

TELEVISION AND POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

IN THE STATES: IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP?

by

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Submitted to the Department of
Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the
Degree of

DOCTORATE IN PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June 1985

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the growth of television as a factor contributing to the decline of partisanship in the U. S. More specifically, the study focuses on the effects on partisanship of television as a source of increased political information. The hypothesis is that television, by providing political information to the electorate, is taking over a significant portion of the information function traditionally performed by parties. This has resulted in increased reliance on television for political information at the expense of political parties.

This hypothesis was tested in fifteen different states in the U.S. Television was controlled for by examining partisanship at the state level and by analyzing differences in partisanship between counties with and without local television. Partisanship was measured using aggregate election returns for counties and by developing a measure which factored out the effects of other variables. The explanatory power of television in relation to partisanship was tested using four different methods: a visual inspection of the data; tests of means; regression analyses; and a two-way analysis of variance.

The results indicate that television does not have a systematic effect on partisanship in a variety of states. The findings are that television's influence is insignificant in nine states, positively significant in three states and negatively significant in three others. Thus, the nature of television's effect is different depending on the context. This does not mean that television does not have an important effect in some states. It simply means that a general explanation which would cover the relationship between television and partisanship in a variety of environments is not possible at this point. What does emerge clearly however is the overwhelming importance of

state effects. State effects explain almost all the variance in volatility scores and also help explain the internal patterns of volatility found within three states examined as case studies. In these three states, the internal patterns of political opposition and articulation and the political cultures appear to be more important in explaining the pattern of volatility than does television. Where television does play a role, it is only within the bounds of established state political patterns.

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There are several people I would like to give special thanks to because without their help this paper would not have been possible.

First is my husband Ted who gave me the gift of time to work. This was the greatest and hardest sacrifice of all.

Second is Professor Ithiel Pool who was the guiding hand behind this paper until his death in 1984. I only regret that he did not see it completed.

Third is Professor W. Russell Neuman who willingly assumed Ithiel Pool's role as chairman of my committee.

Fourth are Professors Walter Dean Burnham and John Freeman who read numerous drafts of this paper and who cheerfully worked through the summer.

Finally, for reasons known to her, I want to thank Anne Grazewski. Without her help at critical moments, I doubt I would have made it.

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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Problem Statement

The purpose of this study is to analyze the growth of television as a factor contributing to the decline of partisanship in the United States since 1964. More specifically, the study will focus on the effects on partisanship of television as a source of increased political information. The hypothesis is that television, by providing high levels of low cost political information to the electorate, is taking over a significant portion of the information function traditionally performed by parties. This has resulted in increased reliance on television for political information at the expense of political parties. This factor is one cause of the decline of partisanship.

This hypothesis has been advanced in some of the literature on the decline of partisanship in the United States. However, there are no specific empirical studies of the relationship between television and declining partisanship. Statements of the causal relationship between the two variables seem to be intuitive based on the fact that in the aggregate, reliance on television for political information has increased at the same time that partisanship has decreased. However, whether the relationship is a causal one is not clear.

The studies which cite television as a cause of

declining partisanship focus on information dissemination as the causal link. The most direct statement of this causal relationship is by Ladd and Hadley (1978):

The emergence of the electronic communications media as the principle source of political information is yet another precipitant of independent electoral behavior. ... Party activists are displaced as the primary source of political information for the rank and file of the population (330).

[Parties] are less critically needed...by the contemporary electorate, as some of their old functions get taken over by new structures. Historically, parties have performed important linkage functions.... Increasingly today, the communications linkage is performed by the national media (330).

...the weakening of political parties in the U.S. would be ordained by the extension of a national communications complex. Television news, not party handouts or doorbell ringing by precinct committees, is the principle source of information on candidates for much of the population (379-380).

Finally, Pomper (1975) notes:

Party cues are particularly important in the absence of other sources of information. Thus, a second important change has been the development of alternative means of acquiring political intelligence. The mass media are major sources, providing essentially costless and reliable information independently of the parties and leading to a reduced impact of partisanship on voting (34).

Other studies which note this relationship are Ranney (1978), Mendelsohn and Crespi (1972) and O'Keefe (1975).

The hypothesis that the growth of the electronic media is a contributing cause of declining partisanship reflects the view among many social scientists that the mass media, particularly television, has a significant impact on political life and electoral behavior. This view represents a major shift from the previously held position that the media had little impact on voter choice and attitudes and that more relevant explanatory variables were partisanship, group membership, socioeconomic status and the nature of interpersonal communication within an individual's immediate environment. This latter view emphasized the long-term factors which affect electoral

choice and did not consider short-term variables such as the nature of current issues or short-term media stimuli. These conclusions grew out of research on electoral behavior conducted during the 1940s and 1950s. The first important work to advance this argument was The People's Choice (1944) by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia University.

The People's Choice was the first major study to use modern survey techniques to study the impact of election campaigns and the media and to attempt to determine why people vote the way they do. Based on panel surveys of voters in Erie County, Ohio, Lazarsfeld et. al. found that the primary determinant of voter choice was not a rational analysis of information about candidates and issues gained during the campaign, but rather long-standing ties to either the Democratic or Republican Party. Consistent with this finding was the finding that only 5% of the voters could be said to have been swayed by political information conveyed by the mass media during the campaign. The Lazarsfeld team found that approximately 50% of the voters who voted in November had made their decisions the previous May and that these decisions were not changed by the campaign. Another 25% of the voters made their final decision by late August---these also remained unchanged by information conveyed during the campaign. Finally, approximately 25% of the voters did make their choices

during the campaign, but these choices were not made on the basis of issues and candidates. Rather, choices were consistent with voter predispositions as indicated by religion, social class and place of residence.

Lazarsfeld and his colleagues also found that although the media was not unimportant, it did not have the effect of influencing voter choice. Instead, Lazarsfeld et. al. found evidence for what they termed selective exposure, i.e., voters only exposed themselves to that media which supported the voting decision which they had already made or which they were predisposed to make. Selective exposure therefore reduces the chances that a voter will make his voting choice on the basis of exposure to and analysis of a wide variety of media messages. Media effects are thus limited to reinforcement of preexisting attitudes and choices.

Another major conclusion of the Lazarsfeld study was that interpersonal communication was more significant in determining voter choice than was the mass media. In relation to this, the authors formulated what they called a "two-step flow of communication" whereby ideas "flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population" (151, emphasis Lazarsfeld's).

The findings of The People's Choice differ significantly from the hypothesis being tested in this

paper. That hypothesis asserts that voters will make their choices on the basis of information received rather than on the basis of party identification and group reference. It is hypothesized that television, by making information readily available to voters, has increased the likelihood of this kind of behavior at the expense of the parties.

In assessing the findings of The People's Choice, it's important to note that what Lazarsfeld and his colleagues did not know at the time, was that the election of 1940 was an acutely class-polarized election. There were deep, almost European style class issues in this campaign and this directly affected what the authors of The People's Choice found. With class issues of paramount importance, it is not surprising that the authors found that voters voted on the basis of long-standing ties to either the Democratic or Republican Party or that electoral decisions were made long before the actual election. Thus, the class nature of the election is crucially important contextually for understanding the 1940 election and for assessing what Lazarsfeld et. al. found. This is not to say that what the authors found was true only in 1940 but that perhaps the strength of long-standing ties to parties was not as great as it seemed nor as long-term as it seemed.

The findings of the second study by the Columbia group, Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954), supported the conclusions of The People's Choice. Voting

again found that electoral choice was highly stable and that little change took place during the campaign. The study found that most voters (2/3) had made their electoral choices by June; approximately 15% decided during August and 11% during October. Voters were also found to have made their choices largely on the basis of preexisting party affiliation and group membership. Media exposure was not found to be significantly related to electoral choice although it was related to interest, turnout and voter knowledge of candidate positions.

To again put the findings of Voting into its electoral context, the election of 1948 turned out to be one of the most volatile in American electoral history. Thus although the authors of Voting found that electoral choices were made long before the election and that these choices were made on the basis of preexisting party loyalties, the reality was that in the last weeks of the campaign, people changed their minds. This is why the pollsters' decision to suspend operations prior to the last weeks of the campaign proved to be so disastrous. The important point here is that in an era when much research points to enormous stability based on long-standing party ties within the electorate, there was in fact an extremely volatile election with voters changing their minds right up to the last day. Thus, the election of 1948 constitutes a counter example to the general model of voter stability anchored in

strong partisan identity which was so prevalent prior to the 1960s.

The major findings of the Columbia group on the determinants of electoral choice were supported by the studies of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The Michigan group found that partisan identification was the major factor influencing electoral choice, not issue or candidate preference. In The American Voter (1960), Angus Campbell and his colleagues found the American voter to be politically disinterested and uninformed. They described him as politically uninvolved; as not thinking about politics in ideological terms; as heavily committed to one of the major parties by ties based on habit and group reference rather than on policy preferences; as paying little attention to issues of public policy; and as basically satisfied with the American political system. This voter, characterized by Pomper (1975) as the "dependent voter," rarely analyzed issues or considered them in light of his own policy preferences. Indeed, he was rarely informed on them. In 1956, Campbell and his associates found that only approximately 1/3 of the voters had an informed opinion on policy issues relevant to the electorate.

Thus, the voter described in The American Voter relied on party identification and the cues of his social group when making electoral choices, not on issue or candidate

preferences. Campbell and his colleagues also found that attachment to parties was habitual, based on sentiment, group reference and the partisanship of one's parents. Party identification was not based on policy preferences.

Within this framework, the media did not play a significant role. Whatever impact the media might have was seen as being overridden by the long-term effects of partisan identification and group reference, particularly in relation to altering a voter's voting intention. Summarizing the literature on media effects up to 1969, Weiss (1969) observed:

When the effects of the media on the outcomes of political campaigns in an open society are limited to conversions of vote intentions from one party to another, the media seem relatively ineffective. Few people appear to be converted merely through exposure to formal political communications. The available evidence suggests that the preponderance of total media effects is contributed by the reinforcement or substantiation of vote decisions brought about by other factors, such as habitual patterns of voting or social and personal influences (176).

Some authors dissented from this prevailing view

however, largely because much of the research on which it was based was done before television was widespread. Pool observed as early as 1959 that "There is little doubt that the effect of television will be profound. To say something about the specific quality of its impact is a challenge to students of communication" (242). Also important was that the early research was not specifically designed to isolate media effects. At best, it treated the media as an intervening variable. As Swanson (1972) noted, the studies by the Columbia group were sociological studies which sought to "establish correlation between distinctive voting patterns and the sociological or attitudinal characteristics of voters" (36). In these studies, the media was seen as an intervening variable.

In sum, what emerged from the voter studies of the 1940s and 1950s was a picture of the voter who was not terribly interested in politics, who thought about them in very simple, non-ideological terms and who was basically uninformed about political matters. Perhaps most significant, the strength of his partisan attachment overrode all other considerations, including information gained from the media, in making an electoral choice. As one author noted:

It is abundantly clear that the voter of today does lack both high political interest and an urge to

participate in political discourse. The voting studies indicate that political discourse is limited, sparse and desultory. Indeed, most voters make up their minds, and act ultimately on that decision, even before the campaigns begin. Family background, cultural milieu, all of the inchoate pressures of "socioeconomic status" seem subtly to work on the voter in a process which is neither rational nor accompanied by high interest (Burdick, 1959, p. 139).

The New Image of the Voter

Reflecting the changing political environment, the view that the best predictors of electoral choice are party identification, socioeconomic status and group affiliation began to change significantly during the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning with V.O. Key (The Responsible Electorate, 1966), research suggested that voter choices are influenced by issue preferences, candidate evaluation and government performance. This view clearly contradicts the deterministic quality of the party identification, socioeconomic status and group affiliation argument and emphasizes the rational dimension of voter choice based on issue preferences.

The events of the 1960s and 1970s called for a reevaluation of the traditional image of the American

voter. What emerged was a portrait of a voter whose political motivations and voting choices were dependent on the nature of the existing political environment. Thus, the characteristics of the American voter came to be understood as time dependent; these characteristics could vary as the nature of political issues and circumstances varied (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976). Generally speaking, the image of the voter which emerged from the research of the 1940s and 1950s was not discredited; rather it came to be seen as accurate for that point in time but not necessarily accurate under all circumstances.

An important factor contributing to the reevaluation of the American voter was the decline of partisanship during the 1960s and 1970s. This decline has been well documented by survey research and deserves some attention here since the phenomenon is central to the hypothesis being tested in this thesis.

Beginning in approximately 1964, the decline of partisanship manifested itself in three important ways: (1) a decline in the number of citizens who considered themselves strongly attached to a political party; (2) an increase in the number of Independent identifiers; and (3) a drop in the use of party affiliation as a means of evaluating candidates and policies and as a guide to electoral choice (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976). This last point is true even among those voters who claim to be

affiliated with one of the major parties. Such changes are a major departure from the nature of party identification during the 1940s and 1950s. Some of the relevant data is presented in Figures 1.1-1.5 and Table 1.1 in Appendix A at the end of this thesis.

The decline in the number of strong partisan identifiers is traced in Figure 1.1. The graph clearly indicates that between 1964 and 1974 the number of strong party identifiers drops while the number of Independents increases. Figure 1.2 illustrates the same point in different form.

The data presented in Figure 1.3 is also indicative of the decline of partisanship. This data documents the decline of partisan affiliation as a guide to electoral choice. Among those voters who claim to be affiliated with a political party, the proportion voting for candidates of the opposite party increases between 1964 and 1974 at all three levels of government.

The increase in split-ticket voting is illustrated in the data presented in Figure 1.4. It is significant to note that this data represents split-ticket voting among party identifiers. Data on party identifiers who report not always voting for the candidate of their party is presented in Figure 1.5. The proportion of these voters has increased among party identifiers. Finally, the data in Table 1.1 brings the trend in party identification up to

1980.

One important point to make about the above data is that even among partisan identifiers, the strength of that identification has decreased. This is indicated by the growing proportion of identifiers who vote for candidates of the opposite party. Party identification has therefore become quite flexible, allowing the voter to vote for candidates of the other party based on issue preference and candidate assessment. This change is accompanied by a decline in the absolute number of identifiers and an increase in the number of Independents. Based on this evidence, one author asserted that "Party loyalties no longer explain electoral outcomes" (Pomper, 1975, p. 19) and "[Party] loyalty is increasingly flabby, as weak partisans now outnumber those who strongly assert their partisan identification" (Pomper, 1975, p. 20).

As partisanship declined, there was a concomitant increase in the importance of issues, particularly as a guide to electoral choice. Research indicates that the new voter demonstrates a concern with issues and a level of issue consistency and ideological thinking which did not characterize the voter of the 1950s (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976). The increase in the importance of issues and in issue voting is a significant factor separating the voter of the 1940s and 1950s from the new voter.

The decline of partisanship and the rise in issue

voting are clearly linked. One of the most important explanations of declining partisanship focuses on issues as the cause of that decline (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976). This explanation contends that the events and issues of the 1960s which formed the political consciousness of a new generation of voters, resulted in a political generation which has rejected traditional parties. Many of the issues of the sixties cut across partisan lines and/or simply were not addressed by parties since they did not coincide with the issues upon which the existing partisan alignment rested. Parties therefore offered no meaningful alternatives on issues which were salient to new voters. The result was movement away from parties among a new political generation. It is this group which has swelled the ranks of the Independents. The issues argument is advanced most notably by Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), Abramson (1976) and Pomper (1975) who notes that:

The more tenable explanation for this generation's evolving loyalties are the events it has endured. Rather than "growing up" and accepting the established parties, it has spurned the leaders who were unable to resolve an escalating war, to promote jobs and economic security, to quiet the discontent in the streets, or even to protect themselves from assassination. Limited

party loyalties are even more evident among the new voters of 1972, whose political memories are completely unclouded by earlier innocence.

Rather than inevitably adhering to the major parties, the two youngest cohorts have broken with past patterns, while responding to events of their public lives (23-24).

This is essentially a generational explanation for the decline in both the intensity and direction of party identification. Specifically, the argument states that the political experiences of a new generation of voters form their long-term views of the party system and the nature of their partisan identification. According to this view, the nature of this generation's attachments to parties will change relatively little as the generation ages---e.g., the aging process will have little impact on partisan loyalties. An essential part of this argument is that the aggregate decline of partisanship within the American electorate after 1964 is due to the low level of partisanship among this new generation; relatively little of the aggregate decline is due to declining partisanship among older generations. For this latter group, the particular set of circumstances which they experienced during their politically formative years will hold their partisanship relatively constant. Thus, aggregate change results from new entrants into the electorate, not from

change among older voters.

A conflicting argument is presented by Converse (1976) who argues that although much of the decline in partisanship after 1964 can be explained by the entrance of a new generation of voters into the electorate, this by no means explains all the decline. Instead, Converse argues that the same events which produced a decline in partisanship among young voters also caused older voters to move away from their partisanship. Thus, according to Converse, older voters contributed significantly to the overall decline in partisanship since 1964.

Another area of disagreement on the subject of the "new voter" of the 1960s and 1970s has to do with the contention that issue voting and attitudinal and ideological constraint also increased after 1964. Two important research pieces by Sullivan et. al. (1978) and Bishop et. al. (1978) question this conclusion and argue that the changes in issue voting and attitude constraint which have been detected in the American electorate since 1964 are the result of methodological artifacts, not real changes in the American voter. Both Bishop and Sullivan and their colleagues point out that in 1964, the SRC (which provided the data on which the "new voter" hypothesis was built) changed the wordings of the questions used to measure issue voting and attitude constraint and that it is these changes which account for the so-called "new voter"

not substantive change within the electorate on issue voting and attitude constraint. As Sullivan et. al. note: "Our argument is that levels of constraint probably did not change substantially during this period, but that reported changes were largely due to subtle changes in the survey instruments used to measure the concept" (234). They go on to observe that "[T]here were important changes in question wordings beginning with the 1964 survey which suspiciously coincide with the changes in correlations across issue areas" (237). Echoing Sullivan et. al.'s position, Bishop et. al. argue that "much of the change which has been uncovered during this period can be traced to methodological artifacts, specifically changes in question wording and format introduced by the SRC in 1964. The effects of these artifacts have some major implications for many current theories of electoral behavior" (250).

Based on these two articles, the validity of the hypotheses regarding the increase in attitude constraint and issue voting since 1964 are called into question. What's important to point out however is that Bishop and Sullivan and their colleagues are not arguing that there was no---or very little---issue voting and attitude constraint after 1964. Rather, they argue that there was more of it before 1964 which research was not able to pick up because research techniques at that point in time were not sophisticated enough. Thus, what they argue with is

the notion of change, not the notion that there was considerable issue voting and attitude constraint after 1964. As Bishop et. al. point out:

Had Campbell...and Converse...had access to survey data from 1956 and 1958 that used the "improved" 1964 items, they would probably not have been quite as strong in their statements that only a small percentage of the American electorate was ideological or issue-constrained. Their basic conclusion might not have changed, but it would have been tempered. In addition, they would probably have found that issue voting explained more of the variance in the vote than the 1956 items led them to believe; thus they might have rated it nearly as important as party identification and candidate images (266).

In spite of these various disagreements about the cause of the decline in partisanship and whether or not there have been real changes in certain attributes of the electorate since 1964, the fact that partisanship did decline after 1964 is not disputed. Also generally not disputed is that issue voting was indeed very common throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. It is therefore time

to turn to a discussion of how the media fits into the decline of partisanship and the prevalence of issue voting and whether it tends to accelerate these two phenomena.

The Voter and the Media

Instrumental to the voter of the 1960s and 1970s with his emphasis on issues and issue voting is information about political affairs. Only with information is the behavior described above possible. Interestingly, most of the literature cited above did not specifically incorporate a discussion of the relationship between the voter and the media, nor did it attempt to define what was cause and what was effect in the information-strength of partisanship relationship. Was television as a source of political information a partial cause of the decline of partisanship as suggested by the hypothesis being tested in this study? Has television enhanced issue voting or has the voter increased his consumption of television information in order to facilitate a style of independent electoral behavior which was already established? Although there is much speculation about these questions in the literature on voting behavior, research has not yet specifically addressed them.

At approximately the same time that the portrait of the voter of the 1960s and 1970s emerged, researchers more specifically interested in the media began to reassess the

question of the effects of the mass media on political life, both at the macro and micro levels. At the micro level, research sought to determine how the media might affect voter behavior, cognition and attitudes and conversely, how the attributes of the new voter affected his media use patterns. Much of this new interest in the media was a result of the fact that after 1960 television became an increasingly important source of political information for the general public (Roper, 1976). In addition, some researchers argued that television reached a broader socioeconomic audience than any other mass media and it provided information at little or no cost to the viewer. Television also began to increase its coverage of political events, both at the national and local levels. These aspects of television called for a reevaluation of the research on media effects conducted during the 1940s and 1950s when television was less pervasive.

The results of this research represented a major shift away from the dominant thinking about the impact of the mass media. Research found that the media, most notably television, did have a significant effect on the voter. Part of the reason for these new findings was that research abandoned the practice of focusing only on the media's effects on attitudes and began to include an examination of media's effects on knowledge acquisition and behavior. Emphasis also shifted away from a consideration of the role

of the media during election campaigns only toward a broader conceptualization of the media's role between elections in keeping the electorate informed, creating frames of reference and in setting the agenda of politics. This emphasis on inter-election communication had been suggested by Lazarsfeld as early as 1944 and by Lang and Lang in 1959. In commenting on why campaigns are not the best time to observe media effects, the Langs (1959) noted: "...examination of change within this short span [the campaign] fails altogether to account for the cumulative impact of media exposure which may, over a period of time, lead to such changes in the motivational patterns as differentiate one election from another or to a breaking away of many 'primary' groups from older allegiances" (221). Similarly, in relation to the long-term impact of the media as contrasted with short-term campaign stimuli, Pool (1959) noted that:

The voter is not a passive target of the messages of mass media. Rather he is a repository of countless bits of previous information. He retains within him a lifetime of earlier messages that have been structured into a series of pre-dispositions. The new message adds one more, but its net effect in changing the balance is infinitesimal compared to its effect as a trigger to

responses already determined by predispositions. At any one moment the voter's predisposition is likely to be a far better predictor of his response to a stimulus than the character of the stimulus (241).

Research thus began to consider the media from a broader perspective, recognizing the variety of ways in which media can have an impact. In Berelson's (1954) words, research became concerned with the "pervasive, subtle and durable effects" of the media (182). Or as Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970) noted, researchers recognized that "simply by being there, the electronic media have altered the customary routines of politics in this country that go considerably beyond the exertion of undue direct influence upon voters' choices; and, in doing so, those media have created a set of new and consequential issues which transcend the more mundane concerns such as the alleged direct effects that the mass media may induce upon the electorate" (255). This new focus yielded results which differed from the results of earlier research.

In the discussion of the literature on the media's impact on the American voter which follows, one general question needs to be addressed. This question has to do with the role of television in information acquisition and how television compares with information acquisition from

other media sources. The hypothesis being tested in this study implies that television has contributed to the informational levels of the general population and that television viewers have more information than non-viewers (both of the pre-television era and present day). However, we need to consider the variety of ways in which people acquire political information and to emphasize that television is only one of many media which provides information to voters. Thus, we need to examine how television fits into the total communication network surrounding an individual and to recognize it as only one part of that network. We also need to acknowledge that many non-viewers (either now or prior to television) may be better informed than viewers. Styles and sources of information acquisition may vary from group to group and person to person, with television perhaps having a more significant influence on some persons than on others. These questions cannot be answered definitively here. However, they are important to keep in mind in the discussion which follows because of their impact on the validity of the hypothesis. If television is in fact having little impact on the actual informational level of the electorate, then the relationship hypothesized by some political scientists between television and partisanship via information needs to be reconsidered. However, it may also be that the relationship holds for certain groups but

not for others. If this is so, determining how different groups are affected by television is important.

Under the rubric of this general question, three specific questions need to be addressed in the literature review. First is the simple question of whether voters actually acquire information through exposure to television? Does a person learn something if he listens to a news program or a political broadcast? What does the literature say about this?

Second, how does learning from television compare with learning from other media sources? Do people learn more or less from television when compared with other media, particularly the written media? Are there certain kinds of issues which are more easily learned through television than through other media?

Third is the question of different learning patterns and media use patterns among different social and economic groups. Do some groups get the bulk of their political information through television while others acquire it through the written media? Do different groups learn at different rates when exposed to the same media? How does media use and information retention vary from group to group?

A fourth question which is closely related to the above is the issue of the nature of television and of the television audience and how that audience differs from the

audience of other media. These are important variables in explaining differential media effects between the television and pre-television eras and between the written and spoken media. Television is said to be a unique medium which produces effects which are quite different from other media effects. What are the unique characteristics of television and what impact do they have? How do these characteristics create an audience which is different from the audience of the written media?

Closely related to these questions is the question of whether voters of the television era have more political information than voters of the pre-television era. Since there is no research dealing explicitly with this subject, answering this question requires that inferences be drawn from the research on the nature of television and of the television audience and from research on information acquisition from television and its role in electoral choice.

A fifth question which deals with the second aspect of the hypothesis addresses the issue of the relationship between the level of political information and strength of political party identification. The hypothesis assumes that sufficient independent political information will make the voter less dependent on party cues when making his electoral choices, thereby leading to a weakening of party identification. What does the literature say about this

question? Is there in fact a link between information level and strength of partisanship? Or, is the kind of information ---as opposed to simple quantity---more significant in its effect on partisanship?

Television and Information Acquisition

One of the most important studies of television's impact on politics was carried out in Britain (Blumler and McQuail, Television in Politics: Its Use and Influence, 1969). Blumler and McQuail surveyed voter responses to political television during the 1964 British general election. One of the important questions addressed by the study was why people watch political programs. In answering this question, the authors distinguished between politically motivated voters who purposefully watched political broadcasts and politically unmotivated voters who "happened" to see such broadcasts. Within the unmotivated group, Blumler and McQuail found that those voters who happened to see political broadcasts had more political information and were more interested in the campaign than the non-viewers within the unmotivated group. In relation to the motivated voters, the authors found that these people regarded political programs as a source of information about political issues and they used television programs as a means of keeping in touch with political events. This information seeking activity was found to be

the predominant motivation for watching televised political programs.

A major finding of the Blumler and McQuail study was that viewers acquire a significant amount of political information through exposure to television. There was a strong correlation between level of exposure and level of information, with low levels of exposure associated with limited knowledge gains and high exposure levels associated with greater information gain. Blumler and McQuail therefore concluded that people can and do learn from television. The authors also found that the motivation for watching political broadcasts was not a factor in information acquisition except at very high motivation levels. These findings were so strong that Blumler and McQuail concluded that one of the major long-term effects of television on politics is that television is instrumental in raising the level of knowledge about political affairs among the entire electorate. This conclusion was based on the notion that television informs a sector of the electorate which would be uninformed were it not for television. This confirmed the findings of an earlier study which analyzed the role of television in the 1959 general election in Britain (Trenaman and McQuail, 1961). In fact, the latter study found that knowledge gain was often the greatest among those voters who are least politically informed (171).

