What Happens When Resettlements Focus on the Physical Environment: The Aftermath of the Resettlement Process in a Displaced Community in Cartagena, Colombia

by

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B.A. Architecture, Andes University (2009)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning

at the

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June 2017

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What Happens When Resettlements Focus on the Physical Environment: The Aftermath of the Resettlement Process in a Displaced Community in Cartagena, Colombia

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Abstract

Over three million people were affected in the country by the rain season associated with “La Niña” phenomenon between April 2010 and June 2011. Likewise, Colombia has the second largest number of internally displaced persons in the world: 6.3 million trailing only Syria with 7.6 millions victims, and followed by Iraq with 3.3 million (IDMC 2015b). Given the magnitude of displacement, this problem contributes the largest number of human rights violations in the country (HRW 2005). This research studies the dilemmas that accompany resettlement processes; the involuntary physical and social isolation of residents from access to services and public facilities; the consequences for economic well-being and quality of life, and the improvement of the personal security from crime and violence. This research will answer the following question: Why do resettlement processes create deteriorated socioeconomic livelihoods and fragmented communities? This thesis finds that while resettlement processes provide new built environments to address the physical needs of the displaced population, they do not address the needs that perpetuate poverty, vulnerability, and marginalization. The research explores the challenges and dilemmas that those communities face in order to inform discussions related to the physical, economic, and social reconstruction of communities in the aftermath of displacement. It also analyses the parallels and contrasts between 28 displaced families that went through the sponsored government program of resettlement process, and 10 families that decided to reconstruct their lives outside that program. The goal is to re-examine the policy, the specific approach of the state, and the gains and losses for the resettlement process. This thesis identifies potential recommendations for other displaced communities and for policymakers and non-profit organizations, examining how housing is necessary but not sufficient to resettle sustainable and resilient communities.

Thesis Advisor: J. Phillip Thompson, Associate Professor
Reader: Lawrence J. Vale, Ford Professor
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First, I am deeply grateful to the amazing people from San Francisco and Ciudad Bicenterario, who open their homes to share their stories, their frustrations, and their hopes. I want to thank the staff of the Fundacion Mario Santo Domingo in Cartagena, particularly Wilson Bernal.

I am grateful to all of the people who participated in this process by contributing insights, feedback, or support:

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Juan Camilo Osorio, for always challenging me to think in new and critical ways with his dedication and generosity, and with his time during this process. I am truly grateful for him asking hard questions, challenging me, and encouraging me consistently.

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My parents, for their love and unconditional encouragement to reach further, even when I’m far from home.

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Catherine Lazerwitz for her help in articulating key ideas and feedback.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Area of study

Figure 1: Localization of the Case Study

Source: Andrés Achury
Like many other countries in Latin America, Colombia is suffering the impacts of climate change. Over the past 40 years, natural disasters have caused losses that rise to US$7.1 billion, that is, an average annual loss of US$177 million\(^1\) (Campos Garcia et al. 2011) and displaced more than 3 million people between 2008 to 2015 alone (IDMC 2015b). Additionally, during 2010 and 2011, in just 15 months a total of 3,149,000 people were affected in Colombia by the rainy season associated with “La Niña” phenomenon between April 2010 and June 2011 (Alta Consejería para las Regiones y la Participación Ciudadana 2012). With this framework, forced displacement in Colombia has established itself as the first humanitarian crisis of the country.

Figure 2: Number of displaced people by natural disaster 2008-2015

![Graph showing the number of displaced people by natural disaster in Colombia from 2008 to 2015.](image)

Source: IDMC Disaster-Induced Displacement Database as of 1 June 2015

According the RUD\(^2\) (Single Registration of Victims) 3,219,239 people were disrupted and 568,438 housing units presented partial or total damages. In the estate of Bolivar alone the number of victims reached 405,604 (13% of the total victims) and 80,710 of the housing units (14% of the total houses). Thus, Bolivar reported the highest number of victims by natural disaster in the country between 2010 and 2011 and the population affected by this catastrophe in Bolivar in relation to the total amount of people living in the state is around 20%.

---

1 Corresponds to economic losses in housing (millions of constant dollars of 2010) due to geological and hydrometeorological events between 1970 and 2010 (OSSO Corporation, 2011).

2 According to the RUD (single registry of victims), those who are considered “Damnificados” (victims of natural disaster) include persons who have had: (a) loss of total or partial of property, are owners, tenants or other tenure condition; (B) loss of agricultural activities; Or (c) disappearance, injury or death of household members as a direct consequence of the winter emergency that affects the areas Identified by the National System for Prevention and Disaster (UNGRD) during 2010 and 2011.
Figure 3: Affected houses by “La Niña” Phenomenon 2010 by state

Source: Single Registration of Victims

Figure 4: Affected people by “La Niña” Phenomenon 2010 by state

Source: Single Registration of Victims
Figure 5: Affected people and houses by “La Niña” Phenomenon 2010 by state

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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>3,210,239</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>874,464</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>568,438</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Single Registration of Victims

In 2015, Cartagena had a housing deficit of 58,870 units. The government through the MISN and the Housing Ministry have provided 3,862 housing units (6.56%) (Cartagena Como Vamos 2015). However, those houses are also meant to attend IDPs from violence, natural disasters and population in extreme poverty. The selection process for the housing recipients is managed by the Ministry of housing (MVCT) and the local government who determine the demographic composition (mix) of the affordable housing project (i.e. how many displaced households, how many families affected by natural disasters and how many household in extreme poverty conditions).
The project’s demographic composition of the project is reported to the Social Prosperity Department (DPS)\(^4\) to review which households belong to other social programs and to confirm the households’ status. The Ministry, through the National Housing Fund, (Fonvivienda) postulates and verifies potential beneficiaries previously approved by the DPS. The final list is reviewed by the DPS who will rank the selected beneficiaries according to the prioritization criteria listed above. In the event that households exceed the number of houses per project, a lottery is carried out in the presence of the Governor, the Mayor of the municipality where the project is located, the Director of the DPS, the Director of Fonvivienda, or whom they delegate, and the Municipal official.

In response to the floods of 2010-2011 in Bolivar the government reserved part of that housing stock exclusively to allocate IDPs victims from the floods of 2010-2011. This thesis focuses in Bolivar not only because it is the estate with the highest number of victims, but also because it is one of the few states that implemented a resettlement process to aide IDPs.

Figure 6: Approved Macro-projects in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Approved Gross Area in Hectares</th>
<th>Potential Housing Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altos de Santa Elena</td>
<td>Cali</td>
<td>46.63</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudadela San Antonio y Nueva Buenaventura</td>
<td>Buenaventura</td>
<td>215.25</td>
<td>4,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecoeidad Navarro</td>
<td>Cali</td>
<td>67.32</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villas de San Pablo</td>
<td>Barranquilla</td>
<td>133.31</td>
<td>18,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ciudad Bicentenario</strong></td>
<td>Cartagena</td>
<td><strong>388.04</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,128</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Occidente</td>
<td>Medellín</td>
<td>125.86</td>
<td>11,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosques de San Luis</td>
<td>Neiva</td>
<td>36.73</td>
<td>3,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centro Occidente de Colombia San José</strong></td>
<td>Manizales</td>
<td><strong>98.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,974</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad Verde</td>
<td>Soacha</td>
<td>327.96</td>
<td>49,656</td>
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<td>Pereira</td>
<td>163.34</td>
<td>13,971</td>
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<td>Palmira</td>
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<td>124.98</td>
<td>17226</td>
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</table>

Source: Single Registration of Victims

This situation allowed me to study the challenges that IDPs have faced after a natural disaster and also to assess the ability of the national and local government to attend to the immediate needs of the displaced communities and understand where the

---

\(^4\) The Social Prosperity Department (DPS) is the Colombian entity who leads the Sector of Social Inclusion and Reconciliation, to which are attached the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF), the National Agency for Overcoming Extreme Poverty (ANSPE), the Victims Unit of Attention and integral Compensation (SNARIV), The Special Administrative Unit for the Territorial Consolidation and Historic Memory Center.
resources and institutional capacity is focusing to implement resettlement process.

To understand the complete picture of displacement in Colombia it is important to mention that a long-standing civil conflict linked with the drug trade continues. Guerilla movements and paramilitary groups engaged in violent conflict has contributed in forcing millions of people to flee over the past 60 years. Colombia is the second country with the most displaced persons in the world with 6.3 millions after Syria with 7.6 millions victims and followed by Iraq with 3.3 millions of internally displaced persons (IDMC 2015b). Forced displacement is the issue with the largest number of human rights violations in the country (HRW 2005).

Figure 7: Top 10 countries with highest number of IDPs

Source: IDMC, USCR (IDP figures); UNHCR, UNRWA (refugee figures), 2014
Figure 8: Countries with new displacement associated with natural hazards and conflict, 2010-2014

Source: IDMC, conflict-related data as of 6 May 2015 and natural hazard-related data as of 1 June 2015

Given the magnitude of displacement, the disruption of spatial and social communities, and the deterioration of the economic and social livelihoods of IDPs, this thesis focus its analysis on a community located in the neighborhood of San Francisco, Cartagena. In 2011 a landslide destroyed 2,400 houses (ONU, CEPAL, and BID 2013) located in 30 blocks of a neighborhood in Cartagena. This fragmented the social fabric of the community, meaning that the connections between neighbors, the support networks they created and the economic livelihood they constructed were destroyed along with their houses. In response to that event, the government provided housing, relocating some of the affected families into a large-scale affordable housing project called “Ciudad Bicentenario,” developed by the Fundación Mario Santo Domingo (FMSD). Another part of the community decided to stay in the neighborhood using their support networks for immediate shelter (family members and neighbors), while working on either illegally reconstructing their homes in their original high-risk land, or deciding to move to another house within SF. This community serves as an important case study for examining how the resettlement processes stimulate or constrain new occupational and residential opportunities, and reconstitute lives and communities in the aftermath of displacement.

