Understanding the Outcomes and Aftermaths of Nonviolent Resistance

by

Stephen Bernard Wittels

B.A., Dartmouth College (2009)

Submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY September 2017

© Stephen Bernard Wittels, MMXVII. All rights reserved.

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created.

Signature redacted

Department of Political Science
July 2, 2017

Fotini Christia
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Signature redacted

Ben Ross Schneider
Ford International Professor of Political Science
Chair, Graduate Program Committee
Understanding the Outcomes and Aftermaths of Nonviolent Resistance

by

Stephen Bernard Wittels

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on July 2, 2017, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Abstract

This dissertation examines variation in the immediate and long-term success of nonviolent resistance movements. It consists of three discrete papers. The first introduces three “organizational technologies of resistance:” a loose confederal, or “umbrella” administrative structure; a robust “operational core,” or cadre of mid-level leaders; and access to levers of economic or political disruption. I argue that these attributes are important determinants of a campaign’s probability of success and are most likely to be acquired through collaboration with civil society organizations in which they inhere naturally. Two bodies that satisfy this criterion with high regularity are industrial labor unions and structured religious communities. In the final section of the paper I posit that partnerships between these organizations and extant nonviolent movements are typically characterized by concerns about the consequences of victory and aggregate capabilities. To illustrate these hypotheses I conduct an historical case study of the African National Congress and the black labor movement. The second paper enclosed herein centers on three empirical tests. The first is intended to evaluate the prevailing theory in the study of nonviolent resistance today: that unarmed methods of struggle succeed at a greater rate than violent ones because they tend to elicit mass participation. Using causal mediation analysis, I estimate a robust null effect along this causal pathway. A subsequent test focuses on the unmediated relationship between a nonviolent movement’s scale and its likelihood of success. Using an instrument for mass participation I find that this “power-in-numbers” hypothesis also lacks veracity. However, the third and final inquiry shows that if one models participation as a function of a movement’s access to organizational technologies, mass participation does exert a robust positive effect on the likelihood of campaign victory. The last paper in this dissertation pertains to the aftermath of successful nonviolent resistance. Contra much of the extant literature, I find that only some of these campaigns yield a stable and democratic political dividend. Those that achieve victory in one year or less are substantially more likely to experience democratic slippage, coups d’état, and episodes of violent conflict.

Thesis Supervisor: Fotini Christia
Title: Professor of Political Science
Acknowledgments

I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without the support I received from a variety of sources, institutional and personal. Funding from the MIT Political Science Department and the Smith-Richardson Foundation’s World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship were invaluable in the early and latter stages of my research, respectively. On two occasions I was fortunate to receive the Tobin Foundation’s National Security Fellowship, which provided not only funding but regular contact with a variety of scholars whose comments on early drafts of all three portions of this dissertation were very helpful. I would like to personally thank all of the Tobin Foundation Fellows who participated in these discussions as well as the Tobin Foundation’s coordinator in charge of this fellowship, Will Wittels. Other working groups and structured discussions that improved my thinking, methods, and writing pertaining to the ideas included herein include the Strategic Use of Force Working Group and International Relations Work-In-Progress bodies at MIT. Attendees at the Harvard-MIT-Yale Political Violence Conference, as well as the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security and the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago were all helpful as well. I have Peter Krause, Charles Lipson, Kevin Song, and Paul Staniland to thank for making these engagements so productive.

Within the academic community studying nonviolence I owe special thanks to three individuals who provided unique advice on the subject matter on which my project focuses. Erica Chenoweth, Jonathan Pinckney, and Ches Thurber provided helpful critiques and encouragement both in independent communications and discussions and as participants on panels at the International Studies Association. At MIT there are scores of faculty and students who contributed to my development as a scholar and student of nonviolent resistance. Teppei Yamamoto and Danny Hidalgo were especially helpful in providing methodological training and offering advice on the empirical aspects of this project. The students I would like to specifically thank include all members of my graduate cohort: Laura Chirot, Justin de Benedictis-Kessner, Daniel de Kadt, Dean Knox, Renato Lima de Oliveira, Tom O'Grady, and Amanda Rothschild. I would also like to thank the following current and former student in cohorts other than mine: Noel Anderson, Mark Bell, Elissa Berwick, Fiona Cunningham, Chad Hazlett, Marika Landau-Wells, Ben Morse, Alec Worsnop, and Ketian Zhang. Most important among my colleagues, though are the members of my committee: Fotini Christia, Roger Petersen, and Richard Nielsen. All three brought great attention to the various drafts and ideas I presented along with a tremendous depth of intellectual and professional knowledge. To my chair, Fotini Christia, I owe an un-repayable debt of gratitude for her enduring and multitudinous support.
Contents

1 Prefatory Remarks .................................................. 9

2 Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance ......................... 13
   2.1 Motivation and Context ......................................... 14
   2.2 Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance ....................... 20
      2.2.1 Umbrella Structures ...................................... 20
      2.2.2 Operational Cores .................................... 25
      2.2.3 Socioeconomic Leverage ................................ 28
   2.3 Technology Adoption through Co-optation ................... 38
      2.3.1 Candidate Partner Organizations ......................... 38
      2.3.2 Partnership Conditionality ............................... 46
      2.3.3 The ANC and Black Labor in the 1950s .................. 48
   2.4 Conclusion ...................................................... 59

3 Examining the Link Between Popular Participation and Successful Political Resistance ........................................ 61
   3.1 Nonviolence, Participation, and Success in Theory .......... 62
   3.2 Testing the Prevailing Argument ................................ 64
   3.3 A Further Test of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance ... 70
      3.3.1 Instrument Construct Validity and Measurement ........ 71
      3.3.2 Assessing Ignorability .................................. 73
      3.3.3 Assessing the Exclusion Restriction ..................... 74
      3.3.4 Instrumental Variable Results ............................. 77
   3.4 Organizations and Mass Nonviolent Action .................... 81
   3.5 Conclusion ...................................................... 89
   3.6 Appendix A: Further Evaluation of Ignorability ............... 91
   3.7 Appendix B: Additional Flexible Modeling ..................... 93

4 The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle ................................ 99
   4.1 Introduction .................................................... 99
   4.2 Literature and Theory ......................................... 100
   4.3 Data and Methods ............................................... 108
   4.4 Results .......................................................... 111
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................. 123

5 Final Thoughts ............................................................. 125
Chapter 1

Prefatory Remarks

An abundance of research on nonviolent resistance has been published in the last ten years. As a result, scholars and practitioners now possess at least rudimentary insights on a wide variety of issues that previously escaped systematic comparative analysis. Much of this new work focuses broadly on explaining the initiation of nonviolent campaigns and their immediate outcomes (e.g., Svensson and Lindgren, 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011; Pearlman, 2011; Braithwaite et al., 2012; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Sutton et al., 2014; Thurber, 2015a; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). A great deal of inquiry has also been directed at narrower aspects of nonviolent mass action, including, inter alia, security-force defections, nonviolent “jiu-jitsu”, transitions between violence and nonviolence, movements’ internal structures, and post-campaign political transitions (e.g., Schock, 2005; Hess and Martin, 2006; Bob and Nepstad, 2007; Ganz, 2009; Nepstad, 2013; Dudouet, 2013; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer et al., 2016). However, the most significant finding to emerge is simply that nonviolent resistance “works” as a method of unseating authoritarian regimes and ending foreign occupations, among other broad political goals (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Indeed, by virtue of its comparative advantage in eliciting mass participation, nonviolence has significantly outperformed rebellion, insurgency, and terrorism as a strategy of political contention in the post-war period.

Buoyed by this result and the scholarly discourse it prompted, advocates of nonviolence have experienced a renaissance. Groups that educate students and interested communities, such as the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict and the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, have seen their revenues increase dramatically (Hughes-Fraitekh, 2017). Other organizations that take a more active role, teaching specific nonviolent tactics and advising prospective resistance entrepreneurs, have also grown. Of these the most prominent is the Belgrade-based Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, which claims credit for aiding successful nonviolent resistance in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Lebanon

---

1 In the 1970s, and early 1980s, Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, under the auspices of the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, conducted numerous workshops on the praxis of nonviolent resistance in Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines (Deats, 2008). Evidence of similar transnational advocacy in the 1990s and early 2000s is lacking.
Encouraging as it is that nonviolence is now held in higher esteem than it was in even the recent past, there is still strong reason for caution. As the abortive Syrian chapter of the Arab Spring shows, along with other recent failures in Bahrain (2011), Thailand (2014), and Hong Kong (2014), organized civil disobedience is not an infallible coercive strategy. More problematically, scholarly inquiry has only begun to uncover the factors upon which its success is contingent. This lacuna poses both practical and ethical challenges for advocates of nonviolence. Where engagement will be fruitful, and what an intervention should consist of in a given context, remain open questions. In the absence of convincing answers, the risk of counter-productive or even disastrous engagement is high. For the scholarly community, the collective challenge is to articulate and empirically validate a model that can serve as a guide.

A second, more academic opportunity for progress in the study of nonviolent resistance is methodological in nature. Before the recent surge in scholarly output, virtually all of the major publications on nonviolence were not in the positivist tradition. Most obvious among these were largely normative works by Gregg (1935), Miller (1964), Gandhi (1968), Bedau (1969), and others that juxtaposed unarmed and violent methods of struggle in moral or philosophical terms. Another substantial segment of this literature consists of publications that combine qualitative studies of one or more cases with a modicum of summative analysis (e.g. Lakey, 1987; Elwood, 1986; Ackerman and DuVall, 2000; Clark, 2000). Problematically, many of the insights these authors draw – e.g., the utility of parallel institutions, “propaganda of the deed,” or extreme administrative acephaly – follow from “selecting on” campaign success as a dependent variable. Since the mid-2000s, and continuing with the advent of the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes Dataset (NAVCO), scholars have paid more attention to structured comparison and research design (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Nevertheless, there continues to be a paucity of research that satisfies the inferential standards common in other domains of empirical social science. Design-based methods of identification are all but absent (cf. Bhavnani and Jha, 2014a). Even more troubling, perhaps, is the lack of rigor that attends most uses of model-based inference and covariate adjustment (cf. Shellman et al., 2013; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). As such, one cannot escape the conclusion there is substantial room to advance the empirical quality and associated academic standing of the literature on nonviolent resistance.

This three-paper dissertation endeavors to contribute to the field on both of these theoretical and inferential dimensions. Towards the first end it will posit a theory of campaign success, rooted in “organizational technologies of resistance,” that scholars can easily build upon or test, and which has considerable practical utility for policymakers. Best methodological practice, meanwhile, will be advanced in two distinct empirical exercises. An initial set of analyses will use a novel instrumental variable to directly test a seminal argument

---

2 See http://canvasopedia.org/about-us/.
on the role of mass participation in successful nonviolent action while also indirectly substantiating the role of organizational technologies. A second empirical inquiry will then use model-based techniques to optimize the inferential utility of selection-on-observable as a means of verifying the adverse effect of rapid nonviolent victory on subsequent levels of democracy and stability. This last finding, perhaps even more than the dissertation’s larger theory of nonviolent victory, has direct real-world applicability.

The first, largely theoretical paper, titled “Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance,” begins by specifying three organizational attributes of resistance movements, or “technologies.” These are campaign-wide administrative decentralization, the presence of experienced local-level leaders that can serve as a campaign’s de facto officer corps, and access to either economic or political mechanisms of nonviolent coercion. Each organizational technology is hypothesized to be a non-trivial determinant of a nonviolent movement’s likelihood of success. As concepts, none is entirely new to the literature on nonviolence; however, their explication in this paper is unique for its attention to causal antecedents. While each feature can be developed independently as resistance organizations prosecute their campaigns, the alternative, more expeditious path under investigation is one that relies on a partnership with organizations in civil society. These candidate partners are industrial labor unions, mass-based religious communities, and university-level student unions. To varying degrees that the paper specifies these organizations are imbued with the technologies of resistance that boost nonviolent movements’ chances of victory. While securing their cooperation can be a difficult task, their active involvement promises to deliver nonviolent movements critical structure, assets, and opportunities.

The virtues of the theory featured in “Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance” are substantial. The fact that it specifies both organizational conditions relevant to campaign success as well as a hypothesis about the origins of these conditions means that it provides is a solid frame around which to build an inferential strategy for theory testing. No other theory in the study of nonviolent resistance offers this level of specificity. In addition, if it is correct, the model has real implications for those seeking to change the fortunes of nonviolent campaigns from without. Insofar as “technology adoption” through civil society is the most productive or most efficient channel for a campaign to form itself into an optimally effective resistance organization, these prospective intervenors’ menu of useful short-term policy options may be quite limited.

The second paper, “Examining the Link Between Popular Participation and Successful Political Resistance,” combines a partial large-N test of the argument in paper one with a further test of a more fundamental claim in the study of nonviolence. Both sets of empirical exercises use an instrument for campaign participation derived from quasi-random variation in the layout of countries’ capital city squares. Those that possess central squares and plazas amenable to the congregation of individuals on foot are more likely to host nonviolent movements that achieve higher levels of peak participation. At the same time, these two types of cities are not meaningfully different from one another on any other causally relevant dimension. Using this variable, the paper begins by showing, contra Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Sharp (1973), and numerous other implicit arguments in the field, that exogenous
increase in nonviolent movement participation are not robustly associated with a higher likelihood of campaign success. Rather, it is higher levels of participation combined with the early, active participation of organizations like labor unions and formal religious hierarchies that result in a higher predicted probability of victory.

Taken together these results represent a substantial critique of the prevailing argument in the study of nonviolence — namely, that “power in numbers” causes nonviolent resistance to “work.” This analysis shows, in keeping with the theory of nonviolent organizational technologies, that the quality of participation in nonviolent resistance likely matters more than the quantity. “Examining the Link Between Popular Participation and Successful Political Resistance” is also significant for demonstrating the utility of a methodologically sophisticated approach to the study of nonviolence. This paper is the first to test the seminal argument in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in a manner consistent with its logical structure as a sequential argument. To do so it uses the technique of causal mediation due to Imai et al. (2011). It is also the first paper in the study of nonviolent resistance to make extensive use of an instrumental variable. Without the creative use of urban topography as an encouragement to different levels of campaign participation, the revealing test of the “power in numbers” hypothesis that this paper delivers would not have been possible.

In the third and final paper analysis turns from campaign outcomes to campaign after-maths. The specific hypothesis tested in “The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle” is that the polities that emerge following fast-won nonviolent victories are less democratic and less stable than the those that redound from longer, but still ultimately successful campaigns. One rationale underlying this finding is that sudden victory leaves important questions about the balance of capabilities between and within formerly competing interest groups unanswered. It may also create a destabilizing legitimacy deficit for the entity endowed with the status of incumbency once calm is restored. In toto, the result is lower average polity scores, higher rates of coups d’état, and a greater average occurrence of violent conflict episodes. Unlike the second paper, this analysis involves no design-based inferential strategy; however, using a combination of highly flexible, kernel-based modeling and sensitivity analysis its robustness to both misspecification and omitted variable bias is clearly demonstrated. “The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle” thus provides manifest illustration of the benefits from deploying cutting edge empirical tools in observational studies of nonviolent movements. On a practical level, the results of this paper send a clear message to organizations, public and private, that build capacity and provide resources in the context of major political transitions. It suggests that among instances of regime change effected by nonviolent resistance, those that ended following less than a year of struggle are probably most deserving of attention and priority.
Chapter 2

Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance

Much has been written on nonviolent resistance in the past decade and a half that has found practical manifestation in the policies of advocacy groups, philanthropic organizations, and even nation-states; however, the scholarship on which these endeavors are based is not without flaws. Most notably, while scholars have been keen to posit best-practices at the operational level, and have shown equal zeal in dismissing structural determinism, little research has been done on the properties of nonviolent movements themselves that may be associated with campaign outcomes. Furthermore, the work that has been done on this subject says little about the causal antecedents of the critical organization features they identify. Such omissions weaken both the practical utility of these arguments and their ability to serve as a foundation for further researcher in the field. The following paper aims to rectify this trend.

It begins by specifying three organizational attributes, or “technologies,” that are likely to be associated with campaign success. These are a decentralized, umbrella-like overall structure, the presence of a robust core of mid-level leaders, and access to levers of socioeconomic coercion. Umbrella structures are useful, if not necessary because of their potential to generate tactical innovation and variety, a critical operational component of success; to maximize a movement’s mobilization base; and to increase survivability in the event of concerted repression. Mid-level leaders, or an “operational core,” also play an important role in sustaining nonviolent movements. Without such a cadre, nonviolent movements are vulnerable to counter-mobilization strategies of decapitation and seeing enthusiasm at the grassroots wane through costly or slow periods in a campaign. Members of an operational core also serve the critical function of maintaining a movement’s nonviolent discipline in the face of pressure that could otherwise cause a descent into escalating violent tit-for-tat. Finally, to win, nonviolent movements need access to tools besides force of arms to ultimately coerce their opponents. These can take the form measures that create economic costs, such as tax noncompliance, strikes, or boycotts, as well as more explicit political strategies intended to peel away a target regime’s winning coalition, or “pillars of support.”

These technologies of nonviolent resistance, while substantiated with a unique breadth of evidence herein, are not new concepts in the study of nonviolent resistance. This paper’s principal contribution is to specify a causal pathway by which these technologies are adopted. While movements can build them on their own, following a path of “organic” development,
this is often a costly model in terms of the time required and the demands it places on top-
level leaders. A more expeditious approach is to incorporate umbrella structures, operational
cores, and access to socioeconomic levers by partnering with civil society organizations that
possess these technologies as a matter of course. Below, I use arguments from a breadth of
fields to examine the utility of three such organizations: labor unions, religious communities,
and student groups. This analysis shows that of these three types of collective actors,
industrial labor organizations are the best able to contribute, followed by decentralized or
hierarchical religions, and then by student unions.

Merely being co-located with one of these organization or another of a related type is
not of independent consequence for nonviolent resistance movements, though. For one, the
movement and organization in question must have sufficiently consonant preferences about
the objectives of nonviolent struggle. A strong desire to oust an unpopular incumbent may
not be sufficient to bridge serious divides over major economic and social issues or other
ideological differences. Secondly, and no less significantly, any prospective union between
a nonviolent resistance outfit and a potential partner in civil society must pass a certain
threshold of aggregate capability. Even if both parties see eye-to-eye on the goals of a cam-
paign, the latter may well see a policy of neutrality more attractive than active engagement if
the proposed union’s prospects are not particularly good. For an explication and illustration
of how these concerns manifest in a real campaign, this analysis closes with an inquiry into
relations between the African National Congress and the black labor movement in the early
phases of anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa. This case aptly shows how both ideolog-
ical and practical concerns affected these two parties as they attempted, over the course of
the 1950s, to maximize their collective leverage vis-à-vis their common political opponent.
However, it is also an important case for the broader qualitative literature on nonviolence, as
it draws attention to the less sanguine moments of a campaign almost universally evaluated
solely as an unmitigatedly successful instance of nonviolent resistance.

The remaining four sections of this paper proceed as follows. Section two reviews the mo-
tivation and scholarly context for this paper, focusing on practical, theoretical, and empirical
shortcomings. The following section proceeds to provide a detailed explication of the three
technologies of resistance emphasized in this paper – umbrella structures, operational cores,
and access to socioeconomic levers. In so doing it provides evidence of these attributes’ util-
ity from a variety of campaigns spanning the globe and the twentieth century. Section four
then addresses how these organizational technologies come to be adopted. As noted above,
it focuses on labor unions, religious communities and student groups as potential vehicles,
and concludes with a focused inquiry into one particular union movement in the context of
anti-Apartheid resistance in South Africa. Section five concludes.

2.1 Motivation and Context

An abundance of research on nonviolent resistance has been published in the last ten years.
As a result, scholars and practitioners now possess at least rudimentary insights on wide
variety of issues that previously escaped systematic comparative analysis. Much of this new
work focuses broadly on explaining the initiation of nonviolent campaigns and their immediate outcomes (e.g., Svensson and Lindgren, 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011; Pearlman, 2011; Braithwaite et al., 2012; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Sutton et al., 2014; Thurber, 2015a; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). A great deal of inquiry has also been directed at narrower aspects of nonviolent mass action, including, inter alia, security-force defections, nonviolent “jiu-jitsu”, transitions between violence and nonviolence, movements’ internal structures, and post-campaign political transitions (e.g., Schock, 2005; Hess and Martin, 2006; Bob and Nepstad, 2007; Ganz, 2009; Nepstad, 2013; Dudouet, 2013; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer et al., 2016). However, the most significant finding to emerge is simply that nonviolent resistance “works” as a method of unseating authoritarian regimes and ending foreign occupations, among other broad political goals (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Indeed, by virtue of its comparative advantage in eliciting mass participation, nonviolence has significantly outperformed rebellion, insurgency, and terrorism as a strategy of political contention in the post-war period.

Buoyed by this result and the scholarly discourse it prompted, advocates of nonviolence have experienced a renaissance.1 Groups that educate students and interested communities, such as the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict and the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, have seen their revenues increase dramatically (Hughes-Fraitekh, 2017). Other organizations that take a more active role, teaching specific nonviolent tactics and advising prospective resistance entrepreneurs, have also grown. Of these the most prominent is the Belgrade-based Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, which claims credit for aiding successful nonviolent resistance in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Lebanon (2004), and Egypt (2011).2 Even the United States government has played a role in spreading the revived gospel of nonviolence. Indeed, one of the State Department’s officers on scene when Syrians first began agitating against President Bashar al-Asad was Maria J. Stephan, a principal author of Why Civil Resistance Works (Stephan, 2015).

Encouraging as it is that nonviolence is now held in higher esteem than it was in even the recent past, there is still strong reason for caution. As the abortive Syrian chapter of the Arab Spring shows, along with other recent failures in Bahrain (2011), Thailand (2014), and Hong Kong (2014), organized civil disobedience is not an infallible coercive strategy. More problematically, scholarly inquiry has only begun to uncover the factors upon which its success is contingent. This lacuna poses both practical and ethical challenges for advocates of nonviolence. Where engagement will be fruitful, and what an intervention should consist of in a given context, remain open questions. In the absence of convincing answers, the risk of counter-productive or even disastrous engagement is high. For the scholarly community, the collective challenge is to articulate and empirically validate a model that can serve as a guide. One way to structure this task is by levels of analysis. To date, students of nonviolent resistance have posited that properties of the strategic environment, the resistance

---

1 In the 1970s, and early 1980s, Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, under the auspices of the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, conducted numerous workshops on the praxis of nonviolent resistance in Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines (Deats, 2008). Evidence of similar transnational advocacy in the 1990s and early 2000s is lacking.

2 See http://canvasopedia.org/about-us/.
organization, and the organization’s specific operations all bear on a campaign’s likelihood of victory.

Of these three categories, tactics and operations have received the most scholarly attention. Indeed, much of the literature that pre-dates the most recent wave is devoted principally to describing the praxis of nonviolence and prescribing particular behaviors. Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) is a noteworthy example. From six cases spanning the twentieth century they distill 12 principles of nonviolent conflict that encompass all phases of a campaign, from preparation through execution. Examples include articulating clear objectives that attract as wide a following as possible; cultivating external assistance; and muting the effects of opponents’ weapons by, inter alia, getting out of harm’s way, disabling weapons, or minimizing potential losses.\footnote{Schock (2005) draws analogous lessons from structured comparisons of successful and failed unarmed insurrections. Among the most original and most cited correlates of victory to emerge from this study is a movement’s capacity to conduct concentrated and dispersed actions interchangeably. Schock finds that insurrectionary organizations possessing this flexibility are less likely to collapse under repressive pressure.} Schock (2005) draws analogous lessons from structured comparisons of successful and failed unarmed insurrections. Among the most original and most cited correlates of victory to emerge from this study is a movement’s capacity to conduct concentrated and dispersed actions interchangeably. Schock finds that insurrectionary organizations possessing this flexibility are less likely to collapse under repressive pressure.\footnote{This insight and most others arising from broad syntheses of past nonviolent campaigns are, at the level of theory, derivative of Sharp’s (1973) three-volume treatise on nonviolent strategy.} Sharp’s premise is that all political power is dependent on the continuous cooperation of many individuals and institutions. Nonviolent resistance works by disturbing these relations. If a sufficient number of individuals spoil the normal correspondence between an authority’s commands and its subordinates’ obedience, even the strongest regime can see its power erode.

Since the publication of Sharp’s simple but powerful observation, much of the social scientific research on nonviolent resistance has sought to explicate the specific mechanisms by which movements can achieve effective “withdrawals of consent.” For example, because of their significance in supporting many autocratic regimes, several scholars have examined how armed forces’ loyalties can be shifted (Binnendijk and Marovic, 2006; Nepstad, 2011, 2013; Lee, 2015). A common theme in these works is the importance raising soldiers’ and police officers’ moral, psychological, and personal costs of training their weapons on nonviolent actors. Behaving amicably around these forces, and transparently ensuring their actions are visible to a national or global audience, can be especially helpful towards this end (Nepstad, 2011). Another of Sharp’s methods that recent research has investigated is “political jujitsu” – the practice of exploiting violent action against members of a nonviolent movement for the purpose of undermining the violent actor’s political standing. Through an analysis of the massacres at Dharasana (1930), Sharpeville (1960), and Dili (1991) as well as the political fallout from these atrocities, Martin (2007) finds that the promulgation of particular narrative themes to a wide audience is vital to this process. Sutton et al. (2014) corroborate this conclusion in a large-N framework, noting that nonviolent movements with parallel

\footnote{Numerous other exhaustive manuals of nonviolent resistance exist. See, for example, Helvey (2004), Sharp (2010), and Popovic and Miller (2015).}

\footnote{McAdam (1983) also argues for the merits of “tactical diversity.”}

\footnote{For other descriptive accounts of nonviolent resistance, see Zunes et al. (1999); Ackerman and DuVall (2000); and Bartkowski (2013).}
media institutions are much more adept at increasing domestic mobilization after major episodes of repression. A third posited modality of successful nonviolent insurrection that is less studied than either political jiu-jitsu or security-force defections, even though it is likely no less significant, is nonviolent discipline. Some argue that charismatic and committed leadership is a crucial requisite (Pearlman, 2011). Others contend that there is no substitute for a cadre of trained devotees to nonviolence analogous to Gandhi’s satyagrahis (Nepstad, 2011; Bhavnani and Jha, 2014b). Sharp, for his part, places emphasis on collective activities like singing or prayer that build group cohesion (Sharp, 1973). While no evidence yet exists to arbitrate between these or other hypotheses, a consensus nevertheless exists that broad and steadfast eschewal of violence is critical to any nonviolent movement’s chances of victory (Schock, 2013; Nepstad, 2015).

As a separate class of variables that may belong in a model of nonviolent campaign success, immutable features of the political, economic, or social context in which nonviolent movements operate are viewed with greater skepticism than concrete operational concerns. In part this is an historiographical artifact of the field (Schock, 2013). Since scholarly inquiry into the efficacy of collective nonviolent action began, proponents have felt obliged to defend their position against the charge that nonviolence is ultimately a limited political tool. To make this argument, many authors have given descriptive and theoretical primacy to individual and collective agency in determining a given movement’s outcome. In recent years this focus has received some empirical validation. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) find that almost none of the structural variables associated with the initiation of violent resistance in Fearon and Laitin (2003) also predict new nonviolent campaigns. Indeed, with the exception of aggregate population, most covariates are both opposite-sided and statistically insignificant. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) present an even more thorough test of the hypothesis that nonviolent resistance defies prediction from features of the strategic environment. Using sets of covariates rooted in four theories of social conflict – those pertaining to grievances, resource mobilization, modernization, and political opportunity structures – they observe little variation in predictive power. Indeed, k-fold cross-validation shows that no model exhibits generalization error significantly better than a univariate fit with population as the sole predictor.

Important as these cross-national statistical findings are, they do not definitively discredit the notion that certain circumstances are more conducive to successful nonviolent resistance than others. One potentially prohibitive factor suggested by several scholars is the degree of social distance between a people and their ruler (Galtung, 1989). Where this relationship is characterized by low “horizontal legitimacy” – i.e., where it is widely believed, on the basis of identity, that a regime should not have authority over the citizenry in its remit – Svensson and Lindgren (2010) argue that nonviolent success is unlikely. To substantiate this claim, they show that minority regimes, ethnic polarization, and territorial incompatibilities

---

6 These rebuttals feature prominently in Sharp (1973); Summy (1994); Ackerman and DuVall (2000); Schock (2005) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), to name just a few major works. One also should not lose track of the fact that many of these authors are practitioners as well as scholars. This dual role may provide a motivation, largely absent in other domains of academic political science, to defend the normative value and efficacy of nonviolence.
are all associated with unsuccessful nonviolent resistance. Others have made the argument that certain autocracies rely on particularly strong “pillars of support” that nonviolent insurrection cannot easily vitiate. Way (2008) identifies three of these: a predominant and unified ruling party; a military that has won an international or revolutionary victory; and an economy that is both under state control and outside the orbit of the industrialized West. He finds that incumbent regimes buttressed by these forces can withstand nonviolent resistance even when it is massive and guided by best strategic practice. Still other research has identified institutions of an opposite nature – those that render autocracies vulnerable to nonviolent exploitation. Sham elections and rubber-stamp legislatures are prime examples. Both Bunce and Wolchik (2006) and Kuntz and Thompson (2009) note that the former create a fixed window of opportunity within which otherwise closed regimes’ de jure authority can be contested. What is more, western democracies often take an interest in ensuring that national elections around the world meet a minimum standard of freeness and fairness. Nonviolent opposition movements victimized by blatant electoral fraud may consequently earn powerful international allies. However, even if they do not, and autocratic electoral institutions are allowed to persist over time, the effects on future nonviolent resistance efforts may be significant. Participating in elections and legislative assembly, regardless of these institutions’ authenticity, can help instill norms of consensus-based decision-making and build competencies like popular mobilization. Both are essential to successful nonviolent action (Braithwaite et al., 2012).

Resistance movements’ properties as organizations represent a third domain of analysis within which one might be able to partially answer why some nonviolent mass action is successful. Unlike nonviolent tactics, which scholars have researched for decades, or strategic context, which is widely considered marginally significant, matters of bureaucracy have mostly been ignored by the field of resistance studies. More problematically, the studies that defy this trend share a common, non-trivial flaw: they identify a complex or endogenous organizational feature as a determinant of resistance success then fail to define the causal antecedents that give rise to this attribute.

Pearlman (2011) illustrates this shortcoming aptly. The central concept in this study is cohesion. Movements that possess it are hypothesized to be less violent and more likely to succeed, ceteris paribus. To add explanatory detail to this otherwise almost truistic claim, Pearlman stipulates that a movement’s cohesiveness is proportional to the quality of its leadership, institutions, and collective purpose. However, each of these underlying dimensions is also problematic. Leadership, for one, is notoriously nebulous. Pearlman equates it with the absence of multiple executive bodies, which is relatively concrete, but also invokes yet another ambiguous term – legitimacy. In the analysis, which encompass nearly a century of Palestinian national resistance, one cannot escape the conclusion that leadership is an under-specified attribute. Pearlman notes its presence when the resistance’s most prominent figures were Ottoman-era elites, independent middle-class activists, and locally elected...
township mayors. Yet she finds it lacking during the period of the Second Intifada, when Yasser Arafat sat atop the movement’s administrative hierarchy. Given these indeterminacies, leadership would seem to offer little purchase with which to grasp the origins of cohesion. The same can be said for institutions and collective purpose, though for somewhat different reasons. It is likely that these additional dimensions of cohesion are derivative of complex strategic decisions and environmental incentives; however, Pearlman makes little attempt to ascertain whether these dependencies render her claims spurious. For example, most of the administrative bodies and communications networks she associates with episodes of nonviolent Palestinian resistance were formed by middle-class professionals. She also notes that these structures were more durable when they were rooted in minimally affluent communities with dense quotidian ties. Nevertheless, she does not entertain the hypothesis that socioeconomic status or the contours of social networks are independent determinants of nonviolent mass action. Repression represents a third confounder of this type. Pearlman finds a correspondence between factional infighting and violent repression, but gives only limited consideration to whether counter-mobilization is a truer determinant of a movement’s unity than collective purpose, per se. In short, Pearlman’s analysis leaves unanswered both how a nonviolent movement achieves cohesion via leadership, institutions, and unity of effort and whether these constructs are independent causes of successful nonviolent resistance.

