THE ROADS NOT TAKEN:
THE U.S. SECURITY DEBATE OVER GERMANY, 1944-1949

by
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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
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at the
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ABSTRACT

United States policymakers at the end of World War II had an unparalleled opportunity to establish multilateral and collaborative collective security arrangements. Yet, despite propitious circumstances, none of these policies were adopted. Why was it so difficult for US policymakers to develop proposals advancing a collective security regime and a final peace settlement of Germany? This thesis adopts an institutional perspective to argue that the institutional flux and constricted power during this turning-point period shaped and constrained the policy options developed within the US government. The thesis develops a theory of institutional capacity to highlight the impact of the real or perceived ability of different institutions to promote and implement a policy option. As the study shows, policy outcomes during such periods of fundamental change are largely determined by those government agencies with the institutional capacity to exploit the new situation. In particular, the analysis focuses on the latent power of key individuals and coalitions to promote particular alternatives as ideas were filtered and channelled within government agencies.

The thesis examines three major policy alternatives considered between 1944 and 1949. The first case study investigates the wartime debate over the tenets of collective security, focusing on a proposal to create an international police force under the auspices of the United Nations in the fall of 1944. Despite far-reaching support for this measure, a careful examination of the debate shows that the wartime mobilization of the Army and the institutional weakness of the State Department ultimately favored those in the War Department who preferred to leave the issue unresolved.

The second case study examines the terms of the Allied occupation of a defeated Germany advocated by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau toward the end of World War II. In this case, a surprisingly radical and harsh proposal for the dismemberment of Germany was accepted by President Roosevelt, only to be subsequently rejected. An institutional perspective highlights that a key factor in the demise of the Morgenthau plan was not simply disagreement over economic policy, but the intervention of important institutional interests—namely the Army's demand for institutional autonomy and minimal involvement in the occupation—and the filtering of ideas within government agencies.

The final case study examines a policy alternative set forth in 1948 by George Kennan of the State Department during the Berlin blockade. Known as "Program A", the proposal called for a collective settlement of Germany based on the withdrawal of foreign military forces to specified garrisons and the holding of elections throughout Germany. In contrast to the effort to sustain the Berlin airlift, the proposal offered a long-term settlement that was in keeping with prior US positions. Stressing the institutional context of the debate, this chapter argues that a key source of opposition stemmed from the policy's challenge to the institutional power of the Army by transferring control of the occupation to the State Department.

Thesis Supervisors: Carl Kaysen; Steven Miller; George Rathjens, Chair
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PREFACE

At the time I began my research, the United States (US) was locked into an adversarial and highly militarized confrontation with the Soviet bloc nations. The division of Germany into two hostile states was one of the enduring features of this Cold War confrontation. Visitors to the Berlin wall met with guard towers and tombstones. In West Berlin, graffiti artists continually revised and recast the wall’s political montage, but East-West political relations were essentially frozen.

I grew up with the Cold War. E.P. Thompson captured the problem for my generation, writing that for the young in the 1980s,

The Cold War has been a received condition, which has set the first premises of politics and ideology from before the time of their birth. It is now a settled and unquestioned premise: a habit. Most people assume that the condition will persist--far into the 21st century, for the full length of their own lifetimes--if war does not supervene. It has always been there.

But it has not always been there. I do not suggest that Europe, before the Cold War, was in any way, politically or culturally, united. It was the seat of rival imperialisms which extended over the globe....Yet the savage divisions among Europeans did not exist as a fracture splitting the continent in half. They ran deeply within the political and cultural life of each nation-state. ¹

In the United States, as elsewhere, the body politic had matured within the psychological constraints of the Cold War, locked in a mindset that shaped and limited what the government and people deemed possible.

Within government circles, few alternatives offered hope of fundamental change. Proposals for the withdrawal of nuclear forces from Europe and deep reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces stood outside the boundaries of so-

called realistic debate. The notion of common security, promoted by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and other Europeans in the early 1980s, remained a topic of interest only to left-leaning activists. Policymakers directed much of their attention during this period towards heated debates over arms control negotiations that would have brought only marginal reductions in nuclear arsenals, even if negotiators could have reached agreement. Most of these proposals served primarily to codify existing forces and doctrine, rather than reduce the likelihood and devastation of war. During the 1980s, the massive US military edifice appeared permanent: active military forces totalled 2.1 million with 350,000 US troops based in Europe, the military maintained a vast stockpile of some 25,000 nuclear weapons, more than 1,500 US military facilities spanned the globe, and a dozen aircraft carriers traversed the oceans. During the 1980s, the US government doubled defense spending and developed a new generation of strategic weapons. In this climate, where military might was justified on the basis of the need to deter the Soviet Union, the boundaries of governmental debate were limited to whether there should be a 3 percent or a 5 percent annual increase in defense spending over inflation.

I devoted much of my graduate work to exploring the evolution and rationale for such forces. Investigating the underpinnings of US security policy, my research went backwards in time, to the early days of the policy of containment. The outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, marks a watershed in US defense policy. I studied the US decision to intervene on behalf of South Korea and the subsequent expansion of war aims (from an effort to reinstate the

status quo to the advance north to the Yalu River) which precipitated the Chinese intervention in the war.

Yet Korea illuminated only part of the puzzle. By the time the Korean conflict broke out, the West was already launched on the Cold War path and, within the United States, the strategy of containment dominated debate within the government. I decided to go back one step further, to the first months and years after World War II. The immediate postwar period offered a rare opening in the security debate. The unprecedented circumstances wrought by the war created an unusual climate of turmoil and change. Coming out of a time when concerted allied action overcame the most daunting obstacles in a devastating war, the victors were suddenly charged with adjudicating the terms of the peace. A sense of urgency and mission permeated postwar planning. In the final months of the war, 46 nations acted together to create the international machinery of the United Nations to mediate future conflicts and coordinate international economic, political, military, and cultural relations. Within the United States, the New Deal vision of social reform resonated in debates over American involvement in international politics, international control of atomic weapons, and the prospects of future collaboration with the Allies.

At the heart of this postwar debate was the issue of what steps should be taken to assure that Germany would not again threaten the peace and well-being of Europe. To many, the daunting scale and complexity of the job was mitigated by a conviction of its necessity to prevent a replay of the past forty years.

At the outset, most envisioned that the United States would conduct a short-term occupation of Germany without making a long-term commitment of military forces to Europe. Diplomatically, US policymakers sought a peace treaty that not only "punished" and "reformed" Germans, but also codified the long-term
disarmament and neutrality of Germany. More ambitious yet, some officials sought to end the traditional spheres of influence and European power politics they believed to be a source of continuing conflict. Finally, many Americans craved for life to return to "normal", without "entangling alliances" and the frightening specter of continued military confrontation.

Despite the propitious circumstances and the high stakes involved, attempts to negotiate a settlement of Germany resulted in failure--a failure of postwar hopes and plans. Over time, the fracture of Germany into autonomous zones undermined efforts to establish a disarmed and democratic nation that would not pose a future threat to its neighbors. The polarization of the eastern and western zones of occupation symbolized the failure of the Allies to sustain united, concerted action against their former enemies. But most importantly, the division of Germany marked the failure of the Wilsonian dream of collective security.

What accounts for this failure? Virtually all US policymakers believed that preventing future German revanchist claims required nothing short of a formal and uncontested peace settlement that assured the political and economic unity of a disarmed Germany. Yet this goal was stymied by the impasse reached in Allied negotiations over reparations, levels of industry, and central administration. While US officials awaited the outcome of international negotiations, a series of policy disagreements and delays undermined the military's initial plans for a short-term occupation and the rapid transfer from military to civilian control. As economic paralysis deepened in Europe and undermined efforts at postwar reconstruction, the administration underwent a profound reassessment of the nature of US involvement in Europe.
Most tragically, the failure to reach agreement on the postwar settlement of Germany threw into question the framework of demilitarization and international collaboration that had initially guided US postwar security policy. As agreement in Europe faltered, US policymakers opted for policies that primarily sought to thwart a newfound adversary from achieving its goals—a long-lived strategy that became widely known as the policy of containment. Rather than advance liberal democratic interests or the prospects for peace, policies were conceived and evaluated along the criteria of a negative, zero-sum calculus, based on worst-case assumptions and the necessity of military might as the primary means of influence.

Conceived originally in the midst of the Cold War, this thesis attempts to illuminate the intragovernmental process through which possibilities were considered at a formative juncture—identifying the difficulties facing alternative options during a fluid period. It is my hope that such a study can contribute to our understanding of security policy decisionmaking. In addition, this investigation of alternatives has renewed relevance to the policy options confronting the US government today. Once again, soul-searching in the United States and other nations over military postures, political relations, and security interests in the post-Cold War world has created a climate of immense possibility. US policymakers, no longer preoccupied with the Soviet Union, now face a diverse constellation of challenges from unexpected quarters. Within Europe, the frenzied pace of political change has brought a number of new players and problems to the forefront of security relations. Much of the historical baggage that remains today from the Cold War needs to be discarded, other pieces must be reclaimed and recovered if we hope to prevent, or at least mollify, regional sources of conflict.
Once again, German security relations are central to these changes. Our foresight and adaptability to changing circumstances is contingent upon our decisionmaking processes. If history proves any guide, narrow institutional interests are likely to be promoted at the expense of more ambitious programs.

The opportunity to launch such an ambitious effort to recast security relations will likely be short-lived. As at all turning points, the stakes are high. The danger now is not that we lack ideas or the opportunity to restructure international security arrangements in a collective and defensive manner, but that our governmental institutions will not nurture these prospects.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At rare moments, nations undergo fundamental shifts in security policy. During these turning-point periods, policymakers face a significant challenge to the existing premises that underlie the conduct of security relations. The outset of the Cold War between 1944-1949 is arguably the most important such transformation in modern US history. By examining the competing policy alternatives under consideration at key points in the US security debate over the settlement of Germany at the end of World War II, this study investigates the transformation of the initially stated goal of collective security into the ultimately adopted policy of containment. Examining the range of possibilities under consideration at the time and their formulation into policy options, I pose the questions: what types of alternative policies were considered, and why did they falter?

While a number of different ideas circulated during this formative period, only a few specific policy options were developed within the government at the level of the decisionmaking agenda. Conflict, confusion and disagreement over what policies should be advanced often stalled or altered the policy alternatives under consideration. The fate of alternatives rests upon an intragovernmental filtering process through which institutional structures channel a range of forces from external actors to domestic politics. This process is altered during times of flux and change when these institutional structures face stress and instability. Specifically, institutional capacity in this process provides a crucial source of
leverage when it comes to measuring the feasibility of various alternatives. Ultimately, the winning alternatives on the decisionmaking agenda must be understood as a function of the degree to which an individual or coalition advancing an idea was able to utilize the institutional capacity of various governmental agencies responsible for security policy.

Most theorists to date who have concerned themselves with issues of governmental decisionmaking have sought to explain changes in policymaking primarily during more normal, stable periods. Charles Lindblom, for example, developed the useful notion of incremental decisionmaking. Incremental theorists rightly note that most governmental decisions are best understood as the product of ad hoc minor revisions to existing policies. But what happens when the status quo falls away? When decisionmakers have no choice but to chart a new policymaking course? The key turning-point period in US security policy addressed here puts several prominent decisionmaking theories to a critical test.

There are three steps to the argument of this study. First, by explicating the open and substantive nature of the debate during this period, I challenge the myth that the division of Germany was inevitable and that the United States and its Allies had little choice but to embark upon a path of intense confrontation with the Soviet Union (USSR). Second, I identify the salient features at work in the decisionmaking process, testing the applicability of several prominent


decisionmaking theories during this turning-point period. Third, underscoring the importance of several aspects of the institutional approach, I offer the concepts of intragovernmental filtering and institutional capacity to explain the fate of losing policy alternatives.

Windows of Opportunity

Despite the many accounts of the origins of the Cold War and much scholarly discussion of its necessary and sufficient conditions, little research explains the range of possibilities considered at the time and their formulation into policy options. In reconstructing the debate over Germany, one finds a number of possible choices under contention that were favored by different coalitions within the government. These competing paths have disappeared from our understanding of this era. As historian H.R. Trevor-Roper has argued,

Any alternative history that we can offer is necessarily a tentative hypothesis. However, such hypotheses are, in a sense, necessary too; for the alternatives that were on offer at any time were real in the minds of those who rejected them, or could not grasp them: they were an element, an intangible but real element, in the total historical situation; unless we are aware of them, how can we reconstruct the reality of the historical conjuncture, or learn from it?³

Many scholars argue that fundamental differences in goals between the Allied nations regarding the fate of Germany made its division inevitable. This argument surfaces in both traditional and revisionist accounts of the origins of the Cold War.⁴ For example, two prominent historians, Herbert Feis and Arthur Schlesinger, portray US policy during this period as an unavoidable response to

⁴. For a useful summary and annotated bibliography of traditional and revisionist studies of the Cold War, see Kenneth Thompson, Cold War Theories, Volume I (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).
the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union.\footnote{5} In another example, Louis Halle portrays the Cold War as the product of historical determinants that left the two emerging superpowers with little choice. In Halle's account, Russia is the aggressor in a conflict portrayed as an inevitable struggle for control between great powers. Halle compares the United States and the Soviet Union to a scorpion and a tarantula in a bowl, arguing that "the objective of their own self-preservation will impel them to fight each other to the death. For the moment, at least, no understanding between them is possible...There is a condition of 'absolute predicament,' or 'irreducible dilemma.'\footnote{6} Revisionist historians have taken a similarly deterministic stance, arguing that US economic interests and the drive for overseas markets largely dictated the division of Germany.\footnote{7}

This thesis challenges such deterministic arguments. Contrary to other revisionist accounts that stress a central organizing principle such as expansionist capitalism or nuclear supremacy for emerging Cold War policies, this study challenges traditional accounts by emphasizing the policy alternatives under consideration during the period. Such a focus illuminates the fact that the circumstances at the end of the war did not dictate the long-term division of Germany.\footnote{8} In fact, in most quarters, division was neither anticipated nor desired at the end of the war.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\footnote{5}{Herbert Feis, \textit{From Trust to Terror} (NY: Norton, 1970); Arthur Schlesinger, \textit{The Imperial Presidency} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).}
\footnote{6}{For other examples, see Zbigniew Brzezinski who views "the cold war as more the product of lengthy and ineluctable historical forces and less the result of human error and evil." "How the Cold War Was Played," \textit{Foreign Affairs} Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1972), p. 181. For an analysis by German specialists that emphasizes the "fundamental incompatibility of conflicting aims in Germany," see Dennis Bark and David Gress, \textit{From Shadow to Substance 1945-1953} (Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 49.}
\footnote{7}{\textit{The Cold War As History} (NY: Harper and Row, 1967), p. xiii.}
\footnote{8}{See for example, Bruce Kuklick, \textit{American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations} (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1972).}
\end{thebibliography}
In order to explain some ideas about agenda setting in government and institutional processes, I use case material from the immediate postwar period as illustrative data, selecting a few important episodes in an ongoing stream of events. To be sure, this approach leaves out important pieces of the story. But other scholars have already offered accounts that attempt to provide a full, chronological treatment of events. This is not my aim. Rather, I seek to explain certain features of decisionmaking during an unusual turning-point period in the formation of US foreign policy. I look at three important decisions that were made during this period. In the first, an unusual item was accepted in the preliminary formation of the United Nations. In the second, an unlikely governmental actor promoted a plan with a surprising degree of initial success. And, in the final case study, a proposal that offered a seemingly rational policy alternative was shunted aside. Each case, I contend, offers important insights into

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Steven Reardon argues that "the division of Germany was not inevitable. In principle, the Allies agreed on nearly all major issues. With the exception of France, they were committed to reunification." "American Policy Toward Germany, 1944-46," Unpublished PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1974, p. 400.


the institutional processes operating during this period to guide the formulation of US foreign policy.

External Factors

Our understanding of this period must account for the qualitative attributes that mark it as a "window of opportunity." Major changes in the external environment periodically create disruptive pressures on existing policy; faced with these changes, governmental institutions confront the need for rapid adaptation. These dramatically altered conditions can create an opening in governmental policymaking. In short, the open, fluid nature of the period affected the decisionmaking process.

Rather than identify a single determinant (notably, the central impact of Soviet actions and foreign policy on US security decisionmaking), this thesis argues that these features combine to create an institutional context of decisionmaking that fosters certain types of solutions and inhibits others.

Many scholars of the division of Germany have fallen into the trap of explaining the failure to reach a political settlement after the war in terms of either international or domestic forces.¹⁰ Both external and internal factors were intrinsically linked in a complex web of shifting interests and constraints. As a result, it is not particularly helpful to attempt to attribute relative causal weight to one type of constraint versus another. Such an endeavor is akin to the "fallacy of

¹⁰. As one policymaker has noted, the distinction between international and national variables "exists only in the minds of those who use the words." Philip Mosely, cited by James Rosenau in "Pretheory and Theory in Foreign Policy," in R. Berry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative International Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 56.
false dichotomous questions," in which a choice is required between two answers that are not exclusive or exhaustive.\textsuperscript{11} Policy alternatives develop in response to--and in conjunction with--a diverse constellation of circumstances and external constraints, governmental structures and ideologies.

Specific external events impinged on the internal US policy process--bolstering certain alternatives, fostering the introduction of new participants and organizations during periods of crisis, and foreclosing certain diplomatic tools that might otherwise have been considered. In sum, US policies were significantly influenced by the filtering of inputs and constraints from the broader policy environment through complex organizations. This filtering process served to narrow the boundaries of debate over the direction of US security policy by enforcing certain rules and procedures for decisionmaking.

**Decisionmaking and the Filtering of Ideas**

Rather than analyze a policy alternative in isolation, it is imperative to consider the broader institutional context. First, the international system and external events, especially the policies of several international actors, impinged on the institutional environment, shaping the universe of choice. Over time, the policies of the Soviet Union and the other occupation powers profoundly influenced the nature of alternatives under consideration within the United States. Second, domestic politics and economic concerns played a major role in influencing the governmental agenda and governmental institutions themselves, further shaping the available choices. Given the sacrifices demanded during the war, policymakers were acutely aware of the need to obtain public and

congressional support for policy towards Germany and Europe more generally. In addition, German issues frequently entwined with other domestic concerns and controversial problems. Third, the individual persuasive power of key participants working within government organizations influenced the character of these organizations and had a fundamental impact on the types of alternatives under consideration. Finally, during this transitional period from wartime to peace, important organizational interests and the institutional capacity of governmental agencies responsible for German policy played a crucial role in shaping alternatives as decisions were crafted in multiple governmental agencies.

Taken together, these features of the institutional context help to explain what problems arose on the agenda and what type of alternatives were considered; they also provide clues as to why some ideas mustered a winning coalition while other ideas became discredited or stalled within the decisionmaking process.

The process of selection leading up to a policy decision is competitive and conflict-ridden as various ideas are weeded out or transformed. Organized opposition surfacing from a number of quarters can undermine an alternative: the President could decide against an idea, persuasive officials in the State Department (or any other governmental agency) could argue against it, or a foreign actor could reject an alternative, blocking its implementation. John Kingdon conceptualizes this process as a "policy primeval soup" where various ideas are floated, revised, altered, or rejected in a selection process that narrows them down into a smaller set of alternatives under serious consideration.\footnote{Kingdon, \textit{Agendas, Alternatives}, p. 21.}

At historical turning points with no status quo to rely upon, one might postulate that a wider-than-normal array of ideas and choices will percolate through the government. In fact, the expansion of the governmental agenda to
include important policy choices of long-term significance—such as US involvement in an international organization to uphold the peace or the nature of its long-term commitment to Europe—did not translate into a comparable expansion of the universe of formal policy options considered within the government. While there was a remarkable debate over US security policy at the level of the governmental agenda, the ideas developed within the government were much more modest in scope and key foreign policy decisions remained remarkably insulated from this changed climate of ideas. Instead, policymakers were influenced by a discrete cluster of stimuli—inputs from the outside world that were selectively filtered by the governmental agencies responsible for German policy.

As certain problems and alternatives emerged on the agenda, the government faced a series of pivotal decisions. In the absence of agreement on a workable strategy for German policy at the end of World War II, a number of ideas vied for influence and consideration. While in general, policy choices and outcomes proceeded in an ad hoc manner, these ongoing processes (or what Charles Lindblom describes as the process of muddling through)\textsuperscript{13} were intermittently punctuated by formative decisions and events that reshaped the boundaries of choice. Only rarely was there any comprehensive evaluation of alternatives in relation to overarching goals or problems. This tendency towards nonevaluation contributed to a climate of remarkable incoherence and paradox. In the case of Germany, numerous decisions served to constrain the menu of alternatives, ultimately excluding proposals for a joint settlement.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} This is the thesis of John Backer's account of The Decision to Divide Germany: \textit{American Foreign Policy in Transition} (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978).
Applying this institutional approach to the US policy debate about how to translate the goals of collective security into a comprehensive settlement of Germany after World War II illustrates the filtering of ideas and problems through the security apparatus. A range of ideas were considered on the overall governmental agenda, but governmental agencies selected out a smaller number of problems and issues for attention. In many cases, these issues on the decisionmaking agenda were more likely to be influenced by narrowly focused, technical arguments that furthered institutional interests. This filtering process helps to explain both the transformation of US security policy during this period and the missed opportunities for achieving a collective system of security in Europe.

Institutional Capacity

Despite widespread support and propitious circumstances, comprehensive proposals for a system of collective security faced serious obstacles to consideration alongside narrower, technical policies that promoted existing institutional agendas. Notwithstanding the expressed concerns and electoral mandate of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the overall quest for collective security was not translated into a series of feasible steps to be taken and was ultimately undermined by other policy options competing on the agenda. In the process, some ideas were discarded that, if pursued, might have fundamentally altered the prospects for four-power agreement among Britain, France, the Soviet

15. Agendas are defined as more programmatic choices that shape the universe of governmental attention by delimiting the strategic, political, economic, and social issues of concern among governmental elite.
Union, and the United States and perhaps achieved the US goal of negotiating a strong viable international structure for postwar security.

Despite the absence of a clear status quo for policymakers to fall back on during the unusual turning-point period under discussion, a key variable is the ability of individuals and coalitions to utilize "institutional capacity"--capitalizing on the institutional tools at hand. In ensuing policy debates, institutional capacity also can be seen in the latent power and leverage brought to bear by representatives of existing government agencies to promote particular alternatives on the decisionmaking agenda.

THE SETTLEMENT OF GERMANY: A PIVOTAL DEBATE

The political settlement of Germany proved pivotal to the transformation of US security policy at the outset of the Cold War. The trauma of two world wars, the advent of the atomic bomb, and the rapid ascendance of the United States in international politics presented uncharted terrain for policymakers. The near success of German aggression and the devastation wrought by the war fostered widespread domestic dissatisfaction with traditional security arrangements and provided the impetus for far-reaching action and institution building. During this time, many people believed the world could finally achieve a truly collective security arrangement, as exemplified in the adoption by both political parties in the 1944 election campaign of the platform of "one world or none." The country had rallied to war largely inspired by the hope of a future based on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision of joint great-power
cooperation and the disarmament of aggressors. This hope was fostered by the agreement, reached in the fall of 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, DC, to found an international organization to uphold the peace.

Within the government, there was intense debate over how to best translate Roosevelt's vision of postwar cooperation and self-determination into a global system of security. Most notably, two overarching frameworks for security policy competed during this tumultuous period. With the backing of Roosevelt, one coalition called for continued Allied cooperation in support of self-determination and democracy in what was loosely defined as a system of collective security that included the Soviet Union. On the other side, advocates of more hard-line policies warned against Soviet expansionist policies and stressed the idea of separate spheres-of-influence in order to limit communist influence in Europe.

16. President Roosevelt identified the "great powers" as Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France; there was some disagreement among officials over whether France merited membership and Roosevelt sometimes included China as a member.

17. Within the government, the Roosevelt coalition included: the Ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph Davies, Vice President Henry Wallace, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, among others. The anti-Soviet faction comprised most of the officers in the Foreign Service—including George Kennan, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Bullitt, and Loy Henderson—as well as a few officials in the War Department. Outside the United States, Winston Churchill opposed the policies of Wilsonian idealism and endorsed a more "realistic" approach of establishing spheres of influence.

Daniel Yergin describes these competing approaches in terms of those who supported a diplomatic approach towards the Soviet Union based on the Yalta axioms of cooperation versus those who supported the comparatively hard-line Riga axioms. Shattered Peace, Chapters 1 and 2.

18. George Kennan, a career foreign service officer, was among the earliest and most articulate spokespersons for a settlement of Europe that was based on spheres-of-influence. From his post at the Soviet embassy, Kennan warned State Department officials that the Soviet Union was intending to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe following the war in a series of cables. (See for example, Cable from Ambassador Harriman, drafted by Kennan, September 1944.)

In other communications, Kennan endorsed a comparable concept for the United States. In a conversation with foreign service officer Charles Bohlen in the spring of 1944, Kennan argued that it was futile to attempt to deal with the Kremlin and that Roosevelt's policy of seeking a Grand Alliance was hopelessly naive. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 227.
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The so-called "German Problem" loomed prominently in this fundamental debate. As the focus of two world wars, Germany naturally appeared to be the "key to peace" and stability in Europe.\textsuperscript{19} Grappling with its new-found position as conqueror and wielding unprecedented control over another country, the United States stood in a unique position, free to embark upon any of several strikingly different paths for postwar security. At the same time, however, postwar Germany created specific dilemmas for policymakers. Fear of future German aggression was counterposed by the perceived need for some form of German economic revival, and wariness about the difficulties involved in implementing four-power occupation.

The success of a European peace settlement hinged on cooperative action among the Allies to assure German disarmament following the war and agreement on a final peace treaty. At the end of the war, most people assumed that upon Germany's surrender, the Allies would jointly occupy Germany to assure its disarmament and eliminate all remnants of Nazi power. Following this brief period of military occupation, the thinking went, a world security organization would take over responsibility for Germany (and the other Axis powers), a final peace settlement for Germany would take effect, and the United States would withdraw its military forces from Europe.

