

RISE AND DECLINE OF ETHNO-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF PAKISTAN:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

by

TAHIR AMIN

M.SC., International Relations,
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad,
1976

M.A., International Relations,
Carleton University, Ottawa,
1978

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fullfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

February 1988

c Tahir Amin 1987

Signature redacted

Signature of Author _____
Department of Political Science

Signature redacted October, 1987

Certified by _____
Professor Myron Weiner
Thesis Supervisor

Signature redacted

Accepted by _____
Harvey M. Sapolsky, Chairman
Graduate Program Committee

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY

MAR 14 1988

LIBRARIES ARCHIVES

TO
IEESHA,
SIDRA AND FURQAN

Acknowledgements

In completing this study, I am most grateful to my thesis committee: Professor Myron Weiner (Chairman), Professor Hayward R. Alker Jr. and Professor Nazli Choucri. They provided me with invaluable comments on every stage of this study. I am also thankful to Dr. Anwar Syed who went through the first four chapters of the study and gave thorough comments. I am also indebted to the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad for allowing me to freely use the facilities at the Institute during my field trips to Pakistan. I also thank Tobie Weiner for typing this manuscript with great care. Finally, I wish to thank King Faisal Foundation of Saudi Ministry of Higher Education for funding my study at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

RISE AND DECLINE OF ETHNO-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF PAKISTAN:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

by

TAHIR AMIN

ABSTRACT

The rise of ethno-national movement as a global phenomenon has attracted significant attention from social scientists but not the decline. Post-1971 Pakistan represents an excellent case-study to examine both the rise and the decline of the ethno-national movements. This thesis focuses on the three movements: the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement, and the Baluch movement. The Pushtunistan movement which was a powerful mass-based movement prior to the creation of Pakistan began to decline in the post-independence era. The Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement have significantly emerged on the Pakistani political scene in the contemporary period 1978-1987. The central question addressed in this dissertation is: what domestic and international factors have been responsible for the rise and decline of these movements?

The dominant thrust of the theoretical literature of nationalism and comparative ethnicity has until recently been on society-centered explanations. The theorists, focusing their attention on the ethnic groups, have mainly emphasized factors of social change at the group level broadly associated with the process of modernization. The post-modernization writers, noting the inadequacies of the modernization perspective, have now begun to emphasize the role of the context, especially the state as a primary causal factor in understanding the variations in the course of ethno-national movements. This shift from the society-centered explanations to the state-centered explanations is in accord with the mainstream political science literature on the role of the state.

We present two sets of arguments in this dissertation: (1) In an analytic-empirical mode, our argument is that the explanation for the rise and decline of the movements primarily lies in the domestic and international political context. Among the domestic factors, it is the political policy of the state elite which is the most important factor in determining both the rise and decline of the movements. If the policy of the state elite leads to the greater power-sharing among the ethnic groups, the movements are likely to decline. Conversely, if the policy aims at the monopolization of power by certain ethnic groups, the groups excluded from the power-sharing arrangements begin to formulate secessionist ideologies leading to the rise of the movement. The policies of the state elite and their consequences are the major catalysts of changes at the group level. Ethnic elites' perceptions

and strategies of political mobilization are largely determined in reaction to the policies of the state elite.

Among the international factors, three factors, transnational influences, activities of coethnics living in the adjacent countries or abroad, and the policies of the foreign states also play a role in influencing the course of the movements. However, the international factors play a secondary role and reinforce the trends generated by the domestic factors.

Our second set of arguments is in an interpretative vein and relates to the ideologies of state. The proponents of state admit that the states cannot be divorced from their broader cultural context, but they do not pay enough attention to state-ideologies. The focus on the state ideologies allows an analyst to cut across such analytic distinctions as state/society and national/international. We note the relevance of three ideologies, liberalism, Marxism, and Islam, three transnational cultural traditions, to our case study, and argue that the perceptions, attitudes, actions and reactions of both the state elite as well as the ethnic elites cannot be adequately understood without understanding these alternative cultural traditions.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Myron Weiner

Title: Ford International Professor of Political
Science

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER I: <u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
1.1. Problem	1
1.2. Significance of the Problem	3
1.3. Central Argument	8
1.4. Relevance of Three Traditions	12
1.5. Methodology	15
1.6. Organization of the Study	16
CHAPTER II: <u>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</u>	23
2.1. Review of the Literature on Nationalism and Ethnicity	
Liberalism	
(a) Traditional Writers	24
(b) Modernization Theorists	28
(c) Post-Modernization Theorists	37
2.2. Marxism	
(a) Traditional Writers	41
(b) Modernization Theorists	43
(c) Post-Modernization Theorists	49
2.3. Islam	
(a) Traditional Writers	52
(b) Modernization Theorists	55
(c) Post-Modernization Theorists	59
2.4. Summary	61
CHAPTER III: <u>ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE LIBERAL PHASE 1947-1970</u>	70
3.1. Peoples and Geography	73
3.2. Pakistan Movement and Regional Loyalties: PrePartition Legacy	78
3.3. State Elite Versus Ethnic Elites: Conflicting Perceptions	85
3.4. Liberal Pakistan: Background	91
(a) Ayub's Perceptions	94
(b) State Elite	96

3.5.	Perspective from Center: Policies - An Overview	97
	(a) Political	98
	(b) Cultural	99
	(c) Economic	100
	(d) Consequences	100
3.6.	Perspective from the Provinces: The Movements	103
	N.W.F.P.: The Pushtunistan Movement	
	(a) Organization	104
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	106
	(c) Social Base	
	Sind: The Jeeya Sind Movement	
	(a) Organization	109
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	110
	(c) Social Base	111
	Baluchistan: The Baluch Movement	
	(a) Organization	112
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	113
	(c) Social Base	114
3.7	International Factors	115
	(a) Transnational Influences	115
	(b) Activities of Coethnics	117
	(c) Policies of Foreign Governments	118
3.8	Summary	124
CHAPTER IV:	<u>EVOLUTION OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE SOCIALIST PHASE 1971-1977</u>	
4.1	Socialist Pakistan: Background	140
	(a) Bhutto's Rise to Power	144
	(b) Bhutto's Perceptions	145
	(c) PPP	147
4.2	State Elite Versus Ethnic Elites: Short-Lived Federalism	148
4.3	Perspective from the Center: Policies: An Overview	156
	(a) Political	157
	(b) Cultural	159
	(c) Economic	160
	(d) Consequences	161

4.4	Perspective from the Provinces Movements	164
	N.W.F.P.: Pushtunistan Movement	
	(a) Organization	164
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	167
	(c) Social Base	169
	Sind: Jeeya Sind Movement	
	(a) Organization	172
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	174
	(c) Social Base	176
	Baluchistan: Baluch Movement	
	(a) Organization	177
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	179
	(c) Social Base	180
4.5	International Factors	181
	(a) Transnational Influences	181
	(b) Activities of Coethnics	184
	(c) Policies by Foreign Governments	185
4.6	Summary	189
CHAPTER V: <u>RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENTS:</u> <u>ISLAMIC PHASE 1977-1987</u>		
5.1	Islamic Pakistan: Background	204
	(a) The Coup d'Etat of July 1977	204
	(b) Zia-ul-Haq's Perceptions	206
	(c) State Elite	208
5.2	Perspective from the Center Policies: An Overview	209
	(a) Political	209
	(b) Cultural	213
	(c) Economic	214
	(d) Consequences	215
5.3	Perspective from the Provinces: Movements	220
	N.W.F.P.: Pushtunistan Movement	
	(a) Organization	220
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	221
	(c) Social Base	224
	Sind: Jeeya Sind Movement	
	(a) Organization	229
	(b) Ideology and Strategy	231
	(c) Social Base	234
	Baluchistan: Baluch Movement	
	(a) Organization	237

	(b) Ideology and Strategy	238
	(c) Social Base	241
5.4	International Factors	243
	(a) Transnational Influences	243
	(b) Activities of Coethnics	245
	(c) Policies of Foreign Governments	248
5.5	Summary	254
CHAPTER VI:	<u>WHY RISE AND DECLINE: EXPLANATIONS</u>	267
6.1	Domestic Factors	270
6.2	International Factors	281
CHAPTER VII:	<u>CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS</u>	293
7.1	Perspective from Alternative Cultural Traditions	294
7.2	Alternative Theoretical Explanations: Syntheses	302
7.3	Conclusions Summarized	308
	Selected Bibliography	314

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem

The rise of ethno-national movements as a global phenomena since the early 1970's has been attracting significant attention from social scientists as well as policy-makers. Both theoretical and empirical literature dealing with these movements continues to proliferate.¹ However, social scientists have paid little attention to the fact that some ethno-national movements in the recent history have declined as well. The Biafran movement in Nigeria, the Quebec movement in Canada, the Walloon movement in Belgium and the Pushtunistan movement in Pakistan are some of the salient cases of decline which have gone unnoticed.² Post-1971 Pakistan represents an excellent case-study to examine both the rise as well as the decline of the ethno-national movements. This thesis focusses on the three ethno-national movements of Pakistan: (1) the Pushtunistan movement, (2) the Jeeya Sind movement and (3) the Baluch movement. The Pushtunistan movement which grew as a powerful mass-based movement prior to the creation of Pakistan, began to decline in the post-independence era. This decline became dramatically clear in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in Dec. 1979. Both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements which enjoyed little public support at the time of formation of Pakistan in 1947, have significantly emerged on the Pakistani political scene in the contemporary period, 1971-1987. The central question to be addressed in this dissertation is: what domestic and international factors have been responsible for the rise and decline of these movements?

Ethno-national movements are defined as "ideological movements based on shared meanings of common descent, real or imagined that elites within the appropriate group formulate in order to mobilize political support for a variety of objectives ranging from autonomy to secession to statehood."³ A commonly held distinction between an ethnic movement and a nationalist movement is that the goal of an ethnic politician is to gain some advantage within an existing state whereas the nationalist seeks to establish or maintain his own state. It is often difficult to keep this distinction between the two because of continuously changing nature of the phenomenon, one transforming into the other or vice-versa. A.D. Smith, the most prolific writer on nationalism and ethnicity suggests that the difference between the two types of movements is mainly the difference of level and scale. In his view, both concepts, "ethnie" and "nation," refer to the notion of common descent or upbringing. He defines ethnie as a "named collectivity sharing a common myth of origins and descent, a common history, one or more elements of distinctive culture, a common territorial association, and a sense of group solidarity."⁴ By 'nation' he means "a phenomenon related to the ethnie but much more impersonal, abstract and overtly political, i.e., a large cultural-historical community possessing its own territory, a unified economy and education system, and common legal rights and duties, in other words, a politicized, territorialized and homogenized ethnie, a fusion of ethnic with civic-territorial identities."⁵ By "rise" of the movement we mean when the increasing number of people begin to support or sympathize with the cause of the movement, and by "decline" of the

movement we mean its opposite, i.e., when the number of the people supporting or sympathizing with its cause decreases.

Significance of the Problem

We shall establish the significance of the problem in two ways, from the perspective of the Pakistani policy-makers whose fear is that the country may further break-up as a consequence of success of these ethno-national movements, and from the perspective of a social scientist, indicating critical flaws, which this problem points out in both the theoretical and empirical literature, aimed at understanding the dynamics of ethno-national movements.

The Pakistani decision-makers, since the formation of the country in 1947, have continuously been preoccupied with the ethno-national movements. Their state-building efforts proved counter-productive as the Bengali ethno-national movement in East Pakistan was matured during 1958-1970, eventually leading to the disintegration of the country in the wake of the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971.⁶ India's military intervention on behalf of the Bengali ethno-national movement and the Soviet Union's diplomatic help to both India and the Bangladesh movement against Pakistan (supported by the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China), were critical international factors in the final success of the Bangladesh movement. The Bangladesh syndrome continues to haunt the Pakistani decision-makers, who fear that the ethno-national movements in the other provinces, the Northwest Frontier province (N.W.F.P.), Sind and Baluchistan may also follow the precedent set by the Bangladesh movement.⁷ The Soviet military intervention in

Afghanistan in Dec. 1979 radically changed the geo-political situation of the region, highlighting the worst-case scenario long feared by the Pakistani decision-makers. They now see the prospects of development of ethno-national movements in the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan into full-fledged secessionist movements, expect covert aid to these movements from India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and a repetition of the Bangladesh history.⁸

The South Asia scholars writing on Pakistan also share the above worst-case scenario. Some even have prematurely declared an imminent demise of the country. Tariq Ali, a neo-Marxist writer in his book, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, analyzing Pakistan's ethno-national movements believes that the foreign powers' aid to these movements would eventually lead to the demise of the "Islamic banana republic." He predicts:

The national question is the time bomb threatening the very structures of the post-1971 State. The hour of explosion cannot be far away.⁹

Lawrence Ziring, analyzing Pakistan's nationalities dilemma concludes:

The winds of change are blowing throughout the region and the radicalization of these countries (Iran and Afghanistan) must in time influence Pakistan. A socialist Pakistan would not be the end of the process. Given the impact of the change, Pakistan could cease to exist in its sovereign nation-state form.¹⁰

Anwar Sayed notes:

The bonds of solidarity among the regions of Pakistan are clearly infirm. For many years but especially since General Ziaul Haq's coup d'etat in July 1977 Pakistan's continued survival has been an open question among foreign as well as her own observers.¹¹

Ataur Rahman declares:

The future of Pakistan is in doubt. Threats to the unity of the nation arise from the social structure and external environment. Post-1971 Pakistan has witnessed a resurgence of regional and ethnic identities.¹²

Khalid B. Sayeed writes:

Throughout the 1970's, both during the Bhutto and Zia regimes, Pakistan has been faced with continuing regional discontent bordering on threats of secession in the Pushtun and Baluchi areas. These threats would become even more menacing if the communist regime in Afghanistan backed by Soviet military and economic resources starts capitalizing on regional discontent...¹³

This widely shared projected scenario about the likely developments of Pakistani ethno-national movements among both the policy-makers and the scholars alike is based upon flawed assumptions with respect to the understanding of the real dynamics of rise and decline of the movements. Making these assumptions explicit, we critically evaluate the existing literature on the three Pakistani ethno-national movements--the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluchi movement, and also note the contribution of our study.

There are two major assumptions which underlie much of the literature on these movements. The first assumption held implicitly or explicitly by most writers on these movements is that ethnic identities are more basic and entrenched and, ethno-national movements based on these identities have an inevitable tendency to rise. Yu V. Gankovosky, Feroz Ahmad, Selig Harrison, Inayatullah Baluch, Hans Frey, Mohammed Hassan Hosseinbor and Ahmad Shah Mohabbat's works are primarily guided by this assumption.¹⁴ Focussing exclusively on the ethnic groups -- the Pushtuns, the Sindhis and the Baluchis, these writers, mostly historians, trace the histories of these groups and tend to project the present

histories of these group identities into an immemorial past to prove a continuous unbroken stream of ethno-national consciousness. They reconstruct an imagined history of these movements stretching back to centuries and show an inevitable evolution of the movements. Most of these historians do not keep the subtle distinction between ethnic identity and ethno-national identity and intermingle them together leading to a highly confused historical treatment of these movements. They tend to ignore the fact that ethno-nationalism is a very recent and modern phenomena having little relationship with much of the previous history. They, unconsciously, seem to accept a fake historicity reproduced by the propagandists of these movements, who make use of past history to serve their present political purposes.

The political scientists, Lawrence Ziring, Robert G. Wirsing, Khalid B. Sayeed, Anwar Syed, and Tariq Ali, though more sophisticated than the historians, also fall into the same trap and locate the causes of the rise of these movements in such objective cultural makers as race, language, color, and tribal customs treating them as immutable.¹⁵ Most of the studies done by the political scientists are descriptive and historical and do not make use of the theoretical insights of the growing body of literature on nationalism, comparative ethnicity and international relations. Their perspective influenced by the primordialists' notion of ethnicity conceive ethnic groups as rigidly defined and presumes a linear upward rise of the movements usually projecting their disintegrative potential in the national polity.

However, there is a mounting evidence of dynamic and changeable character of ethnicity. The fact that the ethnic groups hold multiple

identities and the hierarchical rankings of these identities keep changing, is strongly evidenced by the variations in the course of these movements in our case too. The Pushtunistan movement which had flourished significantly prior to the creation of the country went into a near complete decline in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979). The Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements which carried little public support in 1947, had gained substantial mass-bases in 1980s. Why do these variations occur in the course of the movements? Why do political salience of some ethnic identities rise while that of others decline is the question which is not answered by the above writers. Nearly all of them present a static picture of the development of these movements describing their rise only and failing to note their decline.

The second major assumption underlying the above projected scenario is that as each of Pakistan's ethnic communities are a trans-border people -- the Pushtuns (Pakistan and Afghanistan), the Baluchis (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Soviet Union), the Punjabis, the Sindhis and the Kashmiris (Pakistan and India) -- therefore, the impact of external events have necessarily to be contributive to the rise of the Pakistani ethno-national movements and disruptive of national integration. This presumption about likely negative influences is further supplemented by the inclination of foreign governments to support these ethno-national movements. The scholars on Pakistan strongly fear that Pakistan's assistance to the nearly three million Afghan refugees in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 may provoke the Soviets to encourage the Pakistani ethno-national movements

leading to a further disintegration of the country. Citing the past history of a joint Indo-Soviet support to the Bangladesh movement, they also widely believe the possibility of a joint Moscow-Delhi-Kabul covert venture to assist Pakistani ethno-national movements. The works of the above cited historians and political scientists pay little systematic attention to the impact of external events and only make prejudgments, usually in concluding sections.

This assumption about the impact of international factors contributing towards the rise of ethno-national movements is a speculative conjecture on the part of the authors. There is a need to empirically test the nature and extent of the impact of international factors on the movements. The impact could be positive or negative depending on a variety of factors and may differ from one situation to another.

Most of the above cited studies are partial and deal either with one or two movements, mostly with the Pushtunistan and the Baluch movements. There has been no analysis of the Jeeya Sind movement in any of the above works. Our study, in fact, is the first in depth comparative analysis of the post-1971 Pakistani ethno-national movements which attempts to understand the domestic and international factors affecting the rise and decline of these movements. Our primary focus is on the contemporary period of Pakistani history, 1971-1987.

Central Argument

The theoretical literature on nationalism and comparative ethnicity, to be surveyed in chapter two, also suffers from the same two critical

weaknesses as have been pointed out in the empirical literature on the Pakistani ethno-national movements reviewed above. The theoretical literature, in general, notes the episodic character of ethno-national movements, i.e. the rise and decline of the movements but does not adequately account for their decline. Secondly, the literature does not systematically relate the group processes to the domestic and international factors, while we know from the recent experiences of these movements that it is the continuous interplay of internal and external factors which decisively affects the course of these movements.

These two weaknesses in the literature primarily arise because the dominant thrust of the theoretical literature of nationalism and comparative ethnicity has until recently been on society-centered explanations. The theorists, focussing their attention on the ethnic groups have mainly emphasized factors of social change broadly associated with the processes of modernization i.e. industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, media expansion, increasing literacy and education, etc.¹⁶ To use Ernest Gellner's phrase, it is the "tidal wave of modernization" which engenders ethno-national movements the world over.¹⁷ The Marxist writers, using different terminology also shared the modernization theorists' concerns and emphasized global process of uneven development of capitalism, which in their view, created conditions of center and periphery in various parts of the world, in turn catalyzing ethno-national movements.¹⁸ The post-modernization writers, whether liberal (A.D. Smith and Donald L. Horowitz) or Marxists (Tom Nairn, Michael Hechter), noting the inadequacies of modernization perspective, have now begun to emphasize the role of the state as a primary causal

factor in understanding the variation in the course of ethno-national movements.¹⁹ This shift from society-centered explanations to state-centered explanations is in accord with the mainstream political science literature on the role of the state (Theda Skocpol, E. Nordlinger, Stephen Krasner, and others).²⁰ The literature conceives states as organizations claiming control over territories and people and strongly argues for the "state autonomy" i.e. the states may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demand or interests of social groups, classes or society.

We present two sets of arguments in this dissertation: (1) In an analytic-empirical mode, our arguments is that the explanation for the rise and decline of the movements primarily lies in the domestic and international political context of the ethnic groups. Among the domestic factors, it is the political policy of the state elite which is the most important factors in determining both the rise and decline of the movements. The term 'state' has been defined in terms of set of institutions claiming control over territory and the people or as public officials exercising authority. We use the term 'state' in both senses. By 'state elite,' however, we mean, "all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon all parts of society."²¹ If the political policy of the state elite leads to a greater power-sharing among the ethnic groups, the movements are likely to decline. Conversely, if the political policy aims at the monopolization of power by certain ethnic groups, the groups excluded from the power-sharing arrangements begin to formulate secessionist ideologies leading to the rise of the movement.

In the absence of power sharing, economic and cultural policies designed to reduce ethnic conflict may, in fact, be counterproductive and contribute to the rise of the movements. In short, the policies of the state elite and their consequences are the major catalysts of changes at the group level. Ethnic elites' perceptions and strategies of political mobilization are largely determined in reaction to the policies of the state elite. In the Pakistani case, our hypothesis is that the political policy of the state elite, intendedly or unintendedly has led to an increasing power-sharing with the Pushtun elite which in turn has led to the decline of the Pushtunistan movement, but the Sindhi and the Baluchi elites' exclusion from the power-sharing arrangements has led to the upsurge of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements among their respective ethnic groups.

Among the international factors, three factors, transnational influences, activities of coethnics living in the adjacent countries or abroad and the policies of foreign states also play a role in influencing the course of the movements. However, international factors usually play a secondary role and reinforce the trends generated by the domestic factors, but may have the potential to assume primacy over the domestic factors in crisis moments. In the Pakistani case, our hypothesis is that the international factors -- transnational influences, activities of coethnics and the policies of foreign governments have negatively affected the Pushtunistan movement leading to its decline, while positively encouraging the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements on the separatist course.

(2) Our second set of arguments are in an interpretative vein and relate to the ideologies of the state. The proponents of the state admit that the states cannot be divorced from their broader cultural context, but they rarely pay enough attention to state ideologies.²² In the deeper sense, focus on the state-ideologies allows an analyst to cut across such sharp analytic distinction as state/society and national/international. These state ideologies define the world view of the actors involved, giving a deeper understanding of their perceptions, attitudes, actions and reactions. Pakistan's history, in terms of state ideologies can be divided into three distinct historical phases, in each of which the three different traditions, liberalism, Marxism and Islam have dominated the activities of the state: (1) the liberal phase, 1947-1970; (2) the socialist phase, 1971-77; and, (3) the Islamic phase, 1978-1987. We now turn to the relevance of these three ideologies, Liberalism,, Marxism and Islam, three transnational cultural traditions, to our case study.²³

Relevance of Three Traditions

These three traditions, Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, to use Kuhn's phrase, constitute "paradigms" with their own core beliefs. The term "paradigm" is used here in a broad sense and stands for "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community."²⁴ These alternative paradigms bring different models of state and society which are clashing and contradictory to each other. These three alternative paradigms deeply affect both the state-building efforts and societal reactions to them.

Achievement of five tasks of integration by the state elite as set out by Myron Weiner -- national integration, territorial integration, value integration, elite-mass integration and integrative behavior, become greatly complicated as each paradigm brings its own notion of "community" and alternative strategy to build it.²⁵ The following diagram shows the alternative criteria of these three traditions in cultural, political and economic spheres.

Alternative Criteria in Three Traditions

	<u>Liberalism</u>	<u>Marxism</u>	<u>Islam</u>
Cultural	Nationalism/ Internationalism	Classless World Socialist Community	Umma
Political	Liberal Democracy	Multi-National Socialist Democracy	Shura
Economic	Growth/ Modernization	Absence of Exploitation	Justice

The Pakistani community is a deeply divided community across these three traditions, unable to achieve consensus on the basic core values.²⁶ Each of the three phases of Pakistani history, liberal (1947-1970), socialist (1971-77) and Islamic (1977-87) is preceded by a mass movement and brings its own discourse of politics, drawn from a different cultural tradition. The state in each phase draws its legitimacy from a different criterion. The meanings of both state actions and ethnic groups' reactions change during each phase.

During the liberal phase the state-elite wanted to build a unitary liberal nation-state on the Western pattern. They claimed to establish a liberal democracy, invoked maximization of growth as a sole criterion for

their economic policies and also pursued a policy of close alignment with the West in foreign policy sphere. The ethnic elites reacted to the unitary policies of the liberal regime and drawing upon a synthesis of both liberal and socialist traditions put forth their demands for a federal, decentralized and non-aligned socialist state with maximum autonomy for the provinces.

In the socialist phase, the state elite sought to construct a multi-national socialist community through what they termed as 'socialist Democracy' and "an exploitation free society." They also opted for a non-aligned foreign policy with friendly relations towards the socialist bloc. The ethnic elites, also drawing upon the socialist tradition demanded the recognition of a nationality status with the ultimate right of secession.

In the Islamic phase, the state elite attempted to build an Islamic community within the broader framework of the Umma (the Muslim World Community). They instituted a system which they termed as "Islamic democracy" (Shura), claimed to build a society based on justice and pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. The ethnic elites, reacting to the unitary policies of the state elite, responded by developing guerrilla organizations on the radical Marxist-Leninist-Maoist pattern, and overtly worked for the secessionist goals.

The focus on these alternative paradigms not only allows an analyst to incorporate self-understanding of the social actors involved but also has the advantage of giving insight into the structure, content and mode of these alternative cultural traditions. To use Lakatos' terminology, these paradigms are, in fact, alternative "research programmes" with

their own scholarly literature.²⁷ Each research programme offers its own theoretical explanation in understanding the phenomena of ethno-nationalism. We critically evaluate and contrast the literature in these alternative traditions looking for a better synthetic explanation valid cross-culturally.

Methodology

We employ a synthesis of two methods of investigations: interpretative and natural scientific. Interpretative method attempts to discover intentionality of the social actors involved, focussing on their values, beliefs, perceptions and purposes. It attempts to discover 'constitutive meanings' of human actions through interpretation and understanding of both the perceptions of the actors and the practices and conventions of a society. Scientific method, on the other hand, looks for law-like similarities in the behaviors of individuals, groups, state institutions and society and attempts to explain the phenomena in natural scientific mode. We agree with J. Donald Moon that both modes of inquiry presuppose each other and a synthesis of the two is necessary to account for the complexity of social life.²⁸

We conducted intensive open-ended interviews with both the state elite and the ethnic elites during the summers of 1985 and 1986. Among the state elite, we focussed on the top military and civilian public officials both in the center and provinces. Among the ethnic elites, we interviewed a cross-section of both the traditional landed/tribal elite, educated middle class elite in Pakistan and in Britain (living in self-exile). Interviews were aimed at discovering their perceptions about

power-sharing/monopolizing policies of the state elite and their consequences for the movements. Interviews were also aimed at understanding the world views of both the state elite and the ethnic elites, especially focussing on their multiple allegiances rooted in alternative cultural traditions.

There is no adequate measure available to determine the level of public support for these ethno-national movements. We use a number of partial measures as indicators of "rise" or "decline" of ethno-national movements. They include election results, survey data, data on the level of ethnic violence both against other groups as well as the state to supplement the findings gained from indepth interviews.

A vast published and unpublished literature produced by these movements was also consulted besides the historical accounts of these movements, mostly written by historians.

Organization of the Study

The second chapter 'Theoretical framework' presents a detailed discussion of the theoretical literature on nationalism and ethnicity in three traditions or paradigms, liberalism, Marxism and Islam. Within each tradition, the theoretical knowledge proceeds cumulatively from traditional to modern to post-modern phase. We discuss the scholarly literature in each tradition under three catagories: (1) Traditional writers (2) Modernization theorists and (3) Post-modernization theorists. We compare and contrast the central concerns of the literature of three traditions in holistic sense and note that the dominant foci of all three traditions differ in accordance with their core values, but the tendency

among the post-modern writers in all three traditions is to stress the role of contextual factors, especially the state and its ideologies in the perpetuation of nationalist culture.

The third chapter, "Origins of the movements: The Liberal phase 1947-1970" is the background chapter. It traces the origins of the movements against the British Indian state in the pre-partition era. It discusses the rise of the Pushtunistan movement prior to the creation of the country and relative dormancy of the antecedent ethno-national movements in Sind and Baluchistan in 1947. Analyzing the composition and political, cultural, and economic policies of the state elite, it discusses the birth of both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and the beginning of the decline of the Pushtunistan movement.

The fourth chapter, "Evolution of the movements: the socialist phase 1971-77" analyses political, cultural and economic policies of the state elite and their consequences. After an initial policy of sharing power with other ethnic groups which had an immediate effect on the ethnic elites in terms of their renunciation of their ethnic claims, the state elite pursued highly repressive policies aimed at liquidating ethno-national movements. The policies led to the transformation of provincial autonomy movements into the secessionist movements. However, as a result of an intended or unintended policy on the part of the state elite which accorded greater share of power to the Pushtuns and a skillful strategy of the state elite to undercut the external sources of support of the Pushtunistan movement, the decline of the movement continued. The Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements, however, continued to rise.

The fifth chapter, "Rise and Decline of the Movements: the Islamic phase 1977-1987" discusses the policies of the state-elite in the Islamic mould. Both the policies and the 'ethnic groups' reactions were remarkably similar to the liberal phase. This period witnessed a near complete decline of the Pushtunistan movement and the rise of both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements.

The sixth chapter, "Why Rise and Decline: Explanations" summarizes the findings of this study in analytic-empirical mode, focussing on the major hypotheses of this study with regard to the domestic and international factor influencing the rise and decline of the Pakistani ethno-national movements.

The final chapter, "Concluding Reflections" compares and contrasts alternative theoretical explanations offered by the three paradigms, Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, and aims at achieving both a comprehensive understanding and a synthetic explanation of the phenomena of rise and decline of ethno-national movements.

Notes

1. A sample of the recent literature on ethno-nationalism is the following: E.A. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski, New Nationalisms of the Developed West, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Miton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1977); Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen, Ethnicity, Politics and Development (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); Walker Connor, "Ethno-nationalism" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, (ed.) Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987); Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-determinization (New Haven; Yale University, 1979); Gail Warshofsky Lapidus "Ethno-nationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case" World Politics (July, 1986).
2. Only recently, social scientists have begun to note the phenomena of decline of the movements. See a recent article which deals with the rise and decline of Western Ethno-national movements: Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, "Ethno-territorial Movements and the Policy Process" Comparative Politics (April, 1985).
3. This definition has been influenced and in part borrowed from A.D. Smith's work, Theories of Nationalism (N.Y.: Holmer & Meier Publishers, 1983).
4. A.D. Smith, "Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World" Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Summer, 1985) p. 128.
5. Ibid p. 132.
6. A vast literature exists on the rise of Bengali ethno-national movement and the events surrounding the disintegration of the country. Following books and articles cover the domestic and international factors leading to the formation of Bangladesh in an excellent manner: Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University, 1972); G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers (N.Y.: Free Press, 1975); M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement" Asian Survey (March, 1972); Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System" International Journal 27, 3 (1972); R. Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India,

Pakistan and Bangladesh (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); Robert LaPorte Jr., "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation" Asian Survey (Feb., 1972); Howard Schuman, "A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism" American Journal of Sociology (Sept., 1972).

7. Based on interviews with senior military officers.
8. See for a detailed perspective of this projected scenario from the policy-makers' point of view: Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)
9. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (London: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 150.
10. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 257.
11. Anwar Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), See introduction.
12. Ataur Rahman, "Pakistan: Unity or Further Division?" in The States of South Asia (ed.) by A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982) pp. 197-222.
13. Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) See the last chapter.
14. A classic example of this kind of work is the Russian writer Yu V. Gankovsky's work. He does not discuss the movements, but his description of the histories of ethnic groups set the pattern usually followed by the ethno-national historians of the Pakistani provinces. The work traces the histories of these groups in the Marxist framework, claiming that the Pushtun, the Baluch, the Sindhi and the Punjabi consciousness had been rooted in the time immemorial. See Yu V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan (Lahore: Peoples' Publishing House, 1971). Other works which specifically focus on the movements in the same mode are the following: Feroz Ahmad, Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtun Question, (Lahore: Peoples' Publishing House, 1975), Ahmad Shah Mohabbat, "Pakhtun National Self-Determination" (unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1979), Inayatullah Baluch, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self-determination," in Pakistan in the 80s, ed. by Zingel Lallemand, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985); Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pushtunistan-Baluchistan," Aussen Politik (3, 1980); Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 1981); Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor, "Iran

- Hassan Hosseinbor, "Iran and its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism" (unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1984).
15. Lawrence Ziring, in The Subcontinent in World Politics (ed.) L. Ziring, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); Robert G. Wrising, The Baluchis and Pathans, (London: Minority Right Group Report no. 48, 1981); Khalid B. Sayeed (1980); Anwar Syed (1984); Tariq Ali (1983).
 16. See two excellent reviews of the literature of comparative ethnicity which summarize the main issues addressed by Modernization theorists: Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity" World Politics (July, 1983); James R. Scarritt and William Safran, "The Relationship of Ethnicity to Modernization and Democracy" International Studies Notes vol. 10, no. 25, (Summer, 1983).
 17. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
 18. For an extended review of the Marxist literature, see the next chapter.
 19. See A.D. Smith (1985); Donald L. Horowitz (1985); Tom Nairn, "The Modern Janus" New Left Review (Nov.- Dec., 1985); Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethno-regional Movements" Ethnic and Racial Studies 2, no.3 (July, 1979); Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, (eds.) State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).
 20. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); also his review article, "Taking the State Seriously" in Myron Weiner and S.P. Huntington (1987); Stephen Krasner's article, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics" Comparative Politics (January, 1986); For a useful selection of the literature on State, see David Held et al., States and Societies (New York: New York University Press, 1983).
 21. E. Nordlinger (1987) p. 353.
 22. It is interesting to note that the state theorists are increasingly becoming conscious of role of ideologies and their relationship with the state and societies. For example, Theda Skocpol in her recent article on the Iranian revolution modifies her earlier stated position and notes:

"In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was made because a culture conducive to challenges to authority as well as politically relevant networks of popular communication, are already historically woven into the fabric of social life. In and of themselves, the culture and networks of communication do not dictate mass revolutionary action but if a historical conjuncture arises in which a vulnerable state faces oppositionally inclined social groups possessing solidarity, autonomy and independent economic resources, then the sorts of moral symbols and forms of social communication offered by Shia Islam in Iran can sustain the self-conscious making of a revolution." See her article: "Rentier State and Shia Islam in the Iranian Revolution" Theory and Society (May, 1982).

23. By 'Liberalism' we mean 'the dominant ideology of the West.... Liberalism in its contemporary form in not so much a set of ideas or doctrines to which people subscribe by conscious choice, it is a way of seeing the social world, and a set of assumptions about it, which are absorbed by the individual in so natural and gradual manner that he or she is not conscious of their being assumptions at all. See an excellent discussion: Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (N.Y.: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
24. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
25. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences CCCLVIII (1965) pp. 52-64.
26. See an interesting recent debate among the Pakistani proponents of the three traditions, Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, which highlights their clashing perspectives: Afzal Iqbal, "We have to learn a basic lesson" Dawn (Karachi) May 22, 1987; Eqbal Ahmad, "Causes for Anxiety and Remedies" Dawn (Karachi) May 17, 1987; and A.K. Brohi, "Need for Standing Up to False Ideas" Dawn (Karachi) May 19, 1987.
27. I. Lakatos, "Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in I. Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
28. See an excellent article: J. Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives" in Handbook of Political Science vol.I (eds.) F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Despite cumulative sophistication of the theoretical literature on nationalism and ethnicity, recent assessments of the literature conclude that our understanding of the subject remains 'undeveloped'.¹ Donald L. Horowitz, in a recent comprehensive attempt to understand the dynamics of ethno-national politics laments: "We lack explanation... that will hold cross-culturally."² Although the literature in the liberal and the Marxist traditions is generally well-known in the academic circles of the West, very little is known of the literature in the Islamic tradition. With the increasing recognition of politics of Islamic reassertion in the Muslim world, specialists on Middle Eastern politics have produced substantial literature focussing primarily on the transnational dimension of Islam, but they give relatively little attention to the proper context, content and mode of influence of this tradition in the domestic politics of Muslim states.³

A synthesis of the literature on nationalism and ethnicity across three cultural traditions, Liberalism, Marxism and Islam is attempted here with the hope that it may facilitate our understanding of not only the Pakistani case but may, as well, be contributive to the broader theoretical literature on the subject. In each tradition, the literature is categorized under three headings: (1) Traditional writers, (2) Modernization theorists, and (3) Post-modernization theorists.

Review of the Literature on Nationalism and EthnicityLiberalism(a) Traditional Writers

Among the traditional writers, two famous historians who have written extensively on nationalism are: Hans Kohn and Carleton Hayes. Each of them presented a different interpretation and both had an enormous influence in shaping the attitudes of the later theorists of nationalism.

Hans Kohn, "a prophet of liberal rationalism and world community," is the most influential writer in shaping the ideas of most contemporary theorists of nationalism in the liberal tradition.⁴ His categories are uncritically employed by the present-day liberal writers on nationalism. He defines nationalism as a "state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative energy and of economic well being"⁵

Hans Kohn's major argument pervading through his writings is that enlightened nationalism and liberalism are compatible and that such a nationalism could promote individual liberty and world unity. In his early writings, he distinguished between cultural and political nationalism. He thought that cultural nationalism was a progressive force and the best way to minimize the tension between the individual and the community. Political nationalism was the ordering principle of the nineteenth century, but it need not govern the twentieth. He was optimistic that cultural nationalism would replace political

nationalism. He believed that nationalism was compatible with internationalism. He believed that the very growth of nationalism all over the earth, with its awakening of the masses to participation in political and cultural life, had prepared the way for closer cultural contacts among all the civilizations of mankind, simultaneously separating and uniting them. He observed:

With the transformation of social and economic life, with the growing interdependence of all nationalities on a shrinking earth, with a new direction to education, the circumference may widen to include supranational areas of common interest and common sympathy.⁶

He was an ardent believer in the eventual unity of mankind which he thought would come about in the form of a vertical organization of humanity culturally divided into separate units.

He justified imperialism as the middle link in a chain that began with European nationalism and ended with its Asian counterpart. Nationalism united the members of European nations into political states and then impelled each to prove its greatness by extending its political and economic domination to foreign peoples. This imperialism in turn instigated the nationalism of the oppressed people.

His earlier distinction between cultural and political nationalism developed into good political nationalism versus bad political nationalism in his later writings. Good political nationalism such as the English, Dutch, and French emphasized individual freedom, citizenship rights and internationalism while bad political nationalisms such as that of the East European variety were narrow, collectivist and exclusivist.

He condemned fascism, Nazism, Pan Slavism, and Pan-Asianism as they had deviated from the liberal values of the West. In his earlier writing he praised the supranational-nationality policy of the Soviet Union as the true embodiment of the values of Western enlightenment, but after the world wars, he became extremely critical of the Soviet Union.⁷

Carleton Hayes distinguishes between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism is a natural sentiment but nationalism is an artificial construct, an ideology which initially came to dominate Western Europe and later became a major 'European export' to the 'constantly broadening market' of the world. He defines nationalism as follows: "The cultural bases of nationality are a common language and common historical traditions. When these, by some process of education, become the objects of popular emotional patriotism, the result is nationalism"⁸

Why did nationalism arise in Europe? He lists three causes. Firstly the religious void in Europe in which nationalism became the substitute for religion or new 'religion.' He notes:

... it is an arresting fact that the era of Enlightenment which witnessed among the classes the growth of skepticism about christianity witnessed also a substitute exaltation -- a sanctification as it were -- of the secular state, especially of the national state.⁹

Secondly, socio-economic changes taking place under the impact of industrial revolution and democracy. He particularly emphasizes two factors: (1) dislocation of the masses and (2) emergence of middle classes with their vested interests in control and direction of national governments by their own class. This middle class found the

ideology of nationalism useful for their purposes. Thirdly, socializing agencies and institutions, which propagated nationalist ethos under 'pseudo-scientific' garb and educated the masses in terms of new symbols.

Hayes, in fascinating detail, traces the evolution of nationalism from originally a pristine doctrine ('humanitarian nationalism') which emphasized liberty, equality and fraternity, eventually turning into national imperialism from 1874 onward.¹⁰ He stresses the fact that nationalism turned into imperialism in the last stage both internally and abroad. He notes:

... despite the progress made since the French revolution in redrawing the map of Europe along lines of nationality and in creating unified national states, no European state as yet embraced or was confined to, a single nationality... National self-determination gave way to determination by superior peoples. Nationalism became imperialistic not only overseas but within Europe (and America).¹¹

Examining the different varieties of nationalism -- 'Humanitarian', 'Jacobian', 'traditional', 'liberal' and 'integral' -- he notes that none of the variety of nationalism (except the integral one) was opposed to internationalism in theory, but in practice each one of them, gradually and imperceptibly, was transformed into imperialism.

Kohn emphasized the integrative aspects of nationalism while Hayes stressed the disintegrative side of the doctrine. Kohn's distinctions between 'cultural' and 'political' and 'good' and 'bad' nationalism were important in influencing later writers' views. While Hayes' categorization of various forms of nationalism, 'humanitarian', 'Jacobin', 'liberal' and 'integral' and his insistence on lineal projections from one type to another were sounder in the theoretical

terms. Despite different interpretations both agreed on several points: (1) Nationalism was a product of European culture which had spread world-wide. (2) Nationalism was basically an ideology which had a special appeal because of its simplicity and naturalness. It was a kind of a substitute for religion. (3) Nationality was the product of living forces of history continuously fluctuating and never rigid. Specific nationalities had appeared and disappeared, risen and fallen across various historical phases.

Traditional writers' accounts, though insightful, were yet descriptive and narrative. They mentioned many factors but did not stress any single aspect. They raised interesting questions, but did not have satisfactory answers in theoretical sense. However, their interpretations were influential in shaping the ideas of later writers.

Modernization theorists

The two interpretations of nationalism, one emphasizing the integrative aspects and the other stressing its disintegrative potential continued in the post world war II era. Early modernization theorists paid more attention to its integrative effects. Nation state was regarded by them as an unproblematic entity. The two problems stressed by them most were: (a) how to achieve supra-national integration among the western nation-states and (b) how to build homogenized and integrated nation-states in the developing countries. Crawford Young rightly captured the mood of the era as he put it, "Thus, in the 1950s, all roads seemed to lead to national integration.

Pathways might differ, but the end point was the same. The doctrine of nation-building reigned supreme."¹²

Karl Deutsch is the most sophisticated exponent of the early modernization theorists. Deutsch believes that both society and community are developed by social learning and that a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other beyond the mere interchange of goods and services. He defined nationality as follows:

In the political and social struggles of the modern age, nationality, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center.¹³

Deutsch argued that modernization and nationalism go hand in hand. The concept of social mobilization is central to his understanding of nationalism. Social mobilization is the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization. Nationalism then fulfills an emotional need in the individual, though, he allows that 'militarism' or 'another ideology' may as well serve the same function.¹⁴ His theory's major thrust is towards integration, though he allows the possibility of exploring the conditions of secession as well. He writes:

If assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people ... where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow, the opposite happens. More and more highly mobilized and disgruntled people are held at arms length from the politics and culture of their state, and they easily become alienated from the government, the state, and even the country to which they thus far had belonged.¹⁵

Deutsch believed that the process of modernization would eventually lead to the global integration of the world. He predicted:

The whole thrust of the technological development of our time pushes beyond wars and beyond the economic fences of nation-states. It seems to push towards a pluralistic world of limited international law, limited, but growing international cooperation and regional pluralistic security communities.¹⁶

More recently, Ernest Gellner has presented a refined version of Deutsch's theory. Gellner defines nationalism as primarily 'a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.' 'National sentiment is the feeling of the anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment.' By 'nation' he means the following.

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation.¹⁷

Mankind has passed through three stages: the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial. In the agrarian age, there is no single overriding cultural identity. Everything in it militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries. Political units in the age are primarily of two kinds: local self-governing communities and large empires. Nationalism is the product of the third stage, industrial age. It is rooted in a certain kind of

division of labor characteristic of this age. Industrialization engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society. It is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism.

Industrial society also has egalitarian expectations such as had been generally lacking in the previous stable, stratified, dogmatic, and absolutist agrarian society. At the same time in its early stages, industrial society also engenders very sharp, painful and conspicuous inequality because early industrialism means population explosion, rapid urbanization, labor migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward turned communities by global economy and centralizing polity. Those less advantageously placed in that period tend to be not only relatively but also absolutely miserable. In that situation latent political tension is acute, and becomes actual if it can seize on good symbols. Characteristically, it may seize on language, or genetically transmitted traits (racism) or on culture alone. Some parts of the pre-existent cultures are used in the process generally in a transformed shape. Gellner sees this process at the global level:

As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost every one, at the same time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of another nation. If he can identify enough of the victims as being of the same nation as himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds and not all of them can, a nation is born.¹⁸

As regards the future, he believes that future lies between less virulent forms of nationalism and internationalism based on shared necessities.

There are many similarities in Deutsch and Gellner's arguments: the central role of modernization, mass dislocations and need for identity, importance of communication and general similarities of conclusions. However, Gellner strongly insists on the unevenness of the processes of modernization and the variety of possible transitions to industrial modernity. He allows more room for a variety of cultural symbols besides language which is stressed more by Deutsch. His treatment of religious symbols is markedly different from that of any of the modernization theorists. For example, he considers Islam as an indigenous "literacy-sustained tradition" and noting its inherent flexibility and potential fit with the modernization process, he remarks:

under modern conditions, its capacity to be a more abstract faith, presiding over an anonymous community of equal believers could reassert itself.¹⁹

Early modernization theorists regarded ethnicity as traditional and primordial which presumably was bound to disappear with the coming of modernity. But their complacency began to shatter when the evidence began gathering in the late 60s and early 70s from all three worlds that ethno-nationalism was on the rise. The scholars began to point out the significance of ethno-national politics in Asia, Africa, Western Europe, United States and the Soviet Union. A corpus of theory of broad comparative significance began to take shape.²⁰

The new field of comparative ethnicity was born when Walker Connor published his seminar article "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying" in World Politics and stressed the global reality of rise of ethno-

nationalism.²¹ Connor criticized Deutsch's thrust on integration and his discounting of the tendencies of disintegration. he writes:

On the one hand, this work contains a few passing acknowledgements that increasing contacts between culturally diverse people might increase antagonisms. On the other hand, there are several passages that might lead the reader to conclude that Deutsch was convinced that modernization, in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication, and transportation facilities, etc., would lead to assimilation.²²

Connor argues that a preponderant number of states are multiethnic. Less than 10 percent of all states, in his sample, would qualify as essentially homogeneous. Citing a number of examples of rising ethno-national movements from all three worlds, he convincingly argues that "ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years."

He distinguished between 'nation' and 'state' and emphasized that each evoked a different kind of loyalty. 'Nation' in his view, must be understood in a very subjective sense. It is "self-view of one's group" rather than tangible characteristics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation. He notes:

... ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, custom, economic inequity, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us-them" syndrome. And the ultimate answer to the question of whether a person is one of us, or one of them, seldom hinges on adherence to overt aspects of culture.²³

Since the emergence of comparative ethnicity as a distinctive field of social inquiry, there have been disagreements among the leading scholars of the field on how to define the term "ethnicity". The major line of cleavage, as Crawford Young has recently identified it, is the one between the "primordialist camp" and the

"instrumentalist camp". The primordialists stress, what Geertz has called "the 'cultural givens' -- assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion, custom -- as the heart of the ethnic matter" and the "instrumentalists" focussing upon competition and interaction stress the situational and circumstantial nature of ethnic solidarity.²⁴ They consider ethnicity as a weapon in the pursuit of collective advantage. It seems reasonable to assume, as many authors have recently argued, that ethnicity has both objective and subjective dimensions and the relative weight of each dimension may vary from case to case. According to Rothschild, "Ethnicity is a plastic, variagated, and originally ascriptive trait that in certain historical and socio-economic circumstances is readily politicized." Paul Brass defines ethnic community as "...objectively distinct from their neighbors, subjectively self-conscious of their distinctness, and laying claim to status and recognition either as a superior group or as a group at least equal to other groups." Nelson Kasfir considers ethnic identity as both "fluid and intermittent" and "one of the many possible identities" that could become the motivation for political action. His concept of ethnicity involves the following four conditions:

- (1) Particular objective indicators associated with
common ancestry
- (2) become the focus of subjective perceptions both by
members within the unit and by non-members
- (3) through social solidarity created by a resurgence,
or the fictive creation of traditional unity

- (4) so that in certain situations political participation will occur.

All three authors admit the importance of objective "cultural markers", but emphasize more the subjective dimension, i.e. the contextual and situational variables as the real causal factors in the politicization of ethnicity. Rothschild convincingly argues:

For both the individual members of an ethnic group and for the group as a collectivity, the behavioral significance of ethnicity, and even the selection of the operative criterion of ethnicity, flows out of the contours of particular situations, as well as of overall, historically shaped, systems and heritages... These contours of particular situations, by shaping which (if any) of several possible ethnic criteria and interethnic boundaries shall be salient, also help to determine how the confrontational antagonists identify themselves, recruit their allies, and select their leaders. And as the situations change, so do these identifications, allies and leaders.²⁵

Implications of accepting the above mentioned interpretation of ethnicity are the following: (a) relationship between traditional culture and ethnicity is variable, (b) Identity may change with respect to change in political situation and place, (c) Identity may shift dramatically not only from one ethnic category to another but from ethnicity to class or religion and (d) researchers must consider the situation that activates the particular identity the individual chooses.

The instrumentalists argued that ethnic groups are in fact, modern interest groups which invoke ethnicity as a matter of strategic efficacy in order to make claim on governmental sources. Daniel Bell writes, "Ethnicity has become more salient [than class] because it can combine interest with an affective ties."²⁶ Melson and Wolpe argued that in culturally plural societies, citizens tend to perceive their

competitive world through a communal prism and to be responsive to communal appeal.²⁷ Myron Weiner observed:

It is not inequalities between ethnic groups that generate conflict, but competition. Inequalities, real or perceived, are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnic conflict; there must also be competition for control over or access to economic wealth, political power, or social status."²⁸

He specifies a number of situations where ethnic conflict may generate:

(a) When the ethnic division of labor between the dominant and subordinate ethnic groups parallels class relationship; (b) When the local population seeks access to occupations that they previously did not seek or from which they were once excluded; (c) When a change in the power structure stimulates competition by giving one group the political resources for modifying and transforming the ethnic division of labor; (d) When the geographic core and the political core are held by different ethnic groups. His central proposition is that ethnic conflict is generated when the educated middle class of indigenous ethnic groups finds itself blocked by another ethnic group in its social mobility. It is the educated middle class of indigenous ethnic group which takes up the banner of ethnicity in the name of the collective interest of the group.

But sometimes ethnic identity presents itself not as a balanced combination of interest and affect but a "non-rational, primordial, exclusive and overriding compulsion." Boundaries of "us-they" are clearly delineated. Walker Connor believes that in some cases, ethnic nationalism may be due to the general historical message of principle of self-determination. It could be explained better in terms of "chain reaction in the evolution of nationalism" rather than any other factor.

It may be because of the communication revolution in modern times that they have come to realize late that they also deserve a state of their own. Another related explanation emphasizes the demonstration effect where the concrete examples of certain active ethnic minorities may have set precedent for the passive ones.

The later modernization theorists advanced our understanding in several ways. They brought to light the dynamic and changeable character of ethnicity by putting emphasis on its contextual, situational and circumstantial nature. They emphasized its linkage to the broader processes of modernization. Their perspectives also highlighted the role of the educated middle classes and centrality of the political process in giving shape and content to ethno-national movements.

Post-Modernization Theorists

I discuss two writers who have launched a sharp attack on the modernization paradigm: Donald L. Horowitz and A.D. Smith.

Horowitz argues that by focussing on the modernization processes, the theory has assumed a partial character.²⁹ It fits certain aspects of ethnic processes much better than the other aspects. For example, it does not explain why so much ethnic conflict has occurred in some of the least modernized areas of the world such as Chad, Ethiopia, the Southern Sudan, Mauritania, the mountainous areas of Iraq, Northeast India, the periphery of Burma and Papua New Guinea. Secondly, he thinks that the theory does not explain why the non-elite should render their support to the ethno-national movements. By failing to attend to the 'unmodernized strata', he believes, the theory tends to neglect the

potential heterogeneity of conflict motives. Thirdly, the theory does not explain why class interests are so strongly reflected in ethnic tensions which after all usually cross-cut class lines.

Horowitz thinks that the explanation of ethnic conflict is to be found in the intergroup comparisons. When two or more such groups are placed in the same environment, no two groups are seen to possess the same distribution of behavioral qualities. Stereotypes crystallize and intergroup comparisons emerge. What produces group feeling and discrimination is simple division into categories. In the case of developing countries, he argues that the origins of these categories and stereotypes lies in the colonial past, particularly the policies of the colonial governments which led to different modernization rates in different areas, in turn, leading to particular images of groups and their inter-comparisons according to their relative worth. He reverses the modernization theorists' emphasis on the elite. In his view, the educated elite makes use of ethnic antipathy for their own economic purposes does not mean that ethnic conflict is fundamentally about jobs and privileges. The elites could not use the antipathy for their own ends unless ethnic feelings were already strong. He also thinks that the participation of non-elites in the conflict, hard to explain on the basis of narrow group interests, is easy to explain on the basis of "invidious comparisons."

Smith develops an elaborate critique of Gellner's theory.³⁰ He appreciates the theory's positive points: its linkage between unevenness of the processes of modernization and variety of possible transitions to industrial modernity, synthesis between literacy culture

and industrial competition and balance between subjective and objective factors. He makes the following critical points: (1) Theory does not take into account preindustrial national movements which were often successful in mobilizing masses for their causes. (2) The social composition of the nationalist movements has often been very diverse and not confined to the industrial workers only as the theory implies. (3) There is a sort of economic determinism in the theory which leads us to believe that certain kind of structure necessarily leads to certain kinds of consequence. As a result, it is assumed that nationalism is a transitional phenomenon, which will come to an end when modernization is completed. Pointing to the contemporary resurgence of nationalism in Europe and America, he argues that there is no strong and necessary connection between the course of nationalism and the trajectory of industrialization. His basic argument is that nationalism is here to stay, as long as the world state system continues to exist. He notes:

The fact is, that we have arrived at the point where nationalism appears to be a self-reproducing phenomena, given the persistence of the world state-system in any form. Hence cosmopolitan hopes for an early withering away of nationalism are doomed to disappointment, for they are based on a failure to grasp the importance today of the conjuncture of ethnic sentiments, secular ideals and changing elements of modernization and its social concomitants.³¹

Smith thinks that too great an emphasis on the modernizing potential of nationalism overlooks the importance of its ethnic roots in the past. He notes:

... the study of nationalism needs to be reoriented to take account not only of the new forces associated with the French and industrial revolutions, but also of the retention of older ties and sentiments often long antedating the modern era.³²

He defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation." He differentiates between ethno-centric nationalism and poly-centric nationalism, the former being of primitive variety and the latter the modern one. He notes three components of poly-centric nationalism: autonomy, individuality and pluralism.