Relevant to the hypothesis being tested in this study is Blumler and McQuail's question about how many voters watch political broadcasts seeking reinforcement for predispositions or decisions already made and how many watch in order to decide how to vote. The authors found that vote guidance seekers were weakest in partisanship and more volatile in their voting than were the reinforcement seekers.

The Blumler and McQuail study addresses all four questions raised above. First, the study found very conclusively that exposure to political television resulted in information acquisition among all sectors of the electorate irrespective of educational level or motivation for watching. Much of this information gain took place among groups who "happened" to see a broadcast because the television was on or because it was perceived as having entertainment value. Second, Blumler and McQuail found a relationship between partisanship and motivation for watching political television. The group Blumler and McQuail termed vote guidance seekers was the weakest in partisanship and the most likely to watch political broadcasts. Here, the direction of causality appears to be the reverse of that proposed in the hypothesis under consideration in this study: the Blumler and McQuail finding implies that weak partisanship causes voters to seek information from television in order to make their

electoral choices.

Finally, the Blumler and McQuail findings indicate that the nature of television and of the television audience have had the effect of facilitating information gain among sectors of the population who are politically unmotivated and who would normally have been uninformed in the pre-television era. These people receive political information because the television is on when a political broadcast comes on---they therefore inadvertently expose themselves to political information. Similarly, many voters who are normally heavy television viewers for entertainment reasons do not give up television during election campaigns. They therefore expose themselves to political information, much of which they absorb.

In assessing the applicability of the British findings to the American setting, several important differences between the British and American electoral and communications systems are relevant. First, British campaigns are very short compared to American campaigns. Because the British election campaign is short, voters may be more attentive to televised election information than is true in the American case where the length of campaigns and the flood of information may cause voters to tune out. Greater attentiveness may promote a higher level of learning. Second is the fact that in Britain, party election broadcasts are carried on all available channels,

thereby making it impossible for the viewer to change programs. This fact makes it much more likely that viewers will be exposed to political information---whether purposely or inadvertently---and that they will subsequently absorb some political information. In contrast, in the American system it's always possible to find a station with non-political programming. This could decrease learning since voters are less likely to be forced to listen to a political broadcast. Also important is the format of British political programs which tend to be much longer and analytical than their American counterparts. British television offers "current affairs programs" which provide analysis and discussion which is much more detailed than election spots on the nightly news or political advertisements. This kind of detailed programming may increase learning. In contrast, although there are many election specials, the American system tends to rely more heavily on short news spots and advertisements (See Blumler, 1975, pp. 132-136 for a discussion of the characteristics of British political television). Finally is the different nature of viewer political attitudes and predispositions which lead to different attitudes toward political information. Without going into a lengthy discussion of the characteristics of the British and American electorates, it's fair to say that the British electorate is generally more partisan (particularly in 1964

when the Blumler and McQuail study was carried out) than the American electorate and that it votes in much higher numbers. This greater political "interest" on the part of the British electorate may result in greater learning from television than one would find in the American context.

In spite of these various caveats, the Blumler and McQuail finding that exposure to television information results in learning is applicable to the American setting and it is consistent with research done in the U.S. The proposition that exposure to the media---any media---results in information acquisition has been confirmed numerous times and seems to be generally accepted in the literature on media effects. In this respect, television appears to be no exception. As early as 1954, Berelson et. al. found that those persons with the greatest media exposure (in this case newspapers) were most likely to know candidate positions on issues. In 1963, Pool noted that the "Power of the media to persuade...is very much less than is usually assumed, but their power to inform is enormous" (136). More recently, Robinson (1972) found a strong relationship between high media exposure and knowledge of political affairs. This relationship held up even among groups with low educational levels and is in fact stronger for people with little education. McClure and Patterson (1974) found that political advertising on television was effective in promoting knowledge of

political issues. Clarke and Kline (1974), Fitzsimmons and Osburn (1968) and Prisuta (1973) also found a strong relationship between knowledge gains and exposure to political information.

Other research on knowledge gain focused only on exposure to televised political advertisements. Atkin and Heald (1976) found that exposure to political advertisements directly increased levels of political knowledge and that the impact was greatest for those voters with low levels of exposure to television news and newspapers.

One view which dissents somewhat from the above is The Unseeing Eye (1976) by Patterson and McClure. The authors contend that voters cannot learn about issues from television news because the format of the news is not conducive to learning and because the news does not provide information on issues. They contend that political advertisements are much more effective in conveying information on issues.

The distinction between news and political advertisements raises another important issue in the television and information acquisition relationship. That issue has to do with differential amounts of information acquisition depending on the form and content of the message. Are different formats more likely to convey more information? Do some persons learn more from some formats

than others? Do different groups of people acquire information at different rates depending on how information is presented? This issue is important because television can take many forms with each form having a potentially different impact.

In sum, research supports the proposition that exposure to television leads to knowledge gain about political matters among all sectors of the electorate. Much television learning is incidental or inadvertent and is simply a result of having the television on or of viewing news and political broadcasts for their entertainment value rather than for the express purpose of gathering information. This inadvertent quality of television viewing helps account for the fact that information gain takes place among all sectors of the electorate, regardless of education or interest in politics.

Learning From Television vs. Learning From Other Communication Sources

The above discussion indicates that people do learn through exposure to television information. However, the fact that people learn from television does not address the issues of the quality of what they learn or of the amount of information which they actually acquire from television. Nor does this resolve the issue of whether, in the

aggregate, the electorate is better informed now than it was in the pre-television era. Similarly, it does not resolve the question of how much information people acquire from other sources and how television relates to other media within an individual's communication network. It may be that certain groups do indeed have information which they would not have without television, but it's not clear that one of television's major impacts is a better informed citizenry. It may actually be that the quality of television information and its format inhibits information retention and that people who rely on television are less well informed than people who rely on other media sources.

The finding that people do learn from television also does not address the issue of the variety of ways, including other types of media, in which people acquire political information. To be without television is not to be without information. Interpersonal communication and the print media may remain major sources of information among most groups with television interacting with these sources, perhaps reinforcing them. As McClure and Patterson (1974) noted: "[T]elevision shares its influence with other mass communications channels, and all the mass media share their influence with the voter's family, friends, and co-workers. Most voters...are nestled in a network of communications; disentangling the influence of one source, when the same information could have been

obtained from any of several sources, presents a difficult problem" (21). Thus, to assume---as does the hypothesis being tested in this study---that people who have access to television information are better informed than people who do not have access to that information via television may be an erroneous assumption. We therefore need to know something about what other media sources people use and what they learn from those sources.

The question of what people learn from television news and how it compares to what they learn from other news sources is taken up by Patterson in The Mass Media Election (1980). In considering the question of television's impact on information acquisition among the general public compared to the impact of other media, Patterson argues that the print media actually has a larger regular news audience than does the evening news. He finds that a larger percentage of people regularly read a daily newspaper than watch the evening news and that only among persons who tend to be low news users is television used more heavily than newspapers. He also finds that people who regularly read newspapers are more likely to watch the evening news. He states that: "Roughly half of all regular readers watched the evening news consistently; only a fifth of non-regular readers did so. As a result of this overlap in the two audiences, television viewing alone does not greatly expand the proportion of the population that

follows at least one news medium regularly. Television enlarges the attentive public by roughly one fourth of what it is when newspaper readership alone is considered" (60). Another important finding is that people who are most attentive to the news cited the newspaper as the major source of their news. In contrast, people who were least attentive to the news, relied most heavily on television for what little news they got (60). Thus, Patterson finds the claims that television has had a major impact on the information level of the general public highly exaggerated. His findings point to newspapers as a more significant source of information for most people.

This finding is further supported by research done by Clarke and Fredin (1978) who find a "limited contribution of television coverage to public information" (148). They go on to conclude that "Neither TV news viewing nor message discrimination in any television programming correlates significantly with knowing about senatorial contenders. Newspapers contrast by showing large correlations for both number of papers read and amount of message discrimination" (148).

An issue closely related to where people get their news is how much they actually retain of what they've heard and/or read. People may expose themselves to a great deal of news, but how much they actually remember is a different question. This issue is also addressed by Patterson in The

Mass Media Election.

Patterson finds that a major issue in how much information people retain is the medium they use to gather information. Here, the print media outdistances television and Patterson attributes this finding to the nature of the two different media. Patterson argues that newspaper readers have considerably more control over their information intake: they can read as slowly or as quickly as need be in order to digest the information and they can skip what does not interest them. Newspaper information is also more detailed than the typical television story, thereby leaving a greater impression on the reader. Patterson also makes the point that television is a highly visual medium and that viewers tend to pay more attention to the pictures than to the words, thereby retaining little actual information. This contrasts with the newspaper where people are attentive to the actual information. Finally, Patterson makes the point that reading the newspaper is a primary activity which requires most of the reader's attention. Because he gives it his attention, he retains a significant amount of what he reads. In contrast, television is a low involvement media which people often attend to while they are involved in other activities. This lack of attention makes for low information retention. Interestingly it is precisely this inadvertent quality of television which many scholars have

argued make it possible for more people to have more information.

The finding that people retain more information from the press than from television news was attributed by Patterson and others in past research to the format of the news. In a research piece done in 1972 comparing the impact of television with the print media and with televised political advertisements, Patterson and McClure found that television news consistently had the least impact on the audience. In their words: "...exposure to network news invariably has had the least effect on the audience. And in every one of these instances, the format of the television news program has emerged as the root cause of the failure. Rather than providing in-depth reports, television news gives limited coverage to a large number of stories. This format makes television news little more than a headline service and guarantees that the content of television news will be severely restricted" (25).

These research findings were echoed in other research pieces, most notably McClure and Patterson's major work The Unseeing Eye (1976). One of their most significant findings dealt with the differential impact on learning of television news vs. televised political advertisements. Political advertisements were found to be more effective conveyors of information on political issues than was the

evening news.

One major point which must be made about television however is that it is highly successful at conveying large amounts of information to a broad spectrum of people on certain types of issues. McClure and Patterson (1976) found that television news has an impact when the news story has interesting and directly relevant visual presentations. Television is also successful at conveying information when regular entertainment programming is interrupted to report a story in significant detail. McClure and Patterson cite Richard Nixon's trip to China as a story which satisfied both these criteria.

In summing up this section, it is important to emphasize the analytical distinction between the question of whether people learn from television and the question of how much and what they learn. These questions are important to this study because the answers may mean that there are no significant informational differences between voters with and without access to political television. Research has answered the first question affirmatively and yet the questions of "how much" and "what" remain problematical, particularly when one is interested in how much people learn from television vs. from other news sources and where, proportionately, they get the bulk of their political information. The answer to this might vary among groups---this issue was touched on above and will be

the topic of the next section.

Differential Learning Among Social Groups: The Gap Theory

An important issue in the area of learning deals with the differential rate at which different groups actually acquire information from the available media. A significant body of literature propounds a knowledge gap theory which states that as the flow of information within a community increases, persons of high socioeconomic status acquire information more rapidly than people of low socioeconomic status, thereby producing a widening information gap between these two groups. This theory states simply that: As the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease. (Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, 1970, pp. 159-160).

The gap theory deals largely with information acquisition from the print media and does not specifically consider television. This raises the question of whether television information also contributes to the knowledge gap or if it is a "mass leveler" in Tichenor et. al.'s words. In assessing this question, one would have to consider issues such as the low cost of television

information, low involvement learning and the inadvertent audience. This would be contrasted with evidence which indicates that people of high socioeconomic status attend more carefully to all information than people of low socioeconomic status and that they retain more of what they expose themselves to.

The question of whether television is a "mass leveler" and whether the knowledge gap exists in relation to learning from television was addressed specifically by Neuman in 1976. Neuman attempted to determine whether level of education, motivation for watching the news and general patterns of news consumption affected the amount of information which viewers could recall from a television news program. Surprisingly, he found very little difference in the rates of recall among viewers categorized according to education, motivation for watching and general patterns of news consumption. As he concludes: "The combined effects of education and motivation explain only two percent of the variance in recall. The extent of discussion of news and general broadcast news consumption habits appear to be completely unrelated to recall" (119). These conclusions are confirmed even when news stories are categorized according to level of abstraction. Based on these findings, Neuman concludes that "television may play a potentially substantial role as a knowledge leveler because many people not reached by newspapers and magazines

are exposed to television news" (122). He also states that the results of his study "reveal very little in the way of differential impact and tend to support the knowledge-leveler model" (122).

In another reconsideration of the gap theory, Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1975) hypothesized that under certain conditions, the gap theory would not hold up and that people of both high and low socioeconomic status within a community would acquire information at a similar rate. In these circumstances, the knowledge gap would shrink considerably. The kinds of situations described by Donohue and his colleagues are as follows:

Donohue et. al. found that issues which were of basic concern to the whole community, were local in nature and which generated a fair amount of social conflict tended to be issues on which a significant knowledge gap did not develop. These types of issues "may have positive functions for arousal and maintenance of citizen participation," thereby promoting similar rates of learning among all groups (6).

Another variable cited by Donohue et. al. was whether a community was pluralistic or traditional in nature. The authors speculate that in a more pluralistic community, "the greater the possibilities for widening the knowledge gaps between different social strata within that community" (8). The reason given for this is that there are more

sources of information within a pluralistic community, thereby requiring "more selective patterns of self-exposure among its members" (8). Thus, high status groups would expose themselves to more media than low status groups, thereby acquiring more information. This contrasts to a small rural community where the media is highly unspecialized and where there is more reliance on informal communication networks. In this situation, there is a greater likelihood that the whole town will talk about issues of basic concern to them, thereby reducing the knowledge gap.

Finally is the issue of the degree of redundancy in the media message. The more a theme is repeated, the more likely it is that the less active members of the community will eventually acquire the message. This would result in more equal information acquisition across status levels.

The issue of different patterns of media use and different rates of learning across socioeconomic groups is an important one in understanding television's effects. It may be that television affects different groups in very different ways. This question about different socioeconomic groups underlies the next section which deals with the nature of television and the television audience.

The Nature of Television and of the Television Audience

According to the literature, part of the impact of

television is due to its unique nature and to the nature of the audience it reaches. Most research agrees that television reaches a larger and more varied audience than any other mass medium and that it has the ability to convey information even to those individuals who would normally not seek it.

The size of the television news audience is considerable---it is estimated that 41 million people watch the news each evening (Wamsley and Pride, 1972, p. 436). In 1967, Roper found that television had replaced newspapers as the most frequently cited source of political information. Roper also found that 33% of the public relies exclusively on television for all its news. In addition, 65% of the public find television the most effective way to become acquainted with candidates for national office and 54% feel that television gives them the best understanding of candidates and issues during national elections (Roper, 1976).

In addition to size, the television audience is unique among media audiences. It is an extremely heterogeneous audience, representing a cross-section of the total population on all demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. In this sense, it is somewhat different from the audience of the written media which, although also heterogeneous, is more upwardly skewed than the television audience. Because of television's entertainment value and because many people

simply have a television on, information conveyed by television reaches people who would normally be uninformed. These people do not have the motivation or the interest to actively seek out news from other media. Wamsley and Pride (1972) characterize this as the "unavoidable nature" of television, noting that if the television is on, it is difficult to be selective about what one hears. It is therefore "much more difficult for the viewer to avoid being confronted with and absorbing some information from television news" (438). Another author stated:

What is crucial is that television news reaches both those who generally monitor politics and those who would have virtually no news were it not for television. Television reaches that large stratum of society which will watch the news but not read it. Television touches those millions who will sit through the news because of what follows or what comes before, but who would rarely expend the energy to read through printed information. Consequently, television produces two audiences---the advertent (those who watch for the news) and the inadvertent audience (those who fall into the news)> As such, the overall television audience is unique in two respects: (1) It is the only audience for news in which socio-

economic status and degree of exposure are negatively correlated. Those who are less well educated etc. are not only more likely to rely on television news, they are also more likely to watch television news. In fact, those low in socioeconomic status watch more television news in absolute terms than those of higher status (Robinson, 1976, p. 426).

It should be noted here however that viewing television for political information is not a characteristic of those only of low socioeconomic status. Research has found that Independent party identifiers and ticket-splitters, many of whom have relatively high levels of education (Pomper, 1975; DeVries and Tarrance, 1972; and Glenn 1972), also use television as a source of political information. This is not to say that these voters do not also rely on other non-television media sources; it does however point out that television reaches all groups and that the important difference between people is whether they supplement television information with information from other sources.

A third dimension of television information which has made it possible for more people to acquire more information is its extremely low cost. Cost is particularly low for the inadvertent viewer. Relevant here are

Downs (1957) concepts of the cost of acquiring political information and of free political information. According to Downs, rational voters seek to minimize the cost of acquiring political information. Voters would therefore seek to acquire a maximum amount of free information, i.e., "that information which is given to a citizen without any transferrable cost. The only cost he must bear consists of the time he spends absorbing and utilizing it" (Downs, p. 222).

The low cost of television information is a result of the character of the audience and its viewing patterns as noted above. It is also a result of the fact that the selection and evaluation process is largely performed by the news givers, not the receivers. These are two important functions cited by Downs which have significant costs associated with them. Both of these costs have been significantly reduced by television news. Also important is the free information picked up from spot advertisements for candidates broadcast during entertainment programs.

Two other dimensions of television which increase its impact are the trust and credibility accorded it and its visual nature. Research has found that considerably more trust is accorded to television news than to any other news source (Wamsley and Pride, 1972; Jacobson, 1969; Roper, 1971). Part of this credibility is a result of television's visual quality which "simulates reality better

than strictly verbal or written media" (Jacobson, 1969, p. 27). People also apparently feel that video cannot lie.

In sum, television reaches a larger and more varied audience than any other mass media. Television news reaches that segment of the population which is generally motivated to follow the news on a variety of media and, as Robinson (1976) notes, it "reaches that large stratum of society which will watch the news but not read it" (426). It is this stratum which "would have virtually no news were it not for television" (Robinson, 1976, p. 426, emphasis Robinson's). This makes television unique. Also, because people simply have a television on, much of the information absorbed by viewers is inadvertent and bears no direct costs to the viewer. Research has found that regardless of motivation for watching or educational level of the viewer, knowledge acquisition takes place. Thus, researchers have inferred that television informs that sector of the electorate which was uninformed in the pre-television age.

The Pre-Television vs. the Television Era

A major inference found in the literature on television and information acquisition is that television provides information to that segment of the population which was largely uninformed in the pre-television era. This inference is based on the notion of the "inadvertent" audience which is unmotivated to spend resources to acquire

political information. However, they do acquire information from television because the television happens to be on and because television information is practically costless. Some researchers go even further and infer that all segments of the electorate have more information now than in the pre-television age. This is again based on the notions of the inadvertent audience and the costless nature of television information which supplements the information received by this group from other media sources. Unfortunately, these hypotheses have no specific supporting evidence.

The findings of the Blumler and McQuail study support these inferences. As noted above, Blumler and McQuail found that the inadvertent nature of the politically unmotivated television audience was the major factor in information acquisition among this group. Because the television was on, this group acquired information which it would not have had in the pre-television era. Blumler and McQuail also concluded that the major impact of television on the 1964 election campaign was to increase the level of knowledge about politics among the entire electorate.

In other pieces of research, the notion that voters in general and unmotivated voters in particular have more information now than in the pre-television era provides a major working assumption. This assumption is intuitive based on the easy access of information from the spoken

media and its low cost. This is true of Converse's article, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes" (1962). Converse argues that during the pre-television era, the "proportion [of voters exposed to no media] must have been very much larger, given what we know of changes in conditions of information flow in the past century" (591). He goes on to say that "the development of the spoken media has provided channels of information accessible even to those not motivated to read. The cumulative change has been of awesome proportion.

...[C]onditions of information propagation have shifted in ways that affect a vast majority of the population" (591). Converse also cites the fact that in the era of the spoken media, 20-30% of the population has read nothing in the printed media about the presidential campaign and has received its only current information from the spoken media. He then notes: "If we can imagine that prior to 1920 such a residuum simply went without information, then the ranks of our 'no media' people would be increased by a factor of three, and the proportion of 'no media' voters by a factor of six" (592). Converse concludes:

We began by remarking upon the extremely low levels of political information in the current period. Now we adduce evidence in some depth that the effective reach of the communication

system has advanced enormously, and that the citizen himself recognizes a greater information intake than he would have had short of the newer media. Naturally, this juxtaposition of findings underscores among other things a fundamental motivation problem. At one time it might have been argued that electorates were uninformed for lack of realistic access to information. Now a fair flow of information is accessible to almost everybody in the society; the fact that little attention is paid to it even though it is almost hard to avoid is a fair measure of lack of public interest. But all these facts do no more than stir our curiosity: if levels of public information are extremely low now, when access to rudimentary information is not a primary problem, what must this level have been a century ago? (592-593).

Accepting Converse's logic, Robinson (1976) also uses the notion of the inadvertent audience as a major working assumption for his theory of "videomalaise." This is well illustrated by the quote from Robinson's article cited earlier in this study. In the concluding section of his paper, Robinson states:

In summary, television journalism disseminates news and information far more widely than does any other news source, bringing political information to people in the society who might never have bothered to obtain this information before television arrived and who might still not bother, were it not for TV news (430).

The argument that television provides information to a previously uninformed segment of the population is quite convincing. This alone constitutes a significant difference between the television and pre-television eras. However, what is much more difficult to assess is how television has affected the information level of those people who attend to other media, particularly the newspaper, both now and in the pre-television era. Does television provide information additional to that acquired from other sources? Does it reinforce and highlight previously acquired information, thereby contributing to learning? Or is television's impact so small that those people who read a newspaper and engage in inter-personal communication on politics have approximately the same amount of information now as in the pre-television era? Or, has television actually decreased the information level of the electorate by substituting television for newspapers, yet being a less effective conveyor of

information? These are important questions and they have a direct bearing on the hypothesis being tested in this study.

The Relationship Between Information and Political Party Identification

Before moving on to a discussion of the relationship between information and partisanship, it is useful to restate the portion of the hypothesis being discussed in this section. The hypothesis is that in low information situations the voting decision is heavily influenced by partisan identification; with no other information, voters use partisan identification as a basis for a decision. In high information situations, partisan identification is less heavily used by the voter because he has other bases upon which to make a decision. From this, it follows that since television has produced higher information situations than exist without it, people in such situations are now less dependent on partisanship when making a voting decision. This factor is often said to have caused a decline in partisanship. As stated by Pomper (1975): "The mass media are major sources [of political intelligence], providing essentially costless and reliable information independently of the parties, and leading to a reduced impact of partisanship on voting" (34).

Pomper postulates that the media is a cause of

declining partisanship. However, the direction of causality in the information-partisanship relationship does not appear to be agreed upon by all researchers. Some researchers hypothesize that easy access to low cost, non-partisan political information makes the voter independent of the party when making electoral choices, thereby weakening his partisanship. Other researchers hypothesize that the decline of partisanship is a cause of increased television use by voters since they need a basis upon which to make electoral decisions. In spite of this disagreement however, research generally agrees that there is a relationship between information level and strength of partisanship.

Before moving on, it is important to clarify two important issues. First is how the notion of partisanship is used in this study. In one respect, we are concerned with partisanship as simple identification with a political party. In this sense, partisanship is dichotomous: a person either does or does not identify with a political party. The second notion of partisanship refers to the strength of commitment among party identifiers and is therefore a continuous variable. As we saw in the data presented earlier in this chapter, partisanship has decreased in both senses: the absolute number of partisans has declined as has the strength of partisanship among those who still identify. Among a large portion of the

latter group, party identification is sufficiently weak so that it no longer provides a definitive guide to electoral choice. In relation to the hypothesis being tested in this study, it is hypothesized that television affects partisanship in both ways: it leads more voters to identify themselves as Independents by making Independent identification a viable option and it leads more voters to defect from their party when making electoral choices because other sources of electoral guidance are available.

The second point is that in this section we will be talking mostly about how information affects the voting decision, not how it affects long-term partisanship. However, many political scientists appear to assume that changes in the way in which the voting decision is made and the way in which partisanship is brought to bear on that decision have implications for long-term partisanship. If the impact of partisanship on the voting decision declines, does it follow that partisan identification in the long-term sense also declines? Or is the relationship reversed with the declining role of partisanship in the voting decision simply indicative of declining partisanship? These questions cannot be answered here, but it is important to keep the distinction in mind.

The literature on the relationship between information and partisanship has emphasized that in the absence of other sources of political information, partisan attitudes

and behavior tend to be stable because voters are dependent on party cues when making electoral choices and because no new or conflicting information disturbs preexisting partisan identity. Referring to partisan identifiers, Converse (1962) noted that "Other things being equal, both the individual rates of defection from party and the amplitude of the vote oscillations will be limited if the flow of information is weak" (586). Similarly, "If there is no new information input at all, there will be no defection and no oscillation: the vote will be a pure party vote" (586). In a more recent discussion of the decline of partisanship, Pomper (1975) notes that "Party cues are particularly important in the absence of other sources of information. Thus, an...important change has been the development of alternative means of acquiring political intelligence. The mass media are major sources, providing essentially costless and reliable information independent of the parties, and leading to a reduced impact of partisanship on voting" (34). In these two statements, both Converse and Pomper hypothesize that the direction of causality runs from information level to strength of partisanship. It should be emphasized that there is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis.

Converse (1962) also found that among partisan identifiers the relationship between information and partisan stability (as indicated by electoral choice) varied

depending on level of political involvement. Those voters of low political involvement tended to have the most volatile partisanship [in terms of electoral choices] "provided that any new information reaches them at all" (587, emphasis Converse's). However, they frequently received no new political information, in which case their partisanship (as indicated by electoral choice) was stable. In contrast, the high levels of information received by voters of high political involvement tended to reinforce partisanship---hence this group also had stable partisanship. Since Converse's study used data collected before television became widespread (1952), these relationships may not hold up for the television era. One test of the hypothesis indicates that this is in fact the case.

Dreyer (1971-72) tested Converse's hypothesis using more data points and more recent data (1952-1968). His findings are consistent with the findings of research on the relationship between exposure to political television and knowledge gain. He found that because of the pervasiveness of television, the short-term flow of political information during a campaign penetrated all segments of society and that the effect of this was to erode partisanship and its stabilizing influence. Dreyer concluded that the extensive penetration of television results in a weakening of the party identification-party

vote relationship across the entire electorate, not just among the politically uninvolved as Converse hypothesized. Here, Dreyer appears to be indicating that the direction of causality is from the level and/or character of information to declining partisanship.