Within five years, however, the effort to achieve a joint diplomatic settlement for Germany had been largely abandoned. What actually developed is surprising and difficult to explain: an unanticipated and dramatic break from past US policy. While the traditional tenets of US foreign policy had been repudiated,

\textsuperscript{19} This conviction was expressed in countless articles and books written during this period. See for example, James Warburg, \textit{Germany: Key to Peace} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Charles Bidault, "Agreement on Germany: Key to World Peace," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1946), pp. 571-90.
few expected (or would have supported) the eventual commitment of large standing armies, high military expenditures, and the long-term division of Germany into two hostile governments controlled by two rival blocs. Even more remarkable was the intensity of the ideological conflict that emerged between the East and West.

With the collapse of the Nazi regime and the advance of Allied forces into Germany in the spring of 1945, the Allies established a military occupation in Germany based on sketchy wartime plans that called for deindustrializing the economy, punishing Nazis and depriving Germany of any war potential. At the same time, the unifying wartime strategy of unconditional surrender suddenly became irrelevant as the fundamental criteria for evaluating alternatives. President Roosevelt's desire to maintain "Big Three" unity among the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union masked divergent conceptions of what specific policies would uphold a fragile peace. On the part of the United States, wartime plans for a "harsh peace" in Germany left many fundamental issues unresolved concerning the administration of the US zone of occupation. As a result, a number of specific controversies arose over the make-up of the German occupation and how to translate broad policy goals into a workable peace settlement.

The sudden death of President Roosevelt in April, 1945, ushered in a new administration, creating an opportunity for new ideas to surface on the governmental agenda. The new president had little experience with the complex problems posed by the anticipated Allied victory. The end of the war required a reassessment of the United States' role in the international arena. In the early days of the Truman presidency, various coalitions within the administration engaged in a fundamental struggle over the direction of US security policy.
All told, these circumstances created a rare opening in the US security debate, fueled by profound uncertainty and lack of consensus among policymakers in the face of a breakdown in international 'politics as usual.' During this opening, military and foreign policy underwent a fundamental reformulation. Notably, the controversial actions of the Soviet government, under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, frequently provoked calls for a US response. A number of alternative strategies could have been pursued; several were under active consideration within the US security apparatus.

**The Transformation to Containment**

In the debate over Germany, the government did not directly respond to important security problems and concerns when they were raised apart from more immediate and concrete problems that required action. Up until the autumn of 1944, planning for the postwar status of Germany remained limited to a relatively powerless State Department working group and Allied discussions in the European Advisory Commission. It was not until Allied gains made the defeat of Germany imminent that President Roosevelt, the upper levels of the War Department, and the Joint Chiefs took up the issue of the occupation and made action possible.

Following the cessation of hostilities, efforts to coordinate occupation policy among the Allies to achieve economic and political unity of a disarmed Germany foundered until looming shortcomings in the occupation (including rampant inflation, economic paralysis, congressional threats to cut appropriations for the occupation, and public criticism of abuses by military authorities) prompted efforts at economic and political reconstruction that were independent
of the four-power body for governing Germany known as the Allied Control Council. Similarly, not until after the Soviets commenced a blockade of Berlin did the Truman administration undergo a high-level policy review of the German problem. This review included the drafting of a comprehensive program for the settlement of Germany within the State Department, known as Program A, as well as several other alternatives advanced in the National Security Council and War Department.

While undisputedly important, broad security concerns often remained divorced from the demands of decisionmaking. Most of the time, officials and governmental agencies developed a very limited set of choices in response to a specific assessment of problems and solutions. As a result, the issues of national strategy, collective security, and defense served as the principal criteria for choice only when they were linked to policies that advanced other domestic political and institutional interests, or in the context of an international crisis.

Despite all the upheaval and change in the broader policy arena at the end of World War II, the organizations vested with responsibility for security policy show a remarkable degree of continuity in the way they handled incoming problems and developments and processed these inputs through bureaucratic routines and decisionmaking structures. Furthermore, the endemic delays in Washington with regard to German policy contributed to the gradual foreclosing of certain options, as rising intergovernmental tensions and actions by the field commanders in Germany undermined coordination among the Allies.

Changes in the Broader Policy Debate

The debate over the general principles to guide security policy in the postwar world revolved primarily around the changing governmental agenda of
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and the evolving US negotiating position in several international forums devoted to 'the German problem,' (most notably in a series of wartime Allied Conferences and, at the end of the war, the Council of Foreign Ministers' Meetings; the Allied Control Council; the US-UK Bizonal Agreement; and discussions over the creation of the North Atlantic Pact). What was at first a problem of assuring demilitarization and minimal US involvement in the German domestic economy soon became a problem of anticommunism and reviving the economies of Western Europe. Over time, policy alternatives under consideration shifted from a modus vivendi based on cooperative approaches to the problems of demilitarizing Germany, achieving economic unity, and maintaining four-power collaboration, to more unilateral and confrontational alternatives calling for limiting Soviet influence, promoting West European economic reconstruction, and integrating the western zone of Germany within a West European sphere of influence. This shift culminated in the de facto division of Germany in 1949.

The dynamic process of changing priorities and ideas was manifest in the changing governmental agenda for German policy; these changes can be broken down into three phases that reflect important forks in the road or defining moments in the debate that helped forge the transformation of US security policy.

During the first phase of wartime planning, the agenda was dominated by ideas that stressed collective security, united Allied action, a "harsh" settlement with Germany, and minimal long-term US involvement in Europe. During this initial, emergency period, internal decisionmaking processes were dominated by military requirements and the enormous influence of President Roosevelt. Yet, although Roosevelt set the agenda, his influence was limited by the relative weakness--or lack of institutional capacity--on the part of government agencies to
advance his grand security goals. These goals were further undermined by competing institutional interests and the turmoil created by the end of the war.

During World War II, there were two main arenas where a postwar collective security system were actually developed into governmental proposals: the charter of the United Nations, and the terms of the initial Allied occupation of Germany. The debate over the Morgenthau plan in the final months of World War II and the drafting of an occupation manual for US forces in Germany (known as JCS 1067) reveal a decisionmaking process in which ideas promoting an ambitious program of collective security became overrun by more parochial, technical, and short-term concerns.

Following the war, narrow institutional interests were promoted through a series of temporary administrative measures that provided only weak support for Allied coordination among the occupation zones. Between 1945-1946, proposals premised on achieving economic and political unity for all four occupation zones dominated the decisionmaking agenda. Yet the fractured and fractious internal decisionmaking process stalled various measures to achieve unity. In the spring of 1947, the Truman administration shifted to a more confrontational policy based in the emerging view that the risks associated with giving up control of Germany through joint Allied agreement were greater than the danger posed by the continuing impasse over Allied policy towards Germany.

During this transitional time, the agenda shifted from a focus on cooperative strategies and a willingness to bargain in order to reach agreement on Germany, to what President Truman articulated as a policy of firmness that opposed accommodating to Soviet demands. This shift is manifest in the breakdown of intergovernmental negotiations over Germany in the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947 and in efforts at currency reform in the Western
occupation zones that culminated, in 1948, in the first Berlin blockade. Of central importance is the shifting conception of "the German problem" on the agenda over time as German recovery became identified as a primary tool to spark economic recovery in Europe and thwart Soviet policies and interests in the region.

In 1945, the German problem was widely understood as the fundamental threat to a stable peace. By 1947, however, the unresolved political status of Germany became linked to efforts to promote European recovery (in the Marshall Plan) and most importantly, to the emerging conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in international negotiations. In the words of one policymaker, "There is no solution to the German problem in terms of Germany; there is only a solution in terms of Europe."20

During the third and final phase, more confrontational, unilateral policies dominated the agenda as officials became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of negotiations and worried over developments in Europe. As negotiations with the Soviet Union stalled, State Department officials undertook separate discussions with the Western powers to establish a West German interim government over the winter of 1947-1948. These negotiations and the prospect of independent action to introduce currency reform in the western occupation zones sparked the Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade in June 1948. The crisis precipitated a far-reaching debate over how the United States should respond. This third period culminated in a rejection of four-power negotiations over a final peace settlement for Germany and the de facto establishment of a separate West German government. As the Berlin blockade brought in a new constellation of

institutional forces to deal with the crisis, a bipartisan consensus emerged over the need to contain the Soviet Union.

During this time, the State Department's Policy Planning Staff considered a program for the withdrawal of foreign forces and the unification of Germany. A number of other ideas circulated within the government over the winter of 1948-1949, yet senior officials opted against reviving negotiations with the Soviet Union. The breakdown and polarization of superpower relations culminated in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the creation of a separate West German government in the spring of 1949.

The unraveling of the US-Soviet alliance transformed elite conceptions of US security concerns from a philosophy of cooperation to one of containment. While the East-West ideological conflict was unquestionably of pivotal importance in shaping alternatives, a number of internal forces also intervened on the agenda, shifting priorities and the universe of choice.

The transformation in the security agenda between 1944 and 1949 yielded unexpected and unintended outcomes. In the face of a difficult and adversarial international situation, the United States ended up adopting policies that, while containing the Soviet Union, did not advance US interests as they were defined in the immediate postwar period. An investigation of the initial definition of the problems confronting the United States shows that much of the policy could be viewed as a failure, resulting in the division of Germany without a final peace settlement, the long-term commitment of US forces in Europe, and the polarization of Europe into two hostile power blocs.
PLAN OF THESIS

This introductory chapter summarizes the central findings of the following investigation of three major policy alternatives considered in the US security debate over the settlement of Germany between 1944 and 1949.

Chapter 2 addresses the phenomenon of "policy windows" that emerge in response to major changes in the external environment and contribute to a reformulation of the governmental agenda. The chapter describes the forces that contributed to the opening of a policy window at the end of World War II. Reviewing these unusual circumstances, this chapter argues that a rare opportunity for far-reaching governmental action was possible due to the confluence of fluid international conditions, the vicissitudes of economic recovery, as well as public support for US participation in an international organization to uphold the peace.

Chapter 3 draws upon the pertinent literature on governmental decisionmaking, adopting an institutional approach. I argue that the key to success for a policy option rests in the ability of influential actors to marshall circumstances and arguments in order to muster institutional support for a given alternative. I identify several salient features of the decisionmaking process that influence the fate of alternatives during this open period, including the concept of institutional capacity as a variable that influences the determination of feasibility for a given policy option.

Building upon this theoretical base, the three chapters that follow offer a close-focused examination of important junctures in the US postwar policy debate.
Chapter 4 examines the debate over collective security during World War II. I argue that the fluid institutional context of the period led to both a patchwork of bold initiatives on the political agenda and glaring decisionmaking lapses that left many issues unresolved. The opening presented by this turning-point period lent credence to calls for collective security arrangements. But despite propitious circumstances and a consensus over the goals of collective security, the governmental agencies responsible for security policy lacked the institutional capacity to translate the general principles of collective security into viable policies.

Chapter 5 analyzes the competing alternatives set forth during the wartime debate over policy toward Germany following its defeat. Debate during the fall and winter of 1944 focused on Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's plan for the dismemberment and deindustrialization of Germany (known as the Morgenthau Plan) as well as discussion of what measures should be taken in Germany following the defeat of the Nazis. This debate culminated in the rejection of proposals to form a joint occupation among the Allies, in the adoption of punitive measures in Germany, and in the development of the US position on reparations. Much of the governmental attention focused on the "machinery" of the occupation zones and the Army directive for the occupation (known as JCS 1067) which was first formally approved in March 1945 and subsequently modified. Debate over the Morgenthau plan and the Army's occupation directive pitted two distinct camps within the administration against each other: those favoring coordinated Allied action versus those who insisted on autonomy for the Army. The political fallout of these institutional conflicts, I argue, set the parameters of future decisions.
Chapter 6 charts the rise of a dominant coalition within the US policymaking establishment favoring containment. Over time, the terms of the security debate shifted, as fear of future German aggression became interwoven with the growing fear of expansionist Soviet foreign policy goals. The Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948 transformed the German question overnight, as Soviet threats and aggressive actions in Berlin galvanized the United States and Western Europe to "stand tough." The Berlin crisis marks a final turning point in the US security debate over German policy, precipitating a wide-ranging review of policy options toward Germany and bringing in new institutions and actors. Following the imposition of the blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council became involved in the drafting of policy alternatives for Germany in a series of interdepartmental meetings devoted to the Berlin crisis. I examine in detail a proposal developed in the State Department's recently formed Policy Planning Staff known as "Program A." In essence, the plan advocated a far-reaching resolution to "the German Problem" through a joint, negotiated settlement that included various security guarantees. The evolution and ultimate fate of this proposal illustrates the impact of institutional structures and capacity.

Chapter 7, the conclusion, summarizes the findings of the thesis. I argue that the alternatives under consideration suggest that the United States could have adopted a variety of strategies, ranging from support for a UN military force, to a preemptive war, to a more nuanced policy of cooperating as much as possible on some issues, while "standing firm" or maintaining an adversarial position on others. These possibilities surface in an exploration of the alternatives under consideration at the time; their fate within the policy process helps to illuminate the important role of institutional capacity on the evolution of various policy
choices during such turning-point periods. I close with a brief discussion of the relevance of these findings for US policymakers in the transition to a post-Cold War era in international security relations.
CHAPTER 2

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: FORCES FOR CHANGE IN THE DEBATE OVER COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Major changes in the external environment periodically create disruptive pressures on existing policy, breaking down the existing consensus and forcing governments to adapt. These dramatically altered conditions create an opening in governmental policymaking, or a "window of opportunity." This window affects both the scope of the agenda and the procedures for decisionmaking. Notably, a wider-than-normal array of ideas attracts governmental attention. In addition, the standard procedures of governmental institutions are revised in a climate of contested power and turbulence, as mid-level officials deal with fateful issues that are usually reserved for cabinet-level officials and the president.

While there has been considerable scholarly interest in explaining policy outcomes during such periods, (particularly in explaining the outset of the Cold War), little attention has been devoted to the question of what distinguishes relatively fluid, open periods of governmental decisionmaking from other, more stable, periods. Do governments have a wider range of policy choices, or greater freedom of action, at these times? Are normal decisionmaking processes operating to produce extraordinary decisions or are the processes themselves altered? And, finally, what are the opportunities for farreaching reformulations of existing policies?

Following a general discussion of policy windows, this chapter addresses the question of governmental choice during turning-point periods. In particular, I investigate the different constraints upon alternatives as they are translated into specific policy options. I argue that, whereas policy is revised in a largely
incremental fashion during normal periods,\(^1\) the familiar pattern of business-as-usual is altered during more fluid or open junctures. During such times, these abnormal decisionmaking processes are reflected in a change in the scope of the agenda, as the choices under consideration frequently involve long-term consequences for security policy offering very different visions of security relations and divergent paths for security policy.

Interestingly, given these higher stakes, I find that policymakers have greater freedom of action. As several scholars of the so-called policy openings school have previously noted, crises can create expanded choice for policymakers and greater room for them to maneuver.\(^2\) In contrast, some followers of the structural/determinist school of thought have argued that policy outcomes are largely shaped by the ineluctable forces of the international system; therefore periods of turmoil and flux do not necessarily create greater freedom of action; rather they change the primary forces at play (national interests, military capabilities, etc.) that ultimately determine outcomes.\(^3\) Another alternative view is represented by the rational choice theorists, who approach the problem from the vantage point of individual actors evaluating alternatives based on an assessment of their relative costs and benefits. If decisions are based on logical calculations, then there should be no significant difference between the choices made during turning-point periods and more 'normal' periods of policymaking.

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This thesis argues that the debate over collective security and various alternatives for the political settlement for a defeated Germany at the end of World War II support the view that there is greater opportunity for farreaching choice during such rare policy windows. This openness stems from a catalytic change that obviates the elite consensus that normally serves to anchor the criteria for choice. Perhaps most significantly, the sudden emergence of new problems in such an open period precludes an incremental reliance on prior institutional approaches or existing policies. The results of this situation are twofold. First, new ideas emerge more readily on the governmental agenda. Second, as normal decisionmaking processes and existing institutional jurisdictions are altered, the emergence of new problems creates more opportunity for input by unconventional coalitions and peripheral institutions. New actors representing these groups find they cannot be as easily marginalized because there is no clear precedent for action under the changed circumstances. Taken together, these altered circumstances create an opportunity for a wider spectrum of choice that can, theoretically at least, foster significant shifts in security policy.

**How A Policy Window Opens**

A variety of circumstances can contribute to the opening of a policy window, ranging from turmoil in the international arena to changes within a nation. Notably, these catalytic developments are often unexpected and largely out of a government's control. Once in motion, however, governmental agencies must adapt, as the issues they traditionally address are suddenly called into question, reversed, or rendered irrelevant by the new set of problems that crop up on the governmental agenda. Whereas most of the time these first order concerns are confined to certain longstanding issues (such as the US-Soviet military
balance during the Cold War, or international trade), a new problem (such as the threat posed by the actions of another government) can quickly move to the fore as a new priority for the President or high-level officials.

The most obvious impetus for a shift in security policy is a dramatic change in international circumstances. Historically, such a change has often been brought about by international conflict, such as a major war, an international crisis, or a large-scale military action or invasion. But war is not necessarily a requisite catalyst. Significant shifts in security policy can also be precipitated by a change in relations between different nations. A notable recent example of such change is the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

While international developments are often the most visible indicators of change, other forces also contribute to major shifts in a nation's security policy. Powerful domestic forces also create strong pressures for policy shifts. Major changes in policy can also arise in response to an economic crisis, a change of administration or turnover of key officials, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of members of Congress, a shift in the national mood, or because a

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4. Paul Kennedy stresses the importance of the more long term process of changes in the relative economic and military power of different nations as they contribute to the outcome of military conflict in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (NY: Random House, 1987).
problem suddenly attracts the attention of government officials and requires action.9

In the case of military policy, for example, the type of major changes discussed above would go beyond minor revisions in policy, such as modifications in existing military doctrine and command structures. Instead, they would entail a fundamental alteration in the missions and priorities of the military, such as developing a defense posture that relies on mobilization potential rather than on the maintenance of large standing forces during peacetime.

Although an opening can be based upon objective measures of change (new leadership, significant events, altered conditions), more subjective measures of increased dynamism and flux in the policy climate also play an important role. These less tangible factors include a burst of public concern over a specific issue or a volatile domestic climate. Politicians and policymakers take such surges in public interest as an article of faith, and such forces can be extremely influential in focusing elite attention on a given problem, or curtailing different approaches to a problem. At the end of World War II, for example, the combination of intense anti-German sentiment, a conviction that aggressors should be punished, support for collective action to assure the peace, as well as deeply held fears over a renewed worldwide economic depression created a climate of strong public concern over the terms of the peace settlement and the occupation of Germany. While elusive and difficult to harness, these forces can create public and internal governmental pressure for change that prevents a government from falling back upon status quo policies and creates circumstances that allow a wide array of alternatives to percolate up through the system.

A policy window opens in response to the confluence of changing international conditions, the pressures of domestic politics (primarily economic and political pressures), and changes in the beliefs of elite policymakers and the public. The interaction of these three realms sets the boundaries of debate that inform US foreign policymaking institutions and processes during these unusual periods.  

So far, I have argued that the confluence of several forces can occasionally create an important "window of opportunity" for US security policy. Taken together, these forces widen the spectrum of possibilities to include fundamental structural changes in security relations. The stakes of decisionmaking in such periods of flux are high: as amply illustrated by the enduring nature of the Cold War, decisions made under such altered circumstances can lead to fundamental, and longstanding realignments of policy.

Before going further, it is useful to examine in more detail the circumstances that contributed to such an opening in security policy at the end of World War II. Following this general discussion, the next chapter will address how governmental policymakers respond to these unusual circumstances through an examination of different models of decisionmaking (particularly, rational choice and organizational theory) and the role of institutional structures in constraining the development of ideas on the decisionmaking agenda. This discussion serves as an introduction to Chapter 4 which examines the governmental response to the opening of a window during wartime planning for a postwar collective security system. The debate over collective security illustrates

10. Some theorists have conceptualized this as a series of 'levels of the environment' that set out the parameters of opportunity or constraints on the state. Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness and Small States: The Relationship between Environment and Foreign Policy," in Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (NY: Freeman and Company, 1989), p. 191.
the unusual range of ideas under consideration as well as the volatile climate of US security policy at this time.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HISTORICAL CONJUNCTURES

The security policy of the United States underwent a remarkable transformation between 1944 and 1949. The clear defeat of the Axis powers and the cessation of hostilities in Europe created a rare opportunity to launch a new framework for international relations. Within the United States, the foreign policy establishment faced an unprecedented challenge. The war helped spawn a resurgence of Wilsonian ideals and vocal debate about the appropriate role of the United States in international politics. While much was uncertain, policymakers were well aware of the gravity of the situation as well as the need to take sweeping action. A common thread in discussions and writings throughout this period is a pervading sense of urgency. This dynamic and volatile transitional period fostered the development of a number of alternative paths for security policy.

While a variety of forces created pressures for change, postwar planning focused primarily on the need to institute a system of collective security. A crescendo of arguments over what might be best for future peace and security influenced planning for the European peace settlement. Much of this debate centered on three clusters of issues: 1) the implications of changes in the international system on US security policy (particularly, the significance of international actors and governments, especially the Soviet Union, as well as the impact of new military technology and atomic weapons); 2) domestic economic
and political changes that linked economic concerns to security policy; and 3) a change in the climate of the times, or the mood of the nation.

CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

World War II delivered a devastating shock to the international system, providing a fundamental catalyst for change. The sudden ascension of the United States and Soviet Union to great power status, as well as the power vacuum and upheaval in Europe, the Far East, and Africa, created unprecedented international circumstances. These changes made it nearly impossible to fall back upon the prewar status quo. The European system was in the process of shifting from a multipolar to a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union taking on a new position as superpowers. The approaching defeat of the Japanese empire brought newfound responsibilities for the United States in the Pacific as well.

International relations were in a state of disequilibrium, wrought by the wartime bloodshed and efforts of states to challenge the international system. The war had brought enormous territorial, political, and economic upheaval. In Europe, the destruction of the German state created the possibility of profound political changes at the center of the continent. Whereas in the past the United States was largely a bystander to European affairs, US involvement in the war effort made it a central player in drawing up the postwar boundaries and terms of the peace. Suddenly, government officials faced a daunting array of problems

12. Robert Gilpin has described this phenomena in terms of changes in three realms: in the nature of the actors, or what he calls "systems change" of the diverse entities that compose the system; in the form of control or governance, or systemic change; and in the form of regular interactions or processes among the entities, or interaction change. *War and Change in World Politics* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 39-40.
associated with the end of the war. The stakes were high; as one policymaker described it at the time, the United States faced the choice between establishing an organized peace or an armed truce.\textsuperscript{13}

The end of the war suddenly thrust the United States onto the center stage of international diplomacy. The complex array of issues that had to be quickly settled entailed no less than the political and economic future of Europe as well as the rest of the world. Faced with the task of seeking to establish stable, democratic societies in Europe, policymakers confronted the need to reassess US security interests in Europe. While it was clear that the United States could not go back to isolationist policies, policymakers faced the conundrum of what was the optimal level of US involvement in international affairs and how much collaboration the United States should embrace in pursuing its security goals.

\textbf{The Impact of International Actors and Governments}

International actors and governments significantly shape the structure and dynamics of national governmental processes.\textsuperscript{14} Between 1944 and 1949, a panoply of statements and actions by other nations profoundly influenced the plausible alternatives for the settlement of Germany. A series of international crises brought major changes in governmental positions. The experience of rapid

\textsuperscript{13} During a very important cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945 on the issue of future control of atomic weapons, acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued that "Overall disagreement with the Soviet Union seems to be increasing. Yet I cannot see why the basic interests of the two nations should conflict. Any long-range understanding based on firmness and frankness and mutual recognition of the other's basic interests seems to me impossible under a policy of Anglo-American exclusion of Russia from atomic development. If it is impossible, there will be no organized peace but only an armed truce." Cited in Daniel Yergin, \textit{The Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 133.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, James Rosenau's discussion of this issue in "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Berry Farrell, \textit{Approaches to Comparative International Politics} (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 57.
German rearmament in the 1930s provoked serious government interest in establishing constraints on the development of armaments. Between 1944 and 1945, the collapse of the Reich and the suffering and devastation of the war necessitated strong and rapid action. Continuing economic hardship and turmoil in Europe spurred plans for a European Recovery Program (otherwise known as the Marshall Plan). Other focusing events included a series of developments in Eastern Europe, notably the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the civil war in Greece, and political instability in Turkey. Finally, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 was a pivotal transformative event, precipitating a comprehensive reassessment of US security policy that ultimately led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 committing the United States to the mutual defense of Western Europe.

In the realm of German policy, the positions of the four occupation powers (and, to a lesser extent, Germany) created important constraints on the terms of a peace settlement. A series of important initiatives to achieve economic unification of Germany between the summer of 1945 and 1946 were stalled by France's intransigent demands for the dismemberment of Germany and its opposition to any form of centralized control. Disagreement between the United States and Soviet Union over whether to first address the economic or military aspects of the peace settlement undermined Secretary of State James Byrnes' proposal for a disarmament treaty early in 1946. Soviet actions in the eastern occupation zone restricted the ability of the United States to coordinate action throughout Germany. The economic collapse of the British empire at the end of the war constrained Britain's ability to commit resources and forces to Europe. By 1948, German political leaders lobbied for various political and economic actions in the western zones.
External constraints obviously shaped the development of policy alternatives. During this period, the tremendous turmoil on the international scene created unique problems and opportunities for US security policy. What is especially noteworthy is the manner in which these external factors were interpreted and used by officials lobbying for a particular policy.

The United States' View of Soviet Foreign Policy

The most important political development during the last ten years of localized and finally global warfare, has been the emergence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the greatest dynamic and diplomatic force on the vast Eurasian land mass which stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans.


The foreign policy of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin was of pivotal importance in shaping postwar relations. Debate still rages over Soviet interests in Europe following World War II. It is unclear to what extent the Soviet Union was interested in the various collective security measures that were under consideration at the end of the war, and the tangled history of relations leaves many uncertainties over what alternatives might have been feasible. Yet without Soviet cooperation, there was little hope for a final peace settlement in Europe.