Fundamentally, nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people, the expression of national character and individuality, and finally the vertical division of the world into unique nations, each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity.³³

He distinguishes nationalism from fascism, racism, populism and imperialism. Fascism is different because it has different objectives and different social base, therefore, a 'unique' phenomenon of interwar years. Imperialism, racism and populism are derogation even a contradiction of the main tenets of nationalism.³⁴

Why has it continued to be so powerful? He offers four reasons:³⁵ (1) the failure of the modern state to contain and minimize the ethnic revival, (2) the counterproductive pressure of the world state-system on state elite to homogenize and integrate, (3) continuing effects of nationalist ideals and movements, and (4) revolt by the intelligentsia from peripheral areas against the inequitable state systems.

The post-modernization writers' criticism of modernization theorists was sharp and clear. They began to note the inadequacies of society-centered explanations rooted in the differential rates of modernization. They emphasized that the modernization perspective did

not take into account the pre-modern past and also ignored the role of the unmodernized strata of the society thus overlooking the heterogeneity of the social bases of ethno-national movements. They also criticized the theories for being economically deterministic and primarily based on the historical experience of the West. The post-modernization writers began to emphasize the role of state, state-system and transnational influences as major factors catalyzing ethno-national movements. Their hypotheses with regard to the role of the state and international factors were inarticulate and unsystematic, but a clear shift from society centered to state-centered explanation was discernable in their writings.

Marxism

Traditional Writers

Marx and Engels did not have a coherent and well articulated theory on nationalism, because it was not their primary concern. They were internationalist in their outlook. Their original position is outlined in the Communist Manifesto. They saw capitalism creating "a universal interdependence of nations." They observed:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.³⁶

They envisioned a proletarian international society emerging out of this universalization of capitalism. Their utopia consisted of a

classless and post-national society free of exploitation. Eventual integration was their primary theme.

They viewed nationalism as the ideology of the capitalist class, part of the superstructure, but a historically necessary prerequisite for the establishment of capitalist order. It served the functional purpose of integrating various localities under one nation at one particular historical stage.³⁷ In their view correlation of state and nation had its origins in the fifteenth century during transition from feudalism to capitalism. The state institutionalized the bourgeoisie power while nationality functioned as the ideological core around which the bourgeoisie both consolidated its domestic power over the working class and peasants and solidified a nation vis-a-vis other capitalist nations. However, they saw the movement of history from the capitalist national state towards an international socialist community. Their advice to the workers was:

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie... The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word... Working men of the world, unite.³⁸

Marx and Engels did occasionally provide support to the nationalist movements, notably Poland and Ireland, but this support was not contradictory to their basic position outlined above as they deemed it compatible with the international objectives of the communist movement.³⁹ Nationalist movement could be progressive or revolutionary depending upon their character. Nationalism was considered as of an

instrumental value in furthering the objective of creating a post-national socialist community.

Modernization Theorists

Lenin was a truly international communitarian in the socialist tradition. He refined and elaborated original Marxist position in novel ways. He was convinced that eventually Marxism could not be reconciled with nationalism, be it even the "most just," "purest," and most refined type, because Marxism advanced internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity.⁴⁰ In order to understand Lenin's position correctly we must see both the context of his writings as well as two alternative theoretical positions advanced within the socialist tradition in opposition to him. One position was represented by the national socialists: Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the other was advocated by internationalists: Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, Karl Radek, Grigori Piatakov, and Leon Trotsky.

National Socialist Position:

Karl Renner and Otto Bauer considered the nation as the enduring form of society. Their plan for national cultural autonomy subordinates class analysis to nation-state as the principal unit, thus reversing the original Marxist position in which class struggle constitutes the substance and nation-state merely a form, subject to change. Bauer wrote:

The construction of the great national states in the nineteenth century is only the precursor of an era in which the principle of nationality will be fully recognized... Socialism leads necessarily to the realization of the principle of nationality...

The transformation of men by the socialist mode of production leads necessarily to the organization of humanity in national communities. The international division of labor leads necessarily to the unification of the national communities in a social structure of higher order. All nations will be united for the common domination of nature, but the totality will be organized in national communities which will be encouraged to develop autonomously and to enjoy fully their national culture...⁴¹

In essence, their plan does not differ very much from the liberal nationalists of western tradition who perceive nation-state as the natural unit and internationalism through the prism of nation-states.

Internationalist position:

Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin, and others were internationalists in their approach. They regarded self-determination as bourgeoisie phraseology. There was no such metaphysical right. Their position was: in the epoch of imperialism, the tendency is for large capitalist states to become larger. This tendency is in the nature of the case and cannot be fought piecemeal; the only solution is to abolish capitalism. The Bolsheviks should not advise the proletariat to spend its forces campaigning for national self-determination within the capitalist orbit; this would be utopian and create illusions. Rosa Luxemburg considered the slogan of national self-determination as a mask for bourgeois class rule:

... under the rule of capitalism there is no self-determination of peoples, that in a class society, each class of the nation strives to determine itself, in a different fashion; and that for the bourgeois classes, the standpoint of national freedom is fully subordinated to that of class rule.⁴²

She thought nationalism was merely a cloak that, translated into foreign policy, covered imperialist desires and rivalries.

This group thought that as socialism was generally against oppression of any kind, therefore, there was no need of recourse to such bourgeois slogans as the right of self-determination. The workers should directly struggle for socialist government, making it a common cause between the proletariat of different nationalities. Rosa Luxemburg sharply criticized Lenin's policy of self-determination as "opportunistic policy," which might eventually lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.⁴³

Lenin's Position

Lenin was critical of both above positions. He believed that cultural national autonomy programme of Austrian socialists and Jewish Bundists undoubtedly contradicted the internationalism of the proletariat and was in accordance with the ideals of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie. He was categorical:

The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois...fraud. Our slogan is: the international culture of democracy and of the world working class movement...the place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among nationalist petty bourgeois not among the Marxists.⁴⁴

He, similarly, blamed the Bundists as "the instrument of bourgeois nationalism among the workers." He also criticized Rosa Luxemburg and other internationalists for not understanding the significance of the right of self-determination, thereby unconsciously supporting a different kind of imperialism i.e. social imperialism.⁴⁵ By the right of self-determination he meant the 'right of secession,' in the absolute sense of the term.

Why have national movements emerged? Lenin's answer was:

Throughout the world, the period of final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked with national movements. The economic basis of these movements is the fact that in order to achieve complete victory for commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have politically united territories with a population speaking the same language, and all obstacles to the development of this language and to its consolidation in literature must be removed.⁴⁶

He believed that nationalism was the universal characteristic of the early stage of capitalism and will disappear with the maturing of capitalism.

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of the national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, sciences, etc.

Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterizes a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society.⁴⁷

He was convinced that nationalism was a transitional phenomenon:

In the same way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so can mankind arrive at the inevitable fusion of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations i.e. their freedom to secede.⁴⁸

Lenin thought that in every society the elements of democratic and socialist culture were present side by side with bourgeois culture. The socialists should support that democratic and socialist element in opposition to the bourgeois culture. One finds a distinct emphasis in his writing on the voluntary reassociation of nations after the conditions of oppression are gone. He deemed Tsarist Russia as "the

prison of the people"⁴⁹ and was convinced that ethnic groups and nations will reassociate themselves under socialism in a voluntary way.

Lenin did not believe in an unqualified right of self-determination. The communist movement, in his view, should decide case by case if supporting the right of self determination would advance the international objective of the movement or not.

He was particularly optimistic about the possibility of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the awakened national liberation movements of Asia and Africa. He writes:

The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan Wars --such is the chain of world events of our period in our orient. And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a whole series of bourgeois democratic movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighboring countries are passing through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self determination.⁵⁰

There were both pragmatic as well as ideological reasons underlying this approach. Lenin had in his mind "two-stage" revolution thesis. In the first stage, the communist would support the national bourgeois in their national liberation movements but would not merge their identity with them, and in the second stage, the communists will takeover by themselves.

Lenin was very sensitive to the questions of oppression, imperialism and injustice towards the non-Russian people within the Soviet Union. In his last years he was greatly concerned over Stalin's policy towards nationalities and specifically the possibility of reemergence of great Russian nationalism developing similar kind of

imperialistic relationship as it had existed during the Tsarist era. Criticizing some episode of mishandling of Ukrainian people, he wrote to Stalin:

It would be unpardonable opportunism if we, on the eve of the debut of the East, just before its awakening, undermined our own authority with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities.⁵¹

Stalin defines 'nation,' as " a historically constituted stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a common culture"⁵²

There are two significant departures from Lenin's position (1) Stalin devotes all of his attention in attacking the Austrian socialists and the Jewish Bundist party's programme of cultural autonomy, but does not attack the position of the internationalists as Lenin had done. (2) He distinguishes between three stages of integration: (a) Socialism in one country, (b) dictatorship of the proletariat, (c) World Socialist community.

In attacking the national socialists' position he reiterates familiar points:

1. They consider nation as an objective, given and fixed category, ignoring the fact that it is a historical category, product of early capitalism and subject to change as the socio-economic conditions change.
2. They tend to forget that nationalism in its essence is always a bourgeois ideology and national movements are launched primarily for the benefit of the bourgeois class.
3. They substitute the principles of class struggle for the principles of nationality, thus breaking themselves from the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

4. They overlook the fact that in the period of mature capitalism, people of different nations begin to scatter as a result of migration, urbanization and industrialization. Old identities are replaced by new identities. With the sharpening of class struggle, national culture begins to split into two distinct cultures, the culture of the bourgeois and the culture of the proletariat.

He describes the following three stages of integration:

...the first stage, during which national oppression will be definitely abolished, we will witness the growth and efflorescence of the formerly oppressed nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust and the knitting and strengthening of international ties among nations.

Only in the second stage of the period of world dictatorship of the proletariat, as a single socialist world economy is built up in place of the capitalist world economy -- only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begins to take shape; for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own national languages, a common international language -- for convenience of economic, cultural, and political cooperation.

In the next stage...when the world socialist economic system has become sufficiently consolidated and socialism has become part and parcel of the life of peoples, and when practice has convinced the nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages -- national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations.⁵³

Post-Modernization Theorists

We discuss three writers in the dialectical Marxist tradition:

Michael Hechter, Tom Nairn, and Immanuel Wallerstein.

Hechter was perplexed by the persistence of nationalism in the industrial society.⁵⁴ Explaining the background to the emergence of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism, Hechter propounds his internal colonial model. The overseas colonial development "produces a cultural division of labor: a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines. High status

occupations tend to be reserved for the those of metropolitan culture, with those of indigenous culture clustered at the bottom of the stratification system." Economic dependency of periphery is reinforced by center through judicial, political and military measures. Aggregate economic differences between core and periphery are causally linked to their cultural differences.

Contrary to the Marxist theorists' prediction of inevitable triumph of class over nationalist politics, the internal colonial model held that under certain conditions nationalism could continue to persist in the very midst of industrial society. Hechter, noting the salience of cultural affinities over material interests as a basis of development of group solidarity, attempts to account for them by making use of class analysis. He does not indulge in grand theoretical generalizations and remains confined to his case-study.

Tom Nairn believes that the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's "great historical failure"⁵⁵. Nationalism is a crucial and fairly central feature of the modern capitalist development of world history. Time bound like other systems of speculation, Marxism did not possess the power to foresee this development, or the eventual, overall shape which capitalist history would assume. In explaining the persistence of nationalism, he believes, the cost would be great, "Marxism" itself.

In his view, the origins of nationalism are to be found in the machinery of the world political economy. It is the location of the state in the world political economy which determines the nature of its ideological response. He emphasizes the role of three factors: (1)

the uneven development of capitalism, (2) the entry of popular masses into politics, and (3) the role of cultural factors.

Founders of Marxism thought that the spread of capitalism would be even and smooth. Had it been so, their predictions would have come true. But the actual process was uneven. He notes:

Real uneven development has invariably generated imperialism of the center over the periphery; one after another, these peripheral areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance, seeking at once to resist it and to somehow take over its vital forces for their own use. This could only be done by a kind of highly idealistic political and ideological mobilization, by a painful forced march based on their own resources: that is employing their nationality as a basis.⁵⁶

The entry of masses into politics could only be possible along the lines of nationality. The new middle class intelligentsia "had to invite the masses into history and the invitation card had to be written in the language they understood."

As capitalism spread, and smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, these always tended to fall apart along the fault lines contained inside them. It is a matter of elementary truth that these lines of fissure were nearly always ones of nationality (although in certain well known cases deeply established religious divisions could perform the same functions). They were never ones of class... As a means of mobilization, nationalism was simply superior to what was contained in a still rudimentary (often one should say, a merely nascent) class consciousness.⁵⁷

According to Nairn, there was never any chance of an emerging universal proletarian class as predicted by Marx.

On the importance of cultural factors, he notes:

Nationalism...actually did provide the masses with something real and important -- something that class consciousness could never have furnished, a culture which however deplorable, larger, more accessible, and more relevant to mass realities than the rationalism of our Enlightenment inheritance. If this is so, then it cannot be true that nationalism is just false consciousness. It must have had a functionality in modern development, perhaps one more important than that of class consciousness...⁵⁸

Wallerstein's basic argument is that both nationalism and internationalism represent politico-ideological responses to the structural conditions implicit in the capital accumulation process. In particular they derive from the persistence of the structural antimony between the unity of the world economy and its division among multiple states. He argues:

Both nationalism and internationalism have resulted from the historical tendencies of capitalist development. They have served both to undergird the objectives of those who have power in this world system and to rally forces of resistance to this system. Consequently, the sense of identity which has sustained these ideological currents has not been a primordial given; rather it has been the outcome of conscious pressures of political forces occupying particular roles and seeking specific objectives within the development of the world system.⁵⁹

Nationalism and communism have basically been anti-systemic movements. But there has been an ambiguity on the part of antisystemic forces. Antisystemic forces have historically remained ambivalent with regard to the state or to their struggle against the interstate system.

He criticizes Marxist literature for this ambivalence. He also notes that the early Bolshevik vision of world revolution succumbed to the demands of 'socialism in one country.' However, despite his criticism, he believes that Marx had narrowly conceived the time frame and eventually we would move to the socialist international community in the long run.

Islam

Traditional Writers

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a North African muslim social scientist has been regarded as an earliest historian who attempted to discover a

pattern in the changes that occur in man's political and social organization.⁶⁰ In his major work 'Muqqadima' (prolegomena or introduction) we find an excellent discussion of asabiyah (ethnic solidarity) and its relationship with the establishment and preservation of states.

According to Ibn Khaldun, asabiyah is a natural feeling which results both from blood relationships or 'something corresponding to it'. Common descent is usually 'imaginary' and 'mythical' because of intermingling and mixture of various group identities. Common ancestry, common interests and common experiences of life and death reinforce each other in developing the feeling of solidarity. In time, the latter factors overshadow common ancestry. Persons outside the blood relations of a group are adopted and become part of it; common ancestry remains important, but in reality, it becomes a mere figment of imagination. In particular he emphasizes economic competition, migration, political interests and imitation of the conquerer as the most salient factors which lead the people to 'invent' new identities.

In his view, communities can be as small as a clan and a tribe or as large as involving several races in diverse lands. Groups with stronger Asabiya usually dominate and rule over other groups. These groups are able to found states and integrate a variety of groups by making use of power, religious propaganda, economic interests and participation to the local notables in the public affairs. He notes the importance of religious loyalties in creating a greater solidarity.

According to him, it creates a new loyalty, superior to and more lasting than the solidarity based merely upon natural kinship and worldly desires. Those who believe in it act from inner compulsion and are motivated by the hope for the rewards it promises them in the world to come.

He notes the five stages of growth and decline of state.

(1) The period of establishment, in which the solidarity is based on Asabiya and religion. (2) The period of consolidation: When ruler succeeds in monopolizing power, national solidarity and religion are checked as far as they mean sharing of power. Impersonal bureaucracies dominate the power structure. The army, the treasury and later a group of learned men become the instruments of preserving the state. (3) The period of luxury and leisure: It is characterized by increasing income and economic prosperity. (4) Period of contentment and complacency, in which signs of disintegration begin to appear and finally (5) The period of disintegration: which is characterized by unjust policies of state, decreasing economic activities, resurgence of Asabiyah of various smaller groups (who had played an integrative role in the first phase), inner power struggle among these groups and outside invasion, eventually culminating in the disintegration of state.

The last stage is of special interest to us because of the reemergence of Asabiyah among various groups leading to the break-up of state as a result of separatist movements. Ibn Khaldun notes that although Asabiyah and power play a very important role in creating a community but they are not sufficient forces in sustaining it. In his

view the lasting bond of relationship between the ruler and the ruled ultimately depends on justice, the supreme social virtue. When policies of the state in social, economic and political spheres are perceived unjust, the social cohesion of the community begins to crumble.

Modernization Theorists

We distinguish between early and late modernization theorists. At the beginning of the twentieth century, several muslim writers in different Islamic countries undertook the task of reinterpreting the Islamic tradition in the modern context. Abduh, Rashid Rida and Mustafa Kamil from Egypt, Jamal Uddin Afghani from Iran, Mahmood Tarazi from Afghanistan, Zia Gokalp from Turkey and Sir Sayyed Ahmad and Mohammad Iqbal from India are some of the well known writers of the time. Among the late modernization theorists, Kamal Ataturk from Turkey, Gamal Abdul Nasser from Egypt, King Amanullah from Afghanistan, Shah of Iran, Mohammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Ahmad Soekarno of Indonesia are some of the representatives elite as well as important writers in various Muslim countries. Because of the colonial rule over most Muslim countries, the liberal culture predominated. Albert Hourani has nicely described the nature of this influence:

...this revival took place under the stimulus of European liberal thought, and led to a gradual reinterpretation of Islamic concepts to the guiding principles of European thought of the time: Ibn Khaldun's Umrān gradually turned into Guizot's civilization, the maslaha of the Maliki jurists and Ibn Taymiyyah into the 'utility' of John Stuart Mill, the Ijma of Islamic jurisprudence into the public opinion of democratic theory, and those who bind and loose into members of parliament.⁶¹

We have chosen to analyze the views of Mohammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, because of two reasons, (a) these two writers are typical representatives of the two above mentioned trends, Iqbal representing the early modernization theorists and Jinnah the late modernization theorists and (b) ideas of these writers have a special relevance to our case study. Iqbal proposed the idea of a Muslim state of Pakistan in the subcontinent and Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, implemented the idea.

Iqbal was impressed by Ibni-Khaldun's scientific approach, dynamic conception of history and balanced synthesis between idealism and realism. Ibn-Khaldun's conception of just order and his justification of power in relation to public interests, as well as his emphasis that injustice ruins civilization, were some of the aspects which influenced Iqbal's thinking. Another philosopher, who influenced Iqbal, was Jamal uddin Afghani, a "precursor and early teacher of anti-imperialism...solidarity against the West, and self-strengthening reforms"⁶² His ideals were pan-Islamic. He advocated that the Muslims should combine nationalism and pan Islamism in order to fight imperialism.

In his view, pan-Islamism means pan-humanism. Islam's message is universal and intended for the whole of mankind. Islam's world view is based on two basic assumptions; (a) the principle of Tauhid -- that God is one and (b) the man is his representative on this earth and a special trustee. Islam elevates man from narrow and parochial concerns and creates a community of believers (Ummah). He notes:

Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final combination of humanity by drawing

its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing self-consciousness of their own.⁶³

He considers modern nationalism as an offshoot of liberalism. He rejects it as an alien idea and a rival principle to the religion. It is a kind of worship of certain local symbols which came to dominate the West after the erosion of religious values and the consequent separation between church and state. Nationalism takes the place of religion, serving the functional purpose of new ideology. He sees its catastrophic consequences for international relations. The pride in one group's achievement inevitably spills over into the imperialistic control of other groups and their exploitation. Above all, it kills humanity. He warned the muslims:

Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, the race idea which appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from their religion.⁶⁴

He exhorted muslims that ethnic, racial, and territorial differences have limited utility and are recognized in Islam for identification purposes only. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism, but a community, a "league of nations," where recognition of artificial boundaries and racial distinctions are for facility of reference only, not for restricting the social horizons of its members.

Iqbal was not simply an idealist. He knew that nationalism was a double-edged sword which could be used to overthrow the yoke of Western imperialism. He adopted the concept of muslim nationalism with a clear view of eventually creating a world muslim community. He defines the concept of muslim nationalism in the following terms:

It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe... that we are members of the society founded by the prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial.⁶⁵

Iqbal in 1930 before the annual session of the Muslim League at Allahbad declared:

I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state... the formation of a consolidated Northwest Indian Moslem State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of Northwest India.⁶⁶

There were three principal positions among the Indian Muslims over the issue of nationalism prior to the partition: (1) Nationalist Muslim position led by Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, (2) Muslim Nationalist position led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and, (3) Muslim communitarian international position advocated by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi. We shall discuss the first two positions here and the third position will be discussed in the next section below. Nationalist Muslim position was that the Hindus and Muslims form one nation and they should jointly struggle against the British imperialism. Accepting the principle of territorial nationalism Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni observed:

The National Congress since 1885 launched its struggle for the political liberation of India on the basis of evolving an Indian nationality that was rooted in territorial nationalism because this common front would be detrimental to the British Imperial "interest."⁶⁷

Mohammad Ali Jinnah represented the second position, i.e. Muslim nationalist position. He advocated his two nation theory, i.e. the

Hindus and the Muslims constitute two different nations, having nothing in common. He declared:

They (Islam and Hinduism) are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ... The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. ...They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.⁶⁸

Unlike Iqbal, Jinnah did not stress the pan-Islamic context of his theory. His statements about Islam and Muslim nationalism are ambiguous and subject to different interpretation. His ideas were of syncretist nature, combining Islam with the liberal nationalism: At times he would declare that Pakistan would not be a "theocratic state" and that religion had nothing to do with the business of the state. This ambivalence in Jinnah's position became a great source of controversy in the post independence Pakistan. It is important to note, however, that encountered by the regional demands soon after the creation of Pakistan, he invoked the Islamic identity stressing its unitarian aspects.

Post-Modernization Theorists

Among the post-modernization theorists, Hasan ul Bannah and Syed Qutb from Egypt, Ali Shariati and Ayatullah Khomeini from Iran, and Sayyed Maudoodi from Pakistan are some of the well known writers. We discuss Maudoodi's views both as a representative of this tradition as

well as because of the special relevance of his views to our case-study.

Sayyed Maudoodi believes that Islam is not against 'nations' conceived in cultural terms.⁶⁹ These sub-identities are natural and it is against Islam to destroy them. Nationalism is contradictory to Islam, because it divides man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that the nationalist should give preference to his nationality over all other nationalities. Even if a man is not an aggressive nationalist, nationalism at least demands that culturally, economically, politically and legally he should differentiate between national and non-national; secure the maximum advantages for his nation; protect with tenacity the historical traditions and traditional prejudices and breed in him the sentiment of national pride.

He [nationalist] would not admit with him members of other nationalities in any walk of life on an equal basis. Whenever there is a chance of obtaining more advantages, as against each other, his heart would be sealed against all sentiments of justice. His ultimate goal would be a nation-state rather than a world state; nevertheless if he upholds any world ideology, that ideology would necessarily take the form of imperialism or world domination, because members of other nationalities cannot participate in his state as equals, they may do so only as slaves or subjects.⁷⁰

He believes that Islam is international and its message is universal.

It presents to all mankind a social system of justice and piety based on creed and morality and invites all towards it... the ultimate goal of Islam is a world state in which the chains of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system with equal rights and equal opportunities for all, and in which hostile competition would give way to friendly cooperation between peoples so that they might mutually assist and contribute to the material and moral good of one another.⁷¹

Islam is a complete code of life.⁷² It does not believe in the separation of religion from society. Its polity is based on four

fundamental assumptions: (1) the belief in the unity and sovereignty of Allah serves as the basis of the social and moral system propounded by the prophet; (2) man is His vicegerent and is not absolutely independent; (3) the right to rule belongs to the whole community of believers; and (4) Islamic polity must conduct its affairs by mutual consultation (Shura) among all Muslims.

Community assumes a special importance in Islam. Shariah (Islamic way of life) prescribes directives for collective life touching upon such matters as "family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, rights and duties of citizens, judicial system, laws of war and peace, and international relations". In short, it embraces all the various departments of life. The Shariah is a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order where "nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking."

Summary

This chapter synthesizes the theoretical literature on nationalism and comparative ethnicity in three cultural traditions, Liberalism, Marxism, and Islam. Within each tradition, the theoretical knowledge proceeds cumulatively from traditional to modern to post-modern phase. We briefly summarize the main findings of these alternative traditions here.

The traditional writers in the liberal tradition (Kohn, and Carleton Hayes) primarily emphasized the role of secular-liberal ideas, emerging market forces, and the vested interests of the educated middle classes in controlling the institutions of state as the major factors

in the rise of nationalist ideologies. As regards the effects of nationalism, one interpretation emphasized its integrative aspect, while the other stressed its disintegrative potential. The early modernization theorists (K.W. Deutsch, E. Haas, Gellner) reversed the causal explanation of nationalism. They believed that it was the objective need for homogeneity rooted in the processes of modernization that resulted in the popularization of nationalist ideologies, not the other way around, as argued by the traditional writers. They stressed the integrative aspect of nationalism more, though they recognized its disintegrative potential too. The later modernization theorists (Connor, Brass, Weiner, Nelson and Wolpe, Rothschild and others) argued that modernization, in fact, led to heightened ethnic consciousness and disintegration. They noted the dynamic and changeable character of ethnicity and stressed the role of the educated middle class in taking up the banner of nationalism and ethnicity. The post-modernization theorists (Horowitz, Smith) criticized the undue emphasis on the processes of modernization and noted the role of the contextual factors such as the state, inter-state system, and pre-modern cultural factors.


The traditional writers in the Marxist tradition (Marx and Engels) viewed nationalism as the ideology of the capitalist class, part of the superstructure, but a historically necessary prerequisite for the establishment of capitalist order. They regarded it as a transitional phenomenon bound to disappear with the maturing of capitalism. The modernization writers (Lenin, Stalin), in addition to emphasizing these factors, saw the spread of the Western liberal cultural catalyzing bourgeois national democratic movements worldwide. They also

considered the movement of history towards the international socialist community. The post-modernization writers (Hechter, Wallerstein, Nairn) believed that the early writers had underestimated the role of the traditional cultures. They stressed the uneven development of capitalism and the internal colonial features both at the domestic and international level. They also began to stress the role of the contextual factors focusing more on the international systemic factors.

The traditional writers in the Islamic tradition (Ibn Khaldun) understood the subtle group dynamics, in particular the changing relationship between objective and subjective factors in the constitution of group identities. They emphasized the central role of justice in building the lasting bond of relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The early modernization writers (Iqbal, Afghani and others) argued that nationalism was an alien idea to Islam, a product of the European culture which had come to dominate the Muslim world after the colonial rule. They temporarily borrowed the idea to overthrow the yoke of imperialism. The later modernization theorists (Jinnah, Kemal Ataturk, Nasser) accepted nationalism both in letter and spirit and sought to create homogenized and integrated nation-states on the West-European pattern. The post-modernization writers (Maududi, Khomeini) did not accept nationalism and argued that the goal of the tradition was to create an umma (community). They emphasized that the existing states in the Muslim world were the product of Western culture and the greatest obstacles to Muslim unity.

The dominant foci of all three traditions differ in accordance with their core values, but the tendency among the post-modern writers

in all three traditions is to stress the role of contextual factors, especially the state, international state system and transnational influences in the perpetuation of nationalist culture.



LITERATURE ON NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY
IN THREE TRADITIONS: LIBERALISM, MARXISM AND
ISLAM

Notes

1. Gale Stokes, "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism," World Politics 31 (October 1978); Arthur N. Waldron, "Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanations," World Politics (April 1985).
2. Donald L. Horowitz (1985). See introduction.
3. Some well-known works are the following: Hamid Enayat, "The Resurgence of Islam" History Today (February 1980). Also his book, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas, 1982). Mohammad Ayoob (ed.) The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981). Ali E.H. Dessouki, Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), R.H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (New York: Syracuse University Press 1985). Joan Donahue and J.H. Esposito, Islam in Transition: Religion and Socio-Political Change (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), John L. Esposito Islam and Development (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980). John L. Esposito (ed.) Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). G.H. Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books, 1979). V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981). C.K. Pullapilly (ed.) Islam in the Contemporary World (Indiana: Cross Road Books, 1980). Philip Stoddard et al. (eds.) Change and the Muslim World (New York: Syracuse University Press 1981). Also see for a useful bibliography: The Muslim World Book Review (Summer 1982).

For two representative opinions: Among the Western Liberals, Ernest Gellner's introduction in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam ed. by Asid, A., Arjomand, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). From the Soviet perspective, see "Analyzing Islam's Reactionary Movements" The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XXIV, no. 32 8 September 1982.

4. See an excellent article: Ken Wolf, "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 4 (October-December, 1976), pp. 651-672.
5. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1948), p. 16.
6. Ibid., p. 21.
7. Ken Wolf (1976), p. 672.
8. C.J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1960), p. 6.

9. Ibid., p. 45.
10. C.J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (N.Y.: Rick R. Smith Publishers, 1931).
11. C.J. H. Hayes (1960) p.
12. See an excellent review article: Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity" World Politics July 1983.
13. K.W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).
14. K.W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternative (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 25.
15. Ibid., p. 27.
16. Ibid., p. 190.
17. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
18. Ibid., p. 112.
19. Ibid., pp. 41-46.
20. In South Asian context see: Lloyd I. and Suzanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Paul R. Brass Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1974); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
In African context: Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalcy (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971).
21. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying," World Politics (April 1972).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Primordialists are: Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States" in Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States (Glencoe, Ill: Free

Press, 1968), Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

Some instrumentalists are: Joseph Rothschild, Ethno-Politics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nation Formation," Ethnicity 3, no. 3 (Sept. 1976), pp. 225-241, Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation," World Politics 31, no. 3 (April 1979), pp. 356-388.

25. Rothschild (1981), p. 20.
26. Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Ethnicity ed. by Glazer and Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
27. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review (Sept. 1970).
28. Myron Weiner (1978), p.
29. Horowitz (1985) p.
30. A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (N.Y.: Holmer & Meier Publishers, 1983).
31. A.D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (N.Y.: New York University Press 1979).
32. Smith (1983), Introduction.
33. Ibid., p. 231.
34. See Appendix, Ibid., p. 260.
35. A.D. Smith, "Ethnic and Nation in the Modern World," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 14, no. 2 Summer 1985.
36. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 84.
37. See an excellent article: Petrus, Joseph, "Marx and Engels on the National Question," Journal of Politics 33 (1971), pp. 797-825.
38. Marx and Engels (1967).
39. See a good discussion, Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984), the first chapter.

40. Vladimir Lenin, Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalist (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1953), p. 30.
41. Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958). Cited in Walker Connor (1984) p. 29.
42. Horace B. Davis (ed.) The National Question: Selected Writings of Rosa Luxemburg (New York: Monthly Review Press 1976).
43. Ibid., p. 295.
44. Lenin (1953), p. 18.
45. Ibid., p. 145.
46. Ibid., p. 22.
47. Ibid., p. 129.
48. Ibid., p. 20.
49. Ibid., p. 62-63.
50. Ibid., p. 80.
51. Ibid., p. 195.
52. This discussion is based on two of his works: Joseph Stalin, Marxism and National and Colonial Questions (New York: International Publishers, n.d.). The National Question and Leninism (Calcutta: Mass Publications, 1976).
53. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
54. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).
55. Tom Nairn, "The Modern Janus," New Left Review Nov-Dec 1985.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Peter D. Phillips and Immanuel Wallerstein, "National and World Identities and the Interstate System," Millenium: Journal of International Studies (Summer 1985).

60. For an introduction to Khaldun's work, see Franz Rosenthal, Ibni Khaldun: The Muqqaddimah, abridged by N.J. Dawood (N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1981) and Muhsin Mahdi, Ibni Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
61. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 344.
62. Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad din al afghani (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
63. Iqbal was an outstanding poet and philosopher who wrote in three languages, Urdu, Persian and English. The work under consideration here is: Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore: S.M. Ashraf & Sons, 1944), p. 169.
64. Iqbal (1944), p. 163.
65. S.A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore: Ashraf & Sons, 1964), p. 396.
66. Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963) p. 240.
67. Ibid., p. 274.
68. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah Vol. I (Lahore: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf & Sons, 1960) p. 160.
69. Sayed Abul Ala Maudoodi, Tehreek-i-Azadi Hind Aur Mussalman (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984) p. 335-466.
70. Sayyed Abulala Maudoodi, Nationalism and India (Pathankot: Maktaba-i-Jammati-Islami, 1967).
71. Ibid.
72. Sayyed Abulala Maudoodi, Political Theory of Islam (Lahore: 1960).

CHAPTER III

ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE LIBERAL PHASE

1947-1970

The origins of the Pushtunistan movement of the NorthWest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), the Jeeya Sind movement of Sind and the Baluch movement of Baluchistan lie in the pre-partition regional autonomy movements of British India. These regional autonomy movements emerged against the political policies of the colonial state and assumed the character of ethno-national movements, espousing goals, bordering on autonomy-secession continuum. The regional autonomy movement of the N.W.F.P., which became known as the Pushtunistan movement on the eve of the formation of Pakistan in 1947, was the strongest of the three movements in terms of public support and had won two provincial elections, one in 1937 and the other in 1946. The regional autonomy movements in Sind and Baluchistan, the precursor of the contemporary Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements, were weak and primarily enjoyed the support of the traditional landed or tribal elite, most of whom were coopted by the Pakistan movement. In the post-independence period, the Ayub era in Pakistan (1958-69) witnessed both the birth of the contemporary Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements in Sind and Baluchistan respectively, and the beginning of a steady decline of the powerful Pushtunistan movement of the N.W.F.P. It is the same period when the provincial autonomy movement in East Pakistan was matured into a nationalist movement leading to the formation of Bangladesh in 1971.

The state elite which ruled Pakistan during the Ayub period was primarily composed of the Punjabis, the Mohajirs and the Pushtuns, to the near total exclusion of the Sindhis and the Baluchis. As they monopolized power and began to pursue highly centralized policies to build a modern western liberal nation-state, the Sindhi and the Baluchi ethnic elites, seeing little possibility of entering into the power structure, reacted to the amalgamatory policies of the state and began to build ethno-national cultures within the framework of socialist tradition.¹ As the Pushtuns were significantly over-represented in the composition of the state elite, the impact of the policies on the Pushtunistan movement had an ambivalent effect. The movement continued to retain its popular following in the rural areas, a prepartition legacy, on a reduced scale, but failed to attract younger, educated middle classes in the urban areas.

International factors - transnational influences, activities of coethnics and the policies of foreign governments reinforced the trends generated by the domestic policies of the state elite. The ethnic elites in the North West Frontier province, Baluchistan and Sind, influenced by both the western liberal tradition and the socialist tradition formulated their ideologies in modern terminology of nationalism, structured their programmes and organization on socialist pattern and developed expectations of help from India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The ethnic elites were also influenced by the domestic nationality policies pursued by these states towards their own groups, an unintended effect of their policies. The Pushtun and the

Sindhi elites developed contacts and expectations of help from their transborder coethnics living in Afghanistan and India. Their coethnics in these countries expressed their sympathies and support for these movements and also attempted to build lobbies to influence the policies of their respective governments in favor of these movements. There is little evidence of the Baluchi elite's such transborder contacts with the other Baluchis living in Afghanistan, Iran and the Soviet Union during this phase. Three countries, India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union openly supported the Pushtunistan movement but apparently did not take much interest in the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements during this phase. However, the net effect of their support was to further erode the support base of the Pushtunistan movement. The state elite, with some measure of success, was able to exploit the external support given to the movement by the foreign powers hostile to the Pakistani state to discredit the Pushtun elite among the masses, blaming them for being disloyal to the new state.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section gives a brief description of the major ethnic groups inhabiting Pakistan. The second section discusses the roots of the movements, focussing on the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistan movement and the nature of prepartition regional loyalties. The third section discusses conflicting perceptions of state elite and the ethnic elites at the time of the formation of the new state in 1947. The fourth section analyzes in detail the state elites' views, their composition, the nature of policies pursued by them and their consequences, both intended as well as unintended. The fifth section discusses the

organizational structures, ideologies, strategies and social bases of the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement. The final section discusses the international factors influencing the course of the movements.

I. Peoples and Geography

According to 1981 census, Pakistan has a population of 84,254,000 and is the ninth most populous country in the world.² It is bounded in the north and north-west by Afghanistan, in the east and south-east by India, in the south by the Arabian Sea and in the west by Iran. The Peoples Republic of China lies in the north and northeast while close across the northern border is the U.S.S.R. It comprises four provinces, namely; North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P), Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. Punjab with 26 percent of the total area has more than a half (56.1 percent) of the total population, followed by Sind (22.6 percent) and North West Frontier (13.1 percent). Baluchistan though largest in area, i.e., 43.6 percent of the total area, has only 5.1 percent of the total population. 96.7 percent of the total population is Muslim. Other important minorities include Christians (1.6 percent), Hindus (1.5 percent), and Ahmadis (0.12 percent)³

Defined in linguistic terms, the peoples of Pakistan form a complex "polyglot", the product of mingling of successive waves of migrations from central Asia and Iranian plateau with the indigenous people.⁴ It is difficult to determine the exact number of the major linguistic groups as the government censuses of 1972 and 1981 do not include an individual question on the mother tongue. It is probably

because of the sensitivity of the government in the wake of the formation of Bangladesh that there is a tendency not to reveal any ethnic related information. In broad sense, there are five major ethnic groups in Pakistan: the Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Mohajirs, the Pushtuns and the Baluchis. The term 'Mohajir' (refugees) refers to the people who migrated from India in the wake of the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Originally, the term referred to all the refugees who migrated from India. However, over time, it has become identified with the urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated from Northern India and were settled in Sind. The Punjabi muslims who migrated from East Punjab were amalgamated into the West Punjabi population which had the same language and culture.⁵ The Punjabis live in Punjab, the Sindhis and the Mohajirs in Sind, the Pushtuns in the North West Frontier and the Baluchis in Baluchistan. Each ethnic group has a transnational character. The Punjabis, the Sindhis and the Mohajirs also live in India. The Pushtuns live in Afghanistan and the Baluchis live in Iran, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union as well. The exact number of these ethnic groups in these countries is not known and has been a matter of conjecture among the scholars.⁶ There exist wide linguistic, social and cultural variations within these groups. We shall show in our discussion of these ethnic groups living in the Pakistani provinces below that there is no single easy available criterion to determine the neat ethnic category of the people.

One question asked in the 1981 Pakistan census was about the language commonly spoken in the household which gives the percentages of families in the following order: The Punjabis (48.17 percent), the

TABLE I

LANGUAGE USUALLY SPOKEN IN HOUSEHOLDS

(In Per cent)

Province	Total	Languages								
		Urdu	Punjabi	Pushto	Sindhi	Baluchi	Brohi	Hindko	Siraiki	Others
PAKISTAN	100	7.60	48.17	13.14	11.77	3.01	1.20	2.43	9.83	2.81
N.W.F.P.	100	0.83	1.10	68.30	0.05	0.04	0.01	18.13	3.95	7.59
FATA	100	0.01	0.10	99.70	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.09
PUNJAB	100	4.27	78.68	0.76	0.08	0.57	0.01	0.04	14.90	0.69
SIND	100	22.64	7.69	3.06	52.40	4.51	1.09	0.36	2.29	5.97
BALUCHISTAN	100	1.37	2.24	25.07	8.29	36.31	20.68	0.13	3.08	2.82
ISLAMABAD	100	11.23	81.72	4.16	0.18	0.16	0.01	0.60	0.10	1.83

Source: Government of Pakistan, 1981 Census Report of Pakistan

TABLE II

PERSONS SPEAKING MAIN LANGUAGES, 1961 AND PERCENTAGES OF SPEAKERS OF LANGUAGES TO TOTAL POPULATION, 1961 AND 1951 WEST PAKISTAN.

Languages	Number of Speakers 1961			Speakers as per cent of Total population 1961			Speakers as per cent of Total population 1951		
	Total	Mother tongue	As additional language	Total speakers	Mother tongue	Ad-ditional language	Total speakers	Mother tongue	Ad-ditional language
Bengali	55,808	45,681	10,127	0.14	0.12	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02
Punjabi	2,66,51,964	2,61,86,586	4,65,378	67.57	66.39	1.18	69.06	67.05	2.00
Pushto	35,26,944	33,39,856	1,87,088	8.94	8.47	0.47	9.12	8.18	0.94
Sindhi	55,83,680	49,63,996	6,19,684	14.16	12.59	1.57	13.99	12.85	1.14
Urdu	58,59,718	29,87,826	28,71,892	14.86	7.58	7.28	15.89	7.04	8.86
Baluchi	11,41,651	9,82,512	1,59,139	2.89	2.49	0.40	3.46	3.04	0.43
Brauhi	4,52,612	3,65,557	87,055	1.15	0.93	0.22	0.13	—	—
Persian	3,14,097	26,378	2,87,719	0.80	0.07	0.73	0.61	0.05	0.56
Arabic	1,92,820	3,334	1,89,486	0.49	0.01	0.48	0.06	0.03	0.06
English	8,35,884	17,531	8,18,353	2.12	0.04	2.07	2.66	0.03	2.63

Source: Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961.

Pushtuns (13.14 percent), the Sindhis (11.7 percent), the Mohajirs (7.60 percent), and the Baluchis (2.49 percent). (See Table I.) The 1961 census, though outdated now, tried to determine the exact number of the people in terms of their mother-tongues. According to the census, the Punjabis constituted 66.39 percent, the Sindhis 12.59 percent, the Mohajirs 7.58 percent, the Pushtuns 8.47 percent and the Baluchis 2.49 percent. (See Table II.)

As the three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement lay special claim to their provinces, the NWFP, Sind, and Baluchistan respectively, it is useful to give a brief description of the salient features of the demographic complexion of these provinces.

The North West Frontier province was separated from Punjab and formed as a separate province in 1901 by the British due to administrative reasons. It was divided into six settled districts and five tribal agencies -- Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.⁷ The Pushtuns predominate in four districts -- Peshawer, Kohat, Bannu and Mardan - and in the tribal agencies. The Pushtun tribes living in the tribal agencies are a transborder people also living in southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan separated by the Durand line (1893) drawn by the British.⁸ There has been considerable intermingling of non-Pushtun muslim population in even predominantly Pushtun districts as many non-Pushtuns have adopted Pushtun culture. In the remaining two districts, Hazara and D.I. Khan, the Hindko speaking (a variant of the Punjabi language) people dominate. Here the Pushtun people have adopted the Hindko culture.⁹

Recently, the pattern of international migration has upset the traditional demographic picture with significant social, economic and political implications for the province. A very high out-migration of population from N.W.F.P., over half a million, both to the other provinces and to the Middle Eastern countries in search of economic opportunities has taken place and 2.1 million Afghan refugees have moved into the N.W.F.P. in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.¹⁰

Sind was separated from Bombay presidency and formed a separate province in 1936.¹¹ The prepartition censuses reveal that a significant number of Baluch tribes have been migrating to the various parts of Sind and have, over time, adopted the Sindhi culture. According to the 1941 census, the Baluchis constituted 23 percent of the Muslim population of Sind. The Baluchis in Sind mainly live in districts of the upper Sind: Jacobabad, Larkana, Dadu, Nawabshah, Karachi. Most of them have become Sindhis over time.¹² Prior to the partition, the Hindus constituted 27 percent of the total population and, in particular, dominated the urban life of Sind forming as high as 64 percent of the total urban population.¹³ The Partition in 1947 led to a dramatic change in the demographic structure of the province. A substantial number of Hindus migrated to India and the Mohajirs began to settle in the urban areas of Sind. According to some unofficial estimates, the population of the Mohajirs and the Sindhis roughly is now evenly balanced.¹⁴ In the three big cities of Sind, Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur, the proportion of the Mohajir population ranges between 60 to 85 percent.¹⁵ According to the 1981 census, a high rate

of in-migration from the N.W.F.P., Punjab and Baluchistan combined with a slow trickle of 1.17 million people from India and Bangladesh and other countries into Sind has further quickly been changing the already fragile ethnic balance between the Sindhis and the non-Sindhis.¹⁶

Baluchistan received its provincial status in 1971. Baluchistan under the British was divided into three parts: the British Baluchistan, Baluchistan states (Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela) and the tribal areas.¹⁷ The population of Baluchistan also shows a highly intermingled pattern. The Baluchis are in majority only in five districts -- Kachhi, Harran, Makran, Sibi and Chagai. The Pushtuns prevail in the districts of Quetta-Pishin, Loralai, Zhob. Lasbela district is mostly populated by the Sindhis and the major part of Kalat's population is Brahui. The Baluchis, according to the 1961 census, constituted only 33.5 percent of the population of the province. Other significant groups were the Pushtuns (28 percent), the Brahuis (15.7 percent), the Sindhis (12.2 percent), the Punjabis (7.2 percent) and the Mohajirs (1.7 percent). Two other demographic features are worth noting: (a) a high rate of out-migration of Baluchis to Sind, Punjab and to the Persian Gulf countries and, (b) an extensive migration of the Afghan refugees into the province, mostly Pushtuns in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. If the refugees stay permanently, the traditional ethnic balance between the Baluch and Pushtun population would shift in favour of the Pushtuns.¹⁸

This brief demographic description of the three provinces shows that each province displays a highly intermingled pattern of population. It is increasingly becoming contentious to decide who is a

pure Pushtun, Sindhi or a Baluch as the boundaries of these groups are constantly in flux because of the demographic changes. The migrant groups are acquiring the cultural traits of the indigenous groups and vice-versa. Each province has an ethnic core, i.e. predominantly Pushtun, Sindhi, and Baluchi areas in their respective provinces, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, but the patterns of domestic and international migration have quickly been changing the traditional ethnic balances.

II. Pakistan Movement and Regional Loyalties: Prepartition Legacy

Roots of the Pakistan movement lie in the prepartition political struggle between the Hindus and the Muslims of the sub-continent, symbolized by the All India National Congress and the All India Muslim League respectively. The All India National Congress advocated a one-nation theory, that India is one nation despite the diversity of its races, cultures and religions. The All India Muslim League challenged the one-nation theory and argued for the two-nation theory that the Hindus and the Muslims constitute two different nations.¹⁹ The political currents in the Muslim majority provinces were influenced by both political organizations. The Muslim League was successful in mobilizing the Muslim masses in favor of Pakistan since 1937, but a significant number of the traditional landed elite in the provinces which formed the part of Pakistan believed in the national socialist ideology of Congress and opposed the creation of new state. The traditional landed elite was in the forefront of the various provincial autonomy movements launched in the provinces in the prepartition era. Briefly noting the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistan movement,

we discuss the nature of regional loyalties in three provinces: the North West Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan.

The Pakistan movement led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah was able to win Pakistan on the basis of Muslim nationalism. The communitarian appeal of Islam proved to be the most important unifying factor in combining the educated middle classes, landed elite and the masses into a powerful movement.²⁰ The Muslim League was able to win 428 out of 492 muslim seats and 86.6 percent of total muslim votes in the 1946 elections.²¹ It enjoyed overwhelming support of the masses in both the muslim minority and all the muslim majority areas except the N.W.F.P. where the regional movement, the Khudai Khidmatgar, an ally of the All India National Congress was successful in winning the majority of the seats in the 1946 elections. However, even in the N.W.F.P., the Muslim League won impressively, securing 99 percent of the votes in a special referendum, held by the British in 1947 to determine if the N.W.F.P. wanted to join India or Pakistan (See the referendum results, Table III).

There were three major weaknesses of the movement which critically affected the later developments. The most important weakness of the League was that there was an absence of consensus on what kind of nation is to be built. The educated middle class which had led the movement was deeply divided on the future agenda. The liberals wanted to build a secular nation-state on the western model. The Islamists, mostly those Ulemas (religious scholars), who had supported the Pakistan movement, wanted to construct an Islamic state and leftist elements, a small minority wanted to make it a socialist state. These

TABLE III

RESULT OF THE N.W.F.P. REFERENDUM (1947)

	Number	Percent
Total Number of Votes Cast	292,118	
Votes for Pakistan	289,244	99
Votes for India	2,874	0.98

Total Electorate	572,798	
------------------	---------	--

Source: Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan (Stockholm: Uppasla, 1981).

differences remained dormant during the prepartition era, but immediately became manifest once the new state was formed.²² The second important weakness of the League was that it did not devise any effective mechanism for settling regional claims within the party. For example, the issue of centralization of power within the organizational structure of the Muslim League and the issue of language were two critical issues which remained unresolved. The constitutions of the All India Muslim League showed a steady centralization of power in the hands of the central leaders who primarily came from the muslim-minority provinces. Khalid B. Sayeed noted that "there was a feeling of uneasiness, sometimes bordering on resentment among the leaders of the muslim majority provinces that the Muslim League was dominated by leaders from the muslim minority provinces."²³ Similarly, the language issue was raised in the 1937 Lucknow session of the Muslim League, when it was proposed by some delegates that Urdu should be made the lingua franca of Muslim India, the Bengalis vehemently opposed the idea.²⁴ The Muslim League avoided all the issues in the pre-partition phase. The third important weakness of the League was that its rise in terms of popular following was so rapid that its organizational structure lagged behind. Particularly in the three Muslim majority provinces which are our focus here -- N.W.F.P, Sind and Baluchistan, the organized support for the League mainly depended on some factions of the traditional landed elite and the general mass support. Among these three provinces, the N.W.F.P had the strongest regional movement closely allied to the Indian National Congress. The traditional landed or tribal elite in the other two provinces, Sind and Baluchistan,

though most of them were coopted by the Pakistan movement, but a small part of them, influenced by Congress, had their own regional aspirations.

The N.W.F.P. had a well developed ethno-national movement under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as the "Frontier Gandhi".²⁵ He founded the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) movement in 1929. It was a social reformist movement aimed at improving the welfare of the Pushtuns. The movement rose in reaction to the British policies who denied the strategically located N.W.F.P. the same responsible government as enjoyed by the other provinces under the provincial reforms. The major reason for the British reluctance was their fear of the collusion of three potential threats, the Russian, the Afghan and the indigenous tribal revolt. When the British persecuted the movement which they nicknamed as the "Red Shirt" movement, it came into alliance with the All India National Congress in 1931. Its program had four major planks: intense Pushtun nationalism, moral and social reforms, non-violence and Islam. The movement was greatly influenced by the national socialist program advocated by the Indian National Congress. The movement leaders were staunchly anti-imperialist and held a sympathetic attitude towards the Afghans who were of the same ethnic stock and were often locked into armed struggles against the British. It is important to note that the movement developed primarily for the provincial autonomy of the province within All India context. The movement never mentioned an independent state of Pushtunistan as its objective during this phase.

The movement was led by the middle-sized landlords and had a popular rural base in the predominantly Pushtun districts of the province -- Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu. Its membership estimates vary: the British official sources put the strength at the minimum 20,000 while the party sources claim 100,000.²⁶ Most observers agree that its following was "impressive". It had its own newspaper and its organizational structure was superb. It won both the provincial elections, one in 1937 and the other in 1946 and formed the provincial government. The N.W.F.P was the only Muslim majority province where the Muslim League had lost in the 1946 elections. The Khudai Khidmatgars secured 51.70 percent of total votes while the Muslim League got only 37.43 percent. The N.W.F.P. was an 'odd man out' from the rest of the Muslim India. The British decided to hold a referendum to determine if the N.W.F.P. wanted to join India or Pakistan. The Khudai Kaidmatgars decided to boycott the referendum and raised the demand for an independent state of Pushtunistan. The leaders of the movement had two principal objections to the referendum. First, as the Khudai Khidmatgars had recently won the elections in 1946, there was no need for another referendum. Secondly, the referendum did not give the option of an independent Pushtunistan or the option of joining Afghanistan. Addressing the Congress Working Committee in the presence of Gandhi in 1947, Abdul Ghaffar Khan stated:

We Pakhtun stood by you and underwent great sacrifices striving for freedom, but you have now deserted us and thrown us to the wolves. We shall not agree to hold a referendum because we have already decisively won the [Spring 1946] election on the issue of Hindustan versus Pakistan and proclaimed the Pakhtun views on it...Now India has disowned. Why should we have a referendum on Hindustan and Pakistan 'i.e. Hindu versus Muslim]. Let it be on Pakhtunistan or Pakistan.

The British held the referendum in July 1947 despite their objections. The overwhelming majority, 99 percent voted in favour of joining Pakistan against India. The Pushtun leaders still contest the validity of the referendum results, but two recent exhaustive studies of the period show that there was a genuine 'massive swing' of the voters toward the Muslim League in favor of Pakistan.²⁸

A provincial autonomy movement emerged in Sind as early as in 1917 against the administrative arrangements of the British who had linked Sind to the Bombay Presidency.²⁹ The movement, led by the traditional landed elite of Sind took a nationalist character. The word 'Sindh Desh' was first time used during this movement. Both the Congress and the Muslim League supported this demand for separation of Sind from Bombay, but the Congress withdrew its support in 1924, fearing that the formation of another Muslim majority province would eventually favor the Muslim League. Sind became very closely identified to the idea of Pakistan. The Sind assembly was the first Indian legislature to pass the resolution in favor of Pakistan. G. M. Sayed, an influential Sindhi landlord and one of the important leaders in the forefront of the provincial autonomy movement who joined the Muslim League in 1938, presented the Pakistan resolution. G. M. Sayed disassociated himself from the Muslim League in 1945 alleging that the Muslim League was working for a highly unitary and dictatorial type of policy with little or no provincial autonomy. The Muslim League enjoyed an overwhelming mass support and won 99 percent seats of the Muslim seats in the provincial elections of 1946. Despite the overwhelming mass support for Pakistan movement, there existed some traditional landed elite led

by G. M. Sayed and a very small section of the educated middle class which did not favor the creation of the new state. They considered Pakistan movement as an 'irrational emotionalism' and wanted an 'independent Peoples' republic of Sind' when the British withdrew from the subcontinent.³⁰

Baluchistan under the British was divided into three parts: Baluchistan states, (Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Lasbela), the British Baluchistan and the tribal areas.³¹ The British had a paramountry relationship with the states. The traditional rulers of these states enjoyed a substantial measure of internal autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the British. In 1920 a movement, Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchistan began to develop whose objective was to unify all the Baluchs and to establish 'Greater Baluchistan'. The movement was transformed into the Kalat State National Party in 1937. It became allied to the All India States Peoples' Conference, a subsidiary organization of the Indian National Congress. Its prominent leaders were Malik Abdul Rahim Khwaja Khel, Mir Ghous Bakash Bizenjo, Abdul Kareem Shorish and Mir Gul Khan Nasir. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the traditional ruler of the principal Baluch state, Kalat, was desirous of achieving an independent state of Baluchistan like the kingdom of Nepal when the British left. He wanted to unite all the Baluch areas under his rulership. He had an ambivalent attitude towards both the Kalat State National Party and the Muslim League, and occasionally supported the activities of both organization to bolster his position vis-a-vis the British. Khan of Kalat declared independence on the eve of the formation of the new state, but his position was considerably weakened

as the other states, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela and the British Baluchistan as represented by the Shahi Jirga, influenced by the Muslim League, had decided to accede to Pakistan. Contrary to the Baluch historians' assertions, the Kalat State National Party did not enjoy any mass support in Baluchistan.³² It essentially represented Khan of Kalat's desire to form an independent Baluchistan. Khan of Kalat procrastinated in his accession to Pakistan and expected help from India and Afghanistan, but faced with the military pressure from Pakistan and the unavailability of any external help, he finally acceded to Pakistan.