5 Fundación Mario Santo Domingo (FMSD), a nonprofit organization in northern Colombia that works with poor communities in housing and microfinance, is a major partner of the national state in the design and implementation of large-scale affordable housing projects. They developed the project Ciudad Bicentenario in Cartagena Colombia.
Figure 9: Localization Resettlements and Downtown

Source: Andres Achury
Research Questions

This research studies the dilemmas that accompany relocation processes, the involuntary isolation of residents from access to services and opportunities in better-located areas of the city coupled with the improvement of the personal security from crime and violence. This thesis hypothesizes that while resettlement processes provide new built environments to address the physical needs of the displaced population, they do not address the needs that perpetuate poverty, vulnerability, and marginalization. In order to test my hypothesis, this research will answer the following question: Is traditional national housing policy, which has focused more narrowly on production of housing, sufficient to resettle sustainable and resilient communities? Today, the government's main drive on the resettlement process is to provide housing to the IDPs while giving less attention to socio-economic metrics such as income per capita, job creation and access to public facilities. With this in mind, this thesis seeks to explore a series of questions: Why did people end up with deteriorated socioeconomic livelihoods and fragmented communities after going through a resettlement process? Can displaced families affordably access jobs and livelihoods? Does the resettlement process improve their personal security from crime and violence and does it produce involuntary isolation of residents from services and opportunities in better-located areas of the city? This thesis studies the parallels and contrasts between 28 displaced families that went through the government program of resettlement process and 10 families that decided to reconstruct their lives outside that program. The research will re-examine the policy, the specific approach of the state, the gains and losses of this resettlement process, and the relationship between Colombia's armed conflict and resettlement processes. Thus, this thesis will identify potential recommendations for other displaced communities and for policymakers and NGOs examining how housing is necessary, but not sufficient to resettle sustainable and resilient communities.
Methods

Displacement and resettlement processes impacts denote a challenge to researchers and policymakers because of the need for data, but also the significant lack of its availability. Quantitative measurements are useful to reveal correlations and relationships; however, they are often limited to providing contextual detail and information of how people feel about a subject (Booth et al. 2016). Qualitative analyses can provide new insights into how displaced communities feel and perceive the new conditions and whether they are better or worse. This method should be ideally complemented with statistical data, but the latter cannot give the complete picture (Davis 2012) (Castles and Miller 2003). For example, instead of only looking at the number of new houses provided to displaced families or the number of relocated people, case studies, interviews, focus groups, and other ethnographic methods can identify the primary sources of poverty, job access, and violence within the new developments. Qualitative research can provide information about challenges and needs in the everyday world of displaced communities with their particular social, spatial, and economic realities. As a result, this thesis intends to understand how displaced communities perceive their personal possibilities and limitation in confronting displacement, and to use this knowledge to identify which conditions they tolerate and which need to be fixed.

This thesis explores the aforementioned questions through a case study of the community of San Francisco, a low-income community located in the urban area of Cartagena. The analysis used in-situ interviews as the main data gathering method. The interviews were conducted with current residents of San Francisco who experienced the impacts of the landslide in 2010. The qualitative part is supported by data collected for the project “Assessing Urban Resilience for Low-Income Housing Enterprises in Colombia”. Those interviews give information about the conditions of the IDPs from San Francisco who accepted relocation by the government to the outskirts of the city in a project called Ciudad Bicentenario. The secondary qualitative data will derive from published papers, books, unpublished works, media articles, dissertations, and non-governmental organization's reports. This thesis will build on the project “Assessing Urban Resilience for Low-Income Housing Enterprises in Colombia”, to provide information of the challenges and needs that the IDPs from San Francisco are facing during the past seven years, after the landslide of 2010.

Considering the time framework of my field research as well as the level of violence within the neighborhood of San Francisco, it was necessary to contact the local leaders to facilitate access to interview the displaced families before traveling to the location. In August 2016, the Resilient Cities Housing Initiative (RCHI) and the Center for Advanced Urbanism (CAU) made a partnership with the Fundación Mario Santo Domingo (FMSD). This nonprofit organization in northern Colombia works with poor communities in housing and microfinance, and is a major partner of the national state in the design and implementation of the housing Macro-Projects. The Resilient Cities Housing Initiative (RCHI) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology helped FMSD to operationalize the question of what affordable housing
should afford once the question becomes “building communities” rather than just building housing. This approach assumes there are social, economic, environmental, and political relationships that connect housing to cities, and seeks to enumerate and assess how these more holistic approaches may be measured (Vale et al. 2014). There are four general objectives of this research. First, to contribute to improving the capacities of FMSD in the design, implementation, and evaluation of their projects in Colombia. Second, to establish an assessment system to measure FMSD’s project impacts in the mid and long term. Third, to document and share FMSD’s approach for learning and knowledge transfer purposes. Finally, RCHI aspires to provide sufficient evidence to influence policy makers towards a more sustainable, equitable and efficient allocation of housing investments in Colombia. Specifically, RCHI’s main goal is to disseminate a broader framework for understanding housing affordability by developing a selection of exemplary practices and operationalizing four interconnected principles of resilience: (1) support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents, (2) reduction of the vulnerability of residents to environmental risks and stresses, (3) enhancement of the personal security of residents in the face of violence or threats of displacement, and (4) empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance. Thus, this thesis is going use these principles as the categories to assess the situation of the community of San Francisco.

The RCHI team formed by Francis Goyes and myself spent one week in August 2016 visiting two projects that FMSD is developing in Colombia, one located in Barranquilla called Villas de San Pablo, and the other in Cartagena called Ciudad Bicentenario. During this field trip, we worked with local leaders in both projects to understand the challenges they face in the process of adapting to the new environment and neighbors. Those leaders are responsible for facilitating the training and workshops that FMSD offers in the project throughout their communities. They also invite members of their neighborhoods (mostly other displaced families) to come to events and meetings. After the first contact with the community, the team realized the importance of the people that came from San Francisco to Ciudad Bicentenario and the role they play in the social dynamics of the neighborhood. Then I came back to Cambridge and spent two months contacting leaders to arrange the interviews. The contacts I acquired through the leaders I met in Ciudad Bicentenario provided information that led me to other San Francisco sources that included other leaders who still resided in San Francisco. As a result of those meetings, I was able to schedule a series of interviews to talk with people from San Francisco who were displaced by the natural disaster but decided to stay in the area, and also with victims that moved to Ciudad Bicentenario. Likewise, these conversations allowed me to create a channel of trust between the leaders of both places to be able to go in both areas and also to guarantee my security during the field research.

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The latter was an important issue considering the high rates of violence and crime in both areas. Interviewing the people who stayed in San Francisco after the disaster gave me a better picture of the challenges that this community faced before being relocated, and yielded a baseline to compare who is better or worse in the aftermath of a natural disaster event.

In January/February 2017, I carried out a total of 38 interviews from people of San Francisco, 10 of them were in the neighborhood of San Francisco as part of this thesis and 28 of them in Ciudad Bicentenario as part of the project with the RCHI group. Additionally, given the level of trust I developed during the previous stage, I was able to walk into both places and collect data on the characteristics of the built environment, including neighborhoods and house characteristics. The length of the interviews was around 45 minutes to an hour and participants had the option to skip or end the conversation at any point. The topic of the interview included a brief overview of the previous residences of the interviewee, the employment and social conditions, the adaptation process in the new environment, the interaction between the neighbors, the perception of security, the threat of violence, and the conditions of the physical space. Before the interview, I asked permission to take notes and record with an audio recorder. After this process, I transcribed and translated all the interviews. Given the situation of vulnerability of the interviewees, their identities will remain anonymous thus, all the names I used to quote the interviewees are aliases. As will be detailed in later chapters, they are dependent on governmental subsidies as well as highly regulated by the local state. These conditions make them vulnerable to threats from the national and local agencies as well as from gangs within their neighborhoods. All the interviews were conducted face to face; however, some of them occurred in pairs, groups, or one-on-one, depending on the convenience of the interviewees. In the case of the people that live in Ciudad Bicentenario, I conducted the interviews in the houses of the relocated families. With the San Francisco group, some of the interviews took place at the community library or in other public spaces because they lost their homes due to the natural disaster, so they were still living in rooms or doubling up with family members or friends. I also conducted interviews with displaced people who chose to stay in their original houses, even though the local government declared the entire area a high environmental risk.

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7 Report quality of life 2015 in Cartagena “Cartagena como vamos? Monitoreamos la calidad de vida de los cartageneros”
Limitations

This thesis also has several limitations. In total, I spent around one month in Cartagena conducting the interviews. However, this was a short time span of the fieldwork and limited the number of completed interviews. Another challenge of this process was the difficulty generating trust with the displaced families that was sufficient to develop a deeper relationship to gain greater insight into the complexities of needs and priorities of displaced families. Although during my time in Ciudad Bicentenario I always presented myself as an independent researcher, my affiliation with FMSD could influence some of the perspective and opinions of the interviewees considering that FMSD provides child and professional programs to the community. Since the San Francisco part of the interviewing was conducted independently from (and largely prior to) the FMSD-funded interviewing at Ciudad Bicentenario, the interviewees in San Francisco should not have associated me with FMSD.

Safety concerns also prevented me from spending more time in the neighborhoods. For example, I was never able to stay in the evening to see the dynamics of both places at that particular time. All the time I spent in the neighborhoods were during daylight hours, so I had to rely on the interviewees' perception of the conditions of the places at night. Another limitation of my research is the inclination of gender and age distribution of my sources. The majority of my sources were women between 25 and 75. This limitation did not allow me to speak to children and teenagers. However, I tried to extract those perspectives with questions targeting that population.
Literature Review

Forced Displacement: A Humanitarian Catastrophe

In the last two decades, violence, natural, and economic disasters, and large development-induced displacement have been associated as the main causes of displacement (Hines and Balletto 2002) (M. M. Cernea 1999). One of the most challenging humanitarian problems in developing countries is attributed to forced displacement where the victims lose their social, legal, and economic ties—leading to other adversities such as physical and psychological difficulties (WFP 2000a). They also face difficulties in the reintegration process that make their livelihoods insecure, in particular when the victims have to adapt to temporary environments when traditional means of livelihoods are not effective and where they must learn to coexist with communities from different backgrounds (WFP 2000a). Forced displacement remains a worldwide development, humanitarian, and governance challenge. While refugees and asylum seekers continue to garner attention, internal displacement now constitutes the core of the displacement crisis. By the end of 2015, there were 40.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the world due to conflict (IDMC and NRC 2016). Additionally, since 2008, an average of 26.4 million people has been displaced from their homes each year by disasters brought on by natural hazards—equivalent to one person displaced every second (IDMC 2015).

Three-quarters of the internal displacement crisis is concentrated in ten countries, including Colombia. This country is an interesting case study for displacement given the complex mix of overlapping factors that cause it. Natural disasters and violence represent the biggest causes for massive forced displacement (Carillo 2009). Forced displacement is the issue with the largest number of human rights violations in Colombia (HRW 2005). Likewise, natural disasters are responsible for the displacement of 3,328,747 people between 2008 to 2015 (IDMC 2015b). Only, from 2010-2011 a total of 3,149,000 people were affected in the country during the rainy season associated with “La Niña” phenomenon (IDMC 2015a). Thus, forced displacement has established itself as the first humanitarian crisis in Colombia.