In a study of ticket-splitters, DeVries and Tarrance (1972) note that "Because information about issues and candidates is of primary importance to the ticket-splitter, he relies heavily on the media" (75). The authors found that ticket-splitters rely most heavily on television, particularly television news, documentaries and specials for their information. Here, the authors seem to be implying that absence of strong party identification leads a voter to pay more attention to the media, particularly television. Later however, they note that "Heavier and more diversified media use for information on politics will continue to diminish the role of parties and other variables traditionally associated with the explanation of voting behavior" (117). Here, the direction of causality appears to be reversed.

Other studies which note the relationship between information dissemination by television and declining partisanship are Mendelsohn and Crespi (1972), Ranney (1978), Ladd and Hadley (1978), O'Keefe (1975) and Pomper (1975).

One interesting approach to examining the effect of

information on partisan identification is to examine partisanship from a functional perspective. What functions are performed by party identification and what purpose does it serve for the individual? Can these functions be performed by other structures and if they can, what will be the impact on partisanship? If television is now performing some of the functions of traditional partisanship, then television's impact is important.

One major function performed by parties is the provision of an informational shortcut to the voting decision. Since voters have neither the time nor the resources to research all the issues involved in a particular election, they rely on party identification to help them make a voting choice which is generally consistent with their own beliefs and political preferences. This was best stated by Niemi and Weisberg (1976): "If the theory [of the 1950s and early 1960s] emphasized candidates and party identification more than issues, it is partly because partisanship could serve as a surrogate for issues. Presumably, people identify with a party with which they generally agree. ... As a result, they need not concern themselves with every issue that comes along, but can generally rely on their party identification to guide them. Party identification becomes a shortcut for deciding how to vote without investing the time at each election to research issue differences between

the parties. Yet it gives voters some assurance that they are voting for the party they would agree with anyway" (165). Thus, one function performed by party identification is to provide a low cost method of maximizing political values in the voting decision. The party identification approach to voting is low cost because the voter need not expend valuable resources acquiring relevant political information from other sources.

The functional notion of party identification provides the basis for an examination by Shively (1979) of the question why people identify with a political party at all. Shively examines the proposition that one reason why people identify with political parties is because of "the party's function of providing cues to voters who feel themselves in need of guidance because they must make political decisions under confusing circumstances" (1040). In examining this proposition, Shively notes that the following variables are relevant: (1) the cost of information pertinent to the voting decision; (2) resources available to the voter to pay those costs; and (3) the availability of other, more efficient, decisional shortcuts (1040-1041). In expanding on these points, Shively observes that if information relevant to the voting decision is expensive, "voters will seek efficient shortcuts to a decision such as party identification" (1041). In relation to the notion of "expense," Shively goes on to say: (1) "The explosion of

news coverage in the last few decades has surely made information cheaper;" (2) "The more expensive political information is, the more the decisional function will produce a guide such as party identification;" and (3) "The lower the resources available to individuals to pay those costs, the more the decisional function will tend to produce such a guide" (1041).

Shively's conception of why people develop a partisan identification is consistent with Downs' (1956) notion of a voter's need to minimize the cost associated with acquiring information necessary for the voting decision. The voter therefore seeks to maximize the amount of free information which he can obtain. Party identification is one way to do this.

In line with the points made by Downs and Shively, we can make some hypotheses about the relationship between television information and the decline of partisanship. First, is that the simple presence of television information means that the flow of information has increased and that there is more information available to the voters than there was before television was widespread. Presumably, an increase in the flow of information increases access to, and therefore acquisition of, information. This assumes however that other media forms remain constant and are not replaced by television. Second, and more important, is the low cost nature of

television information. This was discussed extensively above and need not be repeated here. However, if it is true that voters can acquire information about their voting decision at extremely low cost without political parties, then one of the main functions of political parties is removed: "cheap" information via television decreases the likelihood that the need to make a voting decision will produce "efficient shortcuts to a decision such as party identification" (Shively, p. 1041).

Based on this perspective, we could hypothesize that because one of their important functions has been taken over by other structures, political parties are needed less by the voting public. This decline of function may contribute to the decline of partisanship in the long-term sense. This hypothesis requires that we accept the assumption that there is a relationship between the way in which the voting decision is made and the long term stability of partisanship at the individual level.

Voting in High and Low Information Situations

In a similar vein, other research dealing with the relationship between information and partisanship indicates that party cues are most important in electoral choices when information is low. As Wright (1974) stated: "Party is a useful guide to electoral choice when the voter has little information about the candidates. When one has more

information, decision guides like party labels and party identification are likely to be less heavily relied on as a basis for voting" (122). Similarly, other research has found that in elections where the information flow is relatively weak, such as Congressional elections, party tends to be more important as a guide to voting than it is in presidential elections where information flow is strong (Freedman, 1974). In both cases, causality runs from level of information to intensity of partisan stability as indicted by electoral choice.

One of the most important pieces of research dealing with the relationship between the amount of information available to the voter and his voting decision is "Information and the Party Vote" by Hinckley et. al. (1974). This research attempts to assess the impact of several variables known to affect the vote under both high and low information situations. Hinckley et. al. note that: "[Other] findings suggest that information may vary from office to office and that this variation in information may produce very different kinds of voting behavior: specifically, differences in the relative importance of various attitudes to the vote. Our position is that the visibility of the office (or candidates for the office) will affect the information the voter is likely to have in hand, and this, in turn, will affect the way he makes his decision" (132). Hinckley et. al. go on to say

that: "In high information situations, we expect issues to be relatively more important in voting decisions; in low information situations, we look for the cues of party and incumbency to be of relatively greater consequence" (134).

To test the hypothesis, Hinckley et. al. examined the amount of information which voters had about presidential, gubernatorial and senatorial candidates. They found that voters had the most information about presidential candidates, followed by gubernatorial candidates and senatorial candidates. They then went on to determine the relationship of "low-information" cues (party and incumbency) and "high-information" cues (issues) to the vote in each of the three election categories. The results confirmed their hypothesis: party and incumbency were more important determinants of the vote in sub-presidential votes than in presidential elections where issues were more important.

Another important dimension of Hinckley et. al.'s analysis is their examination of the interaction between information and party identification in determining the vote. Their conclusion is as follows: "Party identification...does not play a simple role in voting choice. Its importance appears to have a curvilinear relationship to the amount of information available. When there is enough information available for there to be both positive and negative affective forces toward candidates

(as for president), an arbiter is needed. Party identification is important here because it plays a balancing role between positive and negative attitudes. When a moderate amount of information is available, and it points in the same direction (as tends to be the case for governor), no arbiter is needed, and party identification effects are reduced. When very little other political information is available (as for senator), party identification becomes a little more important again, but this time to provide a partisan context for whatever the voter does bring to bear on his choice" (145).

The research by Hinckley et al. demonstrates a clear relationship between the amount of information which a voter has and the factors (issues, parties or incumbency) which are important in the voting decision. In high information situations, issues are more important than in low information situations where party and incumbency take precedence. Hinckley and her colleagues also demonstrated a relationship between information and the way in which party identification was brought to bear on the voting decision. These conclusions are important to the questions being considered in this chapter because they indicate that information level is a significant variable in the voting decision. However, it still does not answer the more basic question of how changes in the way in which the voting decision is made (e.g., voters have more information "now"

than before, so the decision process is different) affect long-term party identification. We can say however that partisanship is not so strong as to have a monolithic influence and that it can easily be overridden by other factors---in that sense, it is weaker.

In examining the effect of information on partisanship, another somewhat indirect approach is to look at some of the other factors which have been said to affect the voting decision and partisanship and then to determine how information might affect those variables. The basic question is what causes a voter to defect from his party identification when making his electoral choice and how does information relate to those causes?

Two major variables which cause a voter to defect from his party identification are his evaluation of the candidates and of the issues. These evaluations must conflict with his basic party identification in order for him to defect. However, for these variables to be operative, voters clearly need to have information about them. Thus, the significance of these factors may have become greater as more information is available to the voter about issues and candidates. With no information about these factors, they cannot have a significant influence. It must be said however, that any information which a voter receives tends to be evaluated and organized according to his underlying partisan identification.

Partisanship also predisposes a voter to interpret information about his party's candidates and issues in a favorable light.

Candidate Voting vs. Party Voting

Another important aspect of the role of information in electoral choice is the information which voters gather about the candidate, irrespective of which party the candidate represents. As Popkin *et. al.* (1976) have pointed out, because of the decentralized nature of the American party system and the independence of a candidate from his party, party is a very poor predictor of how a candidate will behave once he gains office. Hence, in this environment it is rational for a voter to gather as much information as he can about the candidate as opposed to party platforms and party issue positions and then to vote on the basis of information about the candidate. This is particularly true in presidential elections where voters are asked to select an individual who will assume enormous responsibilities and acquire tremendous power both domestically and internationally. Of great importance here is the president's control of nuclear war. In such a situation, the attributes of this particular individual assume great importance. Given this situation, many voters will gather information about the candidate and then vote for the candidate, not the party, a fact which relegates

party to a secondary role in the voting decision. What's interesting about this from a media perspective is that television, as opposed to other media, is much more likely to focus on the candidate, thereby further encouraging the voter to also focus on the candidate and his qualifications for elective office. Television helps voters to get to "know" a candidate in a personal sense and to inform voters about the candidate's issue positions. All of this is done at the expense of party. Thus, the convergence of a political system which renders a candidate quite independent of his party and television's emphasis on the candidate's personal attributes and issue positions, sets the stage for the emphasis on candidate rather than party which looms so large in contemporary American elections.

The Impact of Incumbency

Another major factor which has been found to cause a voter to defect from this party identification when voting is incumbency. The importance of incumbency in influencing the voting decision has increased dramatically during recent years and many political scientists have hypothesized---with considerable supporting evidence---that it is replacing political parties as a shorthand cue to the voting choice. In fact, incumbents are having considerable success in attracting voters from the other party. The findings of one study indicate that "the secular decline in

party line voting...reflects the greater ability of incumbents to attract voters from people who identify with the other party" (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980, p. 621). Another study dealing with the effects of incumbency at the state level (Cowart, 1973) suggested that incumbency effects are extremely important in state elections and that incumbency is frequently substituted for party when a voter makes his choice. As Cowart notes: "Gubernatorial and Senatorial voting are best accounted for by attitudes toward party in nonincumbent races and less so in the two types of incumbent races. In nonincumbent races, the vote is more free to fluctuate as a direct function of attitudes toward party, relatively unencumbered by the blocking effects of incumbency" (843). The relationship between incumbency and information is that incumbency operates as a shorthand voting cue in low information elections much as party does. The use of these shorthand mechanisms at the state level operate to a degree not seen in presidential elections where information penetration is greater. Thus, the evidence continues to suggest that high information elections are less influenced by shorthand cues such as party and incumbency than are low information elections.

Conclusion

In summing up this section, it seems that one basic point emerges regarding the relationship between

information and partisanship. That is that the amount of information available to the voter at election time affects the factors which the voter uses to make his voting decision. If information is plentiful, the voter will rely more on issues; if information is scarce, he uses shorthand cues such as party and incumbency. If we assume that more voters have more information now than they did in the pre-television era, then it follows that voters rely less heavily on party identification when making their voting choice. This decline in the function of party may be causally related to the decline of party identification in the long-term sense.

Synthesis and Conclusion

It's useful at this point to synthesize the literature review presented above in an effort to isolate the areas of agreement and/or disagreement among researchers on the effects of television on partisanship. This will help us identify the major questions about the effects of television on partisanship which research still needs to answer. It will also assist in framing a working hypothesis for this research and in assessing the final results of this study.

One of the most general things which emerges clearly from the literature is that just about all research would agree that the effect of the media---and in this case

television---is rarely direct: it does not have a universal effect on all types of people under all types of circumstances. Rather, the literature seems to agree that the media's effect varies from person to person and situation to situation and that it is mediated through a variety of variables, some of which accelerate television's effect, some of which diminish it. What seems to be of central importance in determining television's effect is how television is perceived by voters, how much the voters use it compared to other media, how much information they retain from television and how television fits into the overall communication network surrounding the individual. Also important is how a voter uses the information he has retained and whether it is translated into independence from party labels. The mere presence of television is not enough: television must be listened to and the information received must be processed and used if it is to have an impact. Research indicates that the variables which determine how an individual relates to television and what he does with political information received from television fall into three very general categories. First are the individual attributes of the voter; second is the political context within which the individual finds himself; and third is the nature and number of other available media, i.e., the total communication network surrounding an individual.

The first group of mediating variables consists of the individual attributes of the voter. These include both political and non-political attributes. In the former category are a voter's partisan identification; his interest in politics; his motivation to seek out politically relevant information; his motivation to participate actively in political life and his willingness to move across party lines if his information indicates this is a rational choice. Also important are the resources which the voter has available to him to expend on political affairs. This set of variables has a clear affect on how an individual relates to the media.

Individuals who are interested in politics and who have the motivation and resources to participate in them will pay close attention to the media and will retain significant amounts of information which will be used to make an electoral decision. In contrast, an individual with little interest in politics and few resources to expend will pay little attention to political matters in the media. In general, one would expect the media to have a greater impact on the former group of voters. However, it is among the latter group of voters that television---as opposed to other media---is said to have its greatest effect due to its inadvertent nature and low cost. Also important in this vein is that this latter group of voters would tend not to pay attention to other media, thereby further

increasing television's effects.

The second set of attributes of the voter include non-political factors such as socioeconomic status; educational attainment; and group affiliation. Many of these variables have an important bearing on the political factors cited above and often determine political interest, motivation and resources available to spend on politics.

All of these micro level variables have to do with what an individual brings to a political situation and with how his individual characteristics affect his media use. What kinds of media does an individual attend to? How many different types of media does he attend to? Does he seek out information? How much information does he retain? How do his predispositions affect his interpretation of political information? What does he finally do with the information which he has? Does he use it to help make his electoral choices and does this often involve a vote against his partisan identification?

The next set of variables, the political context, is macro in nature and includes both long and short-term factors. Long-term factors would consist of the general political environment a voter finds himself in. Does the environment encourage voters to participate in and inform themselves about political affairs? Does the environment encourage voting according to the issues or is it heavily partisan in nature? How well organized are political

parties and how deeply do they reach into the community? These are all political culture variables and they make up the more or less permanent political environment within which a voter lives.

Short-term political forces are also important in determining how people relate to the media---how much television or other media they attend to, how much they retain and how they interpret the messages they get. In this group of variables is the nature of the issues during a particular election: how relevant are they to individual voters; how controversial are they; are they addressed by the political parties? We could hypothesize that the nature of the issues affects how much attention voters pay to the media, how much and what they retain and whether the information which voters have is converted into a vote against one's party. Issues which would have the greatest impact in the ways listed above would be those which are of immediate relevance to a person, those which are highly controversial and those which cut across partisan lines and are therefore not addressed by either party. Under the latter circumstances, voters are forced to obtain information from sources other than parties in order to make their electoral choices.

All of these factors intervene between the individual and his media use. Because of different issues from year to year, the same individual may pay considerable attention

to a variety of media one year and retain large amounts of what he hears and reads while the next year he may pay little attention to the media because the issues do not motivate him to do so.

The third group of variables which have an effect on the impact of television has to do with the total media environment within which an individual finds himself. Where there are large numbers of competing sources of information, individuals have greater choice in the media which they use to get information and they would be less dependent on television. This kind of environment will most commonly be found in urban areas. We can hypothesize that the greater the number of media sources available to an individual, the less he will have to rely on television for his information, thereby decreasing television's effect. Where television is the only media available, then we would hypothesize that its effect is greater.

It's important to emphasize that these three categories of mediating variables can affect our research hypothesis at two different points. The research hypothesis has two distinct links. The first link states that whether purposely or inadvertently, people acquire political knowledge through exposure to televised political information. The second link of the hypothesis states that to a significant extent, this knowledge is translated into independence from political parties. Thus, the individual

level variables and the contextual variables discussed above can affect both the quality and quantity of information which a voter retains (the first link) and what he subsequently does with it (the second link). The variables which constitute the total media environment surrounding the individual clearly affect the part of the hypothesis which deals with information acquisition from television. Less obvious however is that the source of information (television vs. print journalism) says something about the quality of the information which the voter retains and the images which he takes with him. This could subsequently affect what he does with his information and whether it translates into a vote against his party.

Assuming that these three categories of mediating variables are essential to understanding television's effects on partisanship via information acquisition, research in this area needs to identify these mediating variables more specifically and to elaborate more fully how they affect the relationship between television and partisanship. Also important is to identify different configurations of variables and how they may produce different effects. It may be that single variables by themselves do not provide a great deal of insight into television's effects on partisanship. Rather, combinations of variables, when interacting, hold the key to understanding television's effects. For example: two

individuals with identical socioeconomic, educational and motivational characteristics may respond differently to television because of the effect of different environmental variables. Similarly, the same individual may relate differently to television from election to election depending on the nature of the issues in each election. Thus, research needs to identify both the individual characteristics of the voter which affect his relationship to television and the contextual variables which further shape his response to television. Equally as important is to determine how information retained from television affects partisanship: two individuals with the same television information may use it differently vis-a-vis their partisanship depending on their individual predispositions and the context within which they find themselves.

The above discussion points out the enormous complexity and scope of how television may affect partisanship. Based on this, one thing seems clear: determining the effect of television on partisanship under a variety of circumstances for a variety of types of individuals is an enormous job which cannot be undertaken here. What we can do however is to examine one small piece of the puzzle and hope to shed some light on that. Given the above discussion of the importance of contextual variables, this study will focus on an examination of the

relationship between television and partisanship in a variety of different environments. Specifically, we will test for the effect of television on partisanship in fifteen different states of the United States. The assumption behind this research strategy is that different states provide very different environments which, if the above hypothesis is correct, will produce different television effects. If this hypothesis is substantiated, we can then go on to identify the contextual variables which either enhance or diminish television's effects.

Perhaps the most dramatic result of such a study would be the finding that television is such a powerful and ubiquitous force that it has similar effects on partisanship across a wide variety of environments and that environmental variables are not strong enough to moderate and shape television's effects. This would contradict the hypothesis about the importance of mediating variables and would support notions about television's vast and pervasive influence in the current era. Perhaps a more likely research outcome however is that television affects partisanship differently in different environments. This would support the hypothesis that environmental variables mediate the effects of television to produce different outcomes. If this were true, we could then go on to determine which variables in the different environments affected television's relationship to partisanship and how

they operated to produce the relationship they did. A third possible outcome is that television has similar effects in similar types of environments, e.g., urban-industrial, rural etc. even though the particulars of these environments may vary considerably. If this were the case, we could go on to isolate the specific environmental variables which help explain why television has a greater effect on partisanship in rural environments than in urban environments---or vice versa.

A final possible research outcome is that television has no effect on partisanship in any of the fifteen states. This would be a startling finding and would indicate that perhaps television's influence is overrated and that it is not nearly as powerful or pervasive as suspected.

All of the above possible research findings would provide equally meaningful conclusions. The two opposite findings of television having an all pervasive influence vs. television's influence being negligible both have powerful implications for our understanding of the effects of television and for policies seeking to regulate television directly or to counterbalance television's purported adverse affects. Equally as important is the outcome that television has significant effects on partisanship in some states but not in others or in some types of states but not in other types. Again, either outcome has important implications for our understanding of

television effects.

This discussion points out that one of the most important aspects of the research findings will be the pattern of outcomes. Because we will be examining the relationship between television and partisanship in fifteen different environments, we have an opportunity to identify patterns of outcomes and to determine whether television has any systematic or general effect, e.g., television has an effect in one kind of environment but not in another. If a clear pattern does emerge, it may suggest a general explanation about the kinds of circumstances under which television has an effect.

A general working hypothesis of this study is that the most likely outcome of the research would be the finding that television has a significant effect on partisanship in some states but not in others. If this turns out to be the case, the pattern of outcomes will then become important. For example, we may find important similarities among the states where television has a significant effect on partisanship. This would help us frame a general explanation regarding television's effects. In contrast, we may find that there are no systematic similarities among the states where television has an effect and that the explanation for each state is idiosyncratic depending on the mix of variables unique to that state.

Chapter 2: The Methodology

The most significant methodological problem in testing a hypothesis regarding the effects of television on partisanship is controlling for television. In this study, television will be controlled for by examining partisanship at the state level and by analyzing differences in partisanship between counties with and without local television within the same state. We will also be examining partisanship in relation to state elections only. The major advantage of this within-state approach is that it controls for many statewide variables such as nature of the party system and primary election procedures which could be counter explanatory if one were comparing states which have local television with states which do not have local television.

Controlling for television within states is possible because media markets do not coincide with state boundaries and there are often large numbers of people within a particular state who listen to television from another state. The television industry divides the United States into Areas of Dominant Influence (ADI) with every county in the U.S. assigned to one ADI. These ADIs do not necessarily coincide with state boundaries. Thus, there are large areas within many states which are either not reached at all by the state's local television or where a

majority of viewers watch television from another state. This is best illustrated by an example. In Pennsylvania, the following counties are in ADIs from other states (See map in Appendix B at the end of this thesis):

Pike County	New York, NY ADI
Franklin County	Washington, D.C. ADI
Mercer County	Youngstown, OH ADI
McKean, Potter and Warren Counties	Buffalo, NY ADI
Tioga County	Syracuse, NY ADI
Bradford, Sullivan and Susquehanna Counties	Binghamton, NY ADI

All other counties in Pennsylvania receive television from local Pennsylvania stations. Thus voters in the ten Pennsylvania counties without local television receive less television news about state politics than voters living in counties which are part of a Pennsylvania ADI.

Assignment of counties to ADIs is based on survey research conducted by the television industry. The purpose of the survey is to determine what stations viewers in each county watch. Thus in the case of Pike County Pennsylvania, surveys found that a large majority of the viewers watch New York television, not Wilkes-Barre television. Pike County was therefore assigned to the New York ADI. The usual reason that people tend to watch

stations from one ADI rather than another is reception, with most people not wanting to watch a poor reception. This leads to two assumptions about these units which are critical to the analysis.

First, in relation to information about state politics, even though the majority of viewers in Pike County watch New York television, this does not necessarily mean that they cannot receive Wilkes-Barre stations at all. There are therefore probably some viewers who will go to the trouble to tune in Wilkes-Barre television for the express purpose of gathering information about state politics. They would then switch back to the New York ADI stations for national news and evening entertainment programs. Thus, in Pike County there probably are voters who are receiving state political information from television news. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in the aggregate there is a gross difference between the amount of Pennsylvania political news received by viewers in Pike County and by those in Wilkes-Barre. This seems particularly reasonable in light of the size of the inadvertent audience which does not tune in expressly for the news and of the probably small number of people who would watch a news program with a poor reception just to gather information about state politics. Thus although the difference between these two types of units cannot be measured, it seems that it is large enough to be used as a

means for designating units as either "high" or "low" in terms of television information about state politics.

A second somewhat obvious assumption is that the volume of political news about Pennsylvania politics is greater on a Pennsylvania station than on a New York station. Thus even though a New York station might put on an occasional story about Pennsylvania politics, those Pennsylvania viewers who watch New York television do not receive the same volume of Pennsylvania political information that Philadelphia viewers receive.

Using this within-state approach, it is possible to control for television news since it can be treated as a nominal variable: we can distinguish between high television information units and low (or in some cases no) television information units vis-a-vis state politics because there are significant differences within states on the amount of television information received by voters. If the hypothesis being tested is correct, voters in those areas without local television news should exhibit greater partisan stability at the state level than voters in parts of the state with local television news.

The fifteen states being analyzed in this study were selected on the basis of their having a sufficient number of counties both with and without local television to provide a reasonable basis of comparison. Some states either have no local television (New Jersey, New Hampshire

and Delaware) while in others all counties receive local television (New York, Utah, Nevada). These states obviously had to be eliminated because there is no basis of comparison. States with only a few counties without local television were also eliminated because there were not enough no-television counties to provide a reasonable comparison (California, Washington, Ohio). Finally, all southern states were eliminated because of the special problems of partisanship in those states. This left fifteen states which represented a good cross-section of urban-industrial/rural-farm states and East, West and in-between states. These fifteen states and the number of counties with and without local television are listed below. Maps of all fifteen states can be found in Appendix B at the end of this thesis. All no-television counties are marked with cross-hatching.

<u>State</u>	<u># of Local TV Counties</u>	<u># of No-Local TV Counties</u>
Connecticut	5	3
Illinois	73	29
Massachusetts	10	4
Minnesota	65	22
Oregon	27	8
Pennsylvania	57	10
Iowa	83	16
Wyoming	13	10

Idaho	30	14
Indiana	71	21
Colorado	49	14
Kansas	85	20
Maryland	13	10
Montana	46	10
Nebraska	67	26

Measuring Partisanship

The second methodological problem to be dealt with was to determine what data would be appropriate and available to indicate partisanship, the dependent variable. In this study, aggregate election returns for each county are used to indicate the strength of partisanship within that county. This is done in the following manner: counties where the percentage of the vote given to the Democratic and Republican Parties remains relatively consistent from election to election are considered electorally stable. In contrast, counties where the percentage of the vote given to each party fluctuates considerably from election to election are considered electorally volatile. Based on this data, certain inferences about partisanship can be made. We assume that electoral stability is an indicator of partisan stability and partisan strength. For example, if 45% of the voters in a particular county consistently vote for the Republican candidate in state elections, then

we assume that identification with the Republican Party is relatively stable and sufficiently strong so that voters are not easily swayed from their partisanship when making an electoral choice. In contrast, in a county where election returns fluctuate considerably, we assume that partisanship is sufficiently weak to cause voters either to be Independent or, among voters who do identify with a party, to stray easily from that identification when making an electoral choice. Note that we are using both conceptions of partisanship as discussed in Chapter 1: we are referring to simple identification---a nominal variable---and strength of identification. In counties which are extremely volatile electorally, we would expect to find large numbers of Independents or large numbers of identifiers whose identification was sufficiently weak to allow them to readily defect from their party when making an electoral choice. If the hypothesis being tested in this thesis is correct, the counties with local television should show greater electoral volatility (and by inference, weaker partisanship) than counties without local television.

It is important to point out that aggregate election returns are imperfect devices to get at partisanship, a phenomenon which exists at the level of the individual. These figures could mask considerable electoral volatility because movement of individual voters from party to party

could take place without any change in aggregate election returns. In the most extreme case, a county could consistently return 50% for Republicans and 50% for Democrats from election to election. Using the assumptions outlined above, this county would be considered electorally stable and, by implication, having strong and stable partisanship. In reality however, it could be totally volatile because the 50% voting for each party was a different 50% each time---e.g., 100% of the voters changed parties at each election (See Gitelson, 1979 for an excellent discussion of these problems). Although this extreme case is unlikely to occur, it points out the problem with using aggregate election returns to indicate partisanship.

In defense of the use of these statistics, one researcher found there was considerable consistency between the inferences drawn from these statistics and the findings reported by survey research. Cummings (1966) reported that: "Inferences about ticket-splitting drawn from analysis of the spread [between the percentage of the vote polled by presidential and House candidates of the same party] in individual districts from 1948 to 1964 can be checked against the relevant findings of social survey studies of those election years. The findings that emerge from the two types of data concerning split-ticket voting correspond closely" (note, p, 36). Also, for the purposes

of this study, aggregate election returns represent the only available option since no longitudinal survey data on partisanship exists for all the counties being studied in this thesis. One study summed up the pros and cons of using aggregate election returns to indicate partisanship at the state level in the following manner: "Obviously the best way to measure the strength and stability of party loyalty and its effects on voting would be to use survey data; but, as we have noted, it is rarely available for state elections. ... To a large extent, we must rely on aggregate voting data. We can estimate the basic, persistent strength of a party by determining its minimum vote for statewide offices over a period of years. And we can gain some impression of the stability of voting patterns by looking at party voting percentages at the county level over a number of years. It is reasonable to assume that, if a county consistently produces a vote that is 60 to 70 percent Democratic, a large proportion of those casting Democratic ballots are persistent voters who identify with that party" (Jewell and Olson, 1978, p. 226).

The specific data being used for the study are gubernatorial and senatorial election returns from 1968 to 1978. Data prior to 1968 cannot be used because it was only in 1968 that the television industry developed ADIs to determine media markets. It is therefore not possible to control for television prior to 1968. Also, only

senatorial and gubernatorial elections are used because they are statewide elections and are therefore consistent with the within-state approach outlined above.

Having selected the data to be used to indicate partisanship, the next task is to use this data to derive a measure of partisanship for each county. How this measure was developed is the subject of the next section.

A Partisan Measure for Each County

Since the ultimate purpose of this study is to determine the effects of television on partisanship, it is important to control for the effects of variables other than television which may be counter explanatory. That is, over a ten year period, there are numerous factors which may affect the stability of partisanship within a particular county. We may find a county which exhibits considerable partisan instability and yet the factors contributing to that instability may have nothing to do with television. Factors such as changes in the income level, the age structure and in and out-migration may all affect the aggregate pattern of partisanship over a ten year time frame. Thus, the score for partisan stability used in this study has been designed to remove the effects of variables other than television which may contribute to partisan instability. The score for partisanship for each county therefore represents a corrected score which has

removed the effects of time and which can then be tested in relation to television.

During the ten year time frame being studied in this thesis, each state had eight or ten gubernatorial and/or senatorial elections. Therefore, for each county we have a set of ten (or eight) election returns and we want to determine what factors other than television help explain the variation from election to election in the percent Republican and the percent Democratic within each county. To do this, time series data on three variables (turnout, age structure and income level) was collected for each county. These three variables were run as the independent variables in a regression analysis where the ten sets of election returns were the dependent variable. The purpose of this was to determine how much of the variation in the percent of the votes given to each party from election to election could be explained by these three variables. The amount of unexplained variation would be the score for partisanship. Specifically, the score was constructed by taking the standard deviation of the ten (or eight) residuals, the residuals being the distance between the actual election returns and the returns predicted by the regression equation. The higher the standard deviation, the greater amount of electoral variability which is not explained by the three independent variables.

Theoretically, there are a variety of variables which

could affect partisan volatility. For the purpose of this study, incumbency, presidential election year, turnout, age structure, percent black, income level and occupational structure were selected as potentially significant independent variables. A series of trial regressions for a few counties in each state were then run to determine which combination of variables explained the greatest amount of variability. Based on these trial runs, turnout, age structure and income level of each county explained the most variation and then became the three independent variables used to construct the partisan volatility score for each county. The only surprise in this outcome was that incumbency didn't have greater explanatory power. This was surprising because a great deal of recent research has found that at the non-presidential level incumbency is a significant force in determining electoral outcomes.

In theory, the three independent variables, turnout, age structure and income, affect electoral variability in the following way (See Appendix C for a list of data sources):

Turnout: One would anticipate a low turnout would tend to increase the percent of the vote given to the Republican Party. This is based on the notion that voters of lower socioeconomic status who tend to identify with the Democratic Party are more likely not to vote---particularly in low interest elections in off-years---than Republican

identifiers who tend to be of higher socioeconomic status. Thus, low turnout elections are disproportionately represented by voters of high socioeconomic status who tend to vote Republican.

Age: According to the issues explanation of declining partisanship (see Chapter 1), voters who came of age during the 1960s and 1970s rejected parties because the parties did not address the salient issues of the times. Thus, the voting cohorts which came of age during the 1960s and 1970s tend to exhibit relatively weak partisan identification. One would therefore anticipate that a decline in the age structure of a county over the 1968-1978 period would contribute to partisan instability. Another factor relating to age and partisanship is that research done on the characteristics of ticket-splitters indicates that they tend to be younger than the typical voter (DeVries and Tarrance, 1972, p. 61). Thus, an increase in the number of young voters would theoretically contribute to increasing partisan instability.

Income: Finally, recent research on ticket-splitters and Independents suggests that these voters tend to be more educated and to have higher incomes than the average voter. It is therefore possible that changes in the income level of a county would have an effect on partisan stability.

After all the data was collected, regression analyses for each county in all fifteen states were run using the

independent and dependent variables as outlined above. The result was a score for partisanship for each county which has eliminated the effects of other variables. The next step is to test these scores in relation to television. Specifically, do the counties within each state which receive local television have higher partisan volatility scores than the counties without television coverage? Does the presence or absence of television help predict partisan volatility scores within each state?

Testing the Relationship Between Television and Partisan Volatility

To test this relationship, four different approaches have been used. The purpose of using a variety of approaches is to determine if different methods reveal different dimensions of the partisanship-television relationship.

The first approach is simply to plot the relationship between partisan volatility and television for each state. A visual plot of the distribution of partisan volatility scores allows one to make hypotheses about the relationship between television and partisan volatility before any statistical tests are run and also to intuitively check the results of statistical tests against a visual display. Sometimes relationships are revealed in a visual display which do not emerge in more elaborate statistical tests.

The second approach is to run a test of means on the partisan volatility scores for each state. A test of means will reveal if there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the partisan volatility scores for the television and no-television units in each of the fifteen states. Significantly higher means in the television units than in the no-television units would support the reserch hypothesis. Also important is that significant results in some states while not in others may reveal something about the kinds of circumstances under which television has an effect and the kinds of circumstances under which it does not.

The third approach to be used is a regression analysis for each state, using the partisan volatility scores as the dependent variable and television (coded "1" for having local television and "0" for having no local television) as the independent variable. The results of each regression analysis will tell us whether television has a statistically significant impact on partisanship in each of the fifteen states. They will also tell us how much of the variation in partisan volatility scores is explained by television.

The final approach is to run a two way analysis of variance on all partisan volatility scores using State, TV and State*TV as the independent variables and the partisan volatility scores as the dependent variable. In contrast

to the other approaches outlined above, the two way analysis of variance is run only once on all 910 partisan volatility scores---not fifteen times, once in each state. The purpose of the analysis is to determine how much variation in the 910 scores is explained by state environments alone (State), by television alone (TV) and by the interactive effect between state environments and television (State*TV). This model should help answer the question of whether television has a greater impact in some states than in others due to certain aspects of the state environment.

Using these four approaches, a pretty good idea about television's effect on the partisan volatility scores should be obtained. We might also gain some insight into the effect of other variables on partisanship, particularly the impact of state environments. Hopefully, we will also learn something about how television interacts with state environments. The results are described in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: The Findings

The relationship between television and partisanship hypothesized in this study states that television is a partial cause of the decline of partisanship. The linking variable is information dissemination which renders the voter independent of party labels when making electoral choices. This was operationalized in this study to mean that those counties within each state with local television coverage would have higher partisan volatility scores than those counties without local television coverage within the same state. The argument is that voters in counties with local television would have higher levels of information available to them in relation to state elections and would therefore be less dependent on party labels when making their electoral choices in state elections. We therefore hypothesized a positive relationship between the presence of television and partisan volatility scores.

As described in Chapter 2, four different methods have been used to analyze the partisan volatility scores in relation to the presence or absence of television at the county level in fifteen states. Each method asks different questions and approaches the data from a different perspective, but the results of each approach are generally consistent with the results of the other approaches. The most viable general conclusion to emerge from the four

analyses is that television does have an important effect on partisanship under certain circumstances, but that its effect is far from universal. According to the results, television has an effect on partisanship in some states but not in others. This points to a mediating role for state level variables such as aspects of a state's political, historical and/or economic environment. These variables may mediate the way in which television affects partisanship and differences in these variables from state to state may lead to different television effects vis-a-vis partisanship. For example, it may be that certain aspects of a state's political environment affect the way voters and government and party officials use television, thereby creating different effects in different states. This issue and others like it will be explored more fully in a later chapter.

The results of the visual inspection of the scatterplots for the individual states in Figures 3.1-3.15 (see Appendix D at the end of this paper) indicate that, in at least some of the states, there appears to be an important difference in the distribution of the television and no-television counties along the continuum of partisan volatility scores. The plots indicate that a greater percentage of the no-television counties fall in the lower portion of the plots (i.e., have lower partisan volatility scores) than do the television counties. This is

particularly true for the counties in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Iowa and Indiana where there are proportionately more counties with television in the upper and middle quartiles of the continuum of partisan volatility scores than there are in the lower quartiles. This can be seen by examining Table 3.1 below which represents a simple tabulation of the television and no-television counties in the bottom quartile, the middle two quartiles and the top quartile of the continuum of partisan volatility scores for each state. The fact that the partisan volatility scores of the television counties in five states appear to fall more heavily in the upper quartiles than they do in the other ten states suggests that the hypothesis being tested in this study may be valid in some states but not in others. This suggests that there are differences among states in the way the political, social or economic environment mediates the way in which television affects partisanship. In some states, the environment may accelerate the effects of television on partisanship while in others it may diminish it.

Table 3.1

<u>State</u>	<u>Bottom 25%</u>		<u>Mid 50%</u>		<u>Upper 25%</u>	
	<u>No-TV</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>No-TV</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>No-TV</u>	<u>TV</u>
Minnesota	15	7	7	36	-	22
Pennsylvania	5	12	5	28	-	17

Illinois	10	16	13	37	6	20
Iowa	6	19	6	43	4	21
Indiana	9	14	11	35	1	22
Nebraska	5	18	13	35	9	14
Massachusetts	-	4	1	5	3	1
Maryland	-	4	6	5	4	2
Montana	2	12	3	27	5	9
Colorado	4	12	9	22	1	15
Idaho	5	6	7	15	2	9
Wyoming	2	4	7	4	1	5
Kansas	9	17	7	46	4	22
Connecticut	1	1	2	2	-	2
Oregon	3	6	4	13	1	8

This conclusion is very tentative since a visual inspection of the data offers only an impressionistic approach to examining the relationship between television and partisanship. No hard conclusions could be drawn from such an analysis and yet when we move on to more sophisticated statistical analyses, the visual approach provides an intuitive way to check the more precise statistical analyses. We can determine if the statistical analyses "make sense" given the visual display of the data.

Also lending some support to the research hypothesis is the scatterplot in Figure 3.16 (Appendix D) which plots the partisan volatility scores for all 910 counties in the

study irrespective of state. This scatterplot suggests that when partisan volatility scores are not looked at on a state by state basis but rather examined according to where they fall on the continuum of scores for all fifteen states, the television variable by itself may be important in explaining partisan volatility. The first indication of this is based on a simple counting of television and no-television counties in the lower quartile, the middle two quartiles and the upper quartile of the continuum of partisan volatility scores. By adding up the total number of television and no-television counties, it becomes apparent that the percentage of no-television counties is greatest in the lower quartile (36%), next greatest in the middle quartiles (22%) and smallest in the upper quartile (19%). This suggests that television may be an important variable which affects partisan volatility irrespective of the environment. This suggests a more universal effect for television than does the conclusion drawn from examining the scatterplots for each state. Again however, this is an extremely intuitive conclusion which will be either supported or not supported by more sophisticated statistical techniques.

The Tests of Means

The second approach to analyzing the data, the tests of means, also supports the research hypothesis in some

cases since the results indicate that there is a statistically significant positive difference between the mean partisan volatility scores of the television and no-television counties in Pennsylvania, Minnesota and Indiana. This result is similar to the visual analysis of the data on a state by state basis which also indicated that television may have an effect in some states but not in others. Also important however are the results of the tests of means which indicate that in the cases of Maryland and Nebraska, the results were statistically significant but in a negative direction.

The tests of means were run on a state by state basis with each test comparing the mean partisan volatility scores between the television and no-television counties in each state. The purpose of a test of means is to compare two populations which differ on one variable---in this case television---and to ask if the difference between the mean scores on another variable---partisan volatility---is large enough so that it cannot be attributed to chance. If so, the differences between the two means are considered statistically significant and the evidence can be said to support the research hypothesis.

The first step in conducting a test of means is to formulate a null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses. The null hypothesis is the hypothesis we hope to reject in favor of the alternative hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis

suggested by theory. Here, both the null and alternative hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the notion that volatility scores will be higher in the television counties than in the no-television counties of the same state. This fact would argue for a single alternative hypothesis and a one-tailed test. However, given the consistent pattern of null effect and reverse effect findings in the literature on media impacts, a two-tailed test is more appropriate. Based on this, our null hypothesis is: $\bar{X}_{tv} = \bar{X}_{notv}$ and our alternative hypotheses are: $\bar{X}_{tv} > \bar{X}_{notv}$ and $\bar{X}_{tv} < \bar{X}_{notv}$. The results of the tests of means are as follows. First is a list of the simple means of the television and no-television units in each state:

Table 3.2

<u>State</u>	<u>$\bar{X}(TV)$</u>	<u>$\bar{X}(NOTV)$</u>
Connecticut	4.88	4.13
Illinois	5.30	4.92
Colorado	5.91	5.00
Idaho	12.43	11.12
Montana	4.79	7.18
Maryland	9.60	11.95
Wyoming	8.93	8.71
Oregon	4.95	4.57
Kansas	10.11	9.64
Nebraska	8.35	9.39

Indiana	2.64	1.81
Minnesota	9.38	6.12
Pennsylvania	4.72	2.80
Iowa	4.86	4.43
Massachusetts	8.21	12.97

Second are the results of the tests of means themselves:

Table 3.3

<u>State</u>	<u>Degrees of</u>		<u>2-tailed t</u>	
	<u>Freedom</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>.05 Column</u>	<u>Table Value</u>
Pennsylvania	18	5.809	2.101	t > 2.101 ∴ reject null hypothesis
Minnesota	32	5.916	2.042	t > 2.042 ∴ reject null hypothesis
Indiana	67	3.503	2.000	t > 2.000 ∴ reject null hypothesis
Maryland	19	-2.542	2.093	t < -2.093 ∴ reject null hypothesis
Nebraska	40	-2.051	2.021	t < -2.021 ∴ reject null hypothesis
Iowa	25	1.174	2.060	t < 2.060 ∴ can't reject null hyp
Massachusetts	4	-2.770	2.776	t > -2.776 ∴ can't reject null hyp

Connecticut	3	0.868	3.182	$t < 3.182$. can't reject null hyp
Illinois	58	1.655	2.000	$t < 2.000$. can't reject null hyp
Colorado	26	1.873	2.056	$t < 2.056$. can't reject null hyp
Idaho	25	1.577	2.060	$t < 2.060$. can't reject null hyp
Montana	9	-1.573	2.262	$t > -2.262$. can't reject null hyp
Wyoming	19	0.267	2.093	$t < 2.093$. can't reject null hyp
Oregon	9	0.527	2.262	$t < 2.262$. can't reject null hyp
Kansas	23	1.138	2.069	$t < 2.069$. can't reject null hyp

As can be seen from Table 3.3, the null hypothesis can be rejected in five states. The null hypothesis can be rejected when the value of t exceeds the value of t in the t table at the .05 level of significance. This occurs for the states of Pennsylvania, Minnesota and Indiana. The null hypothesis can also be rejected when the value of t is less than the negative value of t in the t table, i.e., when the t score is outside the critical point in the negative tail. This occurs in the cases of Maryland and

Nebraska with negative t values of -2.542 and -2.051 respectively. This indicates that the mean partisan volatility scores of the no-television counties are significantly higher than the mean volatility scores of the television counties.

So far, the tests of means and the visual inspection of the scatterplots for each state lead us to the same general conclusion: in some states, counties with television have significantly higher partisan volatility scores than those counties in the same state without television. In addition, the tests of means indicate that in two states, counties with television have lower partisan volatility scores. Thus, so far we can conclude that television does have an effect on partisanship in some states although it is not necessarily in the direction suggested by the research hypothesis. The presence of television effects in some states but not in others points to a role for macro variables in determining how television relates to partisanship.

The conclusion that macro variables are important in mediating the effects of television on partisanship stems from the fact that the important differences between states lie in large scale political, social and economic factors. We can describe some states as urban-industrial or rural-farm; we can talk about political cultures of states, some of which encourage active participation of its citizens in

politics and some of which do not; we can characterize some states as heavily partisan with well organized political parties which reach down to the grass roots; other states can be characterized as less partisan with weak political parties. These types of differences which are macro in nature may have an effect on the way citizens relate to televised political information. They may also have an effect on how and how much government and political officials use television---how often they use it and what types of messages they send. These kinds of variables may mediate the way in which television affects partisanship and since they differ from state to state, they may be important in explaining the fact that the tests of means gave us different results about the effect of television in different states. These issues will be explored more fully below. Now however, it is time to move on to the regression analyses which further support the conclusion that television has an effect on partisanship in some states but not in others.

The Regression Analyses

The results of the regression analyses testing the research hypothesis indicate that television does have the hypothesized effect on partisanship in three states: Indiana, Pennsylvania and Minnesota. In these three states, the coefficient for the impact of television on

partisanship is positive and statistically significant. Importantly, in the models for three other states--- Montana, Maryland and Nebraska---the same coefficients are statistically significant, but they are negative, indicating that those counties with television in these three states have generally lower partisan volatility scores than those counties without television. In the remaining nine states, the coefficients for the impact of television on partisan volatility are positive, but they are not statistically significant.

Before moving on to the actual results of the regression analyses, it is helpful to identify the kinds of questions which regression analyses ask and the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. This will help to assess the results of the regression analyses and to compare the regression results with the results of the other tests. First, regression analysis offers a method for estimating the value of one variable (in this case partisan volatility) from known values of another variable (television). Regression analysis describes how one variable affects another by a linear equation which relates the dependent variable to the independent variable. This equation is represented by $y = a + bx$ where x and y are the independent and dependent variables respectively; a is the y intercept, i.e., the value of y when $x = 0$; and b represents the estimated amount of change in y when x

changes by one unit. In contrast to the tests of means which simply told us whether the means of two distributions differed enough to be considered statistically significant, the regression analyses elaborate the nature of the relationship. The tests of means give us a general yes-no answer on whether television is important in relation to partisan volatility while a regression analysis tells us on average how much of a change we will get in partisan volatility when we move from a television to a no-television county. The "how much" is represented by b in the regression equation. Thus, a regression analysis gives us much more information about how two variables relate than does a test of means and should help us predict the value of a dependent variable when the value of the independent variable is known. A well fitted regression line would also minimize the differences between the predicted values of the dependent variable and the actual values of the variable. Also important is that in regression analysis, tests of significance can be run on a and b . These tests tell us about the validity of the values of a and b in the regression equation.

The specific results of the regression analyses can be found in Table 3.4. It is important to note that as with the tests of means, the regression analyses are done on a state by state basis---e.g., one regression analysis for each of the fifteen states. As with the tests of

means, this approach will tell us in which states---if any---television has an effect on partisanship and in which states it does not. The important statistics to examine in this table are the b 's, the t scores and the r^2 's. These will be discussed below.

The results of the regression analyses are found in Table 3.4 on the next two pages. The first aspect of the regression results which are important are the t scores on the coefficient for television (b). The t scores tell us if the regression coefficient (b) is statistically significant. In assessing the t scores for the coefficients for the television variable, we need to formulate a null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses just as we did for the tests of means. The values of t will indicate whether or not we can reject the null hypothesis. In this case, the null hypothesis is $b = 0$, i.e., television has no effect on partisan volatility. The alternate hypothesis is $b \neq 0$, i.e., television does have an effect on partisan volatility. This alternate hypothesis can be further broken down into two hypotheses: $b > 0$ and $b < 0$. Since there are two alternate hypotheses, a two-tailed test is called for. If the values of the t score for each of the fifteen television coefficients exceed the values of t in the t table at the .05 level of significance or if the value of t is less than the negative value of t , then b is statistically significant and we can

Table 3.4 - Results of Regression Analyses By State

<u>State</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>t score</u>	<u>degrees of freedom</u>
Montana	56	-2.42	-2.49	54
Massachusetts	14	-4.01	-2.07	12
Maryland	23	-2.35	-2.40	21
Nebraska	93	-1.00	-2.06	91
Indiana	92	0.839	2.50	90
Pennsylvania	67	1.488	2.66	65
Minnesota	87	3.038	5.75	85
Illinois	102	0.444	1.84	100
Colorado	63	0.975	1.74	61
Kansas	105	0.514	1.45	103
Iowa	99	0.412	0.94	97
Connecticut	8	0.743	0.96	6
Wyoming	23	0.218	0.26	21
Oregon	35	0.564	0.85	33
Idaho	44	1.306	1.58	42

<u>State</u>	<u>values of t</u>			
	<u>at .05 level</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>f score</u>	<u>a</u>
Montana	2.000	.103	6.19	7.19
Massachusetts	2.179	.264	4.30	12.70
Maryland	2.080	.216	5.78	12.00
Nebraska	1.980	.045	4.25	9.37
Indiana	1.980	.065	6.25	1.82
Pennsylvania	2.000	.098	7.08	3.21
Minnesota	2.000	.280	33.05	6.37
Illinois	1.980	.033	3.39	4.96
Colorado	2.000	.047	3.03	5.04
Kansas	1.980	.020	2.11	9.70
Iowa	1.980	.009	0.88	4.44
Connecticut	2.447	.134	0.93	4.21
Wyoming	2.080	.003	0.07	8.76
Oregon	2.042	.022	0.73	4.63
Idaho	2.012	.056	2.49	11.20

reject the null hypothesis. As can be seen from Table 3.4, the null hypothesis can be rejected in the cases of Montana, Maryland, Nebraska, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Minnesota where the values of the t scores fall outside the critical points determined by the positive or negative values of t. This means that in actuality if television does not have an effect on partisan volatility, there are less than five chances in 100 that we would get the t score which we did. Thus, we can have confidence that 95% of the time the rejection of the null hypothesis is warranted in these six states. This is strong support for the two alternate hypotheses that television does have an effect on partisan volatility in these six states. It is important to note however, that in three of the six states where the coefficient for television is statistically significant, it is negative, indicating that television is associated with a decline in partisan volatility scores, not an increase. Thus, in these three states, counties without television have higher partisan volatility scores than counties with television.

Based on the t scores alone, we could conclude that the presence or absence of television is significantly associated with a decline (in the case of the three negative relationships) or an increase (in the case of the three positive relationships) in partisan volatility scores. However, if we go on to examine the r^2 we find

that they are relatively low, ranging from .28 in Minnesota to .045 in Nebraska. These figures indicate that television explains 28% of the variation in partisan volatility scores in Minnesota (quite a low figure), while in Nebraska, television explains a mere 4.5% of the variability in partisan volatility scores. How can this seeming discrepancy between statistically significant bs which indicate that television does help explain some of the variation in partisan volatility and very low r^2 s in the same states be explained? Since r^2 is an expression of the proportion of variation in the dependent variable (partisan volatility) which is explained by its association with the independent variable (television), how can there be statistically significant bs and yet very low r^2 s?

The low explanatory power of television even in the six states where the coefficient for television was found to be statistically significant, can be seen by examining the scatterplots in Figures 3.1 - 3.6. These scatterplots are a visual representation of the relationship between television and no-television and the partisan volatility scores in each of the six states where television was found to be statistically significant. As can be seen from these scatterplots, there is very little clustering of values along the distribution of partisan volatility scores for either the television or the no-television counties. Since there is so much spread in these values, there is going to

be a large amount of error when predictions of partisan volatility scores are made for either the television or no-television counties using the regression equation. For example, in examining the data for Minnesota, according to the regression equation, a partisan volatility score of 6.37 would be predicted for the no-television counties. However, in looking at the distribution of scores in Figure 3.1, we can see that we are going to get large amounts of error if we predict a score of 6.37 for many of the no-television counties. Thus, television by itself is a poor predictor of partisan volatility in the six states between 1968 and 1978. This does not mean however, that it cannot be statistically significant as one of many variables which explain partisan volatility during the years from 1968 to 1978.

One possible explanation for this discrepancy between the predictive power of television as indicated by r^2 's and the statistically significant coefficients for television lies in the nature of the partisan volatility scores. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, the partisan volatility scores were constructed using election returns from a ten year time span (1968-1978). During this time frame, numerous factors such as candidates, political issues, national trends, economic variables etc. probably had an important effect on partisan volatility as reflected in election returns. Most likely, these other variables help

explain a great deal of the variation in partisan volatility. Television is only one variable among many which affected partisan volatility between 1968 and 1978. Thus, even though the television variable may be statistically significant in six states, its ability to predict partisan volatility over a ten year time frame in these six states is quite low because there are so many other factors which affect partisan volatility. Television's explanatory power is therefore quite low as indicated by r^2 's.

The other caveat which must be included in this discussion of the regression analyses is the problem of omitted variables. We have seen that television's coefficient is statistically significant in six states. It may be however, that this statistical significance does not really indicate that television itself is statistically significant. Rather some other variable which is incorporated in the television-no-television dichotomy is really the one which is significant and if we incorporated this unknown variable into the regression analyses, the television variable might not be statistically significant. One obvious possibility in this case is that television may incorporate some elements of the concept of center-periphery and that this is more important in explaining volatility than is television. Even though this is a possibility, an examination of the maps of each state (see

Appendix B) which indicate which counties have in-state television and which do not makes it possible to reject this hypothesis. The counties without television do not appear to be peripheral in any meaningful economic, political or social sense---at least no more so than many counties with television. However, even though we can reject this possibility, there may still be other variables which are incorporated in the television-no-television dichotomy which are the ones which really affect partisan volatility.

The other point which needs to be made is that based on the data which we have, we cannot conclude that television causes either a decline or an increase in the strength of partisanship in Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Indiana, Maryland, Montana or Nebraska. We can conclude that television and increased (or decreased) partisan volatility may be correlated in some states. Whether television causes increased or decreased volatility is something which we cannot answer on the basis of these tests.

One of the most important outcomes of the separate regressions run in the fifteen different states lies in the overall pattern of results. The fact that the television variable is statistically significant in the regressions for some states but not in the regressions for others suggests that television interacts with aspects of the

environments in the six states which tend to enhance or diminish television's effects. We can conclude that the television variable will be statistically significant or not in certain environments depending upon the nature of that environment and how it interacts with television to enhance or depress television's effects. This is an important conclusion because it says that television is not universally important; rather its effects on partisan volatility may vary depending on how it interacts with environmental variables.

This is a reasonable conclusion based on the data which we have up to this point. It is now time however to turn to the two-way analysis of variance to see if this analysis confirms or disconfirms the conclusions drawn so far. One of the major strengths of the two-way analysis of variance is that it specifically addresses the question of whether television does indeed interact with some unknown variables subsumed under the variable "State," (e.g., specification of which of the fifteen states a county is located in) so as to enhance its impact on partisan volatility. This is important because it will specify whether interactive effects---which so far we've only been able to hypothesize about---are in fact important. As it turns out, the two-way analysis of variance strongly supports the notion that television interacts with state environments so that the interactive effects between state

environments and television help explain partisan volatility.

The Two-Way Analysis of Variance

Before discussing the results of the two-way analysis of variance, several points need to be made. First, unlike the tests of means and the regression analyses which were done on state by state basis, the analysis of variance analyzes the entire distribution of partisan volatility scores for all 910 counties in the study. The analysis is not broken down on a state by state basis. Thus, we have one analysis, not fifteen. The analysis of variance considers the impact of the television variable, the impact of "State" (e.g., which of the fifteen states a county is in) and the impact of the interactive effect between "State" and television on the partisan volatility scores for all 910 counties. Basically, the test asks how much of the variation in the entire distribution of partisan volatility scores can be explained by "State" itself, by television-no-television by itself and by the interactive effect of "State" and television. Examining the effects of each of these variables across the whole distribution is one of the major strengths of the two-way analysis of variance. This is particularly important in relation to the television variable because it helps determine if television has a statistically significant impact on

partisan volatility scores irrespective of the states the counties are in. Because both the regression analyses and the tests of means were done on a state by state basis, it is very possible that television has a potentially important impact on partisan volatility across the whole distribution which was missed in the previous analyses. If the two-way analysis of variance indicates that television does have an important impact across the entire distribution, then this would point to a more universal effect of television on partisan volatility and would not support the conclusion drawn so far that television's impact on partisan volatility varies from state to state depending on how it interacts with environmental variables.

The two-way analysis of variance allows us to compare the means of thirty (television and no-television counties in fifteen states e.g., $2 \times 15 = 30$) populations and to ask whether the differences among them are attributable to chance or if the differences among them are large enough so that our three independent variables (State, TV and State*TV) can be considered statistically significant. This is therefore a more sophisticated test than the test of means which allowed us to compare the means of only two populations (television vs. no-television counties in each of fifteen states) and to ask if the differences between them were statistically significant. The data which the two-way analysis of variance analyzes is presented in Table

3.5.

Table 3.5

<u>State</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>NOTV</u>
Montana	n = 46	10
Massachusetts	10	4
Maryland	13	10
Nebraska	67	26
Indiana	71	21
Pennsylvania	57	10
Minnesota	65	22
Illinois	73	29
Colorado	49	14
Kansas	85	20
Iowa	83	16
Connecticut	5	3
Wyoming	13	10
Oregon	27	8
Idaho	30	14

Note: n = the number of counties---and therefore the number of partisan volatility scores---in each cell.

As with our previous analyses, we first need to set up null hypotheses and their alternatives. The first thing we want to inquire into in our two way analysis of variance is

whether television by itself is important in explaining the variation of partisan volatility scores across all 910 counties in the study irrespective of state. According to the hypothesis being tested in this study, counties with television should have higher partisan volatility scores than counties without television. Therefore, the null hypothesis is: $\bar{X}_{TV,910} = \bar{X}_{notTV,910}$. The alternative hypothesis is: $\bar{X}_{TV,910} \neq \bar{X}_{notTV,910}$. A second null hypothesis follows from the general supposition that we would expect to find important differences among the mean partisan volatility scores for each state regardless of whether or not the counties have television. We expect that "State" is important in explaining volatility scores across all 910 counties. Thus, the null hypothesis is: $\bar{X}_1 = \bar{X}_2 = \bar{X}_3 \dots = \bar{X}_{15}$ where the numbers 1-15 represent each of the fifteen states. The alternative hypothesis is: $\bar{X}_1 \neq \bar{X}_2 \neq \bar{X}_3 \dots \neq \bar{X}_{15}$. Finally are the hypotheses regarding the interactive effect between the variables "State" and television (State*TV). Since we expect an interactive effect, our null hypothesis is: $(\bar{X}_{j-15}) * (\bar{X}_{TV}) = (\bar{X}_{j-15}) * (\bar{X}_{notTV})$. Our alternative hypothesis is: $(\bar{X}_{j-15}) * (\bar{X}_{TV}) \neq (\bar{X}_{j-15}) * (\bar{X}_{notTV})$.

Before moving on to the statistical results and an assessment of whether we can reject our null hypotheses, it is useful to report the simple means of the various units noted above. First are the means of all the television and

no-television counties for the entire distribution, e.g.,
 not broken down by state: $\bar{X}_{TV} = 6.745251$ $n = 697$
 $\bar{X}_{notTV} = 6.755357$ $n = 213$

Second are the mean partisan volatility scores for all
 counties in each state:

Table 3.6

<u>State</u>	<u>\bar{X}</u>
Idaho	12.179
Maryland	10.569
Kansas	10.120
Massachusetts	9.581
Wyoming	8.880
Nebraska	8.657
Minnesota	8.601
Colorado	5.799
Illinois	5.275
Montana	5.199
Oregon	5.063
Iowa	4.789
Connecticut	4.677
Pennsylvania	4.498
Indiana	2.462

Third are the means for the television and the no-
 television counties within each state. These figures can

be found earlier in this chapter.

Finally are the results of the two-way analysis of variance itself. Results are as follows:

Table 3.7

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Type IV Sum of Squares</u>	<u>F Value</u>	<u>PR</u>
State	4923.37310579	103.05	0.00
TV	0.17442343	0.05	0.82
State*TV	373.03710920	7.81	0.00

The results of the two-way analysis of variance indicate that a significant amount of variation in the partisan volatility scores across all 910 counties in the study is explained by variation in "State" and by the interactive effect of "State" and the television variable. Very little of the variation however is explained by the television variable alone. The r^2 for the entire model is 0.700734, indicating that the three variables "State," TV and State*TV explain 70.0734% of the variation in partisan volatility scores. When broken down, practically all of the explanatory power is attributable to the variable "State" and to the interactive effects of "State" and television.

The high F values for "State" and State*TV indicate the importance of "State" and of the interactive effects between television and "State" in explaining partisan

volatility scores for the overall sample of counties. The F value of "State" by itself is 103.05 with a probability of such a high F value occurring by chance of 0%. Similarly, the F value for State*TV is 7.81 with a similar probability of such a value occurring by chance of 0%. These results indicate that "State" is the most powerful explanatory variable in the model while State*TV also has considerable explanatory power. In contrast, the explanatory power of the television variable alone is practically nonexistent. This is indicated by the low F value of TV (0.05).

Based on these results, we cannot reject the first null hypothesis ($\bar{X}_{TV,910} = \bar{X}_{notTV,910}$) and must conclude that among all 910 counties in the sample, the television variable is statistically insignificant in explaining partisan volatility. This points to the conclusion that television's impact on partisanship is not universal and that whatever impact it does have is dependent on how it interacts with the environment. In contrast, we can reject the other two null hypotheses--- $\bar{X}_1 = \bar{X}_2 = \bar{X}_3 \dots = \bar{X}_{15}$ and $(\bar{X}_{1-15}) * (\bar{X}_{TV}) = (\bar{X}_{1-15}) * (\bar{X}_{notTV})$. Rejection of these two null hypotheses supports the notion that "State" by itself and the interactive effects of State and television are important in explaining variation in partisan volatility across the entire distribution of counties. This indicates that when television does have an effect on

partisanship it is based on interactive effects.

The results of the two-way analysis of variance and of the regression analyses complement each other nicely. The regression analyses indicate that television has an impact on partisan volatility in six states only. This points to a role for environmental variables in shaping television's effects on partisanship. This conclusion is consistent with a two-way analysis of variance for the entire sample. This investigation suggests that overall the interactive effects between television and state environments provide the most explanatory power vis-a-vis partisan volatility. According to the two-way analysis of variance, television by itself has little explanatory power for the distribution of partisan volatility scores as a whole. These results also complement the results of the tests of means which indicated that the differences between the mean partisan volatility scores for television and no-television counties are statistically significant in five states only. These results again point to interactive effects.

Assessing the Results

One of the major conclusions which can be drawn from the above analyses is that in some states there is an interactive effect between television and some dimensions of the state environment which gives television the effect on partisanship hypothesized in this study. Television

apparently does not have the strong direct effect on partisan volatility which one might suspect. However, it may interact with some environmental variables to affect partisan volatility.

Based on these results, we now need to move on to an exploration of what kinds of environmental variables enhance or diminish the effects of television. First, we need to explore what aspects of state environments in general might affect the relationship between television and partisanship. Second, it seems appropriate to do an in-depth analysis of some states where the findings indicate that there is a demonstrated and reasonably strong relationship between television and partisanship. The advantage of this is that it will help identify more specifically those variables which give television an effect under certain circumstances. This analysis will include a discussion of one state where the relationship between television and partisan volatility is positive and one state where the relationship is negative. Discussion of a state where the relationship between television and partisanship is negative is included because identifying environmental variables which diminish the impact of television is as important as identifying those variables which enhance television's impact. Also included is a discussion of a state where the relationship between television and partisan volatility is statistically

insignificant. This is included because the absence of a television effect is as interesting as the presence of an effect and it can help to identify environmental variables which prevent television from having an effect.

Chapter 4: Examining Interactive Effects

We saw in Chapter 3 that the results of this study indicated that television by itself does not have a significant impact on partisan volatility. It does however have a significant impact under certain circumstances. Our results indicated that the relationship between television and partisan volatility is positively significant in three states, negatively significant in three other states and insignificant in the remaining nine states. It is now time to do an analysis of some of these states in an effort to determine what kinds of environmental variables television interacts with to produce a significant effect on partisanship. Important in this discussion will be an examination of non-television variables which may help explain the pattern of volatility scores which we found in each state. This is important because we need to consider the possibility that it is not television-no-television which accounts for the pattern of volatility scores, but rather other variables which overlap with the television variable. In doing this, we can develop an explanation of the pattern of volatility scores in each state which includes a variety of explanatory variables. We may also be able to determine whether television interacts with these other variables to either accelerate or decelerate its effect on partisanship or whether it really has little

effect at all.

The states selected for the analysis are Minnesota, Maryland and Oregon. Minnesota represents a state where the results of the regression analysis and the test of means indicate a positively significant relationship between television and partisan volatility, e.g., the research hypothesis was confirmed and those counties with in-state television have significantly higher partisan volatility scores than those counties without in-state television. Conversely, in Maryland the relationship between television and partisan volatility is negatively significant, e.g., the research hypothesis was contradicted and those counties without in-state television have higher partisan volatility scores than those counties with in-state television. Finally, in Oregon, the relationship between television and partisanship is insignificant, e.g., the research hypothesis was not confirmed and there is no significant difference between counties with or without in-state television. The rationale for choosing these three states is that in a state where the relationship is positively significant, we may gain some insight into the kinds of circumstances under which television may have an accelerating effect on partisan volatility as the research hypothesis states. Conversely, in Maryland, we can learn what kinds of circumstances may produce a negative relationship between television and partisanship. Finally,

in Oregon where the absence of an effect is just as important as an effect, we may learn what kinds of circumstances inhibit television's effect and diminish differences between television and no-television counties. Hopefully, based on these three case studies, we will be able to make some generalizations about the kinds of circumstances which either accelerate or decelerate television's effect.

In analyzing the effect of television in these three states, we will first look at where the no-television counties are and what kinds of counties they are. Are there unique characteristics of these counties which would help explain the relationship between television and partisanship found in that particular state? Some of the specific questions to be asked are as follows: To what extent does the television-no-television difference between counties overlap and intensify other differences between the counties? Or, are these differences not overlapping? Theoretically, the more other differences overlap with the no-television variable, the greater the differences between the television and no-television counties will be---this might be part of the explanation for significant differences in partisan volatility between the television and no-television counties. One question which falls under this category is the center-periphery issue. Are the counties which do not receive in-state television

peripheral in ways other than the absence of in-state television? If they are, they may be very cut off from state politics in a variety of ways which would help explain the differences in partisan volatility.

A second set of issues which affects the nature of the no-television counties has to do with the nature of the city where the out-of-state television station is located. Is the city where the no-television counties receive television from a large metropolitan area or is it a small city with very little influence over its surrounding area? In the former case, the no-television counties may be dominated by the large metropolitan area in ways other than just television. A large metropolitan city could dominate the no-television counties in the adjacent state in terms of other media such as newspapers and radio. This would tend to further intensify communication and informational differences between the television and no-television counties within the state being analyzed. A large metropolitan area could also dominate the adjacent no-television counties in terms of employment, a factor which might create more identification with the metropolitan area than with the home state. All of these factors would be quite different in the case of a small city which did not have the ability to dominate the surrounding area to the same extent.

A third group of questions has to do with the

political cultures of the states in question. Political culture represents the larger context within which television operates and it has an enormous impact on how voters respond to television and what the absence of it can mean to those voters who do not have it.

One way political culture is important in relation to television and partisanship is that it helps shape voter response to political information from both television and other sources. Political culture can help determine the degree to which voters attend to political communication, how they perceive the political information they expose themselves to, how much they retain and what they subsequently do with it. Political culture also affects how important the role of information is considered in the voting process. States vary tremendously in the salience voters attach to politics, the amount of interest which they have in politics and the degree to which they vote according to issues as opposed to preexisting party loyalties. In states where politics are viewed as salient and where voters are heavily interested in politics and policy outcomes, one could hypothesize a greater role for political communication than in states where voters are indifferent to politics. Also important in shaping the impact of communication are the reasons why voters are interested in politics. States can vary significantly in this respect: voters may be interested in politics because

the environment is heavily partisan and/or competitive or because they are interested in issues and policy outcomes. The reasons voters are interested in politics can affect their response to political information.

The above are political culture variables which influence voter attitudes toward political information. These factors have a major impact on how attentive voters are to political information, which media sources they attend to, how much information they actually retain and what they do with it. If voters are attentive to political information and retain significant amounts of it, then the influence of information sources is increased. Thus, political culture affects the information-partisanship relationship by affecting the way in which voters receive--or don't receive ---political information and what they subsequently do with it.

Another dimension of political culture's impact on the television-partisanship relationship is that the political culture of a state is likely to influence the form and content of political television. The way in which politicians and parties use television, the kinds of messages they send and the degree to which candidates use television as a major campaign vehicle (as opposed to party organizations and more traditional forms of political communication) would all be partially shaped by political culture. Political culture would also be reflected in the

approach of reporters and news media towards political events and news. The way they interpret political events, the style in which events are reported and the amount of time devoted to political news may be a partial reflection of the political culture of that state.

Thus, political culture affects the television-voter partisanship relationship at two points: it shapes the television variable by influencing the amount and the nature of political information presented to the voter. "Television" is therefore a somewhat different variable from state to state. Political culture also affects the way in which voters receive the messages which are sent.

Closely related to the above is a third variable which can vary significantly from state to state: the journalistic culture of a state and how this might influence the form and content of political news. Most important in this vein is how much attention is paid to issues and to in-depth reporting and analysis; how much time over and above the regular news is given to election specials, candidate debates etc. Thus, the journalistic culture of a state can seriously affect the television end of the television-partisanship relationship.

It's now time to turn to an analysis of the three states to see how some of these variables operate in specific contexts.

Maryland

The state of Maryland is one of the states where the findings of this study indicate that the relationship between television and partisanship is the reverse of the research hypothesis---e.g., counties without television have statistically higher partisan volatility scores than do the counties with television. The discussion which follows will give us some insight into what unique characteristics of the no-television counties and of the state of Maryland make this so.

The first thing to do is to lay out the relevant facts about Maryland. Maryland is a very volatile state, second only to Idaho in this study. Partisan volatility scores range from 4.84 to 15.27 with a mean volatility score of 10.569. Maryland has 23 counties, nine of which receive television from out of state. Of these nine counties, all but one receives television from Washington, D.C. The other county, Garrett County, receives its television from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Below is a list of all counties, their partisan volatility scores and which city they receive television from. The actual location of these counties can be seen on the map of Maryland located in Appendix B. Also listed below are the mean partisan volatility scores for several subgroups of counties.

Table 4.1

<u>County</u>	<u>Volatility Score</u>	<u>Where Receive TV From</u>
Garrett	10.12	Pittsburgh, PA
Allegheny	11.86	Washington, D.C.
Washington	11.87	Washington, D.C.
Frederick	15.00	Washington, D.C.
Montgomery	15.27	Washington, D.C.
Prince Georges	10.51	Washington, D.C.
Charles	9.89	Washington, D.C.
Calvert	11.32	Washington, D.C.
St. Mary's	12.12	Washington, D.C.
Wicomico	8.00	Salisbury, MD
Somerset	9.26	Salisbury, MD
Worcester	10.43	Salisbury, MD
Carroll	9.56	Baltimore, MD
Howard	9.83	Baltimore, MD
Anne Arundel	4.84	Baltimore, MD
Baltimore County	9.97	Baltimore, MD
Harford	5.76	Baltimore, MD
Cecil	8.81	Baltimore, MD
Kent	10.85	Baltimore, MD
Queen Anne's	9.68	Baltimore, MD
Caroline	13.49	Baltimore, MD
Talbot	10.43	Baltimore, MD
Dorchester	14.13	Baltimore, MD

\bar{X} (Washington, D.C. ADI) = 12.23 \bar{X} (Salisbury, MD ADI) = 9.23

$$\bar{X}(\text{Baltimore, MD ADI}) = 9.37 \quad \bar{X}(\text{TV}) = 9.60 \quad \bar{X}(\text{NOTV}) = 11.95$$

The first notable feature of the above table showing the television and no-television counties of Maryland is that eight of the nine no-television counties receive their television from Washington, D.C. Within this no-television group are the three counties of southern Maryland--- Charles, St. Mary's and Calvert---the two suburban Washington, D.C. counties---Montgomery and Prince Georges ---and the rural, mountainous counties of the western panhandle---Frederick, Washington and Allegany. These eight counties share the two characteristics of relatively high volatility and of receiving television from Washington, D.C. Other than this, they have relatively little in common. In spite of their differences however, does the fact that they receive television from Washington, the nation's capital, have a similar effect on partisan volatility in all eight counties? Does the fact that eight of the nine no-television counties receive their television from Washington, as opposed to another city, help explain the negative relationship between television and partisanship found in Maryland?

Based on these larger questions, the first question to ask is what is the effect on voting patterns and partisan volatility of receiving television from the nation's capital? Is it possible that voters who receive television

from Washington identify more closely with national trends when making an electoral decision at the state level than they would if they received television from within the state? Rather than voting in accordance with statewide issues or state political patterns and culture which might tend to have a levelling effect from election to election, the voters in these counties may be responding more to national issues and trends. One might find much less of a "standing decision" in these counties and the effects of state political patterns and political culture could be diminished. Under these circumstances, volatility may tend to increase. This factor would be accentuated if voters in these counties were also tied to other media emanating from Washington such as radio and newspapers. This would further cut them off from Maryland state politics and increase their identification with national trends. Interesting in this respect is that Garrett County which receives its television from Pittsburgh has the next to lowest partisan volatility score within the no-television group. Perhaps since it is not tied so heavily into the national community, voting patterns are more in line with local political traditions and reflect more of a "standing decision"---with a subsequent decrease in partisan volatility.

One specific example which illustrates the effect on voting of receiving television from Washington as

hypothesized above is a greater measure of support for incumbent senators in the counties which receive television from Washington than in the counties of the rest of Maryland. This can be seen by examining Table 4.2 below which gives the mean percent of the vote given to the incumbent senator---be he winner or loser, Democrat or Republican---in three different groups of counties: all no-television counties, counties which receive television from Washington, and all television counties in Maryland. In three out of four of these elections, the incumbent senator got a greater percent of the vote in counties receiving television from Washington than he did in the Maryland television counties. The margin was rather large in 1970 and 1974, but relatively small in 1968, and in 1976 the incumbent received a smaller percentage of votes in the Washington television counties.

Table 4.2: Percent of the Vote Given to the

	<u>Incumbent Senator</u>			
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>
NOTV Counties	33.9%	39.4%	68.4%	49.1%
Wash. TV Counties	35.3%	41.9%	67.5%	46.8%
TV Counties	33.6%	32.6%	56.0%	47.9%

In 1968, Charles Mathias, Republican, defeated the Democratic incumbent; in 1970, Republican Beall defeated Tydings, the Democratic incumbent; in 1974, Charles

Mathias, incumbent, was re-elected; and in 1976, Paul Sarbanes, Democrat, defeated incumbent Beall.

Although these are too few elections to make any sound generalizations from, the pattern of outcomes is suggestive. It suggests a greater level of support for incumbent senators among Maryland voters in the Washington, D. C. ADI. It may be that voters who receive television from Washington get more positive information about senators in that the information may deal with senators performing their duties rather than just with senators trying to win re-election. This more positive image could translate into more votes. Voters may also respond more to senators' positions on national and international issues rather than just their positions on state issues. This may differ considerably from voters who receive television from within Maryland and it may result in more variability from election to election.

Another possible explanation for the pattern of election outcomes in Table 4.2 has to do with the effect of incumbency on voter decisions. It is hypothesized in the literature on electoral decisions that in the absence of other information, voters will often cast their vote for the incumbent. In this sense, incumbency has taken over one of the functions of partisan identification. Thus, if voters in the counties which receive television from

Washington are not receiving adequate information about the candidates, they may be more inclined to vote for the incumbent. This would result in increased volatility since voters would not be voting according to partisan identification. This is an important hypothesis because it implies that television offers the challenger in an election a greater chance of winning since he can use television to communicate with large numbers of voters. Thus an incumbent may be much more vulnerable in television counties than in no-television counties. This hypothesis is further supported by Table 4.3 which outlines the mean percentage of the vote given to incumbents in both gubernatorial and senatorial elections. As can be seen from this table, the incumbents did better in the Washington television counties than they did in the television counties in all elections except one. Again, this is too small a sample of elections to draw any firm conclusions from, but it is certainly a hypothesis which merits further consideration.

Table 4.3: Percent of the Vote Given to the Incumbent

	<u>1968 Sen</u>	<u>1970 Sen</u>	<u>1970 Gov</u>	<u>1974 Gov</u>
NOTV Counties	33.9%	39.4%	58.0%	59.4%
Wash. TV				
Counties	35.3%	41.9%	59.3%	61.5%
TV Counties	33.6%	32.6%	58.5%	53.9%

	<u>1974 Sen</u>	<u>1976 Sen</u>
NOTV Counties	68.4%	49.1%
Wash. TV		
Counties	67.5%	46.8%
TV Counties	56.0%	47.9%

Note: In the 1978 gubernatorial election, no incumbent was running.

Before moving on, it's important to note that the above pattern of outcomes changes somewhat if one examines all the no-television counties rather than just the Washington television counties. As will be discussed more fully below, Garrett County which is the only no-television county which does not receive its television from Washington, has a strong Republican tradition and almost always votes for the Republican candidate. In fact, Garrett County went Republican in all seven elections in this study. Thus, Garrett County is somewhat unique in Maryland in that the strength of its political tradition ~~and its traditional pattern of party identification tends~~ to override other factors.

The above discussion deals with potential effects of receiving television from Washington, D.C. on all the counties in the Washington ADI. However, within the Washington ADI are three important subgroups of counties

which merit specific attention. The first of these is Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties which are part of suburban Washington. What sets these two counties apart from the other counties in the Washington ADI is that in addition to television they are heavily tied to the Washington community through employment and physical proximity. These two counties are probably more closely identified with Washington than they are with Maryland.

Montgomery County with a partisan volatility score of 15.27 is the most volatile county in all of Maryland. It is also unique in other ways however, ways which may contribute to an explanation of its high partisan volatility and which may compound and interact with the no-television characteristic. The population of Montgomery County is extremely wealthy, educated, professional and sophisticated. The suburbs of Montgomery County have the highest median incomes in the country due in part to the increase in civil service salaries (Barone, p. 507). In addition to civil servants, the suburbs of Montgomery County are heavily populated by private lawyers, lobbyists, consultants, trade association executives, and government contractors. Also important in Montgomery County are doctors, statisticians and other highly paid experts who work in federal institutions such as the National Institutes of Health which are based in Maryland (Barone, p. 507). Finally, many members of Congress live in the

Maryland suburbs. This is therefore an extremely sophisticated, affluent and well educated population.

These socioeconomic characteristics by themselves help explain a great deal of the partisan volatility found in Montgomery County for it is this group of voters which tends to move easily across party lines and to vote according to the issues and personalities involved in a specific election. In addition, the fact that these people are so heavily tied to the Washington community through employment and other interests, would tend to make them much more sensitive to issues which are essentially outside the arena of Maryland state politics and which are much more national in character. We could surmise that these kinds of characteristics would tend to increase volatility and would cause these voters to vote differently from voters in other parts of Maryland. To top it off, these voters receive television news from Washington, D.C., further tying them to the Washington community and cutting them off from Maryland state politics. It's also reasonable to assume that a large number of the voters in Montgomery County rely on Washington based newspapers and radio stations for additional information---this would further cut them off from Maryland state politics.

The second Maryland county which comprises suburban Washington is Prince Georges County with a partisan volatility score of 10.51. Prince Georges County is very

similar to Montgomery County although "not quite so much." The population of Prince Georges County is less educated, less affluent and less professional. It is however, by most standards, quite well-to-do based on the high salaries paid to federal employees. Thirty-eight percent of the work force of Prince Georges is employed by the federal government. As one source noted: "This is the land of the inconspicuous bureaucrats, the lower- and middle-level federal employees who work behind the grey walls and glass partitions of Washington, D.C. Each morning, they jam into subway trains or inch down New York Avenue in their cars, heading for one of the many agencies in the capital. At night they return to a suburbia of postwar tract housing" (State Politics and Redistricting, p. 8).