The regional loyalties in Sind and Baluchistan existed at the time of partition but they were not strong enough to pose any significant challenge to the Pakistan movement. The N.W.F.P. which had a well developed mass-based movement presented the most formidable challenge and was the last convert to the cause of the Pakistan movement in the wake of the special referendum.

III. State Elite versus Ethnic Elites: Conflicting Perceptions

It is important to understand conflicting perceptions of the state elite and the ethnic elites in the provinces at the time of the formation of the new state in 1947. These perceptions, grounded in alternative traditions of thought, were diametrically opposite to each other. The views of the state elite, rooted in both the western liberal and Islamic traditions envisioned a unitary nation-state on the western pattern with some incorporation of Islam. Ethnic elites in the provinces of N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan, on the other hand, feared

a strong center and proposed a loosely federated state with maximum provincial autonomy within the socialist framework.

These two positions were crystallized soon after the formation of Pakistan. The state elite attempted to mould the Pakistani society into a unified nation in the western liberal mode and also used Islam to gain legitimacy. As a reaction to the state elite's policies, ethno-national movements with socialist orientation (influenced by the socialist ideology of the All India National Congress in the pre-partition era) emerged in all provinces. These two positions have, over time, become so institutionalized in the political process of the country that one cannot grasp the dynamics of ethno-national movements without fully understanding the divergent perceptions of the state elite and the ethnic elites. We discuss the views of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation as the representative of the state and the perceptions of Abdul Ghaffar Khan from the N.W.F.P., G. M. Sayed from Sind, and Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo from Baluchistan, the three key personalities who led the ethno-national movements in their respective provinces.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah's views reflected a blend of liberal and Islamic traditions.³³ There was an ambivalence in his position. He wanted to build a secular liberal unified nation-state on the western model with some incorporation of Islam. He was not, however, clear about the exact position of Islam. His statements were ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. He told the first Constituent-Assembly on the eve of the formation of Pakistan:

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state

of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state... The people of England in the course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. Now I think, we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.³⁴

At another occasion, explaining the rationale of Pakistan, he said,

The idea was that we should have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play.³⁵

He wanted to build a strong nation, following the policies of one-nation, one culture and one language. He considered provincial identities as a 'curse', 'chinese puzzle' and dangerous to the building of a strong nation. He exhorted his followers:

Now I ask you to get rid of this provincialism, because as long as you allow this poison to remain in the body politic of Pakistan, believe me, you will never be a strong nation, and you will never be able to achieve what I wish we could achieve. Please do not think that I do not appreciate the position. Very often it becomes a vicious circle. When you speak to a Bengali, he says: 'yes but the Punjabi is so arrogant'; when you speak to the Punjabi or non-Bengali, he says 'yes, but these people do not want us here, they want to get us out'. Now this is a vicious circle, and I do not think anybody can solve this 'chinese puzzle'. The question is, who is going to be more sensible, more practical, more statesman-like and will be rendering the greatest service to Pakistan? So make up your mind and from today put an end to this sectionalism.³⁶

He emphasized that urdu would become the only national language of Pakistan, a language which 'embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition'. He declared:

... Let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function...³⁷

In sum, a strong center, following unitary policies aimed at building a nation, was inherent in the views of the state elite. There was little room for provincial identities which were considered as disruptive of the community and dangerous to nation-building.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Kaidmatgar movement of N.W.F.P. believed that the creation of Pakistan was the result of the British policy of 'divide and rule' and not the genuine expression of Muslim masses' feelings as claimed by the Muslim League leaders.³⁸ To him, most of the Muslim League leaders were the "stooges of the British" who, throughout their lives, had not rendered any service either to the Muslim people or to the cause of Islam. In his view, the ideal solution to India's problems would have been the formation of a socialist republic with provinces enjoying maximum provincial autonomy including the right to opt out of the federation. He feared that the formation of Pakistan would lead to the domination of the Pushtuns by the non-Pushtuns. He declared in 1947:

After...our eighteen years struggle for freedom, we are now faced with a new danger [i.e. Pakistani domination]. Not only the liberty of the Pakhtuns but our very existence is at stake. I, therefore, call upon all Pathans who have love of their motherland at heart to unite and work...to achieve the cherished goal of Pakhtunistan.³⁹

Soon after the formation of Pakistan, he redefined his demand. He declared that by 'Pushtunistan' he meant provincial autonomy of the N.W.F.P. within the framework of Pakistan. However, his statements remained ambivalent on the extent of the autonomy. His statements

could be interpreted both ways, in favor of an independent state of 'Pushtunistan' as well as the provincial autonomy for the N.W.F.P.⁴⁰

G.M. Sayed, an influential Sindhi politician, believed that the Muslim League was composed of a clique of big landlords who, in the name of religion wanted to impose their own dominance over Sind. He thought that under the cloak of the 'two-nation theory' the Punjab would dominate Sind, with disastrous consequences for the Sindhis. He wrote in 1947:

The prospect of a unitary Pakistan looms ahead as a terrible nightmare in which the people of Sind will be trampled upon as mere serfs by the more numerous and aggressive outsiders; and it may involve Sind into a desperately violent struggle, before it can shake itself free from this new yoke of outside single domination.⁴¹

He thought that the establishment of a socialist form of society with maximum provincial autonomy or an independent state of Sind was the ideal solution. He urged the Sindhis not to be misled by the Islamic slogans of the Muslim League and to form a new party based on the 'Sindhi culture'.

Sind needs a new party of pioneers and patriots, who derive their inspiration from the soil that has nourished them... The loyalty of such a party must go first and foremost to the Sindhi people, who alone will constitute its real strength...It would provide the rallying ground for the progressive forces in all communities and place before the people the ideal of an Azad Sind in an Azad Hind or Pakistan.⁴²

Ghous Bakhsh Bizenzo, the most articulate leader of the Kalat State National party feared that the accession of Kalat state to Pakistan would mean signing the declaration of death of millions of the Baluchis living in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. He also feared territorial, political and cultural domination of the Baluchis by the

non-Baluchis with the arrival of Pakistan. He declared in a speech in 1947:

I do not propose to create hurdles for the newly created state in matters of defense, external affairs and communications. But we want an honourable relationship and not a humiliating one. We don't want to amalgamate with Pakistan. We cannot become such culprits in the eyes of history that we would take the Baluch into non-Baluch territory. If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people, we are ready to extend our friendship. But if Pakistan does not do so and forces us to accept that fate, flying in the face of democratic principles, every Baluch will fight for his freedom.⁴³

The ethnic elites in all three provinces, the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan, ideally, wanted independent states of Pushtunistan, Sind and Baluchistan, but short of achieving this aim, they were desirous of having maximum provincial autonomy within their own province.

These conflicting perceptions, at the time of the formation of the new state, set a pattern of interaction between the central elite and the ethnic elites which continues to persist until today. The state elite viewed ethnic elites as 'enemies', 'traitors', 'disloyal to Islam and Pakistan' and regarded their demands for the provincial autonomy as veiled scheme for secession. The ethnic elites, on their part, chose to remain on the borderline between autonomy and independence withholding their full loyalty to the new state. Fearing center's reprisal activities, the ethnic elites also chose to be ambivalent towards the hostile neighbours of the state, India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, further inviting the charges from the state elite as 'proofs' of their 'treasonous activities'.

IV. Liberal Pakistan: Background

The policies of the Muslim League leaders led to the emergence of a strong state structure dominated by the military-bureaucratic elite soon after the formation of Pakistan.⁴⁴ With the exception of the few early years (1947-53) and the second parliamentary period (1971-77), it has ruled the country for most of its history. Understanding the character of this state structure is the key to the understanding of the rise and decline of the ethno-national movements of Pakistan. As the military-bureaucratic elite, without sharing power at the center, attempted to pursue amalgamatory policies in political, cultural and economic spheres, it catalyzed the politicization of ethnic identities in the provinces. The consequences of these policies were entirely opposite to the one intended by the military-bureaucratic elite. Briefly discussing the short lived parliamentary phase of the initial years, we analyze the perceptions of composition and nature of the policies of state elite, and their consequences, both intended and unintended.

The leaders of the newly born state was faced with gigantic problems in 1947. The problems were innumerable: development of a national identity, formation and institutionalization of a political system, creation of a new administrative structure, laying down the foundation of national economy and building a national army. Besides these basic problems, traumatic events of the partition had burdened the decision-makers with many other problems to be dealt with immediately such as the refugees' resettlement, war with India over Kashmir (1947) and the problems with Afghanistan.

Pakistan started its journey with the British type of parliamentary system. The three basic inherent weaknesses of the Pakistan movement, the absence of consensus over the shape of the polity, the absence of antecedent procedures for settling regional claims and the weak organizational structure of the Muslim League in the provinces, became the weaknesses of the political system as well. Multiple conflicts proliferated in the polity. The liberals, the Islamists and the socialists crossed swords with each other at the center over the future agenda of the polity. What kind of nation Pakistan is going to be, was the most contentious question. Would it be a liberal nation-state on the western model, or an Islamic state, or a multi-national socialist state? The issue was never resolved.⁴⁵ The issue of power-sharing arrangements became another most contentious issue. The Bengali versus Punjabi conflict dominated at the center while Sindhi versus non-Sindhi, Punjabi versus Pushtuns and Punjabi versus Baluchi conflicts raged in the provinces.⁴⁶ However, as long as the parliamentary system operated, ethno-national movements did not emerge. It was mainly because the ethnic groups continued to get a share in the power structure. A recent study of the composition of the state-elite during the first parliamentary period (1947-58) showed that the Bengali ministers constituted the single largest group in the cabinet (43 percent), followed by the Punjabis and the Mohajirs (18 percent), the Pushtuns (12 percent), and the Sindhis (9 percent). Even those groups who did not get a share in the power (like the Baluchis), continued to perceive at least the possibility of entering into the

power structure as long as the liberal democratic rules of the game were being observed.⁴⁷

The Muslim League leaders, faced with both the internal problems and external threats, chose to rely on the civil service and the military. The thrust of the state elite's policies, in the initial years, was to strengthen the state structure as soon as possible, primarily focussing on the army and bureaucracy. The underlying assumption was that once a structure was built speedily, nation-building would take care of itself. The political system, though federal and parliamentary in form, quickly became dependent on the civilian and military bureaucracies right from the beginning. After the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1948) and the assassination of the first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, the influence of military-bureaucratic elite rapidly increased. They began to perceive themselves as the sole guardians of national interest and the 'only stabilizing' element in chaotic and turbulent Pakistani polity.⁴⁸ In the absence of general elections and disintegration of the Muslim League in the provinces, the leaders of the Muslim League quickly lost their legitimacy. Although the military formally took over power in 1958, the effective power had passed into their hands since 1953.⁴⁹

Ayub Khan, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army and later the President of Pakistan, ruled the country for ten years (1958-1969) primarily with the aid of bureaucracy and the military. Decision-making was restricted to the senior military-bureaucratic elite around Ayub.⁵⁰ Ayub's view represents the views of military-bureaucratic elites' position par excellence. An examination of these

views is important not only for understanding the period of Ayub's rule but also the contemporary phase of Ziaul Haq's rule as well (1977-to date), as the very same ideas have been reproduced and applied with remarkable similarity.

Ayub's Perceptions

Ayub Khan was an ideal-typical modern nation-builder in the western liberal mode. Unlike Mohammad Ali Jinnah's views, there was little ambivalence in his views. He believed that Pakistan had been won by the secular liberal educated middle classes and the Islamists had little claim to make any demands.⁵¹ He thought that it was enough 'to express and practice the spirit of Islam in the language of educated man, which is the language of science, history, economics and world affairs, and above all the language of nationalism.'⁵² In his view, Pakistanis did not have a strong sense of nationalism. The ultimate aim of Pakistan was to become "a sound, solid and cohesive nation to be able to play its destined role in the world history."⁵³

His views about politics and politicians are key to the understanding of the type of political system he evolved. He hated the political process and politicians. He disliked factionalism, disputes, bargaining and dissensions. He considered politicians 'opportunists', 'dishonest' and 'disruptionists'. Ideally, he wanted to organize the nation's life without the party system. He favored a 'controlled democracy'. He wrote:

Our people are mostly uneducated and our politicians are not scrupulous. The people are capable of doing great things, but they can also be easily misled. Unfettered democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous especially now adays when communism

from within and without is so quick to make use of its weaknesses. We, therefore, have to have controlled form of democracy with checks and counter-checks.⁵⁴

He believed that the basic reason for the failure of the parliamentary system was that there was no focus of power. The centralization of power, in his view, was key to the stability of the system. It was in the "Muslim blood". Without central authority, the country could not be held together. He argued that the Muslim rule in the sub-continent started to decline mainly because of the weakening of the central authority. He favored a Presidential system with power concentrated in the Presidency. He wrote:

The President should be made the final custodian of power on the country's behalf and should be able to put things right both in the provinces and the center should they go wrong.⁵⁵

He did not believe that there was any need of provincial autonomy. He regarded ethnic sentiments as inherently divisive and dangerous, more the creation of politicians than real. He did not favor even the recognition of two national languages, Urdu and Bengali, a decision, arrived at during the parliamentary phase. "With two national languages", he wrote, "it is quite clear to me that we cannot become one nation-state."⁵⁶

He believed that modernization would eventually lead towards more and more integration. He placed great emphasis on the economic development. He thought that the creation of modern infrastructure, development of roads, spread of education and improvement in the means of communication would eventually lead to the emergence of a patriotic middle class. "A strong new middle class would surely emerge", he

wrote, "which would be able to make its influence felt in future elections as well as in other aspects of community life."⁵⁷

State Elite

The state elite which came to rule Pakistan during the Ayub era (1958-69) primarily came from the top echelons of the military and the bureaucracy. It was mainly composed of the Punjabis, the Mohajirs and the Pushtuns. The Sindhis and the Baluchis (and the Bengalis) were greatly underrepresented. One study showed that in the sixties, 60 percent of the army consisted of the Punjabis, 35 percent were Pushtuns and others constituted the remaining five percent.⁵⁸ Among the top-most 48 generals, 17 were Punjabis, 19 were Pushtuns, 11 were Mohajirs and only 1 was Bengali. (See Table IV) It is difficult to exactly determine the ethnic composition of the top civilian bureaucrats since the provinces were amalgamated into one unit in 1955. However, soon after the restoration of provinces in 1971, a census conducted by the government provided data on the domicile (residence) certificates of all employees. This district-wise data, though an imperfect measure, (because of misreporting and fraudulent practices in producing domiciles) yet allows to make a rough approximation about the ethnic composition of the senior civilian bureaucrats. The data on the background of class I officers reveal the following ethnic origins of the top civilian bureaucrats. (See Table V)

It is evident from the table that while the Mohajirs have a disproportionately high share among the top elite, the Punjabis and the Pushtuns are next to the Mohajirs followed by the Sindhis and the

TABLE IV

ETHNIC ORIGINS OF THE TOP MILITARY ELITE

	Number	Percent
Punjabis	17	35.4
Pushtuns	19	39.6
Mohajirs	11	23.0
Sindhis	0	0
Baluchis	0	0
Bengalis	1	2.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	48	100

Source: Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of Military in Pakistan," in Armed Forces and Society by Jacques Van Doorn, (Hague: Paris, Mouton, 1968).

TABLE V

ETHNIC ORIGINS OF TOP CIVILIAN BUREAUCRATS
(Class I Officers)

	Number	Percent
Punjabi	1727	48.89
Pushtun	287	8.12
Mohajir	1070	30.29
Sindhi	90	2.5
Baluchis	9	0.25
Others	349	9.95
	-----	-----
Total	353.2	100

Source: 4th Triennial Census of Central Government Employees, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1973).

Baluchis. Both the Sindhis and the Baluchis are greatly underrepresented among the top elite.

The reasons for these imbalances lay in the recruitment policies of the British. Most of what became the Pakistan army after independence virtually came from the six districts of Punjab and the N.W.F.P. - Rawalpindi, Cambellpur, Jhelum, Gujrat, Peshawer and Kohat.⁶⁰ In the civilian bureaucracy, the advanced regions such as the Muslim minority provinces of India and Punjab were overrepresented, while Sind and Baluchistan were underrepresented. The state elite in the post-independence era, continued to maintain the same recruitment policies and did not make any attempt to make these two key institutions more broad based.

Perspective from Center:

Policies -- An Overview

The policy of one-nation, one culture and one economy inherited from the first parliamentary era (1947-58) found a vigorous expression in the form of concrete policy measures in the period of military-bureaucratic rule. The major difference between the parliamentary period and the military-bureaucratic rule was that whereas the Muslim League leaders wanted to proceed democratically, sharing power with other groups, the military-bureaucratic elite was unwilling to share power with any other group in the society. We examine the policies of the state elite in the political, cultural and economic sphere.

Political

The most important decision which was pushed forth by the military and bureaucracy during the last years of the parliamentary period was the formation of one-unit (1955).⁶¹ The provinces of Sind, Punjab, N.W.F.P. and areas now constituting Baluchistan were amalgamated into one province then called West Pakistan. The real political reason for the decision was to counter the Bengalis' numerical strength by presenting West Pakistan as a single unit and set up a parity between the two provinces. The military-bureaucratic elite also believed that the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity was primarily due to the politicians' maneuverings and would disappear once these provincial boundaries were eliminated. They also considered the decision vital both in terms of sound economic development and the defense requirements of the area. Ayub Khan put the rationale of one unit in the following words:

Strategically and economically, ...this area is destined to stand or fall as a whole. Laying as it does in the basin of the Indus River and its tributaries, its future economic development must be considered as a whole to achieve the maximum results...West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defense from the North or South, must be welded into one-unit and all artificial provincial boundaries removed regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real.⁶²

The policy of controlled democracy found its expression in the political system known as "basic-democracies."⁶³ It was designed to permit a limited participation to the 'illiterate masses' under the supervision of the military-bureaucratic elite. It was an indirect democracy where a broad mass of people would elect an electoral college, whose members would be called 'Basic Democrats' or B.Ds.

They, in turn would elect the legislatures and the President. Besides serving as an electoral college for the election of the legislature and the President, the B.Ds were also supposed to act as units of local self-government responsible for village aid and social up-lift programmes. The underlying rationale of the system was that the political process which the state elite viewed as basically disruptive of the community, had to be carefully nurtured under the 'enlightened' and 'modernized' leadership supplied by the top elite of the military and bureaucracy.

The military-bureaucratic elite had little patience with the opponents of the system. It frequently used extreme authoritarian measures to quell any opposition to its policies. Imprisonments, arrests, tortures, executions and the use of military and occasionally the air force were the means used by the elite to enforce their will.

Cultural

The decision to adopt one language, urdu as a medium of education throughout West Pakistan was undertaken by the military bureaucratic elite. Other regional languages which were being used as the medium of education were banned on the recommendation of the Educational Commission in 1958. The military-bureaucratic elite believed that the children will be socialized in one culture only when they receive education in one national language, urdu. Furthermore, they argued that urdu was the major language of literacy throughout West Pakistan and was the product of the Islamic culture of the sub-continent.

Economic

The military-bureaucratic elite gave top-most priority to economic development. The declared philosophy of the regime was that "the road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities."⁶⁴ Both interpersonal and interregional income inequalities were inherent in the liberal economic philosophy of the regime. President Ayub himself was of the opinion that the requirements of social justice could wait until the fruits of development were reaped.⁶⁵ The sole emphasis of the policy was on the maximization of growth. The military-bureaucratic elite believed that development separated from the political process would enhance the pace of modernization. They believed that the faster pace of economic development, such as infrastructural development, construction of roads, spread of education and the improvement in the means of communication would eventually lead to the emergence of a strong middle class which will be Pakistani nationalist in its orientation. The economic philosophy underlying the regime's policies closely resembled the proposition advanced by the modernization theorists that modernization led towards more and more integration.

Consequences

The consequences of the center's amalgamatory policies were far from the one intended by the elite. Ten years of highly centralized and authoritarian rule by a narrowly based modernizing oligarchy fractured Pakistan along ethnic lines. We note the consequences of the policies with special reference to Sind, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P.

The formation of one-unit aroused fears among the Sindhis, the Baluchis and the Pushtuns that a strong center wanted to eliminate their separate cultural identities. They also feared that numerically dominant Punjabis would occupy their lands, enhance their position in the services and would impose their culture under the name of Muslim nationalism.⁶⁷ They believed that the elimination of provincial boundaries was the first step in the larger package of domination. The consequences of the formation of one unit became soon evident when certain acts of the regime began to make the Sindhis and the Baluchis realize that they had little share or say in the affairs of the state. For example, as a result of construction of new barrages on the Indus River, hundreds of thousands of hectares of new land became available in the fertile plains of Sind. The military government, contrary to the promises of the parliamentary government distributed the best of the land among the senior military and civilian bureaucrats and the local peasants were totally ignored. Similarly, the natural gas, discovered in Baluchistan was piped out to the other provinces without supplying to the local areas in Baluchistan.⁶⁶

Highly centralized and authoritarian political system dominated primarily by the Punjabis, the Mohajirs and the Pushtuns promised little redress to the Sindhi and Baluchi grievances. Due to the narrow recruitment policies, it was harder for the Sindhis and the Baluchis to enter the army and the civil service. The recruitment policies inherited by the British were largely maintained during the era. The common colonial stereotypes about the Sindhis that 'they do not belong to the martial races' and about the Baluchis that 'they are savages,

unamenable to discipline', continued to be held by the state elite. This convinced the young Sindhis and the Baluchis that they could never aspire to enter the power structure of the country. They began to perceive these institutions as alien institutions meant to coerce and oppress them. They perceived the situation akin to internal colonial situation, where groups belonging to a different ethnic origin were dominating them.⁶⁷

In the absence of power-sharing, the B.D. system could neither take root nor acquire legitimacy. As the primary political objective of the regime was that there should not emerge any national level political opposition to threaten the control of the military-bureaucratic elite, the provincial politics was encouraged by the regime. Shariful Mujahid noted: "...the Ayub regime encouraged provincialisms to a point -- in order, first, to endear the provincial oriented groups to the regime, and second to use the provincialism bogey to enlist the support of the nationalist and integrationist groups in both the wings by presenting them with the choice of me-or-chaos and trying to impress upon them the indispensability of Ayub for the country's integrity."⁶⁸ Intendedly or unintendedly, the policies encouraged the emergence of ethno-national tendencies.

The decision to adopt urdu language as the medium of education without giving any recognition to the regional languages also created serious reactions in the provinces. The Sindhi language is a well developed language with rich heritage of literature. It was a recognized official provincial language and medium of education since the prepartition era.⁶⁹ The Pushto language was not as well developed

as Sindhi, but the Pushtun elite when it came into power in 1937, had made Pushto as the medium of education.⁷⁰ The Baluchi language was only a spoken language. In all three provinces, the Sindhi, Pushtun and Baluchi elite felt that Urdu was being imposed at the expense of their own languages.

In Sind and Baluchistan, development without power-sharing led to diametrically opposite consequences than the one intended by the regime.⁷¹ In Sind, where development occurred faster than any other province, the educated middle class took up the banner of Sindhi ethno-nationalism rather than Pakistani nationalism.⁷² In Baluchistan, which lagged behind all provinces, both traditional tribal elite and the small educated middle class turned out to be strongly Baluch nationalist. The N.W.F.P. also remained relatively backward but as the Pushtun educated middle classes continued to get recruited to the power structure, the consequences of the policies were mixed. In the urban areas, the educated middle class became more pro-Pakistani, while in the rural areas, the Pushtun ethno-nationalism continued to remain popular.⁷³

V. Perspective from the Provinces: The Movements

The Ayub era witnessed the birth of the Jeeya Sind movement in Sind and the Baluch movement in Baluchistan. The Pushtunistan movement which already had a powerful social base, reemerged under the new name, but its support began to decline. The primary reason for the rise of the new movements in Sind and Baluchistan and the beginning of the decline of the old movement in the N.W.F.P. lay in both the power-

sharing arrangement at the center, and the unitary policies of the central elite of the state. We analyze the three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement, focussing on their organizations, ideologies, strategies, and social bases.

N.W.F.P.

The Pushtunistan Movement

Organization

The Khudai Kaidmatgar movement, which had raised the banner for an independent state of Pushtunistan at the time of the formation of Pakistan, was transformed into a provincial autonomy movement for the N.W.F.P. in the post-independence era. The pattern of interaction between the state elite and the ethnic elites established at the formation of the new state (described in detail earlier in the third section) repeated itself over and over. The state elite, doubting the loyalty of the Pushtun leaders to the new state chose to persecute the movement.⁷⁴ Their ministry, which had been formed in the aftermath of the 1946 provincial elections was dismissed and the Khudai Khidmatgar organization was banned in 1948.⁷⁵ Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the movement was arrested and rearrested several times on charges of sedition. He formed the Peoples' Party in 1948. Its aims and objectives as defined were "stabilization and security of Pakistan as a union of Socialist republics, drawing its sanction and authority from the people through their willing consent; provision of full and

unimpaired autonomy for all and establishment of cultural relations with all neighbouring states, particularly with the Indian nation."⁷⁶

All the regional parties of Pakistan from East Bengal, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. merged themselves into a single party in 1957, named the National Awami Party of Pakistan (NAP).⁷⁷ Its programme included the creation of a strong anti-imperialist state, an independent foreign policy, the abrogation of military pacts (CENTO, SEATO), an end to feudalism, the immediate dissolution of one-unit scheme, and a redefinition of Pakistani provinces with due regard to linguistic, cultural and geographical differences. Despite its all Pakistan programme, the provincial components of the NAP retained their regional character. In the then West Pakistan, the NAP remained confined to two provinces, the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The NAP was split into two factions, pro-Peking and pro-Moscow in 1967. The split occurred because of differences in tactics, programmes and strategies. The factions of the Party in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan remained pro-Moscow.

In the N.W.F.P., the NAP inherited the prepartition organizational structure of the Khudai-Khidmatgar movement and the same constituencies of support, i.e. predominantly Pushtun districts of N.W.F.P. -- Peshawer, Mardan, Kohat, and Bannu. The leadership of the NAP also remained within the same family as Abdul Ghaffar Khan's son, Abdul Wali Khan became the President of the party.

Ideology and Strategy

The movement continued to capitalize on the pre-partition ideology of the Khudai Khidmatgar. The same emphasis that the Pushtuns are a different nation and have more affinity with their Pushtun brethren across the borders in Afghanistan was retained, though, in a lower profile.

The movement leaders' initial statements show a considerable degree of ambivalence on what they mean by 'Pushtunistan'. It is not clear whether they wanted an independent state of their own or an autonomous unit within Pakistan. They remained on the borderline between autonomy and independence.⁷⁸ Their ambivalence was understandable as they had been deprived of their government and were subject to reprisals by the center which was always suspicious of their loyalty. After the initial shock was over, they redefined their demand in the form of provincial autonomy within the framework of Pakistan.

In fact, the movement leaders in the early years (1947-1955) went out of their way to prove their loyalty to Pakistan and to stress that by 'Pushtunistan' they meant regional autonomy of the N.W.F.P. at par with the other provinces of Pakistan. However, with the monopolization of power by the military-bureaucratic elite and the oppressive policies of the center, the same ambivalence which characterized the initial statements of the Pushtun leaders in the immediate post-partition era, returned. They professed provincial autonomy within the Socialist framework, but also kept a separatist option open.⁷⁹

The political strategy of the movement during this phase was to extend cooperation to regional autonomists in the other provinces and

work for the dissolution of one-unit. The movement leaders actively participated in national political coalitions against the military-bureaucratic regime. They also kept an ambivalent attitude towards India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the three countries which openly supported the cause of the Pushtunistan movement. They found this external support useful in order to exercise a leverage on the state elite, so that the latter may not resort to extreme measures against them.⁸⁰

Social base

The movement continued to retain its traditional social base in the predominantly rural Pushtun areas of the province, but failed to attract younger educated middle classes. Its following in the rural areas was maintained both because of the well developed organizational structure inherited from the prepartition era and successful exploitation of ethnic symbols of the Pushtun identity. The movement leaders belonged to the middle-sized landlords who enjoyed the traditional ethnic loyalty patterns from lower classes.

There were several reasons why the Pushtunistan movement could not appeal to the educated middle class. The primary reason for the movement's failure lay in the fact that since the ascendancy of the military-bureaucratic elite into power at the center, both the military and the bureaucracy continued to recruit from those areas which were the heartland of the movement. The top military and bureaucratic elite came from the same districts -- Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat, Mardan, which were the main support base of the movement.⁸¹ As the younger educated

middle class continued to get recruited from these areas, they were less attracted to the cause of the Pushtunistan movement. Furthermore, the top-most decision-makers, President Ayub himself and the three successive Commander-in-Chiefs of the military were also of Pushtun origin. It was difficult for the younger educated middle classes to believe the ideology of the movement leaders that they were being ruled by other ethnic groups.

As the NAP leadership, fearful of the center's oppressive measures such as imprisonments, torture and use of force, continued to be ambivalent in their loyalty to the new state, the center blamed them for their disloyalty to the country. The educated, middle class came to share the center's perceptions and did not want to identify themselves with the movement. Analyses of the voting turn-out in the general elections of 1970 in the N.W.F.P. reconfirm that the NAP could not make any significant inroads into the urban areas.⁸² In the rural areas, it could secure the seats in the same predominantly Pushtun areas, which had been strong-holds of the old Khudai Kaidmatgar movement. Even in the rural areas its popularity showed a declining trend. The NAP captured 18.8 percent of the votes in the National Assembly elections and 19.4 percent of the votes in the provincial Assembly elections. The decline of the movement becomes obvious when one sees that the Kaudai-Kaidmatgar movement in 1946 provincial elections had secured 51.70 of total votes in the provincial elections.

SindThe Jeeya Sind MovementOrganization

G.M. Sayed, an influential Sindhi politician, can rightly be considered the founder of Sindhi ethno-nationalism. He formed Sind Progressive Party in 1947. According to him, it laid down the foundation of "Sindhi nationalism".⁸³ The main purposes of the organization were an opposition to the two nation theory and struggle for provincial autonomy within socialist framework. In 1953, G.M. Sayed formed a Sind Awami Mahaz. It consisted of four parties: Sind Awami Jammāt, Sind Jinnah Awami League, Dastoor Party, and Sind Hari Committee.

The Jeeya Sind movement came into existence in the early sixties. It did not have a monolithic organization, but it consisted of a cluster of organizations under different names. As a reaction to the center's unitary policies, a variety of cultural organizations were formed in Sind: Bazam-i-Soofyan-i-Sind, Sind Adabi Sangat, Sind Students Cultural Organization, and Sind Azad Students Organization. The Jeeya Sind Students Federation came into existence in 1966. The Sind Hari Party (the Sind Peasant Party), a communist organization became active under the leadership of Haider Bux Jatōi.⁸⁴ The word 'Jeeya Sind' (long-live Sind) was first time used in one of his poems. The main purpose of these organizations was to save the Sindhi culture. Over time, these organizations produced voluminous literature emphasizing the grievances of the Sindhi people.⁸⁵ These organizations also served as the socializing agencies for the younger generations and

played the most important role in creating a consciousness of Sindhi ethno-nationalism among the educated middle classes. We now analyze the ideology, strategy and social base of the movement during this phase.

Ideology and Strategy

G.M. Sayed, author of more than fifty books, is the most articulate spokesman and the leader of Jeeya Sind movement. He argues that Pakistan is the 'bastion of the Punjabi-Mohajir imperialism' where the Sindhis can never hope for their due share, because they are unrepresented in the two key institutions, the army and the bureaucracy.⁸⁶ He believes that Islam is merely a legitimizing ideology, a cloak for dominating other nationalities.⁸⁷ The Sindhis are a separate nation, with their own language, culture, customs and a homeland. He believed that a strong center, dominated by alien ethnic groups was bent upon eliminating the separate identity of Sindhis.

The emphasis of the movement's ideology during this phase was primarily on the dissolution of the one-unit and a demand for the restoration of the Sindhi language as an official language at the provincial level. But, behind these demands, the movement leaders, belonging to the educated middle class prepared massive literature on the pattern of the nationalist movements.⁸⁸ It was emphasized that Sind has had a distinct existence and status since pre-historic times. The pre-Islamic period of history was especially chosen to emphasize the Sindhi identity. A Hindu ruler, Raja Dahir, who ruled Sind prior

to the Arab invasion of Sind was chosen as the national hero of the Sindhis.⁸⁹

The political strategy of the movement during this phase was to work for the dissolution of the one-unit and to struggle for provincial autonomy. It joined hands with other regional autonomist forces in the country which were struggling against the regime. The movement leaders also developed expectations of help from India and the Soviet Union against the strong center.⁹⁰

Social Base

The movement began to attract support from both the traditional landed elite and the educated middle class. The traditional landed elite, particularly the middle-sized landlords who had been active in the provincial autonomy movements, felt alienated from Ayub's political system which had left little role for them to play at the provincial level. G.M. Sayed, himself a middle-sized landlord, represented the grievances of that class well. The educated middle class had its own grievances. They did not find any place in the two key institutions. An analysis of the district-level data of the power elite shows that there was little or no recruitment from the Sindhi ethnic heartland districts.⁹¹ This alliance between the traditional landed elite and the educated middle class was of crucial significance in the build-up of an ethno-national culture.

The movement, during this phase, remained at cultural level and could not translate its support at the political level mainly because of the emergence of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, led by Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto. Himself a landlord and a charismatic young Sindhi leader, he appealed to the same Sindhi constituencies and exploited the same regional issues with considerable success.⁹² The Pakistan Peoples' Party successfully played a dual role, as the champion of Sindhi nationalism at the provincial level in Sind and the spokesman of Pakistani nationalism at the national level. Its slogans 'Islam is our religion', 'democracy is our polity', 'socialism is our economy' and 'all power to the people' became extremely popular both in Sind as well as Punjab. But the party assumed a regional role at the level of Sind. An analysis of the voting turn out in the General Elections of 1970 shows that the PPP polled heavily in those very districts -- Thatta, Dadu, Tharparkar, Larkana, Khairpur, Nawabshah, which were the hotbed of Sindhi regionalism.⁹³ A love-hate relationship developed between the jeeva Sind movement and the Peoples' Party as both began to compete for the same constituencies. This competition continued in the post 1971 era.

Baluchistan

The Baluch Movement

Organization

Kalat State National party was banned by the center in 1948. On the formation of one-unit, the tribal chiefs of Baluchistan fearing the loss of autonomy by the encroachment of a strong center formed another party Ustoman Gal (Peoples' Party) in 1955 with Prince Karim, Khan of Kalat's brother as the President and Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo as the secretary. The party had a red flag with three stars on it,

representing the Baluchis of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The aim of the party was described as the formation of 'Greater Baluchistan'.⁹⁴ This party was later merged into the National Awami Party (NAP), working for the dissolution of one-unit and provincial autonomy. At the political level, it played the most important role as the carrier of Baluch nationalism.

As the center resorted to the use of force recklessly and indiscriminately against the tribes, the latter developed a guerrilla organization, Parari, and structured the organization learning from the experiences of Cuba, Vietnam, China and other socialist countries.⁹⁵ According to Harrison, by July 1963, the Pararis had established twenty-two base camps of varying sizes spread over 45,000 square miles. Each camp could call on hundreds of loosely organized, part time reservists.⁹⁶

The third important organization which came into existence in 1967 was the Baluch Students Organization (B.S.O) It was confined mainly to the colleges and schools.⁹⁷ It played an important role in socializing the younger generation in terms of Baluch ethno-national symbols.

Ideology and Strategy

These three organizations, the NAP, the Prari and the BSO, and a variety of other cultural organizations began to produce literature.⁹⁸ The myth of common historical origins was created, the common heroes from the Baluch history were sought, and common villains were identified. The development of literature was a curious synthesis of

remnants of Baluch and Brahui histories, jargon of modern nationalism and Marxist literature.

The emphasis of the ideology was that the Baluchs have been a distinct nation from the time immemorial and they have a right to self-determination. This right of self-determination could best be exercised within the multi-national socialist framework.

Social Base

The social base of the movement was primarily confined to the traditional tribes and a very small educated middle class. The structure of the Baluch society is traditional and tribal. The British fearing Russian influence in the area, had perpetuated the tribal system. They had operated through the Sardars (tribal chiefs) of Baluchistan by paying them subsidies in exchange for their loyalty. The Sardari system of Baluchistan is highly centralized, hierarchical and oppressive. At the apex of the system is the Sardar, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to waderas (the section chiefs) and beyond them to the subordinate clan and subclan leaders of the lesser tribal unit. The word of the Sardar is like law and is enforceable on each and every member of the tribe. The Sardars receive tax, usually known as sheshak (1/6 of the produce.) However, its ratio may vary depending on the Sardar's will. The Sardars provide customary protection in exchange for total loyalty from members of the tribe.

During the Ayub regime, the military-bureaucratic elite attempted to dislodge the tribal system through use of force. Ayub himself

threatened the Baluchis with 'extinction'.¹⁰⁰ The three main tribes, the Marris, the Mengals and the Bugtis resisted the regime's efforts. Their chiefs, Khair Bux Marri, Akbar Bugti and Ataulah Mengal emerged as the heroes of the struggle against the Ayub regime. In the General Election of 1970 the NAP emerged as the sole political party representing the Baluch areas of the province and its nominees winning in both the national assembly and provincial assembly were the tribal chiefs.¹⁰¹

The educated middle class, though, very small because of the lack of educational facilities in Baluchistan, like their counterparts in Sind did not find any share in the power structure. Both the army and the bureaucracy remained nearly inaccessible to the middle classes, who joined forces with the traditional elite in opposing the Ayub regime.

VI. International Factors

International factors reinforced the trends generated by the domestic policies of the center. We discuss the international factors which influenced the course of these movements under three headings: a) Transnational influences, b) the activities of the coethnics living in the neighbouring countries, and (c) the policies of foreign governments.

Transnational Influences

An analysis of the literature of the three movements reveals that all of them were deeply influenced by both the western liberal tradition and the multi-national socialist tradition. Their ideologies

were of a syncretist nature, borrowing from both traditions and combining these with selective parts of each group's local history. In the initial phases of the movements, the liberal ideology of nationalism was predominant. The traditional elite of all three movements emphasized that they were a different nation. The criteria which they invoked was separate language, culture, and homeland. As the base of the movements began to expand and the educated middle class began to support the cause of the movements, the effect and appeal of the multi-national socialist tradition became more pronounced. The programmes of all three movements focussed on provincial autonomy within the socialist framework. All three movements were strongly opposed to the pro-western orientation of the state and were openly pro-Moscow in their foreign policy orientation. The rising Jeeya Sind and Baluch movements were deeply influenced by radical Marxist thoughts in their strategies and tactics. While the declining Pushtunistan movement did not show similar influence in its strategy and tactics, though, its program looked similar to the other two movements. The Marxist literature on guerrilla struggle became quite popular in Baluchistan and Sind. The Baluch movement leaders, learning from the experiences of other socialist countries (China, Vietnam and Cuba) even structured their guerrilla organization on their pattern.¹⁰²

Another kind of influence which usually goes unnoticed is the unintended effect of domestic policies pursued by the neighbouring countries. The policy of the Indian government to reorganize their provinces according to linguistic-cultural criteria had a significant impact upon the ethnic elites of the three movements, who invoked the

Indian example in drawing a comparison between Indian democracy and Pakistani dictatorship.¹⁰³ The Soviet nationality model was also held as an ideal by the ethnic elites of the three movements, but the Indian example closer to home, had a deeper impact.¹⁰⁴

Activities of Coethnics

It is usually difficult to assess whether the activities of coethnics living in the adjacent countries are genuine or inspired by their host governments for their foreign policy ends. The two are quite often intermingled. The Pakistani Pushtun elite maintained contact with their fellow Pushtuns in India and Afghanistan and expected them both to help them and influence the policies of their respective governments in favor of the movement. The Pushtun elite also maintained their well publicized contacts with the high officials of the two governments, India and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ Apparently, with the Indian government's backing, an organization known as the Pushtun Jirga Hind was formed in India in 1950 to support the cause of independent Pushtunistan.¹⁰⁶ A variety of political and cultural organizations to support the Pushtunistan cause were formed in Afghanistan as well which had explicit official backing.¹⁰⁷ Activities of these organizations were both cultural and political. They published literature justifying the cause of the movement and smuggled it into Pakistan. They also held occasional demonstrations in favor of the movement and actively lobbied to influence their respective governments.

The Pakistani Sindhi elite of the Jeeya Sind movement also developed contact with the Sindhi Hindus who had migrated from Pakistan

to India in the wake of the partition in 1947.¹⁰⁸ The literature of the Jeeya Sind movement was published in the Sindhi printing presses of Bombay and was clandestinely smuggled into Pakistan.¹⁰⁹ The Jeeya Sind leaders also developed covert contacts with high officials of Indian government to seek assistance in their activities.¹¹⁰ An organization, All India Sind Azad Council was also formed in Bombay in 1966 to support the cause of the Jeeya Sind movement. A variety of literary and cultural magazines in India, frequently published the writings of the Pakistani Jeeya Sind leaders.

One does not see a similar comparable contact of the Pakistani Baluchi elite with the other Baluchis living in Afghanistan, Iran and the Soviet Union. It was apparently due to the lack of interest and even hostility on the part of the foreign governments displayed towards the Baluch movement during this phase. Afghanistan did not take much interest in the activities of the Baluch movement because it considered the Baluch movement as a part of the Pushtunistan movement. Iran was already following highly oppressive policies toward its own Baluchi groups and was overtly hostile to any Baluchi movement either in Pakistan, or Iran. The Soviet Union also did not show much interest in the Baluch movement because its policy was confined to a diplomatic support in aid of broad Afghan interest in the Pushtunistan scheme.

Policies of Foreign Governments

India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union openly supported the cause of the Pushtunistan movement. Their support alternated through different periods of history depending on their state of relations with

Pakistan. There is little evidence available to show whether these countries also gave direct support to the Baluch movement and the Jeeya Sind movement during this phase, though some indirect evidence suggests that a low profile support to the Jeeya Sind movement was given by India through the activities of Sindhis living in that country. It is usually difficult to make a correct analysis of the policies of foreign governments vis-a-vis ethno-national movements because the actual policies are usually covert and little public information is available. We shall confine our analysis to the three major questions: (1) Why did these countries support these movements? (2) What was the mode of support? (3) What was the impact of their support on the course of these movements?

Indian support to the Pushtunistan movement was largely a carry-over of prepartition politics.¹¹¹ As leaders of the Pushtunistan movement were allied to the Indian National Congress in the prepartition era, the leaders of the Indian government continued to maintain their interest in the well-being of the Pushtun leaders. Gandhi himself, in a letter to the Viceroy of India in June 1947, had endorsed the demand of the Pushtun leaders for a "free Pathanistan".¹¹² It was also on his insistence that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the Pushtunistan movement passed a resolution in Bannu on 22 June 1947 for an "independent Pathan state."¹¹³ Referring to the Indian government's continuing interest in the Pushtun people, Jawaharlal Nehru admitted in the Lok Sabha in 1950:

We are also interested in the future of many of the Frontier areas and the peoples who inhabit them. We are interested in them whatever the political and international aspects may be, because

we had close bonds with them in the past and no political change can put an end to our memories and to our old links.¹¹⁴

The conflict developed between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue and two countries went to war against each other in 1948 and again in 1965. In view of the Western powers' support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan's entry into the U.S. sponsored military alliance of CENTO and SEATO as well as growing Sino-Pakistani entente in the wake of the India-China War of 1962, the Indian leaders became greatly concerned with their security interests. India found it useful in its foreign policy interests to support the cause of the Pushtunistan movement. Indian foreign minister, Swaran Singh, assuring full support to the Pushtun leaders, declared in the parliament in 1965:

With regard to the Pushtunistan issue, we are fully aware that the fundamental freedoms and the natural aspirations of the brave Pushtuns have been consistently denied to them, and their struggle has got our greatest sympathy and we will certainly support the efforts that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan might undertake in that direction.¹¹⁵

India preferred to make a common cause with Afghanistan on this issue which had raised an irridentist claim against Pakistan since 1947. India officially supported the activities of the Pushtun Jirga Hind which was working for the right to self-determination of the Pakistani Pushtun leaders.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, Indian intelligence agencies also covertly developed contacts with the Pushtun tribes, providing them with the monetary support they needed in their activities against the Pakistani state.¹¹⁷ However, the Indian government did not support the movement consistently and changed its policy when its relations with

Pakistan began to improve in the wake of the Tashkent Agreement of 1966.¹¹⁸

Afghanistan supported the Pushtunistan movement more actively and consistently than any other power.¹¹⁹ Its claims have ranged from mere expression of concern for the welfare of the Pushtun tribes with no territorial claims to vociferous irredentist claims for the reunification of all Pushtuns under the Afghan flag. There were three important reasons for Afghanistan's support to the Pushtunistan movement: (1) Historical claim on the areas of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, (2) Strategic Interests and (3) Political Considerations. The historical claims have included both the territories of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The Afghan claim on these areas is based on the non-recognition of the Durand Line (1893) drawn by the British as an international frontier. This line separated the Pushtun population of Pakistan from their coethnics in Afghanistan. Although this line was reaffirmed by the successive Afghan rulers during the British rule in India, but the Afghan leaders, on the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent, proclaimed that as the Durand line had been drawn under duress, therefore, it lacked the legal validity of an international frontier. The British replied that it was an international boundary and agreements with the tribes on the North West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated with the successor authority, Pakistan. Pakistan did not admit the Afghan claim and insisted on the legal validity of the line. It also pointed to the referendum held in the N.W.F.P., in which the majority of the population of the N.W.F.P., the five tribal agencies and all the tribal

groups had consented to join Pakistan. As a result of disagreement, Afghanistan was the only country to protest at Pakistan's entry into the U.N. in 1947. A propaganda war between the two countries ensued and several border clashes followed. Secondly, Afghanistan is a landlocked country dependent on the goodwill of neighboring countries for its outlet to the sea. The Afghan rulers cherished the desire to amalgamate the areas of the N.W.F.P. and strategically located Baluchistan (near the Indian Ocean) under the concept of "Greater Pushtunistan". If these areas join Afghanistan or remain a small independent state, friendly to Afghanistan, its strategic dependency could be eliminated by having free access to the sea. Thirdly, the Afghan rulers were always interested in the fate of the trans-border frontier tribes who during the past, had played an important role in deciding the fate of the ruling class at Kabul.¹²⁰ By supporting an independent status for these areas, the Afghan government was hoping to win them over to its own side.

The Soviet Union actively began to support the right of self-determination of the Pushtun people, when Pakistan moved closer to the West and joined the Western sponsored alliances, CENTO and SEATO.

During his visit to Afghanistan in 1955 Khrushchev declared in Kabul:

We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pakhtunistan problem and think that Pushtu (people) should be consulted on the solution of the problem.¹²¹

When Pakistan began to change its policies and moved closer to the Soviet Union (1965-71) and even accepted the Soviet mediation offer in the wake of 1965 India-Pakistan War, it withdrew its support from the movement quietly.¹²²

As regards the mode of support, India and Afghanistan maintained active contacts with the Pushtunistan movement leaders, while the Soviet backing apparently remained confined to diplomatic support only. Besides providing financial and diplomatic help, India and Afghanistan also attempted to incite the transborder tribes across Durand line to form a separate state of Pushtunistan. These tribes had little feeling of loyalty to either government, Pakistan or Afghanistan. They were adept at the art of blackmailing both governments, a practice which they had learned during the British period. Both the British and the Afghan government had been in competition with each other in the pre-partition era, in winning the loyalty of these tribes by providing them with substantial subsidies. These tribes, aided by Afghanistan and India made several abortive attempts to form a separate state of Pushtunistan, but their attempts failed both because of the declining level of general sympathy for Pushtunistan among the population of the N.W.F.P. and the occasional use of force by the Pakistan government in quelling the foreign inspired tribal revolt.

This open external support to the Pushtunistan movement negatively influenced the popularity of the movement. The state elite exploited this situation with some measure of success, blaming the ethnic elite for their disloyalty to the country. As the Pushtunistan movement had begun to decline primarily because the Pushtun educated middle class was not attracted towards the movement, the state's propaganda against the ethnic elite of the movement began to have its effect on the general population. This factor further began to erode the support base of the movement. The ethnic elites of the Jeeya Sind movement and

the Baluch movement began to develop expectations of help from India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Unions, but there is little evidence to show whether the governments of these countries supported these movements during this phase.

Summary

This chapter briefly traces the background of both the regional provincial autonomy movements and the Pakistan movement which developed during prepartition British India. The Northwest Frontier had the most well-developed mass-based movement while in the provinces of Sind and Baluchistan the regional provincial autonomy movements led by the ethnic elites were weak and did not enjoy comparable mass following similar to the N.W.F.P. These regional provincial autonomy movements in the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan were the precursor movements to the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeys Sind movement, and the Baluch movement respectively, and were generally under the influence of the national socialist ideology of the Indian National Congress. The Pakistan movement, led by the Muslim League, was successful in mobilizing the Muslim masses of the subcontinent under the banner of Islamic nationalism and was also able to overcome these provincial-regionalist tendencies momentarily. The Muslim League had three inherent weaknesses: (1) absence of consensus on the program; (2) lack of agreement on settling regional claims; and (3) lack of organized party cadres in the Muslim-majority provinces. Soon after the creation of the new state in 1947, absence of consensus prevailed in the community. The liberals, the socialists, and the Islamists clashed

with each other on the future agenda of the polity. The secular educated middle class which had led the Pakistan movement wanted to construct a liberal unitary nation-state on the Western pattern, while the ethnic elites in the provinces, more concerned with their provincial concerns, preferred a loosely federal state within the socialist framework.

These alternative views held by the state elite and the ethnic elites at the time of the formation of the new state were matured during the Ayub era (1958-1969). The military-bureaucratic elite which came to power was primarily composed of the Punjabis, the Mohajirs and the Pushtuns. The Sindhis and the Baluchis (and the Bengalis) were greatly underrepresented in the power structure. The Ayub regime followed highly unitary policies in political, cultural and economic spheres to build a modern liberal nation-state. It monopolized power and pursued a policy of "controlled democracy" institutionalized in the "basic democracy" system. It also pursued the policy of one culture adopting the one national language, Urdu, and banned the use of the regional languages. The one-unit policy which had been adopted in 1955, under which the provinces of the N.W.F.P., Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan had been amalgamated into one unit then called West Pakistan, was vigorously sustained. The regime also embarked upon economic development of the regional areas to build a modern nation: the intent of the regime's policies was to create a patriotic middle class which would also be pro-regime.

The unintended consequences of the policies were the resurrection of the provincial autonomy movement in four out of five provinces of

pre-1971 Pakistan, the N.W.F.P., Sind, Baluchistan (and East Pakistan). The perceptions of the ethnic elites in the provinces differed widely. "Nation-building efforts by the state elite were seen as "nation-destroying" by the ethnic elites, "controlled democracy" was perceived as "internal colonialism," and "development" was viewed as "exploitation." The consequences of the policies of the regime were negative for Sind and Baluchistan and mixed for the N.W.F.P. Analyzing the organizations, ideologies, and strategies of the three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement respectively, we note that the movements were primarily a reactive phenomena to the policies of the regime. The prime objective of all three movements was to struggle against the unitary policies of the regime. Our analysis of the social bases of the movements reveals that while the Pushtunistan movement, which was a powerful mass-based movement prior to the partition, reemerged on a reduced scale but failed to make inroads into the urban areas. It was primarily because of the recruitment of the state elite from the same areas which constituted the stronghold areas of the Pushtun movement, indicating the greater cooptation of the urban Pushtun educated middle class. On the other hand, in Sind and Baluchistan, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement were successful in gaining significant numbers of adherents among both the traditional landed elite and the educated middle classes.

International factors reinforced the trends generated by the domestic policies of the state. Among the transnational factors, the effect of the ideas of liberal nationalism was predominant. The

criteria which these movements invoked was a separate language, separate culture, and separate homeland. The effect of the multi-national socialist tradition was also beginning to be felt as the program of all three movements focussed on the provincial autonomy within the socialist framework. Another influence in this category was the demonstration effect of the domestic nationality policies pursued by India and the Soviet Union.

The Sindhi and the Pushtun coethnics in India and Afghanistan also formed a variety of cultural and political organizations both to support the activities of these movements and to influence the policies of their respective governments in favor of these movements.

Among the foreign states, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union openly supported the Pushtunistan movement, however, their support was not consistent and alternated between an open support and non-support, depending on their state of relations with Pakistan. This open external support negatively influenced the already declining Pushtun movement as the state elite was successful in exploiting the movement's alleged external connections.

Notes

1. It is important to note that the literature on the ethnic histories of these groups also began to proliferate since the Ayub era. The old histories and travelogues written by the British officials were reprinted. A new literature focussing and tracing the history of these ethnic groups was produced. It is not merely a coincidence that the literature began to be published in this era, but in fact, it was a direct reaction of the amalgamatory policies of the state which catalyzed interest among the ethnic groups of their separate consciousness. See footnotes 85 and 98.
2. 1981 Census Report on Pakistan (Islamabad: Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan, 1986).
3. Ibid., p. 18
4. See for a background of the Pakistani people: Ahmad Abdullah, The Historical Background of Pakistan and Its People (Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973), Donald L. Wilber, Pakistan (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1964).
5. See Gankovosky (1971), p. 7-8.
6. See for the various estimates of these groups, Richard V. Weekes (ed.) Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984). See sections on Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pushtuns. Also see for the Pushtun and Baluchi estimates, R.G. Wirsing (1981), Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: The Kurds, the Baluchis and the Turkmen" in William O. McCagg Jr. (ed.) Soviet-Asian Ethnic Frontiers (New York: Pergamon, 1979); Yuri Gankovsky, "Social Structure of Pakistans Brahui-Baluchi Population," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, no. 4 (Summer 1982).
7. See for a history of the province as well as the Pushtun people: Sir William Barton, India's North West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939); Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 B.C. - A.D. 1957 (London: MacMillan & Co., 1958); Collin Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier 1890-1908 (Cambridge, 1932); James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963).
8. See for a historical account of the Durand line, W.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1907); Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (N.J.: Princeton, 1973).
9. S.A. Rittenberg, on the basis of the prepartition censuses, shows that many non-Pushtuns, the descendants of earlier inhabitants or immigrants in the predominantly Pushtun districts -- Peshawer,

Kohat and Bannu had been integrated into Pushtun society as subordinate classes and adopted Pushtun values and customs and identified with them. The reverse occurred in Hazara and D.I. Khan where many Pushtuns discarded their old mores and adopted non-Pushtun values. See S.A. Rittenberg "The Independence Movement in India's North West Frontier 1901-1947" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984) p. 21.

