THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL CHANGE:

THE EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON INSTITUTIONAL TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

by

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Submitted to the Department of
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ABSTRACT

Sociologists traditionally viewed migration as an assimilation process involving a gradual shift from one set of arrangements to another. Recent work acknowledges that at least some movements involve circular processes in which migrants keep "feet in two worlds" and remain oriented toward the places they come from as well as the communities they enter.

Just as a single transnational field has increasingly become the setting in which individual migrants orchestrate their lives, so organizational fields also develop between places of origin and destination. A large body of research focuses on the macro-level economic and governance regimes which arise from globalization. But there are many non-state, non-profit institutions operating at more local levels, such as political parties, churches, and community organizations, which also assume transnational forms that we do not know enough about.

This study aims to contribute to an enhanced understanding of transnationalism through case studies of four such organizations that span the Dominican Republic and Boston. It also challenges conventional notions about the relationship between migration and development which tend to emphasize the economic aspects of development at the expense of its social and political dimensions. These notions also tend to view remittances as uni-directional flows which primarily affect sending countries rather than as the two-way flows that reciprocally impact countries of departure and reception they increasingly tend to be.

In response, this dissertation challenges ideas in good currency about the relationship between migration and development by focusing on migration's effect on civil and political life. It analyzes the actual evolution of transnationalization. It suggests a new concept, social remittances, which highlights characteristics of the relationship between migration and development that are often overlooked. And it uses the idea of social remittances to examine the ways in which transnationalization affects political and civil change.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Each Sunday, the Miraflores Development Committee (MDC), a group of approximately 20 men and women from a small southern village in the Dominican Republic meet in a fellow villager's home in Jamaica Plain in Boston. In the last two years, the committee has raised approximately $70,000 to build an aqueduct and to renovate the village school, health clinic, and community center. Construction of a funeral home and baseball stadium are currently underway.

The Boston Committee has a counterpart organization in Miraflores which also raises funds and executes these development projects. The two groups speak regularly by phone to update one another about their respective progress and to inform each other about village news. The Boston group often watches videos of the projects they support which villagers have taped during their visits home. These videos are then passed around from house to house so that other community members in Jamaica Plain who contribute to these efforts can see how their money is spent. Recently, when disagreements about project management arose among the Miraflores leadership, Boston leaders asked that a full membership meeting be held at the same time that their weekly meeting was scheduled. The two groups then conducted a sort of international town meeting via conference call at which all sides aired their concerns and were able to resolve the conflict.

The Boston and Miraflores branches of the Miraflores Development Committee are one organizational manifestation of the transnational communities that increasingly span the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean. Sociologists traditionally viewed migration as an assimilation process involving a gradual shift from one set of arrangements to another, either by adopting prevailing social forms or through a synthesis of the old and new (Rouse 1991). Communities were understood as discrete geographic localities with stable boundaries and fixed constituencies.

Recent work acknowledges that at least some movements involve circular processes in which migrants keep "feet in two worlds" and remain oriented toward the places they come from as well as the communities they enter. Though immigrants in the past also sustained social and political ties with their countries-of-origin, ease of transport, enhanced technology, and the transnationalization of capital have multiplied and strengthened these links, sometimes extending them over generations. From this new transnational perspective, which this dissertation supports, migration is not a journey between distinct communities involving two separate sets of social relationships but one along a transnational migration circuit.

Just as a single transnational field has increasingly become the setting in which individual migrants orchestrate their lives, so organizational fields also develop between places of origin and destination. A large body of research focuses on the macro-level economic and governance regimes which arise from globalization. But there are many non-state, non-profit institutions operating at more local levels, such as political parties, churches, and community organizations, which also assume transnational forms that we do not know enough about. This study aims to contribute to an enhanced understanding of transnationalism through case studies of four such organizations that span the Dominican Republic and Boston. It attempts to undertake a more systematic examination of the properties of transnationalism, including its lifecyle, range of influence, pathways, and orientation, as well as the relationship between transnational community and society formation.

This study also challenges conventional notions about the relationship between migration and development which are often incomplete because: (1) they tend to emphasize the economic aspects of development at the expense of its social and political dimensions (Goldring 1992b, Glick-Schiller et al. 1992) (2) they generally examine economic remittances without taking into account the social remittances that are also exchanged along the migration circuit, (3) they frequently view remittances as uni-directional flows that primarily affect sending countries rather than as the two-way flows reciprocally impacting countries of departure and reception they increasingly tend to be, and (4) they focus on changes in individuals without paying sufficient attention to the variety of organizational manifestations of transnationalism nor the relationship between organizational and individual change.

In response, this dissertation challenges ideas in good currency about the relationship between migration and development by focusing on migration's effect on civil and political life. It analyzes the actual evolution of transnationalization, observing these processes at previously unexplored levels and in understudied organizational contexts. It suggests a new concept -- social remittances -- which highlights characteristics of the relationship between migration and development that are often overlooked. And it uses the idea of social remittances to examine the ways in which transnationalization alters political and civil life.

The study focuses on migration between Miraflores, a semi-urban village located 65 kilometers southwest of the Dominican capital, and Jamaica Plain, a poor, urban neighborhood in Boston. The Dominican Republic is a small country in the Caribbean which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. Dominicans began migrating to the U.S. in the late 1960's and now an estimated five percent of the country's population lives in the U.S. Though most of these individuals live in New York, the Dominican population in Massachusetts is rapidly growing. Almost 75 percent of the 445 households in Miraflores have relatives in the greater Boston Metropolitan area who began emigrating about 20 years ago.

The four organizations selected as case studies were chosen for their role as building blocks in civil and political society. They include the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), one of the principal opposition political parties in the Dominican Republic; the Catholic church; legal and judicial institutions; and the Miraflores Development Committee, a community organization.

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two briefly reviews the relevant literature on migration and civil and political change. Chapter Three defines the concept of social remittances. Chapter Four describes the research context and methodology, including an analysis of U.S. Census data on Dominican immigrants in Boston and findings from a 184 household survey in Miraflores. Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight cover the four institutional case studies. The final chapter offers a summary of research findings and conclusions.

A summary of the argument is as follows:

Four kinds of organizational systems connect Boston and the Dominican Republic. The political and community organizational systems are comprised by Dominican organizations recreated in the U.S. The political party system links all levels of political activity at various points along the migration circuit. The community organizational system unites two chapters of the same organization that spans the Dominican Republic and Boston.

In contrast, the religious and legal systems bring U.S. and Dominican organizations together. The church system links the two autonomous U.S. and Dominican churches through exchanges of labor, assets, and training. These interactions take place within the context of the universal Catholic church system which furnishes a rationale for their emergence and pre-existing structures that the system is built with.

The legal system is the least developed structurally of all the cases in this study. It is transnational because the criminals themselves, the crimes they perpetrate, and the individuals who prosecute and punish these activities carry out these tasks within a transnational field (Marx, forthcoming). Significant transfers of resources, in support of training and institutional capacity building, have been exported from the U.S. to the Dominican Republic. The organizations that execute these activities tend to be U.S. entities with branches on the island. There are few examples of actual joint U.S.-Dominican structures, though U.S. officials work closely with their Dominican counterparts. Examples of cooperation between U.S. organizations fighting Dominican crime in Boston and their

Dominican-based colleagues are also rare.

Social remittances are the normative structures, systems of practice, identities, and social capital that flow back-and-forth through these transnational systems. They are exchanged by individuals through interpersonal communication or by letter, fax, or phone. Remittances flows are constant and evolutionary, feeding back upon and iteratively changing one another. Social remittances create, strengthen, and alter transnational relationships and are themselves transformed by the transfer process.

Various factors determine social remittance impact including the goodness of fit between countries-of-origin and reception, the timing and order of remittance introduction, the nature of the transmission process, the context of reception, the magnitude of difference between sending and receiving countries, and the character of the group at which remittances are aimed.

The process of transmission changes remittances in different ways: they may remain unchanged, added to but not altered, combined with other remittances to create new forms, or reshaped by the receiving-country milieu.

Findings from this study lend credence to the argument that migration, and the social remittances flows it engenders, make small, positive contributions to civil and political change. Some Mirafloreños changed their ideas about their rights and responsibilities. They gained experience articulating claims, negotiating with political institutions, and participating in democratic decision-making. They invented new political identities and standards for performance. And they imparted these to non-migrants Mirafloreños who have also begun to question their political preconceptions and behaviors.

Change within the legal sphere appears to be the exception. Though some immigrant Mirafloreños acquired new ideas about justice and rights, others used the same skills that enable them to circumvent the inequities of the Dominican legal system to benefit from U.S. law. They are also exposed to a culture of crime and violence in the U.S. that some Mirafloreños fall prey to. The exportation of these negative social remittances back to the Dominican Republic impedes civil and political change.

Social remittance flows also transform the organizations in this study, but to a lesser degree. In contrast to individuals, Dominican criminal justice and law enforcement agencies seem to have undergone the greatest democratization in response to social remittance flows. The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) assumed an aura of greater participation and representativity but often continued to conduct business as usual when the social context allowed. The Miraflores Development Committee (MDC) did not become more democratic. Instead, the resources it contributed to the community enabled Miraflores to become a more effective political actor. Finally, involvement in the church, per se, did not heighten activism. Rather, it was the new practices and identities members acquired by participating in religious movement groups and in church governance functions that contributed to political change.

Civil life in the U.S. is clearly not as unproblematic as many Mirafloreños make it out to be. Dishonesty, unfair practices, and wastefulness also characterize U.S. institutions. U.S. politicians are also corrupt and self-seeking. That so many Mirafloreños come away captivated by U.S. politics reflects their continued propensity to value U.S. institutions more than their own. Though they hold such a romanticized view, Mirafloreños correctly sense that U.S. political and civil life generally functions better, is more equitable, and involves more accountability than in the Dominican Republic. This does not mean that the migration of U.S.- style political practices holds the key to democratic consolidation. It is only to say that the ideas and practices Mirafloreños acquire in the U.S. appear to contribute positively to the citizen formation process.

The character of the transnational organizational systems described here results from the Dominican Republic's closeness to the U.S. and a history of U.S. engagement in Dominican political affairs. Migration flows spanning more significant geographic and cultural distances or between countries-of-origin and departure that are more similar in in magnitude and power would certainly produce different types of organizations and social remittance flows.

CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter is organized into five sections, four of which cover the different bodies of literature which inform this study. The first section defines what is meant by political change in the context of this study. The second section outlines the international migration literature and locates this work squarely within these debates. Section Three looks to recent work on democratization and civil society for tools with which to analyze political change at the individual and institutional level. The fourth section looks at migration from a historical perspective to determine the level of transnationality among previous immigrant communities and how these linkages contributed to or impeded civil and political change. Finally, Section Five examines more recent work to differentiate the sociocultural context of contemporary migration from that in the past.

A NOTE ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE

My use of the word "political" in this dissertation is broadly defined, including the domains of nations, governments, political parties, as well as the organization of interests in everyday life in non-electoral and informal settings (Goldring 1992a). I examine "the political" in a democratic context. My primary goal is to examine the ways in which migration contributes to or inhibits democratization, equity, the ability to organize and participate, and respect for human rights.

International migration is one among many potential engines of political change. Its contribution will be small compared to other change catalysts. It is not my intention to suggest a unilinear or pre-determined notion of how these changes will occur or what their outcomes will be. I expect that political change in the Dominican Republic and among Dominican immigrants in the U.S. may be uneven and intermittent, proceeding in stops and starts. Improvements in equality of access, for example, may be reversed by regime or leadership change. Nor do I anticipate that migration will result in the one-way exportation and adaptation of U.S. forms but rather the selective and partial incorporation of Dominican and U.S. styles and values in both sending and receiving-country contexts. These interchanges of political ideas and structures will yield both positive and negative results. Finally, political change prompted by migration occurs within the larger context of global economic and political relations that inhibit the acts of individuals and states. Race, class, and gender relations make some individuals more willing and capable of political participation than others. Similarly, organizational choices and behavior are constrained by national and international structures of power and interests.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION[1]

International migration theories generally respond to the following four questions: (1) What factors precipitate migration flows? (2) What are the sociodemographic characteristics of the migrants themselves? (3) Through what processes are immigrants incorporated into host country labor markets? and (4) What are the consequences for countries of departure? The relationship between sending and receiving countries and its impact on social and political change are my primary concerns here but a brief review of the causes of migration and migrant characteristics is also offered.[2]

Neoclassical or Equilibrium Theorists understood migration as a response to the unequal spatial distribution of the factors of production. Labor, they said, moves from places with abundant land and manpower but capital shortages, to places richly endowed with capital where labor is in short supply (Spengler and Myers 1977). Rationallycalculating migrants, assumed to be from the poorest sectors of their countries, are "pushed" by economic, political, and social factors to leave their homelands and "pulled" by conditions in the host society such as wage differentials, the promise of a higher standard of living, and a more secure sociopolitical environment (Todaro and Marusko 1987). Stark (1991) argued that households try to reduce economic uncertainty by sending family members to work in a variety of labor markets including international ones. Migration is therefore a self-regulating mechanism which brings a spatially disparate but essentially harmonious system back into balance (Todaro 1976, Rothenberg 1977, Sjaastad 1962). Once begun, migration is viewed as unidirectional, toward high-wage areas, and stable, as long as push-pull factors remain constant. If push-pull factors vary, due to changes in host-country unemployment rates or immigration policy, then a new equilibrium point is reached with an accompanying adjustment in immigrant labor supply.

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[1]. This review draws primarily on studies of migration between the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean. Clearly, other work on rural-to-urban internal migration and international migration in other parts of the world would also be relevant.

[2]. Not surprisingly, there is little unanimity among migration scholars as to the number of different approaches to migration theory. Some see all theories as outgrowths of the Neoclassical/Orthodox or Historical-Structuralist perspectives. Others would combine Systems Theory with the Transnational approach. I see these as four distinct perspectives, although I do not disagree with those who point out the strong links between Social Process Theory and a Transnational approach.

According to the Equilibrium perspective, immigrants make a clean break with their countries-of-origin and are gradually assimilated into host societies. Though several formulations of the incorporation process allow for some combining or co-existence of domestic and foreign norms (Glazer and Moynihan 1963), most Orthodox theorists assumed that immigrants would adopt the practices of their host country without serious conflicts between migrant and native values (Portes and Bach 1985).

Proponents of the Equilibrium model viewed international migration as positive for sending and receiving countries (Friedlander 1965, Griffin 1976, Hume 1973, Rose 1976). Migrants, they argued, supplemented a scarce domestic labor force, earned good wages, and acquired human capital. The remittances and savings they generated ameliorated imbalances in the global distribution of resources and evened out the international income distribution, thereby lessening inequality and promoting economic growth. Remittances also provided investment capital, supported the balance of payments, and stimulated a demand for locally-produced goods and services. Exported labor acts as a safety valve for unemployment. Those migrants who returned home allegedly do so with new skills and attitudes and new technology which energizes sending-country economies (Kritz et. al. 1981, Keely and Tran 1989).

Critiques of Neoclassical Theory emerged in the 1970's when structural changes in the organization of production, an increase in the global mobility of capital, and a rise in new international population movements became evident. Critics argued that in spite of evident disparities between labor exporting and importing areas, wage differentials and related indicators poorly predicted certain population movements (Portes and Bach 1985). Several studies revealed that early labor migrants did not necessarily come from the poorest regions, communities, or households. For example, Cornelius (1980) found that most Mexican migrants came from only a few states that were neither the poorest nor the closest to the border. Also contrary to theoretical expectation, the Mexican rural poor facing the largest wage differentials were less likely to migrate than their urban, working-class counterparts (Portes and Borocz 1989). Other explanatory factors, critics charged, needed to be taken into account. These included the role of force, coercion, or recruitment in stimulating population displacements; land tenure patterns; the rise of circular and return migration; and the sociohistorical context in which migration occurs (Piore 1979, Massey, et al. 1987).

In response, Historical-Structuralists proposed an alternative interpretation which brought the mechanisms by which macro-level forces affect the demand for labor, labor recruitment, and remuneration into the fore (Amin 1974; Cheng and Bonacich 1984; Emmanuel 1972; Petras 1980; Balan, Browning and Jelin 1973; Portes 1978). These theorists firmly situate the migration process in the context of the global capitalist system. They treat migration as a class phenomenon, where the unit of analysis is the migration stream rather than the sum of individual migrants' decisions that the Equilibrium approach understands it to be.

According to the Historical-Structuralist view, migration is caused by and reproduces structural imbalances within and between interdependent units of the world system (Boyd 1989). International labor migration is caused by the incorporation of low-wage peripheral or semi-peripheral regions of the world economy into the more advanced, high-wage, or core regions (Portes and Bach 1985, Sassen 1988). In the process, social and economic relations are transformed. Changing land tenure patterns and the weakening of traditional economic organization create pools of potential migrants (Amin 1974). The commercialization of agriculture, for example, displaces individuals who then respond to the demand for labor created by capitalist penetration. Some migrants are recruited (Piore 1979). Others are forced to leave due to economic restructuring or political upheaval (Sassen 1988, Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The flow of migrants out of peripheral areas to advanced industrial economies of the core creates an international division of labor. The periphery supplies labor while capital is furbished by the core (Sassen-Koob 1978, Portes and Walton 1981).

Historical-Structuralists paint a more pessimistic picture of the relationship between migration and development (Rhoades 1978, Weist 1979). Whether from an Internal Colonialist, Split Labor, or Dual-Labor Market perspective, host country employers are said to employ immigrant labor to their own advantage. Immigrants work in low-wage jobs offering minimal benefits, little job security, and few opportunities for advancement. They cheapen the cost of labor by depressing wages in the secondary sector and impede efforts to organize workers (Castells 1975, Castles and Kosack 1973).

Migration is also said to accrue few benefits to sending countries. Since the most productive community members are often those who move, migration allegedly leads to labor shortages and depletes the human resources pool. Migrants acquire few new skills which are generally irrelevant in their home country (Kearney 1986, Keely and Tran 1989). Migration is also said to make consumers out of producers as declines in agricultural production reduce food supplies and exports while heightening the demand for imports. Since immigrant workers earn low wages, they can barely meet their own subsistence needs, let alone send remittances. In cases where remittances do occur, they are said to be spent conspicuously on consumer goods or non-mandatory food imports (Cornelius 1976). They create sending-country communities which are increasingly dependent on remittances for their survival.

Recent empirical work calls into question some of the basic assumptions of Historical-Structuralism. By emphasizing structure, critics claim, theorists in this tradition lose sight of the individual. They do not pay sufficient attention to human agency or contingent events. The conceptual categories they employ, such as core, periphery, and class, fail to capture contextual and historical diversity. And their focus on structure gives too much credence to national distinctiveness and borders. Migration is conceived of as a movement between distinct, coherent social spaces rather than the highly-interconnected ones it increasingly tends to be (Goldring 1992a). Some studies have also revealed that it was not surplus labor that migrates but middle class individuals with access to land and resources (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). Other research found that immigrants possessed higher-than-average levels of education and skill (Reichert 1981, Bustamante and Martinez 1979) and that they worked in relatively skilled sectors of the urban economy prior to migration (Foner 1987, Portes and Guarnizo 1990). Finally, the benefits that migration purportedly accrues to core employers are predicated upon the temporary nature of migration flows but seasonal, circular, and permanent migration patterns are increasingly common.

With these critiques in mind, migration theorists sought a new approach that takes the structural determinants of behavior and the factors motivating individual action into account. The Social Process or Systems Perspective that emerged focuses on the intermediate social structures that mediate between micro and macro processes. This approach emphasizes the embeddedness of economic action in social structures and focuses on the ways that social relations, such as kinship, friendship, and ethnic-based social networks, shape the effect of socioeconomic structures on individuals, families, and households.[3] Social Process Theorists see migration as a social product, not as the result of individual decision-making or as a mechanical response to political and economic structures (Pessar 1982, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Boyd 1989).

Systems Theorists argue that, once initiated, transnational migration becomes a self-perpetuating process with an internal momentum of its own (Massey et al. 1987).[4] Because the first-to-migrate face such high economic and psychological costs, they tend to be from the lower-middle class sectors of sending communities -- primarily males who can afford to migrate but who are not so well off that they can afford to stay home (Pedraza 1991, Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, Goldring forthcoming). These target earners are willing to endure arduous work and living conditions to achieve their goal of quick return with maximum savings (Piore 1979).

As migration becomes increasingly common, a series of changes in social structure, motives, and values, are set in motion, creating conditions that encourage further migration. Migrants' preferences and tastes are transformed by their participation in high-wage economies. New wants, consumption patterns, standards of material well-being, and aspirations for social mobility arise. The demographic base of migration widens as women join their husbands, target earners become semi-permanent migrants, and the mean age of migration declines (Hondageneu-Sotelo 1992, Alarcon 1991). Massey (1990) referred to this as the "cumulative causation of migration." Reichert (1981) called it "the migrant syndrome," which he defined as the combined effect of increasing economic dependence on migration, local value changes encouraging further migration, and persistent socioeconomic conditions which made migration necessary to begin with. Alarcon (1989) used the term "Northernization" to describe the process by which localities specialize in the production and reproduction of international migrants through changes in their social and economic organization and cultural practices.

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[3] Portes and Sensenbrenner (1992) and Guarnizo (1992) proposed an economic sociological approach to migration which, in many ways, parallels Social Process Theory.

[4] This section summarizes Massey, Goldring and Durand's (1994) recent excellent synthesis cf migration theory.

Over time, a dense web of social ties, permeated by reciprocal obligations for assistance, links migrants and non-migrants. According to Massey (1990), migration becomes self-perpetuating once the density of network connections reaches a critical threshold. Migration gradually becomes less selective and more commonplace as these social ties decrease the costs of migration and increase returns to risk.

Systems Theorists are more nuanced in their assessment of the relationship between migration and development. They stress the ways in which households use migration as a strategy of production, reproduction, and consumption. They ask who benefits from migration, how the income earned is distributed, and what the subsequent impact is on bargaining power, decision-making, and the division of labor within migrant households.

Both a positive and negative assessment of the impacts of migration on development emerges. With respect to the host country, Social Process Theorists stress the heterogeneity of labor market incorporation, arguing that differences over time in migration patterns, labor market structures, access to resources, and the importance of legal status engender distinct integration modes (Goldring 1992a). On the other hand, as some community members ascend to positions of authority, they are able to hire others, thereby narrowing the diversity in jobs, destinations, and economic strategies, which Jones (1982) called channelization (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). Some migrants develop sufficient cultural fluency to establish links with sending-country institutions such as banks, government agencies, and schools. Others never stray from the self-sufficient confines of their ethnic communities, creating opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurship as the demand for specialized goods, entertainment, and cultural products increases.

With respect to sending-country development, Massey et al. (1987) found that remittances increased the income of Mexican rural households to a level comparable to that of advantaged urban households. Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) reported that remittances also had a significant positive impact on Dominican household income; 34% of the Dominican households they surveyed had received remittances at one time. Portes and Guarnizo (1991) found that one-time migrants owned 90% of the small firms in the towns they surveyed; 89% had been started with capital earned abroad. Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) also reported some job creation with remittance funds.

Many studies, however, found that remittances supported consumption rather than investment. Short-term improvements did not result in lasting economic gains. Dominican migrant households tended to own more consumer goods than their non-migrant counterparts. In fact, households often spent symbolically on commodities and memberships associated with middle class lifestyles they could not sustain once remittances stopped (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991).

Research also revealed that sending-country communities relied heavily on migrant earnings. Sending communities became dependent on remittances since migration did little to alter the basic terms of the relationship between the periphery and the core. The potential for locally-generated development declined, agricultural production decreased, and migrants and labor exporting economies became increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in remittance flows (Kearney 1991, Reichert 1981, Mines 1981). Stuart and Kearney (1981) and Arizpe (1982) claimed that the Mexican villages they studied could no longer survive as viable economic entities without remittances. Although migration eased unemployment, land shortages, and access to credit, it also inhibited growth and adaptation. Villagers did not need to change their income-generating strategies because remittances furnished a social safety net. Finally, Grasmuck (1984) found that out-migration contributed to higher unemployment because as the more skilled, educated members left, the economic base of many communities weakened. Migration also weakened pressure for agrarian reform.

Social Process Theorists challenged the foundations of migration theory in several ways which this dissertation builds upon. First, their emphasis on migration as a social process that involves deepening, farther-reaching links between migrants and non-migrants over time, suggests a two-way flow of people and goods. It also suggests that strong links between sending and receiving countries are likely to endure. Second, Social Process Theorists also highlight the role of changing tastes and values in stimulating migration. This study tries to unbundle the actual process of value transfer and to examine the content of value change more closely. Third, while most Social Process Theorists focus on the economic consequences of migration, some researchers have begun to examine its effect on social and political change (Georges 1990, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). They also propose a more complex, contextually-specific view of migration's impacts which vary within and between households as well as by age, gender, and marital status (Arizpe 1982).

The sustained movement back and forth between communities-of-origin and destination, coupled with a recognition of empirical regularities in the way migration unfolds over time, have prompted some scholars to speak of transnational communities (Georges 1990, Guarnizo 1992). Rouse (1989, 1991, 1992) coined the phrase "migration circuits," which he defined as social and geographic spaces created by the constant circulation of people, money, goods and information. As these circuits consolidate, the distinct practices and values that once distinguished discrete societies from one another begin to transform each other. Over time, migrant communities become culturally transnationalized. they incorporate ideologies, practices, expectations, and political claims from both societies that create a distinct culture of migration (Reichert 1981; Rouse 1989, 1991, 1992; Georges 1990; Goldring 1992; Smith 1994). The social meaning of places of origin and destination is also transformed --sending communities become sites of rest and recreation while host-country communities becomes sites of production and reproduction (Goldring and Smith 1993).

From this perspective, migration entails a continuous journey along a transnational migration circuit, rather than the substitution of one set of social relations for another (Rouse 1991, Goldring 1992a, Smith 1994, Portes and Guarnizo 1990, Guarnizo 1993, Guarnizo 1994). Migrants carry on their lives within the circuit as a whole rather than at any particular point along it (Rouse 1992). They develop and maintain multiple familial, economic, social, religious, and political ties, taking actions, making decisions, and feeling concerns within a field of social relations that links their countries-of-origin and settlement. The social fields which emerge cross geographic, cultural, and political borders (Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992). The convergence of identities and memberships which results leads not to division and incoherence as Rouse (1991) suggested but rather to a "durable juxtaposition" in which migrants manage multiple, shifting memberships and identities (Goldring 1992a, Smith 1994).

Much of the research within this perspective has focused on the process of transnational community creation and on explaining the diversity between them (Goldring 1992a). Smith (1994) argues that transnational communities are first imagined. Then a set of practices that manifest membership develop which are institutionalized and reproduced. The result is a locally-oriented community constituted transnationally by migrant social networks. Such entities are also political communities which coexist within other political communities without being of them and generate political affiliations which supersede membership in the sending or receiving-country polity.

Recent theories have only begun to analyze the extent to which the preservation, synthesis, or homogenization of social and political life results from transnationalization. Some transnationalists build on work that challenges the immutability of what were once thought of as fixed social roles. They expand upon the notion that class formation is an internationally-driven phenomenon by suggesting that class experiences are no longer uniform nor do they involve a clear shift from one position to another (Castles and Kosack 1973, Portes and Walton 1981, Goldring 1992a, Smith 1994). Instead, migration often entails numerous and sometimes conflicting experiences of status that involve managing multiple identities. A transnational perspective also encompasses a more fluid notion of citizenship and community membership. Migrants increasingly exercise some measure of civil and political rights in both sending and receiving-country contexts over an extended period. These new, simultaneous allegiances produce new forms of membership including membership without residence and membership without citizenship (Smith 1994, Soysal 1995).

This dissertation builds upon these prior works by trying to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of transnational communities. It takes the existence of transnational communities as given and focuses instead on the different kinds of political and civil organizations they give rise to. It also examines the ways in which transnationalization alters individual actors' political practices and beliefs.

This study differs from much previous work in that it does not view transnational communities as separate from the two larger societies in which they are located (Rouse 1989). Rather, the transnational social and organizational fields that transnational communities engender are firmly rooted in the sending and receiving-country contexts that they span. They continuously evolve as they change and are changed by contact with the home and host country and by the steady stream of social and economic remittances that flow between the two. Transnational communities do not, as Kearney (1986) suggests, supersede or escape the nation-state. Rather, there is increasing evidence that nation-states are developing new ways to encapsulate migrant identities and loyalties (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992). Thus, I understand transnational communities, and the political acts that transpire within them, as transnational social fields that constantly transform and are transformed by the two contexts from which they emerge. They are not new, distinct spheres which exist apart from the contexts which produce them. The circular, iterative flow of social remittances that migrants bring with them, their transformation or lack thereof through contact with U.S. civil and political institutions, and the subsequent impact of these transformed remittances on civil and political life in the Dominican Republic is the subject of this dissertation.

Both Smith (1994) and Goldring (1992a) make important strides toward articulating a more comprehensive view of migrants as political actors and migration as a political act. They focus on the community organizations which serve as forums for transnational community creation and development. Smith (1994), for example, argues that it is through the contestation of membership, and the resolution of disputes over the rights, obligations, and duties it entails, that transnational communities are created. This study builds on Smith and Goldring's work by analyzing the wide range of transnational organizations that arise following community creation and the ways in which these organizations contribute to or impede political change.

The importance of research on this new class of organizations is twofold. First, just as transnational social fields have become the primary context for migrant life, so organizational fields also develop between places of origin and destination. International Relations Theory focuses on the international regimes which operate at a global level (Chalmers 1991, Keohane and Nye 1970, Krasner

1983).[5] But a second group of smaller, non-state, non-profit institutions functioning at more local levels also assume transnational forms. Prior research has not paid sufficient attention to the internal operations of these organizations nor their role in transforming political life.

Second, scholars of transnationalism have not produced a systematic analysis of its multiple dimensions. In addition to broadening the range of organizations which fall within it purview, researchers need to take a more rigorous look at transnationalism's durability, directionality, and spheres of influence. We also need a more systematic treatment of the relationship between transnational communities and societies.

The following section outlines a framework for analyzing civil and political change and raises questions about the potential role that migration plays in these processes.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

The social and cultural prerequisites of democracy and the relationship between democratic transition and consolidation is far from clear (Fox 1990, Lipset 1994). For democracy to endure, a strong cadre of institutions and authorities must inculcate democratic practices (O'Donnell, et.al 1986). A transition from "clientelism to citizenship" whereby individual actors acquire the capacity to participate autonomously in politics and to take actions which shape state decisions and demand state accountability must also occur (Fox 1993) But how are such social and political institutions created and sustained? And how are political actors socialized to take on such tasks? In what ways might migration between less well-established democratic regimes to more long-standing ones contribute to or impede these processes?

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[5]. For example, the international laws, organizations, and formal practices that develop in response to global concerns, such as managing shared natural resources, trade (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), or financial transactions (The International Monetary Fund).

Democracy, in its most basic form, is the selection of leaders through fair and periodic elections such that all adults can participate and candidates can freely solicit their votes. The right to speak, publish, meet, and organize must be respected and safeguarded by the state (Schumpeter 1950, Huntington 1991, Lowenthal 1991). Civil society is the sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which manifests itself in values of cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication (Bratton 1994). In contrast to the state, where the authority of governing elites rests on the potential to use force, participation in civil society is voluntarily. It is motivated either by some anticipated material advantage or a commitment to a particular set of political and ethical values. The success of democratic governance is at least partially related to the density of associational life in civil society and the widespread acceptance of a concomitant set of supportive cultural values that these embody (Putnam 1993, Lipset 1994, Inglehart 1990).

Democracy is also a culture, belief-system, and set of values that develop through interpretation, practice, and change (March and Olsen 1995). It assumes new forms and meanings in response to the new contexts and ideological climates in which it is established.

This study uses a framework developed by March and Olsen (1995) to conceptualize and evaluate the components of political change which transnationalization may influence. According to these researchers, democratic governance requires the development of identities, capabilities, political accounts, and adaptiveness. Identities develop through debate, education, socialization, the use of political institutions, and participation in democratic deliberations and decision-making. An important concern of this study is the ways in which political identities are transformed as migrants and non-migrants are exposed to and participate in an increasingly transnational political system.

Identity formation and the ability to act in accordance with it requires resources and capabilities. Four types of capabilities must be built: rights and authorities, which empower citizens and officials and provide discretion over resources and action; resources; competencies and knowledge; and organizing capacity (March and Olsen 1995). Capabilities are diffused through networks of contact.

> "Political institutions routinely maintain contact with other institutions within the same country and internationally. Bilateral and multilateral contacts among political institutions are an ordinary part of international, economic, cultural and scientific and political exchange. Letters, telephone calls, visits and resources are exchanged. Individuals, committees, task forces, and delegations establish contacts with counterparts elsewhere. They trade information, gain knowledge, and create mutual awareness and the conditions of reciprocity. They establish and maintain networks of association which lead to spread of political practices." (1995:94-95)

A second concern of this study is the inter and intra-organizational contacts stimulated by migration; the actual process of resource, information, and skill exchange; and its subsequent impact on political capabilities and practices.

Political accounts refer to the stories and explanations of political events which bring order, justification, and meaning to "the obscurities of political causality." Such accounts are constructed within the context of a particular set of norms and institutional arrangements that constrain the story- telling process and its moral. Also of interest here is the way in which these interpretations vary when they are constructed in reference to a transnational political backdrop. Are Dominican politicians, for example, held accountable to a different standard of behavior that migrants witness in the U.S.?

Democratic governance also requires political adaptiveness or the ability to adjust to new institutional features and new environmental requirements. Institutions need to sharpen their learning skills and hone their ability to analyze and learn from their experiences. How, then, does transnationalization foster or inhibit adaptiveness?

How can progress toward the components of democratic change be assessed? For the purposes of this study, individual action may take many forms ranging from heightened political engagement and participation, such as exposure to political stimuli[6], to running for and holding office (Nelson 1987). At the organizational level, such things as capacity building within organizations; the expansion of the nonprofit sector; the incorporation of previously marginalized groups in leadership and lay positions; or a more merit-based distribution of benefits may occur.

In sum, modern democracies are shifting collections of meanings, identities, and accounts that infuse social and political relationships (Hannerz 1992). Identities, preferences, capabilities, accounts, and experiences change as they are acted upon and respond to changing environments. Democratic governance involves creating identities and proclivities that define what is suitable and advantageous. It involves creating and limiting capabilities for action, including the ability to consider and chose between an array of options and to believe that these choices matter. Governance also involves devising explanations for political events which attribute credit and responsibility for different outcomes. It entails adaptiveness or the ability to interpret and incorporate lessons from experience.

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[6]. Political stimuli include such things as reading or listening to political news and listening to or engaging in political discussions.

This study examines migration's role in the emergence of this cultural configuration and the ways in which the transnationalization of civil and political life enhances or inhibits democratic practice. The Dominican Republic held its first democratic elections in 1978, following a 31 year dictatorship and 12 years of semi-authoritarian rule. Most consider the elections held since to be fraudulent. Though many observers feel there is little chance that the country will revert back to a dictatorship, political and civil institutions are still weak; distrust of politicians and law enforcement officials is rampant; caudillismo, corporatism, and corruption persist; and the extent to which Dominican citizens are informed about and participate in civil and political institutions varies widely (Espinal 1991). On the U.S. side, many of the structures and relations which facilitated immigrant political integration in the past no longer exist. The new ways in which more recent immigrants are incorporated into the economy have uncertain outcomes for democratic practice.

What happens when a significant proportion of a country's population travels between a "democracy-in-consolidation" and a more established, stable democratic regime? How do the political tools immigrants bring with them shape their ability to articulate demands vis-a-vis the U.S. state? In what ways do their ideas and practices challenge prevailing notions about U.S. politics? What aspects of civil and political life do immigrants assimilate? To what extent do they transmit back new ideas and practices? Do these represent the trappings of democracy or actual democratic practice? How do they influence democratic consolidation and the citizenship formation process?

The following section reviews descriptive and historical literature on earlier migrations to the U.S. It asks to what extent the political, religious, legal, and mutual assistance organizations these communities created were also transnational. What role did they play in civil and political change?

WHAT CAN HISTORY TELL US?

A brief overview of the extensive literature on immigration to the U.S. prior to 1965 reveals that many immigrant communities did sustain some level of involvement in the political and civil lives of the countries they came from. Their participation, however, was not transnational in the sense that I use the term here. Most communities did not create enduring transnational systems involving new sets of arrangements and strategies directed toward both sending and receiving-country affairs. A constant transfer of ideas and resources did not connect and reciprocally change each context. Rather, with the exception of legal and judicial exchanges, immigrants in the past generally used the U.S. as a base from which to pursue political change at home, their involvement weakening as their stay in the U.S. lengthened or as they achieved their goal of regime change. This historical bifurcation of sending and receiving-country civil and political life resulted from the context of reception, the characteristics of the immigrants themselves, and the greater physical and social distance separating migrants from their homelands.

1. POLITICAL LIFE - The extent to which immigrants remained active in sending-country politics was determined by their reasons for migrating, their plans for return, their socioeconomic status, and the political status of the states they left behind. Political refugees were more likely than economic migrants to remain focused on their communities-of-origin. Because they hoped to return home as soon as political conditions allowed, their communities often served as beachheads from which opposition to sending-country regimes was organized. Jose Marti, the leader of the Cuban

Revolutionary Party, literally formulated Cuba's War of Independence from Spain in his New York office; he received critical support from Cuban immigrants throughout the U.S. (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The first Lithuanian newspaper, which opposed the regime in power, was published in New York rather than Lithuania. And Czech and Slovak immigrants contributed many of the resources which helped to undermine the Austro-Hungarian Empire and led to the eventual creation of the Czechoslovakian state (Glazer 1954). Because their primary goal was to return home, political refugee communities generally focused their energies on sending-country politics and remained on the margins of U.S. political life.