Although Prince Georges is considerably less volatile than Montgomery County, it is still a volatile county. As with Montgomery County, much of the explanation for this lies in the socioeconomic character of the county and in the fact that it is so heavily tied to the Washington community both geographically and in terms of interests. One very interesting and important difference between the two counties however which helps explain the difference in the partisan volatility scores is the fact that Prince Georges has a very large black population which tends to vote heavily Democratic. The black population of Prince Georges is the result of a large migration of blacks out of

Washington proper during the late 1960s and 1970s. At this time, the black percentage of the population rose from 15% to 37%. The black population is very similar to its white counterpart on most socioeconomic and demographic indicators. They are however very different politically: almost all of the blacks in Prince Georges County are Democratic and vote accordingly. This factor reduces the aggregate partisan volatility score for Prince Georges County and helps explain the difference in partisan volatility between Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties.

One of the major points about Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties is that they are heavily tied to the Washington community in a variety of ways and that this fact may help explain partisan volatility. Interesting in this regard is that in the senatorial election of 1970, Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties were the only two counties in all of Maryland to be carried by the Democratic incumbent, Tydings. Tydings carried Montgomery by a 56-43 margin and Prince Georges by a 53-46 margin in a statewide election where Tydings was soundly beaten by Republican Beall.

Also receiving television from Washington, D.C. are the three counties of southern Maryland---Charles, Calvert and St. Mary's with partisan volatility scores of 9.89, 11.32 and 12.12 respectively. These three counties are not part of the Washington suburbs and they have a decidedly

rural and southern quality. These counties also have a large Catholic population and they have a Democratic registration which is deceptively high because many elections go to the Republicans. This latter characteristic of frequent crossing of party lines probably helps explain why volatility is high in these three counties. At this juncture however, the role that the lack of in-state television plays is not clear. Does it somehow enhance partisan instability in an area which is already volatile?

The three counties of western Maryland---Allegany, Washington and Frederick---form a third subgroup within the Washington, D.C. ADI. This area was settled by Pennsylvania Dutch and Scots-Irish families during its early history and it resembles neighboring Pennsylvania and West Virginia more than it does other parts of Maryland. The people who settled this area brought a strong Republican tradition with them which is unique in largely Democratic Maryland. Most people are however registered Democrats although the margin of Democrats to Republicans is not nearly as great as in the rest of Maryland. These so-called Democrats usually vote Republican in the November elections. What's surprising about these three counties is that they are as volatile as they are---with such a strong Republican tradition, one would expect lower volatility scores. How might the absence of in-state television fit

into this?

The final county among the no-television counties of Maryland is Garrett County of extreme western Maryland. Garrett County has a partisan volatility score of 10.12 and receives its television from Pittsburgh. Garrett County is the only county in Maryland where registered Republicans outnumber registered Democrats. Election returns generally reflect this heavily Republican tradition. This is a very rural and conservative county with no central cities of any importance.

What's most striking about Garrett County is that it is heavily isolated from the rest of Maryland both by geography and by political tradition. This is accentuated by the fact that it is the only county in Maryland to receive its television from Pittsburgh. It would be a reasonable assumption that there is practically no information on Pittsburgh television about Maryland politics and elections and that candidates would be unlikely to run television ads on Pittsburgh television to reach the very few voters in Garrett County. This contrasts with Washington television which may run some information about Maryland politics since there is such a large audience for it and where political advertisements designed to reach Maryland voters are quite common. Given this absence of outside influence, Garrett County probably relies more heavily on political tradition and partisan

identification when making its electoral decisions. In line with this, Garrett County's partisan volatility score of 10.12 is the second lowest of all the no-television counties of Maryland. However, a partisan volatility score of 10.12 is still relatively high and it is higher than nine of the television counties of Maryland. Thus, an important question to ask is why is partisan volatility as high as it is in a county where other indicators would lead us to expect partisan volatility to be lower.

Up to this point, we have discussed specific no-television counties and groups of counties in an effort to determine why the no-television counties have significantly higher partisan volatility scores than television counties in Maryland. One of the major points to emerge from this discussion is that voters who receive their news from Washington, D.C. are more volatile than those who do not because they are tied into the national community, national issues and trends in such a way as to increase their partisan volatility. It is now time to put the discussion of counties into the larger context of Maryland politics and political culture to see if we can add to the explanation of the relationship between television and volatility in Maryland. Important in this discussion will be an examination of non-television variables to determine if they help explain the overall pattern of volatility scores found in Maryland. We can then determine if

television interacts with these variables or if they operate independently.

Maryland: The Political Context

Perhaps the major feature of Maryland state politics which shapes the partisan identification and voting patterns of Maryland voters is the fact that, in addition to the Republican Party, there are two Democratic parties. One of these Democratic parties is located in Baltimore City and is the party of the New Deal. The other Democratic party is the party of Tidewater Maryland. It is a product of the Democratic Party of the Civil War and its center is the rural Eastern Shore. These two Democratic parties appeal to very different coalitions of voters. The first Democratic party appeals to the labor vote, blacks, immigrants and white liberals. The second Democratic party appeals to conservative rural and protestant voters whose opinions are rooted in the pre-Civil War South. Although these two parties both call themselves Democrats, the differences between them are enormous and they cause strains which make it difficult for them to work together. It is also extremely difficult for the party to find candidates who can appeal to both wings of the party and successfully win an election. It is these contradictions within the Democratic Party which help explain increasing Republican strength within Maryland. Many conservative

Republican candidates receive large numbers of votes from the Democrats of Tidewater Maryland who would prefer to vote for a candidate who is closer ideologically to their own position than is the Democratic nominee. Similarly, many voters of the Democratic Party located outside of Tidewater Maryland would prefer to vote for a liberal Republican than for a Democrat who represents the views of Tidewater Maryland. Thus, a Democratic partisan identification says relatively little about how a voter will actually vote since the party frequently does not represent the issue position or ideological stance of large numbers of Democratic identifiers. Such "difficult fits" mean that voters frequently need to cross party lines in order to support a candidate who more clearly represents their ideological views and issue positions. These strains within the Democratic Party and the frequent Republican voting of many Democratic identifiers help explain the extremely high volatility scores found in all parts of Maryland. As was noted earlier, Maryland has a mean volatility score of 10.569 and is the second most volatile state examined in this study. What the general political situation within Maryland does not explain however is why the counties without in-state television have higher volatility scores than do the television counties.

In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party has fewer internal contradictions. Republican

strength is centered in western Maryland where the hill and farm people have a long Republican tradition. These people had few slaves at the time of the Civil War and they strongly supported the Union. Also important is that many settlers in this region initially came from northern states. The other center of Republican strength is in Baltimore City where they are supported by very different groups of voters than are the Democrats (See Fenton, 1957 for a more detailed discussion of the political situation in Maryland).

What's interesting about this description of Republican areas of strength is that it would lead one to believe that the western counties of Maryland would have relatively low volatility scores based on a strong Republican tradition which would lead to relatively consistent Republican voting. However, the volatility scores developed in this study do not support this notion: Garrett, Allegany, Washington and Frederick counties have volatility scores of 10.12, 11.86, 11.87 and 15.00 respectively. These scores are generally higher than scores in the television counties of Maryland and Frederick County has the second highest volatility score in the state. What accounts for these volatility scores in an area which is termed a Republican stronghold is not at all clear. Is the absence of in-state television partially responsible for these relatively high scores? The answer

to this is extremely difficult to determine.

What emerges from this very brief description of political parties and their bases of support in Maryland is a party system which lacks any statewide coherence or internal consistency. The diversity of interests which the parties attempt to accommodate within the bounds of a two party system mean that the lines of party cleavage are extremely fuzzy and voters frequently need to cross party lines to find a candidate who represents their ideological and issue positions. Although much more true of the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, neither party has a coherent ideological stance or consistent position on the issues, and their bases of support shift constantly from election to election depending on the issues and the candidates. There has however been growing Republican strength within Maryland based on their ability to attract conservative Democratic voters. Similarly, liberal Republican candidates like Charles Mathias attract large numbers of liberal Democrats. This pattern of "triangular" cleavage undoubtedly contributes to the extremely high partisan volatility found in Maryland.

As if political and ideological differences between different regions of Maryland were not enough, a second major feature of Maryland is an extreme heterogeneity which springs from the diversity of the various regions of Maryland. This further contributes to---and in some senses

is a cause of---the fractured political picture in Maryland. We've already seen that there are three very different groups of counties within the no-television counties of Maryland. The first group are those counties of western Maryland. This group of counties has a unique political tradition and is physically quite different from the rest of Maryland. Second are the counties of suburban Washington, D.C. with their very high socioeconomic status. And third are the rural counties of southern Maryland. Within the television counties of Maryland there is urban Baltimore with all the modern urban problems of any large metropolis. Surrounding Baltimore proper is a second huge collection of suburbs located largely in Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County. Finally is the Eastern Shore, a rural, isolated and traditional area which resembles the deep South. The counties of the Eastern Shore closely resemble those of southern Maryland and together they comprise the First Congressional District of Maryland.

Within these various areas of Maryland are very different political traditions. As was noted above, the political traditions of the Eastern Shore and southern Maryland are very similar to those of the Deep South. Voters in these areas have long been tied to the Democratic Party of the Civil War era although they have frequently deserted the Democratic Party since the liberal reforms of the New Deal. In contrast, the city of Baltimore has large

ethnic and black constituencies and closely resembles other big East Coast cities. The heavy industry located within the city attracted a large number of second wave immigrants in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as well as a large black migration from rural Maryland and other parts of the South. These groups are strongly Democratic and they form the base of one of the wings of the Democratic Party within Maryland.

Within the suburban Baltimore area are Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County. Baltimore County is a white, blue collar constituency which although somewhat conservative, is loyally Democratic in most elections. In contrast, Anne Arundel County is quite diverse and can be divided into four distinct areas. First is a southern section where tobacco farmers and Chesapeake Bay watermen are ideologically similar to residents of the Eastern Shore. In the middle of Anne Arundel County is Annapolis which, with its surrounding areas, is rather densely populated. Within the Annapolis area are a large number of government workers since Annapolis is both the county seat and the state capital. The area also contains a large black population and a growing number of young urban professionals. North of Annapolis, the more well-to-do suburbs of Baltimore begin. Many corporate executives live in this area and Republicans are usually in control. Finally, closest to Baltimore City are the less prosperous

suburbs of Anne Arundel County. This section of the county is populated by blue collar Democrats (State Politics and Re-Districting, p. 8).

The other two distinct areas of Maryland are suburban Washington and the western panhandle. These areas have already been discussed. What is most striking about this brief discussion of the various areas of Maryland is the extreme diversity located within the borders of one state. As one author described this diversity: "Looking at Maryland on a map of the United States, you would hardly think that this small state was so diverse. ... [Within its borders] you move from the south-of-the Mason-Dixon Line Eastern Shore, through the booming suburbs (and some dreary ones) of Baltimore and Washington, and up into the Appalachian Mountains. Tiny Maryland has just about every kind of people---northerners and southerners, blacks and ethnics, civil servants and Chesapeake Bay watermen---almost all the diversity of the United States compressed into one small package" (Barone, p. 507).

The extreme diversity of Maryland coupled with the contradictions within the Democratic Party has made it very difficult for the state to establish a single identity. Politically, this diversity has created political parties which have practically no statewide coherence and which try to gain the support of very different groups of voters. This is most pronounced within the Democratic Party. Thus

although many voters call themselves Democrats, they support the Democratic Party for very different reasons and they easily cross party lines in order to support a candidate who more closely represents their own views. In this environment, a Democratic Party identification says little about how voters actually vote. In light of these circumstances, it is not surprising that Maryland's partisanship is as volatile as it is. What's not totally clear however is why those counties which receive television from out of state are even more volatile than those counties which receive television from within Maryland. This question deserves some attention since it is key to our understanding of television's effects. Is it simple coincidence that the no-television counties have higher volatility scores than the television counties? Are there some variables unrelated to television which explain the higher scores in the no-television counties? If this is so, the explanation is not readily apparent at this point. Or finally, do certain aspects of Maryland's political context, the specific characteristics of the no-television counties and the absence of television within these counties interact so as to produce the outcome which we have. At this point, the latter explanation seems most convincing.

What is most striking about the case of Maryland is that it combines three features which may very well be

related and which may be part of the explanation for higher volatility scores in the no-television counties. First, it is a state which lacks statewide political coherence and which is extremely diverse in a political, geographic and socioeconomic sense; second, almost all of the no-television counties get their television from Washington, a large metropolitan area with the ability to dominate surrounding areas in a variety of ways, all of which have been discussed above; and third, it is one of the states where the relationship between partisanship and television is negative. What's interesting about this particular convergence of circumstances is that because the no-television counties are not part of a Maryland based communication network, perhaps they are even less a part of an entity called "Maryland" than are the television counties and they are perhaps more easily pulled into another arena, in this case Washington, D.C. (It's important to remember here that the no-television counties are probably also dominated by other types of media emanating from Washington.). Because the voters in the no-television counties lack easy access to information about Maryland politics in general and about the specific issues and candidates in a particular election, they may be outside the mainstream of Maryland politics and their views of Maryland parties and politics may be even more fractured than the views of voters within the television counties.

Without any coherent underlying political culture to guide them, with partisan identifications which say little about underlying ideological concerns, with a Democratic Party which is very loosely organized in order to accommodate such diversity, and with television and other forms of information coming from a large out-of-state metropolitan area, voters in the no-television counties may vote solely on the basis of issues and candidates in each election. These circumstances could contribute to significant partisan instability and large amounts of volatility from election to election---which is indeed the case.

This particular set of circumstances would be exacerbated as television increasingly becomes the vehicle through which campaigns are conducted. As television's role in election campaigns increases, those voters without television may be increasingly left out of election campaigns and may have to vote on the basis of different information---or little information---than those voters who do receive in-state television. Without strong preexisting party loyalties to anchor these voters, one result may be greater partisan volatility. In contrast, in a state as diverse and politically fractured as Maryland, television's availability to parties and to candidates to communicate with voters and to mobilize them may have a unifying effect which may result in less volatility from election to election. Without this "unifying" medium, voters in the

no-television counties may have a less stable basis upon which to make electoral choices and they may constantly shift parties from election to election. Thus, we could argue that a possible effect of television in a state like Maryland may be one of shoring up bases of party support, helping to mobilize voters and helping to communicate some kind of coherent political message both about the parties in general and about the specific candidates and issues in a particular election. This may tend to reduce volatility somewhat and might help account for the differences in volatility between television and no-television counties. This argument is similar to the argument that at the national level, television has nationalized politics--- i.e., a candidate for national office can't say one thing in Georgia on Tuesday and something totally different in New York on Wednesday. Thus, voters in all regions of the U.S. receive a similar political message, a fact which tends to downplay regional and group interests and to increase a sense of political coherence and of belonging to a larger political entity. Could something similar be happening in Maryland? Although this argument is very speculative, it does take into account the convergence of several unique circumstances in Maryland. It also answers the question of why volatility scores are higher in the no-television counties when no other explanation is readily apparent. Finally, it helps deal with the puzzle of why

volatility scores in the western counties are as high as they are when other indicators would lead one to predict lower scores. This question was raised above.

This particular explanation of the pattern of volatility scores found in Maryland does not argue for a general explanation for how television affects partisan volatility in a variety of environments. What we do have in Maryland is a unique set of circumstances which converge to produce significantly higher volatility scores in the no-television counties of Maryland than in the television counties. This set of circumstances may not occur in any other state. The explanation does however argue rather well for interactive effects. In this case, we have the interaction between a general political context of extreme diversity and lack of coherence and no-television counties which receive television from a large out-of-state metropolitan area. This out-of-state metropolitan area may dominate the no-television counties in a variety of media and non-media ways and pull them even further from "Maryland." The result may be increased volatility. On the flip side of the coin, we could argue that within a state as diverse and fractured as Maryland, television could play a unifying role which would become more important as television plays an increasingly important role in political campaigns. Television provides an opportunity for parties and politicians to communicate a

coherent political message to diverse groups of Maryland voters. This unifying role could decrease volatility---an effect which would be absent in the no-television counties.

Minnesota

Minnesota is one of the states where the findings of this study strongly support the research hypothesis---e.g., counties with television have significantly higher partisan volatility scores than counties without television. The interesting thing about Minnesota is tht it is a "perfect fit" with the research hypothesis in that the political culture of Minnesota emphasizes the importance of information about issues and then voting in accordance with those issues. Because Minnesotans tend to vote the issues and the candidates rather than their partisan identification, they need considerable information about the issues and the candidates. In this environment, the media plays an important role. As we will see later in this discussion, the larger context of Minnesota's political culture is an important factor in explaining the research findings.

As with the disscussion of Maryland, the first task is to set forth the relevant facts about Minnesota. Minnesota is a relatively volatile state with a mean volatility score of 8.6. Scores range from 1.95 to 13.6 wnd within this range scores are spread relatively evenly---e.g., there is

no particular clustering of scores at a particular point within this range. In this it is similar to Maryland and both states have practically identical standard deviations ---2.52 for Maryland and 2.55 for Minnesota. Minnesota has 87 counties, 22 of which receive television from outside of Minnesota. Of these 22, 14 counties in the northwest corner of Minnesota receive television from Fargo, North Dakota; six counties in the southwest corner of Minnesota receive television from Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota; and two counties in the southeast corner of the state receive television from La Crosse-Eau Claire, Wisconsin. Below is a list of all 87 counties, their partisan volatility scores and the city they receive television from. The actual location of these counties can be seen on the map in Appendix B where all no-television counties are marked with cross-hatching. Also listed below are the mean partisan volatility scores for several subgroups of counties.

Table 4.4

<u>County</u>	<u>Par. Vol. Score</u>	<u>Where Receive TV From</u>
Becker	8.90	Fargo, ND
Clay	5.31	"
Clearwater	5.85	"
Kittson	5.36	"
Lake of the Woods	2.83	"

Mahnomen	4.66	Fargo, ND
Marshall	2.95	"
Otter Tail	4.99	"
Norman	9.42	"
Pennington	5.86	"
Polk	9.96	"
Red Lake	3.85	"
Roseau	9.06	"
Wilkin	6.35	"
Big Stone	7.26	Sioux Falls-Mitchell, SD
Lincoln	4.54	"
Murray	5.61	"
Nobles	7.76	"
Pipestone	9.31	"
Rock	5.57	"
Houston	3.21	La Crosse-Eau Claire, WI
Winona	9.88	"
Aitkin	7.37	Duluth, MN
Carlton	9.12	"
Cook	7.62	"
Itasca	8.34	"
Koochiching	8.41	"
Lake	7.71	"
St. Louis	7.16	"
Beltrami	6.60	Alexandria, MN
Cass	9.11	"

Crow Wing	8.46	Alexandria, MN
Douglas	7.25	"
Grant	7.00	"
Hubbard	6.28	"
Lac Qui Parle	8.62	"
Pope	10.87	"
Stevens	8.65	"
Swift	10.33	"
Todd	11.75	"
Traverse	5.05	"
Wadena	9.16	"
Dodge	13.08	Rochester, MN
Faribault	11.96	"
Fillmore	9.64	"
Freeborn	11.16	"
Mower	10.76	"
Olmstead	10.82	"
Blue Earth	9.95	Mankato, MN
Cotton Wood	11.01	"
Jackson	9.32	"
Martin	10.28	"
Anoka	11.53	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
Benton	10.82	"
Brown	10.13	"
Carver	12.44	"
Chippewa	9.12	"

Chisago	10.92	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
Dakota	1.95	"
Goodhue	10.23	"
Hennepin	8.60	"
Isanti	11.20	"
Kanabec	7.80	"
Kandiyohi	10.44	"
Le Seur	8.71	"
Lyon	8.00	"
McLeod	10.37	"
Meeker	10.51	"
Mille Lacs	12.13	"
Morrison	9.11	"
Nicollet	7.39	"
Pine	10.04	"
Ramsey	9.08	"
Redwood	8.11	"
Renville	10.29	"
Rice	9.65	"
Scott	10.35	"
Sherburne	10.79	"
Sibley	10.99	"
Stearns	10.79	"
Steele	12.59	"
Wabasha	13.57	"
Waseca	9.25	"

Washington	8.19	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
Wantonwan	9.36	"
Wright	10.33	"
Yellow Medicine	2.66	"
\bar{X} (Fargo) = 6.09	\bar{X} (Wisconsin) = 6.54	\bar{X} (S.D.) = 6.67
\bar{X} (Duluth) = 7.96	\bar{X} (Alexandria) = 8.39	\bar{X} (Mankato) =
10.14	\bar{X} (Rochester) = 11.23	\bar{X} (Minn.-St.Paul) = 9.64
\bar{X} (TV) = 9.38	\bar{X} (NOTV) = 6.12	

As we did with Maryland, it is useful to subdivide Minnesota into groups of counties based on where they receive their television from and to identify characteristics of these subgroups in an effort to explain the relationship between television and partisanship found in Minnesota. Also useful is to compare various groups of counties on a variety of factors in an effort to isolate the effects of television.

The first group of counties are those within the Fargo, North Dakota ADI with a mean partisan volatility score of 6.09. This group of counties is located in the northwest section of Minnesota, it is very sparsely populated and it is geographically removed from the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Physically, the region is covered by lakes, forests and wheat fields and the economy is dominated by wheat farming. What's most striking about this set of counties is its isolation due to

its very low population density, lack of any major urban areas, distance from Minneapolis-St. Paul and absence of in-state television. Also important is that there is no major daily newspaper published in the entire region. However, Fargo, North Dakota does have a daily newspaper and it may be that the voters of this region not only listen to Fargo television but also read a Fargo newspaper. Because of its remoteness and its lack of either an in-state television station or a daily newspaper, it may be difficult for the people of this region to gather information about Minnesota politics and elections. It may also be that candidates would find it difficult to reach voters here during an election campaign due to the absence of an effective communication system. Also important is that the sparse population would mean that candidates would not find it worthwhile to spend valuable resources reaching these voters during a campaign. All of these factors would tend to further isolate the voters in this region and may force them to rely heavily on partisan identification when making an electoral choice---hence the relatively low partisan volatility scores for the counties within this region. What's important to note is that the absence of television overlaps with other factors which also tend to isolate this group of counties.

It is quite instructive to compare the counties within the Fargo, North Dakota ADI with those in the Alexandria,

Minnesota ADI which have a mean partisan volatility score of 8.39. These two sets of counties are very similar in a socioeconomic sense, but they do differ on whether they receive in-state or out-of-state television. These two sets of counties are located adjacent to each other in the northern tier of Minnesota (see map in Appendix B), they are both very sparsely populated---the two areas together have 32% of the land area of Minnesota and only 12% of the population---and they are similarly removed from the Twin Cities area. They are also physically and economically similar in that both areas are covered by wheat fields, lakes and forests and the economies of both areas are dominated by wheat farming. With so much in common, one would not expect such a discrepancy in partisan volatility scores. A partial explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the fact that the counties within the Alexandria ADI receive more information from television about Minnesota state politics and elections than do those counties within the Fargo ADI. Thus, voters in the Alexandria ADI may be more able to leave their partisan identification and vote according to the issues and the candidates at election time since they have the appropriate information. Interestingly, there is no daily newspaper published in the Alexandria ADI and in this it is similar to the Fargo ADI. We do not know however if newspapers from other parts of Minnesota circulate in these two areas.

The second set of counties which receives television from out of state are those within the Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota ADI. These counties have a mean partisan volatility score of 6.67. Probably the best approach to understanding the effects of the absence of in-state television in this area is to compare it with the counties located within the Mankato, Minnesota ADI. This latter group of counties has a mean partisan volatility score of 10.14 and is located adjacent to the Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota ADI in the southwest corner of Minnesota. These two groups of counties are geographically similar; historically they have similar patterns of settlement and political traditions and the economies of both areas are dominated by wheat farming. Also important is that both areas have a daily newspaper: The Free Press is published daily in Mankato and the Worthington Globe is published daily in Worthington in Nobles County (Sioux Falls-Mitchell, S.D. ADI). Thus, both areas have access to a daily in-state newspaper. With so much in common, it is rather striking that their partisan volatility scores are so different (6.67 vs. 10.14). Is television the critical factor here? Are the voters in the South Dakota ADI deprived of an important source of information so that they are forced to rely more heavily on partisan identification to make electoral decisions?

The two counties which receive their television from

La Crosse-Eau Claire, Wisconsin are very difficult to say anything about since they have partisan volatility scores of 3.21 (Houston County) and 9.88 (Winona County), giving them a mean partisan volatility score of 6.54. However, since these two scores are so divergent, it would be erroneous to discuss this out-of-state ADI as having meaningfully lower partisan volatility scores than the other five in-state ADIs.

In comparing these various ADIs and examining the whole map of Minnesota, one of the things which is striking is what appears to be a "remoteness factor." In looking at the map of Minnesota, it becomes clear that the three ADIs of Mankato, Rochester and Minneapolis-St. Paul which have the three highest mean partisan volatility scores in Minnesota---10.14, 11.23 and 9.64 respectively---are also located in the "center of things." All the other ADIs which are remote in either a geographic or communication sense---or both---have significantly lower mean partisan volatility scores. The northern ADIs of Alexandria and Duluth are physically remote from the central area around Minneapolis-St. Paul and one suspects that these areas are cut off from a great deal of the political communication which voters in the more centrally located areas receive. This would be true even though these areas do receive in-state television since they might receive much less information from radio, newspapers and campaign

information. Interesting in this respect is that there is no daily newspaper published in the city of Alexandria although both a morning and an evening paper are published in Duluth. One also suspects that candidates would find it unproductive to spend significant amounts of time or money in these areas because of their extremely sparse population and of the difficulty of reaching the voters in these areas. One important point which should be made is that even though the counties in the Duluth and Alexandria ADIs do receive in-state television, this does not mean that during an election campaign there is necessarily a great deal of election information on television. This may be true because, as noted above, candidates do not choose to expend resources to get on the evening news in Duluth or Alexandria, nor do they pay for political advertisements in these areas. Thus, voters in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Rochester and Mankato ADIs may get regular election coverage as part of the evening news since candidates will surely try to get on the evening news in these areas. Voters in these areas are also likely to be exposed to large numbers of political advertisements. Thus voters in the three centrally located ADIs are likely to receive more political information than voters in the outlying ADIs. The counties within the Fargo, North Dakota ADI are even more isolated than the other two groups of counties because they don't even receive television from within Minnesota---

and indeed they have the lowest mean partisan volatility score (6.09) in the entire state.