10. The total number of refugees at the end of 1985 was nearly 3 million. Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in NWFP (Peshawar: Afghan Refugee Commissionerate NWFP, 1985).
11. For a general introduction of Sind province and the Sindhi people: R.F. Burton, Sind and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of the Indus (Lahore: Khan Publishers, 1976; H.T. Sorely, Gazetter of West Pakistan: The Former Province of Sind, 1968; Maneck B. Pithwala, An Introduction to Sind, (Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1951).
12. One author, on the basis of the prepartition censuses, has shown that one-fourth of Sind and one-fifth of the Punjab is populated by Baluchis, who have been migrating to these provinces because of economic opportunities and have adopted the culture of the area where they inhabit. See the introduction: Mir Khuda Bukhsh Bijrani Marri Baloch, Searchlights on Baluchis and Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1974).
13. Census of Pakistan 1951: Sind and Khairpur State, (Karachi: Govt. Publications) Vol. VI, p. 52; See Hameeda Khuro, The Making of Modern Sind, (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978).
14. Gallup Pakistan poll surveys show that the population is roughly evenly balanced. Interview with the Gallup director in Islamabad.
15. Hafeez Malik, "Problem of Regionalism in Pakistan," in Pakistan in Transition (ed.) W.H. Wriggins (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975), p. 85.
16. 1981 Census Report of Sind Province (Islamabad Government of Pakistan, 1984) See section on migration.
17. For a general introduction of Baluchistan during the British period: A.W. Houghs, The Country of Baluchistan (Karachi: 1977); E.A. Floyer, Unexplored Baluchistan (Quetta: 1977); H.G. Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan (Quetta: 1976); M. Sardar Khan, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, (Quetta: 1976).
18. According to the refugees commissioner Baluchistan, there were 580013 Afghan refugees in Baluchistan in July 1986 and their camps were located in Quetta, Pishin, Gulistan, Chaman, Zhob, Loralai, Chagai. Interview with the refugee commissioner, Baluchistan.

19. See I.H. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965); Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (London: Meridian Press, 1963); B.R. Ambekar, Pakistan or Partition of India (Bombay: Thaker Press, 1946).
20. See a perceptive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistan movement: Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Historical Origins of Some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems," in States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (ed.) by A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton, (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1982), pp. 27-44.
21. I.H. Qureshi (1965), p. 242.
22. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, himself eloquently pointed out these problems as he said:

"We shall have time to quarrel ourselves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when wrongs and injuries will have to be remedied. We shall have time for domestic programme and policies, but first get the government. This is a nation without any territory or any government"

Cited in Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967) p. 59. Khalid B. Sayeed in his book describes these controversies between the liberals, the Islamists and the socialists in detail.
23. See Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1957-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 206.
24. Ibid.
25. The following books and articles have been consulted to reconstruct the background of the Pushtun movement in the N.W.F.P.: Pyarelal Nayar, Thrown to the Wolves (Calcutta: Eastlight Book House, 1966); Anwar Muzdaki, Bacha Khan Aur Pushtunistan (Lahore: Tariq Publishers, 1972); D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle (Bombay: Popular Parakashan, 1967); Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan (Stockholm: Uppsala, 1981); Stephen Rittenberg (1986); Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism," The South Atlantic Quarterly 63, no. 41 (Autumn, 1964) pp. 478-506; Eknath Easwaran, A Man to Match His Mountains: Badshah Khan, Non-Violent Soldier of Islam (California: Nilgiri Press, 1984); Allah Bakhsh Yousufi, Haqiqat-i-Pushtunistan va Durand Line (Karachi: 1967).
26. Erland Jansson (1981) p. 95.
27. Cited in Tendulkar (1967), p. 424.

28. See Erland Jansson (1981) p. 222 and Stephen Rittenberg (1984).
29. The information about the prepartition political trends in Sind was drawn from the following sources: Hameeda Khuro (1978); M.A. Khuro, Sufferings of Sind (Karachi: 1983); G.M. Sayed, Struggle for New Sind (Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1949); Allen Keith Jones, Muslim Politics and the Growth of the Muslim League in Sind 1935-1941 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1977); Philmeon Mateke, "The Separation of Sind from Bombay," Grass Roots (Jamshoro: Sind University, Autumn, 1978).
30. Ibrahim Joyo, Save Sind, Save the Continent (Karachi: Agtae Kadam printers, 1947), p. 4.
31. This information was drawn from the following sources: Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book Co. 1975), Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch, Baluchistan Ka Masala (Lahore: 1978); Mohammad Khan Mengal, Suba Baluchistan Mein Siyasi Partian Aur Ba-Asar Halqa (unpublished M. Phil. dissertation, Karachi University, 1985; Inayatullah Baluch (1985), Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement in Baluchistan (n.d), Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (N.Y.: Columbia University, 1963).
32. The ethno-national historians usually magnify the strength of Kalat state National Party by pointing to the so-called 'elected legislature' of Khan of Kalat's parliament. See Inayatullah's work (1985), but Wayne Wilcox points out that it was an 'appointed legislature' expressing merely the will of the Khan of Kalat. See Wayne Wilcox (1963) p. 77. The later version appears to be closer to the truth as one reads Khan of Kalat's own version. See Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1975).
33. See two recent biographies of Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1984); Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah the Muslim League and Demand for Pakistan (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Stanley Wolpert writes a moving portrait of M.A. Jinnah's personality and brings out the tensions between the western liberal and Islamic currents influencing his views. Ayesha Jalal's account is highly biased, distorted and lacks the true understanding of the personality.
34. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48 (Karachi: A Government Publication) (n.d.) pp. 28-9.
35. Ibid., p. 22
36. Ibid., p. 85.
37. Ibid., p. 86.

38. Abdul Ghaffar Khan's statement given in the West Pakistan high court, reproduced in Pyarelal Nayar (1966), p. 139.
39. Tendulkar (1967), p. 441.
40. For example, on 3 Sept. 1947 he declared Sardaryab:
- "I have been working for the establishment of Pakhtunistan all my life. It was for the purpose of achieving unity among the Pukhtuns that the Khudai Khidmatgar was formed; and I stand for those objectives now as I did in the past. My path is therefore quite clear. I will not forsake it even if I stand along in the world. Cited in Tendulkar (1967), p. 451.
41. G.M. Sayed (1949), p. 226.
42. Ibid., p. 229.
43. Selig Harrison (1981), p. 25.
44. A number of political scientists have made this argument with great clarity: Khalid B. Sayeed (1967) terms the system as 'vicegeral' in the British tradition. Hamza Alavi makes the same argument with telling clarity. "The State in the Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review no. 74 (July-August 1972); Robert Laporte Jr. terms the parliamentary system as a mere 'facade'. See his book: Robert Laporte, Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
45. See for the discussion of these debates: Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Anwar Syed, Pakistan: Islam Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984); Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples' Power? (N.Y.: William & Morrow Co., 1970).
46. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan," Middle East Journal Vol. XIII, no. 4 (Autumn 1959).
47. See Shaheen Mozaffer, The Politics of Elite Transformation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinet (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980).
48. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of Pakistan Army (Lahore, 1966). Also see H.A. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974).
49. Ayub Khan's account leaves little doubt that every important political decision since 1953 was taken with the implicit or

explicit consent of the military and bureaucracy: Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

50. G.W. Choudhury notes: "Every vital decision, whether it is related to political or defense or economic or diplomatic matters, was in the final analysis made by the ruling elite composed of West Pakistani civil and military officers", G.W. Choudhury, Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 6.
51. See his autobiography, Mohammad Ayub Khan (1967), p. 194-196.
52. Cited in Altaf Gauhar, "Pakistan: Ayub Khan's Abdication," Third World Quarterly (Jan, 1985), pp. 102-131.
53. Mohammad Ayub Khan (1967), p. 187.
54. Ibid., p. 189.
55. Ibid., p. 190.
56. Ibid., p. 102.
57. Ibid., p. 90.
58. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of Military in Pakistan," in Armed Forces and Society by Jacques Van Doorn, (Hague: Paris, Mouton, 1968).
59. The ethnic origins was determined by the district-wise data. Ethnic heartland districts in Sind and Baluchistan virtually go unrepresented while the Mohajir dominated urban Sind, and the Pushtun dominated urban Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. have a disproportionately high share. See Report on the 4th Triennial Census of Central Government Civil Employees, (Islamabad: 1973).
60. Khalid B. Sayeed (1968).
61. Ayub Khan revealed in his autobiography: "I pressed very hard for it and initiated the process of merger of the provinces," see Ayub (1967), p. 192.
62. Ibid., p. 187.
63. See two books for the detailed description of the B.D. system: Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972 and Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).
64. Mahbubul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1966), also The Poverty Curtain (New York: Columbia University, 1976)

65. Mohammad Ayub Khan (1967), p. 88.
66. Observation based on extensive interviews in Sind, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P.
67. Based on interviews.
68. See Shriful Mujahid, "Pakistan's Political Culture During Ayub Era," Scrutiny (Jan-June, 1974), p. 37.
69. Burton writes about Sindhi language: "It yields to no Indian dialect that I have yet studied. There does not exist a single thing in the province for which it has not a name, and in the Persian used in Sindh most local terms are borrowed from the vernacular...it bounds in grammatical niceties, and considering the rude state of the literature of the country, it has been more attended to by the people than might be expected." Cited in Hameeda Khuro (1978), p. 247.
70. Ahmad Shah Mohabbat (1979), p. 166.
71. Since the provinces had been amalgamated into one-unit, little data is available on the province-wide development activities. A preliminary effort, on the basis of district-wide data, allows to make some inferences about the differential development patterns. See: Naved Hamid and Akmal Hussain, "Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development," Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Special Issue (1976).
72. Interviews.
73. Interviews.
74. Mohammad Ali Jinnah reportedly told the Pushtuns to "totally disown such people who made a pretension of loyalty to Pakistan but are out really to weaken its edifice", Khan Abdul Qayyum, then the N.W.F.P. Premier termed them 'enemies trying seriously to undermine the Pakistan government' and their oath of allegiance 'nothing better than a farce'. See Pyarelal (1966), pp. 68 - 69.
75. The new provincial Muslim League government led by Abdul Qayyum Khan attempted to crush the movement by highly authoritarian measures. On August 12, 1948 at Babra Village, the police opened fire on the Kaudai Khidmatgars killing 15, and injuring hundreds of workers. See Ibid., p. 71.
76. Ibid., p. 67.

77. See for the detailed background of the party: M. Rashiduzzaman, "The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis," Pacific Affairs 43 (Fall 1970).
78. For example, Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared: "I wish to tell you, my Pathan brethren, that you are partners in the state of Pakistan. You are fully entitled to a one-fourth share. It is up to you to rise and unite and pledge yourself to achieve what is your due. Be united and act with determination. Demolish the wall of sand which the leaders of Pakistan have built around you. We cannot tolerate the present state of affairs any longer... We will not rest content till we have succeeded in establishing Pathanistan -- rule of the Pathans, by the Pathans, for the Pathans cited in Pyarelal (1966), p. 70.
79. About 1700 party-workers were arrested during Ayub era. See Feroz Ahmad (1975).
80. The movement leaders never condemned these countries' behaviors for interfering in Pakistan's affairs. They quite often praised these countries and openly asked them for help in order to settle the Pushtunistan issue. See Tendulkar (1967), p. 180.
81. See the 4th Triennial Government Census, pp. 87-89.
82. See, Stephen Rittenberg, "Continuities in Borderland Politics," in Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977; Iftikhar Ahmad, General Elections of 1970 (Lahore: South Asia Institute, 1976).
83. G.M. Sayed, Muntakhab Siyasi Mazameen Aur Taqareer (Hyderabad: 1975) p. 48.
84. See for the background of Sind Hari Party: I. Liskani, "The Hyder Bakhsh Jatoi Sage" The Grass Roots (Jamshoro) Sind University, (Spring 1979).
85. A small sample of the literature is given here: G.M. Sayed, Sind Ji Kahani Sayed Ji Zuban (Sindhi) (Karachi: 1975); G.M. Sayed, Sindhi Culture (Sindhi) (Karachi: 1972); G.M. Sayed, Sind Kay Hagqooq Aur Inke Hal (Sindhi) 1956; G.M. Sayed, Maujooda Siyasi Masala (Sindhi) (Karachi: 1956); G.M. Sayed, Diyar-i-Dil va Dastani-Mohabbat (Sindhi) (Bombay: 1973); Abdul Wahid Aresar, Pareh Jo Pegham (Sindhi), (Karachi: n.d.); Rasool Bux Paleejo, Ganwarun Ke Bateen (Sindhi); Aasi Mazalim Sind Mein Hote Hein: A Memorandum of Jeeya Sind Students Federation (n.d.)
86. G.M. Sayed, A Nation in Chains, 1974, p. 75.
87. G.M. Sayed, Khutbal-i-Sayed (Sindhi) Karachi: 1975).
88. See footnote 85.

89. G.M. Sayed announced to celebrate the Rajah Dahir day in Sind in 1967, Hafeez Malik (1975), p. 91.
90. Based on interviews.
91. See the 4th triennial census.
92. See Mohammad Ayoub, "Profile of a Party, PPP in Pakistan," Economic and Political Weekly (Feb. 1972).
93. Iftikhar Ahmad (1976), p. 75.
94. Zahoor Ahmad, "Baluchistan Par Kia Guzri," Weekly zindagi (Lahore) 6, (July, 1970), pp. 11-19.
95. Harrison (1981), p. 30.
96. Ibid., p. 30.
97. See an introductory note on B.S.O. in Democratic Pakistan March 1975, pp. 60-62.
98. A small sample of the literature is the following: Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh Baluchistan Vol II (Quetta: 1956) Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Baluch Kaun Wa Khawanin-i-Baluchistan, (Quetta: 1972); M. Sardar Khan, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan (Quetta: 1958); Monthly Baluch Duniya, Weekly Chingari.
99. Cited in Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1975) p. 75.
100. Cited in Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1975) p. 73.
101. Iftikhar Ahmad (1976), p. 74.
102. Harrison (1981), p. 30.
103. See Abdul Ghaffar Khan's statements on Indian Nationality policy; Pyarelal Nayar (1966); Also G.M. Sayed's statements in A Nation in Chains (1974).
104. Based on interviews.
105. See Tendulkar (1967).
106. For the background of this organization Shanti Ranjan Bhattacharya, Pakhtunistan Ka Mutaliba (Calcutta: 1967).
107. See for details: Leon B. Poullada, "Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan," in Pakistan's Western Borderlands (ed.) by A.T. Embree (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977).

108. Based on extensive interviews in Sind.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Following sources have been consulted about Indian policy: H.A.S. Jafri, Indo-Afghan Relations (New Delhi: 1976); Hough Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Short Political Guide (London: 1962), p. 142; Asoka Raina, Inside R.A.W. (New Delhi: 1976); Tendulkar (1967); Pyarelal, (1966).
112. H.A.S. Jafri, "India's Pakhtoonistan Policy," South Asian Studies Vol. 5, no. 1 (Jan, 1970).
113. J.C. Johari, "The Struggle for Pushtunistan," The Indian Journal of Politics, (Jan-Dec 1969).
114. Cited in H.A.S. Jafri (1970).
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Asoha Raina, Inside R.A.W. (New Delhi: 1976).
118. Tahir Amin, Tashkent Declaration: Third Party's Role in Resolution of Conflict (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980).
119. The following sources were consulted to gather background information about Afghanistan' policy. S.M.M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Pacific Affairs 39, Nos. 1-2 (Spring and Summer 1966); A.T. Embree, (ed.) Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977); Louis Dupress, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Mujtaba Rizvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971).
120. See for a detailed discussion of impact of tribes on the Afghan dynasties: James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague, 1963), p. 228.
121. Dawn (Karachi) 8 December, 1955.
122. K.B. Sayeed, "The Capabilities of Pakistan's Political System," Asian Survey (Feb. 1967), p. 103.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE SOCIALIST PHASE (1971-1977)

The components of all three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement evolved into secessionist movements working for independent states of Pushtunistan, Sindhu Desh and Baluchistan respectively during this phase. The state elite during the Bhutto regime, in an attempt to restructure the Pakistani society into socialist mould, after following a short lived policy of granting regional autonomy to the provinces (April 1972 - Feb. 1973), chose to pursue policies similar to those which Ayub had followed. They monopolized power, persecuted the regional movements, pursued contradictory cultural policies, and embarked upon vigorous development policies in the provinces. The consequences of those policies were to strengthen the trends which had emerged during the Ayub era. They dramatically increased the number of the people supporting the cause of the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement, but the support for the Pushtunistan movement continued to decline further.

Among the transnational factors, the formation of Bangladesh had the most significant demonstration effect. The success of the Bangladesh movement set a precedent closely followed by the all three movements. The effect of the multi-national socialist tradition also became more pronounced during this phase. The rising movements of Sind

and Baluchistan were greatly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts in their strategies and tactics. The declining Pushtunistan movement, however, remained pro-Moscow. The transborder ethnic groups in Afghanistan, India and the migrants in the Gulf countries became actively involved in support of these movements. The secessionist components of these movements looked for help towards India, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and in the case of Baluch movement also the Arab countries, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf countries. Only Afghanistan openly gave support to the Pushtunistan and Baluch movements, but reversed its policy when Pakistan, to counter Afghan interference, began to support the dissident Islamic movement of Afghanistan. The Iranian mediation helped to bring a rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the mutual cessation of interference in each others' affairs.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the events leading to the dismemberment of the country in 1971, and Bhutto's rise to power, his perceptions and the background of his party, the Pakistan Peoples' Party. The second section describes the short-lived federal experience when the state elite followed the policy of sharing power and allowed the democratically elected ethnic elites to rule the provinces. The third section discusses the policies of the state elite (1973-77) and their consequences. The fourth section analyzes organizations, ideologies, strategies and social bases of the movements. The final section discusses the international factors affecting the course of the movements.

Socialist Pakistan: Background

The regional movements in post-1971 Pakistan were deeply influenced by the events leading to the dismemberment of the country in 1970 and the formation of Bangladesh from its former province of East Pakistan. The detailed analysis of the formation of Bangladesh has been the subject of several excellent books and falls outside the scope of this study.¹ We shall, however, briefly discuss the events leading to the formation of Bangladesh and the emergence of post-1971 Pakistan as they provide the necessary context to the understanding of the evolution of the regional movements in post-1971 Pakistan.

A strong country-wide protest movement developed against the Ayub regime in the late sixties. The most significant dimension of the movement was the emergence of regionalism in four out of five provinces of Pakistan, East Pakistan, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan.² The provincial autonomy movements in the above four provinces led the revolt against the regime. The question of socio-economic justice also came to the scene because of widely held public perception (real or imagined) that the policies of the Ayub regime had led to the worsening of interpersonal as well as interregional inequalities in incomes.³ In the advanced parts of Punjab and the Sind the movement against the Ayub regime had capitalized both on the denial of political participation to the masses as well as the issues of socio-economic justice. The Ayub regime quickly lost legitimacy in the wake of the massive public protest.⁴ Ayub Khan resigned and handed over power to General Yahya Khan at the end of 1969.

In the brief Yahya period (1969-1970), the military-bureaucratic elite quickly began to reverse the policy directions of the Ayub regime. They took three significant decisions which had far reaching consequences: (1) the dissolution of the one-unit in West Pakistan, (2) holding of the first General Elections in Pakistan and, (3) the military action in East Pakistan.

The one-unit in West Pakistan was dissolved by the Yahya regime and the old provinces of Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan were restored on July 1, 1970. It was a clear admission on the part of the military-bureaucratic elite of both the failure of their one-unit policy, as well as, the recognition of the rising level of violent regional political protest in the then West Pakistan. As the provincial autonomy movements in the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan had primarily struggled against the one-unit policy of Ayub, there was an immediate momentary relaxation of tensions in the provinces against the new regime.

The second important decision was the reversal of the 'controlled democracy' policy institutionalized in Ayub's 'Basic Democracy' system. The regime held the first General Elections based on universal adult franchise. The results of the General Elections brought into the limelight the regional character of Pakistani politics.⁵ A look at the National Assembly results (see Table I) and the provincial Assemblies' results (see Table II) show that the Awami League (AL) led by Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman swept both the National Assembly elections as well as East Pakistan provincial elections. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Z.A. Bhutto emerged as the second majority party in the National

TABLE I
Pakistan National Assembly Elections, 1970-71

<i>Party</i>	<i>Punjab</i>	<i>Sind</i>	<i>NWFP</i>	<i>Baluch- istan</i>	<i>West Pakistan</i>	<i>East Pakistan</i>	<i>Total</i>
AL	-	-	-	-	-	160	160
PPP	62	18	1	-	81	-	81
PML(Q)	1	1	7	-	9	-	9
CML	7	-	-	-	7	-	7
JU(H)	-	-	6	1	7	-	7
MJU	4	3	-	-	7	-	7
NAP(W)	-	-	3	3	6	-	6
Jl	1	2	1	-	4	-	4
PML(C)	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
PDP	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Ind	5	3	7	-	15	1	16
TOTAL	82	27	25	4	138	162	300

TABLE II
Pakistan Provincial Assembly Elections, 1970-71

<i>Party</i>	<i>Punjab</i>	<i>Sind</i>	<i>NWFP</i>	<i>Baluch- istan</i>	<i>West Pakistan</i>	<i>East Pakistan</i>	<i>Total</i>
AL	-	-	-	-	-	288	288
PPP	113	28	3	-	144	-	144
PML(Q)	6	5	10	3	24	-	24
NAP(W)	-	-	13	8	21	1	22
CML	15	4	1	-	20	-	20
MJU	4	7	-	-	11	-	11
JU(H)	2	-	4	2	8	-	8
PML(C)	6	-	2	-	8	-	8
PDP	4	-	-	-	4	2	6
Jl	1	1	1	-	3	1	4
Others	1	1	-	2	4	1	5
Ind	28	14	6	5	53	7	60
TOTAL	180	60	40	20	300	300	600

Source: Craig Baxter, *Pakistan Votes 1970 Asian Survey* (March 1971).

Assembly elections and won decisively in the provincial elections in Punjab and Sind. The National Awami Party (NAP) led by Wali Khan, emerged as the largest single party in the provincial assemblies of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Behind the thin facade of party politics, keen observers of the Pakistani political scene feared that the outcome of the first general elections could lead to the dreadful specter of "five Pakistans", i.e. splitting up of the five provinces into five separate countries.⁶ Both the Awami League led by Sh. Mujib and the National Awami Party led by Wali Khan were in agreement on the maximum provincial autonomy based on the Awami League's six points.⁷ The PPP led by Z.A. Bhutto disagreed with the Awami League's six points and favored a strong center with some measure of provincial autonomy to the provinces. Lack of agreement on power-sharing formula between the Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples' Party, the two majority parties of East Pakistan and West Pakistan respectively and the reluctance of the military-bureaucratic elite to transfer power to the democratically elected politicians led to the deepening of the political crisis.

The third important decision of the regime with the most disastrous consequences for the integrity of the country was to seek a military solution to the political problems of regionalism. The Awami League in East Pakistan and the National Awami Party in West Pakistan were banned and the regime resorted to the unfortunate military action in East Pakistan. The regional movement of East Pakistan was transformed into a secessionist movement after the military action. As the domestic crisis of East Pakistan was escalated, the role of external powers became more significant. Active Indian intervention on

behalf of the Awami League eventually led to the dismemberment of the country and the emergence of Bangladesh in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

Who was responsible for the events leading to the dismemberment of the country became an extremely controversial question between the state elite and the ethnic elites in post-1971 Pakistan. Three major questions overshadowed much of the political debate in the country: (1) Was Sheikh Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, working for secessionist designs to dismember the country under the garb of the maximum provincial autonomy? (2) Did Mr. Bhutto, the leader of the PPP, in order to secure power in West Pakistan, in league with the military junta, persuade the military-bureaucratic elite to pursue the course of the disastrous military action? (3) Did Yahya Khan, in view of the military-bureaucratic elites' own interest in preserving their power, decide to use force against the Awami League, eventually leading to the disintegration of the country? It is difficult to give conclusive answer to any of the above questions. The proponents of each of these positions present formidable arguments to prove their point. However, from hindsight, it is possible to speculate that if the military-bureaucratic elite had recognized the election results and transferred power to the democratically elected representatives, a loosely federal united Pakistan could have emerged with the Awami League in power and the PPP in opposition at the center.

The significance of the above discussion from the perspective of our study lies in the positions taken by the state elite and the ethnic

elites in post-1971 Pakistan. The state elite (Bhutto and the PPP leaders) charged that Sh. Mujib was a secessionist and the parties supporting his position were also potential secessionists. The ethnic elites, on the other hand, blamed that Bhutto, in league with the military junta, for securing power, had the motive to break the country because otherwise, he could not have assumed power in a federal united Pakistan. We shall discuss these charges and counter-charges later.

The military rule came to an end in Pakistan in the aftermath of Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war. Yahya Khan handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the PPP, the majority party in Punjab and Sind.

Bhutto's Rise to Power

It is necessary to know Bhutto's own background, his perceptions and the context of his party's emergence in order to understand the character of the 'New Pakistan' which Bhutto sought to rebuild after assuming power. Bhutto belonged to a traditional landlord family of Sind, acquired advanced education at British and American universities and emerged as an ambitious and volatile figure on Pakistan's political scene.⁸ During Ayub's period he served as his foreign minister and became his leading opponent after the Tashkent Declaration when Ayub Khan dismissed him from the government. During 1967-69, he propounded his theory of Islamic socialism, played upon the themes of social and economic injustices and organized his political party, the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP).

Bhutto's Perceptions

Bhutto's ideas were influenced by all three traditions, Islam, liberalism and Marxism.⁹ The motto of his party 'Islam is our religion', 'Democracy is our polity' and 'Socialism is our economy' reflected the synthesis of his thoughts par excellence.¹⁰ His choice of emphasizing the socialist tradition in the Pakistani context was a novelty and a fact of great significance in his popularity and charisma in Punjab and Sind. He characterized himself as a "democratic socialist."

Bhutto believed that the disunity in the nation and the emergence of regionalism was primarily due to the exploitative political system of Ayub Khan which had denied political and economic participation to the broad masses. Ayub's economic policies, in his view, had created a new class of 'capitalist barons' who were unabashedly plundering national wealth. Analyzing Pakistan's political and economic problems of the Ayub era, he suggested socialism as the panacea to all the ills of the country. He wrote:

Socialism offers the only way to end exploitation and to foster unity. Unity will remain a slogan and an illusion until exploitation is ended...only socialism, which creates equal opportunities for all, protects from exploitation, removes the barriers of class distinctions, is capable of establishing economic and social justice. Socialism is the highest expression of democracy and its logical fulfillment.¹¹

He believed that Islam and the principles of socialism were not mutually repugnant. Islam preached equality and justice and socialism was the modern technique of attaining it. In his speeches to the Pakistani masses, he emphasized basic compatibility among the basic principles of Islam, liberalism and socialism. He stressed that both

Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of Pakistan and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan had envisioned a socialist society based on the principles of Islam. He emphasized the universality of socialism and noted its direct relevance to the Pakistani society marked by both 'internal and external exploitation'.

Bhutto's early ideas reflected a good understanding of both the theory and working of the comparative federal political systems. He believed that a federal political system was the only solution for ethnically heterogeneous countries like Pakistan. He wrote:

In view of the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences of our relatively decentralized social order...only a federal government could foster the solidarite sociale of the people.¹²

Later, trained and socialized in Ayub Khan's political system, he developed a preference for a strong unitary form of government and reportedly even expressed his liking for a "one-party rule".¹³

Bhutto, having keenly read Machiavelli, Napoleon, Hitler, Metternich and Talleyrand was fascinated by power politics. He told Oriani Fallaci:

Anyway look, you don't go into politics just for the fun of it. You go into it to take power in your hands and keep it. Anyone who says the opposite is a liar. Politicians are always trying to make you believe that they are good, moral, consistent. Don't ever fall in their trap. There is no such thing as a good, moral consistent politician... The rest is boy-scout stuff, and I have forgotten the boy-scout virtues ever since I went to school.¹⁴

Bhutto sought to combine his fascination for power politics with his Marxism. He recalled the early influences of Napoleon and Marx on his thoughts from his death cell:

On my twenty-first birthday on 5th January 1948, I received in Los Angeles two birthday gifts from Larkana. One was an expensive set of five volumes of Sloanes biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. The other was an inexpensive pamphlet. From Napoleon, I imbibed the

politics of power. From the pamphlet, I absorbed the politics of poverty. The latter ended with the words, workers of the world, unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains. You have a world to win."¹⁵

In sum, Bhutto envisioned his task to end what he called 'predatory capitalism' and to build what he regarded a modern progressive socialist Pakistan.

PPP

It is important to note the diverse coalitions of interests to which the Pakistan Peoples' Party appealed. Its socialist message had a general appeal in Punjab and Sind and also to some extent in the N.W.F.P and foreshadowed the emerging post-1971 socialist Pakistan.¹⁶ In Punjab, it capitalized on both its progressive socialist image as well as anti-India campaign. It drew its support from the middle landlords, emergent middle classes and the rural poor. In Sind, it had built its support primarily exploiting the regional autonomy issue and appealing to the big landlords as well as the emergent middle classes. This contradiction in the PPP's double role as a regional party in Sind and a national party in Punjab is of central importance in understanding the policy of the PPP after the take-over of power.¹⁷

The PPP, like the Muslim League, had the same three critical weaknesses. (1) It lacked a consensus on the programme. The socialist faction predominated in the beginning but other factions had their own agendas.¹⁸ (2) There was no mechanism for settling regional claims within the party. Party elections were never held and the local office bearers were always nominated by Bhutto himself. He was often proud to declare: "I am the Peoples' Party and they are all my creatures."¹⁹

(3) The organizational structure of the party lagged far behind its popularity. Bhutto's biographer noted that "So rapid was the growth and response that membership could never be organized or properly controlled. No hard core group of party cadres developed --- Throughout its various stages, the PPP had remained a kind of ideological catch all, with the personality of Bhutto as the sole cementing force."²⁰

The State Elite Versus Ethnic Elites:

Short-Lived Federalism (April 1972-Feb. 1973)

Bhutto followed the policy of sharing power in the provinces of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan for nine months. He allowed the rival opposition parties, the NAP and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) to form coalition governments in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan while the PPP was in power in Sind, Punjab and at the center. Democratically elected political elite was in power both at the center and in the provinces. This brief phase of elite consensus had an immediate and significant impact on the regionalist stance of the ethnic elites in the provinces. The ethnic elites in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan not only disowned any regionalist tendency but demonstrated in categorical terms that they had an equal stake and interest in the national integrity. This brief phase came to an end as the state elite, perceiving the likely emergence of the NAP as an alternative national opposition party to the PPP, chose to undermine the NAP - JUI governments in the provinces. The state elite alleged that the Baluchi and the Pushtun ethnic elites

were conspiring with the foreign powers to secede from the country and chose to get rid of their provincial governments from Baluchistan and N.W.F.P.

Bhutto was faced with gigantic problems of rebuilding Pakistan after assuming power. The country was in a demoralized state after the secession of one of its provinces and the humiliating defeat at the hand of India with 90,000 Pakistani prisoners in Indian custody. Bhutto had to start over again. He had to develop political rules of the game, frame a new constitution, determine the role of political parties, the civil service, the military and tackle pressing foreign policy problems with India. The question of regional autonomy was potentially the most explosive issue after the secession of East Pakistan. The prospects of Bangladesh-like movements emerging in N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan seemed real. The provincial autonomists in the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan were demanding their rights and threatening that they would also turn secessionists like the Awami League if the center continued to deny their rights.²¹ Bhutto, himself hinted at the gravity of the situation in his first address to the nation when addressing the provincial autonomy issue, he noted that there was indeed a "thin line" between "autonomy" and "secession".²² Removing the ban on the National Awami Party, placed by the Yahya regime, he declared:

I will start with a clean slate. I am assuming that we are all patriots and that we all want to serve Pakistan.²³

Bhutto negotiated a tripartite agreement among the PPP, the NAP and the JUI. According to the agreement the government of the country was to be carried on the basis of an interim constitution based on the

Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The Acts provided a strong center with residual powers vested in the provinces.²⁴ The federal list contained 60 subjects including foreign affairs, defense, currency, foreign and interprovincial trade, education, national planning, railway and nuclear energy. Furthermore, center had a concurrent list of 47 subjects with the provinces. It was also agreed that the government at the center would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majorities. The three parties settled for the PPP rule at the center and in Punjab and Sind, and the NAP-JUI rule in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. It was also agreed that the center had the right to appoint governors in the provinces, but as a compromise, the center would appoint governors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. This agreement was the result of the concession on both sides. Bhutto had an expressed preference for the Presidential type of system but settled for a parliamentary form of government in response to the demand of the opposition parties.²⁵ The NAP which had won the election on the basis of maximum provincial autonomy (leaving only three subjects with the center, namely defense, foreign affairs and currency) softened its stand and was willing to accept a strong center in exchange of the parliamentary system and the choice of provincial governors.

Bhutto entered into the agreement mainly because of a delicate internal political situation and his dire need to show national unity in his handling of foreign relations with India. Before the agreement, he had made several unsuccessful efforts to build the PPP dominated coalition majorities in these two provinces.²⁶ After the agreement

with the NAP and JUI, Bhutto also joined hands with the NAP's rival political forces both in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the leader of the Muslim League (Q) who had been a traditional rival to the NAP in the N.W.F.P. was made a cabinet minister at the center and was entrusted with the interior ministry.²⁷ In Baluchistan, Bhutto made use of the traditional division between the Baluchs and the Pushtuns and began to patronize Abdus Samad Khan Achackzai, leader of a splinter faction of the NAP, who was struggling for the Pushtun rights in Baluchistan.²⁸

From April 1972 to February 1973, the NAP - JUI formed coalition governments in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The Pushtun leaders, in N.W.F.P. lifted the ban on Khudai Kaidmatgar movement, both as a mark of protest against the center's arbitrary action taken in 1948 and as a symbolic gesture to the social services rendered by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the veteran leader of the Pushtunistan movement.²⁹ Abdul Ghaffar Khan returned from his self-exile in Afghanistan, where he had been staying since 1964 and declared:

Our demand for Pushtunistan has been fulfilled. We have got the Pushtunistan we had desired. But there are some elements both in Afghanistan and Pakistan who do not like this situation.³⁰

The militant elements of the NAP began to raise demands for the adoption of the Pushtu language as the official language of the province and to rename the province as 'Pushtunistan'.³¹ The provincial leaders, under the provisions of the interim constitution, were entitled to accept these demands through the assembly, but they instead chose to adopt Urdu as the official language of the province. Wali Khan, leader of the NAP also declared:

We have left the Pushtunistan issue. We are not even thinking of renaming the N.W.F.P. as Pushtunistan because it is no longer an issue for the NAP.³²

The Pushtun leaders, on more than one occasion assured the central leadership that they would fully support the national interests and will protect Pakistan's integrity against both any internal threat or external interference.³³

The NAP government in Baluchistan also adopted Urdu as the official language of Baluchistan. The Baluch elite in power, sought to redress the Baluch grievances by giving a preferential treatment to the Baluchis in the provincial services and made arrangements for the return of the Punjabi civil servants to Punjab in accordance with the previous decision of the central government with regard to the break-up of the one-unit.³⁴ Some militant Baluch elements resorted to attacks on the Punjabi settlers in Pat Feeder area, but the provincial Baluchi leaders were able to control occasional incidents of ethnic clashes.³⁵ The leading Baluch provincial leaders of the NAP, Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bukhsh Marri, like their counterparts in the N.W.F.P., made several statements vowing to protect the integrity of the country.³⁶

The PPP government in Sind adopted Sindhi as the official language of the province. There were three important reasons why the PPP decided to adopt the Sindhi as the only official language of the province. Firstly, the Jeeya Sind movement led by G.M. Sayed had launched an effective province-wide campaign in favor of declaring Sindhi as the only official language of the province.³⁷ Secondly, the PPP itself had exploited the regional issues of Sind during the 1970

elections against Ayub regime's imposition of the Urdu language. Now in power, its leaders felt that they had to make good on their promises.³⁸ Thirdly, the PPP at the provincial level was in competition with all other regionalists and was worried that if it did not take an extremist stand, it might politically lose vis-a-vis other groups. The decision to adopt Sindhi as the only language aroused the concerns of the Mohajir population of Sind which constituted roughly half of the population of Sind. The Mohajirs feared that they would lose their predominance in the provincial civil services. Furthermore, the recruitments, promotions and the appointments within the services would favor the Sindhis against the Mohajirs.³⁹ The manner in which the language bill was hastily passed without consulting the Mohajirs, provoked widespread linguistic riots throughout Sind. More than 55 persons were killed and thousands were injured.⁴⁰ The non-Sindhis began to flee from the interior of Sind. The widespread violence led the PPP to amend the language bill by making both Sindhi as well as Urdu the official languages of the province. Furthermore, the Sind provincial government also began to redress Sindhi grievances by according preferential treatment to the Sindhis in the provincial services.

A contrast began to develop among the masses. The NAP governments in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan controlled by the opposition parties were seen displaying a more patriotic and Pakistani nationalist image whereas the party in power in Sind, which was also ruling at the center appeared championing ethno-national cause of a province.⁴¹ The opposition led by the NAP leader, Wali Khan began to exploit this

situation projecting their favorable image among the masses. The NAP began to make vigorous mass campaigns in Punjab and Sind in an attempt to build their party organizations in these two provinces. Bhutto found this situation both embarrassing and dangerous. He perceived Wali Khan and his party as the most potent threat to his rule.⁴² He did not have the same pressing internal and external constraints which had forced him to enter the tripartite agreement in the beginning. He had consolidated his power by purging the top military-bureaucratic elite, had successfully negotiated Simla accord with India in 1972 and was firmly in control of the country. From Bhutto's perspective, the agreement had not only outlived its utility, but was giving his political opponents a chance to further consolidate their position at the national level as a serious alternative to the PPP.

The state elite decided to undermine the provincial governments of the NAP as a first step to vanquishing all the national opposition to the PPP.⁴³ The state elite first attempted to buy off the loyalties of the NAP - JUI provincial assembly members in order to turn the majority of the NAP coalition into a minority, hoping to replace their provincial governments by the PPP dominated coalition. Having failed, it resorted to a number of unconstitutional strong-handed methods to create an excuse for dismissing the provincial governments. The center instructed the civil servants of the federal government not to cooperate with the provincial governments of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan with a view to create a law and order situation in the provinces. It also began to take advantage of the petty ethnic squabbles, making them a pretext for center's interference in the

provincial matters. It primarily worked through the rival political forces to the NAP governments to create or aggravate law and order situation in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The central interior minister, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan played the key role in engineering political problems in the N.W.F.P. especially in inciting the Mazdoor Kisan party in the NAP support-base areas of Mardan and Peshawer. Sardar Akbar Bugti, the rival Baluch Sardar in league with other anti-NAP tribal chiefs and Abdus Samad Khan Achackzai, leader of a splinter faction of the NAP played center's game in Baluchistan in order to destabilize the NAP government in Baluchistan.

The state elite alleged that the provincial government of Baluchistan had failed to maintain a law and order situation in the province, was being uncooperative with the state elite and was conspiring with the foreign powers to secede from Pakistan.⁴⁴ The allegation was accompanied by a sensational discovery of the Soviet arms at the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. The state elite blamed that these arms were meant for Baluchistan and the ethnic elite in Baluchistan was preparing to launch an insurgency by creating both the private armies from the domestic provincial resources as well as secretly acquiring arms from the foreign governments, Iraq, Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The NAP leaders counter-alleged that the charges were concocted and part of a plan to dismiss the provincial government. The NAP leaders counter-argued that if they had desired to get the arms from the foreign powers, they could have smuggled them from across the borders (both the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan are the border provinces) and they were not foolish enough to get them shipped

through the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad.⁴⁵ We shall discuss this episode in detail in the last section on international factors, but it will suffice to note here that the center failed to substantiate its charge against the NAP leaders and in fact, chose to deemphasize the whole episode after the dismissal of the provincial government. The center dismissed the NAP government in Baluchistan. The NAP government in the N.W.F.P. resigned in protest and the short-lived federal experience came to an end in Pakistan.

Perspective from the Center

Policies: An Overview

The Bhutto regime between 1973 and 1977 followed the same policies which Ayub had followed with remarkably similar consequences. It monopolized power, pursued contradictory cultural policies and embarked upon vigorous development policies in the provinces. According to one perceptive observer, "the nation-building strategy of Bhutto's government combined overt repression of competing parties with politically directed economic development designed to allay discontent and to integrate dissenters into a national mainstream embraced by the PPP."⁴⁶ We analyze the policies of the regime briefly in political, cultural and economic spheres and their consequences with special reference to the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan.

Political

The political policies followed by the regime were highly repressive and authoritarian primarily aimed at strengthening the power base of the state elite. The political system established by Bhutto was parliamentary in theory, but in practice, it gradually became a highly personalized system of governance.⁴⁷ The regime, after getting rid of the NAP - JUI governments from the provinces, embarked upon a path of unbridled authoritarianism. A series of constitutional amendments were passed to enhance the power of the executive and curtailing the power of the judiciary. The regime also resorted to the widespread arrests, torture, assassination attempts and murders of its political opponents.⁴⁸ Twenty-four eminent opposition leaders were murdered during this phase. Several thousand political prisoners languished in jails. A strict censorship was imposed on the press. Institutions created by the constitution had a mere paper value. The whole political system revolved around one personality -- Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto, hearing the news of one party rule in Bangladesh boasted that he could also establish the "one-party rule" within "half an hour".⁴⁹

The regime persecuted the political parties demanding regional autonomy with an iron hand. The center sent four divisions (80,000) of army to crush the Baluch movement in Baluchistan, banned the National Awami Party (NAP), and arrested all prominent regional leaders. Bhutto alleged that they were "secessionists" and assured the nation that "all anti-national forces" would be "liquidated".⁵⁰ In the N.W.F.P., the regime made coalition provincial government in league with the Qayyum

Muslim League, but Baluchistan was virtually handed over to the bureaucracy and the army.⁵¹

Bhutto attempted to restructure the pattern of civil-military relations. In the context of the 1971 defeat he shrewdly capitalized on the unfavorable position of the military among the public and implemented a number of organizational changes in the command structure and also placed constitutional check by declaring the act of take over by the army as "high treason".⁵² He suggested the idea of replacing the present army by the 'peoples' army, but did not pursue it.⁵³ He also announced a series of administrative reforms to restructure the civilian bureaucracy. But these reforms did not in any fundamental way affect the basic structure and character of these two key institutions. The intent of the regime was merely to control the top elite of these institutions in pursuit of the regime's objectives. As the regime pursued authoritarian course, it began to disassociate itself from the broad coalition which had helped Bhutto and his party into power and relied on the bureaucracy, for both advice as well as the implementation.⁵⁴ Police, intelligence agencies and the para-military forces became the mainstay of power. The expenditure on the FSF (Federal Security Force), Bhutto's personal army, increased from Rs. 36.4 million during 1974-74 to Rs. 107.7 million for 1976-77. Expenditure on civil armed forces increased from Rs. 192.5 million to 388.2 million. And total expenditure on police and security forces were as high as Rs. 521.8 million for 1976-77. These figures reveal the growing dependence of the Bhutto regime on security agencies (See Table III).

Table III

Police and Security Expenditure

	1973-74 (Rs.)	1974-75 (Rs.)	1976-77 (Budget estimate, in rupees)
Intelligence Bureau (Cabinet Division)			(1) 25,839,200
Federal Security Force	36,467,531		(2) 107,786,600
Civil armed forces			
Police (Coast Guards and Rangers)		96,266,705	108,633,000
Frontier Watch and Ward		96,294,939	279,627,000
		Total civil armed forces	(3) 388,260,000
		Total expenditure on police and security (1, 2, and 3)	521,885,800

Source: Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (N.Y.: Praeger, 1980), p. 108.

Table IV

Public Sector Development Expenditure

(Million Rs.)

Executing Agency	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77
Sind	139.0	126.5	490.0	717.7	801.0	802.2	972.3
N. W. F. P.	123.0	91.0	213.0	334.8	539.4	569.5	718.7
Baluchistan	85.6	39.5	140.5	301.3	361.6	309.6	312.7

Source: Pakistan Basic Facts 1978-79 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information (Government of Pakistan, 1979)

Cultural

The Bhutto regime followed an ambivalent and often contradictory cultural policy under the name of "Islamic socialism". Theoretically it emphasized both Islam as well as the development of regional cultures in spirit with the multi-national socialist tradition and hoped to work out some national synthesis. The 1973 constitution designated Urdu as the national language but also authorized provincial governments to promote and use the local languages. In practice, its cultural policies were contradictory and largely subordinate to the political interests of the regime. In the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, where it banned the NAP, charging their leaders for preaching a four nationalities theme and for working against the national integrity, it projected itself as the guardian of Pakistan ideology with special emphasis on Islam.⁵⁵ In Sind where the regime was faced with the ethno-national sentiments it recognized Sindhi an official language at the provincial level, it emphasized the promotion of Sindhi culture within the nationalities framework and even actively patronized the cause of the Sindhi ethno-nationalism.⁵⁶ The leading Urdu daily Nawai Waqt wrote in an editorial:

If some of the leading opposition leaders are blamed by the ruling party for preaching a four nationality slogan, there is little dearth of leaders among the PPP ranks as well who actively work within the four nationality framework.⁵⁷

Explaining the rationale of the policy, a senior official of the Bhutto government explained:

Bhutto hoped to outbid both the extremist faction of the Jeeya Sind movement at the provincial level and create an impression in the majority province, Punjab, that being a Sindhi, only he could control the secessionist movement of Sind. His objective was to

maintain political support in both provinces which he considered as the bastions of power.⁵⁸

Economic

The regime also pursued vigorous development policies in the provinces with socialist rhetoric. The regime put its economic development policy in the provinces in the context of a struggle between the "forces of progress" and the forces of reaction".⁵⁹ The basic thrust of the policies was to create modern infrastructure, construction of roads, improvement in the means of communication, spread of education and health facilities.⁶⁰ Various peoples' development schemes were initiated in the provinces. The regime considered development as a necessary substitute to the political oppression. Bhutto himself eloquently explained the development rationale of his policy in the context of Baluchistan:

I recognize that Sardari system (tribal system) is a symbol of their identity for many Baluchs...you cannot get rid of it overnight without putting something in its place, something substantial in the form of modernization. This is what we have been trying to do and the Sardars realize they are done for if we can do it, if we can get roads in, schools in, hospitals in. That is why they are opposing us. They know that if we destroy the Sardari system, we will destroy Baluch identity, or at least begin the process of destruction.⁶¹

The public development expenditure began to phenomenally rise in the provinces as the regime began to pursue an authoritarian course. (See Table IV) The basic underlying assumption behind the developmental thrust was that the educated middle class emerging in the provinces would be more PPP oriented and Pakistani nationalist.

Consequences

The consequences of the Bhutto regime's policies were to further politicize the ethnic identities. The trends generated during the Ayub era were matured during this phase. Political repression, culturally contradictory policies followed at the center and in the provinces and politically directed economic developmental policies led to the evolution of ethno-national tendencies in Baluchistan and Sind. In the N.W.F.P., policies led to mixed results. The regime successfully capitalized on the declining strength of the ethno-national movement by making an alliance with the educated middle classes and also winning over the peasant based socialist party, the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) in N.W.F.P.

The major consequence of the policy of monopolization of power was that the center developed an interest in regionalizing the political process. Its policies were motivated by the desire that no united national political opposition should emerge to threaten the PPP rule at the center.⁶² Intendedly or unintendedly, the state elite made use of the ethnic divisions within the provinces thus further politicizing these identities. It began to exploit the differences between the Punjabis versus the Pushtuns in the N.W.F.P., the Sindhis versus the Mohajirs in Sind, and the Baluchs versus the Pushtuns in Baluchistan.⁶³

Another major consequence of political repression was that the extremist factions among the regionalists lost faith in the political system and normal party politics. Baluchistan, where the regime employed four divisions of army in crushing the resistance, a civil war went on for four years. In this civil war, an estimated 6,000

civilians and 3,000 military men were killed.⁶⁴ An estimated 2,700 Baluchs crossed borders and established camps in Afghanistan.⁶⁵ In Sind, where the regime officially patronized the slogan, ideology and propaganda of the Jeeya Sind movement under the socialist rhetoric and also persecuted the extremist faction of the Jeeya Sind movement, the impact of the propaganda was carried to the masses through official agencies.⁶⁶ The regime, operating under short run political consideration of primarily strengthening the party ranks of the PPP, unintendedly, helped swell the ranks of the Jeeya Sind movement.⁶⁷ In the N.W.F.P., as a result of repression, one component of the Pushtunistan movement became overtly secessionist and crossing the Durand Line sought help from the Afghan government. But the regime's policy of forming coalition provincial government in alliance with the urban-based political party, the Muslim League (Q) helped the regime to successfully overcome the challenge of the Pushtun regionalists. Furthermore, the only peasant-based socialist party, Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) of the province also chose to support the PPP against the NAP.

The state elite's reliance on the state apparatus -- the military, bureaucracy and host of other para-military and intelligence agencies -- was the major factor both in terms of erosion of the legitimacy of the regime and the consequent overthrow by the military in 1977, as well as, for the political processes in the provinces. As the state elite heavily began to depend on the state institutions, its grip on power began loosening. In Baluchistan, where the regime was conducting a major military operation, the military had started to assume an

autonomous role. Bhutto's own intelligence director in a secret note to him, presciently noted the consequence of the regime's military policy in Baluchistan:

For all intents and purposes it appears in Baluchistan that the army has taken over even the field of development and is formulating all policies... The army action is justified for a quick, incisive operation, but its prolonged role in dealing with the internal situation has its limitations. ...unfortunately, the army in this country has a long tradition of getting involved in civil administration. Power has its own taste and in course of time, the army officers especially in the middle ranks start relishing the power...They also develop contempt for the ways of the politicians...The impression among the junior army officers that the army is a panacea for all ills, which had received a severe blow after the debacle in East Pakistan is again gaining ground. It can be very infectious and cannot remain confined in one province. This infection may not be allowed to spread.⁶⁸

The regime's reliance on the state apparatus had significant consequences for the political processes in the provinces as well. The original perceptions held by the Sindhi and the Baluchi ethnic elites towards the military and the bureaucracy during the Ayub era were perpetuated. The Sindhi and the Baluchi youth who were not represented in these two key institutions continued to perceive them as alien institutions, while the Pushtuns who were significantly overrepresented in these two institutions continued to hold favorable images of these two institutions.

The consequences of development policies for Baluchistan and Sind were negative and for the N.W.F.P. were mixed.⁶⁹ Both in Baluchistan as well as Sind, the educated middle classes were further alienated from the political system because of the presence of ethno-national cultures in which they were socialized. In the N.W.F.P., however, the urban educated middle classes supported the regime's policies and the popularity of the PPP began to rise. These differences in consequences

were significantly related to the perceptions held by the educated middle classes towards power-sharing arrangements at the center. We shall note these consequences in detail while discussing the social bases of the movements in the next section.

Perspective from the Provinces: Movements

The components of all three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluchistan movement evolved into secessionist movements as a consequence of repressive policies of the state elite during this phase. The movement leaders who had been working for the provincial autonomy of their respective provinces in the Ayub era, also began to emphasize that there existed four nations who had the right to self-determination. We discuss the evolution of the movements during this phase.

N.W.F.P.

Pushtunistan Movement

Organization

The center banned the NAP in 1975 alleging that it was working against the integrity of the country. It took the case against the NAP in the Supreme Court. The center alleged in its reference presented in the court that the "National Awami Party has long been acting against the interests and security of Pakistan. Some of its leaders fought against the creation of this country, did not reconcile to its

existence and never missed a chance of harming it".⁷⁰ Specifically, the center charged that the NAP leaders in collaboration with the foreign governments, especially India and Afghanistan, were conspiring to dismember the country by carving out a new state of Pushtunistan. Furthermore, they have been preaching the four-nation theory, proclaiming that there exist four nations in Pakistan which have the right to self-determination, thus acting against the ideology of Pakistan. The center claimed that it had removed the ban on the NAP in 1971 and had given the NAP a chance in good faith to form their provincial governments in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, but they proved both through their actions and utterances that they were "methodically working towards the disintegration of the country". They had even supported Shaikh Mujibur Rehman's six points during the events leading to the dismemberment of the country in 1970 who was working for the secession of the country.

Wali Khan, in his statement to the court counter-alleged that it was in fact the center which wanted to push the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan out of the Pakistani federation by following extremely repressive and authoritarian policies.⁷¹ He charged that it was Mr. Bhutto's desire to establish 'one party rule' which had led to the unrest in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, virtually forcing the NAP workers to flee from the country. The external powers' involvement was the result of the consequence of the policy of the center. He also alleged that it was Mr. Bhutto's "Machiavellian approach to politics" which had led to the break-up of the country in 1970 and would be responsible for the further disintegration of that country. He also

counter-alleged that only Mr. Bhutto in league with the military elite had the motive to break the country in 1970, because in the united Pakistan, Shaikh Mujib would have been the Prime Minister, not Mr. Bhutto.

The NAP did not defend the case on the ground that the case was primarily political in nature and motivated by the desire of the ruling party to extend their control over the two provinces, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Furthermore, given the nature of Bhutto regime's tactics and the partisan nature of some of the judges sitting on the bench, it did not expect the court to give a fair verdict. The Supreme Court gave a one-sided verdict essentially supporting the government position.⁷² Despite the verdict, the Bhutto regime, behind the scenes, kept making contacts with the NAP leaders, offering them release as well as the removal of the ban, if the NAP stopped opposing the regime.⁷³ One analyst aptly noted:

...the whole case was the product of Mr. Bhutto's vendetta against Wali Khan and his associates. It was designed to destroy the only political party in the country that was a problem for Mr. Bhutto at the zenith of his power and to demolish the only leader who threatened to become an effective rival.⁷⁴

The militant elements of the NAP had crossed over the Pak-Afghan border and sought help from Afghanistan. Approximately, between 700 - 1000 hard core members launched the Pushtunistan movement under the leadership of Ajmal Khattak, the Secretary General of NAP, who had fled to Afghanistan in the wake of the firing by the PPP hooligans at a Liaquat Bagh opposition parties meeting in which a number of participants were killed including many Pushtuns. It is significant to note that the NAP workers had started fleeing to Afghanistan only when

the center had embarked upon ruthless repression, inhuman torture and reckless use of force against its opponents.