In contrast, immigrants who came with the intention to stay gradually assumed a U.S.-bound political orientation. The Irish in mid-nineteenth century Boston, for example, initially contributed generously to disaster and famine relief and to organizations fighting British oppression. Their efforts waned, however, as they became more involved in U.S. political and religious life (Handlin 1975). The challenges posed by maintaining communication and achieving some level of social mobility encouraged this U.S.-oriented shift.

One possible exception was the case of Italians. The Italian government encouraged temporary, periodic emigration as part of its state-building strategy. Government officials viewed migration as a way to dampen political instability resulting from disparities in development between the north and south. They sanctioned short-term emigration as a safety valve while strongly encouraging return through a system of institutions that aided emigrants in their host countries and reinforced their home-country ties. Fifty to seventy-five percent of Italian immigrants to the U.S. were said to return home (Smith 1994, Schmitter-Heisler 1984).

The context of reception and the characteristics of the immigrants themselves were more conducive to political integration than they were today. Most immigrants entered legally. Prior to the 1920's, non-citizenship constituted less of a barrier to political participation. At least 22 states permitted non-citizen voting at some time between the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Racusen 1994). Political party machines actively recruited immigrant manpower and votes (Merton 1949). The expansion of city government and public sector employment created greater opportunities for immigrant incorporation and mobility.

Ethnicity, then, fostered immigrant political advancement in the U.S. But what of the impact of return migrants on their countries-of-origin? Although U.S. political incorporation was largely unconnected to sending-country politics, did the new ideas and experiences re-emigrants returned with foster political change in the countries that they came from? While many studies found that migrants promoted innovation and change by returning with new ideas, agricultural methods, and social practices, their legacy with respect to more fundamental change is less clear (Curti and Barr 1950, Semmingsen 1963).

Because many emigrants acquired first-hand experience with American industry, European union leaders hoped they would return home as labor activists. Wyman (1982) found that some tried to use the organizing skills and ideas they learned when they returned. Others returned with few new skills, having worked in menial jobs involving minimal exposure to the union apparatus. They generally returned to restrictive states and conservative social milieus that were hostile to the new ideas they imported from America.

Conclusions about return migrant impact on political life are also mixed. While U.S. and European industry shared many common traits, there were sharp contrasts between European and U.S. political systems. The new ideas and skills re-emigrants brought back were often irrelevant. On the one hand, migrants promoted educational improvement campaigns which heightened nationalism and stimulated reform. On the other hand, traditional elites, who feared that return migrants threatened the underpinnings of society, often blocked these initiatives and held fast to the status quo.

2. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS - Unlike their political

counterparts, at least some of which began with a sending-country focus, the main, if not only, thrust of immigrant hometown and mutual assistance associations was to help newcomers face social welfare issues in the U.S. (Sutton 1992). Italian, Polish, and Jewish immigrants in the early 1900's formed mutual aid and self-help associations to offset burial costs, assist the poor and orphaned, facilitate savings, or ease access to capital (Tenenbaum 1993, Reimers 1985). These organizations exerted little influence over sending-country civil and political life.

Ethnic associations also functioned as important conduits for urban political integration. They provided a cohesive foundation from which ethnic leadership emerged. Political bosses often encouraged their creation because the leaders of these groups effectively brokered between the machine and neighborhood residents (Georges 1988). The vertical linkages between local groups, ethnic leaders, and city-level officials which resulted offered newcomers an alternative means of accessing services and jobs (Steinberg 1978).

3. THE CHURCH - Some turn-of-the century immigrants tried to reconstitute and sustain ties with the churches they left behind. The cost of such activities was prohibitive, even with occasional contributions from beneficent monarchs and international religious orders (Handlin 1948). When successful, these efforts were often out of context. Though

immigrants could build churches, they could not obscure the surrounding city nor recreate the village background. New arrivals clashed with their predecessors about devotional styles, parish organization, and old country traditions, which impeded the development of a cohesive whole. Church authorities established national parishes, expressly created to facilitate immigrant integration. As a result, ties between sending and receiving-country churches gradually weakened. Though contrary to expectation, religious diversity persisted beyond the first generation, (Hansen 1938, Hansen 1940, Herberg 1960), most groups eventually moved toward integration into a multi-cultural church and into the mainstream of society as a whole (Tomasi 1987).

Though the church has long been an important provider of social services to immigrants, its role as a civil and political change catalyst among pre-1965 immigrants is less clear. Some priests used the church as a forum from which to encourage political mobilization and integration. The Irish, confronting American hostility to Catholicism, found a receptive, ethnically-cohesive environment in the church. They quickly took over the leadership of New York's Catholic community from the French and used the church infrastructure as a springboard toward social mobility by becoming priests, hospital employees, and school workers (Dolan 1985). Strong connections between Irish church and political officials eased political advancement as well. Other religious leaders purposefully dampened political inquietudes. Union leaders in turn-of-the-century Buffalo, for instance, got little help from the priests they sought support from during a local builders strike (Yans-McLaughlin 1977).

Those migrants who did return wielded a more significant impact on home country religious institutions. Vecoli (1972) found that some church officials viewed re-emigrants as a threat to the existing order. They felt that returnees came back more independent, reading books and American newspapers, and attempting to displace traditional elites by organizing their own improvement campaigns. Return migrants also tried to convince others of the new ideas they had been exposed to by establishing new churches of their own.

4. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE -

Transnational linkages between sending and receiving-country law enforcement and criminal justice authorities differ from the connections described above in several fundamental ways: (1) They are more long-standing and highly-developed, (2) They involve inter-state relations rather than connections between branches of sending-country organizations reconstituted in the U.S. or newly-created organizations, (3) They sometimes entail involuntary cooperation, arising from inequalities in power between states and shaped by foreign policy and economic interests.

Prior to World War II, U.S. law enforcement efforts focused on domestic crime (Nadelmann 1993). With the exception of the New York Police Department (NYPD), the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and several private detective agencies, American police devoted little attention to what went on outside U.S. borders. There is also little evidence of extra-territorial law enforcement efforts against political emigres. American involvement in international law enforcement increased by 1939, however, in response to the changing nature of transnational criminality and the emergence of an international civil order. According to Nadelmann (1993), it was demilitarized, professionalized, and police-focused.

Since the turn-of-the-century, however, the U.S. participated actively in training Latin American military and law enforcement officials. Assistance patterns shifted with changes in U.S. economic and political interests or perceived political and economic threats (Higgins 1994). In the early 1900's, due to its intensive involvement in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Panama[7], the U.S. focused its efforts on establishing national police forces. These activities grew out of a desire to bolster pro-U.S. government or government factions with little popular legitimacy and to reduce unregulated opposition and politicization. Later, U.S. efforts responded to fears about the spread of communism and anarchism. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations saw foreign police and security forces as the first line of defense in the Cold War. Policy makers believed that, under U.S. tutelage, foreign militaries and police could be made into "nation builders" and promote an appreciation of U.S. values and way of life.

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[7]. The U.S. assumed control of Cuba following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. It had also recently acquired Puerto Rico. Work on the Panama Canal began in 1903.

The organization and perpetration of crime is also transnational. Complaints linking ethnicity and crime began in the Colonial era, later extending to crime among Irish and German indentured servants (Daniels 1990). The classic example of criminal transnationality is the Italian Mafia with its alleged links between Sicily and U.S.-based crime family organizations. In conclusion, the research reviewed above provides clues about the character of transnationality and the relationship between migration and political change during particular eras and in specific locales. In the cases of political groups, churches, and community associations, most of the organizational ties that joined sending and receiving countries gradually weakened or disappeared after one or two generations. Despite some early orientation toward sending-country affairs, most organizations eventually assumed a U.S.-based focus. Linkages between political refugees and their homelands seem to have endured the longest. Once sending-country governments changed, however, these organizations also weakened as immigrants returned home. In contrast, transnational legal ties persisted over time because they were driven by state-backed efforts to pursue foreign policy goals.

The nature of these organizational ties is qualitatively different from those in place today. Even those early relations that could be termed transnational were uni-directional in the sense that they were primarily oriented toward sending-country life. Most did not involve an interactive back-and-forth exchange affecting both sending and receiving countries. Many did not endure over time. Ethnicity clearly contributed to civil and political advancement in the U.S. and return migrants did stimulate some measure of change in their countries of origin but these processes evolved apart from one another. Immigrant community mobility and sending-community development were not interconnected as they are in many cases today.

The particular type of transnational ties that evolved between the U.S. and immigrant countries-of-origin prior to 1965 resulted from the context of reception, the character of particular immigrant groups, and the magnitude of social and physical distance between the U.S. and sending countries.

The following section discusses the ways in which contemporary immigrants and the economic and political context which greets them differs from those in the past. In what ways are the transnational ties which emerge distinct? What factors explain these differences?

CONTEMPORARY TRANSNATIONALITY

A host of factors distinguish contemporary migration flows from those in the past. Transnational ties are more likely to develop and endure because the attributes of the immigrants themselves, the context of reception, the role of sending-country states, and global changes in social and economic organization encourage their emergence and perpetuation.

Contemporary migrant characteristics impede host country integration. Whereas the majority of pre-1965, U.S.-bound immigrants came to settle permanently, more recent arrivals are more likely to be economic sojourners or circular migrants who do not want to remain indefinitely in the U.S. (Daniels 1990, Reimers 1985).[8] The vast majority come from Third World countries in Asia and Latin America rather than Europe. In fact, many come from countries with significant legacies of U.S. involvement that are still heavily dependent on and influenced by the U.S. Illegal immigration has also skyrocketed which automatically limits the possibilities for economic and political incorporation.

The sociopolitical and economic context greeting new arrivals also inhibits their integration and encourages their continued involvement in sending-country affairs. Urban and immigration reforms of the 1920's curtailed rather than expanded non-citizen voting rights (Racusen 1994). While some European countries allow immigrants to vote in certain types of elections, this is still fairly uncommon in the U.S.[9] Civil service reforms undercut political machines and diminished the role of public sector patronage in fostering advancement. The urban poverty programs of the 1960's created some alternate routes to mobility. The "povertycrats" that emerged from these programs have been less effective in easing political integration than the party bosses who preceded them (Jennings 1988).

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[8]. It is important to distinguish between what immigrants hope for with respect to resettlement and what actually occurs. The majority of Miraflorenos interviewed for this study had no intention of remaining in the U.S. yet many never returned home to live.

Sending-country states adopt a variety of postures toward their expatriate citizens which further mold these transnational relationships. Their involvement takes a variety of forms including: (1) policies of official indifference, (2) actively shaping alliances which further sending-country goals, (3) forging links that simultaneously promote immigrant community advancement and sending-country development objectives, and (4) inhibiting assimilation through an extensive system of organizational linkages aimed at reinforcing citizen loyalty and identification (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

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[9]. Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are among the nine European countries that do so. New Zealand also allows some non-citizen voting. Though progress toward non-citizen enfranchisement has been slower in the U.S., there are isolated examples, such as the New York City School Board or Cambridge City Council elections.

The Korean government, for example, views the Korean immigrant community in the U.S. as a sort of economic outpost, using their political organizations as an informal, government in absentia. While the Korean state encourages the growth of officially-sanctioned immigrant political organizations, it opposes competing groups and participation in U.S. politics for reasons other than bettering Korean-U.S. economic relations (Portes and Rumbaut 1991, Light and Bonacich 1988). The Filipino government encourages its immigrants to reinvest their earnings in Filipino agriculture. By inventing the term balikbayan (homecomers) and developing an economic and legal infrastructure that aids annual homecoming and duty-free good importation, the Filipino state encourages its expatriates to remain active contributors to sending-country development. Other states facilitate expatriate voting, either by organizing absentee ballots or by providing non-residents with the resources they need to be able to return home to vote. Spain, Italy, and Portugal are a few of the countries that have experimented with these efforts (Rogers 1986).

Finally, some states pursue a more balanced transnationality which links receiving country integration and advancement to the achievement of sending-country goals. Opposition political groups and civil associations also contribute to this process. The Grenadian government worked with Grenadian immigrants who belonged to the Caribbean Chamber of Commerce to introduce Grenadian agricultural goods to the U.S. market (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992). The Mexican government instituted the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad. The program's goal is to create a global Mexican nation by encouraging Mexicans to identify as members of an entity transcending Mexican borders and by formalizing links between Mexican immigrants, their children, and their communities of origin (Smith 1994). According to Basch (1992), political activities linking Grenadians and Vincentians to their home countries strengthened rather than detracted from their New York-oriented political activities. Homeland ties heightened participants' sense of being an ethnic group with distinct political interests while remaining within the orbit of Black-American politics.

That contemporary migration takes place within an economic and social context saturated by global connections also fosters stronger transnational tie maintenance than in the past. Improved technology and transportation, including the fact that many movements are intra-hemispheric rather than transatlantic, enhance migrants' abilities to travel back and forth easily and often. Ties reinforced by the mass media, sophisticated diplomatic networks, and ease of communication tend to be more frequent, far-reaching, and longer-lasting.

Global economic restructuring creates conditions that impede immigrant labor market incorporation. The introduction of large-scale agro-businesses, export processing industries, and tourism disrupts sending-country economies. These shifts create a displaced, underemployed labor force not easily absorbed by the highly technified, service-oriented, capitalized sectors of the global economy (Nash and Fernandez 1983). Because it is more difficult for new groups to establish secure cultural, social, and economic bases in their new homes, they are more likely to construct a transnational existence.

Finally, that many "new immigrants" are black or hispanic may create additional barriers to incorporation, which also contributes to the maintenance of transnational ties. Increasing support for "multiculturalism" also makes it easier for new groups to sustain these connections.

All of these factors distinguish contemporary migrations from those in the past and combine to make transnational social and political relations increasingly common. The Caribbean case is particularly salient. Noting that Caribbean migrants continued to support their families, purchase land, and start small businesses despite extended periods away from home, scholars called these remittance societies (Sutton and Chaney 1992). As a result, a continuous, intense, bi-directional flow of peoples, ideas, practices, and ideologies between the Caribbean and the U.S. has persisted over generations. Such ties generate what some have called a transnational sociocultural system, "a distinctly unitary, though not unified transmission belt that reworks and further creolizes Caribbean culture and identities, both in New York and the Caribbean" (Sutton 1992:19).

In sum, enduring links between sending and receiving countries are more and more frequent. They differ from transnational relations in the past in that they tend to be more long-term, state-supported, and two-directional. This dissertation builds on prior work on transnationalism and attempts to move forward in four ways. First, it examines transnationalism in several understudied organizational contexts. Second, it challenges traditional notions of the relationship between migration and development by focusing on its civil and political dimensions and by emphasizing the linkages between sending and receiving-country outcomes. Third, it attempts a more systematic examination of the properties of transnationalism including its lifecyle, range of influence, pathways, and orientation, as well as the relationship between transnational community and society formation. Finally, it introduces a new concept, social remittances, which captures the flow of ideas and behaviors that engender, reinforce, and modify these transnational relationships. Social remittances are the focus of the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL REMITTANCES -- A CONCEPT DEFINED

The preceding chapter outlined conflicting theories about the causes and consequences of migration and descriptive and historical studies about how transnational international was in the past. In this chapter, I examine the social remittances flowing between sending and receiving countries which are produced by and stimulate these processes. Social remittances are the ideas, behaviors, values, organizational norms and practices, and social capital that are transmitted back-and-forth through the migration circuit. Social remittances are carried by migrants and travelers or they are exchanged by letter or phone. They travel through identifiable pathways -- be they formal or informal organizational structures or personal interactions between individuals. Remittance flows are continuous and evolutionary, feeding back upon and iteratively changing one another.

The concept of social remittances is not entirely new. Studies of the transition from "immigrant" to "ethnic" group are filled with references to the cultural tools immigrants bring that aid their adaptation to their new lives. In general, however, these studies examine one-way flows. They do not usually capture those cases in which there is a two-way, interactive exchange of ideas and behaviors. A new term is needed to draw attention to these reciprocal transfers. Using the phrase "social remittances" also brings the social as well as economic goods that are exchanged within the migration circuit into the fore.

This chapter aims to make explicit what prior research infers about social remittances and to systematically build upon these insights to define a useful analytical tool. Though I want to emphasize the mutually-changing nature of social remittances, the following pages are written as if there were a beginning and end to the migration circuit. This is an expository device, because, once initiated, remittance flows feed back upon and reciprocally alter one another. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the sending country as the source, from which goods are emitted, and the U.S. as the target, where remittances are received and remitted back to the emigrant's country of origin.

AN UNDERLYING THEORY OF CHANGE

If one accepts social remittances as a plausible concept, one must also acknowledge the implicit notions about the potential for change in individuals, organizations, and nations upon which it is based. The idea of social remittances rests on a view of individuals as autonomous agents who are not completely constrained by the socio-historical context in which they live. Individuals act, reflect, and are open to new experiences, but the nature of their actions and their identities are shaped by their prior experiences as well as by the institutions that currently pattern their lives. The relationship between ideas and practice is interactive. Exposure to new ideas opens up new conceptual spaces creating the possibility for action but not necessarily leading to action itself.

Organizations are the sites at which communities manifest themselves. They are also instruments that have agendas of their own. They involve routine sets of practices, norms, and arrangements that are frequently complemented by activities in the informal sphere. The less institutionalized these are, the more amenable they are to change.

Social remittance transfers are embedded within the global socioeconomic system. The nations that belong to this system differ significantly with respect to size, richness, power, history, and complexity. While acknowledging these inequities, the notion of social remittances rests on the idea that smaller nations can influence larger ones. Though they face more constrained choices, they do not face no choices at all. Social remittances flow south-to-north as well as north-to-south, affecting both sending and receiving countries in an interpretative, iterative process (Hannerz 1989). Likewise, social remittances are transferred between organizations and individuals of unequal standing, though their impact is molded by these inequities in status and power.

WHAT IS EXCHANGED?

Four categories of remittances are suggested by previous literature and by my own empirical work -- normative structures, identities, systems of practice, and social capital. Throughout the following sections, I draw upon examples of flows from the literature that resemble social remittances but do not fully capture the concept as I wish to define it. These cases provide an intellectual rational for remittance content but do not provide a complete picture of their direction or consequences. Many examples involve one-way flows. Others describe two-way flows but do not capture the continuous, mutually changing nature of social remittance transfers and their cumulative effects over time. I turn to these literatures as a foundation upon which to build.

1. NORMATIVE STRUCTURES -

Normative structures are the ideas, values, and beliefs that flow between sending and receiving countries. They include norms for interpersonal behavior, notions of intra-family responsibility, information and gossip, standards for age and gender-appropriate behavior, accepted principles of neighborliness and community participation, and aspirations for social mobility. Normative structures also include expectations about organizational performance. For example, ideas about the function of the church and state are transmitted. Norms concerning the role of clergy and politicians are also exchanged. Several studies examine one-way normative structure transfers. European intellectuals who relocated to the U.S. following World War II were said to infuse the academic community with a new set of intellectual approaches and traditions (Hughes 1975, Fermi 1968). Black West Indian immigrants, such as Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael, introduced new ideas to the U.S. civil rights movement (Patterson 1988).

In examples of bi-directional flows, members of a U.S.-Dominican transnational community exchanged information about infractions of community norms committed in both settings (Georges 1988b). The renegotiation of social ties and reshaping of beliefs experienced by Polish immigrants in the U.S. and communicated to their non-migrant family members in letters fostered individuality and weakened the control of family members who remained at home (Thomas and Znackieki 1929). The cassettes that Haitian, St. Vincent, and Filipino immigrants sent home introduced the latest styles to even the remotest rural areas. Their family members, in turn, returned the cassettes with messages, warnings, and information intended to influence how immigrants behaved in New York (Richman 1987). Finally, migrants returning to Barbados repatriated change-inducing ideologies they learned from the Black Power movement (Sutton and Makiesky-Barrow 1987). Migration was said to furnish a channel through which a bi-directional flow of ideas traveled, allowing political events at home to influence migrant communities abroad while migrant experiences were relayed in the opposite direction.

These examples lend credence to the view that normative structures are interchanged between sending and receiving countries. In addition to offering a systematic analysis of these flows, this dissertation takes a more in-depth look at their impact on sending and receiving-country political and civil life and its long-term consequences.

2. IDENTITY

Ideas about gender, class, and racial identity also constitute social remittance flows. Migrants carry notions of self with them, which may be challenged and reshaped by the host country context, and then sent back home. These revised concepts also expose non-migrants to a more ample range of possible identities from which to chose.

Such a view is implicit in many studies, particularly more recent work on transnationalism. Since migrants exist, interact, assert their identities, and exercise their legal and social rights within spaces that transcend national boundaries, their identities are constantly shifting with respect to the different roles they assume (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992, Goldring 1992b, Smith 1993). The experience of migration increasingly entails managing these fluid, constantly evolving statuses which often conflict with one another.

For example, changing images of self and shifts in class consciousness resulted from migration between peasant to proletarian modes of production (Castles and Kozack 1973, Portes and Walton 1981). As migrant women participated more actively in host-country economic life, their ideas about gender roles changed. They began to push for more egalitarian arrangements and encourage activities leading to longer stays abroad so they could preserve their enhanced gender status (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Goldring forthcoming). Pessar (1988) found, however, that Dominican womens' experiences as employees, did not result in heightened class consciousness. Their identities as mothers continued to take precedence over their role as workers. Finally, the conceptions of race that Caribbean immigrants bring with them are said to weaken the existing binary classifications of race in the U.S. (Patterson 1988). Since large new segments of the population are no longer merely black or white or do not want to be, new racial categories must be created. Furthermore, tourists and return migrants, who introduce new ideas about racial pride and political independence allegedly exert a positive influence over racial values in the Caribbean.

> "Tourists have revolutionized the primitive racist and sexist as well as racial-sexual norms of the traditional peripheral cultures. Thus the willingness of North American female tourists to sleep with working-class black Barbadians undermined almost overnight the vicious patterns of racial exclusiveness and notions of racial purity that prevailed before the tourist era." (1988:254)

Organizational identities are also socially remitted. As organizations develop transnational structures and begin to serve increasingly transnational constituencies, their concepts of self, including how their publics and objectives are defined, change. These self-definitions are also transmitted and transformed in the process.

3. SYSTEMS OF PRACTICE

Systems of practice include individual and organizational activities, customs, and practices -- the modus operandi and culture of the emigrant and the transnational organization. Within the household, these include the division of labor with respect to housekeeping and income generation, religious practices, and patterns of civil and political involvement. Within organizations, they include modes of member recruitment and socialization, strategies and styles, and patterns of intra-organizational contact.

Examples of systems of practice as social remittances abound in the literature but, again, they generally refer to one-way flows. The political acuity of Irish immigrants is attributed to the skills and practices they imported from Ireland (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Immigrant entrepreneurs use the ethnic and class resources they bring with them to start small businesses (Light and Bonacich 1988). Equilibrium Theorists argue that return migrants bring back new skills and techniques which contribute positively to sending-country growth. A more complete examination of social remittances would also address the ways in which these remittances are transformed by the context of reception and subsequently feedback upon the milieus from which they came.

4. SOCIAL CAPITAL -

Social capital is the value of those aspects of social structure that actors can utilize as resources to realize their interests. It is intangible, embodied in relations among persons and created when these relations change in some way so as to facilitate action. Many of the social remittances thus far described are potential forms of social capital. They only become so, however, when they are used productively to achieve some previously unattainable goal.[1]

Both the values and norms on which social capital is based, and social capital itself, are socially remitted. For example, Dominican entrepreneurs in New York and Boston successfully harnessed the social capital they brought with them to create their businesses (Guarnizo 1992, Levitt 1994). One immigrant business owner was able to borrow money because his family had helped the money lender's family at home. Grenadian political organizers in New York were said to be able to transfer and build upon the political capital they accrued in New York to Grenada and vice versa (Basch 1992).

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[1]. Coleman defines social capital, "by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible, but is fungible with respect to specific activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful to others. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production." (1990:302)

MECHANISMS OF TRANSMISSION

Social remittances are exchanged between individuals and within transnational organizational systems. Individual exchanges occur when emigrants return to live in or visit their communities-of-origin; when non-migrants visit their emigrant family members; or through interchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, and telephone calls. Social remittances are also transmitted through the transnational organizations which migration gives rise to. Here again, the remittances themselves may actually be communicated by letter, phone, fax, or face-to-face contact, but the actual exchanges take place within an organizational context between individuals acting in their organizational capacities.

Formal organizational systems are often paralleled or intertwined by looser, informal sets of arrangements and relationships. Examples of these include: (1) temporary political working groups which supplement the activities of political parties, (2) groups organizing popular religious ceremonies which take place outside the church, and (3) interpersonal dealings between political actors during which many political decisions are made. Social remittances also flow through these networks.

Social remittance flows are distinct from the transnational cultural system in which they are embedded. Food, entertainment, goods, services, and cultural meanings are also transferred back and forth across national boundaries (Apparadai 1990) but these do not constitute social remittance flows. What differentiates the two is that social remittances normally travel through well-marked channels to clear destinations. For example, immigrant listeners to Spanish talk radio in the U.S. receive a constant flow of information about social services, personal finance, politics, and legal affairs. They share this information with their non-migrant family members during weekly phone conversations or visits home. Their families, in turn, bring these new ideas to political party or community organization meetings where they are discussed and perhaps adapted. Or immigrant parishioners, accustomed to lay leadership's active role in the Dominican church, bring these practices to their new religious lives where they are gradually incorporated into parish routines. In each of these scenarios, the source, destination, and passage through which social remittances flow is clear.

In some cases, social remittances echo, complement, or magnify global socio-cultural exchanges. Non-migrants may begin petitioning the state for more social services both because of social remittance flows and because of the stories they see on the Cable News Network (CNN) about welfare and Section 8 housing.[2] The new patterns of gender relations they learn from emigrant family members are also portrayed in the movies.

The second feature that distinguishes social remittances from the general international transmission of ideas and culture is that the latter tends to be unsystematic and diffuse. Perhaps non-migrants demand more from their politicians when they witness the standards of accountability that prevail in receiving countries. But this is a different kind of change catalyst than when their emigrant family members speak directly to them about the political practices they witness and encourage them to pursue these changes.

This is not to say that social remittances cannot be en-masse disseminations of ideas, but that to be characterized as such, idea transmission must be organized and purposefully directed. Altering religious practice in response to a tele-evangelist is not a social remittance.

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[2]. A federal government rental voucher program that assists low-income families with housing costs.

Changing religious practices because one joins a religious community created by a transnational religious system is. Though religious and consumer-oriented global marketing efforts are directed at specific audiences, these do not constitute social remittances because the channels through which they flow are too open-ended and mass-oriented.

A third factor distinguishing social remittances from global cultural transfers is the timing with which they flow relative to one another. In many cases, a staged process occurs whereby global flows precede and ease the way for social remittance transmission. That receiving-country citizens have already been exposed to latino food and music engenders a familiarity and gradual acceptance which prepares the soil for the political and religious styles that are subsequently introduced. That non-migrants want to emulate the consumption patterns repatriated by their emigrant counterparts makes them more receptive to the social and political changes that are later interjected. The new ideas and behaviors which follow do not arise out-of-the-blue. They are part-and-parcel of an already on-going, albeit often barely-perceptible process. Such a staged transmission sets a precedent for future remittance transfers which then seem to make more sense.

DETERMINANTS OF IMPACT

Social remittances are separable from their effect --

normative structures and systems of practice may be transmitted but produce little change. A variety of factors determine the nature and magnitude of social remittance impact:

1. THE NATURE OF THE REMITTANCE ITSELF - Remittance impact partially depends upon the ease of transmissibility. Some remittances change easily, their content fluid, and therefore more difficult to transmit. Other remittances remain stable and are more easily communicated. Vote winning or new member recruitment strategies, for example, are introduced and adapted or they are ignored. In contrast, normative structures are messier; individuals constantly redefine and reinterpret them. Their changing nature makes them more difficult to exchange and may diminish their force.

In the same vein, remittance impact also depends upon the malleability of the remittances themselves or how easily they can be packaged and sent. Some remittances fit effortlessly within the structures and pathways of transmission. Others resist adaptation or remolding. Normative structures and behaviors governing non-personal, instrumental contacts, such as employer-employee or storeowner-customer relations, for example, may be more amenable to reshaping than those involving highly personalized, affective ties.

2. THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM - The stability

and extent of closure within organizational systems affects ease of transfer. More open systems engender sloppier, less efficient exchanges which temper the impact and intensity of transmission. There may be leakage. Remittances flowing through systems which form part of larger systems, such as national political parties which belong to international political party systems, exert a greater effect due to the combined impact of these two flows.

The extent to which systems are formally or informally structured also influences remittance impact. Highly-structured organizational configurations can exert greater control over the transmission of remittance flows. The exchange of remittances in informal networks may be more diffuse and traverse a more circuitous route. Remittance impact in informal settings is also a function of the personal relationships on which these networks are based. Tempestuous relations may impede remittance flows while close personal ties may aid them.

Levels of remittance permeability, incorporation, and influence also vary across organizational form. Organizations in flux may be more amenable to change or may involve greater barriers to remittance flows. Receiving-country institutions are more difficult to infiltrate because of higher barriers to entry; pre-existing norms and routines may be in direct conflict with social remittance flows. Organizations may be more porous at particular stages of development or during particular historical periods. For example, political parties in the U.S. were more open to the ideas and practices that new immigrants brought during the era of ward politics than they are now that civil service reforms have diminished their clout.

Finally, particular types of organizational arrangements heighten remittance impact. Transnational organizations that are essentially sending-country organizations reconstituted in the U.S. receive remittances differently than transnational organizations that combine U.S. and sending-country groups. In organizations where latinos and anglos conduct their activities within separate sub-structures, such as masses in English and Spanish, remittances may penetrate more easily because they do not have to conform to prevailing organizational cultures.

3. THE GOODNESS OF FIT BETWEEN SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES - Whether social remittances affect socio-cultural configurations along the migration circuit depends upon relative differences between sending and receiving-country contexts. If the value structures immigrants bring with them are similar to prevailing social norms, or if patterns of social relations approximate those already in place, then social remittances may have more of an impact. If what is remitted represents a completely new idea or concept, then it may face greater barriers to transplantation.

For example, Black (1987) found that immigrants from British-style systems adapted more easily to Canadian politics than those who came from non-British systems. He attributed the ease with which they could bring their political skills to bear on their new political lives to fewer differences between sending and receiving-country contexts. In some cases, however, greater dissonance, even with respect to non-political roles, impeded social remittance acceptance. In a second example of a one-way flow, Jones-Correa (1994) found that men resisted political resocialization as a way to reassert their pre-migration status. Since migration involved greater declines in socioeconomic standing for latino men, they resisted political change. Latino women were more open to new ideas and strategies because migration entailed less downward mobility for them.

There may be cases, however, where significant differences between sending and receiving-country contexts wield the opposite effect. When social remittance flows expose individuals to completely new ideas and behaviors, new conceptual spaces are created bringing to light a wider range of potential responses for the first time. Caribbean residents thoroughly rejected inter-racial relations until American tourists set a precedent for these type of liaisons (Patterson 1988). The repertoire of social relations individuals now engage in was wedged open by social remittance flows. Participation in the wage economy in the U.S. induced changes in tastes and motivations that transformed immigrants from target earners[3] to more long-term migrants (Piore 1979). Though they came fully intending to return, their exposure to a completely new set of social arrangements opened them up to a wider range of possibilities.

4. IMPACT AS A STAGE-LIKE PROCESS - The sequencing of social remittance exchange influences impact. Just as global socio-cultural flows seem to ease remittance transmission, particular types of remittances may pave the way for others. Womens' identities must expand to include a notion that it is appropriate for them to participate in politics before they will be open to new political ideas and strategies. Immigrants may have to command sufficient social capital before the new ideas and behaviors they bring to U.S. institutions are heeded.

5. THE NATURE OF THE TRANSMISSION PROCESS - Some remittances have a stronger impact because they travel in conjunction with other goods. They are like parasites journeying along with hosts already en-route. For example, religious and politically-oriented remittances flowing between Boston and the Dominican Republic initially traveled together via

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[3]. Target earners are immigrants who want to earn a specific sum of money and then return home. They are willing to endure arduous work and living conditions if this facilitates their goal of rapid return. They form few ties to their receiving countries because they do not intend to stay.

political channels because of significant overlap between political party and church membership. The impact of each flow magnified the other. Other remittances travel through multiple conduits. Because there is a high degree of congruence between political and legal social remittances, they are often transmitted through multiple routes, thereby heightening impact. Remittances confined to a single path do not benefit from this additive effect. Some remittances are also propelled or promoted by secondary catalysts. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, funds a variety of efforts to strengthen democratic and judicial systems which lend momentum to social remittance flows already-in-progress. Finally, transmission force affects impact. If a high volume of remittances are emitted during a short period, their impact will be greater than if less intense flows emerge at a more sporadic rate.

There is also a qualitative difference between flows between individuals and those within organizations. On the one hand, flows between individuals may have greater impact because they are more direct. They do not have to overcome structural barriers to movement or be reconfigured to fit within a particular organizational system. Flows between individuals face less competition than flows within organizations that may have to contend with other remittances that crowd them out. On the other hand, flows mediated by structures may benefit from organizational momentum which propels remittance introduction. Prior contacts between sending and receiving-country organizations may also diminish contextual differences that can impede remittance flows.

6. THE CONTEXT OF RECEPTION - Remittance impact is highly influenced by the context of reception, which is, in turn, shaped by several factors.

Global understandings and discourses about rights combine with national-level arrangements to create modes of incorporation that vary in receptiveness to immigrant political and civil integration (Soysal 1994). Such international and national ideological debates also mold social remittance impact. That the U.S. views itself as a "cradle of democracy" may harden its public from accepting the political ideas and practices introduced by immigrants or blind it from recognizing the subtle ways in which these quietly reshape democratic practice. A political climate infused by anti-immigration sentiment will certainly dampen receptivity to social remittance flows. Studies of return migrants suggest similar findings. The ideas and behaviors returnees brought back with them (one-way remittances) wielded a greater effect when returnees were "heroes" rather than "deserters" in the eyes of the sending-country public.

More importantly, where and how immigrants are integrated into receiving-country socioeconomic structures influence remittance impact. Modes of incorporation determine the settings into which immigrants introduce the remittances they bring with them, the new ideas and practices they are exposed to, and the extent to which they are at liberty to respond to them. Mirafloreños who work primarily with other latino immigrants have less impact on and are influenced less by the U.S. than immigrants who engage in more extensive contacts with the anglo world around them. The socioeconomic structures which channel new immigrants into segregated work and social settings limit their ability to introduce and respond to social remittance flows.

7. THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF THE SENDER AND THE RECEIVER - Social remittance transfers may be alternatively like casting a large stone into a small pool or a pebble into an ocean, depending upon the differences between sending and receiving countries. The associated contrasts in ripple effect are obvious. It is more difficult for Dominican styles and practices to have an impact on the larger, more heterogeneous U.S. context than it is for remittances from the U.S. to influence the Dominican Republic. Impact is also shaped by the relative vitality and coherence of the core vs. the periphery. When the center is strong, centripetal forces may overwhelm remittance flows. When the periphery is cohesive, centrifugal forces may serve as catalysts for social remittance flows.

8. THE TARGET GROUP - Social remittance impact depends upon

the group at which remittances are directed. The life circumstances of some individuals allow them greater flexibility than others. Younger, unmarried women enjoy greater freedom of choice with respect to future life decisions and the quality of the social relations they engage in than already-married women with children. They are better able to respond to the social remittances they are exposed to if they so chose. Responding to certain kinds of remittances requires a qualitatively different kind of adaptation than others. Assimilating new values or mores entails fundamental, systemic change while adapting new behaviors requires a more superficial transformation.

9. A CONSTANT STATE OF FLUX - Once remittance flows are initiated, the pathways through which they flow, the organizational forums and individuals which carry and receive them, and the contexts within which they are emitted and received change constantly. In general, these changes stimulate further social remittance impacts.

Individual migrants clearly change through their contact with host-country institutions. The new experiences they have open them to new possibilities, provide them with new frames of reference for understanding these, and equip them with a new vocabulary with which to express these new ideas.

The pathways through which social remittances are transmitted also change. These are initially reactions, arising in response to incipient flows, which are gradually reshaped and more purposefully constructed. The outcome of this evolutionary process is by no means a foregone conclusion. While in some instances, these organizational pathways consolidate, in other cases, they weaken. Church and political party systems may become more sophisticated as these organizations become increasingly dependent upon their transnational constituencies, while ties between individuals and families break down in response to the heightened individualism engendered by migration.

Finally, the character of the migration circuit is also transformed. Migration changes the cultural context within which the decision to move and actual movements take place, supplanting traditional pursuits and transforming local values and expectations (Reichert 1981, Alarcon 1992). The soil becomes more fertile for subsequent remittance transfers because the social fabric of the transnational community is permeated by their influence.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REMITTANCE ITSELF

The content of social remittances is fluid by nature; the very process of transfer often redefines the character of the remittance. What is sent comes in contact with and is potentially reshaped by the context of reception. Thus transformed, it flows back from whence it came where it may again be reshaped and remitted. The essence of the resource is constantly changing through continuous, iterative use.

What kinds of transformations result from these recurrent, circular exchanges? The first are changes with respect to remittance content:

1. REMITTANCES REMAIN CONSTANT - There may be instances in which some of the ideas and behaviors immigrants bring with them are not changed by their new lifestyles. That which is remitted back is unaltered.

2. ADDITIVE BUT NOT TRANSFORMATIVE - Immigrants' ideas and practices are modified by their lives in sending countries. They incorporate new items into their social repertoire, but because these do not alter the existing elements, they expand it rather than transform it. An example of this are the new skills immigrant women acquire when they successfully demand benefits from their employers or from the state. Because so many of these women were not employed prior to migration and because sending-country employers offer few if any of the benefits that are routine in the U.S., women learn what their rights are and how to claim them. They add these skills to their tool kit which they communicate back to their non-migrant counterparts.