Up through 1945, US policymakers did not generally view the Soviet Union as an adversary or its greatly expanded power as a threat. While there was an active anti-Soviet coalition within the government (as seen in the anti-Soviet lobby at the San Francisco Conference), \(^{15}\) the Roosevelt administration and the

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transitional Truman administration remained committed to continued cooperation and planning based on continuing the wartime alliance. 16

There is still uncertainty over whether Stalin was primarily interested in securing the territory occupied by the Soviet Army during the war, 17 or whether Stalin held more expansionist aims of communizing Western Europe. 18 By most accounts, it appears that Stalin had not made up his mind about the status of postwar Germany at the end of the war. 19 In contrast to Soviet efforts to set up satellite communist governments in Eastern Europe, 20 there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet Union assumed that Germany would probably be reunited within a few years and that the foreign military occupation of Germany would be temporary. 21

17. See, for example, John Lukacs who argues that there was continuity between the earlier Czarist aims during World War I and Stalin's postwar aims of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, British and French domination of Western Europe, and a weak and divided Germany. "The Soviet State at 65," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65 (Fall 1986), pp. 28-29.
18. Critics of the Potsdam agreement and the Truman Doctrine frequently argued that it failed to take account of the imperialist and expansionist aims of the Soviet Union.

Even with the benefit of more open historical accounts by Soviet scholars, it is still unclear what Stalin's intentions were in Europe. See for example, Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Strategy, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (NY: Columbia University Press, 1980).

While there is still much room for speculation, the important point is that the Soviet government initially established good working relations with the allies in the German occupation. Even more significantly, the many paradoxes and contradictions in Soviet policy toward Germany suggest that, while the Soviet Union sought to promote its interests, Soviet policy was also quite indeterminate during the initial occupation period. In an analysis of the origins of the Berlin blockade, Avi Shlaim summarizes Soviet policy as follows:

while placing tremendous value on Communist success in Germany, the Kremlin evidently failed to develop a clear and consistent policy towards the defeated enemy between 1945-1949. Moscow was pulled in two contradictory directions. On the one hand, the thirst for revenge, the fear of a revived Germany, and the desperate plight of the war-ravaged Russian economy combined to push for a punitive policy of extracting as much as possible out of Germany in the way of material goods and services. On the other hand, the long-term hope of bringing the whole of Germany into its sphere of influence prompted the Kremlin, on some occasions, to pose as the champion of German unity. 22

Stalin's contradictory policies toward Germany suggest that he did not contemplate placing Germany under communist control. As Isaac Deutscher argues, in looking back on Stalin's actions, there are a variety of "strange and striking contradictions which do not indicate that he had any revolutionary master

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plan. They suggest, on the contrary, that he had none.\textsuperscript{23} Deutscher summarizes some of these "glaring contradictions" as follows:

\begin{quote}
if he had beforehand planned revolution in eastern Germany, why did he detach from Germany and incorporate in Poland all the German provinces east of the Neisse and the Oder, of the acquisition of which even the Poles themselves had not dreamt? Why did he insist on the expulsion of the whole German population from those lands, an act that could not but further embitter the German people not only against the Poles but also against Russia and communism. His claim for reparations to be paid by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland, understandable as it was in view of the devastation of the Ukraine and other Soviet lands, could not but have the same damaging effect on the Communist cause in those countries. This was even truer of Stalin's demand for the liquidation of the bulk of German industry. Already at Teheran, if not earlier, he had given notice that he would raise that demand; at Yalta he proposed that 80 per cent of German industry should be dismantled within two years after the cease fire; and he did not abate that demand at Potsdam. He could not have been unaware that his scheme, as chimerical as ruthless, if it had been carried out, would have entailed the dispersal of the German working class, the main, if not the only, social force to which communism could have appealed and whose support it might have enlisted...even at the close of the war his intentions were still extremely self-contradictory, to say the least.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Soviet foreign policy during this period is characterized by a remarkable dualism. Stalin pursued a contradictory course that apparently was motivated by both ideological and pragmatic security concerns.\textsuperscript{25} This multifaceted policy has been largely lost in Cold War accounts of Soviet behavior. The popular understanding of this era is that the Soviet Union pursued a consistent policy of communizing Germany and dominating Europe, and that this ruthless policy precipitated the breakdown of Allied cooperation and the ultimate partition of Germany. Yet an analysis of Soviet actions shows this view to be false.

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\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 536-537.  
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{25} William Taubman stresses this dualism in his study of \textit{Stalin's American Policy}, arguing that Stalin was \textit{both} an ideologue and a realpolitician, p. 131.  
\end{flushright}
There is little doubt that Soviet leaders were terrified of the threat posed by German militarism and the prospect of German rearmament and revenge. Stalin repeatedly made reference to the prospect that Germany would again rearm and launch a war within twenty or thirty years. This danger went hand-in-hand with an intense anti-German feeling among Russians in the aftermath of German atrocities and a devastating occupation of the Ukraine and Russia.

Notwithstanding the contradictions and tensions manifest in Soviet foreign policy, Soviet leaders shared a core interest with the western powers: to keep Germany under a firm military occupation in order to prevent its rearmament. This shared interest served as the basis for wide-ranging allied collaboration in the occupation of Germany.

**The Impact of New Military Technology and Atomic Weapons**

Revolutionary developments in military technology created enormous pressures for change. These pressures pushed international relations in several different directions. The many technological advances achieved during the war and the advent of the atomic bomb required a fundamental reevaluation of the strategic posture of all nations. The development of air power and long-range bombers contributed to a newfound feeling of vulnerability. At the end of the war, the US Army Air Force argued persuasively that improved versions of the German V-2 rocket would be capable of reaching the United States and that "bombers can now range the world." 26

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Not only was there a profound shift in the balance of military power, but nuclear weapons made all nations vulnerable.27 Within the United States, government officials and many atomic scientists called for a radical rethinking of national policy in light of the fact that there was no effective defense for atomic weapons. The prospect of a world where several nations could produce such weapons of mass destruction fostered a profound sense of urgency to efforts to establish international "machinery" to resolve future conflict.

Even before the atomic bomb had been tested, policymakers privy to the secret program known as the Manhattan Project debated the future handling of atomic weapons and whether to pursue a policy of total secrecy, partial secrecy, or the more-or-less open international exchange of information. Each path offered a markedly different framework for US security policy. As early as September 1944, Manhattan Project members Vannevar Bush and James Conant discussed the future handling of atomic weapons in a memo to the Secretary of War. With striking prescience, these scientists sketched out the basic outlines of the postwar policy alternatives for atomic energy.28

In the spring of 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson devoted a good deal of his time to consider the implications of atomic weapons on US security policy. In a memo to the President on April 25, 1945, Stimson raised the question of whether to share information on the bomb with other countries, and if so, on what terms. Secretary Stimson identified this dilemma as the "primary question of

our foreign relations." At Stimson's urging, a special advisory group was created in May 1945 to address the implications of atomic weapons on US security.

Several different responses to new developments in military technology were possible and atomic weapons contributed to the unusual atmosphere of both optimism and profound danger for future international relations. The horrifying prospect of nuclear war worked to strengthen the hand of those calling for international cooperation. In some respects, the awesome threat posed by nuclear power reenergized the notion of one world or none. While some argued that the atomic bomb might succeed in "ending all wars," most people feared that only new political arrangements (in the form of an international organization) could manage the peace. This contributed to widespread support for the creation of strong international machinery to uphold the peace. At the same time, the extraordinary destructiveness of atomic weapons fueled the military's concern with maintaining absolute secrecy in order to preserve the United States' monopoly for as long as possible.

The rapid changes in the technology of warfare created contradictory pressures on efforts to develop international institutions. While virtually everyone agreed on the need to negotiate some form of international controls,

29. Stimson also cautioned about the difficulty of assuring adequate international controls on atomic weapons because they required an unprecedented degree of internal controls and rights of inspection. Cited in Sherwin, A World Destroyed, Appendix I, pp. 291-292, Memorandum September 30, 1944, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder no. 60, National Archives, Washington DC.
30. The advisory group was named the Interim Committee and it held a series of meetings to discuss various alternatives.
32. During his tenure as Vice President and Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace was a leading advocate of strong international machinery, among others.
33. The most outspoken proponent of this position was Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.
there was deep disagreement over how much the United States should share information on military secrets and what was the preferred forum for discussion. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, several senior officials even endorsed the idea of creating an international air force for the UN.  

Following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, debate within the US government revolved around whether to pursue direct bilateral talks to establish international controls on atomic weapons with the Soviet Union, or to negotiate in a multilateral forum such as the United Nations. Most agreed that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union and other nations obtained nuclear weapons. Most agreed that it was in the United States' interests to attempt to secure some type of international controls; the big problem was what actions should be taken.

On one side of the debate, Secretary of War Stimson pushed strongly for direct negotiations with the Soviet Union and opposed early reliance on multilateral negotiations. In an influential memo to the President in September 1945, Stimson distinguished the alternatives in terms of the "old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution" to prevent future use of the bomb (along the lines of international prohibitions on chemical weapons) versus directly approaching the Russians to establish controls

34. Vice President Henry Wallace was a strong proponent of this idea.
35. In one of his final acts before retiring, Secretary of War Stimson had prepared a memorandum to the President on "Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs." In the memo, Stimson proposed a direct approach to the Russians to negotiate control. He argued against a multilateral approach, arguing that this would only waste time with "loose debates" in an international forum such as the UN. Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman, September 11, 1945, FRUS 1945, Volume II, pp. 41-44. See also Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 29-31; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (NY: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 136-139.
on atomic weapons. The advent of atomic weapons created strong pressures for a break from the traditional practice of military secrecy and defense strategy. It also sparked intense disagreement within the government over the role of atomic weapons and how to establish controls on them. Both the scientific community and the public continued to exert pressure on the Truman administration to work for international controls that had implications on other realms of security and foreign policy. While the United States was at the center of this whirlpool, all nations were drawn into its centripetal pull because nuclear weapons uprooted the traditional basis of national security.

All told, the international circumstances at the end of the war had a number of consequences for US security policy. Changes in the positions and makeup of international actors created a number of opportunities, as well as constraints. Given this broader arena of turmoil and change, the prewar premise for foreign policy and the tradition of isolationism were no longer operative. As will be discussed further on, there was a strong renunciation of the prewar status quo which was seen as the source of two world wars. And yet this was not the only source of tension, as domestic concerns exerted a profound impact on security policy.

36. Stimson suggested that the United States "enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use." Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman, 11 September, 1945, FRUS 1945, Volume II, pp. 41-44.
ECONOMIC CONCERNS AND SECURITY POLICY

The interwoven threads of economic concerns and security affairs created additional pressures for government action. Historically, economic interests have played a central role in US foreign policy. The Great Depression of the 1930's left a profound imprint on all Americans. As a result, economic and military concerns were explicitly linked, weaving the problems of peace and prosperity together in public discussion and thinking. While the New Deal and the wartime mobilization of the economy helped to alleviate domestic economic difficulties, there were widespread fears that the end of the war would lead to an economic slowdown. This fear of a postwar recession prompted high-level efforts to establish an international economic system that would foster US prosperity through free trade and open markets for US products.37

Many economists anticipated a recession following the end of the war and looked to foreign markets to take up the slack. The dominant coalition of business internationalists in the Roosevelt administration (representing the interests of international financiers and businesses that benefitted from exports, especially in the field of agriculture) took as their canon the "open door system" of international commerce based on free trade. According to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, among others, the roots of war rested in economic dissatisfaction and deprivation: as a result, Stimson stressed that "the essential basis of enduring peace must be economic."38 While the

38. Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present (Berkeley: University of
economic debate ostensibly focused on what, if any, central administration of
Germany should be created, the implications were clear: a strong central
government would facilitate German economic recovery, which was in turn
crucial to European economic recovery.39

The specter of the failure of the economic measures imposed at Versailles
and Germany's remilitarization after World War I created difficult questions of
how to prevent a resurgence of the German war machine.40 In light of this
danger, there was a general consensus within the Roosevelt administration that a
joint Allied agreement on Germany was the primary component of future
economic prosperity and, by extension, peace and stability.41

The end of the war raised the dilemma of how to promote the economic
wellbeing of the United States and Europe without reestablishing German
industrial power in a way that could contribute to future military power. As
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau argued, recent German industrial policies,
international cartels, discriminatory trading practices, and the legacy of Junker
estates were in essence an "economic blitzkrieg" strategy that undermined the
security of its neighbors.42 Morgenthau was not alone in his views; many

California Press, 1977); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (NY: Simon and
39. A memo from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State raises
the need for planning on this subject, FRUS 1944, Volume III, December 27, 1944, p. 175.
40. In a study of The Causes of War, Geoffrey Blainey notes that the harsh terms of the treaty as
well as the treaty's economic terms (that lead to inflation and a world depression) were widely
41. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the consensus broke down when it came to
drawing up the terms of the settlement. Some individuals advocated extremely punitive measures
against the vanquished powers, while at the same time called for extending loans and aid to the
Soviet Union and other nations in what became known as the Morgenthau plan. Others pushed for
the establishment of strong international machinery to exercise political and military controls to
enforce the terms of the peace. Another more conservative group advocated no additional U.S.
involvement after the war beyond disarming all Axis military forces and minimal intervention in the
governance and economy of the occupied territories.
42. "Part I-The Road to Peace" Draft Memo by Henry Morgenthau, undated, in the Harry S.
Truman Official Files, (198 Misc Box 689), Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).
believed that the roots of international conflict rested in discriminatory economic policies. As a result, economic interests created additional pressures for the establishment of a United Nations and final peace settlements.

In yet another wrinkle in the debate, support or opposition to the President's foreign policy was an important weapon in the ongoing fight over New Deal domestic policies. The extent of US involvement and expenditures abroad was closely associated with the level of government activism at home. Conservative opposition to the administration's occupation policies tended to grow out of a general dissatisfaction with President Roosevelt's liberal use of executive power.\(^{43}\) Policy toward Germany became ensnared in the ongoing fight over the economic policies of the New Deal as policymakers debated the nature and scope of intervention in the German economy. This surfaced in debates over whether Germany should be forced to dismantle its industrial infrastructure or be allowed to recover from the war.

In large measure, neither economic nor security concerns could be divorced from the other. Economic concerns gave added support to a more activist foreign policy, paving the way for more extensive international involvement. The sincere conviction that conflict often stems from economic hardship, as well as more crass ambitions of cultivating a profitable business climate for US goods and services, fostered a wide range of proposals for economic growth. Yet the feasibility and success of these proposals presumed that a successful peace settlement could be reached and were contingent on

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security guarantees and other military measures. This in turn rested on the ability to reach agreement with other governments.

While partisan domestic debates over economic policy undoubtedly influenced policy towards Germany, perhaps the most important pressures surfaced in the serious economic disagreements arising during intergovernmental discussions over the fate of Germany. Clashes with other nations over economic policy often spilled over into the security realm, as witnessed in a series of disagreements between 1944 and 1949. A dispute over the level of reparations to be exacted from Germany surfaced as a central obstacle to agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The lack of agreement over this economic issue stalled diplomatic efforts to reach a final peace settlement and fostered divergent economic policies in the separate occupation zones.44

Discussions in March of 1947 which focused on the issues of reparations and German economic and political organization offered perhaps the best hope of agreement on Germany. While negotiators came close to agreement, the talks ended in stalemate. A key source of Secretary of State George Marshall's frustration with the Soviets stemmed from his concern that a compromise with Russia would cost US taxpayers more money due to the expense of the German occupation. While there are numerous other examples, the interplay of economic and security issue surfaces dramatically in the clash with the Soviet Union over currency reform in the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949. The push for reform at the end of the war built on the synergy between economic and security concerns

because peace and stability were necessary preconditions for any successful economic recovery.

CHANGING BELIEFS AND THE PUSH FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORM

Amid the turmoil in the world, ideas about war, peace, and US interests and obligations were undergoing a remarkable transformation. Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US government had remained on the sidelines of the conflict in Europe, with the majority of the public opposed to US involvement in Europe. Following the United States' entry into the war, wartime planning was infused with a reformist mindset that was committed to promoting liberal democratic principles (along the lines of US institutions and ideals) and continued international cooperation with America's wartime allies. By the end of the war, the administration was strongly supporting the United Nations and the Wilsonian vision of a collective system of security.

Perhaps most notably, planning took place in an atmosphere permeated by both fear and zeal. The horrors of the war imbued the debate with both a sense of urgency and a rare commitment to altering the status quo of international politics. Building upon the legacy of the New Deal, the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war were viewed in moral terms, as evils that required fundamental social reform to be purged once and for all. As a result, many policymakers believed the best hopes for US security rested on eliminating the prospects of future aggression through a comprehensive social, political and economic program of reform.

In a ringing speech to Congress in January 1941, President Roosevelt enunciated the "Four Freedoms," in what became the official justification of US involvement in the war against fascism. These four freedoms were the freedom
of speech and expression, freedom to worship God, freedom from want for all of the earth's inhabitants, and freedom from fear—that is, "a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world." Government officials made frequent appeal to these ambitious ideals to rally support for the war effort. Along with an appeal to nationalism, officials stressed the more idealistic aims of making the world safe for democracy and achieving a new world order to justify the sacrifices and loss of life brought on by the war.

This reformist mood is perhaps best captured in the final address Roosevelt was preparing at the time of his death in April 1945. In assessing the state of the world, Roosevelt enjoined the nation:

The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling. The Japanese war lords are receiving, in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor. But the conquest of enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible...

Today we are faced with the preeminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, at peace...
The work, my friends, is peace. More than an end of this war - an end to the beginnings of all wars. Yes, an end, forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the differences between governments by the mass killing of peoples.  

45. Annual Message of the President to the Congress, January 6, 1941, Development of United States Foreign Policy, S. Doc. 188 77th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 86-87.
46. Taken from the draft of a speech that President Roosevelt was preparing for the Jefferson Day address. The last sentence was written into the typed draft by Roosevelt. President Roosevelt, undelivered address prepared for Jefferson Day, April 13, 1945. "Let Us Move Forward with Strong and Active Faith."
The desire for reform brought an outpouring of public and elite support for the establishment of the United Nations and a collective system of security, based on the principles of self-determination, democracy and open trade.

Widespread support for the creation of a system of collective security made this issue a leading item on the political agenda. Throughout the war, President Roosevelt set forth a "grand design" or strategy for postwar security premised on the continued cooperation of the great powers and the creation of international machinery to uphold the peace. Most key administration officials espoused a coherent, if undefined program of collective security based on joint action and agreed-upon standards of international conduct. This program included the establishment of the United Nations, an international tribunal to try war criminals, and Allied cooperation and agreement on the postwar peace settlement. These efforts marked a dramatic change in citizens' perception of the appropriate scope of government action. Ironically, they also masked the widespread feeling of uncertainty over the future as many wondered what was in store in the coming peace.

CONCLUSION

The unusual combination of international turmoil and domestic openness at the end of World War II created a number of pressures for a fundamental change in US security policy. The rare opportunity for far-reaching governmental action was made possible by the confluence of fluctuating international conditions, the vicissitudes of economic recovery, and public opinion favoring

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47. President Roosevelt expressed his ideas for the postwar world in an article by Forrest Davis, "Roosevelt's World Blueprint," Saturday Evening Post, April 19, 1943, pp. 20-21, 109-110; On the importance of the article in reflecting the "Old Man's Grand Design," see Daniel Yergin, interview with Elbridge Durbrow, Shattered Peace, p. 43.
some form of international organization to uphold the peace. Such a major
opening altered decisionmaking processes and brought a wide spectrum of policy
alternatives on the governmental decisionmaking agenda, each offering a
markedly different framework for US security policy.

In light of these dynamic circumstances, US security policy was pushed in
a number of directions that expanded the realm of choice. It could continue with
its present wartime course of Allied cooperation, continued economic aid
(through lend lease and other wartime aid provisions to the allies), and political
coordination and involvement in international negotiations. Alternatively, it
could retrench to a lower level of international involvement, in keeping with past
practice and its commitment to remove US troops from Europe within two years
of the end of the war. A number of variants on this latter strategy were possible,
but this path meant that the United States would return to something on the scale
of its prewar force levels and commitments.

In a third alternative, the United States could have attempted to capitalize
on the momentum gained from the wartime mobilization and seek to maximize its
military and political gains in Europe and Asia. This course would have risked
forfeiting the wartime alliance and most probably alienating the Soviet Union.
Yet, it offered the hope of rapid and decisive action that advanced some important
US goals. Given these very different choices, the question remains: How can
we explain how the government responded?

This study seeks to answer this question through an examination of the
development of different ideas and key decisions within US governmental
institutions.
CHAPTER 3

EXPLAINING THE FATE OF ALTERNATIVES

A turning-point period can create a marked opening within governmental institutions that can facilitate policy shifts. How do governmental actors respond to such openings? How do alternatives\(^1\) reach the decisionmaking agenda? And how do policy choices evolve within governmental organizations?\(^2\)

As in normal, stable periods, the success of a given policy option rests in the ability of influential actors to marshall circumstances and arguments in order to build institutional support for a policy.\(^3\) However, the decisionmaking process during periods of flux is subtly, but significantly, altered from its normal state. Absent the grip of stable institutional structures and a lack of agreement over the 'rules of the road' both within and among organizations, greater influence is afforded to a governmental institution's capacity to carry out a feasible policy.

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1. An alternative is defined as a choice or trade-off between different courses or outcomes, only one of which may be chosen. Alternatives can also mean the opportunity for deciding between two or more propositions or courses of action. In foreign policy, this tends to translate into specific action programs, directives, or various diplomatic, military, or economic initiatives.

2. The literature on organizations and organizational theory spans at least three academic disciplines: sociology, business administration, and political science. While I have drawn upon all three literatures, each field has a different emphasis that raises some confusion over certain terms and hypotheses. For the purposes of this study, I use the terms organization, institution, and agency somewhat interchangeably to describe the governmental bodies with jurisdiction over US foreign policy. In general, I distinguish between the terms organization and institution in the following manner: an organization refers to a number of persons or groups having specific responsibilities and united for a particular purpose; an institution refers to an established organization and encompasses its important customs, practices or behavioral patterns. Adapted from The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985).

This greater emphasis on what I call *institutional capacity* during flux periods works as a powerful force to modify or circumvent traditional organizational relationships.

Institutional capacity denotes the real or perceived ability of a given institution to generate, nurture, promote and implement a policy option. In the agenda-setting process, institutional capacity represents a given organization's resources and structure that foster certain ideas and approaches at the expense of others. In the decisionmaking process, institutional capacity is represented by individual participants who bring this backing or weight to the negotiating table. During the opening in security policy at the end of World War II, institutional capacity (and the lack thereof) played a decisive role in creating a winning coalition in support of the tenets of containment.

Institutional capacity has several dimensions. It includes the ability to generate and nurture new ideas; the physical resources that a governmental organization brings to bear on an issue or problem; the administrative procedures and policy instruments it can employ to achieve a desired outcome; budgetary resources; and normative authority to legitimize a given action. Physically resources might include personnel or equipment (such as aircraft, or computers). Clearly, an organization such as the US military can bring a significant institutional capacity in many kinds of direct actions or self-help measures involving the use of force. Less obviously, administrative procedures and policy instruments such as regulations, directives, and policy statements offer an

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important source of institutional capacity, conferring upon organizations the
ability to influence outcomes.

In the decisionmaking process, institutional capacity is represented by
individual participants who bring significant backing or weight to the
decisionmaking process. During the opening in security policy between 1944 and
1949, institutional capacity (and the lack thereof) played a decisive role in
creating a winning coalition in support of the tenets of containment.

To date, most scholars who have addressed institutional or administrative
capacity have done so in the context of state-building. Stephen Skowronek, for
instance, discusses the development of US administrative capacity in the early
1900s to explain the consolidation of national judicial authority as well as the
growth of other governmental organizations. To be sure, governmental
organizations can build capacities to consolidate their position and further
organize state interests. But the existence of such institutional capacities also
impinges upon the decisionmaking process, dictating the available tools at hand
and shaping the perception of the feasibility of a given alternative. When it comes
time for a decision, the central actors assess the feasibility of competing options.
While this complex calculation rests on a variety of criteria, a key constraint is an
institution's ability to carry out or implement a given option.

To understand how institutional capacity operates within the context of
governmental decisionmaking, this chapter will first address how alternatives

5. Theda Skocpol, Peter B. Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State:
Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 16 (January
1984), pp. 223-46. For a summary of state-centered explanations, see G. John Ikenberry, David A.
Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca
6. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-
1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
reach the decisionmaking agenda and what we know about how policy choices evolve within governmental organizations. Next, I will review several different decisionmaking models. Finally, I will return in more detail to the concept of institutional capacity in an effort to relate it to other decisionmaking theories and explain more fully how it operates. With these tools in hand, subsequent chapters will employ an institutional perspective to analyze three important alternatives for US security policy under consideration at the end of World War II.

UNDERSTANDING AGENDAS

Why do some ideas receive serious consideration and become items on the governmental decisionmaking agenda, while other salient issues are ignored? The question presents a crucial problem for democratic theory. E.E. Schattschneider argued in a seminal work on democratic participation, "The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power." And yet, agenda selection within the government is little understood, often neglected by theorists and citizens alike. Any theory of governmental decisionmaking must first address the definitional issues about governmental agendas and the alternatives they present.

An agenda is a programmatic choice that identifies the scope of governmental attention by delimiting the strategic, political, economic and social subjects of concern to governmental decisionmakers. Once the problems, issues, or alternative choices are presented on an agenda, they will be discussed in a

9. John Kingdon describes an agenda as "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time." *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 3.
variety of contexts. Proposals might be debated in congressional testimony, interagency governmental memos, newspaper articles, and many other venues. My analysis is limited to the subset of ideas that are seriously considered as policy options among high-level government officials. Such a focus helps to understand key forces underlying governmental decisionmaking processes in the realm of security policy. It also yields insights into the fate of particular alternative proposals. But it is important to note that this limited focus neglects many proposals that--despite their importance--were ignored by government officials and were not included on the decisionmaking agenda.  

Before going further, it is useful to distinguish between two forums for the governmental agenda: the political agenda and the decisionmaking agenda. The political agenda includes those issues and ideas that form the stated priorities and goals of US foreign policy. This set of broad goals is most often articulated by senior officials in public statements or by the President, such as in the annual State of the Union address to Congress. This political agenda draws from a wellspring of campaign promises, perceived electoral mandates, and current

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11. Other authors use slightly different terminology for these two forums. For example, John Kingdon distinguishes between the "governmental agenda, the list of subjects that are getting attention, and the decision agenda, or the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision." *Agendas, Alternatives*, p. 4.

Roger Cobb and Charles Elder define two types of agendas: systemic and institutional. By systemic agendas, they include "all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority." The institutional or formal agenda is defined as "that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decisionmakers." *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), pp. 85, 86.
problems that have captured public attention. It reflects both the personal priorities of key elected officials (such as the President, members of Congress, and key Cabinet officials and advisors), as well as political and economic exigencies (such as electoral outcomes or economic downturns).

Notably distinct, the decisionmaking agenda includes those issues that require governmental action, as determined by a coterie of policymakers. In truth, the term "decisionmaking" itself is an imprecise catchall for a number of different complex activities and processes. For the sake of simplicity, most researchers define a "decision" as a conscious choice between at least two alternative actions. 12 A further distinction can be made between strategic decisions and operational decisions. 13 The former address the question "what should we do?" and can be arrayed along a continuum from minor to major choices; the latter ask: "how do we carry it out?"

Different sets of participants and processes govern the political agenda and the decisionmaking agenda. In the area of foreign policy, a number of influential clusters of participants tend to frame the political agenda, including highly visible, elected officials and political appointees such as the President, the Cabinet and, to a lesser extent, Congress. By contrast, less-known and less publicly visible clusters of specialists both within and outside the government tend to shape the decisionmaking agenda, molding alternatives into policy


options. Ideas that succeed in being included on the broader political agenda have somewhat different attributes than those required for acceptance on the decisionmaking agenda. Similarly, different factors about the environments from which they emerge can aid their acceptance. Table 1 delineates some of these differences, asking the question: what attributes can help an idea get on one agenda or the other?

14. This pattern of influence on the governmental agenda has been identified by John Kingdon in a study of the development of public policy in the areas of health and transportation, *Agendas, Alternatives*, p. 123.

In the area of post-war German policy, there were a number of influential specialists within the bureaucracy: the Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), made up of representatives from State, War, Navy, Treasury and FEA; the military and civilian staff in the Office of Military Governor Germany (OMGUS), especially the planning branch and General Lucius Clay and his aides; the Civil Affairs Division and the Occupation Policies Division of the Department of the Army; John McCloy and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; the Presidential Commission on Reparations (active between the summer and fall of 1945); the staff of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, formed in July 1945; the Office of European Affairs, the Policy Planning Staff, and the Office of Occupied Territories, in the State Department; Averill Harriman and the staff of the European Recovery Program; the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate, as well as other subcommittees. In addition, there were a number of influential specialists outside of government, most notably: American corporate executives with interests in Germany; lobbying groups such as the Society for the Prevention of World War III, and relief groups such as the American Friends Service Committee.

Table 1

From Ideas to Policy Options: Attributes That Explain an Idea's Success at Reaching the Political and Decisionmaking Agendas.

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<th>Political Agenda</th>
<th>Decisionmaking Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>outside catalyst</td>
<td>specific deadline or opportunity to act emerges</td>
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<tr>
<td>creates sense of urgency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>perception of public and elite support</td>
<td>perception of feasibility and institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>widely shared goals</td>
<td>able to overcome organized opposition (through compromise, bargaining, or dominance of winning coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major issue of far-reaching importance</td>
<td>option presents minimal costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idea has broad public appeal</td>
<td>idea fits departmental routines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linkage to other important issues</td>
<td>linkage to other organizational interests</td>
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Despite the wide range of programmatic ideas that frequently circulate on a particular policy question, only a small number of policy alternatives receive serious consideration, making it onto the "short list" of the decisionmaking agenda. As a result, and because getting an issue onto the agenda is an essential first step, various government agencies and coalitions struggle continually to shape and limit the menu of choice. In the realm of security policy, only the

15. This point is also stressed in Paul Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter (With Notes on Ronald Reagan)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 105.
most senior government officials can make major policy decisions. At the same
time, these senior officials rely on the expertise of middle-level officials within
the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, on outside experts to analyze problems
and develop viable policy options. Thus, even when a specific alternative is
endorsed by a key official, a process of give and take within government agencies
often ensues as an idea is modified or fleshed out by other interested parties.
Decisions are rarely the product of an individual; in general, policies emerge from
calitions. The relative success of these coalitions is profoundly influenced by
institutional structures and interests within the bureaucracy as groups muster their
resources to channel the debate in a desired direction.16

In matters of governmental decisionmaking on issues of national security,
competing ideas often take the form of research memos and draft position papers
that are discussed and reviewed by key players within governmental agencies.
This iterative process is an essential part of the story, as actors in various
departments respond to criticism and changing circumstances. Policy alternatives
must survive this process of refinement and revision through existing
organizational structures until they are either rejected, accepted, or ignored. John
Kingdon likens the process to a "primeval soup" of policy alternatives, where
various ideas are floated, revised, altered, or shunted aside in a process of
selection that narrows them to a smaller subset under serious consideration.17

16. This is often described as the organization of bias, or the tendency to organize around
particularized interests and a shared ideology. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, "Communication
and Public Policy," in Dan Nimmo and Keith Sanders, eds., Handbook of Political

Charles Perrow stresses the central importance of organizational structures in channeling
power in certain directions, arguing that "Organizations are tools for shaping the world as one
wishes it to be shaped. They provide the means for imposing one’s own definition of the proper
affairs of humankind on others." Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd Edition (NY:

17. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, p. 21 and Chapter 6, especially, pp. 122-123.
This initial stage sets the parameters of subsequent debate and is pivotal to understanding the ultimate construction of policy options.18

To simplify matters, some scholars break the process of decisionmaking into phases, presenting a step-by-step sequence that falls roughly into chronological order: a preliminary stage of directing attention and setting the agenda; designing different alternatives and formulating policy options; making a choice (decision selection); and finally, implementation.19 While this can be helpful in isolating different phases of the process, the step-by-step approach assumes that policymaking proceeds through an orderly process that Charles Lindblom likens to "writing a term paper with a beginning, a middle, and an end, with each part tied logically to each succeeding part. That policy making proceeds in this manner," Lindblom says, "should be questioned rather than assumed."20 Instead, Lindblom and others favor the study of policymaking as "an extremely complex process, without beginning or end and whose boundaries must remain most uncertain."21

18. James March and Herbert Simon stress the importance of the premises of decisions in their pathbreaking study of organizational structures and decisions. Organizations (NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

   In a study of the president's agenda, Paul Light stresses the importance of an "available alternative," or a well-honed proposal as a central feature distinguishing what gets on to the 'decision agenda.' The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter (With Notes on Ronald Reagan), (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), p. 11, pp. 147-149.

19. This approach has also been called the policy process approach. Harold Lasswell, one of the first authors documenting this approach, divided the process into the following steps: intelligence, recommending, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising, and terminating. "The Public Interest," in C.F. Friedrich, ed., The Public Interest (NY: Atherton Press, 1962).


In an effort to account for marked shifts in government agendas, John Kingdon has stressed the importance of the confluence of three relatively independent policy streams--problems, policies and politics--to explain those times when a government acts. Kingdon's theory models the free flow of problems, solutions, and participants in organizational decisionmaking, stressing the importance of the timing of an idea as a key variable. Kingdon posits that the fate of alternatives rests in linking an idea to these other streams. Throughout, the mobilization of institutional resources is crucial to achieving a policy output.

For an idea to be sustained and translated into policy, it must receive institutional support; conversely, the absence of such support can stall or stifle an idea. Quite frequently, in fact, an alternative under discussion does not yield a policy output. Inaction can stem from a variety of causes. Participants might deadlock over a feasible solution. They might lack the inclination or resources to tackle the problem. Sometimes existing bureaucratic structures limit the possibility of implementing a policy. Action can also be blocked by external factors such as the position of other governments or other geopolitical circumstances.

In sum, to be successful, a proposal must pass through the critical hoop of option formulation--a process of bargaining, revision, and adaptation that lies at the heart of the puzzle of the evolution of policy alternatives. In this process, the definition and redefinition of alternatives shapes and constrains the substance and scope of political outcomes to an extent that is hard to overstate. In a study of the presidential agenda, Paul Light has noted that "selecting the alternatives is perhaps the single most important step in the presidential policy process. It is the

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point where the programmatic content is framed, where the political benefits are
set. More than any other choice, the choice of alternatives determines who gets
what, when, where, and how."²³ Because of the often significant stakes
involved, efforts to influence the construction of the elite agenda are often quite
intense struggles, engendering strong animosity and controversy.²⁴ Such
conflicts are especially prevalent during times of heightened uncertainty and far-
reaching organizational change.

MAKING DECISIONS: EXPLORING THE EVOLUTION OF
POLICY OPTIONS

The preceding overview suggests that the selection of the decisionmaking
agenda is a critical--and surprisingly insulated--part of the broader policy process
that can provide important clues about why certain ideas and strategies might
ultimately prevail. From the start, key participants play important roles and
institutional processes begin to channel alternatives along established policy
pathways. Still missing, however, is a model positing what these pathways are
and how they actually affect the fate of a given alternative.²⁵

²³ The President's Agenda, p. 105.
²⁴ In a more recent account of The Power Game in Washington during the 1980s, Hedrick Smith
documents the battles over the agenda waged among the different agencies. (NY: Random
House, 1988).
²⁵ While this study is limited to a focus on the conditions that hold prior to an actual decision,
there is also a whole literature that addresses the subsequent stage of implementation, including
the myriad of details, problems and unexpected outcomes that go along with executing a policy.
For a study that explicitly focuses on the implementation of American policies during the postwar
occupation of Germany, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and
For an overview of the recent emphasis on an institutional approach to implementation,
see Steven Maynard-Moody, "Beyond Implementation: Developing an Institutional Theory of
Administrative Policy Making," with a Response by Adam W. Herbert, Public Administration
Ultimately, this thesis adopts an institutional approach that stresses the role of government officials and organizational structures in shaping and constraining policy choices. But first, I will try to review some fundamentally distinct views of the way decisions get made, starting first with those approaches that stress the role of individual actors and building toward those theories that emphasize the organizational context.

Before going further however, it is important to emphasize that agenda setting and the formulation of foreign policy do not occur in a vacuum. Exogenous events shape the environment in which policymaking occurs. As a result, an understanding of policy outcomes requires a careful analysis of how the broader environment is filtered within government institutions.

Clearly, changes in the international arena create new opportunities for policymakers. But external forces alone cannot explain specific policy outcomes. In fact, this point is not lost to the policymakers themselves who--drawing upon their understanding of institutional structures and interests--often characterize and stress certain aspects of the external environment to promote a preferred policy path. Thus, the interpretation of external events serves as a fundamentally important resource for institutional actors. This is evident in the debate over policy during the 1948-49 Berlin blockade. While some parties argued for conciliation on the grounds that the Soviet blockade of the city indicated that the Soviets might be willing to go to war over the Berlin issue, others pushed for a firm response, characterizing the blockade as a desperate ploy of a weakened nation.

26. Although I have benefitted from the insights of the institutional model as it has developed in the field of sociology, this study does not use a strict structural-functional framework in the manner of Philip Selznick and others in this tradition. For a discussion of the institutional approach, see Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations, Chapter 5; and W. Richard Scott, Organizations, pp. 64-68, 117-118, 163-66.
As stated earlier, some scholars have mistakenly sought to attribute relative causal weight to external versus internal factors. In the analyses that follow, it is assumed that both external and internal factors are intrinsically linked in a complex web. Inputs from the external environment filter through the interpretive lenses provided by institutions and actors.

In the realm of foreign and security policy, as in other areas, theorists continue to debate whether decisionmaking should be understood as coherent (i.e., based on a rational actor model of decisionmaking), or as a result of organizational politics and internal conflict (i.e., based on a variety of organizational models of decisionmaking). Early studies stressed an idealized practice of decisionmaking, formulating step-by-step stages and explaining outcomes from the perspective of a rational actor. This early work spawned a wide range of critiques, from the multifaceted work of organizational theorists such as Herbert Simon to Braybrooke and Lindbloom's work on incremental decisionmaking and disjointed incrementalism. Graham Allison attempted to analyze the utility of three different approaches to decisionmaking—the rational actor, organizational process, and governmental (bureaucratic) politics models—

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27. For a thoughtful review essay on these competing approaches, see Lynn Eden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History?," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 174-207.

spawning, in turn, a new generation of critiques. More recently, John Kingdon has focused on the governmental agenda to analyze major changes in governmental policy.

Building upon concepts from both rational actor and organizational theory, this thesis stresses the role of individual persuasive power and institutional capacity in the evolution of alternatives. First, though, it is important to review the key features of these theories as they contribute to our understanding of the impact of individuals operating within an organizational context to make decisions.

THE RATIONAL DECISIONMAKER

The rational actor model explains the existence of alternatives on the decisionmaking agenda and the evolution of policy choices within governmental organizations in terms of the preferences of key players and their assessment of the strategy most likely to achieve a desired outcome. Rational actor theory posits that certain criteria (in terms of US foreign policy goals) can explain what types of ideas hold sway. The theory postulates a kind of meritocracy as to what ideas are taken up and adopted. Ideas are measured against each other; the proposal adopted is the one that appears to solve a given problem most effectively.


31. *Agendas, Alternatives.*
The rational actor approach starts from the assumption that a key actor (usually the President, with the input of key advisors) makes major decisions on problems of national security based on a comprehensive analysis of the relative costs and benefits of competing alternatives. A winning alternative is distinguished by offering the best promise of success at a reasonable cost. The model assumes that policy objectives can be articulated clearly enough to systematically evaluate an alternative's merits relative to other choices. Thus, the fate of an alternative can be predicted on the basis of individual preferences and whether it is viewed as better or worse in achieving a desired goal.

Certain aspects of the rational actor model are essential to understanding the basic contours of governmental debate. Elite conceptions and goals obviously serve as the starting point for policy choices and priorities. For example, the popular lesson taken from the interwar experience was the importance of prosperity in order to maintain the peace. This conviction helps to explain why the issue of reparations was placed at the top of the policy agenda in the early stages of negotiations. The high-level concern with reparations had a major impact on the US position and ultimately helps to explain why US negotiators

32. Several scholars have analyzed the rational actor model in great detail. Graham Allison's account of decisionmaking during the Cuban missile crisis sets out the rational actor approach in the context of a thoughtful discussion of the fundamental importance of conceptual frameworks in constructing the types of questions asked and what variables are deemed relevant. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1971).

supported such a weak structure for the Allied Control Council, the international body designed to oversee the German occupation.\textsuperscript{33}

Another strength of the rational actor model is its suggestion that policymakers seek to avoid costs. Paul Light and others have found that alternatives are generally evaluated by the President on the basis of costs; as a result, the relative cost of a proposed policy (rather than its objectives) tends to drive policy choices.\textsuperscript{34}

The rational actor model remains popular despite a number of compelling critiques.\textsuperscript{35} While the approach often simplifies and idealizes the policy process, perhaps its enduring appeal stems from the fact that it offers a convincing argument of cause and effect: there do indeed seem to be occasions when decisionmakers consider a constellation of alternatives and evaluate their substantive and political costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, many scholarly analyses of security policy remain deeply committed to this conception of rationality, a fact perhaps best illustrated by the Cold War literature on deterrence theory which was widely premised on a rational actor perspective.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{33} American policymakers insisted that each zonal commander be given widespread latitude over actions in their zone in order to assure control over the rate of reparations removed from the occupied territories.

\textsuperscript{34} The President's Agenda, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{36} In a study of presidential decisionmaking, Paul Light has found that there are instances when decisions are reached based on the tenets of rational decisionmaking, The President's Agenda, Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{37} During the Cold War, an enormous subdiscipline concerned with the dilemmas and requirements of deterrence flourished. In his work on The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), Thomas Schelling presented a trend-setting analysis of
Despite its appeal, however, the rational actor perspective is weakened by its assumption that actors always know what they want and that they have stable preferences and goals. Furthermore, this model tends to assume that decisions derive from a single overarching goal or, if goals compete, that decisionmakers choose by ranking the priority of different goals. For example, most elite policymakers at the end of World War II were quite unclear about the role of the US in international politics and whether the public would support a more activist foreign policy. This uncertainty is manifest in the remarkable ambiguity and ambivalence of US foreign policy in 1945.

An analysis that focuses on the articulated goals of individuals risks ignoring the diverse alternatives and factors that come into play. This problem is illustrated by the tendency of scholars and pundits to view the goal of countering the Soviet Union as the key explanatory variable in US foreign policy at the outset of the Cold War. Policymakers have contributed to this misconception. For example, President Truman explained his policies as follows: "the one purpose that dominated me in everything I thought and did was to prevent a third world war" by thwarting Soviet expansionist policies in Europe.38 Especially in the realm of historical research, it is all too easy to fall into the trap of accepting


at face value the *post hoc* rationalizations of key participants. While Dean Acheson, General Lucius Clay, and other key officials defended their actions on the grounds of the need to create a strong German economy as a "bulwark against communism," an altogether different picture of decisionmaking emerges from analysis of the day-to-day discussions and actions within the government. The number of shifts, flip-flops, and contradictions in US goals and policy is striking. Competing interests and concerns are fiercely promoted by players representing various agencies involved in postwar policy. Although the goals articulated by relevant elites provide much insight and are undoubtedly important, explicit rationalizations and arguments are only one variable among a number of diverse forces that push and pull different policy alternatives as they make their way through institutional structures and processes.  

Finally, rational actor theory does not account for the fact that a policy often reflects no one individual's preferred alternative, but rather results from conflict and compromise. This perspective is well-documented in the literature on bureaucratic politics. Officials faced a perplexing dilemma in choosing between competing policies towards Germany. On the one hand, some favored a centralized occupation government in order to increase food distribution and economic competitiveness, while others insisted on dismembering Germany into several states to decentralize power and prevent future aggression. The difficulties in reconciling these conflicting priorities contributed to a climate of delay and vacillation that is essential to understanding the evolution of alternatives. Yet this

key aspect of the process is largely ignored in the rational-actor assumption that preferences and priorities are ranked in the pursuit of specific goals.

The period's documentary evidence highlights the role played by conflicting interests and concerns of the day in shaping alternatives. Despite the paramount goal of creating a stable peace in Europe, this explicit goal rarely surfaced in the policy debate as a criterion for evaluating the merits and feasibility of various alternatives under consideration.\textsuperscript{41} Instead, partisan considerations and immediate problems take center stage in the early emergency planning for the occupation of Germany. It was not until considerably later—in 1946-1947—that policymakers became overtly preoccupied with anticommunist considerations.

The main stumbling block in the US reparations plan in 1945, for example, came not merely from Soviet demands for $20 billion in reparations from Germany, but from political concerns on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the issue of "forced labor" in Germany. Truman instructed Edwin Pauley, the head representative of the government's reparations panel, to "use his best judgment in the matter but in no circumstances to commit us to anything resembling slave labor."\textsuperscript{42} The government's internal struggle over the reparations issue does not always feature prominently in accounts that characterize the clash over reparations in terms of conflicting interests between the US and Soviet Union. But a close look suggests that Pauley's plan for reparations had less to do with long term US strategic interests and goals, than with Truman's view of what proposals would cost him politically in the Senate.

Domestic forces, like so many other variables, surely influenced US policy regarding the occupation of Germany. Such forces can constrain the parameters of

\textsuperscript{41} This tendency towards "nonevaluation" has been frequently noted by organizational theorists.

debate in unpredictable, but significant ways that are normally excluded from rational actor models of decisionmaking.

In sum, while it provides a useful conceptual framework for individual actors, rational actor theory falters at the level of government action, especially during turning-point periods. It is misguided to assume that decision processes start with a clear definition of the problem and proceed through a systematic search for alternatives that culminates in their ultimate acceptance or rejection. As David Welch puts it, "rationality is constrained in various important ways by factors that are either determined or strongly influenced by organizational or bureaucratic considerations."\(^{43}\) And the evidence is contradictory at best regarding the rational actor view that decisions result from an explicit, conscious, evaluation of costs and benefits of alternative courses of action based on certain identifiable preferences and goals. Prior to the institutionalization of containment, the US pursued several contradictory and piecemeal policies. Reliance on the stated preferences of key individuals does little to illuminate this seemingly haphazard process.

**THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT OF DECISIONMAKING**

The field of organizational politics has attracted tremendous attention in the last thirty years, developing a rich and wide-ranging literature that has attempted to redress some of the conceptual weaknesses of the rational actor model. For the purposes of this study, consideration of the organizational model will be limited to a few key issues that pertain to the evolution and fate of alternatives on the decisionmaking agenda. In this regard, perhaps the most

\(^{43}\) "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms," p. 138.
notable contributions of organizational theory include the observations that: 1) the idealized process of comprehensive decisionmaking is constrained by organizational structures and processes; 2) the process is fraught with conflict; and 3) there is a proclivity for incremental adjustments rather than more far-reaching choices in governmental decisionmaking.

One of the most helpful insights of organizational theorists is their observation that decisionmakers are subject to important limitations, or what has become known as "bounded rationality." When individuals face a choice, for example, they tend to construct a simplified model based on past experience and a highly selective view of the data.

Institutional structure refers to the organizational features of groups as well as the rules and norms that guide the relationships between actors. James March and Johan Olsen describe these structures as "a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals." This institutional structure shapes political battles and can provide the resources and leverage to win them; it can facilitate or limit "access to political resources and the policymaking apparatus, including the role and influence of governmental officials themselves.”

The structures of organizational decisionmaking are manifest in standard operational procedures for distributing tasks and allocating responsibility. These operational procedures often dictate which individuals within an organization are

responsible for a given problem or issue (for instance, high-level officials or lower-level employees); whether attention is directed to a given problem and the amount of time devoted to it; the allocation of limited resources to different issue areas; and the amount of authority delegated to various officials.

Organizational structures operate both within and between government agencies, facilitating and constraining the actions of actors. Changes in organizational structures can affect the balance of power between governmental agencies, the centralization and coherence of bureaucratic organizations, and the resources and policy instruments available to officials.

In addition to organizational structures, problem solving in organizations takes place in routinized processes that can explain much about the way alternative choices evolve. March and Simon suggest that decisionmakers engage in a limited search for alternatives that seeks the first satisfactory solution rather than the optimal or comprehensive one.\(^{49}\) March and Simon also stress the importance of delay and inaction (or passing the buck) in organization processes; the importance of established channels of authority and standardized operating procedures in drafting intergovernmental proposals (such as high-level negotiations or international agreements). By incorporating these features of organizational decisionmaking into an analysis of policy alternatives on the governmental agenda, one can identify some of the obstacles that contribute to the demise of many policy options.

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COMPETING ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS

Organized bureaucracies have an extraordinary influence on human social life. Using their considerable resources, organizations wield tremendous power. Charles Perrow has noted, for instance, "bureaucracies satisfy, delight, pollute, and satiate us with their output of goods and services, they also shape our ideas, our very way of conceiving of ourselves, control our life chances, and even define our humanity."50

Through various institutional processes, organizations advance their interests and exercise control to foster ideas and policies compatible with existing institutional interests and agendas. The institutional structures of organizations tend to promote organizational interests and as such, one might predict the fate of an alternative based on its efficacy in protecting or expanding organizational interests. This would hold especially for alternatives that affect the size, operations and autonomy of an organization. From this perspective, ideas compatible with organizational interests will tend to thrive, while ideas that undermine these interests will be more subject to challenge and modification. This perspective also stresses that important decisions will tend to be compatible with organizational goals.51

As many scholars and practitioners have observed, institutions seek to perpetuate their own existence. This fundamental interest in organizational survival helps to explain the tendency for organizations to promote problems and issues that justify their existence. Secondly, organizations seek to further their basic mission and secure the necessary capabilities to uphold a given mission--the

50. Perrow, Complex Organizations, p. 5.
basic goals and purpose of an organization. Morton Halperin has termed this mission an organization's "essence."

52 For example, the core mission of the Army is ground combat capability. This core mission leads to a focus on activities, policies, and weapons programs that promote this warfighting capability. The core missions of the State Department are to report on the affairs of other governments as they pertain to US interests and to negotiate specific policies and agreements. In line with these missions, the regional offices in the State Department are the heart of the organization and are ranked according to their relative importance to US interests.

53 Organizational interests are advanced through various procedures, or mechanisms that exercise institutional control by shaping and constraining the development of ideas. These mechanisms operate on different levels within organizations. Charles Perrow describes three types of controls: 1) direct, fully obtrusive controls such as formal rules and regulations, direct orders, surveillance and supervision; 2) the more unobtrusive forms of bureaucratic control, such as specialization, standardization and hierarchy, and 3) fully unobtrusive controls, in the form of cognitive premises and assumptions.

54 In the case of unobtrusive controls, workers voluntarily limit the range of information that will be attended to ("those sorts of things are irrelevant," or "What has that got to do with the matter?") and the range of alternatives that would be considered ("It would never occur to me to do that").

55 As a result of these mechanisms, organizational

53. This includes the following five regional bureaus: Europe (historically the largest and most prestigious), the Near East and South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Inter-American Affairs. Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 134.
54. Perrow, Complex Organizations, p. 129.
55. Ibid, p. 129.
biases shape the scope of alternatives developed within the government. These alternatives, then, reflect the distinctive culture and interests of the organizations from which they emerge.\textsuperscript{56} These powerful and elusive forces contribute to shaping policy alternatives by providing the backdrop, or the premises of decisions, as well as by explicitly constraining what problems will be addressed, with what means and by whom.

These mechanisms filter and reinterpret information as it passes through an organization. March and Simon have identified several features of communication within organizations, including: 'uncertainty absorption';\textsuperscript{57} technical language and organizational vocabulary; fixed channels of communication; programmed tasks; procedural and substantive programs, the standardization of raw materials, the frequency of communication channel usage, interdependencies of units and programs.\textsuperscript{58}

For March and Simon, the process of uncertainty absorption limits information content and flow through various bureaucratic procedures. For example, the information transmitted in State Department cables and position papers contains a select slice of 'reality'. Organizational vocabularies, or bureaucratic language, meanwhile, can profoundly alter the meaning of a problem.


\textsuperscript{57} "Uncertainty absorption takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated." March and Simon, \textit{Organizations}, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{58} Summarized in Perrow, \textit{Complex Organizations}, p. 128.
or proposal. These mechanisms have a number of implications. They draw attention to some aspects of an issue and play down others; they limit the search for alternatives when problems are confronted, thus ensuring more predictable and consistent solutions; and they coordinate work by setting guidelines for work techniques and schedules. Taken together, these mechanisms reshape a problem or issue so that it can be handled along routine organizational channels.

Taking a different approach, a number of scholars have identified conflict as a key feature that helps to explain organizational outcomes. In this way, the fate of alternatives over German policy, for instance, can be explained as the outcome of various fights among different agencies and coalitions with overlapping jurisdictions. In an early study of the behavior of business firms, Cyert and March documented the central importance of conflict in shaping organizational processes in order to achieve what they term the quasi-resolution of conflict. The main organizational processes that contribute to the quasi-resolution of conflict are: the use of organizational goals to minimize the impact of different goals among participants; an emphasis on local rationality so that problems are broken down into subunits; reliance on acceptable-level decision rules; and sequential attention to goals. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of alternatives, a number of researchers have documented the central role of intense disagreements and conflict in shaping alternatives. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has gone so far as to describe these conflicts as "internecine warfare" within the government.

59. For an interesting discussion of this issue with regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis, see David Welch, "Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics," pp. 138-139.
60. Perrow, Complex Organizations, p. 128.
63. Present at the Creation, p. 22.
In line with this view, historian John Gimbel has argued that the evolution of US policy toward Germany after World War II can be understood as the manifestation of disagreement among various departments in Washington over which interests should be given top priority, the struggle between Congress and the administration for control of German policy, and disagreements between Americans and their Allies on the one hand, and between Americans and Germans on the other. Although less visible, intragovernmental politicking—what Morton Halperin describes as the process of pulling and hauling within the bureaucracy—played an important part in the decision process, as different organizational factions and coalitions vied for influence during the transition to peacetime government.

THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF KEY PARTICIPANTS

As we have seen, the organizational context can be an important factor in influencing not only the diversity of options considered, but what kind of outcomes are likely to be favored. Understanding the competition between different governmental agencies, however, or the role of institutional interests, goes only so far in explaining policy outcomes. A fuller understanding comes from those theorists who have tried to incorporate notions of power within decisionmaking circles—and the subtle, informal ways in which power is derived.

It goes without saying that interests, organizational or otherwise, are promoted by people. Rather than look to individuals *per se*, though, it is helpful to examine the persuasive power wielded by individuals and coalitions to help

understand which ideas are developed into formal alternatives. More than the ideas themselves, the ability of key participants to gain institutional backing for an idea distinguishes a winning alternative.

Four facets to individual persuasive power contribute to the success of an alternative: the relative power of an advocate (or his or her position in the governmental hierarchy); how actively a person or group takes on a problem or advocates a proposed solution (how much time and energy are invested in a given alternative); the subjective assessment of the persuasive ability of the person promoting an idea (this rests, in turn, on the preferences, beliefs or values of decisionmakers), and the nature and extent of institutional backing.

Persuasion can take a variety of forms, ranging from making telephone calls and drafting memos, to formally presenting a proposal at a meeting and obtaining the necessary approval for action. When all else fails, for instance, an idea can be taken to the public through leaks to the press or in congressional hearings. Obviously, persuasive power depends on an individual's level of energy and skill in selling an idea or convincing others to tackle a given problem. Persuasiveness, in this sense, rests on subjective judgments about what will sell to other important players. As a result, the shared values, ideology and beliefs of the

68. E.E. Schattschneider refers to this as widening the scope of conflict, *The Semisovereign People*. 
inner circle of policymakers help to explain the types of arguments and logic that are deemed persuasive.

Individual beliefs and ideas are integral to the development of policy alternatives. Many studies attest to the central role of the president in shaping the agenda. At the pinnacle of governmental decisionmaking, the personal beliefs, interests, and style of a president all play a crucial part in determining what ideas and problems attract the attention of the government as well as what types of policies are developed into formal options for action. By extension, the central senior policymakers also play a major role in shaping alternatives on the agenda.

But while some aspects of power in organizations are conferred by one's position in a hierarchy, true persuasive power is a subjective and ephemeral condition. Often, an individual's reputation, position in government and relationship to other powerful people (especially the president) contribute to influence within decisionmaking circles. Also, the extent of individual persuasiveness may vary widely over time and from one issue to another.

While individual persuasive power is always an important variable, it takes on heightened significance during turning-point periods. Normal policymaking periods tend to be dominated by precedent, past policies, and "rules of the road." To some extent, then, individual persuasive power can be seen to have an inverse relationship with the extent of such formal structures.

Along these lines, some theorists have posited that relative power becomes a significantly more salient variable in periods of uncertainty. 70

69. This is not to say that the President enjoys comparable control over what alternatives are actually considered and how policies are implemented. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, p. 25-28, p. 45; Light, The President's Agenda.
Lawrence Goodwyn has noted, for instance, that crisis periods afford individual actors and coalitions increased latitude in the decisionmaking process.\textsuperscript{71}

Of course, the goal of persuasive power is to succeed in getting a preferred idea or action to be officially sanctioned as policy. Alternatives are rarely compared to an ideal course of action. Instead, they are almost always judged by how "feasible" they are and viewed in the context of opposing options. Feasibility serves as an important hurdle that is influenced to a varying degree by the persuasive power of an individual or coalition.

\textbf{TOWARD A SYNTHESIS}

This study stresses the importance of the institutional setting in understanding particular policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{72} The preceding review has briefly surveyed a variety of theories about organizational decisionmaking. Many of these theories offer valuable tools for understanding the US government's efforts to establish security policy at the end of World War II. Each of the various approaches emphasizes different, relevant features of the process entailed to reach its decisions.

As I have argued in the preceding review, governmental organizations filter and channel external inputs in the important process of setting decisionmaking agendas. Despite its other failings, the rational actor model rightly emphasizes the central role of individual actors within a broader governmental context. The institutional approach, meanwhile, highlights the fact

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{The Populist Moment} (NY: Oxford University Press, 1978).

\textsuperscript{72} A similar institutional perspective is presented in Ikenberry et al., \textit{The State and American Foreign Economic Policy}, Chapter 1 and Chapter 9, especially p. 222.
that state actors must work within and through governmental organizations to translate the constraints and opportunities of an era into policy.

Early organizational theorists tended to emphasize the formal structures of institutions which shape and channel inputs from the broader environment by enforcing certain rules and procedures for decisionmaking. Organizational structures can include organizational features of groups as well as the rules and norms that guide the relationships between actors. James March and Johan Olsen describe these structures as "a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals."73 These structures shape political battles and can provide the resources and leverage to win them; they can facilitate or limit "access to political resources and the policymaking apparatus, including the role and influence of governmental officials themselves."74

An additional dimension is the importance and impact of organizational interests. As we have seen, actors within organizations must marshal support for policy options by building coalitions. Often, in the conflict-ridden process of building a coalition, parochial institutional interests come to the fore.

74. Ikenberry et al., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 220-1.
Finally, scholars have struggled with the persuasive power and informal forces that are important but often difficult to assess. Power within organizations derives from a range of variables--from an individual's formal position in government to his or her skill in persuasion.

As noted above, the decisionmaking process is also influenced by any number of other factors, such as domestic politics, linkage with other problems on the agenda, international actors, and external events. All these different dimensions are necessary for a full understanding of decisionmaking within governmental organizations. The seeming "bedlam" of governmental decisionmaking reflects this complex interplay of factors.

It is important to remember, however, that the consideration and selection of various alternative policy options forms the heart of governmental activity. In particular, this study is concerned with the alternatives themselves--especially those ideas that initially attract support and are subsequently discarded or rejected as infeasible.

As many scholars have noted, the initial starting point for debate--the status quo--serves as the basis for the process in which ideas are filtered and channeled within organizations. This approach has become known as incrementalism because it views decisionmaking as a series of incremental steps, marked by a process of *ad hoc* mutual adjustment.\(^{75}\) The incremental model posits that decisionmakers take existing programs as a starting point, and then suggest only minor alterations.\(^{76}\) In this way, alternatives can be best understood as the outcome of small, marginal adjustments to current programs and actions.


rather than as the result of any comprehensive selection. Thus, predictions of why certain alternatives develop depends on the context of prior choices and partisan bargaining within the government.

The theory of incrementalism offers a compelling explanation for much of governmental policymaking and provides a useful model for the generation of alternatives. In essence, the various features of organizational decisionmaking outlined above work to perpetuate the status quo, assuring stability and continuity in governmental policy. Yet, the theory of incrementalism does not account for important transformations in the menu of alternatives, or nonincremental shifts in the governmental agenda that result in major policy changes.

What happens when the status quo falls away? In a period of flux, such as the striking upheaval brought on by World War II, previously accepted governmental channels and established mechanisms to process issues may become obsolete or otherwise cease to operate. This thesis argues that in such unusual circumstances, the capacities and resources of institutional actors become relatively more important. (See Table 2.)

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Table 2: Characteristics of Turning Point Periods That Afford Greater Influence to Institutional Capacity

1) Administrative rules and procedures
   -- ad hoc channels gain prominence
   -- temporary, makeshift organizational rules and procedures adopted
   -- less stringent inter- and intra-organizational controls contribute to "free for all" conflict over competing approaches
   -- upheaval in rules and procedures allows more choice, wider boundary of debate

2) Power and organizational interests
   -- contested balance of power
   -- extensive institutional adaptation and development as relative power shifts among different departments
   -- augmented central power in key individuals combines with dispersed/fractured organizational authority
   -- contested jurisdiction yields greater likelihood/willingness to apply capacities and resources in innovative/nonconventional ways

3) Normative order/ideology
   -- legitimacy of status quo policies debated
   -- past norm challenged; emerging norm takes hold
   -- uncertainty and changed circumstances foster changing world view
Just as agendas frame what choices are available, realities about the capabilities and resources that allow a government to act set the boundaries of the decisionmaking process. As often as not, policymakers ask the question: "What can we do?" rather than "What do we want to do?" While alternatives percolate within the government, landing on the agenda and advancing various desired ends or policies, the evolution of the decisionmaking process winnows out alternatives on the basis of perceived feasibility.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, the decisionmaking process during periods of flux is subtly, but significantly, altered from its normal state. In the face of a lack of agreement over the 'rules of the road' both within and among organizations, greater influence is afforded to a given institution's capacity to carry out a feasible policy. This greater emphasis on institutional capacity during flux periods works as a powerful force to modify or circumvent traditional organizational structures and helps to explain the fate of three losing policy alternatives at the end of World War II.
CHAPTER 4

EMERGING NORMS AND THE US DEBATE OVER COLLECTIVE SECURITY DURING WORLD WAR II

A very large part of our present difficulties may be traced to the policy of reiterating high principles and of postponing the settlement of concrete issues.

-- Walter Lippmann, January 1945

Toward the end of World War II, US policymakers had an unparalleled opportunity to establish multilateral and collaborative collective security arrangements. During this period, in fact, ideas flourished about how to create a postwar security system. The formation of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) codified an international commitment to respond to future threats to peace; yet these arrangements fell far short of the officially stated goals of the period and the more far-reaching proposals under consideration.

The policy discussions that occurred in the final years of the war presage much about the ultimate formation of the United Nations and the Allied occupation of Germany. Despite propitious circumstances and a consensus over


2. Prior to 1945, the term "United Nations" referred to "democratic" countries. The original members of the United Nations comprised the group of 26 nations, headed by the United States and Britain, that signed an agreement pledging a Grand Alliance against the Axis powers. This agreement pledged the joint conduct of the war and a fight to the finish; it also established a Combined Chiefs of Staff to achieve this goal. Kenneth Davis, Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of Dwight Eisenhower (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1952), p. 290.
the goals of collective security, the governmental agencies responsible for
security policy lacked the institutional capacity to translate the general principles
of collective security into viable policies.

Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, the far-reaching policy debate
over the nature and scope of an international organization ultimately benefitted
those policies advanced by senior officials in the War Department. This was
largely because when it came time for a final decision, the War Department had
the capacity to handle the complex problems posed by a collective security
regime and the occupation of a defeated Germany. By 1944, the War Department
possessed an extensive infrastructure (including a clear chain of command) and
vast military forces in response to the extraordinary demands of mobilizing and
fighting a world war. At a critical juncture in the debate, War Department
officials succeeded in preventing a provision for an international air force from
being included in the final conference document of the Dumbarton Oaks
negotiations on the UN charter, leaving the issue unresolved.

During World War II, a central tenet of postwar planning was the need for
international agreement on a system of collective security. This chapter examines
the institutions and actors involved in this debate, focusing on how governmental
structures and organizational interests influenced the prospects of some ideas over
others and their development into policy options. I then discuss the alternative
approaches to collective security and an international police force in more detail,
dividing the debate into advocates of regional, universal, and ad hoc measures.
Finally, I analyze the impact of institutional capacity on these diverse efforts to
achieve a collective security regime.
THE EMERGING NORM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

During World War II, government officials, the media, and the public all stressed the need for a new system of collective security in order to create a lasting peace. The term collective security refers to universal or joint action to deter and combat aggression and covers a wide range of different measures and ideas that range from armed combat, the negotiated settlement of conflict, preventive diplomacy, to the general promotion of international peace.³ In a 1952 UNESCO report, collective security is explained as a political conception that is ambiguous, lying somewhere between world government and an organization created by sovereign states for the prevention of war. Nonetheless, the ultimate objective of collective security is "a state of affairs in which attempts to change the status quo by violence are, and are known to be, unnecessary, unlawful, and doomed to frustration through opposition in overwhelming force."⁴

³ Although widely used, it is difficult to offer a precise definition of the notion of collective security because it is not a technical term and was never clearly defined in any official statement or treaty, beyond the general wording of the UN Charter. Roland Stromberg sets out the following assumptions underlying the concept of collective security:

(1) All international disputes are subject to peaceable, just, satisfactory settlement.
(2) Nations are for the most part inclined to peace, not war.
(3) The inclination to war is everything: war results only when at least one side is guilty of a deliberately aggressive act.
(4) Since wars are always caused by a deliberate aggressor, this action must be checked in its first stages or it will lead on to ever greater aggression; the incipient criminal will certainly become a hardened one if not caught in time.
(5) As an inference from (3) and (4), all states have an obvious stake in a war no matter where it may occur, and will, if they understand their interests properly, join in helping to suppress it.


Much of the thinking about future security drew upon the earlier Wilsonian principles of an international covenant set forth during efforts to create a League of Nations at the end of World War I.\(^5\) This time, however, policymakers were determined to avoid the mistakes of the League. Thus, not only did proponents of collective security reject the concept of alliances, but they also endorsed a commitment by all members to oppose any cross-border aggression, as embodied in the phrase, all for one and one for all.\(^6\)

The disastrous experience of the interwar period held important lessons of the pitfalls to be avoided in the coming peace. The threat of a future Hitler, intent on aggressive expansion, necessitated some form of joint action by the international community. Most called for governmental action to redress the instabilities that led to World War II.\(^7\) Even Senator Vandenberg, one of the period's most influential conservative republicans in Congress, gradually moderated his opposition to US participation in an international organization, or what came to be known as the United Nations. Throughout the wartime debate over whether to commit the United States to membership in a new collective security organization after the war, there was little disagreement between either the 'internationalists' or the 'realists' over the goal of undercutting isolationism.\(^8\)

A number of security concerns were hotly debated in governmental circles during World War II. Of primary importance to President Roosevelt and others in the administration was the question of what form of international "machinery"

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8. Gaddis, "The Insecurities of Victory," in Lacey, p. 239.
would be most likely to uphold the peace. Several courses of action were considered that relied upon joint international action to disarm the losers in the war and to police future threats to peace. Much of the debate focused on whether to institute regional, universal or ad hoc institutions. The general debate over international police forces went hand-in-hand with debate over the form of the Allied occupation of Germany following the defeat of the Nazis. In addition, there was also the question of timing, or when to address postwar security concerns. Secretary of State Hull (along with other officials in the State Department) stressed the need to establish postwar machinery while the war was still underway, while Secretary of War Stimson urged that many of these decisions be delayed until after the war. Another issue was how to control military forces and the dual threats of militarism and nationalism (e.g., how to bring about the disarmament and pacification of adversaries). And finally, there was the looming fear of a renewed economic depression and worries over future economic relations that had important ramifications for international security.

During this period, the major points of contention were not so much differences over goals—there was general consensus during the war of the need for some form of institutional machinery to punish aggressors—but disagreement over what institutional structures would operate most effectively and when they should take effect.9

Yet, collective security remained ambiguous. Did it imply a military alliance with policing action to prevent or punish aggression? Would it be global or regional in scope? Should the arrangement treat every country as an equal, or should special restrictions be imposed on the Axis powers to prevent renewed

aggression? In cases of conflict or aggression, who should mediate and, if
necessary, intervene? How did economic reconstruction and international trade fit
in? What was the time frame for establishing such an international system? And
finally, how would this system handle the prickly issue of limiting the sovereignty
of nations to enforce its mandate?

A Consensus on Postwar Security Goals, but Differences in Approach

While much was left unspecified, the wartime discussion included several
important goals for this new system of collective security. First and foremost,
aggressor states (the code words at the time for Germany and Japan) were to be
completely disarmed and denied the capability to pose a threat to other nations.
This meant that the Allies must first take control of all war materials and
weapons, capture military officers, the police, important party members and the
leaders of the Nazi government. Virtually no one challenged this goal as the first
priority of the Allied military occupation and there was little controversy over
what steps should be taken to disarm the German and Japanese war machines;
indeed it was the core tenet of the demand for unconditional surrender. 10 Toward

10. In President Roosevelt's address on the Crimean Conference on March 1, 1945, he reiterated
the United States' commitment to the unconditional surrender of Germany, describing it as
follows:

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia,
France and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a
separate zone of Germany--and the administration of the four zones will be
coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of representatives of the
four nations.

Unconditional surrender also means the end of Nazism and of the Nazi
Party--and all of its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public,
private and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and
just--and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany; the destruction of its
militarism and its military equipment; the end of its production of armament;
this end, military considerations were paramount and military requirements received dominant consideration throughout wartime planning.

Most assumed that, following a limited period of occupation to disarm the German and Japanese war machine and punish war criminals, the United States would pull back its forces and vastly reduce its military budget to earlier peacetime levels. Interestingly, given this view, there was little discussion of restrictions upon the level of armament or military arrangements of the other major powers. There was a basic assumption that the victorious nations would remain armed (allowing for adjustments to peacetime conditions) while the guilty nations would be completely disarmed. In light of the sorry record of compliance to the peace terms of World War I, much of the planning emphasized the need for assurances that the United States and Allies would retain the capacity to intervene if the terms of the occupation were violated or circumvented. In documents prepared for the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, postwar planning was based on the proposition that the United States should be "prepared to intervene in Germany to prevent [the] re-emergence of dangerous, nationalistic

the dispersal of all its armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff, which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations in kind for the damage which has been done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind—in plants and machinery and rolling stock and raw materials—we shall avoid the mistake that we and other people made after the last war of demanding reparations in the form of money, which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the future world. Too much experience has shown that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive war.

activities." The questions of what machinery should be created to coordinate Allied action and oversee the forces that would be deployed, however, were left unanswered.

A second shared feature of wartime discussions was the demand for a global prohibition on war. President Roosevelt and other senior actors stressed the fundamental obligation of all nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Whereas the League of Nations had distinguished between lawful and unlawful private wars, most of the wartime debate focused on the indivisibility of peace. In his final speech under preparation at the time of his death, President Roosevelt enjoined the nation that: "The work, my friends, is peace. More than an end of this war--an end to the beginnings of all wars. Yes, an end, forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the differences between governments by the mass killing of peoples."13

A third goal of the postwar security system was the need to address not only armaments, but 'militarism' which was also described as extreme nationalism. The widespread belief that militarism was a root cause of war led to a series of proposals to re-educate and reform the Axis nations along the lines of US-style democracy. While the causes of militarism were an ongoing point of contention, there was basic agreement that the first steps in eradicating this

12. This global assumption was later included in the UN Charter.
13. This is the latest (but not final) draft of a speech that President Roosevelt was preparing for the Jefferson Day address. The last sentence was hand written into the typed draft by Roosevelt. President Franklin Roosevelt, "Let Us Move Forward with Strong and Active Faith," undelivered address prepared for Jefferson Day, April 13, 1945, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel Rosenman (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 615.
'scourge' included measures to eliminate the most obvious manifestations of militarism by disbanding and outlawing all Nazi organizations and institutions that promoted fascist values.\textsuperscript{15}

A fourth essential goal was the need for economic security against a revival of German military strength. All the Allies stressed the need to dismantle or at a minimum severely restrict German industries that had any war potential.\textsuperscript{16} Concern over the economic causes of conflict contributed to a preoccupation with the critical relationship between military power and economic capacity.

A fifth goal was to get all nations to sign onto the terms of this postwar security system. The fundamental lesson drawn from the war and the failure of the League of Nations was that future security rested upon the participation of all members of the international community in an agreement that could maintain the peace through the necessary mechanisms of enforcement. Such an international agency would be based on collective action—or all against one—and empowered to protect against external attack or interference. This required creating an international rule of law to deter aggression and reduce reliance on standing military forces for security.\textsuperscript{17}

From the early stages of the war, US postwar planning was premised on the twin concepts of Allied victory and continued cooperation among the wartime Allies to achieve this postwar structure.\textsuperscript{18} Yet beneath the surface of these

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{15} This belief motivated the ambitious yet ultimately unsuccessful denazification effort after the war.
\textsuperscript{18} Robert Hilderbrand argues that from the outset of the war, "American postwar planning was invariably predicated on the dual concepts of Allied victory and cooperation." *Dumbarton Oaks*, p. 16.
\end{flushleft}
general goals, liberals and conservatives in the United States held strikingly different ideas about what policies should be pursued. These differences surfaced in disagreements over the timing, scope, and extent of US participation in an international institution.

For some, the big mistake of World War I was that countries waited until the fighting stopped before considering the postwar settlement. In order to avoid this problem, some officials (notably, Vice President Henry Wallace and Secretary of State Cordell Hull) pushed for the United States to take strong action while the war was still underway in order to assure agreement by all nations. More conservative elements warned against any early agreements that might impinge on future US freedom or restrict the sovereignty of the President or Congress to commit forces in a conflict. Yet following US entry into the war, even longtime isolationists qualified their opposition to a postwar collective security system—rather than object outright to such a system, these opponents argued that the United States would be better off waiting until the end of the war to negotiate such a structure.

An important area of disagreement was whether to organize an international structure on a regional or global basis. One proposal set forth early on in the war called for the establishment of regional organizations coordinated by an umbrella international organization. The idea was endorsed by several prominent officials, including British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,

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This commitment was codified in two treaties: the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed May 26, 1942, which called for the two countries "to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace" and "to collaborate closely" in the "peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction," and the Lend-Lease Agreement with the United States, signed on June 11, 1942, which called for continued postwar economic cooperation.
President Roosevelt, Under Secretary Sumner Welles and several other officials in the State Department.19

The problem of how an organization would be able to enforce the peace brought calls for an international police force. Another coalition of prominent liberals took this idea one step further and advocated a global organization that gave extensive power to a centralized structure to enforce the peace. The leading advocates of this approach were Vice President Henry Wallace and Secretary of State Cordell Hull (although, as will be explained further on, Hull disapproved of certain aspects of Wallace's scheme). A third group remained skeptical about the immediate relevance of an international organization for postwar security. These conservatives opposed any restrictions on US sovereignty and argued that governmental efforts to reach agreement on international machinery would sidetrack the government from the crucial task of developing a foreign policy based on recognition of spheres of influence. These three approaches to postwar security are illustrative of the spectrum of debate during this period and will be discussed in greater detail further on. But this debate did not take place in a vacuum; it was conducted through various officials operating in different governmental institutions. These institutional forces played a crucial role in the development of various proposals.

THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

Institutional structures shape political battles by providing the resources and leverage to win them. As described in Chapter 3, several characteristics of organizational structure facilitate or constrain the actions of actors, notably the

balance of power between governmental agencies, the centralization and coherence of bureaucratic organizations, and the resources and policy instruments available to officials.

The wartime debate over the makeup of a collective security regime took place in an institutional setting of centralized power that rested in a few key individuals and dispersed organizational power based on a diffuse, contested institutional structure. During this period, President Roosevelt largely shaped the agenda, due to his exceptional wartime powers and his enormous personal persuasive power.

As will be documented further on, the powerful resources and organizational strength of the War Department relative to the State Department contributed to a policy climate where military interests tended to dominate the decisionmaking process. But before going further, it is helpful to identify the key institutions and actors within the War Department, the State Department and the Office of the President that were responsible for postwar policy.

The following overview of the major officials and organizations with jurisdiction over postwar security concerns gives a sense of the many voices in the government that contributed to the debate. In the War Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff topped the military command, supported by various Service Chiefs and the Civil Affairs Division. Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Under Secretary John McCloy also contributed to the debate over general policy issues. In the State Department, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles (who was replaced by Edward Stettinius in 1943) oversaw a changing collection of foreign service officers working in a series of subcommittees to develop postwar options within the State Department. These subcommittees included: the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy
which consisted of three subcommittees on Political, Territorial, and Security issues; the International Organization Subcommittee; the Formal Agenda Group; the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee; the European Advisory Commission; and the planning group for the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations.

Finally, in the White House, President Roosevelt served as the arbiter of policy in his position as commander-in-chief. In addition, Vice President Henry Wallace was quite influential and tirelessly worked to strengthen public support for US participation in a collective security structure.