After the NAP was banned, and its main leaders including Wali Khan were arrested, the second level leadership formed the National Democratic Party (NDP) in November 1975. Its program emphasized the rejection of all laws repugnant to Islam, struggle against feudal capitalist order, non-aligned foreign policy, equal rights and opportunities to all geographical historical and cultural entities within federal framework.⁷⁵ Its program like its predecessor party NAP, emphasized complete provincial autonomy with only defense, currency, foreign affairs and communication with the federal government. It also stressed the reorganization of provinces according to linguistic and cultural criteria. The NDP president Sher Baz Mazari explicitly rejected the idea of an independent Pushtunistan and disowned the activities of the secessionist component publically.⁷⁶ He also declared that his party was against Afghanistan's interference in Pakistan's affairs.⁷⁷

Ideology and Strategy

As the NAP leaders were deprived of power and were subjected to repression from the center, they began to adopt an ambivalent attitude towards the future of the country. The extremist faction which had fled to Afghanistan began to work for an independent state of Pushtunistan on the pattern of Bangladesh. But they also kept the

option of a negotiated settlement open. Ajmal Khattak wrote:

Pakhtoons and Baluchs have no choice except to launch their struggle for self-determination...It is a struggle against the agents of imperialism and representatives of reaction; it is a struggle against a strong, blood-sucking and suffocating center and for political and economic liberation of the different nations inhabiting Pakistan...We neither desired nor desire conflict and confrontation. It was the military rulers of Pakistan who compelled us to resort to active revolutionary struggle. We want to declare...that we are always and any anytime prepared for resolving all our problems through negotiations.⁷⁸

Wali Khan, addressing a public meeting in Peshawar began to warn the consequences of high-handed policies of the center. He declared:

If Pakistan was further broken, a new country comprising Frontier province, Baluchistan and Afghanistan would come into existence. Only Punjab and Sind would have to face the consequences of a break-up [of the country]. On our part, we would take the chain at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and continue enjoying the grapes and melons (produced largely in Afghanistan).⁷⁹

The movement leaders also began to emphasize the "four nationality" theory. Wali Khan explained that by "nationalities" he meant ethnic groups, speaking the same language with culture of their own, living within specified geographical bound. The nationalities, the NAP chief said, had the right to determine their relationship as federating units with the center. Wali Khan declared:

The NAP believe there is one nation in this country and that is Pakistani nation -- And, this Pakistani nation is composed of nationalities -- who have their own distinct language and culture - There is no contradiction in the two, but these nationalities are like flowers who with their distinct colour and fragrance into a bouquet manifesting their unity in diversity.⁸⁰

The secessionist faction of the movement established its 50 base camps in Afghanistan and engaged in the terrorist activities in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. They attempted to launch a guerilla warfare and also tried to intertwine the causes of the Pushtun movement and the

Baluch movement, but except the occasional bomb blasts in the N.W.F.P. and attacks on the provincial PPP leaders, they could not launch a successful campaign in the N.W.F.P. They did not succeed in the N.W.F.P. mainly because of lack of sympathy and support from the urban areas.⁸¹ Despite the military and material support given to the movement by Afghanistan (which we shall discuss in the next section) the movement did not have enough hard core devoted members who could pose any significant challenge or even create any serious law and order situation for the coalition provincial N.W.F.P. government of PPP and Qayyum Muslim League.

The bulk of the movement, however, publically disowned the secessionist activities and the NDP, the successor party to the NAP preferred to make a common cause with the other national opposition parties against the regime. NDP joined the United Democratic Front, formed by nearly all the national opposition parties against the PPP and on the eve of the 1977 elections again entered into an alliance, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) with the seven other opposition political parties to contest the elections against the PPP.

Social Base

The social base of the movement continued to decline further. There were three important reasons for the declining level of support for the Pushtunistan movement: (1) Increasing share of power given to the urban educated middle classes by the new PPP-QML coalition provincial government which replaced the NAP government, (2) Increasing level of support for the PPP among both the students as well

as some sections of peasants, (3) Highest number of out-migration from the N.W.F.P., especially from the traditional support base districts of the NAP.

The PPP in league with the urban based Qayyum Muslim League continued to coopt the Pushtun educated middle classes through the coalition government in the province, who had already been alienated from the NAP during the Ayub era. The Qayyum Muslim League, the traditional rival to the NAP received 22.6 percent of the votes while the PPP had received 14.2 percent in the 1970 provincial elections of N.W.F.P. (See Table V) The support base areas of the two parties were primarily the urban areas of the province. Both parties together (36.8%) fairly represented the urban areas of the province.⁸² The NAP which had acquired 18.3 votes in the provincial elections was primarily popular in the rural Pushtun areas, was weakest in the urban areas. The NAP's coalition partner JUI which had received 25.4 percent in the elections was also primarily a rural-based party. The PPP had little difficulty in forming a coalition government through democratic process when the NAP government resigned. This coalition government was a fairly good representative of the urban middle class of N.W.F.P., which was least sympathetic to the cause of the NAP.

Secondly, the increasing level of support for the policies of the PPP regime was especially visible among the students as well as some sections of radically oriented peasants of the province. The vigorous development initiatives taken by the PPP also began to strengthen its support among the younger, educated middle class. The Peoples' Party's affiliate student organization, Peoples' Students Federation (PSF) was

TABLE V
 PARTY VOTES BY PROVINCES NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
 ELECTIONS
 (Percentages)

<i>Party</i>	<i>Punjab</i>	<i>NWFP</i>	<i>Sind</i>	<i>Baluchistan</i>
People's Party	41.6	14.2	44.9	2.3
Muslim League (Council)	12.6	4.0	6.8	10.9
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan	9.8	—	7.4	—
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	5.4	22.6	10.7	10.9
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi Group)	5.2	25.4	4.3	20.0
Jamaat-e-Islami	4.7	7.2	10.3	1.1
Muslim League (Convention)	5.1	0.5	—	—
National Awami Party (Wali)	—	18.3	0.3	45.1

Source: Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972)

able to win the Peshawer University Students Union elections in 1974. The results of the Students Union Election clearly showed the declining trend in the popularity of the Pushtun Students Federation, an affiliate of the NAP.⁸³ It could poll only 32 percent of the total votes polled in the Elections.

Table VI

Results of Peshawer University Students Union Elections 1974

	Total votes	Percent
Peoples Students Federation	1412	35.26
Pushtun Students Federation	1301	32.49
Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba	1291	32.25
Total votes	4004	100.00

Source: Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 21 April, 1974.

The Peoples Student Federation was making its presence felt in other colleges of the province. The PPP was also able to win the support of the only peasant-based leftist party of the N.W.F.P., the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) which had started exploiting the tenants-landlords tensions in the NAP stronghold areas. The MKP leaders began to project the NAP as the party of the landlords and supported the more progressive PPP against the NAP.⁸⁴

Thirdly, another factor which may also have started eroding the support base of the movement is the high out-migration rate of the population of the N.W.F.P. to the Gulf countries (See Table VI). It

Table VI.1

Number and Percentage of Persons Gone Abroad During the Last Ten Years By
Province and Rural-Urban Residence, 1981.

Province	From Rural Area		From Urban Area		Total		Provincial Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Percent
Baluchistan	67,846	4.8	9,280	3.2	77,126	4.5	1.78
NWFP	555,637	39.3	35,768	12.1	591,405	34.6	5.34
Punjab	576,522	40.7	158,763	54.0	735,285	43.0	1.5
Sind	213,019	15.1	87,335	29.7	300,354	17.6	1.57
Islamabad	1,436	0.1	2,933	1.0	4,369	0.3	1.28
Pakistan	1,414,460	100.0	294,079	100.0	1,708,539	100.0	

Source : Population Census of Pakistan, 1981, special tabulations.

was comparatively four times higher than the other provinces.⁸⁵ The bulk of the migrants went from the rural areas of the province, especially from the same districts -- Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat and Bannu, which were the main stronghold areas of the NAP.⁸⁶

Sind

The Jeeya Sind Movement

Organization

The Jeeya Sind movement was split into two organizations during this phase. The Jeeya Sind Mahaz led by G.M. Sayed and the Sind Awami Tahreek (The Sind Peoples' Movement) led by Rasool Bux Paleejo. The Sind branch of the PPP led by Muntaz Ali Bhutto also must be considered as a part of the movement as it adopted the symbols and ideology of the Jeeya Sind movement and actively competed with the above two factions for political following.

The Sind United Front led by G.M. Sayed which had been formed against the one unit policy of the center during the Ayub era in 1967 was renamed as the Jeeya Sind Mahaz on June 18, 1972. Its original program included maximum provincial autonomy, with the center retaining only foreign affairs and currency, recognition of Sindhi as the national language and the only official language at the provincial level, one-fourth share in the armed forces and civil service and the return of the agricultural land to the Sindhis.⁸⁷ As the center adopted repressive measures towards this faction of the movement, it

turned secessionist and began openly working for the independent state of "Sindhu Desh" on the pattern of Bangladesh.⁸⁸

The Sind Awami Tahreek led by Rasool Bux Paleejo, a splinter faction of G.M. Sayed's movement, broke away from the movement due to differences in strategy from the Jeeya Sind Mahaz.⁸⁹ It is a successor party to the Hari Party (Peasants Party) led by Haider Bux Jatoti during the Ayub era. It preached both Sindhi nationalism and socialism of the Maoist variety. Its program included the eviction of all non-Sindhi landlords who had obtained lands in Sind through auction and other malpractices and strive for the distribution of lands to the landless peasants. It also worked for the rights of Sindhis in government services, autonomous and local bodies and other semi government offices. It had three separate wings working among farmers, students, and labourers.

The Sind branch of the PPP, though a ruling party in Sind during this phase adopted the symbols and ideology of the Jeeya Sind movement. Mumtaz Bhutto, then chief-minister, adopting the 'Sindhi only language bill,' declared in the provincial assembly that even if he had ten heads, he would have sacrificed all of them for the honor of Sind. He earned the title of Dehesar-i-Sind (ten-headed man of Sind) among the Sindhi regionalists.⁹⁰ The Sind PPP also declared 4 March as an official holiday, a day the Jeeya Sind movement used to commemorate in honor of students killed during anti-one-unit riots in 1967.⁹¹ Furthermore, it actively patronized the moderate Jeeya Sind faction to build PPP's strength. It adopted preferential policy towards the Sindhis in terms of increasing their share both at the provincial level

and at the center. It also provided jobs to some of the leading figures of the Jeeya Sind movement who were willing to support the PPP.

Ideology and Strategy

The Jeeya Sind Mahaz openly began to work for an independent state of Sindhu Desh. G.M. Sayed's faction of the Jeeya Sind movement turned secessionist when the provincial government of the PPP began to persecute its hardline followers. G.M. Sayed claimed in his book, A Nation in Chains, that Pakistan was the bastion of "Punjabi-Mohajir imperialism" and Bhutto, though Sindhi in origin, was merely a "show-boy of the Punjabi-Mohajir axis".⁹² He argued that the two-nation theory which had served as the basis for the creation of Pakistan was dead after the formation of Bangladesh. He exhorted the Sindhis to work for an independent separate state of Sindhu Desh.⁹³ He claimed that the Sindhu Desh had been in existence since the last 5000 years. In terms of population, area and GNP, it was larger than 91 countries of the United Nations. He presented a detailed 63 point program for the formation of Sindhu Desh in his book. He argued for a guerrilla-type war for the liberation of Sind. He wrote:

For placing the issue of Sind's freedom on the anvil of times, what indeed is needed, only about a thousand of trained freedom fighters, who with their blood and fearless fighting tactics and superior peoples' strategy can shake the imperialist's power at its roots.⁹⁴

The Jeeya Sind Mahaz actively campaigned for the 'Sindhi only' language bill, played highly provocative role during the language riots and vehemently opposed the repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Sind. It concentrated on its effort to socialize the younger

educated middle classes, introducing them to the literature produced by the movement.

The Sind Awami Tahreek disagreed with both G.M. Sayed's goal as well as the strategy. It considered the liberation of all nations inhabiting Pakistan as the ultimate goal, and envisioned a multi-national socialist Pakistan. But it gave priority to the liberation of the Sindhi nation from the oppression of other nations.⁹⁵ Its leader, Rasool Bux Paleejo argued that the real enemy of the peoples was the feudal landed elite who were the worst exploiters themselves but had raised the flag of Sindhi nationalism in order to divert the attention of the public from its own exploitative role. He considered G.M. Sayed as a part of the exploiter landed elite, who in his view were not only the protectors of the Punjabi-Mohajir imperialism, but also the real 'inner disease' of Sind.⁹⁶ He believed in the education of the peasants by teaching them "scientific socialism". He recommended Lenin, Mao, and Ho Chi Minh's writings.⁹⁷

The Sind Awami Tehreek opened the guerrilla training camps and began to impart guerrilla training as well as the education of scientific socialism along the above lines. The works of Lenin, Mao and Ho-Chi Minh were translated into Sindhi language and the persons trained were known as "Sind Congs" on the pattern of "Viet-Congs".⁹⁸

The Sind PPP's aim and strategy were directed towards preempting the above two organizations. Its aim was primarily to maintain and to increase their own political following. It adopted the slogans, tactics and demands of the extremist faction of the Jeeya Sind movement. Its main provincial party newspaper, Hilal-i-Pakistan

(Sindhi) tried to outbid the Jeeya Sind movement by taking a highly provocative and vitriolic stand against the Mohajirs and the Punjabis living in the province.⁹⁹ Apparently, the PPP's strategy at the provincial level was to increase the party's popularity vis-a-vis the Jeeya Sind movement.

Social Base

The social base of the movement began quickly expanding among the educated middle classes. A number of student organizations loosely affiliated with the Jeeya Sind Mahaz were merged into the Jeeya Sind Students Federation (JSSF).¹⁰⁰ The JSSF emerged as the most potent instrument of the Jeeya Sind Mahaz throughout the interior of Sind. It won most of the Student Union elections in the rural Sind. The Peoples' Students Federation, an affiliate of the PPP, formed during the PPP rule, was unable to withstand the strength of the JSSF. The JSSF rooted out most of the rivals belonging to the other parties. The teachers, lawyers, doctors and other professionals, the generation of sixties, formed Sind Graduates Association (SGA) to protect the interests of the educated Sindhis, but its real purpose was to carry the ideas of G.M. Sayed to the masses.¹⁰¹

The Sind Awami Tehreek primarily concentrated on the peasants and workers and its affiliate student bodies focussed on the village schools. The Tehreek believed in grass-root ideological training of the masses in Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideas. It opened training camps in the districts of Badeen, Thatta, Tharparkar and Dadu. Its

following during this phase was limited, but its peasant mobilization strategy was slowly gaining success.¹⁰²

The PPP's primary support lay with the landed elite but it competed with the other organizations for the support of both the educated middle classes as well as the peasants and workers. The PPP which had won an overwhelming victory in Sind in the General Elections of 1970 was increasingly facing competition both from the extremist elements of the Jeeya Sind movement as well as the Sind Awami Tehreek.

Baluchistan

The Baluch Movement

Organization

The center dismissed the provincial government and chose to employ four divisions of the army (80,000) against the Baluch tribes and also sought military help from the Iranian government in quelling what it terms "insurgency". A civil war broke out between the Pakistan army and the Baluch tribes. A variety of tribal guerrilla organizations came into existence with little program of action. They fought a reactive and defensive war against a strong central army which also recklessly used the air force and often straffed their villages. Much of the resistance was uncoordinated and without any definite goal, but there also emerged two organizations which served as the principle vehicles for channeling the resistance into an ethno-national mould: Baluchistan Peoples' Liberation Front (BPLF) and Baluchistan Students Organization (BSO). The NAP went into the background and a guerrilla

organization, Baluchistan Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) emerged. BSO, which had been formed during the Ayub era, reemerged as an effective political force to fight against the regime.

The Baluchistan Peoples' Liberation Front was an outgrowth of the Parari Organization which had fought against the Ayub regime.¹⁰³ Its program emphasized the liberation of all nationalities of Pakistan and envisioned a multi-national socialist Pakistan as an ultimate goal. The program, formulated by the Marxist component of the Front, emphasized the struggle as a war of national liberation for all nationalities of Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ The other components of the Front emphasized the secession from Pakistan and the formation of an independent socialist republic of Baluchistan as their objective. Different components within the Front emphasized different aspects of the program. The hard core Marri and Mengal tribes emphasized the recognition of national identity and the right of nationality to secede within the multi-national socialist framework.¹⁰⁵ A small component of the educated middle class, hardline Marxists deemphasized the right to secession and argued for the liberation of other nations within Pakistan.

The Baluchistan Students Organization (BSO) also played an active role in the civil war both in the guerrilla warfare as well as at the political front.¹⁰⁶ The BSO was divided into two factions, the BSO and the BSO Awami. (Peoples) The former faction was more moderate and ambivalent on the issue of secession and the latter faction was more radical and believed in the Peoples' warfare. The BSO's program also reflected the same ambivalence on the issue of secession as it was

displayed within the ranks of the BPLF. It was not clear whether they wanted an independent Baluchistan based on the national communism or a largely autonomous Baluchistan within the loosely federal socialist Pakistan.

Ideology and Strategy

The early statements of all the leading Baluch leaders, Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Ataulah Mengal and Khair Buksh Marri, soon after the dismissal of their provincial government clearly reveal that the Baluch leaders wanted to fight the regime through normal democratic process in alliance with the other national opposition political parties. But the regime, arresting the leading Sardars and sending the 80,000 army in Baluchistan left the tribes with little choice but to fight a defensive war. Khair Buksh Marri, the leader of the Marri tribe put their dilemma in an interview:

Mr. Bhutto, through the use of the army, wants to crush our democratic struggle by isolating us from the rest of the national democratic struggle of the country. He knows that politics in Baluchistan is still tribal or semi-tribal. It is very easy to provoke the Baluch tribes because the tribal reaction always takes the form of an armed struggle. Once you bring in the army and attempt to destroy the local culture, the tribes will naturally resist in the only way they know how to resist -- armed protest...the breakup of Pakistan is as harmful for the Baluchis as it is for Pakistan. This country is a nucleus for the Baluchis and it is in the interest of the Baluchs to preserve it and to fight for their rights within the country.¹⁰⁷

As the civil war was prolonged, the movement leaders became ambivalent with regard to the issue of secession. They chose to put the struggle as a first step towards the liberation of nationalities in Pakistan. They began to emphasize the four nationality theme and the ultimate right of nationalities to secede. There was much ambivalence whether

the Baluch should exercise their right of secession at this stage or not. The leftist faction within the movement considered Baluchistan as a "cradle of socialist revolution" and argued for making the movement broad-based by inviting other nationalities from N.W.F.P., Sind and Punjab and to make it a democratic socialist struggle of all nationalities. The major tribal groups fighting an actual guerrilla warfare were less concerned with the theoretical objectives of the Marxist faction, and followed their tribal chiefs' instructions. Their position was primarily that of their tribal chiefs.

The Baluch fought guerrilla warfare against a much stronger army.¹⁰⁸ They were poorly equipped, loosely organized and dependent on the meager help from the Afghan government. Drawn into a battle which they did not want to fight, they crossed over the Pakistan-Afghan border and established camps there. Their strategy was to disrupt communication lines, attack military convoys, and stop all development activities conducted by the government. In 178 major military engagements, more than 6,000 Baluchis were killed and an estimated 3,000 army men died.¹⁰⁹ Wali Khan claimed that the military had to suffer as many casualties in this war as it had suffered during the Bangladesh War.¹¹⁰

Social Base

The social base of the movement was primarily tribal and traditional. The B.P.L.F. guerrillas drew their strength from four major tribes, the Marris, the Mengals, the Hasnis and the Bizenjos.¹¹¹ The leadership, organizational structure and the nature of the

following of the movement was largely based on the tribal patterns. The chiefs and the sub-chiefs of the tribes dominated the top layers of the leadership. The inter-tribal rivalries even between the two major tribes, the Mengals and the Marris and among their various sub-tribes often manifested themselves, seriously hindering the effectiveness of their operations. A faction of the BSO and some enthusiastic leftists who had joined the struggle had a hard time in their effort to transform the movement along modern socialist lines.¹¹² They tried to educate them in the concepts and strategies of Peoples' warfare, but found it very difficult to make them adapt to the new patterns. An uneasy compromise developed between the tribal leaders and the educated middle class layer of the movement, where the tribal elite was willing to learn the theoretical knowledge of Marxism in exchange for respect for the deeply held tribal customs and mores.

International Factors

Among the transnational international factors, the success of the Bangladesh movement and the effect of the multi-national socialist tradition exercised important influences on the movement. The secessionist components of the Pushtun, Sindhi and Baluch movements also began to develop greater contacts with their coethnics in the adjacent countries in order to seek help against the strong center. Among the foreign countries, Afghanistan's role was most important. It supported the Pushtun and Baluchi movements but reversed its policy when Pakistan, to counter Afghan support, began to support the Afghan dissident Islamic movement. Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf countries

also became involved with the movements in varying degrees. It is difficult to ascertain any Soviet involvement, but some circumstantial evidence suggests their possible interest in the situation.

Transnational Influences

The impact of the success of the Bangladesh movement had a most profound demonstration effect on the course of all three movements. The success of the Awami League movement set a precedent closely followed by these movements. As the center began to persecute all three movements and used the army and the bureaucracy to crush them, comparisons between their own situation and Bangladesh situation were increasingly drawn by the ethnic elites of the movements.¹¹³ The literature published by these movements identified the military and the bureaucracy as the chief villains. The secessionist components of the movements in N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan adopted the same pattern of slogans, propaganda techniques and strategies to influence the masses.¹¹⁴ The secessionist components of the movements also looked for help towards the three external powers, India, Soviet Union and Afghanistan, two of which -- India and the Soviet Union had actively aided the Bangladesh movement. The Jeeya Sind movement became more inclined towards seeking help from India and the Soviet Union, while the Pushtunistan movement and the Baluch movement practically sought help from Afghanistan and possibly the Soviet Union as well.¹¹⁵

Among the cultural influences, the effect of multi-national social tradition exercised an important influence on the three movements. The four nationality theme, i.e. there exist four nations and the vision of

a multi-national socialist Pakistan as believed by the ethnic elites of all three movements was directly inspired by the socialist tradition. Wali Khan demanded: "We want a Soviet-type of constitution in Pakistan".¹¹⁶ Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo acknowledged that "we have been inspired by their [the Soviet Union] idea that the existence of separate nationalities should be recognized and that each nationality should have the ultimate right of secession."¹¹⁷ Khair Bux Marri declared that "capitalist nationalism is obsolete" and national communism is the only way to solve Pakistan's nationalities question.¹¹⁸ He commented on Lenin's writings:

What I see in Lenin, I miss elsewhere, but it doesn't mean I feel a blind attachment to the man and his teachings. Marxism-Leninism has helped me to understand politics, though being Marxist-Leninist is not easy and I am not sure that I qualify.¹¹⁹

G.M. Sayed and Rasul Bux Pleejo also acknowledged the impact of the Marxist-Leninist ideas.¹²⁰ The ethnic elites of all three movements emphasized the right of secession to a nationality as embodied in the multi-national socialist tradition.

Both the Baluch movement and the Jeeya Sind movement were influenced by Mao's concepts of Peoples' warfare and his peasant mobilization strategies. The Baluch guerrillas sought to apply the Maoist doctrines in the war and also hoped to establish a liberated base area similar to Mao's Yen-an.¹²¹ Rasool Bux Pleejo's faction, the Sind Awami Tehreek (Sind Peoples' Movement), also strongly influenced by Mao's thoughts, translated his works in Sindhi and extensively used them in the study circles of the movement. The peasants in Sind were imparted both the theoretical knowledge of Marxism as well as the

guerrilla training on the Vietnamese style and were known as "Sind Congs" on the pattern of "Viet-Congs".¹²²

Activities of Coethnics

The Pushtun groups belonging to the militant factions of the NAP, the members of the Pushtun Zalme and the Pushtun Students Federation, established about 50 base camps with an estimated 700 hard core followers with the Afghan government's help to launch guerrilla activities in Pakistan. Their attempts to recruit the Pushtuns of Afghanistan were carefully controlled by the Afghanistan government. They allowed them only to make use of some of the facilities traditionally provided to the transborder Pushtun tribes by the government but the direction of the movement remained under the close supervision of the ministry of the tribes of the Afghan government.¹²³ They made several unsuccessful attempts to mobilize the transborder Pushtun tribes for their cause, but had limited success due to the declining level of sympathy for the movement among the public.

Approximately 2700 Baluch guerrillas also established their camps on the Afghan territory with open support of the Afghan government and launched their guerrilla operations.¹²⁴ There is little evidence to show whether the Baluchis of Afghanistan and Iran in any significant way attempted to join or support their struggle. The Baluchi migrants of Pakistani origin working in the Gulf countries also played an important role in influencing the policies of their host government in favor of the movement.¹²⁵ The literature of the Baluch movement asserted that the Baluchs were in fact Arabs in origin, but had

forgot their identity because of migration. The Baluch problem was actually an "Arab problem" and thus it was a moral duty of the Arab governments to support their "Arab brethren" against "non-Arab oppression".¹²⁶ The propaganda did have some effect on the Arab countries as the movement was able to establish cells in Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, and Muscat. It was also able to get a limited financial support from these countries for their propaganda purposes.¹²⁷

The faction of the Jeeya Sind movement led by G.M. Sayed sought to establish and forge greater contacts with the Sindhi Hindus in India.¹²⁸ Many of the books written by G.M. Sayed were published in the Sindhi printing presses of Bombay, India and were smuggled into Pakistan across the Indo-Pak border. The Hindus living in Sind on the Pakistani side of the border played an important role in supporting the activities of the Jeeya Sind movement both in Pakistan as well as India.¹²⁹

Policies of the Foreign Governments

Afghanistan's role in providing both the sanctuaries and financial and material help to the guerrillas of the Baluch and the Pushtun movements was of critical importance to their activities. Bhutto's persecution of the Pushtun and Baluch movements had coincided with the coup d'état in Afghanistan led by Sardar Daoud in July 1973, an ardent and the most vocal supporter of the Pushtunistan cause in Afghanistan. Sardar Daoud, having assumed power, declared that Pakistan was the only country with which Afghanistan had a political problem to settle, i.e.,

the question of recognition of the Durand Line and the issue of Pushtunistan.¹³⁰ Sardar Daoud began to give open military and political support to the guerrillas of the Pushtun and Baluch movements in view of Afghanistan's own larger interest in the Greater Pushtunistan scheme. According to one estimate, the Afghan government spent \$875,000 per year for the Baluch and Pushtun guerrillas to support their activities.¹³¹ It is significant to note that the Afghan rulers considered Baluchistan as a part of Pushtunistan and did not agree with the claim made by the Baluchi leaders that ethnically, they constituted a nation, different from the Pushtuns. Primarily the Afghan rulers were interested in the fate of the Pushtuns living on the Pakistani side of the border but they found it useful to secondarily support the Baluch movement as well, the opportunity offered to them by the Pakistan government itself.

Sardar Daoud began to support these movements at the same time when he himself was in the process of consolidating his power base at home by persecuting the Islamic movement of Afghanistan. The Daoud regime had unleashed a reign of terror on the Islamic movement exterminating approximately 600 leaders of the Islamic movement, forcing them to flee towards Pakistan.¹³² A faction of the Islamic movement led by Gulbadeen Hikmatyar crossed over the Durand Line, Pak-Afghan border and sought the military support of the Pakistani government against Daoud. Interestingly, the followers of the Islamic movement were also predominately Pushtuns (of Afghan origin) who were seeking the support of the Bhutto government against the Daoud government.¹³³ Bhutto's government to counter Afghanistan's

interference, began to train and sponsor the guerrilla activities of the Islamic movement. The Bhutto regime, reportedly, trained 5000 Afghan opponents of the Daoud government at secret camps in Pakistan.¹³⁴ The objective was two-fold: to neutralize Afghan interference on the Pushtunistan issue and to bring Daoud to heel on the question of the disputed Durand Line. The effectiveness of the Bhutto regime's military support can be assessed from the fact that the Daoud regime was virtually shaken by the activities of the Islamic guerrillas, and became willing to cut a deal with the Bhutto government through mediation by the Shah of Iran for the recognition of the Durand Line as an international frontier and the burial of the Pushtunistan question in exchange for the Pakistani government's cessation of its support for the Islamic movement and the release of the NAP leaders imprisoned by the Pakistani government. The Shah of Iran's role was critical in bringing this rapprochement. One analyst reported:

The carrot of the agreement was a massive aid program for Afghanistan. The Shah committed himself to nearly U.S. \$3 billion in aid for Kabul. That was more than the total foreign aid Afghanistan had received from all donors in the previous 30 years...On the Pakistani side the stick remained. It was implicitly understood that should Kabul go back on the new agreement vis-a-vis the Durand Line and Pushtunistan issues, Pakistan would be prepared to unleash the forces it had set in motion...¹³⁵

Both Sardar Daoud and Bhutto agreed to stop interference in each others' internal affairs, but before the deal could be formalized, the Bhutto regime was overthrown by the military in Pakistan.

The Shah of Iran's role was also very important in the mediatory efforts between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Shah perceived a number of interests at stake in the situation. He was apprehensive that the

Afghan support to the Baluch movement could have a spillover effect on the Iranian Baluchs. In the wake of the formation of Bangladesh, he had declared that if Pakistan was further disintegrated, Iran would consider the Pakistani part of Baluchistan within its own sphere of influence. He declared:

If Pakistan is disintegrated, a new Vietnam could develop itself. We should see to it that Pakistan does not fall into pieces...But if in spite of all, it happens the least we can do is to adopt defensive measures in Baluchistan.¹³⁵

He had also reportedly pressured the Bhutto government to dismiss the first elected provincial government of the Baluchis in Pakistan because it could potentially give 'dangerous ideas' to his own Baluchis.¹³⁶ The Shah feared that the Baluchis in power in Pakistan could stimulate the Iranian Baluchis to make similar demands to the Iranian government for the provincial autonomy. Secondly, because of long-standing Iran-Iraq rivalry, Iraq was supporting the Baluchi movement in Iran to counter the Iranian support to the Kurdish movement in Iraq. Iraq had sent some Soviet arms for the Baluchi movement in Iran in February 1973 but the arms were confiscated by the Pakistani government.¹³⁷ Bhutto had his own domestic reasons to dismiss the provincial government in Baluchistan, but he used the Iraqi arms discovery to both malign the NAP government for their alleged conspiratorial role with the foreign governments as well as to please the Iranian government which was not happy with the Baluch provincial government in Pakistan. Iran, in turn, gave \$200 million in military help to the Bhutto government to quell the Baluch "insurgency" in Pakistan.¹³⁸ Thirdly, the Shah of Iran, in the wake of the huge oil earnings, began to see a greater regional role for Iran in the area and considered it in his interests

to patch the regional disputes as a first step towards paving the way for a regional market including India, Pakistan and Afghanistan under the leadership of Iran.¹³⁹

Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE allowed the Baluch movement to function and even gave limited financial help for propaganda activities mainly because of the projection of the Baluch movement of their Arab credentials, but the Bhutto government was able to successfully persuade them to reduce their support through diplomatic channels at the intergovernmental level.¹⁴⁰

It is difficult to establish whether the Soviets were involved in aiding the Baluch movement. Some Pakistani sources claimed that the Soviets were involved in aiding some components of the Baluch movement, though the Pakistani government at the official level did not make any such claim.¹⁴¹ The Soviet diplomatic officials actively maintained contacts with the secessionist components of the movements.¹⁴² Apparently, the Soviets were interested in keeping contacts with the extremist factions of all three movements but were not actively involved in aiding the movements to destabilize the "socialist" regime in Pakistan.

Summary

The Bhutto regime's short-lived policy of sharing power in the early phase of his rule led to an immediate renunciation of the regionalist stance on the part of the ethnic elites in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. They, in categorical terms, not only disowned any secessionist tendency but also by adopting Urdu as the official

language of their respective provinces, refraining from taking any extremist regional stance and repeated assurances to the center of their cooperation demonstrated that they also had an equal stake in the national integrity. The center, fearing the likely emergence of the NAP as a serious potential alternative to the PPP at the national level chose to undermine the provincial governments of the NAP in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan.

In the aftermath of the dismissal of their provincial governments, the regime embarked upon a highly repressive and authoritarian policy towards the regional movements. It sought to liquidate the "anti-national forces" through the use of the bureaucracy, the para-military institutions and the army. The cultural and economic policies were largely subordinate to the political interests of the regime. With the change of regime character, and oppressive state policies towards the regional movements, the extremist factions within these movements turned secessionist, began to forge greater contacts with their coethnics across the border and also sought help from the foreign powers, especially Afghanistan against the strong center. The moderate factions of these movements began to emphasize the four-nationality theme and envisioned a multi-national Pakistan within the socialist framework. They also stressed the right of a nationality to secede. The trends in the evolution of the rising Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movements parallel each other though for different reasons. In Sind where the regime persecuted the hardline faction and officially patronized the moderate factions of the Jeeya Sind movement, the intended or unintended consequences of the policy were to swell the ranks of the Jeeya Sind movement. In Baluchistan, where the regime

used more than 80,000 army, its policies catalyzed full scale tribal warfare. In both cases, the peasant based guerrilla organizations emerged which were deeply influenced by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts.

The Pushtunistan movement continued to decline further. The regime's strategy of making an alliance with the urban educated middle classes, its increasing following among both the students and the peasants, highest number of international out-migration from the rural N.W.F.P. areas and skillful undercutting of the external support given to the movement by Afghanistan were the major factors in helping the regime to both overcome the challenge of the regionalists in the N.W.F.P., and in fact contributing to their further decline.

Among the international factors the demonstration effect of the success of the Bangladesh movement and the effect of the multi-national socialist tradition exercised important influences. Among the activities of coethnics, both the Pakistani Pushtuns and the Pakistani Baluchs crossed the Pak-Afghan border and sought help from Afghan. Simultaneously Afghan Pushtuns began to come to Pakistan to seek help against the Daoud regime which was busy liquidating its opponents in Afghanistan. Pakistani Sindhis cultural interaction with Indian Sindhis also showed a phenomenal increase during this phase. Among the foreign states, Afghanistan actively supported the Baluch and Pushtunistan movements but reversed its policy when Pakistan began to counter support the dissident Islamic movement of Afghanistan. Iran, Iraq, the Gulf countries and the Soviet Union were also involved with the movements in varying degrees, but the effects of their support were marginal and largely contributed to the trends generated by the domestic factors.

NOTES

1. See G.W. Choudhury, Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), -- India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, (NY: The Free Press, 1975); Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (NY: Columbia University Press, 1972); Robert V. Jackson, South Asian Crisis (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975); Wayne Wilcox, Emergence of Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973).
2. Three books which chronologically trace the rising currents of regionalism both in East and West Pakistan and provide a perceptive analysis in historical mode are: Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).
3. Pakistan Planning Commission's official documents at the end of the Ayub era had begun to acknowledge that "the economic policy put too much stress on a high rate of growth and neglected the social and regional distribution of the benefits of economic development" cited in G.W. Choudhury (1974) p. 15.
4. For extended analyses of the protest movement: S.J. Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," Asian Survey (March, 1972), W.M. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan," Pacific Affairs (Fall, 1969), Wayne Wilcox, "A Decade of Ayub," Asian Survey (Feb. 1969).
5. See for an analysis of the General Elections: Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes -- 1970," Asian Survey (March 1971).
6. Shariful Mujahid, "Pakistan's First General Elections," Asian Survey (Feb. 1971).
7. The Awami League's six points were: (1) The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary based on universal adult franchise, (2) The federal government shall be responsible only for defense and foreign affairs, (3) There shall be two separate currencies, (4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units, (5) Separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of federating units, (6) The governments of the federating units will be entitled to maintain a militia or a paramilitary force. See the full text: Jackson (1975), p. 166.
8. For Bhutto's biography, see Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980); Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972).

9. This reading of Bhutto's perceptions is based on the following books: Zalfiqar Ali Bhutto: Interviews to the Press (Islamabad: Ministry of Information, n.d.); Z.A. Bhutto, Politics of the People I: Reshaping foreign Policy 1948-1966, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), -- Politics of the People II: Awakening the People 1966-1969, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.) -- Politics of the People III: Marching Towards Democracy, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).
10. Foundation document of the PPP is also a classic example of " a blend of Islamic, Socialistic and liberal democratic values and vocabulary". See for an excellent analysis: Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan Peoples' Party: Phases One and Two," in Pakistan: The Long View (ed.) Lawrence Ziring et.al., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 70-116.
11. Z.A. Bhutto, Political Situation in Pakistan (New Delhi: Veshasher Prakashan, 1969), pp. 8-10.
12. Z.A. Bhutto, Politics of the People I, 1948-1966, p. 35.
13. Dilip Mukerjee (1972), p. 34.
14. See his interview: Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History (NY: Live Right, 1976), p. 206.
15. Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated... (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1979), p. 224.
16. Anwar H. Sayed, (1977); Craig Baxter, "The Peoples' Party vs. The Punjab Feudalists in J.H. Koroson (ed.) Contemporary Problems of Pakistan. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
17. Pakistan scholars writing on the PPP have failed to note this contradiction in the PPP's role. My observation is based on both the interviews with the provincial PPP leaders in Sind as well as the press reports on the election campaign of PPP in the interior of Sind. See Ahmad Jamal Ijaz, "Report on Sind," The Weekly Zindagi 1-7 March 1971. Also see the issues of 1971 reports on Sind in The Weekly Zindagi (Lahore).
18. S.J. Burki remarks: "In coming to power...Bhutto brought with him a party that wanted to totally restructure the country's institutions but had not achieved a consensus on the shape the new structure was to take. The designs that were offered ranged from a Westminster type of parliamentary democracy to a Soviet style dictatorship of the proletariat." See his book, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1980), p. 79.
19. Cited in "Report on Pakistan," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1977.

20. Saalman Taseer (1980), p. 158.
21. See the reports on the political situation from the provinces of N.W.F.P., "Baluchistan and Sind," The Weekly Zindagi, January and February issues, 1972.
22. Cited in Craig Baxter, "The Development of Federalism in Pakistan," Asian Survey, (December 1974).
23. Cited in White Paper on Baluchistan (Islamabad Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 6.
24. See the text of the tripartite agreement: Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), p. 13.
25. Ibid., p. 75.
26. "Baluchistan Ka Siyasi Waqiat Ki Aik Musalsal Kahani," The Weekly Zindagi, February, 1972.
27. Bhutto's strategy was to keep all his options open and not to trust anyone. The NAP leaders became very suspicious of Bhutto's move. Bizenjo said that Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's "sole mission was to bring about a confrontation between the PPP and the NAP." The Morning News Karachi, 29 June, 1972.
28. Bhutto gave special importance to Achackzai and encouraged him to seek center's protection for the Pushtun rights against the Baluch provincial government of Baluchistan. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi) 3, September, 1972.
29. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi) 2 May, 1972.
30. See a detailed interview of Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Mukatar Hasan, "A Meeting with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan," Weekly Rifaqat, 7 November, 1972.
31. The New Times (Rawalpindi), 4 May, 1972.
32. See Nawai-waqt (Rawalpindi), 12 May, 1972.
33. See Wali Khan's statement, The Jang (Rawalpindi) 24 June, 1972.
34. See Mukhtar Hasan's reports on the performance of Baluch provincial government, The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 10 June, 1973. Also the Weekly Adakar 29, August - 4 September, 1972.
35. See an excellent account of the incident of Pat Feeder, "Baluchistan Ka Mada Kaia Hal Ho," Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 7-13 April. 1974.

36. See the leading Baluch elites' interviews: "An Interview with Khair Buksh Marri," The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 3 June, 1973, "An Interview with Aatullah Mengal," The Weekly Azan-i-Haq 14-20 September, 1972.
37. G.M. Sayed had successfully mobilized the students in favor of his demand. He had even demanded in a speech that "All the Mohajirs be sent back to India." See "Sind Khun Khun Ha," The Weekly Zindagi 24-30 July, 1972.
38. See an excellent report on the PPP's election strategy in Sind, Ahmad Jamal Ijazi, "Nafrat-Nafrat," The Weekly Zindgi, 1 March - 7 March, 1971.
39. See the demands of the Mohajirs The Weekly Zindagi, 17-23 July, 1972.
40. See a report on the language riots of Sind, The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 31 December, 1972.
41. This observation is based on the reading of the Press in those days.
42. This observation is based on the reading of the editorials of the Daily Mussawat, the official PPP spokesman.
43. There is alot of evidence available to show that the central elite (PPP and its leaders) consciously hatched several intrigues to destabilize the provincial governments of the NAP. My observations are based on detailed interviews with both the central elite as well as the ethnic elites in the provinces. Also see: Mukhtar Hasan's reports on the provinces, The Weekly Adakar, 29 August - 4 September 1972, Interview of Wali Khan in the Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 11 January, 1978. See Ataullah Mengal's interview, The Morning News, 24 May, 1973. Text of his statement in the Supreme Court, The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 25 August - 2 September 1975. The PPP's official spokesman, The Daily Musawwat's editorials and reports from 18 February, 1972 to February 1973.
44. For the center's perspective see: White Paper on Baluchistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1974).
45. Based on my interview with Sardar Ataullah Mengal in London, 10 October, 1986; Also see Wali Khan's statement in Nawai-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 16 February, 1973.
46. Richard S. Wheeler, "Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of Opposition," Asian Survey (February 1976), p. 111.
47. Zia-ul-Haq's government has issued white papers covering various

- aspects of the performance of the Bhutto regime. Annexures of these white papers contain secret official documents which, though selectively chosen, reveal the real inner working of the Bhutto regime. See White Papers on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. I, II, III, IV (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, January 1979); White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections of 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan) For Bhutto's reply see: Z.A. Bhutto, If I am assassinated... (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1979).
48. See a report, "Torture Claims in India and Pakistan," Far Eastern Economic Review (13 June, 1977).
 49. Cited in Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: A Political Perspective," Asian Survey (July, 1975), p. 630.
 50. Ibid.
 51. See Bhutto's special secretary, Rao Rashid's secret note on Baluchistan situation. Annexures A-97.
 52. He declared his intention to root out 'Bonapartism' from the military holding them responsible for most of the political problems of the country. See for details: Hasan A. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. 251.
 53. Ibid.
 54. If one reads through the white paper annexures, one begins to note that the top elite of the bureaucracy had virtually been in the main advisory capacity of the regime and the PPP was relegated to the secondary position.
 55. See the Bhutto regime's reference against the NAP government, reproduced in Democratic Pakistan, July-September, 1975.
 56. See Mohammad Musa Bhutto's excellent report on the Provincial PPP's policy towards the Sindhi nationalism. The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 3 March and 9 March, 1974.
 57. The Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi), 1 November, 1973.
 58. My interview with the intelligence director of research cell during the PPP's rule.
 59. White Paper on Baluchistan, op. cit. p. 8.
 60. "It is roads and electricity, schools and hospitals rather than any constitutional change for which the people of Baluchistan hunger," Ibid., p. 10.

61. Cited in Harrison (1980), p. 156.
62. For example, Bhuttos Intelligence Director, Rao Rashid, in a secret memo to Bhutto wrote about the strategy of dealing with the National Democratic Party, the successor party to the NAP (NAP was banned in 1975). This note dealt with the issue of "preventing the NDP from coming into the fold of opposition". Rao Rashid wrote: "This can be achieved by attacking their secessionist manifesto. An immediate attack can be launched on the similarity of their program with Mujib's six point program, their plan to reopen the fundamentals of the constitution in proposing redefining of the boundaries of the provinces and encouraging local cultures and languages. If this attack is launched immediately without waiting for a detailed study of their manifesto, it will scare the JUI, the Muslim League and the Punjab generally from accepting the NDP in their fold." Bhutto remarked: "Yes, may try...Keep them out if you can..." White Paper, Vol. III, op. Cit., p. 5-6.
63. This deliberate use of ethnic divisions was noted by the press reporters in all three provinces: Mukhtar Hassan's report on N.W.F.P. in the Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 1 April, 1973, Mohammad Musa Bhutto's report on Sind, Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 3 March - 9 March, 1974, Muslim Querish's report on Baluchistan, Zindgi, 24 December, 1972.
64. The Weekly Takbeer (Karachi), 6 September, 1986.
65. Harrison (1980), pp. 80-86.
66. See for a detailed impact of the Bhutto regime's policies in Sind: Mohammad Musa Bhutto, Sind Kay Halat Ki Sachi Tasveer (Hyderabad: 1976).
67. Ibid.
68. The White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections in March 1977 (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, July 1978) Annexures A-97.
69. See an extended discussion of the consequences of the policies in Baluchistan: Harrison (1980)pp. 65-85; in N.W.F.P. Khalid B. Sayeed (1980) pp. 121-129; in Sind, Musa Bhutto (1976) pp. 45-50.
70. For the center's perspective: See the reference to the Supreme Court reproduced in Democratic Pakistan (London) July-September 1975; Also see Rejoinder in Supreme Court of Pakistan: To Written Statement of Abdul Wali Khan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, August, 1975).
71. See Wali Khan's statement reproduced in Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 11 August 1975 to 16 September - 23 September 1975. Also see his statement before Hamood ur-Rehman commission reproduced in the

- Weekly Adakar 28 August 1972; also his interview in the Weekly Zindagi, 30 December, 1977.
72. Supreme Court Judgement on Dissolution of NAP (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, October 1975).
 73. Wali Khan revealed after his release that Bhutto had offered him three times in the Jail for a conditional release but he refused to accept his offer. See his interview in the Daily Mashriq (Lahore) 10 December 1977.
 74. The political nature of the case was further evident from the fact that the trial had gone on for two years, but only 6 of the 465 witnesses were examined. See The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi) 1 November, 1977.
 75. See the details of the NDP manifesto Dawn (Karachi) 5 May, 1975.
 76. See the details of NDP convention in The Weekly Alfatah (Karachi) 11-18 June, 1976.
 77. Dawn, 16 November, 1975.
 78. Cited in the Supreme Court Judgement (1975), p. 91.
 79. Dawn (Karachi) 20 October, 1973, Also reported in The Jang (Rawalpindi) 31 October, 1973.
 80. Cited in The Supreme Court Judgement (1975), p. 26.
 81. Wali Khan acknowledged later in an interview that because of their "limited strength" they could not launch an effective campaign. See The Weekly Zindagi, 30 December - 5 January, 1978.
 82. See two background articles which discuss the social bases of these two parties "Sarhad Ka Siyasi Mado-Jazar," The Weekly Zindagi 8-15 September, 1970; Ali Ashtar Mirza, "Focus on the Frontier," The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi) 14 May, 1972.
 83. See a report on the University Elections, The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 21 April, 1974.
 84. The MKP was a splinter faction of the NAP (pro-Peking) which had broken away from the main party in 1968. See for a background The Pakistan Forum, October, 1972; Also see for the NAP's position, Wali Khan's interview, The Pakistan Forum, June-July, 1972; Also in the same issue, "Sarhad Peasants Under Attack."
 85. Akhtar Hasan Khan and M.S. Karim, "Migration Patterns in Pakistan During 1970s: Evidence from the 1981 Census Data," Pakistan Administration (July - December, 1983).

86. M. Irfan and G.M. Arif, "Return Migration: An Evidence from the Surveys," unpublished paper.
87. See Mohammad Musa Bhutto, Babul Islam Sind Kay Halat Ka Belag Jaiza (Hyderabad: 1977).
88. Ibid.
89. Rasool Bux Pleejo, Raste Bees Hoiyai (Sindhi).
90. See a report on Sind, Weekly Zindagi, 24 - 30 July, 1972.
91. The Daily Dawn, (Karachi) March 2, 1972.
92. G.M. Sayed, A Nation in Chains, (Bombay: 1976), p. 24.
93. Ibid., p. 57.
94. Ibid., p. 88.
95. See an important interview of Rasool Bux Pleejo: "Unlocking Peoples' Power," The Muslim (Islamabad), July 4, 1986.
96. Rasool Bux Pleejo, Ganwarun Ki Bateen (Sindhi), 1974.
97. Ibid.
98. Based on interviews.
99. Mohammad Musa Bhutto (1976, 1977).
100. See for a brief history of the organization a report on Sind, The Daily Jang (Karachi) 13 June, 1986.
101. Sind Graduates Association: An unpublished report.
102. Based on interviews.
103. Harrison (1981), p. 76.
104. Interview by Kadir Buksh Nizamani, "Democratic Struggle in Baluchistan," in Siyasat (London: 1975).
105. "Unity, Struggle, Freedom", an unpublished Pamphlet of BPLF.
106. See Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan, Pushtunistan, Baluchistan," Aussen Politik (No. 3, 1980).
107. Interview with Khair Bux Marri in the Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 3 June, 1973.
108. See Harrison (1981), pp. 67-120.

109. The Weekly Takbeer (Karachi), 6 September 1986.
110. See his interview in Far Eastern Economic Review, December 23, 1977.
111. See an excellent report, Mukhtar Hasan, "White Paper Ka Andheri - Aжалay," The Weekly Lail-o-Nahar, 27 October - 2 November, 1974.
112. Ibid.
113. The literature published by these movements was greatly influenced by the Bangladesh movement. Especially in Sindhi and Baluchi, many pamphlets appeared on the Awami League's "heroic struggle".
114. For example, in Sind, a very common slogan was adopted, on the Bangladesh movement's pattern, 'Tunjodesh, Moenjo Desh, Sindhu Desh, Sindhu Desh,' (My country, your country, Sind Desh, Sind Desh). G.M. Sayed also mentioned in his book: "As for the armies of Sind, its fighting youth struggling for the liberation of their motherland, like liberation armies, the Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh, will form the vanguard of the Sindhu Desh army," G.M. Sayed, A Nation in Chains, (1974), op. cit. p. 81.
115. G.M. Sayed (1974), p. 281; Inayatullah Baluch (1980), Harrison (1981).
116. Cited in the Weekly Adakar, 12 June, 1972.
117. Cited in Harrison (1981), p. 57.
118. Ibid., p. 49.
119. Ibid., p. 49.
120. See their works cited in footnotes number 42, 95, and 96.
121. Harrison (1981), p. 81.
122. Based on my interviews in Sind.
123. See the two background articles which deal with Afghanistan's transborder contacts: Mukhtar Hasan, "Afghanistan," The Weekly Azan-i- Haq, 13 November, 1972 and The Weekly Rifaqat, 20 November - 26 November, 1972.
124. Harrison (1981), p. 84.
125. "A note on Azad Baluchistan Movement" an unpublished report.
126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.
128. Mohammad Musa Bhutto (1977), p. 76.
129. Ibid.
130. The Pakistan Times, 14 July, 1973.
131. Harrison (1981), p.
132. Based on my interview with Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, the leader of the most effective component of the Afghan resistance.
133. Ibid.
134. Lawrence Lifschultz, "Afghanistan: The Not-so-new Rebellion," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1981.
135. Ibid.
136. Wali Khan had revealed in the National Assembly that the Shah of Iran had opposed the formation of the NAP government in Baluchistan and played a major role in pressuring the Bhutto government to dismiss the Baluch government. The New Times (Rawalpindi), 6 March, 1973.
137. Jean Pierre Viennot, "Les Troubles Ethniques au Pakistan le Baluchistan, Nouveau Bangladesh," Lemonde Diplomatique, November 1973.
138. Harrison (1981), p.
139. Shirin Tahir Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an area of Conflict," Asian Survey, May, 1977.
140. Based on "A Note on Azad Baluchistan Movement," an unpublished report, 1976.
141. The daily Jasarat (Karachi) claimed in its editorial, 11 March, 1973.
142. Based on interviews.

CHAPTER V

RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE ISLAMIC PHASE, 1977-1987

The state elite during the Zia-ul Haq regime, in an attempt to restructure Pakistani society into Islamic mould, reproduced a modified version of the Ayub political system. The state elite during this phase consisted of the Punjabis, the Pushtuns and the Mohajirs while the Sindhis and the Baluchis were greatly underrepresented, a situation similar to the composition of the state elite during the Ayub era. They also pursued unitary policies in political, cultural and economic spheres with remarkably similar consequences. Their policies significantly increased the level of public support for the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and markedly contributed to a near total decline of the Pushtunistan movement.

Among transnational factors, the Marxist coup in Afghanistan (1978) leading to the Soviet military intervention in the country (1979) and the Islamic revolution in Iran (1978) had major demonstration effects on the Pakistani ethno-national movements. Although different components of the movements reacted to these two events differently, but in general, the rising Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements were positively encouraged by these regional developments while the declining Pushtunistan movement was further weakened. Some dissident Pakistani Pushtun and the Baluch tribes continued to stay in Afghanistan, but the influx of three million Afghan refugees in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in

Afghanistan into the NWFP and Baluchistan, mostly Afghan Pushtuns but also Afghan Baluchs, dramatically changed the domestic political scene in the two provinces, leading to an erosion of political support for Pro-Moscow Pushtunistan movement and forcing the leading ethnic elite of Baluch movement to rethink their alternatives. The Sindhi Hindus in India, apparently with some success, made vigorous efforts to persuade the Indian government to give support to the Jeeya Sind movement. Among the foreign countries, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union attempted to reopen 'Pushtun and Baluch national question' by giving diplomatic as well as material support to the Pushtunistan and Baluchistan movements, but had little success. India showed interest in the Jeeya Sind movement but there was little evidence that it gave any active support as well. The net effect of international factors, however, was to reinforce the same regional trends generated by the domestic factors.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section deals with the events leading to the July, 1977 coup d'etat, the new ruler General Zia ul Haq's perceptions and composition of the state elite during the present phase. The second section, 'perspective from the center', discusses the Zia regime's political, cultural and economic policies and their consequences. The third section, 'perspective from the provinces' analyzes organizations, ideologies, strategies and social bases of the ethno-national movements. The final section deals with the international factors.

"Islamic" Pakistan: BackgroundThe Coup d'etat of July 1977

The military deposed Prime Minister Bhutto and took over the country on 5th July, 1977 under the leadership of General Zia ul Haq. This coup d'etat brought back the same pattern of military-bureaucratic rule which Pakistan had experienced under the Ayub rule (1958-1969). The coup was preceded by five-months long agitation against the Bhutto regime which assumed the character of an Islamic movement, unprecedented in Pakistan's political history. Briefly discussing the nature of the movement which led to the July, 1977 coup, we shall discuss General Zia ul Haq's perceptions and the composition of the state elite of the regime in this section.

The opposition parties had formed an alliance against the Bhutto regime on the eve of the March 1977 General Elections.¹ This opposition parties' alliance known as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was a conglomerate of heterogenous political parties ranging from extreme right to left: The Muslim League (ML), the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), the Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Pakistan (JUP), the Jammaat-i-Islami (JI), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal-i-Pakistan (TIP), the Khaksars and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim conference. The only common basis among the PNA's political parties was their opposition to Mr. Bhutto. The PNA launched an agitational movement against the regime in the wake of the General elections, charging that the regime had massively rigged the elections reducing it to a 'farce'.² Bhutto maintained that the

elections were fair and there was no planned rigging as alleged by the opposition parties.³

The PNA's movement assumed an Islamic character when its leaders announced that it was a Tehreek-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa i.e., the movement for the Islamic system of life as given by prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon him). The movement was extremely fierce and continued unabated despite a special announcement by Bhutto promising promulgation of Islamic laws within six months and an immediate prohibition of such unIslamic activities as the use of alcohol, gambling and night clubs.⁴ More than 300 people were killed and over 20,000 were arrested during the movement. In fact, the movement had gone beyond the control of even the PNA leaders⁵. The movement was more successful in the urban areas of Sind in the beginning, but after 9th April's violent demonstration in Lahore, the movement quickly engulfed Punjab as well. By 20th April all the major urban centers of Punjab, Sind and N.W.F.P. were under curfew. The Bhutto regime resorted to a partial martial law in the major urban centers accompanied by a proclamation of a state of emergency, suspending citizens' constitutional rights, placing a long list of penal offenses under the jurisdiction of military courts and amending the army laws to grant the troops wider powers.