3. CROSS-FERTILIZATION PRODUCES HYBRID FORMS - Immigrants' ideas and practices may mesh with prevailing host-country norms. Cross-pollination occurs producing hybrid social forms which are then remitted back to sending countries. The allocation of household labor is a good example of this.

Immigrants bring norms about how responsibilities within the household should be delegated. Because so many women work outside of their homes in the U.S., these values are challenged as men assume a greater role in housekeeping and child care. New behavior patterns result, combining U.S. and sending-country practices, which are remitted back where they are once again accommodated to existing norms.

4. RESHAPING RATHER THAN MELDING - Remittance content is also transformed by use. These changes may be propelled by factors within the transnational system itself or they may result from adaptations made so that remittances are suitable for use within new environments. Such changes involve little if any meshing of sending and receiving-country values or practices. Instead remittance transformation is driven by factors internal to the transnational organization or by adjustments made so that they fit better with existing structures and social patterns.

The second kind of change concerns fluctuations in remittance magnitude and volume. Certain types of social remittances are depleted or depreciated through non-use. Beliefs weaken if they do not become ideas in good currency. Social relations die out, expectations and obligations wither, practices become unfamiliar, and social capital is depleted if it is not used regularly (Coleman 1990). Patrones (benefactors), for example, will be unable to make demands of their beneficiaries if they do not consistently bestow favors upon them. Intense usage tends to reinforce rather than expand social remittance content, with the exception of social capital which increases with frequent use.

Third, social remittance exchanges may also precipitate changes with respect to control over their access. The fact that new normative structures are generated and new practices are adapted redistributes authority over the formulation of and management of subsequent remittance flows. For example, if social remittance flows engender greater autonomy for women and adult children, then these groups may also gain greater control over the distribution of social capital.

WHAT SOCIAL REMITTANCES ARE NOT

It is important to conclude with two short comments on migration effects not caused by social remittance flows.

1. SOCIAL REMITTANCES ARE DISTINCT FROM THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REMITTANCE FLOWS - In some cases, the transformation of sending-country social life is a direct consequence of the monies villagers receive from their emigrant family members rather than the new ideas and behaviors they learn from them. Practices surrounding death in Miraflores are a good example of this. Most villagers used to pay their respects to the family of the deceased on

the ninth day following death. Some women now choose not to go because they say they do not have appropriate clothing. Before emigration, and the heightened class stratification it engendered, most Mirafloreños had the same modest wardrobe. Dress as a vehicle for status display was uncommon. The completion of a funeral home, currently being built with funds raised in Boston will further fuel these changes. When finished, many Mirafloreños will no longer mourn in their homes, thereby further abandoning traditional rituals. What is important to note is that new ideas and behaviors learned in the U.S. did not precipitate these changes. Rather, it was the social spillovers from the economic fruits of migration that brought them about.

2. SOCIAL REMITTANCES ARE DISTINCT FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL IMPACTS OF MIGRATION - It is important to distinguish between what is emitted and remitted and the organizational changes occasioned by migration in general. A priest in the Dominican Republic, for example, who serves regularly in a Brooklyn church during his vacations, liked that churchgoers felt a sense of affiliation to a particular parish. He noted that the church promoted this sense of membership by organizing social functions after each mass. He is a social remittance carrier because, upon return, he compiled a list of the members of his parish and used some of the same community-building techniques he witnessed in the U.S. to stimulate a comparable sense of affiliation.

But not all the new functions the Dominican church has assumed in response to emigration result from social remittance flows. That the church in Miraflores established a special office to supply the baptismal certificates now required by the U.S. Embassy to secure a visa is an institutional response to new demands created by emigration. It is not the result of new ideas and strategies that church officials acquired in the U.S.

The following chapter outlines the study methodology and offers background data on Dominicans in Boston and in Miraflores.

CHAPTER 4: PROFILES OF DOMINICANS IN BOSTON AND MIRAFLORES

In this chapter, I review sociodemographic and historical data to set the stage upon which this study takes place. I outline the study methodology, offer an historical overview of the contexts of departure and reception, and use U.S. Census data and data from a survey conducted in Miraflores to construct socioeconomic profiles of non-migrant Mirafloreños and of Mirafloreños and Dominicans living in Boston.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

The questions addressed in this dissertation grew out of an earlier study I conducted on latino entrepreneurship in Boston (Levitt 1994, Levitt 1995). Before I began that study, I believed that Puerto Ricans owned most of the small businesses in the city. A short foray into the field quickly convinced me that many entrepreneurs were Dominican. In fact, many business owners came from Bani, a city of an estimated 100,000 residents located approximately 60 kilometers southwest of Santo Domingo (See Appendix 1). Bani is surrounded by several partially-urbanized villages, called campos, located between two to ten kilometers from the center of town. Miraflores is one such village of approximately 4,000 residents. Many of the migrants from Miraflores seemed to have settled in Jamaica Plain. What were the characteristics of this transnational community? How did these transnational ties affect life in Miraflores and Boston?

Findings from this study are based on a year and one-half of field work, including eight months in the Dominican Republic and 10 months in Boston. I employed five data collection strategies:

(1) I conducted 115 interviews with local, provincial, and national-level leaders, members, and users of each of the organizations in the study. For example, for the Catholic church case study, I interviewed churchgoers, religious movement group members, and individuals known to lead or participate in home-based religious practices in Boston and Miraflores. I spoke with parish priests serving Mirafloreños in both countries. I interviewed members of the Dominican church hierarchy who had served or were serving in Bani or who helped formulate church policy toward emigrants. In Boston, I also interviewed religious and lay church officials responsible for services to the hispanic community.

I also spoke with numerous members and leaders of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the Partido Reformista Social Cristiana (PRSC), and the Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana (PLD) working in Miraflores, Bani, Santo Domingo, and Boston.[1] Though the PLD also has a headquarters in Boston, and the Dominican consul functions as the PRSC's representative in the city, I chose to focus on the PRD for two reasons. First, it has the oldest, most highly-developed organization in Boston. Second, PRD leaders in Boston and the Dominican Republic were more open to my overtures. I was able to arrange interviews with many high-ranking officials and to gain access to party documents. Though I also conducted a large number of interviews with representatives from the other two parties, I did not feel I gained the same level of insight.

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[1]. These are three of the/four most important parties in the Dominican Republic. The other party, the PRI, is not represented in Boston. I also conducted several interviews with members of each party who had lived and worked in New York or were familiar with the current New York politics. I did not conduct my own field

Approximately 75% of all of the interviews were taped and later transcribed. I did not tape those interviews in which respondents refused my request to do so or in cases where I sensed intuitively that the respondent would be more comfortable if I took notes instead.

(2) I conducted a set of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 20 return emigrant families in Miraflores and 20 immigrant families living in Boston. These discussions focused on respondents' migration histories, their work and social lives as immigrants, their impressions of U.S. political and civil life, and their changing perceptions of and modes of participation in the organizations in the study. I asked each respondent the same set of open-ended questions but encouraged them to digress as much as they pleased.

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work in New York.

I initially planned to interview men and women and younger and older family members separately to highlight differences in migration experiences between different gender and age groups. Such a strategy proved untenable. Insisting that respondents speak separately with me exacerbated the discomfort many already felt with the unfamiliar interviewing process. If I treated the interview instead as an informal conversation that anyone in the household could join in I was usually more successful. The informal focus groups which evolved were a more appropriate data collection strategy for this population.

(3) I attended a wide range of meetings and special events. I participated in meetings of village and municipal-level party organizations, political rallies, and caravans. I attended mass, popular religious ceremonies, and Charasmatic Catholic group meetings in Boston and Miraflores. I spoke with prisoners at the jail in Bani and observed court sessions at the municipal court house. I also worked with the Miraflores Development Committee (MDC) in Boston and Miraflores to organize two fund-raising dances.

(4) I reviewed pertinent documents and bibliographic materials about each organization. These included financial records from the MDC, collections of pastoral letters published by the Catholic church, PRD membership handbooks, analyses of the Dominican judicial and legal systems, and relevant newspaper and journal articles from Bani, Santo

Domingo, and Boston. I also collected pertinent survey and census data. Finally, I interviewed a group of "expert respondents," including academics and political observers, to solicit their analyses.

(5) I conducted a survey of 184 households in Miraflores. I designed the survey instrument, with assistance from MDC members in Boston, to collect background information for this study and to help the community gather data that would enable it to secure better services.

The questionnaire asked non-migrant Mirafloreños two sets of questions concerning household members in Miraflores and emigrant family members in Boston. The first set focused on non-migrants' sociodemographic characteristics, economic status, and living conditions. The second set collected data on emigrant family members' migration histories, employment, phone calls and visits to Miraflores, and remittances (See Appendix 2). The questionnaire was pre-tested and refined among Mirafloreños in Boston.

Once in Miraflores, I recruited and trained a group of community members to assist with the implementation of the survey.[2] We divided up the 545 households in the village into six sectors or neighborhoods. A complete census of each household in the sector was completed from which a random sample of households to be surveyed was then selected. One-third of all the households in Miraflores were interviewed.

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[2]. I did not have sufficient funding to hire interviewers to carry out the survey. Instead, I relied on community members who generously volunteered to help. While using Mirafloreños helped me to organize and conduct the survey quickly, in some cases, it also compromised the data quality. Data on monthly income and property ownership are particularly suspect, as I will describe below.

Teams of two interviewers were assigned to each sector. It took each pair approximately 5 days to cover the 30 odd households they were assigned to. Each evening, the completed questionnaires were reviewed for consistency and completeness. In cases where questions about the data arose, we returned to the household and re-interviewed the family. Data processing, cleaning, and analysis took place in Boston.

In households with return emigrants, interviewers explained the purpose of the survey and asked these individuals if they would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview. If they agreed to do so, I returned to speak with these individuals at length. At the end of these sessions, I inquired about neighboring households where return emigrants were also living who I asked to participate in the study as well. I also asked each household if I could contact their emigrant family members in Boston. These individuals, combined with MDC members and the households they referred me to, constituted the current immigrant group with whom in-depth interviews were carried out in Boston.

The following section offers a brief historical overview of the socioeconomic context of departure.

THE CONTEXT OF DEPARTURE[3]

Throughout much of its history, the Dominican economy relied on export agriculture. Regional socioeconomic differences, however, resulted in uneven development and produced disparate out-migration patterns.

At the turn-of-the century, two modes of export agriculture prevailed. In the northern Cibao valley, small landowners produced tobacco and cacao exported by an urban merchant class in Santiago.[4] The Cibao commercial bourgeoisie flourished and consolidated its power because Dominican owners dominated production. In the south, Cuban and U.S. owners gained control of most of the large-scale sugarcane plantations by the early 1900's, thereby curtailing peasant production. Capitalist penetration of what had been a largely self-sustaining agrarian system disrupted rural southern society. The commercial bourgeoisie were almost insignificant; the dominant class were the large landowners who lived off their own land. Food shortages, diminished access to land, and resource concentration and monopolization ensued (Baud 1987).

Though there was some out-migration from the north prior to the Trujillo dictatorship (1930-1961), few people emigrated from Bani during this period. Emigration dropped off even more during Trujillo's reign due to the government's restrictive policies. Those who left during this period belonged to the country's economically-privileged class (Georges 1990).

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[3]. This section summarizes material presented by Guarnizo (1993) in his excellent overview of Dominican economic history.

[4]. The Republic's second largest city

By restricting capital accumulation to a small group of civilian and military advisors, Trujillo successfully kept the power of the economic elite in check. As a result, the Dominican upper class was not strong enough to gain power following his assassination, leading to a period of political instability. A U.S.-backed provisional government was created to organize presidential elections. In September 1963, however, a group of military officers ousted President Juan Bosch, who had been elected only seven months before. An unstable partnership between large landowners, industrialists, and international trade merchants formed the U.S.-orchestrated de-facto government that replaced him. Such an alliance exacerbated already sharp tensions between these sectors and liberal urban groups. On April 24, 1965, a military faction called the Constitucionalistas (Constitutionalists) broke away in support of Bosch. Their rebellion escalated quickly into a popular uprising. U.S. troops invaded Santo Domingo four days later to prevent an "allegedly imminent" communist revolution.

Because of their experience in Cuba, U.S. leaders would settle for no less than complete control of the island.

They established a new provisional government and demanded that elections be held as a condition for withdrawing troops. Joaquin Balaguer, a former Trujillo protege and the candidate of the oligarchy, was elected in 1966.

During the 1960's, Dominican emigration to the U.S. increased from a yearly average of 990 registered immigrants between 1951-1960 to 9,330 persons per year in the 1960's (INS 1990). Most of those requesting visas to escape these politically turbulent years were middle class. To alleviate sociopolitical pressure, the U.S. increased the immigrant visas it issued, doubling them between 1961 and 1962 and tripling them between 1962 and 1963. Politically-driven emigration strengthened and extended the existing social networks that earlier immigrants had already established. Primarily New York-bound emigration gradually assumed a momentum of its own, despite declines in the manufacturing economy ostensibly "pulling" these migrants (Sassen-Koob 1985). Balaguer strongly repressed political opposition and popular movements during his first 12 year rule, forcing many of his political opponents into exile as well.

Balaguer pursued an economic reform program which initially yielded positive results. The annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased, the middle class expanded, the state apparatus modernized, and the country's infrastructure was repaired and expanded (Lozano 1985, Cassa 1979). Though many urban dwellers benefitted from these policies, they generally led to lower incomes and worsening conditions in the agricultural sector. Widespread rural-to-urban migration and emigration ensued.

By 1978, the Dominican public had tired of twelve years of unfair electoral practices, increasing inequality, and repression (Espinal 1986). The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) defeated Balaguer. The new President, Silvestre Antonio Guzman, instituted major shifts in economic and political policy. The PRD's approach favored the industrial bourgeoisie; the party also reached out to labor and other previously-excluded urban groups. It aided the agricultural sector by easing access to loans and farming supplies. Public sector employment increased by an astonishing 79% during the PRD's eight year term (Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo 1989). Though these policies resulted in salary increases, they also drove up prices without expanding the supply of goods.

Changes in the global economy also affected the Dominican economy negatively. A declining demand for exports and increasing foreign debt obligations reversed gains achieved under Balaguer. Unstable sugar prices, sharp declines in export volume, and interest rate increases created such severe conditions that Salvador Jorge Blanco, the PRD's second president, had to sign an austerity plan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1982. Wage freezes and dramatic price increases in basic consumer goods led to widespread popular protests throughout the country in April 1984.

These unfavorable economic conditions, and the state policies instituted to correct them, influenced migration in two contradictory ways. Deteriorating living conditions and sharper wage differentials between the U.S. and the island stimulated migration. The existing social networks between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic lowered migration's economic and social costs. At the same time, the economic conditions stimulating migration also created conditions that favored investment and return. The devaluation of the peso and high interest rates made it profitable for those earning dollars to invest or save in Dominican financial institutions. For the first time, Dominican emigrants became investors rather than subsidizers -- a transformation the government actively encouraged (Portes and Guarnizo 1990). In 1982, for example, President Jorge Blanco streamlined procedures for establishing emigrant savings accounts and raised interest rates. Since then, capturing emigrant-generated resources and transfers has formed part of the state's official economic strategy.

Continuous changes in the world economy contributed to additional economic declines throughout the 1980's. Oil price increases heightened the foreign debt. Structural adjustment policies adopted under the IMF shifted the country's economic focus away from traditional export commodities such as sugar, coffee, and tobacco to a reliance on labor and service exports (i.e. emigration, export processing zones, and tourism). Until the late 1970's, traditional export crops generated over 60 percent of the foreign currency entering the country. By 1988, sugar export earnings accounted for only one-tenth, while economic remittances, export processing zones, and tourism accounted for 57 percent of hard currency earnings (Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo 1989).

Economic restructuring also narrowed the range of employment opportunities available to the Dominican public. The GDP declined to an average of 1.6 percent between 1980 and 1988. Official unemployment rose from 24 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1988. According to some estimates, informal sector and domestic service work also grew from 45 to 60 percent of the economically-active population in the 1980's (Kleinekathoefer 1987). Declining wages, rising prices, and the need to hold down multiple jobs increased emigration once again.

As a result, the number of Dominican immigrants admitted to the U.S. grew from 35,400 between 1961-1965 to 137,000 between 1986 - 1990 (INS 1960,1970, 1980, 1990). By 1990, 356,971 legal Dominicans resided in the U.S. (U.S. Census 1992). In 1989 alone, 26,744 Dominicans entered the country which accounted for 30.5 percent of the total

Caribbean immigrant population (INS 1990).[5] All told, at least five percent of the total Dominican population lives in the United States.

The Dominican Republic is currently one of the countries most affected by emigration; in the 1980's it ranked third in the world for registered immigrants to the U.S. per 10,000 population. In 1991, 16.7 percent of all Dominican households had members who were currently migrants or who had emigrated in the past. Migration rates increased from 32.25 emigrants per 10,000 Dominican inhabitants in 1981 to 40.5 in 1989 (ENDSA 1992).

Early studies of Dominican migration concluded that most emigrants came from rural, agricultural communities (Gonzales 1970, Pena and Parache 1971, Hendricks 1974, Garrison and Weiss 1979, Sharpe 1977, Bray 1987). Some studies found that these individuals first emigrated to urban areas before leaving the country (Kayal 1978) while others concluded that migrants went directly from their rural communities to receiving-country societies (Sassen-Koob 1978). Most of this early research examined single communities involving small numbers of respondents. Subsequent work, based on more representative samples, suggested that most Dominicans emigrated from urban areas

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[5]. These figures do not include individuals who overstay their tourist visas or enter the U.S. illegally. Estimates of Dominicans illegally residing in the U.S. range anywhere from 350,000 to 400,000 (Warren 1989).

(Ugalde et al. 1979, Perez 1981, Ugalde and Langham 1980, Gurak and Kritz 1982, Del Castillo and Mitchell 1987, Baez and Ramirez 1986).

A recent national survey lends credence to the notion that there are two types of emigres leaving the Dominican Republic. Both urban and rural, uneducated and schooled, and poor and middle-class individuals emigrate, though individuals with more income and education from urban areas seem to predominate. Nearly 21 percent of the urban households in a recent national survey had emigrant members as opposed to 10.5% of the households in rural areas. Emigrants tended to come from families and regions that were better off. Households with incomes higher than 3,000 pesos, for example, had two times more emigrants than those with lower incomes.[6] There was also more emigration among better-educated groups. Forty-eight percent of the households with emigrants had household heads with secondary or university educations compared to 11.5% with no education or who had not completed primary school. Almost one-third (27.4%) of all households with emigrant members, though, were headed by individuals who were unemployed (ENDESA 1992).

Return migration to the island is also fairly common. Warren (1988) estimated that 23.5% of the Dominican immigrants entering the U.S. between 1960-1980 returned home.[7] A 1991 Dominican national survey found a return rate of 28.6%. More individuals went back to urban (32.8%) than to rural areas (16.6%) (ENDESA 1992).

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[6]. It is not clear whether household income was higher precisely because of emigrant remittances.

Widespread migration from Miraflores did not begin until the 1980's. Before then, most families supported themselves through farm work, either as day agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, or by renting land. About one-fifth of the families in Miraflores are property owners. Most farmers grew cebollines (small onions), that were a staple in the Dominican diet, and other vegetables. Several factors, in addition to changes in the country's global economic role, triggered out-migration. First, a severe drought in 1975 and a hurricane in 1981 decimated production, rendering some land uncultivable. Second, cebollin production was particularly hard hit. Higher prices led consumers to use onions instead. Third, the farm supports initiated under the PRD ended when Balaguer was re-elected in 1986. In fact, the policies Balaguer re-instated deleteriously affected the agricultural sector. These factors combined to leave many Mirafloreños with few economic options but emigration. The following section compares the socioeconomic characteristics of Mirafloreño emigrants to Dominican emigrants in general based on findings from the Miraflores household survey.

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[7]. It is unclear whether these individuals returned permanently or whether they engaged in seasonal or circular migration patterns.

A PROFILE OF MIRAFLORES

The province of Peravia, where Miraflores is located, is neither the poorest nor the richest region of the Dominican Republic. Banilejos are known for their business acumen; in fact, many of the colmados (small grocery stores) in Santo Domingo are owned by Banilejos. The region is also noted for its coffee production. Despite this, many of the residents of the campos around Bani lived in poverty prior to the advent of emigration.

Before emigration from Miraflores became common, the community consisted of three economic classes: a small group of landowners, a small merchant class including the intermediaries (middlemen) who bought up agricultural production and sold it in urban markets, and a large group of landless peasants. Mirafloreños' early emigrants were socioeconomically similar to those in the rural community studies described above. The community's class structure, however, became more complex as migration became more widespread. Economic remittances improved the economic position of many households while households receiving less funds or with no emigrant members remained impoverished. Social mobility was often capricious. When remittances declined or when emigrants returned but were unable to find productive employment, some households reverted back to their pre-migration status.

I conducted a survey in Miraflores during March - April 1994. It covered 806 individuals from 184 households (the average household size was five, ranging from 12% single member households to seven percent with eight members or more). Forty-five percent of the respondents were male and fifty-five percent were female. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents were under 20 years of age; 55% were between the ages of 20-59. Fifty-two percent of those 16 years or older were either married or living in union. Thirty-four percent were single. Nearly 80% of the respondents had not completed primary school, though 19% of those individuals were currently school-aged.

Today's emigrant Mirafloreños include impoverished individuals with few resources and more educated individuals from middle-class families. They depart from a community-in-transition. Life in Miraflores combines patterns of urban social organization with many long-standing traditions and taboos. For instance, most people own color TV's and VCR's but they are often unable to use them because of frequent power outages. They own the latest fashions but there are few places to wear them and few cars to get there. Emigration is integrating Miraflores into the wider world at the same time that it stubbornly resists or is economically unequipped to assimilate the changes that world introduces.

Though earlier emigrants from Miraflores may have been among the poorest members of Dominican society, current emigrants leave from this semi-urbanized mental and material state. They are more likely to be married or living in union (80%), older (94% are between 20-59 years of age), and slightly better educated (33% had finished primary school and beyond) than their non-migrant counterparts. They are also somewhat more likely to be male (56%) than female (44%).

Forty-five percent of the households in Miraflores reported incomes of less than 200 dollars a month.[8] These figures are low compared to national income data and most likely underestimate actual earnings. I include them here to denote the range of incomes in the community rather than to indicate actual amounts. Thirty-five percent of the surveyed households had no working members. Among those employed, the majority work in agriculture, as day laborers or in land rental/share cropping arrangements (35%); own their own businesses (12%); or work in stores, offices, government, or sales (17%). Only one-fifth of the households own their own land (19%). Among those that do, 65% own between 1-5 hectares while 32% own 51 hectares or more.[9]

Most families live fairly well. Eighty-three percent own their own homes. Only 20% are made of wood and less than five percent have dirt floors and thatched roofs (better homes are made of cement blocks, tile floors, and zinc roofs). Sixty-five percent of the households have running water though almost two-fifths (38%) do not have bathrooms inside their homes.

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[8]. At the time of the survey, one dollar equaled 12.89 pesos.

[9]. One hectar is equal to 2.47 acres

Emigration from Miraflores has increased steadily in the last two decades. While only 11% emigrated before 1980, 21% left between 1980-1984, and 47% emigrated between 1985-1989. An additional 21% departed between 1990-1994. The overwhelming majority live in the U.S. (96%). Survey respondents reported little step-migration. Ninety-eight percent of those who migrated went directly to the place where they currently reside -- 84% in Boston and 12% in New York. Sixty-eight percent had been in the U.S. for between 1-5 years. Though most emigrated illegally (64%), many Mirafloreños now have their residency papers (73%). Less than one percent, however, are citizens.[10]

Seventy-eight percent of those who emigrated were said to leave for economic reasons. The overwhelming majority left with the intention of returning (80%). Some, in fact, have already done so. Of those households with one-time migrants, 17.4 had one returnee; 4.8% have two returnees.

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[10]. Unlike income data, most respondents did not seem reluctant to report about their family members' migration status. By the time we conducted the survey, many people already knew me. They agreed to participate because the survey was approved by the MDC. Emigrating illegally is also so commonplace that most people feel it is nothing to hide.

At the time of the survey, 66% of the households in Miraflores had emigrant members. Fifty-nine percent said they received some income from the U.S. Seventy-three percent of all emigrants reportedly send some monies home. Among those households, 37.3% receive between 75-100 percent of their income from remittances. Almost one-third (31.4%) of the households earn all of their money in the Dominican Republic.

Fifty-five percent of the emigrants held full-time jobs; 44% hold part-time jobs. The majority worked in factories (26%), as employees in small businesses, (21%), or for office cleaning companies (35%). Among those individuals who send money, 38% send between 50-99 dollars each month; 16% send between $100 - 149.

Only five percent of the households have members who have traveled to the U.S. Sixty percent of those who have visited went between one to two times; the majority stayed for one month or less (51%). Most emigrants, however, remain in close touch with their families. More than one-half call between one to two times per month (52%). Seventy-three percent have returned at least once. Most stay between 1-4 weeks (86%).

THE RECEIVING-COUNTRY CONTEXT

Dominicans immigrating to Massachusetts during the last three decades encountered a troubled economy which, in many ways, disproportionately disadvantaged latinos. The recessions of the 1970's resulted in declines in the manufacturing sector which was precisely where many immigrants had the skills needed to find work. In contrast, the high-tech industry growth propelling the Massachusetts Miracle of the 1980's did not benefit latinos because they generally lacked the education and skills that jobs in these sectors required (Boston Foundation 1989).

Massachusetts lost 8.3 percent of all manufacturing employment during the 1970's (Melendez 1994). Of the three reasons proposed for the state's economic downfall during this period[11], declines in manufacturing employment affected latinos most. According to Harrison (1988), about one-fifth of the jobs lost during the early 1970's involved unskilled labor. During that same period, 37.6 percent of all latinos were employed in unskilled manufacturing jobs.

Growth in high-tech industries, construction, and business services later propelled the state out of its economic doldrums (Melendez 1994). Between 1975 and 1980, employment in the high-tech sector, for example, expanded by 37.9 percent. In this case, latinos were disproportionately excluded from these economic gains because they were underrepresented in the industries experiencing growth.

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[11]. These include: (1) a diminishing demand for defense products, (2) a decline in mill-based industries, particularly shoes and textiles, and (3) the region's precarious position at the end of national power and transportation systems (Harrison 1988).

Though employment in the service-sector also expanded, where many Dominicans did find jobs, these types of jobs generally offered lower wages, fewer benefits, and limited opportunities for advancement.

Some studies indicate that economic conditions for latinos in Boston were even more adverse than those in the state as a whole. Whereas the manufacturing sector declined by 9 percent statewide between 1965-1987, Suffolk county (where Boston is located) lost 50 percent of its manufacturing jobs during the same period (Falcon 1994). Kasarda (1989) estimated that, between 1970-1980, Boston gained 80,000 jobs for workers with at least some college education while jobs for workers with a high school education or less declined by 125,000.

Dominican immigrants arriving during the last two decades were greeted by these difficult economic conditions. Generally low levels of education and poor English-language proficiency also impeded their economic integration. The socioeconomic profile which emerges in the paragraphs which follow reflects some of these hardships.

Massachusetts' latino population increased from 141,043 in 1980 (2.5% of statewide population) to 287,549 in 1990 (4.8% of the state's population). Boston's latino population also grew from 36,068 or 6.4 percent (1980) to 61,955 or 10.8 percent (1990).[12] In 1980, Puerto Ricans constituted the largest latino group (53.7%), followed by "Other Latinos" (35.7%).[13] By 1990, however, "Other Latinos" made up 50.9% of the city's latinos as opposed to 41.6% Puerto Rican. Included in this "Other Latino" category were 7,938 Dominicans who made up 13% of latino residents citywide. There were 2,070 Dominicans living in Jamaica Plain in 1990, providing a rough estimate of the numbers of Mirafloreños in the city since the majority settle in this area (U.S. Census 1992).

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[12]. There were 574,283 residents in Boston in 1990.

The Dominican population is fairly young; 34% are under 20 years of age. Dominican children were slightly more likely to live in two-parent families than other latinos. Forty-six percent of all Dominican households with children under 18 were female-headed households as opposed to 51% for all latino households. In addition, twenty percent of the children born to all latino mothers were born to women who had never been married compared to 14% among Dominican mothers. Teenage pregnancy among Dominicans was also slightly less common; eight percent of all latino children were born to mothers (regardless of marital status) between 15-25 years of age while only five percent of Dominican children were born to mothers in this age group.

In 1990, eleven percent of Dominican men and eight percent of Dominican women had never attended school or had less than a first grade education. Twenty-one percent and 20% of males and females respectively had high school diplomas. At the other end of the educational spectrum, six percent of Dominican men and eight percent of Dominican women had received a Bachelor's, professional, or graduate degree. Many Dominicans reported poor English language proficiency; 49% classified themselves as speaking English "not well" or "not at all."

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[13]. The "Other Latinos" category includes Dominicans and Central and South Americans.

In 1990, unemployment among Dominican males was en par with latinos as a whole. Thirteen percent of Dominican males between the ages of 20-64 were unemployed compared to twelve percent among all latinos. Dominican women in the same age group were slightly less likely to be working than their latino counterparts (16% and 12% respectively). The majority of Dominican males and females worked in the service sector[14]; 53% of Dominican males and 57% of Dominican females were employed in service occupations.

In 1989, the median household income in Massachusetts was $36,952; in Boston it was $29,180. Dominicans fared better than other latinos but worse than the average. Fifty-one percent of all latino households had incomes below $20,000 compared to 28% among Dominicans. Dominicans did not keep pace with other latinos in the higher income brackets, however, where 13% of all latino households compared to 8% of all Dominican households had incomes of

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[14]. This includes commercial building and cleaning services.

$50,000 or over.

In 1989, latinos in Boston had the largest proportion (33.9%) of persons with incomes below the poverty level. The poverty rate for latinos was approximately two and one-half times that of whites (13.9%) and higher than the rate for blacks (24.2%) and asians (29.5%). Of those latinos under the age of 18, 45.6% had incomes below the poverty level. Among Dominicans, 39% of all males and 39% of the females living in poverty were under 18 years of age.

Finally, Dominicans were less likely to become naturalized citizens than other latinos. Ninety percent of all the foreign-born latinos who immigrated between 1980-1990 were not citizens, compared to 93% of Dominicans. Sixty-one percent of all foreign-born latinos who immigrated between 1965-1979 were not citizens, compared to 68% Dominicans. Thirty-eight percent of pre-1965 latino immigrants who were foreign-born did not become U.S. citizens compared to 58% of the foreign-born Dominicans.

In conclusion, this chapter provides a general profile of Mirafloreños in Boston and the Dominican Republic, the sending-country context from which they come, and the host-country context which receives them. The following chapters focus on the ways in which these migrants, the organizations they create, and the places they come from and go to are transformed by the migration process.

CHAPTER 5: POLITICS ACROSS BORDERS

The following chapter is the first of four case studies of organizational transnationalization. It begins with a brief overview of the political culture which Dominican emigrants come from. The sections which follow examine the nature of the transnational political system which arises, the types of remittances that are exchanged within it, and their effect on political life in the U.S. and in the Dominican Republic.

DOMINICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

Dominican political history combines a long authoritarian tradition with brief democratic openings. Spanish conquerors transplanted hierarchical institutions and authoritarian practices from the old world. When they departed for South America, they left a leadership and institutional vacuum exacerbated by continuous invasions from Haiti, France, Spain, Britain, and the U.S. The struggle for independence and sovereignty that ensued engendered an ambivalent sense among Dominicans that they needed a strong protector while, at the same time, they resented its (Hartlyn 1993).

A second factor shaping the Dominican political psyche was the unusually repressive Haitian occupation of 1822-1844 which directly following Dominican independence in 1821. When sovereignty was reestablished, a liberal, democratic constitution modeled after the U.S. was adopted. It had little relevance to the hierarchical patterns of social relations upon which it was superimposed. After a series of brief, unsuccessful democratic openings, followed by more protracted periods of stability under more restrictive regimes, many Dominicans came to believe that authoritarian regimes were necessary prerequisites to economic and political security. The seeds of a persistent tension between a tradition of liberal democracy and an authoritarian political and constitutional system were thus sewn. The country blended these two political legacies successfully at only a few brief junctures in its history (Wiarda 1989).

Many believe the Trujillo regime was as repressive and centrally controlled as its European totalitarian counterparts. It left the country bereft of leadership and institutional structures upon which a new democratic order could be built (Wiarda 1989, Hartlyn 1993). Under Trujillo, however, the Dominican public achieved greater affluence and a sizeable middle class emerged. After his death, Dominicans were economically and educationally better prepared than during any previous period to voice their concerns. Between 1961-1965, popular participation reached unprecedented levels, which helped to stave off a return to the country's totalitarian roots.

Since then, the Dominican Republic has moved fairly steadily along a transitional course toward democracy. Balaguer's rule during his first twelve years in office was a *dictablanda* (soft dictatorship) as opposed to the *dictaduras* (severe dictatorships) of the past; he combined authoritarian repression with democratic overlays. When the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) was elected in 1978, it instituted rule by constitution, curbs on the military, and human rights protections (Espinal 1986).

Currently, the country enjoys an emergent democracy that remains fragile and under-institutionalized (Hartlyn 1993, Espinal 1987). Balaguer regained power in 1986 and remains in office despite a highly-contested election held in 1994 which most people believe the PRD won. Two other particularly strong opposition parties, the PLD, and the PRI dot the political landscape along with a host of smaller political entities. Though economic declines and increasing political factionalism have weakened the country's agricultural and industrial labor movements, business-owner, professional, middle-class, and neighborhood associations afford an increasingly viable platform from which to express dissatisfaction and pursue reform (Sharpe and Lynch 1993).

The political context that emigrants leave, then, is characterized by weak, frequently ineffective institutions that often wield little influence over their daily lives. Many are deeply mistrustful of politicians and the political system in general. If further democratic consolidation is to occur, stronger, better-functioning state institutions and more representative political parties are needed. Individual political actors need to become citizens who can independently articulate claims and demands rather than clients who are at the beck and call of their benefactors (Fox 1993).

The following pages examine the ways in which migration contributes to or detracts from these processes. In what ways, if any, does the transnationalization of politics promote identity and capability formation? Do individual actors, for example, demand that political organizations perform better or that politicians be held accountable to different standards? Do political organizations institute more participatory practices?

THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Long before migration became a massive social phenomenon, Dominicans established a tradition of expatriate political organization. Juan Bosch formed the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) in 1939 while in exile in Cuba from the Trujillo dictatorship. Throughout Trujillo's reign, the PRD used its ties with U.S. political leaders to mobilize public opinion against him.

During Balaguer's 1966 - 1978 rule, immigrant PRD members continued to pressure for change in the Dominican Republic from their beachhead in New York. They organized public demonstrations, published open letters in the U.S. press, and enlisted the support of U.S. political leaders. When the party gained power in 1978, leaders shifted their attention to fund raising, sending as much as $40,000 per month back to Santo Domingo. They also began to focus on their own political advancement in the U.S., thereby sewing the seeds of an emerging conflict between the party's financial dependence on the emigrant community and its political platform, which failed to address the social and political realities these members faced. Worsening socioeconomic conditions in the Dominican Republic also turned the government's attention to the emigrant community as dependence on economic remittances increased.

The 1986 election in which Balaguer regained power left the PRD in disarray. Bitter internal disputes discredited the party in the eyes of the Dominican public. To restore unity, and to regain and extend its base of support, the PRD underwent a major structural overhaul in 1990. Under the leadership of Dr. Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, it decentralized decision-making and instituted more democratic procedures. Party leaders also introduced these reforms in response to their growing recognition that emigrants play a critical role in party life. First, they make major contributions to the party budget. Second, they often dictate how their non-migrant family members vote,

> "In addition to their economic clout, they also influence social and political decisions. Be it

> the father, mother, brother or sister who emigrates, a relationship of dependence is created because the person here needs the money that is sent. When their migrant relatives tell them how to vote, they listen. We went to Boston so that when people write to their relatives here they would tell them to support PLD candidates." (PLD Leader, Bani)

Third, they have the potential to be organized into a strong lobby that could advocate for Dominican national interests.[1]

As a result, the PRD expanded its existing transnational structure to include all levels of political activity along the migration circuit. Party leaders created base-level communities, that are then aggregated into municipal zones, which are then grouped into regional sections in New England, New Jersey, Florida, Puerto Rico, and Washington. Today, the New England section, boasts approximately 800 members in eight zones located between Providence and the North Shore of Boston. The PRD also appointed a coordinator to oversee all U.S. party activities. Four members of the U.S. sections represent the emigrant community on the party's National Executive Committee in Santo Domingo.

The PRD system intersects with a second transnational political system through which social remittances also flow: the Socialist International Party system. The social remittances introduced by this convergence complement or magnify changes stimulated by concomitant social remittance flows and by migration in general as this PRD Vice-President described:

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[1] PRD leaders interviewed for this study estimated that between 10-30% of the party's operating budget, and as much as 50% of the funding for specific campaigns, came from emigrant contributions.

> "These parties (i.e. member parties of the Socialist International) have influenced us. They have made us more democratic. We learn from the experiences of these parties and their governments. We have learned from their successes and errors." (PRD Vice-President, Santo Domingo)

Finally, social remittances also flow through an informal network of transnational political relationships within which so much of Dominican political life takes place. Included in this arena are such things as unofficial _equipos de trabajo_ (working groups) that involve fairly routine set of roles and responsibilities but enjoy no formal status or interactions between members and non-members during which political deals are consummated. All of these activities relate to and feed into the party in some way but are less encumbered by its formal rules and structures.

Social remittances, then, flow through formal party structures linking the Dominican Republic and the U.S., larger transnational systems that these parties belong to, and the informal network of group and individual relations which also span the migration circuit. The following section examines the content of social remittance flows.

WHAT IS REMITTED

Each of the four social remittance types flow through this transnational political system.

1. NORMATIVE STRUCTURES -

As the PRD's financial dependence on emigrant contributions increased and emigrant members articulated their conditions for remaining active in the PRD more clearly, new ideas about the PRD's function, ideology, and relationship to its U.S. membership arose. Party leaders recognized the need to manage a dual political agenda which simultaneously addressed the needs of emigrants in the U.S. and spoke to Dominican national interests. "We listened to those in the U.S.," said one Vice-President in Santo Domingo,

> "and we heard that they wanted the PRD to help them to return to a secure job and income, to get advice about how to invest, to be treated well at the airport[2], to be exonerated from taxes on the cars they imported, to be granted the absentee ballot, and to be able to influence what goes on in Dominican Republic. They wanted us to open an office that would help them prepare their papers and advise them about the resources and laws which protect them."

> "We began to understand," said another Vice-President,

> "that the party had to be more realistic about capturing supporters in the U.S. We realized that they were living in a situation that is a little unusual -- a dual lifestyle. They live in the U.S. but they don't have representation with respect to the government there. They feel Dominican and they want to be politically active. So the party developed new structures and is putting into place a strategy which is more

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[2]. meaning to be asked to pay a "reasonable" rather than exorbitant fee (bribe) to customs officers

> realistic and more aggressive with respect to the Dominican community in the U.S. Our policy is to stimulate Dominican participation in political life in the U.S but to also help them remain active in Dominican politics."

The idea of the two-directional political strategy that emerged was a response to new demands placed on the party resulting from migration and to subsequent social remittance flows. According to PRD leaders interviewed for this study, the party decided to support easing the terms of return to the Dominican Republic in exchange for emigrants' continued economic support. The idea of actively promoting Dominican political integration into the U.S., thereby enhancing emigrants' standing vis-a-vis U.S. politics and better positioning them to defend Dominican national interests, also became widespread. Several leaders raised the example of the Jewish-American communities efforts on behalf of Israel as a model they wished to emulate. Just as the Jewish-American lobby successfully influenced U.S. foreign policy on Israel's behalf, so the Dominican emigrant community could also build support for favorable sugar quotas, terms of trade, and development assistance.

Individual actors' also have their political values and ideas challenged by the new ideas they come into contact with when they live in or visit the U.S. Non-migrant Dominicans learn about these through social remittance exchanges,

> "The Dominican is prepared for democracy because he belongs to the western world. The problem is

> that he does not have the habit of exercising democracy, of the practice of democracy. This is what the U.S. teaches him. He reads the newspapers, he sees the electoral campaigns in the U.S., the discussions, he sees that when a politician robs he is censured." (PRD Vice President, Santo Domingo)

Respondents are exposed to a different set of expectations about the workings of politics and the activities of politicians.

> "Those that go to the U.S. in one form or another, although they haven't participated in the political heart of the U.S., they have lived there. They have a notion of the relation between public and private and that the distinctions are clearer than those in the Dominican Republic. There is also a notion of public good and a notion of what the public's rights are. And these things, any person can perceive them because they see it when their kids go to school or when they pay taxes. If people live this in their daily lives, it produces a change in mentality." (PRD Senator, Santo Domingo)

Flows of normative structures at the organizational level began in response to the new demands placed on the PRD by migration and because of the new ideas about the party's agenda, strategies, and constituency that arose in response. Individuals' new ideas and values, in contrast, did change in response to the U.S. context. Both additive and hybrid forms traveled back to the Dominican Republic where respondents felt they were challenging traditional political views.

2. SYSTEMS OF PRACTICE

Political actors, working both within and outside of the PRD, bring strategies and practices with them to the

U.S. For example, PRD leaders often use non-political institutions to pursue political goals, employing religious and community associational forums to gain legitimacy and visibility among the Dominican electorate. Female party members in Bani frequently organize religious groups or teach literacy classes. Though political messages are seldom imparted explicitly, participants forms a positive association with the party because most organizers are also active party members. Party leaders win support by actively fostering this connection between the party and community service, particularly church-related work.

PRD members in Boston also employ this strategy. They formed the Altagracianos, a group based at a local church which organizes Dominican Patron Saint's Day celebrations. They also established a Dominican social club which sponsors social and educational events. Neither organization explicitly articulates political goals. Though their front-line organizers are not PRD leaders, many more behind-the-scenes board members are. Because of the clear association between the Altagracianos, social club directors, and the PRD, these groups also become non-political forums from which the party platform is espoused. Again, the association made by emigrants between the party, the church, and the patria (homeland) made them more likely to support the PRD.

In this example, the strategies that are remitted do not change because, again, they are mounted within a Dominican context. Even though the Altagracianos are based at an anglo church, the group is controlled by Dominican leaders and imbued with a Dominican modus operandi which does not necessitate strategy revision. The remittances which flow back arrive unchanged.

Dominican political party leaders also curry favor with opposition party leadership as a way to recruit new members. When they are successful, individuals who follow that leader (who belong to his base committee, for example) generally defect as well.

> "The natural leaders of the community, when they switch parties, many people also change with them. They say I am the one who runs things here, if I go, all the Reformistas (members of the PRSC) will also go. .. if there is an effective leader in the community, we try to get him to join us, we find them, we invite them to a meeting. Parties often try to recruit groups from one another." (PRD Senator from Peravia)[3]

Leaders in Boston try to appropriate leaders as well. But the fact that their supporters travel back and forth between Boston and the Dominican Republic, or that the leaders themselves permanently circulate between the two, means that a bi-national courtship is needed. The target group at which the remittances are aimed is changing. Hybrid recruitment strategies emerge combining membership incentives that are attractive in both sending and receiving-country contexts.

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[3]. Province where Bani is located

Other remittances are reshaped so that they work in the U.S. context. They are refashioned rather than combined with U.S. strategies to create new forms. In the Dominican Republic, for example, leaders generally recruit supporters through a cara-a-cara (personal home-visits) during which they personally invite people to meetings or solicit their collaboration. The party also engages new members by providing social services such as organizing vaccination campaigns, paying for drug prescriptions, and assisting with job placements. Party leaders attend funerals and visit when family members are ill. They organize large, outdoor activities and motorcades. In fact, two months before the May 1994 election, each party held outdoor block parties in Bani and its surroundings almost every night. They each organized motorcades between Santo Domingo and Azua (90 kilometers) on the weekends leading up to the election.

Colder weather, less leisure time, and greater distances between households in the U.S. necessitate that meetings are more substantive, organized, and less frequent. Though PRD leaders still make home visits and organize comisiones (work-groups), they need to schedule these meetings in advance. They no longer know the daily routines of their members --- that Jose is always home after 5:00 or that he plays dominoes at the corner grocery on Thursday evenings. Party leaders also organized a car caravan when presidential candidate Pena Gomez visited Massachusetts in

1994. It looked more like a small, funeral procession, however, than the massive, mile-long outpouring of floats and trucks these events tend to be in the Dominican Republic. Finally, PRD leaders cannot solve problems as effectively in the U.S. because they do not have access to the same set of resources. But since many Dominicans still make their political choices based on which party has the most to offer, the PRD must devise an alternative package of premiums with which to elicit and maintain support. Systems of practice, then, change in response to the new structural constraints and demands inherent in the sending-country lifestyle.

The party transmits many of these new strategies back to the Dominican Republic.

> "Here are a series of concrete examples. With respect to publicity, we have begun to imitate North American political advertising with the slogans, posters, "bumper stick." We print up leaflets. We didn't use these things before, photographs of the president but not posters. This comes from the U.S." (PRD Vice-President, Santo Domingo).

Individuals, acting outside of formal political forums, are also social remittance carriers. They bring a repertoire of practices with them that they may or may not exercise in the U.S. including voting, attending rallies, discussing politics, reading newspapers, and participating in non-partisan, politically-oriented organizations.

Those active in politics prior to emigration who remain so must adjust their political behavior to fit their new lifestyles. In Bani, for example, there are six prominent municipal leaders who each have their own equipo del trabajo (working group of followers), one of the informal political forums mentioned above. These groups generally meet each morning at their leader's home to sit in his garden, have coffee, and discuss politics before going to work at around 10:00 a.m. Party members also do this in Boston but in a revised form. Their gatherings are less frequent and they tend to take place in stores or other public gathering places after work. Here again, these social remittances are transformed by the exigencies of receiving-country life not through contacts with receiving-country organizations.

3. SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital also flows through the transnational political system. It is constantly altered by the changes in social conditions and relationships which migration engenders. Migration challenges the allocation and volume of social capital by redistributing the population concentrations and frequent contact upon which it depends. It also challenges the norms which underlie the relationships in which social capital inheres. In Miraflores, for example, individuals win the trust and indebtedness of others through routine exchanges of goods and services. The implicit terms of these exchanges are altered in the U.S., where a conflicting, new set of pressures erodes traditional social values and replaces them with more individualistic, accumulation-driven ones. Access to social capital changes because the relations, values, and resources which generate it are redefined. Social capital management becomes transnationalized as fluctuations in the U.S. have increasing repercussions in the Dominican Republic.

Social capital is a political resource which political parties and actors use to pursue political goals. Emigrants replicate or enter into new patron-client relationships in the U.S., though a new set of actors with access to a somewhat different set of goods,[4] may replace the old patrones (benefactors). These bonds, which involve implicit, enduring contracts between participants, shape political outcomes. For example, the Cardenas', a prominent Mirafloreño family, the Cardenas', are involved in patronage relations with several community members in Miraflores. Many of these bonds are sustained in Boston. When Pena Gomez visits the U.S., PRD leaders visit Carlos Cardenas and ask him to send his people to the rally they are organizing. If he agrees, there are also repercussions in Miraflores because Carlos' non-migrant brother Jose will ask his "people" to do likewise. If, on the other hand, Carlos Cardenas decides not to support the PRD, or he reneges on his perceived obligations to his "clients," news of this travels back to Miraflores. The social capital the

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[4]. such as apartments or immigration papers rather than jobs

Cardenas' family commands subsequently declines.

In the case of social capital, social remittances change because the values and relations on which they are based are transformed by migration. Just as social capital is a by-product of social relations, so its transformation is a by-product of changes in these relations and the values engendering them. Once begun, however, changes in social capital feedback upon one another. Alterations in distribution and volume in Miraflores are quickly reflected in Boston and vis versa.

4. IDENTITY

Individuals' and organizations' political identities are socially remitted. Organizations redefine themselves as transnational actors as their constituencies, spheres of activity, and agendas spread throughout the migration circuit. The new activities and functions they take on, and the new ways in which they delimit their organizational identities as a result, reinforce one another and contribute to the emergence of a transnational whole.

Individual political actors' identities are also transformed. Many Dominican women, for example, believe that politics is too dangerous for women. They do not perceive themselves as political beings. After coming to the U.S. where they witness women politicians and active female constituents, they may begin to reformulate an identity which includes political action. They transmit these ideas back to the Dominican Republic where many respondents claimed it was becoming more acceptable for women to participate in politics.

In sum, normative structures, systems of practice, social capital, and identities travel through the transnational political system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic. Remittances change in response to the new organizational demands created by migration and the new organizational constituencies, domains, agendas, and ideologies that arise as a result. They are also reshaped by the context of reception and by merging with existing forms.

The following sections examine the impact of these remittance flows on U.S. and Dominican politics.

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL REMITTANCE ON U.S. POLITICAL LIFE

1. THE CONTEXT OF RECEPTION

Dominicans immigrants to Boston encounter a complex political panorama. Politics are sharply divided along ethnic and neighborhood lines. Latino politics are further fragmented by nationality and class (Jezierski 1994). A small cadre of middle-class, primarily social service professionals generally speaks for the poor majority. Divisions within and between country-of-origin groups often thwart efforts to organize latinos as a whole. Puerto Ricans dominate most of the community's political organizations because they are citizens and they are the largest, most-established group in the state.

Although latinos are the fastest growing minority in the state, the Republican and Democratic party organizations have not been particularly responsive to them. The latino population is still relatively small; many are too young to vote. Until Governor Weld's election in 1990, the Republican Party was not a serious political force. Most latinos, with the exception of Cubans, tended to support the Democrats. In-fighting between groups, and the fact that latino support was not critical to Democratic party success, undercut the Latino Democratic Committee's (LDC) effectiveness.[5]

In spite of these barriers, the statewide latino community has made some political gains. In 1994, there were at least eight elected officials in Massachusetts (Racusen 1994). Though no latinos serve on the Boston City Council, there are two latinos on the Boston School Committee, long a stepping stone toward elected office. There is also a municipal Office of Hispanic Affairs.

2. PRD ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONS WITH U.S. POLITICS

Dominicans generally appear to be on the margins of these efforts. Only 14% are naturalized U.S. citizens. There are no formal ties between the PRD and the Democratic Party in Massachusetts. Mayoral candidates did meet with PRD leaders during the 1993 election because the party headquarter's was close to a campaign stop not because of a planned visit. PRD members, acting as private citizens, have worked on campaigns and forged relationships with individual politicians. Such ties to State Senate President Billy Bulger resulted in the proclamation of Dominican Day; a public ceremony commemorating Dominican independence is held at the State House each year. Bulger also officially receives Pena Gomez and other high-level PRD leaders when they visit Boston. Party leaders have powerful incentives to strengthen these ties. The more they deliver during these visits, the greater legitimacy they wield in the eyes of party leaders at home.

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[5]. The Latino Democratic Committee is a semi-official organization within the Democratic party. Other latino political organizations include the Latino Political Action Committee, currently involved in a redistricting lawsuit, and The National Congress of Puerto Rican Rights, which focuses on voter registration.

Despite the PRD's official strategy, then, party members are just beginning to participate in U.S. politics. The social remittances they bring with them barely infiltrate U.S. political structures. Individual actors may bring new ideas and strategies to the campaigns they work on, but they lack the critical mass necessary to exert any meaningful effect on Boston politics. To date, most respondents continue to view U.S. politics as an arena from which to secure resources for the Dominican Republic rather than to foster Dominican advancement in the U.S. At the organizational level, social remittance flows stay primarily within the PRD's transnational structure. Strategic and normative change are a response to the party's new transnational character not the result of interactions between U.S. and Dominican political structures.

It is worth noting that while "the PRD approach" has not yet taken hold in Boston, party leaders in New York are actively involved in Democratic party politics.[6] It may be that this study examines these events when the Dominican community is still too young and small. If the New York case is prototypical, PRD leaders will probably develop stronger ties to Boston political groups in the future. It may also be that these relationships evolve in stages whereby PRD structures are first harnessed toward homeland goals, then applied toward resource accumulation in Boston to help the Dominican Republic, and eventually devoted toward Dominican political advancement in the U.S. The President of one PRD zone in Boston implied this when he said that if Pena Gomez lost the 1994 election, he would finally turn his energies toward the Boston political scene. "After all," he commented, "one can still help one's country by working to get donations of fire engines and equipment sent back home."

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[6]. Most agree that the PRD played an active role in Guillermo Linares' successful bid for the New York City Council in 1991. The PRD has also supported Dominican community efforts to back a candidate for State Assembly, create a separate Washington Heights Congressional District, and participate in local school and community planning boards (Duany 1994).

Once the PRD leadership reorient their focus, party members are likely to do so as well.

Despite limited interaction with U.S. politics, social remittances flows have generated change within the PRD. For example, party leaders initiated a number of new tactics in response to the new "dual-agenda" the party now espouses. Greater responsiveness to the emigrant community has become a vote-maintenance, as well as vote-winning, strategy.

> "We are trying to be mindful of their needs as well and to put mechanisms into place that can help them in a number of ways. From a political point of view, by doing this we can only win. It is not only a question of taking from them but of giving to them as well. If we can do a series of things for the Dominican in Boston, 7-8 things for him, although this person is not initially in the PRD they could become a member. I would say a higher percentage would end up belonging to this party because it is the institution that helped them, that gave them a hand, that has resolved their problems where no other institutions, political or otherwise, has worried about them. The political goal of all of this then is that those that are able to vote for us will, others will influence their relatives or friends who can vote and will send us more resources." (PRD Executive Committee Member, Santo Domingo)

Additional strategies the PRD now employs include supporting dual citizenship for Dominican emigrants and for extending absentee voting privileges to emigrants.[7] At its 1994 annual convention, the party also approved the formation of sections of naturalized Dominicans and offspring of Dominicans. Party leaders hope that these strategies will ensure that members continue to identify as Dominicans. They also hope that a cadre of permanently transnational political actors will simultaneously attain positions of power in the U.S. and favorably influence party goals in the Dominican Republic.

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[7]. Despite widespread debate about dual citizenship and absentee voting, it is unlikely that either of these proposals will be implemented. Dual citizenship would require modifications to the U.S. and Dominican constitutions. Many ask how the Dominican government could organize absentee balloting if it cannot hold fair elections at home.

Finally, when the 1980 census revealed that women comprised over half of the Dominican electorate and that many male supporters had emigrated, the PRD began to reach out more systematically to women. At the same time, many Socialist International parties were changing their statutes to encourage more female participation. The PRD followed suit -- 30% of all the candidates the party supports and 30% of the leadership at all levels of the party structure are now supposed to be women. The PRD also established FEDOMUSDE (the Federacion Dominicana de Mujeres Social Democratas), a women's federation within the party aimed at increasing female membership.[8] It formed FEDOMUSDE chapters in each PRD zone in the Dominican Republic and the U.S. In this instance, a convergence between the need to reach out to women (a social consequence of migration), changed perceptions about women's political roles (social remittances), and the new ideas introduced by the Socialist

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[8] FEDOMUSDE forms part of the Socialist International's worldwide women's federation as well.

International (social remittances) heightened efforts to increase female political participation.

3. CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL ACTORS

Most people who were not politically active prior to emigration tend to remain outside the party in the U.S.[9] Even those individuals who were active in the PRD prior to emigration tended to become less so in Boston. Their inactivity does not appear to result from a shift toward U.S. politics. Instead, they typically claimed they were too busy or that they were initially involved but later dropped out. "I looked for the party headquarters twice when I first arrived," one man explained, "but it was always closed." Some of these individuals, however, may be "on-call." Their friends in the PRD know they can be counted on to turn out for rallies or make contributions when officials visit from Santo Domingo.

Respondents suggested the following explanations for the PRD's poor track record in preserving and expanding its base of support among emigres in Boston. First, some accused the party of overemphasizing economic gains at the expense of political development.

> "The U.S. Coordinator has been positive for Pena Gomez economically but in terms of creating a political structure I don't see much progress. There has been too much of an economic thrust. We

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[9] The one exception to this is just prior to elections. Membership increases dramatically because people believe that if the party wins they can get a job that will enable them to return home.

> should have political education, consciousness raising, meetings to teach people and inform them about politics. We need to educate the masses of the party about why we are fighting. So far, we are not preparing them to be politicians but to be fundraisers."(PRD Zone President, Boston)

Second, the party's message and strategies do not resonate with the experiences of the emigrant community -- the refashioning of social remittances to fit within the U.S. context is incomplete.

> "Leaders in Santo Domingo still don't understand because they don't know the U.S. They think that the PRD is organizing in Gazcue[10]. Dominicans in the U.S. live in a society that is very developed and sophisticated. They have to work a lot of hours to earn enough money to live a halfway decent life. They don't have time for politics. Also it is not easy to organize people who live in Jamaica Plain with those in South Boston. Two hours on a subway to discuss foolishness, never anything substantial." (Return emigrant PRD leader, Santo Domingo)

Third, there are emerging conflicts between the traditional Dominican-based party elite and a new elite arising in the U.S.

> "There is an elite Dominican immigrant community in the U.S. that is conscious of its interests and has tried to put the brakes on those here. This emerging elite is not just political, it is intellectual, cultural, social...It is achieving a place in City Hall and cannot be bossed around anymore." (Sociologist, Santo Domingo)

Fourth, some believe that PRD proposals for a transnational agenda are more symbol than substance. They question the party's commitment and capacity to take its emigrant members fully into account.

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[10]. a neighborhood in Santo Domingo

> "There is a real disconnection between what the party generally proposes, its actual attitude with respect to migration, and its capacity to understand the problems that emigrants face. The Dominican political leader in the United States does not play any real role here...They are members of the National Executive Committee but they are how many 4,5,6 members out of a committee of 125 members. Politics is done here not there...I do not mean that they are not important but they do not have any real influence." (PRD Vice President, Santo Domingo).

Finally, some constituents feel the party does not give them what they need. They view political entities first as social service providers and then as a forum to pursue political goals. The Dominican Consul in Boston, for example, sees part of her role as a counselor because so many immigrants ask for her help in resolving personal problems. Party leaders reported that immigrants also expected help in completing income tax forms, locating housing, finding employment, and regularizing immigration papers. If the party has lawyers, they say, why can't it help us?

In marked contrast, participation in non-party related activities in the U.S. seems to increase. About half of the return emigrants and current immigrants interviewed reported at least periodic participation in community organizations, business-owners associations, school committees, church councils, and cultural clubs in the U.S.

Most respondents said they had not participated in similar organizations in the Dominican Republic. The immigrant experience seems to engender a different set of problems or needs that these kinds of groups address more effectively. Participation serves both political and social ends -- several Mirafloreños said they joined community groups to be able to see their friends and neighbors. There is also a wider array of organizations to work with.

Respondents also reported much higher levels of contact with the public sector. They interacted frequently with school officials, social service and health care providers, and subsidized housing program managers. Whereas many had had little prior contact with the Dominican state, they were now learning to negotiate the U.S. government's social support system.

Individuals actors bring social remittances to their dealings with these institutions and learn new ideas and strategies through their interactions with them. Respondents reported that they acquired organizational and leadership capabilities, learned interpersonal and assertiveness skills, broadened their knowledge about the services and protections they are entitled to, and mastered how to work with the systems that provide them.

The extent to which these remittances permeate and are transformed depends upon how the receiving organization is structured. Members of the Dominican Business Owners Association went house-to-house and asked the patrones (leaders or benefactors) of the community to help them stop the construction of a supermarket which threatened their small grocery stores. Because Dominicans dominated this group, they used organizing strategies imported from home. The fact that members shared cultural templates made remittance adaptation easier.

In contrast, The Jamaica Plain Development Committee, a group involving Dominicans and other neighborhood residents, combined the strategies and ideas introduced by Dominican members with other tactics, more common in the U.S., such as leafleting. In this organization, which include a more heterogeneous anglo and latino membership, the social remittances introduced by Dominicans had to compete with existing protocols. In such contexts, social remittances tend to have less impact because their incorporation requires a shift in the status quo. Integrated organizations, however, are forums for the acquisition of new organizational skills and hybrid social remittance production.

Even outside organizational forums, emigration seems to stimulate a heightened awareness of the political world as well as generate more discussion about it. Many respondents said they talked about politics more and were more likely to listen to news about politics in the U.S. "I began to watch the news in the U.S.," one returnee said, "and though I wasn't a member of a party, I knew what was going on around me and how the American system works." The new social and economic roles emigrants assume in the U.S. integrate them more fully into the multiple spheres of activity which surround them. Women, in particular, are politically socialized by the more active role that they play in public life.

The political values and ideas emigrants bring with them change in response to these new experiences and settings. Discussions with immigrants in Boston and return migrants in the Dominican Republic elicited some of the following comparisons between the U.S. and Dominican political systems. Clearly, many of the ideas expressed are exaggerated, romanticized accounts that diverge sharply from actual practice. Though overstated, these comments attest to social remittance flows.

a. U.S. Citizens Enjoy Greater Freedom of Speech

> "In the U.S., Dominicans are exposed openly to different ideas and these are modern ideas. The U.S. is the land of opportunities. It is a land where they discuss things freely, they talk about police brutality which they don't talk about here. Here the Dominican knows that if he wants to get something done, he has to have a friend or give someone a bribe. This doesn't happen in the U.S." (Return migrant PRD leader, Santo Domingo)

b. Citizens Enjoy Greater Equality Of Opportunity In The U.S. Most respondents felt that services, jobs, and economic opportunities were distributed according to objective criteria rather than according to who you know.

> "In the U.S., when you go to university you know you were accepted because of merit. There is financial aid but you know you don't have to bribe the official so they put you on the list. You know that your boss will pay you for the hours you worked, it might not be a lot, he might not want

> to know anything about you because he is prejudiced, but he will pay you for what you worked, and he won't try to trick you like here where salaries are based on dishonesty." (Return migrant PRD leader, Santo Domingo)

> "In the U.S. if you get sick and you are hispanic, they send an ambulance, they put you in the hospital. They don't ask if you are a communist, or a delinquent, or a drug addict, or a drug trafficker, they just worry about saving your life... If you don't have money to pay, the city pays. Here no, here my cousin is sick and they have to pay 50,000 pesos. If you go to a private clinic, they ask if you have money. If you don't, they send you to a public hospital where they have no supplies or equipment so you die. When you apply for a bank loan, they check your credit record. It doesn't matter who you know at the bank." (Return migrant, Miraflores)

c. Politicians Are Held Accountable For Their Actions. They Are Sanctioned When They Break The Law

> "When Bill Clinton ran for office they did a background check and when Oliver North broke the law he was punished. It is not like here where everyone knows that Fernando Alvares Bogaart stole money when he ran the Corporacion Estatal de Azucar (the National Sugar Corporation) but he is still running for President." (Nelson, return migrant, Miraflores).

d. Since Politics Is A Vehicle For Advancement In The Dominican Republic, People Base Their Political Decisions On Economic Need

> "Everyone in politics in the Dominican Republic is looking for something. It is not like the U.S. Everyone works, they support a particular party, but on the day of the election, they work, they vote, and they go home. Here, no one works on the day of the election but they are interested in who wins. 'Oh, we are going to win City Hall, and I will get a job for 1,000 pesos a month.' That is what they are looking for." (Jose, return migrant, Miraflores)

In contrast, the majority of respondents believe that political decisions in the U.S. are based on political principle.

> "The government is not the biggest employer in the U.S. like it is here," said one returnee, "so people don't have to think about getting a job when they make a political choice." (Luis, return migrant, Bani)

e. Politics Is Fairer And More Honest In The U.S.

Most respondents feel that political participation in the United States is not dangerous while it is in the Dominican Republic.

> "There is another style of politics in the U.S. People don't fight with each other on the street. The candidates don't attack each other in an offensive manner. The Dominican Republic should be more like the U.S. where there is a complete democracy. In Santo Domingo, there is limited democracy. The other parties can't participate as equals because the government uses state resources in the campaign, the cars that belong to the state. In the U.S., this doesn't happen. The government doesn't have its own T.V. or radio station. There are limits on campaign finances, but in Santo Domingo you can spend as much as you want." (Carlos, emigrant Mirafloreño, Boston)

> "Here, if I have a base committee meeting in my house, people will come by and throw rocks. But people participate, even though it is dangerous because they need the money. Here, they give you money to participate in a caravana (motorcade). They fill up the gas tanks, give them t-shirts, a cap and 50 pesos so they go and make noise. They buy off the opposition party so many people appear on T.V. and then they say many people went but it was because the Left bought off everyone." (Juan Luis, return migrant, Miraflores)

f. Rights In The U.S. Are Clearly Defined and Respected

> "Return emigrants say to us that if I go to get a form in the U.S. I don't have to pay a cent because it is the state's obligation to give it to me. If I pay my taxes, I have the right to this, this, and this. If I don't consume 2,000 pesos

> worth of electricity, I don't pay a 2,000 peso electricity bill. Although they have menial jobs, they acquire a certain discipline that they didn't acquire here because here there weren't any jobs for these people... These are the things that are transmitted in the process of resocialization. This is a benefit that these people bring back to our society." (PRD leader, Santo Domingo)

In sum, social remittances began flowing within the transnational PRD system in response to the changing conditions created by migration. The transnational party structure was expanded, a transnational ideology was adopted, social remittances were exchanged, yet political action remained primarily oriented toward the Dominican Republic.

Such findings may be typical of one form of transnational party politics that may occur at the early stages of a particular migration circuit. Three organizational dimensions were transnational -- structures, rhetoric, and social remittance flows -- while political action continues to be aimed at sending- country political goals. Despite the PRD's espoused commitment to a bi-national agenda, both the party and individual political actors in Boston engaged in little contact with U.S. political institutions. The transnational party system, and the social remittances exchanged within it, did little to advance immigrant community political gains.

It may be that non-citizenship, the immigrant community's small size and relative youth, the way in which the jobs Mirafloreños secure shape their social integration, and the absence of the organizational mechanisms which facilitated immigrant political integration in the past will mean that this form of transnationality is sustained over time. Or political action may also become transnational if and when Mirafloreños begin to perceive their interests as related to the U.S. and the PRD or U.S. political institutions as viable means to pursue them. Or, as the N.Y. example suggests, transnational action may also become more common as the community matures and grows.

Non-electoral politics assumed another type of transnational form. In this case, there was no transnational structure or ideology. Political action focused on immigrant community life. The social remittances Mirafloreños brought with them, however, did have some impact on the workings and effectiveness of the organizations they participated in. Social remittances may have a greater impact on non-electoral forums because they tend to be smaller, less institutionalized, and therefore more open to change. This was especially true in latino vs. mixed latino/anglo organizations in which there were fewer differences between sending and receiving-country members. Shared cultural templates facilitated remittance incorporation.

Changes in individuals' normative structures and systems of practice were by no means restricted to those who participated in organized settings. On the contrary, more frequent, extensive contacts with the public sector, and the increased awareness of the political world that migration seemed to bring about, contributed to remittance acquisition and reformulation. Respondents claimed that they learned new skills and routines. Their expectations of politicians and political entities also changed. It is to the impact of these on the Dominican Republic that I now turn.

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL REMITTANCES ON DOMINICAN POLITICAL LIFE

1. THE EFFECT ON ORGANIZATIONS

The impact of social remittances at the organizational level in the Dominican Republic varies. Remittance flows influence politics to the extent that they further the PRD's agenda. Thus, new publicity techniques and bi-national recruitment efforts are in place on both sides of the border. The rhetoric of greater responsiveness to the emigrant community, dual citizenship, and absentee voting is pervasive. PRD chapters constituted by emigrants, Dominicans who are naturalized U.S. citizens, and the U.S.-born children of Dominicans are represented on the party's Executive Committee.

Furthermore, the PRD embarked on a process of modernization with support from the Socialist International and, in particular, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela. Technical advisors are now assigned to each region. For the first time, the party conducted a census of its members, prepared computerized roster lists, and gave each member an identification card. It systematically calculated how many votes it needed in each ward. Some party leaders believe that the "modern mentality" that social remittances engender encouraged greater acceptance of this reorganization and technification.

Social capital flows broaden leadership opportunities. A new cadre of leaders has emerged in Bani, three of whom are return migrants. In fact,

> "There are leaders who maintain their positions via remote control in the U.S. In Villa Altagracia, the president of the party has a business in the U.S. He is here part of the time and in the U.S. part of the time. The same thing is true in Mao, the principal leaders have businesses in the U.S. One lives in New York, one lives in Providence but wants to run for Senator of Mao. The people accept this because he comes back frequently and he has friends and relatives that work for him. This is not a majority of the party but it is significant." (PRD Vice-President, Santo Domingo)

In other areas, the party faces fewer incentives to change. Social remittances flow back to a context which, in some respects, has been changed drastically by migration and, in others, remains very much the same. In some cases, social conditions in Miraflores still support "business as usual;" vested interests also resist the challenges posed by social remittance flows. The paternalistic organization of the party persists because Dominican society as a whole still supports this behavior. Heightened demands by return emigrants for greater democratization and accountability by return emigrants are often blocked by the powers that be.

For example, when the PRD joined forces with Accion Democratica (a new party which split-off from Balaguer's PRSC) during the 1994 presidential campaign, all senatorial, mayoral, and congressional candidacies were divvied up between the two parties. According to the President of the PRD Provincial Committee, Pena Gomez himself eliminated all the female candidates from the Bani slate to make room for the male Accion Democratica candidates. The PRD's commitment to a 30% female slate was conveniently forgotten.

Social remittances affect the political participation of social groups differently. Young people are particularly difficult to mobilize because many see their future in the U.S. rather than in Miraflores. "The party's message isn't reaching them because they don't want to hear it," the President of the Peravia Provincial Committee commented. "What they want to hear is the voice of their parents or their siblings in Boston saying, 'I will send you your immigration papers'."

The new structures created by the PRD, combined with heightened overall acceptance of women's political participation, have stimulated female involvement in the party. Over time, however, women in Boston and Miraflores use comparable party structures differently. Meetings to elect the leadership of FEDOMUSDE (the PRD's women's federation) took place in Boston and Bani. In Bani, the male leadership essentially chose the platform before the meeting, and FEDOMUSDE members merely approved their choices. Men attended the election and, in fact, gave five of the six speeches that followed it. In Boston, the delegation of FEDOMUSDE leaders that arrived from Santo Domingo to conduct the meeting also presented a single platform. Here, the women objected and accused the visitors of trying to control the election. They also barred men from attendance, claiming they would try to dictate how FEDOMUSDE women should vote.

Two factors help to explain these differences. First, emigrant women change faster than their non-migrant counterparts because they are exposed more directly and intensively to a different set of values. Second, not all male party leaders support the new positions espoused by party rhetoric. Though women do enjoy more opportunities, male leaders who may or may not favor their political integration, ultimately decide the business at hand.

2. THE EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS

Party members who were active prior to migration tend to rejoin the party when they return home, even if they were not active in the party while in the U.S. Re-migrants who were not party members prior to migration are not likely to join the PRD when they return.

Emigrants returning to Miraflores seem to sustain greater involvement in non-electoral forums. They come back accustomed to such practices. Non-migrants also seem to expect successful returnees to take on leadership roles. They assume these individuals return with the resources and skills needed for such tasks. For example, one return Mirafloreños organized the committee overseeing aqueduct construction. Another recently assumed the presidency of the Miraflores Sports Committee.

When asked about the impact of social remittances on Dominican politics, respondents offered a range of responses. Few disputed that social remittances flow between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic. Their disagreement lay in the effect these remittances had on the Dominican political scene.

The first group argued that remittances had little or no impact on the Dominican system. Some respondents felt that emigrants send back few new ideas and practices to the Dominican Republic because they are too uneducated and too weakly integrated into U.S. politics to learn anything.

> "We don't feel the influence of emigrants because the people that go to the U.S. are Dominicans with a very low cultural level and very little education. It doesn't matter what developed country they find themselves in, the fact is that even when they develop new ideas, they are still very much conditioned by the way in which they lived here." (PRD Vice President, Santo Domingo)

Others see emigrants as a conservatizing element who cling to the ideas and practices that prevailed before they left even though the party itself has moved ahead. This was considered to be particularly problematic among return migrants who prospered in the U.S. and came back assuming that their new economic status automatically entitled them to greater political clout. They expected to assume leadership positions but their old-style mentality was perceived as going against the grain of change.

> "They haven't changed. I think they come back with more economic power but with the same clientelist political culture. If you go to a small town, you will find many of them with a gun in their belt...I don't want to be unfair...I don't want to generalize but it is obvious that though they are better off economically, they are not a factor in bringing about a better democratic order...if anything they ask for more privileges." (Sociologist, Santo Domingo)

Still others suggest that the ideas and strategies emigrants transmit negatively influence politics.

> "Those that live in the U.S. influence their family members because they transmit the economic bonanza to those who stay behind. Miraflores has the most T.V. antennas, the most satellite dishes, the most appliances, refrigerators. It has a culture that is almost Americanized. Emigrants transmit this criteria to their families and they become politically indifferent." (PRD Provincial Committee President, Bani)

Finally, some argued that emigrants are re-educated politically by their experiences in the U.S. what they learn is irrelevant in the Dominican context. "People realize that the treatment they receive from the government and the authorities in the U.S. is different than what they get here," one return emigrant leader commented, "but they just don't think that this could happen in the Dominican Republic."

A second group argued that the social remittances emigrants transmit positively influence individual political actors. Even non-migrant Mirafloreños glean ideas about differences between U.S. and Dominican politics which this man described,

> "I have never been to Boston but my brothers say that the elections there are honest. Bill Clinton can't just tamper with votes because he wants to stay in power like Balaguer does here. In Santo Domingo, politics is a risk. Everything is personal. If I am from one party and you are from another we can't share with one another. We can't discuss things. There you can say what you think. During the last elections, my brother told me how Bush and Clinton in a certain t.v. program said things to each other and at the end they shook hands and one felt that the things that they said remained behind because it was a political thing. Here the same thing happens but after the t.v. program is over they go outside and fight. Here if there is a rally, the police are there and they hassle the parties on the Left. There the police have to supervise the entire rally and they can't favor one party over the other." (Freddy, non-migrant, Miraflores)

Proponents of this more positive view argued that social remittances contribute to the creation of a new kind of climate, engendering different kinds of expectations and claims from return emigrant and non-migrant political actors.

> "There are greater demands for more democracy within the parties, that the justice system should be separate from the executive branch which is so corrupt... Emigration is a factor in the modernization of the political system in favor of a new type of establishment within the society. It is playing a role since the people who come back come with these ideas. It is not that they have formed a movement in favor of the rights of citizens but they have friends and neighbors, and they say to their cousins if you have a problem, go to a lawyer. Don't try to work it out through a friend." (Independent Senator, Santo Domingo)

My observations lend support to this second view. Social remittances do help individual actors learn to participate autonomously in politics, shape state decisions, and demand accountability. The case of Lucho, a 60 year old emigrant who lived in Boston between 1983-1988 may be a prototypical one.

Lucho worked as a day agriculture laborer before he emigrated to the U.S. In Boston, he was employed by an office cleaning company. He returned to Miraflores with only minimal savings but borrowed money and purchased a small stand where he sells dry goods. He also works for the Bani city government as a truck and road inspector. Lucho has been a member of the PRD since 1962. He is president of one of three base committees in Miraflores.

Lucho's experience with government is fairly typical. The state plays only a peripheral role in his everyday life. He has never contacted a government official or politician for help in resolving problems. He sees them as corrupt, ineffectual, and biased towards their friends and family members. He raises the example of price control inspectors who come everyday to his stand to collect their 10 *peso* "tip" as proof.

> "Hardly a day passes when they don't come and when they come, what am I going to do? I give them ten pesos, but they don't know how much I am charging. They don't check anything."

He knows that this is wrong but he has never gone to complain to government officials because he feels the justice system will not work. Yet, in his capacity as road inspector, though he doesn't ask for bribes, he does not fine people in violation of the law either. He fears alienating his neighbors and he feels that the government will not back him up.

> "I know everyone here and when I see a road that is dirty I go and I visit them personally. I don't like to have to bring anyone down to the police. They don't back me up a lot. Today I have a job but tomorrow I may not but I will still have that enemy and I will have problems. If it is one's own community, you must pressure them as little as possible."

How, then, does Lucho think about the political system in the U.S.? He described it as much more equitable, organized, democratic, and effective than his own.

> "Politics in the U.S. is something marvelous. There are more opportunities. Here you have to have a friend in the government to be able to get a job or get things done. There they respect your rights more. Here I go to the bank and whatever rich one with a tie cuts in front of me, there everyone has to stay in line."

But when asked how the nature of his political activities changed since his return, he says they have not. His ideas about politics shifted in the U.S. but the institutions he found when he returned remained the same. He encountered a party and a political system which he characterized in general "as corrupt as before." Lucho wants a more objective, merit-based system but he cannot find an appropriate institutional vehicle through which to make that work.

CONCLUSION

Ideas, strategies, identities, and social capital flow through a transnational political party system, created by a Dominican political organization spanning Boston and the Dominican Republic. Social remittances flows are also spurred by political actors' participation in non-electoral settings. These remittance exchanges prompt organizational and individual changes that differ qualitatively and with respect to the rate at which they occur.

The PRD changed in response to the new terms of reference created by migration. The party altered its strategies, ideology, and structures because it needed to capture a more transnational constituency, requiring a more transnational agenda. These changes were not stimulated by new ideas and strategies party leaders learned through their experiences in the U.S.

The effect of these social remittance flows on the party's modus operandi varied considerably. In some cases, more democratic practices have been adopted. More party members can achieve leadership. The party is including previously-marginalized groups. In cases where the social context permits, paternalism, personalism, and discrimination persist. Overall participation in the party in Miraflores does not appear to have increased. At an organizational level, then, migration engendered some democratization within the party, particularly when such changes furthered its new agenda. In most cases, however, vested interests were much too strong and politics proceeded as usual.

The experience of individuals is quite different. Greater involvement in non-electoral organizations, heightened contact with government, and increased exposure to new ideas and practices in the U.S., does transform some individuals into democratic catalysts. They develop new identities and capabilities which they bring or send back to Miraflores. They introduce new ideas about accountability and performance which they share with their non-migrant counterparts. They use these new skills within community organizations, thereby strengthening the civil organizational sector. All of these factors stimulate the citizen formation process.

In this sense, the party is out-of-sync with its emigrant constituency and those within their circle of influence. Emigrants want a new modus operandi as well as a new agenda, which the PRD is not yet ready or willing to do. By challenging traditional notions about politics and fortifying non-state organizations, migration may eventually create a climate which no longer tolerates politics as usual. The PRD may be forced to change because the social context in which it acts will be sufficiently transformed that current practices will no longer be acceptable.

CHAPTER 6: OVER MY DEAD BODY - TRANSNATIONALIZING THE CHURCH

This chapter examines the transnational religious system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic. The religious system unites the two independent U.S. and Dominican churches, unlike its political party counterpart which is a completely Dominican organization. The Dominican-U.S. connection is just one of many transnational church systems connecting countries of origin and departure. These ties are forged within the larger context of the universal Catholic church that is itself inherently transnational. International governance structures and the discourse of global Catholicism provide a rationale for these linkages.

THE DOMINICAN CHURCH[1]

Emigrants who began leaving the Dominican Republic in the late 1960's reinforced the incipient transnational religious system already connecting Boston and the island. Due to a shortage of native-born priests, foreign-born clergy have been working in the Dominican Republic since the early 1930's. In fact, Trujillo actively encouraged western religious orders to come to the country, hoping they would introduce "white" cultural models that would aid his efforts to use anti-Haitian sentiment to galvanize popular support. Trujillo also gambled that foreign clergy would not challenge his politics since many came from countries ruled by totalitarian regimes.

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[1]. Though Pentecostalism is spreading throughout the Dominican Republic, most Dominicans continue to identify with the Catholic church. There are two Pentecostal congregations in Miraflores, which most villagers observe from a safe distance, with a mixture of curiosity and respect. The overwhelming majority of Miraflorenos, however, are Catholic. Pentecostalism is also spreading in the U.S. Most priests felt that Pentecostalism in Boston, however, is much more common among Puerto Ricans than it is among Dominicans.

Trujillo was right about the non-interventionist stance assumed by most foreign-born clergy until the late 1950's. At that time, Monsignor Reilly, a Redemptorist priest from Boston serving as Bishop in a southern province in the Dominican Republic, actively began to speak out against the government. Emboldened by his efforts, many Dominican Bishops also assumed a more anti-government stance, which ultimately contributed to the regime's downfall (Saez 1987).

In this sense, the transnational religious space linking the Dominican and U.S. churches was delineated over 40 years ago. Foreign-born Redemptorist, Jesuit, and Franciscan priests were the primary disseminators of institutionalized Catholicism throughout the country. The Boston-Dominican connection was particularly strong because Redemptorist and Diocesan priests from Massachusetts were the principal clergy active in the Dominican south.[2]

Relations between the Dominican government and the church are extremely close. Trujillo signed a Concordato with the Vatican in 1954, which grants the church specific rights and privileges in exchange for its patronage and approval. Modifying such an agreement is like altering the Constitution. Under the Concordato, the state funds the majority of church construction projects, exonerates taxes on imported goods, pays for religious teacher training, and generally leaves the church to its own devices in exchange for the institution's support. In fact, many church officials receive a salary from the military for serving as chaplains in the armed forces.

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[2]. These relations may also partially explain why so many emigrants from Bani move to Boston, in addition to economic motivations.

These close church-state ties, particularly the Cardinal's close relationship to President Balaguer, proscribe the social justice component of church activities. The church tolerates a variety of political tendencies, ranging from Liberation Theology-like base communities to very conservative Christian-renovation groups as long as they do not directly challenge the government.[3]

In contrast to other Latin American countries, where the church has been an important supporter of anti-government efforts, the Dominican church is more likely to provide social services then to question the underlying causes of poverty. It calls attention to a moral high ground and legitimizes reform movements through its support. But it is not usually the catalyst for these initiatives, nor does it normally point fingers at those responsible for social wrongs. Many Mirafloreños pointed out that most clergy would not challenge the prevailing order because of these close church-state ties. The church could, however, be called upon to use its connections to resolve problems, sometimes more effectively than politicians. When residents tried unsuccessfully to get local police to close down a prostitute bar, they appealed to the Bishop who was able to do so. Several respondents also believed that the government was finally paving the streets in Miraflores because the church got the state to do it in El Llano, the neighboring campo where the Bishop lives.

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[3]. Dominicans have not embraced Liberation Theology with the same fervor as many of their Latin American neighbors. When asked to describe its impact, most clergy interviewed for this study said there were few Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (Christian Base Communities) in the country and that they wielded little effect outside their direct area of activity. In other Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, these communities of fellowship and prayer have played a critical role in bringing about social change.

Despite the cadre of foreign-born priests serving in the Dominican Republic, there was and continues to be a shortage of religious personnel. As a result, the church focused its energies on northern, urban areas; Bani was particularly under-attended. It fell under the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese of Santo Domingo until 1987 when a separate Archdiocese was created. As a consequence, many Banilejos have had little contact with the formal church; their ties to the church tend to be weak. Their reputation as "difficult to evangelize" was shared by several clergy.

> "The Banilejo is a hard working man, a business man, so I feel that in certain ways he doesn't need God so much, humanly speaking, because he tends to be more sure of himself, more aggressive,

> more productive, it is easier for him to forget about religion. In Bani, for example, religious organizations have not been necessary, but in the north, all of the agrarian leagues and the peasant organizations develop around the church. In the south, they established these organizations themselves without the church stimulating them. Bani is a city that has more organizations than the whole country. People have a natural tendency to form groups. Here the church has not had to be the leader in social activism, it competes with other calls for social action." (Bishop, Bani)

While Dominican Catholicism normally synthesizes African, Haitian, and Catholic practice, Miraflores has a unique religious subculture of its own. African influences are weaker because the descendants of the Spaniards and Canary Islanders who settled the area strongly resisted intermarriage with surrounding Black communities. A syncretic mix of predominantly Catholic popular folk practices developed, manifesting only a weak Haitian influence.[4]

> "Miraflores is an enclave where the hegemonic subculture is very influenced by the Spaniards. The African influence is very hidden in Miraflores, it is almost subconscious but it exists. But there is no such thing as a religiosity that is totally Catholic. There is Catholic primacy with a syncretic presence of the element of the African culture." (Folklorist, Bani)

When asked to describe their childhood religious experiences, older Mirafloreños recalled only minimal contact with the church. Until the late 1950's, there was a thatched-roof sanctuary that the community built where a small group attended "celebrations of the word." Most of the time, no clergy were present. Trujillo built the existing church as part of his un-executed plan to convert Miraflores into a sugar production colony. Weekly mass and regularly-scheduled religious education activities only began in the last 10 years.

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[4]. African influences were introduced by slaves brought to the island. The Haitians conquered and occupied the Dominican Republic between 1822-1844 (Peguero and de los Santos, 1988). Anti-haitian sentiment is still strong. In fact, one sociologist described the Dominican national identity as an anti-identity -- anything that Haitians are not. He says that though many Dominicans practice a combination of Haitian-influenced and Catholic religious practices, they would be reluctant to acknowledge these Haitian roots.

The church's weak presence, combined with foreign-born priests and parishioners' conflicting views on appropriate religious practice, kept most rituals in the private, informal sphere. Despite efforts to orient foreign priests about Dominican customs[5], "popular religion was a total 'no' for them." Mirafloreños developed their own brand of popular folk Catholicism which was essentially private, personalized, and divorced from formal institutional settings. Some of these practices are tacitly approved by the church while others are considered unacceptable. In the last decade, however, since clergy visit Miraflores on a regular basis, some villagers have begun participating more actively in church-based practices.

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[5]. Including the creation of the Instituto de Adaptacion Pastoral (The Institute of Pastoral Adaptation) where newly arriving priests attended month-long orientations about popular religion.

THE RECEIVING-CHURCH CONTEXT

The Catholic church in Boston did not create national parishes for Puerto Ricans, the first major Spanish-speaking group to migrate to the city, because church officials did not consider them to be foreign-nationals. A national parish-style approach, though, was the implicit model used to serve this emerging group. One church located in the South End, the neighborhood where most immigrants initially settled, became the hub of all Spanish-language activities -- a viable strategy until latinos began moving to other areas. Then, a small cadre of anglo, Spanish-speaking priests launched a kind of itinerant religious show. Each Sunday, they celebrated mass, performed the sacraments and gave baptismal instruction at a number of churches with Spanish-speaking parishioners with whom they had little ongoing contact.

> "When I first went to Marlboro, the old pastor told me that while I was welcome to use the church, anything that was consumable I had to bring with me because they are not really our folks. So that meant I had to bring my own candles because wax burns, bring my own bread and wine because that was consumable. For all intents and purposes we were having mass in basements because we were not welcome upstairs." (Diocesan priest, Boston)

In the early 1960's, services to Spanish-speakers expanded when the first members of the Missionary Society of St. James of the Apostle began returning to Boston. The St. James Society was organized by Cardinal Cushing in 1958 in response to Pope John XXIII's call to first world countries to tithe their priests to Latin America. When the priests sent by the Boston Archdiocese to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru returned, they were dispatched to serve the burgeoning, geographically-dispersed latino community. By 1968, the community had grown large enough that all activities for the Spanish-speaking were subsumed under the newly-created Hispanic Apostalate (HA).

Thirty-three parishes, staffed by 34 Spanish-speaking priests, currently belong to the HA; five priests are foreign-born. A Puerto Rican Auxiliary Bishop directs the Office. Unlike past efforts to serve immigrants, which promoted eventual assimilation, the HA's stated goals are to integrate new parishioners into the church while allowing them to maintain their unique identity, pray in their own language, and celebrate festivals from their homelands. The HA coordinates a range of services including mass in Spanish, Spanish-speaking bible study and prayer groups, activities for latino youth, and celebrations of country-of-origin specific holidays or holiday rituals that differ stylistically from those in the U.S.[6] Most parishes also organize a separate latino parish council which sends representatives to a general parish-wide council. The Dominican-U.S. transnational system, then, is partially constructed from U.S. religious structures already in the process of incorporating latinos. The linkages that arise contribute further to a multi-country transnationalization already in progress.

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[6]. such as processions re-enacting the Stations of the Cross on Good Friday.

During the last thirty years, the Boston Archdiocese has undergone a dramatic shift to the Right with respect to social justice issues.

> "The church in Boston used to be exclusively a triple-hyphen: Irish-Catholic-Democratic. Republicans were crucified when they entered the seminary. Now over the years, Catholics have become more Republican as they have become more middle class. The Kennedy-Cardinal Cushing connection was fundamental but you see a shifting toward conservatism with Cardinals Medeiros and Law. The church speaks out on abortion, capital punishment, homelessness, and AIDS but these are framed as humanitarian rather than political reform issues." (Diocesan priest, Boston)

THE NATURE OF THE WEB

The transnational religious system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic connects the essentially autonomous U.S. and Dominican churches through impermanent, informal exchanges of parishioners, labor, resources, and training at the parish, diocese, and archdiocese levels. While the political party system consisted of actual, formal transnational structures, the religious system is formed primarily by interpersonal contacts between religious personnel and the circulation of parishioners in-and-out of church structures and religious movement groups.

The most basic religious ties between the Dominican Republic and Boston are forged by parishioners traveling back and forth between individual churches. Since Miraflorenos tend to cluster in the same neighborhoods in Boston, churchgoers normally attend the same two or three parishes. Visiting relatives from Miraflores who attend church with them, or Miraflorenos who attend mass when they visit home, create a fairly steady circular flow between parishes in Miraflores and Jamaica Plain.

Linkages between churches also grow out of relations between individual priests. Some Dominican priests sought connections with the church in the U.S. out of concern for their flock:

> "I went to Boston thinking about getting in touch with the Banilejos. I was on vacation but I got permission from the Bishop to visit some families. The Banilejos do not usually tend to be very religious and so they do not participate that much in the church. I was worried about this and thought that by building on the pride and loyalty the Banilejo feels about his Patron Saint Day, I would try to build a bridge like we had done in New York. I thought I would throw out the idea and see if it caught fire. We could organize a mass to celebrate the Virgin de la Regla Day so that people would participate and then become committed to other activities in the church." (Bishop, Dominican Republic, formerly served in Bani)

Other priests viewed the U.S. as a potential source of aid or supplemental income:

> "For many of us, the church in the U.S. is a refuge to go and look for money. It is a cheap vacation for us and cheap for U.S. parishes that need replacements. They pay air fare and stipends. It is a way we supplement our salaries...Also, the Dominican church does not have enough resources to progress forward. We have to look outside for help. Most of the country should still be on horseback and using candles but someone arrived with a Mercedes Benz

> so we now need gas. We haven't had a gradual enough development to be able to sustain what we have." (Diocesan priest, Dominican Republic)

Some clergy look to the U.S. as a refuge during times of personal difficulty -- a place to make a fresh start, escape from problems with superiors, or rethink their commitment to the priesthood. "In one sense," one priest said, "the U.S. becomes a dumping ground for priests with personal problems or problems with the church hierarchy who leave the country to get away."

The relationships forged by U.S. and Dominican priests deepen and proliferate over the years, precipitating visits to the Dominican Republic by anglo priests which, in turn, give rise to additional, farther-reaching connections. Some of these relationships continue as highly-personal, informal exchanges between friends. Others develop into fairly systematic arrangements whereby Dominican priests serve regularly in a particular parish during the anglo priest's vacation or during "high-demand periods" such as Holy Week. Semi-permanent placements have also been arranged.[7]

Cooperative ties also resulted in a seminarian summer-abroad program. Approximately 20 students worked in northeastern U.S. parishes each summer throughout the 1980's. Dominican leaders cancelled the program in 1992 because of disagreements over the importance of acquiring work experience at home or in the U.S. and because of problems with visa overstays. One continuing impact of this program has been exchanges of Catholic television shows. When a former seminarian with his own religious program in Santo Domingo began sending videos to be aired on the Catholic Cable Network in Boston, a Boston priest whom he befriended helped him secure funding from the U.S. Catholic Communication Campaign Foundation. He uses these monies to produce additional programs which are shown in Boston and Santo Domingo.

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[7]. "Adopt-a-Parish" type arrangements often evolve from these relationships which are important sources of income and material support for the Dominican church. A priest working in Brooklyn, for example, received sacramental items and a statue of the Blessed Virgin for his newly-established parish in Santo Domingo. The U.S. Bishop responsible for the Diocese where he served later visited Santo Domingo on a "needs-assessment" mission which resulted in further donations.

A general sense that each country's manpower and training needs are increasingly connected drives the search for a more organized approach to labor sharing. Some Dominican and U.S. church officials believe they need to reach some agreement about who should ultimately serve the immigrant flock. Should Dominican clergy be held responsible for their emigrant parishioners as Irish and Italian priests were in the past? Or since the Dominican Republic faces its own labor scarcity, should it be up to the U.S. church to meet its own manpower needs?

> "Now, few people in the U.S. enter the priesthood. Before, this was always a church with many clergy and they could offer priests to us. In Latin America there has always been a scarcity. Now we are growing vocationally but our priests are still very young. We need them to mature. Even though

> they have the theoretical preparation of the seminary, they still need the preparation one gets from experience. If we send them now, they get work experience in the U.S. but not in the Dominican Republic." (Bishop, Dominican Republic)

Leaders in both countries hope that periodic conversations between Cardinals Law[8] and Nicolas de Rodriguez[9] during the last five years will result in a more formal meeting at which the terms of these exchanges can be agreed upon.

These kinds of arrangements could also be hammered out through discussions between the Bishops' Conferences of each country. To date, however, few interchanges have taken place at this level. Though church authorities do meet at Pan American Bishops' Conference events[10], their conversations generally focus on national or regional issues rather than bilateral relations between specific countries.

Discussions at the Bishop's level do create an ideological climate which encourages religious transnationalization. At the last meeting of the Episcopal Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM) in Santo Domingo in 1992, church officials agreed that though the church is a worldwide communion of faith, it is squarely rooted in a particular time, place, and culture. Indigenous, heterogeneous manifestations of faith merit greater acceptance. By abandoning its long-standing ambivalence toward popular religion and resolving to "inculturate the faith", the Latin American church has become potentially more accepting of the syncretic faith that predominates in the Caribbean and is enhanced by social remittances flows.

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[8]. of Boston

[9]. of the Dominican Republic

[10]. which includes the U.S., Latin America, and Canada

The Catholic renewal movements proliferating throughout the U.S. and Latin America are the final component in this transnational system. These movements aim to restore a sense of ecclesial community to popular hispanic religion and to bring spiritual renovation to the church. They create communities of prayer, organized and directed by lay individuals, which meet on a regular basis in members' homes. The popularity of these groups lies in their ability

> "to create the opportunity for emotional encounters in a world that is characterized more and more each day by an affective void. Some groups also combine the traditional church with African religion which is corporal and musical. This is very appealing to the substrata of the population that doesn't have a textual but a verbal culture." (Jesuit Anthropologist, Santo Domingo)

Though most groups originate outside the actual transnational system[11], they often travel through its network of connections or overlap with them. In addition, individual members enter and exit movement chapters as they circulate back and forth along the migration circuit.[12]

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[11]. imported by U.S. and Spanish missionaries

Most of the findings described here are based on women's experiences because they are generally more active in the church despite concerted efforts to engage men. Though most male respondents answered unconditionally "Soy Catolico" (I am Catholic) when asked about their religious affiliation, this had few consequences for their daily lives.

> "I am Catholic, I believe in God but I am not much of a churchgoer. I go when someone is being baptized, a funeral, but I don't go to mass. In the U.S. it was the same. I would prefer to read a paragraph from the bible in my house. And I think that I believe more in God than many that go to church." (Jose David, return migrant, Miraflores)

SOCIAL REMITTANCE FLOWS

Parishioners and clergy traveling throughout the migration circuit are social remittance carriers. Each group generally engages in a combination of four types of religiously-oriented activities: (1) non-institutionally-based, private manifestations of faith, including both church-sanctioned and popular religious practices, (2) popular religious group activities enacted outside the church, (3) formal church-based practices, and (4) activities relating to the more secular functions of the church. The social remittances they bring with them influence each of these spheres of activity in a distinct fashion.

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[12] Three movements are particularly important in the Boston-Dominican connection -- The Charismatic Catholic Movement, the Neucatecumenal Movement, and the Cursillista Movement. Cursillo Movement members attend a three day course where they form small prayer, study, and discussion groups which hopefully continue after the course ends. In Boston, several thousands have attended these courses and 500 are currently active in the movement. In Bani, there are approximately ten groups. Charismatic Catholic groups were imported to the Dominican Republic from the U.S. These also employ a small group methodology to restore practice to a more human scale and to heighten its spiritual content by integrating Pentecostal-style practices. There are an estimated 33 Spanish-speaking and over 300 English-speaking Charismatic groups in Boston. There are 15 such groups in the Bani.
The Neucatecumenal movement's focus is to return religious practice to its biblical roots. There are an estimated 600 groups in the Dominican Republic. In Boston, these groups are just forming. There is one Anglo-speaking community but a Spanish-speaking group has yet to be established.

Normative structures include an individual's personal beliefs about God and faith. They involve norms about spirituality, destiny, and relations between the living and the deceased that undergird popular folk Catholic practices. They also encompass standards about the more institutional, administrative functions of the church, including norms about church governance, finances, the role of priests and laypersons, the church's commitment to its members, and the individual's responsibility to the church.

Individuals manifest these values and ideas through a variety of practices which are also socially remitted. They engage in private, personalized expressions of faith, such as home-based devotions to particular saints, praying the rosary, and fulfilling promesas.[13] They participate in popular religious practices such as veladas and hora santas.[14] They take part in masses, baptisms, and first communions. Finally, they bring ideas about the church's secular functions, such as counseling and social service provision.

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[13]. Promesas are promises made to perform a certain task or abstain from a particular behavior if a petition is granted.

Religious identities are also remitted. Individuals carry with them a concept of themselves as Catholics, and as observant, faithful individuals. Most Mirafloreños generally described their religious identity as an affiliation with the Catholic pueblo (community). Their identity as Catholics was rooted in their affective ties with other members of the group. This view stands in stark contrast to the U.S. where one is Catholic because one belongs to a church, participates in its associations, and identifies with its structures. One manifests one's membership by taking part in the organized structures of faith.

In contrast to the political case, where remittances flows within the PRD had little impact on and were affected little by U.S. party politics, social remittance flows in the religious sphere exert a much greater effect on U.S. religious life. Several features of the context of reception, the U.S. Catholic church structure, and the nature of religious beliefs and practices heighten their impact.

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[14]. These are home-based ceremonies, generally conducted in honor of someone who has died or a particular saint, that combine church-approved and popular folk practices.

First, because the PRD is a transnational Dominican institution, it has put down few roots in U.S. political soil. In contrast, because the transnational church system combines U.S. and Dominican institutions, social remittance flows necessarily interact more with the U.S. context. They exert more influence and are transformed more fully by the transmission process.

Second, U.S.-Dominican social remittance flows take place within the rubric of the universal Catholic church, which provides a rationale for and the structural conduits through which they are transmitted. An institutional climate which supports cooperation and exchange already exists. The prevailing rhetoric of inculturation also creates an environment which encourages social remittance transmission.

Third, Dominicans in Boston are greeted by a church that began integrating latinos 30 years ago. They reap the benefits of the many changes already instituted by the church to integrate the latinos who arrived before them. For example, since many parishes already celebrate the Patron Saint Day of Puerto Rico or El Salvador, it is relatively easy for them to add a celebration for the Patron of the Dominican Republic.

Fourth, there is more mutual interdependence between the U.S. church and its latino parishioners than there is between U.S. political parties and their potential latino constituents. The U.S. Catholic church is an organization in-flux. Many long-standing members have left its urban parishes. Unlike politics, where Boston political organizations are not dependent upon new latino immigrants for their success, the church desperately needs to attract new groups who can refill its pews, replenish its coffers, and serve as the next generation of priests.

Some religious practices also require immigrant contact with the church. If Mirafloreños want to baptize their children or have a priest officiate at someone's funeral, they must interact with the U.S. church system. In contrast, participation in politics is more voluntary. Dominicans do not have to come into contact with U.S. political parties unless they chose to do so.

All of these factors create a context of reception more favorable to remittance impact than within the political sphere. However, even within this more pliant milieu, fundamental differences in anglo and latino worldviews place inherent limits on interpenetration. When asked to describe these, anthropologist responded as follows,

> "The novelist Garcia Marquez talks about Latin America's great loneliness and says that it is due to the fact that Europeans are completely unable to understand us because theirs is a rational world, a world in which two plus two is undoubtedly four. In Latin America two plus two, who said that they are four, it could make 5 or 10, whatever, because the everyday world is also the world of the fantastic. I, as a priest, must be profoundly immersed in people's daily lives to

> be able to understand them. It shouldn't surprise me when a pregnant woman comes to me and she says that she is pregnant by her husband even though he died over five years ago. At night, sometimes he comes, knocks on the door, she says who is it, he answers me, the deceased, and since it is the deceased, she opens the door and lets him in. She is completely convinced that the dead can return and have sexual relations with her. This is the world of the spirits, the saints, and of miracles. This is a world that anglo priests are completely unprepared for."

Some respondents also described basic differences in the ways in which anglos and latinos perceive their relationship to God. Religious practices in the Dominican Republic are said to be characterized by a quality of _personalismo_ -- patterns of close, intimate personal relationships. Individuals perceive their religious lives as a series of personal relationships with Saints and the Blessed Virgin. These are their _compadres_ (godparents) who they pray to, light candles to, carry in processions, and build shrines to in their homes. The saint is the counterpart of the _padrino_ (godfather) or _patron_ (benefactor) who eases relations in the secular world.[15]

Finally, respondents pointed out basic differences in anglo and latino practices.

> "When we have a saint in our home, we are always touching it. That is how we communicate with each other. An American priest said to me that Dominicans do not have more than 200 religious words in their vocabulary and I said to him, and you, you do not have more than 15 gestures in your vocabulary. This is our language." (Jesuit

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[15]. Fitzpatrick (1987) described similar patterns among Puerto Ricans.

priest, Santo Domingo)

Despite a more open context of reception within the religious sphere, fundamental differences in faith and practice create inherent barriers to remittance impact.

THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION ON U.S. RELIGIOUS LIFE

Actual remittance penetration and subsequent transformation varies by type of remittance, the particular sphere of activity in which the remittance is used, and the ways in which anglo and latino church-based activities are structured in relation to one another. A continuum is suggested whereby more private, non-institutionalized, popular religion-oriented remittances are easily transmitted but little changed because they are not used within the formal church. In contrast, remittances that are used within public, formal, church-based settings, particularly those applied to the administrative sphere, are more likely to be transformed by the transmission process.

1. CHANGES IN INDIVIDUALS' BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

At one end of the continuum of change are norms about God and faith. Beliefs about God are, in some sense, the most transnational of concepts. They are highly personal. They do not require public, organizational outlets. They can remain unaltered because they do not have fit within existing organizational structures.

Certain types of home-based, personal practices are also highly transferable. Creating an altar in one's home, practicing devotions to a particular saint, or saying the rosary are all easily replicated. It is when individuals decide to manifest their faith within organized, formal settings that remittance transformation begins.

The majority of Mirafloreños appear to remain on the margins of the formal church. They seek out the church when they need help, when logistical requirements force them to do so, or when the demands of their immigrant lifestyles make church-based practices more expedient. Parents come to church, for example, when they want their children baptized or to attend catechism classes. They may go to church in order to socialize with other Mirafloreños. Masses in honor of the deceased or ill are substituted for the home-based prayer sessions held in Miraflores because they require so much less organization and effort.

When Mirafloreños do come to church, the customs they bring with them are transformed to varying degrees. The cultural templates they share with anglos, rooted in their mutual Catholicism, ease transmissibility. But since these templates are merely empty shells, the colors, textures, and rhythms which fill them differ and Mirafloreños must adjust accordingly.

For example, the substantive content of the sacraments[16] in each country is generally the same but the prerequisites for and modes of expression for such rituals differ. In the case of baptism, Mirafloreños must adapt to new administrative requirements. In Boston, one must belong to a parish to baptize one's child. "People don't know what parish they belong to in the U.S. because there are so many of them," one priest said. "It is not like Miraflores where there is only one church." The Archdiocese requires all baptismal godparents to be individuals who are married within the church, which is fairly uncommon among Dominicans.

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[16]. such as baptisms, communion, and marriage

Basic stylistic differences characterize mass in each country. In Miraflores, there is no pre-established length. Lay people actively plan services, form choruses, organize readings, and clean the church. The liturgy includes many rhythmic songs.

> "The anglo mass at our church is more reserved, private, individualistic. Mass in the Dominican Republic is more communal and more sensual. There is more music, community participation, a sense of gathering people together. Children are part of it and brought to mass at an early age. There is a higher devotion to Mary and an emotion or drama that gets acted out, like when we reenact the stations of the cross on Good Friday." (Diocesan priest, Boston)

Though Spanish masses in Boston incorporate some of these elements, institutional constraints intrinsically limit the extent of accommodation. Mass in Boston can only last an hour because the next group of parishioners is waiting to enter the church. The Saludo de La Paz[17] becomes a short handshake with one's seat-mate rather than the 10 minute, noisy stroll around the church it is in Miraflores.

Confession is more complicated because unlike baptisms and masses, which involve pre-determined ceremonies, the content of the priest-parishioner exchange are matters of the heart. Meaningful encounters require a cultural as well as organizational fit.

> "Banilejos who are very hard workers and like to earn money, they don't have time to come to church, maybe they can't make it during the hours set for confession. I understand how they are and I listen to them, I can orient them in a different way than other non-latino priests because I know where they live, what their strengths are, how they live their lives. I know how they can help themselves more easily than another priest and they also understand me better because I speak to them in parables. I make comparisons in a language they can assimilate. The same thing would happen to me in English. The culture in which I have lived, in which I have learned, makes me different and people come to me to confess with more trust. Now there may be Dominicans who speak English well who may prefer to confess to an American priest in English because they will finish quickly. I have listened to confessions in English and in 70% of the cases they don't come looking for guidance but a confession where there are 10 other people waiting and you only have to listen to them and absolve them. People know when they confess in a line that you have to go quickly, and when they do it under these circumstances it is because they want to finish quickly." (Dominican Priest, Boston)

In these three examples, remittances are transformed because they have to fit within existing organizational arrangements, logistical requirements, or patterns of social relations.

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[17]. the greeting of peace - a part of the mass when parishioners greet one another.

Practice and belief systems are also transformed by new lifestyle configurations in the U.S. The climate, pace of life, and differences in the organization of work and leisure change religious expression. In Miraflores, most agricultural labor is finished by 2:00 p.m. People have their afternoons and evenings free to join in religious activities or receive visits from priests. In Boston, many Dominicans are employed by office cleaning companies. They have less time to participate because they work between 5:00 - 9:00 p.m. It is often too cold for religious processions during Holy Week. And Mirafloreños do not live so close to one another that they can meet easily or spontaneously for prayers.

> "In this country (the U.S.), life moves very quickly. You have to work on Good Friday. The days I used to observe as holy, I cannot observe anymore because I have to work at 8:00 a.m. One lives alone. In Bani, if I came home late from teaching, I found three plates of food waiting for me. I did the same for my neighbors. If I said, I am sick, my neighbor would say, ah, and the next minute she would appear with a cup of tea in her hand. Loneliness changes you a lot. And the fact that you have to work on Good Friday and on the 24th of December, you don't feel like doing it anymore. In Bani, on the 24th, I would begin making pastelitos in the early morning. Here, I can't because my life isn't the same. I have to live quickly. The food doesn't turn out the same. You come to an unknown culture, you have to adapt rapidly. To survive, you begin losing some of your cultural roots." (Julita, Banileja, Boston)

Interestingly, the small communities of fellowship and prayer that Mirafloreños form as members of Catholic renovation movement groups allow them to preserve their religious practices within church-based settings. They offer latino participants protected spaces within the anglo church structure where they can maintain their unique religious styles. Instead of encouraging members to go out into the world, group involvement pushes them farther away from it by prolonging their ability to remain isolated.

2. CHANGING RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH AS AN INSTITUTION

Normative structures and systems of practice that apply to the administrative, secular aspects of the church lie at the other end of the change continuum. Greater differences separate Dominican and anglo church management practices because there are few shared administrative templates comparable to the ritual ones that ease remittance penetration. The church's continued well-functioning depends on new members adapting to existing norms about parishioners' financial responsibilities and lay participation. Many priests are unwilling to change despite Mirafloreños' different expectations about their relations with them. Such conditions necessitate greater social remittance transformation.

For example, several Boston priests said parishioners had to be resocialized to new norms of financial responsibility to the church. In the Dominican Republic, they felt, parishioners were accustomed to receiving assistance from the church, while in the U.S. the church relies on their financial support.

> "Latinos come naturally to the church looking for social services. They are used to being on the receiving end of missionaries. Here they don't understand that the church has finite resources and that it depends on their contributions." (Diocesan priest, Boston)

Ideas about the parishioner-priest relationship also differ. Boston clergy claimed that Dominicans often expected them to be available at all times instead of during pre-arranged office hours, while Dominican priests felt it was their responsibility to come when a parishioner called. Such divergent expectations created conflict. One Dominican priest described his difficulties with a priest who supervised him in a U.S. parish who felt that his "ever-readiness" created unrealistic demands from the flock. In an interesting twist, a Dominican priest working in Boston attributed his difficulties in reaching parishioners to the fact that they

> "... have been Anglicized by the priest that came before me. In the U.S. there are certain times for confessions, certain times to visit the priest. He is not on call 24 hours a day. I might have been willing to do that but latinos have already adjusted to a more scheduled, organized version of faith. The people do what the priest tells them to do. If he says don't call me at this hour, they won't call. So now, I don't get calls. They are directed to a nun but she has an answering machine in English." (Dominican priest, Boston)

Restricting priest availability and limiting his scope-of-work begins to shift the crux of the clerical role from one of service to one of employee. Rather than looking to the priest as a leader or guide who is an integral, visible member of the community, he becomes its employee, thereby commodifying and depersonalizing his ties to the group. One priest commented that in the Dominican Republic his services were very much in demand, while in Boston, he often felt isolated and under-utilized.

> "In Latin America, the priest cannot confine himself to just saying mass. He has to go to meetings, look for help, clothing, land, or a house. In this country, it is not that there aren't needs, but I am just one more person. In my country, people offer me their houses for church activities, here I have to ask for them. There I was always in demand, here I am lonely. Many times I tell people I am here whenever you need me. I would like to go and help out but I don't feel comfortable. Even among people I knew in the Dominican Republic, I have lost the ability to tell them I'll be over in a little while. In the Dominican Republic, there is atmosphere and an openness. People have fewer commitments. They are not so busy. They have more peace. They enjoy life more in the sense that even though they are poor, the priest accompanies, walks, visits, and plays with them. Here you have to fight hard to get a little of people's time. You can't ask them for a lot and they don't ask a lot of you." (Dominican Diocesan priest, Boston)

The role of laypersons also changes in Boston. While clerical shortfalls in the Dominican Republic necessitated active lay participation, the U.S. church is not yet prepared to accept significant lay involvement. Though the Archdiocese in Boston is creating an institute to train lay leaders, catechism teachers, and deacons, many priests are not comfortable delegating responsibility. The roles and responsibilities immigrants used to assume must be fine-tuned to fit their criteria. The time and energy constraints which characterize immigrants' lives reinforce these diminished opportunities and expectations for lay participation.

> "Here people often become accustomed to not taking the initiative and there is a perception on the part of church leaders that they can't. We tried to organize a small prayer group that met on Wednesdays. Each member had to prepare a reading before the meeting. And because of the two or three hours that this required, the members tired, they lost interest, and soon the group broke up. In the Dominican Republic we organized the same thing and these communities are still running. Here the nun working with me said it was a lot to ask of people." (Diocesan priest, Dominican Republic)

The church's role as a social service provider is also transformed. Parishioners-in-need in Boston can seek help from a number of sources. Because Mirafloreños receiving public assistance get counseling from their social workers, they may no longer solicit advice from their priests. They rely less on the church for clothing and food donations. "Those who do well financially," commented one priest, "seem to need God less."

Finally, the church's role in stimulating civil engagement among immigrants is mixed. Some respondents reported that they assisted in church fund-raising or clothing and food drives. Others said they attended anti-violence or anti-abortion marches. Some Mirafloreños also served on the latino parish councils. They claimed that these experiences taught them skills such as organizing elections, taking minutes, maintaining financial records, and running meetings according to established procedures.

The Boston church's generally conservative stance, and its emphasis on humanitarian assistance over social change, meant that these new skills normally reinforced rather than challenged the status quo. Immigrants gain new expertise that fosters civil engagement by participating in the U.S. church. These skills, however, generally form part and parcel of the existing order rather than call into question the premises upon which it is based. The fact that there are fewer opportunities for lay leadership may also weaken civil engagement.

3. CHANGES IN POPULAR RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

The changes in popular religious practices which result from social remittance flows fall midway on this continuum. Some folk practices are unaltered by the remission process because, like many of their officially-sanctioned, home-based counterparts, they are divorced from organizational forums. Others require greater transformation because they rely on particular appurtenances, patterns of social relations, and spiritual conditions not replicated in Boston. The following section explores social remittance flows with respect to popular religious practices around birth and death.

a. Echando Agua - The belief that newborns are susceptible to Mal de Ojo (the evil eye), is common among Mirafloreños.

Adults admiring or envious of a new baby are said to cast a spell which makes the infant ill. Echando agua (pouring on water) is a popular, home-based baptism ceremony which arose to protect children before a priest came to Miraflores to perform the formal ceremony. Though priests are now readily available, many Mirafloreños still

> "... do two baptisms. The first when the baby is small and then when it is older in the church. In the first, a person comes to pray to the saint which protects children. We give thanks to God for the baby and ask God to make the baby healthy. We put holy water from the church on the baby's face and a little salt on its head. This baptism protects the baby from Mal de Ojo. The baptism in the church would also protect him but one has one's customs. I am Catholic. I believe in God. The baptism that one does in the house and the baptism that one does in the church for me means the same thing" (Maria, emigrant Mirafloreña, Boston).

The tradition of echando agua remains strong among immigrant Mirafloreños. Three Banilejos, known for their gift of prayer in the community, will come to one's home to perform the ceremony for a small fee. Since such ceremonies are held apart from the formal church and the manpower needed to perform them are readily available they continue unchanged. The only problem arises when anglo priests prohibit parishioners from taking holy water from the church.

b. Death - Practices surrounding death are more difficult to replicate.

According to a Banilejo folklorist, Mirafloreños believe that death is a transition to another place where the deceased, present in a different form, can be visited, consulted, or petitioned. The crypts in the Miraflores cemetery, adorned with benches, photographs, and flowers, are meeting grounds for the dead and the living.

> "Death is a transition to being present in another dimension that people understand and know has a relationship to them. That is why there is a tomb. When families build a little house in the cemetery, and they bring flowers and candles and visit it all the time and when one is sad one goes there, it is because one understands that the deceased family member is there in another dimension. It is possible to go and talk with that person. Their spirit can be invoked when there is a disgrace in the family, when there is a need." (Folklorist, Bani)

Mirafloreños believe the deceased remain in their homes for nine days after dying. The doors and windows of the home are closed and visitors enter only through the side doors so that the spirit remains inside. Female family members guardar el rincon (guarding the corner) or sit continuously in the enclosed room where the deceased is thought to be present. His or her possessions are displayed on an altar along with flowers, bells, and holy water.

The Rezo de los Nueve Dias (the prayer of the ninth day) is the final, communal mourning ceremony. In several that I attended, visitors entered to express their condolences, sat silently with the bereaved for a short time, and then went outside where men and women talked separately in small groups in what became almost a party-like atmosphere. Cigarettes, small plastic cups of coffee, and mints were distributed. Women from Bani sold sweets, keeping the flies away by slowly fanning large palm fronds. At noon, a large meal was served. In the afternoon, women from the Charismatic Catholic group, or a person who was paid to do so, led an hour-long prayer session after which a formal mass was said in the Miraflores church.

There is also a set of well-defined rules about the clothes one can wear and the activities one can engage in depending upon one's relation to the deceased. Immediate family members wear only black, white, or purple for two years following death. Even neighbors or distant cousins wear mourning attire and refrain from attending dances and parties.

Maintaining these traditions in Boston is difficult. Since most Mirafloreños are sent home to be buried. There is an insuperable distance between the deceased and those remaining behind. "If I am here," one woman said, "and they are grieving in my house in Miraflores, it is like the deceased is there not here -- the dead spirit is there not here, and I cannot accompany it on its journey." Mourning practices among Mirafloreños change because immigrants are irreparably separated from the spirit, thereby augmenting the distance between the living and the dead. Gradually, the custom of evoking the deceased weakens because they are two rather than one world away.

This distancing, combined with the fact that mourning for those buried in Boston occurs in funeral parlors rather than in people's homes, drives some grieving practices closer to the formal church. Those customs which depend on the close proximity, availability, and generosity of neighbors in Miraflores, factors not easily replicated in Boston, are gradually being replaced by formal church observances. For example, the Hora Santas that mark the anniversary of a death are fairly easy to organize in Miraflores. In Boston, the cost[18] and the effort[19] prompt some Mirafloreños to have a mass said in the person's honor instead. Rules about mourning attire are also weakening.

In sum, the transnational system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic forms part of an already on-going process of transnationalization between Boston and earlier-arriving national origin groups. The social remittances that flow further stimulate this already on-going process. The U.S. context of reception is more responsive to religious than political remittance flows. A continuum of remittance transformation arises. Normative structures and systems of practice used within private, non-institutionalized, informal religious settings penetrate the U.S. context more easily and are less likely to be modified than remittances used within public, church-based settings. Popular religious practices lie midway on this continuum of change.

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[18]. refreshments must be served and someone hired to pray

[19]. in Miraflores, one spreads the word and people come; in Boston, one must find people, invite them, and hope they will brave the distance and cold to attend.

As a result, Mirafloreños can sustain some beliefs and continue to engage in some practices just as they did at home. Other, particularly managerial and administrative behaviors, require greater adjustment. The U.S. church operates according to a set of protocols for financial, time, and manpower commitments between clergy and parishioners. Its successful performance depends upon socializing newcomers to these, with only limited flexibility. Finally, Mirafloreños acquire new skills that contribute to the citizen formation process and encourage civil engagement.

The following section examines the impact of these changes on religious life in the Dominican Republic.

THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Transnationalization prompts greater change in the Dominican Republic than it does in the U.S. particularly at the organizational level. It also exerts more of an impact on civil society, though in somewhat surprising ways. These transformations result from a combination of social remittance flows, the new demands placed on the Dominican church by migration, and from the social spillovers that arise from the economic changes prompted by migration.

That migration wields more of an effect on the Dominican than on the U.S. church is partially due to the size of the sending country in relation to the country-of-destination. Migration's impact on Dominican religious life is like throwing a large stone in a small pool as opposed to a small pebble in a large pond. Dominicans are also one in a long line of immigrant groups that the U.S. church has incorporated, while in the Dominican Republic, emigration is a relatively new and powerful process.

Migration does not appear to heighten religiosity. If individuals do not attend mass prior to migration, they do not generally begin to do so when they return. "People who come back have not changed," one priest claimed, "If they were observant before they left, they come back and are faithful again."

Most respondents reported that their notions about God remained unchanged. Some, however, continued the shift from more informal, home-based manifestations of faith to the more formal, church-based practices they began in the U.S. They model this behavior for their non-migrant counterparts who have also begun to adapt a more church-based focus.

> "We are more educated now about the church, so when our last child was born we knew what we wanted and took him to the priest to be blessed in the church. With my older children, we did echando agua (informal baptismal ceremony) and placed a red ribbon around the babies wrist to protect it from Mal de Ojo." (Julita, emigrant Banileja, Boston)

Dominican priests and seminary students who serve in the U.S. are also social remittance carriers. One priest liked the "organized sociability" at the parish he visited so he instituted an after-mass coffee hour and began personally greeting parishioners at the end of each service. After observing lay ministers give communion, a second priest organized a training school where Dominican parishioners can now learn to perform these functions. He also wants to introduce the "personalized collection envelopes" he noted as a way to teach his parishioners a stronger sense of financial responsibility toward the church.

Social remittances are also transmitted to the Dominican Republic through religious movement channels. These groups serve the opposite function they do in the U.S. Instead of providing protected spaces which enable members to remain separate from their anglo colleagues, some Catholic renovation movement groups in the Dominican Republic empower their members to participate more fully in the world around them.

There are three Charismatic Catholic groups in Miraflores; all of the members are women. The approach to faith that these groups espouse and the organizational methodologies they employ fundamentally transform their members' religious and secular lives. Women organize and lead meetings, speak out, interpret the bible, are listened to, and share intimately with one another. For many, it is the first time they have been asked, and felt equipped, to take responsibility for their own lives.

> "Belonging to the charismatic group has changed my life. Before I felt empty, timid, I almost never

> went out. I hardly talked to anyone. I felt a terrible loneliness. Almost all the time I was quiet, doing my chores alone. Then when I began the catechism, I began to feel different, like my spirit was being renewed again. I am more relaxed now. I stand up and read the word during our groups, I have shared with a lot of other charismatic communities. I go to meetings with many people from many different places."
> (Carolina, non-migrant, Miraflores)

Participation in such groups often redefines one's self-image and expectations about intergroup relations. New conceptual spaces are created which make members more open to new ideas about legitimacy, fairness, and authority (Levine and Mainwaring 1989). The women in Miraflores who participated in these forums said that they began to see themselves as more competent, independent actors entitled to better treatment by their husbands, communities, and the Dominican state. They said they acquired skills which helped them to demand such treatment more effectively.

The personal transformations these women undergo imbue them with the potential to become more autonomous, engaged citizens. The new capabilities and self-concepts they assume make them potentially powerful contributors to the civil and political change process. But just as in Boston, where membership on church committees inspired particular types of political practice, so participation in religious movement groups precipitates certain kinds of political participation as this Jesuit priest in Santo Domingo described,

"Women in charismatic groups are empowered but

> this doesn't necessarily translate into social action or a search for fundamental social change because such a sharp division is drawn between the religious world and the world of daily life. Participants gain the capacity to feel more of a person, to be able to speak, to have more information which let them enter their social world in a different way but it is often like two distinct compartments which don't influence one another."

Again, social remittances promote greater civil engagement, but it is one that maintains the status quo.

A second group of changes in the Dominican church arise from the new demands placed on the institution by migration which require new kinds of structures, roles, and moral responses. The Archdiocese in Bani, for example, created a special office to cope with the increased demand for baptismal certificates now required to obtain a U.S. visa. Staffers must also contend with the black market for counterfeit documents; last year individuals offered parish secretaries as much as $1,000 to falsify papers or forge priests' signatures.

The Dominican Bishops Conference already runs a Migration Department which focuses primarily on serving Haitian immigrants. Plans to create a separate Office of the Immigrant Apostalate are under consideration. The new entity would coordinate seminarian and priest exchanges, advocate for emigrants and expatriate priests in the U.S., and oversee services to tourists and Haitians.

Migration has also given rise to an instrumentalization and commercialization of the sacraments -- using baptism and marriage as a way to further migration goals. Baptisms or marriages consecrated solely to obtain visas are common. Dominicans who are legal residents in the U.S. often charge as much as $5,000 to "marry for business." While most priests feel that "sacraments for visas" depreciates these rituals, at least some clergy view this as an opportunity to incorporate more people into the church.

Migration engenders a new set of social problems that many church officials felt required a church response, including: (1) the frequent death or imprisonment of immigrant Dominicans involved in drug dealing or other criminal activities, (2) home foreclosures when families cannot keep up payments on mortgages taken out to pay for emigration or to fund businesses in the U.S., (3) a Catholic school student body, the majority of whom are being raised by their grandparents, (4) rising school drop-out rates since students think they no longer need to go to school because their relatives in Boston will support them, and (5) a reversal of traditional household roles,

> "The relationship between fathers and sons has been completely transformed. Before the father defined and upheld the norms. Now no, it is the son and it doesn't matter if he is the youngest in the family. If he goes to the states and he earns a bit of money, he is the one that is consulted and decides and imposes his view on the other family members. Before, for example, if the father knew that his son was involved in some sort of questionable business, he punished him. Now, it is the other way around. A lot of those who migrate make money fast and people know that they are dealing in drugs but the parents justify this and the kids become, in the family context and in the

> context of the community, not someone condemned but a sort of hero. He goes and triumphs and it doesn't matter how." (Folklorist, Bani)

Traditional values about social mobility are also changing. Young people no longer respect agricultural work, which was always a venerated occupation in Miraflores. Instead, they see their future in emigration.

> "This implies a complete break with old values because in this rural context, one's survival depends on working the land. It used to be normal to work the land as an owner or as a salaried worker. People were proud to do this. Now today, no one who goes to the U.S. and comes back is going to work directly on the land. There is a certain shame involved. All of these values have been completely transformed." (Sociologist, Bani)

Such fundamental challenges to the moral fabric create a climate that is ripe for political discussion and organization. As one priest said,

> "We are suffering from a crisis of confidence in our ability to solve our own problems. The church can either address itself to emigration's fundamental causes or we can chose to confine our comments to its moral consequences."

According to most respondents, the church has tended toward the latter.

All five Dominican Bishops interviewed for this study felt that the church response to emigration was satisfactory. Articles by church leaders denouncing poverty, unemployment, and corruption appear regularly in the Dominican press, though they rarely link these explicitly to widespread emigration.

> "The church's mission should be to teach people once again that we can and should solve our own

> problems here. The principle response of the church to migration should be to inculcate a sense that what is Dominican is valuable. A love of what is ours. The church cannot create jobs, that is not its mission." (Diocesan priest, Dominican Republic)

Some critics, both within and outside of the church, argue that such a response misses the mark.

> "The church has not accepted the real impact that migration has had on the country. Economic remittances are now the second most important source of dollars to the country. What has the church done about suggesting how this money should be invested? Most people buy televisions, appliances, stereos, have we thought about how this money could be used toward something else? ... We protest the transnationalization of culture but it is a fact. To combat it is fruitless. But how should we assimilate this process?" (Anthropologist, Santo Domingo)

A third group of changes in religious practice and organization are social spillovers from the economic fruits of migration. The Miraflores Development Committee in Boston, for example, raised money to build a funeral home. When the project is completed in the near future, Mirafloreños will no longer mourn at home, which will further weaken traditions already attenuated by transnationalization.

When asked why they chose this particular project despite other pressing needs in the community, Mirafloreños gave several responses. Some supported the project because Llano, a neighboring campo, already has a funeral home and villagers did not want to be outdone by their long-standing rival. Others felt that emigrant community members were the primary supporters of the project because they increasingly view Miraflores as a site of recreation and retirement[20]. Others argued that the project was misguided

> "If they had left it up to me to decide, I would not have built it. We are going to break a tradition that we have always had and we are going to bring a modernization here that we don't have and that we don't need...If you ask other Mirafloreños, I bet there would be 70% who would prefer to be laid out and mourned in their own homes. They wouldn't want to go to a funeral home... I also realize that when people die in the U.S. and are sent home to be buried, if they are laid out in the homes, all of Miraflores goes. But if it is in a funeral home, women have to go to the beauty parlor, men have to wear ties, and you have to have the right clothes and this destroys something about it. Many people prefer not to go. They wait until the family goes back to their home to pay their respects. I know that this is going to happen. It was not a priority." (Gustavo, return emigrant, Miraflores)

Whatever combination of reasons, funeral home construction would not have been possible without monies raised in Boston. In this case, religious change is prompted by social changes resulting from the economic rewards of emigration. It is not the product of new ideas and practices transmitted from Boston.

Selecting baptismal godparents has also assumed economic overtones. Mirafloreños increasingly chose emigrants, rather than those they share close ties with at home, because of the potential economic support emigrants can offer their children. A new breed of godparents has developed: those who stand-in for los ausentes (the absent ones) at the actual ceremony and the real godparents who live in the U.S.

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[20]. Goldring (1993) also found this in the Mexican communities she studied.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to politics, where emigrants circulate in and out of the comparable structures replicated by the PRD in each setting, religious transnationalization involves a movement between two cultural and institutionally distinct chapters of the same international church. There is an inherent conflict. The religious receiving context is generally more receptive than the political. All Catholics are members of the Dominican and U.S. churches. A shared ideological discourse and structures support their integration at any point along the migration circuit. Yet intrinsic differences in worldview and practices limit religious convergence.

The extent to which transnationalization transforms religious ideas and practices in the U.S. depends upon how linked these are to institutional forums. Personal, individualized expressions of faith do not require much adjustment, while communal, institution-based practices brought from the Dominican Republic have to be made to fit American molds. While some rituals exhibit greater flexibility than others, most administrative and logistical aspects of church practice do not. The church's relationship to its public in the U.S., with respect to openness, flexibility, and negotiating power clashed with the ideas and practices Dominicans brought with them. This perpetuates the breach between formal and informal religion that Dominicans arrive with. At the same time, though, the logistical demands of their immigrant lives often push some informal practices into the formal church sphere.

Religious change in the Dominican Republic results from social remittance flows, the new functions the church assumes and new moral dilemmas it confronts as a result of migration, and from the social changes which accompany the economic transformations that migration brings about.

With respect to the relationship between religious participation and civil and political change, neither the Dominican nor the Catholic church in Boston backs a fundamental social change agenda. Both churches generally confine themselves to acting as society's moral conscience and to providing social services. Church membership, in and of itself, will not stimulate activism. Two forums within the church, though, do introduce participants to new skills and behaviors that aid the political change process. In Boston, the techniques parishioners learn by participating in church groups can be applied to other settings. In the Dominican Republic, the self-confidence and leadership skills women gain by participating in religious movement groups may also increase civil involvement. The personal transformations that women who participate in such groups undergo position them to assume more pro-active roles in their personal and political lives.

CHAPTER 7: "IT'S A LUXURY TO BE HONEST" - DOMINICAN - U.S. LEGAL CONNECTIONS

This chapter begins with a fairly detailed ethnographic account of Mirafloreños' legal consciousness -- the ways ordinary people understand the legal system and their right to use it (Merry 1992, Ewick and Silbey 1991). An important caveat must be stated from the outset. Accurately assessing the level of criminal activity in any community is extremely difficult. Reliable local-level statistics are scarce in the Dominican Republic. Highly exaggerated accounts and an active rumor mill often create the impression that many are responsible for what may be the work of a few. I believe this is the case with Dominican criminal activities in Boston, particularly with respect to drug trafficking. Because I lack the tools to properly address these claims, I focus instead on Mirafloreños' prevailing conceptions of themselves. The perception that drug dealing and use is rampant in Miraflores is equally as important as the reality. That the U.S. press, law enforcement officials and, to some extent, the general public, associate Dominican immigrants with drug-related crimes is clearly important, whether or not these claims are justified.

DOMINICAN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Older Mirafloreños' perceptions of the law are based on their experiences during the Trujillo regime. They remember a Miraflores that was virtually crime-free, an image they have passed on to younger community members. "People could sleep in the street and no one bothered you," one elderly Mirafloreña recalled. "You could walk around with money and no one tried to take it. There was respect for other people's property."

Despite the state's overall weakness, Mirafloreños felt its presence in their daily lives. The mayor of Bani appointed an unofficial alcalde (mayor) of Miraflores. In addition to the national police, Trujillo also organized a system of secret police called the Calieses. According to one respondent, "they used to drive around in Volkswagen beetles. When people saw these cars, they used to run."

Mirafloreños obeyed the law because of the repression and fear instilled in them by Trujillo and later perpetuated by Balaguer. Some respondents wax nostalgic about the lawfulness and sense of "government-as-protector" that characterized this era. "We need a mano duro (strong hand) or we will not obey the rules," many claimed. Others objected to the freedoms abdicated in exchange for order, arguing that terror was too high a price to pay for security.

In either case, Trujillo and Balaguer bequeathed legacies of obedience predicated on control and fear rather than on well-functioning institutions. The executive branch of the Dominican government frequently overrules the judicial system. Judges are appointed rather than elected.

As the Director of a judicial reform NonGovernmental Organization (NGO) explained,

> "Here there is no justice, and without justice, there is no real democracy. Nor can there be real development. The institutions are weak and there is no equality between the powers of the state. The Executive branch does what it feels like."

The perception that corruption is ubiquitous is widely shared. Most Mirafloreños feel that laws are enforced capriciously. For many, the police are agents of terror rather than public servants. As one respondent put it, "Everyone in uniform thinks he is a superhombre (superman), a person who has the rights of the people in his pocket."

Mirafloreños place equal blame for what one termed this "parody of justice" on judicial and law enforcement officials.

> "The law in the U.S. differs from those here. Here, no one generally accuses the big guys. In the U.S. they check the background of presidential candidates to see if they had extramarital affairs. Here no. Last December, Balaguer announced he was going to conduct an audit of all state-owned industries to see if employees were stealing. The District Attorney in San Cristobal[1] accused the Mayor and the President of the City Council of stealing money to build private homes. He presented proof and denounced them. But Balaguer realized what was going on and fired the District Attorney. When a District Attorney wanted to act, when there was an honest government official, they kick him out." (Journalist, Bani)

Even judicial system employees echoed these views,

> "I am going to tell you an anecdote. One time my car was robbed. And a politician from San

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[1]. a city neighboring Bani

> Francisco de Macoris said to me, our police do their jobs well when they want to or when there is a divine mandate. And it's true, my car appeared the next day and it was because the President gave an order that it should be found." (District Attorney, Bani)

Most Mirafloreños were hardpressed to describe instances when they sought help from the police or the criminal justice system. "Why should I?" one Mirafloreña inquired, "it's a waste of time which can only get you into more trouble. Have you seen the police at the cuartel (police headquarters in Miraflores)? They just sit around all day and do nothing." The belief that these institutions are ineffective, combined with Mirafloreños' general inexperience with formal institutions, means that an alternative set of social controls, rules, and sanctioning mechanisms constitute the community's social glue.

> "You must realize that the Dominican people lived without organizations until only about 12 years ago; there was very strong repression. If you look at the institutional experiences of the majority of people, they have lived in a house with a grandmother, their father left, then a step-father came who fathered their other siblings. Half the time their brothers and sisters live with them, half the time they do not. So the family is a weak institution. They went to school for a few years but the teacher only showed up every other day. They may have worked at one time, little jobs here and there, or as a chiripeo (street vendor). They have not had experience with institutions in any parts of their lives. The civil institutions don't work. Most people, for example, if they have a problem, they do not go to the police because it's just not worth it. They resolve it in another way. They don't believe in the criminal justice system because they know the criminal justice system doesn't pay any attention to them, they have other mechanisms of justice."(Anthropologist, Santo Domingo)

One type of informal social control is the "que diran?" or "what will people say?" syndrome. People refrain from challenging norms and rule breaking because they fear they will be ostracized by their neighbors.

> "Dominican society has created its own mechanism for controlling its citizens. Since I was young, my community taught me how to behave. If my neighbor saw me doing something bad, they would say, no Roberto, you are not that kind of person. One becomes afraid to break out of that kind of pattern." (non-migrant lawyer, Bani).

Such mechanisms depend upon constant interactions between community members and their intimate windows into one another's lives.

> "In small communities like Miraflores, people always stop to say hello. It is very uncommon for someone to just pass by. You have to stop, greet, embrace, ask how did you sleep? How are the children? There is a minimal level of privacy; sometimes privacy hardly exists. Your neighbor knows your debts, who lent you money, where you are at any particular time. The solidarity is immense." (Journalist, Bani)

As a result, the young woman who goes out at night thinks twice about returning home in the early morning hours because she knows her neighbors will be watching from behind their "closed" shutters when she returns. The man who drinks excessively or fails to adequately provide for his wife and children is marginalized. Community members respect these established norms because they fear the informal sanctioning, through isolation or exclusion, that occurs when they do not.

> "In Santo Domingo you often hear people say, did you see so and so? In Boston, that doesn't exist.

> In your house, you can live the way you want. In Santo Domingo, no. My sister has been visiting from Santo Domingo for the last two or three months. And she is always saying you have to have all the pots shiny and the house clean because if the neighbors come and the house isn't clean what will they say? In the U.S., I live the way I want." (Lourdes, immigrant Banileja, Boston)

Legal and moral socialization within this kind of system engenders a particular kind of legal consciousness characterized by the following:

1. TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY - U.S. citizens generally approach the law in terms of polarities -- an individual is either right or wrong, the appropriate response to a given situation is either black or white. In contrast, Mirafloreños expressed a normative vision of nuanced greys lying somewhere in between these two extremes. For example, while the U.S. law enforcement officers I interviewed disapproved of Dominicans' "flexible interpretation of the law," a Banilejo lawyer described the U.S. system as a "dictatorship of the law," critiquing its rigidity and heartlessness.

Tolerance of ambiguity may arise because Mirafloreños' are generally more comfortable massaging the law and more forgiving of those who break it. It may also grow out of Mirafloreños sense that the laws that prevail do not pertain to them. They are the laws of the state and a class that they do not feel part of.

Examples of tolerance of ambiguity abound. A Banilejo judge told me he is forbidden to practice law during his term in office. But, he explained unabashedly, he gets around the rule by having a colleague sign all the official papers he prepares for his clients. He is also barred from party politics but since another judge in town is active in the Reformista party, he saw no problem in running as the PLD's candidate for Senate last May. Another judge in town is reputed to send cases involving potentially large fines to particular defense lawyers who allegedly give him a percentage of their fees. When asked to reflect on this, the District Attorney commented that there were certain kinds of cases in which it was more important to follow the rules strictly than others. She also devised a way of get around the judge: when he dismisses cases in which she believes the defendant is guilty, she appeals the case in San Cristobal where she has friends whom she knows will treat the case more rigorously.

A third case in point is the prominent Mirafloreño who worked as a coyote (guide), charging fellow community members to help them enter the U.S. illegally. He views his job as a humanitarian social service because "not everyone can get a visa, so the person who helps other people do this is helping mankind." It matters little that he charged exorbitant sums for this service. He sees only that he helped someone fulfill their dream and enabled them to earn a better livelihood.

In each of these examples, individuals engaged in what would commonly be considered rule breaking in the U.S. but from a Mirafloreño perspective is merely rule bending. In fact, two cases involve criminal justice system employees. The public responded not with passionate outrage or surprise but by quietly accepting that this is the way things are done. That such behavior is common and generally condoned reflects a vision of the law as context and person-specific. There is no one right or wrong but rather a range of possible responses that are subject to a degree of adaptation.

2. MISTRUSTFUL SOLIDARITY - Mirafloreños exhibit remarkable levels of solidarity toward one another. Neighbors frequently share plates of food, clothing, or money. If a group of friends goes out, the person who happens to have money pays knowing that next time someone else will pick up the tab. There is a long-standing tradition of convites (agricultural labor exchanges). People help their neighbors with particular tasks with the expectation that such favors will be reciprocated later on in the growing season. Community members often commented on their sense of commitment to Miraflores. "We are the children of Miraflores," said one Mirafloreña, "and it is our responsibility to give something back to the community that gave so much to us. No matter what, I always have time for my community." Social capital is thus plentiful as Mirafloreños access and replenish these bonds of exchange,

mutual expectation, and obligation to resolve problems and acquire the goods and resources they need.

Such solidarity stands in stark contrast to the individualism and self-interest that prevails in the U.S. It also constitutes an important component of Miraflores' social glue -- community members abide by established norms because they feel a strong commitment and obligation toward one another. This solidarity, however, is not undifferentiated; it is often highly-selective, instrumental, and task-dependent. For example, neighbors may exchange food constantly but never borrow money from one another because they know that the level of confianza (trust) they share will not sustain such interchanges. The number of individuals a household actually trades with depends upon how it defines its "sphere of trustworthiness." Often, this circle only includes family members, though family ties can be broadly defined by evoking real or fictitious, often distant, kinship ties. In this way, one household may almost merge with one of its neighbors while engaging in only minimal contact with the household on the other side.[2]

Such differentiated or circumscribed solidarity arises because high levels of skepticism accompany the strong communal bonds on which it is based. In numerous conversations, Mirafloreños emphasized their commitment to the community coupled with a wariness toward community members. "Here, people, I don't know why, but they are almost always trying to trick you," one Mirafloreño said. "Not everyone, there are many friendships outside the family that are real, but you often trust someone and they abuse that confidence."

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[2]. Clearly, not all household members agree on who can or cannot be trusted. Frequently, however, once someone manages to establish such bonds with one family member, other members tend to trust the individual as well.

This somewhat paradoxical, mistrustful solidarity was the subtext in a number of stories villagers shared. Some Mirafloreños join a sans (mutual savings and loans groups). Each member contributes a certain amount each week and gets to keep the combined pool when it is his or her turn. A pattern developed whereby individuals who drew a late number during the first round[3] and an early number in the second san would refuse to contribute again after they collected their money. In order to attempt a savings and loan group, community members must share a basic level of confidence in one another. At the same time, this pattern of deception was not infrequent. When asked if the rule breaker would be ostracized, the answer was almost always a resounding no. "If a person tricks you one time, okay," replied one Mirafloreño, "but if a person is tricked twice, it is because they want to be tricked."

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[3]. thereby gaining the trust of those who collected before them because they kept contributing even though they could not be sure other members would continue to do so after they collected their money.

3. A PATTERN OF MINI-CAUDILLOS - A pattern of patron-client relations permeates all levels of Dominican society. As in politics, since formal legal mechanisms often fail, Mirafloreños tend to seek out their own patrones (benefactors) who can settle problems with the law or offer protection when needed. One Mirafloreño, Jose, for example, is known to have an enllave or contact at the local police station.

> "Jose can resolve problems when people get put in jail. He has many contacts. He has his businesses and he makes contributions to the police and the military. There are many people who have a friend in the military or the government. They go and speak to them, whatever the problem, they can resolve it. In the U.S. people resolve problems with lawyers. Here, you don't need lawyers because any friend can resolve your problem, no matter how big it is."

That social relations are so much more effective than formal protocols reinforces a legal consciousness which values personal connections and flexible arrangements over objective, standardized procedures.

4. DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY - Constituents in the U.S. generally hold their politicians responsible for their actions. Mirafloreños expressed a slightly different notion of accountability illustrated, in particular, by their comments about President Balaguer. While most agreed that government corruption was rampant, it was Balaguer's advisors, not the President himself, they held responsible. A typical comment was as follows,

> "It is not Balaguer's fault. It is those around him. Our leader is blind and aging. He is only aware of what they tell him about, not what he can see. I believe it is the people he has working for him who are doing him harm. Because he doesn't need much money. He doesn't have children, the sisters that he had are now dying of old age. What he does he does for the Dominican people. Since he is going blind, the people who work for him are taking advantage of his goodness. They realize that if he doesn't win this election (in May 1994), they are out of a job." (Gonzalo, return migrant, Miraflores)

It does not occur to Gonzalo that Balaguer chooses his advisors, and that if he cannot do the actual work, he is still responsible for those he delegates the work to. Gonzalo also chooses not to acknowledge that if his advanced age and poor health prevent him from functioning effectively, Balaguer should no longer be in office. In fact, Gonzalo, along with many Mirafloreños, seemed reluctant to criticize Balaguer because he felt such a strong personal, almost familial, attachment to him. He argued that one should not judge the elderly because they deserve respect.

Such expectations about accountability breed a legal consciousness that backs away from assigning responsibility. Personalized, arbitrary norms tend to prevail rather than systematic, pre-established performance standards.

5. "IT'S A LUXURY TO BE HONEST" - Finally, another commonly-expressed perception about the law was that honesty is a luxury only particular individuals can afford. Against such a normative backdrop, minor infractions such as

accepting bribes become acceptable. Many respondents even went so far as to call someone foolish if they did not take advantage of such opportunities.

The Bani District Attorney's comments on this are striking.

> "I am single, I don't have a sick husband, so I can afford the luxury of being honest...but when you are in a position like mine with a lot of pressure and little job security and you go home and you have to pay for your house and the telephone, for the servant, for your kid's school, and one day comes and you don't have anything left and someone comes along and offers you a bribe..."

She goes on to say that accepting such gifts is encouraged.

> "No one wants to see themselves on the bottom. So your friends start to tell you, you are being a fool, everyone who has held your post has taken money. You are in a very precarious position because you could be out of a job if the government changes. The cost of living has gone up so, people have to do anything they can to be able to buy a house or a car. So people become vulnerable and their friends say don't be a fool..."

In some cases, bribe-taking is considered necessary. According to one journalist, "The police in this country are the worst-paid public employees. In 1990, Balaguer said publically, that the mordisco in Mexico (the bribe police commonly take) was permitted here... he said it to justify not raising public salaries."

How successful can criminal justice reforms be when they are overlayed onto this type of legal consciousness and institutional context? What impact can the transnationalization of the legal system and social remittances exchanges have? For as one Mirafloreña reflected,

> "With our civic institutions we have a big problem. Trujillo once said that he was going to make the Dominican Republic into another Switzerland. And someone said, well that's okay but where are the Swiss?" (Claudia, non-migrant Mirafloreña)

The following section describes the nature of the transnational ties which have evolved.

THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEM

The Dominican-U.S. legal system is transnational because the places where perpetrators commit crimes; where the loss or rewards from these crimes are registered; and the citizenship of the investigator, prosecutor, offender, and victim often differ (Marx, forthcoming). Crime perpetrators, particularly in the U.S., are increasingly non-citizens. Some of the crime spoils from the U.S. are transferred back to the Dominican Republic. Individual actors also import and export practices and norms about legal system functioning and use.

The transnational legal system is the least structurally developed of the four cases in this study. It consists of loose connections between two discrete state systems, each made up of multiple organizations. Though the structures are in place through which U.S.-Dominican interagency cooperation could occur, to date, most law enforcement activities are either U.S. or Dominican-based. The U.S. government, however, has dedicated significant resources toward training, technical assistance provision, and institutional capacity building in the Dominican Republic.

Many would argue that the U.S. supports these efforts so that Dominican authorities are better equipped to enforce U.S. - defined interests. The Dominican government is under pressure to cooperate or it risks losing foreign aid or trade subsidies. Others claim that the Dominican criminal justice system is less corrupt and more effective because of U.S. support. These two impacts are not always mutually exclusive. Clearly, the U.S. has an agenda. There have been many examples of brutal, repressive U.S.-trained police and military forces in Latin America. But there may also be cases in which improvements in criminal justice do result from U.S. support, regardless of U.S. foreign-policy goals.

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Boston Police Department (BPD) are the principal U.S.-based actors in this transnational scenario. To date, only the DEA, the FBI, and the DOJ have collaborated directly with Dominican officials. The other agencies instituted changes in structure and function in response to the increasing transnational nature of crime and law enforcement. Each will be discussed in turn.

1. THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA) - The DEA is responsible for combatting drug trafficking. The Dominican Republic became important to the agency when drug shipments from South America to the U.S. began being sent via the island. A DEA country attache and two U.S. staff members work with Dominican state entities to improve their ability to prevent drug dealing and drug-related crimes.

Until 1988, each branch of Dominican law enforcement had its own drug crime unit. At that time, drug-related crimes became a serious enough problem that the Dominican government, with assistance from the DEA, created the Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas (DNCD).[4] By establishing an independent agency, reporting directly to the Dominican President, Dominican and U.S. officials hoped to avoid some of the turf battles and capriciousness that had plagued police-directed drug control efforts in the past. The DNCD is a multi-agency force, including national police and military officials, which is trained, equipped, and advised by the DEA. A new Dominican Law 50-88, which imbues the DNCD with broad-reaching powers, allocates more resources to drug control, and increases penalties for drug-related crimes, was also enacted.

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[4]. This is a good example of the convergence or imposition of U.S. and Dominican interests. Some respondents claimed that the Dominican government recognized that drug-related crimes were increasing and welcomed U.S. assistance. Others felt that the U.S. pressured Dominican officials into creating this drug-combatting apparatus in order to pursue its own foreign policy goals.

DEA agents in Santo Domingo gather and feed information to Dominican officials and work with Dominican officials to strengthen their crime prevention and enforcement capabilities. They are not supposed to pursue criminals on their own. One example cited as prototypical of the DEA's involvement was a case in which the agency learned that a group of Dominicans in Puerto Rico planned to ship drugs to the island. Agents shared the information they had with Dominican police, passed on what Dominican officials knew to DEA agents in Puerto Rico, and helped the DNCD plan its response.

The DEA also runs a New England regional office staffed by 107 agents serving six states. Most agents reported that many of the office's cases involve Dominican immigrants. They also reported that these crimes do not appear to be related to criminal activity on the island. Therefore, there has been minimal coordination between agents based in Santo Domingo and Boston.

2. LAW ENFORCEMENT - Boston Police Department (BPD) officers reported no direct contact with their Dominican counterparts. This stands in contrast to New York where Dominican and New York Police Department (NYPD) officials regularly exchange information about particular cases. Both retired and active members of the NYPD train Dominican

officers and donate equipment to them. The U.S. Department of Justice encourages these ties by funding internships for Dominican officers in U.S. police departments and by supporting Dominican police training at U.S. police academies.

The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP) began working in the Dominican Republic in 1986. ICITAP initially focused on training. It provided technical assistance and organized courses in criminal investigation techniques, administration, and ethics and human rights in law enforcement. Prosecutors and judges were sometimes invited to these sessions in order to weaken professional jealousies between criminal justice branches. According to ICITAP's Acting Director for Latin America, the agency recently shifted its focus towards institution building in anticipation of ending its program in 1996. It is currently developing law enforcement policies and procedures and training trainers who will be able to implement its curriculum nationwide.

3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - U.S.-Dominican cooperation on criminal investigations is supposed to be channeled through the Office of International Affairs in the Department of Justice. However, the Assistant U.S. District Attorney in Boston knew of no cases in which such collaboration had actually occurred.

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Administration of Justice (AOJ) Program normally functions as ICITAP's equivalent for training judges and prosecutors. For reasons not readily apparent, the AOJ program has not done much work in the Dominican Republic. Their inactivity created a situation in which the national police are sometimes better equipped than their prosecutorial and judicial counterparts. Several respondents felt this represented an impediment to judicial reform. Plans to merge ICITAP with the DOJ's Office of Professional Development and Training (OPDAT), which trains prosecutors, may rectify some of these imbalances.

4. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - The FBI office in Boston is one of 56 field divisions nationwide. Two hundred and fifty agents cover Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. The FBI covers crimes such as drug investigations, bank robberies, and kidnapping that involve dual-jurisdictions. It is also active in foreign counterintelligence and counter-terrorism.

The FBI forms part of the transnational legal system because of its role in extradition cases. When a Puerto Rican woman accused of child abuse in Boston fled to Bani (her current boyfriend is Dominican), she became a federal fugitive. The FBI worked with Dominican authorities to arrange her return to face criminal charges in the U.S. In cases such as this, the agency's activities and target population are transnational though its structure is not.

5. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS) - The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is charged with preventing illegal immigration and apprehending illegal aliens who are already here. Like the FBI, the INS' organizational structure does not span the Dominican Republic and Boston. INS officers reported no coordination with Dominican immigration officials. Instead, the agency is transnational to the extent that its target population are transnational migrants. Its tasks and responsibilities have also changed because of its "client" characteristics.

In sum, the criminal justice system linking the Dominican Republic and Boston is transnational because its users and abusers act across borders. Crimes are committed by foreign-nationals, technical assistance and training is transferred, and some cooperative investigations and prosecutions have occurred. Unlike the PRD, which replicated itself in the U.S., and the U.S. and Dominican Catholic churches, which already share and are in the process of creating more transnational linkages, few organizational structures connect the U.S. and Dominican legal systems. Instead, some U.S. institutions work in the Dominican Republic. Dominican and U.S. branches of law enforcement working within their own jurisdictions also respond to an increasingly transnational population acting within a transnational space.

The following section examines the impact of these relations on the criminal justice system in Boston.

SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN BOSTON

The transnational criminal justice system connecting Boston and the Dominican Republic precipitates three broad categories of change. At an organizational level, most change occurs because the changing nature of crime and of the criminal population requires new kinds of responses. Among individuals, changes in legal consciousness result from the interaction between social remittance flows and new patterns of social relations that characterize the immigrant community in the U.S.

1. THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY - The law enforcement officers interviewed for this study generally agreed that Dominican immigration has had a major impact on crime in the region. There is no way to know how many Mirafloreños are involved. Some Dominicans illegally sell Dominican lottery tickets. Others deal drugs. The following paragraphs piece together an account of Dominican's activities based on respondents' conflicting reports. I recognize that their anecdotal character, tendency toward subjectivity and exaggeration, and off-the-record nature clearly constrain such an exercise.

Unlike other groups, Dominicans are said to be poly-drug distributors. They allegedly deal in heroin, which they get from Southeast Asian importers, and in cocaine, supplied by Colombians. A small number import drugs directly. Most respondents believe that Dominicans did not arrive selling drugs. According to one DEA agent, their involvement began when black dealers who had "grown addicted and sloppy" provided them with a window of opportunity. Since then, Dominicans "have cornered the market" on street-level distribution and are beginning to distribute wholesale as well.

Most drugs arrive in Boston via New York. The transport vans which carry passengers daily between the two cities allegedly double as drug transporting schemes; some passengers work as "mules" who get paid for carrying drugs with them. Once the drugs arrive in Boston, a mid-level worker distributes them to street dealers and collects a percentage of prior sales. Most distributors limit the quantities they give out to under 14 grams because dealers caught with larger amounts face stiffer penalties. Many of the Casas de Cambio (check cashing and money remittance stores) common in latino neighborhoods are allegedly fronts for money laundering and for shipping drug monies back to the Dominican Republic.

Law enforcement officials say that Dominicans tend to work in small groups rather than multi-level, large organizations. They engage in little street trafficking. According to one DEA agent, "Dominicans bury their drugs in the ground, they work off beepers, there's not a lot of foot traffic because Jamaicans have made a career out of ripping them off." They also don't sell out of their houses "because they are religious people." Instead, they often use safehouses, apartments rented by white girlfriends, for example, where sales are actually consummated.

"Dominicans," said one INS agent,

> "have made a science out of drug dealing. They come in and take over. They are so successful because they are willing to work. They use innovative ways to hide drugs and move them. They are willing to work 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. They outlast traditional drug dealers. They're also willing to work in volume and to go where it's lucrative, like public housing. They'll go anywhere to make a score and then keep moving before they get caught. So they stand outside boutiques, subshops as contact points. This is not against the law. They also drive fancy cars like Acura Legends and they build excellent hides. I've seen one where the radio had to be tuned to a particular station and the windshield wipers on to get into hiding place."

2. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES - Law enforcement agencies have assumed new functions in response to the changing nature of crime. Dominicans, along with other groups, prompted these changes.

The INS is a particularly salient example of this. The INS' original mandate was to detect illegal aliens and to apprehend those individuals who violated immigration law. In recent years, however, new immigrants, such as Asians, Jamaicans, and Dominicans, have engaged in such high levels of criminal activity that the INS has shifted its focus to fight alien crime. As one agent put it,

> "Fifteen years ago, we used to go into Chinese restaurants and arrest the kitchen help. We did routine investigations for visa applications to see if applicants had good characters. The people who were in violation of immigration law were not criminally involved. Now we spend most of our time investigating immigrants who commit crimes."

In addition to drug and organized crime, the INS also fights document, marriage, and insurance fraud as well as money laundering.

The changing nature of the INS target population necessitated changes in organizational structure and tasks. According to one INS agent, for example,

> "We now spend many manhours each day handling requests for information from the Concord Jail, which is where they do intake for the Massachusetts State prison system. We assigned a full-time agent to review new intakes because so many prisoners brought in on other charges are also in violation of the immigration law."

Some officers also described shifting organizational priorities. "We tend to overlook those who are here illegally but working hard because we need to concentrate on immigrants who are breaking the law."

The changing nature of criminals and crimes created a need for greater interagency cooperation. Before, agencies worked in isolation or coordinated informally with one another. Serious infighting characterized these relationships. Boston Police Department (BPD) officials said they resented their federal colleagues with "their college rings and penny loafers." The FBI and the DEA were notoriously poor bedfellows. But when BPD and Bureau of

Tobacco and Firearms, conducted raids on Jamaican gangs, for example, they could only arrest individuals with guns and drugs, not those who were illegal aliens. Agents began to believe that greater coordination would increase productivity.

The INS is in particularly high demand because of its unique skills and mandate. When the INS participates in a raid, those captured face the additional threat of deportation.

> "When we don't go along, a person can break bond and bail out. But if they know they will be deported, they are less likely to do so. The other agencies love to have us along because we put an extra hammer over the prisoner's head." (INS Officer, Boston)

Because the INS has recourse to laws that other agencies do not, they can hold individuals suspected of illegal status, thereby buying time for other agencies. The federal laws regulating their work are generally tougher than state sanctions.

> "When you get nabbed under the federal system, you have to be tried within three months. There is truth in sentencing because there is no parole; you must serve 85% of your sentence. When you are convicted under the state system, you get a 10 year sentence and you are out in two years because of crowding." (INS Officer, Boston)

Finally, INS agents generally have better foreign language skills.

3. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS -

Mirafloreños' legal consciousness arises in response to a system most people perceive as corrupt and ineffective.

Laws are to be outwitted and avoided rather than sought for protection. Mirafloreños devise an elaborate set of practices enabling them to survive the inequities of such a system. They give the bribes they are asked to, develop powerful enllaves (contacts) in government offices, or form relationships with influential community members who can advocate on their behalf. In this sense, Mirafloreños are no different from other individuals. These kinds of adaptive behaviors are common in settings where corruption and inefficiency is widespread.

Mirafloreños bring this same mind set and skills to their dealings with U.S. institutions. And, while contact with U.S. political and religious organizations is mostly voluntary, Mirafloreños must interact with the legal system when they renew their migration papers, pay taxes, or register their children for school.

Some Mirafloreños felt that their experiences with the U.S. legal system left them better informed about their rights and how to claim them. They said they had not known that individuals could be entitled to such benefits and protections. They had little experience with a system based on need rather than who you know.

> "In the United States there is some corruption. It is not a perfect society. But there are some minimum standards that you can't break because you will be criticized by the press or by the church and civic organizations. Though there is some flexibility and latitude, you can't pass certain boundaries or you will be penalized by the society." (Santiago, return migrant, Miraflores)

Some Mirafloreños claimed that the types of jobs they held in the U.S. taught them more discipline and respect for the rules. Many returned with positive impressions of the Boston police.

> "The police in the U.S. are better than here. If they stop you in the street, they give you a chance. If they need to take you in, they take you in, but they don't ask for money or put their hands on you. You can't bribe them." (Salvador, return migrant, Miraflores)

Other community members use the same adaptive behaviors and attitudes that enable them to cope in the Dominican Republic to circumvent the U.S. legal system. One striking case in point is the widely-known practice of feigning accidents at work to collect disability insurance.

> "I was working in a job where it was very easy to fake a case[5]. My friend said to me, let's pretend to have an accident so we can collect disability insurance and then we can work under another name in another place and still receive insurance money. I told him I would do it but one never knows what one can do in life, there are many things that I have never thought of doing. I remember that we were cleaning the floor with a machine and he said to me you are going to throw yourself over there and then throw the machine over there so they know that it was an accident and I told him let's go ahead, but then I didn't have the courage and I didn't do it. I know that many Dominicans go to the U.S. to do these things but I do not agree with it." (Marino, return migrant, Miraflores)

Another return migrant continues,

> "There were lawyers who would tell you how to do these things because, as they say, there are

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[5]. Miraflorenos use the term caso (case) when someone purposefully orchestrates an accident at the work and is able to collect disability insurance.

> _Mafiosos_ everywhere. This opened people's eyes here. There are people who mounted three or four disability cases. Imagine it. Many of the houses in Miraflores were built with this money because working honestly in the U.S., one can live more or less well. But I don't think that working in a factory or working for a cleaning company for a short time one can achieve these things. I don't agree with these Dominicans, or for me, these Dominicans are not Dominicans." (Edgar, return migrant, Miraflores)

Another example of using adaptive behaviors from the Dominican Republic to get ahead in the U.S. is running home-based informal businesses. One return migrant claimed he made more money by illegally selling beer and lottery tickets and by organizing domino games on weekends in his home than he did working two part-time jobs.

Finally, some Mirafloreños marketed documents.

> "There were people who collected unemployment under their own names and then they would buy other people's names so they could collect two or three times. The same thing happened with welfare, people would buy different I.D. numbers and collect for them all... (Francisco, return migrant, Miraflores)

Job supervisors were also known to charge for giving other Mirafloreños a job. It is difficult to know how many community members actually engage in these practices. Again, one can easily form the impression that many are responsible for the work of a few. The informal social sanctioning at work in Miraflores, which inhibits such activities, weakens in Boston because the organization of immigrant life differs. First, the tightly-woven social fabric and the intense solidarity which constrains normbreaking in the Dominican Republic diminishes in the U.S. Unlike Miraflores, where neighbors are aware of each other's comings and goings, even family members in Boston often grow distant from one another,

> "I lived in the same building near City Hospital for ten years. I knew the Manager and the Assistant Manager but I hardly ever knew the neighbors who lived in front of me. Their doors were always closed...In the U.S., members of the same family share little, even though they are brothers. You don't live near one another. My brothers were there but it was rare for me to go to their houses." (Bueno, return migrant, Miraflores)

Second, the sense that many Mirafloreños are engaging in illicit activities heightens community members' suspicions of one another and further erodes group cohesiveness.

> "You had to be cautious because there were people coming to your house who may have been dealing drugs. When I was living in Boston, not everyone had a car. And I always said that I had to know someone really well to let them ride in my car. When I first got to Boston, the other Mirafloreños who were there were just like me. But then as immigration started changing and there was less work, people started to make their living doing things that were against the law. If you're involved in drug dealing and I'm not, and you get into my car, I'm putting myself at risk." (Sixto, return migrant, Miraflores)

Third, solidarity also weakens as community members ascend to positions of power and use them to pursue personal gain. When supervisors fire workers and replace them with their own relatives and friends or they threaten to turn in community members illegally in the U.S. who demand better conditions at work, they weaken long-standing norms which value group over self interest. These ruptures liberate individuals from pressures to conform and to sacrifice their own advancement for the good of the group. At the same time, they weaken informal social control mechanisms which inhibit aberrant behavior and law-bending.

Fourth, Mirafloreños face enormous pressures to succeed. Their families depend on them. Many non-migrants take for granted the gift-filled suitcases their emigrant family members bring home each Christmas. They have no idea how much hard work goes toward making these purchases.

> "Even if an emigrant fails economically, he can't admit that he failed when he comes back. He has to show that he's been a success. Our society has changed. We now live in a society of the champion and he is a champion who succeeds as an individual. There is very fierce competition. It doesn't matter any more if you hurt someone or you sell your principals along the way to success." (Jesuit priest, Santo Domingo).

Economic expectations have risen at the same time that conditions in Boston make it more difficult to meet them. Seen within this light, one can understand how Mirafloreños fall prey to illicit, quick-money schemes. Some Mirafloreños feel they have to take advantage of opportunities apparently involving few penalties and high potential gains. These individuals are admired at the same time that they are condemned since such decisions are made within the context of a legal consciousness which views rule bending as a necessary, smart practice,

Finally, Jamaica Plain is a high-crime neighborhood.

Mirafloreños witness more criminal activity and violence than they have ever seen. Some community members are the victims of these acts. As a result, some Mirafloreños adopt this culture of crime and violence. Young people are particularly vulnerable to these new role models.

In sum, Mirafloreños bring the normative structures and systems of practice they use to cope with the inequities of the Dominican legal system to the U.S. Some emigrants claimed that their experiences with the U.S. legal system taught them about their rights and how to claim them. Others used these remittances to circumvent U.S. law, adopting their "old bag of tricks" to reap profit from a new setting. The informal sanctions which check such behavior and reinforce solidarity in Miraflores weaken in Boston. Mirafloreños are also exposed to a culture of crime and violence which some adopt. As a result, legal social remittance impact in the Dominican Republic has two contradictory effects. Some of the remittances sent back to Miraflores reinforce law abiding behavior and stimulate demands for change. Others encourage further rule-bending and introduce socially-aberrant role models. These effects are the subject of the following section.

THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY - Crime was still relatively uncommon when widespread migration from

Miraflores began. In the interim, most respondents felt that crime had risen significantly. They described their world as increasingly unsafe, a change they attributed at least partially to emigration.

Mirafloreños generally distinguish between the Dominicano ausente (the absent Dominican) and the Dominicanyork. The first group works hard, saves assiduously, and returns home to build a house and live quietly among his neighbors. The second group, also referred to as Cadenusos (those who wear chains), come back laden with jewelry, drive fancy cars, and build ostentatious homes. They return home with a lot of money despite their short stay and their humble origins. Most people attribute Dominicanyork's improved economic status to their involvement in the drug trade.

> "There is so much money around here because of the narco-traffickers who live in the U.S. They are in the U.S. for a year, they buy three houses, two jeeps, they have a million dollars in the bank. I have a brother in the U.S. who doesn't have $100 in the bank and he has been there for 10 years. He is working and those who work don't have anything. Breaking the law is smart." (Javier, return migrant, Miraflores)

Assessing the Dominicanyork's impact on Banilejo society is difficult. Some believe they are law-abiding citizens in the Dominican Republic even though they deal drugs in the U.S. They may, however, come back to the island to find new manpower recruits. Others believe the Dominicanyork also deal drugs when they return home. Still others held them responsible for increases in non-drug related crime.

> "After migration began, people became much more violent in how they resolve conflicts. When emigrants return, all they want is their jeep, to have many girlfriends, a house, and a gun. When there is a fight they use guns or they burn the place down. You never saw this before 1985. You see it more in Bani than in other parts of the country." (Journalist, Bani)

2. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE - Most respondents, regardless of their political persuasion, felt that relations between U.S. and Dominican authorities improved the Dominican criminal justice system. The Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas (DNCD) was often cited as a case in point. The competition between law enforcement branches which thwarted drug crime prevention in the past has declined because the DNCD include military and police officers. The DNCD is also empowered to replace criminal justice employees who do not do their jobs properly. The former District Attorney in Bani, considered too lax on drug offenders, was replaced. The new drug law also involves stiffer penalties and provides the resources with which to enforce them.

The Dominican police have also benefitted. In 1993, the former head of the DNCD was named Director of the National Police.

> "There is no doubt that he imbued the national police with a different orientation. Since they named him head of the national police, there is more respect and courtesy toward the citizenry. They kicked many no-goods off the force because it was filled with them. For the first time, you have to have a high school diploma to be a police

> officer. There is a forensic laboratory. The police act in a less arbitrary manner - they do sweeps less frequently."[6] (District Attorney, Bani)

Because the police are not responsible for drug control anymore, their activities involve lower stakes. Officers can no longer demand exorbitant payments from suspected law-breakers. As one respondent put it, "They can no longer extort, they can only bribe."

Despite widespread agreement about improvements in the Dominican criminal justice system, there was less consensus about the challenges to national sovereignty posed by U.S. assistance. There was also disagreement on how much these activities resulted in more democratic police practices. While some respondents felt the DEA "respects our national idiosyncracies," others argued it had gone too far. "To talk about a democratic DEA is absurd," one sociologist comment. "Whenever you have a hierarchical regime and authoritarian-like military or para-military institutions of punishment, democracy is not involved." Others took the fact that drug-related law enforcement and criminal justice activities function better than any other aspect of Dominican law as proof that the Dominican government had become a puppet for U.S. interests.

3. CHANGES IN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS - The social context

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[6]. "Sweeps" refer to the indiscriminate rounding up of people who happen to be at the scene of a crime which was allegedly quite common.

greeting the remittances emigrants send or bring back with them is in flux. On the one hand, the context of reception is responsive to reform. There is a general call for change, emanating from U.S. foreign aid programs and from the Dominican public. When new ideas reach the island, they fuel fires already set by international and domestic forces. New conceptual spaces are being created that fit well with the norms about rights and fairness that emigrants introduce.

These social remittances exert a positive influence on civil and political change. Some respondents cited cases in which they had refused to give the bribe the police officer asked for. Others claimed they had demanded to be treated in the same way as their better-off neighbors. This is not to say that change comes easily. Many of the same barriers inhibiting social remittance penetration in other organizational domains also inhibit their effectiveness in the legal sphere. Since organizational change lags behind individual change, the new ideas and practices individuals bring to the organizations that serve them often fall on deaf ears.

But, unlike politics, legal social remittances can also exert a negative influence on civil and political reform. Skills used to circumvent the system, honed in the U.S., also flow back to the Dominican Republic. Some non-migrants adapt these behaviors when they see the houses and cars that they buy. Many respondents also felt that emigrants introduced more criminal, violent behavior.

Such remittance flows impede civil and political change. For example, a group of unemployed young men spend most of their day hanging around one of the main colmados (small grocery stores) in Miraflores. Many villagers believe that they are using and selling drugs they were introduced to by visiting and return emigres. Several mothers worried that their children will be influenced negatively but they did not go to the police because they feared reprisals.

In a second case, Victor returns to Miraflores each year to visit his family. He spends his days relaxing and his nights drinking heavily. He often ends up in a fight. "Victor was not like this before he left," his neighbors claim. "He never bothered anyone." They believe that the "stress" and "craziness" of life in Boston has made him this way.

The ways in which migration transforms the social fabric of Miraflores reinforces these negative impacts. Heightened stratification and individualism, challenges to traditional notions of right and wrong, and new ideas about acceptable paths to social mobility make such behavior acceptable.

> "People used to admire those who were responsible, hard workers. Now, a new class has emerged which challenges the old Bani elite. They build these incredible mansions. They don't follow the old

> rules of modesty and unpretentiousness. The old guard needs them economically because they are the only group with investment capital, but they ostracize them socially. Not one has been allowed to become a member at the Bani Country Club. Young people admire them because they see themselves as having few other alternatives." (Sociologist, Bani)

The impact of legal social remittances on civil and political change, then, is mixed. New ideas about rights and responsibilities stimulate the on-going process of judicial reform. Some aspects of the criminal justice system appear to function better. But the importation of a culture of crime and rule-breaking patterns of behavior that are richly rewarded often counteracts these benefits.

CHAPTER 8: "YOU KNOW, GOD WAS BORN IN MIRAFLORES AND HE SPENDS HIS WEEKENDS HERE." - COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS TRANSNATIONAL SPACE

This chapter examines the fourth transnational organizational case in this study -- the Miraflores Development Committee (MDC). The MDC is the latest incarnation of a community development group linking Boston and the Dominican Republic since the early 1970's.

THE DOMINICAN CONTEXT

The Dominican public had little experience with civil and political institutions prior to the mid 1960's because Trujillo prohibited the establishment of community organizations, After his downfall, the government actively promoted cooperative, club, and association formation. State officials organized agricultural youth groups, women's associations, and men's organizations in Miraflores.

Mirafloreños also formed a savings and loan cooperative in 1968 with assistance from the state-run Instituto de Desarrollo de Cooperativos (INDECOOP). Though an initial success, the cooperative later disbanded amidst accusations of corruption. Several long-time community leaders claimed it failed because community members lacked the required socialization and discipline. Anger and disillusionment over the coop's demise are still fresh, though these events occurred over 25 years ago. Most respondents clearly remember who was responsible for stealing the funds.

Two organizations emerged from the defunct coop. Mirafloreños established a farmers' association to improve access to technical assistance, equipment, seed, and credit. By working as a group, they also became eligible for government marketing assistance programs. Though still strong, members complain that emigration has hurt the association. Many of its original leaders now live in the U.S. Farming as an occupation has also fallen into disrepute.

The second group founded was the Miraflores Comite de Mantenimiento y Obras (The Miraflores Committee for Projects and Maintenance) -- an earlier version of today's MDC. The committee was formed to promote community development.

The MDC's current activities occur within a context that is uniquely supportive of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs). There is a growing recognition among certain sectors of Dominican society, and among foreign donors, that the state cannot resolve all the country's problems on its own. Unlike the U.S., communities are expected to contribute to the development projects that benefit them. The MDC, for example, normally donates land or labor toward government-supported projects in Miraflores. This expectation of community participation, combined with the fact that donors see working with NGOs as a way to circumvent government corruption, increased the resources dedicated to the nonprofit sector. If elected, the PRD also promised to form a gobierno compartido (a shared government) which would include representatives from civil organizations for the first time.

THE NATURE OF THE WEB

The Miraflores Development Committee consists of two chapters of the same organization operating in Boston and Miraflores. During the 1970's, emigrant community members also formed chapters in Santo Domingo and New York but these quickly disbanded. The two surviving groups are theoretically equal, though the way in which power is allocated between them is constantly being renegotiated.

Though some migrant organizations manage joint sending-receiving-country agendas, the MDC's activities have always been oriented toward Miraflores. In addition, unlike the other organizations in this study, the group generates most of its own resources. Each month, anywhere from 40 to 150 Mirafloreños in Boston donate a $10.00 quota to the MDC. Each committee member recruits contributors from the community members he is closest to. He goes to their homes, collects their donations, and shares news about the committee's progress.

Emigration reconfigured the MDC's leadership. In Boston, the principal leaders are early emigres who were active in youth group activities prior to emigration. They do not come from traditionally prominent Mirafloreño families, though they have achieved some measure of economic success in the U.S. Two other leaders were not active prior to emigration. They say they have prospered in Boston and wanted to give something back to the community. A fifth member, a female college student, left Miraflores when she was quite young and participates as a way to stay connected to her birthplace.

There is also another group of unofficial leaders who do not attend meetings but who are called upon at strategic junctures to support particular activities. Everyone knows, for example, that Carlos Chipoco will help out in sports-related activities. He also takes charge of the money at most fund-raising functions. Gustavo Quiroz never comes to meetings but committee members always consult him before starting a new project. They know that an "okay" from the Quiroz family can mean the difference between project success and failure.

In Miraflores, the Committee's membership combines long-time leaders and their families with returnees. Mirafloreños expect successful return emigres to assume positions of leadership. Thus, three out of the seven regular members of the group are returnees. A fourth member came back to Miraflores after attending college in Santo Domingo.

SOCIAL REMITTANCE FLOWS

Though some committee members in Boston acquire and remit new ideas and practices back to Miraflores, these are not the most significant social remittances exchanged within this sphere. More important is the flow of social capital, which rises and falls with fluctuations in emigrant family member participation in Boston.

In one example, the non-migrant sister of the current MDC president in Boston became ill. Her family went to the health clinic and asked the doctors to make a home-visit, which they refused to do. Her relatives became angry and told the physicians she was related to the president of the MDC, which had recently paid for extensive clinic renovations. When the doctors heard this, they suddenly became available. The president's family in Miraflores harnessed the social capital he accrued in Boston by working so hard for the community.

Access to social capital, however, can also decline. If an emigrant Mirafloreño does not contribute to the community, but is thought to be in a position to be able to do so, his family in Miraflores may suffer the consequences. After Manuel was promoted to supervisor in Boston, he began charging community members for finding them jobs. When word of this got back to Miraflores, committee members became reluctant to involve Manuel's family in their fund-raising plans.

Mirafloreños' identity as a community is also socially remitted. The notions of community emigrants bring with them change in response to their experiences in the U.S. Some Mirafloreños, like the Mexican immigrants Goldring (1993) studied, increasingly divide the world between Miraflores, as a site of rest and recreation, and the U.S. where they are productively engaged. Others want to make Miraflores more modern as an indication that they too have changed. They fund celebrations or support building projects that attest to their success.[1] Other Mirafloreños try to preserve their notion of Miraflores as it was before they emigrated because these memories sustain them in Boston.

At the same time, non-migrants revise their ideas about community in response to the changes precipitated by migration and social remittance flows. Young people, in particular, have begun to see the U.S. as the place where they will make their future and Miraflores as the place they will return to when they are done. Several young women recalled how young men from Bani used to refuse to go out with Mirafloreñas because they were too provincial compared to women from town. "Now, they no longer look down on us," one young woman claimed, "because Miraflores is not a country village anymore. We are almost like Bani."

Like Smith (1994) found among the Mexican immigrants he studied, Miraflores constantly renegotiates its identity as it grows and consolidates as a transnational entity. Who belongs to Miraflores, what their rights and responsibilities are, the community's self-image, and its goals for the future are continuously redefined through on-going conversations between emigrant and non-migrant members.

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[1]. Berry (1985) and Arizpe (1982) also found that some immigrants wanted to fund projects that would be monuments to themselves.

THE IMPACT ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The fruits of the MDC's labor are quite impressive. The committee purchased the land where most communal facilities have been built. With minimal government support, it constructed the community center, clinic, park, cemetery, and bridges over the irrigation canals that traverse Miraflores. It also renovated the school and health clinic and paid for physician salaries and medical supplies. The MDC's current projects include the funeral home, the aqueduct, and the baseball stadium.

The way in which project selection has evolved over time reflects the underlying process of community identity negotiation. It is also indicative of an increasingly marked division of labor between non-migrant and emigrant MDC members. Committee members in Miraflores have become project executors while members in Boston act as donors. Though non-migrants are also asked to contribute funds, the amount they are expected to donate is only about 10% of what emigrants give. Both groups consider this fair because emigrants' earning power far surpasses that of their Miraflores-based counterparts.

Since Boston members now control the committee's purse strings they enjoy greater clout. They can withhold funds as a way to influence events in Miraflores. In fact, they recently stopped sending money, although there were funds in the MDC bank account, to register their displeasure over what they perceived as non-migrants lack of support.

Project selection also reflects a growing divergence between emigrant and non-migrant community goals. Initially, members in Boston and Miraflores agreed they should focus on meeting the community's basic needs. Their early efforts focused on education, health, and water supply. Later, when the community's basic needs were satisfied, there was some debate between Boston and Miraflores leadership as to what the community's priorities should be.

The funeral home is a case in point. I already described the questions some Mirafloreños raised about this decision. They wanted to continue mourning at home and felt that the community faced other, more pressing, needs. Because the Boston-based "donors" have come to see Miraflores as a place to retire and die, however, they wanted a funeral home.

Some community members also criticized the committee for spending so much money on such an elaborate design. The style of the funeral home stands in stark contrast to earlier MDC supported projects which were built like most of the other buildings in the campo. For this project, the committee hired an architect who created a large, somewhat ostentatious structure. The fact that many community members in Miraflores criticized the committee for its choice reflects a divergence of opinion over how to satisfy the community's needs. One Boston leader countered, "I have a more future-oriented vision. This is like planning for a child. You have to think about when it grows up." But many non-migrants do not see the future in the same way.

If emigration continues, differences in emigrant and non-migrant community goals and priorities are likely to increase. The Boston committee objected when nine replacement players were hired to play on the Miraflores baseball team.[2] Even if Miraflores wins, they said, it would not be a real victory for the community. Those who play on the team should be young men from Miraflores, because it is an important character-building experience, regardless of whether they win or lose. Most community members in Miraflores, however, cared little about these larger social goals. They just wanted to win and they were willing to go to any extreme to do so.

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[2]. According to campesino (peasant) baseball league rules, when a community feels they do not have enough good players of their own, they can hire "replacement players" to play on their team. These players are paid to play while team members from the community do not receive a salary.

In addition to the infrastructural improvements supported by the MDC, the committee's work also furthers civil and political change in the following ways:

1. INSTITUTIONALIZING SOLIDARITY

I have already described the impressive levels of solidarity that characterize Mirafloreños' relations with one another. In general, solidarity is expressed through inter-personal relations. It often breaks down when it is channeled into organized settings.

> "People are very unified but it is very unstructured. Solidarity is very spontaneous. If someone dies everyone is there to help and collaborate but if someone suggests that the community should meet every week in a structured, organized way with roles and responsibilities, this is more difficult. This is because solidarity here is at the level of interpersonal relations not at the level of structure. It is based on a feeling of loyalty to one's family, community, or nation. What's missing is to translate this into organizations and to develop an organizational culture. ... In the U.S. people assimilate an organizational culture. It could lead to rigidity, repression of feelings, but it is also clear that people have rights. When something happens they can call the appropriate office, they know what the structure is, that there must be someone in charge. Emigrants who keep coming and going, or those who return for good, help this process of institutionalization." (Anthropologist, Santo Domingo)

The MDC engenders a more structured solidarity. As more and more resources are exchanged, the committee has had to develop systems and establish protocols enabling it to function both transparently and efficiently. Given Mirafloreños' past experiences with money mismanagement and their tendency to mistrust one another, MDC leaders felt they had to develop routines which would enable them to respond to challenges from the community they would undoubtedly face.

For example, the MDC in Boston used to send money to the sub-group in Miraflores that was in charge of a particular project. The funds they raised for the baseball stadium went directly to the head of the sports sub-committee. However, MDC members felt that such an arrangement left them unable to respond adequately to the community when questions about the project's pace or money management arose. They developed a new organizational structure which channels all funds through the central committee and empowers committee members to supervise the sub-committees. Devising structures, developing protocols, and abiding by them transforms the MDC into a potentially more effective development actor.

Standardizing routines also ameliorates the problem of the "santa claus syndrome" which has impeded the MDC's effectiveness in the past. Visiting Boston members who brought down money and supplies with them often delivered these directly to beneficiaries instead of working through the central MDC. The committee President in Boston gave funds to the physicians staffing the health clinic. By dealing directly with the doctors, he exacerbated already strained relations between the community and the clinic staff. He also weakened the community's already-attenuated sense of ownership of the clinic and bolstered the physicians' position at the expense of the community's. A similar case occurred with donations to the school. Here again, some community members complained that by giving monies directly to the teachers, the MDC undermined community control of the school.

Interestingly, while a more institutionalized solidarity has evolved with respect to the MDC's efforts in Miraflores, solidarity seems to weaken around projects to support immigrant community advancement. While emigrant Mirafloreños make significant contributions of time and money to aid Miraflores, they are reluctant to divert resources to Mirafloreños in the U.S. Jose, an MDC member, explained that people have limited time and energy -- there is just not enough to help Mirafloreños in Boston despite a growing recognition of the problems families face. A second MDC member, Raul, claimed that different social rules govern life in Boston and Miraflores. In Miraflores, he said, when he sees a teenager doing something wrong he feels obligated to correct them. In Boston, he does not intervene because he feels the youth are "too far out of control" and that a sense of every man for himself prevails.

Regardless of its orientation, the level of MDC activity has fluctuated throughout its history. When I first began this study, both chapters were meeting regularly and actively raising funds for baseball stadium construction. During 1995, however, the committee's activities have precipitously declined.

What explains these highs and lows? First, fluctuations reflect natural rhythms in individuals' attention spans. Members participate, work hard, get tired, drop out, and join up once again. Second, emigrant contributions are a function of economic conditions in Boston. When work is plentiful, many Mirafloreños' contribute regularly. When jobs are more difficult to come by, contributions taper off. Furthermore, as members become more established in Boston, some shift their attention away from Miraflores. Last spring, the MDC's president started his own radio program and opened his own clothing store. When he scaled-back his involvement, participation among other members also declined.

2. MIRAFLORES EMERGES AS A DEVELOPMENT ACTOR

A second way that the MDC engenders civil and political change is by transforming Miraflores into a more viable political actor. The resources and monies generated by the committee strengthen the community's position with respect to the state and convert it into a force to be reckoned with.

Initially, MDC contributions enabled the community to provide services for itself that the government did not deliver. For example, Mirafloreños staffed and stocked the health clinic before the government began delivering rural health care. Later, the community was able to leverage the resources generated by the committee to secure additional assets. In 1985, for example, the MDC raised money to construct a park. After they raised about half the funds needed, they approached the mayor of Bani who allocated city monies toward their efforts.

More recently, the MDC's labors almost enabled the community to circumvent the state. The committee raised approximately $50,000 to construct an aqueduct that would alleviate serious water supply problems. Committee members planned to finance and execute the entire project on their own because they were tired of waiting for the government. When they were unable to obtain the permits they needed from water authority officials, they began going to Santo Domingo each week to complain to government officials. They finally arranged a meeting with President Balaguer during which he told the committee's president, "Keep your money, I will build your aqueduct." The MDC plans a similar strategy for finishing the baseball stadium. The committee is trying to make enough progress so that when Balaguer comes to Miraflores to inaugurate the aqueduct, they can ask him for funds to complete the project.

Emigrant contributions enabled the MDC to advance aqueduct construction far enough on its own to be able to command Balaguer's attention and to pressure him into building it for them. Because one of the ways he retains power is by bestowing favors on his constituents, Balaguer is unlikely to allow Mirafloreños to solve problems on their own. At an early stage in the baseball stadium project, when its completion seemed unlikely, the committee also considered asking the government to finish it for them. Choosing such a path would have meant that the government rather than the community would control the completed facility. Because of contributions from Boston, however, the committee was able to proceed without the state. In both examples, emigrant-generated resources put Miraflores in a better negotiating position. The community became a political entity with sufficient clout that its claims had to be responded to.

In sum, the transnational community organizational system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic links two chapters of the same organization. Ideas, practices, social capital, and Mirafloreños' perceptions of themselves as a community are exchanged within this system. Families of emigres who accrue social capital in Boston are able to access that resource in Miraflores. Likewise, the non-migrant family members of emigres who do not fulfill social obligations or abuse trust may command less social capital in Miraflores.

An increasingly clear international division of labor characterizes the MDC's activities. Boston members raise funds while Miraflores members execute the committee's projects. In addition to supporting community development activities, the MDC contributes to political and civil change in a two ways. First, it "organizes" innate, interpersonal solidarity that is plentiful in Miraflores so that it can be used in more effective ways. Within the context of the MDC, norms and procedures are super-imposed onto what is already a rich community resource, making the MDC a more effective development agent. Second, the MDC's efforts have enabled the community to achieve greater self-sufficiency and power vis-a-vis the state. Mirafloreños are better equipped to make demands or act without the state because of the MDC's support.

CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At least four types of transnational organizational systems link Boston and the Dominican Republic. Social remittances flowing through these systems transform and are transformed by the receiving-country context and, in turn, reshape the context from which they come. Flows within the political, religious, and community organizational spheres seem to make modest but generally positive contributions to civil and political change. In contrast, while some social remittances contribute to the on-going process of Dominican judicial reform, other ideas and practices exchanged within the legal sphere appear to impede civil and political functioning. They reinforce law-bending, introduce criminal behavior, and glorify new models of social mobility predicated on illegal practices.

Before I review the main findings from this study and the questions they raise for future research, I want to place this study within a larger context. Civil and political life in the U.S. is not as unflawed as so many Mirafloreños believe it to be. Corruption, inequity, and inefficiency also plague U.S. institutions. Some U.S. politicians are dishonest and self-serving. The fact that so many Mirafloreños come away so uncritically impressed by U.S. politics reflects their continuing tendency to prize what is American and undervalue what is their own.

Mirafloreños' perceptions are as important as the reality when it comes to the questions raised by this study. And, though their views may be exaggerated, Miraflore√±os correctly sense that U.S. political and civil institutions generally perform better, are fairer, and involve more checks and balances than their Dominican counterparts. This is not to say that U.S.-style democracy can and should be exported intact. It also does not mean that more widespread political participation automatically leads to democratization. Pressures from below can result in greater repressiveness. It is only to say that, despite their rose-colored glasses, the ideas and practices that Miraflore√±os acquire in the U.S. can potentially make positive contributions to political change in the Dominican Republic.

SOCIAL REMITTANCE FLOWS

Social remittances are the normative structures, systems of practice, identities, and social capital that flow back-and-forth through these transnational systems. They are exchanged between individuals during face-to-face contacts or by letters or phone. Social remittances engender, reinforce, and modify these transnational relationships and are themselves modified by the transmission process. Miraflore√±o emigres brought ideas and practices to their dealings with the U.S. legal system which were transformed by their experiences in the U.S. and, in turn, sent back to the Dominican Republic. The PRD devised a new organizational identity as its constituency and agenda began to transcend national borders. Emigrant women also amended their self-concepts to include a more politically active role.