**Wartime Mobilization and Power in the War Department**

The structure of military planning reflected a combination of highly centralized policymaking (through the military leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and decentralized operational decisionmaking (through the various wartime agencies and field commanders). In the general debate over collective security, the institutional influence of the military was felt in two major ways: the military often succeeded in either delaying action or controlling policy formation (through its access to the Oval Office) on a variety of politico-military issues. The term politico-military affairs came into official use late in the war and was used to describe problems, policies and actions requiring consultation and agreement between the State Department and the armed services.20

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established during the war with the initial aim of facilitating cooperation with the British. The JCS advised the President on matters of grand strategy and relations with the Allies as well as on various matters relating to the war effort, such as munitions, shipping, manpower

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and research. The JCS was headed by: the Army Chief of Staff (General Marshall), the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces (General Arnold), the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral King) and, after June 1942, Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. The JCS maintained a policy of complete secrecy over its internal structure and decisionmaking, guarding against any outside scrutiny during wartime.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised a de facto veto power on any issue that pertained to the conduct of the war. In addition, all high level decisions pertaining to Germany had to be approved by the JCS. This meant that the Joint Chief's inaction on a policy effectively stymied an alternative. This institutional leverage worked hand-in-hand with their powerful position as the senior military advisors to the President with direct presidential access. Roosevelt relied almost solely on the views and advice of the Joint Chiefs, generally excluding the civilian military leadership from involvement in important wartime matters.

Organized around the goal of complete military victory, the Joint Chiefs measured all other political issues in terms of this preeminent goal. As a result, many postwar problems were deemed to be either of secondary importance, or a potential threat to the military's chief task of unconditional surrender. Delays in formulating postwar policy were often the result of a 'wait-and-see' attitude that

22. Two other important staff members were Brigadier General A. J. McFarland (Secretary to the JCS) and E. D. Graves.
23. The JCS set up a "labyrinthine structure of committees" that provided advice to the Joint Chiefs on various issues, but there were no formal procedures for informing the secretaries of the Army or Navy; there were even fewer contacts with the State Department. Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 30.
24. In a study of civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington argues that during World War II, "So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war." The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 315, 320.
was widely held by military personnel on many issues that were judged as secondary to achieving military victory. While military personnel were generally careful to draw a line between what they viewed as purely military concerns and political affairs, they had few qualms about using their influence to block government action or to push certain political issues aside that impinged on their more immediate concerns.

A second point is that while the military did not have a direct role in charting the structure and course of a collective security agreement (or in designing the United Nations, for that matter), War Department officials did have tremendous influence on a host of related issues that were crucial to such a system. The Joint Chiefs were very influential when it came to issues such as the disposition of troops or air power to enforce any peace, and the disposition of land that was occupied by US troops or could serve as overseas air bases (including the US trust territories), among other matters. During the war, the JCS relied on direct military channels to the President to get things accomplished.25 This channel of command was fractured with the death of Roosevelt and the eclipse of the Joint Chiefs' job of running the war effort.

On the civilian side, Secretary of War Stimson did not have direct control over matters of grand strategy within the military. A well-respected Republican who had served in both democratic and republican administrations (he was formerly the Secretary of State under Hoover), Stimson did not enjoy access to Roosevelt's inner circle. The Secretary did not regularly meet with the President and Joint Chiefs and was not included on the routine distribution list of JCS

papers; he also did not attend most of the Allied wartime conferences. But Stimson remained a well respected figure and Roosevelt periodically consulted with him on specific issues, especially on topics that required bipartisan support in Congress. As a result, despite Stimson's limited bureaucratic control, he exercised great influence on postwar military planning in a few notable internal fights.

Stimson was strongly committed to fostering continued cooperation among the big powers as the best means to prevent another war. Although skeptical about the effectiveness of an international organization, he nonetheless strongly endorsed continued postwar cooperation and pushed for various international agreements in this regard. Stimson lobbied for delayed action on a postwar international institution on both philosophical and parochial grounds: he was afraid that it would be colored by the hostility of the moment and that it might interfere with the military's interests.

Within the War Department, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was responsible for coordinating policy, and in this capacity it played a formative role in shaping (or more accurately stalling) various policy alternatives. The Civil Affairs Division was responsible for coordinating policy for liberated and conquered territories. Housed in the Pentagon, CAD implemented policy decisions in the territories under military control. CAD was first established on March 1, 1943, in a bureaucratic shake-up in response to the poor performance of troops following the Allied advance into North Africa. Grudgingly, the Joint Chiefs decided that the Army needed to take some responsibility for economic, political, and fiscal decisions in the liberated areas.

The Civil Affairs Division was influential because of what it did not accomplish. In practice, CAD's primary goal was to protect the military's discretion and turf. With this in mind, CAD officials generally viewed the State Department as its primary institutional adversary. CAD officials zealously blocked State Department planners and other civilians from formulating postwar plans for Germany throughout 1944. In one notable example, CAD officials almost single-handedly blocked planning due to disagreement over the preliminary organizational issue of which civilian departments and agencies should participate. This "bitter and troublesome controversy" was never fully resolved. By obstructing and undermining various efforts at planning for the postwar occupation of Germany, CAD officials had the net effect of delaying and ultimately toughening the US position. As one historian has noted, "In the days before military government became a reality in Germany, CAD frequently had a crippling effect on German policy inside the bureaucracy." 

Despite the mandate to lessen the misery caused by the war, the primary focus of CAD planning concerned the combat functions of military government and how to help the advancing armies, with relatively little attention devoted to the conduct of military government after the cessation of hostilities. Leaving aside bureaucratic rivalry, CAD was a poorly managed and badly run organization. CAD's major activity during the war was to create a training school.
of military government at the University of Virginia that was widely criticized for the poor quality of its faculty and its reactionary curricula. After Germany's defeat, CAD became primarily responsible for relaying orders between Washington and the Office of Military Government (OMGUS) and the office was dissolved in 1949.

An additional source of input on postwar planning came from various field commanders who were periodically called upon to give advice on specific operational issues or problems. Drawing upon their firsthand familiarity with the other Allied military commanders and actual conditions in Europe, the field commanders (especially General Eisenhower) were sometimes influential in shaping postwar options. Yet, while this input was often solicited by the Joint Chiefs and other Pentagon officials, it was not necessarily heeded.

Up until mid-1944, senior officials in the War Department maintained an attitude of indifference concerning the postwar occupation of Germany. The major impetus for change came with the sudden Allied advances into Germany in the summer of 1944 that made victory appear within their grasp. Once the prospect of having US forces in Germany became imminent, senior officials identified the problem as two-fold: establishing clear zones of occupation and deciding on how much action should be taken to attempt to prevent the collapse of the German economy.

Despite widespread discussion about future security concerns, the immediate catalyst for action was the more immediate fear that the German economy was likely to collapse. When the War Department did push for action, the primary agenda of Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and others

31. The officers that attended this program were also generally unimpressive according to Earl Ziemke, The US Army in the Organization of Germany (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1975), p. 14.
was to assert unconstrained military autonomy and to insist on the power of the occupation forces to control the German economy. \(^{32}\) This shift in policy also coincides with the intervention of the Secretary of the Treasury in planning for the occupation of Germany in the summer of 1944.

**Weakness and Divided Leadership at the State Department**

The State Department was a relatively weak and passive organization with marginal influence on most foreign policy decisions during World War II. \(^{33}\) Widely viewed as a conservative (and to many a reactionary) bastion that was hostile to Roosevelt's New Deal political agenda, the State Department suffered from both ideological and structural challenges to its authority. Roosevelt was deeply suspicious of the foreign service establishment and often derided the department as conservative, unimaginative and rigid. The Department's tendency to uphold the status quo did little to counter this impression. As a result, State Department officials were left on the sidelines or excluded from crucial wartime meetings. \(^{34}\) Roosevelt's inclination to serve as his own Secretary of State was heightened by the exigencies of war and Hull was excluded from important policy decisions and Allied Conferences.

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33. Although the State Department had little input into the conduct of the war itself or foreign policy in general, Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull did retain a large degree of control over policy towards Latin America and other neutral states. See Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over US Foreign Policy* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 33.
34. Despite a widespread belief that Hull was a weak Secretary of State, Thomas Campbell stresses the importance of Hull as Secretary, see Thomas Campbell, *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973), pp. 4-5.
Despite a variety of obstacles, the Secretary of State did exercise some influence over policy, although more often than not his role was largely ceremonial. From the outset of US entry in the war, Hull enthusiastically promoted a more internationalist formulation of US foreign policy aims and was an outspoken advocate of a global postwar organization. In a speech approved by President Roosevelt in July 1942, Secretary Hull called for the creation of an international agency "which can, by force, if necessary--keep the peace among nations in the future." As support for an international organization grew in 1944, Hull called for an end to the traditional international practice of adopting spheres of influence and pushed for early negotiation of a collaborative security structure among the wartime Allies.

Hull's deputy, Sumner Welles, was a part of Roosevelt's inner circle of advisors and was often more influential than Hull on postwar policy matters. Roosevelt practiced a divisive strategy of setting Welles and Hull in competition with each other through his selective solicitation of advice on a number of foreign policy matters. As a result, the two were troubled rivals; this competition eventually led to the ouster of Welles in the summer of 1943. The specific views of these two men will be discussed in more detail further on, but at this point it is relevant to note that despite their titular power, their efforts to shape policy were often frustrated by the actions of others.

The State Department's limited influence on the President was further exacerbated by the Department's organizational weakness. Rooted in a foreign policy tradition of standing on the sidelines and avoiding 'entangling alliances', the foreign service was trained to provide background information and report on

world events. Embued with an aristocratic ethos that tended toward traditional formulations, the State Department upheld a firm distinction between diplomatic and military affairs. This rigid distinction limited the State Department's ability to adapt to the fluid wartime circumstances; as a result, State Department diplomats were largely sidelined with the advent of hostilities. Instead, a number of temporary wartime agencies succeeded in taking over some of the State Department's important functions, exacerbating turf battles and conflict. One such example was the creation of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW). In the executive order creating the BEW in 1942, Roosevelt gave it authority over the formulation of postwar economic policy and named Vice President Henry Wallace as its head. As might be expected, this created serious opposition within the State Department and the ensuing tussle between the two agencies delayed any preparatory work on developing postwar economic policy in the first half of 1942.

37. The Board of Economic Warfare was created to coordinate the activities of various agencies and departments involved in economic defense, to procure and stockpile strategic materials and to block Axis countries from purchasing key war materials. Given this mandate, not to mention Wallace's personal agenda of promoting New Deal social programs in the realm of postwar planning, it is little wonder that BEW came into conflict with other bureaucracies responsible for various economic policies.
38. While debate generally focused on the more narrowly defined issues of support or opposition to US credits, trade agreements, tariffs, and contracts, these disagreements were based on opposing views of the relation of economic policies to the conduct of US security policy. Wallace explicitly linked domestic economic interests to the conduct of foreign policy, pushing for free trade policies with any country despite its ideology. During the war, this stance greatly alarmed more conservative forces, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and conservative southern senators who preferred the more isolationist, protectionist policies of Jesse Jones (Secretary of Commerce and head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation which handled federal loans) and, to a lesser degree, James Byrnes (Office of War Mobilization).

Ultimately, interagency factional fighting crippled BEW in the summer of 1943. When the tensions became public, Roosevelt replaced BEW with a new agency, the Office of Economic Warfare, headed by Leo Crowley. For one account of this controversy, see Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 21.
The ongoing reshuffling of committees, subcommittees and staff during the war did little to remedy this fundamental weakness. One historian summed up the situation as follows: "With the Secretary of State stripped of any significant function, Under Secretary Welles too busy making policy to run the Department, and communication between the two top men in disarray, feuds proliferated at the lower levels." While conflict was in no short supply in Washington, the State Department's structure contributed to a series of impasses, and pronouncements that were largely ignored.

The State Department's initial efforts to chart long term security policy highlight its institutional weaknesses. In response to the war in Europe, Secretary Hull announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Policy in January 1940, but it was not until December 1941 that its members were finally selected and approved by Roosevelt and it did not meet until February 28, 1942. As mentioned above, a fight with the Board of Economic Warfare over jurisdictional authority delayed planning on economic policy for several months in early 1942.

In an effort to widen support for its recommendations, the Committee soon invited representatives from the Army, Navy, Senate, House of Representatives, and White House. Because of the large number of members and the complex issues under consideration, the Advisory Committee established several subcommittees, such as the Subcommittee on Political Problems (chaired

40. Hull was forced to take a two-month leave of absence for rest and recuperation early in 1942 and, as a result, Welles chaired the first meeting of the group in February 1942.

The Committee also included members outside the State Department, including: Norman Davis, Myron Taylor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong (editor of Foreign Affairs), Isaiah Bowman (President of Johns Hopkins), and Anne O'Hare McCormick (New York Times). Julius Pratt, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Cordell Hull, Volume II (NY: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), pp. 719-720.
by Under Secretary Sumner Welles until January 30, 1943, when Hull took over. The Subcommittee on International Organization, also chaired by Welles, started work in June 1942 and completed "A Draft Constitution of an International Organization," by March of 1943. Leo Pasvolsky served as the Executive Officer of the Advisory Committee and coordinated the work of the subcommittees.

With the departure of Welles in August 1943, the new Under Secretary Edward Stettinius, Jr., attempted to clean house by reorganizing the Department's committees. Stettinius created a Committee on Postwar Programs (chaired by Hull) that issued a new draft of the proposed postwar charter in April 1944 that will be discussed further on. Then there was the January 1944 reorganization of the geographical and functional divisions under the assistant secretaries. In an effort to speed up inter-Departmental approval and coordination, a new State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) started operating in December 1944 that was initially responsible for the surrender terms and occupation policy.41

The rapid succession of committees and draft proposals were less reflective of rapidly changing circumstances than the weak administrative structure of the State Department and its marginal influence. In contrast to the military's clear chain of command and access to presidential authority, the State Department did not develop a successful method of positively influencing policy; it rarely conveyed a united front on policy issues and was unable to force governmental action on its various proposals for postwar organization. This was amply evident in the failures of the primary negotiating forum for the Allies, the European Advisory Commission.

41. SWNCC members were primarily assistant secretaries and included: the Secretariat, Wallace E. Whitson, Alvin Richardson, Raymond Cox, Secretary of State Hull, and Under Secretary of State Stettinius.
The European Advisory Commission

The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was formally established in January 1944 with the vague mandate to study postwar European questions as the war continued. Based in London, the EAC was intended as a forum for three-power negotiation of the future of liberated areas. The US representative from the State Department, Ambassador John Winant, became a strong advocate of a cooperative framework and international machinery for the occupation of Germany and peace settlements in the rest of Europe. Unfortunately, Winant was not delegated any real authority by Roosevelt to develop the US position at the talks, as manifest in his plaintive series of requests for instruction and guidance from Washington during tripartite negotiations in London throughout 1944.

Officially, the EAC was responsible for negotiating the surrender terms of the Axis states as well as the control machinery for the occupation of Germany. While it has been chronicled in detail elsewhere, the EAC was a largely ineffectual commission, marred by a lack of decisionmaking authority. The US delegation could not get clearance for draft directives (first on a program of postwar cooperation and then when that effort was largely abandoned, on policy toward Germany) to be informally circulated because of delays in Washington in developing a US position. These delays were fostered at the top by Roosevelt's refusal to delegate real authority outside of the executive. But it was also undermined by the difficulty in reaching agreement among the representatives of

42. The European Advisory Commission was established in response to continued British pressure for such a body, and was formally commissioned in the Moscow Protocol of November 1, 1943.
43. For documents pertaining to the discussions of the EAC, see FRUS 1944, General, Volume I, pp. 100-434.
State, Army, Navy and War Departments and coordinating policy through a cumbersome bureaucratic structure of inter-Departmental clearance. Instructions to the US representative on the EAC were drawn up by the joint action of State, War and Navy representatives meeting in the Working Security Committee (WSC). 45 This meant that each department could effectively 'veto' any proposed instruction, either through delays or outright rejection. 46 As a result, the drafting of US policy was plagued with divisive conflict and interminable delays in drawing up US guidelines for negotiation. While this will be discussed further on, what is relevant here is that despite the sincere efforts of Ambassador Winant and others to promote a cooperative policy for the occupation based on the principles of joint responsibility and disarmament, lower level officials (most notably in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department) succeeded in blocking action in an effort to preserve the prerogative and authority of the War Department and the JCS. In one frustrated cable to Washington, Winant closes his message by noting that "I do not think that any conference or commission created by governments for a serious purpose has had less support from the governments creating it than the European Advisory Commission." 47

As a result, the head US delegate to the EAC spent much of his energy reminding officials in Washington that these delays placed the United States at a "decided disadvantage" in efforts to get the US viewpoint considered by the British and Soviet delegations. 48 Nonetheless, the EAC was the only ongoing forum for the circulation of ideas concerning a regional framework for peace.

45. The Working Security Group started meeting in December 1943.
47. FRUS 1944, General, Volume I.
48. See for example, a telegram dated October 7, 1944, in which Ambassador Winant pleaded to Secretary of State Hull for prompt US action in developing position papers to be presented to the EAC. Telegram, October 7, 1944, FRUS, General, Volume I, p. 348. Winant also complains of
For most of World War II, the State Department remained at the periphery of US foreign policy. Lacking the power to implement most of its internally generated options for postwar policy, it more often succeeded in delaying more objectionable proposals from being devised elsewhere and channelling US policy along more traditional diplomatic lines. The next section will address the central role of the White House and the towering influence of President Roosevelt in the establishment of a United Nations and the postwar treatment of Germany.

The White House: Roosevelt's Grand Design For Peace and Wallace's Century of the Common Man

In contrast to the State Department, the White House made full use of its institutional strength. President Roosevelt was a pivotal player, capitalizing on his powerful position as commander-in-chief of US forces as well as his enormous personal influence. Given Roosevelt's dominance in most urgent matters pertaining to the war and his role in shaping the agenda, it is important to briefly summarize Roosevelt's beliefs and decisionmaking style. In this regard, three features stand out: his vision or "Great Design" for a universal collective security system, his personal antipathy toward Germany, and his tendency to procrastinate, or delay decisions.49

Roosevelt was deeply committed to creating a strong United Nations in which he envisioned 'the four global policemen' (the US, USSR, Britain, and China) as responsible for maintaining peace and order in their own sections of the world.50 Roosevelt first used the concept of global police in 1941.51 Although

the "tremendous lag in clearing our documentation on Germany." Over the course of 9 months, Winant reported receiving only five fully cleared policy papers.
49. For a discussion of Roosevelt's great design, see Gordon Craig and Alexander George, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's System of Postwar Security," in Force and Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 1982).
the concept was never fully developed by Roosevelt and his ideas evolved over
time, Roosevelt repeatedly returned to this phrase throughout his wartime
addresses, endorsing a world organization as the central component in a stable
peace.52

At the same time, Roosevelt strongly believed that the German people
must be taught a firm lesson and called for a harsh peace settlement. In a private
conversation with Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau on August 19, 1944,
Roosevelt stated: "We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the
German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people
or you have got to treat them in such manner so they can't just go on reproducing
people who want to continue the way they have in the past."53 Roosevelt's
thinking about the occupation of Germany stressed a two-pronged program of
Allied cooperation to create an international structure for peace and strict
punishment of aggressors.

Vice President Henry Wallace served the President as a powerful
spokesperson in mobilizing public support for a postwar international
organization. With the outbreak of war, Vice President Henry Wallace was
appointed by the President to head the newly created Board of Economic Warfare

51. For a summary of Roosevelt's concept of the Four Policemen, see Robert Divine, *Roosevelt
52. Roosevelt first made reference to "the United Nations" in his Presidential Message to
Congress on January 6, 1941. At this time, it referred to the members of the alliance against the
Axis powers.

At the time, Roosevelt was careful to stress the differences between this new security
organization and the discredited League of Nations.
53. Morgenthau Memo of Conversation with Roosevelt, August 19, 1944, Presidential Diaries,
Morgenthau Papers, FDR Library, pp. 1386-1388. Cited in Warren Kimball, *Swords or
Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*, Harold M.
Hyman, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1976), Appendix pp. 95-97. See also, John
Morton Blum, *From The Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton
(BEW). In a time of national emergency, the position of directing the US mobilization effort gave Wallace more power than perhaps any Vice President in US history. A leading liberal voice in domestic politics, Vice President Wallace also became a leading figure in mobilizing public support for the war. Along with the need for victory over the evils of fascism, Wallace spoke frequently on the recurring themes of a return to liberalism after the war and on the need for a United Nations organization in the postwar world. In perhaps his most famous speech, delivered on May 8, 1942, Wallace outlined a vision of the postwar world in what became known as "The Century of the Common Man." In other speeches, Wallace called for the creation of an international air force to enforce the peace through the United Nations. Throughout, Wallace stressed the essential need to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union. While only

54. See footnotes 44 and 45.
56. May 8, 1942, "The Price of Free World Victory," later known as "The Century of the Common Man." The speech attracted tremendous attention and was widely redistributed and debated. While most of the speech was directed towards defeating the Nazis, it includes reference to earlier struggles of the "common man" to be free by tracing past "people's revolutions." Wallace went on to describe Roosevelt's credo of the Four Freedoms. But in contrast to Roosevelt's more open-ended statements, Wallace directly linked this freedom to the right to attain basic needs, such as food. In Wallace's eyes,

"The peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin America—not merely in the United Nations but also in Germany and Italy and Japan.... Cartels in the peace to come must be subjected to international control for the common man, as well as being under adequate control by the respective home governments. In this way, we can prevent the Germans from again building a war machine while we sleep.... Yes, and when the time of peace comes, the citizens again will have a duty, the supreme duty of sacrificing the lesser interest for the greater interest of the general welfare. Those who write the peace must think of the whole world. There can be no privileged peoples."

Reprint in RG 40, Wallace Correspondence, National Archives; Excerpts in Walton, Henry Wallace, pp. 11-13.
57. In a moving eulogy to Roosevelt in June 1945, Wallace cautioned that "Those enemies of peace are those who are deliberately trying to stir up trouble between the United States and Russia. They know that the United States and Russia are the two most powerful nations in the world and that without both of them in the world organization, permanent peace is impossible." Address in Memoriam of Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 4, 1945, New York City. Wallace Files, RG 40, NA.
peripherally involved in the development of policy options pertaining to collective security within the government, Wallace's popular appeal influenced the climate of decisionmaking largely because he motivated more conservative officials to advance alternate proposals in an effort to co-opt Wallace's appeal.

During World War II, Roosevelt strongly restricted postwar planning to two overarching goals: adoption of the Atlantic Charter and the unconditional surrender of Germany. Agreed upon in August 1941, the Atlantic Charter called for eight major points of a just peace at the end of the war, including: self-determination and independence for all nations; the renunciation of any territorial claims or other aggrandizement; equal access for all parties to world markets and raw materials; and a renunciation of the use of force by all nations and the disarmament of aggressor nations pending "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and US entry into the war, the key guiding principle was unconditional surrender rather than a peace settlement that re-instituted the traditional power balance in Europe. Yet Roosevelt undercut this commitment in other statements that asserted that the United States would not commit itself to any long-term involvement in Europe but was solely committed to eliminating Germany's war potential.

Although slippery with specifics, Roosevelt consistently operated from the premise that the primary US postwar objective was continued Soviet-US cooperation. There has been some debate over whether Roosevelt's role as the

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mediator among the 'Big Three' Allies reflected his sincere desire to maintain close ties or was a shrewd effort to play off British and Soviet tensions during the war. Nonetheless, the majority of Roosevelt's memos and public statements indicate that he intended to continue amicable relations with the Soviet Union after the war. According to Roosevelt and other key officials within the administration, this cooperation was essential to secure a stable peace. In September 1944, Roosevelt instructed Robert Murphy, the US advisor to General Eisenhower, that US planning for the German occupation was to be premised on the central importance of persuading the Soviet Union of US cooperation.

Roosevelt stressed the need for continued cooperation in his January 1945 State of the Union address, warning that:

\begin{quote}
In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with Nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world. We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again—the road to a third world war.\footnote{59. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Nation, January 6, 1945, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45, p. 498.}
\end{quote}

Yet, despite the President's convictions and ability to influence planning through his near dictatorial powers at the height of the war, Roosevelt had little time to grapple with postwar policy. Most of his time was taken up with the ongoing military campaign and the spotlight of the upcoming election campaign of 1944. In addition, Roosevelt's failing health and his evasive handling of political controversies muted efforts to resolve the intense disputes that erupted in the administration over postwar German policy. Taken together, these factors created an impasse within the government that prevented a working consensus from emerging. As a result, governmental planning took the form of an intriguing
interplay of high-level policy decisions, directed and overseen by the President at key meetings and conferences, surrounded by ongoing efforts by a circle of mid-level officials working to interpret and translate Roosevelt's general guidelines. Along the way, there was ample room for reshaping Roosevelt's instructions, as well as for allowing some presidential priorities to fall through the institutional cracks.

Until the spring of 1945, there was little specific technical planning for postwar policy towards Germany. Instead, at the highest levels of policymaking, the United States lacked an agreed-upon strategy and program beyond the general goals of unconditional surrender and creation of the United Nations. President Roosevelt's wartime policy mandated only limited discussion of the postwar settlement even after it became clear that it was only a matter of time before Germany would be defeated. As Roosevelt instructed Secretary of State Hull in the fall of 1944,

> It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed in these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.

By postponing major decisions on the occupation until US forces entered Germany (or what some charged as procrastinating), Roosevelt contributed to the festering of sharp internal divisions over the direction of US policy. Nonetheless, the overarching agenda and framework for decision came from Roosevelt.

Throughout the war, Roosevelt remained center stage; his death in April 1945

60. Roosevelt Memorandum to Secretary of State Hull, October 20, 1944, FRUS 1945, Yalta, pp. 158-159.

Roosevelt also made a similar point to Churchill in February, 1944, writing, "I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives." FRUS 1944, Vol. 1, p. 188.
created a traumatic vacuum that heightened the political dilemmas attendant with
drawing up a peacetime plan.