As the Bhutto regime became overtly dependent on the military for the maintenance of law and order in the country, the political role of the military grew. In the wake of the protracted dialogue between the PPP and the PNA to reach a political settlement and the perception of the military elite of the failure of the politicians to reach an

agreement, the military finally staged a coup on 5 July, 1977 under the leadership of General Zia ul Haq.

Zia ul Haq's Perceptions

General Zia ul Haq believed that Pakistan was an "ideological state" created only in the "name of Islam".⁶ He acknowledged that the PNA's movement was not an "ordinary agitation" and that it genuinely reflected the people of Pakistan's desire for 'Nizam-i-Islam' (Islamic system). He believed that successive governments in the past had not lived up to the ideals of Islam. It was his duty to bring Islam back. Referring to his process of Islamization, he explained in an interview:

The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan was that the Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was on the two-nation theory that this part was carved out of the subcontinent as Pakistan. And in the last 30 years in general...there has been a complete erosion of the moral values of this society...These are the Islamic values and we are trying to bring these values back.⁷

He placed the concept of Umma, a pan-Islamic unity of the Muslim world ahead of nationalism. He noted:

Islam does not recognize any geographical limits dividing its followers. Muslims are Muslims, regardless of whether they are also Ajami, [foreigner] Arab, Pakistani or Russian. Nationality is irrelevant within the Ummah, within the universal brotherhood of Islam or the commonwealth of Muslim nations. But Islam does recognize separate communities and nations, separate countries within their own geographical frontiers.⁸

Like Ayub, he also hated political process which he considered 'disruptive' of the Muslim community. He believed that in "Islamic democracy" there was no justification for the existence of political parties. He also thought that Pakistan should devise its own version of "limited democracy". He considered Ayub Khan's "basic democracy

system" as a "very good experiment" and on several occasions paid glowing tributes to the Ayub era. In an interview, he admitted that he was a 'great admirer of Ayub" and declared:

Field Marshall Ayub's era was, in my opinion, the golden era of Pakistan. We had a very good army, economic development, industrial growth and every kind of development.⁹

He strongly believed that the armed forces should have a constitutional role to intervene in an emergency in order to resolve a political deadlock and suggested "supervision of the political process by the armed forces". He envisioned a 'Turkish model' for Pakistan where the army's political role had been institutionalized in the constitution.¹⁰

He considered Ayub's one-unit as a 'valid concept' and a 'mistake' on the part of General Yahya to dissolve it. In his view, the problem of regionalism existed in Pakistan primarily because of regional disparity in the economic development patterns of the various provinces. He told an interviewer that economic backwardness of some provinces was 'really the crux of the problem". He said:

In 30 years of Pakistan, we inherited the big province of Punjab, which is very well developed; two small provinces of Sind and NorthWest Frontier province, which are not so well developed and an underdeveloped Baluchistan. Now the underdeveloped province cannot catch up with the rest of the country easily. When the Baluchis see their province so economically underdeveloped, their grumbling is but natural; it becomes a hotbed for subversion. ...We are trying to build up Baluchistan if not to the level of the rest of the country, at least to a major level so that economic disparity is obliterated.¹¹

In sum, Zia wanted what he termed to build a "modern unitary Islamic Pakistan" under the supervision of the army.

State Elite

The state elite of the Zia regime came from the top echelon of the military and bureaucracy. Its composition was remarkably similar to the state elite during the Ayub era. It is primarily because of strict continuance of the same recruitment policies both in the army and the bureaucracy inherited from the colonial era. A recent study of the Pakistan army has shown that soon after independence 77 percent of army recruitment came from Punjab, 19.5 percent from the N.W.F.P., 2.2 percent from Sind and 0.06 percent from Baluchistan.¹² The percentages have remained the same over the years -- as 75 percent of all ex-servicemen still come from only three districts in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Campbellpur) and two districts of the N.W.F.P. (Kohat and Mardan).¹³ A sample of 50 top-most senior army officers shows the following percentages in ethnic terms. (See Table I)

Similarly the top bureaucratic elite's composition has also changed very little since the Ayub era. A survey conducted by the government in 1983 showed the following approximate percentages of top bureaucratic elite in terms of their ethnic origins. (See Table II)

It is clear from the above tables that the Sindhis and Baluchis are greatly underrepresented among the top military-bureaucratic elite. While the Punjabis, Pushtuns and Mohajirs are well or overrepresented. Thanks to similarity in recruitment policies maintained by successive regimes since the colonial era, the composition of the top military bureaucratic elite has changed very little.

TABLE I

ETHNIC ORIGINS OF TOP MILITARY ELITE

Punjabi	20	40%
Pushtun	17	34%
Mohajir	10	20%
Sindhi	1	2%
Baluchis	0	0%
Others	2	4%
	-----	-----
Total	50	100%

Source: "Regional Representation in Pakistan Army: An Unpublished Report," 1981.

TABLE II

ETHNIC ORIGINS OF TOP BUREAUCRATIC ELITE
(Class I Officers)

	Number	Percent
Punjabis	6590	47.94
Pushtuns	1638	11.91
Mohajirs	2382	17.32
Sindhis	601	4.37
Baluchis	103	0.74
Others	2438	17.72
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	13752	100

Source: Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report, January 1983
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1984).

Perspective from the Center

Policies: An Overview

The Zia regime literally implemented the Ayub prescriptions in its political, cultural and economic policies with remarkably similar consequences. It established a highly centralized quasi-federal political system under the name of 'Islamic democracy', pursued unitary policies in the cultural sphere, and embarked upon vigorous economic development policies towards the provinces. We briefly analyze the main contours of the policies in political, cultural and economic spheres and their consequences.

Political

The regime, in the beginning, maintained a semblance of constitutional facade by upholding the 1973 constitution, but gradually established a highly unitary and authoritarian political system through a series of sweeping and arbitrary constitutional amendments in 1981 and 1985. The amendments through the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) of 1981 and Revival of Constitutional Order (RCO) of 1985 were virtually tailored to suit the interests of the ruling military junta.¹⁴ According to the amendments, the President would emerge stronger and appoint the Prime Minister. The general thrust of the amendments was to further reinforce an already strong executive and weaken other institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary. The amendments restored a highly centralized quasi-federal political system reminiscent of Ayub's political system of the sixties.¹⁵ They made the President a virtual total 'custodian of power', including the

power to dissolve the parliament at his will. The amendments also empowered him to appoint Governors and all important key officials in the provinces. Accounting for the rationale of the amendments, Zia declared that the 1973 constitution was "unIslamic" and needed to be "corrected."¹⁶ The regime seriously tempered with the federal character of the state by acquiring the powers to appoint all the key officials in the provinces, in effect restoring the one-unit policy of the Ayub regime without making any formal announcement for it.¹⁷

The Zia regime, through a series of intricate maneuvers, embarked upon a policy of controlled democracy under the name of so-called "Islamic democracy".¹⁸ In the wake of the 1981 amendments, it nominated a pro-regime Majlis-i-Shura (consultative assembly) and attempted to run the country without giving any share of power to political parties. It also sought to control political parties through the Political Parties Act of 1962 (promulgated by the Ayub regime) under which the regime had the discretion to ban any party which acted in "any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan" or held "views defaming or ridiculing the Judiciary or Armed Forces".¹⁹ Alarmed by a gradual rise in public protest against the regime, it held a sham national referendum and party-less elections in 1985.²⁰

Zia himself sought to legitimize his own role as the President through an ambiguously worded questionable national referendum indicating that a "yes" vote for Islam would automatically mean that he would continue as President for the next five years, thus cleverly intertwining the issue of the legitimacy of his rule with the virtually noncontroversial issue of Islam.²¹ Having secured his position, he

sought to implement Ayub's original idea of organizing the nation's life without political parties. Zia had already declared several times that the existence of multiple political parties was "unIslamic" as they subverted and divided the "muslim community" along factional lines.²² The regime banned political parties and held party-less national and provincial assemblies' elections (1985). By changing the ground rules, Zia sought to ensure that no united national level political opposition should emerge to threaten the vested power interests of the top military-bureaucratic elite. Later, after 'positive results' were achieved, the regime allowed the revival of political parties. On the eve of the elections, Zia made it clear that there will not be a 'transfer of power' to the elected representatives but only a 'sharing of power' with them.²³

The regime followed a policy of cooptation towards the Baluch and the Pushtun leaders and a policy of suppression towards the Sindhi leaders. It released the principal Baluch and Pushtun leaders who had been arrested during the Bhutto regime, dropping the charges of 'treason' against them. It also offered a general amnesty to those who had fought against the army in Baluchistan during 1973-77 and sought to compensate their losses by paying them money. The military elite especially offered the Baluch tribal elite highly lucrative business opportunities in the form of ship-breaking contracts, incentives for industrialization and allocation of funds for development projects.²⁴ The principal Pushtun leader, Wali Khan, was twice offered the Prime-Ministership of the country, which he declined.²⁵ The regime also sought the Pushtun leaders' advice on a variety of domestic and

external matters in the early years, as long as they supported the military regime.²⁶ Zia himself met Abdul Ghaffar Khan and told him that he was willing to rename the N.W.F.P. whatever name Abdul Ghaffar Khan proposed other than 'Pushtunistan' which was controversial.²⁷ He also publically declared Abdul Ghaffar Khan "as patriotic as any other Pakistani".²⁸

Zia followed a policy of repression in Sind. The regime adopted a number of both subtle and strong-handed methods to break the PPP's and other regionalist parties' power in Sind. They involved selective application of land reforms and Islamic agricultural taxes (Ushar) against the anti-regime landlords, banning the Sind Graduates Association, frequent arrests and summary trials by the military courts, and purgation of the Sindhi officials from both the provincial and central administration, who allegedly had sympathies with the PPP.²⁹ The PPP, in alliance with the other regionalists parties launched the movement for the restoration of democracy in 1983 and 1986. The Zia regime proceeded to crush the movements as ruthlessly as possible.³⁰ It employed nearly two divisions of the army (40,000) to crush the movement and also used the gunship helicopters to straff the villages. In the wake of the party-less elections, Zia consciously appointed a Sindhi Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo to head the new government to give a sense of participation to the Sindhis apparently to counter-balance the Punjabi dominance institutionalized by Zia's presidency.³¹ The regime also in the wake of the 1983 movement adopted some partial measures such as the extension of the quota system for the

Sindhis in government employments for another ten years and special attention to the educated unemployed Sindhis.³²

Cultural

The regime emphasized that it wanted to restructure Pakistani society along Islamic lines. Zia declared:

We [the military] have no intention of leaving power till the establishment of our objectives of Islamization of the national polity and induction of decency in politics. Until then neither I will step down nor will let any one rise.³³

The regime embarked upon a wide variety of measures to Islamize the society such as the promulgation of the Shariah laws, interest free banking and imposition of Islamic taxes. The detailed discussion of the regime's Islamization measures has been the subject of several excellent articles and is outside the focus of this study.³⁴ We shall, however, briefly mention two aspects of the policies having direct bearing on the regional tendencies, the role of Pakistani nationalism and the policy of one language within the framework of the broader concept of the unity of the Ummah (Islamic community) stressed by the regime.

The regime officially began to emphasize the role of Pakistani nationalism within the Islamic context. It changed the official dress to Shalwar Kameez, launched special campaigns to celebrate independence day with an unusual vigour and emphasized unitary aspects of the Islamic culture. The motto "Faith, Discipline, Unity" was ostentatiously displayed in every public building and the birth and death anniversaries of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah were celebrated with more than usual enthusiasm. Special

campaigns to popularize the waving of national flags were officially sponsored.

The emphasis on one language, i.e. Urdu, and its primacy over the regional language returned. The role of regional languages was deliberately deemphasized. Zia stated that his regime's policy was to let Urdu assume the role of national language and to keep English as a subsidiary language. He declared:

...We have Pushto...Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi, but there should be one language which should be official, but that can come gradually, it will take a lot of time...In a nutshell, the policy is that whereas Urdu should be able to assume the role of a national language, English shall be kept as a subsidiary subject.³⁵

It was announced that Urdu will replace English at the matriculation level by 1989.³⁶

Economic

The regime also resorted to the vigorous development policies towards the provinces. The aim of the economic policy has been to focus on the underdeveloped areas of N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan to remove the sharp interprovincial economic disparities. Zia emphasized that this differential development pattern among the provinces was "really" the "cause" of "regionalism". He explained:

There is no other problem and, in my opinion, this [economic underdevelopment] is the crux of the whole political issue. If we can solve this problem, which we are trying to do, to boost up the underdeveloped areas like Baluchistan, I think 80 percent of the problem will be solved. The remaining 20 percent is politics, which the politicians should solve.

The Zia regime like its predecessor regimes accorded highest priority to building infrastructure, especially, roads, telephones,

electricity and improving means of communication. It also allocated funds for expansion of educational facilities, health facilities and a wide variety of rural development schemes. The regime gave special attention to politically troubled Baluchistan. Under the Special Development Plan (SDP) 82-88 it chalked up a Rs. 20 billion plan with the assistance of foreign friendly countries -- the U.S., U.K., Japan, West Germany, Canada and a number of Arab countries and international aid-giving agencies. Under SDP, stress has been laid on such projects as could provide efficient physical infrastructure, with fifty percent of SDP outlay set aside for communication.³⁷ The rest of them were devoted to education, industrialization and rural development projects.

Consequences

The consequences of the policies of the regime led to a dramatic rise of ethno national tendencies in Sind and Baluchistan and a virtually near total decline of the Pushtun identity in the N.W.F.P. We discuss the consequences of the policies with special reference to the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan.

As the policies of the regime tended to centralize power in the hands of the military-bureaucratic elite, the situation came to resemble very closely the Ayub era with the difference that this regime employed Islamic terminology. The Sindhis and the Baluchis were nearly totally unrepresented in the power structure while the Pushtuns, the Punjabis and the Mohajirs were fairly well or overrepresented among the top state elite. In Sind and Baluchistan, widely held public perceptions towards the military and bureaucracy as two 'alien

institutions' nurtured since the Ayub era, continued to prevail. In the absence of power-sharing, virtually every decision of the regime was perceived in ethnic terms. For example, Bhutto's hanging, though after an elaborate judicial trial through normal procedure, was widely perceived by the Sindhis as an execution of a Sindhi Prime Minister by the Punjabi army.³⁸ Similarly the execution of some Baluch students on the criminal charges of murder were widely believed to be the work of the 'alien Punjabi imperialists' in Baluchistan.³⁹

As the regime through arbitrary constitutional amendments effectively abrogated the 1973 constitution and moved towards the restoration of the one-unit policy in defacto terms, its policies catalyzed the demand for a confederal arrangement among the two units of the federation.⁴⁰ A Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front was formed in April 1985 as a direct reaction to the March 1985 constitutional amendments. Its declaration stated:

The federal character of the state having been destroyed, the covenant between constituent units has been broken and Pakistan has been turned into occupied territory, where the Sindhi, Baluch and Pushtun peoples are held in bondage...the four constituent units [of Pakistan] through voluntary participation, and as equal partners, must now form, and coexist as, a confederation, wherein the constituent states are autonomous and sovereign, and only such powers vest in the federal entity as are expressly conferred on it. There must be a total decentralization of authority, as a strong center is completely alien to the real concept of Pakistan, and intolerable in a confederal structure.⁴¹

Despite its name, the Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front as we shall discuss in the next section primarily gained its following in Sind and Baluchistan only. There was little following of the Front in the N.W.F.P.

The most significant consequence of the party-less elections has been that the political campaign inevitably revolved around tribal

ethnic and sectarian issues in the absence of any programme.⁴² Opportunist local power holders, principally the land owning rural class emerged victorious in the elections and the regime was more than happy to make them a junior partner in the power game both at the center and in the provinces.⁴³ Having already secured power through amendments and a bogus referendum, the regime proceeded to establish a democratic show principally with the help of the compliant landlords.

The policy of 'limited democracy' and the party-less elections also left the major opposition parties outside the political process. Intendedly or unintendedly the regime helped to regionalize the political process. The NDP was confined to the N.W.F.P., the PPP was confined to Sind and the PNP was limited to Baluchistan. All three parties, despite their national orientation, were forced to play regional roles due to the policy of the military-bureaucratic elite which did its best to prevent any national democratic opposition alliance against the regime.⁴⁴ The regime as a matter of policy, not only tended to break the major opposition parties who had entered into an alliance, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) under the PPP leadership, but also played a major role in sowing the seeds of disunity among the pro-regime political parties as well who were formerly allied with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The regime also found it useful even to seek an informal cooperation from the secessionist components of the Jeeya Sind movement, the Pushtunistan movement and the Baluch movement in order to weaken the prospects of emergence of any national democratically oriented opposition to the regime.⁴⁵

The policy of cooptation of the Pushtun elite in the N.W.F.P. had some success as the regime was able to enlist the support of the principal Pushtun elite both traditional as well as educated middle class. A great factor in the success of the regime was attributable to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the consequent changes in the life of the province which we shall discuss in detail below.

The policy of cooptation of the Baluch elite through the use of funds had a mixed success. It has quieted the guerrilla opposition in the short run, but generated a blackmailing mentality among the middle level tribal elite who are willing to work for any higher bidder. Finding themselves in the midst of international attention in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, they have become more susceptible to external powers' overtures and more willing to exploit the central government's sensitivities.⁴⁶

The policy of suppression in Sind led to a full scale armed rebellion against the regime in 1983. Estimates of casualties differ, the government sources claimed 50 dead and 200 injured while the Sindhi nationalists estimated 800 dead and 1500 injured.⁴⁷ The impartial observers put the casualties figure at 600 both dead and injured.⁴⁸ The intensity of the rebellion in Sind took most political observers by surprise. All the symbols of the government -- courts, railway stations, post offices, jails and police-stations -- were vehemently attacked by angry mobs.⁴⁹ The movement flared up again in 1986 forcing the regime to redeploy two divisions of the army (40,000 troops) to maintain the law and order situation in Sind.

The Islamization policies of the regime with their unitary emphasis in cultural sphere in general and the stress on the one language policy in particular pushed even the moderate factions among the regional movements to support the demand for a confederal structure, eroding the consensus achieved in the 1973 constitution on the division of powers between the center and the provinces. Nearly all the major opposition parties under MRD, have moved closer to the position of regional parties on the issue of provincial autonomy. The MRD parties now favor a weak center with only four subjects, defense, currency, foreign affairs and communication and the rest of the powers to the provinces. An analyst observed:

The change in the MRD stand seems indicative of the rising level of ethnic and provincial discontent which they are trying to control and contain within the framework of one Pakistan.⁵⁰

Economic development policies in Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P. and Sind are perceived as more strategically oriented in the context of changes occurring in Pakistan's international environment and less directed to real development. The perceived defense-oriented thrust of the infrastructural development in Sind and Baluchistan has alarmed the educated middle classes who view the objective of these policies to acquire better means of control on the part of the security-conscious regime. Furthermore direct involvement of the Western powers especially the U.S. role in Baluchistan has strengthened the suspicions of leftist-oriented educated middle class of Baluchistan that the regime is more interested in countering the Soviet threat arising out of Afghanistan situation rather than developing their provinces in the real sense.⁵¹

Perspective from the Provinces: Movements

The Pushtunistan movement nearly completely declined while the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement significantly emerged on Pakistan's political scene during this phase. The decline of the Pushtunistan movement and the rise of the Jeeya Sind and Baluch movements was deeply connected to the distribution of power at the center and the nature of policies pursued by the state elite. We discuss the decline and rise of these movements in this section.

N.W.F.P.

Pushtunistan Movement

Organization

The National Democratic Party (NDP) which had been formed in 1976 in the aftermath of the ban on the NAP by the Bhutto regime, continued to remain the chief organizational vehicle under the leadership of Wali Khan. The NDP, though theoretically a national party, remained chiefly confined to the N.W.F.P. province only. Its Baluchistan wing broke away from the party and formed another party, Pakistan National Party (PNP). There emerged factionalism in the NDP over both the manifesto as well as the strategy to be pursued vis-a-vis the regime. The moderate faction of the NDP was led by Sher Baz Mazari, who revealed that the extremist left oriented faction predominated in the party which wanted elimination of clauses relating to Islam from the manifesto, the right of secession to the four nationalities inhabiting Pakistan and special emphasis on the relationship with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc to be included in the party programme.⁵²

Apparently, under the pressure from the extremist left wing, the name of the NDP's N.W.F.P. branch was also changed to the Pushtun Khwah NDP.⁵³ The NDP also continued to maintain allegiance of its affiliate students' organization, the Pushtun Students Federation.

The NDP leaders, initially, continued to insist that the issue of the provincial autonomy had been settled in the 1973 constitution and there was little need for reopening the issue, but gradually began adopting an ambivalent attitude towards the regional autonomy issue, supporting the demand for the confederal arrangements. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the veteran leader of the Pushtunistan movement claimed that he was the first to present the confederation proposal which had been taken up by the Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front later.⁵⁴

In August 1986, the NDP leader, Wali Khan, initiated a merger of four left based regional parties of Pakistan under the name of Awami National Party (ANP).⁵⁵ Its program emphasized struggle against imperialism, rights of nationalities, recognition of the Soviet-installed Marxist regime in Afghanistan and a special relationship with the socialist bloc. It was a reincarnation of the former NAP under a new name.

Ideology and Strategy

The NDP leaders supported the military government's policies in the beginning and insisted that the issue of the provincial autonomy was a settled matter according to the 1973 constitution.⁵⁶ Their support to the military government was due to both the cooptive policy of the Zia regime and the reaction against the PPP's oppressive

policies towards their party. According to one observer, the NDP leaders even played an advisory role to the regime on the domestic and foreign policy matters in their brief courtship with the Zia regime.⁵⁷ However, as the Zia regime became reluctant to hold elections on a party basis and embarked upon its own version of party-less controlled democracy, the NDP leaders became ambivalent on the regional autonomy issue. Wali Khan declared:

Pushtuns could live in Pakistan only as equal partners with the peoples of Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. Otherwise there might be a parting of ways sooner or later.⁵⁸

At another occasion, Wali Khan declared that if the unrepresentative military-bureaucratic elite continued to rule the country, the smaller provinces might go even beyond confederation and seek independence with the assistance of external powers. Visiting India in 1984, he stated: "We have just four provinces. We do not have one country".⁵⁹

Enthusiastic supporters of the NDP openly raised the slogans of "Greater Pushtunistan" and "long live Babrak Karmal regime of Afghanistan" in the public meetings.⁶⁰

The NDP joined the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1981 and took part in various agitations launched by the movement against the regime. However, it could not effectively mobilize any public support in the province. The NDP general secretary, Ghulam Ahmad Bilor publically admitted the failure of the NDP to mobilize the masses in the N.W.F.P. and said that the people of his province and Baluchistan were convinced that until Punjab comes forward to lead the movement it would not succeed.⁶¹

The NDP leaders remained indifferent to the Marxist regime in Afghanistan in 1978 and even opposed the Taraki and Amin regimes' Pushtunistan campaigns. Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared that successive Afghan governments had just exploited the Pushtunistan issue for their political ends.⁶² There were three main reasons for their indifference towards the Marxist regime's Pushtunistan campaign. First they were still hopeful that the military government of Zia-ul Haq would hold party-based elections, therefore, they were giving qualified support to the regime. Second, they did not personally know the new Kabul rulers and third, they believed that the new regime's nationality policies (to be discussed in the next section in detail) were actually aimed at reducing the historical Pushtun dominance in the Afghan state. In the wake of the Soviet military intervention and the installation of Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan in 1979, the NDP leaders took a pro-Soviet stand on the Afghanistan issue. Abdul Ghaffar Khan described the conflict in Afghanistan as a 'war between the Soviet Union and the United States' and cautioned the Pushtuns that they would be lost in the Afghan war and should better stay away from it.⁶³ Both Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan repeatedly issued several anti-refugees statements terming them as 'traitors' to the Afghan regime. The NDP leaders also acknowledged that they were sending the members of the Pushtun Students Federation to Afghanistan for educational purposes and criticized the Pakistani government for banning the employment on these educated Pakistani Pushtuns trained by the Afghan regime. Wali Khan acknowledged in a press statement:

We requested the Afghan government to provide educational facilities for the sons of poor Pushtuns and they acceded to our

request...the Pakistani rulers were denying these boys employment in Pakistan. We don't accept this posture because we have every right in our land.⁶⁴

According to one estimate, about 500 young Pushtuns have crossed the Pak-Afghan border since 1979 apparently to receive education in Afghanistan or in the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ The NDP leaders also severely criticized Pakistan government's policy on Afghanistan and campaigned for the recognition of Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan by Pakistan.

Social Base

The social base of the Pushtunistan movement nearly completely declined during this phase. There were three important reasons for this decline: (1) High share of the Pushtuns among the state elite, (2) Rise of the national parties' political support vis-a-vis the NDP, (3) Refugees factor and public perceptions in the N.W.F.P.

Among the state elite the Pushtun share has been disproportionately high next to the Punjabis (see Tables I and II). More importantly, the Pushtun component of the N.W.F.P. both in the military as well as bureaucracy came primarily from those districts which had traditionally been the strongholds of the Pushtunistan movement. A senior military officer revealed that the military has been getting the best of its officers corps from Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat and the tribal Pushtun belt.⁶⁶ Similarly a district-wide analysis of the top bureaucrats also shows that the same districts -- Peshawar, Mardan and Kohat -- together represented the highest chunk,

44.32 percent of the Pushtun component.⁶⁷ It is significant to note that the Pushtun leaders loudly demand their equal share in the national life at par with the other provinces, but privately do recognize that the Pushtuns have a greater share in the national institutions. Wali Khan in his written statement to the Supreme Court admitted that the Pushtuns were disproportionately highly represented in both the armed forces and the civil services.⁶⁸

Another important reason for the decline of the NDP has been the rise of political support for the rival national political parties to NDP, the Muslim League, the PPP, and the Jammāt-i-Islāmī in the province. This trend which was already visible since the 1970 general election apparently picked up pace. The Pushtun landed elite which had traditionally supported the NDP, was confused over the initial qualified support of their leaders to the military regime. When the NDP leaders stopped supporting the regime, many of the Pushtun landlords continued to support the regime and switched over their loyalties to the pro-regime Muslim League. The PPP also increased its support among middle sized landlords, professional middle classes and lower classes. Its affiliate students organization, Peoples' Students Federation significantly won in the provincial colleges in 1981.⁶⁹ The most important gain, however, was that of Jammāt-i-Islāmī which heavily capitalized on the Afghan situation and was able to increase its support in the traditional strongholds of the NDP. Its affiliate wing, Islāmī Jamiat-i-Talba was also significantly making its presence felt in the colleges of the province. In the absence of party-based elections, it is difficult to exactly determine the relative electoral

strength of the parties. The 1985 party-less election though an imperfect indicator because of the boycott of the political parties, nevertheless, shows that the candidates having affiliation with the Muslim League, the PPP and the Jammat-i-Islami succeeded in winning most of the national and provincial assemblies' seats in the province. The candidates affiliated with the NDP suffered defeat even in their traditional rural constituencies of Peshawar and Mardan.⁷⁰

Keeping in view the rising share of the Pushtuns in top echelon of the military and bureaucracy in general and disproportionately higher share especially from those districts which had constituted the support base of the movement, as well as, the rising level of political support of other rival parties to the NDP, it is fair to assume that the educated Pushtun middle class has been drifting away from the Pushtun based NDP, either finding access to the military and bureaucracy or supporting other Pakistan-based parties against the NDP. The NDP leadership also recognizes their decline but attributes state violence against them and political propaganda by the successive regimes as the major causes of their decline. Wali Khan admitted in an interview:

We could not cater for the middle generation which was born and brought up after the formation of Pakistan.⁷¹

Another NDP leader, Latif Afridi, was more forthright in admitting the failure of the Pushtunistan movement in attracting the younger generation, but blamed it on the failure of leadership's strategy to adjust to the changing circumstances. Latif Afridi said:

No doubt [Pushtun] nationalists made heroic sacrifices...But they also failed to realize that the British - whose presence united the Pathans across class cleavages - had left. They failed to appreciate that a process of urbanization was on. Professional


middle classes were expanding and capital accumulation taking over the agrarian base of the economy.⁷²

The third most important factor in the decline of the Pushtunistan movement has been the influx of three million refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in December 1979. The N.W.F.P. sheltered nearly 75 percent of the refugees, 2.1 million out of 3 million. A look at the map shows how drastically the arrival of the refugees has affected the demographic structure of the provincial population. Eighty percent of the refugees have been Pushtuns and the N.W.F.P. has been an ideal place for their temporary stay because of geographical contiguity, climatic similarity and close tribal affinities, further augmented by intermarriages.⁷³

In the wake of the world's largest refugees influx in contemporary history (about one-fifth of the Afghanistan's population) most observers feared that Pakistan would become another Lebanon. The widely speculated scenario was that tensions would arise between locals and non-locals leading to a condition of internal civil war. But this scenario did not materialize because of the intelligent policy of the government to consciously avoid any possible frictions, timely international assistance and, above all, overwhelming public support for the refugees.⁷⁴ There was a markedly noticeable resurgence of Islamic identity which was the most important factor in sustaining the tranquil situation between the refugees and locals. The refugee commissioner, Abdullah, emphasized in an interview:

The people often don't realize that it is an unprecedented resurgence of a spirit of Muslim brotherhood and rekindling of the memories of Jihad (Holy War) which has been actually the basic factor in keeping a tranquility in the N.W.F.P. and in the

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN
N.W.F.P.



sustenance of both the Afghan refugees and the resistance against the Soviets.⁷⁵

There has been a massive out-pouring of public sympathies for the Afghan refugees both at the national level as well as at the provincial level. In a nationally representative survey conducted in April 1980, 87 percent of the respondents said the government of Pakistan must help the Afghan refugees (see Tables III and IV). A follow-up question in the same survey educated the respondents on the possible cost of supporting the Afghan refugees. Only 3 percent became reluctant to support the Afghan refugees when they were told that it could provoke Soviet hostility. This public opinion survey was repeated in 1982, 1983 and 1984. There is a slight decline in the public support for the Afghan refugees, but it still remains overwhelming. The public opinion survey also probed the willingness to give private help to the refugees: only 13 percent disapproved that Pakistanis in their personal capacity should help the Afghan refugees. It is significant that this high level of public support to the Afghan refugees is maintained despite realizing that the refugees are an economic burden, and the fear that they may be infiltrated by saboteurs.

The NDP leaders' pro-Moscow stance on the Afghan issue and their hostile attitude towards the Afghan refugees, mostly Pushtuns, was sharply at variance with the public perceptions. The survey also found out that 62 percent of the NDP voters did not agree with their own leadership on the issue which was directly concerned with the fate of their Pushtun brethern.⁷⁶ The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, the other rural based Pushtun party in the N.W.F.P., which was a coalition partner of the NDP during the Bhutto era, completely disassociated itself from the

TABLE III

Public Support for the Afghan Refugees

	Percent of Respondents					
	Agree		Don't agree		Don't know	
	1983	1984	1983	1984	1983	1984
Afghan refugees must be supported by the Pakistan government	84	76	9	11	7	13
Afghan refugees must be supported by every Pakistani	80	75	11	13	9	12

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

TABLE IV

Public Apprehension About the Afghan Refugees

	Percent of Respondents					
	Agree		Don't agree		Don't know	
	1983	1984	1983	1984	1983	1984
Afghan refugees are an economic burden on Pakistan's economy	66	67	26	21	8	12
Afghan refugees are heavily infiltrated by saboteurs	43	47	47	37	11	16

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

NDP on this issue. Its chief Mufti Mahmud, referring to the NDP leaders, declared that those who called the refugees "traitors", had destroyed the Pushtun values.⁷⁷

This factor has so radically altered the political alignments in the province that it has virtually turned the tables on the proponents of the Pushtunistan movement, discrediting them completely in the eyes of the masses leading to a near total erosion of their political support. Furthermore, most of the refugees are extremely anti-Soviet and an overwhelming proportion of them belongs to or sympathizes with one or other Afghan resistance groups affiliated with the Islamic organizations. The refugees and the resistance organizations found the Islamic parties as natural allies both in the relief work for the refugees as well as in their Jihad (Holy War) against the Soviets. Commenting on the implications of the changing political scene of the N.W.F.P., a perceptive analyst rightly concluded:

The Frontier Province which was known at home and abroad for secessionist tendencies, demonstrated today more intense patriotism than any other part of the country. The Pushtunistan issue which in the last decade, as in the previous two, was the major thorn in Pak-Afghan relations has suddenly disappeared from the agenda. The former proponents of Pushtunistan have become in a matter of a few years the nativist opponents of the Afghan refugees, while the Islamic opponents of Pushtunistan appear to be the major champions of Afghan inroads in the Pakistani territory.⁷⁸

Sind

The Jeeya Sind Movement

Organization

The Jeeya Sind Mahaz (G.M. Sayed faction) began to play increasingly important role among the younger educated Sindhis. Dr.

Hamida Khuro, who replaced G.M. Sayed as the chairman of the Jeeya Sind Mahaz, pleaded for drafting a new constitution for Pakistan envisioning greater quantum of autonomy for the provinces with the center retaining only defense, currency, communication and foreign affairs. She also demanded a principle of parity in the services and rightful share for the Sindhis in the bureaucracy and the army.⁷⁹ An affiliate body of the Jeeya Sind movement, Sind Graduates Association (SGA) whose role had remained relatively dormant until 1977, became very active in the wake of the ban on the political activities. Apparently, under such non-political activities, protection of Sindhi officials' interests in government and semi government organizations, monitoring the quotas fixed for the Sindhis and a host of other welfare activities, it significantly began to emerge as the principal organization of the Jeeya Sind movement's objectives. The SGA had 42 branches throughout Sind and had an estimated membership between 4000 and 6000.⁸⁰ The Zia government put an effective ban on the organization in June, 1983, by instructing the government officials to stay away from its membership.⁸¹

The Sind Awami Tehreek led by Rasool Bux Pleejo was renamed as the Awami Tehreek. It began to work for a multi-national socialist Pakistan in alliance with the other leftist forces in Pakistan. At Sind level, it concentrated its efforts in consolidating its strength by establishing various affiliate sub-organizations such as Sind Hari Committee, Sindhi Shagird Tehreek, Sindhi Porhiat Sangat and Sindhiani Women Tehreek, representing peasants, students, labourers and women

respectively.⁸² The Sind Awami Tehreek stood for class struggle and basic changes along socialist lines.

The Sind PPP, out of power, reverted to its earlier role of an aggressive regionalist party. One faction led by Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada formed the Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front in 1985 and began to work for confederation.⁸³ The other faction led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazeer Bhutto continued to maintain that the provincial autonomy issue had been resolved in the 1973 constitution and there was no need for reopening it. But in practice, the PPP maintained an ambivalent position i.e. to side essentially with the regionalist position at the provincial level and to maintain the theoretical position at the national level.

Ideology and Strategy

The objectives of the Jeeya Sind Mahaz (G.M. Sayed's faction) were ambivalent. G.M. Sayed, who had turned secessionist during the Bhutto era continued to maintain his position that he had little to do with any movement for the restoration of democracy within the framework of united Pakistan.⁸⁴ He believed that as long as there was martial law it was good for the Jeeya Sind movement, because the continued martial law would spell the death-knell for existing Pakistan and would eventually lead to conditions favorable to the formation of Sindhu Desh.⁸⁵ However, the new chairman, Dr. Hamida Khuro, representing the educated middle class, argued that it was a static position and the Sindhis could not wait that long to get their rights in some distant hypothetical future state. She maintained that the Jeeya Sind Mahaz

stood for a loosely federal united Pakistan where each province enjoyed maximum provincial autonomy.⁸⁶

The Jeeya Sind Mahaz adopted a strategy of partial cooperation and partial confrontation with the martial law regime. Its leadership maintained contacts with the high functionaries of the Zia regime and did not refrain from obtaining personal and other favors which the regime was willing to grant because of its own objective of weakening the strength of the PPP in Sind. But the Jeeya Sind leadership also supported the confederation proposal advanced by Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front and its followers actively participated in the two major anti-regime campaigns launched by the PPP and other regionalists in 1983 and 1986, described below in detail. As a part of the strategy, the Jeeya Sind Mahaz also extended its hand of cooperation towards the principal Mohajir regional organization, Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), a Karachi based leftist organization working for the national rights of the Mohajirs.

Sind Awami Tehreek, led by Rasool Bux Pleejo worked for the multi-national socialist Pakistan. It did not agree with the Jeeya Sind Mahaz on the objective of Sindhu Desh and strictly placed its objectives within the framework international socialist class struggle. Simultaneously it also considered the liberation of the Sindhi nation from the oppression of other nations as its primary responsibility. Pleejo put it succinctly in an interview:

We may be internationalists, but we have our roots in Sind. That is our first responsibility. In my view, Sindh has been the most oppressed province of Pakistan...In Sindh, the Sindhis have been reduced to a minority. Waves upon waves of a literal flood of people have come and taken our lands and our jobs and become rulers over us.⁸⁷

Sind Awami Tehreek joined the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and took the most active and enthusiastic part in the civil disobedience movements of 1983 and 1986. It joined hand with the Awami National Party (ANP) in August 1986. It also actively campaigned for the recognition of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan.

The Sind PPP assumed the role of the regional party at the provincial level. Its various factions competed with each other to win the loyalties of the Sindhi voters. A faction led by Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, the two most important members of the cabinet during the Bhutto era, formed the Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front and worked for a confederal Pakistan. The proposed confederation would consist of four states of Sindhi, Baluchi, Pushtun and Punjabi peoples. The center, as a result of surrender by the states will have authority only on the following four subjects: 1) Defense, 2) Foreign Affairs, 3) Currency, 4) Communication.⁸⁸ The mainstream PPP, led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazeer Bhutto, however, disowned the confederalists and insisted on the distribution of powers agreed between the center and the provinces in the 1973 constitution. The party, however, returned to its traditionally held ambivalent posture. At the national level it maintained its theoretical position of insisting on the validity of the 1973 constitution to retain its following in the other provinces, but at the provincial level it assumed a regionalist role and exploited similar issues which the other components were exploiting. The main issue which the Sind PPP exploited was Bhutto's execution by the Martial Law regime. It was termed as a 'judicial murder' by the 'Punjabi army'. Bhutto was given

the status of a 'Shaheed' (Martyr) in the cause of the poor masses of Sind.⁸⁹ The propaganda that a 'Sindhi Prime Minister' was murdered on the verdict of 'Punjabi judges' by the 'Punjabi army' had a devastating effect when the Zia regime delayed the execution of the other four convicted along with Bhutto who were all Punjabis.

Despite differences in their objectives, all three parties -- the Jeeya Sind Mahaz, Sind Awami Tehreek and the Sind PPP -- coordinated their strategies in the movement for the restoration of democracy in 1983 and 1986 against the regime. The movements though launched at the national level, remained primarily confined to Sind province. The intensity of the 1983 movement in Sind, particularly surprised most observers. Angry mobs attacked all the symbols of the federal government -- banks, government offices, courts, colleges, post-offices, railway stations, jails and arsenals.⁹⁰ According to official sources, 61 were killed, 200 were injured and 4691 people were arrested in the movement.⁹¹ The Sindhi nationalists estimated 800 killed, 2000 injured and thousands of people arrested.⁹² Most impartial observers estimated the casualty figure at 600 and 800-1000 injured.⁹³

Social Base

The Jeeya Sind movement made most significant headway in terms of gaining public support in Sind during this phase. The most important reason for the rise of the movement has been a near total exclusion of the Sindhis from the state elite (See Table I and Table II). They have been virtually unrepresented in the higher echelon of the military and greatly underrepresented among top bureaucratic elite. A district-wide

analysis of the ethnic background of top bureaucratic elite shows that the interior Sind districts -- Dadu, Thatta, Tharparkar, Badin, Jacobabad, and Sanghar are especially underrepresented.⁹⁴ Besides a virtual exclusion from the power sharing arrangements, the policy of overt oppression in Sind by the Zia regime, led to a combined protest by all the regionalist elements in Sind under the leadership of Sind PPP, which erupted in the 1983 and 1986 movements.

A comparative analysis of the two protest movements of 1983 and 1986 reveal the following social bases of the movement (see Table V). An analysis of the arrests made by the authorities showed that the largest component of those arrested in the 1983 movement came from the PPP (72.39%) followed by Sind Awami Tehreek (13.45), and Jeeya Sindh Mahaz and others (9.5) percent. In the 1986 movement, the same pattern was repeated again, the PPP (65%), Sind Awami Tehreek (21.70%) and the Jeeya Sind Mahaz and others (13.3%).

The PPP representing the landed elite of Sind played the most significant role in both agitations. The landed elite, consistently out of power since 1977, strongly reacted against the repressive policies of the regime and played the most important role in the agitation. In the 1986 movement, as the regime had held the party-less elections (March, 1985) and was partially successful in coopting some of the moderate PPP landlords, they played a lesser role. The PPP's share in arrests declined slightly to 65 percent, a drop of 7.4 percent (See Table V).

The Sind Awami Tehreek, representing ideologically trained peasants, workers, primary school teachers and students, though second

TABLE V

Analysis of Arrests Made in the 1983 and 1986
Protest Movements in Sind

	1983	1986
PPP	72.39%	65%
SAT	13.45%	21.70%
JSM and Others	9.5%	13.3%

Source: Compiled from the Daily Muslim (Islamabad) August - September, 1983 and 1986.

to the PPP in courting arrests, played the most effective role in organizing the movement and coordinating its strategy in the medium sized rural towns. Trained Maoist Sind Awami Tehreek workers actually played the backbone role in both the movements against the regime. They led the attack on the official buildings, disrupted the means of communication throughout Sind and engaged in firing incidents with the police and the army. They played their role with greater effectiveness in the 1986 movement.

The Jeeya Sind Mahaz and other parties mostly belonging to the educated middle classes were active mainly in the urban areas of Sind and their role was important in planning the overall strategy of the movement and organizing protest marches in the cities. The Jeeya Sind leaders in their press statements maintained that they were little concerned with any movement within the framework of a united Pakistan, but in practice, the Jeeya Sind Mahaz, Sind Graduates Association (SGA), Jeeya Sind Students Federation (JSSF) and other cultural organizations actively participated in both the movements.

Despite differences in strategies, tactics, leadership and organization, there has been considerable degree of overlap of social bases of support among these three above organizations.

BaluchistanThe Baluch MovementOrganization

Both the Baluch leaders and the Pushtun leaders had fought together under the banner of the National Awami Party (NAP) during the Bhutto era. After the ban by the center on the NAP, its successor organization, the National Democratic Party (NDP) claimed to represent both the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. The differences cropped up between the Baluch and the Pushtun leaders over the strategy to deal with the military government after they were released from the jail in 1977.⁹⁵ Baluch leaders separated themselves from the NDP but were further split on the issues of strategy and tactics in dealing with the Zia regime. The moderate faction led by Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo formed another political party, Pakistan National Party (PNP). Sardar Ataullah Mengal formed a Sind-Baluch-Pushtun front in Baluchistan. Sardar Khair Bux Marri went to Kabul in self-exile to lead the BPLF where the members of his tribes who had crossed the Pak-Afghan border during 1973-77, had continued to stay. The Baluch Students Organization (BSO) also prominently emerged on the scene often playing the role of an independent political party.

The Pakistan National Party (PNP) was formed in 1979 under the leadership of Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo.⁹⁶ It favored maximum provincial autonomy, leaving only four subjects with the center, namely, defense, foreign affairs, currency and communication. Its program emphasized recognition of regional languages, Baluchi, Sindhi, Pushto and Punjabi as the official languages of these respective provinces. It also

stressed the redemarcation of the provinces according to linguistic and cultural criteria.

The Sind-Baluch-Pushtun front (SBPF) is led by Sardar Ataullah Mengal who lives in self-exile in London. Its program emphasizes a confederal structure for Pakistan with states having the right to secede. According to the Front's program each state will have its own flag as a mark of sovereignty and the center will retain only those powers voluntarily surrendered by the states.⁹⁷

Baluchistan Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) is led by Sardar Khair Bux Marri. It continues to maintain its ideological position with regard to the struggle for the recognition of the rights of nationalities within the Marxist-Leninist framework. Its objective is to work for a multi-national socialist Pakistan.

Baluchistan Students Organization (BSO) has most prominently emerged during this phase. Its various factions have sympathies with all three of the above political parties, but it often plays the role of an independent political party. Its programme emphasizes achievement of socialism through nationalism recognition of Baluchi as the national language and struggle for a multi-national socialist Pakistan.

Ideology and Strategy

The PNP believes that it is possible to work within the framework of united Pakistan. Its objective is to achieve maximum provincial autonomy within a multi-national socialist Pakistan. Its leader Ghous

Bakhsh Bizenjo explained in an interview:

We are still struggling to achieve national rights for the Baluch people. We believe that our national rights can be achieved within the framework of Pakistan, but if they are not given on the basis of the 1940 Pakistan resolution, the demand for separation will be strengthened. The desire for independence has increased during these last nine years of military rule.⁹⁸

Its strategy has been to struggle for the unity of "progressive democratic forces" of the country leading to some kind of an alliance among the leftist parties. At the provincial level, the PNP believes that it is no longer possible to launch an armed struggle under the present circumstances, rather, it should direct its effort to create a political consciousness among the masses for Baluch nationalism.⁹⁹

Ataullah Mengal, who lives in self-exile in London, now leads the Sind-Baluchistan-Pushtun front (SBPF) in Baluchistan. He turned extremist after his release by the Zia regime. First he stated his objective as an independent Baluchistan in 1983. He declared:

We have tried our best over all these years to solve the issue [of provincial autonomy] within the framework of Pakistan. It is the reason why we have been fighting for provincial autonomy and democracy at the all Pakistan level. Had Pakistan accepted the concept of nationalities within Pakistan and the rights of those nationalities as partners within the boundaries of Pakistan, one could have said 'Yes, adjustment is possible' But they have always denied the existence of such rights...If the Baluch are to survive, then we must struggle for an independent Baluchistan.¹⁰⁰

He formed the SBPF in 1985, but made little secret of his desire that if the proposed confederation did not materialize, the next logical step would be an outright secession from Pakistan.¹⁰¹ The strategy of the SBPF is to prepare the Baluchi people for an eventual independence and wait for opportune moment when the domestic and international circumstance favor emergence of an independent Baluchistan. its leadership is very pessimistic about the prospects of democracy in the

country as long as any centralized coercive institution like the army, has the ability to engineer coups in the country.

Sardar Khair Bux Marri who heads the Baluch Peoples Liberation Front (PBLF) has gone into self-exile in Afghanistan where approximately 2700 Marri tribes still continue to stay since the Bhutto era. The BPLF maintains its ideological position of a struggle for a multi-national socialist Pakistan or an independent socialist Baluchistan. There is still a degree of ambivalence whether they should opt for a secessionist course or stay within the framework of Pakistan. Sher Mohammad Marri, the most important lieutenant of Khair Bux Marri, put his dilemma in these words:

No one in today's world wants secession. It is easy to achieve independence, but very difficult to maintain it. People are not so naive that they don't understand the consequences of secession. But if national rights are not given then history will take its own course...Every national province should have the constitutional right to maintain its separate armed forces and it should have equal participation in the center.¹⁰²

The BPLF continues to keep options open and its strategy is to "wait and see". It continues to maintain its guerrilla camps in Afghanistan, but is not actively engaged in any guerrilla activity.

Baluchistan Students Organization (BSO), the most radical organization of the province, is struggling for multi-national socialist Pakistan. It leans toward BPLF and SBPF supporting their position, but it has also emerged as a political force in its own right. In fact, other parties are beginning to depend on it. It usually projects educated middle class grievances such as the lack of jobs, maintenance of the quota system and recognition of the Baluchi language as a medium of education at the provincial level. It also

agitates against the involvement of external powers in the development activities, especially opposing the U.S. presence.¹⁰³ It denounces strategically oriented development of the government which its leaders charge is actually motivated by a desire to acquire better means of control in line with the broad strategic interests of the "Western imperialist powers". It also strongly campaigns for the recognition of the Soviet-installed Marxist regime in Afghanistan and opposes the presence of Afghan refugees in Baluchistan.

Social Base

Social base of the Baluch movement has phenomenally expanded during this phase. There are several reasons for the rise of public support for these organizations: lack of representation of educated Baluchis in the power structure, especially in the army and the bureaucracy (see Tables I and II), unintended consequences of massive development activities, and reluctance of the military bureaucratic elite to hold party-based elections.

The Baluchi educated middle, finds little access to the two institutions, the military and the bureaucracy. The Baluchis are heavily underrepresented in these two key institutions. They are virtually unrepresented in the top echelon of the army. An analysis of the ethnic background of the top civil bureaucratic elite shows that there has been little recruitment from the Baluch-majority districts of Baluchistan.¹⁰⁴ The massive development activities, especially the expansion of educational facilities are increasing the constituency of the educated middle class. BSO represents this alienated educated

Baluchi middle class. The membership estimates of the BSO range between 6000 and 10,000.¹⁰⁵

Due to the reluctance of the military-bureaucratic elite to hold party based elections, the major regional parties, the PNP, SBPF and BPLF have remained outside the controlled democracy experiment of the Zia regime. These parties represent the traditional tribal political forces of Baluchistan. The SBPF represents the Mengal tribe, the BPLF represents the Marri tribe and the PNP claims to cater for both the smaller tribes (such as Bizenjos and Hasanis) as well as the detribalized middle class. But the second level tribal chiefs and sub-chiefs have also kept an ambivalent attitude towards the regime. Theoretically they oppose the Zia regime but practically, they are availing themselves of the opportunities offered by the cooptive policies of the regime. They have accepted the compensatory money offered to them by the regime for the losses suffered by the tribes during the military action (1973-1977), have believed the general amnesty given by the regime resulting in the return of many tribesmen and their families from Afghanistan and have also participated in the controlled democracy experiment. In the 1985 party-less election, 27 out of 40 candidates elected to the Baluchistan provincial assembly were either tribal chiefs or their close relatives.¹⁰⁶

This ambivalence in the position of tribal elites has pacified active guerrilla opposition to the regime in the short run, but has also generated a blackmailing mentality which may any time lead them to switch over their loyalties in exchange for a better prospect of benefit.

International Factors

Among the transnational international factors the Marxist revolution in Afghanistan (April 1978) leading to the Soviet military intervention in the country (Dec. 1979) and the Islamic revolution in Iran (1978) had major demonstrative effects on the course of the ethno-national movements in Pakistan. The Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement were positively encouraged by these events while the Pushtunistan movement went into a near complete decline. Among the foreign countries, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union provided support to the Baluch and Pushtunistan movements, while India gave a diplomatic support to the Jeeya Sind movement. The net effect of the Jeeya Sind movement was to reinforce the trends generated by the domestic factors.

Transnational Influences

The Marxist revolution in Afghanistan (April 1978) was the most important development in the regional context. The Khalqi regime led by Taraki and Amin, began to follow the Soviet nationality model after assuming power.¹⁰⁷ The new Afghan rulers sought to deemphasize historical Pushtun dominance of the Afghan state and began to encourage smaller ethnic groups -- Uzbek, Tajiks, Turkmen, Baluch, Nuristani and others. They recognized their languages as official languages and embarked on the policy of educating their children in their own mother tongues. They also started issuing weekly newspapers in these languages. The revolution and its nationality policy had major unintended effects on the ethno-national movements in Pakistan. Both the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movements were greatly

encouraged by these developments. A visitor to the educational institutions of Sind and Baluchistan could see the walls painted red with enthusiastic slogans in favour of the Marxist regime and its policies.¹⁰⁸ The Pushtunistan movement was not much influenced by the Marxist regime because its policies were actually aimed at reducing the already dominant Pushtun position in Afghanistan. However, the younger radical elements within the Pushtunistan movement felt sympathetic to the Marxist regime's efforts.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 had a startling effect on the regional movements in Pakistan. It affected the various components within these movements very differently. The traditional landed (or tribal) elite of all three movements became greatly scared of the Soviet move and feared the loss of its privileged position in case the Soviets decided to move further.¹⁰⁹ However, it cleverly sought to exploit the situation vis-a-vis the central government to enhance its own bargaining position. Simultaneously, it also seized upon whatever opportunities were offered by the government.

The Soviet military move greatly encouraged the radical educated middle class components of these movements especially in Sind and Baluchistan. They perceived the Soviet action as an avenue of possible liberation from the "Punjabi imperialist yoke". The masses as is revealed in the country-wide public opinion surveys were generally opposed to the Soviet move. The province-wise breakup of the public perceptions shows that the greatest degree of opposition to the Soviet Union existed in the N.W.F.P., followed by Baluchistan and Sind. It is

not surprising as the N.W.F.P. has suffered most from the Afghan war out of all Pakistani provinces.¹¹⁰

The Islamic revolution in Iran (1978) too had an initial radicalizing effect on the regional movement because of its perceived "anti-imperialist orientation" by these movements. However, with the passage of time, the Marxist educated middle class elite of these movements became more ambivalent to the revolution and growingly skeptical of its revolutionary credentials. The suppression of the Marxist oriented regional movements in the Iranian part of Baluchistan further contributed to their disillusionment from the Islamic regime. The public opinion surveys showed that there was an outpouring of public support for the Islamic regime in Iran in the beginning, but it petered out in the wake of the protracted Iran-Iraq war and the perceived shift of the regime towards narrow Shia practices, by a largely Sunni population of Pakistan.¹¹¹

Activities of Ethnic Groups

Young Pakistani Pushtuns mostly affiliated with the Pushtun Students Federation who had crossed the Durand Line during the Bhutto era began to return to Pakistan because of the initial policy of support to the Zia regime by the Pushtun elite. The PPP followers who were under repression from the Zia regime went over to the Afghan side. According to one estimate, about 500 Frontier youths crossed the border to join the Al-Zulfiqar, a terrorist organization led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's son Murtaza Bhutto and sponsored by the Kabul regime.¹¹² As the policy of the Pushtun elite shifted from support to the opposition

of the Zia regime, the Pushtun youths in a small number probably about 100 to 200 annually, again began to go over to the Afghan side apparently for 'educational purposes'. In Kabul, reportedly, they get passports from Afghanistan which offers them seats from its own quota to go to the Soviet universities.¹¹³

However, the exodus of the Pushtuns from Pakistan has been nothing as compared to the exodus of the Pushtuns from Afghanistan in the wake of highly repressive and authoritarian policies of successive Marxist regimes of Afghanistan. Nearly three million Afghan refugees, mostly Pushtuns, have arrived in Pakistan since 1978. A diagram on the opposite page shows how the inflow of the refugees has been influenced by the successive regime. Within twelve months of the Taraki regime's rule there was an influx of 109,900 refugees into Pakistan. Hafizullah Amin assassinated Taraki and took over power in September 1979. At the end of Amin's brief rule, the approximate number of Afghan refugees was 200,000. In the wake of the Soviet military intervention in December 1979 and the installation of Babrak Karmal regime, the influx of refugees reached tidal wave proportion. (See Table V) In 1985, it was as high as 3,000 a day. It appears to fluctuate in proportion to the intensity of the military activities of the Soviet and Afghan troops. Eighty percent of the refugees belonged to the Pushtun tribes of Afghanistan, many of them interconnected with the same tribes on the Pakistani side.¹¹⁴

A significant number of the Baluch tribes who had crossed the Pak-Afghan borders during the Bhutto era returned with the take over of the Zia regime. Some, principally, the Marri tribes under the leadership

TABLE V
Afghan Refugees in N.W.F.P.