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8 As defined by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognized State border” (UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 1998, p. 1).
Resettlements: A response to displacement

In response, resettlement initiatives appeared as the solution to overcome the physical and economic displacement. Despite the implementation of several resettlement processes, impoverishment and disempowerment for IDPs has not yet been effectively addressed.

In 1983, Scudder and Colson formulated a theoretical model of settlement processes based on four stages: recruitment, transition, development, and incorporation. This framework focuses around the settlers’ stress and their particular behavioral reaction in each stage (Scudder, T and Colson, E 1982). This model was designed to be implemented to voluntary settlement processes; however, Scudder evolved it to include involuntary resettlement processes and empirical research demonstrated that successful resettlement process that implemented all four stages had positive results among those involuntarily displaced (M. Cernea 1997).

Meanwhile discussions around this literature have continued (de Wet 1988) and argue that none of these models included impoverishment in the debate of resettlement. This concern came up in the context and efforts to bridge two key fields of concern in displaced population, the research on refugees and the research on development, and research in the field found that involuntary displacement by development projects and IDPs, escaping from violence or natural disasters experienced similar social and economic traumas (M. Cernea and McDowell 2000).

In order to bring these two domains closer, Michael Cernea developed the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations (IRR). This model concentrated on both the forced displacement and the reestablishment aspects using three fundamental concepts as the core of the model: risk, impoverishment, and reconstruction. The IRR encapsulates the aforementioned housing, economic, and social challenges arguing that impoverishment resulting from displacement is primarily due to the following eight factors: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration (Cernea, 1997). Some of those variables play a primary role and others a secondary role, according to the context and needs of the particular population; however, all of the eight aspects are interlinked and influence each other during the process (M. Cernea 1997). The eight risks have been mostly associated with outcomes of development-induced displacement, but the IRLR is applicable to other types of displacement.

In Colombia’s case, the majority of resettlement processes, including the ones developed in Cartagena, meet the government benchmark which focuses on reducing the deficit of housing units in the region. However, it has been unsuccessful and failed to solve the cumulative impacts of displacement generally according to Scudder or Cernea’s models. (M. Cernea and McDowell 2000) (Satiroglu and Choi 2015) (Hines and Balletto 2002).
Climate Change

The atmosphere and the ocean have warmed, the volumes of snow and ice levels have declined, sea levels have risen, and concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased (Farmer 2015). Additionally, human activities have added to the processes of climate change on Earth that affect their dynamics and alter their natural cycles. The burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and degradation, as well as changes in land use, among others, increase the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the air, which limits the capacity of the atmosphere to eliminate it, parallel with the increasing scarcity of vegetation. This situation stimulates the alteration of the optimal climate conditions of the planet and therefore, the living conditions of their living beings (Panel Inter-gubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático - IPCC 2013). Since the 1950s, these alterations have changed the optimal climate conditions, causing natural phenomena to become less predictable (Le Treut et al. 2007). Unplanned urban growth in areas prone to flooding and in unstable lands in addition to high recurrence and magnitude of disasters associated to climate conditions, situate Colombia as a country vulnerable to climate change (UNDP 2010).

Forced Displacement in Colombia

The complexity of displacement in Colombia also has other challenges. Collecting and disaggregating data according to hazard type is particularly difficult. Thus, the government calculates that there were 5,185,406 victims of forced displacement between 1985 and December 2013 (RNI, 1 December 2013), while the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, CODHES), a national NGO, estimates the number to be 5,701,996 (CODHES, 31 May 2013). It is also potentially misleading in terms of understanding causes and predicting dynamics to consider hazard types separately. The various factors that lead to peoples’ displacement and determine their subsequent options and decisions also reflect this complexity, as illustrated in the case of Cartagena being one of the main receptor cities for IDPs around the country. According to the UN refugee agency, 82,000 IDPs arrived in Cartagena between 1985 and 2009. Another 8,700 IDPs arrived in Cartagena between 2009 and 2011 (CODHES 2012) for a total of 90,700 IDPs which represents 10.6 percent of the total city population in 2011.9 The variation in climate change caused “La Niña” phenomenon of 2010-2011 to present the highest intensity rains and to became the most extreme natural event in record. According the RUD (Single registration of Victims) during “La Ola Invernal” between 2010–2011 the state of Bolivar had 405,604 IDPs equivalent to 13 percent of the total registered IDPs in the country and 80,710 housing units presented par-

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9 This calculation is based on the projections made by the Departamento Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) that established a total of 67,103 people for Cartagena in 2011.
tial of total damages being 14 percent of the total affected housing stock. This state presented the highest number of IDPs during the “La Niña” phenomenon in 2010. Meanwhile Cartagena, capital city of Bolivar, received 18,578 IDPs and 3,713 affected housing units (Alta Consejería para las Regiones y la Participación Ciudadana 2011).

“La Niña” phenomenon in Colombia

Most of the disasters in Colombia are due to climate variations. 90 percent of emergencies reported by the UNGRD for the period 1998-2011 in the country (13,624 in total), relate to Hydroclimatological phenomena and other associated ones. Between 1950 and 2007 the disasters associated with rains increased by 16.1% during the “La Niña” phenomenon in relation to normal conditions (DNP 2012).

In Colombia, high volumes of water associated with the “La Niña” phenomenon exceeded the discharge capacity of the rivers and thereby generated flood risk (Sanchez 2011). Official numbers reported a total of 3,219,239 as “victims” during the rainy season associated with the “La Niña” phenomenon. Between April 2010 and June 2011, the government registered a total of 3,219,239 people, 73% (2,350,207) as “victims” and the rest 27% (869,032) as “affected”, which represents 7 percent of the national population (ONU, CEPAL, and BID 2013).

Likewise the literature on climate change concludes that cities such as Cartagena are more vulnerable to the impacts of natural climate related threats such as the “La Niña” phenomenon in 2010-2011 where the city had serious material and humanitarian damages (DNP 2012) (UNDP 2010) (Office of the Mayor of Cartagena de Indias et al. 2014). Although, the literature on climate change argues that one of the principal climate related threats for Cartagena is associated with the increase in sea level and extreme natural events such as tidal waves, torrential rains, and intense heat (Office of the Mayor of Cartagena de Indias et al. 2014). The questions that the literature is formulating on displacement in Cartagena focuses mainly on forced displacement and armed conflict. (Campos Garcia et al. 2011). This gap in the literature is an important frame to start the discussion and evaluate more deeply the impacts of natural hazards on Cartagena.

The literature on climate change argues that the presence of the population in vulnerably-situated homes decreases their ability to respond to a natural hazard (traveling, finding food, working after the disaster) (ONU, CEPAL, and BID 2013). That is to say that the people who will be most affected by climate-related disruptions

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10 El Niño and La Niña phenomena, in which rainfalls cause hydro-meteorological events such as droughts, floods, flash floods and landslides, among other events (Campos Garcia et al. 2011).

11 The National Statistics Administrative Department (DANE), as operator of the registry, does not validate nor verify the conditions of registered people, reason why that document uses the category of persons potentially affected or victim. Both conditions require verification in the field.
are generally also the poorest people. Vulnerability refers to "the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected". It includes a variety of concepts and elements "including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt" (IDMC 2015a) and coincides with the socio-economic and racial discrimination, capacity to access goods and services, and the fragility of the environment where the poorest people are based. Thus, these communities are more likely to be affected by the effects of climate change and lack the ability to recover rapidly by themselves in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

The so called "other Cartagena" encompasses the poorest neighborhoods in the city where most of the population are located in high risk zones and poverty affects 60.3 percent of the population in Cartagena which, in many cases, classify as extreme poverty (Sanchez 2011) (Escobar 2003). Thus, Cartagena is considered one of the most vulnerable cities in the country because of frequent occurrences of climatic events, the concentration of IDPs by violence and natural disasters, and high levels of vulnerability and poverty among its inhabitants.
Figure 10: Socio-economic stratification in Cartagena

Source: Andres Achury
The disconnect between the literature of displacement, resettlement, and climate change opens an interesting debate of bridge-building concepts to consolidate an integral view of how to prevent future natural disasters produced by climate events, respond to and aid IDPs, and implement an integral resettlement process. The literature on forced displacement encompasses the problem through the lens of violence and its impacts, whereas the literature on climate change has been focused largely on institutional coordination and sectoral policy responses to risk. The literature on resettlement processes creates a holistic approach to the displacement problems, but has failed in the implementation of those models. As a result, the literature on resettlement processes in Colombia failed to combine the aforementioned concepts and focuses on solving the most immediate needs of the displaced, such as food and shelter, but fails to understand socio-economic problems such as reemployment, social inclusion, and restoration of community assets, and services among others.

For those reasons this thesis collected more information about the conditions of the IDPs in Cartagena, to better understand the transformative effects of forced displacement on peoples' behavior, practices, and economic livelihoods. The next chapter will illustrate the challenges, needs, and anxieties of the IDPs from San Francisco and how both groups (the ones who stayed in the neighborhood and those who have left) are coping with the process of rebuilding their lives after the effects of a natural disaster.
Chapter 2. Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

Economic opportunities

San Francisco (SF)

Ana, an IDP from SF, is a 45-year-old woman who, unlike some of her neighbors, decided to stay in SF after the landslide hit the area. She has been living in SF her entire life. She is part of the group of residents that don’t want to move to CB, because according to her, “We deserved something better”. Most of the people form SF have informal jobs. Some are street vendors on the beaches of Bocagrande, others work in the Bazurto Market (central city market), and in informal commerce, e.g., street vendors or selling cellphone credits.

“Here most of the young people are on the streets doing nothing and that is what leads them to commit crimes, join the gangs and take drugs ... it is for the lack of opportunities. If anyone gave them opportunities, these kids won’t be doing all these bad things, but here there is a lot of inequality. Thanks God I was able to continue working as a social worker.”

Jorge was 18 years old when he moved to SF with his parents in 1977. There, he met his wife Carmen. They were young when they decided to move to their own house and start a family in SF. Jorge lived for over 40 years with his wife and kids in a house that he built with his own hands and the help of his neighbors on a plot of land that he bought it from the “Instituto de Credito Territorial” (Territorial Credit Institute). He believes that when he moved to SF his quality of life improved because he had his own place to live and he could establish a small business doing photography and videos for events. “Filmaciones Jorge Video” was the name of his business and with it, Jorge supported his family for around 17 years. Some members of his family worked here as well.