The other group of counties which does not receive in-state television (those counties within the Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota ADI) is not as geographically isolated from the central areas of Minnesota as are the northern counties of Minnesota. They are isolated in a communication sense however in that they do not receive in-state television. This could tend to isolate these communities politically, particularly during an election campaign when it may be difficult for candidates to reach the voters in these counties. This becomes more and more true as candidates and their organizations rely more heavily on television as a campaign vehicle. Thus, the voters in these counties may rely more heavily on partisan identification when making an electoral choice---this would account in part for the lower partisan volatility scores found in these counties.

Another important point which needs to be made about the three groups of counties which receive television from out of state is that none of the out-of-state television stations are part of large metropolitan areas which would tend to dominate the surrounding region in ways other than just television. In this, they are very different from the counties in Maryland which receive their television from Washington, D. C. We saw that Washington dominated parts

of Maryland not only in terms of television, but also in terms of employment and probably other media. Based on this, one could speculate that parts of Maryland identify more closely with Washington than with Maryland and become more tied to the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area than to the state of Maryland. This would not be true in Minnesota where the out-of-state television cities are relatively small and probably would not be able to dominate an entire region. Less effect on partisan volatility may be one result.

The "remoteness factor" offers some insight into the pattern of partisan volatility found in the different regions of Minnesota. What is interesting is that television aside, there appears to be a pattern of lower partisan volatility scores in areas which are in the peripheral parts of Minnesota. This suggests that all of these areas are cut off in some way from the mainstream of Minnesota politics and that they rely more heavily on their partisan identification when making electoral choices. It may be that political information is much more difficult to obtain in these areas not only because there are fewer news sources, but also because there is less actual information in the sources which are available. Thus, even though voters in the Alexandria and Minneapolis-St. Paul ADIs both receive in-state television, it's not unreasonable to assume that there is less actual information broadcast in

the Alexandria ADI. It may be that it would not be worthwhile for candidates to spend significant amounts of resources in such peripheral and sparsely populated areas. If one then adds in a lack of in-state television as is true of the three groups of counties which receive television from out of state, then these voters are even more cut off in an informational sense from the mainstream of Minnesota politics. This may indeed account for the fact that partisan volatility scores are significantly lower in these three ADIs. Thus, this "remoteness factor" seems to offer the best explanation for the relationship between television and partisan volatility found in Minnesota.

Another interesting aspect of the pattern of volatility scores found in Minnesota which is closely related to the "remoteness factor" has to do with settlement patterns and with the ways in which different ethnic and religious groups align themselves with political parties. We saw above that the ADIs in the "center" of Minnesota tended to have higher volatility scores than those on the periphery. Interestingly, these are also the areas which were settled by various groups of different political affiliations. The farm lands which comprise the bulk of central and southern Minnesota and which make up the Mankato, Rochester and Minneapolis-St. Paul ADIs were settled by Republican Norwegians and Republican Yankees, Democratic-Farmer-Labor

Swedes and ticket-splitting German Catholics and some Irish Catholics. The Norwegians and Yankees and Swedes tended to align themselves with the Republican and Democratic-Farmer-Labor parties respectively and to vote consistently for the candidates of that party. In contrast, the German and Irish Catholics tended to be at odds with both the largely Scandinavian DFL and with the Yankee Republicans. Unable to fit neatly into one of the major parties, these two groups have tended to be extremely volatile and to cross party lines regularly to support a candidate who represents their views. The relatively large numbers of Catholics in these areas compared to the rest of Minnesota probably helps to account for much of the volatility found in the central region of Minnesota. Interestingly, the area along the South Dakota border which comprises much of the Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota ADI was settled mostly by Swedes with very few German and Irish Catholics. The Swedes have had strong roots in the DFL and vote accordingly. This tends to reduce partisan volatility because political preferences within the populace line up with the major political party cleavage, making it relatively easy for voters to find a party who represents their views. There is therefore little need to cross party lines and volatility subsequently goes down (See State Politics and Redistricting, p. 102 for a discussion of settlement patterns in Minnesota. See also Fenton, 1966.).

The northwest region of Minnesota which comprises all of the Fargo, North Dakota ADI and much of the Alexandria ADI was settled largely by Scandinavian Democrats and Republican Yankees with very small numbers of German and Irish Catholics. The Scandinavians and the Yankees fit neatly into the major party cleavage and have little need to cross party lines. This fact may very well be related to the low volatility found in this area.

What's interesting about this description of how settlement patterns and alignment of ethnic groups with political parties may affect overall volatility within an area is that it may provide a clear case of interactive effects; it may be a good illustration of how television's effects operate within the context of overall patterns of political opposition to have an accelerating effect on partisan volatility. The pattern of settlement by itself provides some explanation for why the areas in central Minnesota are more volatile than other areas in the peripheral parts of Minnesota and we could argue that, television aside, the central areas of Minnesota would be more volatile than the peripheral areas. However, if we add to this an increased flow of information via television which theoretically frees voters from party labels, we may find large numbers of voters, who are already somewhat volatile, deserting parties in even larger numbers and voting increasingly on the basis of issues and candidates.

In contrast, in the northwest region which receives its television from Fargo, North Dakota and where there is relatively little incentive to cross party lines, the absence of information from television (and other sources) may result in partisan identification and party voting which are not disturbed by new, conflicting information. There would therefore be little reason to cross party lines. The result would be low volatility which is indeed the case. This scenario also holds for the southwest corner of Minnesota where voters receive television from South Dakota. Thus, where general patterns of partisan stability and instability based on factors unrelated to television coincide with the television-no-television variables, we may indeed see television having an accelerating affect on partisan volatility as predicted by the research hypothesis. This would be a clear case of interactive effects.

This argument is somewhat similar to the argument advanced by Converse in 1962. As will be recalled from Chapter 1, Converse argued that "Other things being equal, both the individual rates of defection from party and the amplitude of the vote oscillations will be limited if the flow of information is weak" (586). He also went on to argue that "If there is no new information input at all, there will be no defection and no oscillation: the vote will be a pure party vote" (586). In relation to

Minnesota, we are arguing for example that voters in the northwest region---who tend to have relatively stable partisan identification anyhow---receive relatively little information which would disturb their partisan loyalties and cause them to cross party lines. We therefore see rather low partisan volatility. It's important to recall also that there was no major newspaper published in the region---they are therefore lacking two major sources of information which are available to voters in other parts of Minnesota. We could say that although there is certainly information available to these voters, the "flow of information is weak" compared to other more central areas of Minnesota where the flow of information must be strong(er). Again, a very similar scenario could be written about the southwest corner of the state although there is a daily in-state newspaper published in the area.

Finally is Converse's point that voters of low political involvement tended to have volatile partisanship "provided that any new information reaches them at all" (587, emphasis Converse's). We could argue that because they are not tied heavily to a political party, the German and Irish Catholics could be characterized as having low political involvement in this particular sense. Thus, when information does reach them via television and other media sources---as surely it does in central Minnesota where the information flow must be relatively "strong"---these voters

would tend to be very volatile. Hence higher volatility scores and a clear case of interactive effects.

The above discussion provides some insight into the factors which affect the relationship between television and partisanship in Minnesota. In addition to this, one of the most productive approaches to understanding the relationship between television and partisanship in Minnesota is to see it in the overall context of Minnesota politics and political culture. Minnesota offers a "perfect fit" with our hypothesis in that the political culture of Minnesota emphasizes the importance of political information and of making electoral choices on the basis of that information. It is worth exploring Minnesota's political culture more fully and then analyzing how it affects the relationship between television and partisanship and specifically why the no-television counties in Minnesota have lower partisan volatility scores than the television counties. This explanation fits nicely with the remoteness argument because it suggests that when information is available to Minnesota voters, they will use it to make their electoral choices and will not be so dependent on their partisan identification. When less information is available as it is in the more peripheral areas of Minnesota, voters may rely more heavily on their partisan identification.

Political Culture in Minnesota

The major contours of the political culture of Minnesota which are relevant to our purposes have to do with a citizenry which is heavily interested in politics and in issues. Voters in Minnesota are unusually well informed about issues, particularly those of immediate relevance to themselves, and they tend to relate government activity to their own needs and interests. Politics and election campaigns in Minnesota tend to revolve around issues, and elections are fought with the notion of converting policies into programs. In addition to their interest in issues, voters in Minnesota also maintain a strong sense of partisan identification although they are relatively willing to desert their party at election time. Finally, politics in Minnesota are heavily competitive and parties are well organized.

Much of Minnesota's political history consists of a series of alignments of political groups with the political party which advanced their interests most fully. Prior to 1918, Minnesota was a heavily Republican state---this was based on strong support of the Republican Party during the Civil War and on the influx into the party of Scandinavian liberals who aligned themselves with the anti-slavery, anti-liquor, anti-Catholic Yankees in the Republican Party (Fenton, 1966, p. 76). During the time that the rural Scandinavians supported the Republican Party, the party was

responsive to the needs of a rural constituency. However, this changed in 1918 when the Republican governor alienated large numbers of Scandinavian farmers by attacking the programs of the Non-Partisan League which was a strong advocate of agrarian reform. This attack by a Republican governor resulted in the permanent severance of large numbers of Scandinavian constituents from the Republican Party. The final upshot of this was the formation of the Farmer-Labor Party and a permanent rearrangement of Minnesota's political groupings. This reshuffling of groups is best summed up by Fenton (1966):

The 1918 election caused a radical reshuffling of groups associated with the parties. Scandinavians and like-minded progressives moved out of the Republican Party by the thousands and numbers of Germans deserted the Democratic Party, both groups going into the Farmer-Labor Party. The Democratic Party retained the loyalty of most Catholics. The Republican Party was left as the nativist party and thereafter was dominant only in those areas with few Scandinavians or Catholics (81).

As illustrated by the above discussion, Minnesotans have a political tradition of demanding reforms from candidates and parties and of being rewarded with

appropriate policies and programs. This has resulted in "programmatic" parties, i.e., parties which are issue oriented rather than job oriented. Part of the explanation for these programmatic parties lies in the passage of a strict civil service law during the 1930s which eliminated incentives for political patronage. Another part of the explanation for Minnesota's issue oriented politics is that women and college professors filled the vacuum created by the absence of professional politicians and job hunters: the former groups tended to focus heavily on issues and on delivering programs based on campaign promises.

A second important characteristic of Minnesota politics is that voters are extremely interested in issues and they demonstrate a unique ability to relate a candidate's proposals and his actions if elected to their own needs and interests. Once having made a judgement as to which candidate is promoting their interests, Minnesota voters tend to vote accordingly even if it means going against their partisan identification. This was illustrated by Louis Harris in a discussion of the results of a survey done in Minnesota in 1958:

We are singularly struck by the fact that people who are concerned with mental hospitals are by and large keenly aware of what Governor Freeman has done to improve conditions. Much the same

is the case with retarded children. It is unusual to find an electorate that has such a high degree of awareness of things having been done which directly relate to them and their families. We ran into some 13 families which had retarded children and felt they had been helped by the Governor's program. This high degree of "relating" of governmental programs with live and active need is indeed an accomplishment in the art of governing (Quoted in Fenton, 1966, p. 100).

This high level of political awareness on the part of the voters is partially explained by the fact that Minnesota voters have a history of demanding reforms from candidates and parties and then having them translated into public policy. Such a political tradition has made it important for voters to be informed about issues, for only with such information can a voter vote for the candidate who most closely approximates his issue position. Another quote, this one by a German Catholic wife of a mail carrier, illustrates these points well:

We need more schools more than anything. And we also need more mental hospitals real bad. Now I'd say that Ike [Republican] has done pretty good. But Humphrey [Democrat]

has been excellent. Freeman's [Democrat] been good, too. He's worked hard for mental health, and, as I've said that's important all right. Then our state taxes haven't gone up, so that's good. And Freeman's honest.

Senator Thye [Republican] has done an excellent job, too. He backed our pay raise for mail carriers. You see, he has the average person in mind. So I'll vote for Thye against McCarthy [Democrat]. He's done a good job. And has a bit of experience behind him. He writes a beautiful letter. Now, McCarthy seems honest and he's interested in the good of the state and the government. And he's a Catholic, which means something to me. Still and all, Thye's been too good to us to change (Quoted in Fenton, 1966, p. 101).

As Fenton notes, what is unique about this statement is the clear identification of government programs with certain candidates and the woman's non-partisanship. She supports both Republicans and Democrats depending on which candidate most closely approximates her own issue position and she clearly finds the candidate more important than party membership.

One important dimension of the issue oriented

character of Minnesota politics is that it makes politics heavily competitive since voters could vote for either party depending on which candidate they prefer. To some extent, election victories need to be formed by aligning different groups for each election---there are no sources of constant support for either party.

To sum up this very brief sketch of politics in Minnesota, the important features from our perspective are the issue nature of Minnesota politics and the willingness of voters to vote against their own party. Minnesotans do have a strong sense of partisan identification, but it is not the determining factor in electoral choice. Also important is that politics in Minnesota are very competitive, with each party vying for the votes of different groups at election time. The question now is how does this particular political context interact with television to produce the hypothesized effect on partisanship?

Television and Partisanship in Minnesota

In looking at the impact of political culture on the relationship between television and partisanship in Minnesota, we want first to examine what aspects of Minnesota's political environment affect the way in which voters relate to political television. To what extent does the political culture affect the degree to which voters

attend to television, how they perceive the messages sent, how much information they retain and what they do with the information which they do have?

The first dimension of Minnesota's political culture which is important in determining how voters relate to political television is the issue oriented character of Minnesota politics. One can hypothesize that where citizens are interested in issues and where they make their electoral choices on the basis of those issues, information is important. In such a situation, we could hypothesize that voters would be inclined to attend to all forms of political information and to actively seek out information about issues and about candidate position on the issues. This need for information may enhance the affect of television as one source of information and could help explain why partisan volatility scores are higher in the television counties in Minnesota. Voters in those counties without television may have less information available to them and may therefore rely more heavily on partisan identification when voting.

Another important dimension of Minnesota's political culture is that voters are relatively interested in politics. One could hypothesize that an interest in politics encourages voters to be attentive to political information and therefore to retain a significant amount. What's interesting however is the degree to which this

translates into a vote against one's partisan identification. Voters in Minnesota may be quite willing to translate this into a vote against their party because the political culture of Minnesota values voting against one's party if issue positions make this a rational choice. Where voters do not have adequate information, voting according to the issues is not a choice. Hence, they may vote with their partisan identification, thereby decreasing volatility.

We have hypothesized that voter response to television is shaped in part by the political beliefs and needs of the individual voter as influenced by political culture. However, voter response is also affected by the kinds of messages sent and by the volume of information on television. This gets us into a discussion of how Minnesota's political culture affects the television end of the television-partisanship relationship.

Because of the issue nature of Minnesota politics, we can hypothesize that there is considerable information about issues on television. This would be true because the messages sent by candidates, parties and government officials would tend to be heavily informational rather than partisan. We can also hypothesize that television newscasts would tend to pay considerable attention to issues and that there are additional election specials such as debates which convey information to the voters. Large

amounts of information on television increases the chances that voters will actually acquire information. Finally, we can also hypothesize that candidates and parties rely heavily on television as a campaign vehicle since politics are competitive and since television is a good means of communicating with voters. This would increase the simple presence of television, thereby giving it a greater influence where it exists. However, this also would create a greater gap between counties with and without in-state television, giving those who do receive in-state television a greater opportunity to vote the issues.

Oregon

Oregon is one of the states where our findings indicate that there is no significant difference in partisan volatility scores either positively or negatively between counties with in-state television and counties without in-state television. Unfortunately, information about Oregon and about the no-television counties within Oregon is sparse, making it difficult to determine the reasons for our research findings. However, one of the most plausible explanations for the findings lie in the nature of Oregon as a whole: Oregon is an extremely homogeneous state which has no important minority, ethnic, racial or religious divisions nor are there any longstanding political differences between regions of the

state. There are also no major economic cleavages within the state. This absence of cleavages creates a unity of interests which is unique and which may be the key to understanding why there are no significant differences in partisan volatility between the television and no-television counties.

As we did with both Maryland and Minnesota, we need first to lay out the relevant facts about Oregon. Oregon has reasonably stable partisanship with a mean partisan volatility score of 5.06. Scores range from 2.58 to 10.19 but within this range all but four scores lie between 2.5 and 6.0. Thus, Oregon's partisan volatility scores are more clustered in a particular range than are those in either Maryland or Minnesota. This is indicated by a standard deviation of 1.64 which is much lower than those of the other two states. Oregon has 35 counties, eight of which receive television from outside of Oregon. Of these eight, seven counties are located in the extreme eastern portion of the state and receive television from Boise, Idaho, Yakima, Washington and Spokane, Washington (See map in Appendix B). The eighth no-television county is Curry County located in the extreme southwestern corner of the state. This county receives its television from California. Below is a list of all 35 counties in Oregon, their partisan volatility scores and the city from which they receive television.

Table 4.5

<u>County</u>	<u>Partisan</u> <u>Volatility Score</u>	<u>Where Receive</u> <u>TV From</u>
Baker	5.34	Boise, Idaho
Grant	3.98	"
Malheur	4.40	"
Curry	4.56	Eureka, Calif.
Union	4.26	Spokane, Wash.
Wallowa	8.74	Spokane, Wash.
Morrow	2.58	Yakima, Wash.
Umatilla	3.14	"
Jackson	4.86	Medford, OR
Josephine	5.04	"
Klamath	5.51	"
Lake	3.63	"
Coos	5.55	Eugene, OR
Douglas	5.56	"
Lane	9.01	"
Benton	10.19	Portland, OR
Clackamas	5.50	"
Clatsop	4.53	"
Columbia	4.26	"
Crook	3.38	"
Deschutes	4.44	"

Gilliam	4.03	Portland, OR
Harney	5.20	"
Hood River	4.65	"
Lincoln	5.22	"
Linn	3.44	"
Marion	4.96	"
Multnomah	7.54	"
Polk	5.27	"
Sherman	3.13	"
Tillamook	4.36	"
Wasco	4.29	"
Washington	5.64	"
Wheeler	5.79	"
Yamill	5.26	"

$\bar{X}(\text{Boise}) = 4.57$ $\bar{X}(\text{Calif.}) = 4.56$ $\bar{X}(\text{Spokane}) = 6.50$
 $\bar{X}(\text{Yakima}) = 2.86$ $\bar{X}(\text{Portland}) = 4.84$ $\bar{X}(\text{Eugene}) = 6.71$
 $\bar{X}(\text{Medford}) = 4.71$ $\bar{X}(\text{TV}) = 5.19$ $\bar{X}(\text{NOTV}) = 4.62$

As noted in the introduction to this section, Oregon is unique in its absence of important social, economic and political divisions within the state and in an unusually high degree of historical continuity both socially and economically. These characteristics create a statewide homogeneity which is rarely found at the state level.

Oregon society is characterized by an absence of minority groups, either ethnic, racial or religious, which

are important enough to play a decisive role in state politics. Although several distinct European immigrant groups did settle in Oregon, they were easily assimilated into the existing system and they never formed an ethnic community with a distinct political identity. Also important is that non-white residents have always represented an extremely small percentage of the population. Historically, whatever ethnic and racially distinct groups did move to Oregon were absorbed easily due to Oregon's slow rate of growth and relative isolation. This very gradual social evolution has created both social and economic continuity which many historians believe to be the key factor in Oregon's history and politics (Burton, p. 2).

Economically, Oregon has been heavily dependent upon natural resources within its own borders. Traditionally, the backbone of the economy has been lumber, agricultural products and fishing. This is still true today (Barone). With such a heavy dependence upon the products of the land, important economic differences between regions and groups have been slow to emerge. In contrast to many states, longstanding political differences between regions based on economic differences have been practically non-existent. Since all Oregonians are dependent on the natural resources within the state, a unity of political and economic interests based on environmental values and preservation of

Oregon's natural resources has emerged.

The very gradual evolution of Oregon's society and the commonality of economic interests across the state has created a political and social environment which is highly unusual in terms of its unity of interests and absence of long-term political divisions. As one author summed it up: "Oregon's measured rate of growth, the religious, ethnic and racial homogeneity of its small population, and an economy dominated by resources within the boundary of the state have combined to produce a high degree of intrastate cohesiveness. This, in turn, prompted a relatively stable attitude toward politics, a contrast to some states where cultural diversity and a rapid industrial pace nurtured continuing political divisions in the electorate" (Burton, p. 5).

The unity of interests throughout Oregon is reflected in the outcome of our analysis regarding the presence or absence of in-state television and partisanship in Oregon. The data indicates that there is no significant difference in partisan volatility scores between those counties which receive in-state television and those which do not. One could hypothesize that the unity of interests across the state would lead voters statewide to vote relatively similarly based on the issue positions. Thus, a candidate which appealed to voters in one of the eastern counties would also appeal to voters in a western county. If this

were true from election to election, patterns of volatility would be similar throughout the state as indeed they are. The question remains however as to how voters in the no-television counties receive their political information at election time and on what basis they choose between candidates. Oregon does have a number of good daily newspapers, but all of the major ones are published in the cities of Portland, Medford, Salem and Eugene. These are all television areas of the state and there would seem to be considerable overlap in terms of an absence of information in the eastern no-television counties. What we do not know however is to what extent, if at all, these newspapers circulate in the eastern counties. If they do, then these voters are receiving similar information via the press as are voters in the western portion of the state. We also do not know how candidates campaign in this area nor what media they use to convey information.

What's interesting about Oregon is that if one looks at the map, the no-television counties are located in an area which is geographically removed from the Portland area and from the other urban areas of the western sector. These counties are also extremely sparsely populated. These two factors combined with the absence of in-state television would normally lead one to hypothesize that there would be important political differences between the two regions based on differences between center and

periphery. In fact however, we have seen that geographic differences are not terribly important in Oregon and indeed our data reflects this fact. This is quite different from either Maryland or Minnesota where the no-television variable overlapped with other variables to create political differences between regions which were reflected in our partisan volatility scores.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The clearest general conclusion to emerge from the preceding two chapters is that television does not have a systematic effect on partisanship across a wide variety of states within the United States. The findings very clearly indicate that television's influence is insignificant in nine states, positively significant in only three states and negatively significant in three others. Thus, the nature of television's effect is clearly different depending on the political context. This does not mean that television does not have an important effect in some states. It simply means that a general explanation which would cover the relationship between television and partisanship in a variety of diverse environments is not possible at this point. This is an important finding. Although it may be more intellectually satisfying to be able to develop a general theory about television's effects in different settings, the null finding is equally as important in that it tells us that perhaps television is not as powerful a variable as many people have thought and that its influence can be superseded by other factors. Thus, based on this study, we can conclude that television does not appear to be an autonomous, monolithic variable which creates similar effects on partisanship in diverse environments.

One positive finding which does emerge very clearly from this study however is the overwhelming importance of state effects in explaining overall patterns of volatility and volatility patterns within states. State effects explain almost all the variance among the 910 volatility scores in this study and also help explain the patterns of volatility found within Minnesota, Maryland and Oregon. In these three states, the internal patterns of political opposition and articulation and the general political cultures appear to be more important in explaining the patterns of volatility scores than does television. Where television does play a role---and we have argued that it does in Minnesota and Maryland---it is only within the bounds of state political patterns. Television does not have an independent effect, but in some cases it does have an interactive effect.

These two conclusions about the absence of a systematic television effect and the importance of state effects emerge clearly from both the analysis of variance and the fifteen regression analyses. The analysis of variance clearly indicated that television by itself was statistically insignificant in explaining the variance among the 910 volatility scores. At the same time, it pointed to the overwhelming influence of state effects and to the importance of interactive effects. When we move on to the regression analyses however, we found that in nine

of the fifteen states television was insignificant in explaining the distribution of partisan volatility scores. Among the six states where television was found to be significant, only three cases were in the direction suggested by the research hypothesis, e.g., no-television counties had lower partisan volatility scores than television counties. In the other three cases, the results contradicted the research hypothesis with a negative sign. Also important is that in the discussions of Maryland and Minnesota where we tried to explain the fact that the no-television counties were either higher (Maryland) or lower (Minnesota) than the television counties, we found that it was exceedingly difficult to attribute the pattern of volatility scores to television alone. It could be that other variables or combinations of variables which overlap with the television variable are the ones responsible for the pattern we found. Thus, one of the major difficulties encountered in this research is disentangling television effects from the effects of other variables. Based on the results which we have, we could argue that television is having an effect on partisan volatility---either positively or negatively---in some states but only within the bounds of already established political patterns. It is impossible at this point to argue that television has an independent effect on partisan volatility or that where it does have an interactive effect, that effect is systematic

across a wide variety of environments. What we really have is a state by state story with television perhaps having a significant effect in some states but not in others and in the states where it does have an effect, it is only at the juncture of other variables.

Having formulated these two general conclusions, we need to ask why the results look as they do. With so much importance attached to the influence of television in recent years, it is somewhat surprising that we do not get a clearer television effect. Two general issues seem important in explaining these results. First are methodological issues; second is the issue of the overwhelming importance of state effects on partisan volatility, a fact which would tend to mask television effects.

In the area of methodology, the first point to be made is that we are looking only at television's effects on partisan volatility as indicated by aggregate election returns. The shortcomings of this measure have been discussed in Chapter 2. More important however is that another study which examined television's effects on something other than partisan volatility may find that television's effects are quite significant. The second point is that television has been measured as a dichotomous variable only---e.g., television-no-television. This measure has the inherent weakness of not accounting for

differences in the quality and volume of television news presented in different television markets. For example, the counties in the Missoula-Butte, Montana ADI and those in the Boston, Massachusetts ADI are all classified as television counties. One instinctively feels however, that there are vast differences in the quality and quantity of state news presented in these two ADIs. These differences could affect the findings and yet they are masked in the dichotomous classification of the television variable. Also important in our measure of the television variable is that we used the Arbitron classification of counties to determine whether a county was designated television or no-television. The A. C. Nielsen system however assigns counties to television markets somewhat differently; thus, if we had used the A. C. Nielsen system instead of the Arbitron system, some counties would be classified differently. The point of all of this is not that the measure of television used in this study is invalid, but that all measures have inherent weaknesses which may affect the results.

Another point is that methodologically it is extraordinarily difficult to disentangle television effects from the effects of other variables. Perhaps most important in this area is the difficulty of separating television effects from the effects of other media. We have emphasized repeatedly throughout this paper that to be

without television is not to be without information. Thus, to conclude that people with access to television are better informed and therefore freer of political parties is obviously erroneous. Also important in this area is that many variables or combinations of variables overlap with the television variable and it is perhaps these variables, not the television variable, which explain the pattern of volatility scores found within a particular state. Thus, it is extremely difficult to determine how much of a pattern of volatility scores can be attributed to television-no-television and how much should be attributed to other factors. The best we can do at this point is to make educated guesses.