(A)

S/No.	Name of District.	No. of RTVs.	No. of families	Male	Female	Child- ren	Total po- pulation
1.	Abbottabad.	15	21965	21456	29155	83493	134104
2.	Bannu.	6	7034	11497	13396	26447	51340
3.	Chitral.	3	5245	7431	10095	14493	32019
4.	Dir.	9	14132	17331	22772	41912	82015
5.	D.I. Khan.	10	12360	19011	24585	45546	89142
6.	Kohat.	17	34154	61422	60379	118043	248844
7.	Mansehra.	9	10760	10000	15418	51104	76522
8.	Mardan.	18	18601	25724	32181	54304	112209
9.	Peshawar.	59	80586	127722	132776	154023	414521
10.	Swat.	2	2481	2667	4127	7019	13813
Total:—		148	207318	304261	533884	596384	1254529


(B)

	Name of Agency.						
1.	Bajaur.	22	25196	51693	65695	58701	176089
2.	Kurram.	33	49502	97628	94934	146825	338487
3.	Malakand.	3	5722	5466	11053	23629	40148
4.	Mohmand.	1	1533	1502	2863	4354	8719
5.	North Waziristan	24	23050	44360	38909	79272	162541
6.	Orakzai.	2	1920	2586	4698	5789	13073
7.	South Waziristan.	6	7357	10039	11779	24159	45977
Total:—		91	114280	213274	229031	342729	785034

(C)

		Grand Summary						
a)	Districts	(10)	148	207318	304261	533884	596384	1254529
b)	Agencies	(7)	91	114280	213274	229031	342729	785034
Grand Total:—		(17)	239	321598	517535	582915	939113	2039563

Source: Afghan Refugees Commissionera te, N.W.F.P., Report 15-10-85.



Source: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Will They Go Home Again? December 1982.

of Khair Bux Marri continue to stay in Afghanistan in the sanctuaries provided by the successive Marxist regimes in Afghanistan for their possible use against Pakistan.¹¹⁵ However, because of the change in the circumstance, both domestic and international, they have not engaged in any guerrilla activity so far. Domestically, partial success of the Zia regime's cooptive policies towards the Baluch tribal elites and their own perceptions towards the changed situation in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet military move have pacified their activity in the short run.

Similar to the N.W.F.P., the Afghan refugees arrived in Baluchistan as well. By 1986, their number in Baluchistan was 580,013 (See Table VI). It is significant to note that although most of the refugees belonged to the Pushtun tribes, a substantial chunk of this refugee population, approximately 150,000 - 200,000 belonged to the Baluch tribes of Afghanistan. These refugees are generally anti-Soviets and many of them actively participate in the Jihad (Holy War) in Afghanistan.¹¹⁶

Some of the leaders of the Jeeya Sind movement contacted the Indian government for help, but apparently did not receive any encouraging response.¹¹⁷ However their contacts with the Sindhi Hindus in India resulted in a renewed spurt of cultural and political activities to win the support of the Indian government for the objectives of the Jeeya Sind movement.¹¹⁸

TABLE VI

Afghan Refugees in Baluchistan

Quetta	82102
Pishin	119452
Gulistan	119633
Chaman	38981
Zhob	34329
Loralai	61314
Chagai	<u>124202</u>
Total	580013

Source: Afghan Refugees Commissionerate
Baluchistan, July, 1986

Policies of Foreign Countries

Afghanistan's role has been most important in aiding the Pushtunistan and the Baluch movements. In the wake of the Marxist revolution in 1978, Taraki regime's socialist cultural, political and economic policies led to a sharp reaction in the Afghan society generating a wide spread resistance to the regime.¹¹⁹ The Amin regime's authoritarian policies further intensified resistance. Both regimes followed a Soviet nationality policy in its crudest form irrespective of the realities of Afghan society. Although all the groups participated in the resistance organized by the Islamic parties, the Pushtuns who predominated in the Afghan society also constituted the core of the Mujahideen fighting against the regime. Both regimes tried to rally non-Pushtun minorities -- Uzbek, Tajiks, Hazaras, Baluchis as a counterpoise to the Pushtuns who played the leading role in resisting the regime. Simultaneously, both regimes declared full support for the 'Pushtun and Baluch national rights of self-determination' celebrating Pushtunistan and Baluchistan national days. They also continued to provide the same facilities to the dissident Baluch and Pushtun groups who had crossed the Pak-Afghan border during the Bhutto era. The Amin regime also supported the dissident elements of the PPP terrorist organization 'Al-Zulfiqar' headed by Bhutto's son, Murtaza Bhutto.¹²⁰ Despite their overt support to the Pushtunistan movement and the Baluch movement, the regime's own concern for security in the face of growing resistance kept them severely constrained in their policy.

The Babrak Karmal regime installed by the Soviets embarked upon a wide range of policies in order both to counter the resistance as well as to incite the Pushtunistan and Baluch movements. It pursued a watered down version of the Soviet nationality policy than the previous regimes. Although it continued to emphasize its continuity with the 1978 Marxist revolutions, it sought to reverse the deemphasis accorded to the Pushtun tribes by the Amin regime. On December 19, 1981, it especially appealed to the Pushtun tribes to join the armed forces to defeat the resistance. It blatantly appealed to their Islamic sentiments in general invoking Islamic terminology of Jihad (Holy War) and Sunnah (tradition of the prophet Mohammad). The appeal implied admission that the Pushtuns were particularly opposed to the Soviet occupation and strongly believed that communism threatened their religion.¹²¹

Secondly, the regime vigorously began to pursue the policy of inciting trans-border Pushtun tribes living on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. It especially targeted the Afridis, Mahmands, Safis and other Pushtun tribes living in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Distributing money and weapons, it attempted to buy their loyalties encouraging them both to fight the resistance against the Afghan regime as well as to create problems for the Pakistani authorities. The Karmal regime also held two Jirgas (assemblies) of border tribes in 1984 and 1985.¹²² Karmal asked them to protect the borders and exhorted that "if the borders are not consolidated, there will exist no state". Reportedly, 300 Pakistan Pushtun tribal leaders were invited to the tribal Jirgah. Occasional events of the revolt by some of the

tribal leaders on the Pakistani side were projected as "revolutionary" by Kabul radio, but the policy had limited success only.¹²³

Thirdly, the regime challenged the validity of the Durand Line as an international frontier and reopened the Pushtun and Baluch question. Kabul radio continuously harped on the theme of "oppressed Pushtun and Baluch nationalities" in Pakistan. Babrak Karmal declared in his May Day speech in 1984:

On the basis of historical antecedents, our nomads had been going and coming to and from the sub-continent of India for many years in the history even when there was no Durand Line between the Afghans and the Pushtuns. One brother is on this side of the line and the other on that side of the line. We can prove at every international tribunal that most of our country fellows who are currently living in Pushtun and Baluch areas are our Pushtun and Baluch brethren...We want that all issues be taken up at the dialogue. If there is prudence, we can solve all differences.¹²⁴

The regime's message to Pakistan in essence was that the regime could agree to the Durand Line as an international frontier if Pakistan stopped assisting the refugees and resistance who were fighting against the Afghan regime.

Fourthly, the regime actively began to court the principal leaders of Pushtunistan movement, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan and other NDP leaders. Kabul radio routinely referred to Abdul Ghaffar Khan as 'the Great Pushtun leader'. Karmal himself met Wali Khan on his visits to Afghanistan in 1982 and 1984 and according to the Kabul radio, both declared their unanimity of views on Pak-Afghan relations.

Fifthly, the regime through its secret agency Khad, has covertly been trying its best to create a rift between the locals and the Afghan refugees and has engaged in subversive activities through the disguised agents under the refugee cover. Khad has in fact become such a

principal state organization that its chief Najibullah replaced Babrak Karmal in 1986. This change engineered by the Soviet Union foretells a much enhanced role of Khad in escalating cross-border subversive activities in Pakistan, because Najibullah, himself a Pushtun, has previously been in charge of organizing the activities of transborder Pushtun tribes in Pakistan.¹²⁵

Despite multi-dimensional policies of successive Marxist regimes in Afghanistan with the twin objective of defending their own security in the face of growingly powerful resistance and inciting Pushtun and Baluch tribes in an attempt to reopen the Pushtunistan and Baluchistan question, the regimes have failed in their policies. Babark Karmal at the end of his forced resignation admitted the failure of their policy.¹²⁶

The Soviet Union's policy towards Pakistan's ethno-national movements is closely linked with Kabul's policy. The Soviet Union became actively involved in Afghanistan's affairs in the wake of the Marxist revolution in 1978. Apparently it played only an indirect role in the marxist coup of 1978. However, since June 1979, it started identifying Afghanistan as "a member of socialist community" implying that Afghanistan fell within its sphere of influence. It was further confirmed by the treaty of friendship signed between the Taraki regime and the Soviet Union in December 1978 and hints that the Brezhnev security doctrine was also applicable to Afghanistan. In the aftermath of Amin's counter-coup in September 1979 and the Soviet displeasure over his policies, the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979, dislodged the Amin regime and installed

the Babrak Karmal regime. Since then, Afghan and Soviet policies are closely guided by the Soviet advisors.

The Soviet's prime objective also has been to pacify the resistance and secure the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. They have followed a carrot and stick policy towards Pakistan (which has leaned towards the U.S. and China in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan) sometimes offering economic and technical aid and other times threatening that its independence may be endangered if it continues to support Afghan resistance. The Soviets have also been giving a low-profile support to the Jeeya Sind movement, Baluch movement and Pushtunistan movements, primarily to force the Zia regime to accept Soviet line of thinking on Afghanistan.¹²⁷ This low-profile support takes many forms: (1) The Soviet Union has been courting the leading Pushtun, Baluch and Sindhi leaders by inviting them directly to visit Moscow; (2) The Soviet diplomatic officials in Pakistan maintain close contacts with both the principal leaders as well as the second level leaders of these movements in N.W.F.P, Sind and Baluchistan; (3) Under the cover of Pak-Soviet Friendship Houses, the Soviets channel monetary support to these groups; (4) The Soviets, through a variety of networks, arrange to send Pushtun, Baluch and Sindhi students to the Soviet universities apparently for 'educational purposes'.

India began to openly give diplomatic support to the Jeeya Sind movement during the 1983 MRD protest movement. Mrs. Gandhi, then the Prime Minister of India publically expressed sympathies for the movement.¹²⁸ She also participated in the World Sindhi Conference organized by the Sindhi Hindus in Delhi. All India Radio also began to

air new programs in Sindhi language in the wake of the 1983 movement.¹²⁹ Zia ul Haq obviously referring to the Indian government (and possibly the Soviet Union as well) charged that Pakistan had 'irrefutable proofs' that more than one foreign government were involved in Sind.¹³⁰ India later in 1984 counter alleged Pakistan's complicity in the Sikh problem in Punjab.¹³¹ Some analysts in Sind claimed that India provided a low-profile support to the Jeeya Sind movement through the Sindhi Hindus living on the Pakistani side of the border.¹³²

There were some indications that India, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan could coordinate their policies towards Pakistan (which leans towards the U.S. and the Peoples' Republic of China in its foreign policy) in the light of the Afghan situation. It was revealed by Morarji Desai, the ex-Prime Minister of India that the Russian leaders suggested to him during his visit to Moscow in 1978 'to attack Pakistan, to teach it a lesson but not to dismember it'.¹³³ During Mr. Brezhnev's visit after Mrs. Gandhi's take over of power, the Indian journalists reported a consensus on Pakistan's 'intransigent attitude' and possible coordination of strategies between the two powers.¹³⁴ Keeping in view India's ambivalent position on the Afghan issue with a tilt towards the Soviet position and continuing unsteady nature of Indo-Pak relations, it is not unlikely that Delhi-Kabul-Moscow axis may further enhance Pakistan's regional troubles.

Summary

Pakistan, under Zia, reverted to a modified version of Ayub's political system under the name of 'Islamic democracy'. The state elite which came to power in 1977 was primarily composed of the Punjabis, the Pushtuns and the Mohajirs to the near total exclusion of the Sindhis and the Baluchis. The Zia regime, like the Ayub regime though with different symbols, pursued unitary policies in political, cultural and economic spheres with remarkably similar consequences. It adopted a defacto one-unit policy through sweeping constitutional amendments, embarked upon a controlled democracy, sought to restructure the society through a wide variety of Islamization measures and pursued vigorous developmental policies to remove the inter-provincial economic disparities. In addition, the regime combined a variety of cooptive and coercive policies towards the ethnic elites.

Consequences of the policies differed in accordance with the perceptions held by the ethnic elites towards the distribution of power at the center and the nature of the policies. The Sindhis and the Baluchis, least represented among the state elite, viewed the unitary policies with a great apprehension. In Sind, where the regime resorted to coercive policies, a full scale rebellion erupted in 1983 and then again in 1986. The Jeeya Sind movement significantly gained public support as all the regional political forces, under the leadership of the PPP, combined to launch fierce protest movements throughout Sind. The Baluch movement also made a significant headway in terms of gaining public support but its leaders did not consider it wise to rise against the regime into an open revolt. One important indication in terms of

similarity of regional trends in Sind and Baluchistan has been the emergence of a demand for a confederal arrangement and an increasing following for the Sind-Baluch-Pushtun front. The Pushtunistan movement went into a near complete decline because of changed domestic and international situation which drastically affected the fate of the movement. With the take-over of power by the military-bureaucratic elite in 1977, the Pushtuns who were fairly highly represented among the elite, enjoyed similar preeminent position which they had during the Ayub era. Furthermore, the background of this elite showed that they were disproportionately highly represented especially from those districts which had constituted the traditional strong-holds of the Pushtunistan movement. The influx of nearly three million anti-Soviet Afghan refugees in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, mostly Pushtuns, also led to a fundamental transformation of public perceptions in the N.W.F.P. towards the pro-Moscow Pushtunistan movement.

Among the transnational international factors, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran had a major demonstration effect. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan affected the various components of these movements differently. The traditional landed elite in Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P., though scared of the Soviet military move for fear of the loss of its own privileged position in case of further Soviet move, however, cleverly sought to blackmail the situation vis-a-vis the central government. It adopted an ambivalent position towards the issue of secession and also availed of the opportunities offered by the

cooptive policies of the regime. The educated middle class in Sind and Baluchistan was positively encouraged by the Soviet action while in the N.W.F.P., anti-Pushtunistan middle class supported the Zia regime's Afghan policy. The public perceptions, generally, as is revealed by the survey data, strongly favored the Zia regime's Afghan policy. The Islamic revolution in Iran had an initial radicalizing effect on the regional movements and also enjoyed a public support but it lost its support in the wake of perceived oppressive policies towards its own regional movements and a perceived shift on the part of the largely Sunni Pakistani masses of its narrow shia orientation.

The dissident Pakistani Pushtuns and Pakistani Baluchs who had crossed over the Pak-Afghan border during the Bhutto era continued to stay in Afghanistan in smaller number, but did not engage in any major guerrilla activity. Apparently, a massive influx of the Afghan Pushtun refugees and also some Afghan Baluch refugees into Pakistan and their enthusiastic participation in the Jihad (Holy War) against the Soviets kept the Soviet-installed Marxist Afghan government so worried about its own security that they did not think that such guerrilla venture into Pakistan could succeed. Encouraged by the activities of the Jeeya Sind movement in Sind, the Sindhi Hindus in India made enthusiastic efforts to influence the policy of the Indian government in according some support to the Jeeya Sind movement. Apparently they had limited success.

The policies of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union which became virtually identical in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were designed with a twin objective, i.e. to secure the

beleaguered Marxist regime in Afghanistan as well as to incite the Baluch and Pushtun tribes for a national struggle, failed to achieve both of its objectives in the short run. Both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union patiently continue to give a low-profile support in the hope to revive the Pushtun and Baluch national question in the long run. India gave a diplomatic support to the Jeeya Sind movement though little evidence was available that it also gave any material support to the movement.

NOTES

1. See two articles for the details of election campaign and the conduct of elections: Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: The campaign before the Storm" Asian Survey July, 1977; M.G. Weinbaum, "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost," Asian Survey July 1977.
2. See the PNA leaders' statement The Pakistan Times (Lahore) March 10, 1977.
3. In fact, the rigging was well planned and at a very large scale. Walter Schwartz, "Why Bhutto's Power is Crumbling," The Guardian (London) May 1, 1977. Zia's government also issued a white paper on the conduct of General Elections which reveals the extent of rigging, see: White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan July, 1978).
4. See for details of these proposed measures of Islamization The Pakistan Times 10 May, 1977.
5. Based on the personal interviews with the PNA leaders. also see for the details of the movement, Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Weathers Storm," Far Eastern Economic Review May 6, 1977.
6. This study of Zia's perceptions is based on the following collection of interviews: Press Conference by General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administration July, 14 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977; Address to the Nation: Accountability Should Precede the Elections: General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, October 1, 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977); President of Pakistan: General Mohammad Zia ul Haq; Interviews to Foreign Media Vol. I, II, III, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information, Government of Pakistan, n.d.)
7. Interview to Ian Stephens in Ibid. Vol II, p. 5.
8. Interview to Nelson News Weekend Television London in Ibid. p. 313.
9. Interview to Ayad A. Madani, Saudi Gazette Jeddah in Ibid. p. 131.
10. He approvingly quoting the 'Turkish Model' stated: "In an ideological state like the one that we have in Pakistan...the armed forces should have the constitutional power to intervene for a short period at the behest of the President." in Ibid. p. 210.
11. Interview in Ibid. Vol. III, p. 112.

12. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 44.
13. Ibid.
14. See a discussion of the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981. Keeping Contemporary Archives (1981) p. 31069. See the text of the Revival of Constitutional of Constitutional Order Daily The Muslim (Islamabad) 3, March, 1985. Also see: Zia ul Haq, Constitutional Amendments Announced: Address to Nation (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1985).
15. See Dawn's editorial, "The Amendments - What Discretion Forbids," Dawn (Karachi) March 5, 1985.
16. See his statement, The Hurriyat (Karachi) 3 September 1985.
17. See an article on the implications of constitutional amendments for provinces, Shahid Kardar, "Provincial Autonomy and National Unity," Dawn (karachi) 29 April, 1985.
18. See a good article: Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan," Asian Survey May, 1984.
19. Cited in William L. Richter and W. Eric Gustafson, "Pakistan in 1979: Back to Square One," Asian Survey May, 1984.
20. See a very important address by Zia: Political Plan Announced: Seventh Session of Federal Council Address by President General Mohammad Zia ul Haq (Islamabad, August 12, 1983).
21. The phraseology of the question asked in the referendum was such that it precluded a 'no' question. The sole question asked in the referendum was this: "Do you approve the policies of the present government, do you believe in the ideology of Pakistan and are desirous of its preservation, do you support the process of Islamization and are in favour of its strengthening, do you want elections to be completed by March 23, 1985, according to the program announced by the president in 1983 and transfer the power to elected representatives in a peaceful and normal way?" See the coverage of referendum The Washington Times 21 December 1984.
22. See for a full argument of the regime against parties Ansari Commission's Report on Form of Government (Islamabad: August 1983).
23. See the editorial of the leading urdu daily: "Intiqal-i-Iqtidar Naheen Ishtrak-i-Iqtidar" the Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 21 Feb. 1985.
24. See a revealing interview of the Governor of Baluchistan, General Rahimuddin Khan. He 'particularly called upon tribal chiefs to

- switch over to industry which would open new avenues for them and for the country at large" Pakistan and Gulf Economist December 17-23, 1983.
25. Wali Khan revealed that he was twice offered the Prime Ministership, but when he talked of an immediate election, there was no further headway with the military elite. See The Daily Jang (Rawalpindi) 2 February 1982.
 26. See a detailed interview of Zia by Selig Harrison. Full text reproduced in Interviews to Foreign Media, Vol. I op. cit. (March-December 1978, p. 154.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Cited in Anwar H. Syed, "Pakistan in 1977: The Prince is Under the Law." Asian Survey Feb. 1978 p. 124.
 29. Information gathered during the detailed interviews in Summer 1986.
 30. See a detailed account of the movement Aijaz Ahmad, "The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet," South Asia Bulletin Vol. IV No. 1 (Spring 1984) pp. 27-44.
 31. It was said at the top level that the offices of President and Prime Minister would be shared by the Federating units. Dawn (Karachi) 28 Feb. 1985.
 32. See the editorial of Haider (Rawalpindi) 1 April 1984.
 33. See Ashari (1984).
 34. See William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence," Asian Survey June 1979, Mumtaz Ahmad, "The Military and the Search for Legitimacy in Pakistan," An unpublished paper, 1985; "Class, Power and Religion: Some Aspects of Fundamentalism in Pakistan," An unpublished paper read at the Conference on Islamic Revival, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Chicago, 1980.
 35. Interviews to Foreign Media Vol. II, op. cit. p. 132, p. 203.
 36. Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Redistributive Preferences in Pakistan," in Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States ed. by Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 63.
 37. "Baluchistan: Banishing Backwardness," Pakistan and Gulf Economist December 17-23, 1983; "Bringing Baluchistan into the Fold," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 28, 1979.

38. Based on extensive interviews in Sind in 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1986.
39. See Lawrence Lifschultz, "A Fundamental Debate," Far Eastern Economic Review March 13, 1982.
40. One analyst perceptively observed that as the regime moved towards arbitrary constitutional amendments, it catalyzed the extremist demands for confederation. See M.B. Naqui, "Confederation Ka Tanazia," The Daily Jang (Rawalpindi) 9 May, 1985.
41. See for the text of the Declaration of SBFP in Dawn (Karachi) 19 April, 1985.
42. This was admitted even by the Pro-Zia analysts as well. See Saluhuddin's analysis "Intikhabat Ka Chand Numanian Pehlu," The Weekly Tahbeer (Karachi) 1-7 March, 1985.
43. See an election study: Ijaz S. Gilani, Pakistan at the Polls: A Study of the 1985 Elections (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1985).
44. A senior government official revealed to me that his task was to break up any national alliance of the opposition parties. He especially mentioned his success in keeping the NDP lukewarm about the prospect of any alliance with the PPP.
45. Based on interviews.
46. Based on interviews in the provinces in Summer 1986.
47. See the interior minister, Mahmood A. Haroon's statement The Muslim (Islamabad) 11 November 1983. See the chairman of Jeeya Sind movement, Dr. Hamida Khuro's statement The Muslim (Islamabad) 20 Jan. 1984.
48. A detailed discussion of the movements follow in the next section.
49. Based on interviews.
50. Kemal A. Faruki, "The Ethnic Question in Pakistan," Dawn (Karachi) June 7, 1985.
51. Based on interviews.
52. See Sher Baz Mazari's statement in Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 31 March, 1979.
53. The Daily Jasarat (Karachi) 18 Nov. 1984. Also see the editorial of the Daily Hurriyat (Karachi) 20 August, 1985.
54. See Abdul Ghaffar Khan's statement in The Muslim (Islamabad) 21 January, 1986.

55. See an article: Minhaj Barna, "Some Thoughts on ANP and Left Unity," The Muslim (Islamabad) August 7, 1986.
56. See Wali Khan's statements in The Daily Hurriyat (Karachi) 21 December 1977, The Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 18 December 1977, and his interview in The Daily Jasarat (Karachi) 7 January 1978.
57. Nussat Javeed, "Profile of Frontier Politics," The Muslim (Islamabad) April 2, 1985.
58. Dawn (Karachi) 25 January 1986.
59. Dawn (Karach) editorial November 13, 1984.
60. The Jang (Rawalpindi) 25 January 1986.
61. The Muslim (Islamabad) 11 Feburary 1984.
62. The Morning News (Karachi) 10 April, 1980.
63. The Muslim (Islamabad) 21 January, 1986.
64. Dawn (Karachi) 25 January 1986.
65. Nasrat Javeed (1985).
66. Interview with Brigadier Nur Hussain, Director Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad in Summer 1986.
67. Calculation made from the domicile data of the N.W.F.P. provided in Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report January 1983. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1984).
68. See Wali Khan's written statement to the Supreme Court reproduced in the Weekly Lail-o-Nahar (Lahore) 2 September 9, 1975.
69. See a series of articles on the Frontier politics: Nusrat Javeed "Profile on Frontier Politics," The Muslim (Islamabad) March 30-April 4, 1986.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Cited in Ibid. I also interviewed him in August, 1986.
73. See a good introductory article which deals with the arrival of the refugees, Zafar Samdani, "Search for a Solution," Pakistan and Gulf Economist April 3-9, 1982.

74. See an excellent article covering the multi-dimensional aspects of the refugees problem by refugees commissioner, Abdullah "Afghan Refugees: World's Largest Case Load," Pakistan an Gulf Economist July 2-8, 1983.

Also see Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications," Pakistan Horizon No. 1, 1984, pp. 40-60.

75. Interview with ex-refugees commissioner Abdullah in Summer 1986.
76. Ijaz S. Gilani, The Four R's of Afghanistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, 1985).
77. The Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 27.
78. Gilani (1985).
79. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi) 1 June, 1985.
80. Sind Graduates Association, an unpublished report, 1983.
81. Kausar, S.K., "Out of Bounds," Star (Karachi) 1 September 1983.
82. Yameema Mitha, "Unlocking Peoples' Power," The Muslim (Islamabad) July 4, 1986.
83. The Muslim (Islamabad) 2 April, 1985.
84. Mohammad Ali "Sind Ke Diary: Interview with G.M. Sayed," The Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) 15 June, 1985.
85. See a detailed interview with G.M. Sayed Qaumi Digest (Lahore) June, 1985.
86. Based on my interview with Dr. Hamida Khuro in Karachi in September 1986.
87. The Muslim (Islamabad) July4, 1986.
88. See for the details Dawn (Karachi) 19 April, 1985.
89. Based on interviews in Sind.
90. A.T. Choudhuri, "Politics of Violence in Sind," Dawn 27 August 1983.
91. The Muslim (Islamabad) 11 Nov. 1983.
92. The Muslim (Islamabad) 20 June, 1984.
93. Interviews.

94. See 1983 census op. cit.
95. See two background articles on the split in the NAP: Nasir Arafat, "Baluch Politics," Al-Fatah (Karachi) 20-27 January, 1978, 17-24 February, 1978.
96. The Daily Hurriyat (Karachi) 2 June, 1979.
97. Dawn (Karachi) 19 April, 1985.
98. Interview in Herald (Karachi) July, 1986.
99. Interview in The Muslim (Islamabad) July 11, 1986. My interview with PNP leader, Abdul Hakim Lehri in Quetta, 1986.
100. Lawrence Lifschultz, "Independent Baluchistan? Ataulah Mengal's Declaration of Independence," Economic and Political Weekly, May, 1983.
101. My interview with Mengal in London in September 1986.
102. Interview in Herald (Karachi) July, 1986.
103. Interviews with Mohammad Ayub, a BSO leader in Baluchistan in Summer 1986.
104. 1983 Government Census of Employees, op. cit.
105. Ameneh Azam Ali and Zahid Hussain "Baluchistan: High Stakes Game," The Herald (Karachi) July 1986.
106. Dawn (Karachi) 2 March, 1985.
107. See two articles which deal with the nationality policy in detail: Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet Afghan Relations," Asian Survey (March 1980); S.P. Bhattacharya, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Afghanistan," Asian Affairs (June, 1984).
108. My visits in Sind and Baluchistan.
109. My observation is based on extensive interviews with the traditional elite in all three provinces.
110. Tahir Amin, "Pakistani Public's Perceptions Towards Great Powers," Strategic Studies (Islamabad) Summer 1980.
111. Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion Surveys on "Pakistani Public's Perceptions Towards Iran," unpublished paper.
112. Nusrat Javeed (1986).

113. Ibid.
114. Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in NorthWest Frontier Province, Pakistan (Peshawar: Afghan Refugee Commissionerate, 1985).
115. "The Rebellious Tribe in Russia's Path," U.S. News and World Report, February 4, 1980.
116. Interview with Baluchistan refugee commissioner.
117. Based on interviews in Sind.
118. See an special Jeeya Sind number issue of Organizer (New Delhi) July, 1985.
119. Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future," Asian Survey April, 1984.
120. Nusrat Javeed (1986).
121. Mohan Ram, "Jihad, The Soviet Style," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 19, 1982.
122. Much of the following information is based on extensive Kabul Radio monitoring reported in Report on Afghanistan (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies) April 1984 - May, 1987.
123. The Muslim (Islamabad) 31 January 1986.
124. Report on Afghanistan (May, 1984).
125. Henry S. Bradsher, "Stagnation and Change in Afghanistan," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Fall, 1986, pp. 3-35.
126. Ibid.
127. Information gathered during two trips to Pakistan in Summer, 1985 and Summer, 1986.
128. The Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) 27 September 1983.
129. The Muslim (Islamabad) August 21, 1986.
130. Zia's statement in The Muslim (Islamabad) 6 September 1983.
131. Salamat Ali, "The Hidden Hand," Far Eastern Economic Review 28 June, 1984.
132. Based on an interview with Musa Bhutto, a Sindhi scholar.

133. Reported in Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1980).

134. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

WHY RISE AND DECLINE: EXPLANATIONS

The origins of the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement lay in the pre-partition regional autonomy movements which emerged against the policies of the British Indian colonial state. The regional autonomy movement in the N.W.F.P. province which was transformed into the Pushtunistan movement at the time of the formation of Pakistan in 1947 was a powerful mass-based movement which had won two provincial elections, one in 1937 and the other in 1946. The Pushtunistan movement, however, gradually declined in the post-independence era. The declining level of the Pushtunistan movement has been evident in the repeated failure of the Pushtun leaders to launch any protest movement against the Bhutto and Zia regimes and in their decreasing electoral support in the 1970 General Elections, the 1985 party-less elections and public opinion surveys. Its decline has become dramatically clear in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan when the Pushtun leadership found itself bereft of general public support in the province as is shown through the repeated survey results.

On the other hand, the regional autonomy movements in Sind and Baluchistan which enjoyed little public support at the time of the formation of Pakistan in 1947, have steadily gained substantial mass-bases in the provinces of Sind and Baluchistan in the 1980s. The most

significant indicator of the rising level of the public support for the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement, besides the proliferation of a cluster of regionalist organizations with secessionist causes in both provinces, has been an increasing spiral of ethnic violence against the state in Sind and Baluchistan. Estimates of the people killed in Sind during the language riots (1972) and two civil disobedience movements launched in 1983 and 1986 range between 600 and 800 people. About 6000 to 9000 people were killed in Baluchistan in a civil war (1973-1977) fought between the Baluch guerrillas and the Pakistan army. The main question to be answered in this chapter is: What accounts for the gradual decline of the Pushtunistan movement and the cumulative rise of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements.

Our major finding in analytic-empirical mode is that the explanation for the rise and decline of ethno-national movements lies in the changing domestic and international political context. Among the domestic factors, it is interaction between the state-elite and the ethnic elites which primarily determines the rise and decline of ethno-national movements. If the political policy of the state-elite monopolizes power, the ethnic elites excluded from power-sharing arrangements react to the policy of state and begin to formulate secessionist ideologies and mobilize public support among their ethnic groups. In the absence of power-sharing, cultural and economic policies aimed at reducing the public support for the ethno-national movements tend to be counter-productive and may, in fact, contribute to a further rise of mass support for these movements. Conversely, if the state elite shares power with the ethnic elites, they begin to go along

with the state elite in their desired direction and ethno-national movements begin to decline. Organizations, ideologies, strategies and social bases of ethno-national movements may largely be explainable in the context of interaction between state-elite and ethnic elites. Demographic changes occurring with the ethnic groups are of secondary importance, though their impact too, may better be understood in the context of the domestic and international political situation.

International factors, -- transnational influences, activities of coethnics and policies of foreign states -- usually play a secondary role and reinforce the trends generated by domestic factors, but may have the potential to decisively affect the course of the movements at crisis moments.

We analyze the domestic and international factors responsible for the rise of the Jeeya Sind and Baluch movements and the decline of the Pushtunistan movement in this chapter. The first section of this chapter discusses the state-elite versus the ethnic elites interaction across three phases, (1) Origins of the movement: (1947-70); (2) Evolution of the movements: (1971-77); and (3) Rise and decline of the movements: (1977-87). The second section analyzes the impact of international factors -- transnational influences, activities of coethnics and the policies of foreign states on the ethno-national movements. The third section summarizes the major conclusions of this study in analytic-empirical mode.

Domestic FactorsState-Elite versus Ethnic ElitesOrigins of the Movements; (1947-1970)

Most of the Sindhi and the Baluch elite who were in the forefront of the pre-partition provincial autonomy movements had actively participated in the Pakistan movement. Only a small part of the elite, some disgruntled landlords or tribal chiefs, largely influenced by the Indian National Congress, were opposed to the formation of Pakistan and had cherished the visions of a separate state of Sindhu Desh or an independent Baluchistan, but they were without any mass base in 1947. The most formidable challenge to the Pakistan movement came from the N.W.F.P. where the powerful mass-based Pushtunistan movement led a boycott campaign of the special referendum held by the British to determine whether the N.W.F.P. should join India or Pakistan. The Pushtun leaders raised the demand for the formation of a separate state of Pushtunistan, but they failed in their boycott campaign of the referendum as the people of the N.W.F.P., overwhelmingly voted in favor of joining Pakistan.¹

Pakistan began its journey in 1947 with a federal parliamentary political system. The major weakness of the political system was that it heavily relied on state institutions especially the bureaucracy and the military. It was primarily due to such inbuilt weaknesses of the Pakistan movement as the absence of a consensus on the core values and the weak organizational structure of the Muslim League which had led the movement for Pakistan. The regional autonomy movements remained dormant as long as the democratic system operated (1947-53). A major

change occurred in 1953 when the military-bureaucratic elite became ascendant in the political system. Their informal ascendancy was formalized when the military staged a coup d'état under the leadership of Ayub Khan in 1958. The composition of the military-bureaucratic elite which became the state-elite during the Ayub regime (1958-1969) was such that the Punjabis, the Pushtuns and the Mohajirs were fairly well or overrepresented among the state-elite while the Sindhis and the Baluchis (and also the Bengalis) were either unrepresented or greatly underrepresented thanks to the maintenance of colonial recruitment policies by the state.² The state elite monopolized power and began to pursue unitary policies in political, cultural and economic spheres. The most significant step, in the political sphere, was the adoption of the one-unit policy, thereby abolishing the provincial boundaries of the existing provinces and amalgamating them into a new entity then called West Pakistan. The state elite pursued a policy of controlled democracy through the "basic democracy system" to maintain a facade of democracy.³ The regime also pursued a policy of overt repression of the Pushtun, the Sindhi and the Baluchi, ethnic elites resorting to widespread arrests and occasional executions. In the cultural sphere, the regime expressed its determination to mould various regional identities into a single identity of a liberal Pakistani nation. It adopted one language, Urdu, banning the use of regional languages as medium of education. In the economic sphere, it pursued vigorous development policies to modernize the society.

The consequences of political, cultural and economic policies became soon apparent to the ethnic elites in the provinces. The

formation of the one-unit alarmed the ethnic elite who feared that the state elite was bent upon destroying their separate cultural identities. They considered the abolition of provincial boundaries as a first step in the larger package of domination. Their fears were not unfounded as the state elite undertook several actions under the one-unit framework which were perceived by the ethnic elite as severe injustices. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of new fertile agricultural land which became available in Sind in the wake of construction of new barrages on the Indus river, was distributed among the top military and civilian officials (mostly the Punjabis), ignoring the local Sindhi peasants.⁴ The Sui-gas which was discovered in Baluchistan in huge quantity was piped out to the other provinces without any share being given to Baluchistan. In the absence of power sharing, the "Basic Democracy" experiment remained a cosmetic show. The Sindhis and the Baluchis who were little represented among the state elite perceived the army and the bureaucracy as two alien institutions controlled by other ethnic groups and meant to dominate them. The Pushtuns, who were well represented in both the institutions, however, saw the situation differently and did not develop the same feelings of hostility. As the major purpose of the political policy was that there should not emerge any nation-wide democratic political opposition to threaten the power of the state elite, the regime also sought to break up national political parties, intendedly or unintendedly, regionalizing the political process. The ban on the use of regional languages and imposition of Urdu alarmed the ethnic elites that their languages and literature would be thrown into

the dustbin of history and their youths would lose in competition with other groups. The consequences of modernization policies were negative for Sind and Baluchistan and mixed for the N.W.F.P.

The policies of the state elite catalyzed regional autonomy movements in the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan. The Pushtunistan movement quickly reemerged because of its strong pre-partition mass-base. The Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements were born during this phase. All three movements primarily struggled against the one-unit policy of the Ayub regime. Their demands included recognition of their regional languages, restoration of democracy and provincial autonomy. Apparently all three movements looked similar in their organizational structures, ideologies and strategies, but a deeper analysis of their social bases of support reveal the differences. Both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements were attracting support from both the traditional landed elite and the educated middle classes. The ethnic elites in both provinces, seeing little possibility of entering into the state elite, perceived the military-bureaucratic rule as alien rule. The boundaries between "us" and "they" began to crystallize in these two provinces. A variety of literary and cultural organizations were formed in Sind and Baluchistan which began to produce literature on the pattern of nationalist movements. Historical myths of common origin were reconstructed, unifying symbols from respective ethnic histories were searched, and heroes were found which differentiated them from the ones emphasized by the leaders of the Pakistan movement.

The situation differed in the case of the Pushtunistan movement which encountered great difficulty in maintaining its pre-partition

social base of support. The British colonial state against which the Pushtun elite, mostly the middle sized landlords, had so successfully mobilized their public support had been replaced by the Pakistani state. The state elite included the Pushtuns who were significantly overrepresented among the military elite and roughly evenly represented among the top-bureaucratic elite. Continuing recruitment of the Pushtun educated middle class, especially from those areas which had constituted strongholds of the Pushtunistan movement into both the army and the bureaucracy, ensured that the educated middle class would be little attracted to the Pushtunistan movement.⁵ As a result, we see that the Pushtunistan movement began to decline and it essentially remained a rural based movement. Its popularity even in the rural areas, as is evidenced in the 1970 General Election results, began to erode when compared against its own performance in the pre-partition elections. This decline in the popularity of the movement was accompanied by a corresponding rise of public support for other national parties, rival to the Pushtunistan movement.

At the end of this phase, Ayub Khan was forced to resign in the wake of a mass protest movement throughout the country.⁶ The most significant dimension of the movement was the emergence of regional provincial autonomy movements in the N.W.F.P., Sind, Baluchistan (and East Bengal). In the brief period of General Yahy's rule (1969-1970), the state elite reversed the policy directions of the Ayub regime. The one-unit was dissolved in West Pakistan and the provinces of N.W.F.P., Sind, Punjab and Baluchistan were restored. The policy of controlled democracy was also reversed and the regime held the first General

Elections in 1970 in which the regional political parties won. Lack of reconciliation between the two majority parties of East and West Pakistan and the reluctance of the military-bureaucratic elite to transfer power led to the escalation of the crisis, culminating in the disintegration of pre-1971 Pakistan and the emergence of a 'new Pakistan' under the leadership of PPP, the majority party in Punjab and Sind.⁷

Evolution of the Movements: (1971-77)

Pakistan started again with a federal parliamentary political system. The state elite which took over power in 1971 was faced with extremely delicate internal and external problems in the wake of the secession of its majority province, East Pakistan. To forestall the prospects of other provincial autonomy movements turning secessionists, the state elite, initially (April 1972 - February 1973) was forced to follow the policy of sharing power with the ethnic elites. The state elite allowed the ethnic elite to form provincial governments in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. As the party in power at the center was also a majority party in Sind, it formed the provincial government there. This brief phase of power-sharing led to an immediate renunciation of the regionalist stance on the part of the ethnic elites. They not only disowned any secessionist tendency in categorical terms, but the Baluchi and Pushtun elites also willingly adopted Urdu as the official languages of their respective provinces displaying greater patriotism vis-a-vis the state elite which had adopted the Sindhi as the official language of Sind at the provincial level. However, this brief phase of

power-sharing came to an abrupt end when the state elite returned to authoritarian policies towards the regional movements, fearing that the rival regional parties might become serious national political alternatives to the ruling state elite.⁸

The state elite, in the political sphere, through arbitrary constitutional amendments, sought to strengthen the power of the executive over the other institutions. Despite its democratic form, the parliamentary system was reduced to a highly personalized and authoritarian system of governance, strongly reminiscent of the Ayub era. The state elite also resorted to an overt use of force to liquidate the regional movements in the aftermath of dismissal of their provincial governments and heavily relied on the bureaucracy, the paramilitary institutions and the military.⁹ Simultaneously, it made an alliance with the urban-based rival political parties to the Pushtunistan movement in the N.W.F.P. The regime's cultural and economic policies were largely subordinate to its political interests. Culturally, the state elite followed an ambivalent and often contradictory policy under the name of Islamic socialism. It projected itself the guardian of Islam in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan where it sought to crush the regionalists and the champion of socialism in Sind where it officially promoted Sindhi ethno-nationalism.¹⁰ Economically, it sought to modernize the backward provinces within the socialist framework.

The consequences of the state-elite's policies were to further politicize ethno-national identities, swelling the ranks of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and to contribute to a further erosion of

the public support for the Pushtunistan movement. As the state elite moved to consolidate its power, it began to disassociate itself from its mass-base and depended heavily on the state institutions -- bureaucracy, military and para-military organizations.¹¹ The character of the regime changed and it began to closely resemble the Ayub system despite its democratic form, perpetuating similar perceptions towards the army and bureaucracy in Sind and Baluchistan. The state elite also resorted to similar tactics. It sought to crush the regional movements through an overt use of force and also deliberately manipulated to break-up the national political parties along regional lines to prevent the prospect of emergence any national level democratic opposition. However, the state elite's strategy to make an alliance with the urban-based political parties in the N.W.F.P. helped them to overcome the Pushtun regionalists' challenge. The regime's contradictory cultural policies especially promoted Sindhi regionalism and helped increase the following of the Jeeya Sind movement. Its economic policies further increased the constituencies of the alienated middle classes in Sind and Baluchistan.

The components of all three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement, which had hitherto been working for the provincial autonomy of their respective provinces, evolved into secessionist movements. Some of their components began to work for the formation of separate states of Pushtunistan, Sindhu Desh and Baluchistan respectively. The trends in the evolution of the rising Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements paralleled each other though for different reasons. In Sind where the regime persecuted the

hardline faction and officially patronized the moderate factions of the Jeeya Sind movement, the consequence of the policy was to increase the following of the Jeeya sind movement. In Baluchistan where the regime used more than 80,000 troops, its policies catalyzed full scale tribal warfare. The social bases of support of these two movements reveal considerable similarities. An alliance between the landed or tribal elite with the educated middle classes forged during the Ayub era was matured during this phase. In both cases, peasant based guerrilla organizations emerged which were deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas.

The Pushtunistan movement continued to decline further. The regime's policy of making an alliance with the urban educated middle classes, its increasing following especially among the students and the peasants and four times higher number of out-migration from the N.W.F.P. as compared to the other provinces were the major factors contributing towards further decline of the movement.¹²

Rise and Decline of the Movements: (1977-1987)

The military under the leadership of Zia ul Haq staged a coup d'etat in July 1977, replacing the civilian government. The military-bureaucratic elite again became the state-elite. Its composition and the nature of policies were remarkably similar to the Ayub era (1958-69).¹³ The Punjabis, the Pushtuns and the Mohajirs were well represented among the state elite while the Sindhis and the Baluchis were greatly underrepresented thanks to the continuity in the recruitment patterns in the army and bureaucracy strictly maintained in

the colonial tradition. The state elite, in the political sphere, sought to restore the same one-unit policy in defacto terms through sweeping amendments in the constitution. The regime also reverted to a controlled democracy policy under the name of "Islamic democracy".¹⁴ In addition, the regime pursued cooptive policies towards the Baluchis and the Pushtuns elite and coercive policies towards the Sindhi elite. In the cultural sphere, the regime reverted to the same unitary policies and adopted one language policy, Urdu, deemphasizing the role of regional languages. Economically, the regime vigorously sought to develop the backward areas in the underdeveloped provinces, especially focussing on the infrastructural development.

The consequences of unitary political, cultural and economic policies were also remarkably similar to the Ayub era, leading to a significant increase in the public support for both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and a virtual decline of the support for the Pushtunistan movement. The regime's defacto one-unit policy triggered a demand for confederation in Sind and Baluchistan.¹⁵ Its controlled democracy policy deeply alienated Sind and Baluchistan. In Sind, two full scale rebellions erupted against the regime, one in 1983 and the other in 1986. Baluchistan has remained quiet on the surface but deeper alienation from the regime continued to persist. The one language policy has led the regionalists to make a demand for the recognition of their regional languages as official languages. Economic developmental policies are perceived more strategically oriented to acquire better means of control on the part of the state elite rather than directed towards real development.

The policies of the state elite pushed even the moderate factions of the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement to go beyond the federal arrangements and make a demand for a confederation. The trends in the Jeeya Sind and Baluchistan movements again followed similar trends. In both provinces, a variety of regionalist organizations with secessionist causes have proliferated. These organizations draw their support from all three sections of the society, landed or tribal elite, educated middle classes and peasants. Their membership has cumulatively been on the increase.¹⁶

The Pushtunistan movement went into a near complete decline. Its primary reason was the greater representation of the Pushtuns among the state elite, who especially came from the same districts which constituted strongholds of the Pushtunistan movement. Other factors included successful cooptation of the Zia regime in winning over both the traditional landed elite and a significant component of the Pushtun educated middle classes. Influx of three million Afghan refugees, mostly Pushtuns, into the N.W.F.P. in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has been another very important factor in leading to a dramatic decline in the public support for the Pushtunistan movement. The outpouring of public support for the refugees which cuts across party lines left the Pro-Moscow Pushtunistan movement without much public support. The movement found itself completely discredited in the face of domestic and international changes.

International FactorsTransnational Influences

Among the transnational influences, both liberal nationalist ideas and the multi-national socialist tradition influenced the ideologies of the ethno-national movements in the first phase (1947-1970).

Ideologies of the movements had a syncretist character, borrowing from both the cultural traditions and combining it with the selective parts of the local histories. However the influence of liberal nationalist ideas was predominant during this phase. The traditional landed elite invoked their right to self-determination, referring to a separate language, culture and history. As the state elite was also invoking the same terminology to justify its nation-building policies, the ethnic elites both because of the pre-partition socialist influences inherited from the Indian National Congress, as well as to distinguish themselves from the state elite, preferred to emphasize their program within the socialist framework. The traditional elite of these movements was also greatly influenced by the Indian government's policy of reorganizing Indian provinces according to linguistic and cultural criteria, an unintended effect of the policy.

In the second phase (1971-77), the formation of Bangladesh had the most significant demonstration effect on the course of the ethno-national movements. All three movements, the Pushtunistan movement, the Jeeya Sind movement and the Baluch movement, emulated the Bangladesh movement in their strategies and tactics and also developed expectations of help from India and the Soviet Union, two external powers which had played a decisive role in the success of the

Bangladesh movement. The effect of multi-national socialist tradition became more pronounced. All three movements emphasized the four nationality theme and the vision of a multi-national socialist Pakistan. They also stressed the rights of nationalities to secede. Ideologies and strategies of both the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements were deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas. The declining Pushtunistan movement, however, displayed little interest in radical Maoist ideas and remained pro-Moscow in its orientation.

The Marxist coup in Afghanistan (1978) leading to the Soviet military intervention in the country (1979) and the Islamic revolution in Iran (1978) were the two major regional developments which affected the course of Pakistani ethno-national movements during the third phase (1977-87). Developments in Afghanistan affected the various components of the movements differently. The traditional landed elites, generally, were afraid of the Soviet move and became ambivalent towards the issue of secession. However, they sought cleverly to blackmail the state elite by exploiting the external situation. The educated middle classes in Sind and Baluchistan were most influenced by the Soviet nationality model followed by the successive Marxist Afghan regimes. The masses in general, as it shows through the national survey results were opposed to the Soviet move and supported the Zia regime's Afghan policy.¹⁷ Islamic revolution in Iran had an initial radicalizing effect on these movements because of its perceived 'anti-imperialist' orientation on their part, but gradually lost its support because of its unitary policies towards its own ethnic groups.

Activities of Co-ethnics

In the first phase (1947-70) the Pakistani Pushtuns maintained contacts with their fellow Pushtuns across the Pak-Afghan border and also developed expectations of help from both their transborder fellow Pushtuns as well as the Afghan government. The Pushtuns in Afghanistan and India formed a variety of cultural organizations whose primary purpose was to influence the policies of their respective governments in favor of the Pushtunistan movement. Similarly, the Sindhis in India also formed various organizations. The Sindhi magazines, journals and newspapers began to be published in India and were smuggled into Pakistan. There is little evidence of such comparable contact among the Baluchis of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran in the first phase.

In the second phase (1971-77), as a consequence of the oppressive policies of the state both the Pakistani Pushtuns and the Pakistani Baluch crossed the Pak-Afghan border and sought help from Afghanistan. Both groups engaged in the guerrilla activities against the state. Despite overt Afghan help, the Pushtuns had little success in the N.W.F.P. because of declining level of sympathy among the public. The Baluch guerrilla activity was more effective because of public support it received from the Baluchi people. Simultaneously, the Afghan Pushtuns began to come to Pakistan to seek help against the oppressive Daoud regime which was busy liquidating its opponents in Afghanistan.¹⁸ Pakistani Sindhis' cultural interaction with the Indian Sindhis also showed a phenomenal increase during this phase.

During the third phase (1977-87), a small number of Pakistani Pushtuns continued to trickle into Afghanistan, but the influx of

nearly three million Afghan refugees, mostly Pushtuns in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan dramatically changed the situation.¹⁹ Most of the Afghan refugees were extremely anti-Soviet and aligned themselves with the Islamic parties, rival to the Pushtunistan movement. It fundamentally affected the fate of the Pro-Moscow Pushtunistan movement which found itself in a very odd situation of not supporting their Pushtun brethren against the Soviet Union. Some Pakistani Baluch tribes who had crossed the Pak-Afghan border, continued to stay in Afghanistan, but did not engage in any guerrilla activity because of changed domestic and international situation. Among the Afghan refugees, a significant portion of Afghan Baluch also arrived in Baluchistan who actively participated in Jihad (Holy War) against the Soviet-installed Marxist regime.²⁰ Some leaders of the Jeeya Sind movement contacted the Indian government for help, but little evidence of any direct complicity of Indian government was available. However, the Sindhis in India actively engaged in lobbying efforts to influence the policy of their government in favor of the Jeeya Sind movement.

Policies of Foreign States

Afghanistan, India and the Soviet Union publically gave support to the Pushtunistan movement during the first phase (1947-70).

Afghanistan based its claim on the non-recognition of the Durand line as an international frontier and sought to claim the Pakistani Pushtun and Baluch areas under the concept of "Greater Pushtunistan". India which had developed strained relations with Pakistan over Kashmir also

found it in her interest to support the Afghan claim. Both countries provided moral and material support to the Pushtunistan movement, courted leading Pakistani Pushtun elite and also occasionally incited the transborder Pushtun tribes to form a separate state of Pushtunistan. The Soviet Union's support to the Pushtunistan movement remained confined to a diplomatic level only, primarily in support of India and Afghanistan against Pakistan, a Western ally. The Soviet Union quietly withdrew its support from the movement when Pakistan moved close to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Tashkent agreement (1966) between India and Pakistan mediated by the Soviet Union after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.²¹ This open Indo-Afghan-Soviet support, however, negatively influenced the popularity of the Pushtunistan movement as the Pakistani state elite, of which the Pushtuns were the most significant component under the leadership of Ayub (himself a Pushtun) successfully exploited the Pushtun leaders' alleged external connections, questioning their loyalty to the state.

Afghanistan's role grew more important in the second phase (1971-77), in aiding both the Pushtunistan movement and the Baluch movement in the wake of highly oppressive state policies of the Bhutto regime towards these movements. However, Afghanistan reversed its policy of support to the Pushtunistan and Baluch movements when the Bhutto regime began to support the Afghan Pushtun dissidents against the Afghan regime to counter Afghanistan's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. The Bhutto regime's skillful strategy undercut the main external source of support for the Pushtunistan movement contributing to the further decline of the movement.²² Iran also became involved in

helping mediate the Pushtunistan dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan and also militarily collaborated with the Bhutto regime in suppressing the Baluch revolt for fear of its spillover effect into the Iranian Baluchistan. Iraq, Syria, UAE, Behrain and Muscat who were giving aid to the Iranian Baluch movement to counter Iranian support to the Kurdish movement in Iraq, also gave a limited financial help to the Pakistani Baluch movement as well. However, their involvement had a marginal effect and apparently stopped when the Bhutto regime protested. The Soviet Union and India maintained an interest in the development of the movements but there is little evidence to show whether they also supported the movements.

Afghan and the Soviet policies towards Pakistani ethno-national movements became closely identical in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan during the third phase (1977-87). The policies of both the countries are primarily aimed at two objectives: (1) to reduce the strength of the growingly powerful indigenous Afghan Islamic resistance and (2) to encourage the Pushtun and the Baluch movements of Pakistan to force the Zia regime to abandon its support to the Afghan refugees. Both the countries have actively courted the leading Pushtun and Baluch elite, have attempted to incite trans-border tribes through the distribution of weapons and money and have been training the Pushtun and the Baluch students in Afghan and the Soviet universities. The policies have failed in the short run, but both countries continue to patiently give aid to these two movements hoping to revive them in the long run. India has shown some interest in the Jeeya Sind movement but apparently has not given any

active support so far. If the Afghan stalemate continues, the possibilities of some joint Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis to enhance Pakistan's regional problems may not be ruled out.