Incomplete reasoning linking the organizational characteristics of a nonviolent movement to its chances of success also afflicts Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). Though they find strong evidence of an association between campaign size and nonviolent victory – affirming their principal expectation – the process by which a resistance achieves mass participation is left unclear. Most notably, Chenoweth and Stephan neglect to clarify how a movement seeking wide appeal overcomes perhaps the fundamental challenge of large-scale collective action – the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965). Several plausible solutions exist, each of which suggests causal processes that have the potential to confound their main finding. Consider, by way of illustration, the idea of social sanction (Hechter, 1987). Where individuals who might otherwise eschew involvement in costly collective action are socially connected to those who contribute, this mechanism can serve to punish, deter, and ultimately minimize free-riding. If such enforcement action were necessary for a nonviolent movement to achieve mass mobilization, successful nonviolent resistance might only be possible in communities with a particular social structure. Alternatively, it might be dependent on a resistance organization that can recruit some of its adherents to act as in-group police. Critical-mass theory, which offers a further solution to free-riding, has similar implications (Oliver et al., 1985). One of its principal results is that cascading collective action for costly public goods is often contingent on a community of first-movers with unique aptitude for, or interest in, achieving the objective (Oliver and Marwell, 1988). In the context of nascent maximalist resistance, such groups might be scarce. If a qualifying religious community, political party, or other socioeconomic group does not exist, successful mass-based nonviolent resistance might simply not be possible. Other limiting factors might exist as well. At the level of the resistance movement itself, advocates of frame alignment might contend that an aptitude for media outreach and marketing is what drives its popularity (Snow et al., 1986; Popovic and Miller,
In failing to examine these or other potential drivers of participation, Chenoweth and Stephan weaken both the intellectual and practical usefulness of their contention that participation, sui generis, makes nonviolent resistance work.

The analysis that follows is intended to remedy these weaknesses in the study of nonviolent resistance organizations, specifically, and successful nonviolent insurrection, generally. It will go beyond Pearlman (2011), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and other works in the field by reviewing the processes through which nonviolent movements acquire plausible organizational correlates of successful nonviolent action. In so doing, it will provide the theoretical foundations upon which to ascertain the true causal effects of movements’ bureaucratic features as distinct from the forces that give rise to these features. On a practical level, it will be the first scholarly work to articulate how a nonviolent campaign obtains the movement-wide characteristics that lead to victory.

2.2 Technologies of Nonviolent Resistance

Before proceeding to address how insurrectionary movements acquire the facilities for effective nonviolent coercion, it is necessary to specify what these facilities are. In this section, I will discuss three: an umbrella organizational structure; a robust middle-tier of leaders; and access to sources of socioeconomic leverage. I do not contend that this list is exhaustive, or collectively sufficient for successful nonviolent insurrection. Nor am I the first to posit their significance. I will, however, be the first to fully explicate their development in the context of nonviolent resistance. The present section serves primarily to define the technologies in question and articulate their utility under circumstances of unarmed insurrection.

2.2.1 Umbrella Structures

Once a resistance grows beyond a certain minimum size or geographic scope, far-reaching choices about its macro-organizational structure are brought to the fore. At one extreme is the option to maintain a centralized administrative hierarchy. Leaders in business, military affairs, and a host of other domains have long-recognized that this ideal typical structure maximizes the extent to which a given strategy is realized coherently across an entire organization (Weber, 2009). Hierarchy is also relatively efficient in the sense that it minimizes the activities that take place between a strategy’s articulation and its implementation. As a mechanism for generating cooperation under social circumstances of weak goal congruence and opaque individual performance, few organizational archetypes are its equal (Ouchi, 1980). Another option is to eliminate coordinating bureaucracy altogether and build a

---

8 Examples of other arguments that share the structure, and flaws, of Pearlman (2011) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) include Burrowes (1996) and Schock (2005).

9 The importance of decentralization is mentioned in Burrowes (1996), Tarrow (2011), and Schock (2005). The idea of a middle-tier operational corps is due to Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) and is partially explicated in the social movements literature by Robnett (1996). Leverage is at least mentioned in a large number of works on nonviolence, with the most thorough discussion arguably in Sharp (1973).
movement recognizable only as a network of weakly connected nodes. Perhaps the clearest benefit of such administrative acephaly is the survivability it affords: Acts of violent repression with anything more than highly localized consequences are very difficult, if not impossible to mount. An absence of formalization also minimizes the chance that a movement will succumb to the so-called “iron law of oligarchy” wherein key movement figures exploit their stations for personal, rather than collective benefit (Michels, 1915; Piven and Cloward, 1979). For movements that begin in a dispersed, uncoordinated, and grassroots fashion, it is also a natural administrative fit involving little transformation.

These merits of hierarchy and organizational acephaly notwithstanding, I contend that nonviolent resistance movements derive more benefit from an entirely different administrative framework – a loose confederation, or umbrella. Taxonomically, this highly decentralized organizational form bears a resemblance to an inter-state military alliance, a sporting body like the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, or, in the realm of religion, the Worldwide Council of Churches. The principal constituents are, like national militaries, soccer leagues, and individual churches, functional organizations unto themselves rather than dependent units. Each has a high degree of autonomy as well as a distinct set of priorities and goals. Their choice to form a larger supra-organization, with limited rules and obligations, is usually tied to the achievement of a circumscribed set of mutually important objectives that no one constituent can realize on its own (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2005). This said, umbrella structures need not emerge from the bottom up. Though it is perhaps more common for constituent organizations to precede the formation of an overarching superstructure, the two can also grow in parallel, particularly if lower-echelon entities exhibit a strong fissiparous tendency (Gerlach and Hine, 1970).

Among historical nonviolent resistance campaigns, Poland’s Solidarity movement is a prime example of an umbrella-like organization. Though it originated in a decidedly local struggle around the city of Gdansk, which culminated in political authorities granting strikers the right to form an independent trade union, Solidarity’s leaders had wider goals. To secure the interests of the Polish working class, they reasoned, would require a national network of union locals strong enough to confront city and township authorities. So too would some kind of national body be needed to engage the central government when necessary. Initially there was disagreement as to which of these administrative tiers should predominate. Decentralists believed that local unions needed the experience of achieving local recognition on their own to survive over the long term. They also believed that bottom-up expansion was critical to Solidarity’s larger mission of re-introducing autonomous public activity into

---

10 Centralized hierarchy, to extend two of these analogies, would be akin to a territorial empire or a single global faith like The Roman Catholic Church.

11 I follow Ahrne and Brunsson (2005) in distinguishing umbrella organizations from federations by stipulating that in the latter, constituent organizations are formally subordinated to a central body upon which they depend for core capabilities. Federations’ member organizations also tend to share a stronger common identity than their counterparts in loose federations. Structurally, this difference is usually manifest in formal membership extending past local organizations to individual people. The difference between umbrella-like organizations and uncoordinated networks is more straightforward in that the latter necessarily features no centralized coordinating body.
Polish society. Centralists, while sympathetic to these concerns, believed that the costs of foregoing a unitary national union in the near term were prohibitive. Other industrial towns, they argued, would need the experience and momentum that veterans of the Gdansk experience could provide to defeat a regime apparently bent on staunching further reform. In the event, Solidarity adopted an intermediate administrative course, building a movement with strong resemblance to an umbrella-structured organization. A central coordinating commission would issue authoritative statements of policy and order nation-wide acts of disruption and conciliation. At the same time, an expansive network of local and regional union structure were given wide berth to pursue their own interests, and often did so in contravention of national pronouncements. That Solidarity charted this middle path was partly a result of compromise between decentralists and centralists; however, it had a strategic rationale as well. As subsequent discussion will explicate further, it offered the unique benefit of concentrating Solidarity’s strength when necessary while also preserving sufficient local autonomy to render de-capitation a manifestly unproductive counter-strategy (Ost, 1990).

A well-known and equally successful nonviolent movement that never featured the kind of hybrid unitary, but decentralized form that characterized Solidarity is the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This campaign began, as many spontaneous uprisings do, with little apparent structure. Motivated by a newspaper article that alleged Ruholla Khomeini was an agent of western imperialism, seminary students and religiously minded youth stormed the streets of Qum (Keddie and Richard, 2006). In the months that followed, similar demonstrations occurred in cities across the country. Though Khomeini bore most of the responsibility for motivating these subsequent uprising, his status during the opening stages of the revolution was not entirely stable. For one, he was not the country’s pre-eminent cleric. More importantly, he had no staunch allies among the ranks of Ayatollahs and Grand Ayatollahs. In Iran’s rigid, highly stratified Shia hierarchy, this placed real limitations on the authority Khomeini could command through his pronouncements alone (Arjomand, 1988). It also did not help that Khomeini was exiled in Najaf, Iraq, where personal contact with his sympathizers was limited. Those who competed with him for status and influence in the fluid politics of early 1978 included secular constitutionalists, communists, and a host of senior religious scholars whose political preferences spanned the gamut from radical Islamism to traditional quietism.

By late summer, this crowded field of claimants to the mantle of authority within the resistance began to narrow. Through a variety of tactics, Khomeini and his followers persuaded, bullied, and coerced many senior religious figures to fall in line or recede into the background. This not only gave Khomeini increased access to the country’s mosques and religious schools – a network of scarce safe spaces from which to plan and stage demonstrations – it also dramatically raised the Ayatollah’s personal profile (Kurzman, 2009). As the campaign took on an increasingly religious tone, so too did Iran’s various secular oppositionists lose standing. This was especially true of Marxists, whom Khomeini singled out as enemies of the Umma (Roberts and Garton Ash, 2011). Finally, it was not insignificant that in October, Khomeini re-located from Najaf to a château in the Île-de-France region outside Paris. The Shah of Iran requested that Iraqi authorities force this move, thinking that it would
further reduce the exiled Ayatollah’s exposure in Iran. In fact, superior communication technologies and proximity to European broadcast agencies had the opposite effect (Kurzman, 2009). What emerged in the waning months of 1978 was a movement entirely different from the one that existed a year earlier. The opposition to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was neither polycephalous nor a loose network of resistance cells, but a movement dominated tactically and ideologically by one individual: Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini.

The experience of the Islamic Revolution in Iran notwithstanding, umbrella structures offer several distinct advantages in the context of large-scale nonviolent resistance. One, rooted in a purely administrative logic, is its propensity to generate tactical innovations. Scholars of business and public service organizations have long noted a correspondence between between “prospecting,” a corporate strategy that prioritizes experimentation, and a decentralized administrative structure (Thompson, 1965; Miles et al., 1978; Damanpour, 1991; Boyne and Walker, 2004). For nonviolent resistance movements, the implication is that new approaches to exercising nonviolent leverage are not likely be scarce if non-overlapping leadership responsibilities can be effectively delegated to a large number of individuals. Indeed, if those in charge represent diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the campaign’s overall creative potential is likely to be that much greater (Staggenborg, 1989; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Schock, 2005; Ganz, 2010). As a practical matter, tactical innovation is a major benefit to a movement engaged in nonviolent struggle: By enabling it to deploy an evolving array of disruptive actions instead of a fixed or limited set, stable, straightforward counter-strategies are effectively vitiated. Target regimes are thereby kept “off balance” with little opportunity to pro-actively engage their nonviolent challenger (McAdam, 1983; Schock, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).12

A second commonly cited utility of organizational decentralization is its propensity to increase popular participation. In part this arises from the essential fact that decentralization delegates significant authority to a relatively large number of individuals. With more people empowered to plan or execute coercive nonviolent action, and an even larger number just a few degrees removed from this status, individuals’ average perceived efficacy is commensurately greater. This condition, in turn, tends to increase the amount of effort each nominal participant exerts in pursuit of a movement’s strategic goals (Mansbridge, 1980; McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996). Another means by which decentralization augments the quality of participation across a nonviolent campaign is by creating space for intra-movement friendships to flourish. Each cell that conducts its own localized struggle must necessarily prepare for these engagements independently. At the level of the entire campaign, the effect is a proliferation of meetings and events that provide the social basis for strong personal ties; often a crucial determinant of whether an individual will take part in the costliest and most crucial aspects of nonviolent collective action (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Barkan et al., 1995). Segmented, polycephalous organizational structures are also uniquely adapted to maximize

---

12 Delegating leadership responsibilities to a sub-executive echelon also allows resistance activity to be optimized with respect to local conditions better than it would be if strategy were determined by a single administrative body. While the direct benefits of this rationalization are perhaps obvious, it also has considerable indirect utility. All other things being equal, it is more difficult for a regime to parry many qualitatively different nonviolent challenges than it is to counter just one.
a movement's popular breadth (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). Autonomous sub-units tend, on the one hand, to be competitively disposed to one another because of geographic or socio-economic difference, personal rivalry, or subtle ideological divergence, inter alia. At the same time they also share a common purpose and identity by virtue of their affiliation to a wider movement. On net, the result is a positive-, rather than zero-sum expansive impulse focused on tapping new popular frontiers. Indeed, to the degree that a movement's individual nodes are truly diverse in both form and substance, their collective effect on the parent movement's scale is likely to be greater still: Amidst such breadth, most social groups will be able to find at least one movement segment with which some form of partnership is attractive (Klandermans, 1993).

A final significant virtue of organizing nonviolent resistance along decentralized but co-ordinated lines is the durability this structure affords a movement vis-à-vis the exigencies of repressive counter-mobilization. Broadly speaking, these threats take two forms: decimation or erosion from without via the removal individual participants, and decay from within as a result of infiltration. Regardless of structure, nonviolent movements are necessarily vulnerable to the coordinated application of a repressive dragnet. Unlike violent outfits, which are both armed and clandestine, nonviolent organizations must rely upon “safety in numbers” and moral jiu-jitsu to deter or mitigate such action, neither of which is clearly tied to a particular organizational form (DeNardo, 1985). This said, loose confederation does present distinct advantages in muting the effects of a particular kind of repressive strategy that often tempts counter-insurgents with its promise of high efficacy and minimal cost: de-capitation. Against this threat, umbrella-like revolutionary organizations are protected by the absence of any single, paramount “head.” While a central coordinating body is presumed to exist, it is definitionally unnecessary for either resistance activity or movement survival. The constituent organizations that together constitute the overall movement are presumed to be able to carry a struggle forward in its absence, albeit with potentially reduced efficiency and strategic coherence. For this reason, umbrella-structured movements can be expected to outperform more hierarchical ones in averting catastrophic dysfunction caused by the death or imprisonment of higher-profile individuals.

Infiltration, being a subtler and more sophisticated method of counter-mobilization, often is also more difficult than violent repression for an insurrectionary movement to guard against. It is no coincidence that a strong correspondence exists between the assiduousness of resistance organizations’ procedures for maintaining operational security and their odds of survival when pitted against competent counter-insurgents (Erickson, 1981; Finkel, 2015). For nonviolent campaigns, the challenge of excluding prospective saboteurs are made even greater by the philosophical association between this method of political resistance and a policy of transparency and openness (Sharp, 1973; Burrowes, 1996). This said, administratively umbrella-structured organizations are again relatively well-positioned. Compared in particular to flatter, more reticulated movements, populated by largely dependent sub-units that must communicate extensively to mount a serious resistance effort, few if any nodes exist through which a hostile entity can disable the entire movement (Enders and Su, 2007). Stated in more precise terms borrowed from network theory, durability is generally
optimized by reducing global clustering to a point where very few “cliques” in the network exist, far fewer than what is observed in most naturally occurring networks (Lindelauf et al., 2011). Indeed, even within the set of empirically common covert network patterns, those that exhibit a star-like, cellular form – i.e., an umbrella structure – tend to be top-performers with respect to resiliency and balancing performance with operational security (Carley, 2006; Lindelauf et al., 2009).

2.2.2 Operational Cores

In addition to being structured to meet the demands of launching and sustaining mass-based insurrection, successful nonviolent movements tend to possess the right people to fill crucial positions. A casual observer of nonviolent resistance might assume that the principal such stations are those which belong to a movement’s most conspicuous, charismatic, or formative participants. After all, it is difficult to conceive of campaigns like the Filipino People Power movement, the American civil rights movement, or the Burmese democracy movement without a Benigno Aquino, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Aung San Suu Kyi. However, leaders of this stature are often organic to the production of resistance and its nonviolent expression. In this sense they are more accurately thought of as essential features of the movements they lead rather than components of an organizational technology. What is more, little evidence exists to suggest that they are truly crucial to successful nonviolent resistance (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Ganz, 2009). While charisma is certainly a valuable asset for practitioners of nonviolence at all levels to draw upon, singularly charismatic elites have been absent from many successful campaigns.\(^{13}\) They may even represent a vulnerability, as preceding analysis of aggregate movement structure shows.

A more important human resource for nonviolent movements to cultivate is what Ackerman and DuVall (2000) call an operational core. Like officers in conventional militaries or “+2” insurgents on the continuum introduced in Petersen (2006), these individuals occupy positions functionally different from those belonging to movement-wide leaders and baseline participants. Unlike the former, they are not typically involved in answering a campaign’s most pressing strategic questions, negotiating on its behalf, or representing it before important third-parties. Unlike the latter, they typically have responsibilities beyond merely taking part in discrete nonviolent acts. These can be grouped into three main categories, the first being implementation. Most nonviolent campaigns, particularly those that are large, geographically dispersed, or decentralized in the fashion specified above, do not have the luxury of seeing carefully laid plans promulgated across an entire movement. Not only does the natural pace of a resistance usually defy such pre-meditation, the individuals expected to deliver direction under such conditions typically are far removed from a large fraction of the rank and file. The important task of translating their strategic vision – e.g., dispersed non-cooperation – into concrete actions – e.g., defying curfew, displaying banned symbols, or refusing services from offending providers – thus may fall to the operational core. The same

\(^{13}\) Examples include South Korea’s democracy movement, the Tunisian Arab Spring, the Anti-Duvalier movement in Haiti, and many of the movements that attended the collapse of the Soviet Union.
is true with respect to the important task of popularizing a movement and recruiting individuals into the fold. While effective top-tier leaders generally carry a powerful motivating message that facilitates this process, the mere existence of such a pitch is often insufficient. Constraints imposed by time or the exigencies of repression may severely circumscribe the population that experiences it in its purest form. Even if this is not the case, it may require re-framing depending on the particular community being courted (Robnett, 1996). In this respect too, a robust, locally rooted operational core can be crucial in optimizing a nonviolent movement’s most important efforts.

The second broad responsibility that falls to the middle-tier of leaders participating in nonviolent resistance is sustaining the popular base. In contrast to a situation of rebellion, in which virtually all non-auxiliary members participate full-time, the first stratum of a nonviolent campaign largely consists of individuals volunteering on an ad hoc basis. This difference, rooted in lower moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation, has the benefit of enabling nonviolent movements to grow to a massive scale (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). It also subjects them to sudden, sweeping depletions of their ranks. To forestall such exoduses, many of which are tied to marked setbacks, slow progress, and extended periods of inactivity, careful attention must be paid to maintaining morale. At a general level, this means reinforcing group cohesion, rapport, and solidarity, as well as re-articulating or clarifying the movement’s overarching goals (Sharp, 1973). Organizing concrete events that accomplish these tasks is again well-suited to the operational core, a body that is both capable of leading and well-positioned to tailor events to local conditions.

A related, and perhaps even weightier task under the rubric of campaign support is maintaining nonviolent discipline. Like mass withdrawal, it is a risk originating in the grassroots that may cascade to dramatically deleterious proportions at any time. Effective safeguards thus cannot come entirely from the highest echelons of the movement. Lower-level leaders must assiduously monitor and mitigate precipitating pressures. Though only minimally theorized in the literature, Sharp (1973) posits three precipitants that bear special attention.

The first, closely related to the issue of morale, is fear. Fearful nonviolent practitioners typically also feel vulnerable and outmatched. Taken together these emotions elevate the allure of arming oneself or otherwise preparing to perpetrate violence. As an antidote, nonviolent movements must cultivate a sense of collective strength. Propitiously, many of the same activities a movement might conduct to prevent large-scale departures – e.g., mass meetings, ceremonies, and collective performances – serve precisely this function. Deteriorations of nonviolent discipline can also occur as a result of inadequate operational planning. Encounters with security forces, partisans of the opponent, and provocateurs are all predictable facets of nonviolent action that raise tensions, creating the potential for violent paroxysms; however, these risks too can be minimized. Workshops that explain the logic of nonviolent resistance, teach psychological techniques for maintaining discipline, and simulate potentially escalatory incidents can all serve this purpose. Yet such measures are rarely part of campaign leaders’ larger strategic vision. Ensuring that they occur, and have the desired effect, is therefore a duty that falls to the operational core. Their final such responsibility
in service of nonviolent discipline is strictly tactical. In the course of any demonstration, sit-in, strike, or other act of protest, situations may arise that portend a descent into bloodshed. Local resistance leaders must be present to anticipate such incidents and respond with appropriate ameliorative action, whether that is re-arranging a group of people, altering its script, or canceling an action altogether. Once again, this is not an assignment that can consistently be discharged at either the highest levels of a movement or in a democratic fashion among all participants. It requires a robust and competent operational core.

Two other highly practical responsibilities form the third portfolio suited to being vested with a middle-tier of nonviolent leaders. The first encompasses what one might call nonviolent special operations – actions that have the potential to change the entire complexion of a campaign but also carry substantial risk for both the individual participants and the movement writ large. Prominent examples include the confrontation in Dharasana during India’s independence movement and, more recently, the early stages of the Egyptian Arab Spring. The former saw scores of satyagrahis trained under Gandhi’s tutelage march, with no attempt at self-defense, into serious, sometimes fatal injuries as part of a protest against a British salt monopoly. In Egypt a similar scene played out just three days into the January 25 Revolution that ended Hosni Mubarak’s rule. Egyptian security forces bent on suppressing what would come to be known as the “Friday of Rage” protests clashed with youth members of the Muslim Brotherhood who took it upon themselves to shield still mostly unseasoned demonstrators gathering in Tahrir Square (Masoud, 2011). Both of these endeavors were costly, required a high degree of commitment and nonviolent discipline, and had far-reaching effects. In India, the carnage at Dharasana effectively recast popular perceptions of the British colonial regime across the western world (Weber, 1997). The Egyptian Arab Spring similarly may have taken an entirely different course if its earliest participants had not been spared exposure to harsh repression. Such operations are therefore a crucial facet of belonging to a nonviolent movement’s operational core.

Paradoxically, the final hands-on responsibility associated with this station is very much the mirror image of a nonviolent special operation. It involves avoiding, rather than inviting, exposure to repressive counter-mobilization so that if a movement’s principal leaders should be imprisoned or killed, others are available to assume their duties. Put differently, operational cores provide a measure of leadership in depth. For an illustration of how important this function can be, consider the final stage of the Indian independence movement – the 1942 “Quit India” campaign. Unlike prior resistance efforts on the subcontinent, this initially nonviolent demonstration met with swift and comprehensive repression. British authorities, wanting to avoid a repeat of the upheaval that attended the 1930 Salt March at a critical stage in World War II, arrested nearly 60,000 high-profile affiliates of the Congress Movement (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014b). The aggregate result of this dramatic counter-mobilization effort was a marked increase in acts of rebellion and a substitution of violence for nonviolence; however, spatial variation in this pattern is telling: Where Congress’s roots were strongest, and the number of affiliated grassroots organizations greatest, nonviolent methods of resistance remained prevalent (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014a). In other words, a deep pool of organizations whose leaders had experience partnering with the Indian National Congress
at the local level provided the redundancy necessary to carry nonviolent resistance forward under even extraordinary levels of repression.

The First Palestinian Intifada represents another historical example of this pattern. As in India, years of hardship provided fertile ground for the growth of a vast network of civic associations dedicated to providing basic goods and services in the occupied territories. When mass nonviolent resistance broke out in 1987, these groups coalesced into geographically segmented “popular committees” which collectively managed Palestinian society during the upheaval as well as most aspects of the Intifada itself. For years, their ranks provided the resistance with a steady stream of leaders to replace those sidelined by Israeli repression. When, in 1990, the assassination of several key figures and the continuous imprisonment of more than 10,000 Palestinian leaders ran this well dry, rock-throwing, Molotov cocktails, and the use of small arms began to eclipse nonviolent methods of resistance (Pearlman, 2011). Members of the Palestinian operational core, like their counterparts in India, thus proved vital in perpetuating nonviolent national liberation as such. For this reason, its role as an emergency reserve of top-level movement leaders is a critical one.

2.2.3 Socioeconomic Leverage

Important as it is for nonviolent resistance movements to maximize their popular breadth and sustain momentum over time, these circumstances are seldom sufficient for campaign success. Sharp (1973) suggests three conditions that are. One involves the “conversion” of opponents such that they embrace the same ends the nonviolent actor seeks. Though central to Gandhi’s philosophy of satyagraha and other theological treatments of nonviolence, this path to success is subject to a litany of constraints, making it difficult if not impossible to achieve in many contexts (Bondurant, 1965; Childress, 1972). The other two, more realistic victory states are labeled “disintegration” and “accommodation.” The former occurs when an opponent’s de facto and de jure authority are wiped out or reduced to a degree that render it at most a marginal political force. While nonviolent movements must strive for this goal through cumulating acts of non-cooperation and defection, on a strategic level, disintegration bears strong resemblance to what Schelling (1966) describes as “brute force” in the context of warfare. Accommodation, to extend this comparison, can be equated to compellence. From the perspective of the resistance movement it is similar to nonviolent disintegration except with respect to degree. The critical difference is that success is achieved not solely by stripping the target of its standing and means, but by causing it to accept, unwillingly, the resistance’s principal ends.

In short, both feasible paths of successful resistance suggested in Sharp (1973) are contingent on a movement imposing, or credibly threatening, unbearable and enduring costs on its opponent. Straightforward as this appears as a precept applicable to any variety of conflict, in the case of nonviolent resistance it presupposes an easy answer to what is not necessarily an intuitive question — namely, how to impose, or threaten, such costs. Nonviolent

---

14 Sharp (1973) discusses four discrete “paths;” however, following the synthesis in Sharp (2013) I combine “coercion” and “disintegration.”
campaigns cannot imperil leaders, their families, their followers, or even their opponent’s property. They can, however, target other assets. The precise leverage points will naturally vary from campaign to campaign; however, most can be considered one of two types. The first concerns an opponent’s fiscal viability and the second its standing within the selectorate.

**Economic Levers**

At a very basic level, regimes must keep costs and revenues in rough equilibrium to survive. Though they have access to extraordinary means of ensuring this in the short term – including sovereign debt, foreign aid, and the authority to tax – when even these measures fail states experience many of the same pressures as embattled firms. Most importantly, individuals who are “employees” or agents of a regime will go unpaid and begin to look elsewhere to earn their daily bread. Such circumstances mark an effective terminus for any leadership. No national government worthy of the label can function if soldiers take off their uniforms, police do not patrol the streets, employees of state-owned enterprises don’t work, and important bureaucratic duties go unfulfilled.

Nonviolent campaigns can threaten a state with this reality and its associated fiscal pain in a variety of different ways, perhaps the least complicated of which is the nonpayment of taxes. This form of economic noncooperation, though present in some form in many campaigns, probably had its greatest effect during Hungarians’ push for autonomy from Austria between 1848 and 1867. Richard Gregg (1935, 2-3) summarizes a critical portion of their economic strategy thusly:

> When the Austria tax collector came, the people did not beat him or even hoot him – they merely declined to pay. The Austrian police then seized their goods, but no Hungarian auctioneer would sell them. When an Austrian auctioneer was brought, he found that he would have to bring bidders from Austria as well. The government soon discovered that it was costing more to distrain the property than the tax was worth.

Combined with other acts of passive resistance, this recalcitrance placed an onerous burden on the Austrian imperial treasury. During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 it reached a point of crisis. Lacking men and material to continue after severe losses at the Battle of Königgratz, Emperor Franz Josef agreed to negotiate with his Hungarian subjects. In 1867, these talks culminated in the formation of Austria-Hungary, a dual monarchy placing both kingdoms on an equal legal footing.

Another systematic modality by which nonviolent movements can exact an economic toll on their opponents is the consumer boycott. Like a blanket refusal to pay an income or poll tax, this lever’s ultimate efficacy lies in its potential to reduce a target regime’s domestic revenues. From the perspective of the average movement participant, an important difference is that boycotts carry the added cost of having to substitute a non-tangential good or service. This constraint influences both how widely subscribed a boycott will become and, relatedly, what types of action will be most appealing to a nonviolent movement. Those that ask sympathizers to eschew luxuries or consumables with an obvious acceptable substitute will
be most attractive. Still, these conditions are not fixed and definitive. Two of the more efficacious boycott campaigns in the history of nonviolent resistance – those accompanying Indian and American independence – encompassed a wide variety of mostly basic goods.

In India, the *swadeshi* movement that spanned almost the entire independence struggle focused specifically on British cloth and clothing, the principal markets for which were all on the subcontinent. At its apex, year-on-year losses for British exporters amounted to more than 1.5 billion present-value pounds. Indians could draw on mothballed means of textile production and a history of household loom usage to replace British imports; nevertheless, the disruptive effects of *swadeshi* for the average Indian consumer were not negligible (Chandra et al., 1989). Still greater adjustments were necessary for colonists in British North America. Colony-wide resistance first took place following the imposition of the Stamp Act of 1765, which imposed a duty on legal documents and other printed materials. American newspapers and periodicals responded by ceasing publication, printing with no stamp, or, among those that complied, seeing their circulation drop precipitously. Lawyers also refused to comply, effectively paralyzing the entire court system (Conser Jr., 2013). When the Townshend Acts of 1767 extended the British tax regime to include other goods, including glass, paint, paper, and tea, American resistance escalated to total non-importation. Colonists even went so far as to alter their burial rituals so as to avoid the use of silk and other finished textiles that could only be procured from foreign manufactures (Sharp, 1973). The effect for the British empire was an unmitigated disaster. Taxes that collectively were projected to net 60,000 pounds instead brought in 3,500, less than the administrative costs of implementation. Imperial producers’ lost revenues, meanwhile, amounted to an estimated 7.25 million pounds (Gipson, 1962).

It is no coincidence that these and many other examples of successful economic boycott date from the colonial and pre-war era. With the exception of the very poor and resource-dependent, today’s governments rely more on broadly based revenue streams like income and value-added taxes that are harder to avoid than good-specific or excise taxes that dominated in prior eras (Burgess and Stern, 1993; Gordon and Li, 2009). These trends notwithstanding, modern and economically developed regimes can remain highly vulnerable to well-organized and targeted consumer boycotts. The desegregation campaigns that took place across the U.S. South as part of the Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960s provide apt illustration. Although these campaigns are most often associated with lunch counter sit-ins and dramatic scenes of black protesters being assaulted with water cannons and police dogs, their success in many instances was contingent on a boycott that met two conditions. One was a high degree of compliance within a locality’s black community. Another, more nuanced requirement pertained to the businesses being targeted. Most of these were selected for racially segregating their customers or being similarly discriminatory in their hiring practices; however, not all such firms were likely to respond favorably to a boycott. Those that depended on black patronage or were vulnerable to bad publicity stemming from a boycott (e.g., firms in the tourist industry or branches of corporations headquartered outside the South) were. Those for which neither of these conditions held, or which were susceptible to segregationist counter-mobilization, were not (Luders, 2006). Where the former were preponderant and
local organizers succeeded in uniting black consumers, the boycott was one of the most effective methods of resistance civil rights activists deployed (Garrow, 2006; Biggs and Andrews, 2015).

Modern governments remain exposed to one further mode of economic disruption which can create insoluble crises: strikes. Like the nonpayment of taxes and boycotts, strikes are essentially an act of withholding. Its principal distinction vis-à-vis other levers of nonviolent coercion is the thing it seeks to makes scarce. Instead of depleting a target’s revenue directly or depriving its business interests of customers, strikes typically operate by divorcing means of production to which an opponent is tied from the labor these productive enterprises require. A further point of contrast concerns the amount of sacrifice demanded of those who participate in strikes. Whereas being in arrears on one’s taxes presents no immediate costs beyond the risk of punishment, and boycotts necessitate merely an alteration of consumption habits, going on strike means forgoing income or employment altogether. This stark fact limits the forms that strikes can realistically take. Most obviously, they typically cannot be sustained for an extended period of time. Indeed, because individuals sympathetic to movements for far-reaching political reform typically are not among a society’s wealthiest, potential strike participants in the context of nonviolent resistance are rarely positioned to abide more than a brief period without earnings. For movements leaders aiming to maximize a strike’s economic effects, and coercive utility, the principal consequence of this constraint is that it places a high premium on how widely subscribed stoppages and slow-downs become. If a community, region, or country can be brought to a point where such disruptions are endemic, productive economic activity will decline and the costs of maintaining order will mount, perhaps to the point of effecting nonviolent disintegration.