In sum, up until his death Roosevelt remained deeply committed to united
Allied action, the creation of a United Nations to uphold the peace, a harsh
settlement with Germany and minimal long-term US involvement in Europe.
These ideas were profoundly important in shaping the overarching agenda and
debate, but they did not translate into a clear plan for action, especially with
regard to the treatment of Germany. Instead, there was continuing disagreement
within the government over the exact makeup of a postwar security organization.
This complex debate can be roughly divided into three camps: advocates of
regional approaches, those who called for a global international organization, and
skeptics who supported delayed action and ad hoc measures pending clarification
of the postwar order.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Regional Institutions

As the war progressed, a number of regional approaches were explored by
policymakers to create a stable peace following the defeat of Germany and Japan.
Proponents of a regional security system argued that several smaller regional
structures would be the most pragmatic and effective stepping stones to the long-
term goal of world organization. These advocates cautioned that a global
organization would prove to be too unwieldy and diverse to allow it to govern
effectively.
Although there was little detailed planning up through 1943, State Department officials floated several ideas for a regional security system. An early State Department memo on the "Objectives and Priorities in an International Security Program," dated April 3, 1942, favored such a regional approach. The cautious tone and limited scope of State Department thinking at this time is reflected in the following caveats about such a regional plan:

Two basic points must be made about this security mechanism: first, it cannot be created artificially by a stroke of the pen when hostilities cease but, whatever its final form, must grow more or less naturally out of the security mechanisms created during the war; second, its ultimate form will be largely conditioned by the character of the international political organization which arises after the war.61

Ideas promoting a regional organization had been circulating since even before the United States entered the war.62 Under Secretary Welles became a leading exponent of the need to strengthen regional organizations first as the best means to resolve future conflicts. Drawing upon his influential position as a confidant of Roosevelt, Welles headed up the State Department's efforts to chart postwar policy between 1942 and mid-1943 in the newly created Committee on International Organization and Security. The Subcommittee on International Organization, chaired by Welles, started work in June 1942 to formulate a regional program and completed "A Draft Constitution of an International Organization" by March of 1943.63 This plan drew largely on the ideas

62. The earliest State Department efforts to formulate a vision for a postwar peacekeeping organization entailed a draft plan in the spring of 1940 that advocated a European-based organization. The plan did not specify US participation and only mentioned in passing the participation of other countries outside Europe. The primary objective of the plan, and by implication, the peacekeeping organization, was disarmament of the aggressors which necessitated some machinery for enforcement. "Memorandum [by Hugh R. Wilson] Arising From Conversations in Mr Welles' Office, April 19 and 26, 1940," in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 458-60.
advanced by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was perhaps the most outspoken and influential exponent of regional organizations at the time. 64

Among the Allies, Churchill received Roosevelt's endorsement for a regional framework during the three-power discussions on postwar matters early in 1943 and Stalin indicated that he also supported a regional approach. 65 Building on the strengths of the League of Nations, Churchill called for the establishment of a European governing body to include some twelve states or confederations (which would include the nations of Europe and Asia Minor, including Scandinavia, the Danube and the Balkans). This regional European Council would form a "United States of Europe." 66 A separate body would oversee the Far East and the Americas, with the idea that these councils would function "under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations." 67

These regional councils would serve as the primary mechanisms to resolve disputes; problems that were not settled in this forum would be referred to the World Council, which would be composed of the four great powers (Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China) with other nations included by

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64. A major reason for Churchill's support of a regional approach was his desire to see a revitalized Europe under the leadership of Great Britain. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, pp. 803-805.
66. From the early stages of the war, Churchill supported the establishment of several regional organizations to uphold the postwar peace and went public with his ideas in a radio address on March 21, 1943.
Churchill maintained his support for the principles of the League, arguing that "It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League." Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 805.
rotation from the regional councils. Each regional Council would maintain an international police force to uphold the peace (with each country also maintaining a national force), based on agreement among the United Nations on the levels of forces. (The idea of an international police force came up again and again in wartime discussions of postwar security and will be taken up in the next section.)

Although Churchill's plan included a future world organization, he did not give it much emphasis, leaving its mandate and structure quite vague. As Churchill has written, he attached

great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were themselves directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement, the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

In an effort to stimulate US thinking about the structure of the postwar settlement, Churchill met with several senior government officials on May 22, 1943, at the British Embassy in Washington. The US officials included Vice President Wallace, Secretary of Defense Stimson, Under Secretary of State Welles, and two other State Department officials: Ickes, and Connally. At the time, this group constituted the major players in developing a postwar policy within the administration. Secretary of State Hull faced an uphill struggle in asserting his leadership on the matter during the early stages of the war.

There were several obvious advantages to this less ambitious regional approach to postwar security. Walter Lippmann, an influential columnist, wrote eloquently about the need to establish such a regional structure, or what he termed

68. In some iterations of this plan, Churchill included France as a fifth great power to be included in the Council.
70. Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 804.
an Atlantic Community of Nations, in order to achieve a peaceful balance of power.\textsuperscript{71} Perhaps most notably, the deep undercurrent of isolationism in the United States meant that Roosevelt and State Department planners faced a tough battle in gaining Congressional support for any international obligations, especially with regard to committing US forces abroad.

Second, regional proposals built on the experience of the League of Nations. A State Department Committee on postwar planning, headed by Under Secretary of State Welles, reviewed the shortcomings in drawing up the League's covenant and in its operation as a starting point to discussing a modified international structure.\textsuperscript{72} Some of the changes under consideration addressed the thorny problems of whether nations should have veto power; the commitment of forces to enforce the organization's rulings; and the need for negotiations while the war was still underway in order to assure cooperation among the Allies and uncontested terms of surrender for the Axis nations.

Third, a program of regional mechanisms of security addressed fears of renewed militarism and unilateral action that might contribute to yet another war. The upheaval and political vacuum created by the war in Europe was testament to the belief that the earlier balance-of-power framework for European politics was no longer operative.\textsuperscript{73} The desire to end such a system—seen by many as a major

\textsuperscript{71} Welles stresses the influence of Lippmann's writings during this period in \textit{Where Are We Heading?}, pp. 26-27.

\textsuperscript{72} Formed at the end of June, 1942, the Special State Department Committee on International Organization met forty-five times over the next year to study options for a postwar organization. The regular members included: Sumner Wells, James Shotwell, Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin Cohen, Green Hackworth, Leo Pasvolsky, and Harley Notter. Cited in Hilderbrand, \textit{Dumbarton Oaks}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{73} One example of this belief is Roosevelt's address to Congress on the Crimean conference, in which he said that the agreement reached at the conference for a universal security organization "spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed." Address to Congress on the Crimean Conference, Washington, DC, March 1, 1945, Zevin, ed., \textit{Nothing to Fear: The Selected Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 1932-1945}, p. 453.
cause of two world wars—was a driving force behind the administration's thinking.74

But perhaps most important, a regional approach offered the most practical means to sustain the unity of action necessary to carry out the difficult process of disarmament and the gradual transition to self-government in Germany that would come with the expected withdrawal of US troops and the dominance of Soviet forces in Europe. Any such effort required some form of policing action to assure compliance. A number of ideas circulated within the government concerning various forms of joint military and policing action to enforce the terms of the coming peace.

**International Police Forces**

Again and again, planners faced the question of how to make sure that future measures would be upheld once the fighting stopped. The success of any proposal for collective security depended upon making sure that it could be enforced. A number of individuals suggested that the best hope for maintaining peace resided in establishing an international military force to occupy Germany (and other threats to the peace) in order to prevent future aggression.

While there was much theoretical discussion of the role of international forces, the anticipated defeat of the Axis powers provided the first clear case where such a force might be needed. As a result, while there are general proposals for international forces that were developed during the debate over the creation of a regional security structure, all the specific planning for such a force focused on the occupation and control of Germany and Japan. One such proposal

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74. It also appealed to the idealism of voters and helped mobilize support for the war.
argued for extending the jurisdiction of the Allied military command that oversaw
the final defeat of German forces (the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF) to assume joint control of the occupation of
Germany. This plan avoided the division of Germany into separate zones
governed by each Allied command. Another proposal considered deploying an
international contingent of 'token forces' to police Germany that would include
some of the smaller European nations.

Roosevelt secretly commissioned the Joint Chiefs to conduct a study of
what bases might be needed for a postwar "International Police Force."75
Intended as background preparation for postwar peace negotiations, the Joint
Chiefs went beyond Roosevelt's instructions to consider not only bases for the US
role in international peacekeeping, but also bases for national defense and
commercial aviation.76 Although Admiral Leahy and other JCS staff officers
objected to this broadening of Roosevelt's request, JCS officials argued that
national security was inseparable from an international force and, according to
one officer, that national defense had to be the Joint Chiefs' first consideration.
This is but one example of the inclination of officials to promote their narrow
institutional interests. The Joint Chiefs efforts to raise their own parochial
concerns also suggests the relative importance placed in achieving such an
international force in 1943.

The plan for international forces remained a subject of discussion within
the government and Vice President Wallace continued to strongly advocate a
United Nations air corps consisting of sufficient numbers of planes and

75. Robert Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45
76. Minutes of the JCS 65th Meeting and from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee Report 9/3,
25 March 1943, cited by Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, p. 42.
'strategically located bases' to "bomb the aggressor nations mercilessly" until they set down their arms. But as will be discussed further on, few fleshed out proposals were in place by the summer of 1944, when German defeat was thought to be imminent. At this later stage, the rapid advance of forces into Germany required a mad scramble in the government to provide appropriate guidance to forces in the field. One of the first concerns was how to handle the different Allied ground forces entering Germany and the other conquered territories. Along with consideration of international air forces, there was even greater interest in developing multilateral ground forces to uphold the peace.

Much of the impetus for such a multilateral ground force came from the Soviet Union. Stalin argued that there must be a world police force at the Cairo Conference in 1943. In the context of discussions about Germany, Stalin stressed interest in such forces in order to make sure that Germany would not fight again within 20 years. According to Stalin, the goal of preventing renewed German aggression served as the fundamental goal and test of any new security body. As Stalin argued at Teheran, "safeguarding" against Germany should be the most important objective of a postwar organization.

The official forum for discussion of such proposals was the European Advisory Commission. In a memo circulated at the European Advisory Commission in January 1944, the British delegation proposed that Allied states bordering Germany who wished to participate could send "token contingents" to help in the occupation of Germany prior to making a more substantial

78. Roosevelt also discussed with Stalin dividing Germany into five states and internationalizing some of Germany at the Cairo meeting. Cited in Henry Wallace's diary, December 17, 1943, Blum, Price of Vision, pp. 280, 284.
contribution later on. In a British memo dated January 15, 1944, one alternative proposal suggested that the Allies should be deployed in zones in Germany, but that each zone should contain contingents from the forces of the other two powers and of those interested smaller powers. The proposal set out two components in its plan for security: the mechanism of the UN and a cooperative joint occupation. The memo set forth two possible methods of occupation: an international Allied force based on 'mixed up' small units of United Nations troops, or dividing Germany into separately policed zones. As will be detailed in the next chapter, these various ideas were left undecided by the EAC, as occupation policy became intertwined with a number of other contentious issues.

The State Department's Security Subcommittee conducted a study of the creation of an international police force in order to assure security during the transition period and to maintain a final peace. While some members of the Subcommittee viewed such a force as a powerful deterrent to aggression, others considered it "impractical". The State Department's planning group gave the plan serious consideration, but ultimately deferred to the military. As a result, the group favored two other more modest proposals that relied on national forces.

In contrast to the view of some officials in the War and State Departments, General Dwight Eisenhower pushed for a plan of occupation early in 1944 that was based on joint coordination of Germany through the existing structure of SHAEF, rather than in separate Allied zones of occupation. Eisenhower had

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80. The memo was first presented informally in late December, 1943 by a member of the British Foreign Office. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," p. 589.
81. In weighing the pluses and minuses of these two alternative paths, the British memo favored the zonal arrangement on the grounds of practicality.
83. Philip Mosely writes that State planning group "felt that it could not support it in opposition to the unanimous military opinion," "The Occupation of Germany," p. 589.
84. The idea was first set forth by the British in an EAC proposal in December 1943 and again in January 1944.
been opposed to Roosevelt's plan for dividing Germany into zones of occupation and had expressed these thoughts to Roosevelt when he visited Washington in January 1944, shortly before assuming the post of supreme commander. In his meeting with Roosevelt, Eisenhower argued that Germany should be governed by a coalition of Allied forces, under a single commander, rather than by three separate zonal organizations. On military grounds, Eisenhower argued that joint control was more straightforward and would be more likely to restrain the Soviet Army's actions in Germany.85 Roosevelt argued against Eisenhower's proposal, assuring Eisenhower that he could deal with the Russians. In February and again in May of 1944, Eisenhower lobbied for SHAEF to remain intact at the end of hostilities in Europe in order to administer the western zones of Germany, but none of his proposals were accepted by the President.86 Eisenhower urged Roosevelt to reconsider his position on the grounds that "a joint, as opposed to national command of the entire country was more desirable and practicable." If nothing else, Eisenhower said, it would "quickly test the possibilities" of extending the war-time alliance.87

Eisenhower also pushed his proposal within the military. In a letter to SHAEF Commander Walter Bedell Smith on May 20, 1944, Eisenhower pressed for a compromise arrangement that would still assure some degree of joint control, at least during the immediate interim period.88 Eisenhower opposed "a

complete and arbitrary division of the European Continent into segregated British and US zones" for several reasons. It was impossible to predict where the forces would be positioned at the immediate end of hostilities; the forces would still be organized along national lines, but would be directed by an Allied Commander-in-Chief; and importantly, such a structure would avoid a struggle over which zone would be selected by the two nations.

The proposal was also sent to George Marshall a few days later, with the minor, though notable, addition at the opening of the letter as follows: "I have reason to believe that the President is still open-minded on the question which has given us all considerable thought, namely--a combined or separate British and American zones of occupation in Germany. Accordingly I am setting forth, in some detail, my reasons for preferring the combined setup."

The letter set out the arguments in favor of joint control. Eisenhower noted that no matter what, at the immediate end of the war the Allied High Command would be responsible for the areas occupied by both the British and US forces.

The point at issue is whether we would draw a sharp geographical line between these two areas and eliminate the Allied control which is to remain in full power up until the moment of the Armistice, or whether, on the other hand, we should continue this overall Allied control.

... So long as we do remain in Europe, we should see the wisdom of having British/American policy determined on the very highest levels with the orders of execution coming to a single Commander in the field through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Eisenhower also included as a final argument that:

abandonment of the Allied principle in the control of the British-American military forces in Europe would automatically set up special areas of special influence between the two nations in that territory. Instead of presenting a solid front that has characterized all our operations throughout the Mediterranean and which is now

in effect in this area, every problem arising would first have to be settled on a British versus American basis and in any important matter we might well find the Russians siding with either one of us at the expense of the other.

At the time of Eisenhower's letters, Roosevelt himself had sent word to Eisenhower via Admiral Leahy that US forces would occupy a separate zone.90 Roosevelt's rejection of the idea of multilateral forces in the postwar occupation of Germany was codified in the Second Quebec Conference of September 1944, where the Allies agreed to separate occupation zones for Germany. Interestingly, Eisenhower again wrote a letter to George Marshall in defense of his thinking, making sure to justify it along purely military lines.91 In the fall, discussion in the United States shifted to debate over the boundaries of the zone to be occupied by each Ally that revolved around a disagreement with the British.92

To many, the primary lessons from the failure of appeasement and the success of the Allied forces in the fight against the Axis powers was the need for an international force to respond to aggression. While victory in the war had depended on joint Allied action, it also brought home the impediments to such

91. Eisenhower wrote that:

   With respect to the decision to divide Germany on nationalistic lines, I had known for a long time the way political thought was leaning and I was not astonished. Naturally, I always knew that decisions between Governments would have to be taken on a tripartite basis, and the suggestions I advanced had no implication of making Great Britain and the United States political partners vis-a-vis the third member of the triumvirate. My thoughts were restricted to the military problem; that is, the use of armed forces for carrying out the decisions of the Governments. I felt that on our side of the Western boundary of the Russian area we should use the same system in the control of military forces that had brought about victory. All this had been presented many times to my superiors and since they have decided otherwise, this is the last time that my own ideas on the subject will be expressed.

92. The plan's demise was not a certainty until an agreement on dividing Germany into separate occupation zones was signed at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944.
efforts. As the issue was debated within the government, it became less a question of the makeup of military forces to enforce the peace than a struggle over who would control the lines of national command. Efforts to design an international force were deemed 'impractical' by the Joint Chiefs early on and there was little real enthusiasm within the government (apart from Wallace) for pushing this issue. As will be discussed further on, the issue again came to the fore during the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations. But this time, international police forces were being considered not as an abstract possibility in the distant future, but as part of a binding charter of an actual international organization.

**A Universal Organization for Peace and Security: Proposals for a United Nations**

For many in the United States, the establishment of a comprehensive world organization was an essential feature of the postwar settlement. One catalyst was the perceived need to provide security against future aggressors, with Germany being the primary country of concern. The disastrous results of US refusal to join the League of Nations after World War I and then the failure of the League to stop aggression discredited any return to the policies of isolation or traditional balance of power. To remedy the mistakes of the past, people called for a truly international body vested with decisionmaking and enforcement structures to maintain the peace. Establishment of such an organization contributed to widespread hopes in the public that it could overcome the

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93. While people were also concerned about Japanese aggression, Germany was most often used as the prime example of an aggressor state in governmental planning at this stage in the war.
nationalism and militarism of traditional power politics. This next section will discuss the US debate over the form and function of such an organization, leading up to the Dumbarton Oaks Planning Conference on international organization in August-September of 1944.

A cluster of proposals set forth different ideas for coordinated action to police international disputes and mediate conflict. But there was also a major tension over where the real authority and power would rest. Much of the disagreement stemmed from differing assumptions of whether the organization was designed to promote a community of nations or a big power security alliance. These two competing agendas fostered a fundamental contradiction in planning for the United Nations.

As the debate unfolded, individual persuasive power, institutional structures and military exigencies would combine to influence and shape the outcome. Initially, there was broad agreement over the need for a strong international institution. The competing voices within the Roosevelt administration and in Congress offered merely "the overture to a great debate," as a New York Times reporter put it at the time. "But it gives the shape of the themes, and though they clash in the minor keys, in the majors there is harmony."95

At one end of the public debate, Vice President Wallace promoted immediate action to establish a strong global organization with supreme authority over individual states. Within the State Department, Under Secretary Welles opposed immediate action and endorsed a more modest structure. While less

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94. In a very influential speech in 1942, Vice President Wallace articulated this vision in the context of the war, describing it as a struggle of the free people of the world to overcome fascism and all other militaristic or oppressive ideologies.
involved in postwar planning during the early stages of the war, Secretary of War Stimson also endorsed delayed action. Secretary of State Hull took a middle ground, calling for a strong world organization that retained the wartime alliance.

The Allies endorsed the establishment of a general organization with worldwide membership and jurisdiction at the Moscow meeting of the Allies in October 1943. Following the meeting, Congress quickly endorsed US participation in such a postwar organization. The Four-Nation Declaration, signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, marked a turning point in postwar planning, changing the focus of debate from the scope of the organization (regional vs. global), to the structure and powers of a global institution.

Between 1943 and early 1944, this debate developed into a question of the responsibilities of the general membership of an international organization and a central Executive Committee or Council, made up of the wartime Allies. President Roosevelt, as always, walked a fine line between grandiose exhortations about future organization and pragmatic political calculations when it came to specific government action; he remained uncommitted to many of the important details that would determine how much authority and power this centralized body might possess. To many senior military officials, the uncertain ramifications on the military's institutional power raised fears over the potential risks of an international force. This led to opposition to some ideas, despite their merits.


The Moscow Conference, held from October 18 to November 1, 1943, was headed by Secretary Hull and included several of the State Department's postwar planners. Prior to the Moscow meeting, the Allies endorsed a general international organization in signing the Four-Power Declaration at the first Quebec Conference in August 1943.

97. Outside the administration, Governor Stassen of Minnesota called for US leadership in peacetime through a "world association" that continued the wartime alliance and was based on the American union. This internationalist republican vision conceived of maintaining state sovereignty while working together to achieve international goals. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 18.
The US position leading up to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference remained quite indeterminate, with many important issues left unresolved. While the positions of the other Allies served as a broad constraint in the development of the US position, at this stage, the most immediate obstacles came from within the government because of the continuing uncertainty and disagreement over the complex consequences of different options.

Early Calls for a Federated World Organization

Early in the war, Vice President Henry Wallace became the key progressive spokesperson for a grandiose postwar settlement based on a "federated world organization" to uphold the peace. As the chief liberal ideologist for the war effort, Wallace was quite influential in creating strong popular support for the principles of the UN and the adoption of the charter. In a tremendously popular and influential speech made in December 1942, Wallace unveiled his program for a future world organization equipped with machinery to disarm other nations that threatened the peace, as well as institutions to strengthen economic peace among nations and to prevent economic warfare.98

Wallace's program called for expanded regional organizations within a strong world organization, continued cooperation among the great powers, extensive postwar economic reconstruction, and the creation of an international air force as the central components of peace and security.99 According to

For State Department opposition to the speech while it was being prepared, see Frederick Henshaw Interview, Columbia Oral History Collection, p. 153. See also "Wanted: Political Leadership," Common Sense, XI (October 1942), p. 343. Cited by Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century, p. 77.
Wallace, this future organization should be empowered to: "Preserve the liberty of the United Nations--liberty in a political sense, equality of opportunity in international trade, security against war and business depression due to international causes, and unity of purpose in promoting the general welfare of the world." 100 Wallace eloquently argued against a future era of power politics and saw world organization as the only salvation for the United States of America. Wallace went so far as to argue that the UN should have supreme authority over individual states. Wallace's zealous internationalism went much further than Roosevelt's or any other senior figure in the administration. In Wallace's view:

It is vital, therefore that the United Nations' covenant must provide the machinery to assure 'freedom from fear'--an international peace law, an international peace court, and an international peace force....

We must prevent international cartels of the German type and perhaps substitute for them a United Nations agency to restore stable conditions in raw material markets, on price terms that assure producers fair incomes and promote expanded consumption.

To prevent worldwide unemployment, there will probably have to be a United Nations investment corporation, under whose direction public and private capital can be put to work for worldwide reconstruction. 101

The themes of collective security were closely woven into Wallace's notion of a liberal world economic system based on a common market. In his position as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, Wallace's views on economic policy held great weight. They also sparked great controversy.

There were many within the government who were alarmed at Wallace's 'woolly headed idealism.' Some argued that the effectiveness of any international organization would rest in the predominance of the great powers. Within the

State Department, much of the planning assumed a structure that assured the
dominance of the 'Big Three' (in fact four, including China) jointly collaborating
to uphold the peace.102

One response to Wallace came from Under Secretary Welles, who gave a
speech intended to counter Wallace's ideas in mid-1942.103 While endorsing the
concept of a postwar organization, Welles called for a pause before such a body
grew into effect that would facilitate more cautious and cool-headed planning.
Welles described an 'organic' postwar structure that grew out of the war, whereby
the 'five great nations' (including China and France) would make up the core of
the organization. To help the world rebuild from the devastation of war, Welles
called for relying on a continuation of the US Lend-Lease program to help
postwar reconstruction, rather than create "some untested structure" (as suggested
by Wallace).104 Sometimes described as Roosevelt's left and right hands on
postwar foreign policy matters, Wallace and Welles represented different factions
of Roosevelt's New Deal coalition. They also represented competing institutions,
vying for influence. Threatened once again from outside agencies infringing on
what State officials viewed as their rightful jurisdiction, Wallace's speeches
sparked both public and private action by State officials to speed along more
concrete planning in the State Department's Special Subcommittees on postwar
organization, mentioned above. But this effort was weakened by divisions from
within--most importantly in the different agendas of the Secretary and Under
Secretary.

102. For documents pertaining to planning for the "Organization for Peace and Security" and the
proposals considered at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, see FRUS, General, 1944,
103. Wallace gave a rousing speech on his postwar vision upon accepting an award from the
Churchman on June 8, 1942 which prompted Welles' strong response in a speech nine days later
104. Ibid, p. 17.
Annoyed at Wallace's public relations efforts, Secretary Hull attempted to counter Wallace's ideas with 'more realistic limits on American expectations.' Hull promoted a middle ground (to the left of Welles and the President, but to the right of Wallace) in favor of early establishment of a global organization. As mentioned earlier, Secretary Hull opposed the efforts of Welles to promote a regional system. While Hull supported regional bodies like the Inter-American organization and the Arab League, he believed that there needed to be a strong global structure in order to prevent the dominance of a regional power surrounded by satellites. A debate ensued between Welles and Hull over whether the State Department should promote a regional or global approach. In an effort to gain the upper hand, Hull stopped the work of the Subcommittees on Political Problems and International Organization (headed by Welles) in July 1943, calling for a new start to postwar planning. This internal struggle culminated in the forced resignation of Welles in August 1943. It was not until the end of 1943 that the newly created Informal Agenda Group (now under Hull's direction) set to work to formulate postwar policy.

The new Under Secretary, Edward Stettinius, Jr., was appointed on the basis of his compatibility with Hull and his administrative talents, rather than on the basis of his foreign policy experience. With the ouster of Welles from the State Department, there was no powerful institutional voice to push for the regional approach. The State Department also lost its only representative among the President's tight inner circle of advisors. While the State Department entered a period of smoother sailing, it lacked real clout when it came to top level policy.

decisions. Nonetheless, State officials tried to build on whatever opportunities they could find to develop Roosevelt's positions in the postwar working groups.

**State Department Plans for an International Organization**

Following the President's return from the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt requested that Secretary Hull have the State Department draft a possible plan for postwar organization. State planners quickly submitted a broad outline for a "Possible Plan" to the President on December 29th, 1943, and between December 1943 and July 1944, the State Department entered into a more active phase of preparation for a possible postwar organization. Acutely aware of the constraints imposed by the views of the President, senior War Department officials, leading members of Congress, and other influential groups, not to mention the incessant appeals of Wallace and other internationalists, State Department planners painstakingly analyzed the possibilities.