“That business generated good dividends because the sector (SF) was all inhabited, and people liked the idea...it was a boom, the trendy thing to do at that time (1993).”
Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

Image 1: Original design of the house from the Territorial Credit Institute in SF

Source: Andres Achury

He also had a restaurant that served homeless people from the area and the government paid him to get them food. But after the natural disaster, everything collapsed and he had to leave his house and lost his businesses. Currently he is living at his wife’s aunt’s house in SF and working as a taxi driver. But he feels bad because he always was an entrepreneur with his two businesses. He argued that part his success was because both his restaurant and video shop were located near the main avenue of the neighborhood and that “facilitated the trade.” He explained that even though his businesses were modest, they “lived relatively well in SF before the disaster” and never considered to move outside SF even after the landslide.

The 144 square meters of plot size (8 meters width x 18 meters length) allowed residents to expand their houses according to their needs. Also, the lack of regulations encouraged people to customize their homes. In many cases people built additional floors to add work spaces as a way to increase their income. According to the interviewees it was common to find family businesses in the neighborhood such as restaurants, grocery stores and hairdressers. Many of the residents in SF reported that they had jobs before the landslide.
They also said that they had more jobs opportunities in SF than their former neighborhoods or towns. The residents who have lived all their lives in SF claimed that they had job opportunities because SF is close to the tourist areas of the city (beaches and Walled City, designated a World Heritage Site in 1984). Also, the number of people living there cluster enough inhabitants that many businesses flourished within that environment, generating a local economy. Short and cheap commuting also promoted job-seeking in downtown Cartagena. Nevertheless, most of the residents in SF had informal jobs, such as selling fruits or sunglasses in the beaches of Bocagrande and Las Americas or in the Walled City, thus, the economy development of SF was supported mainly by a local businesses and informal workers.

Security is a main concern among residents in SF. Even before the landslide of 2010, residential and commercial burglary was frequent in the area. Residents and pedestrians were attacked by gangs. This situation in addition with the natural disaster damaged the local economy, “espantando” (frightening) the clients.

"Now SF is in worse condition. Before the landslide this was a neighborhood with commerce; You got everything here. Since 2010 (date of the natural disaster) the neighborhood has deteriorated and now there are few businesses because people are gone."
Source: Andres Achury

Carlos Bicentenario (CB)

Carlos and his wife used to own a farm in Sudan, located in a rural area of the department of Bolívar. In 2000, after living there for 50 years, they were displaced due to violence between guerrillas and paramilitary groups. They migrated to Cartagena and rented a house in SF. They lived in SF for almost 16 years until the landslide forced them to relocate. It is important to mention that Carlos became a beneficiary to the Free Housing program as a victim of displacement by violence before the floods of 2010-2011. After one year of living in his own two-story house, Carlos explains his situation in CB:

“Here there is no place for work. I am unemployed. I would like to work selling cassava, plantain or fish. I used to work in the fields when I lived in Sudan, but now when I moved to SF I began to do anything to have an income. I bought a wheelbarrow and started selling food on the streets. I purchased the food from the central market with money from informal moneylenders and resell it in SF. I tried to start the same business here (CB), but I am afraid to walk in the neighborhood because of the gangs. I also would like to open
Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

"a shop within my house but I am too afraid to use moneylenders here in CB because I don't know them." a shop within my house but I am too afraid to use moneylenders here in CB because I don't know them."

Image 4: One-story house in CB

Source: Andres Achury

A few blocks from Carlos in a one-story house in CB, Yolanda, a community leader, describes the difficulties of living with a chronic autoimmune disease:

“I was born and lived my whole life in the neighborhood of San Francisco here in Cartagena, but in 2010 I had to move to CB Because I was a victim of landslide in 2010. Before arriving to CB I used to work, so my sister in law and my aunt took care of my children. Then before the natural disaster of 2010, I was diagnosed with lupus and I couldn’t work anymore. Now I receive a pension from the government because of my illness.”

She also mentions that she lives with her mother and her two children who are a fundamental support. Her mother is a seamstress and in her room, they created a workshop where she sleeps and works. Yolanda remarks that both seek to separate
the workshop from the home and they would like to have the opportunity to lease a small workspace outside the house. They do not see the fact of sharing the space of the home as something positive. On the contrary, Yolanda argues “the loss of familiar ties” when the workspace is part of the domestic space. She says:

“For example, with the schedules: people pass at any time, in any moment. Or if someone of the family is watching a movie, some customer arrives and interrupts.”

Yolanda adds that having a job outside the home would also help organize and make the time more efficient, in addition to the annoyance of having the room cramped with “rags and things” inside her mother’s room. Another problem is distance from CB to downtown Cartagena and access to public transportation. The combination both circumstances exacerbates the living conditions of the residents.

“I have to spend more money in transportation because if I want to go downtown I have to take two buses. Additional now it takes me one hour to go to the Walled City vs 15 minutes that it took me when I was in SF.”
Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

Challenges

Like Yolanda, other interviewees are uneasy about sharing a workspace within their house spaces. They are willing to pay a small rent for some kind of space or to have access to commercial areas within the neighborhood. However, the regulations on land uses in CB prohibit the development of commercial activities within the neighborhood (e.g., local grocery stores, shops etc.) and local stores are considered illegal. Likewise, the lack of formal commercial spaces in the design of the projects force the residents of CB to adapt commercial uses within the houses. Likewise, around 70% of the respondents report that it is more difficult to find jobs in CB and that there are even fewer job opportunities than in SF. One reason that exacerbates this situation is long and expensive commuting that impedes job-seeking, making them less competitive or desirable in comparison with their counterparts in SF. A second reason is that security concerns have damaged the domestic economy. Shops located within houses are threats to home safety, and street vendors and clients are frequently assaulted by gangs. Because of the levels of insecurity, neither street vendors nor residents frequent public spaces at night. Although the FMSD provides job training, residents find several challenges to becoming entrepreneurs or to translate those trainings into actual jobs due to the lack of financial support, adequate spaces, logistical resources, and low consumer buying capacity (from people living in CB).

Basic social infrastructure

San Francisco (SF)

Ana claims that residents in SF have access to most of the services and infrastructure of the city.

“SF is a good neighborhood to raise children, it has many advantages. I have access to transportation at any time. The location of SF facilitates a lot of things to me like going to downtown, access to recreation spaces... the schools are also close to SF too. We have the school “San Jose Claveriano”, the wall is near, the Castle of San Felipe, the tourist area (refers to the Walled City) ... that is the main tourist attraction of Cartagena. Now there is another thing and it is the landscape. If you go to the top of the mountain right now you will see the landscape... you can see the neighborhood of Bocagrande, La Boquilla, and the airport ... I don’t change this neighborhood for anything.”
Meanwhile Jorge explains that his settlement process was tough. His house was the result of an auto-construction process where Jorge and his neighbors built the unit around 40 years ago.

“At the beginning, we didn’t have all the services, we had to walk to the upper part of the mountain to get water and we didn’t have sewage system, but little by little the government was legalizing all the services. But you know we had to fight for them, it was a constant struggle with them (local authorities). I think we make it happen because we (the neighbors) were very close and we organized to demand legal public utilities”

In terms of infrastructure and services, there are two circumstances. On the one hand, the residents that live in the lower part of the mountain have legal connections to public utilities, paved streets and houses made with brick and concrete; on the other hand, the inhabitants from the upper sector of SF have illegal connections to the public utilities and some of them do not even have all the services, especially a sewage system. Most of the streets are not paved and the houses in the area were built with wood or tin. The reason for those differences are that the first group called “People from the Territorial Credit Institute” were part of a government project in
the 1950s, where the government gave them the land and the residents had to build their own house. The government also provided the design of the house. Afterwards the government added public utilities and social infrastructure. The second group called “The Subnormal” are mainly displaced people from violence or people that moved from the rural areas to the city looking for better living conditions. They arrived in SF after the Territorial Credit Institute where people were already settled. This urbanization process created confrontations between both groups particularly for the access to public utilities and illegal connections. Later on, the “Subnormal” group also organized themselves and went through the same process of legalization. In 2010, the landslide destroyed both areas.

Image 7: House of the “Subnormal” group in SF

Source: Andres Achury
Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

Figure 11: Destroyed area in San Francisco

Source: Andres Achury
Carlos says that they don’t have any problems with access to public utilities; however, in terms of the quality of the services he points out that power cuts occur often in the neighborhood. He explains that in the case of the so-called “towers” (4-story apartment structures), the situation is even worse because the water system uses electricity to pump the water to the apartments that are located at the top floors, thus when there is a power cut, they run out of water too.

“You know they cut our lights when they feel they like it. Here there is an additional problem with the water because the water works with the electricity, so when the electricity goes out the water goes out too.”

Image 8: Two-story houses and towers in CB

Source: Andres Achury
According to the interviewees, the living costs such as transportation, food and public utilities are more expensive in CB than in SF. It is important, however, to mention that some of the residents did not pay public utilities before moving to CB because they were illegally connected to have access to those services. Food is also a concern because there are no formal commercial spaces within the neighborhood. Therefore, people have to purchase all the groceries in small shops that then tend to be more expensive or need to take transportation to go to the big supermarkets which means more costs.

"I spend more on transportation because a taxi from here to the market (Bazurto) charge me 20,000 pesos ($6.6 USD) and when I lived in SF a taxi charged me 8,000 pesos max ($2.6USD)... The food is more expensive because buying food in the small stores here is more costly than going directly to the market."

Image 9: Grocery store within one-story house in CB

Source: Andres Achury
Support for the community social structure and economic livelihoods of residents

Challenges

Although residents in CB have access to all public utilities, they have to deal with frequent power cuts. People from the towers suffer from both power and water cuts because the hydraulic system of the towers need water pumps to circulate the water. According to the interviewees, living costs is a huge concern. Food and transportation costs increases are related to the neighborhood's isolation from the city. Additionally, the lack of commercial areas make access to food sources difficult. Although CB has some bus routes, public transportation is limited, particularly at night when the bus services stop working at 10:00PM. Residents are forced to use taxis to get in or out of the neighborhood. Insufficient amount of public facilities such as health care centers and schools also force people to travel outside of CB to attend their needs.