Major Findings

Our major finding in analytical-empirical mode is that the explanation for rise and decline of ethno-national movements lies in a combination of domestic and international political factors. Among the domestic factors, the primary explanation lies at the state level. It is interaction between the state elite and the ethnic elites which determines the rise and decline of ethno-national movements. If the state elite shares power with the ethnic elites, they begin to go along with the state elite in their desired direction and the movements begin to decline. Conversely, if the state elite monopolizes power and pursues unitary policies in the political, cultural and economic spheres, the ethnic elites, excluded from power-sharing arrangements react to the policies of state, begins to formulate secessionist ideologies, mobilizes public support among their respective ethnic groups and the movements begin to rise. Organizations, ideologies, strategies and social bases of ethno-national movements may be explainable in the context of interaction between the state elite and the ethnic elites. Demographic changes, occurring at the group level may as well be secondarily important but their impact on the movements, positive or negative may also be better understood in an overall domestic and international political context.

International factors, -- transnational influences, activities of coethnics and policies of foreign states -- usually play a secondary role and reinforce the trends generated by domestic factors, but may have the potential to decisively affect the course of the movements at crisis moments.

In the two brief phases of the Pakistani history (1947-53) and (1971-73) when the democratic system was in operation and the state elite shared power with the regional elites, the ethno-national movements either remained dormant or immediately began to decline. However, leaving aside these two exceptional phases, despite different self-characterization of the three regimes, one finds a basic structural similarity in the state elites' behavior across the three phases, liberal, Socialist and Islamic. Similarities between the liberal and Islamic phase are strikingly clear. The Socialist phase, which looks different on the surface because of its democratic form, after an initial policy of sharing power, so heavily began to depend on the state institutions -- bureaucracy, para-military organizations and military, that it reproduced a similar pattern of policy which existed in the liberal and the Islamic phases. All three regimes, in political sphere, monopolized power, made use of overt force against the ethno-national movements, and also intendedly or unintendedly helped regionalize the political process to forestall the possibilities of emergence of any national level opposition against them. They also especially focussed on the infrastructural development of the provinces in economic sphere with an explicit purpose of reducing the public support for the ethno-national movements. However, in the absence of

power-sharing, the economic policies proved counter-productive in Sind and Baluchistan where they increased the constituency of alienated, educated middle classes. In the case of the N.W.F.P., which was significantly overrepresented in the power structure, the consequences of the economic policies were generally positive and led to a desired result of reducing the support for the Pushtunistan movement.

The parallels between the liberal and the Islamic phases are strikingly similar both in terms of policies and their consequences. The unitary state-building policies in political, cultural and economic spheres produced a sharp reaction among the ethnic groups. The Sindhis and the Baluchis, who found themselves excluded from the state elite thanks to the continuance of the same recruitment policies to the army and the bureaucracy by the state inherited from the colonial era, sharply reacted to the policies of the state. We see the political salience of the Sindhi and the Baluchi identities born in the liberal phase and cumulatively rising across three phases. Ideologies and strategies of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements also changed in each phase from a demand for provincial autonomy to secessionist goals overt or covert. The social bases of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements also reveal a great degree of similarity. We see an alliance between the landed/tribal elite and the educated middle classes, forged during the liberal phase, mature through the Islamic phase. On the other hand, the Pushtun elite which was significantly well represented among the state elite and continued to find access to the higher echelon of the military and bureaucracy did not react to the policies of the state and was little attracted to the Pushtunistan movement. As

a result we see a gradual cooptation of the Pushtun educated middle classes by successive state elites and corresponding declining level of the Pushtunistan movement. Other factors such as the out-migration of a very high number of the Pushtuns from the rural areas of the N.W.F.P. and in-migration of three million Afghan refugees from Afghanistan were also significant but secondary factors which hastened the process of the decline of the movement.

One distinguishing feature of the socialist phase was that the Sindhi elite was in power both at the center as well as at the provincial level. The question arises that why did the Jeeya Sind movement continue to rise and gain public support. Does it invalidate our power-sharing argument? There appears to be two explanations for the continuing rise of the Jeeya Sind movement. First, the change in the regime character which we have pointed out above, i.e., the regime's gradual dissassociation from its mass-base and heavy reliance on the state institutions which were dominated by other ethnic groups. Second, the provincial PPP's role at the Sind level, which consciously sought to exploit Sindhi ethno-national symbols both to preempt other regional organizations as well as to increase their political following in Sind. We may qualify our power-sharing argument by saying that the movements may continue to rise despite power-sharing if the ethnic elite in power continues to promote ethnic symbols and mobilize its public support on that basis.

Our analysis of international factors shows that their role remained secondary, generally reinforcing the trends generated by the domestic factors, but such drastic international change like the Soviet

military intervention in Afghanistan has the potential to fundamentally affect the course of the movements. It is premature at this stage to accurately assess and forecast the likely changes in the course of the movements as a result of the situation in Afghanistan, but these changes may have the potential to assume priority over the domestic factors in the long run. If a Sovietized Afghanistan emerges, it may be a significant catalyst to the Pakistani ethno-national movement in the long run. On the contrary, if the present stalemate continues or the Afghan resistance forces the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan, the ethnic elites of the movements may rethink their alternatives.

NOTES

1. See the referendum results, Table III in Chapter 3.
2. See the composition of the state elite during the Ayub era, Table IV and Table V in Chapter 3.
3. See the description of the system in Chapter III, p. 98.
4. See Chapter 3, p. 101.
5. See an analysis of social background of the state elite in Chapter 3, p. 107.
6. See a brief description of the movement, Chapter 4, p. 140.
7. Ibid., p. 142-144.
8. For a detailed analysis of the motives of the state elite, see Chapter 4, p. 154.
9. See Table III in Chapter 4.
10. See for details, Chapter 4, p. 159.
11. See a revealing secret note of the director of the Intelligence Bureau's to the Prime Minister Bhutto on the regime's reliance on the bureaucracy and the military in Chapter 4, footnote no. 62.
12. See Table VII in Chapter 4.
13. See Table I and Table II in Chapter 4.
14. For details see p. 210.
15. See Chapter 5, p. 216.
16. See analysis of the social bases of the movements Chapter 5, pp. 234-241.
17. See Table III and Table IV in Chapter 5.
18. See details, p. 187.
19. See the graph of the refugees' arrival in Chapter 5.
20. See Table VI in Chapter 5.
21. See p. 122.
22. See for details, Chapter 4, p. 187.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Why did the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements rise and the Pushtunistan movement decline over time? In analytic-empirical mode, we have so far argued that the explanation for their rise and decline lies in a combination of domestic and international factors. Among the domestic factors, the primary explanation lies at the state level. Interaction between the state elite and the ethnic elites on power-sharing continuum is, in fact, the principal causal factor in catalyzing or defusing the ethno-national movements. International factors usually play a secondary role and reinforce the trends generated by domestic factors, but may have the potential to assume greater significance at crisis moments.

Alternative cultural traditions also form part of domestic and international context. States and societies cannot be divorced from their cultural contexts. Three transnational cultural traditions, Liberalism, Marxism, and Islam, whose relevance to our study was noted in the introduction, in fact, impinge upon three distinct phases of Pakistani history. Each phase was preceded by a mass movement and brought its own notion of "community" rooted in respective cultural tradition. State structures claimed to draw their legitimacy from these alternative cultural traditions. Their political, cultural, and economic policies, which apparently looked similar, drew on a very different criterion in each phase. At the interpretative level, an analyst may treat each phase differently, exploring the different

meanings of each phase rooted in the mode of discourse brought forth by each cultural tradition. The major argument of this chapter is that perspectives from these alternative cultural traditions not only provide a deeper understanding of the perceptions, actions, and reactions of the social actors involved, but may also yield a better theoretical explanation of the rise and decline of ethno-national movements. This concluding chapter has three sections. The first section, "Perspective from Alternative Cultural Traditions" analyzes each of the three phases, liberal, socialist, and Islamic, on its own terms, focussing on the perceptions of the actors involved. The second section, "Alternative Theoretical Explanations: Syntheses," critically evaluates the theoretical explanations offered by these alternative cultural traditions in holistic sense and synthesizes the major findings of this study. The third section, "Conclusion Summarized," notes relative utility of the two modes of inquiry, analytic-empirical and interpretative-hermeneutic and summarizes the major findings of this study.

Perspective from Alternative Cultural Traditions

Liberal Phase: 1947-1970

The emergence of Pakistan movement reflected a convergence of interests among the traditional landed elite, secular educated middle classes, and the masses. The Pakistan movement, though led by secular liberal educated middle classes, primarily drew its mass support on the basis of an Islamic communitarian tradition. The promise of a just Islamic community helped bridge the elite-mass gap among the Muslims of

the sub-continent, resulting in a powerful mass-based movement, eventually culminating in the formation of the new Islamic state in 1947. The opposition to the Pakistan movement came from some of the traditional landed or tribal elite in Sind and Baluchistan who were desirous of establishing their own autonomous states but were unable to counter the mass support for the Pakistan movement. The most notable opposition to the Pakistan movement was from the N.W.F.P., where the mass-based Pushtun regional autonomy movement launched a boycott campaign of the special referendum held by the British to determine if the masses of the N.W.F.P. wanted to join India or Pakistan and demanded the formation of a separate state of Pushtunistan. The Pushtunistan movement failed in the campaign as the masses in the N.W.F.P. overwhelmingly favored the formation of a new state.

The strands of all three traditions, liberal, socialist, and Islamic, were present in the making of the new community, but it was a synthesis between liberal and Islamic traditions, i.e. liberal nationalism and Islamic communitarian internationalism (Umma) combined which was of crucial significance in the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The predominant debates at the center were between the liberals and the Islamists which focussed on the shape of the new community, but there was also a dormant socialist dimension as well. The state elite and the ethnic elites held divergent perceptions of the new state. The state elite had an expressed preference for building a liberal unitary nation-state on the Western pattern and also wanted to combine Islam in some way, while the ethnic elites (largely influenced by the Indian

National Congress) preferred a loosely federal socialist Pakistan with maximum provincial autonomy.

These divergent perceptions held by the state elite and the ethnic elites began to crystallize when the military-bureaucratic elite became ascendant in 1953. The synthesis between liberal nationalism and Islamic communitarian internationalism (Umma) which had characterized the state ideology since 1947, broke down in favor of liberal nationalism as the military-bureaucratic elite, under the leadership of Ayub Khan, chose to build a homogenized and integrated liberal nation-state, a Western prototype. In the political sphere, they adopted a one-unit policy eliminating the provincial boundaries, amalgamating them into a new entity called West Pakistan. They also devised a "basic democracy system" to ensure the orderly participation of the masses. In the cultural sphere, they adopted one language policy, banning the use of regional languages. In the economic sphere, their policies were aimed at modernizing the society based on sole criteria of maximization of growth rate. In the foreign policy sphere, they pursued a policy of close alignment with the West and friendly relations with the Peoples' Republic of China.

The perceptions of the ethnic elites in the provinces rooted in the socialist tradition began to differ widely from the state elite. "Nation-building" efforts by the state elite were seen as "nation-destroying" by the ethnic elites; "basic democracy" was perceived as "internal colonialism"; and modernization was viewed as "exploitation." In Sind and Baluchistan these perceptions began to be widely shared among the traditional landed elite and the educated middle classes,

neither of whom found their due share of power in the political system. The masses in general also began to perceive such state actions as the distribution of agricultural land in Sind to the senior military-bureaucratic officials (mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs) and distribution of natural gas (discovered in Baluchistan) to other provinces as severe injustices. In the N.W.F.P., the traditional landed elite, out of power, also shared the same perceptions as those of their counterparts in Sind and Baluchistan, but their perceptions were less widely shared among the Pushtun educated middle classes and the masses. Its principal reason was the greater cooptation of the Pushtun educated middle classes into two key national institutions, the army and the bureaucracy. The Pushtun state elite was also successful in creating widespread doubt among the masses about the loyalty of the Pushtun elite to the Pakistani state because of their alleged external connections with India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union.

The Pushtun, the Sindhi, and the Baluchi elites were also opposed to the pro-Western foreign policy orientation of the state and developed a sympathetic attitude towards India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. These three external powers overtly supported the Pushtun elite in their struggle for the right to self-determination, which negatively influenced the popularity of the Pushtunistan movement domestically.

Socialist Phase: 1971-1977

This phase was preceded by a mass movement led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party. Ideology of the movement reflected a

synthesis of all three traditions, Islam, Liberalism and Marxism, symbolized by the PPP's motto, "Islam is our religion," "Democracy is our polity," and "Socialism is our economy," but the movement leaders mobilized their public support primarily on the socialist slogans. They successfully challenged the legitimacy of the liberal phase by raising the issues of growing income inequalities, social injustices, and highly centralized unitary political system, and by questioning the close foreign policy alignment with the West.

The new state elite, on assuming power, wanted to build what it termed "Islamic socialist community." For a brief period the state elite followed a policy of sharing power with the ethnic elites which had an immediate effect on regionalist movements. The ethnic elites categorically renounced the regionalist stance and were willing to go along with the state elite. However, this brief consensus between the state elite and the ethnic elites came to an abrupt end when the state elite, fearing that the regionalist parties might become a serious national alternative to the ruling party, reverted to authoritarian policies towards them.

The state elite, in the political sphere, adopted the political system that it termed "socialist democracy." It also sought to liquidate the "anti-national" regional movements through an overt use of force. In the cultural sphere, the state elite's policies intentionally or unintentionally followed a multinational model. They promoted regional languages and advocated at least in theory, of not in practice, cultural autonomy of the provinces. Economically, they sought to modernize Pakistani society within the socialist framework

and claimed that their economic policies were aimed at creating a society free of exploitation. In the foreign policy sphere, they disengaged themselves from the pro-Western foreign policy and opted for a non-aligned path and friendly relations with the socialist bloc.

The ethnic elites of all three movements, the Pushtunistan, the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch, began to emphasize the four nationalities theme. They envisioned a multinational socialist Pakistan and began to stress the right of nationalities to secede. Extremist components of all three movements turned secessionists in reaction to the oppressive policies of the state. In Sind and Baluchistan, peasant-based guerrilla organizations emerged which were deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas. Both in Sind and in Baluchistan, we see a similarity in the perception among the traditional landed/tribal elite, educated middle classes and the peasants.

On the other hand, the Pushtunistan movement witnessed a further decline in its public support. The educated middle classes were coopted by the socialist regime through a coalition provincial government and the regime was also successful in winning over the political support of the rural-based radical peasants' organizations.

The Pushtun, the Baluchi, and the Sindhi elites sought to develop greater contacts with their coethnics in Afghanistan, Iran, and India. They also sought help from the external powers, especially Afghanistan, which, morally and materially, supported the Pushtun and the Baluch elite in their struggle against the Pakistani state. However, Afghanistan reversed its policy when Pakistan began to support radical Islamic opposition to the Daoud regime to counter its support to the

Pushtun and Baluch elite. Iran also helped mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan to resolve the Pushtunistan dispute because of its own vested interests. The Gulf countries also became marginally involved with helping the Baluch movement, but stopped supporting it when the Bhutto regime protested.

Islamic Phase: 1977-1987

This phase was also preceded by an extremely fierce mass movement, Tehreek-i-Nazami-i-Mustafa (the movement for the establishment of the system of life brought by the prophet Mohammad), led by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of nine opposition parties against the socialist regime. This movement successfully challenged the legitimacy of the socialist phase by raising unresolved issues of cumulative injustices, loss of civil liberties, and the oppressive nature of state institutions. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government was overthrown by the military and the military-bureaucratic elite, which took over power, quickly seized upon Islamic symbols and began to undertake multi-dimensional measures to Islamize the society.

The state elite, in the political sphere, instituted a system of Shura, its own version of what it termed "Islamic democracy," and also pursued a variety of cooptive-coercive policies towards the ethnic elites. In the cultural sphere, the state elite stressed the *raison d'être* of the state within the broader framework of Islamic communitarian internationalism (Umma). The original partnership between liberal nationalism and Islamic communitarian internationalism (Umma) which had resulted in the formation of the state in 1947, has

returned, though with one significant difference: Islamic communitarian internationalism (Umma) now claims to be a senior partner in the Islamic-liberal synthesis. The state elite also reverted to the one-unit and the one-language policy, deemphasizing the role of regional cultures and languages. In economic sphere, the state elite claimed to build a just society. In foreign policy, the state elite supported both the Afghan refugees and resistance in their Jihad (Holy War) in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and moved closer to the United States, China, and the Muslim countries.

Pursuit of highly unitarian policies under the name of Islam pushed the ethno-national movements towards making the demand for a confederal arrangement. The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist opposition in Sind and Baluchistan began to take a coherent shape against the Islamic regime. The Sindhi ethnic elite was especially successful in launching two fierce protest movements against the regime, one in 1983 and the other in 1986. A deeper alienation continued to persist in Baluchistan, resulting in increasing membership of radical regionalist organizations. The Pushtun elite nearly completely lost its mass-base during this phase. Higher representation of the Pushtun educated middle class among the state elite, cooptation of the traditional landed elite by the state, and the changing perceptions in the N.W.F.P. in favor of Islamic-national parties in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan left pro-Moscow Pushtunistan movement completely discredited without much public support.

The Pushtun, the Sindhi, and the Baluchi elites continued to maintain contacts with their coethnics in the adjacent foreign

countries at a smaller scale but the Marxist coup in Afghanistan eventually leading to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and the Islamic revolution in Iran so fundamentally changed the international context that the ethnic elite was forced to rethink its alternatives. The traditional landed elite of all three movements were afraid of the Soviet military action, the educated middle class component of the Sindhi and Baluchi elite was positively encouraged and the masses in general remained opposed to the Soviet move.

The cumulative influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet military intervention and growing powerful Islamic resistance to the successive Afghan regimes, kept both Kabul and Moscow so worried about the security of the Afghan regimes that their policies were primarily directed to reducing the strength of resistance and secondarily aimed at fuelling the Pakistani ethno-national movements. It is significant to note that even the Marxist Afghan regimes also resorted to Islamic symbols appealing the Pushtun component of the resistance to desist from fighting in the name of Islam.¹ Afghanistan and the Soviet Union's policies towards the Pakistani ethno-national movements became closely linked with each other and India also displayed some interest in the Jeeya Sind movement, with a possibility of a joint Kabul-Moscow-Delhi axis against the Islamabad-Washington-Beijing axis.

Alternative Theoretical Explanations: Syntheses

Do alternative cultural traditions contribute to a better theoretical explanation? Our argument in this study is that a

synthesis across three cultural traditions, liberalism, Marxism, and Islam may provide a better theoretical explanation as well. We critically consider the theoretical insights of these alternative cultural traditions, summarized in Chapter two of this study, in the light of our case study.

We demonstrated in Chapter six that a state-centered explanatory framework, shared cross-culturally, helps us build a comprehensive and dynamic picture of both rise and decline of the ethno-national movements. We argued that their organizations, ideologies, strategies, and social bases are largely explainable as a reaction to state policies. International factors usually reinforce the trends generated by domestic factors, but may have the potential to assume primacy over the domestic factors at crisis moments. However, looked at from the perspective of these alternative cultural traditions, such sharp analytic distinctions, state/society and domestic/international tend to break down. The cultural perspective highlights the fact that these state-structures themselves are also undergoing the process of change in response to changes in society. Reality, seen from the perspective of these cultural traditions, appears to be more complex: both state structures and group identities are constantly in flux, changing and shifting from one stage to another.² From liberal to socialist to Islamic, each phase is preceded by a mass movement and state structures draw their legitimacy from a very different cultural tradition during each phase. Terminology and meanings of the state actions and the ethnic groups' reactions change during each phase. In the first phase (1947-71) the state elite invoked the liberal nationalist terminology

to justify their state-building policies. They termed "basic democracy" as "liberal democracy", used "maximization of growth" as the sole criterion for pursuing their economic policies and attempted to mold the Pakistani society into a liberal nation state on the Western pattern. The reaction of the ethnic elites drew both on the liberal and socialist traditions and their demands centered on maximum provincial autonomy. In the second phase (1971-77) the state elite sought to build a socialist community. They established what they termed as "socialist democracy", pursued economic policies to construct an "exploitation free" society and sought to construct a "multi-national" Pakistani nation. The ethnic elites also reacting in the socialist mode demanded the status of a nationality with an ultimate right to secede. In the third phase (1977-1987) the state elite pursued their state-building policies within the framework of Islamic tradition. They instituted a system of Shura (Islamic democracy) and claimed to build a just society within the broader framework of Umma (international Islamic community). The ethnic elites strongly reacting to the unitarian thrust of the "Islamic" policies of the regime, developed radical Marxist organizations working overtly for separate states.

Sequentially, three phases appear to be three contending, competing and clashing world orders, which bring their own notions of "community." They reflect the dilemmas of a deeply divided society unable to achieve consensus across these three traditions, liberalism, Marxism and Islam. These changing state ideologies reveal the fact that the Pakistani community is not a nation-state but a state which is

yet unsure of the type of community it wants to become. The legitimacy of the liberal phase was successfully challenged by the socialist phase which in turn was replaced by the Islamic phase. The state suffers from a perpetual crisis of legitimacy because of the absence of consensus in the society on the basic rules of the game. It is interesting to note that the three phases of Pakistani history, from liberal nationalism to socialist nationalism to Islamic communitarian internationalism, roughly parallel the political developments in other Muslim countries. Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and many other Muslim states, in varying degrees, reveal the same tendencies as reflected in the three Pakistani phases of history reviewed above. They too, like the Pakistani state, suffer from perpetual crises of legitimation, indicative of an absence of consensus in their respective societies.³

Insights from all three traditions, liberalism, Marxism, and Islam, together help us to comprehensively understand the social bases of these movements as well. These alternative research programs complement each other in unique ways and help explain different parts of reality. Assumptions of both the liberal and the Marxist theorists are drawn from the modernization paradigm. Central proposition of liberal theorists, stressing the differential rates of modernization emphasizes the role of educated middle classes, who, acting as a modern interest group in a competitive environment, exploit ethno-national symbols and lead the movements. The Marxist theorists stress the factor of uneven development of capitalism which creates conditions of center-periphery in one area after another, forcing the petty

bourgeoisie of the peripheral areas to revolt against the center, employing ethno-national symbols. The post-modernization writers in both the traditions are increasingly becoming skeptical of the adequacy of theories. The most significant objection raised by the post-modernization writers in both traditions is that the theories rooted in modernization paradigm are the product of the modern industrial environment of the West, which display an inherent Western bias in attaching too much significance to the role of the educated middle classes/petty bourgeoisie in the formation of ethno-national movements and fail to account for the motivations of the unmodernized strata of the society. Consequently, the theories tend to ignore the heterogeneity of the social bases of these movements. On the other hand, the Islamic tradition, product of rural-tribal environment, emphasized different factors than the liberal or Marxist tradition. The traditional writers in the Islamic tradition emphasized the role of the landed/tribal elite in both state-making and state-breaking stages. They also stressed the central role of justice in building an elite-mass integration and the possibility and legitimacy of an ethnic revolt if the policies of state are perceived as unjust. Much of the modern literature in the Islamic tradition under the influence of the liberal tradition borrows the assumptions of liberal modernization theories and has little difference from the Western tradition. However, the post-modernization writers of the Islamic tradition are returning to the precepts of the traditional theorists, especially emphasizing the central role of justice in building a unified community. By a 'just society' they mean a society with a fair equality of opportunity for

everyone without discrimination against any race. In their view, the ethnic revolt, arises against the unjust state-structures built by the imperialists in nearly all Muslim countries which systematically favor some racial, linguistic or religious groups against the others. They believe that unless these unjust colonial state structures are replaced by the just ones, there always exists the possibility of an ethnic revolt.

We have shown in our analysis of social bases of the ethno-national movements in our case study that the role of the educated middle classes, though critical in both the rise and the decline of the movements was, however, not the only factor. Both in the case of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements, it is the alliance between the traditional landed elite, the educated middle classes, and the peasants which has been responsible for the gradual rise of these movements. In the case of Pushtunistan movement, it is the failure of this alliance to develop due to the gradual cooptation of both the traditional landed elite, the educated middle classes, and changing public perception at mass level which led to the decline of the movement. Perspectives from three different cultural traditions provide alternative explanations of the motivation of each stratum of society. The traditional landed tribal elite plays an integrative role in the polity when it gets a share of power in the state-structure and is equally willing to play a disintegrative role, exploiting ethno-national symbols when out of power. The educated middle class, principally because of lack of accommodation in the state-structure, also finds itself a willing partner of the traditional landed/tribal elite. The non-elites go

along with them because of both traditional loyalty patterns and perception of injustice. Perception of injustice may, in fact, be a more significant factor, as in both Sind and Baluchistan peasant-based radical Marxist-Leninist-Maoist organizations are not only challenging the legitimacy of the state whose policies are perceived as unjust but also the sanctity of the traditional loyalty patterns between the peasants and landlords as well. The N.W.F.P. represents an interesting contrast, where the resurgence of Islamic identity due to both domestic and international factors has stifled the class-based radical peasant consciousness, at least in the short run. Whether the Afghan Marxist regime will be able to revive it in the long run is still an open question.

Conclusions Summarized

In the introduction of this study we made a critical distinction between state-centered explanatory approach and society-centered approaches rooted in the modernization paradigm to the understanding of ethno-national movements. We summarize the principal findings of this study making an explicit contrast between state-centered versus society-centered approaches, showing the greater explanatory potential of our approach.

State-centered explanatory framework allows an analyst to conceptually distinguish among domestic and international factors affecting the rise and decline of ethno-national movements whereas the society-centered approaches with a primacy focus on modernization processes confine themselves to group level socio-economic changes.

Our framework allows us to encompass not only the group level but also other levels of analysis which are not normally taken into account by society-centered approaches. Most of the studies of ethno-national movements conducted in the comparative politics field tend to ignore both the state level and the international level and primarily stress the internal sociological factors at the group level. Their exclusion of other levels of analyses has been duely criticized by a number of social scientists who have emphasized the need of bridging the gap between micro and macro levels in understanding the phenomena of ethno-nationalism comprehensively.⁴ In our case study we have shown how the interplay of a variety of domestic and international factors continuously affects the rise and decline of the movements. The rise of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and the delcine of the Pushtunistan movement was principally linked to both the state elites' behavior and such international factors as the transnational influences, activities of the coethnics and the policies of the foreign states. Ignoring these domestic and international levels may yield seriously misleading and unsatisfactory results.

Second, the state-centered framework avoids deterministic causal explanation while the society-centered approaches rooted in the modernization perspective assume that certain socio-economic changes necessarily lead to certain kind of consequences. Differential rates of modernization as assumed by the liberal theorists or uneven development of capitalism as assumed by the Marxist theorists necessarily catalyze ethno-national movements. Our framework avoids such deterministic causal explanation and assumes that certain set of

policies may lead to certain kind of consequences. If the policies change, consequences may change as well. In our case study, we strongly argue for the reactive nature of ethno-national movements rising and declining in direct response to both the state elite's policies and the international factors. It is argued that if the state elite's political policy monopolizes power, the ethnic elites excluded from the power-sharing arrangement, begin to formulate secessionist ideologies and the movements begin to rise. Conversely if the state-elite shares power with the other ethnic groups, the movements begin to decline. In the absence of power-sharing, economic and cultural policies designed to reduce the public support for the ethno-national movements may, in fact, be counterproductive and may contribute to the rise of the movements. During the two brief phases of Pakistani history 1947-54 and 1971-73, when the state elite shared power, the ethno-national movements either remained dormant or immediately began to decline. Leaving aside these two phases we see that all three Pakistani regimes, liberal, socialist and Islamic monopolized power and designed economic and cultural policies to reduce ethnic conflict. Their policies failed in the case of Sind and Baluchistan because of the absence of the Sindhi and the Baluchi elites' participation in the power structure and had some success in the case of the N.W.F.P. only which was disproportionately highly represented among the state elite. We argue that the outcomes of the movements are not predetermined as has been the claim of society-centered approaches, but they primarily depend on the nature of the state policies and external factors. If

the Pakistani state elite had pursued a policy of sharing power, they could have been successful in containing the ethno-national movements.

Third, our state-centered framework allows us to develop a dynamic picture of group identities and their fluctuating nature while the society centered approach, by virtue of its focus on the groups remains static and usually assumes a linear upward rise of ethno-national movements, overlooking the possibility of their decline. In our case study, we see a gradual cumulative rise in political salience of the Sindhi and the Baluchi identities and a dramatic decline in the Pushtun identity. This dynamic picture of changing group identities also strongly contradicts the basic assumptions of many South Asia scholars who widely believe the projected scenario about the likely development of Pakistani ethno-national movements (outlined in the introduction of this study) which presumes that all three of the movements would inevitably rise leading to the disintegration of the country. We have attempted to show the oversimplification of this widely speculated scenario by demonstrating that the domestic and international factors could contribute to the rise as well as to the decline of the ethno-national movements. The scholars are biased in favor of the rising phase and do not entertain even the possibility of a decline.

Interpretative mode of inquiry gives a deeper understanding of the meanings of each phase. Transcending such sharp analytic distinctions as state/society, domestic/international, an analyst is able to capture the uniqueness of each phase through alternative cultural prisms. Focus on cultural traditions allows an analyst to understand how the character of each phase derived from specific cultural tradition,

determines both the nature of the state and group identities. One gets a dynamic picture of changing history from one stage to another. The approach also gives an understanding of divergent perceptions of the actors involved, rooted in alternative cultural traditions.

Interpretative mode also holds the promise of building a better theoretical explanation shared cross-culturally. Understanding the development of theories in their historical contexts allows an analyst to evaluate the relative strength and weaknesses of alternative theories and the possibility of a synthesis. Alternative research programs rooted in different cultural traditions tend to emphasize different factors in explaining a phenomenon. Consciously or unconsciously, these research programs are influenced by their peculiar socio-cultural contexts. Understanding of these contexts on the part of an analyst is essential in terms of evaluating their explanatory potential and building a possible synthetic explanation valid across cultures.

Notes

1. It has been claimed by the Afghan regime that "respect for the sacred religion of Islam" is part of the government's policy. See Babrak Karmal's speech, June 18, 1980 Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, Daily Report: South Asia (Washington, D.C., June 20, 1980).
2. Rupert Emerson, in a recent review article, made the same observation about the changing nature of state-structures and group identities. He noted: "Most of the states of the world cannot legitimately be called nation-states, nor can most of the increasing number of ethnic groups, which have of late attracted so much attention, be seen as nations or nationalities, but rather as aspirant entities which resist the melting pot of the state of which they are a part." See his review of Harold R. Isaac's book "Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change," The American Political Science Review (March 1978), pp. 324-325.
3. See an excellent article which traces the same three phases in the rest of the Muslim countries and notes the perpetual crisis of legitimacy of these states. Hamid Enayat, "The Resurgence of Islam," History Today (Feb. 1980).
4. William J. Foltz reviewing Deutsch's works noted: "We cannot understand either the persistence or the change in overall structures without understanding the micro-processes, just as those processes cannot be understood without reference to the larger structures which constrain and incite their actions. The researcher must always be prepared to move continuously up and down in level of analysis, taking with him to each level the same principles of inquiry." See William J. Foltz, "Modernization and Nation-Building: The Social Mobilization Model Reconsidered," From National Development to Global Community by Richard L. Merrit and Bruce M. Russett (eds.) (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).

Also see Chadwick F. Alger, "Bridging the Micro and the Macro in International Relations Research," Alternatives (Winter 1984-1985).

Selected Bibliography

Books

- Abdullah, Ahmad. The Historical Background of Pakistan and its People. Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973.
- Ahmad, Feroz. Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtun Question. Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975.
- Ahmad, Iftikhar. General Elections of 1970. Lahore: South Asia Institute, 1970.
- Ali, Tariq. Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. London: Penguin Books, 1983.
- _____. Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples' Power? N.Y.: William & Morrow Co., 1970.
- Arjomand, A.S. From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam. Albany: State University of New York, 1984.
- Ambedkar, B.R. Pakistan or Partition of India. Bombay: Thaker Press, 1946.
- Arblaster, Anthony. The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism. N.Y.: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
- Aresar, A.W. Pareh Jo Pegham. (Sindhi) Karachi: n.d.
- Ayoob, Mohammad (ed.) The Politics of Islamic Reassertion. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Baloch, Mir Khuda Bakhsh. Search Lights on Baluchis and Baluchistan. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1974.
- Baluch, Mir, Abdul-Baqi. Baluchistan Ka Masala (Urdu). Lahore: 1978.
- Barton, William. India's North West Frontier. London: John Murray, 1939.
- Bhattacharya, S.R. Pakhtunistan Ka Mutaliba (Urdu). Calcutta, 1967.
- Bhutto, Z.A. Political Situation in Pakistan. New Delhi: 1969.
- _____. If I am assassinated... New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1979.
- Bhutto, Mohammad, Musa. Sind Kay Halat Ki Sachi Tasveer (Urdu). Hyderabad: 1976.

- _____. Babul Islam Sind Kay Halat Ka Belaqa Jaiza (Urdu). Hyderabad: 1977.
- Binder, L. Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
- Brass, P.R. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Burki, Shahid, J. Pakistan Under Bhutto (1971-1977). New York: St. Martin Press, 1980.
- Burton, R.F. Sind and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of the Indus. Lahore: Khan Publishers, 1967.
- Caroe, Sir Olaf. The Pathans: 550 B.C. - A.D. 1957. London: MacMillan & Co., 1958.
- Choudhury, G.W. The Last Days of United Pakistan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- _____. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers. N.Y.: Free Press, 1975.
- Cohen, Stephen. The Pakistan Army. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Connor, Walker. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Davies, Collin. The Problem of the North West Frontier 1890-1908. Cambridge: 1932.
- Davis, H.B. (ed.). The National Question: Selected Writings of Rosa Luxemburg. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
- Dekmejian, R.H. Islam in Revolution. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
- Dessouki, Ali, E.H. Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.
- Deutsch, K.W. Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953.
- _____. Nationalism and Its Alternatives. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
- Donahue, J., and Esposito, J.H. Islam in Transition: Religion and Socio-Political Change. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980.

- Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. New Jersey: Princeton, 1973.
- Easwaran, Eknath. A Man to Match His Mountains: Badshah Khan, Non-Violent Soldier of Islam. California: Nilgiri Press, 1984.
- Embree, A.T. (ed.). Pakistan's Western Borderlands. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977.
- Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin: University of Texas, 1982.
- Esman, Milton, J. (ed.). Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Esposito, John, L. Islam and Development. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980.
- _____ (ed.) Voices of Resurgent Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Evans, Peter, B.; Reuschmeyer, D. and Skocpol, Theda. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Fallaci, Oriana. Interview with History. New York: Live Right, 1976.
- Feldman, Herbert. From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- _____. The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Floyer, E.A. Unexplored Baluchistan. Quetta: 1977.
- Gankovsky, Yu, V. The Peoples of Pakistan. Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1971.
- Geertz, Clifford (ed.). Old Societies and New States. Ill: Free Press, 1968.
- Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gilani, I. S. Pakistan at the Polls: A Study of 1985 Elections. Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1985.
- _____. The Four R's of Afghanistan. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, 1985.
- Haq, Mahbubul. The Strategy of Economic Planning. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1966.

- _____. The Poverty Curtain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- Harrison, Selig, S. In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. New York: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 1981.
- Hayes, C.J.H. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: MacMillan, 1960.
- _____. The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. New York: Rick R. Smith Publishers, 1931.
- Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Fringe in British National Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
- Held, David et al. States and Societies. New York: New York University Press, 1983.
- Horowitz, Donald, L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Hosseini, Mohammad, H. "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1984.
- Houghs, A.W. The Country of Baluchistan. Karachi: 1977.
- Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Iqbal, Sir, Mohammad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam. Lahore: Ashraf & Sons, 1944.
- Issacs, Harold. Idols of the Tribe. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
- Jackson, R.V. South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.
- Jafri, H.A.S. Indo-Afghan Relations. New Delhi: 1976.
- Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and Demand for Pakistan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Jansen, G.H. Militant Islam. London: Pan Books, 1979.
- Jansson, Erland. India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan. Stockholm: Uppsala, 1981.
- Jones, Allen, K. "Muslim Politics and the Growth of the Muslim League

- in Sind 1935-1941." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1977.
- Joyo, Ibrahim. Save Sind, Save the Continent. Karachi: Agtai Kadam Printers, 1947.
- Kasfir, Nelson. The Shrinking Political Arena. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Kauser, Inamul Haq. Pakistan Movement in Baluchistan. n.d.
- Keddie, Nikki, R. An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad din Al Afghani. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Khaldun, Ibn. The Muqaddima. (translated by Franz Rosenthal and abridged by N.J. Dawood) New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Khan, Fazal, M. The Story of Pakistan Army. Lahore: 1966.
- Khan, Mir Ahmad Yar. Inside Baluchistan. Karachi: Royal Book Co. 1975.
- Khan. Baluch Kaum Wa Khawanin-i-Baluchistan. Quetta, 1972.
- Khan, Mohammad, Ayub. Friends Not Masters. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Khan, M. Sardar. History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan. Quetta: 1976.
- Khuro, Hameeda. The Making of Modern Sind. Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978.
- Khuro, M.A. Sufferings of Sind. Karachi: 1983.
- Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism. New York: MacMillan, 1948.
- Kumar, Satish. The New Pakistan. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978.
- Kuhn, Thomas, S. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Lakatos, I, and Musgrave, A. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Laporte, Robert, Jr. Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

- Lenin, Vladimir. Question of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalist. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1953.
- Low, Alfred, D. Lenin on the Question of Nationality. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958.
- Mahdi, Muhsin. Ibuni Khaldun's Philosophy of History.
- Malik, Hafeez. Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto. New York: Penguin Books, 1967.
- Maudoodi, Sayyed, Abdul Ala. Tehreek-i-Azadi Hind Aur Mussalman (Urdu). Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984.
- _____. Nationalism and India Pathankot: Maktaba-i-Jammati-i-Islami. 1947.
- _____. Political Theory of Islam. Lahore: 1960.
- Melson, Robert and Wolpe, Howard. Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971.
- Mengal, Mohammad, Khan. "Suba Baluchistan Mein Siyasi Partian Aur Ba-Asar Halqa." Unpublished M.Phil dissertation, Karachi University, 1985.
- Mohabbat, Ahmad, Shah. "Pakhtun National Self-Determination." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1979.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen. "The Politics of Elite Transformation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinet." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980.
- Mukerjee, Dilip. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972.
- Muzdaki, Anwar. Bacha Khan Aur Pushtunistan (Urdu). Lahore: Tariq Publishers, 1972.
- Naipaul, V.S. Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey. London: Andre Deutsch, 1981.
- Naseer, Gul, Khan. Tarikh Baluchistan. Vol. 11, Quetta: 1956.
- Nayar, Pyarelal. Thrown to the Wolves. Calcutta: Eastlight Book House, 1966.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. Discovery of India. London: Meridian Press, 1963.

Nevitte, N., and Kennedy, Charles, H. Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.

Nordlinger, E. On Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Paleejo, Rasool Bux. Gawarun Ki Bateen (Sindhi). Hyderabad: n.d.

_____. Rastee Bees Hoi (Sindhi). n.d.

Pithwala, Maneck, B. An Introduction to Sind. Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1951.

Pullapilly, C.K. (ed.) Islam in the Contemporary World. Indiana: Crossroad Books, 1980.

Qureshi, I.H. The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965.

Raina, A. Inside R.A.W. New Delhi: 1976.

Raverty, H.G. Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Quetta: 1976.

Rittenberg, S.A. "The Independence Movement in India's NorthWest Frontier 1901-1947." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984.

Rizvi, H.A. The Military and Politics in Pakistan. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974.

Rizvi, Mujtaba. The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971.

Ronen, Dov. The Quest for Self-Determination. New Haven: Yale University, 1979.

Rothchild, D., and Olorunsola, V.A. (eds.). State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Roudolphs, L.I, and Suzanne, H. The Modernity of Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

Sayed, G.M. Struggle for New Sind. Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1949.

_____. Muntakab Siyasi Mazameen or Taqareer. Hyderabad: 1975.

_____. Sind Ji Kahani Sayed Ji Zubani (Sindhi). Karachi: 1975.

_____. Sindhi Culture (Sindhi). Karachi: 1972.

- _____. Sindh Kay Haqooq Aur Inke Hal (Sindhi). Karachi: 1956.
- _____. Maujooda Siyasi Masala (Sindhi). Karachi: 1956.
- _____. Diyar-i-Dil Va Dastan-i-Mohabbat (Sindhi). Bombay: 1973.
- _____. A Nation in Chains. 1974.
- _____. Khutbat-i-Sayed (Sindhi). Karachi: 1973.
- Sayeed, Khalid, B. Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984.
- _____. The Political System of Pakistan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967.
- _____. Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Smith, A.D. Theories of Nationalism. New York: Holmer & Meier Publishers, 1983.
- Smith, A.D. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1979.
- Soreley, H.T. Gazettes of West Pakistan: The Former Province of Sind. Karachi: 1968.
- Spain, James, W. The Pathan Borderland. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963.
- Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and National Colonial Questions. New York: International Publishers, n.d.
- _____. The National Question and Leninism. Calcutta: Mass Publications, 1976.
- Stoddard, Philip et al (eds.). Change and the Muslim World. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
- Syed, Anwar. Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984.
- Taseer, Salmaan. Bhutto: A Political Biography. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980.
- Tendulkar, D.G. Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle. Bombay: Popular Parakashan, 1967.

- Thompson, D.L., and Ronen, D. Ethnicity Politics and Development. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.
- Tinker, Hough. India and Pakistan: A Short Political Guide. London: 1962.
- Tiryakian, A.E., and Rogowski, R. New Nationalisms of the Developed West. Boston: Allen & Irwin, 1985.
- Tytler, W.K.F. Afghanistan. London: Oxford University Press, 1907.
- Vahid, S.A. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal. Lahore: Ashraf & Sons, 1964.
- Weekes, Richard, V. (ed.). Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- Weiner, Myron and Huntington, Samuel, P. Understanding Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987.
- Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Wilber, Donald, L. Pakistan. New Haven: Hraf Press, 1964.
- Wilcox, Wayne, A. Emergence of Bangladesh. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973.
- Wilcox, Wayne, A. Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Wilson, J.A., and Dalton, D.(eds.). States of South Asia. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982.
- Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah of Pakistan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Wriggins, W.H. Pakistan in Transition. Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975.
- Yousufi, Allah, B. Haqiqat-i-Pushtunistan va Durand Line. Karachi: 1967.
- Ziring, Lawrence. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Colorado: West View Press, 1980.
- _____. The Subcontinent in World Politics. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.
- _____. The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971.

_____. Pakistan: The Long View. Durham: Duke University Press, 1977.

Articles

- Abdullah. "Afghan Refugees: World's Largest Case-Load." Pakistan and Gulf Economist (April 3-9, 1982).
- Ahmad, Aijaz. "The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet." South Asia Bulletin (Spring, 1984).
- Ahmad, Eqbal. "Causes for Anxiety and Remedies." Dawn (Karachi) May 17, 1987.
- Ahmad, Zahoor, "Baluchistan Par Kia Guzri." Zindaqi (Lahore) July 1970.
- Alavi, Hamza, "The State in the Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh." New Left Review No. 74 (July-August 1972).
- Ali, Azam, A. and Hussain, Z. "Baluchistan High Stakes Game." The Herald (Karachi) July, 1986.
- Ali, Mohammad. "Sind Ke Diary: Interview with G.M. Sayed." The Nawa-i-Waqt (15 June, 1985).
- Ali, Salamat. "The Hidden Hand." Far Eastern Economic Review (28 June, 1984).
- Ali, Salamat. "Bhutto Weathers Storm." Far Eastern Economic Review (May 6, 1977).
- Amin, Tahir. "Pakistani Publics Perceptions Towards Great Powers." Strategic Studies (Islamabad) Summer 1980.
- _____. "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future." Asian Survey (April 1984).
- "Analyzing Islam's Reactionary Movements." The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XXIV, no. 32, (8 September 1982).
- Arafat, Nasir. "Baluch Politics." Al-Fatah (Karachi) 20-27 Jan. 1978.
- Ayoob, Mohammad. "Profile of a Party: PPP in Pakistan." Economic and Political Weekly (Feb. 1972).
- Baluch, Inayatullah. "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self-Determination," in Pakistan in the 80s ed. by Zingel Lallemand, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985.

- _____. "Afghanistan-Pushtunistan-Baluchistan." Aussen Politik (3, 1980).
- Baxter, Craig. "Pakistan Votes 1970." Asian Survey (March 1971).
- _____. "The Development of Federalism in Pakistan." Asian Survey (Dec. 1974).
- Bell, Daniel. "Ethnicity and Social Change." in Ethnicity ed. by Glazer and Moynihan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Bhattacharya, S.P. "Soviet Nationality Policy in Afghanistan." Asian Affairs (June 1984).
- Bhutto, Musa. "Report on Sind." Lail-O-Nahar (3-9 March, 1974).
- Bradsher, Henry, S. "Stagnation and Change in Afghanistan." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Fall 1986).
- Brohi, A.K. "Need for Standing Up to False Ideas." Dawn (Karachi) May 19, 1987.
- "B.S.O." Democratic Pakistan (March 1975).
- Burki, S.J. "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation." Asian Survey (March 1972).
- Choudhuri, A.T. "Politics of Violence in Sind." Dawn 27 August 1983.
- Connor, Walker. "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying." World Politics (April 1972).
- Dobell, W.M. "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan." Pacific Affairs (Fall 1969).
- Enayat, Hamid. "The Resurgence of Islam." History Today (Feb. 1980).
- Faruki, Kemal, A. "The Ethnic Question in Pakistan." Dawn (Karachi) June 7, 1985.
- Gankovosky, Yuri, V. "Social Structure of Pakistan's Brahui-Baluchi Population." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Summer 1982).
- Gauhar, Altaf. "Pakistan: Ayub Khan's Abdication." Third World Quarterly (Jan. 1985).
- Hamid, N., and Hussain, A. "Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development." Pakistan Economic and Social Review Special Issue (1976).
- Hasan, Mukhtar, "A Meeting with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan." Refaqat (7 Nov. 1972).

- _____. "Report on Provinces: NWFP." Adakar (29 August 1972).
- _____. "White Paper Ka Andheri-Ujalay." Lail-O-Nahar (27 Oct.- 2 Nov. 1974).
- _____. "Afghanistan." Azan-i-Haq (13 Nov. 1972).
- Hechter, Michael and Levi, Margaret. "The Comparative Analysis of Ethno-National Movements." Ethnic and Racial Studies 2, No. 3 (July 1979).
- Ijaz, Ahmad, J. "Report on Sind." Zindaqi (Lahore) 1-7 March 1971.
- Iqbal, Afzal. "We Have to Learn a Basic Lesson." Dawn (Karachi) May 17, 1987.
- Irfan, M., and Arif, G.M. "Return Migration: An Evidence from the Surveys." Unpublished paper.
- Javed, Nusrat, "Profile on Frontier Politics." The Muslim (Islamabad) March 30 - April 4, 1986.
- Joseph, Petrus. "Marx and Engels on the National Question." Journal of Politics 33 (1971).
- Kardar, Shahid. "Provincial Autonomy and National Unity." Dawn (Karachi) 29 April, 1985.
- Kasfir, Nelson. "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation." World Politics 31, No. 3 (April 1979).
- Kennedy, Charles, H. "Policies of Redistributive Preferences in Pakistan." in Ethnic Preferences and Public Policy in Developing States. (ed.) by Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986).
- Khan, Akhtar, H. and Karim, M.S. "Migration Patterns in Pakistan During 1970s: Evidence from the 1981 Census Data." Pakistan Administration (July-Dec. 1983).
- Kheli, Tahir, S. "Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an Area of Conflict." Asian Survey (May 1977).
- Khan, Wali. "Statement in the Supreme Court." Lail-O-Nahar (25 August-2 September, 1975).
- _____. "Statement Before Hamood Ur Rehman Commission." Adakar 28 August, 1972.
- Krasner, Stephen. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." Comparative Politics (Jan. 1986).

- Lapidus, W.G. "Ethno-nationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case." World Politics (July 1986).
- Lifschultz, Lawrence. "Afghanistan: The Not-So-New Rebellion." Far Eastern Economic Review (Jan. 30, 1981).
- _____. "A Fundamental Debate." Far Eastern Economic Review (March 13, 1982).
- _____. "Independent Baluchistan? Ataulah Mengal's Declaration of Independence." Economic and Political Weekly (May 1983).
- Liskani, I. "The Hyder Bakhsh Jatoli Saga." The Grass Roots Sind University (Spring 1979).
- Malik, Hafeez. "Problem of Regionalism in Pakistan." in Pakistan in Transition (ed.) W.H. Wiggins (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975).
- Mateke, P. "The Separation of Sind from Bombay." Grass Roots (Autumn 1978).
- Melson, R., and Wolpe, H. "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective." American Political Science Review (Sept. 1970).
- Mitha, Y. "Unlocking Peoples' Power." The Muslim (Islamabad) July 4, 1986.
- Moon, J.D. "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives." in Handbook of Political Science Vol.I (eds.) F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
- Mujahid, Shariful. "Pakistan's Political Culture During Ayub Era." Scrutiny (Jan-June 1974).
- _____. "Pakistan's First General Elections." Asian Survey (Feb. 1971).
- Naby, Eden. "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: The Kurds, the Baluchis and the Turkmen." in William O. McCagg Jr. (ed.) Soviet-Asian Ethnic Frontiers New York: Pergamon, 1979.
- _____. "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations." Asian Survey (March 1980).
- Naqui, M.B. "Confederation Ka Tanazia." The Jang (9 May, 1985).
- Nairn, Tom. "The Modern Janus." New Left Review (Nov-Dec. 1985).
- Nizamani, K.B. "Democratic Struggle in Baluchistan." Siyasat (1975).

Pakistan Forum (June-July 1972).

Philips, Peter, D. and Wallerstein, I. "National and World Identities and the Interstate System." Millenium: Journal of International Studies (Summer 1985).

Rashiduzzaman, M. "Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of Bangladesh Movement." Asian Survey (March 1972).

_____. "The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis." Pacific Affairs (Fall 1970).

Richter, W.L., and Gustafson, W.E. "Pakistan in 1979: Back to Square One." Asian Survey (Feb. 1981).

Richter, W.L. "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence." Asian Survey (June 1979).

Rittenberg, Stephen. "Continuities in Borderland Politics." in Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977).

Rizvi, Hasan, A. "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan." Asian Survey (May 1984).

_____. "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan." Pakistan Horizon No. 1, 1984.

Rudolph, J.R., and Thompson, R.J. "Ethno-Territorial Movements and the Policy Process." Comparative Politics (April 1985).

Salahuddin, Mohammad. "Intikhabat Ka Chand Numanian Pehlu." The Takbeer (Karachi) 1-7 March, 1985.

Samdani, Zafar. "Search for Solution." Pakistan and Gulf Economist (April 3-9, 1982).

Sayeed, Khalid, B. "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System." International Journal 27, 3 (1972).

_____. "The Historical Origins of Some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems." in States of South Asia (ed.) by A.J. Wilson and B. Dalton (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1982).

_____. "Pathan Regionalism." The South Atlantic Quarterly 63, No. 41 (Autumn 1964).

_____. "The Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy." Middle East Journal Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1959).

_____. "The Role of Military in Pakistan." in Armed Forces and society by Jacques Van Doorn (Hague: Paris, Mouton, 1968).

- _____. "The Capabilities of Pakistan's Political System." Asian Survey (Feb. 1967).
- Scarrit, J.R., and Safran, W. "The Relationship of Ethnicity to Modernization and Democracy." International Studies Notes Vol. 10, No. 25 (Summer 1983).
- Schwartz, Walter. "Why Bhutto's Power is Crumbling." The Guardian (London) May 1, 1977.
- Schuman, Howard. "A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism." American Journal of Sociology (Sept. 1972).
- Skocpol, Theda. "Rentier State and Shia Islam in the Iranian Revolution." Theory and Society (May 1982).
- Smith, A.D. "Ethnic and Nation in the Modern World." Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Summer 1985).
- Stokes, Gail. "The Underdeveloped Theory of Nationalism." World Politics 31, (Oct. 1978).
- Syed, Anwar. "The Pakistan Peoples' Party: Phase One and Two." in Pakistan: The Long View (ed.) Lawrence Ziring et al (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977).
- _____. "Pakistan in 1977: The Prince is Under the Law." Asian Survey (Feb. 1978).
- Viennot, Jean, P. "Les Troubles Ethniques au Pakistan le Baluchistan Nouveau Bangladesh." Lemonde Diplomatique (Nov. 1973).
- Waldron, Arthur, N. "Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanations." World Politics (April 1985).
- Weinbaum, M.G. "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost." Asian Survey (July 1977).
- Weiner, Myron. "Political Integration and Political Development." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences CCCLCII (1965).
- Wheeler, Richard, S. "Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of Opposition." Asian Survey (Feb. 1976).
- Wirsing, Robert, G. The Baluchis and Pathans (London: Minority Right Group Report No. 48, 1981).
- Wolf, Ken. "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism." Journal of the History of Ideas (4 Oct. - Dec. 1976).

- Wylcox, W.A. "A Decade of Ayub." Asian Survey (Feb. 1969).
- Young, Crawford. "The Temple of Ethnicity." World Politics (July 1983).
- Ziring, Lawrence. "Pakistan: A Political Perspective." Asian Survey (July 1975).
- _____. "Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm." Asian Survey. (July 1977).

Other Sources

(a) Government Documents

- Address to the Nation: Accountability Should Precede the Elections:
General Mohammad Zia ul Haq Oct. 1, 1977. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977).
- Ansari Commission's Report on Form of Government (Islamabad: August, 1983).
- Census of Pakistan 1951: Sind and Khairpur State (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, n.d.).
- 1981 Census Report on Pakistan (Islamabad: Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan, 1986).
- 1961 Census Report of West Pakistan (Lahore: Government of Pakistan, n.d.).
- Constitutional Amendments Announced: Address to Nation (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1985).
- Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report, January 1983
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1984).
- Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in NorthWest Frontier Province, Pakistan (Peshawar: Afghan Refugee Commissionerate).
- Political Plan Announced: Seventh Session of Federal Council: Address by President General Mohammad Zia ul Haq (Islamabad, August 12, 1983).
- President of Pakistan: General Mohammad Zia ul Haq: Interviews to Foreign Media Vol. I, II, III (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d.).
- Press Conference by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator, July 14, 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977).

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Karachi: Government Publication, n.d.).

Rejoinder in Supreme Court of Pakistan: To Written Statement of Abdul Wali Khan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, August 1975).

Report on the 4th Triennial Census of Central Government Civil Employees (Islamabad, 1973).

Supreme Court Judgement on Dissolution of NAP (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, Oct. 1975).

White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections of 1977 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, July 1978).

White Papers on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime Vol I,II, III, IV (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Jan. 1979).

White Paper on Baluchistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1974).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Interviews to the Press (Islamabad: Ministry of Information, n.d.).

Z.A. Bhutto: Politics of the People I: Reshaping Foreign Policy 1948-1966 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

Z.A. Bhutto: Politics of the People II: Awakening the People 1966-1969 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

Z.A. Bhutto: Politics of the People III: Marching Towards Democracy (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

(b) Newspapers

Dawn (Karachi)

The Jang (Rawalpindi)

The Muslim (Islamabad)

The Mussawat (Lahore)

The Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi)

The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi)