, both to satisfy the elites' ambitions and to weaken their ability to resist French penetration.⁷³⁴ The French also gave support to local leaders opposed to the King and bolstered local charismatic religious leaders as a counterpart to

⁷³⁰ William A. Hoisington, Jr., *The Casablanca Connection: French Colonial Policy, 1936-1943* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 7-8.

⁷³¹ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 184.

⁷³² Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, pp. 135-139.

⁷³³ Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, pp. 90 and 194-195 and Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 16; in general, French colonial administration was highly decentralized and gave considerable authority to officials in the colonies. See William B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 4.

⁷³⁴ Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, p. 170.

the King's influence as Commander of the Faithful.⁷³⁵

The French also tried to promote Berber identity and distinguish it from that the Berbers' Arab neighbors. In 1930, the French issued the Berber *zahir*, a decree that shifted judicial powers from the central government-appointed notables to traditional Berber representatives. This decree strengthened Berber identity and autonomy vis-a-vis the King and placed tribal law above Islamic law.⁷³⁶ Moreover, the French recruited Berbers for the armed forces, established Berber schools, and made radio broadcasts in the Berber language, all of which reinforced Berber distinctiveness.⁷³⁷ Protectorate authorities also opened a Berber college in the town of Azrou, where the curriculum was taught in the Tamazight dialect and French rather than Arabic.⁷³⁸ Although this shift toward divide-and-rule weakened Berber and Arab cooperation, it increased Berber autonomy vis-a-vis the Arabs.

Berbers, particularly Berber leaders, came to recognize that their improved status depended in part on continued French rule. As one Moroccan academic noted:

There was a realization that while the French were foreigners, they were also more pro-

⁷³⁵ In early 1951, as tension between Moroccan nationalists and the French rose, French co-opted Berber tribal leaders mobilized thousands of Berbers to demonstrate outside Fez against the King's nationalist leanings, but these same leaders eventually went over to the nationalist cause. *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 52.

⁷³⁶ The *zahir* was a major catalyst for the formation of the nationalist movement in Morocco; nationalists claimed the *zahir* was an attempt to divide Muslims on the basis of ethnicity. In reality, however, the *zahir* simply codified existing differences although the French decree no doubt was also motivated by political concerns.

⁷³⁷ Abdaslam Ben Kaddour, "The Neo-Makhzan and the Berbers," in *Arabs and Berbers*, p. 260-261; Hoisington, *The Casablanca Connection*, pp. 30-31.

⁷³⁸ Daniel A. Wagner, *Literacy, Culture, and Development: Becoming Literate in Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 17.

Berber than pro-Arab. This made Berbers happier than Arabs with the fiction that Morocco was indeed a sovereign state with a special relationship with France. Only the French decision to remove the King turned the Berbers against them.⁷³⁹

Indeed, Berber-Arab cooperation was so limited that, until the expulsion of the King in 1953, the Berbers played almost no role in the anti-French liberation movement. The colonial government often was quite popular with the Berber tribes. French popularity was particularly high with groups they actively cultivated such as El Glaoui and his followers. Nationalist opposition to the French was centered on the Arab-dominated cities.⁷⁴⁰

Spanish Morocco and the Revolt of 'Abd el-Krim

The Spanish occupiers of Morocco followed the French model of combining control and accommodation. Pacification proved much more difficult for the Spaniards than for the French. Berbers in the Rif Mountains in particular vigorously resisted Spanish encroachment. In the early 1920s, under the leadership of 'Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi, the Berbers almost succeeded in pushing the Spanish entirely out of Morocco, killing tens of thousands in the process. The

⁷³⁹ Interview with academic, June 1996.

⁷⁴⁰ Ironically, several Berber tribes played a major role in the consolidation of Moroccan independence despite playing little role in the formation of the nationalist movement. The Berbers resented the French efforts to silence the pro-nationalist King Mohammed V, considering him a potent traditional symbol worthy of veneration. Without the Berber-based Liberation Army--essentially a small insurgency of pro-King Berber tribal members--the King might never have been restored. Thus, the Berbers made possible their own subjection to the Crown they had long resisted. See A. Coram, "A Note on the Role of the Berbers in the Early Days of Moroccan Independence," in *Arabs and Berbers*, p. 269. Although anger at the expulsion of the King set off the Berber revolt, economic discontent also played a role in Berber disgruntlement with the colonizers. Around the time of Independence, virtually no work could be found for many Berber migrants since the Algerian frontier was closed due to the insurrection that began there in 1954.

violence briefly spilled over into the French zone as 'Abd el-Krim's forces tried to push the French out of areas near the Rif Mountains.

'Abd el-Krim was not defeated until 1926, when French and Spanish forces united to subdue him. After the defeat of 'Abd el-Krim, the Spaniards initiated similar policies to those of the French under Lyautey. They too demanded the surrender of weapons but worked with local leaders. As time went on, the Spanish incorporated 'Abd el-Krim's former ministers into their administration. Eventually, not a single tribal office-holder in the Spanish Zone had not served under 'Abd el-Krim in some capacity. Indeed, many of the colonial laws built on reforms of 'Abd el-Krim. The Spanish also used 'Abd el-Krim's system of working with a leader from each of the five subunits of the tribal confederation.⁷⁴¹

For the French-administered part of Morocco, 'Abd el-Krim's revolt is a fascinating "non-conflict" that suggests that power of France's control over Morocco. 'Abd el-Krim, charismatic and successful leader, failed to rouse Moroccan Berbers in the French zone to his cause even though the foe--the Christian West--was long one of the few things that would inspire unity among Moroccan Berbers. Even in the darkest days of 'Abd el-Krim's attack on French Morocco, when it seemed likely that he would capture Fez and proclaim himself King, Berbers under French control in general did not follow his call to revolt.

Such loyalty is a tribute to the success of French efforts in Morocco, particularly since it

⁷⁴¹ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, pp. 406-413. The Berbers played a major role in both the Spanish and French armed forces. Berber troops may have been responsible for the fascist victory over the loyalists during the Spanish Civil War. The French also recruited large numbers of Berbers for the Army. Over 300,000 Moroccans saw service in the French army by the end of the Second World War, and many of these veterans later joined the resistance. See *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 57 and Ben Kaddour, "The Neo-Makhzan and the Berbers," p. 260.

demonstrated that the French monopoly on violence was not the only source of its support in Morocco.⁷⁴² Lyautey's pacification campaign and policy of indirect rule had left many Berber tribes content with French rule. Indeed, by the time of the revolt many Berber leaders depended on French subventions for their political survival.⁷⁴³

The Social Ramifications of Colonialism

Colonialism had a lasting impact on the daily lives of Moroccans. By providing security, it changed the daily rhythms and institutions of tribal life. Politically, it undermined the traditional leadership while strengthening the national government. Economically, it integrated self-contained villages into the national and international economy.

The security provided by colonization resulted in dramatic changes in the Berber way of life. A major cause of tribal conflict was fear: often tribes refused to submit to the French until the French agreed to protect them.⁷⁴⁴ The result of French pacification was a dramatic decrease in the need for self-defense. At the end of the pacification campaign, the price of rifles had fallen from 1,500 francs to 200 as tribesmen felt it was not necessary for personal protection.

The subsequent disarming of the tribes reduced their ability to resist the central

⁷⁴² Anthony Clayton, *France, Soldiers, and Africa* (New York: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 109.

⁷⁴³ The failure of the 'Abd el-Krim revolt can be explained by several factors. First, support for 'Abd el-Krim would put power into the hands of tribal rivals. As Moroccan Berbers did not perceive themselves as an ethnic group, they did not automatically see 'Abd el-Krim as an ally. Thus, for both status and security reasons support for 'Abd el-Krim may have been seen as counterproductive.

⁷⁴⁴ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, pp. 41-44 and Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco: two case studies," p. 15.

government. Before the French pacified Morocco, all tribal males carried weapons, which were regarded as symbols of honor. However, many post-1945 French officials in Morocco could not recall having seen an armed tribesman.⁷⁴⁵ At the same time, many Berbers became active in the armed forces and police under the French.⁷⁴⁶

For individual tribal members the peace of the protectorate decreased the importance of the tribe, which was no longer essential for self-defense. By ending the endemic feuding of tribal society, colonialism allowed individuals to leave their tribal units without fear of leaving the tribe open to military conquest. Perhaps more importantly, it also allowed individuals to be safe if they left the protection of the clan.

Many tribe members gave up their traditional way of life and settled down as cultivators or migrated to work in the cities. Because overpopulation and scarce resources remained a problem, Berbers were compelled to look elsewhere for jobs and resources, a scarcity problem exacerbated by the ban on feuding, which had previously served as a grim form of population control. For example, in 1920 the entire Zemmour tribe lived in tents and was transhumant; by 1953 only 63 percent were.⁷⁴⁷ In the past, transhumant groups would seek new fields or move their flocks when their survival was threatened; today individual members emigrate in search of work.⁷⁴⁸ During times of drought, such as 1944-1945, tens of thousands of Berbers migrated to

⁷⁴⁵ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 44.

⁷⁴⁶ Clayton, *France, Soldiers, and Africa*, p. 262.

⁷⁴⁷ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 314.

⁷⁴⁸ Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, p. 28.

urban areas.⁷⁴⁹ SAI officers encouraged tribesmen to become farmers and helped them modernize agriculture. These administrators believed that settled farming would aid stability and security.⁷⁵⁰

By ending violence, colonization shattered Berber institutions. Gellner notes that key Berber institutions were the peacemaking hereditary holy men, the elective annual chieftaincy, and the collective oath.⁷⁵¹ The imposition of the colonial peace--and the disarming of recalcitrant tribes--ended feuding. As a result, larger tribal units atomized. Tribal alliances, chieftains, peacemakers, and the institutions that went with them such as the collective oath no longer were necessary because large tribes stopped acting as corporate groups for judicial, military, or administrative purposes. Financially, decisions about and the imposition of fines for murder no longer brought people together.⁷⁵²

The French and Spanish administrative structures also undermined the traditional tribal order. Previously, leaders in Berber society rose and fell based on their charisma, prowess in war, and ability to dispense patronage. Now leadership was exercised with two separate chains of command going back to Rabat and Tetuan, where the French and Spanish were headquartered respectively. The theory was reduplication--pairing off a Moroccan and a French official to keep

⁷⁴⁹ Mohammed Azeddine Refass, "Historical Migration Patterns in the Eastern Rif Mountains," *Mountain Research and Development* 12:4, 1992, p. 386.

⁷⁵⁰ Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons*, p. 131 and p. 139.

⁷⁵¹ E. Gellner, "Political and religious organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas" in *Arabs and Berbers*, pp. 59-61.

⁷⁵² Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 413.

each district an island unto itself.⁷⁵³ Furthermore, tribe members, who previously owned and worked property in common, now registered it individually as property owners, thus separating individual livelihoods from that of the tribe.⁷⁵⁴

The colonial administration rationalized Morocco's economy, society and government to an unprecedented degree. The French introduced modern trading practices, the use of machinery for farming, and bookkeeping to Morocco.⁷⁵⁵ Regional French officials gathered information for the government and administered areas of dissidence. Although the French officials theoretically were to supervise rather than to administer, in key areas such as establishing property rights, ensuring taxation, and building public utilities they played a direct role.⁷⁵⁶

Colonial economics and infrastructure development also tied local economics to broader national and international trends. The French built a large road network, railroads, dams, ports, and irrigation systems in Morocco. This effort was coupled with the building of hospitals, electrification, and the modernization of the tax system. As Montagne notes, the French presence resulted in a decline in primitive industries and the growth of raw material exports such as fruit, wool, and skins.⁷⁵⁷ Economic change also fostered communal contact as individuals migrated into new areas for economic reasons.

⁷⁵³ E. Gellner, "Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco during the Early Years of Independence," *European Journal of Sociology* (1962), pp. 365-367 and Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco: two case studies," pp. 39 and 54.

⁷⁵⁴ Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, p. 28.

⁷⁵⁵ Hoisington, *The Casablanca Connection*, p. 74.

⁷⁵⁶ Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, pp. 71-72.

⁷⁵⁷ Montagne, *The Berbers*, p. 54.

Another major change Lyautey initiated was the development of a private property system. As Lyautey himself noted:

We are trying to convince them [the Moroccans] and we have already been able to make them understand that the only real form of property is individual property. And thus, as we transform tribal property into private property, as we increase the value of the estate of each member of the tribe, we ask in return to have a part of the collective tribal property transferred to State ownership.⁷⁵⁸

This creation of private property had four significant effects. First, it increased the power of tribal leaders and decreased that of the tribal assemblies as property was often given to the head of the tribe rather than divided among the tribe. Second, government expropriation of property increased the wealth and influence of the state. Third, the creation of private property weakened the economic base of tribal organization, undermining tribal identity in the process. Fourth, the regularization of land ownership resulted in a huge increase in land cultivation as people could invest and farm without fear of dispossession; previously a man cultivated only what he could defend.⁷⁵⁹

This administrative and economic penetration of society by the state changed Morocco forever. As John Waterbury notes:

When the state finally monopolizes the coercive means, the production of law, and the administration of justice, the selection of leaders and to some extent the process for allocating scarce goods, then segmentarity loses its functional moorings. All that remains is the outer shell: the idiom of blood, the reality of the feud, and a style of politics.⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁸ As quoted in Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, p. 118.

⁷⁵⁹ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, pp. 204-208.

⁷⁶⁰ John Waterbury, "Bargaining for Segmentarity," in *Tribe and State*, E. Joffe and C.R. Pennell, eds. (Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1991), p. 13

This penetration reduced the ability of tribesmen to resist the government. Marshall Bugeaud, who administered Algeria during the 19th century, noted that nothing is as effective as a fruit tree in attaching a cultivator to his land and preventing him from becoming a dissident.⁷⁶¹ Morocco's experience demonstrates the wisdom of Bugeaud's philosophy.

The French also installed a new education system. Religious leaders had long provided traditional Moroccan education, which was based on learning the Koran. The French did not abolish the old school system, but they established rival "Franco-Muslim" schools that taught both the Koran and French culture, including language, math, and history. The French also set up technical schools and elite colleges. The French intended to keep Morocco's existing social stratifications intact while providing new modern skills.⁷⁶² By 1940, about 3 percent of Moroccan children were attending school, a percentage that steadily increased in the years to come. The Berber Zemmour tribe, for example, went from being 100 percent illiterate before the French to 50 percent bilingual by the end of the protectorate in 1956.⁷⁶³

The French expansion of education changed Morocco and increased the common identity of Arabs and Berbers. As the Berber language did not have a written form, it was impossible to use for administration. Although the French taught Berber dialects at a university, most communication and administration occurred in Arabic, which most educated Berbers and Arabs

⁷⁶¹ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 43.

⁷⁶² Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, pp. 145-155, Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 238.

⁷⁶³ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, pp. 253 and 314.

spoke along with French administrators.⁷⁶⁴ Thus, Arabic as well as French became the *lingua franca* of Berbers, French, and Arabs in Morocco. Education decreased the relative power of traditional elites by creating a new, rival class of managers, technicians, and intellectuals. Other social changes such as mobility and the spread of the market further increased the importance of learning another language.⁷⁶⁵ Berbers who served in the French military often learned Arabic and made friends outside their own ethnicity.⁷⁶⁶ The improved security and communications also put the Berbers in touch with the broader cultural and religious life of Morocco.⁷⁶⁷

The Arab Response

Status issues played a major role in the growth of Arab nationalist resistance to the French. Many Moroccans, particularly newly-educated elites, resented their limited influence in Moroccan society and blamed the French for not devolving enough power to the local level. Although these Arab nationalists resented the prominence of many Berber elites, they focused their anger on the French administration, not on their Berber neighbors.

Indeed, Arab nationalist resistance to French rule owed part of its strength to French efforts to divide Moroccans along ethnic lines. The Berber *zahir* became a rallying cry among

⁷⁶⁴ Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, p. 158. In Berber areas, the French emphasized the teaching of French over the teaching of Arabic. See Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 272.

⁷⁶⁵ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 52. The education system also inculcated common values among Moroccans; schools in general teach morality, respect for the state, and propagate national myths. See Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, pp. 77-89 and 322-334.

⁷⁶⁶ Clayton, *France, Soldiers, and Africa*, p. 270.

⁷⁶⁷ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 55. *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 53, and Scham p. 199.

Arab nationalists. Although in theory nationalists opposed efforts to divide Morocco along ethnic lines, some of the academic experts interviewed suggested that these nationalists also resented their loss of influence in status under the French.⁷⁶⁸

Resistance to the French masked an underlying tension between Berbers and Arabs. As one Moroccan academic noted, Berbers who opposed colonialism often identified with Arab nationalism simply because this ideology became identified with resistance to imperialism. Berber elites, however, often did not share a core belief of Arab nationalism: that Morocco was an Arab country, that should be led by Arabs and should represent Arab culture only.⁷⁶⁹

The Role of Outside Powers

Unlike in Israel, outside groups in Morocco had little influence on ethnic relations during the colonial period. Spanish and French officials generally interfered little in each other's zones after pacification was completed.

Intervening Variables

Three important factors shaping French policy in Morocco were beyond the control of local administrators. The segmented nature of tribal groups, the geographic concentration of particular ethnic groups, and the low level of ethnic consciousness among the Berbers all affected the French ability to manage ethnic relations.

Tribal segmentation made divide-and-rule policies far easier. Every major tribal

⁷⁶⁸ Interviews of academics conducted in June, 1996.

⁷⁶⁹ Interview conducted in June, 1996.

confederation could be administered, rewarded, or punished in ever smaller units, depending on the desire of the French administrator. Thus, the French could divide potentially rebellious groups and set rival leaders against one another with relative ease while strengthening the power and influence of loyal leaders.

The geographic concentration of Berber groups made devolution and divide-and-rule easier. Because Berbers were concentrated in three areas, the French could decree separate laws and promote separate institutions there without affecting many non-Berbers. Although efforts such as the Berber *zahir* angered many Arabs, it did not directly change the Arab way of life, which surely would have resulted in greater protest.

Perhaps most importantly, the low level of ethnic consciousness among Berbers aided ethnic peace. Because Berbers did not see themselves as one people, they did not organize together, making them easier to subdue. Moreover, Berbers appeared content to be led by tribal figures rather than national ones.

Lessons Learned from Colonial Morocco

The French successfully used a combination of strategies to maintain ethnic peace during the protectorate. The French initially used mild selective control to inhibit Berber and Arab ethnic political organization and end the ethnic security dilemma. As they took power, the French co-opted local ethnic elites to buy their goodwill, provided good offices to resolve conflict, and devolved power on many cultural and symbolic issues to the communities involved. Over time, the French reduced the overall level of control but began a policy of divide-and-rule, emphasizing Berber-Arab differences and tribal identities. These policies, when combined,

brought a hitherto unknown period of tranquility to Morocco and laid the groundwork for peace in the current monarchy.

Family One: Control

The French used control to prevent ethnic groups from organizing to use violence against their neighbors or against the colonial regime. Initially, the French employed selective control. The French disarmed most of the tribes to prevent trouble and tried to prevent any organization that might lead to violence. Through the SAI, they also developed an active intelligence infrastructure to anticipate and counter any unrest. Police control came into being over time as the pacification of Morocco became complete. The French then concentrated on punishing violence after the fact and imposed fewer restrictions on Berber efforts to organize. During the entire French protectorate, French officials attempted to divide Berbers from Arabs and to divide both groups internally along tribal and regional lines.

Selective Control. Selective control's most important effect on Morocco was that it reduced the ethnic security dilemma and the possibility of ethnic hegemony. As all tribes felt confident in France's ability to prevent violence, the demand for arms and perceptions of insecurity fell dramatically. The beneficial impact of selective control proved self-supporting: by increasing security, it led fewer tribes to organize for violence, which in turn further improved security. The fall in tribal violence spoke for itself: both groups and individuals had less to fear. The plunge in the price of weapons is but one indicator of the greater security felt by the tribes. Selective control also contained individuals who promoted the use of violence to gain dominance over others. These "hegemonic" individuals went to jail or were executed by the French rather

than becoming strong and influential tribal warriors, as they would have in the past.

By providing security, the French were able to change Morocco's social structure-- changes that had a dramatic impact on ethnic relations. Groups such as those led by El Glaoui and the Ait 'Atta reverted to using the administrative system set up by the French to press their claims to pasturage rather than using violence, as in the past. Control enabled groups to become accustomed to resolving grievances through new institutions, such as French courts or the local administrative official. In addition, ending the ethnic security dilemma enabled individuals to migrate or settle down without fear of leaving their fellow tribesmen vulnerable.

Selective control also hindered groups and individuals that might have felt hegemonic ambitions by interfering with ethnic organization. Berbers attempting to use violence or stir up blood feuds found themselves imprisoned or exiled from their community. Political elites in particular felt the impact of French selective control as it was they who were punished for violence.

The Moroccan experience suggests the importance of targeting the use of force accurately. The French officials on the ground developed a wide network of informants and became extremely knowledgeable about events in their region, helping them learn firsthand of problems before they sparked violence. The French also were careful to punish only leaders whenever possible.

Lyautey's attempts to minimize the use of force in the subjugation of the tribes may have made such accommodation easier by not creating a hostile legacy that his successors had to overcome. The French used the threat of force frequently, but when they actually had to put down a rebellion or arrest an individual, they often used local forces rather than French forces.

Punishments often were nominal. Indeed former enemies often proved firm friends of both the French government and that of its monarchical successor.

Police Control. Successful selective control, by lessening the security dilemma, made the less intrusive police control possible. Once the French spread the expectation of punishment and reduced the need to arm for self-defense, a lesser level of control became possible. This reduced the potential for backlash against the colonial regime.

Divide-and-Rule. The French divide-and-rule efforts included attempts to play up Berber-Arab divisions and tribal identities to divide the Berber population. This policy came into being after Lyautey left Morocco. Its manifestations included the Berber *zahir*, attempts to strengthen Berber culture, and conscious efforts to set rival tribal leaders against one another.

Divide-and-rule policies interfered with ethnic organization. Because the French administered the tribes individually, they did not work with one another on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, Berber tribes saw themselves in competition with one another and worked at a subethnic level (clan, village, etc.) to curry French favor. French promotion of identity also increased divisions within Morocco. The nationalists were almost all Arabs, and many Berbers worked with the French against them. This cooperation infuriated many Arab nationalists, who came to see Berber particularism as equivalent to treason.

In general, the French divide-and-rule policies were not intrusive and thus did not cause tremendous resentment among the Berbers. The French worked with existing divisions and did not invent wholly new distinctions. Moreover, French officials offered incentives to change identity rather than use coercion to achieve this. Divide-and-rule policies, however, angered many Arab nationalists, who resented the status enjoyed by the Berbers during the protectorate.

Family Two: Accommodation

Control by itself did not end violence in Morocco. When 'Abd el-Krim's forces invaded French Morocco from the Spanish zone, the colonial government's monopoly on violence was temporarily broken. Yet the Moroccan tribes in the area stayed loyal to the government. A key reason for this loyalty was the accommodation policies of the French. In their effort to win the hearts and minds of the Moroccan populace, the French tried to accommodate the concerns of tribes, political elites, and the population in general. This accommodation took two forms: co-optation and devolution.

Accommodation did not always result in support for the French government, but it did help reduce ethnic violence. Many Arab nationalists considered French devolution efforts insufficient, but this did not lead to ethnic conflict. Arab nationalists blamed the French, not the Berbers, for their loss of status. Indeed, Arab nationalists tried to woo Berbers to their side, recognizing that they could play a crucial role in the independence struggle.

Co-optation. Co-optation proved a highly effective means of ensuring peace. Co-opted political leaders minimized the cost of preserving peace in Morocco while serving as a multiplier to the French military and police presence. Co-optation took the form of subventions to selected political elites and the granting of administrative positions and honorary awards to elites.

Because the French co-opted Berber elites in particular, Berber groups in general voiced fewer status fears. Ethnic leaders could credibly argue that working with the French would guarantee a group's security and way of life (and the leader's own position) better than violent resistance. Thus, many Berber tribal leaders protested against the nationalists for many years.

Like control, successful co-optation became more successful as peace continued. Co-

opted leaders came to depend on the French for their power, thus further weakening their ability to stir up dissent. By providing cooperative leaders with money and patronage--and removing potential dissidents--the French created a cadre of leaders who supported using peaceful means to resolve disputes.

The French, like the British in Palestine, faced several problems when implementing co-optation. First, efforts to foster the goodwill of a particular leader often had to be balanced by the needs of administration in general. The result was often an unsatisfied leader, poor administration, or both--all of which led to resentment. Second, working with one group's elites often angered elites of a rival group. Arab resentment spread due to the co-optation of Berber elites, particularly after education began to create large numbers of potential administrators.⁷⁷⁰

Devolution. Devolution appears to have satisfied many Moroccans' status fears, particularly those of Moroccan Berbers. At least initially, devolution involved granting Moroccan leaders a high level of local administration. The French did not try to change the rhythms of daily life and respected the language, culture, religion, and symbols of Moroccans. Traditional courts, customs, and laws all were preserved under the French.

Devolution undercut status concerns as a source of conflict. By giving the King or local officials control over many local issues, such as Muslim affairs or control over pasturage, Berber and Arab tribes had fewer incentives to resist the central government. Perhaps equally important is what the French did not do. Unlike many colonial regimes, including the French regime in Algeria, they did not try to transform Morocco's culture or make Moroccans French.

⁷⁷⁰ Indeed, it can be argued that the French failure to co-opt the emerging class of young intellectuals and urban elites--created by the French education system--led to their hostility toward the government and the formation of the nationalist movement.

Unlike the British experience in Israel, the French devolution effort actually strengthened their hold over local communities. Because the French organized local areas, provided revenues, and often appointed leaders, these regions and peoples came to depend on the French. In short, the French devolution effort differed from that of the British in Palestine in that it did not provide its recipients with financial or political independence from the regime as a whole. The combination of devolution and control proved especially beneficial. Devolution offset much of the resentment that control engendered, while control prevented devolution from becoming a means of organizing for violence.

Certain aspects of colonialism limited the beneficial effects of devolution. Settlers interfered with efforts to co-opt the local elite and to devolve power to local groups in general. Especially after Lyautey left, settlers took leading positions and tried to spread French culture. Settlers, to preserve their own status and ensure their own security, have an interest in a strong central government of which they are local representatives. Thus, they sought to maintain their dominant position vis-a-vis local elites.

Family Three: Identity Change

In addition to control and accommodation, the post-Lyautey colonial government tried to change the identities of Moroccans. To a degree, the French succeeded in creating pan-Berber sentiment where little existed in the past. This sentiment made Berbers and their leaders more willing to support continued French rule, or at least not work with anti-French nationalists.

Family Four: Mediation

As in the Israeli case, mediation in general played little role in bringing ethnic peace to Morocco. SAI officials tried to resolve disputes--track one mediation--but in general inter-tribal conflict came to an end due to an imposed peace, and subsequent flare-ups were not mediated. Furthermore, in contrast to what mediation theory would predict, an imposed solution proved to be highly stable.

Yet mediation did help reduce conflict in small ways. Once peace was established, French administrators did facilitate peaceful relations by mediating tribal conflicts. Being able to redress grievances through the French, or rely on their good offices in a dispute, provided an alternative means for a group to have its claims recognized. Unlike the holy man, the French administrator had force to back his solution to ethnic disputes. Furthermore, he could compel recalcitrant tribes and individuals to accept mediation.

Case VA: Morocco under the Istiqlal

For a brief period after the end of French rule the Istiqlal party--an Arab nationalist organization that played a leading role in the struggle against the French--dominated Morocco's government. Istiqlal leaders rejected the concept of a different Berber ethnicity and tried to impose a new identity--that of the dominant Arab ethnic group--on Berbers. This policy failed for several reasons common to imposed identity change strategies. First, it angered traditional elites, who stood to lose under a new identity. Second, it directly interfered with the daily lives of many Berbers. Both of these problems produced a violent backlash, which the Istiqlal neither suppressed with force nor appeased with accommodation. Had the Istiqlal not lost power to the

King, Mohammed V, violence may have become widespread.

Box VD: Morocco under the Istiqlal: An Ethnic Relations Failure
Types of Ethnic Conflict
o Status
o Hegemony
Primary Strategies Used
o Assimilation (to a dominant ethnic group)
Role of Outside Powers
o None

An Overview of Morocco under the

Istiqlal

In 1956, Morocco gained its independence from France, bringing to the fore the question of who would rule. Two forces dominated the struggle: the Istiqlal Party, composed of nationalists who wanted a figurehead King, and the monarchy of

Mohammed V. The Istiqlal appeared to have the upper hand until the late 1950s.⁷⁷¹ The King, however, was a nationalist force in his own right and a religious presence due to his descent from the Prophet Mohammed. Although the Istiqlal carried out much of the struggle against the French in alliance with Mohammed V, it was his refusal to submit to French authority that had sparked a popular revolt, particularly in rural areas. Upon independence, both the King and the Istiqlal had tremendous prestige and struggled for control of the country. Initially, the Istiqlal seemed to dominate, but in large part due to its failure to win the allegiance of Morocco's Berber

⁷⁷¹ Liberation brought Berbers and Arabs closer together temporarily. Because the anti-colonial ideology of many revolutionaries elsewhere in the Middle East was Arab nationalist, even Berber elites came to see themselves as part of the Arab cause. French efforts to play on ethnic differences further sullied the idea of a distinct Berber identity. Thus, many Berber elites who were part of the nationalist movement initially championed Arab nationalism despite obvious ethnic differences.

population--a failure manifested by ethnic violence--it lost its bid for control over the state.⁷⁷²

The Istiqlal government sought to assimilate the Berbers into a larger Moroccan identity. As depicted by the Istiqlal, however, Moroccan identity did not include the heritage of Berbers. Like many revolutionary parties, the Istiqlal had an organic vision of society, held unity as an ideal, and rejected ethnic differences. The Istiqlal's vision of Morocco became entwined with Arab nationalism and the supremacy of Arab symbols. Istiqlal leaders saw the only good Berbers as the ones who had renounced their Berber identity.⁷⁷³ Mehdi ben Barka, an Istiqlal leader, typified this sentiment when he argued that a Berber was a man who had never been to school. The Istiqlal goal was to change the Berbers' identity, language, and way of life to fit its Arab nationalist model.

When the Istiqlal came to power, it set about trying to impose their dominant Arab nationalist identity on the Berber parts of Morocco. The Istiqlal filled all the local leadership posts with French-speaking Istiqlal supporters, almost all of whom were Arab and urban. Hart notes that among the Rifian Berber group, no colonial Rifi leaders survived the transfer of

⁷⁷² Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif*, p. 225. Conclusions about the long-term impact of assimilation based on the Istiqlal experience must be drawn carefully. The Istiqlal period of control was too brief to fairly measure whether shared history, religion, or language improved. It is unfair to say assimilation failed to make long-term changes, since the policy was not in effect in the long-term. However, its rapid failure does suggest several lessons regarding its short-term impact.

⁷⁷³ Many Istiqlal members considered support for a distinct Berber identity to be comparable to support for French colonialism. This was a legacy of French divide-and-rule policies, which had angered many Arab nationalists who saw the policies as an attempt to divide anti-French forces.

power.⁷⁷⁴ The Istiqlal made the Berber college an ordinary school and took the Berber language broadcasts off the air.

The Istiqlal policies caused the Berber uprisings against the Arab-dominated central government, which took place shortly after independence. Berbers in the Tafilalt revolted in 1956-57, those in the Rif in 1958-59, and those in the Central Atlas in 1960. These revolts were not similar to past resistance to the central government. Gellner notes the paradox that the so-called tribal "rebellions" in fact often occurred in support of the people in office who were seen as favorable to Berber issues.⁷⁷⁵ Furthermore, the rebels supported the authority of the King, who was considered a symbol for Berbers as well as Arabs. A Berber slogan of the time reflected this sentiment: "We did not achieve independence in order to lose freedom" (to the Istiqlal). The Istiqlal provoked a popular backlash that it did not have the political ability to contain, a major source in its loss of power to the monarchy.⁷⁷⁶

Traditional leaders, most of whom the French or Spanish had previously co-opted, led the revolts. They rightly saw the Istiqlal's rise as a threat to their status positions and to their communities' ways of life. The Istiqlal, in its preparation for assuming power, began to supplant

⁷⁷⁴ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 427; Octave Marais, "The Political Evolution of the Berbers in Independent Morocco," in *Arabs and Berbers*, p. 277; Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, p. 49. Adding to the Rifians misery was the fact that the colonial language most of the Waryaghar knew was Spanish, which was now worthless.

⁷⁷⁵ Gellner, "Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco during the Early Years of Independence," p. 361.

⁷⁷⁶ Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco," p. 42; Coram, "A Note on the Role of Berbers," p. 272.

rival leaders who did not share their vision of Morocco.⁷⁷⁷ The tribesmen shared this perception that the Istiqlal measures threatened their groups' status and way of life and Istiqlal policies produced little positive feeling to offset this, since any benefits resulting from the Istiqlal's assimilation policy would only be felt in the long-term if at all.

The uprisings, however, proved easy for the army to suppress. Although the Berbers had once battled European armies ten times their size to a stalemate, they now succumbed to much weaker central government forces easily. Due to the Spanish and French measures, the Berbers had almost no rifles and often had to use rocks as weapons.⁷⁷⁸ In addition, the ambiguous position of the revolts toward the government probably muted their fury. In keeping with the French policy of mitigating resentment from repression, the government of Mohammed V acted leniently toward the rebels. Although several leaders were condemned to death *in absentia*, fighters who the government captured were jailed briefly and then pardoned.⁷⁷⁹ As a result, the government measures created little lasting resentment.

The relationship between the revolts and ethnic policies can best be understood by looking at the conditions for their abatement. Peace resumed when an accomodationist approach replaced the Istiqlal's assimilation policy. King Mohammed V worked with local Berber leaders and did not try to change Berber culture. The Berber revolts differed, however, from the "leave us alone" movements that have dominated Berber-central government relations throughout Moroccan history. Hart notes that the December 1958 uprising in the Rif occurred in response to

⁷⁷⁷ Interview of Berber cultural leader, June 1996.

⁷⁷⁸ Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco," p. 46.

⁷⁷⁹ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 431.

the underadministration of the area. Due to the French pullout and problems in Algeria, the Moroccan economy was in shambles. There were no schools or work, resulting in almost total unemployment.⁷⁸⁰ A program for the Rif area submitted to King Muhammad V in 1958 as the Rifian revolt was in progress included calls for local Rifian judges, Rifian representation in the central government, the development of Rif agriculture, and the creation of rural schools.⁷⁸¹ Thus, we can conclude that the revolt was neither a simple rebellion of a people long-suppressed by colonialism nor the same sort of revolt as the ones that had plagued pre-colonial Moroccan governments. Rather, the protests were in tune with a desire for more government rule in the form of accommodation (restoring local leaders, increased spending) and a concern about the Berbers' status vis-a-vis their Arab neighbors.

Lessons Learned from the Istiqlal Period

The brief Istiqlal period represents a failure in ethnic relations in Morocco. By trying to assimilate Berbers into a dominant Arab identity, the Istiqlal upset the social harmony created during French colonial rule. The Istiqlal identity change policy created widespread resentment and led to the party's fall from power.

Identity Change--Dominant Ethnic Group. Regardless of the long-term effectiveness of identity change policies, it can fail due to short-term pressure from those who lose out. Identity change under the Istiqlal had disadvantaged the Berbers (particularly their leaders) in terms of power and status, offering them little in return in the short run. However, because assimilation

⁷⁸⁰ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 427.

⁷⁸¹ Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco," p. 46.

did not prevent groups from organizing along ethnic lines and engendered resentment, the Berbers could and did use violence and protest to voice their displeasure. Thus, the Istiqlal's policy of assimilation, by provoking a backlash, strengthened rather than weakened the traditional political order.

The imposed identity change in the short-term increased both ethnic hostility and status fears. Berber tribes felt, correctly, that the Istiqlal policies were intended to subjugate them and end their way of life. These policies led Berbers to fear for their language, culture, and relative social position vis-a-vis their Arab neighbors. In fact, efforts to assimilate the Berbers increased their desire to organize in the short-term. That an identity change policy produced this result is particularly striking given that Berber ethnic sentiment was not strong.

Because the new identity favored a new set of leaders, it proved particularly threatening to Berber elites. Due to the French, elites were, as never before, dependent on the central government for their patronage network. These elites lost their status positions and ability to influence the central government while the new order, which favored Arabs, left them with little chance of gaining comparable status positions. Elite dependence on the central government had made them pliable when in power, but when removed with no hope of near-term recovery they became bellicose. This anger was directed against the Arab nationalist government, the source of the egregious policy.

One particular reason for the resentment of the Istiqlal's identity policies is that--unlike the French--they used sticks rather than carrots to have their way. The Istiqlal tried to impose Arab identity rather than offer inducements for individuals to change their ways. Thus, in the short-term any benefits from an identity change were not apparent, while drawbacks were

immediate.

Case VD: Morocco After Independence

Following the collapse of the Istiqlal, King Mohammed V became the dominant force in Moroccan politics. The King used a combination of control and co-optation to manage ethnic relations. The earlier French successes, however, had reduced the need for force and allowed even the weak monarchy to effectively limit ethnic violence. Mohammed V's son, Hassan II, continued his father's policies and has tried to develop a new, national identity for both Arabs and Berbers. These policies have continued the ethnic peace established under the French.

Box VE: Post-Independence Morocco: An Ethnic Relations Success

Primary Policies Used

- o Selective Repression
- o Devolution
- o Co-optation

Secondary Policies Used

- o Assimilation (new national identity)

Important Intervening Variables

- o Strength of the ethnic group in question
- o Regime type
- o Migration as a safety valve

Role of Outside Powers

- o Small (aided cultural revival)

An Overview of the Reigns of King

Mohammed V and Hassan II

Upon taking over effective control of Morocco from the Istiqlal party, King Mohammed V used a policy of devolution and co-optation to woo the Berbers to his political camp while keeping the Arab community as a whole satisfied. The King gave Berbers representation in the government and provided support to Berber political organizations. In his first

government, two out of four members of the Throne Council (an advisory body similar to a

President's Cabinet) were Berbers. In addition, the monarchy tacitly supported the Popular Movement, a Berber-based political party which claimed to represent Berber interests, giving Berbers a sense of inclusion.⁷⁸² The government also gave the lands of the French *colons* to local Popular Movement officials, thus increasing its clout in the countryside.⁷⁸³

Berber groups responded to the King's blandishments. After the 1958-9 revolt, the once-bellicose Aith Waryaghar Berber tribe abstained from politics almost completely, having the lowest voting rate in the country.⁷⁸⁴ Interestingly, this abstention occurred almost immediately after the tribe had risen against the Istiqlal policies. Several experts contended that the King's bribes and token representation efforts had satisfied the concerns that had led Berbers to revolt during the time of the Istiqlal.⁷⁸⁵ At the same time, these bribes and gestures also reassured Morocco's Arab population that the King would protect and promote Arab culture.

Reinforcing this policy of inclusion was the threat of punishment for those active in politics. The King arrested, jailed, and harassed political opponents on a regular basis. As a result, most Moroccans of all ethnic groups came to consider politics a dangerous, unrewarding business.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸² *Morocco: A Country Study*, p.63.

⁷⁸³ Ben Kaddour, "The Neo-Makhzan and the Berbers," pp. 262-266.

⁷⁸⁴ Hart, "The tribe in modern Morocco," p. 49.

⁷⁸⁵ U.S. government interviews conducted in May and July 1996.

⁷⁸⁶ As al-Hajj Mohammed notes, "At election time, all the candidates are full of words about how they will make Morocco a wonderful place to live in. But these are just empty words. The elections change nothing." Munson, *The House of Si Abd Allah*, p. 176. Such cynicism actually can be stabilizing, as it leads individuals to ignore politics.

When Mohammed V died in 1961, many Moroccans and outsiders feared that chaos would result. The Istiqlal remained a strong force in Morocco, and the Crown Prince Hassan II's ability to rule was questioned. Some observers at the time worried that if Hassan II could not rally rural and tribal areas to him then civil strife might spread.⁷⁸⁷ Hassan II proved brilliant at rallying Moroccans to his banner while using the state's coercive apparatus to discourage any dissent.

Under Hassan II control policies always operated in the background to discourage political agitation. In the 1960s and 1970s state control was particularly harsh. In the 1960s, there were hundreds of forced disappearances of potential and actual government opponents.⁷⁸⁸ In 1973 the King did not hesitate to crush a Berber tribal revolt near Gwilmima in the Atlas Mountains before it assumed major proportions.⁷⁸⁹ Censorship was vigilant. In 1978, for example, one activist was arrested for publishing an article on Berber history--an action that served to remind the associations that their activity depended on the goodwill of the government.⁷⁹⁰

The Moroccan government used several overlapping police and security organizations to maintain public order--a policy that has diminished political activism to this day. Reports regularly persisted of torture and police brutality, although the scale has been reduced in recent

⁷⁸⁷ U.S. government expert, May 1996 interview.

⁷⁸⁸ "Human Rights in Morocco," *Human Rights Watch* 7:6 (October 1995), p. 8.

⁷⁸⁹ Marais, "The Political Evolution of the Berbers in Independent Morocco," p. 281; *World Directory of Minorities*, p. 185.

⁷⁹⁰ Interview of Moroccan activist, June 1996.

years.⁷⁹¹ The government also suppressed even peaceful gatherings. The (Berber) Minister of Interior Driss al-Basri once bragged, "If there is a mouth open, I will shut it. If there is a hand out, I will cut it off."⁷⁹² This harsh control hangs over the shoulders of activists of any stripe. In general, people have hesitated to exploit any new freedoms for fear of repercussions if the state returns to earlier policies.⁷⁹³

These control mechanisms severely inhibited ethnic organization. Interviews indicate that many Berber leaders feared arrest, particularly if they strongly protested government policies and that they believed that the fear of punishment prevented many people from joining their cause. As one activist lamented:

You can say all you want about how people love the King or the Muslim tradition of accepting authority. Yet in reality it all boils down to fear. I'm afraid to directly protest against the government even though I oppose it. My people in the countryside are afraid to even join my organization though many say they support it.⁷⁹⁴

Hassan II also tried to prevent the formation of independent political organizations in Morocco. In part he did so by arresting activists, censoring newspapers, and otherwise using force to prevent organization.

The King mixed divide-and-rule techniques with efforts to ensure that all political organizations depended on the monarchy to survive. With regard to the Berbers, the monarchy

⁷⁹¹ *United States Department of State Human Rights Report, "Human Rights in Morocco" (1994), p. 3.*

⁷⁹² *Recollection of Moroccan activists related in June 1996 interview.*

⁷⁹³ *"Human Rights in Morocco," p. 27.*

⁷⁹⁴ *Interviews with several Berber and Arab activists and cultural leaders, May and June 1996.*

continued the French policy of dividing Berbers into local communities under local leaders.⁷⁹⁵ Different clans and villages often had different local administrators. At the same time, the monarchy used its patronage to create cultural and political organizations. The King has even created several "opposition" parties to represent various factions and interests in Morocco. These efforts created organizations and individuals dependent on the goodwill (and often the subventions) of the government for their survival.⁷⁹⁶

This blend of repression and absorption has proven especially effective with regard to Arab nationalist parties. Although the Istiqlal and its successor parties tried to maintain a pretence of independence, several Moroccan experts interviewed dismissed these parties as little more than token groups. These same experts believed that Arab nationalism has very real support in Morocco--what they dismiss is that the parties effectively channel or represent this sentiment.⁷⁹⁷

Over time, this policy of preventing political organization became one of quashing any independent association or form of civil society, making it wholly subservient to the monarchy. When independent leaders arose, they were given a simple choice: join the government publicly or be removed from the public sphere. This policy extended from labor leaders to soccer players;

⁷⁹⁵ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 194.

⁷⁹⁶ The monarchy also encouraged migration in Berber areas as a safety valve for dissent. Migration to Europe began in large numbers around 1960. In 1971, for example, roughly 5.5 percent of working age Moroccan men were employed abroad, but 32 percent of Rifian Berbers were. See Refass, "Historical Migration Patterns in the Eastern Rif Mountains," p. 387.

⁷⁹⁷ Interview of U.S. government expert, July 1996 and of Moroccan activists, June 1996.

after rising to a certain level they were asked to use their popularity to back the monarchy.⁷⁹⁸ Efforts to develop an infrastructure on a local level, such as building a bridge or paving roads, also were actively discouraged by the government.⁷⁹⁹ The endemic corruption of Morocco--bribes are often necessary to obtain licenses or permits, for example--also hindered the formation of autonomous organizations.⁸⁰⁰

Although Morocco's Constitution calls for a pluralistic political system with a parliament and an independent judiciary, the King retained ultimate authority. The King appointed and dismissed ministers and has the right to dissolve Parliament, which in any event has limited authority. As the King noted after a 1992 referendum approved a new constitution delegating a few of the monarch's powers: "The fact that I am delegating certain powers to the government and parliament does not mean I am renouncing them."⁸⁰¹

The King's effort to undermine civil society and replace it with government-supported institutions has led some Moroccans to see the King as the guarantor of their status in Morocco. As one Berber intellectual noted, "For all his faults, the King is better than the alternatives. He at least provides minimal resources for developing Berber areas and does not actively try to prevent the use of Berber. Others [the Istiqlal] would stop everything."⁸⁰²

⁷⁹⁸ Interviews of Moroccan academics and activists, June 1996.

⁷⁹⁹ One interlocutor described how when people in his neighborhood built a bridge they were accused of conspiracy and briefly detained. Interview of activists, June 1996.

⁸⁰⁰ For a bleak but intriguing description of the this aspect of Morocco, see Tahar Ben Jelloun, *Corruption* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

⁸⁰¹ Jack Rowland, "A yes for the king," *Middle East Insight*, 11 September 1992, p. 16.

⁸⁰² Interview of Berber activist, June 1996.

Like his father, Hassan II has tried to include Berbers in prominent positions, including the security forces. One U.S. government expert suggested that this was a particularly important source of ethnic harmony: "Although Arabs tend to dominate Morocco in many ways, Berbers still can be found in almost every area. This is particularly true in the military and the security services."⁸⁰³ This inclusion has led some Berbers to believe that the Moroccan government does not discriminate between Berbers and Arabs. As one Berber businessman commented, "Look at the government and among the rich, and you will see Berbers everywhere. How can anyone say there is discrimination?"⁸⁰⁴

Like Israel under the Military Government, electoral participation in Morocco under the monarchy became a means of control, not a form of sharing power. Participation in Morocco legitimated the King's rule by providing a semblance of popular sanction for his policies. The various parties identified interest groups and elites for the dispensing of patronage.⁸⁰⁵ Only a few parties attracted members for ideological reasons--most members joined for the patronage opportunities. Nor were the parties themselves a force for pluralism; in general, party leaders appoint members, not the other way around.⁸⁰⁶ Morocco currently has roughly 10 political parties, most of which have seats in parliament.

Parties in general, even ones that claim to represent Berber interests, focus on expanding

⁸⁰³ Interview of U.S. government expert, May 1996.

⁸⁰⁴ Interview of Berber businessman, June 1996.

⁸⁰⁵ In recent years, a slight political opening has occurred. Newspapers now regularly criticize government policies and officials--though not the King himself--and a healthy political exchange appears to be developing. See "Human Rights in Morocco," pp. 25-26.

⁸⁰⁶ Interviews of Berber and Arab activists, June 1996.

their political and economic clout rather than cultural preservation. The Popular Movement, for example, sought to ensure that Berber elites received their share of patronage, but it did little to promote or defend Berber culture against Arabization.⁸⁰⁷ Indeed, the recent emergence of Berber particularist movements threatened existing groups' share of the political pie and led some traditional parties to oppose it.⁸⁰⁸ The monarchy took advantage of this tension to try to balance the Berbers with rival interest groups such as the Arab urban bourgeoisie and Berber tribal sheikhs.⁸⁰⁹

Creating Moroccans

In addition to using force to prevent political agitation and political parties to divide up patronage, Hassan II and his government have tried to slowly bolster a Moroccan identity as part of their effort to manage ethnic relations.⁸¹⁰ Rather than impose this identity on recalcitrant tribal groups, he has tried to encourage it indirectly by playing up sources of national unity and by minimizing Berber identity--a policy that has had mixed success.

The King has tried to promote a national identity with himself as the center. Hassan II, like his father, has tried to claim the mantle of Berber culture as well as an Arab heritage. The

⁸⁰⁷ Interview of Berber academic, June 1996.

⁸⁰⁸ Interview of Berber activist, June 1996.

⁸⁰⁹ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 273.

⁸¹⁰ Unlike the French, the Moroccan government often did not respect Berber culture. Berber language and culture also are indirectly denigrated. Both regime and leftist leaders at times associate Berber particularism with colonialism. In urban areas, police and officials often harassed Berbers--though perhaps as poor immigrants as much for not speaking Arabic. Interviews of Berber cultural activists, June 1996.

King's wife is a Berber, and in speeches he regularly noted the Berber heritage of Morocco. The King also tried to stress issues that unite Moroccans regardless of ethnicity: the 1975 "Green March," where thousands of Moroccans mobilized behind the King's call to claim the Western Sahara after the Spanish withdrew, is one example of where the King succeeded in uniting Moroccans.⁸¹¹ Furthermore, the King and his advisers tried to use as many "isms" as possible to describe their government in an effort to include all potential interests.⁸¹² These efforts have created loyalty to the regime. Even Berbers of former areas of dissidence such as the Rif were loyal to the Moroccan state and supported Moroccan foreign policy on "national" issues such as the dispute with Algeria.⁸¹³

The government has also sought to foster a Moroccan identity in part by minimizing exposure to Berber culture and cultural activism. Arabic remains Morocco's official language of government and schooling, and the government has tried to prevent the official use of Berber.⁸¹⁴ In February 1996, for example, the government banned a Berber cultural show by an independent Berber cultural organization--the fourth time the interior ministry had banned a public activity by

⁸¹¹ As Munson's Al-Hajj Muhammad notes, "We no longer kill our neighbors in the village. Now will kill our brothers in the Sahara." Although Al-Hajj Mohammed spoke with bitterness, his words highlight how violent cleavages and actions now focus on the national rather than local level. See Munson, *The House of Si Abd Allah*, p. 61.

⁸¹² One government broadcast even compared the current government policies to Maoism, "if Mao had truly understood Islam." Recollection of Moroccan academic, June 1996.

⁸¹³ Furneaux, p. 31; Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, p. 446; *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 116.

⁸¹⁴ French is often used in place of Arabic by many ministries.

this group.⁸¹⁵ Similarly, the government fined and arrested (but shortly amnestied) members of the Tilelli (Liberty) Berber cultural association for publicly parading banners calling for the Berber dialect Tamazight to be made a national language.⁸¹⁶ No academic resources were provided for the study of Berber languages or culture even though classes ranging from French to Hebrew can be found.⁸¹⁷

Religion too has acted as a source of unity. Berbers and Arabs recognized their joint Islamic heritage as a bond that unites them. As one interlocutor noted, "sure we have our differences, but we do not forget that we are all Muslims."⁸¹⁸ Furthermore, Arabic is the language of Islam and thus was respected by Berbers as a language of learning--indeed, the teachings of ancient Berber political leaders have only survived in Arabic.⁸¹⁹

Education is another force for national unity in Morocco. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of primary-school students grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent and secondary school students by 10 percent. University enrollment more than tripled. By 1980, roughly 60 percent of those in the primary-school age bracket and 25 percent in the secondary-school bracket reportedly were attending school, as compared with enrollment figures of less

⁸¹⁵ "Morocco bans Berber cultural show," *Reuters*, February 5, 1996.

⁸¹⁶ "King Says Berber Will be Taught in State Schools," *Reuters*, August 21, 1994. In 1994 other Tilleli activists were briefly detained for distributing a calendar in the Tamazight language. See "Human Rights in Morocco," p. 34.

⁸¹⁷ Interview of Berber activist, June 1996.

⁸¹⁸ Interviews of several Berber and Arab government officials, activists, and businessmen, June 1996.

⁸¹⁹ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 116; Wagner, *Literacy, Culture, and Development*, p. 181.

than half the children of primary-school age and roughly 5 percent of secondary school age before 1960.⁸²⁰ Education has produced subtle identity changes. It has fostered a common language, a common history, and shared political values. Arabic today is taught at school, and most Berbers speak it.

Migration also undermined traditional sources of identity. More and more men bring their immediate families to town, which may weaken ties to tribe and village in the long-term as the children or grandchildren of these migrants become Arabic speakers. The nuclear family has emerged as the viable socioeconomic entity, causing the functions of lineage and upper level tribal segments such as clans and fifts to atrophy.

Migration, however, appears to have strengthened Berber particularism in recent years. Because of the large migration of Berbers from rural areas to the cities, many now find themselves in the majority, and thus feel less pressure to shed their "backward" ways.⁸²¹ Furthermore, many of the urban migrants who succeed economically have not found themselves rewarded in terms of social status and political influence. Thus, they reject the traditional networks that exclude them and are forming their own, culturally-based organizations.⁸²²

⁸²⁰ *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 114 and p. 144. Overall education quality remains poor. Some estimates put illiteracy as high as 70 percent, and it officially is at 55 percent. See "Human Rights in Morocco," p. 8. Few rural women know Arabic, however. Although school attendance is compulsory in Moroccan urban areas, in the country it is often ignored during harvest time or by extremely poor families. For a fascinating account of male-female differences in Berber tribal society, see Ursula Kingsmill Hart, *Behind the Courtyard Door: The Daily Life of Tribeswomen in North Morocco* (Ipswich: The Ipswich Press, 1994).

⁸²¹ Interview of Berber cultural activist, June 1996.

⁸²² Interview of Moroccan academic, June 1996. This pattern of national formation is also supported by the lack of Berber particularist sentiment in the countryside where there is little challenge to the status of Berber speakers.

As a result of these forces, at least some sense of a Moroccan identity is developing. Several interviewees noted that many Moroccans, particularly Moroccans educated in the last 30 years, derive their identity in part from the state as well as from their region and family.⁸²³ As one Arab official noted: "The process is difficult, but we have made great progress. Today, many of the children of both Arabs and Berbers see themselves as Moroccans."⁸²⁴ Several Berbers in government echoed this sentiment and noted that their social and professional advancement came in part by embracing a Moroccan rather than a Berber identity.⁸²⁵

Growing Berber Particularism

Despite the government's efforts to develop a Moroccan identity, Berber culture remains strong, and Berber intellectuals have tried in recent years to foster a sense of Berber identity. In the 1994-1996 period, perhaps 25 Berber cultural associations began operating, dedicated to the idea of preserving and strengthening Berber language and culture.⁸²⁶ Although Arabic remains Morocco's official language, Berber cultural organizations have campaigned to have Berber taught as a language in primary schools; the King has promised this would occur but this promise has not been implemented. Several publications now regularly appear in Berber languages. The discrediting of Communism and Arab nationalism after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi

⁸²³ Interviews of Moroccan academics and political activists, June 1996.

⁸²⁴ Interview of Arab government official, June 1996.

⁸²⁵ Interviews of Berber cultural activists, June 1996.

⁸²⁶ Interview of Berber cultural activists. Organizations include regional organizations for the promotion of Berber culture and national ones such as the New Association for Culture and Popular Arts and the Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural Exchange.

invasion of Kuwait both have reinforced the trend of many Berber elites to embrace particularist identities.⁸²⁷

The government tried to carefully balance any effort to promote Berber culture with efforts to preserve social stability. State radio broadcasts 12 hours a day in three Berber dialects. Moreover, the state permitted the Communist daily *al-Bayane* to run a weekly page in Tamazight and the publication of a new Berber magazine written in Tamazight with Latin characters. Yet activists complained that the times of the broadcast are at non-peak moments and that the quality of programming was poor. Furthermore, Mohammed V University teaches Japanese and Hebrew as well as other European languages but does not teach any Berber language.⁸²⁸

The monarchy was highly suspicious of Berber particularism despite Berber leaders' protestations of loyalty.⁸²⁹ The King feared that Berber particularism might be a breeding ground

⁸²⁷ Interview of Moroccan academic, June 1996.

⁸²⁸ Interviews of several Berber cultural activists, June 1996.

⁸²⁹ Berber culture issues are not likely to shake Morocco in the future. The goal of the Berber associations is to gain state resources, not to oppose the state. Because many of the Berber particularist leaders are among the wealthier set, they are highly dependent on the state for their jobs and financial success, making them even more vulnerable. Berber culture remains tied to Islam and to Arab culture in general. Tamazight does not have a written literary tradition. Furthermore, Berbers have a high level of respect for both modern and classic Arabic as languages of learning and religion.

Efforts to keep down a Berber movement are aided by the political tendencies of Moroccan political and cultural elites. In Morocco, much of the educated class considers itself to be leftist and rejects Berber particularism in favor of class or Arab nationalist identities. Bilingual education is particularly suspect by both Berber and Arab elites, who believe it would harm ethnic relations. See Mohamed Salah-Dine Hammoud, *Arabicization in Morocco: A Case Study in Language Planning and Language Policy Attitudes* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1982), p. 21. Interviews of several academics, U.S. government officials, and Berber activists also support this point.

for disloyalty in general and that it might challenge the King's legitimacy.⁸³⁰ Berber activists, however, claimed that they are non-political. Ouzzin Aherdan, the editor of the monthly magazine *Tifinagh* and a supporter of Berber culture, noted explicitly that his movement is not political but that he sought to make Berber an official language that is taught in schools and universities.⁸³¹

So far, Berber cultural agitation has remained confined to urban elites. Only other journal writers read the large number of journals on Berber culture and Berber language, as one contributor noted.⁸³² The wealthier Berber groups, such as the Soussis, generally were the most active in the movement.⁸³³

Divisions within the Berber cultural and political groups have prevented them from emerging as viable centers of resistance to the government. Cultural groups were split over which dialect, and even which type of characters, to use for Berber language and publications. Many leaders saw political parties, such as the Popular Movement, which claimed to speak for the Berbers, as simply patronage machines for a few leaders. These parties had little popular support, a weak organization, and few activists.⁸³⁴ Furthermore, Berbers from different regions

⁸³⁰ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, p. 276; Interview of U.S. government expert, June 1996.

⁸³¹ Stephen Hughes, "Berbers say Morocco is not an Arab country," *Reuters*, August 10, 1994.

⁸³² Interview of Berber cultural activists, June 1996.

⁸³³ Interview of Moroccan academic, June 1996.

⁸³⁴ Interview with Berber cultural activist, June 1996. One interlocutor noted that Latin characters are associated with colonialism even though many Berbers favor them. Arabic characters, on the other hand, are suspect as part of Arabization. A third possibility--using an ancient Berber script that is not wholly understood by scholars today--is also being considered,

of Morocco frequently held hostile stereotypes of one another (Soussis are misers, Rifis are backstabbers, etc.) that inhibit unity.⁸³⁵

Many Berbers were apolitical, and the few active political parties were often ideologically opposed to Berber particularism, both of which led to further difficulties for Berber activists. In general, Berbers in rural areas were not politically active. Many rural Berbers believed the King loved his subjects even though his subordinates did not.⁸³⁶ Islamists and leftists saw Berber particularism as a threat to religious, class, or national unity--a situation that convinced many Berbers to favor the monarchy as the best of a bad lot.⁸³⁷

The Berber community as a whole also aided the King's efforts to prevent a Berber revival. Many Berbers were unwilling to embrace "Berberism." In part this was due to the legacy of colonialism. Drawing distinctions between Berbers and Arabs was seen as favoring the French policy of divide-and-rule. Thus, many Berbers feared being labeled as pro-French or sympathetic to colonialism and often supported Arabicization as a result.⁸³⁸ Another factor leading to this attitude was the association of Berber culture with "backward" behavior.⁸³⁹

Both Berber particularism and the regime's efforts to create a Moroccan identity eroded

but this has the disadvantage of being harder to learn for all concerned.

⁸³⁵ Interview of U.S. expert, July 1996.

⁸³⁶ Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, pp. Although all leading conspirators in the 1971 coup were Berber, this was done by essentially conservative forces who wanted less corruption and more religious observance. See *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 75.

⁸³⁷ Interview of Berber cultural activist, June 1996.

⁸³⁸ Interview of Moroccan academic, June 1996; Hammoud, *Arabicization in Morocco*, p. 52.

⁸³⁹ Interview of Berber cultural activist, June 1996.

tribal identities. Several interlocutors suggested that while tribal identity still is important to many Moroccans, it is becoming less so. Furthermore, its salience as a "fighting issue" became limited.⁸⁴⁰

Despite the Berber cultural organizations' attempts to create a Berber identity, Berbers do not act as a corporate group in Morocco today. Language is not a bone of contention and, as late as the mid-1980s, most Berbers identified themselves by clan or tribe rather than as a people based on language. Thus, many important status issues--representation in government, a prominent role in society, etc.--are considered along tribal or clan lines rather than ethnic ones.

Yet social barriers between Arabs and Berbers remain strong. Many urban Arabs hold Berbers in contempt or fear, primarily due to rural-urban differences. The Berbers, for their part, see themselves as part of the Islamic world and downplay their ties to Arabs around them. Although urbanization of Berbers may have the potential to change social ties, it has not yet done so. Most city folks retain ties to tribal homelands.⁸⁴¹ So far, these differences have not become political. Moroccan elites still debate the question of the Berber role in Moroccan identity. No political party has yet formulated a coherent approach to the issue.⁸⁴²

Important Intervening Variables

Post-independence Morocco reveals several important intervening variables: the strength

⁸⁴⁰ Interviews of a Moroccan academic and a U.S. government expert, June and July 1996 respectively.

⁸⁴¹ *Arabs and Berbers*, p.12-13 and *Morocco: A Country Study*, p. 126.

⁸⁴² Phone interview of Moroccan academic, April 1996.

of the ethnic group in question, the type of regime, and the importance of migration. All these factors affected how well the government managed ethnic relations.

The Berbers of today are far weaker in relative terms vis-a-vis the central government than the Berbers of the past. The disarming of the tribes under the French, the spread of migration and sedentarization, and the general weakening of tribal identity made it far easier for the current government to prevent Berber groups from organizing to use violence. Many Berber leaders are not satisfied with the current government, but they are not able to mount a credible violent threat. In Morocco, the pre-French monarchy had no choice but to accommodate the tribes as it was too weak to force its will upon them; the French weakening of the tribes (and strengthening of the central government) enabled the government of Mohammed V to impose its will in a way not available to Moulay Abd-el-Hafid and other previous Kings.⁸⁴³

The nature of government in Morocco--a traditional monarchy--also gives Hassan II options not available to many governments. Symbolic gestures on his part, such as marrying a Berber woman or proclaiming Morocco's Berber past, are not available to broader-based governments.

Migration also is an important intervening variable that affected both ethnic attitudes and aided government control policies. Many tribal members emigrated to towns and cities and to Europe to obtain higher paying jobs. When these disgruntled, unemployed Moroccans went abroad to work, they took with them their potential for violent political agitation. Thus,

⁸⁴³ Thus, as Carleton Coon notes, technology plays a major role in ethnic conflict. The machine gun, for example, is "the peasant's compensation for poor marksmanship." See Carleton Coon, "The Nomads," in *Social Forces in the Middle East*, Sydney Fisher, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), p 25.

migration served as a "safety valve" that helped prevent strife in Morocco.⁸⁴⁴ Internal migration also has played a force for unity so far, leading Moroccans to learn the same language and identify with one another.

Outside Influences

Although outside powers played only a small role in Morocco after the French departed, they have served as an important cultural focal point for Berbers. Before Berbers could organize in Morocco (i.e. until recently), Berber intellectuals often met in France to discuss cultural issues. Scholarship and organizations often began overseas and then came to Morocco.⁸⁴⁵

Outside opinion may have also lessened the level of control in Morocco. Criticism from Amnesty International and other human rights organizations, as well as the French government and the U.S. House of Representatives embarrassed the Moroccan government and led to the release of several activists.⁸⁴⁶

Lessons Learned from Morocco Today

Family One: Control

Selective control. Selective control under Kings Mohammed V and Hassan II reduced ethnic conflict. As under the French Protectorate, selective control reduced ethnic organization.

⁸⁴⁴ See Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* for a more complete description of how the lack of presence of migration might affect political stability.

⁸⁴⁵ Interview of Berber cultural activist, June 1996.

⁸⁴⁶ "Human Rights in Morocco," pp. 8-9.

Interviews indicate that cultural activists feared the government and many refused to take part in any potential political activity for fear of imprisonment or worse. Furthermore, because elites were easily identifiable, the government had a relatively easy time identifying whom to monitor for dissident activity.

Once again, maintaining an extremely high level of control was not necessary for ethnic peace. Although the government effectively limited discussion of ethnic politics, this is done primarily through indirect media suppression and the granting of patronage positions, not by jailing or executing opponents. By demonstrating early on that there was a limit to the amount of dissent the regime will tolerate, Hassan II has been able to use the threat of force, not force itself, to limit opposition to the regime.

Family Two: Accommodation

Devolution. The Moroccan government has devolved limited authority to local figures, an effort that has successfully depoliticized many issues. Unlike the Istiqlal, the government does not interfere with basic issues such as language and traditional law. Furthermore, it works with traditional elites rather than trying to replace them with members of other tribes or ethnic groups. These measures reduced incentives for people to use violence. Moreover, they led many Berbers to recognize that the monarchy may be the best guarantee of their group's status.

Devolution worked well when combined with force. By isolating groups and limiting participation, devolution minimized unrest as new patterns of behavior came into being; soon, individuals accepted their lack of input into the political system. In addition, leaders had fewer incentives to rebel as their status and wealth became even more entrenched than under the

traditional order. However, groups only accepted these changes peacefully because of force.

Co-optation. Hassan II's government also effectively used co-optation to reduce opposition to the government and foster ethnic peace. Leaders of all sorts, both ethnic and nonethnic, often received a government position or support to cement their loyalty to the regime. Although this has bred widespread cynicism in Morocco, it has also led most Moroccan elites to work with rather than against the regime.

Family Three: Identity Change

Under Hassan II a "Moroccan" identity appears to be developing. Education and migration have brought Arabs and Berbers together, and years of peace have dimmed memories of conflict. Moroccans evince few concerns about the status of their ethnic group, and violence and political action is not based on ethnic activities. Without autonomous organizations, identity preservation efforts are having at most a limited effect. Interviews indicate that Berber cultural organizations so far have had little impact while government education and propaganda efforts have convinced many Berbers of their bonds with Morocco as a state and Arab culture. Tribal identity also is fading, leaving individuals open to competing sources of loyalty.

The government suppression of civil society has inhibited efforts to strengthen Berber identity. Berber groups simply have no way to organize independently of the regime. Thus, their organizations inevitably become co-opted by the government, reach few people, or both.

Conclusions

Much of the credit for the harmonious relations between Arabs and Berbers in Morocco

goes to the French colonial government. The French pacification of Morocco weakened Berber tribes vis-a-vis the central government. As a result, preventing any Berber-led violence after independence was far easier than in the past. The monarchy today continues to rule with a fairly heavy hand and keeps the peace in part by squelching dissent and preventing autonomous organization.

Pacification alone, however, does not completely explain Morocco's peace. The Istiqlal's brief period in power, which experienced considerable communal violence, suggests that Berbers could indeed mobilize when they were dissatisfied with the regime's policies. The current monarchy recognized this danger and, like the French, has tried to placate the Berbers while satisfying the country's Arab community. Both the French regime and the current monarchy made a strong effort to respect both Arab and Berber culture. Moreover, both regimes paid particular attention to the role of elites, winning them to the regime's side through subventions and threats. The current regime also has succeeded in creating a limited Moroccan identity--something perhaps unprecedented in the area's history--that may help improve future communal relations.

Chapter VI: Ethnic Relations in Syria

Syria is currently peaceful, but communal violence has repeatedly shaken Syria in the past. Most recently, in the late 1970s conflict between 'Alawis and Sunni Muslims erupted and required massive force, and many deaths, to end. In the past, Druzes and other groups have taken up arms against other communities. Yet this intense violence was separated by long periods of peace.

To understand why Syria experienced both peace and conflict, this chapter focuses on the two richest cases: the period of French rule between the two world wars and the Baath regime under Hafez al-Asad that rules Syria today. Unlike other Syrian governments this century, both regimes ruled for many years and had a definite ethnic relations policy. The French eventually managed to foster communal peace during their rule in Syria. The policies of the 'Alawi-dominated government that took power in the late 1960s, however, led to communal conflict. Peace has been maintained since the early 1980s, but it appears to be a harsh and hostile peace that may erupt in the future.

This chapter first presents an overview of Syria and its many ethnic and religious groups. It then examines the various regimes that have ruled over Syria this century: the Ottoman government, the short-lived nationalist government following World War I, the French Mandate regime, the post-French nationalist and military governments, and the current Baath regime. For the French Mandate and the Baath regimes, it examines the state of ethnic relations, the policies used to manage ethnic relations, and the lessons learned from these two regimes' experiences.

An Overview of Syria and Its Peoples

Syria, like Palestine and many other Arab areas, has little independent historic identity. Towns and cities served as a focus for identity, not the broader geographic area of what is now Syria. Some of Syria's cities have long had closer ties with regions outside what is today Syria than other Syrian cities. Aleppo, for example, was more integrated with Anatolia and Iraq while Damascus was closer to Beirut and Palestine.⁸⁴⁷ Indeed, the main cities of Syria today historically saw themselves as part of rival political communities.⁸⁴⁸ Such regionalism was particularly common in more inaccessible areas such as the mountains and valleys of the Latakia region, where many 'Alawis live, and the Druze Mountain, which is also known as the Suwayda area.⁸⁴⁹

In addition to regional divisions, Syria is split into many ethnic and religious communities. Religious groups such as the 'Alawis, Druzes, Isma'ilis, and Greek Orthodox Christians are almost exclusively Arabic speaking, but they consider themselves distinct from Sunni Arabs because of their religion. Similarly, Kurds are Sunnis, but do not consider themselves Arabs. Finally, Syria has a large Bedouin population, but its numbers have fallen

⁸⁴⁷ Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 7.

⁸⁴⁸ Derek Hopwood, *Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 4-7.

⁸⁴⁹ Nikolaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 2. Because of these areas' remoteness, persecuted religious minorities such as the Druzes, 'Alawis, and Isma'ilis often fled there.

steadily in recent years.⁸⁵⁰

Historically, Sunni Arabs have dominated Syria, but they were the instruments of rulers, not the rulers themselves. Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims are 57.4 percent of Syria's population.⁸⁵¹ From ancient times until 1945, there was hardly a time when Syria as a whole was ruled by local elites. During most of this period, however, local Sunni Arab notables administered much of what is now Syria.

Syria's Christian community also is quite large, but its members have been drawn toward several different sources of identity and have not had unified leadership.⁸⁵² In general, Christians felt multiple identities tugging at them. Their Christianity led them to identify with the West at times--an identification encouraged by Western governments--yet their desire for local prominence encouraged them to play up their similarity with their Muslim neighbors, leading many to stress secular Arab nationalism.

Syria's Druze community is relatively small, representing only 3 percent of the country's population. The Druzes practice an esoteric form of Islam that leads many Sunni Arabs to shun them. The Druzes are concentrated in the al-Suwayda province, also known as the Druze Mountain, and are highly unified as a community. There is little urban-rural divide among the

⁸⁵⁰ Perhaps 5 percent of Syria's population is nomadic bedouin. Umar F. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 36.

⁸⁵¹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 1.

⁸⁵² Orthodox Christians represent the largest Christian domination. For years the Greek patriarch resident in Constantinople governed Syria's Orthodox community. The Arab laity resented the Greek hierarchy. This resentment made many Orthodox Christians ardent Arab nationalists, and some nationalists have called the 19th century election of an Arab patriarch in Damascus the first real victory for Arab nationalism. Many of Syria's Christians are Armenians who fled Turkey after the post-World War I slaughter there. Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 10.

Druzes, and the Druzes are known for their military prowess.⁸⁵³

The 'Alawi community that dominates Syria today represents roughly 11.5 percent of Syria's total population. The 'Alawi sect came into being around 860 A.D., when Shaykh Ibn-Nusayr began preaching an extreme Shi'a doctrine deifying 'Ali. His followers, the 'Alawis (called Nusayris by those hostile to the 'Alawis), venerate Mohammad's nephew 'Ali, attributing to him particular holiness and even godlike abilities. 'Alawis also believe in the transmigration of souls and that the Koran has a hidden meaning known only to initiates.⁸⁵⁴ Three quarters of Syrian 'Alawis live in the remote Latakia area, and until recently most 'Alawis were rural.⁸⁵⁵ The family (*ahl*), the clan (*'ashirah*), and the tribe (*qabilah*) form the basis of 'Alawi identity along with land and village. Most tribes are grouped into large federations (*ahlaf*), the largest of which are the al-Haddadin, al-Khayyatin, al-Matawira, and al-Jerud.⁸⁵⁶

The 'Alawis suffered under Sunni Arab domination. Many orthodox Sunni Muslims consider the 'Alawis to be heretics due to their deification of 'Ali and other non-standard beliefs. The Sunni jurist Ibn-Taymiyah (1268-1328) even issued a religious decree that 'Alawis are apostates and as such can be killed. In general, Christians in the 'Alawi homeland enjoyed better treatment under Sunni Muslim rule than the 'Alawis. Indeed, the 'Alawis rebelled against the

⁸⁵³ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 10.

⁸⁵⁴ For more on 'Alawi religious tenets, see Fuad I. Khuri, "The Alawis of Syria: Religious Ideology and Organization," in *Syria: Society, Culture, and Polity*, Richard T. Antoun and Donald Quartaert, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 49-61.

⁸⁵⁵ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 7.

⁸⁵⁶ Alain Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," *Monde Arabe*, reprinted in FBIS-NES-95-191-S (October 3, 1995), p. 2.

Ottomans six times from the beginning of the 19th century to the end of the Ottoman era.⁸⁵⁷ Not surprisingly, after years of persecution, the 'Alawis have developed a close-knit society that excels in secrecy and dissimulation.

Like the 'Alawis, the Isma'ilis are another Shi'a offshoot that settled in Syria. Isma'ilis diverge from the mainstream Shi'a community by proclaiming that the Seventh Imam was the final Imam, not the Twelfth as Shi'a in Iran and elsewhere claim. Isma'ilis represent about 1.5 percent of Syria's population.⁸⁵⁸ Over 80 percent of Syria's Isma'ili population lives in the Hama province.⁸⁵⁹

Syria also has many non-Arabic-speaking minorities. Kurmanji Kurds represent roughly 8.5 percent of Syria's population, Armenians 4.0 percent, and Turkomans 3.0 percent. Most of Syria's Armenian and Kurdish population fled from Turkey during the genocide there following and during World War I.

Given all these communities, the fact that Syria remains a nation is surprising to some. Mutual hostility and stereotypes characterize inter-ethnic relations, and history provides all groups with plenty of reasons to dislike other sects and ethnicities and to fear for their people's security.

⁸⁵⁷ James Robert Woodward, "Hafez al-Asad and the Future of Alawite Rule in Syria," (masters thesis: James Madison University, 1986), p. 4.

⁸⁵⁸ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p.1.

⁸⁵⁹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 11.

Syria under the Ottomans

The Ottomans allowed Syria, which during their reign included the area that is now Lebanon, a considerable degree of autonomy and ruled primarily through the Arab Sunni merchant bourgeoisie in Damascus. The Ottomans did not seek to change society or the local power structure and were happy if Syria was orderly, loyal, and prosperous.⁸⁶⁰ The coercive apparatus of the state -- the army, the police, and taxation -- remained under Ottoman control, but local officials administered less vital areas.⁸⁶¹ Indeed, the Ottoman governor of Syria often did not know the local language or customs and frequently lacked the military backing to impose his will. Thus, he came to rely on local forces, who balanced the influence of the government with that of their clientele.⁸⁶²

During the Ottoman time religion, not language or ethnicity, proved a basis for identification. The Ottomans accepted other Muslims as equals in theory. Traditional elite families were of mixed Arab, Turkish, and Kurdish stock and relied on their common religion and language to overcome their divisions.⁸⁶³ Sunni Arabs did not see Ottoman rule as alien, while religious minorities did.⁸⁶⁴

Sunni Arabs did not organize as a community, in contrast to religious minorities. The

⁸⁶⁰ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 15.

⁸⁶¹ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness."

⁸⁶² Philip S. Khoury, "Syrian Political Culture," in *Syria: Society, Culture, and Politics*, p. 14.

⁸⁶³ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 13.

⁸⁶⁴ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 2.

Ottomans allowed religious minorities to form *millet*s, highly-autonomous religious communities that essentially ran their own affairs and had their own courts. Sunni Arabs, on the other hand, tried to join the Ottoman elite and thus did not organize themselves as a distinct community.

In general, Sunni intolerance was directed far more at schismatic Muslim sects rather than Christian communities.⁸⁶⁵ Yet even this intolerance was limited by the Ottoman government's weakness. Although the Sunni Ottoman state tried to enforce Islamic orthodoxy, it failed in its repeated attempts to impose its authority, and collect revenue, in 'Alawi and Druze areas.

Major tribes acted as independent political units during the Ottoman era. Before World War One, the Syrian tribal shaykh had large retinues that included armed warriors. He collected protection money from peasants in his area and received a tax from passing caravans and strangers. He also served as an intermediary between the government and the tribe.

As in Palestine, the 19th century brought dramatic changes to the area that is now Syria. Ideas of equality, modernization, political reform, and nationalism emanated from Europe, and many Ottoman elites embraced them. These changes, and the continued penetration of the Ottoman Empire by European merchants and missionaries, upset the local communal balance of power, presenting minority populations with new opportunities for advancement.⁸⁶⁶

The Ottomans gradually began to centralize their power in the 19th century. By the late 1880s, the Ottomans had pacified most Syrian tribes and other sources of unrest. New areas fell

⁸⁶⁵ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 2

⁸⁶⁶ The brief period of Egyptian control from 1831-1840 furthered these trends. The Egyptian regime unified the area under a strong central government. Even more importantly, it began to open the country up to Europe and created councils to represent the concerns of area Christians. Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 16.

to the plow, as greater security for agricultural settlements and the 1858 Ottoman Land Code made agriculture a safer, more profitable investment.⁸⁶⁷ The Ottomans also built roads, railways, and telegraphs and expanded education and international commerce.⁸⁶⁸ Although this centralizing approach encountered resistance, in general the Ottoman government proved strong enough to force its way on local communities. In 1910, the Ottomans suppressed a Druze revolt generated by their centralizing policies and subdued the entire Druze mountain.⁸⁶⁹

Ottoman reforms undermined tribal power. In addition to reducing the need for the shaykh to provide security, the Ottoman land reforms transformed many shaykhs into landowners, driving a wedge between them and their tribal constituencies, who now found themselves to be landless peasants. The shaykhs, however, often made poor landed elites. Over time, much of the shaykh's influence--and property--fell into the hands of urban notables who served as moneylenders to the shaykh.⁸⁷⁰

Arab nationalism began in Syria, largely in reaction to Turkish nationalism and the relative decline of the Sunni Arab position in the Ottoman empire. A small society of Arabs formed in Beirut in the 1870s and called for love of the Arab nation. The movement received a boost after the Young Turks seized power in 1908. The Young Turks tried to increase their

⁸⁶⁷ Philip S. Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement Between Two World Wars," *Middle Eastern Studies* (April 1982), p. 180.

⁸⁶⁸ Khoury, *Urban notables and Arab nationalism*, p. 53.

⁸⁶⁹ Itamar Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-1945," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14:4 (October 1979), p. 694.

⁸⁷⁰ Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 181.

control over their far-flung empire. To this end, new Turkish officials replaced Syrian-Arab notables in many positions and imposed the Turkish language in schools and in the administration. Many nationalists were part of the elite class that in earlier Ottoman days would have dominated local administration.⁸⁷¹ Before World War I, the movement gradually spread and called for decentralizing the empire, making Arabic the official language in the area and otherwise increasing Arab control.⁸⁷²

Western influence in the region grew as the Ottomans consolidated their power. The penetration of the Levant by colonial powers led to ties between Syria's religious communities and European powers. In the 19th century, France claimed the right to protect Lebanon's Maronite Christians, Russia claimed a similar right with regard to the area's Greek Orthodox population, and England cultivated local Druze and Jewish communities. These ties led the Sunni community to see them as potential traitors and a danger to the Islamic community.⁸⁷³

Syria under Faysal

Between 1918 and 1920, the Hashemite leader Faysal bin Husayn ruled Syria with the tentative backing of many Syrian nationalists. Although this dissertation does not examine this period in depth--Faysal's rule was too brief and too uncertain to have had an ethnic policy--some background on this period is instructive for understanding later developments in Syria and in

⁸⁷¹ The Turkish officers were from the aspiring middle class and saw the Damascene elite as an unworthy provincial upper class. Khoury, *Urban notables and Arab nationalism*, pp. 58-59.

⁸⁷² Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 17.

⁸⁷³ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 3.

Iraq, which is examined in Chapter VII.

In 1916, Sharif Husayn, the Hashemite family leader who controlled the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, led a revolt against the Ottomans with British encouragement.⁸⁷⁴ Husayn hoped to rule Arabia, Iraq, and Syria as his reward. In October 1918, his son Faysal liberated Damascus and began to press the World War One victors to recognize his rule. Arab government effectively began with the liberation of Damascus from Ottoman rule and ended in July 1920, when French troops occupied the same city.

Faysal's brief reign witnessed a flowering of Arab nationalism. Under Faysal, the Syrian government began pushing a wide education program that stressed the Arabic language and Arab identity.⁸⁷⁵ The government also projected a sense of Arab identity and disseminated nationalist ideas in the press.⁸⁷⁶

The nationalist *al-Fatat* society dominated the ranks of the government. *Al-Fatat* allowed only men of stature and education to become members. It played a role in Syria similar to that played by the Committee for Union and Progress with respect to the Turkish government, and many office holders were members. In addition to promoting an Arab nationalist agenda in

⁸⁷⁴ The classic description of this revolt, of course, is T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York, 1926). Philip Knightly and Collin Simpson provide background and balance to Lawrence's account in *The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia* (London, 1969).

⁸⁷⁵ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 120.

⁸⁷⁶ Khairia Kasmieh, "An Evaluation of Arab Government in Damascus, 1918-1920," in *State and Society in Syria and Lebanon*, Youssef M. Choueiri, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 27-28.

the government, *Al-Fatat* also organized and aided armed bands who resisted the French.⁸⁷⁷

A lack of acceptance abroad and unrest at home troubled Faysal's brief rule. To appease the French, Faysal accepted an agreement where Lebanon would be separated from Syria, a decision that led to anti-Hashemite demonstrations in Damascus and calls for his downfall. Faysal, under French pressure, tried to dismiss the extremists, but part of the population rose up, leading the French to intervene and, in July 1920, rout Syrian forces who resisted them.⁸⁷⁸

Case IVA: Syria under the French

The French management of ethnic relations in Syria was a blemished success. The French experience suggests both the power and the limits of devolution, selective control, and divide-and-rule policies. Shortly after the French pacified Syria, communal violence briefly flared in the "Druze revolt" that began in 1925, though this revolt was chiefly directed at the French, not at other communities. After putting down this revolt, little communal violence occurred for the remainder of French rule, which ended in 1946. In general, France won the goodwill of most of Syria's minorities due to the high level of autonomy it gave them and the security it provided. The French co-opted many minority elites and gave minority communities in general considerable status. However, the French administration's unwillingness to deploy a significant garrison to Syria and its lackadaisical approach toward developing an "on the ground" presence at times hindered the effectiveness of control. Moreover, French favoritism toward

⁸⁷⁷ Eliezer Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 15-22.

⁸⁷⁸ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 22. It is likely that the French would have intervened in any event, as they were eager to secure Syria for their empire.

minorities generated resentment among the mainstream Sunni Arab community while the end of French rule left minorities fearful about their future status in society.

Box VIA: Syria under the French: A Mixed Success

Types of Ethnic Conflict Solved:

- o Security Dilemma
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Selective control
- o Devolution
- o Divide and Rule
- o Co-optation

Secondary Strategies Used:

- o Participation

France entered Syria as a last gasp of its empire, driven by a combination of strategic, commercial, and ideological motives. Paris sought to improve its overall strategic position in the Mediterranean by developing a base on its eastern end. Moreover, French officials believed a position in the Muslim heartland would enhance France's effort to dominate Muslim politics. In addition to these political

motivations, France had long had commercial interests in the Levant.⁸⁷⁹ The French also had ties to the religious communities, particularly the Maronite Christians of nearby Lebanon.⁸⁸⁰ Finally, French officials hoped to head off growing pan-Islamic sentiment and Arab nationalism emanating from Syria, which could threaten French holdings elsewhere.⁸⁸¹

Despite what would seem a dramatic change in Syria, the coming of the French did not

⁸⁷⁹ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 31-32.

⁸⁸⁰ The French saw sectarianism as a useful issue for justifying their claim to power. As the defender of the Christian faithful, colonialism became more palatable than if it were justified by simple power interests. See Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 28-29.

⁸⁸¹ Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," pp. 175-176.

represent a complete break in Syria's political life. The French prevented any one community from dominating Syria. As under the Ottomans, most political power remained in the hands of city elites knitted together by marriage, Ottoman culture, and common financial arrangements.⁸⁸² Members of urban upper class families and former Ottoman officials led the major Syrian political movements. Under the French, however, Syria's minority communities gained a voice in government and considerable opportunities in the military and commerce.

Many Sunni Arabs remained suspicious of the French. As a non-Muslim power, French rule had less legitimacy than that of the Ottomans. Moreover, the French in the past had tried to use local Christian communities to make inroads into the Levant.⁸⁸³ The French did little to appease the concerns of the majority community. In 1919, General Gouraud, the commander of the French army in the Levant, noted in a speech in Beirut that, "We come to you as descendants of the Crusaders."⁸⁸⁴

Initially, many minorities resisted French rule. Minorities feared the *de facto* autonomy they had gained under the Ottomans would be jeopardized if the French established a strong government in Damascus. Thus, even the anti-Sunni 'Alawi region worked initially with Arab nationalists against the French out of fear that a French government would centralize authority. In 1921, French columns encircled the Alawite mountain and established authority there.⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸² Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 3-4; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 693.

⁸⁸³ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁸⁴ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 23.

⁸⁸⁵ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 102.

French Policies

Syria is a useful counterpoint to Morocco for understanding the limits of indirect rule. In Syria, the French consciously tried to use the model developed by Marshall Lyautey for Morocco, and the First High Commissioner, General Henri Gouraud, was one of Lyautey's closest collaborators. The French encountered particular difficulties reconciling the Moroccan protectorate model with the Syrian Mandate needs. Preparing a nation for independence -- the Mandate model -- raised different expectations and demanded quite different skills than the Protectorate model. Moreover, the French did not execute their policies as skillfully in Syria as they had done in Morocco.

The French relied heavily on the threat and use of military force to maintain their authority in Syria. Initially, the *Armee du Levant* was the bulwark of the colonial defenses, and it numbered 15,000 in 1924.⁸⁸⁶ Over time the French established a Syrian legion, which grew from 6,500 men in 1924 to 14,000 by the mid-1930s. The French also trained a native officer corp and founded a Military Academy.⁸⁸⁷ In addition, the French Special Services often acted as a law unto themselves.⁸⁸⁸

As in Morocco, the French enforced order in the countryside. France used the army and local forces to prevent communal conflict and to deter the use of violence. Minority-dominated

⁸⁸⁶ The initial composition of the French army hindered efforts to reconcile Syrians to French rule. Syrian chauvinism led them to look down on the North Africans, Madagascans, and Senegalese who made up the bulk of the army troops. See Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 79.

⁸⁸⁷ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 80.

⁸⁸⁸ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 24.

units proved particularly important in preventing Arab nationalists from organizing. The French also did not allow the tribes to carry arms into settled areas.⁸⁸⁹

The French tried to promote local rule but not local independence. As in Morocco, the colonial government appointed local leaders as governors and gave their regions considerable autonomy.⁸⁹⁰ They hoped to use malleable elements of the elite to govern and to increase their dependence on -- and eventually loyalty to -- the colonial government.⁸⁹¹ This devolution was particularly strong in minority areas. In Bedouin and Druze areas, French administrators relied on local chiefs to rule their people and created local armed forces to put down dissent.⁸⁹² Indeed, the powerful families ruled the rest of communities in a manner similar to that of Middle Ages European lords to their serfs.⁸⁹³

Unlike the French administrators in Morocco, the French civilian functionaries who ran the Syrian Mandate did not devote their efforts to understanding local needs and concerns. Many of the Mandate administrators did not know the area or the language and did not try to respect Syrian culture. French administrators seldom fraternized with their Syrian Arab collaborators and were far more at ease with Christian minorities.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁸⁹ Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 185.

⁸⁹⁰ Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," p. 180.

⁸⁹¹ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 57.

⁸⁹² Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," p. 181.

⁸⁹³ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 9.

⁸⁹⁴ Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," p. 182; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 71.

In addition to devolving power to local leaders, the French played up cleavages in Syrian society. They hoped to exploit class, sectarian, and ethnic differences to undermine resistance to their rule. In general, these efforts succeeded in weakening the nationalist movement as a whole and strengthening minority communities vis-a-vis the dominant Arab Sunni population.

To counter the politicized and anti-French cities, colonial officials tried to shore up the peasantry. Rural areas received agricultural credit facilities, medical care, and schools. The French also tried to regularize land ownership. Not surprisingly, this relative neglect of urban areas and effort to undermine urban-based notables contributed to a strong anti-French nationalist movement in the largest towns of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.⁸⁹⁵

The most important parts of this divide-and-rule policy were the creation of autonomous minority areas and the administrative division of much of Syria. The French divided Aleppo and Damascus into two states and in March 1921 recognized the Druze mountain as a separate administrative region. The French government brought order to the regions, raised the areas' standard of living, and gave the local communities their share of government positions in their own territory.⁸⁹⁶ In 1922, the French administration declared the 'Alawi territory around Latakia another separate state.⁸⁹⁷ The French also encouraged local Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and placed the Christian area of Jazirah under direct French rule.⁸⁹⁸ Finally, many of the northern

⁸⁹⁵ Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," p. 183; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 10 and p. 61.

⁸⁹⁶ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 704.

⁸⁹⁷ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 24.

⁸⁹⁸ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 4.

desert tribes were placed under a separate administration.⁸⁹⁹ The French also promoted and organized the education of minority children.⁹⁰⁰

The French showed a distinct bias against urban Arab Sunnis in recruiting for the army. For officers the French usually chose rural Sunnis or members of religious and ethnic minorities. To fill the ranks of the *troupes spéciales*, the French recruited from tribes and minority groups such as the 'Alawis, Druzes, Kurds, and the Circassians. Rank and file soldiers were disproportionately non-Sunni Arab. The gendarmerie, which policed the countryside, had an even stronger minority composition.⁹⁰¹ The Sunni Arab community itself opposed participation in the armed forces. In general, Sunni elites had long harbored a hostile, condescending attitude toward military service.⁹⁰² French administrators relied on these minority-dominated units to quell civil disorders among nationalist groups.⁹⁰³

Minorities without a geographic base proved more difficult to divide from the mainstream Sunni Arab community, but the French tried to fracture these groups nonetheless. Kurds, Armenians, and other Christians in particular lacked a geographical base that could support them

⁸⁹⁹ The French also gave considerable autonomy to the Sanjak area on the Turkish border, which had a large Turkish population. French authorities recognized the Turkish language and appointed Turkish officials to positions of authority. In 1939, the French transferred control of the Sanjak area to Turkey. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 58 and p. 496.

⁹⁰⁰ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 3.

⁹⁰¹ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 81.

⁹⁰² Khoury, "Syrian Political Culture," p. 18.

⁹⁰³ Burke, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria," p. 182; Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 4.

as separate political units.⁹⁰⁴ Yet when nationalists pressed for elections, France launched a propaganda campaign warning Christians that elections would consign them a "sea of Islam."⁹⁰⁵

Divide-and-rule policies severely weakened the anti-French cause. The towns with large minority populations only occasionally helped the independence movement. Over time minority groups came to support the French presence. In 1936, for example, 'Alawi leaders issued a declaration rejecting their attachment to Syria.⁹⁰⁶

In some areas, the mere presence of the French increased resentment of minorities. Muslim residents of Aleppo took out their frustrations against the local Christian community after the French took power.⁹⁰⁷ This anger and violence led to a closer relationship between minorities and the colonial government.

The French also supported limited political participation as a means of keeping order. By holding elections for parliament, the French hoped to legitimize their rule, strengthen local government, and promote the appearance of moving the country toward independence. Efforts to regularize political participation failed, however, as Arab nationalists dominated elections and used parliament to oppose French rule.⁹⁰⁸

⁹⁰⁴ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 59.

⁹⁰⁵ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 362.

⁹⁰⁶ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 10; Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 3.

⁹⁰⁷ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 108.

⁹⁰⁸ In 1925, Faris al-Khury and 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar formed the nationalist People's Party, which pressed for Syrian unity and an independent state. Most of the party's founders were urban merchants, professionals, and intellectuals. Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 24-25.

Nationalists did well whenever elections were held, leading the French to dispeel the Assembly repeatedly. In the 1928 elections, for example, nationalists dominated the National Assembly and Hasim al-Atasi, a leading nationalist, became the Assembly's president. After the 1928 Assembly passed resolutions calling for Syrian unity, High Commissioner Ponsot dissolved it. After National Bloc members won the 1932 elections, again a clash occurred over the degree of French rule, leading High Commissioner Martel to dissolve the assembly in 1933.⁹⁰⁹

The French focused their co-optation efforts on minority elites and tribal leaders. Initially, tribal leaders engaged in looting and raiding to compensate for the loss in protection money, which the Mandatory regime had proscribed. To offset this loss, the French regularized the payment of subsidies to the tribal chief.⁹¹⁰

The French, however, did not devote enough resources to Syria to buy wide-scale loyalty. Indeed, French economic reforms--such as pegging the local currency to the franc-- and heavy spending on security and defense often hurt the Syrian economy. Those on fixed incomes, such as bureaucrats and intellectuals, suffered in particular.⁹¹¹

⁹⁰⁹ Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 25-26. The National Bloc consisted primarily of supporters of King Faysal's earlier government and was considered by many to be the People's Party's successor. The Bloc was formed in 1928 from National Assembly members and consisted of an alliance of professionals, intellectuals, leading merchants, and large landowners. It had little political program and no party organization.

⁹¹⁰ Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 185.

⁹¹¹ Khoury, "Syrian Political Culture," p. 20.

Social Change

French policies weakened the independence--but not the influence--of tribal elites. The shaykh soon found himself uncomfortably between the regime and his people. If he did not follow the wishes of the French administration, however, he would lose his lands, subsidies, and perhaps even his position. Thus, the shaykh gradually became a government agent, not a tribal leader and defender.⁹¹²

Indirect rule also indirectly shored up traditional elites. Because only officials with influence and experience proved to be capable administrators, the French often relied on former Ottoman or Faysal-regime administrators, who usually were from the traditional elite ranks. Efforts to undermine the elite's rural power base often failed, as the peasantry were suspicious of attempts to disrupt their way of life. Indeed, under the French many landowners actually increased their holdings.⁹¹³

The French arrival in Syria made the gradual sedentarization process that began under the Ottomans irreversible. French administrative improvements and infrastructure development led many bedouins to settle.⁹¹⁴ Moreover, the security provided by the French allowed individuals to leave their tribes without fear of violence.

Education also spread under the French. Although the growth was not dramatic and was

⁹¹² Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 186.

⁹¹³ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 64-65.

⁹¹⁴ Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 182.

confined primarily to urban elites, the French did significantly expand the number of educated Syrians. The number of secondary schools went from two to 14 during the Mandate period French, and many petty bourgeoisie began to participate.⁹¹⁵

The development of education furthered the nationalist cause. The growing group of professionals, educators, journalists, and other new elites often transcended traditional identities.⁹¹⁶ By the end of the 1930s, these elements were the dynamic part of the nationalist movement.

Arab Nationalism under the French

During the French Mandate, nationalism remained a tool of the upper class of the Sunni Arab community, who tried to use it to restore its influence in society. For most of the Mandate, nationalism was restricted to urban politics. The French policies of working with minorities and promoting economic change undermined the positions of Sunni Arab elites. These elites tried to use nationalism to draw the masses to their cause. To attract religious minorities, they called for secularism. Nationalists, however, avoided issues of social and economic justice for fear of losing their own power.⁹¹⁷

The French opposed even this relatively mild nationalism. French officials believed that Arab nationalism really was Muslim fanaticism in disguise. They feared that this fanaticism was opposed to any spread of Western civilization, whose animating force, of course, was France.

⁹¹⁵ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 410.

⁹¹⁶ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 310.

⁹¹⁷ Khoury, "Syrian Political Culture," pp. 23-24.

French officials also fretted that Britain was behind Arab nationalism.⁹¹⁸ This fear of Arab nationalism shaped "La Politique Minoritaire," as the French policy of bolstering minority independence was known.⁹¹⁹ The French policies, however, fostered Syrian nationalism. French favoritism of religious minorities, meant to weaken the nationalist cause, help unite Arab Sunnis under a common banner of deprivation.⁹²⁰

The mainstream of Arab nationalism came to be intimately identified with Sunni Islam even though many early members were Christian Arabs. Even Christian nationalists felt obliged to note their cultural debt to Islam as part of their Arabism. Sunni Arabs at times explicitly noted that Christians and non-Sunnis were supposed to assimilate into the dominant majority.⁹²¹

Despite this Sunni slant, minorities at times identified with nationalism. Younger, newly-educated Druze often opposed the French and supported the nationalists as a way to oppose the hegemony of their community's predominant chiefs and families. Similarly, the spread of education facilitated unionist trends among the 'Alawis.⁹²² In general, nationalists among minorities sought to overturn their communities' power structures, not just Syria's.

Violence under the French

The most significant outbreak of violence under French rule was the 1925-1927 revolt in

⁹¹⁸ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 53.

⁹¹⁹ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 698.

⁹²⁰ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 93-94.

⁹²¹ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 699.

⁹²² Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," pp. 702-705.

the Druze mountain area--a local uprising that became a nationalist revolt over time.⁹²³ The revolt began because the temporary governor, Captain Gabriel Carbillet, tried to destroy the Mountain's traditional social system, ignored local functionaries, and took harsh anti-corruption measures. Not surprisingly, Carbillet's efforts engendered resentment. The conservative peasantry did not rally behind the land reform efforts for fear of angering their leaders. Moreover, as Philip Khoury notes, the peasants did not appreciate the advantage of roads designed for wheeled vehicles they did not possess.⁹²⁴ Because of Carbillet's reforms, the Druze leadership came to fear the French as a threat to their autonomy and power.⁹²⁵

The catalyst for the revolt was the arrest of three local chiefs. Soon, Sultan al-Atrash--a traditional leader of the Druze community recently ousted by the French--had rallied many Druze families behind him. Out of a population of 50,000, perhaps 10,000 men took up arms. Once order collapsed, sectarian fighting began. The Druze burned five Christian villages and routed a French column, leading to hundreds of casualties.⁹²⁶

Ironically, the French succeeded in making the rebellion a nationalist cause when in fact it was Druze particularism that drove it. The nationalist People's Party issued statements in support of the Druze. The French took these statements as proof of the party's complicity in the revolt, leading the government to crack down on it. Party leader Shahbandar escaped to the

⁹²³ Limited violence occurred as the French consolidated power. In addition to the brief 'Alawi revolt against French authority in 1921, in 1922, Druze rebels waged a guerrilla war around the Druze Mountain.

⁹²⁴ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 157.

⁹²⁵ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 701.

⁹²⁶ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 151 and p. 181.

Druze area, where he proclaimed a Syrian national government.⁹²⁷

As the revolt spread, the casualties mounted. To subdue the nationalists in Hama, the French bombed the city, killing 344 civilians.⁹²⁸ In putting down a revolt in Damascus, over 1,400 people died, including many women and children. The French bombing also destroyed hundreds of houses and shops.⁹²⁹

Despite the scale of the Druze revolt and its success in rousing much of Syria, its failure undercut future support for violence. Both the nationalists and the tribes learned that open warfare against the French was hopeless.⁹³⁰ The French convincingly demonstrated both their capability and determination to use force.

In general, most political agitation under the French was nationalist, not sectarian. The vast majority of the casualties caused by the Druze revolt came from French fighting with nationalists, not from intercommunal violence. Nationalist protests broke out in 1936 after the exile of the National Bloc leader and again in 1939 following the French decision to cede the Alexandretta area to Turkey.⁹³¹

To put down violence, the French relied heavily on minorities, furthering sectarian resentment. For example, during the Druze Revolt, the French used Circassian and Armenian

⁹²⁷ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 25.

⁹²⁸ Hama landlords had been particularly anti-French due to land reform programs. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 171-172.

⁹²⁹ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 178.

⁹³⁰ Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 185.

⁹³¹ Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 26-27.

troops to stamp out brigandage and violence in the countryside, leading to resentment as these troops often looted and pillaged.⁹³²

In general, minorities were far less enthusiastic about resisting the French. Not only did the Circassians and the Armenians openly cooperate with the French, but the 'Alawi and Turkish communities did not participate in the revolt. Syrian Christian minorities also stood aloof from the nationalists. In general, the French won the loyalty of the tribal shaykhs, largely due to the patronage it could offer them. Even the Druze came to support the French over time. After defeating the revolt, the French began to successfully isolate the Druze mountain by targeting development projects there.⁹³³

Syria and the Popular Front

The election of Leon Blum and the Popular Front government in France in 1936 dramatically changed Franco-Syrian relations. Syrian nationalist leaders and French officials negotiated a new treaty, and a new, nationalist, Syrian cabinet took over with Faris al-Khuri as Speaker of the Assembly and Hasim al-Atasi as President. Although the new government negotiated a self-rule treaty with the French, this was never implemented as the French parliament refused to ratify it, in part because it feared that it would jeopardize the welfare of Syria's minorities.⁹³⁴

⁹³² Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 175.

⁹³³ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 155 and pp. 205-206; Khoury, "The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars," p. 188.

⁹³⁴ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 485-491.

In general, the progress toward independence brought sporadic violence with it, as minorities feared for their future status. The 'Alawis in particular opposed union with the rest of Syria, and, despite promises of greater development spending, many Druze also resisted union.⁹³⁵ Christians also opposed a French withdrawal, fearing a repeat on a larger scale of the massacres that occurred during the French time in power.⁹³⁶ The nationalists worsened this problem by ignoring local concerns.⁹³⁷

Syria during World War II

After the fall of France in 1940, British and Free French troops "invaded" Syria in June 1941, occupying the country and removing the Vichy government. The Free French promised Syria and Lebanon independence, a decision supported by the British.

The British opposed the separatist tendencies of 'Alawis and Druze. Perhaps because their clients in Transjordan and Iraq were part of the Sunni Arab mainstream and feared sectarianism, the British supported the nationalist cause in Syria. This new support encouraged the nationalists, and led them to avoid efforts to accommodate minorities.⁹³⁸

⁹³⁵ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 466 and p. 517.

⁹³⁶ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, pp. 528-531. Aleppo witnessed sectarian strife at this time. Violent clashes erupted between Christians and Muslims after the National Bloc won victory in elections in 1936. When news spread that France had agreed to eventual Syrian independence, Christian extremists in Aleppo formed a paramilitary society to press for Aleppo's separation. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 470.

⁹³⁷ The nationalist government appointed Damascus Sunnis to fill the provincial governorships of Suwayda and Latakia. Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 700.

⁹³⁸ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," p. 707.

The minority communities, ever sensitive to the local balance of power, shifted to the nationalist cause. The Druze saw the writing on the wall and proposed to the National Bloc that their autonomous government be abolished. 'Alawis, though less confident, also accepted Sunni control.⁹³⁹

Lessons Learned

The era of the French Mandate offers several useful lessons about the management of ethnic conflict. Although the French era was not an unblemished success, in general communal violence was low, particularly after the end of the Druze Revolt in 1927. However, the French increased communal tension by their divide-and-rule policies and left minorities fearful of their status under the French's Arab nationalist successors.

Selective control. Selective control, over time, led to a decrease in violence. The initial presence of the French army and subsequent presence of French-trained and funded local forces led to establishment of order throughout Syria. Individuals no longer feared random violence and the French pacification of various initial minority rebellions demonstrated French resolve.

The end of the Druze revolt further indicated France's willingness to use force to keep order. After the revolt was suppressed, both minority groups and the nationalists learned that opposition to the French would exact a heavy cost. Not surprisingly, both groups refrained from further violence. Thus, although French divide-and-rule and devolution policies engendered considerable resentment among the mainstream Sunni Arab community, they did not continue to use violence to oppose the French.

⁹³⁹ Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State," pp. 707-708.

Control also fostered social change. By providing security, individuals could leave their tribe or region or settle down without fear of violence. Moreover, the French weakened the power of minorities and tribes vis-a-vis the central government. As a result, the government reduced security fears for both individuals and communal groups.

Selective control in Syria, however, was less effective than in Morocco. The French administrators did not devote the same effort to intelligence and understanding Syria's local politics as they did to Morocco. Officials who did not know the language or culture could not effectively preempt trouble.

Divide-and-rule. Divide-and-rule tactics proved extremely useful in strengthening central government influence and weakening anti-French sentiment. Divide-and-rule helped cement pre-existing divisions within the Syrian polity. When the French first took power, minority groups suspicious of France's centralizing tendencies took up arms along with the nationalists. Divide-and-rule tactics, however, broke off the nationalists and the minorities, making it far easier for the French to contain dissent. By the end of the French era, minorities sought continued French rule rather than government by Arab nationalists.

Divide-and-rule, however, caused problems. Divide-and-rule angered the majority community and poisoned ethnic relations. Divide-and-rule tactics led many Syrian nationalists to associate minorities with foreign powers and consider them enemies, a problem that harmed communal relations in general. For example, the Syrian Christian community's association with the French government led to anti-Christian riots and at times massacres whenever the government lost control of order.

Devolution. Devolution, which went hand-in-hand with divide-and-rule, proved

successful in reducing conflict. Devolution, in addition to reducing the costs of rule, satisfied many local elites and communities. It eased their fears that they would lose their way of life and traditions. Devolution led many minority and tribal groups to strongly support the continuation of French rule even though they had initially opposed it.

This high degree of devolution, however, became another source of contention when in 1936 it became clear that the French were going to leave Syria. This left the minority communities in opposition to the Arab nationalists, as the latter threatened to end the high degree of minority autonomy. As in the Mandate in Palestine, the benefits of devolution--reassuring communities as to their place in society--were dramatically reduced when the future of government is not certain.

Co-optation. French policies helped strengthen community elites. In minority and tribal areas, traditional leaders took administrative and security positions offered by the French. These elites often worked with the French and opposed the nationalists, recognizing that their own power derived from continued French rule. Minorities that cooperated with the nationalists often were newly-educated or mobilized elites who were not co-opted by the French.

Participation. Participation did little to affect ethnic relations under the French, primarily because the French refused to accept nationalist control over the parliament's agenda. As under the British Mandate, participation proved a means for groups to organize against the central government. However, the French refusal to accept nationalist dominance of participatory institutions effectively rendered them irrelevant.

Republican Syria

In the years 1944-1946 Syria gradually became independent and slowly came under the influence of a nationalist government.⁹⁴⁰ In 1946 Syria was in many ways a state without a nation. No political community that was Syrian--as opposed to Arab, communal, or regional--existed.⁹⁴¹ For several years the anti-French nationalists tried to develop a working government, but in the end their efforts degenerated into military rule.

Upon independence the Arab nationalist National Bloc split into two groups, the Damascene-dominated National Party and a new People's Party, which was Aleppo based with many supporters from Homs. Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar also founded the Baath party at this time. The Baath espoused socialism and a broad Arab nationalism and, unlike other parties, did not tie its fate to particular families or regions.⁹⁴² The 1947 elections led to a victory by an alliance of the Baath and the People's Party, which gained 33 seats to the National Party's 24. However, independents -- mainly traditional family heads, landowners, and tribal shaykhs -- won 50 seats and held the balance in parliament.

In general, the nationalists devoted more of their time in power to feathering their nests than building up their political base.⁹⁴³ Despite their progressive ideals, many nationalist leaders

⁹⁴⁰ In 1944, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized Syria. Despite this recognition, in 1945, de Gaulle brought in troops to bolster the French position. Anti-French demonstrations led to a French bombardment, which resulted in perhaps 2,500 casualties. As a result, the British pressed France to leave and by April 1946 France had completed its withdrawal. Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 29.

⁹⁴¹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 5.

⁹⁴² Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 31-32.

⁹⁴³ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 32.

reverted to their previous parochialism.⁹⁴⁴

Many minorities during this period became highly nationalist. Most of the minorities who adopted nationalism had two purposes: to strengthen their ties to Syria's mainstream and to improve their position vis-a-vis their own community's leadership. 'Alawis in the military, for example, took an extreme position on Arab issues in order to better integrate themselves into Syria's mainstream.⁹⁴⁵ Most of these 'Alawis did not come from traditional leading families.

The elite-led nationalist movement sowed the seeds of its own undoing. The nationalist movement roused forces that its leaders could not contain when they gained power. Social reform, Islamic assertion, and radical pan-Arabism captivated new actors in Syrian society such as the growing middle class, army officers, and rural-based forces, who used these doctrines to undermine the traditional elite. Many of these forces joined the Baath party, which proved particularly effective in merging the aspirations of the new middle class, former peasants, and military officers.⁹⁴⁶

Syria under the Generals

The debacle against Israel in 1948 led to dramatic changes in Syria. In a pattern that would become common throughout the Middle East, young officers blamed older politicians and the political system for their defeat. In 1948, Husni al-Za'im, the army chief of staff, seized

⁹⁴⁴ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 622.

⁹⁴⁵ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 3.

⁹⁴⁶ Khoury, "Syrian Political Culture," p. 25 and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," in *Syria: Society, Culture, and Politics*, p. 32.

power in a coup. Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi carried out the next coup in August 1949 and tried to bring back civilian leaders. In December 1949, Colonel Adib al-Shishakli initiated a coup and ruled for four years.⁹⁴⁷

To take power, all three generals relied heavily on narrow groups rather than on broad support. Sunni Arab disdain for the military proved their undoing. Sunni elites considered the military a socially inferior institution and its association with the French strengthened this scorn.⁹⁴⁸ As a result, they had little control over what soon became the most powerful institution in Syria. Al-Za'im relied on Kurds and Circassians, for example, while Shishakli relied on people from Hama.⁹⁴⁹ This reliance led to the formation of sectarian alliances as part of the process for gaining power. Indeed, a combination of communalism and localism led to Shishakli's fall. He resigned after revolts began in the Druze mountain, Aleppo, and Hama.

Shishakli's fall led to a period of confusion in Syria. Elections were held in 1954. Again independents won the most seats, with the People's Party and the Baath making strong showings. At this time, however, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser seized power in Egypt and began captivating many Arabs with his vision of Arab unity. This issue paralyzed Syrian politics. Parties such as the Baath increasingly called for unity and gained strength in government.

On February 1, 1958, Nasser and Syrian President Quwatli proclaimed the formation of

⁹⁴⁷ Shishakli in particular deserves mention because he tried to change the balance of social relations in Syria. He put forward a vision of a secular Arab state that left little room for variation. He banned the Sunni religious group the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, he tried to homogenize Syria's population and did little to reassure minorities. Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 35-36.

⁹⁴⁸ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 628.

⁹⁴⁹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 28.

the United Arab Republic (UAR). In Syria the agreement initially was popular until it became clear that Egypt would dominate the union. Nasser dissolved Syrian political parties, dismissed Syrian security and army officials, and replaced Syrian administrators with Egyptians. Egyptian-backed agrarian reform angered many landowners. Nasser's local proxy, 'Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, proved efficient and ruthless at suppressing dissent with his security services, but this engendered further resentment.⁹⁵⁰ Many minorities such as the 'Alawis came to oppose unity, as they feared being overwhelmed by Egypt's Sunni population.⁹⁵¹ 'Alawis and Druzes felt marginalized and feared that the Sunnis would threaten their privileges--Sunni cabinet representation during the UAR was 95 percent of Syria's total representation. As a result of these combined pressures, army units in Syria rose up in September 1961, and Nasser accepted the split.

Once again, a political void remained as neither military nor civilian leaders stepped forward. In February 1963, a Baath coup in Baghdad inspired Syrian Baathists, leading them to support a coup in Syria that brought many individual Baath party members to positions of influence. Given minority discontent with the UAR, it is not surprising that a Druze, Captain Salim Hatum, led the 1963 coup and that 'Alawis dominated the military committee.⁹⁵² An attempted countercoup by Nasserite officers, most of whom were Sunni Arabs, failed, leading Amin al-Hafiz, a Baath officer, to put it down with extreme force, killing perhaps 800 and

⁹⁵⁰ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 41.

⁹⁵¹ Raymond Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," *Middle East Journal* 47:2 (Spring 1993), p. 19.

⁹⁵² Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 5.

imprisoning hundreds of others.⁹⁵³

The Baath represented a break with Syria's past. Ba'ath leaders sought to carry out a revolution from above, not just another coup. Although urban intellectuals founded the Baath party, most of its members were of plebeian, rural, and lower-middle class backgrounds.⁹⁵⁴ The Baath also attracted many religious minorities due to its secular philosophy. Unlike many other Arab nationalist movements, the Baath saw all Arabs as equal irrespective of their religion.

The Baath that came to power in the 1960s, however, gradually diverged from the ideals of the Baath founders and became a front for military rule. On February 23, 1966, the Baath founders and ideologues Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar fled into exile after a military coup. The Baath military committee, whose leading members included 'Alawis Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad, began to put minorities in positions of influence.⁹⁵⁵ In part these steps were linked to ideology--minorities were more likely to support overturning the social order that had excluded them--but the line between sectarian advantage and ideological difference began to blur.

Case VIB: Syria under Asad

The Baath regime that came to be led by Hafez al-Asad differed strongly from its predecessors. Asad established 'Alawi hegemony over Syria, using repression and cooptation to keep down the Sunni community, particularly religious militants. Asad shattered Arab Sunni

⁹⁵³ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 44.

⁹⁵⁴ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 17; Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," p. 33.

⁹⁵⁵ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 45.

organization, literally destroying almost all expressions of civil society. This hegemonic policy led to open rebellion in the late 1970s, which caused the deaths of thousands before the regime quashed the revolt in 1982. This devastation had troubling consequences for future ethnic relations. Sunni Arabs religious militants in particular were hostile toward the 'Alawi regime, and the tremendous repression and discrimination have hindered attempts to build a common Syrian identity.

Box VIB: Syria under Asad: A Communal Relations Failure

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Hegemony
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Massive control
- o Co-optation

Secondary Strategies Used:

- o Identity change (promoted national Arab identity that includes 'Alawis)

Intervening Variables

- o Central government captured by minority group
- o Strong government control of the economy

Role of Outside Powers

- o Limited (Criticism of Asad for the regime's sectarian character)

Hafez al-Asad, who formally took power in 1970 after ousting Salah Jadid, strengthened the 'Alawis' grip on power. He favored 'Alawis in promotions and recruitment into the army. He also created all-'Alawi paramilitary units.⁹⁵⁶ Initially, the major challenge to Asad's rule came from within the 'Alawi community, which by now dominated many army and security units. As a result, Asad placed increasingly greater reliance on members of his own family, tribe, and village.⁹⁵⁷

Not surprisingly, Asad placed particular emphasis on ensuring the loyalty of

⁹⁵⁶ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 6.

⁹⁵⁷ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 70.

the armed forces. Sectarianism soon applied to the promotion and dismissal of officers and further weakened Sunni Arab representation.⁹⁵⁸ Indeed, some of the units that Sunni Arab officers nominally commanded were in fact run by non-commissioned officers allied to powerful 'Alawi figures.⁹⁵⁹

'Alawis dominated the Baath and used it to ensure their communal hegemony. Under Asad, 59 percent of the most important Cabinet ministers--Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and the office of Prime Minister--came from Latakia, the 'Alawi home region. Sect, region, and tribe soon came to matter more in the Baath under Asad than ideology. Many leaders, to develop their personal power, recruited from parochial support bases. Thus the party blocs that came into being reflected communal rather than ideological ties.⁹⁶⁰ Gradually, 'Alawi control spread to all parts of the government. Since the 1980s, one third of the governors have been 'Alawis, and all the sensitive government ministries--Justice, Finance, Information, and Education--were in 'Alawi hands.⁹⁶¹ Perhaps most importantly, 'Alawis have consistently held two fifths of the military positions on the Syrian Regional Commands of the Baath Party.⁹⁶²

Other communal groups' fears of 'Alawi dominance became self-fulfilling. In February 1966 Salim Hatum, a Druze, attempted a coup out of fear that the 'Alawis would purge the Druze

⁹⁵⁸ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 35.

⁹⁵⁹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 36.

⁹⁶⁰ Of the 15 leaders after the 1963 coup, nine had minority backgrounds. Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 23 and p. 32.

⁹⁶¹ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 6.

⁹⁶² Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, pp. 85-86.

from Syria's leadership. The coup's failure, however, led to many Druze officers being purged for disloyalty.⁹⁶³

The Sunni Response

The 'Alawi-dominated Baath proved a double challenge to religious Sunnis. The secular Baath ideology angered many Sunnis, and domination by the heretical 'Alawis further horrified them.⁹⁶⁴ 'Alawi critics stressed the pagan elements in 'Alawi beliefs and accused them of ignoring, or even worsening, the plight of Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine.⁹⁶⁵ The Baath nationalization and socialist programs also antagonized Sunni merchants and landlords. Not surprisingly, the Islamist movement in Syria had many urban-based merchants and landed families as members, and the movement itself spoke the language of free enterprise.⁹⁶⁶

The Islamist movement arose out of Syrian civil society. The bazaar--the collection of merchants and tradesmen who lived independently of the government--was a center for anti-Baath activity. Professional associations of lawyers and doctors worked with the bazaar, engaging in sympathy strikes and propaganda. Most importantly, anti-regime sermons in the mosques fanned the flames of sectarian conflict, while independent religious schools proved the

⁹⁶³ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 55.

⁹⁶⁴ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 89.

⁹⁶⁵ For one such criticism, see Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, pp. 47-70.

⁹⁶⁶ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 249 and Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," p. 34.

Islamists' best source of recruits.⁹⁶⁷

Anti-'Alawi agitation began soon after the Baath took power in 1963. Almost immediately Baath rivals began to attack the regime for its sectarian character, a theme taken up by religious groups soon thereafter.⁹⁶⁸ In 1964 the Sunni religious organization the Muslim Brotherhood and others provoked a riot in Hama, leading the government to shell the town--a move that led unrest to spread. Although the regime initially tried to appease protesters by easing its repression and leftist policies, hardliners among it overturned these changes and dismissed many Sunni officers.

Religion remained a sensitive point for the regime. In Damascus, Sunni demonstrators first went from the mosques to the streets in 1973, after the secular regime did not affirm that Islam was the religion of the state. Although the regime changed the constitution's language to say that the President had to be a Muslim, violence continued as many demonstrators did not accept the legitimacy of an 'Alawi as the head of state. Only the entry of armored units into the city stopped the unrest.⁹⁶⁹

Foreign events catalyzed the religious opposition. In June 1976 Syrian troops crossed the border into Lebanon. Syria changed sides repeatedly in this conflict, often helping Christians against Muslims and working against Palestinian groups. This support enraged many religious Syrians, who felt the regime was betraying Islam.

⁹⁶⁷ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 249.

⁹⁶⁸ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 33.

⁹⁶⁹ Martin Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism," in *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution*, Martin Kramer, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 246.

Widespread violence began breaking out in 1978 and lasted through 1982. For the regime, the worst single incident occurred on 16 June, 1979, when Sunni militants killed 32 cadets and wounded 54 at an Aleppo artillery school. The vast majority of the cadets were 'Alawis.⁹⁷⁰ The violence led the 'Alawi community, including many Asad rivals, to rally around the Asad regime for self-preservation.

Asad initially responded to the violence by replacing officials, including the Prime Minister, expanding the party leadership, and promising greater respect for the rule of law. The opposition, however, took to the streets and merchants declared a general strike.⁹⁷¹

To quell this dissent, Asad sent in the army. The army killed hundreds and imprisoned many more in 1980. Dissidents, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, responded with a campaign of terror against regime members, killing 300 in the early 1980s.⁹⁷² Deaths squads massacred regime supporters in Hama and in Jisr al-Shughur in early 1980.

The Asad regime responded brutally to this violence. Unreported repression appears to have been extremely high. From 1980 to 1983, thousands of political prisoners may have died. Rape and torture were common, and the regime also destroyed many mosques and other Islamic associations.⁹⁷³ After an assassination attempt on 'Asad, the President's brother led his unit into a

⁹⁷⁰ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 91.

⁹⁷¹ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 63.

⁹⁷² Regime opponents claim many more were killed. They claim that a particularly devastating strike on regime intelligence and security installations killed more than 500 in 1981. See Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, p. 189.

⁹⁷³ Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, p. 86.

prison in Palmyra and gunned down 550 Islamic militants being held there.⁹⁷⁴ The Baath regional command also began to train Baath party members and supporters as paramilitary forces.⁹⁷⁵

The final showdown between the regime and the Sunni militants occurred in February 1982 in the city of Hama. Hama was a traditional Islamic stronghold. Reports that the regime intended to make arrests in Hama led to an armed uprising of the whole city. In response, the regime leveled much of the city, killing perhaps 25,000 inhabitants.⁹⁷⁶

To understand the violence, it is important to note the social groups that did not take part. Minorities in general were at most lukewarm supporters of the insurgents. The Damascus bourgeoisie and bazaar did not join the Islamist rebellion. This loyalty was due in part to the constant surveillance of the Damascus community. Another reason for their loyalty, however, was that the regime had successfully incorporated much of the Damascus Sunni constituency into the regime. Indeed, in general the Sunnis incorporated into the state--those in the army, the bureaucracy, the peasantry, and the government-reliant merchant community--did not join the rebellion in large numbers.⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷⁴ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 106. Regime opponents assert that more than 1,000 were killed. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, p. 84.

⁹⁷⁵ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 105.

⁹⁷⁶ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 111.

⁹⁷⁷ Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," p. 44.

'The Influence of Foreign Powers

Foreign affairs further undermined support for the regime. Asad's support for Christian factions in the civil war that broke out in Lebanon in 1975 confirmed the beliefs of many Sunnis that Asad opposed Islam in general. Syria also supported Shi'a Iran against Arab Sunni Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, weakening Asad's Arab nationalist credentials. In 1981, Israel annexed the Golan heights, dramatizing Syria's weakness and tarnishing Asad's nationalist credentials. Foreign powers also tried to undermine Asad's regime. Egypt in particular was active in the 1970s following Syria's criticism of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Egyptian radio regularly broadcast criticism of the regime, accusing it of being a front for 'Alawi influence.⁹⁷⁸

Policies

President Asad and the Baath party used a mix of policies to preserve their dominance in Syria and quell unrest. Most important was the regime's reliance on brute force--the lesson of Hama will not be forgotten by any Syrian. The regime also tried to divide the Sunni Arab mainstream internally, co-opt its leaders, and work with other minorities.

Unrest in Syria quickly met with repression. Individuals who opposed the regime were routinely arrested, tortured, and killed. A state of emergency has been in force since 1963, and the regime has used this as an excuse to arrest unauthorized opposition group members. The regime also pressed many Syrians to give up politics. This level of repression has prevented almost all organization. Groups opposed to the regime or even to a select policy or minister

⁹⁷⁸ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 93.

could not organize or disseminate information.⁹⁷⁹

The regime of Hafez al-Asad has also brutalized Syria's once vibrant civil society. In the past, trade associations such as guilds, religious brotherhoods, and mosques were active, and autonomous, forces in Syrian society.⁹⁸⁰ The Ba'ath sought to break the power of the urban Sunni establishment. In so doing, they crushed or controlled professional and religious associations, which often were political vehicles for regime rivals.⁹⁸¹

Government repression efforts against civil society intensified after the 1978 Islamist rebellion. Before this time, professional associations had retained some independence as had many mosques. During the rebellion, the government replaced association leaders with state appointees. It also required all associations to receive the approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to function.⁹⁸²

In addition to its reliance on force, the regime also has reached out to other minority communities. Almost half of the Revolutionary Council members--the most important Baath institution--are from heterodox Muslim or Christian minority communities. In the years following Asad's takeover, this was especially true: based on their percentage of the population, there are twice as many 'Alawis, three times as many Druze, and five times as many Isma'ilis as

⁹⁷⁹ *Human Rights Watch World Report 1996* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), pp. 312-313.

⁹⁸⁰ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 243.

⁹⁸¹ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 246.

⁹⁸² Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 247.

one would expect were found in leading Baath organizations.⁹⁸³ In recent years Asad tried to improve Sunni Arab representation, but 'Alawis always formed the inner core. This was especially true in the army, where perhaps three quarters of top positions were held by 'Alawis.⁹⁸⁴ The Baath, however, failed to branch out beyond its sectarian roots. Despite the prevalence of tribalism and localism in the Sunni community, the Baath failed to exploit this to offset charges of sectarianism.⁹⁸⁵

The Baath also tried to use Arabism to gain legitimacy. When Asad took power in 1970, he opened the party apparatus to all Syrians, including non-Arabs, on the condition that they accept Arabization.⁹⁸⁶ Ironically Arabism, which was once used to reconcile minorities to Sunni rule, now was used to reconcile Sunnis to the rule of the Alawis.⁹⁸⁷

The Baath also tried to settle and assimilate tribal groups. The Baath, like earlier regimes, were hostile to the Bedouin community, which represented roughly 7 percent of the total population. The Baath leaders considered the nomadic life to be primitive. Moreover, the Bedouin proved difficult to control due to their mobility.⁹⁸⁸

The 'Alawis have also tried to move toward the Islamic mainstream by joining the world's Shi'a community. Traditionally, most learned Shi'a considered the 'Alawis as *ghulat*--literally

⁹⁸³ Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite, 1966-1976: A Spatial and Social Analysis," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17:1 (1981), p. 13.

⁹⁸⁴ Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," pp. 14-15.

⁹⁸⁵ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 103.

⁹⁸⁶ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 18.

⁹⁸⁷ Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism," p. 245.

⁹⁸⁸ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 178.

"those who exceed"--due to their deification of 'Ali, whom the Shi'a also revere but to a lesser degree. Desperate for legitimacy in the 1970s, the Asad regime worked with the Lebanese Shi'a leader Musa al-Sadr, who declared 'Alawis to be part of Shi'ism, and sent 'Alawi students to study in Shi'a centers in Najaf and Qom.⁹⁸⁹

The government's growing wealth and control over the economy allowed it to co-opt many opponents. For example, those who joined the official Syndicate of Artisans could buy inputs from state agencies, participate in the social security fund, and obtain export licenses--healthy incentives for any business.⁹⁹⁰ In order to gain the goodwill of the business elite, Asad has worked with Syrian capitalists, moderating the revolutionary Baath agenda in many ways. After Asad's takeover in 1970, he began easing restrictions on investment and trying to improve ties to the business community.⁹⁹¹

Government efforts have led to increasing ties between the 'Alawis and the Sunni business elite. As access to the state became the key to new wealth, Sunni merchants sought ties to 'Alawi government and military figures. Political and military elites used power to enrich themselves and became embourgeoisied, while the merchant elite used wealth to buy political influence. Over time, a "military-mercantile complex" of officers and merchants developed.⁹⁹²

Asad also tried to use the Baath party to dominate society. Party leaders select election

⁹⁸⁹ For a fascinating account of this attempted transformation, see Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism," pp. 237-254.

⁹⁹⁰ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 250.

⁹⁹¹ Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," p. 5.

⁹⁹² Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 252; Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," p. 43.

candidates to ensure central control. The party has tried to form separate wings to mobilize peasants, women, and the youth.⁹⁹³ The regime has set up parallel institutions to replace and dominate social ones. Although local councils existed to set local priorities, Damascus must have the last say on projects and budgets. A parallel party structure also laid down broad lines of policy. The regime allowed non-Ba'ath political parties, but these parties were united in the National Progressive Front with the Ba'ath and were not allowed to recruit followers in the army or the university.⁹⁹⁴

Social Change

Education expanded dramatically under the Ba'ath, a change that benefitted many traditionally excluded groups. The proportion of school age population attending school rose from 58 to 85 percent from 1964 to 1977. Enrollment at Damascus University doubled within five years after the coup, and by 1968 almost the entire student body consisted of students of rural origin. The government founded new universities in minority regions as well.⁹⁹⁵ The number of students went from 482,000 in 1960 to 1,500,000 in 1980, but much of this is explained by population growth. Today, however, almost all male students are enrolled in at least primary school and over three quarters of female students are. University enrollment has

⁹⁹³ Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 94-95.

⁹⁹⁴ Patrick Seale, "Asad: Between Institutions and Autocracy," in *Syria: Society, Culture, and Politics*, p. 103.

⁹⁹⁵ Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," pp. 36-37.

reached roughly 100,000 in recent years.⁹⁹⁶

Ba'ath reforms also shattered the power of traditional landed elites. The small peasantry (as opposed to unlanded agricultural workers) grew from 27 percent of the population in 1960 to 42 percent in recent years.⁹⁹⁷ Many urban notables and landowners lost their property under the nationalization program and thus lost their political influence. As a result, the social balance in Syria has changed dramatically. Landlords no longer dominated society. Many peasants also migrated to cities, and the urban population has grown from 30 percent of the population to about half today.⁹⁹⁸

The Baath changed the balance of power in Syria from the old urban elite to a new, minority-based elite of rural descent. Between 1946 and 1958, Damascenes and Aleppans held 66 percent of all cabinet portfolios, and most of the parliamentarians were either landowners or had landowning backgrounds.⁹⁹⁹ Damascus and Aleppo also had a disproportionate share of teachers and doctors. From 1966 to 1976, however, most leading regime members were from Latakia, and almost none were from Aleppo. Cabinet ministers from Syria's two major cities were only 30 percent of the total number.¹⁰⁰⁰

Economic reforms under the Baath also strengthened the central government at the expense of the Sunni Arab community. The statist, socialist Baath policies weakened the Sunni

⁹⁹⁶ Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 123-126.

⁹⁹⁷ Hinnebusch, "Class and State in Ba'athist Syria," p. 38.

⁹⁹⁸ Hopwood, *Syria*, p. 169 and p. 179; Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," p. 3.

⁹⁹⁹ Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," p. 5 and p. 17.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," pp. 7-8.

Arab merchant community. By 1969, 60 percent of the economy was controlled by the public sector and this increased to 75 percent in the 1970s. This wealth gradually came into the hands of 'Alawis and their clients who dominated the government.¹⁰⁰¹ Socialist economics proved a particularly useful tool to the 'Alawis. As one minority officer noted: "Don't expect us to eliminate socialism in Syria, for the real meaning of such steps would be the transfer of all the political, financial, industrial, and commercial advantages to the towns, .i.e., the members of the Sunni community. We, the 'Alawis and the Druzes, will then again be the poor and the servants."¹⁰⁰²

Ba'ath social policies indirectly undermined civil society as well. Nationalization destroyed the economic basis of independent middle class power, and the Ba'ath control of the public sector and foreign aid gave Syria the features of a patronage state. Both the traditional and the newly-emerging middle class came to rely on the state, not their own resources.¹⁰⁰³

Syria Today

Ironically, by taking power the 'Alawis have lost some of their distinctiveness and cohesiveness. Sunnis and other groups have sought to increase their power by forming marital alliances with 'Alawi communities. Moreover, economic success and educational achievement have led many 'Alawis to leave traditional rural areas and move to cities.¹⁰⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰¹ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 7.

¹⁰⁰² As quoted in Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite," p. 16.

¹⁰⁰³ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 246.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Chouet, "Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness," p. 14.

Minority communities, particularly the 'Alawis, have done well under the Baath. Since 1963, 'Alawi areas have enjoyed disproportionate economic growth. 'Alawis have also done well in education and by the 1990s began displacing Sunnis and Christians in the professions and in civil administration positions.¹⁰⁰⁵ Isma'ilis also have done well and made educational advances.¹⁰⁰⁶

Identity change policies appear to have had only a limited impact. Social attitudes remain traditional. First loyalty is still to family, and family background determines social status. Many Syrians believe only relatives can be trusted.¹⁰⁰⁷

The Baath's brutality has created a legacy of sectarian hatred. As David Roberts notes, "the Alaouites have by now made so many enemies and created so many blood-feuds that it must be doubtful whether they dare risk letting the succession pass outside their own ranks for fear of a dreadful settlement of accounts."¹⁰⁰⁸

Recent years have seen a slight revival of civil society. Asad has encouraged the private sector to develop and has relaxed government controls over society. Membership in professional syndicates has increased, and autonomous housing and transportation cooperatives have grown. Religious schools and mosques have been given more autonomy, as long as they avoid even a hint of opposition politics.¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁵ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Hopwood, *Syria*, pp. 170-171.

¹⁰⁰⁸ As quoted in Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 133.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," pp. 244-254.

In the 1990s the Ba'ath have also moved slightly away from socialist economics. The collapse of Communism discredited statist ideologies, and, at the same time, Asad has tried to broaden his base to include the business class.¹⁰¹⁰ Efforts at economic reform, however, have proved difficult. Fighting corruption, for example, would undermine the entire 'Alawi structure.¹⁰¹¹

Lessons Learned

Baathist Syria's combination of policies has kept communal peace in Syria since 1982, but they have created tremendous hostility and resentment among the majority Sunni Arab population, suggesting that this long-term peace may not endure.

Selective and massive control. Control is the most important tool of the Baath regime. Since the revolts of the early 1980s, leaders have been arrested, and the general population intimidated at the slightest hint of political unrest. Control has prevented any organization of anti-regime dissidents. The slaughter of Hama provides a graphic demonstration of the regime's willingness to use violence if necessary. As a result, groups that might consider using violence are deterred and those that are not are weakened by regular arrests and surveillance. Because the regime has also devastated civil society, potential sources of anti-regime activity are fewer in number. Even simple organization is monitored by and depends upon the goodwill of the government. The Baath's control of Syria's economy also gives it additional leverage over potential opponents.

¹⁰¹⁰ Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," p. 254.

¹⁰¹¹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, p. 142.

The regime's harsh hand, however, has led to hatreds that will endure for generations. Before the 'Alawis took power, few Sunnis or other groups considered them enemies, or at least enemies that deserved attention. Today, however, Sunni militants are more hostile than ever to 'Alawis and other minority groups. Sunni militant propaganda from exile, for example, is bitterly anti-'Alawi.

Co-optation. Once again, co-optation weakened anti-government ranks but did not eliminate them entirely. Due to co-optation, many potential regime opponents were passive during the Sunni-'Alawi violence of the 1970s and 1980s. Had the Damascus Sunnis joined the Islamist violence, the regime may not have survived. Their loyalty, bought by regime favors as well as enforced by regime surveillance, enabled the 'Alawis to stay in power. Needless to say, co-optation failed to convince all, or even most, Sunni Arabs that the Baath were their allies. The continued violence suggests limits to the power of co-optation even as the passivity of many Sunni elites suggests co-optation's power.

The high degree of central government control over the economy and society has increased the effectiveness of co-optation. Business success depends on the goodwill of the government. Since almost every transaction requires government approval, the commercial sector is forced to work with the government despite their communal ties.

Identity Change. Efforts to promote a unified Syrian Arab identity also failed. The regime's massive repression strengthened sectarian awareness. Furthermore, the continued reliance on 'Alawis in important positions undermines any claim that communal identity does not matter in Syria today.

In general the 'Alawis have had little success in changing their own identity and becoming

Shi'as. This is due to resistance among traditional 'Alawi leaders, hostility to the idea among the Shi'a community, and Sunni efforts to keep the 'Alawis isolated from other Muslim communities.

Conclusions

Just as the French colonial policies led to lasting peace in Morocco, so they eventually led to violence in Syria. French efforts to win the goodwill of minorities eventually succeeded, but the French gained this goodwill in part by leaving the central government weak. Violence was limited because the colonial government imposed order and suppressed the Arab nationalist movement. When the French departed, however, the Sunni Arab majority sought to regain its dominant position while minorities, accustomed to greater status under the French, also conspired to gain power. The 'Alawis outstepped their rivals in this communal dance, but their victory led to tremendous violence in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Syria today is a relative anomaly in the Middle East: a sectarian minority holding power by ruthlessly suppressing any dissent. Although Asad's regime tries to buy off potential opponents and is careful to clamp down hard on any group or institution capable of using violence, its brutality appears to have engendered widespread hostility. Communal relations are worse today, not better, than in the past. Thus, should a crack appear in the 'Alawi regime's facade in the future, communal violence is highly likely.

Chapter VII: Ethnic Relations in Iraq

Tribal and communal conflict has plagued Iraq since its inception and, if anything, is far worse today than ever before in Iraq's history. Yet on the surface Iraq does not seem doomed to communal conflict. Oil wealth has enriched Iraq, allowing the regime to improve dramatically the standard of living for almost all of Iraq's inhabitants. Moreover, Iraq's many communities have at times cooperated against outsiders and lived together in harmony.

Despite these advantages, Iraq today is home to some of the bloodiest communal conflicts in the Middle East. The Iraqi state has squandered its resources. Arab nationalist governments, particularly the Baath regime that has dominated Iraq since 1968, tried to subordinate Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish communities and impose an unwanted identity on them--policies that led to repeated conflicts. The result is a vicious security dilemma that leads all communities to fear one another and the government.

This chapter has four sections. The first section presents an overview of Iraq, describing its peoples and briefly discussing its history during the Ottoman period. The second section explores Iraq during the initial period of British rule, noting the policies the British used to preserve ethnic peace and why these policies met with only mixed success. The third section assesses ethnic relations during the post-war monarchy period and examines why this period was relatively free of ethnic strife--something rare in Iraq's history. The fourth section analyzes ethnic relations during the second period of Baath party rule and discusses why the regime's ethnic relations policies led to massive bloodshed.

An Overview of Iraq and Its Peoples

Iraq had no formal existence until 1920, and its peoples shared few bonds. No "Iraq" existed during Ottoman rule: the area that now is Iraq consisted of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Ethnicity separated Iraq's Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Arameans, and religious differences among Muslims, Christians, and Jews created additional lines of division. Region and tribe further split Iraq's communities. Even Islam divided rather than unified Iraqis, as the large Sunni and Shi'a communities seldom mixed and never intermarried.¹⁰¹²

The Ottoman grip on what is now Iraq was weak. Most of Iraq's religious or tribal communities had a high degree of autonomy, as the Ottomans would subsidize local leaders in exchange for their keeping order in their region.¹⁰¹³ Large tribal confederations, not Ottoman

¹⁰¹² Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 17. Batatu, basing his figures on Iraqi government figures, gives the following communal breakdown for 1947 Iraq: Arab Shi'as at 51.4 percent of the population; Arab Sunnis at 19.7 percent; Kurdish Sunnis at 18.4 percent; Persian Shi'as at 1.2 percent; Turkoman Sunnis and Shi'as at 1.1 and .9 percent respectively; Christians at 3.1 percent; and Jews at 2.6 percent. Iraq's Christian community is quite diverse. Catholic Nestorians represented the largest community, Assyrians (Nestorians who did not unite with Rome) the second largest, with Syrian Catholics and Armenians also present. Most of Iraq's Jewish population fled in the late 1940s. Sunni Muslims occupied the religious pinnacle, followed by Shi'a Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 9-13 and p. 40. Even cities functioned as alternative sources of identity. Najaf and Karbala, the two leading Shi'a cities, functioned as more or less independent centers and had ties to both the Ottomans and Persia. U. Zaher, "The Opposition," in *Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction*, Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1986), p. 160.

¹⁰¹³ Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (1972), p. 127. In the Kurdish area, this level of autonomy often went down to the level of individuals. As one British observer in the 19th century noted of the Kurdish area, "...every man, even of the meanest rank, has a voice in public affairs." From James Claudius Rich, *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*. 2 Vols. (London: James Duncan, 1836) Vol. I, p. 150 as quoted in Jwaideh, *the Kurdish*

officials, dominated rural areas.¹⁰¹⁴ Indeed, Iraq's many tribesmen viewed the government with contempt, and tribal ties--even among the urban population--often held the first loyalty of citizens.¹⁰¹⁵

Case VIIA: Iraq under the British

The British Mandate period in Iraq was more successful than the British Mandate in Palestine, but it still faced problems with regard to ethnic relations. The British combination of police control, co-optation, devolution, and divide-and-rule helped reassure minorities as to their security and status. Perhaps most importantly, it created a set of elites almost wholly dependent on the British for their control. As in Palestine, however, the finite nature of the Mandate led to problems as tribal and communal leaders feared that their power and privileges would end once an Arab-dominated government assumed power. Perceived favoritism toward minorities also

Nationalist Movement, p. 79.

¹⁰¹⁴ Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered," p. 125.

¹⁰¹⁵ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 14-15. This weakness limited any national identity. One of Baghdad's deputies to the Ottoman parliament wrote in 1910: "To depend on the tribe is a thousand times safer than depending on the government, for whereas the latter defers or neglects repression, the tribe, no matter how feeble it may be, as soon as it learns that an injustice has been committed against one of its members readies itself to exact vengeance on his behalf." As quoted in Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 21. However, by the end of the Ottoman period, a nascent nationalism was developing that began replacing, or at least reducing, tribalism. As the market economy spread, tribal chiefs became landlords as well as tribal patriarchs--a process that often separated their interests from those of their followers. Similarly, the spread of the telegraph, state schools, and the press helped spread new identities at the expense of parochial ones. The decline in tribal identity was particularly important. The peasant had long needed the tribe to survive in terms of physical protection. As land ownership spread, however, the tribes began to weaken as the warrior ethos declined and warriors became cultivators. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 22 and pp. 73-77.

fostered hostility among the dominant Sunni Arab population. Thus, the British reduced ethnic conflict in Iraq, but they left communal groups fearful of the impending transfer of power and did not foster a strong Iraqi national identity.

Box VIIA: Iraq under the British: A Mixed Success

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Security Dilemma
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Police Control
- o Divide and Rule
- o Devolution
- o Co-optation

Intervening Variables

- o Low level of ethnic consciousness
- o Tribally segmented group

Role of Outside Powers

- o Very limited (pan-Arab emanations from elsewhere in the Arab world)
- o Limited Turkish aid to Kurdish rebels

The British military conquered the region that is now Iraq during World War One.¹⁰¹⁶ After the war, the British assumed a mandate over Iraq in 1920, which they relinquished in 1932. The British period is interesting for several reasons. The British managed to use indirect rule--relying on local administration while leavening local forces with the British military--to limit ethnic violence. During the British era, ethnic group leaders shifted their focus from fighting with one another to seeking to influence the British-backed central

government. As in Palestine, manpower limits and financial constraints compelled the British to use only limited control, which in turn allowed repeated tribal fighting. Furthermore, the limits inherent in the Mandate system--particularly the uncertainty of groups' statuses after the Mandate

¹⁰¹⁶ For a fascinating account of the diplomacy involved in the creation of many Middle East states' present borders, see David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1990).

expired--led to conflict at the end of the British period. Nevertheless, in general the British successfully used limited control, co-optation, and devolution to reduce ethnic conflict.

Upon assuming their mandate, the British faced a widespread revolt. Shi'a religious leaders, Sunni nationalists, and other Iraqis all opposed the British claim to rule.¹⁰¹⁷ Perhaps hundreds died as these forces resisted British efforts to establish control. The revolt, though later enshrined as a national rebellion, was largely a tribal affair--tribal groups provided most of the manpower and resources for the revolt and the rebels seldom were unified.¹⁰¹⁸

Because the revolt proved expensive and difficult to quell, the British abandoned their plan to administer Iraq directly.¹⁰¹⁹ Under the British, Iraqi government and civil service officers administered Iraq on a day-to-day basis, while British "advisers"--individuals whose advice had to be followed--supported them. To head Iraq, the British established a monarchy in 1921, led by Faysal bin Husayn, the former King of Syria who had established strong Arab nationalist credentials due to his past resistance to the French. The British retained military and administrative control of Iraq and controlled such important areas as public works, the police, irrigation, and the land registry.¹⁰²⁰

The British strengthened the Iraqi state but tried to limit its independence, fearing that a truly independent government would resist British influence. The British provided artillery and

¹⁰¹⁷ Liora Lukitz, *Iraq: The Search for National Identity* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1995), p. 61; Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered," p. 136.

¹⁰¹⁸ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 23.

¹⁰¹⁹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 33. This British decision occurred largely because taxpayers in England resisted an expensive, India-style policy.

¹⁰²⁰ Lukitz, *Iraq*, p. 15.

air forces to Faysal's government, assistance that gave it a military advantage over Iraq's tribes.¹⁰²¹ This advantage allowed the central government to slowly extend its power into the countryside.¹⁰²² However, the British opposed conscription in part because they believed this would give the government too much leeway for independent action.¹⁰²³ The British also filled the armed forces with minorities to ensure that the armed forces did not join the Arab nationalist cause.¹⁰²⁴ Nor did the British undertake the difficult task of disarming Iraq's tribes. In 1933, after Iraq became independent, tribes held roughly 100,000 rifles while the government had only 15,000.¹⁰²⁵

To further limit the monarch's power, the British administered Iraq through tribal chiefs and other traditional elites.¹⁰²⁶ The British High Commissioner, Henry Dobbs, granted a select group of tribal shaykhs the right to collect revenue, provided them with arms, and bribed them with government monies--moves that strengthened their allegiance to the British.¹⁰²⁷ The British

¹⁰²¹ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 99.

¹⁰²² By the end of the Mandate, all cities became liable for taxes. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 49.

¹⁰²³ Lukitz, *Iraq*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰²⁴ British officials in particular recruited Assyrians, particularly for operations against tribal rebels. Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*, pp. 47-69. Not surprisingly, this preference generated tremendous hostility between the Arab nationalist factions and the Assyrians. Upon independence in 1932, the Arab army and the Kurds worked together and massacred hundreds of Assyrians. See Stafford, pp. 116-179 for a recounting of this time.

¹⁰²⁵ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 12.

¹⁰²⁶ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 90.

¹⁰²⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 32 and Lukitz, *Iraq*, p. 53. The British also worked with Shi'a tribes to undercut more xenophobic religious leaders. Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 75.

also created a separate legal system for the tribes headed by the tribal shaykh, further bolstering his power.¹⁰²⁸ Although Iraq had a parliament, it represented traditional forces rather than popular ones.¹⁰²⁹ Such policies strengthened the shaykh's power over his tribe, but over time the shaykh had little authority other than what he derived from the government.¹⁰³⁰

Recognizing that their administration depended on traditional forces, the British tried to shore up the traditional social order. British administrators in Kurdish areas placed every possible tribesman under a tribal leader and reintegrated old clans.¹⁰³¹ The British even forbade the mixing of tribes in order to preserve each leader's power. Rather than risk alienating their traditional allies, the British looked the other way when tribal leaders abused their privileges.¹⁰³² The British also tried to limit education and other social changes as part of their effort to bolster the traditional order.¹⁰³³

This policy of working with elites had limits. While the British supported the traditional

¹⁰²⁸ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: KPI Limited, 1987), p. 12.

¹⁰²⁹ Politics ran primarily along family lines. Blocs of Ottoman trained officers and Arab nationalists also appeared over time. See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 46.

¹⁰³⁰ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 87.

¹⁰³¹ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*, p. 492.

¹⁰³² Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 94-98.

¹⁰³³ The British opposed the rapid spread of education, fearing that it would produce more graduates than the bureaucracy could handle. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 49. Long-term trends toward sedentarization, however, continued unabated during the British era. Cultivators went from 41 percent of the population in 1867 to 68 percent in 1930, while nomads fell from 35 percent to 7 percent in the same time period. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 5. This decline represents a continuation of trends in the later Ottoman empire, which witnessed growing sedentarization, the fragmentation of large tribes, and other blows to tribal influence. Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, pp. 35-39.

order, they sought to prevent any leader from becoming preeminent. Thus, the British played shaykh off shaykh in an effort to divide and rule.¹⁰³⁴

To counter British efforts to foster particularism, King Faysal and his coterie tried to develop an Iraqi identity based on Arab nationalism--with Faysal at its center. Many Arab nationalists staffed the army and the administration. Arabic became the language of administration, and education quickly assumed an Arab nationalist, anti-sectarian bent.¹⁰³⁵ Even though Arab nationalism was weak in Iraq as a whole, in particular segments of the population and government institutions it was strong. This nationalism, however, did not focus on Iraq's other communities but rather on gaining control of the state from the British.

The Shi'a and Tribes under the British

Iraq's Shi'a community felt excluded from the Sunni-dominated government and sought a greater role in the life of the state. Despite being a majority of Iraq's population, Shi'a held only 15 percent of high ranking posts. A common Shi'a adage during this time was "the taxes are on the Shi'a, the debt is on the Shi'a, and the posts are for the Sunni."¹⁰³⁶ The regime's initial failure to include a Shi'a in the Cabinet magnified this hostility.¹⁰³⁷ Shi'a activists sought a greater share of government investment in Shi'a areas, proportionate distribution of religious revenues, and

¹⁰³⁴ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 91.

¹⁰³⁵ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁰³⁶ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 26.

¹⁰³⁷ *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, p. 574. Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, pp. 109-110.

more support for educating Shi'a students, particularly in higher education.¹⁰³⁸

Many Shi'a became more pro-British because they resented attempts by Faysal's advisers to build an Iraqi nation around Sunni-dominated Arab nationalism and believed Britain would respect their status.¹⁰³⁹ Shi'a leaders saw the British as a bulwark against Sunni hegemony. As one leading Shi'a remarked:

We know we are uneducated and so cannot at present take our proper share in the public services. What we want is British control, to save us from Sunni domination, until our sons are educated; then we, who are the real majority, will take our proper place in the government of our country and shall not want British control, but merely advice as you are giving it now.¹⁰⁴⁰

To reassure Shi'a about their community's status, the 1924 Constitution allowed each religious sect to be ruled by judges of its own rite.¹⁰⁴¹ In the late monarchy period, many leading Shi'a families became huge landowners.¹⁰⁴²

Tribal figures also resented the dominance of urban, Sunni elites. As the British representative Gertrude Bell noted, many tribal people wanted a British administration over an Arab one, because they knew that the British would govern according to the custom of the country.¹⁰⁴³ Tribal leaders also opposed conscription as they rightly believed it would drain their

¹⁰³⁸ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 119.

¹⁰³⁹ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 116.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁴¹ C. J. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1921-1925* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 65.

¹⁰⁴² Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 49.

¹⁰⁴³ *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, pp. 463-464.

own manpower and strengthen that of the government.¹⁰⁴⁴

The Kurds under the British

The Kurds concentrated in the former Ottoman province of Mosul wanted autonomy for the region or, as their next choice, to be part of Turkey.¹⁰⁴⁵ Iraq's Sunni population, however, sought for the Kurds to be put under Baghdad's control, fearing that Iraq might become dominated by the Shi'a.¹⁰⁴⁶ Thus, the Kurds of what is now northern Iraq joined the Iraqi nation in 1926.

The British tried to keep the Kurds divided and weak. The British played up tribal divisions and promoted the ethnic Turkomen community in the north in order to neutralize Kurdish influence. British efforts to divide the Kurds fell on fertile soil. Tribal divisions rent the Kurdish community, and little pan-Kurdish ethnic sentiment was found. Although the Kurds repeatedly resisted government encroachment, their leaders seldom worked together.¹⁰⁴⁷

Like the Shi'a and tribal leaders, Kurdish leaders soon came to favor a British role. Most Kurdish leaders recognized that the British strengthened the traditional patronage system--only the implicit subordination to Arabs in Baghdad angered them. The Kurds disdained the Arabs

¹⁰⁴⁴ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*, p. 433.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Lukitz, *Iraq*, p. 17. For an interesting diplomatic history of the dispute between Britain and Turkey over Mosul, see Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks, and Arabs*. Edmonds had served as the British political officer to the contested region.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 25.

and did not want to be ruled by them.¹⁰⁴⁸

Indirect rule failed to bring complete peace to Iraqi Kurdistan. The British were reluctant to spend the money necessary to have a large military or administrative presence in Kurdistan and thus chose to rule through proxies. The British initially appointed Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji governor of much of the Kurdish area, and entrusted chieftains to govern their own tribes. Many tribesmen, however, felt loyal to religious leaders, not secular chieftains. Thus the British often co-opted the wrong individuals. Moreover, many of Shaykh Mahmud's Kurdish rivals wanted direct British rule, not control by their formal rival.¹⁰⁴⁹ Shaykh Mahmud himself used British aid to the region to bolster his own power base.¹⁰⁵⁰ Finally, Turkey at times aided Kurdish rebels in order to undermine the British position in the region.

Parts of the Kurdish region were in almost constant rebellion during the time of British rule. Because the British had no troops to put in Iraqi Kurdistan, they reappointed Shaykh Mahmud in 1922 even though in the past he had demonstrated his willingness to use violence to advance his power.¹⁰⁵¹ Shaykh Mahmud, at times aided by arms and funds from Turkey, rebelled repeatedly, primarily to increase his own influence in the Kurdish areas and prevent British encroachment.¹⁰⁵² The British quickly, and relatively bloodlessly, put down these revolts.¹⁰⁵³

¹⁰⁴⁸ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 150-154.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*, pp. 474-484.

¹⁰⁵⁰ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 156.

¹⁰⁵¹ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 159.

¹⁰⁵² Kurds under Shaykh Mahmud rebelled in 1919, 1924, 1927, and 1930. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 467.

¹⁰⁵³ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 158

As the British consolidated their power, the nature of dissent changed from tribal revolts against the British to a Kurdish national one against the Arab-dominated government.¹⁰⁵⁴ The Kurdish revolt of 1931--a far larger, bloodier, and more widespread revolt than those led by Shaykh Mahmud--was directed at the Iraqi Arab government, not the British. The Kurds were angered that the Iraqi government, due to take power in 1932, had not taken steps to guarantee the use of Kurdish language in the Kurdish area or to foster Kurdish education.¹⁰⁵⁵ Kurds took up arms in protest, seeking independence for their area or continued association with Britain.¹⁰⁵⁶ Led by the messianic Shaykh Ahmad Barzani (and to a lesser extent Mullah Mustafa Barzani), the Kurds protested the presence of the Iraqi army in the Barzan region. The Iraqi government, by itself, failed to defeat the Kurds, forcing the government to turn to the British.¹⁰⁵⁷

Lessons Learned

The British Mandate period of Iraq represents a flawed ethnic relations success. On the one hand, tribal fighting fell during the British period and Iraq's major communities began to live

¹⁰⁵⁴ Kurdish nationalism had begun growing in the 1920s. Nationalism's wellspring was a fear of domination by Iraq's Sunni Arab rulers. The basic tenet was that Arabs should not rule Kurds, but many nationalists also opposed tribal rule--a situation that led local tribal leaders to clamp down on nationalist activities in areas they controlled. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 174.

¹⁰⁵⁵ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 172-177. The British constantly pressured the Iraqi government to issue commitments that it would respect Kurdish culture, and the Arab nationalist regime responded halfheartedly at most.

¹⁰⁵⁶ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 176.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*, p. 668; McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 179.

together in harmony. On the other hand, the British failed to end tribal fighting completely and did not establish the institutions or attitudes necessary for continued good relations after their departure. Co-optation, devolution, divide-and-rule, and control all depended on the British presence.

Police control. By ending the endemic tribal feuding in Iraq, the British fostered long-term ethnic peace. British airpower and troops strengthened the Iraqi government, thus reducing the security dilemma. After the initial British suppression of the 1920 revolt and the establishment of British rule throughout Iraq, tribes no longer regularly warred because they feared punishment by the British. Iraqis in general became more confident of their individual security. It is noteworthy that the largest Kurdish revolt occurred in 1931--when the British Mandate was ending. Kurds worried that control over their region would pass to Sunnis or to other Kurdish rivals and thus leave them vulnerable to domination.

The British did not end tribal fighting completely, largely because they devoted only limited resources to the Kurdish area. By relying on local leaders to administer the area, the British did not have a strong "on the ground" presence with which to police the area. Moreover, indirect rule relied on local communities to police themselves, a situation that often led leaders to strive for regional dominance. Outside powers encouraged this sentiment and gave local leaders hope that they could overwhelm the British. Thus, in Kurdistan Shaykh Mahmud was not deterred by the British-backed government forces and rebelled repeatedly.

Divide-and-rule. Divide-and-rule helped keep the Kurds and tribal shaykhs weak, limiting their ability to work against the British. Whenever a revolt broke out in Kurdistan, the central government could easily gain Kurdish allies to put it down. Similarly, the British used

divide-and-rule to prevent any tribal leader from becoming too powerful. Pre-existing divisions in the Kurdish community, particularly tribal ones, made divide-and-rule policies easy to carry out.

Co-optation. Co-optation proved highly successful in Iraq. The British policy of working with elites did not lead to absolute peace, but it did win most of the elites to their side. The tribal leaders that became large landowners in general did not participate in uprisings against the government.¹⁰⁵⁸ Shi'a leaders, Sunni tribal leaders, and many Kurdish figures all worked to keep the peace due to British subventions. Voices that advocated continued conflict were undercut by the influence and affluence of pro-British voices.

Co-optation at times failed to produce peace because the British co-opted the wrong figures. In the Kurdish north in particular many Kurds felt loyal to religious leaders, not tribal chiefs. Thus, religious leaders were able to mobilize them from time to time despite the efforts of co-opted tribal elites.

Devolution. Devolution satisfied Iraq's non-dominant communities. By allowing the Shi'a to administer their own courts and providing Kurds with a considerable degree of autonomy, these communal groups began to see the British officials as their culture's protector, not as its enemy. Similarly, tribal groups saw the British as their protector despite earlier rebellions. Over time, these groups began to favor British rule. In fact, devolution worked too well. The Kurds took up arms in 1931, as they rightly feared that the British would leave them subordinate to an Arab-dominated government. This revolt suggests that for devolution to work groups must be confident of the continuity of the powers devolved to them.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 82.

Devolution, however, at times worsened conflict when it was not accompanied by firm control. British control in some Kurdish areas was weak, forcing them to rely on local leaders such as Shaykh Mahmud to keep order. Shaykh Mahmud, however, used the resources he gained from the British to try to increase his influence in the Kurdish region, a goal that led him to rebel from time to time.

Identity change. The hint of identity change policies--as embodied in the Arab nationalist aspirations of many of Faysal's advisers--contributed to conflict in Iraq. Shi'as and Kurds feared the pan-Arab agenda advanced by Iraq's Arab government. This led them to support the continuation of British rule, a stance that deepened the rift between Sunni Arabs and non-Sunnis in Iraq.

Case VIIB: Iraq under the Post-War Hashemite Monarchy

The post-war Hashemite monarchy, which lasted from 1945 until 1958, brought ethnic peace to Iraq.¹⁰⁵⁹ In general the monarchy witnessed communal peace despite widespread instability and violence stemming from political or economic causes.¹⁰⁶⁰ The monarchy used a high degree of coercion to control ethnic political action and co-opted many leading Iraqis,

¹⁰⁵⁹ The brief period of Iraqi independence that began in 1933 ended after the regime in Baghdad appeared to lean toward Germany. In 1941, the British took over Iraq and implemented direct rule, which lasted until 1945. The British reinstated a pro-British ruling circle, which purged many of the highly Arab nationalist supporters of the former regime. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 88.

¹⁰⁶⁰ For example, the 1948 Wathbah revolt was begun by students demonstrating the Portsmouth Agreement with Britain. Over 300 died in the demonstrations. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 548-557. In general, the late monarchy was hardly stable, and demonstrations regularly occurred--but they were not for communal reasons.

buying their support with power and largesse. The regime also included non-Sunni Arabs in the government. This combination of carrots and stick proved highly effective in dampening communal conflict in Iraq. Selective control deterred communal groups from organizing and weakened those that attempted violence. Devolution and co-optation reassured groups about their status in society, only drawing complaints from new elites who felt that co-optation process ignored them.

The monarchy suffered from one dire fault: a lack of nationalist legitimacy. Until 1933, the monarchy was seen as a bastion of pan-Arabism, primarily because Faysal I had advanced a pan-Arab, anti-colonial agenda in Syria and then in Iraq. However, the use of British troops to reimpose Hashemite rule in Iraq during World War Two destroyed the monarchy's nationalist credentials.¹⁰⁶¹ Further

attempts by the monarchy to cooperate with the West--such as signing a defense treaty with Britain--generated huge protests.¹⁰⁶² This proved particularly devastating in the army, which went from a bastion of the regime to a source of opposition.¹⁰⁶³

The post-war Iraqi monarchical government carried out a clever balancing act of assuring

Box VIIIB: Iraq under the Post-War Hashemite Regime: An Ethnic Relations Success

Policies Used

- o Selective control
- o Co-optation
- o Devolution

Intervening Variables

- o Tribal group, highly segmented

Role of Outside Powers

- o Very limited

¹⁰⁶¹ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 30.

¹⁰⁶² Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 104.

¹⁰⁶³ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 102.

communal interests while preserving its power. Many Shi'a and Kurds played leading roles in the government.¹⁰⁶⁴ The 1947 Cabinet and parliament were split among Sunnis, Shi'as, and Kurds, and Shi'as held roughly a third of the ministerial positions in the 1950s--a large increase from previous regimes.¹⁰⁶⁵ Several Shi'as even served as Prime Minister during the late monarchy period. Shi'a and Kurdish families were among Iraq's largest landowners in proportions roughly similar to their community's total percentage of population.¹⁰⁶⁶

The monarchy worked with the traditional elites of all of Iraq's major communities in exchange for their political support. Shaykhs, for example, held 45 percent of the seats in parliament.¹⁰⁶⁷ These favored leaders supported the monarchy. They recognized that the monarchy would help them maintain their personal status and wealth, and thus they did not promote their community's needs but rather worked to preserve the system.¹⁰⁶⁸

The regime carefully kept order. The government never hesitated to use force to suppress disturbances and at times declared martial law to keep order. The government also regularly suspended newspapers and kept an eye on activists of all stripes. The Hashemite regime banned political parties, censored the press, and jailed political activists. Critics accused the regime of spending three times as much on the police as on education. Despite democratic symbols such as

¹⁰⁶⁴ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 353-357.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 125.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Lukitz, *Iraq*, p. 131.

a parliament, many observers considered Iraq a police state.¹⁰⁶⁹

Social Change under the Hashemites

During the time of the monarchy the power of the government grew tremendously vis-a-vis society in general. State oil receipts, which were 1.5 million pounds in 1941, rose to 79.8 million in 1958.¹⁰⁷⁰ By the end of the monarchy, employment by the government skyrocketed, going from just over 3,000 in 1920 to over 20,000 in 1958. The number of policemen rose from around 2,500 to 23,000 in the same period.

Education also increased tremendously during the time of the monarchy. The number of primary students more than doubled between 1950 and 1958, and education at all levels grew.¹⁰⁷¹ In 1921 Iraq had only 99 college students; by 1958 it had 8,568. Similarly, the number of secondary students went from 229 to 73,911 in the same period.¹⁰⁷²

During the post-war Hashemite monarchy, Iraq began changing from a traditional society to a modern one. The growth in education led to the emergence of a new class of individuals who claimed their status based on personal achievement, not family ties. Moreover, the increase in the power of the state led individuals and groups to focus their attention more and more on the

¹⁰⁶⁹ Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971* (New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 84-85.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 32-34. Oil wealth, while strengthening the state, reduced its ties to the population. As the state was free from the people for resources, it did not form alliances or work with leading members, resulting in a lack of loyalty among the politically conscious.

¹⁰⁷¹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 133.

¹⁰⁷² Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, p. 34.

role of the state.

Arab identity as a community grew considerably, but this growth did not foster support for the Hashemites. The growth in education, which was dominated by Arab nationalists, led to a greater perception of common bonds. Moreover, the rise of Nasser in Egypt presented an alternative, and heroic, vision of government. Because of its lack of nationalist legitimacy, the Hashemite regime did not rely heavily on the Arab nationalist section of the Sunni Arab population for support. This further alienated many nationalists, who saw the regime as a puppet of the British and as traitorous for selling out the nationalist cause to Iraq's minorities.

Violence under the Hashemites

Communal violence was rare during the time of the monarchy even though class and rural-urban revolts were common. No Shi'a or Kurdish uprisings of note occurred from 1945 to 1958 even though almost a dozen revolts of peasants or workers against the regime or against local conditions occurred.¹⁰⁷³

Lessons Learned

The era of Hashemite rule suggests that a system using a combination of selective control, devolution, and co-optation can gain the goodwill of a country's communal groups even when the government in general is unpopular.

Selective Control. The regime's heavy use of control to prevent political activism was felt in communal circles. Although the regime devoted most of its attention to the immediate

¹⁰⁷³ Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, pp. 467-468.

problems of labor and student unrest, ethnic group activists could see the obvious consequences of open defiance of the regime. This created a tremendous disincentive to organize against the monarchy. Those individuals who attempted to organize found themselves hindered by police surveillance and censorship. Because the regime prevented all effective organization, it broke the security dilemma. No group needed to fear violence as long as it remained politically passive.

Devolution. The regime's use of devolution reassured Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish communities--particularly their leaders. The communities in general appeared satisfied with their status in Iraq due to the regime's willingness to include them in government in large numbers and respect their distinct cultures. The regime's willingness to give Shi'a and Kurds a large degree of participation in the state reduced the salience of communal identity as a source of opposition. Although complaints about the government were common in this era, few focused on issues of communal rights.

Devolution, however, angered militants among the dominant Sunni Arab community. Because many nationalists among this group had hegemonic ambitions--they wanted all of Iraq's communities to accept an Arab nationalist identity--they resented the Hashemite regime's respect for Shi'a and Kurdish culture. Indeed, these measures increased the chauvinism of the Arab nationalists by giving them a perceived grievance against the Shi'a and Kurdish communities.

Co-optation. Co-optation proved particularly effective in the post-war monarchy. Kurdish, Shi'a, and Sunni elites worked together to preserve the system, recognizing that their wealth and power depended on the regime's continuation. The leaders of these groups became pillars of the status quo, not sources of dissent.

As Iraq modernized the impact of co-optation became more limited. Traditional group members found new forms of association open to them based on class or ideology. Moreover, as education spread a new group of elites emerged, one more focused on national rather than parochial communal concerns. Thus, co-optation served to reduce communal tension but could not prevent unrest in general.

Case VIIC: Iraq under the Baath, 1968-present¹⁰⁷⁴

Despite the relative harmony among communal groups during the monarchy, Iraq plunged into communal war shortly after the monarchy fell in 1958. Beginning in the early 1960s, rebellions broke out in the Kurdish region, and agitation among Iraq's Shi'a population began in the 1970s. Although the Baath temporarily quelled the Kurdish insurrection and destroyed any Shi'a opposition, in the 1980s renewed Kurdish fighting led Baghdad to carry out a mass slaughter of the Kurds--the Anfal Operations. When the Kurds and the Shi'a rose in 1991 after the Persian Gulf War, the Baath killed tens of thousands from both communities and drove over a million Kurds and Shi'a into exile.

¹⁰⁷⁴ The Baath briefly took power in 1963, but soon lost power in a coup to other Arab nationalist forces. The Baath regained power in a coup on July 17, 1968 and have ruled Iraq ever since. This second Baath period is the focus of this section.

Box VIII: Iraq under the Baath: A Communal Relations Failure

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Hegemonic

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Massive Control
- o Identity change (dominant Arab identity)

Role of Outside Powers

- o Aid to belligerents (arms and money)
- o A haven for fighters
- o "Identity construction" (providing Kurds and Shi'as with communal identity alternatives)

Much of the blame for these repeated insurgencies comes from the brutal and misguided policies of Iraq's ruling Baath party. The Baath tried to impose an Arab identity on Iraq's Kurdish population and deny Iraqi Shi'a their own distinct culture and institutions. To back up its assimilation measures, the regime used a policy of massive force, often literally annihilating those who dared oppose their policies. These policies engendered tremendous resentment and led Kurds and

Shi'a to take up arms.

The experience of Baathist Iraq demonstrates that the use of massive force and imposed assimilation often will backfire on a regime, creating further resentment. The indiscriminate use of force politicized many Kurds and Shi'a. Moreover, massive force hardened Kurdish and Shi'a identities, making them more opposed to the central government.

The blundering policy of massive force and assimilation created an additional security dilemma to be overcome--one between the government and the communal groups--that will prove almost impossible for any future regime to master. The Arab nationalist Baath "captured" the Iraqi state, making it incapable of acting as an impartial third party. The sheer scale of the Baath's killing and other crimes also reduces the likelihood that blandishments that might have

created goodwill in the past will do so in the future.¹⁰⁷⁵

Arab Sunnis dominated the Baath government. When the Baath first came to power, almost the entire leadership consisted of Sunni Arabs from the triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border.¹⁰⁷⁶ The Baath also relied heavily on kinship and tribal networks. Three of five members of the Revolution Command Council were from the village of Tikrit.¹⁰⁷⁷

The Baath sought to centralize authority, undercutting traditional leaders. The Baath ideology emphasized state control over the economy and national unity. To this end, the Baath nationalized many industries and frequently seized land from its owners. The Baath engaged in almost no power sharing.¹⁰⁷⁸

The Baath tried to force Arab Sunni culture on the Shi'a and Kurds. The regime actively expounded Arab nationalism, attempting to tie Iraq's identity to that of the Sunni Arab world--a move that alienated both Shi'as and Kurds.¹⁰⁷⁹ In Kurdish areas, Arabic was the official language and Kurdish culture was actively suppressed. The state also restricted Shi'a religious observances and undercut religious independence by controlling religious schools and property.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁵ In a separate article, I argue that because of these problems--and many others--the United States should support the partition of Iraq into Shi'a, Kurdish, and Sunni states should Iraq again appear near collapse. Daniel Byman, "Let Iraq Collapse," *The National Interest* 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 48-60.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Amazia Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-1986: The changing features of a collective profile," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1989), p. 447.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 212.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 136.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 194.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 271.

The Baath and the Kurdish Revolts

In 1961, a Kurdish insurgency began that would last until 1975 and recur in the 1980s and 1990s. Led by tribes loyal to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurds initially strove for the right to use their language in schools, the control of local education, and a greater share of government revenue.¹⁰⁸¹

After taking power in 1968, the Baath negotiated a short-lived peace agreement with the Kurds that soon ended in renewed fighting.¹⁰⁸² In 1970, that Baath and Kurdish leaders agreed to a settlement granting the Kurds a high degree of autonomy.¹⁰⁸³ Almost immediately, both sides charged the other with violating the accords. The central government criticized the Kurds for seeking secession, not autonomy.¹⁰⁸⁴ The Baath, however, openly flouted the accord. The regime did not implement the education or language agreements and gave Kurds almost no say in decisionmaking.¹⁰⁸⁵ The Baath imposed Arab dominance by shutting down local schools, replacing Kurdish administrators and police, and otherwise not respecting Kurdish culture.¹⁰⁸⁶

¹⁰⁸¹ Schmidt, *Journey Among Brave Men*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁸² The Baath hoped to use the time of negotiations to consolidate their position domestically. Moreover, they realized that with Iranian support the Kurds were difficult to defeat militarily. Thus, they opened negotiations with them in 1969. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 326.

¹⁰⁸³ Kurds were given a guarantee of full participation in all aspects of government and the military; the official use of Kurdish in the Kurdish area; development spending in the Kurdish area; more Kurdish input into education; and formal recognition of the Kurdish nationality in the Constitution. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 327-328; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁸⁴ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 332.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 167.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Schmidt, *Journey Among Brave Men*, p. 6.

The government often deported the leaders and engaged in mass arrests.¹⁰⁸⁷

The Kurds soon took up arms, and the region exploded in conflict. Thousands died in the conflict from the start, and it got bloodier over time.¹⁰⁸⁸ The government contained the revolt by working with Barzani's Kurdish rivals.¹⁰⁸⁹ Soon tribal rivals and leftist groups began fighting against Barzani with government support.¹⁰⁹⁰

Outside support enabled the Kurds to resist the Baath initially, but eventually it proved their undoing. Israel began aiding the Kurds in 1966. More importantly, Iran also sent large amounts of arms and materiel to the Kurds and provided a haven to Kurdish fighters. In 1972, the United States began supporting the Kurds in cooperation with Iran.¹⁰⁹¹ Tehran, however, was a fickle ally. The 1975 Algiers Accord granted Iran control over the Shaat al-Arab waterway and other concessions in exchange for Iran's abandonment of the Kurdish cause. The Iranian government sealed its border with Iraq and cut off supplies, leading to the end of the revolt.¹⁰⁹²

This outside support had hardened the Baath's attitudes toward the Kurds. Kurdish

¹⁰⁸⁷ Sluglett, "The Kurds," in *Saddam's Iraq*, p. 196; Schmidt, *Journey Among Brave Men*, p. 247.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Schmidt, *Journey Among Brave Men*, p. 90 reports several thousand Kurds died in early clashes.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Kurdish forces divided along tribal and urban lines. The government supported the Herki and Surchi tribes. See Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 103.

¹⁰⁹¹ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 331. Both Iran and the United States hoped that Iraq would remain weakened by a continuing Kurdish insurgency. Thus, neither outside power sought a resolution to the Kurdish question.

¹⁰⁹² The 1974-75 round of fighting was bloody. The central government suffered roughly 17,000 casualties, while the Kurds suffered slightly less than that. Well over 100,000 Kurds fled to Iran to join Kurdish refugees there. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 339-340.

cooperation with three of Iraq's declared enemies enraged the central government. Thus, many Arab nationalists came to see the Kurds as enemies of the state.¹⁰⁹³

After 1975 the regime ruled with an iron hand in Iraqi Kurdistan. The regime resettled hundreds of thousands of Kurds outside Kurdistan in order to create a *cordon sanitaire* between Iran and Turkey and Iraq. The government destroyed over one thousand villages as part of this program. To break up concentrations of Kurds, the Baath settled Arabs in their place.¹⁰⁹⁴

The regime used massive force to shatter Kurdish organization and institutions. Any Kurd trying to return home was summarily executed. To destroy Kurdish identity, the regime provided financial awards to Arabs who took Kurdish wives, changed Kurdish place names to Arabic ones, and Arabized the faculty and curriculum of Kurdish schools. The regime transferred Kurdish civil servants and police out of Kurdistan. Torture, mass arrests, and executions ensured that everyone obeyed these brutal orders.¹⁰⁹⁵

Nor did the regime make any concessions toward Kurdish culture or assuring Kurds as to their role in Iraq. The government did not allow Kurdish as a language of instruction or give Kurdish representatives input into decisionmaking.¹⁰⁹⁶ The only development spending done in the region was for roads to facilitate military movements. No Kurd joined the Revolutionary Command Council until 1982, and that Kurd--Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf--had little personal or

¹⁰⁹³ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 331.

¹⁰⁹⁴ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 339-340.

¹⁰⁹⁵ The Baath clamped down particularly hard on potential leaders. The Barzani clan in 1975 had been relocated to southern Iraq, but in 1980 soldiers arrested up to 8,000 Barzani males, paraded them through the streets of Baghdad, and executed them.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 235.

political weight.¹⁰⁹⁷

The Kurds reacted to these measures with hostility, but divisions hindered effective resistance. The Kurds split into pro-Barzani forces of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the nominally-Marxist Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani. By the late 1970s, these groups struggled far more with each other than with the central government.¹⁰⁹⁸ Dozens died in the late 1970s as these two groups clashed, with the central government weeping crocodile tears.¹⁰⁹⁹

The Kurds rose again during the Iran-Iraq war, when the Baath appeared threatened with defeat. Syria, Libya, and Iran armed the PUK in 1980, and Iran also worked with Barzani's KDP. Discord was so great, however, that several of the strongest factions regularly fought against one another. Not until 1986 did the Kurdish factions finally unite. Aided by Iranian advances that drained the Iraqi government's manpower, the Kurds steadily expanded their control over Kurdish areas, and the government's writ only applied during daylight.¹¹⁰⁰

The Baath responded to Kurdish military successes with even more violence. They razed villages, tortured and executed families of fighters, and otherwise tried to intimidate the local population. Beginning in 1987, the regime began to use chemical weapons as part of its scorched earth policies. Large swaths of territory were declared war zones, where anyone living would be

¹⁰⁹⁷ Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq," p. 456.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 236.

¹⁰⁹⁹ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 344.

¹¹⁰⁰ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 346-351.

killed on sight.¹¹⁰¹

Baghdad also developed its own local allies--the *jash* (or *fursan*) forces. By the late 1980s perhaps 150,000 Kurds were part of the *jash*. Local chiefs controlled the *jash*, and many cooperated with the regime to avoid having their villages razed.¹¹⁰² The *jash*, while nominally supporting the government, often acted as informers for Kurdish fighters and as a supply of troops.¹¹⁰³

In 1988 Iraq began the genocidal Operation Anfal to end the Kurdish problem. Aided by new troops, the Baath regional commander Ali Hasan al-Majid systematically killed Kurdish males who came into his hands. Perhaps 200,000 Kurds died in the Anfal operations, 1.5 people million were resettled, and several hundred thousand Kurds fled to Iran or Turkey.¹¹⁰⁴

But even the Anfal did not forever end Kurdish resistance to the central government. Once again, regime weakness led the Kurds to rebel--this time after the Persian Gulf war threatened the Baath's hold on power. In March 1991, the Kurdish region exploded. Even Kurdish leaders such as Barzani admitted that the people took up arms spontaneously and that his group followed the people onto the streets. Almost all *jash* leaders sided with the rebels.¹¹⁰⁵ Previous Baath killings and discrimination had politicized the entire Iraqi Kurdish community. They considered the regime's weakness and the prospect of coalition assistance as an opportunity

¹¹⁰¹ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 352-353.

¹¹⁰² McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 354.

¹¹⁰³ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 356.

¹¹⁰⁴ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 357-363.

¹¹⁰⁵ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 371.

for them to gain their independence from the hated Baath.

As the regime recovered, it quickly clamped down on the Kurdish fighters. Tens of thousands of Kurds died as the central government reestablished itself. Over one million Kurds fled to Iran or Turkey.¹¹⁰⁶

The Shi'a and the Baath

Shi'ism did not grow into a strong political movement until the 1970s. Shi'ism in Iraq was worn lightly by many adherents, yet constant regime discrimination reinforced Shi'a identity. Educated Shi'a resented the disproportionate Sunni influence in society, while religious Shi'a resented the regime's active suppression of their rites and observances.¹¹⁰⁷ As with the Kurds, this widespread discrimination against even politically passive Shi'as engendered tremendous resentment.

The Baath regime clamped down on any expressions of political Shi'ism. In 1977, during demonstrations at a religious procession, the regime arrested thousands of demonstrators and killed or imprisoned many of the procession's organizers. The regime also arrested large numbers of suspected Shi'a activists and executed Shi'a religious leaders.¹¹⁰⁸

The Iranian revolution led the Iraqi government to take symbolic steps toward placating Shiism. The government lavished money on Shi'a shrines and gave public monies to the south. The government also appointed three Shi'a to positions on the ruling Revolutionary Command

¹¹⁰⁶ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 373.

¹¹⁰⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 236.

¹¹⁰⁸ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, pp. 198-200.

Council. Concurrent with these gestures, however, was further repression. The Baath government feared that Iraqi Shi'a were working with Iran, which led it to increase surveillance. The Baath also executed Shi'a leaders it considered a threat.¹¹⁰⁹

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran provided support for Iraqi Kurdish and Shi'a dissidents. In 1982, Iran formed the High Council of the Islamic Revolution to work with Iraqi Shi'a. In response, the Baath regime executed hundreds of Iraqi Shi'a activists.¹¹¹⁰

Like the Kurds, the Shi'a rose when the Iraqi regime appeared near collapse in 1991. The Baath quickly crushed the rebellion and slaughtered many Shi'a. Although exact figures are scarce, the regime probably killed tens of thousands of Shi'a in putting down the revolt. Iran provided propaganda and a few weapons, but in general the revolt's sources were entirely indigenous.¹¹¹¹

Lessons Learned

Baathi Iraq is a sad chapter in the history of communal relations. Efforts to impose Sunni Arab hegemony as part of a police state met with repeated resistance. The final result was the worst of both worlds: continued violence and continued tyranny.

Massive control. Massive control failed to prevent the recurrence of ethnic conflict in Baath Iraq. Although the Iraqi regime regularly destroyed the Kurdish and Shi'a capacity to make

¹¹⁰⁹ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, p. 200; Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq," p. 456; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 237.

¹¹¹⁰ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 307-308.

¹¹¹¹ Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, pp. 276-279.

war, each hint of regime weakness led these groups to take up arms. Moreover, the indiscriminate nature of the Baath killing politicized many Kurds and Shi'a, leading them to become more militant and sympathetic to individuals using violence. Each government crackdown provided a ready source of recruits for the next wave of dissent. Indeed, each uprising was more widespread than the last, suggesting that the hatred engendered by massive force is a potent source of recurring conflict.

The Baath government created a "security dilemma" between the Sunni Arabs and Iraq's other communities. Where the government in other places acted as an impartial Leviathan to crush all violence, in Iraq the government became the source of the problem. Thus, a strong government became the greatest threat to Iraq's communal groups.

Identity change. Massive force also "hardened" Kurdish identity. The memory of past bloodshed united Kurds, convincing former tribal enemies that they shared a common bond. The widespread rebellion in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 included members of almost every tribe and region, including those that in the past worked with the central government. Moreover, the violence associated Iraq and Arab identities with the horrors of Baath repression, further increasing the appeal of Kurdish identity.

The high level of discrimination further impeded attempts to make the Kurds and Shi'a into Iraqis. The regime made so few efforts to incorporate Kurds and Shi'a into the government or into Iraqi society that the benefits of changing one's identity were almost non-existent. Like the use of massive force, the high level of discrimination strengthened communal differences.

The Role of Outside Powers

Outside powers played a major role in the recurrence of ethnic conflict in Baathi Iraq. The weapons and funding of outside powers made rebellion far easier, allowing the Kurds in particular to take up arms despite the considerable forces arrayed against them. Moreover, the haven offered by Iran made organizing the revolt far easier. Equally important, Iraq's neighbors offered Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish populations reinforcement for their distinct identities.

Political Shi'ism in Iran also inspired revolt, although the manner in which this occurred was indirect. The Baath regime, anticipating Iranian-inspired violence, cracked down hard on the Shi'a community. This repression made the Shi'a eager to revolt when the regime appeared in jeopardy in 1991.

Outside powers made the security dilemma more acute for several reasons. First, by providing arms and a haven to insurgents they weakened the power of the state vis-a-vis communal groups. Second, the foreign ties of the Shi'a and Kurds alarmed the Baath. Kurdish ties to Israel, Iran, and the United States led many Baath leaders to consider them traitors. Similarly, the ties between Shi'a leaders in Iraq and Iran fostered suspicion in Baghdad. Because of this suspicion, the regime mistrusted both communities and saw every sign of community organization as a foreign-backed threat to remove the Baath from power.

Foreign intervention also hindered Baath identity change policies. Assimilating Kurds and Shi'a into an Arab-dominated "Iraqi" identity proved difficult, as both communities had brethren across Iraq's borders with whom they were in regular contact. Cultural materials, ranging from books and poems to political tracts, travelled across borders. Many Iraqi Shi'a, in particular, studied with Iranian Shi'a leaders, strengthening their perceived bonds.

Conclusions

Restoring even the fragile and uneven communal peace found during the time of the British Mandate and the post-war Hashemite regime is not possible in a future Iraq. The British and Hashemite governments both ruled over Shi'a and Kurdish communities that did not see the Arab central government as a threat to their existence. By tightly controlling communal organization, co-opting elites, and devolving power to local communities, these regimes won the temporary quiescence of communal groups. Violence, when it occurred, was limited in its scope. Not so with the Baath. Baath attempts to impose an Arab identity and its genocidal Anfal campaigns against the Shi'as and Kurds will keep these communities in constant fear of a strong Sunni government in Baghdad. Moreover, outside meddling is likely to prevent the regime from imposing its will indefinitely on these communities.

Chapter VIII: Ethnic Relations in Lebanon

Lebanon represents both an ethnic relations success and a failure. From 1943 to 1975, Lebanon's diverse communities lived together peacefully if not harmoniously--a situation that led many observers to label Lebanon "the Switzerland of the Middle East." From 1975 to 1990, however, a brutal civil war raged in Lebanon. Roughly 170,000 Lebanese died in the war, 300,000 were wounded, and perhaps 800,000 displaced. Almost a fifth of Lebanon's population fled abroad.¹¹¹² How can we explain the thirty years peace followed by 15 years of war?

Lebanon's experience shows both the value and weaknesses of accommodative solutions to ethnic conflict. To keep the peace among its communities, Lebanon relied heavily on a clever combination of co-optation, devolution and participation--a system Arend Lijphart has labeled "consociational democracy."¹¹¹³ Such a consociational system reassured Lebanon's various communal groups as to their status in society and led elites to work toward compromise, not confrontation. Although accommodative solutions kept the peace for over thirty years in Lebanon, they often strengthened communal identities. Adding to Lebanon's woes, modernization made the co-optation of traditional elites less effective, while the changing demographic balance among communities led to tension over how to divide the power and largesse of the state.

¹¹¹² "Lebanon survey: Putting back the pieces," *The Economist*, February 24, 1996, p. S3.

¹¹¹³ Lijphart identifies four elements of consociationalism: 1. a "grand coalition" that includes all major ethnic groups; 2. a mutual veto over decision-making; 3. allocating government offices and public opportunities according to ethnic proportionality; and 4. a high degree of ethnic autonomy. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 25-44.

Perhaps most importantly, accommodation in Lebanon kept the state weak. When security concerns arose due to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the weak state proved unable to maintain order. Battles between Palestinian commandos and the Israeli military spilled over into Lebanon and left many of Lebanon's communal groups believing that the central government was not able to protect them. The internal balance of power became disrupted as Christian groups feared the Palestinians would turn Lebanon into an Arab and Muslim-dominated state.

This chapter describes the long peace in Lebanon and attempts to explain factors that disrupted it in 1975. It then lists what this case teaches us about the long-term resolution of ethnic conflict.

An Overview of Lebanon

Lebanon is home to many religious and ethnic communities, almost all of which have a history of persecution. Armenian Catholics, Assyrian and Chaldean Catholics, Greek Catholics, Maronite Catholics, Roman Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Protestants, Bahais, Jews, Alawis, Druzes, Shi'as, and Sunnis all can be found in Lebanon. Many of these communities came to the Lebanon area in order to avoid persecution. Although Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims were the preeminent communities in Lebanon when the French departed in the 1940s, no group can be said to have dominated the country. Most groups jealously guarded their autonomy. Not surprisingly, Lebanon's communities regularly fought one another and suffered from bloody internecine conflicts.¹¹¹⁴ Such conflicts

¹¹¹⁴ The mid-19th century witnessed a bitter fight between the area's Druze and Maronite communities, resulting in widespread massacres and deaths. For an excellent description of this conflict, see Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus*

are well remembered by the Lebanese and are handed down in tales from generation to generation.¹¹¹⁵

Outside powers regularly interfered in the Lebanon area even while it was nominally under Ottoman control. Starting in the 17th century, the French began to help the Lebanese Maronite Christian community. In the 19th century, the British supported the Druze community to balance the French.¹¹¹⁶ The Russians acted as advocate for the Greek Orthodox community.¹¹¹⁷

After World War One, the French took over the region that is now Lebanon. France enlarged the Ottoman administrative unit of Mount Lebanon, adding to it the Muslim areas surrounding it. The French designed Lebanon to ensure a Christian majority and made it independent of Syria. The fate of Lebanon after the French departed--whether it would rejoin Syria or become an independent, pro-Western country--was subject to heated debate among the Lebanese.¹¹¹⁸

The Maintenance of Peace

As the end of French colonial rule neared in 1943, Lebanon's Christian and Sunni Muslim communities worked out a power-sharing agreement--an informal agreement known as the

in 1860 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

¹¹¹⁵ Fawaz, *An Occasion for War*, p. xiii.

¹¹¹⁶ Moosa, *The Maronites in History*, pp. 283 and 286.

¹¹¹⁷ Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 61.

¹¹¹⁸ Hiro, *Lebanon*, pp. 3-5.

National Pact--for the new state. Muslims would abandon the idea of returning the area to Syria or to another Arab power while Maronites would accept the idea of Lebanon as an Arab rather than a European state.¹¹¹⁹ The National Pact ensured that the government included all of Lebanon's major communities and that the Maronite Christian community held a slight advantage. Under the Pact, the President would be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim, and his deputy a Greek Orthodox Christian. Other communities, such as the Druze, also received official posts. Representation in government and the bureaucracy was allocated on a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims.¹¹²⁰ Christians received 42 of the 77 parliament seats, with the Maronites taking 23, the Greek Orthodox nine, Greek Catholics five, Armenian Catholics and Armenian Orthodox four, and Protestants and non-Muslim minorities one. Of the 35 Muslim seats, Sunnis received 16, the Shi'as 14, and the Druze five.¹¹²¹

¹¹¹⁹ Moosa, *The Maronites in History*, p. 290.

¹¹²⁰ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 31.

¹¹²¹ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 5.

Box VIII A: Lebanon: An Ethnic Relations Failure

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Security Dilemma
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Devolution
- o Co-optation

Intervening Variables

- o Weak central government
- o Strong government control of the economy

Role of Outside Powers

- o Aid to belligerents (arms, training, money)
 - o Direct assistance (Palestinian aid to Sunni groups)
 - o Ideological influence of and reaction to pan-Arabism
-

Lebanon embraced a multi-ethnic solution to communal problems and avoided attempts to impose a new identity. The law prohibited civil marriage and identity cards specified one's confession. Perhaps most importantly, political rewards were given according to a confessional formula. Not surprisingly, the communal group, not the nation, had the ultimate loyalty of most Lebanese.¹¹²² The confessional system propped up the power of traditional and religious elites and worked against the strength of political groups that transcended communal boundaries.¹¹²³

This recognition of multiple identities was not a recognition of mutual equality. The system depended in part on each community accepting limits to its position in the social hierarchy.¹¹²⁴ Maronite Christians in particular saw themselves as Lebanon's leading communal group, and Sunni Muslims considered themselves representative of Lebanon's Muslim population.