“There are almost no bus routes in CB, when the bus arrives it is packed and you know that you want to go comfortable because you spend more than an hour there when you go downtown. I think that what we need is more transportation, because in the evenings at 10 pm it is very difficult to take a bus. As much as we want to go outside CB or visit someone we cannot.”
Chapter 3. Security of residents in the face of violence or threats of displacement

*Displacement and tenure*

San Francisco (SF)

Alberto was born in Sincelejo, the state capital of Sucre, but he has been living in Bolivar for more than 30 years. When he was a child his family settled in a rural area of Bolivar in the municipality of Clemencia, located 30 kilometers from Cartagena. There, he had a prosperous life, producing all kinds of fruits and vegetables in the property he inherited when his parents died. He saved some money and one day he bought a plot of land in the upper area of SF as an investment.

"I had the house deeds of my farm and my plot in SF. I had a quiet, prosperous life. Now I am leasing a room while the government relocates us."

But 10 years ago, armed groups attacked Clemencia forcing Alberto, his wife and his daughter to move to Cartagena to the land he purchased in SF. The violence situation in Clemencia became more dangerous and Alberto had to abandon his property because of the ongoing violence in the region. After this event Alberto thought that the worst had passed, but while living in SF, his daughter died from an illness and then the landslide of 2010 destroyed his home.

"I lost my house in Clemencia because of the violence and I lost my house in SF because of a natural disaster"

A few months after the disaster his wife also died and according to Alberto the main reason she got very sick was because of the stress and trauma of losing everything they had.

"My quality of life has deteriorated since my home collapsed here in SF. At the beginning, I lived well because I had my house in SF and my wife's family lived close to us. I also had my farm in Clemencia where I planted fruits and vegetables and brought
them to the city to sell them in the city. Economically I was doing well: I had money to pay the bills, everything was working. But then I lost my family, my farm and my house in SF ... at this moment I feel that I am in the air, I lost everything I loved. Now I survive with the subsidy that the government gives me. With that money, I pay the lease of the room. Now I can’t pay the bills and employment is difficult to find.”

Image 10: Destroyed house after floods in 2010 in SF

Source: Isairis Gamarra

Tulio is one of the leaders of SF. He is part of the Territorial Credit Institute group. He has lived all his life in SF and his grandfather was one of the founders of the neighborhood. However, 7 years after the natural disaster, he is desperate after not having his own home and last year, he decided to become part of the IDPs who are moving to CB in 2017. He argued that they negotiated better conditions with the local government because they are going to receive a bigger house. In his opinion, this house is a better compensation for what he lost in comparison with what others IDPs from SF received right after they lost their house.

“I’m going to CB because of the need to have my own house. I have been living on a lease the last 7 year, I want my own home. Now if the government says let’s do the project here in SF I’ll stay.”
Residents feel threatened by future displacement because of the vulnerable situation they are in. Although most of them have either land titles or house deeds, they cannot go back to their previous homes because now the government declared that area high risk and are forbidding future development. There is a conflict between the community and the government lengthening the displacement status of the community. People have been forced to accept resettling to CB even when most of the families feel they deserve something "better," but they are afraid of not receiving state assistance if they reject the housing offer.
Ciudad Bicentenario (CB)

Pedro was born in Magangué, city located at the edge of the Mogua marsh in the state of Bolivar. He left Magangué because of violence between paramilitary and guerrilla groups and lost his property. He decided to move to SF where his sister lived. Pedro lived 25 years in SF. In the beginning, he leased a room in the area with his wife and kids, but after a couple of years he bought a plot of land in the same neighborhood and built a wooden house. He did have the house deeds, but he did not have the title of the land. After the landslide in 2010, he lived two years in Pablo VI and then two years in La Paz, both neighborhoods of Cartagena. From La Paz he moved to CB, where he has been living the last three years. He already has his house deeds.  

"In that house, I only had water and electricity, I had no sewer system nor gas. With the natural disaster in 2010, I lost my house and was forced to join the rental assistance program until the government gave the house here in CB. Thank God, after four years of going from one place to another I moved to CB. I have been living here in CB for three years. I feel safe since I have house deeds. With that in my hands I have nothing to worry about."

Sandra is from Cartagena and her first residence was in the neighborhood of Petares, where she lived with his mother but they wanted to move because they were leasing a house and they wanted to buy one. However, they did have enough resources to purchase a house therefore, they moved to SF and invaded a piece of land in the upper area of the neighborhood and built their own house. There they lived in SF for over 20 years up until the landslide of 2010-2011.

"My mom had her own home in SF and the plot of land was huge, so my mom split the backyard and gave me, my brother, and my aunt a piece of land to build our own apartments"

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12 After the subsidy approval, the FMSD and the fiduciary carry out a study of titles to elaborate the Purchase and Sale Agreement. This document will be signed by the seller and the buyer in a notary, and the document stipulates that spouses are not allow sell the property by themselves. Then, the copies of the housing deeds are taken to the “Oficina de Instrumentos Publicos” (Office of Public Instruments) where a lien certificate is issued. In order to get the disbursement, the buyer needs to provide copy of the deeds and the lien certificate along with the receipt of the property for additional signatures. Furthermore, the financial institution and legal attorney will review the house’s legal situation; when no legal problems are found, the attorney creates a report and writes the housing deed. Once the documentation is done, the financial entity notifies the buyer of the date and notary to sign the deed.
In 2010-2011, all the family members lost their houses and were relocated to CB. At the time of our interview, Sandra had been living in CB for four months, but she had not yet received the house deeds.

"In theory I own this house, but you know that without the title of the house I have no security. Without the deeds, I cannot say I own this house. That is one of the things I would like to change."

In SF Sandra was part of a group called “Nucleos” (core). This group were people who lived in the same plot with her parents, but, like Sandra, already had a family on their own. In most cases the owner of the property split the plot of land, generally the backyard to give his or her relative a separate space to have their own family. This phenomenon generates high rates of overcrowding among the properties. In response to the natural disaster suffered in SF, the government tried to solve the lack of housing and also the overcrowding conditions in which those families lived. Therefore, the government decided to provide housing to the families that were considered “Nucleos” to reduce overcrowding rates.
"My quality of life improved a lot, because now I have my own house. It was a change of life. The neighbors are nice. In SF we did not have electricity, we did a strike to force the government to connect our homes to the city’s electric grid. We had no water system, no sewer, no gas."

Challenges

Displaced populations who relocated to CB do not feel threatened by natural or armed conflict based reasons; however urban insecurity such as robberies and gang fights are major concerns, and two main reasons why people would leave CB. Ownership is perceived as one of the main improvements in the quality of life for residents; however, many fear not having property rights titles and feel it as an unfair condition, perceiving it as a threat to their stability in the neighborhood.
Violence and security

San Francisco (SF)

Most of the residents in SF agree that in general the conditions in SF are better now than before. In terms of violence, however, things are different. They argued that insecurity is worse after the natural disaster in 2010. Robberies and gang fights are more frequent, exacerbating the perception of insecurity. According to the survey “Cartagena Como Vamos 2015”, violence levels have been increasing each year since 2012. In 2015, homicides accounted for 273 violent death in Cartagena, representing 64.5% of the total deaths of the city, followed by 17.3% due to traffic accidents (Cartagena Como Vamos 2015).

Jorge feels that SF is better than before because now they have paved streets and access to all the public utilities, but the insecurity has worsened and there is a lot of noise on the streets.

"Now there are more bars and discos. Before we could sleep peacefully and take a nap at noon ... but now with the “Picós” (big loudspeakers). Before the landslide this was a quiet neighborhood, it was good to raise children, but now there are a lot of gangs. Now this is a very dangerous area for the children because of the drug abuse, child prostitution and delinquency... Alcoholism is a virus that is taking over this sector. These problems came from before the disaster, but that event makes things worse."

Like Jorge, Alberto thinks that the insecurity increased after the landslide in 2010; however, he argued the main reason for that is the lack of economic opportunities for the people.

"When I lived in SF I felt that the neighborhood was very quiet. But after the disaster, everything is more dangerous. Many people were left homeless and unemployed, and people got desperate and became delinquent to get a livelihood."
Urban violence by gangs and constant robberies constitute the main problems of SF. After the landslide in 2010, the situation became more traumatic. The fragmentation of the community, the lack of economic and education opportunities particularly for teenagers and the stress of the affected families in not having their own house, are some of the reasons that contribute to the deterioration of security and increase of the tensions between the residents of SF.

Ciudad Bicentenario (CB)

Although people think that the security is better now than before, it remains one of the main concerns among residents in CB. They claim that security levels improved in CB in relation to SF, a neighborhood that they consider “invivable” (precarious). Violent confrontations between gangs is common in the neighborhood. Gangs used to fight and take drugs in the vacant land that had not been developed yet next to CB. Although that land is part of the project, people perceive it as “no man’s land”.

Zoraida is originally from the state of Sucre, but her father was displaced from violence and they ended up living in SF. She lived all her life in SF until her family was
displaced by the landslide. They lost their land and their house. Two years ago, she moved to CB after waiting five years to be accepted into the Free Housing Program. After the natural disaster, she stayed in a friend's house in the neighborhood of Frendia. Her friend helped Zoraida by giving her shelter. In return Zoraida paid the bills and the food expenses. She explains that she is concerned about the security situation in CB:

“There are a lot of teenagers who are on the streets involved with drug abuse and gangs. I have to be the authority in this house because I am the head of the family. I always try to see where each of my sons are when they go outside. But you know, it is difficult to take care of a teenager... I do the best I can. For me my children must be inside the house... What does a child have to do on the street? Taking care of the family is a full-time job, but when you have to work all day, you leave early and come back late, what can you do to keep your kids out of the streets?

Lorena was born in Lorica, state of Cordoba. Her first residence and only residence before CB was in SF. She owned one of the houses from the Territorial Credit Institute. After the disaster, she moved to CB five years ago. She says that she owns this house, because three years ago she received the deeds. She feels that the security situation has improved in comparison with previous years, but she still thinks that
the neighborhood is very insecure.

“Well, CB has improved but in terms of security, but the situation is still complicated because 8 days ago I was robbed ... I came from the doctor and they put a knife on my back and they took my purse, the medicine, my ID...they took everything. That's why we paid 3,000 pesos for private security, but one day they stop offering the service. But if the offer me the service again I would pay again for it.”

Challenges

Because of weather conditions, insecurity and poor design, people feel displaced from public spaces. Children do not go out, and to be in the streets is considered “bad behavior”. To stay at home is a signal of good behavior and public space is perceived as dangerous. Many families pay for private security in order to feel safer. Likewise, rampant insecurity and lack of secure public spaces forces people lock themselves within their houses.