Strikes have played a prominent, even decisive role in many nonviolent campaigns. For Poland’s Solidarity movement, it was the principal modus operandi. In Iran, state oil workers’ decision in September 1978 to stay off the job until Pahlavi stepped down dealt the Shah’s regime a crippling blow by depriving it of more 60 million dollars daily (Zunes, 2016). However, perhaps the most dramatic such display occurred in the course of Denmark’s resistance to German occupation during World War II.\footnote{Strikes similar in scope and scale to those that took place in Denmark also attended the ouster of Gerardo Machado y Morales in Cuba (1933), President Paul Eugéne Magloire in Haiti (1956), and President Abdala Bucaram in Ecuador (1997) as well as the restoration of democracy in Uruguay (1984) and Nepal (2006) (Lakey, 2011).} The Nazis invaded in April 1940, despite Danish neutrality, to prevent the Allies from doing the same and thereby gaining control of the Baltic Sea. An important secondary objective was to maintain Danish acquiescence at minimal cost. German war planners were keen to avoid the financial and military commitments associated with an occupation if at all possible. Nazi leaders also hoped to maintain a good rapport so that Denmark might willingly join the Aryan empire Hitler envisaged. The terms of Denmark’s surrender were consequently quite lenient insofar as they acknowledged Danish authorities’ explicit preference to avoid direct involvement in the German war effort. Nevertheless, German authorities’ aspirations for a compliant Danish protectorate did not come to fruition (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994).

Open resistance to the country’s loss of sovereignty began in June 1941 in the form
of sporadic sabotage directed against the country’s rail system and industrial facilities. It was not until the spring of 1943 that Danish unions instigated a series of strikes. Laborers were influenced by worsening workplace conditions, brought on by Allied bombing and the demands of Germany’s two-front war, as well as the radical influence of fugitive Danish communists. Disruptions escalated throughout the first half of the year, culminating in the so-called “August insurrection,” during which nearly a third of the workforce remained in a state of continuous disobedience. For both strictly material and diplomatic reasons, German officials decided at this stage that they could not allow such conditions to persist. When their Danish “partners” refused an ultimatum to round up and execute provocateurs, the army invaded in force and took over administrative duties. Non-cooperation by Danish labor subsequently abated, but only temporarily. By the spring of 1944 workplace unrest was again widespread and operating to greater disruptive effect than before. With the aid of a political leadership that had almost uniformly abandoned accommodationism as well as a growing underground publishing and communication network, stoppages, go-slow, and stay-aways began occurring in a coordinated fashion across the entire country. German authorities and their Danish collaborators responded by instituting a five p.m. curfew, prohibiting gatherings of more than five persons, and restricting both fuel and electricity supplies, none of which suppressed Danes’ systemic noncompliance. When in summer it became clear that the Schutzstaffel were prepared to begin shooting protestors on-sight and terrorizing the population with bombings, representatives of the country’s de facto native leadership – the Freedom Council – negotiated a return to routine. Nevertheless, brief nationwide economic shutdowns remained a feature of the occupation until the end of war, often as a means of holding German authorities to the Danish king and prime minister’s initial insistence that the spirit of Denmark’s neutrality be respected (Dethlefsen, 1990; Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994).

**Political Levers**

Tax refusals, boycotts, and strikes thus represent three specific fiscal mechanisms by which nonviolent movements can exercise leverage. A second similarly fundamental family of mechanisms includes those that operate by winnowing a target’s so-called pillars of support, or winning coalition (Sharp, 1973; De Mesquita, 2005). Just as regimes cannot persist without funds sufficient to sustain an armed service, a bureaucracy, flows of critical imports, or other national priorities, so too will it fail if the individuals responsible for these functions are persuaded to cease providing them. The paths by which a nonviolent campaign might exercise this suasive influence are, like nonpayment of taxes, boycotts, and strikes, also multiple. One that often coincides with these principally material levers might be called the rational political or realpolitik mechanism. No organized political actor, be it an army, labor union, or religious sect, wants to be on the losing side when a resistance campaign concludes. Nor will its interests be served by contributing to one side’s victory at a high organizational cost when aligning with another is less costly and, to a first order of approximation, equally likely to be a winning strategy. Clear indication of an incumbent’s future demise, or a nonviolent movement’s building strength, can thus provide strong impetus for these entities to with-
draw or withhold support from the former. In some circumstances signals of this nature may be clouded by misjudgment or discrepant theories of how competitors are likely to realize victory; however, other signs are unequivocal. Perhaps the most notable of all in a context of nonviolent resistance is clear evidence that the target regime stands on an unsustainable economic footing or that a prohibitively large, and broad, segment of the population is willing to participate in its downfall.

For a straightforward instantiation of this mechanism vis-à-vis a national military, consider Tunisia’s 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Though under-resourced relative to President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s numerous other security services, or their counterparts elsewhere in the greater Middle East, the Tunisian armed forces were collectively the largest such institution in the country and therefore anything but inconsequential (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). The chronology of the Tunisia’s revolution underscores this point. Although popular participation in the campaign probably reached its zenith on January 6, Ben Ali only departed on the evening of January 13. It unlikely to be mere coincidence that just one day before the army chief of staff withdrew his forces from the capital in contravention of a direct order, or that just hours before soldiers detained fleeing members of his extended family (Rifai, 2011). Also noteworthy is the fact that before January 12 the armed forces made no organized effort to side with either the regime or its emergent opponent. Their decision to revise this position, though precipitated by instructions from Ben Ali that made it untenable, was also decidedly strategic. By the second week of January, nearly 16 percent of the Tunisian population was actively agitating for change. Nor were these two million protestors and strike participants strictly laborers or students. The entrepreneurial class, government workers, and professionals were all well represented (Beissinger, 2012). Quelling such a movement with just 27,000 soldiers would have been challenging at the very least. It would also have violated the Tunisian military’s professional ethos of political detachment, cultivated over years of interaction with western militaries (Brooks, 2013). In short, while the army, navy, and air force did maintain an antipathy for Ben Ali’s regime and its consistent favoritism for parallel security agencies, it took the presence of an ascendent nonviolent campaign for the armed forces to act, with definitive effect, on these interests.\(^\text{16}\)

Crucial as material concerns are in the political calculus of any society’s selectorate, subtler political reasons can also determine whether supporters of a regime facing a nonviolent challenge will change their loyalties. One such rationale, familiar to students of unarmed resistance, arises in the operation of nonviolent jiu-jitsu: Once an incumbent violently suppresses overtly unarmed, unthreatening people, and such actions become known to a national or international audience, the costs of supporting the incumbent increase dramatically. This said, nonviolent jiu-jitsu is more of a counter-strategy than a direct source of socioeconomic leverage. What is more, the initial repressive action upon which it is premised is not one nonviolent movements are wise to invite, as it is strongly correlated with campaign failure (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). A more promising, and more proactive method is to elicit

\(^{16}\text{Further evidence that the window of opportunity provided by the events of January 2011 weighed more heavily than corporate interests in the Tunisian military’s decision to finally abandon the Ben Ali regime can be found in the absence of any coup attempts during his reign and the army’s compliance with political directives during other uprisings, most notably those in the mining region of Gafsa in 2008.}\)
the support of prominent, morally unassailable elites. Not all circumstances of nonviolent resistance present such an opportunity; however, where they exist, movements have the chance to activate a focal point through which un-entrenched members of an embattled incumbent’s winning coalition can defect in a coordinated fashion (Schelling, 1960; Hale, 2013). Their status as moral authorities also enables them to effectively engage in what social movement scholars call value and belief amplification (Snow et al., 1986). The former refers to the “the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents” but which have not yet inspired collective action. The latter is analogous except that the object of amplification is a “cognitive support” for particular actions rather than a goal or end-state. Examples include beliefs about the locus of blame for a particular event or circumstance, beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, or beliefs about the propriety of action over passivity (469-470). The practical benefits of these amplification processes in the context of maximalist nonviolent resistance are twofold: They promise to augment a movement’s base by increasing the degree to which its message resonates with the general population while simultaneously introducing the possibility that key individuals supporting the opponent will themselves be swayed to change their allegiance.

Among recent campaigns, the Filipino People Power Movement to expel President Ferdinand Marcos represents one of the clearer examples of these elite-driven, suasive levers playing a decisive role. Its focal figure, in the sense described above, was Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila and leading ordinary in a nearly 90-percent Catholic country. Sin and the Catholic Church would finish the campaign as apparent leaders of the opposition; however, neither came to this position quickly. When Marcos first suspended the constitution and declared martial law in 1972, the Church’s official stance was one of “critical collaboration” (Schock, 2005). Other organized political actors outside Marcos’ patronage network, most notably the country’s longest-standing parties, were weak and/or divided. Minimal nonviolent resistance was carried forward exclusively by loosely connected grassroots organizations, many of them led by left-leaning priests, that sought to protect the rights of women, peasants, and other vulnerable groups who suffered under Marcos’ crony neoliberal policies (Wurfel, 1988).

Over the late 1970s and early 1980s antipathy for Marcos mounted. Overtly fraudulent elections in 1978 and 1981 angered wide swaths of the population, especially students and professionals. Beginning in 1980, sharp economic recession exacerbated by underperforming public debt and falsified national accounts animated politically unprivileged members of the business community. For many more, the dramatic 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, the nation’s most charismatic anti-Marcos figure, provided singular motivation for active agitation (Boudreau, 2009). Nevertheless, these events were not sufficient to forge a viable nonviolent challenge. Increasing labor unrest and worsening relations with foreign benefactors were eroding Marcos’ hold on power, but domestic opposition lacked coherence and identity.

Into this void stepped Cardinal Sin, who himself saw Aquino’s assassination as a point of no return for the Marcos regime. His first move was to broker an alliance between Aquino’s widow and Salvador Laurel, one of two leading figures in the Liberal party that most threat-
ened Marcos’ legislative majority. Their union, dubbed the United Democratic Opposition
(UNIDO), would be the first to bring both the Liberals’ base and the Aquinos’ Laban party
into open electoral competition with Marcos’ Nacionalistas (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).
Sin also utilized his position atop the Filipino Catholic hierarchy to subtly, and in strictly
religious terms, mobilize nationwide support for UNIDO. In a related effort, he and his fellow
prelates revitalized the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), a long-dormant,
non-partisan, electoral watchdog organization. With the Church’s endorsement, nuns, cler-
gymen, and lay members of the country’s grassroots community organizations quickly swelled
NAMFREL’s ranks (Youngblood, 1987; Wurfel, 1988). In these ways, Sin served as a crucial
coordinating mechanism for the anti-Marcos opposition.

The coalition of partisan, pastoral, and civic forces brought together by Sin met its first
test during parliamentary elections held in 1984, the first since Marcos’ nominal termination
of martial law three years prior. UNIDO did not win a majority, but it did claim 60 of 183
contested seats and 15 of 21 in the capital – a stunning feat to many Filipinos accustomed
to manifestly ill-gotten, lopsided incumbent victories. “Snap” presidential elections held in
February 1986 proved even more successful. By this time NAMFREL had grown considerably
in both size and scope. Not only was it large enough to monitor over 90 percent of precincts
countrywide, it also had its own tabulation process, allowing it an empirical basis upon
which to contest results put forth by the official electoral commission (COMELEC). Anti-
Marcos interests were also aided by the participation of a much wider array of parties and
politicians than in any prior Marcos-era elections. In large part, their decision to incur the
costs and risks of facing Marcos head-on were derivative of UNIDO’s promising showing two
years before. In the event, the Aquino-Laurel ticket won a clear, but still disputed victory.
COMELEC maintained a count showing Marcos to be the winner until two days after polls
had closed, when thirty tabulators left their posts in a widely publicized act of protest against
rampant fraud (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).

At this point, Aquino and Marcos seemed poised for a standoff. The former organized
her own swearing-in ceremony and announced plans for massive general strike to be con-
tinued until Marcos relinquished the presidency. Before Marcos could organize a response,
four hundred soldiers, supported by the defense minister and the armed forces’ deputy chief
of staff, launched an abortive mutiny. Holed up in their barracks outside of Manila and
facing the prospect of violent reprisal, the mutineers submitted pleas for assistance to the
U.S. ambassador and Cardinal Sin (Schock, 2005). While the former remained aloof, the
latter immediately took to the airwaves. At the time, the Church’s Radio Veritas, fortu-
nitously located in the capital city, was the only independent broadcasting apparatus in the
country. Over the years Marcos had successfully coopted or otherwise cowed the Filipino
radio and television industry, but was never willing to confront Sin so directly in his home
diocese. In 1984 and again in 1986, Radio Veritas had proved highly successful in mobilizing
Manila voters and promulgating a spiritual message supportive of the democratic opposition
(Youngblood, 1987). Now Sin used it to issue an emergency call to action. Citizens were
asked to surround the defectors’ barracks in defiance of standing curfew laws and interact
amicably with other forces if the opportunity arose. Clergy and laypeople responded in
the hundreds of thousands, eventually driving Marcos to abscond (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Sin was thus able to effect a massive increases in participation at a critical junctures in the course of Filipino resistance.

A third and final means by which nonviolent resistance movements can vitiate an opponent's most important sources of support is by leveraging social ties that connect the competing parties at the highest levels. That mere relationships might have such far-reaching instrumental effects is not a novel notion in the literature on nonviolent resistance. It is prominent in both Gandhi's writings and Sharp's explication of nonviolent victory via nonviolent conversion. Its present meaning differs from these other accounts in three important respects. First, like the other socioeconomic levers discussed in this section, it is not a holistic strategy or organizing concept for nonviolent action. It is one tool among many of which a movement might avail itself. Second, it does not imply a deep change in preferences like one associates with conversion. Ties of friendship or kinship are more likely to have the limited effect of altering the course of a nonviolent struggle than to cause one party to bow out entirely. Finally, the utility of these ties is premised on social connections that pre-date the conflict rather than any suasive actions or messaging on the part of a campaign. In this respect, too, it is distinct from the idea of conversion.

What social bonds and overlapping identities with a target regime afford a nonviolent movement is the chance to shape its opponent's valuation of different potential conflict end-states. Ideally key decision-makers will find themselves behooved—socially, psychologically, morally, or otherwise—to pay some attention to the gains and losses of their nonviolent challenger instead of focusing exclusively on their side's absolute or relative gains. In the language of social identity theory, movements with these ties are well-positioned to alter their opponent's position on the continuum of social action, nudging them farther from a point where concerns of group membership predominate and closer to one where the interpersonal aspects of identity are salient (Tajfel, 1982). Social scientists who've used this schema to study structured competition have focused mostly on negotiations. Their findings suggest that concerns for joint outcomes and fairness are increasing in the degree to which negotiators are primed by a common identity (e.g., Kramer et al., 1993; Thompson et al., 1995; Swaab et al., 2007; Demoulin et al., 2010; McLeish and Oxoby, 2011). Similar dynamics ought to obtain in the final phases of nonviolent resistance, provided that the principal parties remain organizationally coherent. Equally applicable, and arguably more significant than the terms that end a campaign, though, is the form the conflict takes. Leading incumbents with no reason to view the individuals orchestrating a nonviolent campaign as anything more than members of a threatening out-group will have far fewer reasons to hold violence in abeyance, and thereby minimize the chances of outright civil war, than similar leaders who view their opponents through a more inter-personal lens.17

Friendship between supposed enemies is not an uncommon occurrence in the known history of nonviolent resistance. It featured prominently in the Indian Independence Movement, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, and, to a lesser extent, the First Palestinian Intifada (Gopal, 1957; Csapody and Weber, 2007; Kelman, 1995). One additional instance, less fre-

---

17 For an argument of this nature applied at a higher level of analysis, see Svensson and Lindgren (2010).
quenty mentioned in the literature but no less significant, is Mongolia’s nonviolent movement to end communist rule. As elsewhere in the Soviet sphere of influence, Mongolia’s transition to multi-party democracy in 1990 was abetted by strong global tailwinds in the form demonstration effects emanating from eastern Europe and political turmoil within the Soviet Union itself. Nevertheless, one would be hard-pressed to argue that its democratic revolution was overdetermined. The economics of socialism was popular throughout the country even if the police state that accompanied it was not. Mongolian security forces also were not unfamiliar with the task of large-scale repression (Rossabi, 2005). The ruling Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party’s (MPRP) eschewal of these potential advantages is attributable in part to the personal connection between its general secretary, Jambyn Batmönkh, and one of the leading figures in the resistance, Sanjaasürengiin Zorig.

Both Batmönkh and Zorig were trained scholars at a time when the Mongolian academic community was very small. Even more significantly, Batmönkh’s academic advisor and former superior at Mongolian National University was none other than Zorig’s father. According to founding members of the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), these ties placed important constraints on the MPRP and the state (Amarsanaa, 2017). When the MDU was in its infancy, Zorig was a leading force in popularizing the movement’s ideals, often opting to do so with minimal secrecy from his office and other university facilities. Police could have apprehended Zorig or curtailed his academic privileges without much difficulty at this stage and thereby denied the MDU its pre-eminent member and catalyst for growth. That they failed to do so is widely attributed to Batmönkh’s personal distaste for such action.

Similar opportunities for possibly decisive repression existed during the MDU’s numerous mass gatherings in the capital city’s august central square. Movement leaders like Zorig, who belonged to the general coordinating council, were not always present at these events out of a concern for being captured; however, for the most signal occasions many such individuals were (Amarsanaa, 2017). The MPRP’s politburo, for its part, was not averse to taking aggressive action against whatever fraction of MDU supporters and luminaries showed up on a given day. During what would prove to be the culminating event—a hunger strike in March 1990 aimed at ending the ban on political parties—Batmönkh was reportedly presented with a decree that would have authorized a violent crackdown. He refused to sign it, and within days, democratization was underway (Amarsanaa, 2016). Any number of pressures may have contributed to this fateful decision: Moscow may have advised against repression, the army’s reliability may have been called into question, or the specter of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s grizzly end in Romania may have loomed large (Rossabi, 2005; Amarsanaa, 2017). At the same time, these realities should have affected other members of the politburo as much as its general secretary. It seems plausible that Batmönkh again may have balked because of his personal connections to his opponents, which by the third month of 1990 encompassed not just Zorig but most of the country’s intellectual class.
2.3 Technology Adoption through Co-optation

Having argued that umbrella structures, operational cores, and two sets of socio-economic levers – economic and political – are important technologies of nonviolent resistance, what remains is to articulate how nonviolent movements can acquire them. In principal two paths exist. The more straightforward alternative, which shall not be reviewed here, is what one might call organic development: Nonviolent movements can, through their own ingenuity and effort, develop the structures, skills, and relationships upon which these levers are founded. The principal challenge with this method, apart from the wisdom and foresight it presumes on the part of campaign leaders, is that it can take an extended period of time. For the campaign on which the remaining analysis focuses, the movement against apartheid in South Africa, nearly four decades was not sufficient. A more expedient, but also more politically complex route is that of co-optation, or partnership with a pre-existing a civil society organization that exhibits the relevant attributes. This section will concretize which types of organizations generally do and do not qualify as able partners, elaborate what complexities can complicate their involvement in nonviolent resistance, and detail an illustrative case involving the African National Congress (ANC) and the black labor movement in South Africa.

2.3.1 Candidate Partner Organizations

Three of the more common types civil-society groups to enlist in maximalist nonviolent resistance are labor unions, religious communities, and student groups. The value of each in such endeavors, measured according to their expected capacity to impart organizational technologies of nonviolent action, is evaluated below in descending order. Large industrial labor unions and union federations are discussed first, as they commonly possess the internal structures, mid-level leadership cadres, and means of socioeconomic coercion that best complement nonviolent movements’ needs. Administratively intensive religious bodies, considered second, also make for promising potential allies, though relative to unions they may be too hierarchical or lacking a sufficiently capable operational core. Less useful than both unions and religious communities are student organizations. They are comparatively ill-suited to the rigors of nonviolent resistance as they tend to lack both appropriate structure and immediate means of effecting either economic disruption or a realignment of an incumbent regime’s pillars of support.

---

18 South Africans began organized nonviolent resistance to institutional racism in the early 1950s. By the early 1990s the initial structures they’d created for this purpose had changed considerably, but were not strong in all three aspects of nonviolent coercion emphasized herein. While the campaign did grow into a massive umbrella-like movement with access to important socio-economic levers, it never developed the kind of operational core necessary to consistently maintain a nonviolent disposition (Feit, 1962, 1967; Lodge, 1983).

19 One or more these organizations was a leading entity in over forty percent of the nonviolent campaigns featured in the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) campaign dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Wittels, 2017).
Labor Unions

Labor organizations vary widely in form and function. Not all types are well-suited to the rigors of nonviolent resistance. Unions in communist countries and single-party dictatorship, for example, often serve merely as extensions of the regime, conveying and enforcing doctrine without representing workers’ interests to any higher authority (Brown, 1966). Even if they break from the prevailing order, organizations such as these that lack any meaningful experience exercising autonomy offer little benefit to a movement whose agenda is proactive, dynamic, and highly politically contested.

Another common variety of labor organization with greater, but still limited potential to markedly advance nonviolent resistance is the craft union. As the name suggests, the distinguishing feature of these unions is the central role trade-related skills play in delimiting their membership. Functionally, their raison d’être is to protect these professionals from competition by regulating market entry, often through systems of certification or apprenticeship, and limiting the substitution of technology for specialized labor (Parker, 2008). The exclusionary character of this objective diminishes craft unions’ usefulness to a nonviolent movement in two respects. Most immediately, it has a limiting effect on their membership base. Instead of drawing in as many workers as possible, craft unions endeavor to make certain types of labor artificially scarce. This does not prevent them amalgamating or otherwise combining forces and thereby augmenting their ability to threaten economic disruption. However, as subsequent discussion will elucidate, it does shield individual unions from organizational imperatives that lead more expansion-minded labor organizations to develop the structures and personnel that complement nonviolent movements’ needs. More fundamentally, craft unions are not naturally disposed to the kind of coercive action that typifies nonviolent resistance. Their principal modus operandi, litigation and rent-seeking, are closer to the tools of an interest group than those of an organization struggling on behalf of a larger group (Hannan and Freeman, 1987; Parker, 2008). Again, this does not preclude welders’, carpenters’, and airplane mechanics’ unions from participating effectively in nonviolent resistance; rather, it diminishes their a priori utility as vehicles for nonviolent resistance technologies.

A useful starting point for understanding why general, or industrial unions that are free of state connections represent good partners for nonviolent campaigns is the issue of scale. While systematic cross-national data on such unions is lacking, it is possible to draw some conclusions with respect to the sample of countries in which nonviolent resistance has taken place in the twentieth century. Among states where independent labor unions existed, median membership was approximately 200,000 at campaign outset with wide cross-national variation corresponding closely to population size and time. In many cases, general unions or union confederations encompassed the vast majority of organized laborers. By contrast,

---

20 Using data from the International Labor Organization, the International Trade Union Confederation, the United States State Department, and numerous country-specific labor movement histories, I was able to reconstruct approximate union membership data for roughly half of the campaign-years represented in the NAVCO campaign-year dataset (International Labor Organization, 2017; Addison and Schnabel, 2005; International Trade Union Confederation, 2005; Docherty and Van der Velden, 2012; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). These incomplete data are available upon request.
there are no instances of unionized workers being distributed evenly across a large number of unions.

Regardless of exactly how large a predominant general union becomes, it is likely to encounter certain pressures as it develops. In contrast to craft union federations—which generally grow by virtue of economic expansion or adding unions to their network, if they grow at all—industrial unions face consistently strong incentives to gain new members at the grassroots. The larger the fraction of any firm’s or industry’s workforce that they are able to enlist, the stronger their bargaining position in that context. Sectoral expansion is also crucial. A union or federation that has more members in aggregate than other competing labor organizations can more credibly claim to be a preeminent representative of the working class. This status, in turn, can boost its political profile and associated negotiating power as well as its ability to attract still more members. More subtly, industrial unions that represent a wide swathe of related productive fields actually ease their task of protecting workers’ interests in any one of these domains. Assuming that the costs of organizing are not prohibitive, it is more efficient for them to create new members than it is to defend existing ones against competition from without.

The effects of these pressures to expand vertically and horizontally are well-documented in the sociological literature on organizations: Growth along both dimensions begets not only greater formalization and bureaucratization, but greater decentralization as well (Weber, 2009; Pugh et al., 1968; Child, 1972; Pugh and Hinings, 1979). In the particular case of labor organizations, comparatively limited demands for network-wide coordination and the potential for wide geographic dispersion are likely to accentuate the latter incentives in particular (Warner, 1975; Mookherjee, 2006). While it is difficult to predict the form that decentralization will take in any particular context, certain broad generalizations are possible. The lowest organizational unit is typically bounded by geography or by plant. Responsibilities at this level can include regular discussion of grievances, aggregating preferences pertaining to particular negotiations or strikes, and conveying both instructions and responsibilities to members. At higher strata in the administrative hierarchy, representatives from “locals” congregate episodically to decide, inter alia, union-wide policies, by-laws, and bargaining strategy applicable to the entire organization. In short, large industrial unions often adopt umbrella-like internal structures naturally.

With the bulk of their regular tasks concentrated at the local level, general unions also require a large number of capable administrators. In addition to the varied responsibilities enumerated above, these local leaders or shop-floor stewards must sometimes act on behalf of the entire membership within their remit. This can occur both within the larger union or federation if directives from official superiors are not entirely congruent with local interests or in interaction with the owners and managers of firms. Taken altogether, the demands associated with their station create ideal conditions for the emergence of a robust leadership cadre possessing considerable political and organizational acumen. Their potential to bolster a nonviolent movement’s operational core is consequently great.

Turning lastly to the matter of coercive leverage, the third technology of nonviolence specified in this study, general unions’ and union federations’ suitability for resistance is per-
haps most apparent. Not only are strikes, stay-aways, go-slow, and other analogous tactics a core competence of unions generally, and industrial unions in particular, their expected disruptive potential is manifestly greater for preponderant, mass-based organizations considered here. Membership size is not the only factor moderating unions' coercive potential, though. Workers must ultimately be able to threaten damage that is costly. If the industries in which they are concentrated do not contribute much to a country's or regime's fiscal well-being, they cannot hope to effect much change by withholding labor. General unions that encompass a large number of employees in high-value-added or extractive industries, on the other hand, are especially well-positioned to wield the strike weapon effectively.

**Religious Communities**

As with labor unions, some religious bodies are notably more capable than others of contributing critical organizational attributes to nonviolent resistance. The most important and most obvious limiting factor is the degree to which a given faith exists an organization, per se, as opposed to a community of believers. Though sometimes conceptualized with respect to Christian faiths as the distinction between a church and a religion that is congregationally based, in practice this attribute is probably best defined continuously (Benson and Hassinger, 1972). Non-fringe faiths located at the low end of the spectrum are those that emphasize what sociological studies of religion variously refer to as the experiential, ritualistic, or emotional dimension of religion (Glock, 1962; Verbit, 1970; Hinde, 2009). On a practical level, religions of this type reserve a central role for "self-transcendent experiences that bond the individual with what [he/she] perceives to be the transcendent 'reality,' with others, and/or with the inner-self" (Saroglou, 2011, 1326). The organizational demands of such a belief system are generally minimal. Indeed, some lack even a basic system community-level sites – e.g., mosques, synagogues, or churches – upon which a larger umbrella structure could exist. Among large, global religions, the most prominent examples are Buddhism and Hinduism.

A second, somewhat more “organized” cluster of faiths includes those whose administrative apparatus is located primarily, if not exclusively, at the local level. Their common denominator is the presumption of an unmediated relationship between the individual and the sacred other. Priests, religious scholars, and devotees of distinction play a comparatively minor role in furthering the process of discovery that is often central to a person’s purpose in these belief systems (Tracey et al., 2014). As a correlate, scriptures, creeds, and other written texts are made accessible to all believers and tend to take on greater importance (Dyck et al., 2005). This said, some degree of hierarchy remains. Administrators are still needed to discharge the faith’s responsibilities relating to the cultivation, and enforcement, of its identity and morality aspects (Saroglou, 2011). Indeed, from the perspective of practitioners of nonviolent resistance, experience with tasks in these domains – e.g., coordinating community events, arbitrating disputes, or commanding believers’ respect through oratory – may make these clergy quite attractive as prospective participants. However, with respect to the structural dictates of building a successful nonviolent movement, these religions may not be ideal. In the absence of a strong doctrinal imperative for overarching structure, higher administrative echelons are likely to be weak if they form at all (Dyck et al., 2005). Such
faiths' ability to map a replete umbrella structure, including facilities for some central coordination, onto a partner nonviolent movement are consequently minimal. The capacity of grass-roots units to coordinate their actions effectively might also be questionable. Concretely, mainstream Protestantism, and Sunni Islam to a lesser extent, most closely match this description.21

This leaves three remaining globally relevant sects: Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Shia Islam. Each is highly hierarchical. As faiths they share a strong emphasis on dogma and extensive rules governing access to the truths these dogmas contain (McMullen, 1994; Tracey et al., 2014). Unlike the previous category, clergy and other religious officials feature prominently. It is they who possess the divine authority to perform certain rituals and convey the special knowledge upon which believers depend. On an organizational level, the principal results of weighting fixity and adherence to the status quo as highly as these religions do are twofold – extensive bureaucratization and administrative centralization at the national, if not global level (Dyck et al., 2005). As in other organizational contexts, homogeneity in practice is best matched with a structure that limits autonomy and links those possessing it to all other agents through clear channels of instruction (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Pugh et al., 1968). For nonviolent movements this has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, it indicates that faiths of this type are administratively robust at both the lowest and highest levels. On the other, their mode of operation is far removed from the decentralized ideal associated with umbrella-structured organizations. Their utility to resistance campaigns on this structural dimension cannot consequently be evaluated too highly.

Carrying this comparative analysis forward to the matter of operational cores reveals similar mediocrity across all three categories of mass religion. Most obvious, again, is the incompatibility of largely mystical or experiential religion. Just as they offer few if any focal community facilities, so too are they lacking in individuals responsible for organizing at this level. Conversely, religions in the mold of Protestantism or Sunni Islam are adept at generating leaders with the necessary skills. As a group, their greatest weakness is likely to be unfamiliarity with, or resistance to, operating in concert with many other peers as coordination of this kind is atypical in these flat, highly decentralized faiths. Similarly positioned individuals in more hierarchical faiths are not necessarily as well-suited to succeed as mid-level leaders in nonviolent resistance. Although they too have practice discharging important duties for believers in their community, on the whole their actions are more tightly scripted. This limits the degree to which local ecclesiastic authorities cater and answer to those they are serving, both of which undermine their status as local leaders.22

21 In some national contexts, Sunni Islam is subject to the same limiting scope conditions that apply to labor unions in communist or single-party states. Both of these embodiments of nonviolent organizational technologies are liable to be “captured” by state apparatuses (Nielsen, 2013). Insofar as this is true, their utility as allies to nonviolent resistance movements is diminished.

22 One remedy for these deficiencies is competition. If adherents are at risk of abandoning their faith for an alternative that promises better fulfillment of spiritual needs, both grass-roots-level and higher-order officials are likely to respond, with clear benefits for otherwise discontented believers (Iannaccone, 1991; Gill, 2001). For nonviolent movements, the benefits of inter-faith competition are less clear. While the religion itself and
In short, nonviolent movements should have access to a bounty of qualified individuals for an operational core when tapping organizationally flat, highly decentralized faiths, and a similarly large, though somewhat less competent population when their prospective affiliate is more tiered.

On the subject of socioeconomic leverage there is less basis for differentiation, particularly between the two more structured varieties of religion identified thus far. Both have great potential arising in no small part from their sheer size, a particularly important component of economically consequential action. Tax-related noncompliance, to cite one example, is accessible to a vast number of citizens, enabling it to reach devastating proportions if participation is sufficiently broad. As networks of religious adherents are typically both the largest and most diverse in a given civil society, the formal religious bodies to which they belong, and which can be used for mobilization, make for excellent partners in such efforts. Similar reasoning applies to the boycott tactic. This lever has its greatest impact when consumers are recruited to cooperate en masse. Like tax and rent-payers, consumers are located in all of country’s households regardless of ethnicity, age, ideology, or any other demographic characteristic. Structured mass-based religious organizations that encompass an analogously wide swathe of society can therefore be instrumental in maximizing a boycott’s utility.

Religious organizations’ natural entree into the praxis of nonviolent resistance is, however, via the more value-oriented tactics of pulling an incumbent’s support out from below. As strikes are to labor unions a type of core competence, so is moral signaling in the form of value and belief amplification a core tenet of mass religion. Indeed, one could make a strong argument that it is precisely these skills which ecclesiastic authorities in both decentralized and centralized faiths hone in their regular interaction with believers under their aegis. The other non-material method of political coercion, based in personal connections to critical individuals on the side of the incumbent, is comparatively more accessible to centralized religious organizations. Only these faiths have dedicated positions of high prestige likely to be occupied by individuals with the elite social ties that enable this form of nonviolent leverage. In the case of Catholicism, specifically, there is further advantage in the fact that high-ranking officials in a given country have ready access to a supranational institution in the Holy See that can greatly augment bishops’ or cardinals’ suasive efforts.

at least some of its accredited representatives are likely to see their popular standing improve, ecclesiastic decentralization is not likely to follow (Trejo, 2009). Clergy at the grass roots remain at the bottom of a segmented hierarchy, unable to gain experience exercising authority in the fluid manner demanded of an operational core during nonviolent insurrection. What is more, competition is not always even partially beneficial. Where a highly structured faith is bound to an incumbent regime, or captured in the sense that labor unions under communism and single-party-rule often are, its response to competition is more likely to involve an appeal for repression or other government favors than a concerted effort to become a more capable civil society organization (Trejo, 2009).

23 In 2010 the median combined proportion of Christians and Muslims per country was over 80% (Pew Research Center, 2012). Counting only those adherents that are regular, active members drops this proportion by between ten and 75% (JDSystems, 2015). In virtually every country the number of people meeting both conditions is greater than 3% of the total population, a participation threshold associated with a perfect record of success in conditions of both violent and nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).
Student Unions

Cross-national variation in large-scale student organization is neither well-theorized nor well-measured. The few sources of distinction scholars have identified suggest a taxonomy quite similar to that which I apply to religious organizations above; however, the posited delineating factors are different. They pertain not to doctrine or the ontology of schooling but the intersection of education and formal institutions of national politics. The first, the political centralization of higher education, represents the extent to which a single government agency exercises substantial control over, inter alia, funding, the founding of new schools, curricula, hiring, and admissions. The second characterizes the strength of the association between tertiary schooling in a given country and future political involvement. Empirically, it ranges between a circumstance in which one or more universities act as a pipeline to a political career and one in which academic and elite networks are largely non-overlapping (Weinberg and Walker, 1969).

As a device for evaluating students’ potential to imbue nonviolent movements with organizational technologies of resistance, the more important dimension of this typology is the second. Educational institutions that function as a training ground for major extant political interests must almost ineluctably become a microcosm of the national discourse and competitive landscape in which they are embedded. Under such conditions, there is little space for any school, or its students, to develop an identity meaningfully separate from these outside entities. Student groups that do form are likely to be swiftly subsumed if they are not deliberate constructs at inception. Much like communist trade unions or hierarchical religions interpenetrated by the state, though perhaps to a lesser extent, these groups cannot rightfully be categorized as organizations unto themselves.

Within the posited typology, this leaves for consideration two remaining sub-types of autonomous student organizations, differentiated by whether they operate in a context where education is under tight government control. If this constraint is absent, the network of student bodies that emerge is likely to be a flat one in which students mostly take action within their university environment. This does not mean that broader issues will be ignored; however, because school is separated from the rest of society to some degree, student organizations are more likely to look inward — e.g., at university policies, faculty behavior, or the content courses — when trying to effect change. As a structural matter, such circumscription is likely to reduce bases for interaction across universities, perhaps to the point where a country’s principal student bodies do not constitute a network at all but are instead largely atomized bodies. Separately, it is possible that this network, regardless of its strength of ties, may simply be small. Countries whose populations are poor or highly concentrated are perhaps especially unlikely to support more than a few tertiary education institutions. Student unions under a national regime of decentralized administration are thus likely to be limited in scale as well overall organizational scope, making their potential structural contribution to nonviolent resistance weak if not non-existent.

Where the highest levels of education are centrally controlled a different pattern of or-

24 Here I am referring to students at universities and post-graduate institutions, not those in primary, secondary, or vocational school.
ganization is likely to emerge. With just one potential counter-party to any dispute or contentious act pertaining to education, students are likely to coalesce into a single national union. Student organization writ large will consequently be highly centralized. What is more, the nature of the hierarchy that materializes will be markedly different from one that a nonviolent movement might use to help build an umbrella structure. Centralized religious hierarchies, to take a contrasting case, can be usefully put to this purpose. Although a great deal of information in the form of instruction flows from the top echelons of these structures down, it is at the lowest levels that main the purpose of the organization, living the precepts of the faith, are discharged. The grassroots of these religions tends therefore to be active and robust. For national student unions the opposite is true. Its main tasks, involving interaction with the central authority responsible for education, is best undertaken by those at the top. Apart from passing preferences to these higher tiers and demonstrations of strength or solidarity, there is little to animate the lower levels of these organizations. As a result, national student unions formed as complements to hands-on, centralized systems of administering tertiary education are not likely to yield, or aid in yielding anything resembling an umbrella structure.

Moving from issues of structure to the more human aspects of student organization reveals further reasons to conclude that this type of body, in all its manifestations, is not well-suited to contribute to nonviolent resistance. One such reason, which is nearly universally applicable, is turnover. Students necessarily do not remain students forever. Individuals will therefore cycle through official stations in student organizations at a fairly rapid clip. On the one hand, this ensures that even small bodies will afford a large number of people some leadership experience. On the other, the skills any one person gains from such limited exposure may be insufficient to make them real contributors to a nonviolent movement's operational core. Labor union shop stewards and ecclesiastic officials, by contrast, occupy their positions or otherwise remain active participants in their respective organizations for many years. A second complicating feature of being a student organizer is youth. Regardless of their real or perceived seniority among peers, leaders of student bodies are almost always young in comparison to the rest of a country's citizenry. In some circumstances this may be unproblematic. University enrollment may connote prestige more than inexperience; however, the reverse is also possible. Where it holds, student organizers will be heavily handicapped as mid-level leaders of nonviolent resistance. Finally, student organizations are not especially active, or "thick" organizations. Compared again to labor unions and major religions, they assume fewer responsibilities and have fewer regular happenings, even within the comparatively small world of higher education. Though leading organizers may derive useful experience from political contention with university administrators or central planners, the relationship between these authorities and students is not structurally antagonistic in the way relations between labor and capital are, for example. As a result, the competitive conditioning student organizers go through cannot be relied upon to prepare them for the greater challenge of leading, even on a limited basis, under circumstances of maximalist nonviolent contestation.

Socioeconomic levers, the final basis for evaluating a group’s potential to deliver organiza-
tional technologies of nonviolent action, also are no strength of university student bodies. As numerically small bodies of unemployed individuals with limited overall purchasing power, their access to potential fiscal levers – government revenue, means of production, and the boycott weapon – is minimal. Among the more psychological or purely political mechanisms, their greatest potential lies in their aforementioned status as learned people. In many countries, university students not only represent the country’s “leaders of tomorrow,” but are in fact that relatives of today’s leaders (Luescher-Mamashela, 2015). Thus, in an otherwise bleak outlook for student’s ability to contribute decisively to nonviolent resistance, this relational feature is likely their strongest point.

2.3.2 Partnership Conditionality

Important as it is for the success of coercive nonviolent action that organizations capable of transmitting crucial technologies of resistance be present, the mere availability of these bodies is of little independent consequence. Partnerships that allow these benefits to be realized will only form if cooperation is strategically sound for both parties. Concretely, these calculations will turn on two sets of considerations: the political compatibility of a movement and its candidate organizational allies, and the implications of union for the balance of capabilities under conditions of nonviolent insurrection.\(^{25}\)

Conceptually, the issue of political compatibility is a simple one. Civil society organizations contemplating alignment with a nonviolent movement must positively assess the campaign’s stated goals in light of their first-order preferences and interests. More specifically, the expected results of resistance should these organizations participate, plus the costs

\(^{25}\) One can also represent this decision more formally. Let \(\text{returns}_{i,j}\) represent the returns an organization realizes from a given conflict end-state \(i\) and partnership status \(j\), where \(i\) can take the values \(\text{victory}\) for a successful resistance campaign or \(\sim\) \(\text{victory}\) for a failure, and \(j\) can be \(\text{partnership}\) or \(\sim\) \(\text{partnership}\). Further, let the independent conditions \(\text{victory}_j\) and \(\sim\) \(\text{victory}_j\) as well as the costs an organization incurs in the course of resistance, \(\text{costs}_j\), also be defined according to \(j\). Given these variables, one can define a candidate civil society organization’s utility from joining forces with a nonviolent resistance movement as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{utility} &= \left\{ \left[ (\text{returns}_\text{victory}, \text{partnership}) \cdot \Pr(\text{victory}_\text{partnership}) \right] \\
&\quad + \left[ (\text{returns}_{\sim\text{victory}}, \text{partnership}) \cdot (1 - \Pr(\text{victory}_\text{partnership})) + \text{costs}_\text{partnership} \right] \\
&\quad - \left[ (\text{returns}_\text{victory}, \sim\text{partnership}) \cdot \Pr(\text{victory}_{\sim\text{partnership}}) \right] \\
&\quad + \left[ (\text{returns}_{\sim\text{victory}}, \sim\text{partnership}) \cdot (1 - \Pr(\text{victory}_{\sim\text{partnership}})) + \text{costs}_{\sim\text{partnership}} \right] \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

As a practical matter, a given organization’s returns are likely to vary according to which side wins more than its alignment decision. In addition, costs, which should be negligible if an organization declines to participate, are likely to be difficult to estimate a priori if it does. While larger and better-resourced organizations may find it easier manage the adversity of coercive nonviolent action, they may also be targeted for a comparatively greater share of an incumbent’s repressive efforts. To a large degree, costs will be determined by specific, un-anticipatable strategic decisions taken in the course of a campaign. The valence of utility for a given organization will therefore turn on comparisons of \(\text{returns}_\text{victory, }j\) to \(\text{returns}_{\sim\text{victory, }j}\) and \(\text{victory}_\text{partnership}\) to \(\text{victory}_{\sim\text{partnership}}\), respectively.

46
of participating, must be attractive relative to the status quo. It is tempting to assume that this condition will be satisfied with high regularity. Most regimes that become targets of nonviolent resistance are deeply unpopular in at least some quarters of society. Equally, unarmed movements rarely espouse deeply divisive or exclusionary goals. Two obstacles to cooperation between nonviolent protagonists and civil society nevertheless are common. One follows directly from an appreciation of the fact that regimes, like nonviolent movements, are highly strategic actors. They are likely to recognize that their political survival depends upon keeping important collective actors from forming a coherent opposition. Towards this end, incumbents may deploy policy and patronage, or even devise new institutions, specifically to placate such manifestly consequential entities as labor organizations, religious communities, and, in some contexts, even student groups (e.g., Johnston and Figa, 1988; Collier and Collier, 1992; Gill, 1998; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Sassoon, 2016). Insofar as such measures are effective they will disincentivize participation in anti-regime resistance.

A second basis for dissociation between nonviolent movements and major civil society organizations is fundamental ideological incompatibility. Simply put, while organized labor, religion, and educated youth may agree with resistance entrepreneurs on the desirability of drastic change, these groups’ understandings of what that change should consist of may be irreconcilably different. Consider, for example, a context analogous to what many socialist states confronted in the late 1980s and early 1990s: One in which nonviolent resistance is underway for the stated purpose of introducing multiparty democracy and liberalizing markets. Labor unions, perhaps suffering under the weight of economic recession, might welcome a system of reforms that provides impetus for greater production; however, they are unlikely to accept readily a solution that achieves this goal by reducing returns to labor or drastically curtailing social protections (Valenzuela, 1989; Murillo, 2000; Cook, 2002). Nonviolent entrepreneurs’ commitment to market reforms may therefore create an impasse with workers deeply vested in retaining some features of a socialist political economy. Religious communities, being inherently conservative in many cases, may present an entirely different set of objections. They may see the removal of strictures maintained by the ancien regime as a sign that norms and laws governing social issues of significant doctrinal importance will erode or disappear (Eberts, 1998; Mantilla, 2010). Still more problematically, radical but administratively powerful individuals may reject altogether the merits of democracy and advocate for a more directly theocratic polity (Arjomand, 1988). Either scenario is one in which cooperation with a nonviolent movement espousing the virtues of political and economic liberalism is unlikely to obtain. Students, for their part, may find a broadly democratic campaign that accepts some continuity with the current incumbent – e.g., by promising not to ban the ruling party – entirely unsatisfactory. Moreover, they may embrace a more radical paradigm considered unacceptable in other quarters of civil society (Thompson, 1995; Gana, 2013). In short, even nonviolent movements advocating broadly popular goals may find that the details of their positions render partnerships with groups possessing organizational technologies of resistance highly challenging to consummate.

What is more, congruent preferences are not a sufficient condition for inter-organizational cooperation under nonviolent insurrection. Organizations like industrial unions, religious
bodies, and student groups must have some confidence that in joining forces with a particular nonviolent movement they can achieve victory (Karklins and Petersen, 1993). Exactly how confident they must be will vary depending, inter alia, on how adverse the status quo is; however, virtually no circumstance will be so dire as to make a strategic assessment moot. Like non-great powers looking to “bandwagon for reward” in a context of current or near-future war, civil society organizations must calibrate their behavior based on assessment of how the conflict will unfold depending on its alignment decision (Schweller, 1994).

In essence, the comparison organizational leaders must make is between the strength of the incumbent and that of the proposed union. An assessment of the former might look much like what a military planner prepares with respect to an enemy force (Helvey, 2004). One dimension ought certainly to be about security services, including how many branches exist, their size, their command and control structure, their training and professionalism, and their morale. Economic conditions are also worth considering. A regime facing fiscal crisis is more vulnerable than one with the assets to withstand even long periods of systemic disruption. Some national patterns of production – e.g., concentrated, labor-intensive manufacturing – will also be disrupted more easily than others – e.g., geographically diffuse agriculture. Finally, attention ought also to be paid to the status of an incumbent’s winning coalition within the selectorate. If key players like foreign benefactors or owners of substantial capital have already begun hedging their bets, the task of nonviolent coercion will be commensurately easier.

Gauging the potential combined efficacy of a nonviolent movement and a candidate partner organization requires that a different set of factors be considered. Perhaps the most important is the joint entity’s likely mobilization base (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). The more demonstrators, strike participants, or boycotters it can expect to animate the more likely it will be to wield decisive economic or political leverage. Current leaders’ resistance experience, perhaps from past campaigns, is also highly relevant. Not only is coercive nonviolent action a unique form of political contention, it is also highly nuanced (Sharp, 1973; Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994). The more practical knowledge is available the better. Parallel institutions inherent to the core nonviolent movement provide a similar boon. For example, a movement with its own media and messaging capabilities can mobilize much more efficiently than one that lacks these assets. Established methods of training new entrants and instilling nonviolent discipline are also useful to have in place. Similarly, with respect to the civil society organization in question, it is important to weigh how developed its dual-use, organizational technologies of resistance are. The more mature and more archetypal its overall umbrella structure, the larger and more capable its operational core, and the more extensive its access to nonviolent coercive levers, the greater its ability to contribute to a joint resistance venture will be.

2.3.3 The ANC and Black Labor in the 1950s

For a detailed explication of the dynamics that characterize the interaction between nonviolent movements and potentially pivotal partners in civil society, the analysis now turns to a case – the first decade of nonviolent anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa. A particular
focus on the African National Congress (ANC) and the black labor movement will show that political incompatibilities and mutual weaknesses played a major role in impeding cooperation despite both parties’ interest in combining forces. The rationale for presenting evidence from this campaign, titled “Defiance” by contemporaries, as opposed to any of the many others in which nonviolent movements pursued a similar partnership, is a primarily normative one. Much of the extant qualitative scholarship on nonviolent resistance emphasizes the triumphs of nonviolent action to the exclusion its failures. In the specific case of South Africans’ four-decade struggle against apartheid, a seminal campaign in the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of analyses are restricted to the final decade of resistance, when nearly uninterrupted paroxysms of economic disruption shook the apartheid state to its core (e.g., Zunes, 1994; Schock, 2005; Roberts and Garton Ash, 2011). By comparison, the early years of abortive, mass-based insurrection have received no attention from scholars of resistance. What follows is an attempt to at least partially fill this empirical lacuna.

Although the ideology of apartheid was still nascent in the early 1950s, systemic racial discrimination was already entrenched. It encompassed both visible, everyday matters such as the segregation of public facilities as well as less visible, but profounder patterns involving political representation, marriage, and employment. The framework was backed by three collective actors in South African society. The first was the country’s Afrikaaner population, many of whom believed in a myth of racial superiority propagated by the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa (NGK) since the end of the Second Boer War (De Gruchy, 1986). Apart from being the base of the National Party (or “Nats”) that dominated South African politics for decades after 1948, Afrikaaners were also disproportionate contributors to the country’s principal internal security body at the time, the South Africa Police. This meant that over the course of Defiance the principal enforcers of apartheid and everyday representatives of the state were ideologically reliable; however, they were not an especially powerful force. Compared to either later decades of South African history or contemporary democracies, it was small and relatively un-militarized.

Apartheid’s second and third major collective proponents were the country’s capitalists and white collar workers, respectively. Both derived financial benefit from segregationist education policies and a formal employment color bar that depressed black laborers’ wages, thereby creating a significant economic surplus for business owners, employers, and middle managers (Feinstein, 2005). Overall, the South African economy’s performance in the immediate post-war era was only mediocre given its enormous endowments of mineral resources; however, for the populations apartheid was intended to benefit, this was a period of propitious growth (Moll, 1991). The real incomes of whites mirrored that of Argentinians,

---

26 See note 19 on the frequency of such interactions in the historical record of nonviolent resistance.
27 See, for example, Sharp (1973); Ackerman and Kruegler (1994); Zunes et al. (1999); Roberts and Garton Ash (2011) and Bartkowski (2013).
28 Police numbered slightly more than one per thousand citizens in 1958, compared to over two in countries like the United States and Great Britain at a similar point in time. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, South African security services proliferated under the aegis of the nearly completely autonomous Bureau of State Security. Excluding covert units, which were robust, police and counter-terrorism forces numbered nearly four per capita (Van der Spuy, 1989; Winter, 1981; Brewer et al., 1988).
Chileans, and Australians in both levels and growth, while for blacks wages were stagnant (Van der Berg, 1989). Finally, it is worth noting that the emergent apartheid regime was neither significantly dependent on, nor impeded by, foreign powers. Western governments viewed the country as an important, albeit problematic bulwark against global communism. Newly independent post-colonial states around the world harbored a considerably harsher view of the National Party and its policies; nevertheless, their objections in the post-war years never amounted to more than diplomatic rows and harsh words at the United Nations (White, 1982). At this stage, South Africa was a resoundingly secure country both militarily and economically.

Apartheid was thus as much of an economic institution as it was an ideological or racial one. Moreover, while the state was in good fiscal and international standing, its architects were not backed by an especially formidable security apparatus. A real opportunity to spoil the benefits of segregation for the vast majority its more moderate proponents thus existed through the use of nonviolent economic leverage. Fortunately for resistance leaders, potential working-class allies in form of non-European (i.e., non-white) labor unions did exist as independent collective actors. Though the post-War years were difficult, they retained sufficient power and skills to play a role, real or potential, in the prosecution of a nonviolent campaign (Lewis, 1984). As importantly, neither organized religion nor student groups were similarly promising partners to the oppressed in this period of South African history. Besides the NGK, which commanded a plurality of adherents, there existed hundreds if not thousands of churches with both European and African origins (De Gruchy, 1986). Amidst such fractionalization, neither a unified structure nor a coherent community of local leaders existed. Sympathetic students, meanwhile, were very small in number. Although individual African and Coloured students did play a significant role in the resistance, too few institutions admitted non-Europeans for student organizations to play a major role in 1950s-era mass-based resistance (Walshe, 1971). The following analysis will therefore focus on the leading anti-apartheid forces in the realm of labor, the black trade unions, and their complement in the resistance community, the ANC.

Although South Africa was well on its way to becoming an industrialized country in the period before the start of the Defiance campaign, industries whose workers might have taken part in the resistance were still a relatively small as a percentage of both the national product and the labor force. Only the country’s various manufactures and basic service industries fell within the the anti-apartheid movement’s plausible mobilization base. Altogether these sectors accounted for approximately 15% of national income in 1950 and employed 670,000 workers, 440,000 of whom were non-white, out of a total economically active population of roughly 6 million (Houghton, 1967; Feinstein, 2005, 41,122). Commercial agriculture and mining, South Africa’s other major economic interests at the time, accounted for nearly 30% of GDP and provided work for an additional 2 million non-whites combined; however, for a number of reasons, neither industry was amenable to organized labor, let alone allowing organized labor to be leveraged for political ends (Houghton, 1967, 36,41). Black workers in both fields were contracted via government clearinghouses from the country’s native “reserves” for a non-renewable period of just 6 to 12 months. Legally, their terms of service
were governed by the country’s Masters and Servants Act of 1856, which prohibited employees from striking or otherwise disobeying their employer. In addition, owners of the mines and commercial farms almost uniformly confined workers to residential compounds when not on shift. The isolation these measures imposed, coupled with high employee turnover and the strict terms of the Masters and Servants Act, made the task of forming strong unions on the mines and farms almost prohibitively difficult and costly (O’Meara, 1975). The ANC’s potential working-class partners for the Defiance campaign were thus limited to the manufacturing workforce.

Besides lacking numeric strength in the broad picture of the South African economy, this emergent proletariat was also relatively poorly organized. Importantly for the ANC and leaders of Defiance, this was especially true of non-European constituents. In the 1930s and during World War II, assistance in establishing solidarity and achieving favorable collective bargaining outcomes came from two sources. The first was the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which zealously took up the cause of organizing African workers beginning in 1939. The party’s impetus for assuming this role came from the Communist International in Moscow, which instructed the CPSA to combat both Afrikaner “fascism” and English “imperialism” as it was manifest in the South African context. Black workers responded to such messaging by joining communist-leaning trade unions in droves. As their strength grew, a new Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) came into being whose constituent unions represented over 150,000 workers at their wartime peak (Fine and Davis, 1990).

The communist party’s position at the head of the black labor movement was not to be long-lasting, however. Soon after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the CPSA, again following the lead of Stalin and the Comintern, officially aligned itself with the South African regime in its fight against Nazi Germany. As a consequence, the party’s support for militant trade union activity that might threaten the war effort quickly petered out. Its role in black workers’ affairs was instead increasingly one of promoting reconciliation with employers and discouraging disruptive action. Interestingly, this conservative attitude persisted after 1945 despite clear signs that the central government lacked any appetite for compromise absent the exigencies of wartime production quotas. Only unions led by members of the party’s trotskyist wing continued to animate African workers to wage a politically charged fight for fair treatment in the postwar period. These unions included the National Commercial Distributive Union lead by Max Gordon and the Food and Canning Workers Union by Ray Alexander (Fine and Davis, 1990). Overall, though, the trotskyist sub-branch of the CPSA was small and riven by ideological disputes. The general trend in the latter half of the 1940s was one of increasing disillusion between the leaders of mixed or African unions and these unions’ rank-and-file. As a consequence, black membership in trade unions declined and harshly repressed, often ineffective wildcat strike activity increased.

A second institution that supported manufacturing trade unionism in the years before Defiance was South Africa’s largest trade union umbrella organization, the Trades and Labor

---

29 To these issues one can add, in the specific case of South Africa's gold mines, a tendency the part of employers to recruit labor from across southern Africa and segregating their workforce by tribe. The language barriers and opportunities for inter-tribal hostility this policy created understandably made unionization that much more difficult a proposition (O’Meara, 1975).
Council (TLC). Formed in 1930 at the behest of a South African regime that sought a single negotiating partner on matters relating to labor, the TLC possessed a considerable degree of clout by a fiat. Only unions that belonged could have their grievances presented for official arbitration and subsequently engage in legal strike action. As importantly, the TLC began as an explicitly non-racial organization. In addition to admitting unions regardless of their racial composition, the council’s executive strongly decried existing segregationist labor laws. As a sanctioned convener of labor interests, its position on these issues did not go unheeded. In 1930, it played no small role in encouraging an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 which extended formal trade union recognition to unions representing only natives. Unionized African workers under the auspices of the TLC thus had access to both a strong advocate and a forum through which their concerns could be effectively voiced (Lewis, 1984).

However, as with the CPSA, the TLC did not remain committed to black workers’ cause through the end of the 1940s. By the end of the war, craft unions in the TLC such as the Ironmoulders Society of South Africa and the South African Electrical Workers’ Association were under threat from employers quickly gaining access to labor-substituting technology and processes. Workers in these professions could no longer bargain collectively on the basis of scarce skills; a feature that, in the past, had allowed them to work cooperatively with explicitly non-racial unions. The craft unions now joined the rail-, steel-, and mine-workers in attempting to carve out a wage scale for whites on purely racial grounds. Their membership in a nonracial TLC thus became increasingly untenable and the council’s overall membership declined precipitously with their exit. Accompanying the TLC’s decline in participation was a concomitant loss of deference from the South African central government, which, as noted above, was increasingly disinclined to accommodate African labor interests after Nazi Germany’s defeat. Thus, even though it was not until 1954 that the TLC became formally defunct, by the late 1940s it was clear that the council would be obliged either to dissolve or to deny white, mixed, and African unions equal standing. It was at this point that black workers effectively lost their second major pillar of organizational strength and support (Lewis, 1984).

Left in the wake of the CPSA’s departure from active trade unionism and the slow decline of the TLC was a depleted core of mixed and all-African industrial trade unions. From a height of over 150,000 members in the early years of World War II, this vanguard of black labor counted only 20,000 affiliates by the mid-1950s (Fine and Davis, 1990). A stream of segregationist labor laws issued by the Afrikaner Nationalists after their electoral victory in 1948 placed even greater pressure on the movement. Chief among the offending laws was the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which made it illegal for any current or former “communist,” defined in the vaguest terms, to engage in political activity. Unsurprisingly, the Nationalist regime leveraged this law to imprison a great many of the African labor movement’s remaining leaders, most of whom had spent sufficient time in socialist circles to officially fall under the act’s purview. Such losses would have been problematic enough for a mature labor establishment to overcome. For South Africa’s nascent black unions, the damage was greater still. Few had sufficient organizational depth to adequately replace even
one or two leaders. In some cases such vital skills as bookkeeping and negotiating became too scarce for the union to continue operating. From an already low level of organizational strength in the immediate post-war period, unions positioned to partner with the ANC as part of the Defiance campaign thus sank even further in the late 1940s and early 1950s (SACTU, 1965).

Given this state of affairs, it should come as little shock that architects of the Defiance campaign in the ANC and the ANC Youth League saw little immediate role for organized labor in their plans. Two events that played a particularly significant role in cementing this strategic outlook were the mineworkers’ strike of 1946 and a one-day stay-away organized for June 26, 1950. The former event, at the time the largest industrial action in South African history, was significant for many reasons. Chief among these was that it shattered any remaining illusion within the conservative African intelligentsia still leading the ANC at this time that the central government harbored an inclination to accommodate black people’s concerns (Karis and Carter, 1973). Over the course of their four-day strike for a higher wage and better living conditions, approximately 60,000 striking gold miners suffered at least 12 deaths and over 1,200 injuries at the hands of the police (O’Meara, 1975).

Shocking as this brutality was, the more relevant aspect of the strike for the eventual progenitors of Defiance was the broader working class’ response. Unlike prior strikes in the 1930s and 1940s, mineworkers’ collective action in 1946 had a strong a priori possibility of diffusing to a substantial segment of the black proletariat to dramatic economic effect. J.B. Marks, the strike’s leading figure, was not only the most effective organizer of the country’s 300,000 African laborers on the mines, he was also a prominent member of the SACP (Hirson, 1989). This association with the communist party, coupled with the party’s tenuous but still unquestioned seat atop the black trade union movement, in turn created ample opportunity for industrial action to be planned in connection with the miners’ refusal to work. In practice, this opportunity was not seized. The TLC took a stance reflective of its increasingly racist membership, siding with the government in declaring the strike a plot by foreign agitators that required violent suppression (Lewis, 1984). The leading body of racially mixed and strictly African industrial unions, CNETU, showed greater concern for their brethren on the mines but a high degree of incompetence as well. Due to a lack of communication and poor attendance at executive meetings, CNETU patently failed to prepare its constituent unions and union members for the sacrifices “sympathy” strikes would entail. What few symbolic gestures enterprising CNETU member-unions mustered took place only on the fourth and final day of the miners’ strike. Other protests and sympathy actions were haphazardly organized, leaving participants open to pre-emptive arrest by a police force already on high alert. Such disappointing results in reaction to the bloodiest days in the history of black South African labor understandable angered many African workers and accelerated their dissociation from the CPSA and the unions under its leadership. The 1946 gold-miners’ strike thus placed in stark relief the organizational incoherence that beset the black labor

---

30 This included, inter alia, providing adequate time for strike announcements to be disseminated or setting up a collection to support the families of striking workers fired as a consequence of their defiance (Fine and Davis, 1990).
movement in late 1940s before the initiation of Defiance.\footnote{The disruptive, and therefore political potential of the strike was perhaps most evident in the minor crisis it created on South African stock exchange when it first began (O’Meara, 1975).} Even more significantly, perhaps, it deprived the black working class writ large of a chance to gain valuable, demonstrable experience in executing economic disruption for tangible gains.

A second influential manifestation of working-class agitation during this period was the June 26, 1950 stay-away organized jointly by the ANC, the SACP, the South African Indian Congress, and the African People’s Organization representing Colored South Africans. Although this one-day program of disobedience was briefer, less dramatic, and smaller in scale than the miners’ strike of 1946, for architects of the Defiance campaign, it was probably more significant. Coming less than two months after the CPSA’s own, well-subscribed but violently repressed stay-away on international workers’ day, the “Day of Protest and Mourning” served as a litmus for the ANC’s capacity to successfully animate the African working class in similar fashion for the Defiance campaign. The results, according to the ANC’s own evaluation, fell short of expectations (Karis and Carter, 1973). Adherence to the call for solidarity with those who had been killed the preceding May Day was particularly weak in the Transvaal, the emerging industrial heartland of the country and the area where most black South Africans were concentrated. Support was strong in only a few of the townships surrounding Johannesburg and in the eastern Cape’s main city, Port Elizabeth. Both areas had been ANC strongholds for decades. Unionists outside these havens participated unevenly at best. To some degree this poor showing was due to the relatively brief interlude between May 1 and the Day of Protest, which benefited neither organizers nor those families still reeling from dismissals, injuries, and deaths (Walshe, 1971). Still, the overall conclusion Defiance planners reached was that the black working-class, sui generis, could not initially be relied upon to heed a call for action originating from within the ANC: Industrial action, far from being the centerpiece of the campaign strategy, was relegated to a distant, culminating phase.

Both the 1946 strike and the 1950 Day of Protest thus contributed to the perception that black workers lacked the political efficacy and experience to contribute to Defiance; however, reversing the terms of this analysis brings one to same conclusions about the ANC. It too exhibited real organizational weaknesses in the late 1940s, especially in light of its avowed goal to lead the liberation movement to victory. Although it counted over 20,000 members, less than half of these individuals consistently paid their membership dues of two shillings and sixpence (35 U.S. cents at the time) (Feit, 1967). More problematically, dues payments passed through local and provincial branches before being remitted to the central treasury with considerable attendant leakage. The ANC was consequently chronically broke, unable to pay for even a single salaried employee before Defiance or during. Dysfunction in formal relations between Congress’s executive and its more than thirty branches extended to matters of policy as well. Instructions disseminated from the former to the latter were often honored only in the breach. Even dismissals were sometimes ignored, with fired officeholders carrying on for months after their release without consequence. So poor was the executive’s understanding of activities on its admittedly vast periphery that on occasion it sent correspondence seeking
only to confirm that a branch had not lapsed into non-existence (Feit, 1962).

For an avowedly political organization advocating a particular agenda, the ANC also had surprisingly little presence in the African media. Besides lacking a periodical of its own, its relationship with the major African outlets was regularly made acrimonious by leading officers’ tendency to answer criticism with ad homonym attacks. Offending reporters and editors were deemed “agents,” “sellers-out,” and “friends of the government” for their unfavorable reviews (Feit, 1962). This apparently self-destructive tendency was symptomatic of perhaps Congress’s deepest shortcoming. Despite far-reaching reforms by President A.B. Xuma in the 1940s, the ANC remained a distinctly erudite entity into the 1950s. Most leading members held a bachelor’s or professional degree at a time when the majority of black South Africans had no education at all. These qualifications served Congress well when its principle modus operandi was deputation and argumentation before government officials; however, they presented an obstacle after its turn to mass politics. In language, culture, and patterns of thought, Congress’s figureheads had more in common with the South Africa’s white middle class than their working-class or rural-dwelling kin. More problematically, there remained in its leadership circles a tendency to view “the masses” as a pliant body that would respond readily and uncritically to the august ANC’s calls for action (Walshe, 1971; Gish, 2000). One must therefore add to Congress’s small numeric base and administrate dysfunctions its failure to fully grasp the effort involved in successful grassroots mobilization as yet another systemic deficiency in the 1940s and 1950s.

Neither the non-European labor movement nor the ANC thus presented a paragon of organizational or numeric strength that may have attracted one to the other as an ally around the time of the Defiance campaign. Still, the two entities explored the possibility of such an arrangement twice more after the disappointment of the the 1950 Day of Protest. In 1957 and again in 1958, ANC leaders worked jointly with organized labor over the issue of a universal minimum wage. What is more, Defiance planners recognized from an early stage that, despite their hesitancy to enlist workers en masse, “industrial action is second to none, the best and most important weapon in the struggle of the people for the repeal of unjust laws [sic]” (Karis and Carter, 1973, Doc. 86). Clearly, both parties’ limited latent coercive capacity was not a sufficient cause of their decision to struggle more or less separately during the 1950s. To fully explain their arms-length relationship, it is necessary to compare and contrast each entity’s first-order political goals.

The black and mixed-race labor movement, despite becoming increasingly disillusioned with the SACP, remained a decidedly marxist entity throughout the post-war years. This placed it at ideological loggerheads with the both the ANC writ large and the emergent Youth League in particular. For nearly forty years prior to Defiance, the ANC was an organization dedicated to a political program equal parts classical Liberalism and meritocracy informed by the legacy of British colonial rule. “Cape liberalism,” as this ideology was titled, took a position polar opposite to that of socialism on the issue of class relations: It maintained that educated, well-heeled elites of all racial backgrounds had a right to a seat at the table of political power (Walshe, 1971).

Younger, more militant members of the ANC, including most key figures in the Youth
League, towed a slightly different political line even more hostile to the communist agenda. In their view, South Africa's prevailing political order was one of racial autocracy in which the minority ruled unjustly over the majority. The solution they proposed was to reverse this arrangement. "Democracy" and "majority-rule" were terms Youth Leaguers frequently used to describe their position, but in reality they advocated a program of proud, and exclusive, African nationalism. In their founding manifesto, published in 1944, the Youth League made clear that this "creed" had no room for overt communist influence: "We may borrow... from foreign ideologies, but we reject the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies into Africa" (Karis and Carter, 1973, Doc. 48). The Youth League's founding executive, Anton Lembede, elaborated on this point in his first published article as president, adding that non-Africans purporting to lead South African blacks or create a unified non-European front were particularly objectionable—a clear attack on leftists who sat atop the trade union movement:

African is a black man's country,... No foreigner can ever be a true and genuine leader of the African people because no foreigner can truly and genuinely interpret the African spirit which is unique and peculiar to Africans only. Some foreigners Asiatic or European who pose as African leaders must be categorically denounced and rejected. An African must lead Africans (Karis and Carter, 1973, Doc. 53).

Youth Leaguers' hostility to communists of all stripes also extended beyond verbal denouncements. On numerous occasions they stormed events hosted by the CPSA with the intention of breaking them up and twice they introduced a formal motion to expel all communists from the ANC (Mandela, 1994).

Real ideological divisions thus existed between the heads of the ANC and the communist leaders of South Africa's mixed or African trade unions at the time of Defiance. Interestingly, these animosities did not entirely deter Congress from considering, and in some cases executing, joint action with the CPSA and the trade unions under its guidance. In 1948, it explored the possibility of participating in a "Votes for All" campaign in Transvaal and Orange Free State to protest the country's racially exclusive franchise. The idea initially received Dr. Xuma's blessing, but was rejected by Congress's powerful Transvaal executive officers, a majority of whom bristled at the prospect of the ANC being upstaged by the Transvaal Indian Congress, the CPSA, and the numerous trade unions that had jointly proposed the campaign (Mandela, 1994). Several also feared that the event's progenitors would seek to solidify any enthusiasm the campaign created by forming a new organization from its member entities, thereby diluting the ANC's status as the pre-eminent institution for South African national liberation (Sisulu, 2002).

In 1950, a similar series events surrounded the CPSA's announcement of a "Free Speech Convention" in answer to the Nationalists' surprising electoral victory in 1948 and its stated

---

32 To some degree these differences were bridged as a result of closer association with South African Indians, many of whom were avowed communists, following their campaign against the Ghetto Laws. It also helped that the pragmatic A.S. Mda took over the Youth League presidency from the more fiery Anton Lembede following his premature death (Sisulu, 2002).
intention to pass legislation banning communist political activity. Dr. Xuma had by this time been removed from his post as president of the ANC in favor of another doctor, James Moroka, who’s ideological disposition was more congruent with that of the growing ANC Youth League. Dr. Moroka nevertheless approached the opportunity for explicit coordination with South African communists much as his successor had. Despite strong opposition from rigidly nationalist quarters of Congress, he and several other influential members elected to participate openly in the convention. General sympathy with the CPSA and their trade union affiliates was strong at this stage, as many felt that other liberation-oriented organizations, including the ANC, would soon be subject to repression as harsh as that facing communists under the country’s new leadership. This sentiment nevertheless was quickly eclipsed when, at the convention, resolutions calling for massive work stoppages on international workers’ day and a further “National Convention of the People” in July were passed against strong objections by the ANC. In light of these decisions, Congress’ leaders again interpreted the whole affair as a fait accompli by the CPSA: An attempt both to detract from the ANC’s recently announced Program of Action, which included its plan for the Defiance campaign, as well as to place the whole movement on a socialist trajectory by emphasizing workers’ rights. Needless to say, Congress not only failed to participate in the CPSA’s May Day activities, but strongly encouraged other Africans to refrain as well (Walshe, 1971).

Political jealousies also heavily shaped interactions between the ANC and the black trade movement, specifically, over the course of the Defiance campaign. The first such engagement occurred somewhat spontaneously in Port Elizabeth in November 1952 as the first stage of the campaign, consisting of nationwide anti-segregationist disobedience, was winding down. African workers in this industrial hub and their associated trade unions were among the best organized in South Africa. They also held the ANC in unusually high regard, as was evident during the 1950 “Day of Protest and Mourning,” in no small part because many locals had become Congress luminaries over the years. Working-class citizens in Port Elizabeth were therefore primed to respond in dramatic fashion to employers firing workers arrested for participating in Defiance and city councilors’ decision to institute a curfew and a ban on outdoor meetings. Indeed, with the chief Defiance campaign officer for Cape Province absent, workers took it upon themselves to organize an indefinite stay-away until each of these measures was rescinded. Such bold action may have been beyond the capacity of the local urban population to support; however, it would have been wrong to dismiss out of hand it’s potential to effect change. Historically, industrial action in Port Elizabeth had always been among the most robust, and most effective, in the country. More broadly, because these workers’ readiness for confrontation came at a time when popular enthusiasm for Defiance was seriously waning elsewhere in the country, its potential for positive demonstration effects may have outweighed any local considerations. Still, ANC leaders could not brook such far-reaching trade union action taking place outside of its control. Upon his return to the province, the Cape’s Defiance executive, Dr. James Njongwe, negotiated the strike down to a single day in exchange for concessions from the city which ultimately never came to fruition (Mandela, 1994).

The final and perhaps most significant event of this sort to occur in the context of Defi-
ance was the one-pound-per-day minimum wage campaign conducted by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the new leading body of African trade unions in the 1950s. Like the workers in Port Elizabeth in 1952, SACTU started this campaign in an effort to take advantage of favorable circumstances for industrial action. In January, 1957, 70,000 occupants of the Alexandra township outside of Johannesburg spontaneously began what would become a nearly four-month boycott of the state-run bus service in anticipation of a twenty-five percent fare hike. The boycotter's struggle, and eventual victory, motivated numerous sympathy boycotts around the country. Among these were additional bus boycotts in and around Port Elizabeth and scattered boycotts of other government-run enterprises, including tobacco shops and beer halls (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). SACTU saw in this ferment an opportunity both to advance African workers' living conditions broadly and to grow the trade union movement. They announced a campaign for a one-pound-per-day minimum wage, a two- or three-fold increase for most Africans, and set about campaigning nationally.

Unlike most mixed-race or African trade union organizations of the 1930s and 1940s, SACTU was an expressly political entity. With a core of former TLC affiliates that had argued tirelessly against racial trade unionism until the council's dissolution, SACTU found a willing senior partner in the ANC at its founding. The one-pound-per-day campaign was its first opportunity to fully leverage this arrangement. The ANC nevertheless was cautious about participating fully (Lodge, 1983). In contrast to their compatriots at SACTU, Congress leaders saw little merit in perpetuating the militancy sparked by the bus boycotters. Citizens of Alexandra had successfully forced a withdrawal of the bus fare hike. What is more, the state bus company had been made to feel the pinch of disregarding their Johannesburg riders' circumstances; an average of 7,000 pounds per week in lost revenue (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). ANC officials in Alexandra and beyond thought this a victory worth consolidating, but the vast majority of boycotter’s desired additional concessions. Workers conducting industrial action in sympathy with Alexandra also did not wish to see the momentum behind working-class agitation slow before their demands had been met (Fine and Davis, 1990). Under pressure from these segments of society and officials in SACTU, the ANC belatedly agreed to back a one-day stay-at-home to coincide with the anniversary of the Defiance campaign. Despite their frustration with Congress and official threats of expulsion to the rural reserves, workers responded in force. In Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth between 70 and 80 percent of laborers heeded the call (Lodge, 1983). Out of this success came additional, more localized strikes and stay-aways that, together with the year's earlier disturbances and bus boycott, produced a stream of concessions from the country's official wage arbitration boards (Webster and Webster, 1981).

Both the ANC and SACTU sought to duplicate and broaden in 1958 the material progress their working class constituents had made in 1957. For Congress' leaders the impetus was once again to ensure that the ANC was front and center in the liberation struggle, not the trade union movement. Towards this end it proposed a new frame for the year's culminating industrial action, a national three-day stay-away organized jointly by the ANC and SACTU in March. Instead of focusing exclusively on a living wage, as organizers in 1957 had, joint ANC-SACTU action in 1958 was also to aid Congress' plan to create a united front against
the Nationalist in their bid for re-election. The connection between black workers striking and an all-white election, as well as the awkward pairing of “the Nats must go” with “one pound per day” in a single campaign slogan, created considerable confusion for union members and leaders alike (Fine and Davis, 1990). What is more, even among those that grasped the relationship, many felt three days’ pay was too great a sacrifice for a purely political objective. As a result, when the time for action came, most workers elected to perform their jobs as normal. Results did vary regionally, with participation reaching 50 percent until mid-day in Port Elizabeth; however, in Johannesburg and the surrounding townships, the industrial heartland, only an estimated 10 percent of workers stayed home (Fine and Davis, 1990). To save face after such a poor showing, ANC leaders officially canceled days two and three of the stay-away. As in 1950, its annual report declared the event an overall failure. Congress’ jockeying for political position beside the non-European trade unions had undermined the potential for productive cooperation between the two for the third and final time in the course of the Defiance campaign.

Incongruent political perspectives thus created a real obstacle to an otherwise highly promising possibility of alliance between the ANC and sympathetic organized labor in South Africa. The latter’s leftist leanings jibed with neither the liberal elitism of Congress’ old guard nor the African nationalism that launched the eventually predominant ANC Youth League. Opportunities for joint action were either dismissed out of hand or, when cautiously accepted, failed to come to full fruition out of concern for relative gains. Standing in the background to each of these abortive joint efforts was a pattern of weak organization that afflicted each party. By 1950, African and mixed-race trade unions in South Africa had no allies in the country’s broader trade union movement and were at odds with increasingly embattled South African communists who had been responsible for building the post-war, non-European African trade union movement largely from scratch. Much of the black workforce therefore lay outside a formal trade union structure and those that did not were fortunate to be competently led. The ANC, for its part, was also no paragon of organizational aptitude. Internal reforms to make Congress a mass-based organization only started in 1940 and had hardly reached fruition by the time the Defiance campaign began. The central executive’s control of provincial and local branches was weak, if it existed at all, and Congress’ finances were persistently in bad shape. Neither the ANC nor the black and mixed-race trade unions were thus a sufficiently attractive partner in terms of latent political power or ideological consonance for an alliance between the two to emerge.

2.4 Conclusion

This paper has sought to advance the literature on nonviolent resistance by articulating an argument that 1) emphasizes organization-level correlates of success; and 2) defines a clear causal path by which these correlates, or “organizational technologies,” are adopted by nonviolent movements. Both objectives were sought to fill voids in a field of study that has largely overlooked the nonviolent organization as a locus of factors that determine campaign success and, in exceptions to this rule, have presented under-specified theories. Brief but
numerous examples have been presented to substantiate the claim that these technologies – umbrella structures, operational cores, and socioeconomic levers – play an important role in nonviolent resistance. A similar volume of more focused evidence from the first decade of anti-Apartheid resistance in South Africa shows that the organizations most likely to deliver these technologies, together with nonviolent movements in their midst, consider cooperation very cautiously with a few to maximizing chances for success and ideological fit.

What has not been presented is a holistic test of the entire causal pathway specified herein. There is no narrative that begins with the presence of a nonviolent-technology-laden union or religious body in a context of resistance, continues to examine strategic interaction between this organization and the resistance campaign, and evaluates the effects of any potential partnership on both the overall attributes of the movement as well as its ultimate success. In other work, I present some evidence to this effect in a large-N framework (Wittels, 2017). However, further tests that perhaps yield both new research questions and practical lessons are due. Indeed, the larger purpose in this work is precisely to provide a sound basis for both types of future research.
Chapter 3

Examining the Link Between Popular Participation and Successful Political Resistance

Nonviolence, once strictly the remit of normative or descriptive scholarship, has increasingly become the subject of positive political science. Among other contributions, this shift has generated an explicit theory of successful nonviolent resistance to a field in which such reasoning tended previously to be implicit. The specific argument posited is one students of causal inference will readily recognize as an example of causal mediation: It suggests that the use of nonviolent rather than violent tactics in unseating authoritarian regimes, ending military occupations, and creating new states, among other broad political goals, will lead to greater popular participation in such endeavors, and as a result, a higher likelihood of success.

The methods heretofore used to evaluate this argument take little account of its essentially sequential structure. The first analysis addresses this shortcoming by using causal mediation analysis to parse the “direct effect” of nonviolent methods on resistance campaigns” probability of succeeding from the “causal mediation effect” of nonviolence via levels of active popular participation. Although I cannot causally identify either of these quantities, I do analyze explicitly how sensitive they are to confounding variation from factors correlated with both participation in resistance and resistance outcomes. my findings indicate that while nonviolent forms of action are associated with a higher likelihood of success, no part of this effect operates through levels of participation induced by the use of these methods.

A second empirical exercise targets a more conventional quantity of interest: the average causal effect of participation on successful nonviolent resistance. While conceptually distinct from the estimands associated with the prevailing model of successful nonviolent action, this quantity is nevertheless intimately related to the notion of “power in numbers” that scholars of nonviolence and subnational collective action more generally often invoke. To assist in identifying it, I rely upon an instrument for popular participation: the quasi-random assignment of large public squares in capital cities around the world. I also make use of an under-utilized technique, rooted in randomization inference, for mitigating the inferential
problems associated with instrumental variables analysis in small samples. My results are suggestive of a counterintuitive null effect of participation on success.

In the final set of analyses, I address the apparent discrepancy between these empirics and basic intuition by evaluating four types of organizations – trade unions, religious communities, political parties, and nationally subscribed student bodies – as moderating conditions. I posit that where these entities assume a leading role in nonviolent action, the social networks that bind their affiliates and the structures that guide their prosecution of ordinary forms of collective action will positively affect a movement’s capacity to leverage mass involvement for coercive gains. More specifically, I submit that under these conditions, nonviolent movements will have greater success managing the repressive pressures and tendencies toward internal dissensus that mass involvement creates. Though my results are again limited by a small sample, they do provide suggestive evidence that patterns of this type exist: I find that the marginal effect of an order-of-magnitude increase in participation increases by between 2 and 16% when a nonviolent movement is headed by a trade union, religious authority, political party, or national student organization.

3.1 Nonviolence, Participation, and Success in Theory

Nonviolent resistance has not always been thought of as a form of coercion. For Mohandas Gandhi, perhaps the most well-known theorist and practitioner of the twentieth century, it was a central tenet of a belief system that shared more with Vedic tradition than any strategy of conflict (Borman, 1986). Richard Gregg, the first American to write extensively on the subject, saw nonviolence in more instrumental terms, but nevertheless rejected the notion that it was in any way coercive. Like many in the pacifist tradition, Gregg believed that a movement confronting oppression without force of arms would succeed by producing in the minds of aggressors a “moral conversion” that would alter their perception of the substantive disagreement as well as the appropriate means of redress (Gregg, 1935).

It was not until Gene Sharp published *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* in 1973 that nonviolent resistance came under scrutiny as an expressly political act, rather than a moral or religious one. While it is often cited for its explication of the power inherent in withdrawing consent and its rich description of the praxis of nonviolence, Sharp’s seminal, three-volume treatise also outlines an argument directly linking the utility of nonviolent resistance to the level of popular involvement it enjoys. This implicit theory of nonviolent insurrection is most evident in the four “paths to success” Sharp describes. Two of these, “conversion” and “accommodation,” echo Gandhi and Gregg in describing a harmonization of fundamental differences between rulers and their subjects. The third and fourth, nonviolent “coercion” and “disintegration,” present a decidedly different strategy premised on denying an aggressor the means, and perhaps the will, to further suppress a resistance. Sharp posits eight factors likely to lead to these end-states, ranging from a movement’s capacity for sustained defiance to the target entity’s cohesiveness; however, he cites first and foremost the need for “a very large number of nonviolent resisters” sufficient to overwhelm security forces or “make it impossible for the social, economic, and political system to operate.” (Sharp, 2013, 125).
Scholars who have sought to build on Sharp’s general insights have also noted the fundamental importance of scale in the logic of nonviolent resistance. Stephen Zunes, drawing lessons from the First Palestinian Intifada and the last decade of anti-Apartheid resistance in South Africa, makes particular note of the economic losses wrought when large segments of an oppressed population participate in economic boycotts, stay-aways, and strikes as part of a nonviolent campaign (Zunes, 1994). Although in the Israeli context these measures ultimately accomplished few political ends, they nevertheless curtailed national output by as much as 2.5% (Ibid, 416). In South Africa, the eventual participation of the over half a million workers in nation-wide strikes had a more dramatic effect. Together with divestment and international trade embargoes directed against the Apartheid state, industrial action in the early 1990s contributed to a 3.5% annualized rate of economic contraction, and by 1994 had created precisely the kind of societal paralysis associated with nonviolent disintegration (Whiteley, 2004, 248).

The defection of security forces amidst nonviolent struggle, another oft-posed feature of successful unarmed insurrection, is similarly abetted by mass participation. Sharon Nepstad’s work on these high-profile events highlights civil-military relations, natural resource endowments, and ties to major powers as crucial determinants; however, the sheer scale of resistance stands as an important background condition (Nepstad, 2013). Most notably, the rationale soldiers often give for switching their loyalties – that the locus of a country’s democratic will, or “the people,” has shifted to the side of the resistance – is tied ineluctably to a movement’s popular appeal: Members of a small movement can more readily be deemed “troublemakers,” “criminals,” or “extremists” than masses of demonstrators representing a broad cross-section of a nation’s citizenry. Popular nonviolent resistance also facilitates the defection of military forces in more instrumental ways. By drawing international media attention to their every mass act, such movements place security forces tasked with crowd control or repression in a quandary: They can either perform their duty and face condemnation by a global audience or exercise non-interference and implicitly sever ties with the incumbent regime. In at least one recent nonviolent campaign, the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine, this dilemma resolved decidedly in favor of the dissidents. By ensuring that any violence perpetrated during initial demonstrations would be “live on CNN,” the movement retained momentum at a critical early stage and effectively deprived President Viktor Yunokovich of a military solution to his crisis of legitimacy (qtd. in Nepstad, 2013, 229; Chivers, 2005).

Figure 3-1: The Prevailing Causal Model

Nonviolence \(\rightarrow\) Mass Participation \(\rightarrow\) Success

The explicit hypothesis, illustrated with Figure 3-1, that nonviolence causes successful
resistance in part via the pressures created by mass participation is most clearly articulated by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan in *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Chenoweth and Stephan add to aforementioned arguments, represented by edge “B,” an additional set of reasons why nonviolent movements should attract a larger following than violent ones: Physical barriers to participation should be lower; information about how to participate more readily accessible; moral qualms with killing eschewed; and the opportunity costs of total involvement in the effort lower (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). These processes are represented as edge “A.” Further claims of the type denoted by edge “C” are not the focus of Chenoweth and Stephan’s analysis; however, they are an integral part of the broader argument: Both the general process of “pulling the opponent’s pillars of support apart,” as well as more specific mechanisms, including “backfiring” that follows the repression of unarmed demonstrators, are contingent principally on a resistance opting for a suite of strictly nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 58, 50-1). *Why Civil Resistance Works* thus offers a uniquely complete synthesis of previously under-specified arguments in the study of nonviolence, drawing clear linkages between nonviolence and success and from nonviolent to success through levels of popular involvement.

### 3.2 Testing the Prevailing Argument

In addition to their theoretical contribution, Chenoweth and Stephan also add to the extant positivist literature on nonviolent resistance the first comprehensive cross-national dataset of nonviolent and violent campaigns. The tests for which these data are leveraged are drawn mainly from a model of the following form,

\[
\text{success}_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \text{nonviolence}_i + \gamma_1 \text{peak_membership}_i + \xi_1 X_i^T + \epsilon_{ii},
\]

where the evaluated quantities of interest are the realized estimates of \(\beta_1\) and \(\gamma_1\), and the variables “nonviolence” and “peak_membership” respectively indicate whether a given movement was predominantly nonviolent in its actions and the rough order of magnitude of its
highest membership level. Table 3.1 presents four different specifications of this model with increasingly extensive sets of controls.

Table 3.1: Existing Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nonviolence</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>estimated peak mem.</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.05†</td>
<td>0.06†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population)</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>-0.04†</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violent repression</td>
<td>-0.17†</td>
<td>-0.18†</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target polity &amp; military capacity</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resistance objectives</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decades</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown. The dependent variable is campaign success. Standard errors clustered by country.

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

The principal difficulty in extracting from these results a test of the notion that nonviolence affects resistance outcomes through mass participation is that neither the coefficient on nonviolence nor the coefficient on peak membership speaks to such a sequential process. Definitionally, an individual coefficient in a multivariate linear regression indicates the marginal effect of a particular regressor on a dependent variable controlling for variation induced by other explanatory variables in the model. The estimated values of $\beta_1$ shown in Table 3.1 thus represent the effect of nonviolence on the probability of successful resistance after partialing out variation in movements' success due, inter alia, to peak participation. The same interpretation holds for $\hat{\gamma}_1$ with respect to the independent effect of movement membership. Importantly, neither $\beta_1$ nor $\hat{\gamma}_1$ yields information about the magnitude or statistical signifi-

---

2 Peak membership data is obtained from the nonviolent and violent conflict outcomes event-year dataset (NAVCO 2.0), which has greater coverage than the analogous data from NAVCO 1.0 event data. Membership is measured on the following five-point scale: 1 = 0 - 9,999; 2 = 10,000 - 99,999; 3 = 100,000 - 499,999; 4 = 500,000 - 1 million; 5 = >1 million. This variable and all other data used in the analyses that follow are available in the replication files.
cance of the part of the effect of nonviolence that operates through movement participation. To estimate this quantity, termed a causal mediation effect in Imai et al. (2011), one must add to the empirical set-up represented by equation (1) a model of participation as a function of nonviolence:

\[
\text{peak\_membership}_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \text{nonviolence}_i + \xi_2 X_i^T + \epsilon_{i2}.
\]  

(3.2)

Adding this second, “mediator model” enables one to assess separately the effect of participation on movement success (\(\gamma_1\)) and the effect nonviolence has on participation (\(\beta_2\)). These effects, corresponding respectively to edges “B” and “A” in Figure 3-1, together constitute the causal mediation effect described above. Equations (1) and (2) also permit an estimation of two other quantities of interest, the “direct effect” of nonviolence on success and the corresponding “total effect.” All three estimands can be defined mathematically as follows:

\[
\text{ACME}(t) = E[Y_i(t, M(1)) - Y_i(t, M(0))],
\]  

(3.3)

\[
\text{ADE}(t) = E[Y_i(1, M(t)) - Y_i(0, M(t))],
\]  

(3.4)

\[
\text{Total\ Effect}(t) = E[Y_i(1, M(1)) - Y_i(0, M(0))],
\]  

(3.5)

where \(t\) is an indicator for the use of nonviolent methods, and \(Y(\cdot)\) and \(M(\cdot)\) are (respectively) potential values of the outcome variable (movement success) and the mediating variable (peak participation) under different values of \(t\) and \(m\) (Imai et al., 2011). In this notation, the average causal mediation effect (ACME) is expressed as the average change in the likelihood of successful resistance caused by a shift in movement participation from levels associated with violent revolt to those corresponding to nonviolent action. Importantly, the actual form insurrection takes is held constant in this estimand. The average direct effect (ADE) is the mirror image of the ACME insofar as it captures all portions of the treatment effect that do not pass through the mediating variable of interest. In the present context, it is equivalent to the expected change in resistance outcomes attributable to a shift from violent to nonviolent tactics keeping peak membership constant for a given choice of resistance methods. The total effect is lastly a simple function of the ACME and ADE. Specifically, the Total Effect\((t) = \text{ACME}(t) + \text{ADE}(1 - t)\) for a binary treatment. More intuitively, the total effect is the result of switching from violent to nonviolent resistance methods while also shifting peak participation from levels realized under violent resistance to those realized under nonviolent action.

To estimate each of these quantities with nonviolent resistance as the reference category (i.e., setting \(t = 1\)), I use the procedure detailed in Imai et al. (2011) and the mediation package in R. my pre-treatment covariates, denoted by \(X_i\) in models 1 and 2, include those used in fourth model shown in Table 3.1 less violent regime repression and with the addition of indicators for per capita GDP, majority religion, and ethnic fractionalization. Figure 3-2 shows the results. Notably, even though the direct effect on the probability of successful resistance is estimated to be within the vicinity of 30% (compared to a 4% effect reported in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)), the estimated ACME is essentially zero.
Before evaluating the inferential worth of these estimates it is important to elucidate the assumptions under which they are causally identified. Imai et al. (2010) show that for a process like the one illustrated in Figure 3-1, this condition is met for the ACME and ADE if "sequential ignorability" holds:

\[ \{Y_i(t'', m), M_i(t)\} \perp T_i | X_i = x, \]

\[ Y_i(t'', m) \perp M_i(t) | T_i = t, X_i = x. \]  

The first of these two assumptions is that treatment is conditionally orthogonal to potential values of the outcome and mediator in equations (1) and (2), respectively. In operation, it is directly comparable to the standard assumption necessary for an average treatment effect to be causally identified in a regression framework. The second part of the sequential ignorability condition is more unorthodox. It states that after conditioning on pre-treatment covariates and treatment assignment, there may exist no confounders correlated with the observed level of the mediator and the outcome variable. Outside of mediation analysis, this assumption bears closest resemblance to the identification condition associated with selection on observables: It depends not on random or quasirandom assignment of the mediator, but instead on selecting a conditioning set that blocks all so-called "back-door paths" connecting the treatment and response in the outcome model (Imai et al., 2011, 771-2; Pearl, 2010, 67).
In the particular empirical context considered here, neither aspect of sequential ignora-
bility is readily satisfied. Consider first the process by which resistance movements arrive at
a violent or nonviolent course of action. Rarely is this serious matter decided by stochastic
events. Rebellion, for one, cannot be a strictly impulsive act. Prospective instigators must
necessarily devote some forethought to acquiring armaments, recruiting fighters, and select-
ing targets, among other considerations. Nonviolent resistance, while sometimes sparked
by an unpredictable event or spectacle, is also often a deliberate, carefully planned affair.4
Whether any particular resistance campaign tends towards one of these two modes of oper-
ation thus cannot be considered a random or quasi-random condition. In itself this does not
pose a crippling inferential problem. Sequential ignorability requires only that a movement’s
choice of violent or nonviolent means be conditionally ignorable; however, theory indicating
precisely what this conditioning set consists of is sparse. Ethnic fractionalization, institu-
tions of popular representation, and large-scale civil society organizations like universities,
labor unions, and religious bodies may feature prominently, but there is also little to suggest
that this is a complete list of relevant factors (Thurber, 2015a; Nepstad, 2011; Braithwaite
et al., 2012). Equally important, even these potential confounders cannot all be adequately
controlled for in large-N analysis. Data on the depth and breadth of religiosity or preva-
lence of tertiary educational institutions, for example, is not readily available for a global
cross-section of country-years spanning the entire twentieth century.

Similar issues to these call into the question the validity of sequential ignorability’s second
component. This latter identification condition is violated if there exist unobserved variables,
causally prior to a movement’s choice of violent or nonviolent means, that affect both its
level of popular support and its probability of successful resistance. Pre-revolutionary public
sentiment about the need for dramatic political reform, as it existed in Soviet Union in the
late 1980s or Arab autocracies in 2010s, is one possible confounder of this type (Kuran, 1991).
Clearly conditions like these should positively influence participation in a future resistance
movement. Not only is an individual’s potential utility from direct involvement increasing
in the strength of his or her preference for change, but to the degree that these preferences
are also believed to be widespread, “safety in numbers” makes belonging to a resistance
a less dangerous proposition (DeNardo, 1985). Public desire for revolution can also affect
resistance outcomes independent of its influence on the number of dissidents who ultimately
participate. Among prospective dissidents, it contributes to what Doug McAdam terms
“cognitive liberation,” a critical posited component of political mobilization in which people

4 The First Filipino People Power Movement and the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany are both
examples of relatively spontaneous nonviolent resistance campaigns brought into being under broadly unan-
ticipated circumstances. In the Philippines, revolution began after the assassination of Benigno Aquino by
forces unknown to this day (Thompson, 1995, 109-115). The East German campaign was allowed to grow
past its infancy when local leaders of the ruling party in Leipzig, the site of the country’s largest demon-
strations in October 1989, declined to follow through on plans for repression (Dale, 2006, 23-9). Examples
of more orchestrated and pro-active nonviolent campaigns include the Polish Solidarity movement, the First
Palestinian Intifada, the Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa, and the movements that brought in-
dependence to the Gold Coast, Tanganyika, Mozambique, and Northern Rhodesia in colonial Africa. See
Ackerman and DuVall (2000); Pearlman (2011); and Sutherland and Meyer (2000).
disadvantaged by a prevailing political order become convinced it is illegitimate, articulate demands for change, and in doing so gain confidence in their capacity to effect reforms (McAdam, 1982, 48-51). Separately, and perhaps more significantly, these sentiments can inter-subjectively create a perceived reality of regime weakness that leads key pillars of regime support, such as foreign allies or military elites, to defect (Nepstad, 2013; Lee, 2015). Insofar as these inherently unobservable effects exist empirically, any level of popular belief about the need for major political reform will prevent one from identifying the causal mediation effect of resistance participation on campaign outcomes.

Fortunately, this eventuality does not render mediation analysis altogether fruitless. Using sensitivity analysis, it is possible to assess with some precision the conditions under any confounder would fundamentally alter the estimates shown in Figure 3-2. Figure 3-3 presents one such analysis for both the ACME and the ADE.

Figure 3-3: Sensitivity of the ACME (left) and ADE (right)

Note: The horizontal axes represent the partial contribution of a hypothetical unobserved confounder to the overall fit of a model of campaign participation. The vertical axes are analogous, but for a model in which campaign success is the dependent variable. The contour lines indicate the sets of confounders in this space sufficient to render the estimated ACME and ADE null. The observed values of GDP, decade indicators, and population are plotted in this space for reference.

The x- and y-axes in these plots respectively indicate how well a hypothetical confounder predicts variation in my mediator (participation) and outcome variable (movement success) using $R^2$ values. The regions above the plotted contour lines correspond to combined levels of confounding that would cause the estimated ACME and ADE to be negative. Three observed controls – per capita GDP, population, and time – are plotted in this space for reference. In both plots I see strong evidence that the estimated ACME and ADE are relatively robust. Were a confounder like popular revolutionary fervor to have similar predictive properties.
as any of these covariates, the average effect of nonviolence operating through participation would remain near zero, and perhaps switch sign, while the corresponding ADE would remain near 30%. Mediation analysis thus provides reasonable strong initial indication that while nonviolence is associated with a higher likelihood of successful resistance, participation levels induced by the use of nonviolent methods are not.

3.3 A Further Test of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance

While the mediation argument articulated and tested above is central to extant theory on nonviolent resistance, it is not the only hypothesis on the subject that deserves careful empirical evaluation. A simpler and perhaps more fundamental proposition that has not heretofore been scrutinized is that among nonviolent campaigns, power in numbers creates victory. In other words, greater participation in a nonviolent resistance movement should increase its likelihood of success. This notion follows directly from the truism in military logic, substantiated in correlational studies of armed rebellion specifically, that larger forces win more often than smaller ones, ceteris paribus (Cunningham et al., 2009; Balcells et al., 2014). Indeed, there are further reasons to believe that for nonviolent movements, this relationship between size and success is even stronger. Curtailing cooperation with a target regime, the strategic crux of nonviolent action according to Sharp (2010, 2013), is necessarily more effective the more people there are who demonstrate in the streets, disobey government orders, refuse to pay taxes, or stay home from work. What is more, if a nonviolent movement fails to enlist the support of the masses in these or other acts of defiance, it has little recourse to alternate methods of applying coercive pressure. Unlike a violent movement, it cannot substitute greater bloodshed or destruction for a lack of popular appeal. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, extant data show a clear pattern of increasing success among larger nonviolent movements.

To test the hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 3-4, that size begets successful resistance in situations of nonviolent revolt, I employ the same event data leveraged in the previous section, but a different approach to causal identification. Instead of assuming selection on observables and relying upon sensitivity analysis for a robustness check, I make use of an instrumental variable that isolates un-confounded cross-sectional variation in nonviolent movements' levels of membership: whether sample countries' capital cities possess a large, centrally-located square or plaza.

5 On the importance of force size as a determinant of victory in interstate warfare, see Dupuy (1987) and Rotte and Schmidt (2003).
6 Figure 3-4 models nonviolent campaign outcomes linearly as a function of the coarse measure of peak movement participation described in note 2.
3.3.1 Instrument Construct Validity and Measurement

Anecdotal evidence from the so-called Arab Spring supports the notion that predominant public spaces can be crucial facilitators of collective nonviolent demonstration. Though squares may have played a uniquely important role in this wave of unrest because of their symbolic importance in the region, participants also noted the practical, and therefore more general significance of these venues (Patel, 2013). In Egypt, one prominent journalist and activist commented that, “democracy is people finding space to express the things they want...but things start with a space.” (Federman, 2011). According to this analysis, Tahrir Square provided a crucial platform for anti-authoritarian agitation in Egypt. Observers of the initial unrest in Syria reported, in contrast, that “activists...[bemoan] the lack of a central square in the Syrian capital, Damascus. Like the Egyptians who have Tahrir Square, they want a central place from where they can launch protests.” The evidence from Bahrain is perhaps starkest of all. There, governments officials resolved after initial demonstrations by the country’s Shia minority to deliberately reconfigure the site where these protests occurred. Manama’s Pearl Roundabout, shown in Figure 3-5, ceased to function as a conspicuous area for citizens to congregate and instead became a symbolically innocuous five-way traffic intersection.

---

8 To the extent that urban geographies and architecture are routinely shaped by such considerations, my proposed instrument for participation in nonviolent resistance is fraught with selection effects that undermine its ignorability. In Appendix A I present evidence that these linkages are not a threat to my analysis using
Nor is the intersection of large public spaces and nonviolent revolution a phenomenon associated strictly with the Arab Spring. Throughout the twentieth century, squares in capital cities have hosted massive, sometimes climactic protest events. In South Korea, the 1960 April Revolution that ended Syngman Rhee's tenure as president effectively began when three thousand university students descended on the plaza outside the country's National Assembly (Kim, 1996). The Islamic revolution in Iran saw similarly significant events transpire in Tehran's then-named Shahyad square. On December 2, 1978, an estimated two million demonstrators from across southern Iran filled this expanse near the commemorative gates to the Iranian capital. Within weeks, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime was finished. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, many of the revolutions that attended the dissolution of the Soviet Union were centered on demonstrations in open public spaces. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Mongolia, to name some of the most notable cases, nonviolent movements to terminate Soviet rule conspicuously began, and culminated, in the capital's main square (Reuters, 1989; Battiata, 1989; The Times (London), 1988; Rossabi, 2005).

Central squares' utility as an encouragement to mass involvement in nonviolent resistance is also evident in theories of coordination and collective action. Most obviously, large central squares provide a focal point or locus of public attention that resistance organizers have a strong incentive to exploit for anti-government action (Schelling, 1960). Rallies or demonstrations at such a site are likely to draw a large fraction of the most eager segment of possible participants as constraints due to the accessibility and the size of the venue are necessarily minimized. More importantly, as the size of this first wave of popular involvement increases, in actuality or expectation, the costs of participating for more cautious sympathizers decreases commensurately (DeNardo, 1985; Kuran, 1991). Large central squares thus provide a clear modus operandi for both planned and spontaneous acts of resistance to acquire a large following.

historical case studies of three in-sample cities and their public squares.
Bearing these arguments in mind, my binary measure of capital-city squares combines three criteria: whether the area in question is large enough to facilitate a substantial public gathering, its accessibility to the pedestrian public, and its proximity to important government structures. I operationalized this concept by recording the “sights” associated with each city in my sample according to the Lonely Planet website and cross-checking whether the squares, plazas, and landmarks identified by this method possessed open space for pedestrians. Thirty-eight in-sample cities featured a built environment that met these criteria while seventeen did not. Figure 3-6 shows the geographic distribution of the resulting binary indicator of central squares.

![Figure 3-6: Distribution of Central Squares](image)

3.3.2 Assessing Ignorability

As with any instrument, the most important properties of my indicator for central squares are its quasi-random assignment and its “excludability” – i.e., whether it only affects the results of nonviolent resistance through variation in participation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In Appendix A I assess the former condition qualitatively, using brief historical analyses of the evolution of in-sample capital cities to verify the absence of systemic factors linking the eschewal, creation, or destruction of central squares to resistance outcomes. Here my focus is instead on more readily measurable potential confounders. A regime’s level of democracy, for example, could potentially be correlated both with its propensity to invest in major public amenities and its tendency to be accommodating to large social movements. Analogously, a certain minimum of national wealth might enable such projects while also creating a society in which average per capita incomes disposes citizens to massive, and possibly highly efficacious nonviolent mobilization. Population and population density represent another pair of
potentially problematic covariates: It is usually amidst large or concentrated demographic bases that one finds cities of a size stereotypically associated with conspicuously large central squares. These same factors are also place a hard limit on the maximum feasible size of any nonviolent movement. Another reason states sometimes construct large, central plazas is to commemorate successful revolutionary action. Insofar as these past successes exert a persistent effect on resistance outcomes throughout history, they too represent a problematic observable confounder. Finally, one might reasonably believe that certain country-fixed variables imbue states with both a stylistic taste for public squares as well as a predilection for accommodating (or repressing) grassroots social activism. Colonial heritage, geographic region, and dominant religion would all seem to be categorical factors of this type.

To examine the salience of these potential back-door paths between capital-city squares and nonviolent resistance-movement success, I regress my indicator of central squares on the earliest reliable and widely available records of national economic output, population, democratic government, and dummy variables representing countries” regions, the identity of their colonial occupier, their populace’s dominant faith, and a history of at least one revolutionary success (Marshall, 2013). As Table 3.2 shows, gross domestic product and population are the only variables consistently significant across the three specifications I run. Among the categorical variables I evaluate, indicators of religious heritage and basic geographic region are (separately) jointly significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ significance level, with the latter providing marginally greater explanatory power. I therefore include wealth, population, and regional dummies in all of my subsequent analyses to mitigate my instrument’s non-ignorability.  

3.3.3 Assessing the Exclusion Restriction

Unlike threats to the ignorability of an instrument, which can be dealt with by changing the pre-treatment variables in the conditioning set, potential violations of the exclusion restriction in IV analysis cannot be resolved with one’s choice of models. Problematic covariates are necessarily “post-treatment” insofar as they are causally subsequent to the instrument and therefore risk introducing bias if they are included as regressors. 10 This being said, it is still necessary to investigate pathways by which a proposed instrument might influence an outcome variable via causal pathways that do not coincide with the treatment. To the extent that such pathways exist, my instrument’s inferential value is commensurately diminished.

The present empirical context does not suggest numerous sources of non-excludability – there are but so many conceivable ways a central square could plausibly influence the outcome of a resistance movement except by affecting how prospective participants gather. Two factors nevertheless stand out: government repression and movement diversity. The former is a plausible causal consequence of central squares for much the same reasons that this

---

9 I also include a time trend in these models to account for any causal association between the presence of city squares in my sample and the occurrence of successful nonviolent resistance over time.

10 Of course, if one is intending to conduct mediation analysis of the kind illustrated above, this is precisely the kind of empirical set-up one needs. Where the target estimand is instead an average causal effect, as is the case in the present section, a more conventional approach proscribing the use of post-treatment covariates is required.
Table 3.2: Squares as a Function of National Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>polity</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP\textsubscript{1970})</td>
<td>0.32 *</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.25 †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population\textsubscript{1970})</td>
<td>0.10 *</td>
<td>0.07 †</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population density</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01 †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past success</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion indicators</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonial controls</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(&gt; F)†</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is the presence of a capital-city central square.

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

†† p-value for F-test of categorical-coefficient equality.

A feature of the built environment may affect participation. A clear and accessible focal point for collective political action can ease the task of decisively repressing a nascent resistance movement as readily as it facilitates the formation of such entities. When concentrated in a relatively small, undefended space, dissidents present an easy target for lethal one-sided violence, as tragic events in St. Petersburg (1905), Johannesburg (1960), and Beijing (1989) all illustrate. This reasoning even found expression in the design of modern-day Paris, whose wide boulevards and open plazas were intended, among other purposes, to facilitate the movement of military units in the city and deter the construction of makeshift barricades that dissidents employed to great effect in the Revolution of 1848 (Kirkland, 2013). Yet, as Table 3.3 indicates, my measure of central squares is a small and statistically insignificant predictor of repression in situations of nonviolent resistance writ large. As such, it is unlikely to provide an inferentially problematic causal pathway that links central squares to resistance outcomes.

The threat campaign diversity poses to the excludability of central squares begins with its
connection to successful resistance outcomes. Scholars of social movements and nonviolence alike have noted that movements whose members bring a varied portfolio of experiences, cultures, and skills to the fold are more apt to generate tactical innovations that maintain a movement’s popular appeal and keep its opponents off-balance (McAdam, 1983; Schock, 2005). Associated linkages between social movements’ demographic breadth and geographic focal points like central squares are not so well theorized. Nevertheless, it is plausible that where these features of the built environment exist, recruitment to a resistance movement is affected in ways that increase its diversity. In particular, one might hypothesize that the “passive” recruitment mechanisms such venues enable, wherein participants join of their own volition, knowing only the purpose of a campaign and the epicenter of its activities, can substitute for “active,” or network-based recruitment characterized by a tendency towards group homogeneity, or homophile. Fortunately, the data do not suggest such a pattern. Like Table 3.3, Table 3.4 shows no statistically significant association between my measure of central squares and individual nonviolent resistance campaigns” diversity.¹¹

---

¹¹ I measure diversity by summing the binary indicators for age, class, urban-rural, ideological, party, regional, ethnicity, and religious diversity in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013).
Table 3.4: Evaluating Diversity as an Exclusion Restriction Violation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>squares</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\log(\text{population}_{1970})</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\log(\text{GDP}_{1970})</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{N}</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{R}^2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{adj. R}^2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{Resid. sd}</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is an index of campaign diversity.
Standard errors clustered by country.
† significant at \( p < .10 \); *\( p < .05 \); **\( p < .01 \); ***\( p < .001 \)

### 3.3.4 Instrumental Variable Results

I turn now to the core results of my analysis, beginning with an assessment of my instrument's ability to predict variation in nonviolent resistance movements' levels of popular participation. These first-stage results are shown in Table 3.5, where the dependent variable in each specification is again a categorical measure of estimated peak membership. As in all my analyses, I use a linear model and standard errors clustered at the country level.\(^{12}\) Further models that relax any assumptions of linearity are shown in Appendix B. In accordance with the anecdotal historical evidence and theoretical reasoning presented above, campaigns that take place in countries whose capitals have open and central gathering points tend to attract a larger following than those that occur in states whose capitals lack this feature. The difference is approximately one order of magnitude in peak participation and is statistically significant at the \( \alpha = 0.05 \) confidence level across all three covariate adjustments I employ. Sensitivity analysis, shown in Figure 3-7, reveals that the first stage is also reasonably robust to unobserved confounding: Even an omitted correlate with the same predictive properties as population, GDP, or time is not sufficient to nullify the relationship.\(^{13}\)

These results, coupled with my instrument's ignorability and excludability, provide a

\(^{12}\) I use linear probability models instead of a logit or probit for ease of interpretation; however, no results are affected from using these alternate modeling approaches.

\(^{13}\) R code used to conduct the sensitivity analysis in Figure 3-7 is due to Masataka Harada (masataka-harada@gmail.com).
Table 3.5: First Stage Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>squares</td>
<td>0.91 **</td>
<td>1.07 **</td>
<td>0.95 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population$_{1970}$)</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP$_{1970}$)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partial F stat.</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is estimated peak membership.
Standard errors clustered by country.

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

sound basis for reduced-form and instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the causal effect of participation on nonviolent resistance movements’ success. The first of these two analyses yields the direct effect of squares on campaign outcomes. The second uses variation in movement participation due to central squares as a principal predictor. Neither set of results, shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 respectively, supports the view that a nonviolent movement’s likelihood of realizing its stated ends increases with the size of its following. Estimated effects across all specifications are neither substantively large, statistically significant, nor consistently positive.

Still, the precise quantities these standard methods yield may be misleading. Because my measure of central squares does not pass standard significance tests for an instrument – its partial F-statistic is less than ten in all of the first-stage models – my IV point estimates and standard errors are potentially biased (Nelson and Startz, 1990; Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997). Fortunately, this inferential hurdle can be cleared using randomization inference. Imbens and Rosenbaum (2005) show, in particular, that accurate point and interval estimates of instrumental variable effects from weak instruments can be constructed by comparing these effect across different permutations of the instrument setting. In using randomization to create the basis for exact inference, this method reduces bias due to a poor fit, and associated model dependence, in the first stage (Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005).

The implementation of this framework proceeds as follows. First, I permute my binary
Figure 3-7: Sensitivity of First Stage Effect

Note: The horizontal axis represents the partial contribution of a hypothetical unobserved confounder to the overall fit of a model of campaign participation. The vertical axis is analogous, but for a model in which capital-city squares is the dependent variable. The contour line indicates the set of confounders in this space sufficient to render the estimated first stage effect of squares on participation a null effect. The observed values of GDP, decade indicators, and population are plotted for reference.

measure of central squares $p_0$, creating a matrix of permutations $P$. Because squares are “assigned” at the country-level, each permutation $p$ is effectively a block randomization of $p_0$. Second, I hypothesize a sequence of additive, sharp-null effects of participation on nonviolent movements” probability of success. Formally, I assume:

$$Y_i = \beta D_i + y_{Ci},$$

(3.8)

where $Y_i$ is an observed resistance outcome for observation $i$ with a particular participation level, $D_i$, and $y_{Ci}$ is this campaign’s outcome under an arbitrary but fixed control condition (e.g., peak membership between 0 and 10,000 persons). For each of my null hypotheses, $H_0 : \beta = \beta_0$, I then test for a relationship between the adjusted outcome vector, $\bar{Y} = Y - \beta D$, and $P$ using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. If the null hypothesis is true, the following equalities hold:

$$Y = \beta D + y_C,$$

(3.9)

$$Y = \beta_0 D + y_C,$$

(3.10)

$$\bar{Y} = Y - \beta_0 D = y_C.$$

(3.11)

Assuming an additive effect accords with the results we’ve shown to this point as well as the model used in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
Table 3.6: Reduced Form Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>squares</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population\textsubscript{1970})</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP\textsubscript{1970})</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.

Dependent variable is successful nonviolent resistance.

Standard errors clustered by country.

$^\dagger$ significant at $p < .10$; $^* p < .05$; $^{**} p < .01$; $^{***} p < .001$

and $\bar{Y}$ is related only to the fixed vector $y_C$, not the randomization encoded in $P$. My rank-sum tests evince this condition when the test statistic for the true instrument assignment $p_0$ is indistinguishable from the other, random instrument assignments in $P$. By contrast, when the null is false and $\beta \neq \beta_0$, I have

\begin{align*}
Y &= \beta D + y_C, \\
Y - \beta_0 D &= \beta D - \beta_0 D + y_C, \\
\bar{Y} &= Y - \beta_0 D = (\beta - \beta_0) D + y_C.
\end{align*}

These expressions do suggest a relationship between $\bar{Y}$ and $P$ since $P$ is related to $D$ in the first stage of my analysis. In fact, using the results of my rank-sum tests, I am able to assess with precision the degree to which such a relationship exists, and by extension, my level of confidence in rejecting the null. I do so by counting the number of permutations in $P$ whose associated test statistics are as aberrant as the test statistic for the true instrument vector $p_0$. In effect, this produces non-parametric p-values for each of my null hypotheses, which I use to generate the confidence intervals and median effects shown in Table 3.8.

Contrary to the results Table 3.7, Table 3.8 suggests a consistently negative point estimate of the effect of participation on resistance movements' success across each of my three covariate specifications. Furthermore, despite the wide confidence intervals associated these estimates — reflective of the small sample and a sub-optimally strong first-stage — one of
Table 3.7: Instrumental Variables Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>peak membership</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squares</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population$_{1970}$)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP$_{1970}$)</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear IV models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is successful nonviolent resistance.
Standard errors clustered by country.
† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 3.8: Estimated Treatment Effects from Randomization Inference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\hat{\beta}$</th>
<th>95% CI Low</th>
<th>95% CI High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bivariate Model</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and GDP</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, GDP, and Region</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the two multivariate models indicates an effect significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ confidence level. These results by no means provide strong evidence for the notion, counterintuitive to most extant theory on nonviolence, that larger resistance movements are less likely to succeed than smaller ones. Nevertheless, they do cast doubt on the supposition that scale unconditionally benefits nonviolent movements.

3.4 Organizations and Mass Nonviolent Action

Why might a nonviolent resistance movement seeking maximalist political ends not benefit from a larger popular following? The extant literature on nonviolent resistance suggests few answers. As previously noted, scale is generally believed to be a clear boon, if not a necessity for such campaigns because of its association with costly disruption, its tendency to facilitate defections, and the fact that violent substitutes for “people power” are unavailable.
Nevertheless, there are also at least two serious challenges to successful nonviolent action that become more acute as popular participation increases.

The first lies in the paradox that large campaigns, precisely because they pose a clear threat to an incumbent regime, are more likely to elicit a repressive response, ceteris paribus. While it is true that repression can be beneficial if it creates blowback – or, in the language of Gene Sharp, is leveraged for “political jiu jitsu” – this is not an empirically common pattern of events (Sharp, 2013). In general, repression reduces a nonviolent movement’s chances of achieving victory.\(^{15}\) One can also see from Figure 3-8 that in the set of nonviolent campaigns analyzed in the preceding section, it is increasing in a movement’s popular appeal. Larger nonviolent movements are thus more likely to be beset by government violence.

Figure 3-8: Violent Repression as a Function of Peak Participation

![Figure 3-8](image)

Note: Estimates from a simple bivariate model are shown with country-clustered 95% confidence intervals. Participation is measured as the highest level active popular involvement in a campaign. It is mapped onto the following five-point scale: 1=1-9,999 2=10,000-99,999 3=100,000-499,999 4=500,000-1 million 5=>1 million.

More importantly for the present argument, the expected costs of this counter-mobilization may outweigh the commensurate benefits a movement realizes from having wider appeal. After all, it is also possible to apply coercive pressure in ways that do not depend principally on mobilizing a massive number of people. Creating a spectacle that imposes moral costs on an incumbent (e.g., the Mothers of the Plaza De Mayo in Argentina) or eliciting the attention of important international actors (e.g., the Kosovar independence movement) are both plausible alternatives (Bouvard, 2002; Clark, 2000). So too is a strategy that mobilizes individuals with a high degree of domestic political leverage, such as government workers or business leaders. To the extent that a nonviolent movement is able to rely up on modalities

\(^{15}\) See Table 3.1.
such as these, it is plausible that mass involvement might have a net-negative effect on its chances of victory.

A further problem associated with directing a large nonviolent campaign to victory is that of maintaining unity of effort. Fragmentation, Pearlman (2011) shows, is a proximate precursor to violent escalation. It creates incentives for constituent entities within a resistance to enhance their competitive profile using violent action and eliminates structures and incentives that moderate radical impulses (Pearlman, 2011). As a result, it often spells the end of nonviolent resistance as such. Campaigns that draw a large cross-section of a potential mobilization base face two particular challenges in staving off such dissensus. The first is the need to indoctrinate and train a large number of participants, presumably over a relatively short period of time. Second, as theories of both revolutions and social movements show, popular resistance must often forgo ideological homogeneity to achieve a mass following, bringing into the fold groups with divergent political preferences or individuals lying on the peripheries of society altogether (DeNardo, 1985; Tarrow, 1993). Large nonviolent resistance movements must thus bear a concomitantly large logistical and political burden to maintain a unified campaign committed to nonviolent methods of action. If they are not prepared to satisfy these demands, greater participation may result in dissolution before any practical political gains are made.

I hypothesize that there is a subset of nonviolent movements uniquely competent to withstand the repression and centrifugal pressures of mass participation: those that are led by, or structured around, independent socio-economic or political organizations that predate the onset of resistance and national in scope. ¹⁶ Concrete examples of such organizations include trade unions, religious communities, political parties, and national student unions.

Because these entities feature rules, institutions, and structures for managing collective action, they are comparatively well-positioned to retain organizational coherence under adverse circumstances. Regular meetings and channels of communication, for example, may usefully be employed in contexts of resistance to disseminate instructions and strategies intended to counteract a target government’s strategy. Established organizational structures and norms of leadership may be similarly utile insofar as they minimize the uncertainty that repression creates when it forces certain individuals out of the movement and brings others in. The fact that organizations afford nonviolent movements a coherent group of participants with deep social ties is also significant. Numerous studies in the social movement literature have shown that these relationships are a crucial determinant of individuals’ involvement in costly collective action (McAdam, 1983; Gould, 1991; Petersen, 2006). Depending on their number, they may even form a dedicated “critical mass” that renders a campaign steadfast even in the face of increasing personal costs to involvement in resistance (Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Kuran, 1991; Marwell and Oliver, 1993).

Similar reasons to these suggest that organization-led nonviolent movements will fare well in preventing political dissension and deviations from nonviolent discipline amidst increasing levels of popular involvement. Among those participants that belong to the union, religious

¹⁶ These organizations have much in common with those defined in Tilly (1978) as entities whose members share a set of observable characteristic and are connected by a dense set of social ties (62-3).
community, or political party in the lead, a certain amount of ideological unity is likely to exist simply because these individuals opted into, and were socialized within, a common socioeconomic community. For the campaign writ large, the same hierarchies and structures that create stability in the tumult induced by counter-mobilization will minimize opportunities for dissensus to grow unchecked into outright division. Network-related and structural influences may also act jointly to enforce a commitment to nonviolent action. Among co-unionists, believers, or partisans, inter-personal solidarities ought to impose serious costs on those who choose to defect much as it would those who would exit the movement entirely. Channels of communication and enforcement that link a movement’s leadership to the rank and file provide yet another means by which to maintain nonviolent discipline, particularly as the a movement grows to encompass new entrants.

To test the claim that nonviolent movements headed by trade and student unions, religious bodies, and parties are particularly able to lead large-scale nonviolent movements to victory, I add to the empirical approach employed in the preceding section a binary variable indicating whether one of these entities occupied a leading role. Table 3.9 shows the results of modeling campaign success as a function of participation and the interaction of participation and organizational leadership. In these specifications, a unit increase in movement participation is associated with a 10% increase in the likelihood of success where a trade union, religious community, political party, or national student union is present and null effect where these entities are absent.

Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report this association using the same instrument for participation leveraged in the preceding section. In the reduced form, I again observe that the independent effect of the instrument is negatively associated with success, though at statistically insignificant levels; however, the interaction of this encouragement to participation and organizational leadership is positively and robustly correlated. Instrumental variables analysis, shown in Table 3.11 demonstrates similar, though attenuated patterns. Where nonviolent campaigns are directed by a trade union, religious body, political party, or national student group, the effect of a unit increase in participation increases by 13 to 16% and is significant at the $\alpha = 0.01$ confidence level.

These IV estimates, like their analogs in prior sections, suffer from a weak first stage relationship between squares and movement membership and a corresponding possibility of bias and inconsistency. Since the simple linear effects in Table 3.9 are smaller than those in Table 3.11, any bias in the latter is likely to be towards the former (see Han and Schmidt, 2001). Were this true, the effect of organizational leadership on the marginal

17 The principle source I use to construct this variable is the Global Nonviolent Action Database, which records for each campaign in its catalog the leading actors and organizations http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/. For campaigns in my dataset that were not included in this database, I utilized other secondary sources. A full accounting is available in the replication files.

18 In these models and the others in this section, I omit the main effect of organizations for two reasons. First, it is highly correlated with the interaction term in which I am principally interested, creating a variance inflation factor greater than ten in each of my specifications. Second, because participation is measured on a discrete scale ranging from one to five it is not obviously inappropriate to assume a null effect of organizational leadership when participation is measured as a zero on my scale.

84
Table 3.9: Least Squares Estimates with Organization Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation × organization</td>
<td>0.09 *</td>
<td>0.10 **</td>
<td>0.09 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population_{1970})</td>
<td>-0.08 *</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP_{1970})</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid. sd</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is successful nonviolent resistance.
Standard errors clustered by country.

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

effect of movement participation would actually be greater than 13 to 16%. Unfortunately, because the randomization-inference-based method utilized above assumes an additive effect of participation rather than a multiplicative one, it cannot readily be modified to explore this possibility or the robustness of the interaction between participation and organization more generally. Instead, I test whether the least squares effects in Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 are retained when I use different, more flexible estimators. While these robustness checks cannot correct all biases in my interactive IV estimates, they do present the opportunity to assess how the preceding results change when I place emphasis on selecting the conditional expectation functions that optimize out-of-sample performance. In other words, they are well-suited to reveal whether the un-instrumented, reduced-form, and instrumental variables results presented above are due to model mis-specification.

The first alternative approach I use is kernel-based regularized least squares (Hainmueller and Hazlett, 2013). When operationalized with Gaussian kernels, as I do for the models summarized in Figures 3-9 through 3-11, KRLS effectively estimates conditional expectation functions with an infinite-dimensional mapping of the covariates (Hainmueller and Hazlett, 2013). That it does so with regularization in a ridge regression framework ensures that the optimization is mathematically well-posed. The second method I use is the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator, or lasso (Tibshirani, 1996). Like ridge regression, lasso is
Table 3.10: Reduced Form Estimates with Organization Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>squares</td>
<td>-0.29 †</td>
<td>-0.28 †</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squares x organization</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>0.44 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population_{1970})</td>
<td>-0.08 *</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP_{1970})</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 79, 79, 79
$R^2$: 0.17, 0.26, 0.36
Adj. $R^2$: 0.14, 0.22, 0.26
Resid. sd: 0.46, 0.44, 0.42

Linear models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is successful nonviolent resistance.
Standard errors clustered by country.
† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

A penalized regression method that adds to the standard least squares optimization problem a parameter that reduces the complexity of the fitted model. I implement this method using a Bayesian framework instead of maximum likelihood estimation so as to generate posterior distributions and corresponding credible intervals for my coefficient estimates (Park and Casella, 2008). My final alternate approach to estimating the interactive effect of participation and organization on successful nonviolent resistance is to use generalized additive modeling. GAMs add to the ordinary least squares framework the opportunity to introduce smoothed functions of continuous control variables. Within the set of control variables that I consider, I apply this smoothing to my measures of GDP per capita, population, and time.19

---

19 My implementation of kernel-based regularized least squares uses the KRLS package in R and all of the standard settings under a Gaussian kernel. The Bayesian lasso is implemented using the monomvn package. It uses the prior distributions described in Park and Casella (2008) for each of the parameters in the model and 10,000 Markov chain Monte Carlo samples. My generalized additive models are estimated using the mcgv package. The continuous covariates that I smooth are done so jointly using the default thin-plate splines and 20 basis functions. I opt not to smooth my measure of participation or its interaction with organizational leadership in my endogenous and IV models so as to retain the interpretability of these coefficients. Further, because my bivariate model includes no control variables, I do not estimate a GAM for this specification. All uncertainty estimates from generalized additive modeling and kernel-based regularized least squares were block-bootstrapped. Two-stage estimates were generated using flexible modeling in both stages. Importantly, although they differ substantially from OLS, none presume that the outcome is a non-
Table 3.11: Instrumental Variables Estimates with Organization Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>squares</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation × org.</td>
<td>squares × org.</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(population_{1970})</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP_{1970})</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time trend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear IV models with coefficient estimates shown.
Dependent variable is successful nonviolent resistance.
Standard errors clustered by country.
† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

The results of these further analyses broadly confirm the OLS estimates in Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11, though they are generally somewhat smaller in magnitude. The estimates of the un-instrumented interaction effect of organizations and participation displayed in Figure 3-9 range from 9% on the high end, equivalent to OLS, to 3% on the low end. Statistical significance tests meet or exceed standard levels in most specifications except for the most complex model estimated using KRLS. Reduced-form effects are also similar to, but somewhat smaller than, the equivalent results from ordinary least squares. Interval estimates in each of these models exclude zero by a wide margin, which is also true for the two-stage estimates in Figure 3-11. One is also struck by the variation in the point estimates in Figure 3-11. Posterior medians from the Bayesian lasso are between 0.35 and 0.40, nearly twice as large as their least-squares analogs in Table 3.11. Kernel-based estimates and those from generalized additive modeling suggest, by contrast, that the exogenous effect of a unit increase in participation is between 2 and 9% greater when an established civil society organization occupies a leading role. Nevertheless, even these smaller estimates imply a robust relationship between the interaction of increased participation and pre-existing organization on nonviolent movement success.

linear function of covariates in my operationalization. I thus avoid potential biases associated with non-linear two-stage estimation (see note 11).
Figure 3-9: Linear Effects with Interaction and Flexible Estimators

Note: Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals. Both sets of confidence intervals are clustered at the country level.

Figure 3-10: Reduced-Form Effects with Interaction and Flexible Estimators

Note: Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals. Both sets of confidence intervals are clustered at the country level.
3.5 Conclusion

I have evaluated the role of popular participation in nonviolent resistance movements from three different empirical perspectives. Treating mass involvement as a variable that mediates the effect of nonviolent methods on movements’ success, I have shown that while the direct and total effects of nonviolence are potentially large, the mediation effect operating through peak participation is near zero. My second inquiry into the exogenous effect of participation on outcomes of nonviolent resistance provides little affirmation of the popular notion that such campaigns’ success is contingent on mass involvement. Utilizing capital-city squares as an ignorable encouragement to participation, I find no significant results in the reduced form, in standard instrumental variables regression, or compensating for a weak first stage with the aid of randomization inference. However, when I add to this analysis a moderating variable for whether nonviolence is led by an established socio-economic or political body, such as a trade union, religious community, political party, or national student group, I find that higher levels of participation are, indeed, associated with greater resistance success.

Taken together, these results represent a non-trivial contribution to the emergent positivist literature on nonviolent resistance. With my first analysis, I provide a test of the longest-standing and currently most prominent argument in the study of nonviolence—that nonviolence causally affects the likelihood of resistance movements’ success in part via its influence on popular participation. Importantly, ours is the first quantitative evaluation of this claim to attend properly to its inherently sequential structure. With my second empirical exercise, I interrogate another well-rehearsed argument concerning the general causal relationship between mass involvement in nonviolent resistance and successful resistance out-
comes using what I argue is a uniquely sound identification strategy in this literature. My final inquiry into the details of the relationship between participation and nonviolent resistance outcomes adds a conceptual contribution focusing on the role of organizations in this causal nexus. It is my hope that, in toto, I offer the first in what will be a series of creative tests and theoretical extensions of the many intriguing but under-examined arguments in the study of nonviolent resistance activity.
3.6 Appendix A: Further Evaluation of Ignorability

This appendix presents a detailed, qualitative evaluation of my instrument’s ignorability to complement the results presented in the section titled “A Further Test of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance.” There I considered a variety of plausibly confounding observable correlates of urban geography and resistance outcomes, including national wealth, democracy, geographic locale, colonial legacy, and religious composition. To more thoroughly assess squares” exogeneity, this appendix examines analogous sources of potential confounding arising from the historical processes that led to the absence, creation, and/or destruction of central squares. More specifically, I ask for three randomly selected in-sample countries – Hungary, Belarus, and Nigeria – whether the capital city’s central urban landscape was originally created, allowed to persist, or eventually eliminated because of concerns about its role in facilitating collective popular action. Together, these cases clearly indicate an absence of domestic political content in the decision-making that dictated the initial appearance or fate of capital-city squares. One is instead struck by the degree to which artistic or architectural style determined city planning.

Hungary
Budapest’s main public space did not arise from any regular feature of religious, economic, or social life in the Hungarian capital. Heroes Square was instead purposively built as part of Austria-Hungary’s millennial commemoration of Hungarian tribes’ arrival in the Carpathian basin (Creswell, 2011; Enyedi and Szirmai, 1992; Nemes, 2005). The square was originally conceived both as a national memorial and a means of enhancing Budapest’s grandeur to a level commensurate with its recently acquired status as the seat of the Hapsburg Empire. It was also built during a period when extensive changes were being made to the city in order to cope with a rising population (Enyedi and Szirmai, 1992; Gerő and Poór, 1997; Nemes, 2005).

Few changes were made to Budapest from the early 20th century until World War Two, when over 70% of the city was wholly or partly destroyed, although the square survived (Gerő and Poór, 1997). Post-war reconstruction was intended primarily to restore the Hungarian capital’s pre-war aesthetic. Thereafter virtually all urban development was focused on expanding housing opportunities to accommodate a growing population (Gerő and Poór, 1997). Issues pertaining to popular demonstration thus seem to have played little role in the creation or maintenance of Budapest’s central square. For this reason, I believe it represents a valid instrument for the purposes of this study.

Belarus
Minsk was first settled in 1067 AD as a trading post linking Russia to central and northern Europe. Because it lay at the intersection of numerous European powers, the city was subject to conquest at numerous points in its history. The Soviet Union was the final entity to seize control of Minsk in this fashion following its defeat of Nazi forces in 1945. When the Red Army arrived, it found the city in ruins: Over 80% of its structures had been reduced to rubble and nearly 90% of its pre-war population had either fled to the countryside or
perished in Germany’s infamous Minsk Ghetto (Beyrau, 2001; Bohn, 2008).

As they went about constituting the capital of the new Belorussian SSR from this devastation, Russian planners had good reason to be mindful of the possibility of social unrest. In the previous thirty years, residents of Minsk had twice taken up arms to fight for their city’s independence, once under Polish occupation in 1919 and again when the Nazi’s first invaded in 1941. Nevertheless, post-war Soviet construction in the city appeared to have only one focus – replicating the Soviet architectural style (Beyrau, 2001). Major streets and buildings were given Russian titles, most remaining churches and synagogues were destroyed, and the city’s small market square was expanded and renamed in commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution (Harris, 1970). Minsk’s central gathering place thus seems to have come into being for aesthetic reasons quite independent of concerns about popular social action.

Nigeria

Nigeria has had two capitals since it came into existence: Lagos up to 1990, and Abuja since then. Although Lagos played a prominent role in the transatlantic slave trade beginning early in the eighteenth century, it only started to develop a distinctly urban character when the British Empire formally laid claim to Nigeria in 1861. From this point on, the British Governor guided the city to its present form. Two open spaces were originally conceived. The first, Tinubu Square, only remained accessible to pedestrians until the introduction of automobiles in 1920. The second was a racecourse and polo ground abutting the Governor’s mansion. When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, this racecourse, like most of Lagos” main features, was repurposed for public use and renamed but otherwise left largely unchanged. As a multi-acre area immediately adjacent to numerous government buildings, it provided a clear potential locus for organized civil action (Akinsemoyin and Vaughan-Richards, 1976).

Shortly after Nigeria’s Biafra War concluded in 1970, the federal government appointed a commission to consider relocating the country’s capital from Lagos. Construction of Abuja, a three-million-inhabitant city located in Nigeria’s geographic center, began a decade later. The government’s primary reasons for undertaking a project of this scale were threefold. First, it was believed that a reconfigured capital could provide a basis for inter-ethnic harmony after the bitter experience of Biafra. Second, because Lagos was located on an islet and already suffering from overcrowding, it was not a suitable site for a massive construction effort. Third, building a new capital in the country’s interior would provide economic stimulus to underdeveloped areas.

The actual design of Abuja was outsourced to a consortium of British and American architectural firms (Committee, 1975). In keeping with their employer’s stated commitment to make the new capital equally welcoming to all Nigerians, these firms” plans drew heavily from features of existing federal cities in Washington, D.C. and Brasilia. Abuja is thus notable for its modern grid system of roads and concentrated government sector, but lacks both residential areas and a place for citizens to gather (Elleh, 2001). One may therefore conclude that the absence of a central square in the new Nigerian capital was a result of stylistic rather than overtly political calculations.
3.7 Appendix B: Additional Flexible Modeling

In this appendix I present each of my analytic results from the section titled “A Further Test of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance” using kernel-regularized least squares regression (KRLS), the Bayesian lasso, and generalized additive modeling (GAMs). Substantively, the results from Figures 3-12 through 3-17 closely reflect those in the main body of the paper. Among the potential sources of confounding in capital-city squares – my instrument for peak participation during nonviolent resistance – wealth, population, and categorical measures of culture again stand out. Violent government repression, one of two posited means by which squares might influence campaign outcomes without affecting participation, is also again found to be an implausible source of exclusion restriction violation. Corresponding evidence for campaign diversity, shown in Figure 3-14, is somewhat weaker; nevertheless, only two of eight models show significant effects. First-stage results, shown in Figure 3-15, suggest a smaller and less robust association between squares and participation than corresponding OLS estimates in Table 3.5. As in preceding analyses, this provides strong motivation for the randomization-inference-based approach to instrumental variables analysis due to Imbens and Rosenbaum (2005). Finally, reduced-form and two-stage estimates, represented in Figures 3-16 and 3-17, are again almost uniformly suggestive of a null independent effect of participation on nonviolent movement success.
Figure 3-12: Predictors of Squares

Note: Capital-city squares are modeled using KRLS and the Bayesian Lasso as a function of national characteristics. 95% confidence intervals, clustered at the country level, are shown for the same set of coefficients as in Table 3.2.
Figure 3-13: Evaluating Exclusion Restriction: Regime Violence

Note: Coefficient estimates are shown for models of regime violence as a function of capital-city squares and background covariates, as in Table 3.3. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals, both of which are clustered at the country level.

Figure 3-14: Evaluating Exclusion Restriction: Campaign Diversity

Note: Coefficient estimates are shown for models of campaign diversity as a function of capital-city squares and background covariates, as in Table 3.4. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals, both of which are clustered at the country level.
Figure 3-15: First Stage Effects

Note: Coefficient estimates are shown for models of peak campaign participation as a function of capital-city squares and background covariates, as in Table 3.5. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals, both of which are clustered at the country level.

Figure 3-16: Reduced-Form Effects

Note: Coefficient estimates are shown for models of campaign success as a function of capital-city squares and background covariates, as in Table 3.6. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals, both of which are clustered at the country level.
Figure 3-17: Two-Stage Effects

Note: Coefficient estimates are shown for IV models of campaign success as a function of participation, instrumented with capital-city squares. The background covariates are the same as those in Table 3.7. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals while thin lines correspond to 95% intervals, both of which are clustered at the country level.
Chapter 4

The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle

4.1 Introduction

Six years after mass nonviolent insurrections shook the greater Middle East, few of the democratic "dividends" scholars associate with such events have, in fact, accrued (Bayer et al., 2016). Even the two countries where resistance did not fail or turn violent have foundered. Egypt is currently led by a general-turned-president who seized power in a coup d'état. Political participation, freedom of expression, and other civil rights are all circumscribed (Freedom House, 2015). The preceding regime was also no paragon of democratic virtue. Though popularly elected, many Egyptians came to believe that it was conspiring to illegitimately marginalize its opponents (Debeuf, 2013; Kingsley, 2015).

Tunisia provides somewhat better support for the notion that nonviolence begets democracy. Multiple free and fair elections have taken place since former president Ben Ali's ouster. The new constitution also guarantees a broad array of civil liberties. Yet Tunisia's path to stable democracy has not been without serious challenges. For much of 2012 and 2013, the national political discourse mirrored Egypt's. Islamists who prevailed in the country's post-revolutionary elections fought bitterly with secularists (Gallopin, 2014). As the acrimony worsened, it migrated to the street in the form of demonstrations and assassinations. Only Nobel prize-winning mediation by the country's longest-standing civil society groups restored stability (Nassar, 2016).

The following paper contends that these dynamics are not anomalous. While successful nonviolent action may yield stable democracy, it may also produce autocracy, instability, and violent contention. I argue that a campaign's duration—how hard the victors struggled—drives these long-term outcomes.

Many of the core societal benefits scholars associate with a nonviolent mode of resistance do not accrue to participating movements overnight. The requisite structures, norms, and culture must be assiduously cultivated over time. As importantly, where success is long in the making, it clarifies competing groups' and intra-group factions' relative strengths and priorities. Information asymmetries that threaten inefficient, escalatory conflict are thus minimized. Finally, hard-fought and costly victories alleviate the dilemmas triumphant
resistance organizations face in the post-campaign period as they attempt to build political legitimacy while retaining power. Temptations to subvert fair democratic competition or adopt an autocratic model of governance are consequently reduced.

Much of this first-order hypothesis is rooted in theories of contentious politics and war. One might therefore presume that it applies equally to nonviolent and violent movements. I will argue that this is not the case.

Campaign duration plays an overall more significant role when resistance is nonviolent. Whereas violent campaigns are necessarily punctuated by clarifying zero-sum engagements, nonviolent ones are not. The capacity to endure over time thus becomes a paramount measure of its quality. Nonviolent movements that persist also accumulate facilities different from those in which violent organizations specialize. Most notably, their organizational skills readily translate to electoral politics. Faithful adherence to democratic practice in the post-campaign period thus becomes a comparatively attractive strategic choice. In short, the effect of campaign duration on democracy and stability should be both larger and more positive when resistance is nonviolent.

To test these claims I rely on a large-N analysis. The focus is the ten-year period following successful violent and nonviolent action. Over this interval I examine four dependent variables: levels of institutional democracy, the credibility of national elections, coup d’état attempts, and violent conflict onsets. These outcomes represent an array of strategies incumbent organizations and challengers can employ to circumvent electoral politics. Across each category I find support for my hypotheses. Nonviolent movements that succeed in a year or less give rise to regimes that are less democratic and less stable than those that follow less rapid nonviolent triumphs. For successful violent movements, the effects of a long fight are both more muted and more mixed in their direction.

The remainder of this article details these results and the theory they substantiate. Section two reviews existing literature on the enduring effects of nonviolent resistance. It also grounds the paper’s conditional hypotheses on the effects of campaign duration in a broad array of scholarship pertaining to conflict, legitimacy, and democratic transitions. In section three I turn to the data and methods I use for estimation, robustness checks, and sensitivity analysis. Section four displays the results and section five concludes.

4.2 Literature and Theory

Within the burgeoning literature on nonviolent resistance, there exists a small but consistent set of studies indicating a positive long-term effect of nonviolent mass action on democracy.\textsuperscript{1} A number of causal mechanisms provide logical basis for this finding. For one, successful nonviolent movements have little opportunity to resort to destabilizing violence. Citing Linz and Stepan (1978), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) note that many democratic transitions falter when elites fail to distance themselves from violent co-partisans. Disciplined nonviolent campaigns leave comparatively few such actors in their wake.

\textsuperscript{1} In addition to works cited in the text, see Johnstad (2010).
Second, nonviolent organizations tend to animate a mass mobilization base that can readily check slippage in the course of democratization. Recent success, and resultant popular legitimacy, make this threat credible (Ackerman and Karatnycky, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Returning to the street, or any other site of nonviolent resistance, is also relatively safe. Unlike expressions of discontent that might appeal to recently victorious rebels, it poses little risk of counterproductively undermining the democratic process (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Bayer et al., 2016).

The diverse groups of participants successful nonviolent movements’ attract provide a third impetus to democratic consolidation (Ackerman and Karatnycky, 2005; Schock, 2005; Bayer et al., 2016). To maintain cohesion and nonviolent discipline within such a varied body, internal procedures for reaching consensus must exist. When resistance concludes these routines often remain, implanted as norms of proper political discourse among former members. A constituency staunchly in favor of deliberative democracy thus becomes embedded within civil society and, perhaps, the transition government itself (Bayer et al., 2016).

A fourth argument, closely related to nonviolent campaigns’ rules and procedures, pertains instead to their structure. Shaped again by the exigencies of size and demographic breadth, nonviolent movements often assume a “flat” organizational form (Deonandan and Close, 2007; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). Effective violent organizations tend, in contrast, toward a hierarchical model (Johnston, 2008; Della Porta, 2013). Insofar as these contrasting structures are retained after a campaign concludes, their implications for a post-campaign transition are clear. Whereas one is ready-made for an authoritarian style of governance, the more dispersed alternative is generally congruent with democracy (cf. Gerring et al., 2005).

Each of these arguments linking nonviolent methods of maximalist resistance to stable, democratic political outcomes assumes a mature nonviolent protagonist. Disciplined eschewal of violence, for example, requires extensive training and practice that numerous descriptive accounts suggest is difficult to achieve (Sharp, 1973; Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994; Roberts and Garton Ash, 2011). Effective procedures for building consensus also are neither easily created de novo nor easily settled upon (Polletta, 2012). The same holds for a movement’s internal structure. Though an extended period of tribulation does not guarantee stability, a short campaign inevitably leaves uncertain the true authority of key players.

These are reasons why premature victory – or inadequate resistance experience – might mute the positive effects of nonviolent action noted in extant literature. Still other logics suggests that the same conditions will simultaneously introduce independent negative effects on post-campaign stability and governance.

One argument, introduced in the first section, follows directly from a long-standing literature on the causes of war and revolution (Blainey, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Fearon, 1995). These works posit asymmetric, or private information as a prime cause of conflict: Where competing entities harbor discrepant understandings of one another’s coercive capabilities, one or more might perceive a costly fight as an optimal course of action when, in fact, a suitable bargain that preserves peace exists. Empirical work drawing on this insight demonstrates, paradoxically, that such misunderstandings are often dispelled in proportion to the amount of fighting that has taken place (Werner and Yuen, 2005; Ramsay, 2008; Mason et al., 2011;
Weisiger, 2016). Conflicts that end after only limited competition between participating groups thus create an environment ripe for further instability.

For a stark illustration of this pattern in a nonviolent context, consider the fallout from the re-instatement of parliamentary democracy in Nepal. In April 1990, after less than three months of nonviolent insurrection, a big-tent coalition of political parties successfully pressured King Birenda to cede much of his authority to a democratically elected legislature. Soon thereafter major rifts emerged among the victors. Members of the centrist Nepali Congress systematically excluded their erstwhile communist allies from power at the political center (Lawoti and Pahari, 2009). In 1994 they went so far as to bar one faction from standing for election. At this point the country’s more radical Maoists, who drew support from a vast population of rural poor and marginalized Dalit, announced their intention to revolt. In its first years their insurgency would not have been difficult to crush; however, it was allowed to build under a series of governments that neglected to address the threat adequately. Most notably, the army remained uninvolved until 2001 (Khanal, 2007). Only after ten years of civil war and over 13,000 casualties did the government finally come to terms with the Maoists’ power in Nepalese society via a comprehensive peace treaty that imposed major state reforms. Had the 1990 campaign that preceded this paroxysm of destruction revealed the communists’ true capacity to effect change through nonviolent, rather than violent people power, such costly clarification may have been avoided.

Events in Nepal also demonstrate that the pernicious effects of ambiguous power relations wrought by brief but efficacious nonviolent upheavals extend beyond major interests groups in society to a lower level of analysis – namely the winning entities themselves. One potential consequence, theorized in Bakke et al. (2012), is infighting. Hastily formed nonviolent coalitions are likely to be both weakly institutionalized and, as noted above, un-hierarchical. As such, they are perhaps especially vulnerable to widespread and encompassing bouts of instability. What transpired in Nepal in the course of the Maoist insurgency fell short of this threshold but was nonetheless significant. In the 14 years between the end of the monarchy and the termination of the Maoist insurgency, 17 different administrations held power and every major party underwent at least one split as various factions vied for access to central government rents (von Einsiedel et al., 2012; Hutt, 2004). Corruption, malfeasance, and popular discontent soared (Khanal, 2000; Lawoti, 2007). It is difficult to imagine that under such conditions the Nepalese state was not hobbled, creating conditions that scholars of both civil war and revolution have identified as precipitants of opportunistic power grabs (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Skocpol, 1979).

Clear signs that a regime holds only a tenuous grip on power can also invite military coups d’état. Indeed, it is often precisely these conditions that give prospective coup-makers pretext for their takeover. Anecdotal evidence to this effect is prevalent in the historical record of initially successful nonviolent resistance. Consider, for instance, the fate of South Korea’s short-lived Second Republic. Following the 1960 April Revolution that precipitated President Syngman Rhee’s departure, power struggles within the ruling Democratic Party prevented it from restoring macroeconomic stability or effecting desired reforms. Inflation, unemployment, and crime spiked as the national political discourse became increasingly ad
homonym (Han, 1974). Less than one year later popular frustration was so intense that when Major General Park Chung-hee seized power, almost no organized objection took place (Kim and Vogel, 2011). A similar chain of events transpired in Sudan between the autocratic tenures of Jaafar Nimeiri and Omar al-Bashir. Salih (1990, 202-3) summarizes the tumultuous four-year democratic interlude thusly:

The record of what happened between 1985 and 1989 is utterly depressing. By their very nature the coalition governments proved to be weak, forced to adopt the lowest common denominator when formulating their main policies. Indeed, the fragile partnerships broke up twice within three months in 1987, and the Sudan was technically without a government for almost a year. ...[the ruling parties] failed completely to address themselves resolutely to the crucial issues facing the country, and hence the re-established democracy faded.

Egypt’s transition after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster represents the most recent instantiation of this same pathology. As in South Korea and Sudan, the process began when a sudden change in government prompted by mass nonviolent demonstrations yielded quickly to acrimony within the winning coalition. Executive decisions to remove high-ranking military officers who sided with the resistance and endow the president with extensive powers proved particularly inflammatory (Fahim, 2012; Birnbaum, 2012).2 As in the past, partisan turmoil did not stay contained, but rather drew the public in and forced important matters of government to go unattended (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2012; Hamid, 2012). When the political system reached a point of near total dysfunction, a greater share of the Egyptian public favored a military takeover than opposed it (Kirkpatrick, 2013). The familiar script of nonviolent victory, infighting, political crisis, and coup d’état thus played out in full.

Theories of legitimacy offer yet another perspective on the consequences of swift but sweeping nonviolent resistance. On the one hand, unseating a standing regime confers a certain degree of legitimacy on the agent or agents responsible; however, it also presents a problem. “We rule because I won” is not a claim to authority rooted in an established, well-rehearsed modus operandi of government turnover. In terms used by political psychologists, it lacks innate “procedural” legitimacy (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Over the long term, this deficiency is likely to impair newly empowered incumbents by limiting citizens’ faith in government and voluntary compliance with its injunctions (Sacks and Larizza, 2011; Epstein et al., 2013; Fisk, 2015). More immediately, it may prompt important members of the international community to request, or even demand elections (Toft, 2009; Dunning et al., 2011). Triumphant resistance organizations thus face a dilemma: They may either submit to an open democratic process soon after toppling the ancien régime, and risk losing the spoils of victory, or they may demur, with deleterious consequences for their standing both at home and abroad.

---

2 It is interesting to note that according to many opposition politicians, these watershed maneuvers on the part of President Morsi were adopted largely due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s overestimation of its popular mandate in society (Kingsley, 2015). To the extent that this is true, it further corroborates the notion that short resistance campaigns that leave behind an uncertain distribution of power among competing groups create wide scope for incorrect and highly destabilizing political judgments.
Winners of long and hard-fought nonviolent resistance campaigns are comparatively well positioned to manage such a predicament. Although short on procedural legitimacy, their sacrifice in pursuit of a costly goal shared by a large segment of the population endows them with so-called “moral capital” (Kane, 2001). Like other forms of capital, moral capital can be mobilized for a variety of ends (Bryant, 2005; Brown, 2006). In a context of nascent democratic transition, a natural outlet is turning out voters for a particular party or candidate. Movements that are forced to wait and/or suffer before achieving victory thus possess a potentially significant electoral asset that their competitors do not. Assenting to honest democratic proceedings consequently becomes a comparatively attractive course of action.

Protagonists that triumph under less duress face a more acute bind. Not only do they lack substantial moral authority, the fluid nature of the post-campaign political landscape they occupy makes locking in truly democratic institutions – legally or normatively – a risky tack. As above-mentioned anecdotes from South Korea, Sudan, and Egypt illustrate, favorable distributions of popularity can easily change in a few years, months, or even weeks. What is more, international demands for democracy will likely be greater as donors seek to assess whether recent upheavals represent a genuine expression of public will or an ephemeral paroxysm. Incumbents will thus be simultaneously more likely to incur penalties for avoiding elections and less equipped to win them. Under these conditions, partial democratization and electoral manipulation will acquire elevated status as strategies of political survival.

On the African continent, Zambia’s halting transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy aptly illustrates these dynamics. As in each case of rapid nonviolent resistance discussed to this point, post-campaign politics revolved around a large winning coalition, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). In 1991 the MMD and its leader Frederick Chiluba won a landslide electoral victory; nevertheless, public support and party cohesion eroded quickly. The party’s almost excessive range of interest groups prompted a number of defections. Chiluba’s continued adherence to unpopular structural adjustment measures decreased his popularity further (Burnell, 2001). All the while funds from the international donors kept the Zambian state solvent, but came with the expectation of continued political liberalization (Van Donge, 1998).

In 1996, ahead of general elections, the incompatibility of these expectations and MMD’s tenure as a ruling party came to a head. Chiluba’s popular base continued to suffer economically while his chief opponent, former president and UNIP leader Kenneth Kaunda, appeared poised for a resurgence (Burnell, 2001). Faced with the prospect losing a fair election or returning Zambia to de jure one-party status, Chiluba instead plotted a middle course. One move which observers across the political spectrum decried was the removal of over five-hundred thousand names from the national voter roll. Still more incendiary was parliament’s decision to pass a constitutional amendment disqualifying Kaunda from running (Rakner, 2003). Electorally these tactics secured Chiluba and the MMD victory; however, they also marked a phase shift in the regime’s popular standing. An abortive military coup in 1997 proved to be only the beginning. When Chiluba again tried to manipulate the country’s electoral laws to his benefit in 2001, he met the same fate as his predecessor and rival – mass-based popular resistance and forced removal from office.
In sum, ample theoretical foundations exists to support the contention that the challenges successful resistance organizations encounter en route to victory significantly condition post-campaign political outcomes. What remains less clear are the comparative statics of this effect with respect to violent and nonviolent movements. Although much of the discussion to this point has focused on the latter, the literature upon which I have drawn often takes rebellion and revolution as its referent. My contention is that despite this overlap, there are strong reasons to believe that campaign duration will have divergent long-term political effects in the aftermath of violent and nonviolent action.

Violent campaigns, no matter how brief, feature a modicum of discrete clashes. As noted above, these battles act to clarify participating entities’ relative power (Weisiger, 2016). In this regard they represent a mechanism, distinct from simply enduring over the course of a campaign, whereby conflict-inducing information asymmetries are decreased. Analogously structured contests do not necessarily inher in nonviolent campaigns. At its core nonviolent action is an exercise in which the governed seek to render their rulers powerless by effecting a withdrawal of popular consent, while those that rule seek to vitiate, and ultimately outlast these efforts (Sharp, 1973). In other words, the principal competitors do not set their respective bases of power against one another on equal, or even categorically similar terms. Events that serve to aptly measure nonviolent actors vis-à-vis government opponents are consequently scarce. This is especially true with respect to many states’ nominally most powerful resources – their security apparatuses. Although militaries, police forces, and militias can experience desertions and reductions in morale over the course of a nonviolent campaign, their principal material assets only rarely suffer losses. As such, armed forces often escape their political leadership’s decision to abdicate power untaxed, untested, and poised to vie for power in the aftermath of nonviolent resistance. Competing factions within

---

3 One further field of study which contains arguments highly compatible with those stipulated herein is that which pertains to democratic transitions. In particular, Ulfelder (2010) deduces that countries can fail to consolidate democratic gains even when all relevant players – political parties and the military – prefer democratic competition to alternative forms of government. The conditions he associates with this outcome mirror those a brief but successful nonviolent campaign might create: low mobilization costs; un-depleted resources for a coup or rebellion; and distrust among competing groups. Stradiotto and Guo (2010) offers a different corroborating argument. Through an inductive reading of democratic transitions in the twentieth century they create a typology of transition modes. “Cooperative” transitions, which are associated with the highest probability of democratic consolidation, are characterized as “a hauling back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations on the one hand, and repression, police violence, and martial laws on the other, with cycles of protests and repression eventually led to negotiated agreements between government and opposition” (18). Rapid or “collapse” transitions follow a different, less propitious trajectory: “While the collapse itself occurs quickly, the rebuilding of the state is a lengthy process carried out in an uncertain environment characterized by intense power struggles. The result is a higher occurrence of authoritarian reversion” (12).

4 Although discrete clashes can and do occur – in the form of standoffs between massed demonstrators and security personnel, for example – they are, in a sense, irregular or off the equilibrium path. Nonviolent movements with no comparative advantage in absorbing repression have an especially strong incentive to avoid making such encounters routine. Evidence to this effect is manifest in accounts of nonviolent best practice, which draw attention to so-called dispersed methods nonviolent action and recommend depriving governments of an obvious target for their repressive apparatuses (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994; Schock, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).
a wider nonviolent movement are similarly disposed. Although a crude sense of relative capabilities can be discerned by comparing groups' purported membership bases and (more problematically) their cohesion, the utility of such calculations are ambiguous in a political environment where one group has become a governing authority.

In toto, these observations suggest an important difference between situations of violent and nonviolent collective action. Compared to armed rebellions which feature periodic elucidating engagements, in nonviolent contests it is the capacity to endure that is the dominant measure of the conflicting parties' relative strength. I therefore predict that compared to violent insurrection, campaign duration will have a larger absolute effect on levels of political stability following successful nonviolent resistance.

I also anticipate that campaign duration will have qualitatively different effects in cases of violent and nonviolent resistance. A review of the principal differences in how these two types of conflict shape resistance movements' attributes and structures shows why. Violent movements, for their part, may gain valuable experience governing civilian populations under their control (Kasfir, 2005; Mampilly, 2011; Arjona et al., 2015). There is even evidence to suggest that quasi-governmental administration is a correlate, and perhaps also a cause, of rebel victory (Wickham-Crowley, 1992; Sinno, 2008). However, it is important to draw a distinction between the capacity to govern effectively and the means, or inclination, to do so democratically. Rebel organizations assume a governmental role not out of a sense of duty, but as a means of efficiently channeling resources from the civilian population into their war-fighting machinery. Just as circumstances may dictate that they approach this task by providing certain services or maintaining representative institutions, so too may they incentivize violence, pillage, and abuse (Weinstein, 2007; Metelits, 2009; Mampilly, 2011). One cannot therefore conclude that rebels will become better democrats en route to military victory. On the contrary, violent resistance movements are likely to accumulate skills antithetical to open, representative government. Most obviously, rebels will naturally become more adept at organized violence the longer they fight. As I have already noted, they will also become more internally autocratic and hierarchical. Finally, and not least importantly, movements that survive extended exposure to violent repression face strong incentives to become closed, highly secretive organizations (Finkel, 2015). While these attributes may make seasoned rebel movements proficient at thwarting armed opposition once in power, they are not conducive to a democratic political turn.

Nonviolent movements, by contrast, are likely to see their ability to successfully navigate democratic political competition increase with the duration of their struggle. As I discuss in the opening paragraphs of this section, each of the liberalizing effects scholars have associated with organizing resistance along nonviolent lines – disciplined avoidance of violence; an aptitude for using civic action to political effect; institutionalized procedures for building consensus; and a flat power structure – are only likely to become more pronounced with time. One can also add to this list the fact that successful nonviolent movements should see their popular bases increase over the course of a campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Mass support being the sine qua non of electoral power, this trend too should incline nonviolent protagonists toward democracy. Taken altogether, the conclusion I draw is that
campaign duration should have a more positive effect on levels of democracy and fair electoral competition when resistance is nonviolent.

It is instructive at this point to state the study's hypotheses formally. The first set of claims concerns the effects of resisting successfully via mass nonviolent action. I posit that this effect is significantly moderated by a campaign's duration, with harder-fought triumphs yielding less autocratic slippage, less electoral manipulation, fewer coups d'état, and fewer instances of violent conflict. The estimand I target to verify this hypothesis, $\theta_j$, can be written thusly,

$$\theta_j = \frac{\partial g(y_{i,j} \mid X_{i,j})}{\partial \text{nonviolence}}_{\text{long campaign duration}},$$

where $y_{i,j}$ is observed for campaign $i$ and outcome $j$, $g$ is a function of this outcome, such as its expected value, and $X_{i,j}$ is a corresponding vector of controls.

To more directly evaluate my claim about $\theta_j$ vis-à-vis the prevailing presumption that the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance are unmoderated, I will also examine variation in the effect of nonviolence with respect to campaign duration. If the analysis is correct, this variation should be significant for each of the anti-democratic and coercive actions I consider. Interestingly, this same quantity also bears on a third outcome of interest in this study: The difference in the effect of campaign duration under conditions of violent and nonviolent resistance. My contention, to recapitulate, is that duress exerts a more positive impact on post-campaign stability and democracy when it is a nonviolent entity that experiences this adversity. To evaluate both these hypotheses I will estimate $\tau_j$, defined as follows:

$$\tau_j = \frac{\partial^2 g(y_{i,j} \mid X_{i,j})}{\partial \text{campaign duration} \partial \text{nonviolence}}.$$

In terms of $\theta_j$ and $\tau_j$, then, the principal hypotheses are these:
1. The effect of mass nonviolent resistance, conditional on a long, hard-fought victory, should be to reduce anti-democratic activity and extra-institutional seizures of power in the post-campaign period:

\[ H_1 : \theta_j < 0, \]

\[ \forall j \in \{ \text{autocracy, elections, coups, conflict} \}. \]

2. Prosecuting a resistance campaign over an extended period should accentuate the benefits of resisting nonviolently for subsequent levels of democracy and stability. Likewise, nonviolent action should render winning an arduous campaign more favorable in these respects:

\[ H_2 : \tau_j < 0, \]

\[ \forall j \in \{ \text{autocracy, elections, coups, conflict} \}. \]

Though in this section I have presented theory and anecdotal evidence sufficient to suggest that these hypotheses are valid, contradictory scholarship is also abundant. Uncertain distributions of power that follow brief resistance campaigns may, in fact, be pacifying; longer conflicts may lead to more sweeping and thus more destabilizing reforms; and nonviolent movements' purported institutions of internal democracy may, over time, tend toward squabbling bureaucracy (Schelling, 1966; Bas and Schub, 2016; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997; McAdam, 1982). The following section elucidates how I address these and other competing arguments in the empirical tests.

4.3 Data and Methods

The principal dataset I rely on is version 2.0 of the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes data (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). These data define a sample of 109 successful maximalist resistance campaigns and the study's two variables of interest: whether a campaign was primarily nonviolent and its duration in years. In the main analysis I measure the former using a campaign's designation in the NAVCO 1.0 event data if possible, or a discretized average of its campaign-year coding in NAVCO 2.0 if not. Overall, there are 62 nonviolent events in the data and 47 violent ones. Duration is recorded two ways – as a binary value, taking zero if a campaign lasted less than a year and one otherwise, and as the logarithm of total duration. With the discretized variable I focus on the distinction between nonviolent campaigns that resolve in a matter of days, like the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, and those that truly unfold over the course of years, as the Second Defiance Campaign in South Africa and the Anti-Pinochet movement in Chile did. My supposition is that there are large, possibly stepwise differences across these categories of cases that a linear transformation of
Table 4.1: Dependent variable descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d'état attempts</td>
<td>count</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict episode onset</td>
<td>binary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a duration variable measured in years cannot capture. Nevertheless, I do also report graphic results from models that use a continuous predictor.

The dependent variables I use are fourfold and correspond to the four types of coercive, anti-democratic political strategies highlighted in the preceding section. Attempts by incumbents to rollback democracy at an institutional level or manipulate election results in the post-campaign period directly are measured using Polity IV data and the Free and Fair Elections dataset due to Marshall (2013) and Bishop and Hoeffler (2014), respectively. More specifically, I use the “polity2” variable from the polity data directly and compute a composite measure of electoral freeness and fairness based on the proportion of the ten binary criteria in Bishop and Hoeffler (2014) that are satisfied for a given national election. Coup d'état attempts and outright violent conflict, the two more coercive, challenger-initiated actions I consider, come again from Polity IV and from the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute Oslo armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The former variable is a modeled as a count and the latter as a binary indicator of any intra-state armed conflict episode satisfying an annual 25-battle-deaths threshold. For all four outcome variables I take an average over the ten-year period following the conclusion of a campaign to maximize the effective sample size; however, results are not substantially affected by using a five-year window instead. Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.1.

To minimize confounding variation in the models I include three types of controls. The first pertains principally to the organizations prosecuting resistance; namely, the scale of their popular base, the scope of their parallel, or quasi-governmental institutions, and the ultimate political ends they seek. Each of these variables is plausibly related to a movement's chances of achieving (quick) success as well as its propensity to pursue liberalization or invite aggression. For example, larger or more institutionalized movements may triumph at a higher rate because of these strengths, see greater merit in democratic political competition, and have a greater chance of deterring challengers. Certain campaign objectives may operate in the opposite fashion, rendering an opponent's capitulation less likely and causing rifts in society that make stable, democratic politics challenging. Mathematically, all three variables are computed by averaging over the relevant campaign-years in NAVCO 2.0, or, in the case of campaign objectives, by taking the mode (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013).

---

5 My measure of electoral manipulation is truncated by considering only five post-campaign years as a number countries in my sample did not experience a qualifying national election over this period.
A second group of potential confounders I control for describe the regimes resistance organizations target: their total years in power before the onset of resistance, their autocratic type, and the level of anti-resistance repression they apply. I anticipate that a more senior government will be harder to unseat and more difficult to meaningfully reform once leaders are formally deposed. Extant literature mandates a similar concern for the effects of autocracy generally, and military regime types in particular (Ulfelder, 2005; Cook and Savun, 2016). Repression is a somewhat different type of control variable. In a sense it is coterminous with the notion of duress that occupies a central position in this study's theoretical framework. At the same time, it may also signal a disposition to violence among remnants of the ancien régime, if not society writ large. A priori, it is difficult to know which of these potentially countervailing influences will predominate; nevertheless, its inclusion is merited on the basis of its being a plausible confounder. As with the controls for campaign scale and parallel institutions, I use time-averaged values from NAVCO 2.0 as a specific measure. Covariates for autocratic regime duration and type are coded from Geddes et al. (2014).

The third and final group of control conditions in these regressions relates to the broader context in which resistance campaigns take place. A state's ethnic makeup, for example, is widely thought to be causally related to conflict, coups, and democratization (e.g., Sambanis, 2001; Roessler, 2011; Horowitz, 1993). I therefore include both a standard measure of ethnic fractionalization as well as more nuanced indicators, including the number of national ethnic groups excluded from formal politics and the proportion of political relevant citizens rendered powerless or discriminated for reasons of ethnicity (Wimmer et al., 2009). Urbanization, gross domestic product, population, a second-order polynomial time trend, and regional dummy variables are also among these analyses included covariates (United Nations, 2013; The Maddison-Project, 2010). For those specifications pertaining specifically to conflict and coups d'état, I also control for capital’s share of economic output, countries' histories with coups and conflict, and mountainous terrain (Houle, 2016). Following Gleditsch and Ward (2006), I round out this set of covariates with ten-year averaged pre-campaign polity scores for all states within 500 kilometers of a given campaign’s national centroid.

Methodologically, this study does not employ a deliberate, design-based identification strategy. Nor do I claim that the control sets and model specifications used constitute a solid basis for model-based causal inference. Instead, I show that my estimates from simple generalized linear regression are reasonably robust to the most plausible threats to their internal validity: model mis-specification and omitted variable bias.

To address the first of these two issues, I re-estimate each model using kernel regularized least squares regression (KRLS) (Hainmueller and Hazlett, 2013). Like other flexible methods of estimation, KRLS prevents a researcher from fitting data to a single conditional expectation function chosen at his or her discretion. It is therefore less likely to yield model-dependent estimates than standard regression methods. Indeed, when KRLS is operationalized with Gaussian kernels, it effectively estimates an expectation of a given outcome variable conditional on an infinite-dimensional mapping of of the supplied covariates. That it does so parametrically, using the so-called “kernel trick” in a ridge regression framework, also sets KRLS apart from k-nearest neighbors, support vector machines, classification and
regression trees, random forests and other methods that do not readily yield standard quantities of interest. In the present case it is especially convenient that KRLS yields point-wise marginal effects, which allow us to assess the paper’s hypotheses about the interaction effects of campaign duration and nonviolence graphically.

Although I have sought to include a wide range of plausible observable confounders in the conditioning set, I harbor no belief that these covariates are sufficient for identification under selection on observables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In lieu of estimating causal quantities, I use sensitivity analysis to ascertain how robust the most important estimates are to arbitrary confounding. The precise procedure I use is derived from Imbens (2003). Assuming particular levels of unobserved correlation affecting a given treatment variable and response, I am able to compute how an estimated treatment effect would change. Iterating this algorithm for a large combination of hypothetical confounders clarifies what characteristics an omitted variable would need to exhibit to meaningfully alter the models’ substantive results. Sensitivity analysis thus provides a rigorous robustness check that maximizes the inferential value of the available data.

4.4 Results

Table 4.2 reports the principal estimated quantities of interest while Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the main regression results. Using linear models, I find that the estimated effect of successfully resisting nonviolently over more than one year is substantively large and statistically robust: States’ ten-year average post-campaign polity2 scores are nearly six points less autocratic in expectation, a result that holds at the \( \alpha = 0.001 \) confidence level. The estimated marginal effect of campaign duration on the effect of achieving a nonviolent victory, \( \hat{\tau}_{\text{autocracy}} \), is also noteworthy. Nonviolent action, and subsequent victory, are associated with a post-campaign polity that is nearly 3.5 points less autocratic when a campaign is extended compared to when resistance takes place over less than one year. As noted, this result can also be interpreted as the estimated average difference in the effect of campaign duration between triumphant violent and nonviolent resistance. Whereas a long but successful fight is weakly associated with more autocratic outcomes following rebellion, in the aftermath of nonviolent action it is associated at the \( \alpha = 0.10 \) significance level with considerably less autocracy.

Regressions pertaining to free and fair elections, core results of which are summarized in the second row of Table 4.2, tell an analogous story. When a nonviolent resistance movement achieves its principal goals over a span of one year or more, the associated change in the conduct of national elections is toward decidedly less corruption and manipulation. More specifically, I estimate that \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{elections}} = -0.315 \ (p < 0.01) \), with \( y_i = 0 \) corresponding to optimally free and fair elections in the post-campaign period and \( y_i = 1 \) indicating the opposite conditions.\(^6\) The study’s second estimated quantity of interest concerning elections is similarly substantively and significant. Compared to nonviolent victories that transpire

\(^6\) This mapping of free and fair elections onto \( Y \) is inverted relative to the outcome variables used in Table 4.3.
rapidly, ones that are prosecuted over the course of years are associated with elections that are 0.455 points freer and fairer, a margin that encompasses nearly half the entire scale on which $Y_{elections}$ is measured. Again, the same estimate also differentiates the effect of hard-fought resistance victories that are conducted nonviolently from the effect of those that are prosecuted with force of arms, ceteris paribus.

Results for coups d'état, reported in terms of incident-rate ratios derived from negative binomial regression, are the least statistically significant estimates and the most discrepant relative to the hypotheses in Box 1. Nevertheless, they are both sensible and revealing. I find that successful nonviolent action undertaken over an extended period is not, in fact, associated with fewer coups. Though $\hat{θ}_{coup}$ is statistically indistinguishable from a null effect of unity, the point estimate corresponds to a 42-percent higher post-campaign coup rate, all other things being equal. At the same time, the difference between the estimated effects of a nonviolent triumph achieved over a long interval and one realized over a shorter span, $\hat{T}_{coup}$, is in the expected direction: The model suggests that the the former type of victory is associated with a dramatic, 65-percent lesser incidence of attempted coups d'état relative to the latter ($p < 0.10$). That $\hat{θ}_{coup}$ is more than one, or “wrong-signed” with respect to the reasoning presented above despite the size and significance of $\hat{T}_{coup}$ speaks to the general prevalence of coup attempts in the aftermath of nonviolent resistance. Indeed, in the raw data there is more than one attempted coup d'état for every successful nonviolent campaign, and nearly 40 percent yield at least one such event within ten years of concluding. By comparison, coups occur after only 30 percent of in-sample violent campaigns. In one sense there is an intuitive basis to this pattern. Militaries, or segments thereof, are plausibly more likely to escape a nonviolent campaign without suffering major material or political damage, leaving them well-poised to unseat a transitional regimes. They may also be motivated to take such drastic measures if the incumbent is a former member of a winning nonviolent coalition that threatens the armed forces' bureaucratic interests. Still, this line of reasoning is merely speculative. Further research is needed to probe the true relationship between nonviolent mass action and subsequent coups d'état.

The last set of results models violent conflict episodes as a function of nonviolence and campaign duration. As in the cases of autocracy and electoral manipulation, the main hypotheses are strongly supported. Successful nonviolent action conditional on at least one year of resistance is associated with a 40-percent lower probability of new or renewed conflict. The cross-partial derivative of conflict with respect to nonviolence and an extended struggle, $\hat{T}_{conflict}$, indicates and even stronger association with reduced collective violence. Both effects are also significant at the $α = 0.05$ confidence level.

---

7 I use a negative binomial specification to model coup d'état attempts because this variable is expressed as a count and the null hypothesis of its dispersion parameter being unity is strongly rejected in regression-based testing (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990). The onset of a violent conflict episode is dichotomous, so it is modeled using a logistic, binary-outcome model. Results are not affected by instead using a probit or linear probability model.

8 This model excludes two of the three categorial covariates included above, campaign goals and campaign region, due to issues of separation.
Table 4.2: Estimated quantities of interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Quantities of interest</th>
<th>$\hat{\theta}_j$</th>
<th>$\hat{\tau}_j$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent actions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy$^a$</td>
<td>-5.952***</td>
<td>-3.427*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral manipulation$^a$</td>
<td>-0.315**</td>
<td>-0.449**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger actions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d’état$^b$</td>
<td>1.421</td>
<td>0.357$^l$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>-0.398*</td>
<td>-0.455**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ measured on a negative scale with respect to the outcome variables in Table 4.3.

$^b$ $\hat{\theta}_{\text{coup}}$ and $\hat{\tau}_{\text{coup}}$ represented as incident-rate ratios.

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. 

---

113
Table 4.3: Regression estimates for autocracy and electoral manipulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity Score</th>
<th>Free and Fair Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Linear)</td>
<td>(Linear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>2.557*</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.411)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration &gt; 1 year</strong></td>
<td>-2.117</td>
<td>-0.290*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.398)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonviolence x Duration &gt; 1 year</strong></td>
<td>3.484*</td>
<td>0.437**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.765)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel institutions</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime tenure, logged</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td>-0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.735)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic frac.</td>
<td>2.454</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.566)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded groups, logged</td>
<td>-0.650</td>
<td>-0.092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.402)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerless and discriminated</td>
<td>-3.619*</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.048)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, logged</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.985)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, logged</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.046)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>6.529*</td>
<td>0.596*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.514)</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior campaign</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity, neighbors</td>
<td>0.272*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Campaign goal                  | ✓           | ✓                        |
Autocratic reg. type            | ✓           | ✓                        |
Region indicator                | ✓           | ✓                        |
Time trend                      | ✓           | ✓                        |

ANOVA, $H_0: \beta_{\text{nonviolence} \times \text{duration} > 1 \text{ year}} = 0$ \Pr(> F) = 0.111 \Pr(> F) = 0.016*  
Adj. $R^2$                       | 0.567       | 0.500                    |
Num. obs.                       | 86          | 75                       |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* significant at $p < .10$; \*\* $p < .05$; \*\*\* $p < .01$; \*\*\*\* $p < .001$.  

114
Table 4.4: Regression estimates for coup d'état attempts and violent conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coups d'État (Negative Binomial)</th>
<th>Violent Conflict (Logistic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>3.986* (2.244)</td>
<td>0.099 (0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration &gt; 1 year</td>
<td>1.293 (0.780)</td>
<td>0.251 (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence × Duration &gt; 1 year</td>
<td>0.357† (0.221)</td>
<td>-0.455** (0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.858 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime tenure, logged</td>
<td>1.117 (0.099)</td>
<td>0.057† (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic frac.</td>
<td>4.485† (3.662)</td>
<td>0.319 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerless and discriminated</td>
<td>1.526 (0.735)</td>
<td>-0.362 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, logged</td>
<td>0.412* (0.169)</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, logged</td>
<td>1.951 (1.010)</td>
<td>0.177 (0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>1.190 (1.548)</td>
<td>0.259 (0.581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior campaign</td>
<td>1.466 (0.368)</td>
<td>-0.039 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coups, pre-campaign</td>
<td>1.078* (0.037)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital share of GDP, logged</td>
<td>0.722† (0.126)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, pre-campaign</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign goal</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic reg. type</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region indicator</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LR test, H₀: β_{nonviolence × duration > 1 year} = 0  
Pr(> F) = 0.227  
Pr(> F) = 0.031*

Log Likelihood  
-96.432  
-43.771

Num. obs.  
84  
85

Estimates shown for model of coup d'états are incident rate ratios. For violent conflict they are marginal effects. Some statistically insignificant covariates are omitted due space limitations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. † significant at p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
The next set of results uses kernel regularized least squares to flexibly estimate the point-wise marginal effects of nonviolence on this study’s four main outcome variables. Figures 4-1 through 4-4 then plot these effects against the un-discretized measure of campaign duration, permitting a nuanced, graphical examination of potential dependencies. More importantly, unlike least squares or log-likelihood-based methods, this procedure involves no functional form assumptions. As such, the estimates it produces are uniquely unaffected by model misspecification bias.

Figures 4-1 and 4-2, which show results relating to post-campaign polity scores and electoral manipulation, respectively, feature several interesting patterns. Most strikingly, both plots suggest a large increase in the effect of nonviolence as campaign duration exceeds one year of resistance (i.e., log(duration) > 0). Each also exhibits non-overlapping 95-percent confidence intervals over much of this interval, implying that the apparent variation is statistically significant. Substantively, the greatest change I observe with respect to overall democracy is two polity2 points. For honest electoral practices, the maximum difference is 0.2 points. Both quantities are somewhat smaller than their parametric analogs in Table 4.2, \( \hat{\tau}_{\text{autocracy}} \) and \( \hat{\tau}_{\text{elections}} \); however, such discrepancies are to be expected. It follows directly from the fact that KRLS employs a penalized regression method to create a well-posed optimization problem (Hainmueller and Hazlett, 2013).

Comparing Figures 4-1 and 4-2 to preceding estimates of \( \theta_{\text{autocracy}} \) and \( \theta_{\text{elections}} \) yields similar conclusions. Recall that using ordinary least squares I estimate these quantities to be six polity2 points and 0.3 points of electoral freeness and fairness, respectively. To ascertain analogous estimates from Figures 4-1 and 4-2 it is necessary to average all point-wise partial effects of nonviolence corresponding to campaigns lasting more than one year. To a first order of approximation, these averages are 2.5 polity2 points and 0.15 points on the unit-length electoral honesty scale. While clearly less than \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{autocracy}} \) and \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{elections}} \), both are statistically distinguishable from zero. In this sense, the paper’s main hypotheses pertaining to democracy and elections again find strong support.
Figure 4-1: Polity scores: conditional marginal effects

Figure 4-2: Freeness and fairness of elections: conditional marginal effects
Figure 4-3: Coup d'état attempts: conditional marginal effects

Figure 4-4: Violent conflict episodes: conditional marginal effects
Turning next to Figures 4-3 and 4-4, I again see patterns that reflect preceding findings, albeit somewhat less resoundingly. One broad area of agreement is the valence of the estimated relationship between nonviolent mass action and the incidence of coups d’état. Across the entire range of observed campaign durations, KRLS returns point-wise marginal effects of nonviolence indicating a positive or null association. In both sign and significance this result mirrors prior maximum-likelihood estimate \( \hat{\beta}_{\text{coup}} \) as well as the estimated marginal effect of quick nonviolent victory on post-campaign seizures of power. As with post-campaign polity scores and electoral cheating, the most marked, statistically significant change in the effect of nonviolence occurs when comparing movements that achieved success in less than one year to ones that struggled for longer. However, on a substantive level, this difference is considerably smaller than \( \hat{\tau}_{\text{coup}} \). It corresponds to less than 0.01 fewer coup attempts over a ten-year post-campaign period. As with the kernel-based estimates pertaining to democracy and elections, this inconsistency is likely due to the coefficient penalties KRLS imposes. In this instance the scale of the divergence suggests that the paper’s model of coups d’état, like many in the literature on civil-military relations, is lacking in overall predictive power (Gassebner et al., 2016).

Results in Figure 4-4 are not as shrunk as those in Figure 4-3 and are signed to suggest a statistically robust pacifying effect of nonviolent action across the entire range of observed campaign durations. Once again there exists a sharp contrast between nonviolent triumphs achieved in less than one year and more rapid successes. More specifically, the estimated reduction in the likelihood of new or renewed rebellion is two times as great when resistance is prolonged (\( p < 0.05 \)), equivalent to approximately five percent. In terms of the quantities of interest, \( \theta_{\text{conflict}} \) and \( \tau_{\text{conflict}} \), kernel-based regression yields results that are smaller, but with the same sign and statistical significance as those from generalized linear modeling.

The final empirical exercise addresses omitted variable bias. As with any observational study premised implicitly on selection-on-observables, ours is vulnerable the claim that the conditioning sets I employ do not encompass all relevant confounders. Against this charge I cannot rely on well-substantiated theory or a controlled empirical context as a defense. Instead I present sensitivity analyses. Ideally this would be possible for all eight estimated quantities of interest in Table 4.2; however, the procedure I employ restricts us to evaluating the cross-partial derivatives of outcome variables with respect to nonviolence and duration, \( \hat{\tau}_{ij} \). The results of these analyses are depicted in Figures 4-5 through 4-8, each of which illustrates what kind of omitted variable would need to exist for the study’s hypotheses to be invalidated.

Figure 4-5, for example, presents a sensitivity check for the coefficient on the interaction variable in the polity score model, an estimate which corresponds to \( \hat{\tau}_{\text{autocracy}} \). The two dimensions along which hypothetical omitted confounders are represented – corresponding to the x- and y- axes, respectively – is correlation with the interaction term itself and the outcome variable, ten-year-averaged post-campaign polity levels. The line plotted in this

---

9 Analogous analyses of \( \hat{\beta}_{ij} \) are omitted because, as a bivariate treatment, I cannot define confounders that might affect its significance in the usual parametric sense depicted in Figures 4-5 through 4-8. More specifically, I cannot estimate a "\( \hat{\theta}_{ij} \)" model in which this quantity is a left-hand-side variable.
space represents a threshold, or contour. Confounders occupying the upper-righthand region by virtue of their predictive properties are sufficient to change the sign of the relevant coefficient estimate in Table 4.3 and estimated quantity of interest in Table 4.2. Those to the left are not. No empirical analysis can reveal if any actual confounders occupy these spaces; however, it is possible to make an educated guess based on the observed characteristics of measured covariates. Points representing the set of regional controls, the measure of urbanization, a polynomial time trend, and the pre-campaign controls describing neighborhood polity scores are plotted as crosses for this purpose. Their location in the far lower-lefthand corner of Figure 4-5—far from the contour line representing a real threat to internal validity—suggests that a confounder capable of nullifying $\hat{r}_{autocracy}$ would need to be highly aberrant.

A relatively brief look at Figures 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8 suggests that a similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to $\hat{r}_{elections}$, $\hat{r}_{coup}$, and $\hat{r}_{conflict}$. In all three cases, the influence of extended struggle on the effect of nonviolence, and the associated influence of a nonviolent mode of action on the effect of campaign duration, is not meaningfully affected by plausible confounders. As one might expect from prior estimates, results are least robust with respect to coups d'état; however, even in this instance there is no obvious indication of a truly weak effect.\(^{10}\)

Figure 4-5: Polity scores: sensitivity analysis

---

\(^{10}\) It is worth noting that in the analysis of $\hat{r}_{conflict}$, shown in Figure 4-8, I substitute mountainous terrain for campaign region in the mapping of observed covariates.
Figure 4-6: Freeness and fairness of elections: sensitivity analysis

Figure 4-7: Coup d'état attempts: sensitivity analysis
Figure 4-8: Violent conflict episodes: sensitivity analysis
4.5 Conclusion

Scholars and observers of large-scale resistance credit nonviolent methods of action with effecting a broad range of positive outcomes once order is restored. This study has sought to temper these claims by elucidating, theoretically and empirically, the important role that struggle plays in conditioning the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance. Importantly, this study has not sought to advance the claim that nonviolent movements should attempt to calibrate the timing of their victory. In particular, it should not be construed to imply that nonviolent organizations are best served by waiting to achieve victory in order to maximize the degree to which they are prepared to adequately manage the demands of governing in the post-campaign period. This study’s principal conclusion are intended primarily for policymakers, donors, and non-governmental organizations whose goal is to minimize instability and adversity in the aftermath of events like nonviolent revolutions. Specifically, it provides indication to these parties that their resources may be most efficiently allocated to post-conflict circumstances in which nonviolent victory was won swiftly.

One important consequence of not struggling en route to victory is that competing groups in society animated by the resistance—e.g., social movements, the military, political parties, major socioeconomic interests, etc.—are left un-depleted. Tilly (1978) might describe the situation as one in which a “revolutionary outcome” has apparently been obtained with the attendant “revolutionary situation” persisting. Perhaps even more importantly, these organizations and reservoirs of latent power are likely to also be relatively foggy on their relative position in society, a condition that creates wide scope for destabilizing information asymmetries. Resultant competition for post-campaign status and power, both between groups and within them, cannot but weaken the state. This trend, in turn, invites further encroachment and aggression. That few parties in the aftermath of days- or weeks-long resistance are likely to possess the moral authority to lead exacerbates matters even further. Overall, the pathology of premature victory is not a propitious one.

Yet the drawbacks of effecting maximalist political objectives quickly—and the benefits of doing so more methodically—are not equal for all movements. In this study, I focus on ways that nonviolent and violent actors differ with emphasis on two specific dimensions. The first is the contribution of time spent resisting to a common understanding of a given country’s domestic hierarchy. Put simply, I argue that it is most beneficial when resistance is nonviolent. The unorthodox, contest-less nature of coercing pacifically offers fewer inherent opportunities for measuring relative power than battle-punctuated rebellion or insurgency. Second, and no less important, is an understanding of how duress shapes movements internally. A number of authors have aptly made the case that nonviolent action creates skills and preferences, at both the individual and group levels, that are conducive to peace and democratic politics. This paper’s contribution is to point out that these attributes must be cultivated, over time, in the incubator of resistance experience. Violent campaigns, by contrast, tend to develop along paths that make a liberal democratic path in the post-conflict period less appealing.

Though the data I use to test these contentions empirically is imperfect, thanks to a small number of observations and cross-national data that render design-based inference
practically intractable, I believe I show strongly suggestive evidence. Results from regression, highly flexible modeling, and sensitivity analysis collectively suggest that campaign duration is powerful moderator of the effect of nonviolence on post-campaign politics and overall stability. Indeed, I feel the evidence is strong enough to merit further inquiry in at least two areas. One is the apparent non-monotonicity of nonviolence's marginal long-term effects as demonstrated in the results from kernel-based regression. Another is recording and explaining variation in how resistance experiences are internalized across individual movements. With luck, interesting findings on these questions will open this emerging area of research even further.
Chapter 5

Final Thoughts

This dissertation has sought to advance the study of nonviolence in multiple distinct ways. At the level of theory it has sought to address two shortcomings in extant models of campaign outcomes: a paucity of inquiry at the level of the resistance organization and a pattern of under-theorization in which posited determinants are assumed, a priori, to be exogenous. With respect to empirics, the dissertation has offered improvements over current norms in the field pertaining to both design- and model-based inference. A unique instrumental variables strategy is used to test the project’s core proposition on organizational technologies as well as the the presumption, pervasive in the literature, that nonviolent resistance “works” by creating power in numbers (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). In the absence of an explicit identification strategy, flexible modeling and sensitivity analysis are used to maximize internal validity. Finally, at the level of policy, the dissertation offers lessons applicable to both the early stages of resistance and its aftermath.

Taken together these contributions have revealed four avenues along which the study and praxis of nonviolence can progress. The first follows from the observation that the strategic context of resistance is often a crucial determinant of campaign outcomes. Despite the scholarly’s community’s decades-long insistence on the explanatory primacy of nonviolent strategy and tactics, and equally enduring antipathy for the notion that nonviolence is a niche method of struggle, this dissertation shows that the capacities and fundamental preferences of key actors in a country’s wider civil society ought not be ignored when resistance breaks out. To be clear, this conclusion is not coterminous with structural determinism. While organizational technologies of resistance are undoubtedly tied to macro-political and economic factors like target regime type and socioeconomic development, the latter do not perfectly predict the former. Indeed, evidence from the Defiance campaign in South Africa suggests that neither these static conditions nor equally transparent demonstrations of sophisticated nonviolent strategy can provide an adequate explanation of nonviolent resistance. Rather, it seems that an improved model must proceed from a careful mapping of the strategic environment. This dissertation has outlined some of the principal features such a map should contain: an enumeration of organizations’ capacity to augment a movement’s array of resistance technologies; an account of their nonviolent coercive potential net of these technologies; and a further account of their first-order political and ideological preferences. Collecting such data
in a systematic fashion will be challenge. Important as quantitative data has become in the study of nonviolence, it may be necessary for this particular research program to lean heavily on qualitative studies born of deep, perhaps even real-time immersions into the politics of particular nonviolent insurrections.

A second opportunity for growth in the field of nonviolent resistance pertains to the study of participation, again as a determinant of campaign success. One of this project’s main findings is that the literature’s current emphasis on the quantity of participation nonviolent movements elicit may be misplaced. The theory of organizational technologies and empirical tests of the conditional and unconditional effects of exogenous increases in participation suggest that quality may be more important than quantity. This finding merits further investigation. While it seems clear that certain milieus in civil society are loci of the qualities from which nonviolent movements benefit, the psychological, social psychological, or other roots of these attributes remain unclear. Is it simply that labor unions provide organized workers practice in various forms of contentious collective action that make them able participants in nonviolent action? Do these experiences merely create skills, expertise, and familiarity, or do they shape an individual’s understandings of competition and efficacy in a somewhat deeper way? What, if any, further insights can be gleaned from considering the effects of these positions in civil society on communities and networks, rather than individuals? To a certain extent, questions like these call for a re-examination of insights from the Gandhian approach to nonviolence (Bondurant, 1965). It also suggests that closer partnership with the social and cognitive psychological disciplines may be productive. Not only may it deepen our intrinsic understanding how nonviolent resistance works, it may also suggest tractable policy and advocacy opportunities which the organizational technology model posited herein does not readily admit.

Practitioners’ limits and possibilities represent an entire third domain in which the present project can inform future efforts. As noted above, a model of nonviolent resistance centered on organizational technologies does not provide clear openings for advocacy. Labor unions, religious communities, and student groups, as well as other potential vehicles of nonviolent resistance technologies, cannot easily be cultivated via outside influences. Even policies that succeed in shaping the strategic environment to this end are likely to be of limited immediate utility in the absence of complementary efforts to bring organizations’ experiences, capabilities, and ideological leanings into alignment with incipient or potential nonviolent movements. Indeed, the possibility of such outside efforts coalescing to any effect are probably remote in the long term as well. Greater opportunity for productive engagement exists in the aftermath of successful nonviolent resistance. As indicated in “The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle,” there is considerable predictable variation in the fate of polities that emerge from nonviolent regime change. Those that form after campaigns that transpire over the course of years generally take the form of relatively stable democracies, per the expectations of the field (Ackerman and Karatnycky, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Bayer et al., 2016). Those that follow briefer struggles fare less well. They are more likely to experience democratic slippage, coups d’etat, and violent conflict. As such, this previously unidentified subset of cases is ripe for productive intervention by governments and non-profit entities.
that can facilitate institution-building and act as guarantors of peace. It is in these contexts, more than in the intra- or pre-campaign period, that the burgeoning community of individuals invested in the practice of nonviolent resistance is most likely to be able to act with positive effect.

The final set of potential improvements this project has identified pertains primarily to the academic domain. Put simply, both empirical papers show through multiple positive examples that the study of nonviolent resistance can derive real benefit from greater use of the most established and latest approaches to inference. In “Examining the Link Between Popular Participation and Successful Political Resistance,” concerted effort to causally identify the effect of mass involvement on the outcomes of unarmed insurrection yields a non-finding that contradicts much of the extant literature. In the absence of such analysis, this important result would not have been apparent. So too would the surprising finding of a null causal mediation effect – linking nonviolent resistance methods to campaign victory via mass participation – have been undetectable without the use of a previously unused econometric machinery uniquely suited to this kind of argument (Imai et al., 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Finally, in “The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle,” an otherwise unexceptional set of correlational estimates are made more useful to both scholars and practitioners by minimizing their exposure to invalidating claims of poor or incomplete model specification. Neither the particular empirical tools used for this purpose – kernel regularized least squares and sensitivity analysis – nor the notion of instrumental variables or causal mediation analysis are antithetical to the study of resistance. All of these methods and many others that exist as part of best methodological practice in the social sciences have the potential to reveal interesting new findings and empirical discrepancies in the study of nonviolence if they are used regularly and with due care.
Bibliography


130


Hamid, S. (June 7, 2012). Brother number one. *Foreign Policy*.


138