¹¹²² Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 24.

¹¹²³ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 6.

¹¹²⁴ Fawaz, *An Occasion for War*, p. 219.

Cooperation in Lebanon depended on the cooperation of the elites--often making them more loyal to the system than to their communities. Names such as Jumayyil, Chamoun, Salam, Franjiya, and Jumblatt appear again and again among the ranks of the confessional leadership. Members of these families led Lebanon's communities for generations. The Maronite-led government co-opted several leading Shi'a families, giving them honorary administrative positions, access to government largess, and large salaries. In exchange, these leaders controlled dissent in their villages and clans.¹¹²⁵ All traditional leaders recognized that their power and positions depended in part on the continuation of the Lebanese power-sharing system.

Outside forces almost upset the Lebanese applecart in 1958. President Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine--which would tie Lebanon to the West--engendered a Muslim and Druze-led alliance in protest. Chamoun and his supporters, for their part, feared that the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt would jeopardize Lebanon's independence and thus strongly rejected any pan-Arabism.¹¹²⁶ Fighting briefly broke out between pan-Arab forces and Phalangist militias, but the resignation of Chamoun ended the dispute.¹¹²⁷

Problems with the Peace

Despite much communal tension--and the disturbing outbreaks of 1958--Lebanon's National Pact survived intact for over thirty years. Three factors disturbed this uneasy peace and

¹¹²⁵ Helena Cobban, "The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon," *The Muslim World Today*, Occasional Paper No. 2 (American Institute for Islamic Affairs, 1985), p. 2.

¹¹²⁶ Moosa, *The Maronites in History*, pp. 293-294.

¹¹²⁷ Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 28.

caused the bitter civil war that erupted in 1975: tension between the frozen consociational democracy and the challenges of demographic shifts and modernization; the influx of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas; and outside meddling.

The Frozen Consociational System. The National Pact's division of spoils by community was based on the 1932 census, which revealed a slight Christian majority.¹¹²⁸ The Muslim community, however, had a higher birth rate than the Christian community and many Christians emigrated abroad. As a result, the division of political spoils increasingly did not reflect Lebanon's demographics. Many Muslim leaders began demanding that the system change to reflect the new Muslim majority, but Christian groups resisted, fearing that this would weaken their status in Lebanon.¹¹²⁹

Modernization also disrupted established patterns of subordination. Many Druze, for example, sought an abolition of the confessional system, as it barred them from major political posts. Similarly, many younger Arabs wanted to abandon Lebanon's traditional distance from nationalist causes.¹¹³⁰

In addition to the tension generated by changing demographics, the modernization of Lebanon led to destabilizing change within communities. Under the National Pact, harmony

¹¹²⁸ The initial census may have been fixed to demonstrate a Christian majority. Robert Brenton Betts, *The Druze* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 57.

¹¹²⁹ Lebanon's Shi'a community continued to grow at a faster rate than other communities after 1943. Even more important, the Shi'as began to seek a political system that reflected their greater numbers. Migration to urban areas and new economic opportunities uprooted many Shi'a, making them eager recruits for political action. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 19.

¹¹³⁰ Judith P. Harik, "Shaykh al-'Aql and the Druze of Mount Lebanon: Conflict and Accommodation," *Middle East Studies* 30:3, July 1994, p. 464.

among a handful of communal leaders was sufficient to bring about ethnic peace. Education and urbanization, however, politicized many Lebanese--particularly the previously passive Shi'a. Between 1959 and 1973, the number of schoolchildren in Shi'a areas quadrupled, and almost all villages became tied into the national road network.¹¹³¹

New leaders began emerging, making co-optation harder.¹¹³² Musa al-Sadr, for example, organized Shi'as as Shi'as (as opposed to by village or region), forcing traditional Shi'a elites to become more militant. Many of these new elites formed militias to increase their influence. Leaders increasingly had to respond to pressure from their communities and could not deliver votes or support without concrete accomplishments. Thus, the inequalities and rigidities inherent in Lebanon's system began finding a voice in a new generation of leaders dissatisfied with politics as usual. These new leaders often formed militias to gain their own power bases.

Lebanon's consociational system, however, was frozen. The system depended on each communal group accepting their share of power and on leaders being able to control their followers. Demographic change and modernization disrupted both of these assumptions. Furthermore, the frozen consociational system provided almost no source of common identity to overcome these problems. The result was constant friction.

The Palestinians. In addition to these domestic problems, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon consistently grew both in numbers and in strength. Before 1967, over 200,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon, but most of them were not well armed or highly political. By

¹¹³¹ Cobban, "The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon," p. 3.

¹¹³² Six feudal families dominated the Shi'a community until the mid-1960s, when new leaders emerged. The Shi'a leader militia Nabih Berri, for example, came from a middle class background, not a traditional elite family. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 9.

1969, however, that figure had risen to 235,000, and the dramatic attacks of the Palestine Liberation Organization on Israel had galvanized Lebanon's Palestinian community. "Black September"--the 1970 civil war in Jordan that forced many Palestinians to flee--further added to the Palestinian community in Lebanon. By 1976, 300,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon, and Lebanon had become the PLO's headquarters for its war against Israel.¹¹³³

More than any other factor, the back and forth conflict between the PLO and Israel undermined the Lebanese government and led Lebanon's communal groups to arm and mobilize to defend themselves. In 1968, the PLO launched rockets and mortars from Lebanon against Israel. In response, the Israelis began raiding guerrilla bases in the area. After the murder of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Israel began to preempt Palestinian military action, striking Lebanon regularly. In 1973, Israeli commandos even struck targets in the heart of Beirut. In response, Lebanese groups suffering from the strikes--particularly the Shi'a--called for the government to defend them. When the government failed to do this, they formed their own militias.¹¹³⁴

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict generated a parallel conflict in Lebanon between PLO supporters and those who wanted to drive the Palestinians out. Many Arabs supported the PLO both for ideological reasons and to gain PLO assistance for their causes in Lebanon. Christian leaders feared that the Palestinians would support Lebanese Muslims and strip Christians of their

¹¹³³ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 25.

¹¹³⁴ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, pp. 56-67. Between 1968 and 1974, Israel violated Lebanese territory an average of 1.4 times a day.

power.¹¹³⁵ In a prescient report in 1960, Lebanon's President Fu'ad Shihab noted, "...the Palestinian problem is bigger than Lebanon. For Lebanon will either repress the Palestinians or be repressed by them--and no third solution exists."¹¹³⁶ The PLO heightened these fears by portraying the struggle in Lebanon as part of its overall ambitions.¹¹³⁷ Moreover, PLO fighters often used their struggle as a pretext for robbery and extortion, and they resisted efforts to rein in their excesses.¹¹³⁸

All groups began preparing for a clash. Lebanon's religious and political groups began gathering arms, mobilizing, and seeking foreign allies. The PLO, to bolster its local position, began sponsoring several pan-Arab movements in Lebanon. Several Maronite groups began forming militias after the army failed to control the PLO. As the PLO stepped up its activities from Lebanon, the Israelis began to establish links with the PLO's Lebanese opponents. Soon the militias were as large as the Lebanese army. Muslim soldiers eventually left the Lebanese army after it was ordered to take action against the PLO. By the early 1970s, Lebanese militias, the army, and the PLO began fighting one another sporadically.¹¹³⁹

Outside influence. In addition to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ideologies of outside

¹¹³⁵ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 10.

¹¹³⁶ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 29.

¹¹³⁷ For example, PLO leader Salah Khalaf noted that the "road to Palestine" might pass through Junya, a Maronite center. See Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 95.

¹¹³⁸ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, pp. 136-139.

¹¹³⁹ Hiro, *Lebanon*, p. 14 and p. 59; Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, pp. 63-92. Stopgap solutions failed to bring peace. In 1969, Lebanon recognized the PLO's right to police and administer refugee camps within Lebanon and to take up arms without interference.

powers and their assistance to communal groups buffeted Lebanon's fragile system. The growth of pan-Arabism abroad generated tremendous instability in Lebanon. Sunni leaders, hoping to improve their relative position, used pan-Arabism as a mobilizing tool to increase their influence in Lebanon.¹¹⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, this step alarmed Lebanon's Christian communities, which feared becoming a small minority in the greater Arab world--a fear that made them resist any diminution of their power.

Outside powers also used Lebanese and Palestinian factions as proxies.¹¹⁴¹ Arab nationalists took money from "progressive" Arab countries and Russia and Libya, while Phalangists relied on Lebanese emigres, pro-Western Arabs, and Israel for money and weapons. Similarly, Libya and Iraq began dumping money into Lebanon.¹¹⁴² These outside sources of money and weapons further increased the violence in Lebanon.

Lessons Learned

Although Lebanon's descent into civil war illustrates the imperfections of the National Pact system, the peace that lasted for over thirty years should not be dismissed lightly. The devolution expressed in the National Pact system succeeded in reassuring Lebanon's communities and their traditional leaders. Indeed, without outside interference Lebanon's system might have weathered the demographic and modernization challenges with little or no

¹¹⁴⁰ Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 33. The presence of Palestinian militias gave this mobilization a particularly ominous tinge.

¹¹⁴¹ For example, in 1976 the Syrian-sponsored Palestine Liberation Army forces harassed members of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front. See Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 94.

¹¹⁴² Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 129.

violence.¹¹⁴³

Co-optation. Co-optation satisfied many of Lebanon's traditional leaders, leading them to work to preserve the system. Traditional leaders recognized that the National Pact system enhanced their influence by making them their communities' formal leaders. It is no accident that the leaders of several militias came from non-traditional backgrounds or were younger members of important families. Most of the traditional leaders had rejected armed struggle, preferring to work with the system that ensured their influence.

Co-optation served Lebanon well in the era before mass politicization but proved less effective as a new elite emerged. Co-optation worked better when Lebanese were less educated and more locally organized. Modernization, however, made Lebanon's communities more mobile and gave them wider status aspirations. Several Druze leaders, for example, sought a national role despite their communities small numbers. Moreover, as modernization spread, a rival elite emerged. This elite both sought political power for themselves and used chauvinistic rhetoric both to gain support and to press traditional elites to become more militant.

Devolution. Devolution in Lebanon did not completely quiet status concerns. Groups regularly quarrelled about their share of government positions and largesse. Some groups, such as the Druze, chafed at their limits to advancement due to their community's relatively small

¹¹⁴³ The Shi'a--the community that changed the most in terms of modernization and relative demographic strength--illustrates this argument neatly. Despite their many complaints with the system, the Shi'a community did not organize its own militia until 1974--well after it began to voice complaints. The 1974 date is explained by the growth in Palestinian-Israeli cross-border activity and the growth of militias in Lebanon in general. Indeed Amal, the main Shi'a militia, had security as its main goal, and it grew tremendously when it began to protect Shi'a villagers against Palestinians, whose presence would bring Israeli wrath. In 1982, Amal cooperated initially with the invading Israelis against the PLO. See Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, pp. 50-61 and p. 86.

size. Others, such as the Shi'a, agitated for a larger slice of Lebanon's pie on the basis of their growing population. The granting of positions to one communal group often led to criticism from a rival. Although such problems, by themselves, did not cause Lebanon's collapse they did provide fertile grounds for the fear and suspicion that bred conflict.

Lebanon's experience demonstrates the difficulties of balancing a powersharing system with a flexible system. Powersharing's greatest advantage is that it assures groups a place in the system. Flexible systems, which are needed to accommodate demographic shifts, can unwittingly jeopardize this assurance and alarm groups about their future status. Such a problem is particularly manifest when a changing of the guard occurs as to which group will be first among equals. In Lebanon, the Maronites justified their position due to their greater numbers based on the 1932 census. The fiction of Lebanon having a majority Christian population, however, became increasingly thin as Muslim birthrates exploded far beyond that of the Christian community. The Christians, and particularly the Maronites, sought to keep their group's status as high as possible and feared for their community should they lose their influence; thus they resisted calls for change. In particular, they feared that a Muslim-dominated government would join Lebanon to the Arab and Muslim world more formally. The result was a need for change in a system that had no mechanism for reform.

Successful devolution also led to a weak state, which in turn was a recipe for disaster. No group wanted a strong central government: such a development would leave any individual group vulnerable to the loss of its high level of autonomy and influence. Lebanon's weak central government, however, proved too feeble to prevent the Palestinians from acting as a state within a state or to stop the Israelis from launching attacks on Lebanon. But a consociational state

cannot end the security dilemma as it cannot produce a Leviathan. Thus, communal groups felt compelled to take up arms.

Consociationalism also made changing identities more difficult. Intermarriage, or even interaction, becomes difficult when groups see others as outsiders, not fellow countrymen. In Lebanon, being Lebanese was impossible. Civil marriage was prohibited, identity cards specified one's confession, and political rewards were allocated according to a confessional formula. The result was a political system that deepened communal divisions.

Outside Powers

Outside powers played an important role in the Lebanese collapse. Outside powers greatly exacerbated the security dilemma among Lebanon's many communities. By providing arms and weapons to militias and by direct intervention, outside powers highlighted the weakness of the state. With outside support, communal groups became stronger than the government and thus a threat to one another. Outside powers also exacerbated status concerns in Lebanon. Pan-Arabism in particular exerted a pull on Lebanon's Muslim communities--and a corresponding fear among Lebanon's Christian sects. Moreover, the Iranian revolution mobilized many Lebanese Shi'a, leading them to demand a greater say in running Lebanon.

Conclusions

More than any other case examined in this dissertation, the fate of Lebanon suggests the importance of living in a good neighborhood. Constant outside meddling made conflict almost inevitable in Lebanon and, once it began, this outside interference intensified and prolonged the

violence. In addition to the daunting problems caused by foreign meddling, the paralysis of consociationalism and communal jealousy about autonomy left the state unable to act. Lebanon's government did not simply choose the wrong policies: Communities were too strong, and the state too weak, for peace to continue. Given the state's weakness, constant foreign interference, and high level of domestic discontent, it is not clear what the Lebanese government could have done differently to prevent ethnic conflict from occurring in 1975.

Chapter IX: The Bakhtiyaris and the Persians

The Bakhtiyaris of Iran were important political actors in the early years of the twentieth century, but today that have almost disappeared as an independent entity. The Bakhtiyari's experience suggests that identity change policies can succeed in fostering lasting peace. The Iranian government's assimilation policies changed many Bakhtiyaris into Persians. Successful identity change, however, took generations and required various Iranian governments to shatter Bakhtiyari institutions, repress Bakhtiyari cultural expression, and impose the dominant Persian culture on them through a high level of repression.

The weak Qajar Shahs who ruled Iran during the 19th century gave the Bakhtiyari's near-complete autonomy.¹¹⁴⁴ This autonomy left the Bakhtiyaris free to war against their Persian, Qashqai, and Arab neighbors as well as against each other. However, when Reza Shah Pahlavi took power in the early 1920s, he crushed the Bakhtiyaris and attempted to assimilate them into a broader Persian identity. Reza Shah's policies, which were continued by his son, met with considerable success. His combination of control and assimilation severely weakened Bakhtiyari attempts to maintain a separate identity and defend their way of life. Moreover, it prevented them from warring against each other or against ethnic rivals. When central authority in the Iranian "empire" collapsed in 1979, the Bakhtiyari agitated for more rights but did not join the Kurds in taking up arms in the name of ethnic separatism. This apparent success--continued

¹¹⁴⁴ The Qajar dynasty lasted from 1795 until 1925 though the Qajar Shahs had lost much of their power by the 1906 Constitutional revolution. The Qajars were a tribal group that maintained their supremacy by co-opting and playing off rival tribes and working with important merchants and religious figures. Under the Qajar rule, Iran gradually lost *de facto* control over much of its territory to Great Britain and to Russia.

peaceful relations after the lifting of control--can be seen as the culmination of almost a century-long transformation. In short, the Bakhtiyari experience demonstrates that identity change policies can work under certain conditions.

Box IXA: Iran and the Bakhtiyaris: A Communal Relations Success

Types of Ethnic Conflict:

- o Hegemonic
- o Status

Primary Strategies Used:

- o Massive Control
- o Identity change (dominant Persian identity)

Secondary Strategies Used:

- o Co-optation

Intervening Variables

- o Low level of ethnic consciousness
- o Tribally segmented group
- o Shared high culture with the dominant group

Role of Outside Powers

- o None

This chapter describes how the Iranian government gradually transformed the Bakhtiyaris into Persians. It first describes the Bakhtiyaris and notes their long existence as a highly-autonomous people under the Qajar Shahs. It then describes the Pahlavi period, where both Reza Shah and his son tried to assimilate the Bakhtiyaris into the dominant Persian culture. After briefly discussing the Bakhtiyaris under the current clerical regime, it also describes important social changes that shaped Bakhtiyari identity. The chapter concludes by noting what the Bakhtiyari experience teaches us

about how identity change can prevent ethnic conflict from recurring.

An Overview of the Bakhtiyaris

The Bakhtiyari home is the central and southern Zagros mountains of Iran, an area they share with the Lur people. The Bakhtiyaris exist entirely within Iran's political borders. They

live primarily in the mountainous regions around the provinces of Chaharmahal, Kerman, Hormuzgan, Fars, Isfahan and Khuzistan. Like the dominant Persians, the Bakhtiyaris are Shi'a Muslims of the Twelver sect. The Bakhtiyari language is an offshoot of Persian.¹¹⁴⁵

The Bakhtiyaris are a nomadic people organized along tribal lines. Today they are the largest migratory tribe in Iran, and they consist of 34,333 households--roughly 200,000 people. The nomadic families normally belong to a clan, which is divided into several tribes. The tribe in turn is divided into smaller groups comprised of a number of households related by kinship or marriage. Thus, the tribal organization is based on kinship as well as economic cooperation, which is required for grazing.

Like the Berbers, the Bakhtiyaris were internally divided.¹¹⁴⁶ Ervand Abrahamian reports that of the 250,000 Bakhtiyaris in 1850, there were over 55 tribes among them.¹¹⁴⁷ The two main divisions of the Bakhtiyaris are the Chahar Lang, who led the Bakhtiyari until the middle of the 19th century, and the Haft Lang, who were more involved in Iranian politics. Each of these divisions, however, contains many tribal groupings; the Haft Lang consists today of 55 clans and the Chahar Lang of 24 clans.¹¹⁴⁸

¹¹⁴⁵ Like their Lur neighbors, they speak Luri (a language derived from Persian), but the dialect--Lur Buzurg--is distinct. The Bakhtiyaris have been a distinct tribal entity from the Lurs for at least several centuries.

¹¹⁴⁶ Tribal leaders relied on arbitration and persuasion to get their way, as followers could vote with their feet and join other camps if dissatisfied.

¹¹⁴⁷ See Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 12 for population figures and p. 25 for the number of tribes.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Iran Yearbook 88* (Bonn: Menas Associates, 1988), p. 27.

Tribal Feuding under the Qajars

Until the time of Reza Shah, fighting within the Bakhtiyari community and between the Bakhtiyari and other ethnic groups was rampant. The few historic records that mention the Bakhtiyari do so in the context of conflict: the need to punish them for nonpayment of taxes, their quarrels with other groups over territory, and their general resistance to the wishes of the central government. The Bakhtiyari continually feuded with neighboring Qashqai, Lur, and Arab tribes over revenues and land.¹¹⁴⁹

The Qajar dynasty was too weak to rule by force alone. In the words of Abrahamian, the Qajar Shahs were "despots without the instruments of despotism."¹¹⁵⁰ In the Qajar period, the government demanded only political loyalty, and it did not seek uniformity or assimilation. As long as minimal order prevailed and tax revenue flowed in, the Qajars were content to leave the tribes alone, giving them *de facto* autonomy. The Qajar government used the Bakhtiyaris, Lurs, Kurds, and Arabs as checks on one another and often encouraged internal dissent within these groups.¹¹⁵¹

The central government sought to formalize the Bakhtiyari role and co-opt them through limited accommodation. In 1867, the Qajars invested a leading Bakhtiyari with the title of

¹¹⁴⁹ Gene Garthwaite, *Khans and shahs: A documentary analysis of the Bakhtiyari in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 130 and Gene Garthwaite, "Tribes, Confederation and the State: An Historical Overview of the Bakhtiyari and Iran," in *The Conflict of Tribe and State*, p. 353.

¹¹⁵⁰ As quoted in Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 15.

¹¹⁵¹ Farzanfar, *Ethnic Groups and the State*, p. 87; Gene R. Garthwaite, "The Bakhtiyari Khans, the Government of Iran, and the British, 1846-1915," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (1977), p. 25; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 44.

ilkhani, or head of the tribal confederation, through which it dealt with the tribe. The central government's goal was to make someone responsible for order, taxes, and conscripts.¹¹⁵² Husain Quli Khan, the first *ilkhani*, thus had his base within the Bakhtiyari strengthened through his ties to the government.¹¹⁵³

The policy of limited accommodation did nothing to lessen conflict. Indeed, formal ties to the central government increased ethnic conflict among the Bakhtiyari by providing another area of contention. Now, in addition to conflicts over pastures and irrigated lands, subunits of the Bakhtiyari confederation fought to see who would fill local offices and thus gain a new source of patronage.¹¹⁵⁴

Reza Shah: More Stick, Less Carrot

Reza Shah eliminated all the thieves and bandits in Iran, and made his countrymen realize that henceforth there would be only one thief in Iran.

--British MP (1946)¹¹⁵⁵

When Reza Shah came to power in the early 1920s, the Bakhtiyari were near the peak of their historic strength vis-a-vis the central government. In 1894, they had stabilized the rotation of power within the tribal confederation, thus reducing internal conflict. The discovery of oil in 1908 by William Knox D'Arcy and the building of a major road through their territory further bolstered the Bakhtiyari vis-a-vis the central government. The Bakhtiyari "guarded" the

¹¹⁵² Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, p. 15.

¹¹⁵³ Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, p. 17.

¹¹⁵⁴ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 26.

¹¹⁵⁵ As quoted in Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 93.

concession and road for the British in exchange for payoffs.¹¹⁵⁶ Before Reza Shah took power, Bakhtiyari khans governed seven major cities, including Kerman, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kashan. One khan had been Prime Minister, and another Minister of War.¹¹⁵⁷

Using the new powers of the centralized state, Reza Shah Pahlevi crushed the Bakhtiyaris. Newfound oil revenue enabled Reza Shah to build a strong army and bureaucracy that far exceeded the Qajar state's powers. His policy was one of forced assimilation, using the repressive powers of the state to coerce the Bakhtiyari into a new identity.¹¹⁵⁸

Reza Shah's policy of pacification took most of his rule. In 1922, he imposed a large indemnity on the Bakhtiyari and removed Bakhtiyari khans from the governorships of Kerman, Yazd, and Isfahan; in 1923, he removed one moiety from the *ilkhani* position; in 1929 he crushed

¹¹⁵⁶ Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, pp. 97-98, p. 114 and p. 121 and Garthwaite, "The Bakhtiyari Khans", pp. 30-36. Indeed, the British even guaranteed autonomy to the Bakhtiyari in 1909 to ensure good relations. Stability, however, is a relative term. Rivalry took the form of squabbling, assassination, and intrigue, but those involved were a far more narrow spectrum of the Bakhtiyari than before.

¹¹⁵⁷ Although the particular reasons for the Bakhtiyari's political prominence are not directly tied to this paper, it should be noted that the Bakhtiyari obtained these positions due to their timely role in providing troops to the Constitutional Movement to overthrow the Qajar dynasty. Angered by increased tribal raiding, the Qajar Shah attempted to replace the Bakhtiyari leaders Sardar Asad and Samsan al-Soltaneh, who then led their forces into the capital to oust him. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 54. The Constitutionalists then found themselves in the uneasy position of relying on a traditional tribal group for military force as they tried to reshape several thousand years of Iranian politics.

¹¹⁵⁸ Shahrough Akhavi, "State Formation and Consolidation in 20th Century Iran," in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics*, p. 204. Reza Shah's most important reform was to build up the army. Previously, armies were composed of tribal levies. Reza Shah used the then novel device of paying troops on a regular basis to ensure their loyalty to him. Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 99. Thus, Reza Shah began (in Weberian terms) a bureaucratic modern army, which is provisioned by the lord rather than by the people fighting. Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 981.

a revolt; and in 1933, he abolished the tribal leadership positions altogether. Finally, in 1936 he divided Bakhtiyari territory into the districts of Isfahan and Khuzistan.¹¹⁵⁹

Reza Shah sought to crush the Bakhtiyari for political and ideological reasons. The Bakhtiyari represented a potential rival due to their past ties to the Constitutional Movement, which had sought limited democracy in Iran. In addition, he identified the Bakhtiyari with a decadent past of quarrelsome tribalism and foreign domination due to their ties to the British.

Under the Pahlevi regime, the Iranian government promoted urban, Persian culture over the traditional tribal structure at the point of a bayonet. To remake society along his new national lines and assimilate the Bakhtiyari and other tribes into the national identity, Reza Shah attacked local shrines, enforced military conscription, replaced tribal rulers with local administrators, reorganized the tax system, disarmed many tribes, and imprisoned local khans. He also prevented migrations, thus converting tribesmen into agriculturalists, and forced a change in native dress. At times Reza Shah even deported entire tribes.¹¹⁶⁰ Thus, under Reza Shah the government was not an impartial arbiter among social groups but rather favored one particular group: the Persian majority.

Reza Shah also built up Iran's infrastructure. Reza Shah spent heavily on the highways and railways that would allow his forces to penetrate hitherto remote parts of Iran to patrol the areas and collect taxes.¹¹⁶¹ By 1938, travel time from Tehran to Bushehr had been cut from 30

¹¹⁵⁹ Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, pp. 138-139.

¹¹⁶⁰ Brooks, "The Enemy Within," p. 341; Jwaideh, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*, p. 711; Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, p. 60.

¹¹⁶¹ Garthwaite, "Tribes, Confederation and the State," in *The Conflict of Tribe and State*, p. 326; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 138 and p. 146; and Cottam, *Nationalism in*

days to three.¹¹⁶² These changes increased the central government's reach over hitherto inaccessible regions of Iran.

Reza Shah was not magnanimous in victory after defeating the Bakhtiari. He disarmed the tribes, forcibly settled many of them, and removed their leaders. Tribal rebellions were put down with extreme brutality, creating tremendous resentment among the tribal peoples. He also changed the social structure by redividing pastoral lands and separating Bakhtiari areas administratively.¹¹⁶³

Reza Shah transformed traditional tribal institutions, replacing them with a bureaucracy that extended the role of the state to all the towns and larger villages. He often confiscated property, using it to build up the power of the court and pension off many allies. Under Reza Shah, central government appointees administered the fields and villages. Reza Shah abolished the titles of, but protected the privileges of, the local aristocracy who did not directly oppose him.¹¹⁶⁴

Reza Shah tried to create a new Persian identity that reflected both his admiration for the West and Persian chauvinism. He used fines and the threat of unemployment to force women to unveil. Using fascist Germany as a model, he set up the Society of Public Guidance to instill a

Iran, p. 60.

¹¹⁶² Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era," in *Iran under the Pahlavis*, George Lenczowski, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 99.

¹¹⁶³ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 80; Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 98. Unfortunately, details as to the number of individuals deported or killed are not available.

¹¹⁶⁴ Akhavi, "State Formation and Consolidation in 20th Century Iran," p. 209; Upton, *The History of Modern Iran*, p. 64.

national consciousness through the use of journals, textbooks, papers, and radio. In the same vein, he played up Persian culture, renaming the country Iran to emphasize its Aryan heritage, and commemorated Persian poets and monarchs. He also had architects use a Persian style for buildings, changed Arabic names of cities to Persian ones, and used a Zoroastrian rather than an Islamic calendar.¹¹⁶⁵

Reza Shah, in a policy continued by his son Mohammad, used education as a means of assimilation. For Reza Shah, education was a means to integrate citizens into society, making them loyal citizens devoted to their Shah and state. Persian identity was transmitted through education: textbooks were standard throughout Iran, and a special emphasis was put on knowledge of Persian.¹¹⁶⁶ Between the beginning and end of his reign, the number of students in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 59,339 to 315,355--a jump from less than half of one percent of the population to 2.5 percent of the total population. Reza Shah also tried increasing literacy in Persian. By 1940, 12 times as much money was spent on education as in 1925.¹¹⁶⁷

¹¹⁶⁵ Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 106 and Abrahamian, *The History of Modern Iran*, pp. 143-144. Reza Shah used several Bakhtiyaris during his rule in a token gesture toward accommodation but his regime attempted almost no other efforts to accommodate groups. His Minister of War was Jaifar Quli Khan Sardar Assad, the son of the Bakhtiyari leader who had played a major role in the Constitutional Revolution. Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 101. Reza Shah paid particular attention to the pre-Islamic Persian past of Iran, as he sought to keep down Iran's strong religious identity. Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1996), p. 177-178.

¹¹⁶⁶ Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, pp. 91-92 and 96.

¹¹⁶⁷ The implementation of education, however, was much slower in rural and tribal areas. In 1961, for example, 39 percent of the total school population was from rural tribal areas while 61 percent of the total population was rural or tribal. The number of female students initially represented 17 percent of total students but by the end were 28 percent. Menashri, *Education*

The Bakhtiyari did not completely return to their traditional ways after Reza Shah abdicated in 1941, but they did resist the central government and demand change.¹¹⁶⁸ When Reza Shah fell, several Bakhtiyari tribes literally rose, destroyed their settlements, and took to the mountains again in large numbers; many arms from Reza Shah's army found their way into the tribe's hands. Inspired by calls for autonomy in Azerbaijan and Kurdish areas, Bakhtiyari leaders called for provincial assemblies, an increased role for local officials, and the spending of tax revenues in the local area. To this end, large numbers of tribal troops converged on Shiraz. The tribes did not, however, quarrel with other groups as they did in the past. Nor did tribal leaders seek their old roles.¹¹⁶⁹ Like the Berbers, past control provoked a future search for sinecures and spending rather than autonomy. The revolt in 1941 was not as strong as past rebellions and was put down by the Shah without bloodshed.

Mohammed Shah: A Shift Toward Accommodation

Mohammed Shah also vigorously repressed dissent but increased the use of sinecures as well, raising the level of accommodation. Bolstered by oil revenues, the Shah bought off dissent by employing huge numbers of Iranians in the state. Of an estimated middle class of 630,000 in

and the Making of Modern Iran, p. 102, p. 110, p. 121, and p. 178; Abrahamian, *The History of Modern Iran*, pp. 143-144.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 62.

¹¹⁶⁹ Brooks, "The Enemy Within," p. 343; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 235; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, "Reza Shah the Great," in *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, p. 3; Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, p. 139. Garthwaite notes, however, that tribal leaders did demand the restoration of their property, which would have restored their status and influence to a large degree.

1970, roughly half were civil servants and another 200,000 were teachers or school administrators.¹¹⁷⁰ Mohammad Shah continued his father's vigorous education policy. The number of students at elementary schools went from 286,598 at the beginning of his reign to roughly 5,200,000 when he left power.¹¹⁷¹

Mohammad Shah also stepped up accommodation to a limited degree, increasing the use of Bakhtiyaris in leading positions. His second wife, Soraya, was the daughter of a Bakhtiyari chieftain. General Teymour Bakhtiar served as the military governor of Tehran during much of the 1950s and later headed SAVAK, the Shah's secret police. Yet the Bakhtiyaris did not receive their proportionate share of patronage. Only a little over 8.7 percent of the elite in 1962 was from the Khuzestan-Lorestan, Isfahan, or Kerman areas, where most Bakhtiyari are found, though 23 percent of the population of Iran was born there.¹¹⁷²

The Persian Response

The Persian people did not resist the incorporation of Bakhtiyaris into their identity. A similar language, common ties of Shi'a Islam, and historic interaction between elites of the two communities made it easier for the Persians to accept the Bakhtiyaris as equals. Persians and Bakhtiyaris shared a pride in Iran's past, a common artistic aesthetic, similar values as to ontological questions, and other features that made their common incorporation into one people

¹¹⁷⁰ Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 198.

¹¹⁷¹ Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, p. 186.

¹¹⁷² Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 189; Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 136. These figures on elite numbers, however, are not broken down by tribal or ethnic group and thus could be off considerably.

possible. This acceptance stands in contrast to the Persian disdain for Iran's Kurdish community, which many Persians consider culturally backward.¹¹⁷³

The Bakhtiyari after the Revolution

The Bakhtiyari again looked for more autonomy when the Shah was overthrown and the Khomeini-led clerical regime took control, but they did not take up arms to do so. In 1979, both the Bakhtiyari and the neighboring Qashqai tribes pushed for more autonomy; the Qashqai lost a few members in clashes with regime forces. The Bakhtiyari, however, stockpiled weapons but never used them.¹¹⁷⁴

In general, the Khomeini regime did little to accommodate ethnic minorities. The regime viewed ethnic demands for separate treatment as an attempt to artificially divide Muslims. Thus, it made no effort to gain the loyalty of minorities through concessions.¹¹⁷⁵

The regime continued to encourage schooling and literacy, but the same rural-urban imbalances remained. Between 1979 and 1986, the number of boys primary schools increased by 15 percent and girls' primary schools by 28 percent.¹¹⁷⁶ However, in the 1986 census 73 percent of the over-six urban population was literate while only 48 percent of the rural population was literate. The change was impressive--rural literacy was only 6 percent in 1956--but still fell short

¹¹⁷³ Mackey, *The Iranians*, p. 5.

¹¹⁷⁴ Menashri, *Iran*, pp. 141-142 and p. 236.

¹¹⁷⁵ Menashri, *Iran*, p. 199.

¹¹⁷⁶ *Iran Yearbook* 88, p. 623.

of equality.¹¹⁷⁷

Changes in the Social Structure

The end of endemic tribal feuding and administrative land ownership changes altered the social structure and the tribes' relations to their traditional lands. Workers left tribal and rural areas in search of jobs in the new industries.¹¹⁷⁸ Similarly Reza Shah's policy of forced resettlement also changed the tribal ethos. Settling the tribes by force impoverished them. Furthermore, it created internal class divisions as Bakhtiyari peasants now were split from the interests of Bakhtiyari landlords even if they were of the same tribe. Subsequent land reform measures under the Shah tied the tribesmen-turned-peasant's fortunes to that of the state rather than that of his tribal leaders.

Although the remaining Bakhtiyari may retain hostility toward the central government, traditional tribal rivalries are diminished. As early as 1955, Carleton Coon noted that Bakhtiyari noble families and Qashqai nobles families were intermarrying, a marriage alliance that would have been unthinkable 50 years before. However, the Bakhtiyari who remain nomadic may be resentful of Persian dominance; folk songs and legends that play up anti-Persian heroes became popular amongst these individuals, while in the past anti-Qashqai stories were the most prevalent.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁷ *Iran Yearbook* 88, p. 33.

¹¹⁷⁸ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 147; Upton, *The History of Modern Iran*, p. 120. Population pressures, especially lower infant mortality rates, strained resources in the countryside.

¹¹⁷⁹ Coon, *Caravan*, p. 39.

Both the political and economic importance of the tribe have dwindled. Tribal leaders largely merged with the landed elite while tribal followers lost their customary rights and privileges.¹¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, the end of violence meant that a traditional way of asserting independence or removing an unwanted leader--rebellion--was no longer available.

Reza Shah's enforcement of universal male conscription also affected social relations. Conscription gave recruits a broader view of Iran and decreased the number of potential tribal warriors.¹¹⁸¹ However, conscription raised resentment of the central government by forcing men to abandon their fields and families for low pay.¹¹⁸²

By the time Mohammed Shah became secure in power, the Bakhtiyari identity had changed in several ways. In the 1950s, leading Bakhtiyari families sought to use land, investment, education, and military service to maintain their standing--the same means used throughout Iran--rather than success in feuding.¹¹⁸³ In addition, the Pahlavi social reforms drove a wedge between Bakhtiyaris. In the 1960s, most Bakhtiyaris claimed their khans were now "city people" who no longer shared tribal identity or represented tribal interests.¹¹⁸⁴

Education also promoted assimilation, but its impact on social stratification was limited. New elites were increasingly defined by education: by the end of the reign of Mohammad Shah,

¹¹⁸⁰ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp 167-168.

¹¹⁸¹ Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 61.

¹¹⁸² Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 103.

¹¹⁸³ Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, p. 140.

¹¹⁸⁴ Garthwaite, "Tribes, Confederation and the State," p. 357.

the majority of parliament deputies had higher education degrees, a dramatic change from the early days of Reza Shah, not to mention the Qajar period. But in reality most of these elites were descendants of old ruling classes who had their status reinforced by modern education.

Education, however, increased the Bakhtiyari's perception of having a shared history with their Persian neighbors as well as increasing their knowledge of the Persian language.¹¹⁸⁵

The Bakhtiyari tribal structure remains intact today but is no longer a source for independent political action. Over 100,000 Bakhtiyari regularly make the biannual migration,¹¹⁸⁶ and tribal groups still align themselves along the two major moieties of the tribe, the Ilkhani or the Hajji Ilkhani. Nevertheless, the Bakhtiyari role in Iran today is conspicuous by its silence. Sixty years of control and attempts at assimilation have limited the Bakhtiyaris ability and desire to act as a corporate group.

The biggest indicator of assimilation is an identity change shrouded in demographic redefinition. As the overall population of Iran skyrocketed, that of the Bakhtiyari remained steady. The numbers of Bakhtiyari have remained the same over the last 100 years even though the population of Iran has more than quadrupled in that time. Abrahamian reports that the number of Bakhtiyari in 1979, 250,000, is the same as in 1851.¹¹⁸⁷ The figure I use--drawn from the Iran yearbook based on the 1986 Iran census--is 200,000. Either figure suggests that many

¹¹⁸⁵ Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, p. 188. and p. 270.

¹¹⁸⁶ Garthwaite, *Khans and Shahs*, p. 21 notes that this is a ritualistic act for many Bakhtiyaris that reaffirms group identity but is not a way of life anymore.

¹¹⁸⁷ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 12 and p. 25. According to his figures, in 1956 the Bakhtiyari had 400,000 members, suggesting a precipitous decline through assimilation in the last few decades.

Bakhtiyari are redefining themselves as Persian, whether voluntarily or through intermarriage.

This redefinition appears to be tied to migration and the subsequent abandonment of the traditional Bakhtiyari way of life. In general, the rural population is growing at a much slower rate than the urban population, suggesting large-scale migration from rural to urban areas.¹¹⁸⁸ These figures match with the trend of gradual settlement of the nomad community of Iran. Between the 1974 and 1985 census, almost 100,000 nomadic households settled. This shift is due to the rising costs of commodities that the nomads must purchase and a decline in the conditions of grazing lands.¹¹⁸⁹

Lessons Learned

The Bakhtiyari experience is a fruitful source of insights regarding ethnic peace. Their fate under the Pahlavi and clerical regimes suggests how a policy of forced assimilation can be carried out successfully and help prevent ethnic conflict from recurring.

Control. The Iranian regime's use of force fostered resentment but did not result in violence. Control shattered the Bakhtiyaris' ability to fight other groups or the central government. The regime's crushing of the Bakhtiyari tribal leaders in particular proved devastating. The Bakhtiyari--those who remain unassimilated--retain hostility toward the government, as suggested by the ballads that praise anti-Persian heroes of the past. However, the Bakhtiyari no longer war against other tribal confederations or resist the central government with

¹¹⁸⁸ In 1956 the rural population of Iran was just over 13 million while in 1986 it was just under 23 million; the urban population grew from around 6 million to 27 million in the same time period. *Iran Yearbook* 88, p. 33.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Iran Yearbook* 88, p. 26.

force.

By shattering Bakhtiyari institutions in the 1930s, control in general became easier. Without strong tribes, the Bakhtiyaris found organizing difficult. The removal of many tribal leaders made organization even more difficult. Even when the central government was weak, as it was in 1941 and 1979, the Bakhtiyari's ability to organize and make war was far more limited than in the past.

Control allowed the Pahlavi regime to implement social changes that undercut the Bakhtiyaris' power. The government built schools, paved roads, and developed an economic structure that weakened tribal cohesion and gave the Bakhtiyaris a new identity. The schools provided a new history and a different language, and the burgeoning economy reduced the economic importance of the tribe. Migration proved particularly important, as individuals left the tribe and became open to new identities.

Once this social change took root, conflict shifted to a level focused more on the government and less on other ethnic groups or intra-Bakhtiyari rivalries. The Bakhtiyari, unable to quarrel amongst themselves or with other groups, changed their behavior in a manner similar to the Berbers and sought to press the central government for certain rights and privileges. Like the Berber revolts of the late 1950s, the Bakhtiyari rising after the fall of Reza Shah was for more government, something unprecedented in Bakhtiyari history.

Identity change. Reza Shah succeeded in assimilating many Bakhtiyaris into the dominant Persian identity. Relatively few Bakhtiyaris remain in Iran today, and their percentage of the total population has steadily decreased for over fifty years. The Pahlavis shattered Bakhtiyari institutions, particularly the tribe and the transhumant lifestyle. However, carrying

out this policy took a strong, united government; unlike the Istiqlal Party in Morocco, Reza Shah could and did force his opinions down the throats of recalcitrant minorities.

Identity change policies took generations to work. The demographic redefinition of Bakhtiyaris into Persians is only noticeable by comparing total Bakhtiyari numbers today to what these numbers should be if the Bakhtiyari remained unassimilated. Initially, the resentment created by attempts to change daily rhythms probably strengthened Bakhtiyari identity, as suggested by the repeated Bakhtiyari clashes with Reza Shah. Over time, however, the continued futility of clinging to a lifestyle that brought little economic reward and continued political repression became apparent.

Identity change works on the individual, not the group level. The benefits of assimilation proved too much to resist. By allowing Bakhtiyaris, particularly Bakhtiyari leaders, to assume leading positions in Persian society many individual Bakhtiyaris had incentives to change their identities. For these individuals, their status goals could be achieved easier by becoming Persian rather than by staying Bakhtiyari.

The Bakhtiyari represent a relatively easy case for identity change. The Bakhtiyari did not have a strong sense of identity as Bakhtiyaris that was codified in written historical texts. A shared high culture aided the Bakhtiyari acceptance of Persian identity. Common bonds of Shi'a Islam and Persian learning united the Bakhtiyaris with Persian culture, making the transition from one identity to another less jarring. Unlike the Iranian Kurds, the Persian majority has accepted the Bakhtiyaris as true Persians. Such acceptance has limited Bakhtiyari hostility toward assimilation. Finally, Bakhtiyari are not found outside Iran. Thus, an alternate source of communal identity does not exist.

Co-optation. Co-optation in Iran played into identity change. Mohammad Shah in particular co-opted Bakhtiyaris as Persians, making them part of his grand ambition to strengthen Persian identity. He rewarded leaders who helped their followers become Persian. These leaders thus had less of an incentive to organize against the government even though the government's policies slowly undermined the community as a whole.

Co-optation in Iran was particularly effective due to the nature of Bakhtiyari society. The clan divisions and traditional social order of the Bakhtiyari in the 1930s all focused loyalty and political action on clan leaders. Thus, regime efforts to co-opt tribal leaders yielded enormous dividends, as these leaders could "deliver" their followers.

Conclusions

The case of Iran's Bakhtiyari population was chosen to illustrate the potential of identity change policies. As this case suggests, identity change policies can and do at times work to foster ethnic peace. The difficulty of accomplishing an identity change, however, suggests this policy's application in the world today may be limited. The Pahlavis had to destroy Bakhtiyari institutions and maintain an extremely high level of control in order to prevent violent Bakhtiyari resistance. Moreover, in their attempt to change the Bakhtiyaris' identity, the Pahlavis had many advantages. A lack of foreign meddling, a weak Bakhtiyari identity, and the acceptance of the Bakhtiyaris by the Persian majority aided the regime's identity change attempt. Thus, though Iran's experience with the Bakhtiyaris demonstrates the possibilities of using identity change to foster ethnic peace, it also suggests the difficulties and limits to such a policy.

Chapter X: Outside States and Lasting Peace

Scholars often ignore the role foreign governments play in fostering or frustrating a lasting peace.¹¹⁹⁰ Studies on ethnic conflict in Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Zaire, and elsewhere have focused on the role of foreign governments in the buildup to the conflict and on how outsiders might bring about a ceasefire. Yet scholars pay comparatively little attention to the impact outside powers have on the long-term resolution of conflicts. As the cases examined in this dissertation suggest, however, such a focus is crucial to understanding the general question of how to craft a lasting ethnic peace. The cases examined illustrate three chief roles for outside powers: ameliorating or exacerbating selected causes of ethnic conflict, aiding or hindering government policies aimed at preventing ethnic conflict from recurring, and stepping in directly to replace a government.¹¹⁹¹

¹¹⁹⁰ Recent works assessing the interplay between communal conflict and outside powers include Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*; *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*; *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1992); Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement," *International Organization*, vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 341-378; Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 73, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 20-33; and *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict*, Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).

¹¹⁹¹ The potential range of outside intervention to end an ethnic conflict is tremendous, but examples of actual humanitarian interventions are few and far between. The cases I examine offer no instance of when an outside power tried to engage in humanitarian intervention to end a conflict or change a government's policies on ethnic relations. For more on the general issue of the short-term implications of humanitarian interventions, see Taylor Seybolt, "Knights in Shining Armor? An Investigation of Humanitarian Military Intervention," (MIT dissertation, forthcoming). Seybolt concludes that in most cases, humanitarian intervention is ineffective or counterproductive. Only when the government can neutralize violent opposition and improve coordination among various government and non-government institutions can humanitarian

The mere possibility of foreign intervention raises the dangerous specter of uncertainty. A group's place in society or even survival may be called into question when a hostile power threatens to become involved in domestic politics. Such uncertainty makes it far harder for governments to craft an ethnic peace: promises of largesse or assumptions of security from the government become less convincing when outside intervention is likely. Actual intervention, of course, heightens these concerns considerably.

In addition to the general increase in uncertainty, foreign powers often disrupt government policies designed to manage ethnic conflict. Foreign powers can hinder control policies by aiding, or threatening to aid, an ethnic group with arms, money, or a haven. This assistance makes it easier for violent individuals to organize and harder for the government to convince communal groups it will protect their security. Outside powers can also interfere with attempts to accommodate ethnic groups by destroying the trust necessary for devolution and participation to function. Foreign powers and populations abroad are particularly disruptive with regard to identity change policies. They can preserve or even strengthen a culture outside the reach of the state, thus maintaining a rival identity to the one promoted by the state.

Although the cases examined suggest the impact of outside intervention in general was harmful, outside powers do have the potential to help foster peace. Outside intervention is critical when a government is too weak to implement policies such as control or accommodation. Weak governments often do not have the resources to establish a strong police force and intelligence capabilities, both of which are vital for successful control. Nor can weak governments impose an accommodative system on suspicious ethnic groups. Outside powers can

intervention improve conditions in the country affected.

play the role of Leviathan, replacing the state as an enforcer of peace. In addition, they can impose a power-sharing system or other political framework that recognizes the status of a country's communal groups. Syria has done both of these in Lebanon today.

In theory, outside powers can also coerce the state to carry out better or more humane policies to manage ethnic relations. This coercive role is particularly important when governments do not act as third party arbiters and are "captured" by one ethnic group--as they are today in Iraq and Syria. In such situations, outside powers may be the only solution to crafting a lasting peace. Foreign governments could theoretically compel a state to change its policies through the threat of intervention. The cases examined in this dissertation, however, offer no examples of such coercion.

This chapter has four sections. The first section notes ways in which outside powers in the Middle East have affected the causes of ethnic conflict examined in Chapter Two of this dissertation. The second section explores ways in which outside powers hindered or increased the effectiveness of various policies designed to prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. The third section briefly notes several conditions peculiar to the Middle East that make outside involvement more or less effective. Finally, the conclusion notes how foreign governments might directly end an ethnic conflict by their own actions.

This chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive examination of the question of how outside powers affect ethnic relations. Rather, I seek to reexamine the general questions asked in this dissertation--particularly the question of how governments can craft a lasting ethnic peace--in light of the role of outside powers. Thus, this chapter draws its conclusions only from the cases examined in this dissertation, which limits the range of material covered.

Table XA: A Summary of the Role of Outside Powers

Country and Regime	Intervening Power (s)	Nature of Intervention
Morocco (Sherifian)	France	Weakened government credibility
Morocco (French Protectorate)	None	
Morocco (Istiqlal)	Egypt, other Arab states	Increased pan-Arab sentiment
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	Berbers abroad	Organized cultural activities
Palestine (Mandate)	Neighboring Arab powers	Offered example of nationalist success; provided arms, leaders, weapons, and a haven to guerrillas
	Zionists abroad	Provided arms; interfered with colonial arbitration
Israel (Military Government)	Neighboring Arab powers	Stimulate Jewish fears of Israeli Arab subversion; source of cultural identity for Israeli Arabs
Israel (Current Government)	Neighboring Arab powers; Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	Stimulated Jewish fears of Israeli Arab subversion; source of cultural identity for Israeli Arabs
Syria (French Mandate)	Turkey	Demanded territory (Alexandretta)
Syria (Baath)	Egypt	Criticized regime sectarianism
Lebanon (National Pact)	Palestinians, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, the United States	Provided arms, weapons, and training to communal groups; invaded; engaged in proxy wars; used as base against Israel
	Syria	Provided order and installed a power-sharing political system
Iraq (British Mandate)	Turkey	Limited arms to Iraqi Kurds
Iraq (Hashemite Monarchy)	None	
Iraq (Baath)	Iran, Turkey, the United States, Israel	Provided arms, training, a safe haven, and funding to Kurdish and Shi'a groups; ideological inspiration to Shi'as
Iran (Pahlavi)	Iraq, Turkey	Provided arms to Kurdish fighters; cultural materials to Kurds in general

Outside Powers and the Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflicts rarely arise in a vacuum where the state in question has complete control over the actions of its various ethnic groups or the information they receive. More often, the state's efforts are commingled with the activities of some outside authority seeking to promote the claims of one group. The three causes of ethnic conflict examined in Chapter Two--the ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, and a desire for hegemony--all can be exacerbated by the actions, deliberate or not, of outside powers.

Exacerbating the Security Dilemma

The two bloodiest cases of conflict in the Middle East--Iraq and Lebanon--illustrate how likely violence is when outside powers provide arms, training, and leadership to local radicals. In these cases, outside powers exacerbated the security dilemma both through rhetoric and through direct intervention.

Outside support can increase an ethnic group's expectation that it will achieve its goals in spite of opposition from the state. In Iraq, the Kurds began receiving aid from Iran, the United States, and Israel in the 1960s. Since then, conflict has been almost constant. Outside support made the Kurds far more likely to rise up against the central government simply because they were able to make a more credible attempt at gaining power.¹¹⁹² In Lebanon, a host of outside powers including Syria, Israel, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Palestinian groups, and Saudi Arabia provided

¹¹⁹² Van Evera argues that unattained nationalisms are more troublesome when the movement "has the strength to reach plausibly for statehood" and that without such strength their nationalism will be "deterred by the power of the central state." Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," p. 16. Without outside support, the plausibility of the Kurdish revolt would have been reduced considerably.

money and weapons to their favored proxies. This enabled almost every communal group or faction to use violence.

This change in one group's expectations exacerbates the security dilemma for all ethnic groups in the country, which now must react not only to the government and rival groups, but also to the potential actions of an outside power. The constant threat of foreign aid to belligerents in Lebanon created a climate of insecurity that led all groups to arm, even those not disposed to use violence. Lebanon's Shi'a population, for example, formed its militia Amal in response to the constant Palestinian violence in Shi'a areas and the presence of other communal militias.

The dangerous influence of outside powers in exacerbating the security dilemma is also illustrated by the correlation of high levels of outside interference with some of the bloodier periods in ethnic conflicts that now appear resolved. During the Arab Revolt in the Palestine Mandate, money and weapons from Syria helped sustain Arab fighters, and Syrian nationalist and Islamist figures often led the guerrillas. Jews lived in a state of fear, believing that local Arabs could acquire arms easily from outside Palestine. This concern led them to organize their own militias independent of the British government. Palestinian Arabs too became fearful and stepped up mobilization when British authorities discovered weapons shipments to Jews from abroad. The knowledge that their rival was acquiring arms convinced both groups that the other was mobilizing and bent on hegemony, provoking a counter-mobilization that included many formerly peaceful individuals.

Outside powers can also highlight the weakness of a central government, thus reducing its credibility regarding the enforcement of peace and ability to protect one group from the

hegemonic predations of another. The constant Israeli battering of Palestinians in Lebanon and the virtual autonomy attained by Palestinian militias within Lebanon discredited the central government and convinced ethnic groups they would have to organize and arm to defend themselves, as the government clearly was not up to the task. The Iraqi regime suffered a similar blow to its credibility after Desert Storm, when its military was crushed and its boasts of vanquishing the United States were proven hollow. Iraq's Shi'a and Kurds rose up almost immediately. Again this pattern correlates with the ups and downs of resolved conflicts. In Morocco communal conflict increased as the French slowly extended their influence in the years before 1912. The Sharifian government's weakness vis-a-vis the Europeans undermined its credibility at home; as a result, both Berber and Arab tribes revolted against the regime.

Outside powers may also change the type of threat a group perceives. Exactly who is the enemy often changes in response to trends abroad. The growth of Islamist resistance to Israel, in contrast to the decline in radicalism among many Arab nationalists, has changed Israeli Jews' threat perceptions accordingly. In Israel today, the Israeli public is far more concerned about the Islamist movement among Israeli Arabs than about Arab nationalists even though violence among Israeli Arab Islamists has not increased.¹¹⁹³ Similarly, the Baath government of Iraq became far more concerned about Shi'a unrest at home after the Iranian revolution, which was organized and led by clerical figures.

¹¹⁹³ Indeed, in the past the Israeli government considered the Islamists to be a conservative check on Arab nationalists.

Worsening Status Problems

In addition to increasing security concerns, outside powers and kinsmen abroad can foster disputes over a group's relative status. Like the stimuli of modernization, migration, education, and colonization noted in Chapter II, outside powers can promote inter-group competition where none existed before. Comparison is the basis of status complaints. Events outside a country can highlight status deficiencies, and meddling outside governments can seize on status issues to generate unrest.

Outside powers can publicize claims of discrimination or subordination, thus heightening awareness of a potential slight. Such publicity need not be deliberate. Advances for a communal group in one country can trigger a "demonstration effect," leading groups in other countries to demand the same privileges.¹¹⁹⁴ The Iranian revolution galvanized the Shi'a community of Lebanon by its example as much as by its propaganda. The granting of independence to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq heightened tension in the Palestine Mandate area by leading Palestinian Arabs to believe that they were excluded from this wave of freedom because of the Jewish presence. These examples of co-ethnic success abroad led the Lebanese Shi'a and Palestinian Arabs respectively to mobilize and demand greater recognition of their communal status.

The outside power can champion a downtrodden ethnic group, publicizing its misery and exhorting it to remedy its plight. For example, the Iranian government called on Shi'a around the world to rise up and establish a Shi'a-dominated society. The religious regime in Iran also

¹¹⁹⁴ Samuel Huntington notes the importance of such transnational demonstration effects in his work on democratization. See *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993 (1991)), pp. 100-106.

organized and armed Shi'a in Lebanon.¹¹⁹⁵ The result was a surge in Shi'a militancy around the world, particularly in Lebanon.

Outside exhortations can also alarm rival communities and heighten their status fears. The eager reception of Egyptian President Nasser's pan-Arabism by the world's Sunni Arab population heightened tension with rival non-Sunni Arab communal groups in the Arab world. In Iraq, Shi'as and Kurds came to oppose the pan-Arab cause for fear that it would subsume their identities. In Syria, minorities in the military and elsewhere became disillusioned with pan-Arabism when they realized it served as a tool for Sunni Arab dominance. Similarly, pan-Arab propaganda from foreign states increased tension between Lebanon's Christian communities and the Sunni Muslims, as the Christians feared that the Muslims sought to join Lebanon to the larger Arab world, thus greatly reducing the status of the Christians.

Hegemony

The same outside influences that inspire status and security concerns can also prompt hegemonic conflict. Foreign powers can change the ambitions of ethnic groups and increase fears of hegemony by rival social groups. Outside powers can prompt these changed attitudes by making hegemony more plausible through their example or by providing a group with material aid. The clerical regime in Iran inspired fears of Shi'a hegemony among Iraq's Sunnis, both through its example and by providing limited arms to Shi'a dissidents in Iraq.

Pan-Arabism galvanized Arab communities throughout the Middle East, often leading them to promote an Arab identity for their countries to the exclusion of national or regional

¹¹⁹⁵ Fuller, *The "Center of the Universe,"* p. 125.

identities that might appeal to ethnic minorities. In Iraq, the pan-Arab ideology of the Baath led it to promote an Arab, as opposed to an Iraqi, identity for the country. In Morocco, Arab nationalist successes elsewhere in the Arab world inspired the Istiqlal to impose their unwelcome vision of an Arab Morocco on the country's Berber population. In Morocco and Iraq, the imposition of an Arab nationalist identity contributed to resentment among, and eventually violence from, the countries' Berber and Kurdish populations respectively.

The Impact of Outside Powers on Government Policies for Ending Ethnic Conflict

Governments that must endure meddling outside powers find it far harder to craft an ethnic peace. Ethnic kinsmen abroad or intrusive foreign governments are facts that these governments must accept and try to overcome. The cases examined in this dissertation suggest that outside meddling can make each family of policies--control, accommodation, identity change, and mediation--less effective and that only strong governments can overcome the disruptive influences of foreign governments.

Control

Control becomes less effective when foreign governments meddle. Outside powers can strengthen an ethnic group by providing it with arms, training, or a haven, thus giving groups a greater ability to use violence. Such assistance reduces a government's ability to deter violence and, when deterrence fails, makes it more difficult for the government to halt the violence.

The regular participation of foreign powers in domestic communal conflicts had its biggest impact in Lebanon and Iraq. Despite the Iraqi Baath regime's considerable resources, it

found it difficult to crush Kurdish resistance, in part because the Kurds received support from Iran, the United States, and Israel. This support changed the military balance in Kurdistan and, at times, forced the regime to halt temporarily its efforts to coerce the Kurds. Lebanon's central government also could not deter or crush groups committed to using violence. Lebanese militias received aid from Israel, Syria, the Palestinians and other powers, and the ready supply of arms made it far more difficult for the government to defeat insurgents. Equally important, the possibility that any communal group could easily engage in violence became more realistic, thus undermining the security assurances that come when a government has a monopoly on violence.

The British experiences in Iraq and Palestine also illustrate the problems outside powers create. During the British Mandate in Iraq, minor Turkish aid to Kurdish tribal leaders, such as Shaykh Mahmud, encouraged them to rise up against the British. During the Palestine Mandate, the constant influx of arms and men from outside the Mandate area hindered British efforts to halt the fighting. In both cases, the flow of aid from abroad impeded control by strengthening the resources of fighters. Foreign aid to belligerents proved especially harmful in Palestine, as it increased expectations among both Arabs and Jews that the other would always have ready access to arms despite British efforts to enforce order.

The Israeli military government, however, preserved ethnic peace despite foreign meddling, largely because the Israeli Defense Forces effectively guarded Israel's borders. Israel's Arab neighbors in their propaganda urged Israeli Arabs to rise up. Indeed, in the years immediately following the 1948 War of Independence, Palestinian commandos infiltrated into Israel from Egypt and Syria and killed many Jews. The Israeli government, however, was strong and soon established control over its borders. Moreover, because Jews controlled the

government and the government quickly established a high degree of control over the Israeli Arab population, the Jewish community was reassured that the government would protect them first and foremost. Thus, the Jewish community did not feel compelled to take up arms in its own defense.

Outside powers often render police control ineffective, requiring the government to undertake higher levels of control to prevent violence. When outside powers actively aid combatants, the government monopoly on violence is broken. Thus, the government guarantee of punishment seldom deters violent individuals. In such situations, even the dominant group may use violence, as it no longer is sure that the government will protect its interests. In Lebanon, for example, Maronite militias began attacking Palestinians even though the Maronites nominally controlled the Lebanese government.

When outside powers are active, selective control--targeting a subgroup and preventing it from acting--is thus required. Selective control defeats individuals seeking to use violence and, perhaps equally important, reassures the dominant group of its security. Only when individuals are confident that their rivals will not be able to use violence will they refrain from organizing for violence themselves. Control also becomes more difficult when foreign powers meddle simply because violent groups can organize abroad. In Iraq, for example, the Baath's high level of control failed to completely crush either the Kurds or the Shi'a, in part because both groups often organized their resistance from Iran.

Accommodation

Foreign meddling can destroy the trust that is necessary for an accommodative system to

function. Accommodation discourages ethnic violence by rewarding groups with material and status benefits or a voice in decision-making. When outside powers are active, however, doubts about whether these rewards will continue arise. Social groups must be convinced that rivals will not use this increased influence over decision-making and other benefits to make war against or subordinate rival communities.¹¹⁹⁶ When there is a history of civil strife, this confidence is usually in short supply already. Foreign meddling, however, can destroy trust completely. If social groups have reason to believe that a communal rival will ally with an outside power or is somehow committed to continued violence, then it is not likely to support the establishment of an accommodative system.

Participation. Outside powers can destroy the trust that is necessary for participation to function. When an ethnic group becomes "enemy-affiliated"--as it does when it is perceived to be cooperating with a hostile outside power--then other groups become reluctant to cooperate with it or give it a share of political power for fear that it will use this power against them. Israeli Jews limited the level of Israeli Arab political participation because they saw Israeli Arabs as a security threat due to their cultural ties to Israel's Arab enemies. Propaganda from Israel's Arab neighbors and the *intifada* reinforced these fears, and even today, polls suggest that many Israeli Jews are uncomfortable with Israeli Arab political participation.

Devolution. Outside meddling also hinders devolution. When foreign powers interfere in domestic politics, the dominant group fears that any resources it yields will eventually be used against it, while the subordinate group worries that the resources it gains today may be taken away tomorrow. Iraqi Baath leaders feared that if the Kurdish and Shi'a populations received too

¹¹⁹⁶ Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, pp. 15-50.

much independence they would support Iranian-backed subversion and terrorism. Thus they opposed devolution.

Identity Change

State attempts to promote a new national identity or impose the identity of the dominant ethnic group often failed due to foreign influences. Outside powers can foster an alternative identity to the one proffered by a state. Moreover, they can reduce the bond between the dominant and non-dominant groups by creating a perception that subordinate group is not loyal to the nation.

Outside powers and communities can harbor or create an intelligentsia or serve as a cultural lodestone, preventing the state from obliterating a communal groups' traditional identity. Despite government efforts to downplay Arab culture, the studies by Smootha and others indicate Arabs in Israel became more "Palestinian" and less "Israeli" (in terms of their self-identification) after 1967, when they came into contact with educated and politicized Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Similarly, the long-standing and well-developed high culture of Arabs and Islam was accessible even to uneducated Israeli Arabs through mosques and radio broadcasts. This made it far more difficult for the government to promote an identity that rejected or ignored these elements. In Morocco in recent years, Berber cultural activism increased somewhat after France hosted several conferences on Berber culture--conferences that would have been prohibited in Morocco. The Iraqi and Iranian Kurds, for their part, regularly smuggle nationalist literature across borders and in from Turkey, further solidifying their Kurdish, as opposed to Iranian or Iraqi, identities.

Exposure to outside powers, however, does not simply present local groups with a choice between joining the national community or the one favored by outside actors. As the Israeli Arab experience demonstrates, the identity chosen can be a new one that mixes elements of various identities. Israeli Arabs have forged a new identity for themselves, one that combines their separate Israeli status with their Palestinian heritage.

Outside powers can also prevent assimilation to a common national identity by convincing the dominant group that the minority in question is not loyal. In theory, assimilation leads to long-term peace by instilling a common identity that helps groups transcend the security dilemma. Even when governments promote a common identity, the groups themselves must embrace it for it to succeed in taking root. Ties to foreigners, however, reduce the feeling of shared identity. In Iraq, Sunni Arab nationalists mistrusted Kurds and Shi'a because these communities had ties to Iraq's enemies, such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the United States. Israeli Jews resisted the Israeli Arabs' assimilation into a common identity because they resented their cultural ties to Israel's Arab enemies. These minority groups thus became "enemy-affiliated," an association that prevented bonds of trust forming across the communities as a whole. A key ingredient for successful assimilation--the goodwill of the majority--was thus jeopardized by foreign ties.

Mediation

Like accommodation, mediation requires trust to succeed. Thus, mediation attempts are similarly vulnerable to failure when foreign meddling destroys communal trust and creates uncertainty. Communities that fear outside involvement often see mediation as a guise for

attempts to build up forces or otherwise prepare for war.

Foreign interference can reduce confidence in the goodwill of the mediators. In Palestine, British officials on the scene hammered out painstaking compromises with Jewish and Arab leaders only to have them overturned by pressure from world Jewry on parliament in London. This pressure created the perception among the Arab population that the local Mandate government, which often tried honestly to broker an agreement, in reality was a pawn of the Zionists.

Foreign intervention also leads parties to doubt their rivals' good faith. Both Arabs and Jews refused to take British mediation efforts seriously when it became apparent that outsiders were supplying arms to both parties. In Iraq, the initial negotiations between the Baath and the Kurds were jeopardized in part because of the Kurds' continuing ties to Iran, which led the Baath to suspect their good faith.

The Benefits of a Safe Neighborhood

In general, a lack of outside intervention made it easier for governments to craft an ethnic peace. French administrators in Morocco, who presided over one of the most successful cases of ethnic peace examined in this dissertation, had an almost free hand to carry out their policies. No ethnic kinsmen across borders or meddling foreign powers weakened or opposed the government. While it lasted, relatively low levels of outside intervention aided Lebanon's peace, and Iraq's brief period of communal tranquility during the postwar Hashemite regime also benefitted from minimal foreign involvement. This lack of involvement gave governments a free hand to implement their policies and weakened the deep causes of conflict--such as the security

dilemma or status concerns--that the governments were trying to overcome.

The one case of identity change success examined in this dissertation, the Bakhtiari in Iran, experienced no outside involvement. The Pahlavi and clerical governments had a free hand to impose the education system and high culture of Persia on the Bakhtiari. No Bakhtiari lived outside Iran or were otherwise capable of escaping the reach of the Persian government. Moreover, because the Bakhtiari were so associated with Iranian territory, Persians did not suspect them of harboring foreign loyalties. The success of the Iranian government with the Bakhtiari stands in sharp contrast to its failure to assimilate the Kurds, who had co-ethnics in neighboring countries and at times received foreign arms and support. The Kurds now have a strong identity that opposes assimilation into Persian culture.¹¹⁹⁷

Creating Order in a Weak State

Despite the many disadvantages of outside involvement, at times it is necessary to prevent an ethnic conflict from recurring. When a government is weak, a foreign power can create order in an embattled country, disarming groups and punishing individuals who use violence. Foreign governments can also impose a system of power-sharing and devolution on a country where the social groups, by themselves, might not do so for fear that one group would exploit such a system.

¹¹⁹⁷ Although this dissertation only examines the Iranian Kurds in the context of how hegemony can cause ethnic conflict (see the discussion in Chapter II), it is worth noting that the Pahlavis attempted to change Kurdish identity as well as that of the Bakhtiari. This attempt failed completely, and indeed led to greater Kurdish hostility toward the regime. Part of this failure is due to transnational factors. The Kurds received cultural materials, as well as arms, from Iraq and Turkey.

The French pacification of Morocco and the British Mandate takeover of Iraq eventually led communal groups in both places to embrace peace. In these cases, the colonial powers provided two vital benefits. First, they assured the security of all individuals. In both Morocco and Iraq, the preexisting governments were too weak to impose order, leaving all communal groups vulnerable to violence. Second, the colonial powers imposed systems of devolution and co-optation that included all leading communal groups. Left to their own devices, it is not likely that Sharifian Morocco or Ottoman Iraq would have tried to accommodate all communal groups even if they had the means to do so.

Syria today, like colonial powers in the past, replaced the Lebanese state with an administrative apparatus that served its ends. In so doing, Syria has restored a semblance of order to Lebanon. Some 40,000 Syrian troops (and who knows how many intelligence agents) keep the peace in Lebanon with an iron hand.¹¹⁹⁸ Expressions of dissent--particularly any expressions that might smack of anti-Syrian sentiment--are brutally suppressed. Syrian troops have also systematically disarmed Lebanon's many communal militias.¹¹⁹⁹

Damascus also threw its weight behind the 1989 Taif Accord, which details a power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon. Under the Taif system, no group dominates Lebanon completely, though the Sunni community has replaced the Maronites as Lebanon's preeminent

¹¹⁹⁸ "Lebanon survey: outside influence," *The Economist*, February 24, 1996, p. S4. The coming of peace to Lebanon coincided with the final Syrian defeat in 1990 of General Aoun, a Christian nationalist who called for the expulsion of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

¹¹⁹⁹ The exception to this is the Iranian-backed Hizballah movement, which Damascus allows to remain active to press Israel. Hizballah, however, has been forbidden from engaging in violence against Lebanese targets.

group.¹²⁰⁰ Government positions and largesse are divided among Lebanon's leading communities, and Taif's electoral system also promotes confessional mixing. Indeed, without Syria, it is likely that the Taif compromise arrangement never would have been implemented. The Taif agreement was negotiated in 1989 but was not implemented until 1990, after the Syrian army crushed the forces of General Aoun, who led the last of the Christian resistance to Syrian and Muslim hegemony over Lebanon. Before Syria ended the fighting, Lebanon's communal groups refused to engage in power-sharing because they doubted one another's good faith.

Conditions that Affect Outside Intervention

The Middle East, where one linguistic and religious group stretches across a vast swath of states, is probably more prone to security fears and status demonstration effects generated by outside powers than other regions of the world. Although pan-Arabism is hardly the dominant political force in the Middle East it once was, it still has many adherents. Moreover, almost all Arab governments pay lip service to it. Pan-Islam plays a similarly limited, but not imaginary, unifying role. Because of these transnational identities, events in one country carry considerable emotional force. The fate of Arabs in Syria affected Istiqlal attitudes in Morocco, just as Shi'a Muslim revolutionaries in Iran inspired Shi'as in Lebanon and even Sunni Islamic movements throughout the world.¹²⁰¹

¹²⁰⁰ Although the President remains a Maronite, power is now concentrated in the Prime Minister's position. The President now has a primarily symbolic role.

¹²⁰¹ For the classic study of the origins of pan-Arabism see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement* (New York: 1965 (1939)). Fouad Ajami provides an updated assessment, and incisive criticism, of the movement in *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge

National identities in the Middle East also are weak. Although states like Egypt and Iran have a long historic and cultural heritage, others like Jordan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq have only brief histories as independent nations. Colonial powers often created these states out of whole cloth, focusing almost exclusively on their imperial concerns rather than the identities of the peoples in question. Pan-Islam and pan-Arabism further hindered the development of national identities.¹²⁰²

Minorities too recognized the weakness of national identity and potency of pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, making them far more sensitive to their minority status. In Iraq, Kurds opposed pan-Arab movements, and in Israel, Jews worried that pan-Arabism and pan-Islam would lead Muslims and Arabs to revolt. Indeed, minorities often exaggerated the ties among Muslims and Arabs, ignoring important regional and national differences. In Lebanon, for example, Christians feared that Sunni Muslims sought to merge Lebanon with the broader Arab world even though relatively few Lebanese Sunnis advanced such an agenda.

Areas for Further Exploration

Ignoring the role of outside powers is impossible when assessing the likelihood of lasting peace. Even the best and most benign governments are vulnerable to outside meddling while highly imperfect solutions are often stable when no meddling outside power is present. The potential range of outside involvement is tremendous, but for the most part outside powers tends

University Press, 1981). The best work on pan-Islam available in English is Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 (1990)).

¹²⁰² For an excellent history of how many Middle Eastern states acquired their existence and borders, see Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*.

to inflame, rather than dampen, ethnic conflicts. Foreign powers can make control, accommodation, identity change, and mediation policies difficult or impossible to carry out successfully. Equally important, they can create ethnic conflicts by inciting security, hegemony, and status fears.

Despite these many problems, outside intervention may be necessary when the state is a major cause of ethnic conflict rather than a source of peace. One solution is for outside powers to remove the government, acting as colonial powers did in the past and Syria does today. Such intervention, however, is seldom sought either by a country's communal groups or by the outside power. A more plausible strategy is to coerce the state into proper behavior. This dissertation, however, is short on examples of outside powers stepping in to compel governments to use sensible ethnic relations policies.¹²⁰³

The list of things outside powers can do in theory is long. Outside powers can publicize a conflict, hoping to shame a government into more gentle behavior. They can also help mediate a dispute, using their good offices and influence to put an end to conflict. Outside powers can also apply economic sanctions or cut diplomatic ties. More direct forms of coercion---the use of force

¹²⁰³ In general, humanitarian intervention is a rare event in history. Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and the U.S. intervention in Somalia are among the few modern examples of governments intervening with decisive force primarily for humanitarian purposes. Lesser forms of intervention, however, can affect ethnic relations. Through moral censure, outside powers can limit the extent of repression and discrimination. Michael Brown, "Internal Conflict and International Action," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, pp. 609-610. This pressure can reduce the status concerns that such policies foster. Israeli Jews, for example, eased up on the control of Israeli Arabs in part because they did not like being compared with South Africa's *apartheid* government. This easing of control, however, reduced Israeli Arab status concerns. Attempts to use moral suasion in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, however, failed utterly.

and direct military options--also are possibilities.¹²⁰⁴

Outside intervention, however, often can lead to a spiral of violence. One group, usually the weaker one, may call on outsiders for assistance. Such assistance alarms the government and often leads it to eschew compromise. The government, in turn, mobilizes its supporters. The result is a far bloodier and more protracted conflict.

Concerns about "enemy affiliation" also hinder the effectiveness of outside coercion. Foreign attention to one particular communal group often creates doubts about its loyalty among nationalists and increases suspicions about its willingness to use violence or overturn the social order. Thus, violence often breaks out or discrimination increases when outside powers are distracted or are too weak to protect the communal group they championed in the past.¹²⁰⁵

Because of these problems with direct intervention, perhaps the most useful role outside powers can play in sustaining peace is to act as "supercops" and deter a country's neighbors from inciting violence. As discussed above, a neighbor can destabilize a country by providing arms, a haven, or encouragement to an ethnic group. Countries that do so could be punished by the

¹²⁰⁴ Gurr and Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, pp. 152-153. In theory, outside powers can serve as the guarantor for an agreement in a civil war--a short-term factor not examined in this dissertation. Barbara Walter argues convincingly that parties fight on because there is no guarantor for the settlement: one side must lay down its arms and accept the protection of its former enemy and, not surprisingly, it is unwilling to do this. An important exception to this, however, is when outside powers offer to guarantee the settlement, thus giving groups the confidence to lay down their arms. For more on this issue, see Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil Wars*.

¹²⁰⁵ The Armenians' fate in Turkey offers an example of how outside intervention can actually backfire and cause violence. European powers repeatedly intervened with the Ottomans, forcing them to halt discrimination against and persecution of the Christian Armenian population. These interventions worsened communal relations in Turkey and when the Western powers appeared distracted or unwilling to intervene on behalf of the Armenians, the Armenians were butchered.

international community. The cases examined in this dissertation, however, offer no examples of such benign international policing.¹²⁰⁶

¹²⁰⁶ Current U.S. policy in Iraq and Iran, however, may offer one example of such a "supercop" policy. The United States has warned Iran not to meddle with Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'a population and has intervened to mitigate the worst excesses of Iraq's brutalization of its Kurdish population.

Chapter XI: Congruence Tests of Government Strategies

What do the cases of ethnic relations examined in this dissertation reveal about how to prevent ethnic conflict from recurring? This chapter assesses how the families of strategies governments use to resolve ethnic conflict--repression, accommodation, identity change, and mediation--work in practice. To evaluate these strategies, the chapter uses data from the Israel, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon cases and compares them with the predictions made for each strategy in Chapter III. If the observations from the cases match the predictions, it suggests that the hypotheses presented in Chapter III are correct. If the observations do not match the predictions, it indicates that the hypotheses in Chapter III are false, need to be revised, or only work under particular conditions.¹²⁰⁷

The data from the Middle Eastern cases reveal that control and accommodation are the most effective families of strategies for preventing conflict from recurring but that no family, by itself, can prevent conflict from recurring. As expected, control reduces both the desire and the ability of a group to organize for violence. Accommodation, as predicted, reduces the status concerns of a group and strengthens moderate voices. High levels of control, however, produce resentment that can lead to conflict; some form of accommodation is often necessary to offset this resentment. Accommodation without control often fails as group security fears lead them to organize for violence.

¹²⁰⁷ For more on the use of congruence procedures to test hypotheses, see George and McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories," pp. 29-34; Stephen Van Evera, "Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science" (handbook released by the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program), pp. 29-35; and King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 45-46.

Identity change and mediation strategies in general did little to prevent the recurrence of ethnic conflict. Identity change strategies usually were ineffective and at times even caused conflict. Only when backed by overwhelming force do identity change policies take root, and even then the process is long and bitter. Mediation, while not a cause of conflict, did little to prevent conflict from recurring in the cases examined.

Family One: Control and Ethnic Peace

The general hypothesis that control has a tremendous impact on both the will and ability of an ethnic group to organize--and thus effectively engage in ethnic conflict--is strongly supported by the cases in this study. Throughout the Middle East, governments used control to prevent security dilemmas from arising and to deter or overwhelm hegemonic individuals and groups.

Chapter III presented five predictions about how control will work if effective. They are:

1. that control will discourage violent political organization, and thus make peace easier to achieve;
2. that control will prevent security dilemma and hegemony problems from arising by punishing violence;
3. that elite records and statements will note the importance of control in why they chose peaceful means to voice their calls for change;
4. that control is easier when elites are identifiable; and
5. that massive control will create a threat from the government, and thus work against peace.

Each prediction is now examined in turn.

Table XIA: Congruence Test for Control

Country and Regime	Predictions				
	Discourage violent organization	Reduce security dilemma and hegemony fears	Elites cite control	Easier with identifiable elites	Massive control backfires
Morocco (Sherifian)					
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	
Morocco (Istiqlal)					
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Palestine (Mandate)	No	No	No	Yes	
Israel (Military Government)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Israel (Current Government)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Syria (French Mandate)	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	
Syria (Baath)	?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lebanon (Grand Compromise)					
Iraq (British Mandate)	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	
Iraq (post-war Hashemite)	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	
Iraq (Baath)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Iran (Pahlavi)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No

Yes=Prediction is met

No=Prediction is not met

? = Data unclear or conflicting

Blank = No test offered by this case

Control discourages violent political organization. In all success cases examined in this dissertation, control policies successfully created the expectation that supporters of violence would be punished. Organization, when it was allowed at all, occurred within the framework of the political system. Thus, when governments successfully used control, communal groups did not use violence to further their agenda.

French officials in Morocco suppressed all political organization not done under the aegis of the protectorate government. Protectorate officials at times dismissed or even imprisoned tribal leaders and urban officials they considered too independent. The French, however, did not suppress all organization--only that which helped groups use violence. Berbers and Arabs retained their tribal institutions and were free to use their language and laws. The French also used the threat of force far more than actual force. When removing a tribal leader or urban official, they seldom had to call on troops to do so as all Moroccans were aware that resistance to the French would not be productive.

In both Morocco and Syria, divide-and-rule policies helped the French limit anti-government organization. In Morocco, the French divided Berbers from Arabs, and separated each community internally. As a result, unified action seldom occurred. Individual tribal leaders often were more loyal to French officials than to their ethnic brethren. In Syria, the creation of separate minority homelands strengthened corporate minority identities and reduced groups' willingness to work together against the French. Indeed, in both Morocco and Syria French administrators regularly employed minorities and tribal figures against nationalist movements.

The current monarchy in Morocco also relied on selective control to impede anti-government political organization. The Moroccan government discouraged independent political

organization. The government prevented the media from publicizing exclusive Berber or Arab issues, and an active domestic intelligence presence monitored local organizations for expressions of dissent. Interviews suggested that Moroccans were well aware that attempts to organize along ethnic lines for more than cultural activities would lead to punishment in the form of fines or imprisonment. Occasional arrests reinforced this perception.

Of the governments examined in this dissertation, the military government of Israel was probably the most thorough in its efforts to prevent political organization. The Israeli government initially suppressed all independent Israeli Arab political activity, and an active intelligence and police force monitored the community for dissent. The threat of expulsion, and the obvious precedent of the expelled 1948 Palestinians, made clear the serious nature of the Israeli threat. Press censorship, jailings, and limits to assembly also reinforced government control over the Israeli Arab population.

The post-military government of Israel also used control to interfere with organization. As late as 1980 the government suppressed independent Israeli Arab parties, using force to back up its efforts. Over time, however, the level of control diminished in part because the majority Jewish population became less afraid that the Israeli Arabs would use violence. Furthermore, once violence had stopped for several years, the task becomes easier, as Israeli Arabs no longer had experience using force as an option with which to pursue their claims.¹²⁰⁸

To complement this repression, the Israeli government used a blatant divide-and-rule policy. The Israeli government deliberately targeted the Druzes, providing them with special

¹²⁰⁸ I.e. over time the task switches from compellance (getting individuals to stop doing an activity) to the much easier task of deterrence (preventing them from starting in the first place).

rights and privileges to separate them from the larger Arab community. At the same time, the Israeli government also offered Bedouin lesser advantages to cull them from the larger Arab bloc. As a result, political movements or activities that cut across these divisions were rare. Druzes and Bedouin were far less supportive of "Arab" causes than were Israeli Arab Muslims--only 2.7 percent of Druzes rejected Israel's right to exist, and less than 10 percent saw themselves as Palestinian. Members of these groups have proven loyal soldiers, seldom support violence, and almost invariably believe the Israeli system works to their benefit.

The post-war Hashemite regime in Iraq also maintained a high level of control. Although Iraq in this period experienced considerable unrest for ideological and for economic reasons, the high degree of government policing limited ethnic conflict. Secondary source reporting indicates communal groups in general did not organize, in part because of the government's extensive control network.

Two failures in ethnic relations examined in this dissertation--Sherifian Morocco and Morocco under the Istiqlal--had governments using no control. Because endemic tribal violence threatened groups in Sherifian Morocco, they felt compelled to organize to defend themselves from rival tribes. Although the government did not threaten the tribes, neither did it protect them from one another. Morocco under the Istiqlal, on the other hand, suffered violence because the Istiqlal government threatened Berber rights and privileges but was too weak to prevent Berber tribes from organizing against it. The Berbers saw the Istiqlal government's assimilationist policies as a hegemonic attempt to subjugate their culture and disempower their leaders. The Istiqlal, however, could not put down even the small Berber revolts that erupted, a failure that shortly led to the Istiqlal's loss of power.

The British experience in Palestine represents a rare failure of control to secure communal peace. The British employed police control: they did not target activists or try to weaken organizations, and relied instead on deterrence. Several factors explain the failure of police control in the Mandate. First, parallel British strategies in Palestine undermined police control. British efforts at mediation convinced both Arabs and Jews that violence would at times go unpunished, thus diluting the impact of true police control. Moreover, the devolution of power to local officials enabled them to build up power bases independent of the British, helping rather than hindering ethnic organization. The second factor was the heavy British reliance on local Arabs and Jews to fill the ranks of the constabulary, thus reducing the government's independent "on the ground presence." As a result, neither group trusted the police, and both groups had advance notice of any police crackdown. The third factor was outside powers providing arms and manpower to both groups, further reducing control's effectiveness. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both Arabs and Jews sought hegemony, not just security--a factor examined in the discussion of the next prediction.

Problems associated with the ethnic security dilemma and hegemony should diminish.

Control decreased the perceived need of communities to organize for self-defense and hindered their efforts to organize to impose their way of life on others. As groups' ability to organize fell, so too did their neighbors' fears. A self-sustaining cycle of confidence began, as group confidence of its security reduced the group's perceived need to organize for violence, which further increased the atmosphere of security.

Ethnic relations during the French Protectorate illustrates how control can reduce the security dilemma and intimidate hegemonic groups. The French effort to disarm tribes

dramatically reduced both their desire and their ability to engage in violence. Despite an ethos of violence, Moroccan tribes became quite peaceful. Using violence to dominate other tribes became impossible due to the French presence. By actively preventing ethnic organization intended to use violence--in part by reorganizing the tribal administration structure to ensure French influence--the French quieted fears among all the tribes that their neighbors would gain an advantage over them. Over time, the security dilemma and hegemony faded as an issue of concern in Morocco. Interviews suggest many tribal rivalries have been forgotten or are seen as only of limited importance.

The lack of control correlated with continued security dilemma and hegemony fears. The Sherifian government of Morocco, because it did not end the security dilemma, left Berber and Arab tribes free to war with one another. Only self-defense would provide security, forcing tribes to take up arms.

Outside powers, however, can restore the security dilemma or hegemonic fears even after many years of peace. In Lebanon, communal groups began to fear one another as the Palestinian presence and other outside interference began to foster chaos. A cycle of fear developed as all groups began mobilizing and arming in response to fears of their neighbors doing the same. In Israel, the only significant instance of violence occurred when outside powers and movements threatened to disrupt the peace. Israel Jews' fears on the eve of the Suez conflict contributed to the violence of Kafr Qasim.

A comparison of Iraq and Israel under their respective British Mandate governments illustrates how the same policy--police control--can fail or succeed according to the ambitions of the communal groups in question. Police control failed to prevent communal conflict in

Palestine because Arabs and Jews both sought hegemony, not just security. Thus, groups often organized for violence even when relations were peaceful on the surface: no cycle of peace and reduced organization occurred. In Iraq, in contrast, communal groups did not seek hegemony. Thus, the security provided by police control satisfied them and reduced their incentive to organize.

The cases of Baathist Iraq and Syria illustrate another important caveat to the general point that control reduces the security dilemma. When one communal group controls the state, attempts to enforce order are likely to be seen as a bid for hegemony and thus provoke greater violence. Asad's government and the Iraqi Baath sought communal peace, but they also wanted to ensure that their communities dominated Iraq. Thus, a strong police and army inflamed rather than dampened the security dilemma, convincing groups that their communal security and existence was jeopardized.

In Israel, however, the capture of the government by one communal group may have aided communal peace. Although Israeli Jews clearly mistrusted the Israeli Arabs, they nevertheless became confident that the government and police would protect them from violence. This confidence is particularly remarkable given past violence between Arabs and Jews during the Mandate and the active attempts by neighboring states to invade and subvert Israel.

Elite records reflect the importance of control. The above two predictions suggest a strong correlation between successful control and ethnic peace. The argument that this correlation is indeed causation is strengthened by data suggesting that the actors involved--particularly elites who normally lead violence--perceived that control was what led them to support peaceful behavior. Evidence for this prediction is drawn largely from the Israeli and

Moroccan cases, where I conducted interviews with local leaders and officials.

Memoirs, public statements, and interviews suggest that Israeli Arab and Israeli Jewish elites saw control as a source of peace. For Israeli Jews, interviews indicated that a strong police presence monitoring the Arabs was reassuring and eliminated the need to organize for self-defense. Polling data also suggest Israeli Jews, while distrusting Israeli Arabs in general, were confident that the police and security services will prevent violence. Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, constantly complain about control, primarily because it prevents them from exercising rights to free speech and free organization. Arab leaders were clear, however, that the threat of greater control also led them to carefully avoid violence.

In Morocco, the evidence is less clear but still suggests that control led elites to pursue peaceful means rather than use violence. In Morocco today, interviews of Arabs, Berbers, and outside experts indicate that the police and intelligence presence was a major reason groups did not even consider organizing along ethnic lines. Secondary sources on the French protectorate, which draw heavily from memoirs of French officials, also suggest that tribal leaders saw the French provision of security as an incentive to use peaceful means to resolve disputes.

Attitudes of Lebanese leaders in 1975 and Arab and Jewish elites during the British Mandate in Palestine further indicate that a lack of sufficient control led them to organize for violence. In their public statements, Lebanon's communal leaders increasingly voiced concerns over the government's inability to control the Palestinian movement or rival communal militias. Similarly, public statements suggest both Arabs and Jews felt that the Palestine Mandate authority would not protect them from the other group (or, at times, from their own people).

Identifiable elites make control more successful. For control to succeed, governments

must control the right people. The French government in Morocco, the post-war Hashemite government in Iraq, and Israeli government officials placed a high emphasis on gathering information about local leaders and on ensuring that any organizations formed were subservient to the government. Indeed, the need to work with an identifiable group of people was a reason that these governments sought to preserve the existing social structure as much as possible. Most of these governments also were careful to learn as much as possible about potential leaders, particularly the newly-educated elite.

The French in Syria, however, did not make a concerted effort to identify important elites, and this failure led to occasional violence. The Druze Revolt, for example, occurred in part because the local French officials offended important Druze families, not recognizing the influence they retained. In general, French officials in Syria did not devote themselves to learning the language or the local customs as part of their duty. This failure explains part of the reason French officials were less effective in fostering communal peace in Syria than they were in Morocco.

In Palestine under the British Mandate, Israel during the post-military government, and in Lebanon during the National Pact era, changes in the social structure made control harder. In all these cases, the emergence of new elites increased pressure on traditional elites who did not oppose the government. These traditional elites, often derided as pawns of the administration, were often cast aside or diminished as leaders.¹²⁰⁹

Massive violence fails to bring peace. The Pahlavi governments of Iran, Asad's

¹²⁰⁹ In Morocco today a number of potential new elites are arising. So far this has not led to violence, but the experience of other regimes suggest that control will be harder when rival elites are present.

government in Syria, and the Baath government in Iraq all at times used massive control to compel ethnic peace. With the exception of the Pahlavi repression of the Bakhtiyaris, attempts to use massive control backfired and led to greater conflict.

The Baath in Iraq used massive force in an attempt to prevent any political action among the Kurdish and Shi'a populations. Through arrests, mass killings, and an utter suppression of human rights the Baath sought to snuff out communal sentiment as a source of dissent. The Baath attempt failed completely and indeed worsened ethnic relations. Kurds and Shi'a today are more aware than ever before of their communal status and hostile to the Sunni Arab central government. The Baath regime actually created a security dilemma between the government and the Kurds and Shi'a of Iraq. These communal groups now fear a strong government as well as Sunni Arabs.

Efforts by Asad to impose his regime on Syria's Sunni Arab community also led to widespread violence. Although it is likely that without massive control Asad would have lost power, the widespread killing and imprisonment of Sunni Muslims engendered tremendous resentment. Today, relations between 'Alawis and Sunni Muslims in Syria are far worse than in recent memory.

The indiscriminate nature of massive control usually worsens communal relations. Individuals willing to go along to get along suddenly found themselves punished alongside those politically active. Thus, passivity had no reward. In Iraq, Kurds living in border areas and Shi'a in shrine cities found themselves killed, arrested, and deported regardless of their degree of political activity. Similarly, in Syria many Arab Sunnis in Hama found themselves grouped with the state's enemies regardless of their degree of political activity.

The Pahlavi regimes in Iran, however, represent an exception to the poor performance of massive control. Although Reza Shah's policies toward the Bakhtiyaris engendered tremendous resentment, the regime was strong enough to impose its will on the Bakhtiyaris and shatter their identity. This resentment did not cause violence, however, because the government was so strong that the Bakhtiyaris had no hope of resistance. Moreover, the Bakhtiyaris had the option of assimilating which, over time, weakened their community.

Family Two: Accommodation and Ethnic Peace

Accommodation, in contrast to control, does little to end the security dilemma or prevent hegemonic conflict. Thus, the conditions under which accommodation alone will work to produce a lasting peace are rare, as ethnic conflict almost invariably brings security concerns to the fore. Accommodation, however, reduces a group's status concerns and thus is an important source of lasting peace.

Chapter Three listed four predictions about how accommodation will work if effective in preventing ethnic conflict from recurring. They are: 1. that a high level of accommodation should correspond with a low level of violence; 2. that accommodation will further splits between radicals and moderates; 3. that accommodating groups will lead them to voice fewer status concerns; and 4. that elite records and statements will note the importance of accommodation in why they chose peaceful means to voice their calls for change.

Table XIB: Congruence Test for Accommodation

Country and Regime	Predictions			
	Accommodation corresponds with low violence	Splits between radicals and moderates	Fewer status complaints	Elites note importance
Morocco (Sherifian)	No	No	Yes	?
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Morocco (Istiqlal)				
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Palestine (Mandate)	No	No	No	No
Israel (Military Government)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel (Current Government)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria (French Mandate)*	Yes	Yes	Yes	?
Syria (Ba'ath)				
Lebanon (Grand Compromise) **	?	?	?	?
Iraq (British Mandate)*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq (post-war Hashemite)	Yes	Yes	Yes	?
Iraq (Ba'ath)				
Iran (Pahlavi)	Yes	Yes	?	?

Yes=Prediction is met

No=Prediction is not met

? = Data unclear or conflicting

Blank = No test offered by this case

*Violence increased at the end of the colonial periods in Iraq and Syria in part because minority groups feared that they would lose the rights and privileges they had gained under the colonial regime when the nationalists took power.

**The benefits of accommodation were apparent in Lebanon for several decades after 1943, and they helped increase communal cooperation. As security fears increased, however, accommodation failed to produce peace and actually worsened violence.

High levels of accommodation correspond with low levels of violence. Although efforts to accommodate elites, particularly co-optation, facilitated ethnic peace, in general high levels of accommodation alone often corresponded with higher levels of violence. High levels of accommodation gave violent groups more resources with which to wage war and did little to end the security dilemma or hegemonic conflicts.

When security fears are high, devolution can actually increase conflict. For Sherifian Morocco, a high level of devolution in the form of autonomy gave groups one more plum over which to fight: the support of the central government.¹²¹⁰ Similarly, under the British Mandate in Palestine a high level of devolution did not correlate with peace because increases in devolution actually gave radicals more resources to use in their eventual struggle against each other and the Mandate authority. British administrators helped both the Jewish Agency and the Mufti of Jerusalem acquire a network through which to mobilize followers and funds to increase their influence.

Lebanon represents perhaps the best example of how accommodation can work against peace once security concerns rose to the fore. Under the 1943 National Pact, government positions were divided among all major Lebanese groups, and all groups had a high level of autonomy. For decades peace prevailed despite tension over how to share power. As violence from the Palestinian presence spread, however, Lebanon's accommodative system could do little to ease security concerns. The very institutions through which devolution was implemented--local schools, religious institutions, and other community organizations--made mobilization far

¹²¹⁰ In Sherifian Morocco, however, the target of violence under accommodation suited government interests. Groups in general did not war against the central government, instead focusing their attention on rival tribes.

easier.

Accommodation, however, can foster peace when employed alongside control policies. High levels of devolution employed by the French colonial governments in Morocco and Syria and the British Mandate government in Iraq did correlate with ethnic peace because groups did not fear for their security. In all three of these cases, the governments employed at least minimal control to keep order. With their security assured, minority groups in these countries became supportive of the colonial governments as they recognized that its policies enhanced their status. The Israeli government used participation to a similar end. Because of control, problems with implementing participation were overcome as groups recognized that violence was not an option.

Co-optation, when combined with selective control, proved a highly-effective tool for improving ethnic relations and in general correlated with greater ethnic peace. The French protectorate in Morocco and Mandate in Syria, post-war Hashemite Iraq, the current Sultanate in Morocco, and the Israeli military government all co-opted political elites while punishing those who organized for violence. These co-opted elites worked with authorities to prevent violence within their own communal group.

Accommodation furthers splits between radicals and moderates. When control is used to prevent radicals from organizing, accommodation further bolsters moderates by demonstrating the advantages of working with the system. However, when accommodation is not combined with force, accommodation appears to strengthen the position of radicals.

In Sherifian Morocco, the devolution of authority to local tribal leaders strengthened their positions and increased their ability to use violence. Because the government did not, and could not, punish violence, those who gained authority and support from the central government used it

to improve their military position over local rivals. The very real rewards of accommodation--higher status, insurance about one's way of life, etc.--did little to reassure groups and individuals about their physical survival.

Devolution also strengthened radicals under the Palestine Mandate and in Lebanon under the National Pact. By increasing local power with few strings attached, groups were better able to organize. In Palestine, officials of the Jewish Agency and the Supreme Muslim Council created militias and often took extreme negotiating positions. Schools and other government-backed institutions of both Arabs and Jews became recruiting centers for radical groups. Similarly, in Lebanon the same schools, political organizations, and religious institutions that administered Lebanon in peace became radical recruiting centers for conflict.

Co-optation, on the other hand, almost invariably bolstered the position of moderates in the French and British colonial governments in Morocco, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. In general co-opted individuals worked with the government and tried to prevent violence. In Palestine, traditional elites and Christian notables--who represented the individuals the government co-opted most frequently--usually were far more receptive to British peacemaking efforts than the rest of Arab society. Co-optation weakened the Arab community even when it was in revolt by separating many Arab leaders from their followers and convincing many among the masses that their leaders could not be trusted, thus inhibiting the organization of resistance. In Morocco, the French created a cadre of co-opted elites. The benefits given to leaders cemented their ties to the French administration. In Iraq and Syria, traditional elites co-opted by the government, particularly minority leaders, became staunch pillars of the colonial regime and often worked against nationalists.

In Syria, the Baath regime successfully co-opted many Sunni Arabs. Although this did not buy the entire community's loyalty, it did buy the passivity of many key individuals. Thus, when the militant Sunni Islamists took up arms, many Arab Sunnis stayed home due to their favored position in the Baath regime.

The French protectorate in Morocco, the current Monarchy, and various Israeli governments all combined accommodation (particularly co-optation) with selective control, a combination that greatly increased the influence of moderates. Regime forces overwhelmed and often silenced those advocating violence while those favoring compromise and working with the system gained visible benefits. Over time, the only leaders who could deliver material rewards or offer political influence for a community were the ones approved by government authorities.

Participation proved particularly effective in separating radicals from moderates. In Israel, violence did not increase--despite a decline in the level of selective control--in large part because Arab leaders recognized that working with the system could give them redress in terms of better treatment, more public spending, and other privileges. The use of violence, on the other hand, would just lead to the renewal of past problems. The timing of a major change in Israeli Arab attitudes--the 1977 elections, when the opportunity for greater influence arose due to the Likud-Labor split--is particularly suggestive. Before 1977, Land Day violence and growing support for Rakah indicated increasing radicalism among Israeli Arabs. The increasing effectiveness of participation, however, reversed these trends.

Fewer concerns voiced about status. In general, accommodation performed well in solving status complaints. Even in cases where ethnic conflict continued, the sources of the

dispute were security dilemma or hegemony concerns, not status issues.¹²¹¹

In Sherifian Morocco, where violence was almost constant, Berber and Arab tribes did not see the government as a threat to their position in society or to their group's status. Rather, they warred with other groups over immediate survival issues such as pasturage and blood feuds. Indeed, the tribes at times united when it appeared that the central government would be overwhelmed by outsiders, an event that had the potential to subjugate them under a foreigner, a status they disliked.

Other ethnic relations failures also strengthen the argument that accommodation increases status satisfaction. The Istiqlal government removed the French accommodationist policies, threatening to subjugate the Berber tribes under urban, Arab rule. Berber elites in particular suffered as they lost their status positions. As a result, the tribes took up arms and demanded the restoration of the benefits, positions, and symbols (local administration to be carried out by members of the area tribal groups, more government spending, etc.) threatened by the Istiqlal.

Ethnic relations successes also suggest that accommodation reduces concerns about status issues. Hashemite Iraq decreased status tension through devolution and co-optation. Although in general unrest plagued Iraq during this era, neither the Kurds nor the Shi'a felt their communal position or status threatened and thus remained peaceful. The absence of status demands appears

¹²¹¹ According to many scholars, Lebanon suggests another limit to the benefits of accommodation on status concerns. Under the National Pact, every major communal group received explicit recognition and a share of the Lebanese state's resources and power. Groups regularly quarrelled, however, over the size of their slice. These quarrels led to widespread resentment that proved fertile soil for conflicts to grow when security concerns increased. I believe, however, that the primary driver of conflict (as opposed to tension) in Lebanon was group fears about their security. The National Pact system, while hardly perfect, satisfied most individuals about their place in Lebanese society to the point that status alone would not compel them to take up arms.

to have implied consent for the system as a whole. In Israel, those co-opted seldom complained vociferously about the system--indeed, co-opted Israeli Arab parliamentarians even voted in favor of military government. Today Israeli Arabs recognize that Israel's participatory system can and does bring them benefits. Even though Israeli Arab intellectuals and professionals regularly voice complaints about their status in society, this has not led to violence.

In Morocco, Arabs and most Berbers believed the system did not subordinate them or their cultures. Under the Protectorate, Berbers came to recognize that working with the French preserved, and at times bolstered, their status vis-a-vis their urban Arab neighbors. Local control over pasturage and religious affairs further reduced the incentives for resisting the French. The Monarchy today tries to reassure all groups about their place in society. The King, as a religious figure, presents himself as an important symbol of leadership that all peoples can accept. Moreover, the monarchy does not directly interfere with the use of the Berber language and customs and supports the prerogatives of traditional leaders.

In Syria under the French, the high level of devolution calmed initial fears about status and led to considerable support for the French among minorities. Most minority groups resisted the French government initially, fearing that the French would impose central government control and remove their traditional independence--fear that made pacification difficult. French devolution policies, however, convinced minorities of French goodwill and over time led them to support French rule over independence.

Status conflicts often break out when groups fear the end of accommodation. In Lebanon, violence began in part because groups feared that the accommodation system of the National Pact would be changed and lessen their status. Similarly, as the end of colonial rule neared in Iraq and

Syria, minority groups often took up arms, or at least mobilized. Minorities feared that the new governments would end the accommodative measures instituted during the colonial regime.

Even as colonial governments satisfied the status yearnings of minority groups through devolution, they often increased status tension by threatening the position of the formerly dominant peoples. While the French protectorate bolstered the relative status of Berbers, it left Arabs subordinate to the French--a major inspiration of the nationalist movement. In Syria, the dominant Arab elites bitterly resented the French presence, in part because it deprived them of their leading role. Similarly, the British Mandate threatened to displace Arab and Muslim dominance of Palestine in favor of the Jews.

Elites note that accommodation led them to stop fighting. For both political and cultural elites, accommodation policies are cited as a reason that their status concerns are satisfied. Again, however, elites noted that security and hegemonic fears are not calmed by accommodation.

A constant theme of colonial doctrine in the cases examined was that subject populations must see that the new governments would respect their cultures. In Iraq, Gertrude Bell regularly noted that over time tribal and Shi'a leaders came to recognize the value of British rule, as it protected these groups' ways of life. The French experiences in Morocco and Syria appear to have confirmed in the mind of French officials the validity of an approach that stressed not offending traditions. Lyautey's maxim of "do not offend a single tradition" proved so successful that many officials considered it gospel.

Interviews of elites in Morocco today, and of outside experts on Morocco, also suggest the importance of accommodation in ethnic peace. They noted that both Berbers see the King as

looking out for their interests--at least more than potential alternatives would. Interviews with outside experts on Morocco today suggest that the inclusion in public positions of both Arabs and Berbers (who are disproportionately represented in the police and military) is seen as proof of the government's evenhandedness regarding both populations.

Elites in Israel also recognized that accommodation was important in reducing ethnic tension. Opinion polls suggest that in the 1980s Israeli Arabs in general began supporting a greater role in politics--and a lesser role for the use of violence--once the benefits of accommodation began to be clear. In opinion polls, there is a clear correlation between support for violence and the belief that the system is not working to help Israeli Arabs: this support has diminished as accommodation has increased. Interviews similarly suggest that many Israeli Arabs believe that increased government spending in Arab areas and improved treatment of the Israeli Arab community are important sources of continued peace.

Again, the failure cases of the Istiqlal government, Lebanon, and the British Mandate suggest the importance of satisfying status concerns if peace is to continue. Statements by Berber leaders, in particular their manifesto of demands to the central government, suggest that the Istiqlal's removal of accommodationist policies led them to take up arms. Lebanon's communal leaders regularly complained that other groups sought to destroy their way of life or subordinate their community. Jews and Arabs in the British Mandate also cited fears of communal subordination as a reason to take up arms.

Family Three: Identity Change and Ethnic Peace

Of the cases examined, identity change policies were only used three times as primary

policies for managing ethnic relations. The Istiqlal government tried to change the identity of Berbers completely, transforming them into Arab-defined Moroccans. The Baath regime in Iraq tried to force Shi'as and Kurds to become Arabs. The Pahlavi regime in Iran attempted to impose a Persian identity on Iran's many communal and tribal groups. In a few other cases, governments attempted to foster a national identity to complement existing policies. In general, the resentment created by identity change policies worsened ethnic relations and often caused violence. Only in the case of the Bakhtiyaris in Iran did an identity change policy play a major role in fostering peace.

Chapter III presented two predictions about how identity change strategies will work if they prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. They are: 1. that identity change policies produce a change in identity and 2. that identity change, when successfully implemented, interferes with ethnic organization. Each prediction is examined in turn.

Table XIC: Congruence Test of Identity Change Policies

Country and Regime	Type of Identity Sought by the Regime	Predictions	
		Identity change occurs	Change policy interferes with organization
Morocco (Sherifian)			
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Promoted pan-tribal Berber identity	No	?
Morocco (Istiqlal)	Arab nationalist identity	No	No (not implemented)
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	Moroccan national identity	Yes	Yes
Palestine (Mandate)			
Israel (Military Government)	Discouraged Israeli Arab identification with the Arab world	?*	Yes
Israel (Current Government)	Discouraged Israeli Arab identification with the Arab world	?*	Yes
Syria (French Mandate)			
Syria (Ba'ath)	Promoted inclusive nationalist identity	No	No (not implemented)
Lebanon (Grand Compromise)			
Iraq (British Mandate)			
Iraq (post-war Hashemite)			
Iraq (Ba'ath)	Arab nationalist identity	No	No (not implemented)
Iran (Pahlavi)	Persian national identity	Yes	Yes

Yes=Prediction is met

No=Prediction is not met

? = Data unclear or conflicting

Blank = No test offered by this case

*Israeli Arab identity changed, but the new identity was not one promoted by the Israeli government.

Identity change occurs. With one exception--the Bakhtiyaris in Iran--efforts to impose the identity of the dominant group on a subordinate group failed and often strengthened the rival communal identity. In Morocco, Istiqlal efforts to foist an Arab identity on Berbers provoked Berber risings, and Berber elites to this day remember the Istiqlal's chauvinism. Baath efforts in Iraq and Pahlavi efforts in Iran to assimilate their countries' Kurdish populations also failed. In both countries, the Kurds today are highly politicized and hostile to their governments, in large part due to these identity change policies. Indeed, Kurdish identity is probably stronger today than at any time in Kurdish history. Only the Bakhtiyaris in Iran appear to be changing their identity and accepting the dominant Persian identity. Bakhtiyari numbers as a percentage of total population have steadily fallen as Bakhtiyaris increasingly redefine themselves as Persians.

French efforts to create a new minority identity in Morocco were a mixed success. The French failed to create a strong, unified Berber identity; Berbers continued to identify themselves primarily by tribe, region, and religion rather than ethnicity. Nevertheless, French efforts succeeded in bolstering Berber consciousness and Berber culture. This cultural support made Berbers more unified when pan-Arab ideologues tried to ignore or change Berber identity.

Attempts to foster a common national identity also met with limited success. In Morocco today, some individuals appear to be accepting a national identity. Interviews suggest that many Moroccans see ethnic divisions as unimportant or secondary due to growing national sentiment. In Syria, however, attempts to foster a common Arab identity that embraced 'Alawis, Christians, and Sunnis alike foundered on sectarian differences, as the Sunni majority rejected this identity because it strengthened the 'Alawi hold on power.

Identity change interferes with ethnic organization. When identity change policies could

be sustained, they interfered with ethnic organization. In the short-term, however, they often created resistance to the central government and ethnic hostility--both of which bolstered ethnic identity and organization. Istiqlal efforts to incorporate Berbers into an urban Arab nationalist identity led them to take up arms, thus creating violence and an end to the Istiqlal's chances of holding on to power. By removing Berber leaders from positions of authority, the Istiqlal government created an opposition it was too weak to repress and ideologically opposed to accommodating. Similarly, Baath efforts to force an Arab identity on Iraqi Kurds led to repeated Kurdish uprisings, as previously divided Kurdish tribes all recognized their common interest in resisting Arab hegemony.

However, when the central government was strong enough to compel individuals to follow its policy, over time identity change policies interfered with ethnic organization. In Iran, the Pahlavis brutally suppressed initial Bakhtiyari uprisings. Over time, Bakhtiyaris began to see themselves more and more as Persians, reducing their ability to organize as a distinct group. Unlike the Kurds, the Bakhtiyaris did not rise up after the collapse of the regime in 1979 because many Bakhtiyaris considered themselves to be Persians. The most basic task of an organization--preserving its membership--was jeopardized.

Many Moroccans today see ethnic disputes as an irrelevant subject in Morocco, in part because of the national identity the King has slowly constructed. Several Moroccans interviewed noted that Islam or national identity brought Arabs and Berbers together, thus reducing the chances of any conflict. Interviews suggest that those who claim "we're all Moroccans" were less likely to see ethnicity as even a potential source of conflict.

Family Four: Mediation and Ethnic Peace

The cases examined so far constitute at best a weak test for the three variants of mediation theory detailed in Chapter III. The governments examined never used mediation as a sole policy, and confidence building was not attempted at all. The cases suggest that mediation helped bring about peace only when accompanied by force.

The most common variation of mediation used to resolve conflicts was "Track One"--the use of a third party's good offices to resolve disputes. In Sherifian Morocco, Berber tribes relied heavily on holy men to mediate disputes. Both the French protectorate government and the British Mandate also used colonial officials to mediate between local groups. "Track Two" mediation (informal talks to build confidence) occurred less frequently. British Mandate officials encouraged private meetings of Arabs and Jews, but this did little to foster peace. Most governments examined, however, did not use any mediation, and no regime used confidence-building measures.¹²¹²

Chapter III presented three predictions about how mediation strategies will work if they prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. They are: 1. that those not returning to violence should cite the importance of negotiation; 2. that imposed solutions are less stable than mediated ones; and 3. other strategies, to succeed, require mediation.

¹²¹² A possible case of confidence building is the Baath talks with the Kurds in the late 1960s. Talks and agreements called for back-and-forth concessions by both groups. I do not include this as a case of confidence building, however, because the good faith of the Baath was highly questionable.

Table XIX: Congruence Test for Mediation

Country and Regime	Predictions		
	Mediation importance cited	Imposed solutions less stable	Other strategies require mediation
Morocco (Sherifian)			
Morocco (French Protectorate)	Yes	No	?
Morocco (Istiqlal)			
Morocco (Current Monarchy)	No	No	No
Palestine (Mandate)	No		
Israel (Military Government)	No	No	No
Israel (Current Government)	No	No	No
Syria (French Mandate)	?	No	No
Syria (Ba'ath)			
Lebanon (Grand Compromise)	?*	No	?
Iraq (British Mandate)	Yes	No	?
Iraq (post-war Hashemite)	?	No	No
Iraq (Ba'ath)			
Iran (Pahlavi)	No	No	No

Yes=Prediction is met

No=Prediction is not met

? = Data unclear or conflicting

Blank = No test offered by this case

*French colonial officials helped mediate the 1943 National Pact in Lebanon. Although Lebanese seldom cited French help as an important source of continued peace, perhaps the French role was necessary for the system to exist in the first place--a contention I briefly examine in the next chapter.

Those not returning to violence cite the importance of negotiation. Where negotiation was tried most vigorously--Sherifian Morocco and the British Mandate--violence continued unabated. Negotiation appeared to have little impact on the attitudes of those who participated in negotiating sessions. In both cases, the participants in the negotiation (tribal chiefs and Jewish and Arab leaders respectively) often led the subsequent violence. In Palestine, both Jewish and Arab leaders cited British mediation efforts as a reason for their decision to organize for violence. Indeed, the British Mandate experience suggests, rather ironically, that mediation does dispel misperceptions but that this can actually worsen relations. Jewish and Arab participants in informal meetings (such as David Ben Gurion and George Antonius) record their perceptions of these meetings as confirming their beliefs that compromise was not possible.

In Israel, Iran, and Morocco today a lasting peace is not correlated with the existence of mediation policies. Ethnic leaders in these countries do not cite the importance of any form of negotiation as an explanation for lasting peace. For Arabs in Israel, Bakhtiyaris in Iran, and Berbers and Arabs in Morocco today, interviews and memoirs suggest by the absence of references to negotiation that negotiation is not an important source of group peace.

French officials of the Protectorate in Morocco, however, saw negotiation as part of their bag of tools for mediating ethnic conflict. By mediating tribal disputes and overseeing the judicial process, the French demonstrated to tribal members that they could make progress toward their goal by non-violent means. The difference between French efforts and those of the holy men before them is that the threat of force implicitly backed French efforts while the holy men had little independent influence to sanction violators.

Imposed solutions are less stable than mediated ones. This prediction of mediation

theory is not met by the cases examined in this study. Imposed solutions to conflict--such as post-1948 Israel, various colonial regimes in Moroccan, Syria, and Iraq, and the current Moroccan government--have proven highly stable. Although the French did use some mediation in their pacification effort, in general it was the threat or use of force that guaranteed the initial solution, not mediation. In no case did mediation alone, without the implied use of force, lead groups to forswear violence.

Mediated conflicts in both Sherifian Morocco and Palestine under the Mandate proved highly unstable. All parties to the conflict saw the mediation as a short-term solution that could be changed by efforts on their part. Despite the existence of "hurting stalemates" and other supposed indicators of instances where mediation will be effective, peace did not take root.

Other strategies, to succeed, require mediation. An alternative approach to mediation is to see it as a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethnic peace. This prediction has a loose correlation with the observations in the French protectorate case. There, the government's use of mediation, when combined with selective control and various accommodation strategies, helped facilitate ethnic peace. According to accounts of French officials, at least, French mediation efforts bolstered ethnic moderates, who could point to the successes from mediation as a reason to avoid violence. Yet the other cases suggest that mediation is not necessary for ethnic peace. In obvious successes such as Israel, Pahlavi Iran, and the current Sultanate in Morocco, mediation is not used yet ethnic peace endures. Even the French protectorate used many other policies, including devolution and co-optation, to foster peace.¹²¹³

¹²¹³ Thus, in conclusion a better casting of this prediction is that mediation can help improve the effectiveness of other strategies by offering a means for groups to resolve their status and security disputes.

Chapter XII: Assessing Strategies to Prevent Conflict from Recurring

Having examined in chapter eleven whether the families of strategies used to prevent conflict from recurring work as expected, it is now time to reexamine the general question of the best ways to prevent ethnic conflict from recurring. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the various government strategies? Governments and individuals must recognize that fostering a lasting peace depends not only on choosing the best strategy for the circumstances in question but also on compensating for or offsetting the weaknesses of the chosen strategy.

This chapter has two parts. It first lays out the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. It then notes several of the most important factors that may increase or interfere with the strategies' effectiveness, such as the type of regime and the organization of the ethnic group in question. Neither part is meant to be an exhaustive overview of the policies in question. The goal instead is to use examples from the cases to highlight the most important "lessons learned" presented in this dissertation.

An Overview of Control

The ability of a government to deter ethnic violence and, to some extent, limit ethnic organization, is a key determinant of lasting peace. The use of control, however, often produces a counterproductive backlash, particularly in cases where the sources of conflict are status concerns. Thus, governments must shrewdly manage the use of control, minimizing it when groups feel status pressure and increasing it when security and hegemonic concerns appear to predominate.

The Advantages of Control

The threat of government punishment can reassure ethnic groups that they do not have to fend for themselves against menacing neighbors, thus eliminating a necessary condition for the security dilemma to function. Control also can discourage violent individuals with the possibility of incarceration, fine, or worse. When deterrence fails, control can weaken a group through imprisonment, censorship, or limits to assembly, thus reducing its ability to carry out violence. Particularly noteworthy is the repeated observation that governments that create an expectation of severe punishment for violence can, over time, relax the actual level of control as ethnic groups become confident that violence will be punished and thus is not feasible.

Control deters individuals and groups with hegemonic ambitions and reduces the ethnic security dilemma. In cases where governments effectively implemented control, individuals intending to use violence quickly learned that they would face fines, prison, or worse. Because of control, even warlike groups such as the Moroccan Berbers gradually became peaceful. The surety of punishment reduced group fears of random ethnic violence and led group members to rely on the government, not their own resources, for their security.

A particularly important but often overlooked benefit of control is that it reassures dominant ethnic groups, which on the surface might seem to have little reason to fear for their security. Although Israeli Jews feared their Arab neighbors, particularly in times of international tension, they were confident that the police and security forces--"their" police and security forces--would protect them. Thus, no vigilantism or other, non-official violence occurred. Over time, Israeli Jews became receptive to accommodating the concerns of Israeli Arabs. In the 1980s, surveys of Jews indicate that Jews were increasingly willing to accept Arab superiors in a job and

Arab equality in Israeli society.

Control also allows the government to build organizations that facilitate government power in the long-term. The Military Government in Israel, for example, organized Israeli Arabs as part of Jewish political parties or as traditional clans rather than through new parties or organizations. The clan and Jewish party structure made it easier for the government to control Arabs and prevented inter-Arab coordination. Similarly, in the early days of the French Protectorate in Morocco the French established their parallel administration that changed tribal government from a bottom-up to a top-down structure and disarmed the tribes. These changes weakened the independence and power of the tribes.

This facilitation of government power in the long-term is particularly important when massive control is used. In Baathi Iraq, the regime did not weaken Kurdish organization successfully or create an alternate identity. Thus, when massive control let up the Kurds rose. In Pahlavi Iran, on the other hand, the government destroyed the tribes as political units and incorporated the Bakhtiyaris into the Persian mainstream. Thus, when Reza Shah and Mohammad Shah fell, many Bakhtiyaris remained assimilated while those who clung to their tribal identity were too weak to use violence to press their case.

Successful control in the short-term allows an easing of control in the long-term by creating an expectation that violence would be punished. Israel today is peaceful even though the level of force used appears similar to that used by the British under the Mandate. Although Israeli Arabs again enjoy relative freedom to organize, two factors limit the potential for violence. The first and most important is the knowledge among both Jews and Arabs that any use of violence by Israeli Arabs would result in swift punishment and might even turn back many

of the political gains made by the Israeli Arab community in recent years. Second, Israeli Arabs recognize that they have no chance of controlling the state due to their small numbers and exclusion from security positions. This knowledge reduces the level of status conflict. Israeli Arabs, unlike Palestinian Arabs of the past, are not hegemonic in their aims. Jews are comfortable that their ultimate hegemony is secure, while Arabs moderate their demands in the recognition that extreme demands will be counterproductive. A similar pattern is apparent among the Berbers during the period of French rule: a relatively mild use of control followed the initial pacification campaign. The French succeeded in reducing control in part because they convinced the Berbers that the level of control would increase if the Berbers resorted to violence.

The various colonial experiences and the Israeli case suggest that initially selective control is necessary to prevent ethnic violence if security dilemma, status, or hegemonic concerns are high, as they almost always are in the aftermath of ethnic conflict. After an ethnic conflict, groups fear for their security and their status, as the recent bloodshed brings with it proof of their vulnerability to their neighbors. The Israeli government and the French governments in Syria and Morocco were able to ease up on the level of control over time, but the past high level served as a reminder of the government's power and that violent behavior has the potential to make things worse.

Divide-and-rule strategies proved highly effective in weakening the ability of an ethnic group to resist the central government. Despite Arab propaganda to the contrary, Druzes and Bedouin in Israel remain distinct from Israeli Arabs as a whole. Both Jews and other Arabs perceive them as distinct groups more allied with Jews than with the Arab communities. Similarly, in Morocco French efforts to divide Berber tribes and separate Arabs and Berbers

discouraged cooperation among these groups. In Syria, the French won the loyalty of 'Alawis, Christians, and other minorities over time by providing them with a higher level of benefits and status than they received under previous regimes. It should be noted, however, that divide-and-rule policies often succeeded incompletely, weakening the ability of an ethnic group to use violence but not preventing it altogether. During the British Mandate in Iraq, for example, Kurdish rebels seldom worked together but they nevertheless took up arms against the state. Similarly, in Syria communal groups at times revolted even though they seldom worked together.

Elites of groups subject to divide-and-rule have a particular incentive to promote or maintain a separate identity. Berber leaders, long accustomed to influence due to their role in administering tribal areas under the French Protectorate, led their people to take up arms when the Istiqlal threatened to displace them in the name of Arab unity. Similarly, in Israel Druze and Bedouin elites would have little influence if they were joined to the Arab community as a whole as their numbers would be outweighed by the Arab Muslim majority. Thus, these elites are active supporters of particularist identities even though these identities may weaken the strength of the larger identity as a whole.

Control and Social Change

Control affects the organization of an ethnic group by encouraging changes in the daily routines of group members. Where control did not exist, as in Sherifian Morocco, tribal units organized their way of life for war. Even when the level of control was low, as it was in the British Mandate, groups still organized for conflict. When violence stopped, however, the need for strong tribal or ethnic military units ended as well. Individuals gained tremendous freedom

from their ethnic group, and often emigrated or settled down to farm as a result.

Because control allows the imposition of the new administrative structure, it also resulted in tension within the ethnic group, further weakening it vis-a-vis the state and other groups. Colonial governments in Morocco, Syria, and Iraq, by registering land and otherwise "rationalizing" the economy, separated the interests of tribal leaders, who became property owners, from the interests of their followers. Private property undermined tribal strength by decreasing the functions of the tribe as a whole. Individuals, not groups, now cultivated tribal lands. Furthermore, private property allowed individuals to cultivate and invest in their land without fear of dispossession: in the past, an individual would not cultivate what he could not defend.

These changes suggest that the impact of control increases over time in traditional societies. As private property develops, the tribal ethos changes and a new way of life takes effect that requires less control to preserve peace. Marshall Bugeaud's belief in the efficacy of fruit trees in preventing dissidents appears correct. Over time, the fierce Berber warrior became a kinder, gentler farmer who depended on the state for his livelihood.

The imposition of control also changes the focus of ethnic violence from intra- or inter-group to violence against the central government. After the French consolidated authority under the central government, the Berbers and Arabs organized to influence it rather than fight one another. Upon independence some Berbers returned to the hills to fight, but they did so to change central government policies to their liking, not to gain autonomy. Similarly, the Bakhtiyaris in Iran stopped considering tribal rivals such as the Qashqai their chief foes and began focusing on the central government. Thus, increasing the power of the central government

and the scope of its activity will not necessarily end ethnic conflict forever, but it does reduce intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflict and focus attention on the central government.

The Disadvantages of Control¹²¹⁴

Control suffers from several major problems that limit its effectiveness. Most importantly, control often leads to bitterness and complaints about a group's status in society. Control also is difficult to carry out. It requires an "on the ground" presence and considerable resources. Massive control and divide-and-rule often produce a backlash, creating security, status, and hegemonic fears and worsening ethnic relations in the long-term.

Control produces resentment. Not surprisingly, individuals generally do not like to be harassed, monitored, or even policed. When these activities are done by once-hostile groups or a suspect government, resentment is higher still. Israeli Arabs today, for example, regularly complain about the heavy-handed police and security forces even though they suffer far less from harassment than they did in the past. This resentment can spill over and create status concerns. In part because they are a regular target for harassment by police and security officials, Israeli Arabs take less pride in the Israeli state and consider themselves second class citizens.

Divide-and-rule efforts often anger the majority group that is being weakened or divided.

¹²¹⁴ The failure of control in the British Mandate illustrates a particular problem with police control: police control will not prevent violence when deterrence fails. If violence begins, whether because of outside involvement or because some individuals simply do not fear punishment, it will spiral out of control easily when only police control is used. Because arrests occur after the fact, successful violence shatters police control and groups will feel compelled to take security into their own hands. To prevent violence when groups are hegemonic or when outside powers are active, groups must not only be assured about their security--they must also be deterred from organizing to impose their way of life on others. Thus, a higher level of control--one that denies groups resources and weakens their ability to organize--is necessary.

Arab nationalists in Morocco greatly resented the Berber *zahir*, seeing it correctly as an attempt to divide their ranks and weaken their influence. Nationalists in Syria resented the French division of the country into highly-autonomous regions. Similarly, Arab nationalists are bitterly critical of Israeli attempts to play up Druze and Bedouin identities.

The French Protectorate offers an ideal of how to use control while minimizing lasting resentment. The French used local military forces whenever possible, thus downplaying their own role. The French also tried to demonstrate their might without actually using it through collective punishment or other harsh measures. Leniency after defeat helped lessen resentment. By working with rather than punishing former enemies, the French minimized resentment to their pacification campaign. Yet the French never eliminated opposition to their control policies. Divide-and-rule efforts, while often successful in weakening resistance, also contributed to lasting anger at the French administration.

In addition to creating resentment, control is often difficult to carry out because it requires that the government be strong, or at least stronger than any rival ethnic groups. Weak governments, such as the Sherifian regime in Morocco and the National Pact government of Lebanon, simply did not have the option of using control. Government strength, however, is a relative measure. The current regime in Morocco, while not strong, has far more resources than Berber tribes or organizations, allowing it to dictate events in Morocco.

Control also requires an "on the ground" presence to succeed. The British in Palestine and Iraq and the French in Syria often did not have information about whom was behind the violence or the ability to compel large numbers of activists, a weakness that limited their ability to interfere with violent ethnic organization. British and French unwillingness to expend money

to build a large police force and staff it with dependable residents limited their ability to enforce order. In Palestine, this problem became overwhelming: communal groups used the police and the government to gain information about Mandate authorities, not the other way around.

Successful regimes placed considerable emphasis on building strong police and intelligence services. The French in Morocco, the Pahlavi regimes in Iran, the Baath government of Syria, and the Israelis, had a much greater knowledge of society in general and had far more officials on the ground. All these regimes had large intelligence and police networks that vigilantly guarded against dissent. The Israeli Military Government's use of economic punishments to ensure its control was particularly useful in helping it gather information on every Israeli Arab villager.

Good intelligence is essential because accuracy is particularly important when implementing control. The French were careful to "get the right people," which further reduced resentment. The military government in Israel also tried to encourage "positive" leaders while ruthlessly suppressing those considering the use of violence. Similarly, the Moroccan and Syrian regimes today invest tremendous energy in identifying potential leaders and forcing them to endorse the regime or bow out of society.

A concurrent policy of devolution also makes control hard to implement. Devolution provides an ethnic group with resources, thus removing a potential source of leverage from the hands of the government. Furthermore, by definition devolution allows ethnic groups to organize for at least minimal functions and thus provides a ready base for political ethnic activity. During the Mandate period in Israel, for example, the same Supreme Moslem Council established by the British to oversee the distribution of religious monies and property and the appointment of prayer

leaders over time became a leading source of opposition to the Mandate authority. Similarly, in the Mandate government in Iraq tribal leaders often took up arms to press the British for more resource

In addition to implementation problems, massive control carries with it tremendous disadvantages. Massive control incites the status and security fears of a community simultaneously. Moreover, it creates a fear of the central government. Thus, when massive control lets up--as it did in Iraq when the Baath faced military defeats from Iran and from the U.S.-led coalition--the groups subject to massive control take up arms. In Syria, the high level of control created an image of the 'Alawis as oppressors. Although religious Sunnis often viewed the 'Alawis with suspicion due to their heretical beliefs, today the 'Alawis also bear the onus of repressing true believers, making Sunni militants even more hostile.

Circumstances that Affect Control's Viability

Control is often difficult to carry out. Some regimes cannot implement control measures, while others can capitalize on circumstances that increase the effectiveness of control. The resources of an ethnic group, its social structure, and the type of regime all affect control's influence on ethnic relations.

The resources of the ethnic group in question affect how well control works. Poor groups and those dependent on the government cannot risk their livelihood by supporting resistance.¹²¹⁵ Israeli Arabs for many years barely lived above subsistence levels. The *fellah* who supported

¹²¹⁵ For a more comprehensive exploration of the relationship between poverty and political violence, see Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

violent resistance to Israeli rule under the military government, for example, would find his land confiscated as well as that of his family. Even tacit support might mean being cut off from the land, which often meant the difference between economic prosperity and survival. As time went on and the Israeli Arab population became wealthier, however, the impact of economic punishments decreased. Berbers in Morocco, Sunni Arab merchants in Syria today, and Bakhtiyaris in Iran, even when often relatively wealthy, depended on the government's assistance (in the form of licenses, patronage, and regulation), which was given out in exchange for political cooperation. This assistance made individuals hesitant to turn against the government.

Civil society is an important "resource" of a group, and control is more effective when civil society is weak. The communal organizations that make for a vibrant civil society also provide a ready base of organization for political action. Thus, many governments seek to shatter civil society. The Israeli military government and the present monarchy in Morocco tried to co-opt and repress civil society institutions (such as social clubs, religious organizations, and sporting groups), thus reducing potential rivals to government organizations. Baathist Iraq and Syria and Pahlavi Iran were much less subtle. In all these countries, the regimes used massive force to disrupt civil society, forcing individuals to either not organize or to rely completely on the government.

If the government can disarm a population, then control becomes easier to carry out. The French success in removing arms from the tribal areas--something that few governments are strong enough to accomplish--played a major role in the subsequent monarchy's ease of putting down the tribal revolts. The post-independence monarchy was weak in terms of military strength--far weaker, in fact than the Spanish colonial government that was regularly defeated by

Berber tribes--yet it easily subdued the disarmed Berber tribes. In Iraq under the British, on the other hand, tribal revolts in Kurdish areas occurred regularly, in part because the British were not willing to devote the resources necessary to disarming the tribes.

In addition to group resources in general, a group's social structure has a tremendous impact on the success of control. Traditional ethnic groups proved easier to control than more modern ones. Traditional groups have a readily-identifiable organization structure that a government can target. When these individuals are controlled, the ethnic group as a whole

generally follows. Thus, colonial governments and the Pahlavi government, by co-opting and controlling tribal leaders, gained tremendous leverage over various tribal groups. Israeli Arabs also proved far easier to control before modernization and education changed traditional patterns of authority and organization.

Certain types of government are more effective at carrying out different degrees of control. Colonial governments and authoritarian regimes, for example, are freer to use control than are liberal democracies. Sustaining selective control proved hard in Israel due to its general commitment to

Box XIII: An Overview of Control**Advantages of Control**

- o Reduces the ethnic security dilemma and deters hegemonic individuals and groups
- o Reassures the majority community
- o Channels organization into ways that benefit government control
- o Allows long-term social structure changes
- o Level can be reduced once expectation of punishment is created

Disadvantages of Control

- o Inspires resentment
- o Difficult to implement
- o Massive control often backfires

Important Intervening Variables

- o Segmented and traditional societies are usually easier to control
 - o Lack of civil society makes control easier
 - o Poorer groups are easier to control
 - o Key role of outside powers
-

democratic values. Israeli Arabs successfully used the courts, and later the parliament, to press for a reduction in discrimination. Israeli Jews, for their part, often felt embarrassed about the second class status of their Arab countrymen, leading them to press for an end to military government.

Control and Outside Powers

As discussed in chapter ten, outside powers can play a key role in determining the effectiveness of control. By providing groups with a haven and with arms, control becomes far harder to implement: groups can organize from abroad and can easily turn to violence. Moreover, control's credibility--a key to its deterrent effect--is called into question when outside powers threaten to meddle. Iraq's ability to prevent Kurdish dissent suffered considerably when Iran armed and trained Kurdish rebels. The weak Lebanese government could provide basic levels of control that kept peace when Lebanon's communal groups were weak. However, when outside powers began pouring money and arms into Lebanon and when the Palestinian-Israeli dispute turned parts of Lebanon into a war zone the same level of control was not sufficient to keep the peace.

The experience of Israel, however, suggests that the negative influence of outside powers can be overcome. Israel has avoided ethnic violence--both from Israeli Jews and from Israeli Arabs--despite propaganda, arms, and a haven for potential rebels in neighboring states. This success, however, required a tremendous "on the ground" presence and came when Israeli Arabs, for many years, were disorganized and shattered by the conflicts of the late 1930s and 1940s. Weaker governments, or ones facing stronger ethnic groups, might have failed where Israel

succeeded.

The Question of Government Capture

When one group completely dominates the government, the advantages and disadvantages of control change. Not surprisingly, the capture of the government by one group often incites concerns of security and hegemony among that group's rivals. In Baathist Iraq, for example, the capture of power by Arab nationalists incited the fears of both Shi'a and Kurds. These groups regularly armed and organized in response to Baath attempts to subordinate them and destroy their distinct identities. The threat of punishment still reduced group organization, but control in general became less effective because non-dominant groups had a greater incentive to organize in order to ensure their security and hegemony. Yet government capture has a benefit often overlooked: it reassures the dominant group. In Israel, Jews have seldom engaged in violence against Israeli Arabs despite Jewish security fears, suspicions of Arab loyalty, and their desire to ensure that the country remains "Jewish" in its character.

An Overview of Accommodation

As the congruence tests in the previous chapter revealed, accommodation by itself will not create ethnic peace and indeed often worsens ethnic conflict. When used with control, however, accommodationist strategies are highly useful to prevent status concerns from becoming a source of conflict. Each of the three forms of accommodation examined in this dissertation--devolution, co-optation, and participation--has different advantages and disadvantages. Thus, each strategy is described separately.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Devolution

Devolution by itself did little to improve ethnic relations and at times worsened them.

When combined with other policies, however, devolution plays an important role in fostering ethnic peace by mitigating status fears.

Devolution's greatest strength is that it greatly reduces group concerns about their status. High levels of autonomy left groups content with their status--a contention reflected by the lack of group complaints about status issues such as language or their position vis-a-vis other groups. In Hashemite Iraq, the government's willingness to respect the cultures and traditions of Kurdish and Shi'a communities fostered goodwill among these groups. Similarly, the French colonial governments of Syria and Morocco's willingness to respect, and often promote, the culture of non-Sunni Arab groups often led these groups to become staunch supporters of the French.

Devolution's biggest problem is that it does not ameliorate the ethnic security dilemma or deter hegemonic individuals.¹²¹⁶ Because devolution by itself does not affect the security dilemma--indeed, it may worsen it by giving groups more resources--it may not end ethnic conflict even when it satisfies status concerns. Devolution can also increase the ability of a group to organize to use violence. For example, during the British Mandates in Palestine and Iraq, ethnic groups used the very institutions the British government helped create to foster violence.

¹²¹⁶ In addition to doing little to increase security, devolution angers rival communal groups that have hegemonic ambitions. In the French protectorate of Morocco and the Hashemite regime in Iraq, Arab nationalists in both countries resented the devolution of power to minorities. These hegemonic nationalists believed that only Arab nationalists deserved a say in the country's affairs. This anger, however, did not result in communal violence in most places, although Arab attacks against Armenians did occur in Iraq and Christians in Syria were attacked during the time of the French.

Devolution combined with selective control, on the other hand, does satisfy the aspirations of many ethnic groups while ensuring their security. The right to use local courts, receive proportionate development spending, and other privileges satisfied Berbers and Arabs under the French, and later under the current monarchy. Indeed, the French saw allowing the Berbers the right to use customary law and bestowing better health care and education as key elements in their strategy to subdue and placate the Moroccan tribes. Because selective control prevented groups from taking up arms in self-defense, the all-pervasive state of war and fear present in Sherifian Morocco ended.

Devolution proved particularly effective under the French, in part because the French were careful to devolve symbolic benefits as well as material ones. Lyautey in particular made sure that French respected Islam and did not disturb Arab and Berber customs. He treated local leaders as equals rather than as subjects and worked to preserve the fiction of Moroccan sovereignty. Even after Lyautey left, devolution proved effective in part because symbols of authority remained intact even as actual input into decision-making decreased. In Municipal Councils and in the countryside, French officials increasingly dominated decisionmaking, but they still preserved nominal elite inclusion.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Co-optation

Co-optation proved effective in fostering ethnic peace, but it can only solve part of the problem of ethnic conflict. Under every government examined so far, co-opted elites usually cooperated with the government rather than working toward violence. Co-opted tribal and communal leaders under colonial governments often worked against the nationalists. In Asad's

Syria and Pahlavi Iran, co-opted leaders regularly worked with the government against militants in their own communities. Indeed, as the Israeli Military Government experience suggests, the danger of co-optation is that it may be too successful, depriving elites of any semblance of independence, which destroys their ability to influence the people as a whole.¹²¹⁷

Co-optation strengthened moderate elites over radicals. Elites willing to work peacefully within the system gained more resources and a louder voice in government. This gave them an advantage over rivals, particularly in societies where access to the government is necessary for economic success. In both Israel and Morocco, for example, co-opted elites can offer elementary services such as permits and patronage to those who accept their leadership. Radical rivals are left without similar resources. The British Mandate government of Iraq used co-optation to create a body of tribal leaders that opposed both the nationalists and members of their own community seeking more autonomy. Even Baathist Syria co-opted many Sunni Arabs, weakening their resistance when the community took up arms.

Co-optation also decreases the status concerns of a group by providing them with visible representation. In Hashemite Iraq, the large number of Kurds and Shi'a in government and in leading positions reflected their communities' general inclusion in society. Interviews indicate many Berbers in Morocco do not feel discriminated against because several Berbers have

¹²¹⁷ Although this dissertation does not explore issues of efficient government, it is important to note that co-optation often reduces administrative efficiency. The British under the Mandate worked disproportionately with Christians because they were more pro-Western and better educated than the Arab Muslim community, a preference that undercut the effectiveness of co-optation. Similarly, the French faced a constant struggle between the demands of administration and placating local traditional leaders. French colonial officials regularly ignored the greed and corruption of loyal tribal leaders as did Israeli officials working with clan elders. Even if not corrupt, many loyal leaders were illiterate or incapable of mastering even basic administrative techniques.

attained prominent positions in government and commerce. Needless to say, co-optation does not entirely remove status concerns from a community's agenda, particularly if those co-opted are not respected in the community. Over time Israeli Arabs came to view many of their co-opted political leaders with contempt, a view that limited the status the community as a whole derived.

Despite many advantages, co-optation is far from perfect. Co-optation often is ineffective due to rising education levels and living standards. In Israel today, depriving people of a permit or a government job does not necessarily reduce them to poverty. Urbanization also has reduced the influence of land-owning families while the creation of a newly-educated elite has brought rival leaders, many of whom are ardent nationalists, to the fore to compete with traditional elites. Israeli Arabs became increasingly disgruntled with co-opted leaders, considering them passive pawns of the Israeli government. Co-optation also failed to contain rising Arab nationalism in Morocco, in part because the French proved unable to co-opt many of the very elites their education and modernization efforts created.

The British Mandate and Lebanon suggest another limit of co-optation in the face of social change: even when traditional elites retain positions of influence, they must become more responsive to the frustrations of their constituents. In Palestine, the Mufti of Jerusalem and other co-opted Arab elites became more militant after the formation of the Istiqlal Party in 1933 and other nationalist organizations that were critical of the entrenched leadership. Similarly, when the Arab Revolt broke out forces from below compelled these elites toward militancy.¹²¹⁸ In Lebanon, the growth of education and wide-scale migration led to a decline in the influence of

¹²¹⁸ When security is not assured, co-opted elites also face violence from their own communities. During the Arab revolt, many village headmen who worked with the British during the Mandate were killed by hostile mobs who resented their cooperation.

traditional elites and allowed new, more bellicose leaders to rise to the fore. As modernization began to politicize many Lebanese, traditional leaders had to respond to their desires and could not rely on their loyalty as they could in the past. Thus, many traditional leaders became more militant due to popular pressure.

These problems suggest the dilemma of co-opted leaders: to be respected and effective over time, co-opted elites must have some degree of independence. This independence, however, can be used to counter the government's strategy of preventing effective ethnic organization. The Mufti of Jerusalem illustrates this point nicely. He had the prestige to organize his followers and command their respect even as he worked with the British. When tension heated up, however, he used the organization he built to upset ethnic peace.

Co-optation in general is less effective when a community has independent institutions on which to draw. Contrasting the British Mandate with Morocco today is instructive. During the British Mandate, Arabs disaffected with their leaders could still organize through existing institutions. Similarly, their leaders had resources independent of the central government. In Morocco today, however, almost all resources and institutions derive from the state. Thus, co-opted leaders and their followers have little choice but to work with the system.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Participation

Participation proved particularly effective in reducing ethnic hostility. When ethnic groups participated in the same political system, it helped increase moderation on all sides and reduce status worries. Participation, however, is difficult to enact. Participation also probably

shares the weaknesses of devolution with regard to providing for security.¹²¹⁹

Successful participation increases a group's sense of having a stake in the political system, thus reducing its status concerns. Opinion polls of Israeli Arabs over the years show a direct correlation of perceptions of the effectiveness of participation (i.e. do Israeli Arabs believe that the system can improve their position in Israel) with both decreased support for the use of violence and greater acceptance of Israel's existence.¹²²⁰

In addition to providing status benefits, successful participation strengthens the forces of moderation and pragmatism. The attitudes of Israeli Arab elites in particular suggest pragmatism in their dealings with Israeli Jews. Interviews of leaders of former pariah parties such as Rakah indicate that leaders see their role as influencing Jews as much as leading Arabs. Furthermore, almost all political leaders favor working within the system.

Successful participation itself fostered peaceful attitudes among all groups that in turn strengthened participation. As time went on, Israeli Arabs increasingly voted for mainstream rather than rejectionist parties, and these parties in turn worked increasingly with Jewish parties. Similarly, the continuation of domestic peace led Jewish parties to cooperate with Arab parties,

¹²¹⁹ This dissertation did not explore any cases where participation occurred without control, a situation that almost surely would have resulted in considerable violence since participation would not protect groups' security or prevent hegemony. In Israel, no one interviewed noted that political participation aided their security. Thus, it would be premature to conclude that participation without control will result in continued violence, but I believe violence would be highly likely if groups remained unsure about their security.