Isolation

San Francisco (SF)

Violence between gangs are common and the levels of insecurity increases every year in Cartagena; however, there are few cases where people prefer to stay locked inside their houses, even after the natural disaster. The people of SF walk on the streets to go to the market or to take their kids to school. It is a vibrant community. Although it appears to be counter intuitive, Ana explains the reason for this behavior:

“I am not afraid from the bandits, because the already know me. Some of them are the same age as my kids and some of them even studied with my kids. So, when I walk on the streets the recognized me: Good morning miss Ana...they respect me. That's why I am not afraid of going out. Of course, you have to be careful. I don't walk alone at the middle of the night, but you know it is dangerous to do that in any neighborhood of Cartagena.”
Despite the difficulties that people in SF are facing, they continue to make use of the neighborhood's infrastructure and public spaces. The families walk their children to school, go to the market Bazurto to buy food. Some of them are street vendors who walk every day to get their income. Security conditions are still precarious but the neighbors' long and deep relations between them allow residents to navigate the dangers of violence and insecurity. Most of the gang members are their children or friends of other residents' children so people in SF know where they live and even their names.

Ciudad Bicentenario (CB)

Irma is from Cartagena. She lived 17 years in SF, then she moved to Canapote and stayed there for two years. In 2003 she went back to SF and lived another seven years in the area. After the landslide of 2010 she moved to CB, where she has been living for the last six years. Irma claims that it is common to see teenagers fighting on the streets and that terrifies her.

"Sometimes I am at my front door and I see all these young people running from far away, fighting to each other, so I lock in the house"
with my children. My children can play outside, right in front of the house with other children of the block but when we see fights, they have to come right away.”

Image 17: Kids playing within a house in CB

Source: Andres Achury
Irma explains that access to the public facilities and transportation is limited because CB does not provide the necessary amenities people require. Thus, residents of CB have to drive long distances in order to satisfy their needs.

"I spend more money in public transportation than I used to spend in my old neighborhood. Sometimes, I can't even think of leaving CB or going to the market to do groceries. When I have an appointment with the doctor or if I have to go to the city, I leave my young daughter alone at the home. I lock her in the house, because I cannot pay the tickets for both of us."

Regarding her family and friends, Irma states that it is difficult to maintain contact with family and friends because she lives far from her relatives.

"I leave a lot of family and friends in SF, I would like to visit them more often but sometimes I find difficult to get out of CB and I end up going every six months. If I leave CB at one o'clock I arrive to SF at two-thirty and if I leave SF to late I can't take the bus, and I have no way to return to CB."

Image 18: 15.3 km is the distance from CB to downtown Cartagena.

Source: Andres Achury
Social isolation imposed by ongoing conflict between gangs and robberies in the public space prevents the creation of community ties and limits the communication between neighbors. This disconnection leads to constant conflicts of coexistence between neighbors. At the same time, this social isolation increases the fear of appropriating the public space because it is considered a “no man’s land”, meanwhile gangs take control over it to impose fear in the neighborhood.

Challenges

Residents of CB perceived the neighborhood as a separate town from Cartagena because of long distances to public facilities, precarious transportation and job opportunities. Distance from the downtown of Cartagena increase the sense of living in a different town. This situation forces residents to commute constantly outside CB to satisfy their basic needs. Likewise, the distance between CB and downtown Cartagena weakens family and friendship ties. Therefore, for most families maintaining these ties becomes an economic burden that they cannot afford.
Chapter 4. Empowerment Of Communities Through Enhanced Capacities To Share In Their Own Governance

Community relations

San Francisco (SF)

Residents of SF know each other very well because they have been living together for generations. The first colonizers of SF came from the rural areas in the 50s looking for better living conditions in Cartagena. Once they took over the land, they went through a legalization process with the local government. After a long process, they got land titles, settling permanently in the area. People brought their families there and second generations remained in the neighborhood. Tulio is 51 years old and he is a second-generation resident of SF. He justifies why people are so close in SF:

"Here in SF my grandparents brought me when I was four years old. Now I am 51 years old and I have been living here all my life. My parents decided to come here because of the need of having their own house. Before moving to SF, we lived with my aunt in a neighborhood called Blas de Lezo. We moved to SF because my grandfather was living already here, he was one of the founders of this neighborhoods during the 50s. At the time of the construction the houses the neighbors helped each other. Some people helped in the construction site, others bringing water, cooking Sancocho (a local dish made that is a type of soup with fish, cassava, potato and vegetables on the streets). We built 678 houses from the Territorial Credit Institute. Now I inherit my mom's house when she died."

Ana also explains the reasons of that unity within SF:

"We were very close. For example, I could correct my neighbor's son. The people here respected me. I am very important within this community. The reason why people is so close between each other is that this neighborhood was created as an informal settlement, so we"
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

helped and supported each other and the people became family. Also, our children grew up together we developed more confidence, more respect within us. My neighbors know that if they saw my children doing something bad, they have permission to correct them.”

Image 19: Collaboration among neighbors after floods in 2010 in SF

However, Tulio argues that after the natural disaster things are started to change.

“Previously the people of SF respected each other, but lately the social component and the family values has deteriorated”

SF has a strong and united community; nevertheless, there are different communities within the neighborhood. This situation however, never posed a problem for the neighbors. Patricia was born in Tumaco, state of Nariño. She came to Cartagena 60 years ago and for several years her family was constantly moving between the neighborhoods of Olaya Herrera and Blas de Leso. Then she moved to SF because she did want to pay rent anymore so she built her own home and since then she has lived there for the past 40 years. She is part of the Territorial Credit Institute group, located at the bottom of the mountain and explains her relationship with the neighbors of the upper sector of SF, commonly known as the “Subnormal”.

Source: Isairis Gamarra
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

“I knew my neighbors very well. We were all very close and helped each other. For example, sometimes I took care of the children of my neighbor. Now, I do not know all the people who live in this place. There were differences between the people from the upper sector of SF and us the ones in the lower part. We all felt part of the same community, but the top of the hill had its own atmosphere and down here we had our own environment. We did not have problems between the two areas, but they were different dynamics.”

Residents of SF have a strong relationship between each other. The reason for this cohesion seems to rely in constant interaction between neighbors. Every time somebody needed help building his or her home, helping with the children or inviting them to a party, a solid and reliable relationship has endured in the long run. All the interviewees agreed, however, that the landslide in 2010 was a devastating event that changed the dynamic of the neighborhood. The main reason was the fragmentation of the community. Some people applied to the resettlement process provided by the government and many of them ended living in CB. Other people with more financial capacity just moved to a different neighborhood and another group decided to stay in SF by renting rooms with the rental subsidy given by the government. Also tensions between residents and leaders scaled up because of the stress generated by not having their own house.
The situation in CB is more complex. There are different types of interactions within the neighborhood. In terms of the micro-level or “the person next door”, the relationships seem to be cordial. However, when people refer to residents that lived in a different sector of CB (i.e., the sector of the towers, the sector of the two-story houses or the sector of the one-story houses), the perception changes completely.

The sense of community disappears in relation to the sector in which the person lives. Interviewees tend to blame people who live in other sectors, especially those who live in the towers’ sector, as instigators of violence, insecurity or bad behavior in CB. For the residents that came from SF the situation is more dramatic because this community is discriminated against by other residents of CB who label them as “trouble markers, gangsters or problematic people”.

Rodrigo was born in Cartagena. He had lived all his life in SF, but because of the natural disaster he was relocated to CB. He arrived to CB four years ago and owns a one-story house from the first stage of the project. Rodrigo confesses that the adaptation in CB was difficult.

“At the beginning, we were discriminated for being displaced people. I felt embarrassed to say that I was displaced from SF. People used to say “SF people are bad”. But after a while, people treated me better. In this area where I live (one-story houses) the neighbors are ok, but in the other sectors there is more conflict. For example, in the tower sector there is a lot of conflict because there is no unity in the community and the government put us all mixed and that does not help.”
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

Image 21: Former SF resident living in CB

Source: Andres Achury
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

Incoming residents also perceive it as problematic and it is related with the increase of robberies and tensions between neighbors. Irma describes the situation and challenges she faced with the incoming neighbors.

“The relationship with the neighbors is improving over time, but there are shortcomings with the new families that come to the neighborhood. The problem is that when an adaptation process ends the government brings new families into the territory that they do not know how to behave. There are a lot of gangs here in CB... we pay private security, we pay them every Saturday. The service works for me, because they always come here early in the mornings to check if everything is fine. I pay 3,000 pesos a week.”

Challenges

Relationship among neighborhoods seems to improve within the micro scale but people perceive that future phases in CB will lead to more problems. Segregation between sectors causes tensions between neighbors, and particular groups are discriminated against because of their origin or the place they live. People that came from SF are considered dangerous or with different customs. Likewise, there is another type of discrimination within CB and it is related to the place people live. Residents in CB associate all the problems of the neighborhood with the people who live in the towers. For example, the gangs came from there, conflict between neighbors are more common there too. People from the towers are perceived as violent or without manners.

Neighbors organize “private” security system - weekly monthly payments, but high violent crime rates also threaten “local security people”.

Leadership

San Francisco (SF)

The leaders of SF have been very active and they must be accountable to the residents. Leaders have been important within this community because along the years they have provided many of the necessities people need. Those leaders or community boards also helped to solve conflicts between neighbors. Cecilia— a woman who was born and lived her entire live in SF and who was also leader of SF many years ago— illustrates how the interaction between neighbors and leaders used to work inside this community. She also mentions that after the landslide the accountability of the
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

leaders disappeared and now they are more concerned with how to get personal benefits.

"(Before the natural disaster) we had leaders that when there were problems between people, they solved those problems. Now these leaders do not solve anything. For example, before the landslide leaders raised some internal problems of the community and shared the ideas to present them to the community. For example, to pave some street or to build a park. After the last elections in 2006, the new leaders of SF are not accountable to solve the community's problems...they are not serving the community anymore."

Some residents have concerns about how the leaders managed resettlement process in SF after the landslide in 2010. They say that there were irregularities in the process of housing distribution among IDPs. Jorge argues that the process led by the local government and the leaders of SF at that time caused a lot of suffering in the community.

"The leaders manipulated the census to include people who were neither homeowners in SF nor owned land here. With this process, the fake residents had access to the government rental subsidies and the Free House Program. Those people were registered in the IDP's system through the leaders who handled those databases. The fake beneficiaries paid the leaders a fee for every person they included in the census."