Finally, as noted above, the overwhelming importance of state effects on partisan volatility may mask some of the more subtle television effects if they in fact exist. There may be television effects on volatility which have not emerged because the design of the study brought out state effects much more clearly than it brought out television effects. A study which focused on the differences in media use, retention levels, nature of television and other media sources and their relationship to partisanship between television and no-television units within a single state may pick up more in the way of television effects. By holding the larger environmental variables constant and focusing on the differences between

television and no-television units in a more detailed manner, this methodology may be more sensitive to television effects. If this approach were expanded to include several states---i.e., an in-depth study of television vs. no-television units within several states---perhaps more insight could be gained into television effects and how these effects relate to environmental variables.

Based on the above discussion, the overwhelming conclusion at this point is that there are no systematic effects of television on partisanship across a variety of environments. Whether they simply don't exist or whether they are masked by methodological issues will have to await further research. We can however argue for interactive effects, but these effects are not generalizable. Where they are present, they are dependent on circumstances unique to each state.

Appendices

Appendix A: Figures 1.1 - 1.5 and Table 1.1 Re: The
Decline of Partisanship in the United States Since 1952

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


FIGURE 1.1 Partisan affiliation, 1952-1974

From Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), p. 49




FIGURE 1.2 PARTISAN LOYALTY FROM 1956 TO 1972

From Pomper (1975), p. 21.




FIGURE 1.3 Proportion of party identifiers voting for candidate of other party, 1952-1972

From Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), p. 51.




FIGURE 1.4 Straight and split ticket voting, 1952-1972

From Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), p. 53.




FIGURE 1.5 Percent reporting they have not always voted for the candidate of the same party in presidential elections: all voters and partisan identifiers, 1952-1972

From Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), p. 54.

Table 1-1 Partisan Identification Nationwide by Decade, 1952-1980

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980
Strong Democrat	22%	22%	17%	18%
Weak Democrat	24	25	24	23
Independent Democrat	8	9	12	11
Independent	7	9	14	13
Independent Republican	6	7	10	10
Weak Republican	14	14	14	14
Strong Republican	13	12	9	9


NOTE: Figures do not total 100 percent because of rounding and the presence of "don't know"/"no answer" responses. Survey began in 1952.

SOURCE: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. Adapted in part from data presented in *American Parties in Decline* by William J. Crotty and Gary C. Jacobson (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980), 27-28.

From Price (1984), p. 11.

Appendix B: Maps of the Fifteen States Showing the
Areas of Dominant Influence With All Out-of-State
ADIs Marked With Cross Hatching

Map #1:	Pennsylvania	Page 216
Map #2:	Minnesota	Page 218
Map #3:	Indiana	Page 221
Map #4:	Maryland	Page 224
Map #5:	Montana	Page 226
Map #6:	Nebraska	Page 228
Map #7:	Oregon	Page 231
Map #8:	Wyoming	Page 233
Map #9:	Massachusetts	Page 235
Map #10:	Colorado	Page 237
Map #11:	Connecticut	Page 239
Map #12:	Kansas	Page 241
Map #13:	Iowa	Page 244
Map #14:	Illinois	Page 247
Map #15:	Idaho	Page 250



Pennsylvania

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Pennsylvania

Binghamton, NY ADI

Bradford County
Sullivan County
Susquehanna County

Buffalo, NY ADI

McKean County
Potter County
Warren County

New York, NY ADI

Pike County

Elmira, NY ADI

Tioga County

Washington, D. C. ADI

Franklin County

Youngstown, Ohio ADI

Mercer County

Pittsburgh, PA ADI

Allegheny County
Armstrong County
Beaver County
Butler County
Clarion County
Fayette County
Greene County
Indiana County
Lawrence County
Venango County
Washington County
Westmoreland County

Philadelphia, PA ADI

Berks County
Bucks County
Chester County
Delaware County
Lehigh County
Montgomery County
Northampton County
Philadelphia County

Harrisburg-York-Lancaster-
Lebanon, PA ADI

Adams County
Cumberland County
Dauphin County
Juniata County
Lancaster County
Lebanon County
Perry County
York County

Johnstown-Altoona, PA ADI

Bedford County
Blair County
Cambria County
Cameron County
Centre County
Clearfield County
Clinton County
Elk County
Forest County
Huntingdon County
Jefferson County
Mifflin County
Somerset County


Wilkes Barre-Scranton, PA ADI

Carbon County
Columbia County
Lackawanna County
Luzerne County
Lycoming County
Monroe County
Montour County
Northumberland County
Schuylkell County
Snyder County

Wilkes Barre-Scranton ADI cont.

Union County
Wayne County
Wyoming County

Minnesota



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Minnesota

Fargo, ND ADI

Becker County
Clay County
Clearwater County
Kittson County
Lake of the Woods County
Mahnomon County
Marshall County
Norman County
Otter Tail County
Pennington County
Polk County
Red Lake County
Roseau County
Wilkin County

Duluth, MN ADI

Aitkin County
Carlton County
Cook County
Itasca County
Koochiching County
Lake County
St. Louis County

Rochester, MN ADI

Dodge County
Faribault County
Fillmore County
Freeborn County
Mower County
Olmstead County

Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN ADI

Anoka County
Benton County
Brown County
Carver County
Chippewa County
Chisago County
Dakota County
Goodhue County
Hennepin County
Isanti County
Kanabec County
Kandiyohi County
Le Sueur County
Lyon County
McLeod County

Sioux Falls-Mitchell, SD ADI

Big Stone County
Lincoln County
Murray County
Nobles County
Pipestone County
Rock County

La Crosse-Eau Claire, WI ADI

Houston County
Winona County

Mankato, MN ADI

Blue Earth County
Cottonwood County
Jackson County
Martin County


Alexandria, MN ADI

Beltrami County
Cass County
Crow Wing County
Douglas County
Grant County
Hubbard County
Lac Qui Parle County
Pope County
Stevens County
Swift County
Todd County
Traverse County
Wadena County

Minneapolis-St. Paul ADI cont.

Meeker County
Mille Lacs County
Morrison County
Nicollet County
Pine County
Ramsey County
Redwood County
Renville County
Rice County
Scott County
Sherburne County
Sibley County
Stearns County
Steele County
Wabasha County
Waseca County
Washington County
Watonwan County
Wright County
Yellow Medicine County

Indiana



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Indiana

Chicago, IL ADI

Jasper County
Lake County
LaPorte County
Newton County
Porter County

Dayton, OH ADI

Wayne County

Cincinnati, OH ADI

Dearborn County
Fayette County
Franklin County
Ohio County
Ripley County
Switzerland County
Union County

Indianapolis, IN ADI

Bartholomew County
Benton County
Blackford County
Boone County
Brown County
Carroll County
Cass County
Clinton County
Decatur County
Delaware County
Fountain County
Grant County
Hamilton County
Hancock County
Hendricks County
Henry County
Howard County
Jackson County
Jennings County
Johnson County
Lawrence County
Madison County
Marion County
Miami County
Monroe County
Montgomery County
Morgan County
Owen County
Putnam County

Louisville, KY ADI

Clark County
Crawford County
Floyd County
Harrison County
Jefferson County
Orange County
Scott County
Washington County

South Bend-Elkhart, IN ADI

Elkhart County
Fulton County
Kosciusko County
La Grange County
Marshall County
Pulaski County
St. Joseph County
Starke County

Indianapolis, IN ADI cont.

Shelby County
Tipton County
Warren County
White County

Evansville, IN ADI

Dubois County
Gibson County
Perry County
Pike County
Posey County
Spencer County
Vanderburgh County
Warrick County

Fort Wayne, IN ADI


Adams County
Allen County
DeKalb County
Huntington County
Jay County
Noble County
Steuben County
Wabash County
Wells County
Whitley County

Randolph County
Rush County

Lafayette, In ADI
Tippecanoe County

Terre Haute, IN ADI

Clay County
Daviess County
Greene County
Knox County
Martin County
Parke County
Sullivan County
Vermillion County
Vigo County



Maryland


Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Maryland

Pittsburgh, PA ADI
Garrett County

Baltimore, MD ADI
Anne Arundel County
Baltimore County
Caroline County
Carroll County
Cecil County
Dorchester County
Harford County
Howard County
Kent County
Queen Annes County
Talbot County

Washington, D.C. ADI
Allegany County
Calvert County
Charles County
Frederick County
Montgomery County
Prince Georges County
St. Mary's County
Washington County

Salisbury, MD ADI
Somerset County
Wicomico County
Worcester County



Montana

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Montana

Spokane, Wash. ADI
Lincoln County

Salt Lake City, Utah ADI
Park County

Rapid City, SD ADI
Carter County

Missoula-Butte, Mont. ADI
Beaverhead County
Broadwater County
Deer Lodge County
Flathead County
Gallatin County
Granite County
Jefferson County
Lake County
Madison County
Mineral County
Missoula County
Powell County
Ravalli County
Sanders County
Silver Bow County


Billings, Mont. ADI
Big Horn County
Carbon County
Fergus County
Garfield County
Golden Valley County
Musselshell County
Petroleum County
Powder River County
Rosebud County
Stillwater County
Sweet Grass County
Treasure County
Wheatland County
Yellowstone County

Minot-Bismarck-Dickinson, ND ADI
Daniels County
Fallon County
McCone County
Richland County
Roosevelt County
Sheridan County
Wibaux County

Great Falls, Mont. ADI
Blaine County
Cascade County
Chouteau County
Glacier County
Hill County
Judith Basin County
Liberty County
Meagher County
Phillips County
Pondera County
Teton County
Toole County
Valley County

Helena, Mont. ADI
Lewis and Clark County

Miles City-Glendive, Mont. ADI
Custer County
Dawson County
Prarie County



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Nebraska

Rapid City, SD ADI

Box Butte County
Cherry County
Garden County
Grant County
Dawes County
Sheridan County
Sioux County

Denver, CO ADI

Cheyenne County

Cheyenne, Wyo. ADI

Banner County
Deuel County
Kimball County
Morrill County
Scotts Bluff County

Wichita-Hutchinson, Kan. ADI

Dundy County
Hitchcock County

Sioux City, Iowa ADI

Cedar County
Dakota County
Dixon County
Knox County
Madison County
Pierce County
Stanton County
Thurston County
Wayne County

Sioux Falls-Mitchell, SD ADI

Boyd County
Keya Paha County

Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney,
Neb. ADI

Adams County
Antelope County
Boone County
Brown County
Buffalo County
Chase County
Clay County
Custer County
Dawson County
Fillmore County
Franklin County
Frontier County
Furnas County
Gage County
Garfield County
Gosper County
Greeley County
Hall County
Hamilton County
Harlan County
Hayes County
Holt County
Howard County
Jefferson County
Kearney County
Lancaster County
Loup County
Merrick County
Nance County
Nuckolls County

Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney,
Neb. ADI cont.

Perkins County
Phelps County
Polk County
Red Willow County
Rock County
Saline County
Seward County
Sherman County
Thayer County
Valley County
Webster County
Wheeler County
York County


North Platte, Neb. ADI

Arthur County
Blaine County
Hooker County
Lincoln County
Logan County
McPherson County
Thomas County

Omaha, Neb. ADI

Burt County
Butler County
Cass County
Colfax County
Cuming County
Dodge County
Douglas County
Johnson County
Nemaha County
Otoe County
Pawnee County
Platte County
Richardson County
Sarpy County
Saunders County
Washington County

- KEY**
- MULTNOMAH COUNTY
 - 1 Portland
 - 2 Hazelwood
 - 3 Gresham
 - WASHINGTON COUNTY
 - 1 Hillsboro
 - 2 Aloha
 - 3 Beaverton



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Oregon

Yakima, WA ADI
Morrow County
Umatilla County

Eureka, CA ADI
Curry County


Spokane, WA ADI
Union County
Wallowa County

Medford, OR ADI
Jackson County
Josephine County
Klamath County
Lake County

Eugene, OR ADI
Coos County
Douglas County
Lane County

Boise, ID ADI
Baker County
Grant County
Malheur County

Portland, OR ADI
Benton County
Clackamas County
Clatsop County
Columbia County
Crook County
Deschutes County
Gilliam County
Harney County
Hood River County
Jefferson County
Lincoln County
Linn County
Marion County
Multnomah County
Polk County
Sherman County
Tillamook County
Wasco County
Washington County
Wheeler County
Yamhill County



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Wyoming

Idaho Falls-Pocatello,

Idaho ADI
Lincoln County
Teton County

Salt Lake City, Utah ADI

Campbell County
Sheridan County
Sweetwater County
Unita County

Denver, CO ADI

Albany County

Rapid City, SD ADI

Crook County

Billings, MT ADI


Park County
Big Horn County

Cheyenne, WY ADI

Goshen County
Laramie County

Casper-Riverton, WY ADI

Carbon County
Converse County
Fremont County
Hot Springs County
Johnson County
Natrona County
Niobrara County
Sublette County
Washakie County



Massachusetts

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Massachusetts

Albany-Schenectady-Troy,

NY ADI

Berkshire County

Boston, MA ADI

Barnstable County

Essex County

Middlesex County

Norfolk County

Plymouth County

Suffolk County

Worcester County

Providence, RI ADI

Bristol County

Dukes County


Nantucket County

Springfield, MA ADI

Franklin County

Hampden County

Hampshire County



Colorado

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Colorado

Albuquerque, NM ADI

Alamosa County
Archuleta County
Conejos County
Costilla County
Dolores County
La Plata County
Montezuma County
Rio Grande County
Saguache County

Colorado Springs-Pueblo,
CO ADI

Baca County
Bent County
Cheyenne County
Crowley County
Custer County
El Paso County
Fremont County
Huerfano County
Kiowa County
Las Animas County
Lincoln County
Mineral County
Otero County
Prowers County
Pueblo County

Grand Junction, CO ADI

Delta County
Hinsdale County
Mesa County
Montrose County
Ouray County
San Juan County
San Miguel County

Cheyenne, WY ADI


Logan County
Phillips County
Sedgwick County

Wichita-Hutchinson, KN ADI

Yuma County
Kit Carson County

Denver, CO ADI

Adams County
Arapahoe County
Boulder County
Chaffee County
Clear Creek
Denver County
Douglas County
Eagle County
Elbert County
Garfield County
Gilpin County
Grand County
Gunnison County
Jackson County
Jefferson County
Larimer County
Moffat County
Morgan County
Park County
Pitkin County
Rio Blanco County
Routt County
Summit County
Teller County
Washington County
Weld County




Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Connecticut

New York, NY ADI
Fairfield County

Providence, RI ADI
New London County
Windham County

Hartford-New Haven, CT ADI
Hartford County
Litchfield County
Middlesex County
New Haven County
Tolland County



Kansas

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Kansas

Kansas City, MO ADI

Anderson County
Atchison County
Brown County
Doniphan County
Douglas County
Franklin County
Jefferson County
Johnson County
Leavenworth County
Linn County
Miami County
Wyandotte County

Wichita-Hutchinson, KS ADI

Barber County
Barton County
Butler County
Chase County
Cheyenne County
Clark County
Comanche County
Cowley County
Decatur County
Dickinson County
Edwards County
Elk County
Ellis County
Ellsworth County
Finney County
Ford County
Gove County
Graham County
Grant County
Gray County
Greeley County
Greenwood County
Hamilton County
Harper County
Harvey County
Haskell County
Hodgeman County
Kearny County
Kingman County
Kiowa County
Lane County
Lincoln County
Logan County
McPherson County

Lincoln, Neb. ADI

Cloud County
Jewell County
Republic County
Smith County
Washington County

Tulsa, OK ADI

Chautauqua County
Montgomery County

Pittsburgh, KS ADI


Allen County
Bourbon County
Cherokee County
Crawford County
Labette County
Neosho County
Wilson County
Woodson County

Topeka, KS ADI

Clay County
Coffey County
Geary County
Jackson County
Lyon County
Marshall County
Morris County
Nemaha County
Osage County
Pottawatomie County
Riley County
Shawnee County
Wabaunsee County

Wichita-Hutchinson, KS ADI cont.

Marion County
Meade County
Mitchell County
Ness County
Norton County
Osborne County
Ottawa County
Pawnee County
Pratt County
Rawlins County
Reno County
Rice County
Rooks County
Rush County
Russell County
Saline County
Scott County
Sedgwick County
Seward County
Sheridan County
Sherman County
Stafford County
Stanton County
Stevens County
Sumner County
Thomas County
Trego County
Wallace County
Wichita County



BMOI

Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Iowa

Sioux Falls-Mitchell, SD ADI

Lyon County
Osceola County

Mankato, MN ADI

Emmet County

Quincy, IL-Hannibal, MO ADI

Lee County

Dubuque, IA ADI

Dubuque County

Ottumwa, IA-Kirksville, MO ADI

Davis County
Jefferson County
Van Buren County

Mason City, IA ADI

Cerro Gordo County
Floyd County
Franklin County
Hancock County
Howard County
Kossuth County
Mitchell County
Winnebago County
Worth County

Cedar Rapids-Waterloo, IA ADI

Allamakee County
Benton County
Black Hawk County
Bremer County
Buchanan County
Butler County
Chickasaw County
Clayton County
Delaware County
Fayette County
Grundy County
Iowa County
Johnson County
Jones County
Keokuk County
Linn County
Tama County
Washington County
Winneshiek County

Omaha, NE ADI

Adams County
Audubon County
Cass County
Crawford County
Fremont County
Harrison County
Mills County
Montgomery County
Page County
Pottawattamie County
Shelby County
Taylor County

Des Moines, IA ADI

Adair County
Appanoose County
Boone County
Calhoun County
Carroll County
Clarke County
Dallas County
Decatur County
Greene County
Guthrie County
Hamilton County
Hardin County
Humboldt County
Jasper County
Lucas County
Madison County
Mahaska County
Marion County
Marshall County
Monroe County
Polk County
Poweshiek County
Ringgold County
Story County
Union County
Wapello County
Warren County
Wayne County
Webster County
Wright County


Sioux City, IA ADI

Buena Vista County
Cherokee County
Clay County
Dickinson County
Ida County
Monona County
O'Brien County
Palo Alto County
Plymouth County
Pocahontas County
Sac County
Sioux County
Woodbury County

Davenport, IA ADI

Cedar County
Clinton County
Des Moines County
Henry County
Jackson County
Louisa County
Muscatine County
Scott County

Illinois



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Illinois

Terre Haute, IN ADI

Clark County
Clay County
Crawford County
Cumberland County
Edgar County
Effingham County
Jasper County
Lawrence County
Richland County

Evansville, IN ADI

Edwards County
Wabash County
Wayne County
White County

Rockford, IL ADI

Boone County
Ogle County
Stephenson County
Winnebago County

Quincy, IL-Hannibal, MO ADI

Adams County
Brown County
Cass County
Hancock County
McDonough County
Pike County
Schuyler County
Scott County

Paducah, KY-Cape Girardeau, MO-
Harrisburg, IL ADI

Alexander County
Franklin County
Gallatin County
Hamilton County
Hardin County
Jackson County
Johnson County
Massac County
Pope County
Pulaski County
Saline County
Union County
Williamson County

St. Louis, MO ADI

Bond County
Calhoun County
Clinton County
Fayette County
Green County
Jefferson County
Jersey County
Macoupin County
Madison County
Marion County
Monroe County
Montgomery County
Perry County
Randolph County
St. Clair County
Washington County

Chicago, IL ADI

Cook County
DeKalb County
DuPage County
Grundy County
Iroquois County
Kane County
Kankakee County
Kendall County
Lake County
LaSalle County
Livingston County
McHenry County
Will County

Davenport, IA-Moline,
IL ADI

Bureau County
Carroll County
Henderson County
Henry County
Jo Daviess County
Knox County
Lee County
Mercer County
Rock Island County
Warren County
Whiteside County

Springfield-Decatur-Champaign,


IL ADI

Champaign County
Christian County
Coles County
DeWitt County
Douglas County
Ford County
Macon County
Menard County
Morgan County
Moultrie County
Piatt County
Sangamon County
Shelby County
Vermilion County

Peoria, IL ADI

Fulton County
Logan County
McClellan County
Marshall County
Mason County
Peoria County
Putnam County
Stark County
Tazewell County
Woodford County

Idaho



Counties and Areas of Dominant Influence in Idaho

Spokane, WA ADI

Benewah County
Bonner County
Boundary County
Clearwater County
Idaho County
Kootenai County
Latah County
Lewis County
Nez Perce County
Shoshone County

Idaho Falls-Pocatello, ID ADI

Bannock County
Bingham County
Bonneville County
Butte County
Clark County
Custer County
Fremont County
Jefferson County
Lemhi County
Madison County
Power County
Teton County

Salt Lake City, UT ADI

Bear Lake County
Caribou County
Franklin County
Oneida County

Boise, ID ADI

Ada County
Adams County
Blaine County
Boise County
Canyon County
Elmore County
Gem County
Owyhee County
Payette County
Valley County
Washington County

Twin Falls, ID ADI

Camas County
Cassia County
Gooding County
Jerome County
Lincoln County
Minidoka County
Twin Falls County

Appendix C: Data Sources

Data Sources

1. Data sources for the first regression run used to develop the partisan volatility scores for each county (see Chapter 2):

a. The Dependent Variable: Election returns for each county are from Richard Scammon, ed., America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary Election Statistics. Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1969-1979.

b. The Independent Variables:

1) Turnout: Turnout for 1968-1970 elections was calculated in the following manner:

a) The number of persons voting in each election was taken from Scammon, op. cit.

b) For the 1968 and 1970 elections, the total number of eligible voters was taken from the 1970 Census, Table 35, "Age by Race and Sex for Counties," Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population (one book per state), U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1973

c) The turnout figure for 1972 was taken from the County and City Data Book, 1977, chart for each state, Item #102.

d) For the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections, the total number of eligible voters was taken from the County and City Data Book, 1977, chart for each state, Item #101.

2) Income (per capita):

a) The 1968 and 1970 figures were calculated using the 1969 per capita income figures found in the 1970 U.S. Census, Table 124, "Income and Poverty Status in 1969 for Counties," Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population (one book per state), op. cit., and the average annual rate of change found in the County and City Data Book, 1977, chart for each state, Item #46.

b) The 1972 and 1974 per capita income figures are given in "Population Estimates

and Projections: 1973 (Revised) and 1975 Population Estimates and 1972 (Revised) and 1974 Per Capita Income Estimates for Counties and Incorporated Places in Oregon," Series P-25 of Current Population Reports, Population Estimates and Projections, #685, April 1977, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

- "...in Wyoming," #698, Ibid.
- "...in Maryland," #668, Ibid.
- "...in Illinois," #661, Ibid.
- "...in Nebraska," #675, Ibid.
- "...in Montana," #674, Ibid.
- "...in Colorado," #654, Ibid.
- "...in Iowa," #663, Ibid.
- "...in Minnesota," #671, Ibid.
- "...in Idaho," #660, Ibid.
- "...in Pennsylvania," #686, Ibid.
- "...in Kansas," #664, Ibid.
- "...in Indiana," #662, Ibid.
- "...in Massachusetts," #669, Ibid.
- "...in Connecticut," #655, Ibid.

c) The 1976 and 1978 per capita income figures were calculated using the annual rate of change found in the County and City Data Book, 1977, chart for each state, Item #46 and the 1975 per capita income figure found in the "1976 Population Estimates and 1975 and Revised 1974 Per Capita Income Estimates for Counties and Incorporated Places in Oregon," Series P-25 of Current Population Reports, Population Estimates and Projections, #776, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, January 1979.

- "...in Wyoming," #789, Ibid.
- "...in Maryland," #759, Ibid.
- "...in Illinois," #752, Ibid.
- "...in Nebraska," #766, Ibid.
- "...in Montana," #765, Ibid.
- "...in Colorado," #745, Ibid.
- "...in Iowa," #754, Ibid.
- "...in Minnesota," #762, Ibid.
- "...in Idaho," #751, Ibid.
- "...in Pennsylvania," #777, Ibid.
- "...in Kansas," #755, Ibid.
- "...in Indiana," #753, Ibid.
- "...in Massachusetts," #760, Ibid.
- "...in Connecticut," #746, Ibid.

3) Median Age: Time series data on the age

structure of counties between 1970 and 1978 was not available. Therefore, estimates were made on the basis of past trends as exhibited by the 1950-1970 censuses. The figure given in the 1970 census was used as the basis upon which to calculate age through 1978.

a) 1970 Census: Table 35, "Age by Race and Sex for Counties: 1970, Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population (one book per state), op. cit.

b) 1960 Census: Table 27, "Age by Color and Sex for Counties: 1960," (includes 1950 data), Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population (one book per state), U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1963.

2. Data for the second regression which tests the relationship between the television variable and the partisan volatility scores (see Chapter 2):

a. The Dependent Variable: Partisan volatility scores for each county resulting from the first regression analyses.

b. The Independent Variable (Television):

1) Whether or not a county received in-state television was determined from Broadcasting Yearbook, Broadcasting-Telecasting Building, 1735 DeSales St., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Appendix D: Figures 3.1 - 3.16: Scatterplots Depicting
the Relationship Between Television and Partisan
Volatility in the Fifteen States and in All 910 Counties

Figure 3.1:	Minnesota	Page 257
Figure 3.2:	Indiana	Page 258
Figure 3.3:	Pennsylvania	Page 259
Figure 3.4:	Maryland	Page 260
Figure 3.5:	Montana	Page 261
Figure 3.6:	Nebraska	Page 262
Figure 3.7:	Illinois	Page 263
Figure 3.8:	Colorado	Page 264
Figure 3.9:	Idaho	Page 265
Figure 3.10:	Wyoming	Page 266
Figure 3.11:	Oregon	Page 267
Figure 3.12:	Kansas	Page 268
Figure 3.13:	Iowa	Page 269
Figure 3.14:	Massachusetts	Page 270
Figure 3.15:	Connecticut	Page 271
Figure 3.16:	All 910 Counties	Page 272

Figure 3.1- Television and Partisan Volatility in Minnesota




Figure 3.2 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Indiana




Figure 3.3 - Television & Partisan Volatility in Pennsylvania




Figure 3.4-Television and Partisan Volatility in Maryland




Figure 3.5 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Montana




Figure 3.6 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Nebraska




Figure 3.7- Television and Partisan Volatility in Illinois




Figure 3.8- Television and Partisan Volatility in Colorado




Figure 3.9 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Idaho




Figure 3.10- Television and Partisan Volatility in Wyoming




Figure 3.11 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Oregon




Figure 3.12 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Kansas





Figure 3.14 - Television and Partisan Volatility in Massachusetts



MADE IN U.S.A.

10 X 10 PER INCH

Figure 3.15 - Television & Partisan Volatility in Connecticut





Figure 3.16 - Television + Partisan Volatility in All 910 Countries



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