¹²²⁰ This increase in the benefits of participation bodes well for future Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. Although tension is likely to remain high, Israeli Arab successes in gaining a greater share of government resources, improving their participation in the upper echelons in decisionmaking, and receiving more respect for their civil rights are likely to reinforce their conviction that working with the system offers them opportunities to improve their position in society.

something unheard of before the 1980s. By the late 1980s, even the Islamic parties, which initially rejected the very idea of Israel, participated in national elections.

The conditions for successful participation, however, are hard to enact.¹²²¹ Mutual trust and faith in the system are necessary. The British failure to create participatory institutions in the British Mandate is instructive. Arabs and Jews both saw participation as a means of "winning the census" and imposing their views on the other group. Each group would only agree to participate when the system would guarantee it power, a condition that made participation's implementation impossible. The standard benefits of participation--compromise, trust, and eventually greater system legitimacy--could not accrue.

Another difficulty with setting up participation is that it was seen as a *de facto* endorsement of a system's legitimacy. Under the Palestine Mandate, the Arabs rejected participation outright in the 1920s when the British tried to work around the "winning the census" problem and gerrymander the Municipal Council presence so that the British would hold the balance between Arabs and Jews. When the British later proposed a Council in 1935 that would give Arabs more control, the Zionists bitterly opposed participation for the same reason.

A strong case can be made that participation is only effective when the majority group is divided. During the time of the Military Government, voting did little to improve the lot of

¹²²¹ Because of trust problems, participation in Israel had to be enacted gradually. Although Israeli Arabs began voting regularly after independence, in reality this right to vote gave them little influence over decisionmaking until the mid-1970s. For many years Israeli Jews did not trust Israeli Arabs enough to give them a true voice in decisionmaking. Even after thirty years of peace, many Israeli Jews still do not fully trust Israeli Arabs. Participation eventually worked in Israel because the balance of ethnic relations never was in question. Jews would dominate, and Arabs would remain subordinate. The extent of this subordination--whether as an equal minority or as a second-class citizen--remains in dispute today, but the question of whether Jews or Arabs will rule is not debated by either ethnic group.

Israeli Arabs. After Likud's electoral victory in 1977, however, the importance of the Israeli Arab vote increased as splits among Israel's Jewish population increased Israeli Arabs' electoral importance. As parties competed for their support, Israeli Arabs extracted more concessions for their community. Israel's proportional representation system also increased the ability of smaller groups, such as the Israeli Arabs, to influence events. Without a proportional representation system, the influence of distinct minorities such as Israeli Arabs probably would have been reduced.

Participation can also interfere with the successful implementation of other strategies. The Israeli government gradually decreased the level of selective control it used to intimidate the Israeli Arab population, in part because of political pressure from increasingly powerful Israeli Arab political parties and institutions. Similarly, free elections allow communities more input into choosing their leaders. In Israel, this forced co-opted Arab leaders to look to their communities rather than exclusively carrying out the central government's will. Successful participation also increased the number of non-co-opted leaders who took power.

Circumstances that Affect Accommodation's Viability¹²²²

A wide variety of conditions affect the implementation of accommodationist measures.

Regime type, the nature of the ethnic group in question, and the level of government penetration

¹²²² The presence of settlers also interferes with accommodation in the form of devolution or co-optation. Settlers generally seek a strong central government in order to increase their own status and influence. French *colons*, for example, had an interest in assuming control over the Berber and Arab communities, thus reducing the scope and scale of both co-optation and devolution. The result of this was growing resentment, often targeted at colonial officials. I do not explore this issue in depth as the presence of settlers is no longer an issue in current Middle East disputes, which is the focus on my work.

all affect the chances for success.

Certain regimes, particularly statist ones or those having a chauvinistic philosophy, are reluctant to support accommodationist measures for ideological reasons. The Istiqlal, for example, advanced an Arab nationalist philosophy that implicitly denied ethnic divisions in Morocco. Maintaining a credo that all Moroccans are Arabs proved difficult to square with demands for ethnic distinctions. Israeli Jews and Arabs faced a variation on this problem. Jews saw the Israeli state in national rather than civic terms. Thus Israeli Arabs could not by definition participate in the symbolic life of the state.

Mandate regimes or other temporary governments also face problems. Compromise solutions to status issues are difficult to enforce as groups feel that they could gain more if given self-rule and that a future government might leave their current status vulnerable. In Iraq under the British Mandate, for example, much of the reassurance that comes with devolution was squandered, as Kurdish groups feared future Arab hegemony. In Syria, ethnic hostility increased as talks of independence led minority groups to fear for their status and increased the expectations of Syrian Arab Muslims. Devolution did little to reassure Arabs and Jews in Palestine about their status, in part because it left both groups uncertain as to their status once independence came.

Government penetration affects different accommodative strategies in different ways. A high level of government penetration makes co-optation more effective but interferes with devolution. The more benefits a government can provide, the more influence it has to co-opt potential troublemakers. Furthermore, when groups come to depend on the government, the government can threaten to withhold its benefits to punish those who use violence. Devolution,

on the other hand, requires a low level of government penetration. Groups must look after themselves. The French protectorate in Morocco offers the best example of how to square this circle. The French succeeded in devolving considerable authority to local areas, but only after ensuring that local decisionmakers became dependent on the French for their positions.

The organization of the ethnic groups involved in the conflict also affected government strategies. Segmented ethnic groups proved easier to co-opt than ones with a strong national identity. The Israeli government used existing clan divisions to co-opt rival clan leaders and to weaken the ability of the community as a whole to unite. As a national identity that transcended clans developed, co-optation proved harder to enact. Whom to co-opt became an open question as the number of potential leaders increased and clan identities decreased.

Widespread poverty or state-dependent wealth also makes co-optation easier. Poorer individuals have more to lose from even token resistance to the government's wishes, particularly in a centralized state. Sunni Arab merchants in Syria today and Israeli Arabs during the Military Government period depended on the government for their well-being, which increased the government's leverage over them. In Morocco, wealthier individuals also were often hesitant to offend the government because their economic well-being depended on government support.

Table X11A: An Overview of Accommodation

	Advantages	Disadvantages	Important Intervening Variables
Devolution	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Helps satisfy a group's status concerns 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does not end the ethnic security dilemma or counter hegemonic groups. 2. Increases a group's ability to organize 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regimes, for ideological reasons, are often reluctant to devolve power to ethnic groups 2. Difficult when the level of government control over the economy and institutions in general is high.
Co-optation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Convinces elites not to use violence 2. Strengthens moderate voices 3. Reduces status concerns 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Less effective when new elites are emerging 2. Less effective when communities have autonomous institutions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Segmented ethnic groups are easier to co-opt 2. A higher level of government control over the economy and society makes co-optation easier. 3. Poorer and state-dependent ethnic groups are easier to co-opt.
Participation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provides groups with a stake in the system 2. Increases group pragmatism and moderation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very difficult to enact 2. Requires splits in majority to work well once enacted 3. Interferes with control and co-optation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Type of electoral system

An Overview of Identity Change

At its most effective, identity change offers individuals of an ethnic group the ability to attain status under a new identity even when the group as a whole--along with its leaders, symbols, and culture--is relegated to inferiority. Over time, the new identity may help individuals overcome the ethnic security dilemma and satisfy their status concerns. In the short-term, however, identity change can instill tremendous resentment, particularly when it disempowers an established set of elite or challenges a group's daily routines.

Hegemonic governments often attempt identity change--and at times succeed--but they face tremendous obstacles in their attempts. Identity change goes directly against the status concerns of a people. The language people speak, their customs, and their history all can change when a national or new ethnic identity is assumed. If identity change policies are backed with force--which they must be when identities are well-established--they often set off security dilemma concerns as well.

The Advantages of Identity Change

When successful, identity change policies can devastate an ethnic group and end its ability, and desire, to use violence. The Bakhtiyaris in Iran today, for example, appear to be becoming extinct as a corporate group. The concept of organizing as Bakhtiyaris is increasingly far-fetched. Because so many Bakhtiyaris are becoming Persians, communal conflict between the two is becoming unthinkable.

Promoting a national identity that embraces all ethnic groups equally also increases the likelihood of lasting peace, although the degree to which this new identity takes root is not

certain. Moroccan Arabs and Berbers both have embraced the term Moroccan to at least some degree. Interviews suggest that individuals in both groups saw this common identity as a reason for domestic harmony.

Efforts to meld various small groups into a larger minority identity increased the strength of the larger identity. The French effort to create a Berber identity increased the identity of Berbers as Berbers. It also slightly reduced the salience of tribe, region, and religion as potential identities.¹²²³

The Disadvantages of Identity Change Policies

Attempts to create new identities face tremendous social opposition, particularly when they challenge the daily rhythms of a population. The Istiqlal's attempt to transform Berbers into Arabs met with widespread resentment and backfired completely, strengthening Berber identity and weakening the Istiqlal's already loose grip on power. Although the Istiqlal tried to create a rival identity with which individuals could satisfy their status claims (i.e. Berbers, in theory, could embrace Arab nationalism) this identity did not sink in immediately. During this gap between when the French system--with its co-optation and devolution in Berber areas--was eliminated and the future time when an Arab nationalist ethos might be accepted by the population as a whole, the Berbers' status claims were not satisfied, leading them to take up arms. The Iraqi Baath regime's attempts to impose an Arab identity on Iraq's Kurds and Shi'as also backfired. Identity change policies, if anything, "hardened" Kurdish and Shi'a identities, making

¹²²³ Indeed, the French effort had a lasting impact on ethnic relations in Morocco, as it tied the new identity to a specific regime--the French protectorate--an association that has discredited Berber particularism since.

these groups more aware of their distinct identities.

Berber and Kurdish leaders in particular suffered from these identity changes. They lost the high status positions they had attained under previous regimes while they received nothing in return. Not surprisingly, many Berber elites still harbor hostile feelings toward the Istiqlal to this day. Kurds, of course, are far more bitter toward their Arab neighbors and are in a near-constant state of rebellion.

Identities often were rejected because they did not bring sufficient status with them. Those rejecting the new identity--such as the Israeli Arab rejection of a pure Israeli identity or the Syrian Muslim rejection of the Baath, pan-Arab identity--did so in part because they did not see the aspirations fulfilled, or having a chance of being fulfilled, under the new identity. Israeli Arabs surveyed repeatedly noted that the state did not treat Arab citizens equally. At the same time, however, Israeli Arabs are careful to distinguish themselves from the even less-privileged Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. Similarly, Syrian critics of the regime note that being an 'Alawi is the key to prominence in society, regardless of whether one is committed to Arab unity.

The Bakhtiyaris in Iran who assimilated rightfully believed they would gain sufficient status in society. The Persian majority was not hostile to their incorporation into society, making the change in identity advantageous for individuals. Thus, for individual Bakhtiyari their status was more assured by assimilating into the dominant community than by remaining second class citizens.

The failure of identity change can often lead the dominant group to become violent. When recalcitrant ethnic groups opposed identity change policies, hegemonic groups often brand them traitors or otherwise use violence to compel them to accept the new identity. In Iran, the

continued Kurdish resistance to the clerical regime enraged many clerical leaders and their Shi'a followers. Similarly, Arab nationalists in Iraq saw the continued particularism of Kurds as proof of their disloyalty to the state.

Factors that Affect Identity Change Success

Identity change is extremely difficult to carry out even under the most propitious circumstances. Unifying symbols, a shared culture, and a weak rival identity often help identity change policies to succeed. However, when regimes face a strong intelligentsia and a culture hardened by great tragedy, identity change becomes even more difficult. Once again, the role of outside powers also can interfere with the success of this policy.

As the Moroccan, Israeli, and Iranian cases suggest, the presence or absence of a large intelligentsia with a well-developed written history and culture has a strong impact on identity change attempts. Moroccan schools today emphasize the common heritage of both Arabs and Berbers. Furthermore, the "high culture" of Berbers is written in Arabic, and Arabic is accepted by Berbers as the chief language in Morocco--a choice reinforced by government policies. The Bakhtiyaris in Iran also share a high culture with their Persian neighbors and lack an independent intelligentsia of their own. Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, over time developed a large educated class which had access to nationalist literature from the Arab world and neighboring Palestinian communities. Despite extensive Israeli efforts to prevent Palestinian intellectuals from writing, the distinct history and heritage of Israeli Arabs could not be invented as part of the heritage of Israeli Jews, particularly when the education system emphasized Jewish rather than common

Box XIIB: An Overview of Identity Change

Advantages

- o Can weaken an ethnic group's organization and lower its numerical strength
- o Can create feeling of identity between former rival groups

Disadvantages

- o Imposed new identities inspire tremendous resentment among affected population and increases their status concerns
- o Failure can lead to violence
- o Requires majority to accept changed identity of minority
- o Identity change policies disadvantage traditional elites

Intervening Variables

- o Whether the regime itself represents multiple ethnicities
- o Hard to accomplish when intellectual activity of group is high
- o Hard to accomplish when group has a memory of a tragedy to bind them together
- o Role of outside powers

Identity change policies are particularly difficult to carry out if a group has suffered a great tragedy, usually characterized by bloodshed and emigration. Moroccan Arabs and Berbers did not face a legacy of tremendous bloodshed with other ethnic groups identified as the perpetrators. Iraqi Kurds today, on the other hand, confront decades of massive killings that have hardened Kurdish identity. Again, the intelligentsia plays an important role as it preserves memories of conflict and uses it as a tool for mobilization, making it harder to reconstruct histories in a way that emphasizes the identity the government wants to foster.¹²²⁵

Outside powers can play a key role in

¹²²⁴ Indeed, this argument on the importance of an intelligentsia in preserving identity correlates with fluctuations in the Israeli Arab identity. The vast majority of the small Palestinian Arab intelligentsia fled into exile in 1948. This may explain why Israeli Arabs were more willing to be considered "Israeli" or "Israeli Arabs" in the years following the creation of Israel than in the 1970s, when their own intelligentsia began to develop.

¹²²⁵ Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," p. 154.

preventing an identity change. In Israel and Iraq, outside powers offered the countries' respective Arab and Kurdish populations a strong rival identity with which to identify as well as offers of military support. A distinct literature, history, and language helped keep Arab and Kurdish identity alive. In addition to strengthening particularistic identities, this support also deepened the divide between the Arabs and Jews and the Arabs and Kurds respectively, as it led many among the dominant groups to see the minorities as "enemy affiliated."

Morocco illustrates a relatively easy case for building a national identity. Berbers and many Arabs often identified themselves by tribe, region, or religion as much as by ethnicity. Furthermore, the government did not need to completely invent unity myths. A pre-existing, mutually-respected symbol existed in the King, who was seen by many Arabs and Berbers as a revered religious leader. Furthermore, Berbers have always respected Arabic as the language of Islam--thus its use and teaching does not inspire resentment.

Iran illustrates the limits of identity change policies. Bakhtiyaris, who were smaller in number than Iranian Kurds, found it hard to mount an effective military resistance against the strong Persian government; thus, they had few alternatives to submitting to the government's attempts to assimilate them. Furthermore, the "high culture" of the Bakhtiyaris is Persian, both in their writings and in their religion. The Kurds, on the other hand, often write in Turkic and in Arabic and belong to a different sect (in general) of Islam than the Persians. Finally, the Bakhtiyaris seldom received outside assistance in their efforts to resist the government, while the Kurds regularly did. Perhaps most importantly, Iranian Persians accepted the Bakhtiyaris as equals and countrymen but looked down on the Kurds as ignoble aliens.

Mediation: An Overview

Mediation played a useful but limited role in providing groups with a peaceful means of redressing their grievances. Under the French Protectorate, the colonial administrator served as a third party in mediating local tribal and other disputes. Colonial officials believed this played a role in convincing tribal groups that peaceful means could be productive.

The French role in establishing the National Pact of 1943, however, suggests that third party mediators can also play an important role in establishing an accommodative structure. French officials helped broker a system in Lebanon and reassure the various communities that their interests would be protected. Without this guarantee, it is questionable whether the good faith of the parties alone would have resulted in the National Pact compromise.


Mediation in general, however, has several overwhelming problems that limit its effectiveness. Mediation's greatest problem is the question of enforcement. Without someone to enforce peace, security dilemma and hegemony problems are rampant. The holy men of Sherifian Morocco relied on the tribes themselves to enforce negotiated settlements, which failed to produce long-term peace. On the other hand, the French official could rely on the army (as well as a disarmed populace) to ensure that his solutions were carried out.

Paradoxically, the very concessions designed to foster peace can in fact make the government look weak and exacerbate the security dilemma. When the British worked with Hajj Amin al-Husseini and 'Aref el-'Aref, for example, this appeared a sensible concession to the desires of leading Arab families. This concession, however, alarmed Jews who saw it as a sign that participation in violence would go unpunished.

Mediation depends on actual concessions in order to solve status issues. Constant

mediation efforts occurred during the British period in Palestine, but a mutually-satisfactory status package could not be created by the mediators. Track Two negotiations suffered from the same problem during the Mandate.

Mediation was particularly ineffective or counterproductive when ethnic groups sought hegemony. In Palestine, track two negotiations resulted in learning and improved perspectives, but what was learned was that compromise was not possible. Jewish and Arab talks only reinforced both parties' belief that no compromise was possible.



Box XIII: An Overview of Mediation

Advantages

- o Provides groups with a potential source of redress for their grievances

Disadvantages

- o Difficult to enforce settlement
- o Does nothing in cases of hegemony
- o Outside actors can easily discredit mediation

Finally, mediation is highly-vulnerable to the machinations of outside actors. British officials in Palestine at times achieved what they thought might be a lasting solution to the Arab-Jewish dispute.

Regardless of the validity of this hope, it is obvious that Jewish lobbying in Parliament lowered the credibility of mediators in Palestine and created expectations on both

sides that any mediated settlement would be overruled. Similarly, the success of other Arab peoples in achieving self-rule also undermined the credibility of British mediation by raising the expectations of Palestinian Arabs and highlighting their inferior national status.

Chapter XIII: Conclusions

The problem of how to prevent ethnic conflict from recurring is a severe one. Creating a lasting peace is difficult under the most propitious conditions and impossible when fate and circumstances conspire against governments. Although Britain employed time-tested policies to keep the peace in Palestine, the Arab-Jewish confrontation proved overwhelming. Even governments that keep the peace for many years, like the National Pact government of Lebanon, can collapse under the weight of meddling neighbors and a changing society.

This dissertation is an attempt to help ease the burden governments face by illustrating the benefits and problems with various policies and noting when, if at all, they are effective in producing lasting peace. By assessing these policies in light of selected causes of ethnic conflict--particularly those that stem from concerns about security, status, and hegemony--it becomes easier to understand if, how, and when various policies work in practice.

This final chapter first reviews the major findings of this dissertation. It then briefly examines several possible limits to these findings and describes additional areas that merit further research. This chapter then notes several theoretical and practical implications of this dissertation's findings. Finally, this chapter concludes by speculating on the future of ethnic relations in Lebanon and Iraq based on the lessons learned in this dissertation.

A Summary of Major Findings

Although all the families of strategies examined in this dissertation at times contributed to lasting ethnic peace, some clearly did so more than others. Control and accommodation in

particular proved effective in ending conflicts. Identity change attempts occasionally helped end conflicts, but more frequently they engendered hostility and led to renewed violence. Mediation, while seldom causing conflict by itself, did little to foster lasting peace in the cases examined.

Control policies are necessary to prevent the recurrence of communal conflict. Every government examined in this dissertation that created lasting communal peace used at least minimal control. Unless governments can provide security through control, groups will take up arms in their own defense or at times simply to impose their will on rivals. By arresting, censoring, or intimidating individuals considering the use of violence, governments can foster an atmosphere of security. This atmosphere will lead groups to use peaceful means to pursue their goals and, over time, it may reduce a group's cohesion and its ability to make war. Although the use of control raises legitimate human rights concerns, it is important to note that the level of control can be decreased over time once the security dilemma is broken.

Accommodation is necessary, however, to offset many of the problems that come with control. No successful government used control alone to foster lasting peace. Control creates tremendous hostility: few groups welcome government attempts to impose security, particularly when this involves intrusive measures or limits on organization. Such measures threaten the status of a group, leading it to fear that it will become subordinate. To counter such fears, devolving power to a group or allowing it a voice in decisionmaking is highly useful. Moreover, co-opting the leaders of a group often increases group satisfaction while making it harder for the group to organize for the use of violence.

Without concurrent control policies, however, accommodating groups through devolution and participation often results in disaster. When groups are not sure of their security and fear

hegemony, they often use accommodative measures to bolster their capacity for conflict. The local schools and mosques the community controls due to devolution become centers for mobilization. Elections and political parties become a means of dominating the state, not compromising with voters from other communities. In short, the very resources gained from accommodation become resources for violence.

Identity change, in general, causes more resentment than it alleviates. Groups usually perceive attempts to change their identities as a guise for subordinating their communities. This is particularly true when the new identity is that of a historic rival. The Kurds in Iraq and the Berbers in Morocco, for example, resented attempts to impose an Arab nationalist identity on them, and both rose up in protest. Only in Iran did an identity change policy succeed in fostering lasting peace, as members of the Bakhtiyari tribe slowly accepted a Persian identity. Yet even there this change took decades (and is not yet complete) and engendered hostility that required often brutal government measures to prevent from flaring into violence.

Although this dissertation did not test the mediation family of strategies thoroughly, the cases examined suggest mediation is not a common or strong cause of lasting peace. No mediation was attempted in most of the ethnic relations successes examined. Only in one case--the French protectorate of Morocco--did mediation appear to contribute to peace, and even there it did far less to improve ethnic relations than did control and accommodation.

The success or failure of the above four families cannot be examined without assessing the role of outside powers. If they choose, outside powers can prevent every policy family from functioning successfully by providing aid to belligerents or by promoting a rival culture. Foreign meddling destroys trust, which is a necessary factor for both ensuring security and creating a

power-sharing system. Thus, living in a "good neighborhood" often means the difference between ethnic peace and ethnic conflict.

Limited Answers

This dissertation is only a first step toward answering the broad question of how governments can craft a lasting peace. A wide number of factors may have unduly shaped its conclusions or may limit their applicability to other cases of conflict in the world today.

Several factors related to the general question of communal war and peace were not examined in this dissertation. This study focused only on selected causes of communal conflict. Ethnic conflicts, however, have many causes such as personal rivalries or genocidal ideologies that this dissertation did not explore. Furthermore, many of the policies laid out in chapter three were only briefly examined in this dissertation and, in any event, governments could combine these policies in ways not examined in this dissertation.

The Middle East itself is an unusual area, and this may limit the generalizeability of this dissertation's conclusions. Unlike many geographic areas, the countries of the Middle East share a common culture, religion, and identity. Indeed, national identity is unusually weak in the Middle East. Many of the conclusions presented in this study, particularly with regard to identity change policies and the role of outside powers, may be affected by these transnational links.

The robustness of this dissertation may also be limited because several of the cases examined may have been "easy" in the sense that the governments faced relatively few barriers to crafting an ethnic peace. Morocco and Israel--the two cases studied in the most depth--both at times offered advantages for peacemakers. In Morocco, Berber ethnic sentiment did not run

deep, the past level of killing was limited, and outside powers in general did not disrupt efforts to promote peace. Israel, while situated in a volatile region and facing hardened communal identities, also had the advantage of a strong state and initially faced an ethnic group weakened by elite emigration and clan divisions.

The applicability of many of my conclusions to conflicts today may also be limited because this dissertation examined many cases of conflict that occurred early this century. Each historic era is unique, offering both different challenges and opportunities. The colonial era in the Middle East proved a fruitful one for examining "lessons learned," but this time period was unusual for many reasons: the governments in question were usually far stronger than the communal groups; they had only limited ties to native society; and they seldom faced a large literate and mobilized population. Throughout the Middle East today, however, literacy is widespread, a middle class is growing, and modernization in general is increasing the political and communal consciousness of many individuals. Thus, the lessons of the past may have limited applicability to the realities of the present.

Finally, the strategies presented as solutions were examined in light of their general credibility as possible solutions but were not tested rigorously. To better test their effectiveness for other cases, the strategies should be presented as combinations (i.e. rather than only testing control and accommodation separately, they should also be examined together) and tested across a range of cases. Moreover, in many cases the number of observations I make about each theory is often too low for sound conclusions. Mediation in particular deserves further testing. My hope is that future studies will explore the points raised in this dissertation in more depth.

Areas for Future Research

The question of how to foster lasting peace is a large one, and a complete answer will require considerable further research. In addition to testing the theories developed in this dissertation across a greater number of cases, this study suggests three particular questions that demand further analysis: the lasting influence of outside powers, the viability of partition, and the best way to carry out identity change policies.

At times outside powers offer the last hope for communal peace. When governments are active parties to a conflict, foreign intervention may be the only chance that a government will abandon conflict and pursue policies to create lasting peace. Recommending intervention, however, is difficult if the long-term implications are not known. When scholars assess outside intervention, the focus is almost invariably on the short-term, noting how outside powers can bring about a ceasefire or mediate a settlement between belligerents. More attention needs to be paid to the long-term influence of outside powers. This dissertation suggests that outside powers can hinder lasting peace in a number of ways. These observations, however, were not rigorously examined or tested despite their unsettling implications.

Partition also deserves a second look, particularly with regard to the question of population transfers. Critics of partition rightly note that partition does not eliminate concerns about minority rights in the new region but instead simply creates a new minority in the new states. And these new states seldom respect minority rights.¹²²⁶ Because of minority rights

¹²²⁶ Ideally, an outside power will guarantee minority rights, but such a guarantee may not be forthcoming or may be short-lived. Minority rights guarantees, unfortunately, appear to be an issue scholars embrace with confident ignorance. Halperin, Scheffer, and Small, for example, make the argument for the acceptance of human rights as the key to international recognition of self-determination, ignoring the international community's dismal record on enforcing this issue.

questions, peaceful population transfers should be considered. A population transfer, while brutal, still may be preferable to the burden of guaranteeing minority rights in a new state. Much of the suffering and death that attended past population transfers probably could be alleviated by short-term outside humanitarian interventions. Without population transfers, partition will increase conflict by creating incentives for ethnic cleansing.¹²²⁷

A third question raised but not answered in this study is how to carry out successful identity change policies that do not require shattering rival ethnic groups. Attempts by the Istiqlal and the Iraqi Baath to impose Arab culture and identity on other groups failed miserably. Both regimes, however, carried out their policies in a cumbersome way, using laws and force where perhaps education and time might have prevailed. The Pahlavi regime did assimilate many Bakhtiyaris, but it did so only by using massive control measures to prevent any Bakhtiyari organization. A more comprehensive examination of successful and unsuccessful identity changes throughout the world today would help answer many questions about this policy.

Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 84-93. Similarly, Levine rather blithely notes the importance of minority rights safeguards. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," p. 331. If the historical record is any indication, however, the international community will do little to enforce human rights standards. Time and time again outside powers have agitated for such recognition and have then not followed it up with force when later regimes have repudiated these policies. Again, the true question is not whether safeguards for minority rights are important, but when--if ever--a minority can rely on international guarantees and what should be done when such guarantees are not likely to be fulfilled or forthcoming.

¹²²⁷ Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," p. 161. Studies on whether new settlers face discrimination from old settlers and how a successful population transfer can be carried out would be particularly useful.

Theoretical and Practical Utility

This dissertation explores many theories of how to craft an ethnic peace that discomfit scholars. Many of the policies examined in this dissertation do not represent values shared by many, or even most, Westerners. This dissertation notes that repression is often highly effective and that attempts to shatter a communal identity can indeed work. Although I do not unconditionally endorse these policies, I believe we must begin the study of how to foster a lasting peace by first recognizing what works. Only when this is widely understood should we examine how these policies can best be carried out while respecting important values such as ethnic diversity and human rights.

Crafting a lasting peace is difficult after a communal civil war, but--despite the claims of some scholars and statesmen--governments can prevent some ethnic conflicts from recurring. Continued security concerns are likely to plague states that suffered from civil wars, as several scholars suggest.¹²²⁸ These concerns, however, can be overcome by government policies. The cases examined in this dissertation offer multiple examples of bitter ethnic conflicts that no longer are active today. In Morocco and in Israel, the security dilemmas and hegemony fears that plagued groups in the past have diminished drastically. Groups in these countries no longer eye their neighbors with suspicion: both are confident that the government will protect them. Israel has even developed a viable, if limited, democracy that includes Arabs as well as Jews. This

¹²²⁸ See Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" and Walter, *Resolution of Civil Wars* as examples of the school that sees the security dilemma as insurmountable (Kaufmann) or only defeated through outside intervention (Walter). Michael Lind argues that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines. See "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), p. 95.

finding has tremendous implications when the question of intervention is raised. When historic conflicts flare anew, questions of intervention must not be dismissed simply because of "age-old animosities," which President George Bush cited as a reason to avoid intervention in the former Yugoslavia.

Although this dissertation contends that age-old conflicts can be overcome, it also notes that simple solutions, particularly ones that involve power-sharing, often can be counterproductive.¹²²⁹ Unless the government has established order, attempts to build power-sharing systems will backfire. Attempts to promote a new identity can be particularly dangerous in these circumstances.

This finding suggests U.S. and Western attention often is misguided in the aftermath of a conflict. A preference for kinder, gentler solutions can reduce the effectiveness of interventions. As this dissertation makes clear, what is important initially is often to establish a secure environment. Without such an environment, developing power-sharing institutions or using confidence-building measures often is useless or even counter-productive. Thus, attention should be paid to the police and military of a state that suffered a civil war as well as, or even before, focusing on reforming a country's political system.

Intervention in general, however, should be viewed with a skeptical eye. Outside intervention to foster peace is feasible, but the cases examined in this dissertation paint a much

¹²²⁹ For works that endorse gentle solutions such as power-sharing or nation-building while largely neglecting security concerns, see John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 237-263; Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144; and I. W. Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273.

darker picture of the role of outside powers. In general the possibility of intervention worsens ethnic relations. Outside powers heighten security and status fears and create a specter of uncertainty that undermines control and accommodation measures.

Indeed, the very definition of intervention should be reconsidered and a new aspect--cultural intervention--should be noted. Scholars and statesmen alike neglect the role foreign states play in increasing group ambitions or preserving cultural identity. Analyses of intervention traditionally consist of assessing cross-border arms trafficking, refugee flows, or financial support. In much of the Middle East, however, outside powers also affected the aspirations and identities of the peoples involved. The examples of independence in Syria and Egypt proved far more destabilizing to Mandate Palestine than did any arms or leaders coming in across the border. Similarly, the Kurds in Iraq today owe much of their strength to the preservation of Kurdish identity in Turkey, Iran, and even Europe. This cultural output from abroad made the Baath claims that the Kurds are truly Arabs ring false.

Applying Lessons Learned: Solvable and Unsolvable Civil Wars in Iraq and Lebanon

What are the implications of this dissertation's findings for conflicts in the Middle East today? Lebanon today is a case where even a bitter civil war and continued communal divisions can be overcome. Iraq, on the other hand, offers a counterexample of where a state's probable failure to produce lasting peace make it a prime candidate for partition.

A Chance for Peace in Lebanon

For peace to come to Lebanon, two causes of ethnic conflict--the ethnic security dilemma

and status concerns--must be overcome. As discussed in Chapter VIII, communal violence broke out in 1975 due to fear stemming from the growth of communal militias, the weakness of the Lebanese government, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Contributing to this violence was tension over the distribution of power, wealth, and status under the existing "National Pact" governing system, which had frozen Lebanon's political system since 1943. Both these problems could cause conflict today. Unless Lebanon's many communal groups are satisfied as to their security and status, any peace is likely to be short-lived.

Lebanon, like other countries that have a history of civil conflict, faces the immediate task of reassuring groups and individuals about their security. Although Syria disarmed most communal militias in 1990 and 1991, the Iranian-backed Hizballah remains well armed.¹²³⁰ Perhaps more importantly, all communal groups vividly remember the 15 years of civil war and how even politically-passive individuals often became involved in, or targets of, the violence.

Equally important is the potential for conflict over status issues. Lebanon's governing system, based on the 1989 Taif Accord, distributes positions among all of Lebanon's communal groups and promotes cross-ethnic cooperation. Yet the division of spoils is hardly to the liking of all groups. Christians, particularly the Maronites, remember their past preeminence and are bitter that Sunni Muslims now occupy the dominant place in Lebanon. Shi'as, for their part, are not satisfied with the Taif system, which leaves them less influential than Lebanon's Sunni

¹²³⁰ The experience of the French colonial government in Morocco illustrates the value of disarming a population. Over time, the French disarming of the tribes weakened their ability to resist the government, enabling the post-French monarchy to easily defeat Berber resistance even though the monarchy was weak. If groups stay unarmed, even a weak Lebanese government would be able to impose its will on them.

community despite the Shi'as larger total numbers.

Lebanon, however, has a surprising ally in its quest for lasting peace: Syria. President Asad worries that instability in Lebanon will ignite instability in Syria itself, as it did in the 1970s when Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war led to protests from Islamists in Syria.¹²³¹ Because Asad recognizes his military is no match for Israel's, he also wants to prevent conflict in Lebanon from exploding into a larger conflagration. Moreover, now that Syria is the dominant power in Lebanon, stability is a means of preserving Syrian influence.¹²³²

Since 1990, Damascus has enforced order in Lebanon. Syria has disarmed Lebanon's militias and punished individuals who used violence--at least those who used it without Damascus' permission. Syria's active intelligence and police services are easily capable of detecting and defeating any group considering the use of violence. More ominously, Syria has not hesitated to murder communal group leaders that opposed its wishes, and their heirs will try to keep on Damascus' good side.

Syria's imposition of order is not enough: the Lebanese government must also try to reassure communal groups about their place in the state and society through a combination of co-

¹²³¹ Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, pp. 71-72.

¹²³² Damascus' true goals in Lebanon are difficult to discern, but Syrian-dominated hegemony appears to be Damascus' chief ambition. Asad repeatedly has tried to stop fighting in Syria and prevent the country's partition. Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 270. Equally important, he has tried to prevent any other regional power (i.e. Israel, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia) from gaining influence there and has been willing to sacrifice Lebanon's stability to do so. To these ends, Asad has allied with non-Arabs and Christians, despite his pan-Arab rhetoric. Today, when no outside power except Israel retains influence in Lebanon, and Israel's influence is limited to the SLA-dominated border area, a Syrian-dominated and peaceful Lebanon is a very real possibility.

option and participation.¹²³³ Lebanon should be able to carry out co-optation with reasonable effectiveness. Although the Lebanese government is weak, it is relatively wealthy by Middle Eastern standards and private investment is flowing into Lebanon. The government can use these assets to buy the goodwill, or at least the passivity, of political elites. Furthermore, Lebanon's communal groups are often divided by tribe, region, and family. These divisions will provide fertile ground for co-optation, enabling the government to play off rival community leaders against one another.¹²³⁴

Although co-optation will help keep the peace in Lebanon, participation may prove the most important tool the government has for crafting a lasting peace. Participation will help foster cooperation among Lebanon's many communal groups and create a sense of inclusion. Lebanon has already overcome the biggest hurdle to successful participation: implementing a system.¹²³⁵

¹²³³ This appeasement is necessary because control policies often produce a backlash, making groups even more concerned about their status in society. Israeli Arabs regularly complain about the heavy hand of the Israeli government. Higher levels of control, such as that imposed by the Pahlavi governments in Iran and the Baath in Syria and Iraq, created tremendous resentment and often led to communal rebellions.

¹²³⁴ Co-optation in Lebanon will hardly be a panacea. Lebanon is a modern society, and each communal group has many elites representing traditional families, religious leaders, and educated community members. The change in the composition of Lebanon's elites limited the effectiveness of co-optation in Lebanon in the 1960s and after, and this change is even more profound today. The government will not be able to co-opt all these individuals, and thus some leaders will remain outside its influence. In addition to the problem of changing elites, co-optation will not deeply affect the popular base of all of Lebanon's communities. Thus, while it will help win over elites, co-optation alone is not sufficient for ethnic peace.

¹²³⁵ Because Syria has enforced order, participation began to function. Proposals for compromise and a restoration of democracy in Lebanon abounded after the civil war began in 1975. For many years they foundered on mutual suspicion and a refusal by all groups to accept the verdict of the elections. After Syria crushed the last resistance in 1990, however, it compelled communal groups to participate in elections despite their objections. In 1992, many Christians boycotted the elections, hoping to avoid giving an imprimatur of legitimacy on a

Lebanon has successfully implemented the Taif system, which is fostering communal cooperation and laying the groundwork for a lasting peace.

The Syrians and Lebanese together have cobbled together a system in the Taif Accord that may prevent problems of majority tyranny. Under the Taif system, no group dominates Lebanon completely, though the Sunni community has replaced the Maronites as Lebanon's preeminent group.¹²³⁶ Government spending, the civil service, and senior positions are divided among Lebanon's leading communities. Taif's electoral system also promotes confessional mixing and moderate candidates by requiring voters to pick candidates from other sects. Attaining political power requires that communal group leaders gain the support of other groups. Thus, all of Lebanon's leading groups are "recognized" as distinct entities and are accorded a modicum of respect, but none can use the political system to dominate other communities.¹²³⁷

The Lebanese government must build up its own capacities for control if peace is to last

process they rejected. By 1996, however, such qualms had disappeared as they recognized that only by participating could they gain influence in decisionmaking. Many Christian supporters of anti-Syrian Christian leaders such as General Aoun boycotted the 1992 vote, but since then resistance to Taif has crumbled. Indeed, Lebanese Christians felt forced to participate in the Taif system as their boycott did little more than strengthen radical Sunni and Shi'a forces. Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir insisted that Christians must take part in recent elections. "Lebanon survey: A question of faith," *The Economist*, February 24, 1996, p. S15.

¹²³⁶ Although the President remains a Maronite, power is now concentrated in the Prime Minister's position.

¹²³⁷ The Taif system is far different than a consociational system, which governed Lebanon until 1975. The consociational system did little to promote inter-ethnic cooperation, instead relying on pleasing each group with an extreme form of devolution. Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in Leonard Binder, *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 295. Under the consociational system, each community chose its own leaders and the government relied on inter-communal bargaining among elites. The Taif system, however, directly promotes inter-communal cooperation by forcing individuals to choose candidates from other communities.

when (and if ever) Syria withdraws its forces. Beirut should begin building up its police force and its domestic intelligence services. Particularly important is an "on the ground" presence. This presence will both demonstrate the government's determination to stop violence and improve its intelligence capabilities in the event that deterrence fails.

Preventing outside interference is another vital step for creating an atmosphere of security.¹²³⁸ As Lebanon's past vividly demonstrates, outside powers can challenge the government's monopoly on violence by providing arms or a haven to violent activists or by operating directly in the country. The uncertainty raised by outside intervention hangs over Lebanon. Although Syria has established order and the Taif system has encouraged power-sharing, all groups recognize that Israel, the Palestinians, or other outsiders could easily disrupt this order and cooperation by arming communal groups. This uncertainty alone, even though Lebanon's neighbors do not appear to seek to escalate the violence, is unsettling. Should outside powers other than Syria appear to be meddling in Lebanon again, many communities may oppose the Taif-based governing system because it gives political and economic resources to "enemy affiliated" communal groups.¹²³⁹

¹²³⁸ Iran and Israel both have the potential to increase fighting in Lebanon. Iran, by backing Hizballah with arms and money, contributes to continued violence in Lebanon. Although Hizballah targets its violence against Israel and the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army, the very presence of a well-armed, well-funded Islamic fundamentalist movement alarms many of Lebanon's communities. Israel regularly retaliates against Hizballah. This retaliation undermines the credibility of the Lebanese government and, like the Shi'a themselves did in response to the Palestinians, has the potential to lead affected communal groups to try to arm and train to protect themselves.

¹²³⁹ Even the example of outside powers could prove unsettling. The Shi'a regime in Iran and the Sunni Arab dominance of much of the Arab world poses an implicit challenge to Lebanon's multi-ethnic system. The Shi'a and Sunnis in Lebanon, whose coreligionists are dominant elsewhere in the region, may become dissatisfied with their status in society.

Complete success, however, will also depend on factors outside Lebanon's control, particularly the Arab-Israeli peace process. Good neighbors are necessary for Lebanon to stay peaceful. Should the conflict between Hizballah and Israel intensify, or should Syria become more directly involved itself, then Lebanon may again repeat the sad events that led to civil war in 1975.

In conclusion, peace, if not harmony, is possible in Lebanon. Building goodwill will take time--generations perhaps--but the status quo is stable if the government enacts the right policies. Lebanon also illustrates a rare case of where outside powers are promoting peace. Syria is an unlikely peacemaker, but its willingness to enforce security and impose a reasonable power-sharing system have done wonders for Lebanon.

Continued Warfare in Iraq

Governments cannot solve every conflict. The cases in this dissertation suggest continued fighting is highly likely when one communal group has "captured" a government, when power-sharing arrangements are highly unlikely, and when aggressive neighbors regularly meddle. As discussed in Chapter VII, Iraq is such a state. Because peace is not likely to return to Iraq, it deserves to collapse and be partitioned.

Problems are highly likely when the government is considered "captured" by one particular ethnic group, particularly when that government engaged in widespread killing. The massive population transfers the Baath carried out in the Kurdish areas, as well as the systematic slaughter, are etched into the hearts of all Kurds today. Even more importantly, the major party responsible for the killing in Iraq was the Sunni Arab-dominated government. Thus, Iraq has to

not only quell the security dilemma among groups, but also the dilemma between the government and its Kurdish and Shi'a victims. A Leviathan, in Iraq's case, is a source of fear, not reassurance. Not surprisingly, the security dilemma in Iraq today is worse than ever before in Iraq's history. Each time the central government in Baghdad has weakened, the Kurds have taken up arms. Now it seems likely that the Shi'a too will rise up whenever Sunni Arab power is disrupted.

Sadly, Iraqi history does not suggest a government will come to power that will be willing or able to install a Taif-like system to promote ethnic harmony and power-sharing.¹²⁴⁰ Clearly the current Baath government has no desire to implement a power-sharing system, but the problem runs deeper than this particular regime. The history of communal uprisings for the last 35 years strongly indicates that the problem of good government will not be solved just by a new government. Furthermore, the legacy of Sunni Arab repression under the Ba'ath will make it even more difficult for any successor regime to incorporate Sunnis, Shi'as, and Kurds into one harmonious state.

In Iraq today communal groups clearly have lost faith in the government. The mass killings that occurred during the Anfal campaigns have destroyed any hope of cooperation between Sunni Arabs and their Kurdish and Shi'a neighbors. As one interlocutor put it, "even when Kurds cooperate with the Baath, they look over their shoulders, waiting for the knife to

¹²⁴⁰ The one brief period of communal calm in independent Iraq occurred during the post-war monarchy, from 1945 to 1958. This government, however, was imposed on Iraq by the British. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 88. The most comprehensive description of ethnic and social relations in this period is in Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq*.

appear."¹²⁴¹ Thus, Iraq fits the conditions for when ethnic politics turns democracy into a sham. Because past conflict limits current trust, elections become a census, firebrands prevail over cooler heads, and groups seek to maximize internal solidarity rather than reaching out to others.

Nor will any future Iraqi government be able to overcome this suspicion and forge a shared Iraqi identity, particularly with regard to the Kurds. Such a change in identity may have been possible in the past, when Kurdish identity was more malleable. Today, however, Kurdish identity is truly "hardened:" The Kurdish struggle against the Baath is now preserved in hundreds of written testimonials and other transmittable media. Moreover, the persecution of Kurds as Kurds, as opposed to members of a particular tribe or region, has contributed to their solidarity. Rewriting this history would prove impossible.¹²⁴²

Iraq's neighbors are also likely to work against a lasting peace. Iraq, if unified, is a powerful state. Moreover, Iraq has repeatedly attacked its neighbors in recent years and has sponsored instability outside its borders. Thus, Iraq's neighbors are likely to play a careful balancing game. If Iraq appears strong they will support insurgencies. Turkey and Iran have repeatedly sponsored Iraq's Kurdish guerrillas, and Tehran is also likely to continue working with Iraq's Shi'a population to undermine Baghdad. The Gulf states also might consider supporting insurgencies should Iraq regain its former strength.¹²⁴³

¹²⁴¹ Interview with senior Kurdish official, December 19, 1996.

¹²⁴² Ironically, the very Baath regime that hardened many Kurds through violence also gave them a means of preserving these memories by expanding education.

¹²⁴³ Tehran has organized Islamist Shi'as under the banner of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It seeks to extend its influence among its coreligionists and undermine Baghdad. For works on Iran's foreign policy, see Fuller, *The "Center of the Universe"* and Mackey, *The Iranians*, pp. 301-355.

Reconsidering Partition

What is to be done with Iraq and other countries where a lasting ethnic peace appears almost impossible? State borders should not be seen as permanently fixed if their continuation will do nothing but foster more hatred, oppression, and violence. Partition is an option that should be explored in such extreme cases as Iraq. Partition is hardly an ideal solution, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. Successor states are almost never perfectly homogeneous. They too will face the problems of communal mistrust and a lack of cooperation: only the names of the oppressor and the oppressed will change.¹²⁴⁴ Although partition has many problems, the international community should not support states condemned to constant war: new states, with better borders, should be established in their place. Extreme conditions often demand extreme solutions. Iraq has failed to produce ethnic harmony, and future success is highly unlikely. Stability and human rights both are fostered in states where ethnic conflict does not recur and

¹²⁴⁴ Nor should the international community necessarily reward groups that use violence. Recognizing a new state in one region might prompt other, currently peaceful peoples to take up arms and demand their own states. Finally, partition may only result in the transformation of a conflict from a civil war to an international one.

Works that address both legal and practical problems with partition include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," *Virginia Journal of International Law* Vol. 34, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992-1993), p. 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 45, no. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 347-365. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, R. N. Lebow, and J. G. Stroessinger, *Divided Nations in a Divided World* (New York: David McKay, 1974) and Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For several works assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) and Daniel Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," *Ethics*, 105 (1995), 352-385.

where the state does not preserve itself by repression alone.

In cases such as Iraq where ethnic conflicts cannot be prevented from recurring, the world community should help carry out any necessary population transfers. Historically, population transfers--such as those between Pakistan and India and Turkey and Greece---have imposed tremendous hardship on the communities involved. Simple humanitarian aid, however, can alleviate many problems ranging from water supplies to temporary housing. International media attention and troops can also help protect minority communities from violence during the transfer. Although the will for such interventions may be in short supply, such brief interventions are likely to be more politically sustainable than ensuring minority rights for years to come--the only humane alternative to the partition of particularly brutal states such as Iraq.

Final Words

Peace is often possible in deeply-divided societies. We need not throw up our hands after every civil war and declare the state destroyed forever. Israel and Morocco today appear to be countries that put communal conflicts behind them. Even identities hardened by war and persecution can work together. Today, the Taif system in Lebanon also offers an example of how a political system can be structured to foster inter-ethnic cooperation. Yet peace is not always within reach. Iraq's continuing problems with communal security, meddling neighbors, and a brutal political system bode poorly for peaceful state survival.

Crafting peace is difficult. The preservation of peace requires understanding both the causes of conflict and how it might be ended for good. If scholars are to help statesmen in the task of putting an ethnic war behind us, we must learn from past successes and failures and begin

the process of accumulating knowledge about a complex and often-confusing subject. This dissertation is dedicated to this effort.

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