In the history of SF, leaders have had a fundamental role in the construction and consolidation of this neighborhood. Many of the residents live in informal houses, thus most of them did not have access to public utilities, infrastructure, and social facilities. However, many leaders pushed the government and organized the community to solve many of these issues, but the process of how leaders managed the resettlement process with the government has damaged the relationship between residents and leaders.

Ciudad Bicentenario (CB)

Residents in CB have mixed feelings about the leaders' effectiveness in solving the problems of the community. Although they tend to have an overall positive impact, residents believe that leaders tend to use the FMSD’s resources to benefit certain communities more than others, due to personal relationships. The segregation of CB
Empowerment of communities through enhanced capacities to share in their own governance

by sectors also affects the capacity of the leaders to impact the entire neighborhood. Leaders tend to solve problems at the block scale, particularly in the same block they live. Although there is a Community Action Board for CB the problems at the neighborhood level are solved generally by the FMSD. There is also tension between leaders of CB and the FMSD regarding the decision-making process on where and who to spend the resources in the neighborhood. Irma thinks that the leaders in CB have been very effective in solving the problems of the community.

"I think in general that they are positive for the community. After the construction of 2000 homes the former leader put pressure on the FMSD to build a "CAI" (police station) as well as a hospital.

Those things depend on the state, but the leaders are here to pressure the FMSD and the government to do what they promised to do. For example, when we first moved here, there was no school and the FMSD told us that the solution would be to send our children to schools out of the neighborhood, but then we and the leaders pushed them to put a school here in CB."

However, other people think differently about the situation. Monica was born in Barranquilla, in the state of Atlántico. She moved to Cartagena when she was 15 years old and spent three years living in the neighborhood of Santa Maria in an apartment that her family rented for three years. Then they moved to SF where they built their own house made of wood and tin and lived there 32 years. After the landslide, they were relocated to CB. She claims that the leaders do not have a positive impact on the community because they only think about how to benefit themselves.

"It is very difficult to do things in this sector. The leader here is the one who decides everything. I used to participate in the meetings but I stopped doing so because that was not a serious process. For example, there were holes in the pavement, the community board was always busy, so we organized ourselves and fixed all that. The community board was a failure, it was all fiction. The leaders organized a lottery to collect money to fix the roads but the money disappeared. They spent all the money on themselves. Here the FMSD is the only one that supports us here. Because neither the leaders nor the police do anything for us. When you see that there are people who are smoking (using drugs) you call the police but they don't come.

I think they are already tired of coming all the time...and doing nothing. On the contrary, we had some neighbors who fight a lot. I was sleeping when I heard them discussing. We complained to the FMSD and they came here and solved the problem."
Challenges

People in CB have different perceptions about the leaders, but the general sense is that the leaders have a positive but inappropriately discretionary sharing of benefits. The new development areas are settings for conflictive politics around money issues. There are particular difficulties in the administration of the towers, regarding service payments, electricity and water management.

People view FMSD as the actor that should solve all the problems of the neighborhood because of the lack of government presence in the area. Yet many norms and regulations set by FMSD are perceived as unfair. This perception is based on a contradictory double standard; the FMSD claims to support the autonomy of the community yet places restrictions on what residents can do to build commercial spaces, improve their houses etc.
Chapter 5. Reduction of the vulnerability of residents to environmental risks and stresses

Housing conditions and environmental risks

San Francisco (SF)

The housing conditions in SF vary according to the sector in which the people are located. Residents that belong to the Territorial Credit Institute group are located in the lower part of the neighborhood and the challenges they face are related to the legalization process of the illegal connections to public utilities that they have. In general terms, the housing conditions of this group are good considering that the size of the plots is big enough to permit future expansion. Likewise, the size of the houses allows them the inclusion of additional uses within the housing unit.

People located in the upper sector of the neighborhood commonly known as the “Subnormal” group face other challenges. Many of these residents came from the rural areas of the state and were displaced by the armed conflict in the country. Most of the houses in this sector are made of wood and tin, and most lack public utilities and land titles.
Image 22: Debris of a house of the group called “Subnormales”

Source: Isairis Gamarra

After the disaster both groups were in a vulnerable situation. Both groups lost their homes and they were forced to lease a place to stay. The problem is that with the rental subsidy that the government is giving to them, they cannot afford a house in the same area. Thus, they had to lease only one room or move to another neighborhood.

Tulio describes the conditions in which he lived before the natural disaster:

"Our house met our needs, because for example our house had capacity to build 3 rooms. We also made an apartment for me and my family in the backyard of the house with two rooms, living room and a small kitchen. The house had 127 square meters and we still had space to expand more."
Cecilia explains the challenges she had to face when she had her house in SF:

“When I decided to get my own house at SF I made a wooden ranch with zinc roof with no utilities on a plot of land that I invaded here. Over the time, I was able to use concrete to make it stronger. I had to buy gas tanks to cook, walk down the hill to grab water from a waterhole and get electricity by connecting to my neighbor’s energy supply.”

People renovate, expand, and modify houses to meet their needs. Size of the plots allow residents to subdivide the property to allocate more families within the same area. Lack of regulations promote multiuse units along the neighborhood. Location of houses in high risk areas represent a hazard to the residents of SF. Lack of basic infrastructure and public utilities affected the residents’ quality of life; however, many of the residents install illegal connection to the water, electricity and sewer systems.

Image 23: Impacts of the “La Niña” Phenomenon in SF

Source: Isairis Gamarra
Reduction of the vulnerability of residents to environmental risks and stresses

Ciudad Bicentenario (CB)

Residents in CB have their basic environmental needs met at the macro-scale since there are legal connections to the public utilities, houses made in brick and concrete and basic infrastructure (streets and sidewalks). However, at the micro-scale residents face many challenges, particularly regarding the interior finishes of the houses given that the FMSD delivers only unfinished houses. The quality of the housing units is also a concern for the residents in CB.

Laura is originally from Magangue, state of Bolivar. She moved to SF and lived with her aunt for four years. However, she moved to Barranquilla to study and work until 2006. After her experience in Barranquilla she went back to SF to live with her sister for 4 years. She applied to the Free House program when her mother-in-law lost the house because of the landslide in 2010. Laura got her own house three years ago. She claims that her house does not respond to her needs.

"My house is too small, I had to remove the wall on the living room since I have 2 children and I also had to build my store... I feel tight. I would like to have more area to expand my house even if I have to do it by my own resources, but there is no additional space. I would like to add a second story but it is expensive and I can’t afford it right now."

Lorena says that the spaces are small and do not respond to her needs. She also mentions that after moving to CB she thought that she never would have to suffer environmental risks; however, she was wrong.

"The truth is that for me the house doesn’t respond, because we’re a group of six people and the capacity of the house isn’t big enough. The four kids sleep in the same room and my husband and I in another. We live in overcrowding conditions. Likewise, everything gets wet because of the roof. A lot of water filters in my room. When it started to rain, the rooms filled with water, it. One day when I wasn’t here I found the mattress completely soaked."
Challenges

Like residents in SF people renovate, expand, and change the structure of their houses. In general, residents are aware of lighting and ventilation problems, but trade-off health for basic privacy and space needs. Many families live in overcrowded conditions from the time they move in. This is one of the main causes of unrest. People perceive unfinished houses as unhealthy (very humid, dirty). Water maintenance and administration problems in the towers section leads to significant service backlogs. Likewise, people “stockpile” water inside of the houses because of high costs in the public utilities. Lack of privacy between units and within the same unit is a source of psychological stress. None of the typologies in CB comes with doors for the rooms.

Image 24: One-story house without improvements nor renovations in CB

Source: Andres Achury
Chapter 6. Recommendations

The issue of resettlement is complex because it requires evaluators to consider multiple variables that go beyond physical aspects. The case of Ciudad Bicentenario shows that the resettlement processes generated impacts not only in the physical territory but also in the social communities. As mentioned in the literature review, the risk models and reconstruction as proposed by Cernea may be a useful conceptual tool to construct new resettlement strategies. From a policy standpoint, this model can serve as a basis for the construction of a resettlement policy that integrates all the necessary variables for the planning, implementation and assessment of the projects.

Guidelines at the public policy level

This discussion suggests several recommendations for resettlement processes in Colombia. Thus, any set of guidelines on resettlement should consider the following:

- Restoration of the communities, whenever possible in the same neighborhood where the natural event took place, preserving their settlement patterns and family and neighborhood networks. Also, improving their quality of life in terms of housing, public facilities, and public and social service utilities such as water and sewage systems, health and schools.

- Implementation of a detailed census of the victims is critical to establish the amount of affected people if a resettlement process has to be carried out.

- Based on the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations (IRR), the resettlement processes should include an analysis of the problems in situ of the place of intervention and carrying out local risk assessment. This means discovering the manifestations of the risks identified in the model in the local context, checking if there are other risks, identifying who are the affected groups and how to prevent or reduce those risks.

- Beyond the planning stage, the implementation phase of the resettlement process should have a series of indicators that allow for specific monitoring of the project's progress, identify undesired or unanticipated effects, and construct communication channels between government agencies and the affected communities to obtain feedback on specific variables such as health, housing, violence, access to services and transportation, job opportunities or the recreation of social networks (Cernea 1997) (de Wet 1988).

- The policy on resettlement should include a post-occupancy evaluation system to compare the results achieved with the expected risks and expected effects of the project of planning stage.

- The findings of this comparison can reveal shortcomings in policy in order to improve practices and develop alternative strategies.
Recommendations

- The implementation of this model as a national public policy has the immense potential of scaling this methodology nationwide to attend all the national territory with policy that is aware of the particularities and complexities of the local context.

- The interaction between the government agencies, the economic sectors, unions, academics, and affected communities is fundamental for the construction of an integral model and its effective implementation.

- Involving victims, politicians, and civic society is fundamental to establishing a dialog between the communities and the public sector to position the discussion of resettlement processes in the political sphere, so that the public interest comes to play a role in the discussion and is not just a technical matter. Therefore, the deliberation around this issue becomes an exercise to understand the dimension of the problem of displacement in Colombia and to come up with an integral solution of this problem that benefits all the actors involved in the resettlement. Understanding that there are social, economic, and political aspects that must be articulated is crucial.

Guidelines at the local scale

Understanding the complexity of changing the national resettlement policy and the development model of a country, this thesis also proposes concrete actions to reduce the impacts of the resettlement process in the community of CB that the FMSD could implement in order to enhance the conditions of that community.

- Re-establish the families' economic livelihood based on a shift of income-producing activities that respond to the production sectors of Cartagena. The tourism, petrochemical, and construction industry could be strong allies to help CB community enter the labor market providing job training and opportunities.

- Create programs that scale up domestic economies, organizing productive local amenities such as grocery stores, hairdressers, and farms within a local strategy. At the same time, it is fundamental to learn from the existing productive patterns to develop a local industry that responds to the supply of the community’s skills and the demand of Cartagena’s economy.

- Incorporate design solutions based on residents’ habits and environmental conditions rather than assumptions made by designers. FMSD should build a political platform to start a conversation with national and local governments to discuss structural errors of the policy, the standards and the regulations that must be changed, such as expanding the regulatory frameworks to allow mix used zoning or allowing residents to rent their houses. Understand and organize the services and informal dynamics to make them efficient in order to generate value within the CB. For example, operationalize garbage collection, surveillance, and cleaning of public spaces.
Recommendations

- Create counseling programs so families receive emotional attention that allows them to recover from traumatic events such as the landslide in 2010. Thus, families will be able to move forward in the reconstruction of their life and community.

- Create a CB identity that breaks down segregations between sectors and between vulnerable communities like people from SF. Create a more equitable and less discretionary system of norms and distribution of benefits among the residents. This will reduce tension between residents and leaders of the community.

- Invest in economic and human resources to create and articulate community councils with FMSD in order to organize the community around appropriation of the public space, garbage management, and surveillance, among others.

- Establish a discussion platform between the FMSD and the community. This is important to balance the autonomy and the sustainability of the community with highly-regularized environments, meaning that the regulations of CB established by the FMSD are generating burdens upon the economic and social conditions of the residents. For example, the current regulations prohibit (or at least curtail) commercial spaces within CB, thus forcing people to incur additional transportation expenses in order to access food.

- The FMSD and the community should establish an institutional mechanism for the redistribution of benefits like construction materials for the houses, training programs, and job opportunities, among others. Likewise, FMSD should clarify which behaviors or patterns are desirable to leave intact as cultural expressions and which ones need to have more regulation. For example, the noise caused by excessive volume of the loudspeakers exacerbates the tension between neighbors. This issue could be reviewed to reduce stresses among residents.

Other considerations

The displacement scenario in Colombia is very complex because it includes multiple variables such as job creation, income generation, violence, and social networks. However, it is striking that it is the architects who are leading the current discussion of resettlement in Colombia. As an architect, I see that the country’s public policy is focused on putting roofs over people’s heads, but lacks a broader approach to solve the structural problems that come with building communities. This is very important to understand because the policy on resettlement cannot continue to be carried out from a centralized perspective—where a group of “experts” design and implement from Bogota the entire policy of resettlement that affects mainly the regions that have completely different traditions from Colombia’s capital.

It is also important to point out that the role of philanthropy in the processes of resettlement has increased in the recent years. NGOs such as Fundación Mario Santo Domingo (FMSD), Federación Nacional de Vivienda Popular (FENAVIP) or Fundación Corona among others have become key players in the design and implemen-
tation of resettlement process in Colombia. The case of Ciudad Bicentenario is an example of how a nonprofit (FMSD) replaced the state in its role of designing and implementing a project focused on the attention to displaced communities. However, it is important to ask: what are the expectations of FMSD from this process? What does it mean that FMSD is leading a resettlement process and not the government? What is FMSD's interest in doing this Project? What is the political and planning agenda of FMSD in the discussion of resettlements in Colombia? What is the scope of FMSD in the design and implementation of the resettlement process? To understand the impacts of FMSD in the discussion of resettlements and to answer these questions, it is necessary to undertake further research. Yet, here are some preliminary thoughts about this topic based on the analysis developed in this thesis. The expectation of FMSD is to position its development process implemented in CB as an exemplary model for Colombia. During the process of construction of CB, FMSD has taken on the role of the government to attend the needs of the community. This situation has generated friction between the local government and the non-profit, where the former has failed to provide services and the latter realizes that it does not have the capacity to attend all the community’s needs. Based on the evidence collected for this thesis, it can be assumed that the FMSD has novel intentions in order to help the IDPs that neither the government nor the private sector has considered or implemented such as the DINCS\textsuperscript{13} model and the VASS\textsuperscript{14} route. These questions encourage researchers to explore the implications that can arise from philanthropy participating in the resettlement process by assuming the government’s role.

\textsuperscript{13} The FMSD DINCS model intends to develop sustainable communities with economic, environmental, and social capital. The DINCS model intends to strengthen these capacities through empowerment, support, and training. The underlying theoretical framework is based on the UN’s principles for sustainable development, Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, the collective impact theory, and Darcy Tetreault’s model of micro local interventions.

\textsuperscript{14} The VAAS route is composed of four components through which FMSD develops a self-sustaining community: linkage, adaptation, accompaniment, and exit. The four components each have a time frame and deliverables, some of which include metrics and evaluations.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

This thesis has conveyed some reasons why many residents of CB may well be worse off after going through a resettlement process when compared to their counterparts who chose to remain in SF. In the introduction, I argued that the current resettlement process in Colombia recognizes the urgency to attend to IDPs in Colombia, providing new built environments as a response to the physical issues of the resettlement process. This vision ignores that there are “non-physical” aspects such as economic opportunities, neighbors’ relationships or threats of violence that should be considered in order to addresses the broader needs that displaced communities face in the aftermath of displacement.

This thesis found that high levels of insecurity, proliferation of gangs, and lack of economic opportunities has become typical within this community. For both population groups, ownership of a home is a high priority. For them, having housing deeds or land titles represent huge improvements in their quality of life and security condition. Although over 80% of the resident of SF are homeowners, they cannot move back to their properties because the government declared the destroyed area to be of high environmental risk, which represents 17% of the total area of SF. Around 50% of the CB group interviewees still do not possess housing deeds or land titles, even after obtaining their house three years ago. Although the ownership situation for each group is different, the consequences in both communities are the same: they feel the situation as an unfair condition and perceive it as a threat to their stability in the neighborhood. These issues exacerbate the vulnerability of the people and diminish their options to reconstruct their disrupted livelihoods and community.

For the case of the people who moved to CB, this analysis demonstrates that the physical needs have been resolved. Around 90% of the interviewees of CB argued that access to public utilities and the better quality of the built environment are one of the major advantages of moving to CB. However, the majority of the residents in CB are still dealing with the same problems that their counterparts in SF are facing. Insecurity and presence of gangs are also major concerns in CB. Likewise, precarious transportation makes it difficult the access to basic public facilities such as health care, education, and the labor markets. Distance and physical isolation also increase the living costs of the resident. Food and transportation are more expensive in CB. Additionally, the neighborhood is 15.7 km away from downtown Cartagena and the average commute time is around one hour. This remoteness generates social and economic isolation among the population. This issue seems to be difficult to overcome for the people because their means of support and livelihood comes from the informal economy that is generally located in their previous neighborhood: the tourist and downtown areas of Cartagena.

Although the resettlement process in Cartagena has been focused exclusively on solving the need for physical housing, the number of dwellings built year after year has not been sufficient to reduce the housing deficit of 58,870 in 2015 (Cartagena Como Vamos 2015). Likewise, it has been unsuccessful in solving the cumulative impacts of
displacement more generally, at least according to Scudder or Cernea’s models. (M. Cernea and McDowell 2000) (Satiroglu and Choi 2015) (Hines and Balletto 2002).

This thesis constitutes an initial step to understand the gains and losses in the aftermath of a resettlement process. The evidence from this thesis suggests that the improvements of the living conditions between the SF group and the CB group focus mainly on physical aspects such as access to public utilities—water, electricity, gas and sewage system. However, the improvements in the living conditions achieved from this resettlement process are not significant in relation to the amount of economic and human resources expended in the construction of the neighborhood Ciudad Bicentenario.

This thesis aims at initiating a discussion to rethink the resettlement process in Colombia and to encourage researchers, policymakers, and government agencies to take a more holistic perspective regarding the challenges involved in resettlement processes. It is important to mention that Colombia should go beyond a short-term vision of the resettlement process and start planning long-term strategies, such as including the participation of the communities in the discussion in order to implement a policy that truly matches their needs and can empower the affected communities in the reconstruction process. From my perspective, this is the only way to break the cycle of ongoing poverty, vulnerability, and marginalization involved in the resettlement process in Colombia.

Given the limited time frame of the fieldwork, it was not possible to determine which elements of the resettlement process seem to improve with time and which are structural problems of the resettlement process. For example, it seems that some problems related to governance and neighbor-to-neighbor relations decrease over time, whereas insecurity and physical isolation appear to be more structural. Thus, to confirm the previous assumptions, further research should focus on the implementation of longitudinal studies in order to include the variable of time in the discussion of resettlement in order to find trends in resettlement evolution.

Throughout the interviews on both groups, this thesis revealed the effects of insecurity in the resettlement process. Constant presence of gangs and robberies, social isolation and increasing fear to use public space, couples with lack of economic opportunities are some of the symptoms of the insecurity conditions in SF and CB. Likewise, 90% of the interviewees argued that teenagers with no educational and economic opportunities are the main reason for the insecurity within the neighborhoods. Thus, further research on the situation of youth would help to understand the prevalence and demographic composition of gangs and the impacts of this phenomenon on the resettlement process.
Glossary of Spanish terms and acronyms

IDMC – The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

HRW – Human Rights Watch

UNGRD – National System for Prevention and Disaster

RUD – Single Registration of Victims

MINVIVIENDA – Ministry of Housing, City and Territory of Colombia

MISN – Macro Projects of National Social Interest (large scale affordable housing projects)

ONU – United Nations (UN)

BID – Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

CEPAL – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

RCHI – Resilient Cities Housing Initiative

CAU – Center of Advanced Urbanism

FMSD – Fundación Mario Santo Domingo

FENAVIP – National Federation of Affordable Housing

Fundación Corona – Non-Profit Organization

CODHES – Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement

IDP – Internally Displaced Persons

IRR – Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model

SF – Neighborhood of San Francisco in Cartagena city

CB – Neighborhood of Ciudad Bicentenario in Cartagena city

“La Niña” Phenomenon – Natural phenomenon mainly characterized by intense and abundant rainfall, increased river flow and subsequent flooding

La Ola invernal – Associate with “La Niña” Phenomenon that occurred in 2010 in Colombia

Instituto de Credito Territorial – Territorial Credit Institute

Núcleos – This group of people live in the same plot with a parent, but had a family on their own. In most cases the owner of the property split the plot of land, generally the backyard to give his or her relatives a separate space to have their own family.
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