Social remittance flows are distinct from the food, entertainment, goods, and cultural meanings that also flow back- and-forth between countries. Though in some cases, social remittances echo, complement, or magnify these global exchanges, they represent two different types of change catalysts. Social remittances tend to flow through easily-identifiable pathways to clear destinations. In contrast, global cultural flow transfers are more diffuse and less well targeted. For instance, when emigres describe U.S. campaign finance reform or motor-voter initiatives[1] to their family members during their visits home, it is a social remittance. These new ideas are reinforced by the public education campaigns sponsored by USAID's Initiativa Para La Democracia (Democratic Initiatives project). But these are two different types of change catalysts.

Not all of the changes prompted by migration result from social remittance flows. Some transformations are social spinoffs from the economic rewards of migration. Many of the emigres who can afford to buy homes when they return build them differently than in the past. They leave out the front galerias (patios) where Mirafloreños typically sat, tomando fresco (taking in the cool air), and greeting their neighbors as they passed by. The declining patterns of interaction which result are social products of the economic rewards of emigration. They also result from social remittance flows in that some emigres want to maintain the more individualistic, private patterns of behavior they adapted in the U.S.

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[1]. would allow individuals to register to vote at the same time that they obtain their driver's license.

Another type of change that is distinct from but may accompany social remittance flows are general organizational responses to new demands created by migration. As part of its role as project executor, the MDC also became an employer. The committee had to hire community members to work as guards at the funeral home construction site or to haul cement to the baseball stadium. Various factors determine social remittance impact including the goodness of fit between sending and receiving countries, the timing and sequencing of remittance introduction, the nature of the transmission process, the context of reception, differences between the sender and the receiver, and the characteristics of the group at which remittances are targeted.

The process of transmission changes remittances in different ways: they can be unaltered, expanded upon but not transformed, merged with other remittances to produce new forms, or reshaped by the receiving context. The extent to which remittances are transformed, and how they are actually altered, further depends upon whether they are exchanged within formal and informal settings and the nature and magnitude of contact that remittance carriers have with receiving-context institutions. For example, many of the informal religious practices Mirafloreños brought with them remained unchanged or were changed by new lifestyle requirements. They were less likely to combine with the ideas and practices of the Boston church.

Some readers may ask what is gained by using this new concept. The answer is threefold. First, a focus on social remittances brings to the fore previously under-explored products of migration. Many prior migration studies proposed an undersocialized view of the relationship between migration and development. They focused primarily on migration's economic rewards without exploring the ways in which the social products of migration also affected sending-country communities. Analyses which incorporate social remittances may equalize this somewhat skewed view.

Second, the concept of social remittances highlights the interdependence between sending and receiving-country communities. Much research involves the implicit assumption that social flows are uni-directional. Social remittances draw attention to the reciprocal, interactive nature of these flows. It highlights the ways in which Mirafloreños' normative structures and systems of practices influence life in the U.S. It also draws attention to the ways in which the intermingling of U.S. and Dominican ideas and behaviors change life in Miraflores. Finally, as I will discuss in greater detail below, social remittances are a potential policy resource. Practitioners and planners may be able to harness these exchanges to further immigrant-community and sending-community development.

MIGRATION AND CIVIL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Democratic governance requires the development of identities, capabilities, political accounts, and adaptiveness (March and Olsen 1995). Findings from this study lend credence to the argument that migration contributes to this process, both among individuals and within organizations. Some emigrants underwent a political resocialization process as a result of their contacts with the political, religious, community organizational, and legal spheres. They gained practice at negotiating their way through state institutions and at participating in democratic processes. They constructed new identities and developed new expectations about performance and accountability. And they communicated these to non-migrants who, in turn, began to challenge existing political arrangements.

One possible exception to this patterns seems to be the law. Though some emigrants changed their ideas about fairness, others applied the same skills they use to beat the Dominican system to profit from U.S. law. Some individuals also embraced criminal, violent behaviors that they learned in the U.S. They adopted new paths to social mobility involving illegal activities. When these social remittances are sent back to the Dominican Republic, they negatively affect civil and political change.

The transnational organizations in this study also changed but to a lesser degree. In contrast to the experience of individuals, Dominican criminal justice agencies appear to have undergone the greatest democratization as a result of social remittance flows. Somewhat paradoxically, police and judicial officials seem to act with greater accountability and less arbitrariness because of reforms that have largely been imposed by the U.S. The PRD assumed a patina of greater democratization but in many cases continued to conduct business as usual. The MDC did not become more participatory as much as its institutionalization and enhanced command of resources enabled Mirafloreños to become a more effective development actor. Finally, the Boston church became more open to lay participation because of its own labor shortage. Emigrants and non-migrants also acquired new skills and identities by participating in religious movements and in the church's more secular realm.

1. POLITICS - The PRD changed because migration engendered new "rules of the game." The party modified its

organization, discourse, and strategies because it needed to reach a more transnational constituency with transnational concerns. The PRD became more dependent on its U.S. constituents for financial contributions and to bolster support for the party among their non-migrant family members. To ensure emigres' continued help, the party had to develop a dual agenda which simultaneously addressed the needs of non-migrant Dominicans and Dominicans in the U.S. In response, the PRD created new structures and a new ideology which promotes Dominican political advancement in the U.S. while at the same time reinforces ties to the party in the Dominican Republic.

Subsequent social remittance flows within the party system resulted from dynamics within the PRD not from the new ideas and strategies party members learned by participating in U.S. politics. In Boston, the PRD's commitment to a two-way agenda has produced only limited results. A small group of party members have cultivated ties to the Democratic Party organization in Boston. As a result, when PRD candidates visit on fund-raising and campaign trips, they are greeted officially at the Massachusetts State House. Dominican Independence Day and Evacuation Day[2] are also celebrated each year.

In general, however, PRD members reported few contacts with U.S. political institutions. The social remittances those who do participate bring to these endeavors have little effect on U.S. political life. There are several possible explanations for this: (1) The context of reception is not particularly responsive. Ward politics and anti-poverty programs which facilitated immigrant integration in the past are now weak. (2) Certain immigrant community characteristics are unfavorable to political integration. Dominicans alone, and latinos in general, do not make up a critical enough mass to constitute a serious political force. Both communities are still relatively young and small. Naturalization rates are low. (3) Mirafloreños' contact with U.S. political groups is strictly voluntary. They interact little because most emigres continue to see their political lives as tied to the Dominican Republic. Despite PRD efforts to convince them otherwise, political institutions in Boston are still largely irrelevant, and (4) This study also captures the integration process at a fairly early stage. In New York, where the Dominican community is larger and more well-established, Dominican immigrants are making political in-roads. They have also remained influential in Dominican politics.

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[2]. Evacuation Day commemorates the end of the Haitian occupation.

Despite limited direct involvement in U.S. political institutions, Mirafloreños change politically by living in the U.S. They tended to participate in more non-electoral groups, engage in more intense contacts with the public sector, and become more aware of the political world around them. Women, in particular, are exposed to new ideas and practices because they participate more actively in public life.. These new roles teach Mirafloreños to negotiate new systems. They broaden their conceptions about what politics can be. Mirafloreños acquire new skills through these experiences. Their expectations about state and politician performance change.

The social remittances Mirafloreños bring seem to have more of an impact in non-electoral political forums. Because these types of organizations are smaller and less formal, they are more malleable to social remittance flows. Since some groups involve mostly Latino constituencies, there is less difference between remittance senders and receivers. Shared cultural understandings ease remittance penetration.

Transnationalization has prompted the PRD in the Dominican Republic to take some steps toward greater democratization. It opened up leadership opportunities to new groups and stepped-up efforts to include previously-marginalized constituencies such as women. These remittances are reinforced both by "modernization" efforts supported by the Socialist International and democratization efforts sponsored by USAID. In many cases, however, the social context in the Dominican Republic still allows for paternalism, personalism, and discrimination. Overall participation in the party does not appear to have increased.

In this sense, the party is out-of-touch with its emigrant membership. By participating more in non-electoral organizations, engaging more frequently with government, and learning about new ideas and practices in the U.S., some individuals become potential democratic-change catalysts. They bring or send these new identities and capabilities back to Miraflores. They introduce them to their non-migrant counterparts. They bring them to their subsequent dealings with the party and other community groups. But as Lucho, the return emigre I profiled discovered, the PRD generally continued with "business as usual." Though many emigrants want a new modus operandi and new agenda, the PRD is not yet ready or willing to change.

In general, social remittance transfers positively contribute to the citizen formation process. In fact, by challenging traditional notions about politics and fortifying non-state organizations, migration may eventually contribute to the emergence of a political context which will not tolerate personalism and inequity. The PRD may have to change because social conditions may be sufficiently transformed that its current practices will no longer be acceptable.

2. THE CHURCH - Dominicans arriving in Boston encounter a church with a long-standing tradition of immigrant

integration. The transnational religious system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic, and the social remittances which flow through it, further stimulate this on-going process. The religious system is generally more permeable to social remittances than the political one. A continuum of remittance transformation arises. Normative structures and systems of practice employed within private, non-institutionalized settings penetrate the U.S. context more easily and are less likely to change than remittances used within public, church-based settings. Even within formal church settings, however, the social remittances Mirafloreños bring are easily integrated when they are used within latino and anglo spheres of activities. Popular religious practices lie midway on this change continuum.

As a result, Mirafloreños can maintain some of the beliefs and practices they bring with them intact. Climactic conditions, the pace of life, and differences in the organization of work and leisure, however, can modify religious expression and organization. Other behaviors relating to the more secular functions of the church demand more adaptation. To continue to function smoothly, the U.S. church needs new immigrants to adapt its rules concerning members' financial obligations and clergy- parishioner relations. Secular activities generally involve more joint latino-anglo interaction, requiring latino members to adapt existing routines and procedures.

Several reasons explain why transnational ties are stronger in the religious than in the political sphere. First, certain aspects of the nature of religious life make remittance penetration easier. Personal religious practices are inherently transmissible. They do not have to conform to institutional arrangements because they are practiced alone. Mirafloreños share basic understandings and practices with parishioners in Boston because of their common Catholicism, meaning that less adaptation is required. Furthermore, being Catholic is a more fundamental part of most Mirafloreños' identity than their affiliation with a particular political group. Because their Catholicism is so deeply-rooted, Mirafloreños may be more predisposed to adapt to the U.S. church. Such a change also requires less drastic identity redefinition than a change in citizenship would.

Second, unlike politics where participation is largely voluntary, Mirafloreños must interact with the formal church for specific practices. If they want to baptize their child, for example, they have to come into contact with the institutional structures of the church.

Third, the religious sphere is more receptive than the political one. The church in Boston needs lay individuals, both as parishioners and as potential priests. The church defines itself as an institution of immigrants. Part of it's job is to take care of new arrivals. The church system has already been broken in by earlier-arriving latino groups. There are also some existing and planned transnational structures that this system builds upon.

Fourth, characteristics of the religious system itself ease transnationalization. It combines U.S. and Dominican institutions. The system is relatively stable compared to the political sphere. It does not involve the same shifts in power that politics does. There is a more permanent cast of characters. Furthermore, though there are separate subgroups for latinos and anglos in both the political and religious spheres, in politics, these latino groups tend to be more divided and isolated. Political outcomes are ultimately decided in anglo-dominated settings. Within the religious sphere, separate latino groups enjoy greater autonomy with respect to a wider array of activities.

Social remittances have also stimulated religious change in Miraflores. For the most part, though, change resulted from the new functions the church assumed in response to migration and the new moral dilemmas created by migration that the church needed to react to. Religious life was also transformed by the social changes accompanying the economic transformations migration brought about.

Church membership alone does not stimulate political activism. Several forums within the church, though, introduce participants to new skills and behaviors that foster civil and political change. Immigrant parishioners applied the techniques and skills they learned by participating in church governance and social action activities to other settings. Manpower shortages also created more opportunities to develop leadership skills. In the Dominican Republic, the self-confidence and leadership skills women gain by participating in religious movement groups may also heighten civil engagement. The personal transformations that members undergo position them to assume more proactive roles in their personal and political lives. In most cases, however, the political personae that emerge seem to reinforce rather than challenge the status quo.

3. THE LAW - Social remittances within the legal, organizational sphere flow overwhelmingly from the U.S. to the Dominican Republic. U.S. criminal justice and foreign aid agencies impart new ideas and strategies to their Dominican counterparts. There are few counterflows to the U.S. Some of these transfers are imposed. Others are readily accepted. In some cases, the technical assistance and resources provided place U.S. foreign-policy goals over Dominican national interests. In others, both a Dominican and U.S. agenda are served at the same time.

Both positive and negative effects on political and civil change appear to result from legal social remittance flows. Though corruption is still widespread and arbitrary practices abound, many respondents felt that social remittance exchanges positively benefitted Dominican law enforcement and judicial institutions. They said that new ideas introduced through criminal justice transnationalization further stimulated the reform processes already underway on the island. The Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas (DNCD) and the Dominican National Police are generally felt to be more effective and respectful. Law enforcement officials are better trained and have access to more resources. The public is more aware of the need for judicial reform as evidenced by an emerging debate on whether judges should be elected or appointed. The new ideas about rights and responsibilities that emigrants introduce contribute to these on-going processes.

These same social remittances, however, could easily produce negative outcomes. Most respondents agreed that the new drug law was the most effectively-enforced law in the country. They claimed it works so well because it is backed by U.S. financial and technical support. Some worried that so much U.S. involvement threatens Dominican sovereignty. Others believed that by investing so many resources in the police without similar support to judicial and legal institutions, the system of checks and balances between law enforcement branches will be out-of-whack. An omnipotent, overly-endowed police force might emerge that would be more anti-democratic than ever.

Few legal remittances flow from south to north for several reasons. First, the legal system is fundamentally different than the other cases in this study. It involves state entities which are intrinsically more routine-bound and less malleable. The system involves multiple agencies that are already divided because of in-fighting. The U.S. justice system is more powerful and resource-rich than the Dominican one. Some U.S. law enforcement officials felt that there would be nothing to gain from collaborating with Dominican officials because "corruption is so widespread, you could only work with top officials."

Second, the law itself is inherently unbending. One is either right or wrong. There is little sense that the law should be revised to accommodate newcomers. Furthermore, in the legal arena, the formal sphere, which is particularly impermeable, overwhelmingly overpowers over the informal.

There is a more reciprocal remittance flow at the individual level. Emigres necessarily come into contact with U.S. law when they update their immigration papers or register their children for school. Some Mirafloreños use the same norms and practices that enable them to bypass the inequities of the Dominican legal system to get around the law in the U.S. Such "soft corruption" is functional because it "evens the playing field," letting some individuals get ahead in a system which structurally disadvantages them. Mirafloreños are also exposed to more crime and violent behavior in Boston. Some become involved in drug-selling or other schemes which allow them to earn significant sums quickly.

The rewards of such behavior are easily visible in Miraflores. The fancy homes and cars these individuals own stand in sharp contrast to the modest, though improved, material circumstances of most Mirafloreño families. Such remittances are also transferred within a context where the traditional bases of social solidarity are weakening. The informal system of social sanctioning, which once kept such practices in check, can no longer contain these behaviors. Some legal social remittance flows, then, impede civil and political change.

4. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS - Social remittances exchanged within the community organizational system produce few effects in the U.S. This is unlikely to change anytime soon. The MDC is a self-contained organizational system. Because the committee, more than any other organization, is a site of identity affirmation, a shift in the MDC's focus would require a shift toward more U.S. roots among its members

Though emigrant MDC members also acquire new ideas and practices in the U.S., this is not their most important contribution to Dominican civil and political change. Instead, the energy, resources, and money Boston members donate endow non-migrant community members with sufficient assets that they must be taken seriously by the state. Initially, Boston-generated support enabled the committee to extend services to itself that the state was not providing. More recently, the MDC has been able to leverage these resources to obtain further assistance or to circumvent the state. Such capabilities put Miraflores on the political map as a force that must be recognized if not reckoned with.

Furthermore, as the MDC's work involves the transfer of increasing sums, what was once done informally now requires formal organizational structures and established routines. The process of agreeing upon and sticking to rules about money channeling and record keeping, for example, creates a stronger, more-trusted MDC that is also a more potentially effective development actor.

Notwithstanding migration's modest but generally positive contributions to civil and political change in the Dominican Republic, one should not assume that U.S.-style democracy can or should be wholly exported. Despite mounting pressure for reform, there are certain built-in constraints to democratization that cannot be overlooked. Elites are unlikely to greet swells of participation from below with open arms. If mass political engagement occurs, they may take steps to preserve their status. As long as the public sector is the country's biggest employer, individuals will continue to make political choices based on economic considerations. Where institutionalized corruption is an economic survival strategy, it will not go away. Policies aimed at promoting or consolidating democracy need to be deeply rooted in the social realities of a country as this PRD Vice President argued,

> "Does the U.S. model serve for democracy in the Dominican Republic or do we have to adjust it? Though more and more, governments have to international circumstances into account because sometimes external influences are stronger than domestic ones, each government has to base its actions on its own reality."

THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS

This dissertation used the case of migration between Boston and the Dominican Republic to contribute to a more systematic exploration of transnationalism. Research findings suggest that migration engenders different types of transnational organizational systems which vary along the following dimensions: structure, ideology, orientation of activities, reciprocal impact, citizenship of members vs. leaders, power relations, and the extent to which migrant contact is voluntary or enforced. Each system is transnational to varying degrees, suggesting that impact can not be the sole indicator of transnationality.

The PRD has created a transnational structure and espouses a transnational ideology. The balance of power shifts between leaders on the island and leaders in the U.S. Its activities primarily affect the Dominican Republic. But is leaders are all Dominican. The church system involves only an incipient transnational structure. Yet, the church's transnational ideology, orientation, and membership/leadership combination result in more reciprocal interaction than in any other institution in this study. The legal case is the least well-articulated structurally in the study. This system acquires its transnational character because the criminals themselves, the crimes they commit, and those that prosecute and punish these activities act increasingly within a transnational field. The MDC is transnational structurally with almost no transnational effect. In fact, intercommunity efforts weaken when they become U.S.-focused.

The nature of the transnational systems described here has to do with the Dominican Republic's close proximity to the U.S. and the long history of U.S. political involvement in Dominican national affairs. That the Dominican Republic is deeply embedded in the U.S. sociopolitical orbit smooths the way for transnational organizational development and reinforces these emerging ties. Migration flows involving greater geographic and cultural distance or sending and receiving countries that differ less with respect to size and power would most certainly wield different consequences. For example, there are also very strong relations between Brazilian immigrants in Boston and their city-of-origin but the civil and political consequences of such ties are likely to be quite different than those described here.

In addition, Dominican-U.S. migration occurs within a specific historical context that is supportive of sustained transnational ties. The factors which make it so are not unique to the U.S.-Caribbean relationship. Ease of travel and enhanced technology and communication encourage migrants to conserve these attachments. Higher barriers to political and economic integration and sending-country policies which purposefully block assimilation or encourage dual-affiliations also reinforce these connections. Such factors enhance transnational ties and increase the likelihood of their sustainability.

What, then, is the relationship between transnational communities, transnational organizations, and transnational societies? Is it a continuum whereby transnational communities engender transnational organizations, which eventually create transnational societies? Must we not speak about degrees of transnationality, assuming that the extent to which sending countries are transformed by these processes will always be greater than corresponding changes in countries-of-reception? In this study, for example, the Dominican Republic is much closer to becoming a transnational society than the U.S.

Answers to these questions require further research. One might, for example, examine the organizational systems linking Spain and the Dominican Republic, where significant numbers of Dominicans also emigrate, to understand how different receiving-country contexts shape transnationality and its consequences. A second study could also compare migration between the U.S. and other Latin American and Caribbean countries to the Dominican migration stream. Such a study would uncover the ways in which differences in restrictiveness of entry and exit, geographic distances, and sociocultural dissimilarities spanned by particular migration circuits shape the impact of migration on civil and political change.

SOME THOUGHTS ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Social remittances may be a useful policy tool for promoting sending-country and immigrant-community development.

For example, non-migrant respondents reported changes in their health practices due to social remittance flows. One mother began vaccinating her children because her sister in Boston told her how important it was. During my last visit to Miraflores, many young women had begun spending their afternoons at a gym that had recently opened. More and more people could be seen jogging to the beach in the cool of the late afternoon. Though their relatives in Boston had no time for such activities, they had communicated enough about the "fitness-craze" in the U.S. and given enough exercise clothing as gifts that a new fad had taken hold. There may be ways in which health officials at both ends of the migration circuit can systematically encourage these behavior transfers. Information about health education and preventive health practices could also be purposefully channeled through migrant networks.

Such cooperation could also be encouraged at an institutional level. During the last two decades, significant numbers of AIDs patients have been circulating in-and-out of the New York City and San Juan Health Departments. To encourage coordinated care and more efficient resource use, health officials in New York and Puerto Rico established mechanisms for medical record and information exchanges. As more and more children circulate in-and-out of schools in Bani and Jamaica Plain, similar linkages may be useful. Though Boston school officials serve numerous groups, each with their own particular needs, some effort might be made to establish contact with Miraflores schools. At the very least, teachers in Miraflores and Boston could learn about where their students come from. Eventual exchanges of school records and curriculum materials might help to decrease school drop-out rates that are steadily increasing on both sides of the border.

Finally, the MDC has made major contributions to development in Miraflores. The committee constitutes a wealth of organizational and leadership skills. How can these resources be harnessed to address the growing problems faced by Mirafloreños in Boston?

During the data collection stage of this study, Program

Officers from a Boston-based foundation heard me speak about the committee's efforts. They encouraged me to work with MDC members to develop a project that would aid the community in Boston. When I offered to help MDC members write a proposal, however, they were not interested. They feared that organizing Boston-focused activities would detract from efforts at home.

As transnational communities become more-and-more common, practitioners and planners will no longer be able to address development issues in sending and receiving-country community separately. The fruits of their labors will be increasingly linked. If foundation officials would fund activities in both settings, MDC members would not feel they are "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." Such support would give the committee permission to channel some of its energies toward addressing the problems of immigrant life. Given the committee's track record, this could prove a wise investment.

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APPENDIX

The Dominican Republic


BAHIA DE LUPERON
BAHIA DE MAIMON
Maimon
Monte Cristi
Puerto Plata
Sosua
Rio Yaque
CORDILLERA SEPTENTRIONAL
PICO DE ISABELA DE TORRES
793 meters
2601 ft
Del Norte
Valverde
Dajabon
Santiago
El Rubio
Restauracion
HAITI
CORDILLERA CENTRAL
Moca
San Francisco de Macoris
Nagua
BAHIA ESCOCESA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Samana
BAHIA DE SAMANA
Sabana de la Mar
La Vega
Cotui
Bonao
PICO DUARTE
3125 meters
10,249 ft
Constanza
Elias Pina
CORDILLERA ORIENTAL
Ozama R.
El Seibo
El Macao
Higuey
Villa Altagracia
SAN ISIDRO AIR BASE
Boca Chica
La Romana
San Pedro de Macoris
Boca de Yuma
SAONA I.
Santo Domingo
Haina Arriba
Central Rio Haina
AEROPUERTO INTERNACIONAL PUNTA CAUCEDO
Nigua
San Cristobal
Bani
Azua
Rio Yaque del Sur
SIERRA DE NEIBA
La Descubierta
Los Rios
Neiba
LAGO ENRIQUILLO
Barahona
SIERRA DE BAORUCO
Pedernales
BEATA I.
CARIBBEAN SEA
0
50
100
150
MILES
FLORIDA
Miami
GULF OF MEXICO
Havana
CUBA
MEXICO
BAHAMA IS.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
PORTUGAL
Cap-Haitien
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
San Juan
WINDWARD PASSAGE
JAMAICA
Kingston
Port-au-Prince
MONA PASSAGE
PUERTO RICO
CARIBBEAN SEA

map drawn by Rama Chandrasekhar

Numero de ID ______________
Numero de Hogar ______________

ENCUESTA PARA BOCA CANASTA

ENCUESTADORA DICE LO SIGUIENTE: "Hoy dia, el Comite Pro-Construccion y Mantenimiento de Obras de Boca Canasta esta llevando a cabo una encuesta sobre las condiciones de vida en el campo. El proposito es conocer mejor como vivimos y cual ha sido el impacto de la imigracion aqui. Todos sus repuestas seran confidenciales"

I. DATOS SOBRE MIEMBROS DE LA CASA QUE ESTAN EN BOCA CANASTA

ENCUESTADORA DICE: "Vamos a empezar preguntandole algo sobre su familia aca en Boca Canasta."

A. Cual es el apellido de esta familia? ______________________________

B. Cual es su direccion? ______________________________

ENCUESTADORA DICE "Ahora, vamos a preguntarle un poco sobre cada persona."

C. Cuanta gente viven definitivamente en esta casa o sea que han dormido y han comido aqui durante los ultimos 6 meses? ☐

PARA CADA PERSONA, LA ENCUESTADORA REPITE CADA PREGUNTA. ESCRIBE LAS RESPUESTAS SOBRE CADA PERSONA EN LETRAS MUY LEGIBLES.

	# 1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8
D.) Nombre								
E.) Sexo								
F.) Edad								
G.) Estado Civil								
H.) Educ.								
I.) Migro								
J.) Donde								
K.) Cuando Salio								
L.) Regreso								

D. Como se llama?

E. Es hombre o mujer?
1. Hombre
2. Mujer

F. Cuantos anos tiene? ________

G. Esta casado?
1. casado
2. soltero
3. separado/divorciado
4. viudo
5. convive
6. menor (menos que 17)

H. Hasta que curso estudio?
1. primaria no terminada
2. primaria terminada
3. secundaria no terminada
4. secundaria terminada
5. universidad no terminada
6. universidad terminada
7. instituto tecnico (con secundaria terminada)

I. Migro alguna vez fuera del pais?
1. si
2. no

J. Donde migro?
1. Santo Domingo
2. Otro pais que no sea Estados Unidos______________ (especifique)
3. Estados Unidos
4. no es aplicable

K. En que ano?
1. ____________ (ano)
2. no es aplicable

L. Cuando regreso?
1. ____________ (ano)
2. no es aplicable

II. DATOS SOBRE LOS FAMILIARES QUE VIVEN FUERA

ENCUESTADORA DICE: "Ahora queremos preguntarle sobre los miembros de la familia que estan viviendo fuera. Vamos a preguntarle sobre cada uno."

LAS PREGUNTAS SIGUEN LA MATRIC. PREGUNTA TODAS PARA CADA MIEMBRO DE LA FAMILIA.

	# 1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8
A.) Nombre								
B.) Sexo								
C.) Edad								
D.) Estado Civil								
E.) Curso								
F.) Donde Vive								
G.) Ano Salio								
H.) Legal								
I.) Trabaja #1								
J.) Horario #1								
K.) Trabajo #2								
L.) Horario #1								
M.) Ayuda								
N) Cuanto								
O.) Razon								
P.) Regresar								
Q.) Directo								
R.) Donde Vive								
S.) Siempre								
T.) Legal								

A. Como se llama?

B. Es hombre o mujer?
  1. Hombre
  2. Mujer

C. Cuantos anos tiene?______

D. Esta casado?
  1. casado
  2. soltero
  3. separado/divorciado
  4. viudo
  5. convive
  6. menor (menos que 17)

E. Hasta que curso estudio?
  1. primaria no terminada
  2. primaria terminada
  3. secundaria no terminada
  4. secundaria terminada
  5. universidad no terminada
  6. universidad terminada
  7. instituto tecnico (con secundaria terminada)

F. Donde vive?
  1. Santo Domingo
  2. Otro pais que no sea Estados Unidos (especifique)___________
  3. Estados Unidos

G. En que ano salio?_________

H. Se fue legal (con visa) o por la izquierda?
  1. legal
  2. izquierda
  3. no sabe

I. Cual es su trabajo principal? (Si tiene dos trabajos, indica lo cual a que se dedica la mayoria de su tiempo y genera mayor ingresos)
  1. factoria
  2. echa dia pago
  3. volado
  4. negocio propio
  5. empleado en una tienda
  6. empleado del gobierno
  7. limpieza
  8. estudia
  9. disability
  10. restaurant
  11. ayuda del gobierno
  12. construccion
  13. carpintero
  14. ama de casa
  15. chiripeo (rifas, vender prendas, vender ropas, sanes, dulces, arreglando unas)
  16. Otro____________ (especifique)
  17. No sabe

J. Trabaja tiempo completo o part-time?
1. full-time
2. part-time
3. full-time y part-time
4. no sabe
5. No es aplicable

K. Cual es su trabajo secundario? (Si tiene dos trabajos, indica lo cual a que se dedica menor tiempo y genera menor ingresos)
1. factoria
2. echa dia pago
3. volado
4. negocio propio
5. empleado en una tienda
6. empleado del gobierno
7. limpieza
8. estudia
9. disability
10. restaurant
11. ayuda del gobierno
12. construccion
13. carpintero
14. ama de casa
15. chiripeo (rifas, vender prendas, vender ropas, sanes, dulces, arreglando unas)
16. otro ____________ (especifique)
17. No sabe
18. No tiene segundo trabajo

L. Trabaja tiempo completo o part-time?
1. full-time
2. part-time
3. full-time y part-time
4. no sabe
5. No es aplicable

M. Le ayuda algo con los gastos de la casa o sea le manda el diario?
1. si
2. no
3. no trabaja

N. Mas o menos como cuanto le da cada mes (en dolares)?
1. ________ cantidad en dolares
2. No es aplicable

O. Porque salio del pais?
1. razones economicos
2. razones politicos
3. reunirse con su familia
4. otro ____________ (especifique)
5. No sabe

P. Cuando salio, sus intenciones eran trabajar y regresar a Santo Domingo o quedarse?
1. regresar
2. quedar
3. No sabe
4. No estaba claro

ENCUESTADORA DICE: "Las proximas preguntas son solamente para las familiares que viven en los Estados Unidos"

Q. Se fue directo a los Estados Unidos o salio a algun otro sitio primero (por ejemplo, vivio en Santo Domingo o en un otro pais antes que ir a Estados Unidos?
1. directo
2. Santo Domingo
3. Otro sitio__________ (especifique)
4. No sabe

R. Donde vive en Estados Unidos?
1. Boston (Jamaica Plain, Dorchester, Roxbury)
2. Lawrence
3. Lowell
4. Salem
5. New York
6. Rhode Island
7. Washington
8. Miami
9. Puerto Rico
10. Otro ____________ (especifique)
11. No sabe

S. Siempre ha vivido alla or vivio en otro estado para mas que 6 meses?
1. Si, siempre ha vivido alla
2. No, vivio en otro sitio para mas que 6 meses ____________ (especifique donde)
3. No sabe

T. Tiene residencia o esta ilegal?
1. ilegal
2. residencia
3. ciudadano
4. No sabe

III. NIVEL DEL CONTACTO

ENCUESTADORA LEE: "Ahora, queremos preguntarle sobre la frecuencia con que hablan con su gente en Estados Unidos."

PREGUNTAS A - E SE REFIERON A LOS FAMILIARES EN BOCA CANASTA

	# 1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8
A.) Nombre								
B.) Veces								
C.) Mayor Tiempo								
D.) Trabajo								
E.) En Que								

A. Cuales de ustedes aca a ido de vacaciones a Estados Unidos?

B. Cuantas veces ha ido?
__ numero de veces
__ nunca ha ido

C. De las veces que usted ha ido alla, cual ha sido el mayor tiempo?
1. ____ # de semanas/meses.

D. Trabajo cuando estaba alla?
1. si
2. no

E. Que hizo? (Si tuvo dos trabajos, indica lo cual a que se dedica la mayoria de su tiempo y genero mayor ingresos)
1. limpieza
2. factoria
3. chiripeo (rifas, vender prendas, vender ropas,sanes, dulces, arreglando unas)
5. practico su profesion (dentista, peluquero).

Especifique lo que es ________________.

6. ayudo en un negocio
7. otro ____________ (especifique)
8. no sabe
9. No trabajo
10. No es aplicable

PREGUNTAS F - N SE REFIEREN A LOS FAMILIARES ALLA FUERA

	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8
F.) Nombre								
G.) Telefono								
H.) Regreso								
I.) Veces								
J.) Mayor Tiempo								
K.) Vacacion o Trabajar								
L.) Que Hizo								
M.) Retirado								
N.) Circular								

G. Cuantos veces el or ella les llama a ustedes al mes por telefono?

H. Ha regresado aca alguna vez?
1. si
2. no

I. Cuantas veces?
1. ______ (numero de veces)
2. no es aplicable

J. De las veces que ha regresado aca, cual ha sido el mayor tiempo?
1. _____ de semanas/meses
2. no ha regresado

K. Vino de vacaciones o para trabajar?
1. Vacaciones
2. Trabajar
3. Vino de vacaciones pero trabajo volado
4. Otra ______________ (especifique)

L. En que trabajo (para los que trabajaban mas que la cuarta parte de su estadia)?
1. Tiene tierra propia y la arrenda
2. Tiene tierra propia y la da a partir beneficio
3. Tiene tierra propia y la administra
4. Tiene tierra propia y la trabaja
5. Arrienda tierra y la administra
6. Arrienda tierra y la trabaja
7. Echa dias pago
8. negocio propio
9. empleado privado (en tienda o oficina)
10. empleado del gobierno
11. zona franca
12. Vende algo en su casa
13. chiripeo (rifas, vender prendas, vender ropas, sanes, dulces, arreglando unas).
14. carpintero
15. prestar dinero a redito
16. cambiar dolares
17. Motoconcho
18. Alquila su motoconcho pero no lo conduce
19. Otro______________ (especifique)
20. No trabajo

M. Vino de retirada?
1. si
2. no

M1. Todavia esta en Boca Canasta? Si no, que paso? (escribe la respuesta)

N. Hay alguien que cada ano trabaja un cierto tiempo en los Estados Unidos y viaja por un cierto periodo y despues se pasa el resto del ano aqui? (Si si discribelo)

III. PARTICIPACION COMUNITARIA

ENCUESTADORA DICE: "Ahora queremos preguntarle algo sobre la participacion de su familia en organizaciones en la comunidad."

MIGRANTES	**Republica Dominicana**						**Estados Unidos**					
Nombre	Iglesia		Partido		Assoc. Communal		Iglesia		Partido		Assoc. Communal	
	D	M	D	M	D	M	D	M	D	M	D	M

A. Antes que salio, participo algun miembro de su familia en una organizacion (iglesia, partido politico, associacion comunal)? Cual fue su funcion (dirigente or miembro)?

B. En Estados Unidos, participa algun miembro de su familia en alguna organizacion? Cual fue su funcion (dirigente or miembro)?

NO-MIGRANTES **Republica Dominicana**

Nombre	Iglesia		Partido		Assoc. Communal	
	D	M	D	M	D	M

C. Hay otros miembros de su familia, que no ha viajado, que participan en actividades politicos, religiosos o comunales?

IV. INGRESOS FAMILIARES

Name	Trabajo Principal	Ingresos Mensuales

A. Cuantos miembros de la familia viviendo en Boca Canasta trabajan actualmente?

B. Cual es su trabajo principal (a lo que se dedica la mayoria de su tiempo y genera mayor ingresos)?

1. Tiene tierra propia y la arrenda
2. Tiene tierra propia y la da a partir beneficio
3. Tiene tierra propia y la administra
4. Tiene tierra propia y la trabaja
5. Arrienda tierra y la administra
6. Arrienda tierra y la trabaja
7. Echa dias pago
8. negocio propio
9. empleado privado (en tienda o oficina)
10. empleado del gobierno
11. zona franca
12. Vende algo en su casa
13. chiripeo (rifas, vender prendas, vender ropas, sanes, dulces, arreglando unas).
14. carpintero
15. prestar dinero a redito
16. cambiar dolares
17. Motoconcho
18. Alquila su motoconcho pero no lo conduce
19. Otro____________________.
    (especifique)
20. No trabajo

C. Cuanto gana mensualmente (en pesos)?

____

D. De lo que ustedes gastan al mes, cuanto reciben de su familia en Estados Unidos para ayudarse (pueden contestar en porcentaja o cantidad)?________________

E. De lo que ustedes gastan al mes, cuanto ponen de su dinero (pueden contestar en porcentaje or cantidad)?

____

V. SITUACION DEL HOGAR

ENCUESTADORA DICE: "Ahora, para terminar queremos preguntarles algo sobre su vivienda."

CIRCULA LA RESPUESTA APROPRIADA.

A. La casa es?
  1. propia
  2. alquilada
  3. prestada

B. Esta hecho de?
  1. madera
  2. block

C. El techo esta hecho de?
  1. cana
  2. zinc
  3. plato

D. Tiene agua dentro?
  1. si
  2. no

E. Tiene sisterna?
  1. si
  2. no

F. Tiene motorcito?
  1. si
  2. no

G. El piso es de?
  1. mosaico
  2. cemento
  3. tierra

H. Tiene planta electrica?
  1. si
  2. no

I. Tiene servicio santario dentro de la casa?
  1. si
  2. no

J. Tiene empleada domestica?
  1. si
  2. no

K. Tienen tierra propia?
  1. si
  2. no

L. Cuantas tareas en total (propio y en subseccion)?
  1. ________________ # de tareas
  2. No tiene

K. Alquilan tierra?
  a. si
  b. no

L. Cuantas tareas en total?
  1. ________________ # de tareas
  2. No tiene

VI. SITUACION EN BOCA CANASTA

A. Que considera usted los problemas mas graves que enfrentan la comunidad?

B. Que es lo que le gustaria que el comite de Boca Canasta haga?

C. Que es lo que le gustaria que el comite en Boston haga?