State planners went through several more rounds of proposals for a postwar structure in the Informal Agenda Group (later reorganized and called the Informal Political Agenda Group and Committee on Postwar Programs), which met from the end of 1943 to mid-1944.108 Over time, the group reached a working consensus on the basic design of an organization to maintain the peace. This consensus reflected a compromise position based on the Department's institutional weakness and its continuing efforts to carve out a meaningful role for itself. At each step along the way, State Planners sought Roosevelt's approval for

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108. The Committee's first members were: Leo Pasvolsky, Isaiah Bowman, Myron Taylor, Benjamin Cohen, Norman Davis, James Dunn, Green Hackworth (Legal Advisor) and Stanley Hornbeck. Stettinius was an ex officio member and attended on occasion; Joseph Green joined the group in March 1944 and Harley Notter served as the chief of staff for postwar matters. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 248.
the various overarching components of a postwar structure. But the group relied on key officials in the War Department for guidance when it came to questions such as the supply and use of armed forces in securing the peace. Thus, while the President served as the catalyst for action and final arbiter, State planners sought the approval of War Department officials, and to a lesser extent key members of Congress, on the exact terms of the text.

During this period, the following three main tenets were set forth in the proposals of the Informal Agenda Group: all nations involved in the war effort must participate; the great powers should exercise paramount authority; there needed to be clear enforcement power, or the ability to impose sanctions and military force to thwart aggression. In practice, this meant that such a military force would at least need the capacity to conduct strategic bombing against outlaw states.

Although submitted to the President on December 29, 1943, the State Department Informal Agenda Group (now part of the newly formed Committee on Postwar Programs, chaired by Hull and vice-chaired by Stettinius) was not able to meet with the President on these issues until February 8, 1944. In this meeting, Roosevelt gave his general approval to the plan, although he stressed that they would need the consent of Congress for any peacekeeping commitment.109 The major innovation of the plan was that it revised Roosevelt's notion of a Four-Power Executive Council to include other nations in the Council. At Pasvolsky's urging, the group debated the benefits of broader representation in the Executive Council. While this idea was eventually accepted, it was not until Hull presented the idea to Roosevelt during this meeting and received his support that members lined up behind the idea. The proposal for

international organization was then formally drafted for circulation among the British and Soviet delegations.

The basic tenets outlined above are clearly seen in the group's "Possible Plan for a General International Organization," formally submitted on April 29, 1944. The proposal called for an Executive Council, made up of eight members (including the four major powers and four other countries to be rotated on an annual basis and selected by a majority vote in the General Assembly). The Council would be primarily responsible for security matters, and the plan called on the Council members to be prepared to commit forces for peacekeeping and to reach agreement on the size of such forces. The precise level or type of force commitment was left unspecified. When it came time to present these ideas to the President, Hull removed all mention of the veto issue because of continuing disagreement within the group. Instead, the plan specified that decisions would be based on a majority vote, with all Four Powers casting concurring votes.

With a few changes, these recommendations were presented at the Dumbarton Oaks Meeting in August 1944. Finally, an authoritative US plan was 'on the table' to be discussed with delegates from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and in a follow-on meeting with China. But first, some further elaboration of the three tenets of the State Department's program.

Plans for a global organization were shaped by Roosevelt's conviction that its success hinged on the continued unanimity and cooperation among the Big Three. Despite some misgivings, US policymakers viewed Soviet cooperation

112. The Soviet Union did not want to include the Chinese in the Dumbarton Oaks meeting because they were not at war with China's enemy, Japan. As a result, The Dumbarton Oaks conference had two parts: Four Power meetings on postwar organization were held over a five week period, from August 21 to September 28, 1944; British and US delegates then held discussions with the Chinese from September 29 to October 7 to cover the same issues.
and participation in the UN as essential to postwar security. In this regard, there
was widespread consensus that Soviet participation was the key issue of postwar
politics. In an April 25, 1944, meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Secretary of State Hull informed the senators that the first pivotal
question for the United Nations was "to keep Russia solidly in the international
movement."113 In another major address at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in
1944, Secretary of State Hull assured the public that:

The Soviet Union has made up its mind to follow the course of
international cooperation... It is only through international
cooperation that she can advance her general economic interests,
her industrial development, her social welfare... Like some other
nations at various times under various circumstances, the Soviet
Union might get off the line but... she would have to come back
into line in time because she would discover that any course other
than cooperation was against her own interests.114

The appeal for continued cooperation was not just intended for public relations.

In a private letter to Churchill dated September 28, 1944, Roosevelt wrote:

I think we are all in agreement with him [Field Marshal Smuts] as
to the necessity of having the U.S.S.R. as a fully accepted and
equal member of any association of the great powers framed for
the purpose of preventing international war.

It should be possible to accomplish this by adjusting our
differences through compromise by all the parties concerned and
this ought to tide things over for a few years until the child learns
how to toddle.115

Although patronizing, Roosevelt consistently advocated both cooperation and the
need for compromise to achieve an enduring peace settlement. Thus, any plan
developed within the State Department must promote the goal of continued
cooperation after the war and, more to the point, have a reasonable chance of
being accepted by the Soviets and other Allies.

114. Ibid, p. 1703.
115. Francis Loewenheim, Harold Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill:
The second tenet of great power domination stemmed from Roosevelt's conviction that success depended on his Four Power Police concept. While Hull was able to convince Roosevelt to modify his earlier support for a provisional organization made up of only the wartime allies to enforce the peace, Roosevelt (and others in the State Department) remained convinced of the need for big power hegemony to maintain security. As a result, the real power of the organization was vested in the Council. While this requirement was easily accepted by the other great powers, it met with greater resistance from other nations, notably the United State's neighbors in Latin America.

The last tenet of enforcement was a more elastic concept than the first two. Within the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff delayed issuing directives on specific proposals until very late in the process. Full military participation in the State Department meetings did not come until April, 1944, when Admiral Leahy authorized the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to represent the Joint Chiefs in "furnishing to the State Department the necessary military guidance on the matter of the formulation of post-war policies."116 While a number of ideas were circulated, it was not until the Joint Chiefs gave the formal go-ahead that the State Department planning group could crystallize its ideas on international security provisions in March and April of 1944. Due to these delays and continuing uncertainty, the US position on the exact nature of enforcement provisions and an international force remained unresolved.

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference took place during the halcyon days of wartime cooperation, with the successful Allied landings in France and Soviet

116. While military staff attended earlier meetings as observers, full military participation began in April 1944. The officers that participated included: Gen. Stanley Embick and Vice Admiral Russell Willson of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maj Gen. George Strong for the War Dept, and Admiral Arthur Hepburn and Rear Admiral Roscoe Schiumann for the Navy Department. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 248.
advances into Germany making final victory only a matter of time. The many important issues debated during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (including the voting procedures of the Security Council, establishing trusteeships, requirements of membership, social and economic spheres, etc.) are beyond the scope of this chapter. But the key issue of the powers of the Security Council had a direct impact on what type of a military commitment would be created to provide 'teeth' to the charter's peacekeeping provisions. For this reason, it is helpful to examine the issue in more detail from the perspective of the various US agencies involved.

A United Nations International Police Force

The dramatic technological advances in air power during the war contributed to a revolution in warfare that attracted much attention. The general inclination to seek solutions to complex problems through technology no doubt contributed to interest in creating an international air force.

Stalin expressed enthusiasm for an international air force during his wartime meetings with Churchill and Roosevelt, arguing that a key reason for the League's failure had been due to the absence of an international air force. Up to the time of Dumbarton Oaks, the Soviets saw this force as an essential "sword" to uphold the peace.117 While Britain was generally opposed to an international force and the US military was quite ambivalent, Soviet interest in the matter was enough to force US planners to take the idea seriously in the summer and fall of 1944.

117. Stalin stated Soviet support for an international air force in a conversation with Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of Poland on August 9, 1944. Support was also expressed in an authoritative newspaper article in Zvezda in July 1944. Cited in Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 144.
Before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the State Department was inclined to support such an international force. In a background paper on the question, officials noted that the idea appeared feasible for the following reasons: air power did not yet have an entrenched service bureaucracy that might fight international control; committing air power to an international force was preferable to risking soldiers' lives; it did not interfere with existing national forces that provide security; and air units would probably be cheaper than other service alternatives. But while inclined to support an international air force, planners expressed continued ambivalence about the idea. Some objected that air power would not be sufficient to defeat aggressors, or at least to occupy territory. Rather than take a position, the group deferred the matter pending an analysis and recommendation by a panel of army and navy aviation experts.

The Joint Chiefs were unsure of what to think of the repeated calls for international forces. The lure of legitimizing US air power and securing additional foreign bases had to be balanced against the uncertain dangers of reduced autonomy and the chances of failure. A force also had the added advantage of guaranteeing an important postwar role. The general response of the military was to 'wait and see', given the potential dangers of giving some autonomy and freedom of action. A further undercurrent was concern over an anticipated reduction in postwar budgets and the looming battle among the services over future missions and resources. Unsure about what to support, the military top brass opted to delay action. Only one of the US military delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks Meeting clearly expressed his support of an international air

120. Ibid, p. 143; Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, p. 42.
corps on largely parochial grounds. His thinking is summarized by the historian Robert Hilderbrand as follows:

he thought that his branch of the service stood to gain in prestige and appropriations if singled out for action against aggressors by the new peacekeeping organization. In addition, the United Nations promised to provide army fliers with the kind of forward overseas bases that they would need to play a worldwide role in postwar affairs; otherwise American air power might be limited to targets in the Western Hemisphere or to aircraft carriers—which would, of course, only benefit the rival navy air wing. And finally, operating under U.N. auspices would make the use of air power more widely acceptable in the postwar period.

Prior to the opening of the Conference, the other US representatives had not yet been able to reach a clear position on an international air corps. Such "wavering" up until the last moment brought complaints about the competence of the military's delegates to the conference. 122

The mixed support for international air forces did not extend to proposals for an international ground force. While few disagreed with the practical advantages of a well-coordinated force that would assure swift and effective action in response to aggression, such a force assumed a level of cooperation and loss of individual control that was considered most unlikely to be embraced. As one participant summed up the thinking, a competent military force required a "national basis in terms of munitions, equipment, training, discipline, tactics and everything else"; in addition, the tradeoff between the military desirability of concentrating forces to maximize coordination, training, morale, etc., ran counter to the more politically realistic option of distributing such forces among

121. This final point surfaced because the use of terror bombing brought the possibility of a public backlash after the war. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, pp. 145-146.
122. Stettinus described the US military representatives (Generals Stanley Embick, George Strong and Muir Fairchild), as "on the second or third string side" and Stimson also said privately that he "lacked confidence" in his delegates prior to the conferenc.: The Navy delegates (Admiral Russell Willson and Admiral Arthur Hepburn) were held in higher regard, or at least were not targeted for criticism. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 145.
nations. In sum, while it might be possible for nations to volunteer such forces, they would most likely demand to retain control over them. In pre-conference proposals, the British echoed this view.

If a truly international force seemed to be asking for too much, the next best option of establishing ad hoc national contingents also ran into similar obstacles. Yet the idea remained appealing, given the obvious need for some enforcement power and the advantage that these forces would be easier to control. It was just such reasoning that motivated General Eisenhower to push for the continuation of SHAPE, mentioned above.

Once the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was underway, it became clear that the Soviet Union was quite serious about the need for an international air corps. As the prospects of a truly international ground force dimmed, Stalin dug in his heels about the need for at least an air corps to assure speedy and effective enforcement of any breaches of the peace. The discussion of an international force was shaped by criticism from both within and without the meeting halls. In response to changing instructions from home, the British position shifted from being opposed to the plan in pre-conference proposals, to favoring a modified version. As delegates reconsidered their positions, Senator Vandenberg again asserted the right of Congress to approve any commitment of forces. Several other senators raised objections to the negotiations, raising the possibility that the

125. This view was stressed in the Soviet Union's pre-conference proposals in the month leading up to Dumbarton Oaks. Memorandum on an International Security Organization by the Soviet Union, August 12, 1944, FRUS, 1944, 1:711; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 144.
126. At the end of August, Churchill changed his views and came out strongly in favor of the immediate creation of a force. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 151.
United States might include a reservation on the United States commitment to such a force.

When it became clear that the positions of the Conferees made a compromise agreement on an air corps a serious possibility, the US military advisors started to rally against any such force. Following a prolonged period of uncertainty, when it came time to actually commit to such a force, the military balked. As Under Secretary Stettinius noted in his diary, while the military had taken a long time to make up their minds on the subject, they were now certain that an international air force would be a 'disaster'. Roosevelt sided with the military and opposed committing the US to participate in a truly international force. As Roosevelt was well aware, Congress would pose strenuous objections to any commitment to use armed forces without their specific authorization; as a result, Roosevelt sought to avoid this potentially highly controversial issue during the fall election campaign.

Two alternative plans were then considered, but ultimately the attendant difficulties of formalizing such a force proved to be too much for the delegates. After much debate among the delegates to the Conference, provisions calling for an international air force were dropped. As a result, while the Conference closed in October 1944 with agreement on the basic outlines of the UN Charter, were the earlier proposals that provided the organization with the necessary force to uphold the peace, most notably the original concept of an international ground force (the 'Four Policemen') backed up by an international air force, as well as language that gave the World Court authority to require mandatory acceptance of

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128. Ibid.
its findings. The matter was still potentially open to subsequent agreement, but exclusion of these provisions made it increasingly unlikely that they would be included at a future date. This delay had far-reaching implications on the future of operations of the UN and these same issues resurfaced in Allied efforts to develop a security regime for Germany.

While one might explain this outcome as evidence of the basic unwillingness of a nation to give up its sovereignty over its own national force, a closer look at the US debate as it unfolded in 1944 suggests a much more serendipitous explanation that has more to do with the contested balance of power among government agencies and the fight over competing institutional interests. There was no unitary view that was advanced by the various actors concerning US interests. Instead, more narrowly focused fears over the impact of an international force, either on service interests or electoral chances, served to stymie US action at this time. Although posing major roadblocks, even opposition by the President and officers in the military did not make this the final word. The widespread belief in the need for some joint enforcement to make any such association worthwhile remained sufficiently strong to keep the idea on the agenda. In his public addresses in the fall of 1944, Roosevelt referred to the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations as a work-in-progress; privately, Roosevelt noted to an advisor that the US position did not preclude an agreement later on to establish an international force. 130 As will be explained in greater detail in the next chapter, the occupation of Germany offered the first actual test of the feasibility of a joint command or peacekeeping force in Europe at the end of World War II.

130. Ibid.
The UN was to serve as the central security apparatus of the postwar world. It was based on a two-tiered structure of power. Decisions on matters concerning threats to the peace and the use of force were based in the Security Council, with each of the great powers given the right to veto any action; all other matters could be addressed in the General Assembly, based on the principle of one-state-one-vote. Tirelessly nursed along by Hull and Stettinius, it was hailed as the State Department's greatest accomplishment to date. But not everyone was satisfied with the administration's formulation.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR DELAYED ACTION

Throughout discussions on a postwar organization, a committed group of skeptics supported delayed action and ad hoc measures pending clarification of the postwar order. Critics of US involvement in an international organization remained doubtful about the immediate relevance of such an organization in keeping the peace. These skeptics opposed any restrictions on US sovereignty and argued that governmental efforts to reach agreement on international machinery would sidetrack the government from the crucial task of developing a foreign policy based on recognition of spheres of influence. There was also an undercurrent of opposition that stemmed from fears that President Roosevelt would try to pursue his New Deal social agenda through international commitments. In addition, the complexity of the problems contributed to a profound sense of uncertainty about the shape of the postwar order, prompting some to urge caution.

Outside the Government, one prominent critic of any change in US foreign policy was the publisher Henry Luce, who along with other staunch
conservatives challenged the administration's foreign policies on the grounds that they promoted the socialist policies of the New Deal. Luce's ideas are best set forth in a *Life* article on "The American Century."\(^{131}\) Stressing instead national well-being, Luce advocated a much narrower definition of America's national interest. On the radical right, the small but influential America First Party demanded that the United States maintain an isolationist policy. While the Roosevelt administration eschewed such nativistic sentiments, all were aware of the general attitude of the public that favored "getting our boys out of Europe at the earliest possible moment and then having as little as possible to do with Europe in the future."\(^{132}\)

While Luce represented one extreme, a vocal minority of less extreme skeptics within the government supported delayed action and ad hoc measures pending clarification of the postwar order. As mentioned earlier, Secretary of War Stimson was not committed to a UN organization as the primary means of collective security and peace. While he did publicly support the cause of the UN and helped Secretary Hull in convincing the Democratic and Republican parties to adopt planks in favor of US membership to an international organization in 1944, he also pushed for several other measures that directly conflicted with the purpose of a UN.\(^{133}\) In his retrospective account, *On Active Service in War and Peace*, Stimson reiterates that while most agreed on the ultimate goals of an international organization, the main difference centered on the best way to achieve them.

\(^{132}\) This widespread sentiment is noted by Henry Wallace in his diary, January 25, 1944. Blum, *The Price of Vision*, p. 295.
However attractive it might be to think in terms of a world organization, the real guarantee of peace could only come from agreement among the major powers and such agreement would be much more readily achieved if attention were not diverted from it to blueprints which must remain without effect unless guaranteed by the three great nations.\footnote{Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, \textit{On Active Service in Peace and War} (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 603.}

This view was expressed in a January 23, 1945 memo that argued that the primary mistake of the League of Nations was that it did not secure a guarantee by Britain and America for the security of France.

I think we are in danger of making a similar mistake by attempting to formulate the Dumbarton organization before we have discussed and ironed out the realities which may exist to enable the four powers to carry out their mission, and I was much interested to read Senator Vandenberg's recent speech [of January 10, 1945] in which he took practically the same ground.

Any attempt to finally organize a Dumbarton organization will necessarily take place in an atmosphere of unreality until these preliminary foundations are established. The attitude of the numerous minor nations who have no real responsibility but plenty of vocal power and logical arguments will necessarily be different from that of the large powers who have to furnish the real security...\footnote{Memo to Secretary Stettinius, \textit{Ibid}, p. 604.}

In essence, Stimson argued that any wartime agreement on postwar organization was premature. In his words, it put "the cart before the horse. We should by thorough discussion between the three or four great powers endeavor to settle, so far as we can, accord upon the general area of these fundamental problems. We should endeavor to secure a covenant of guarantee of peace or at least an understanding of the conditions upon which such a general undertaking of mutual guarantee could be based."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p. 604.}

Stimson preferred pursuing a series of bilateral commitments on the critical issues of disarmament and enforcing the peace. While Stimson did not obstruct the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, he argued...
against several measures, such as establishing an international trusteeship, that weakened the mandate of the nascent world organization.

George Kennan's skepticism about the relevance of an organization for international security represents a more common type of opposition to the ideas of collective security among officials in the State Department. While in 1944 Kennan was not a key player in postwar planning and did not actively oppose such efforts, he clearly articulates an influential point of view among more conservative policymakers. Kennan worried that governmental efforts to reach agreement on international machinery would raise public hopes and sidetrack the government from the crucial task of developing foreign policy based on recognition of "the sheer power relationships of the European peoples." In response to press reports of the progress of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on August 4, 1944, Kennan wrote, "Underlying the whole conception of an organization for international security is the simple reasoning that if only the status quo could be rigidly preserved, there would be no further wars in Europe, and the European problem, so far as our country is concerned, would be solved." Kennan argued that such reasoning "mistakes the symptoms for the disease." He went on to say that

The more we ignore politics in our absorption with the erection of a legalistic system for the preservation of the status quo, the sooner and more violently that system will be broken to pieces under the realities of international life... The conception of law in international life should certainly receive every support and encouragement that our country can give it. But it cannot yet replace power as the vital force for a large part of the world... International security will depend on them: on the realities of power—not the structure in which they are clothed.

138. Ibid.
While in the minority, such skeptical voices peppered the internal debate over US membership to a United Nations and no doubt contributed to Roosevelt's political judgment that it would be better to avoid certain controversial matters until the future—at least until after the upcoming presidential election.

**CONCLUSION**

More than anything, urgency and uncertainty pervaded the debate over postwar security measures. While Americans were largely protected from the horrors of the war, events in Europe and the Far East profoundly challenged people's pre-existing ideas and attitudes. Policymakers were caught in the midst of this turmoil. Even Secretary Stimson, who earlier in his career had worked so hard to thwart Woodrow Wilson's plans for an international organization, came to entertain such ambitious notions.

During the war, there was widespread support for the establishment of postwar machinery for collective security to prevent a repeat of events leading to two world wars. Throughout, "the German Problem" was central to US thinking about the prospects of collective security. The threat of renewed aggression sparked consideration of a wide range of options to promote peace and prosperity in the postwar period. The merits and efficacy of a regional versus a global institution depended in large part on the nature of the problem to be addressed. At the time, the primary concern was not so much with improving diplomatic channels and ties to prevent a replay of the outset of a World War I type scenario, but with preventing the rise of another Hitler and fostering economic growth and democracy. These problems required continued Allied cooperation and united action in a global security body.
The wideranging debate over postwar security measures raised fundamental questions about the structure of collective security. Suddenly, government officials were seriously discussing ambitious plans to reform international relations through an international authority. Yet at the same time, the war brought unprecedented centralized control in the executive, with secret wartime summit meetings vesting tremendous power in Roosevelt and his small circle of military advisors. For most of the war, the President did not utilize existing institutional structures to address postwar issues; when he did call on State Department planners to develop the US negotiating position over the winter of 1943-1944, they operated from a position of weakness that inhibited decisive action to resolve many of the outstanding problems of postwar organization. As a result, many of the critical details of the enforcement powers of such an international organization were left unspecified. Prior to Dumbarton Oaks, the only real forums for translating postwar goals into policy were the wartime meetings of the Allies (which generally excluded State Department officials) and the European Advisory Commission to address the specific terms of the Allied occupation of the defeated nations.

President Roosevelt remained the single most important voice in articulating the official US position at the all-important wartime meetings with Churchill and Stalin. The Joint Chiefs also contributed to these discussions. While excluded from the 'big table' for most of the war, the State Department was given some leeway to develop the technical proposals to be negotiated. This can be seen in the development of the US position leading up to the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations in August-September of 1944. But the State Department did not enjoy much latitude or power, as seen in the planning for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. While members of the armed forces were generally careful to
restrict their input in postwar issues, they still retained the right to veto any measure that might inhibit military action.

Various subcommittees in the State Department engaged in extensive planning and negotiations, but lacked the ultimate power to carry out its ideas. Within the military, there was little long-range planning for the postwar period, yet ironically, the military's agenda came to dominate postwar planning because it had the prestige and institutional infrastructure to address the many pressing problems of a postwar settlement. As one officer has candidly recollected,

The US military were 'on a roll.' The US military leadership was full of confidence. These officers had led actions that led to the fall of Germany. They were on the ground, they saw the problems as they existed, they were used to giving orders. They had developed what they viewed as competent planning staffs and they were prepared to take a leading role in seeing that peacetime arrangements confirmed the victory they had obtained by force of arms. There was literally no one else to exert a leadership role. 139

The military viewed itself as a temporary caretaker of the conquered lands and did not assume responsibility for the long-term resolution of complex diplomatic problems. The well-documented push by Army officials for institutional autonomy stemmed from the Army's desire to minimize responsibility in nonmilitary realms of the occupation (i.e. in economic and political arenas). As a result, postwar planning represented an interesting paradox. Despite a great degree of openness with regard to the governmental agenda and the opportunity for governmental action, policymakers were actually quite shortsighted when it came to devising options concerning long term security arrangements and the terms of the occupations of Germany and Japan. Virtually all of the planning that did take place was ignored when the United States

ultimately did take action. Those policies that were adopted were primarily concerned with more immediate military and operational concerns, such as determining the boundaries of the occupation zones, disarming the opposition, and assuring the autonomy of the occupation's commander. Despite a wide-ranging discussion of various possibilities for collective security, a much more narrow and traditional constellation of alternatives was actually developed into policy options.

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Inis Claude has written that "In the half century that has elapsed since the concept of collective security gained prominence as the central feature of the Wilsonian scheme for reforming the international system, it has largely lost its clarity and specificity."140 This may be so, but what Claude and others tend to overlook is the fact that during World War II there were a series of policy alternatives under consideration that translated the more general goals of collective security into an actual institution to uphold the peace. These ideas were quite distinct from the principles of collective defense that were ultimately adopted by NATO.141 Collective defense is directed at a specific opponent--defined either geographically or individually--and its primary aim is deterrence. In contrast, collective security "is directed against any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included."142 This latter goal prompted serious consideration of an international air corps and commitment of joint forces to combat aggression.

142. Ibid, p. 52.
Following Roosevelt's death in April 1945, one of Harry Truman's first acts as President was to reaffirm his participation in the upcoming San Francisco Conference and the US commitment to the UN. The hopes and fears of this time can perhaps be summed up in a Tennyson poem that Truman referred to following the signing of the UN Charter:

Til the war-drums throb'd no longer, and the battle flags were furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.¹⁴³

The UN was to serve as the first step in this direction and the postwar status of Germany was the most immediate test of this commitment.

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CHAPTER 5

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN AND THE FILTERING OF IDEAS ABOUT THE POSTWAR STATUS OF GERMANY

Perhaps the most notorious alternative proposal considered during the war was one championed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau offered a comprehensive program to permanently deindustrialize Germany, dismantling its factories and flooding its mines. The draconian measures reflected the view that US security could be assured only by fundamentally restructuring German society so it would never again be in a position to wage war. To Morgenthau, this meant reducing Germany to the status of a "fifth-rate power." ¹

The plan is perhaps best understood in the context of the vindictive feelings many Americans held towards Germany in 1944. Morgenthau viewed Germany as an inveterate three-time aggressor nation and believed that its rapid rearmament after World War I had been facilitated by the terms of reparations that helped build up its industrial base.² Most recently, as he put it, "the Nazis had brutalized Germany, annihilated millions of human beings, stormed across Europe, and mistreated those whose lands they conquered."³ Morgenthau

² For a fuller discussion of the reparations issue, especially the impact of the post-World War I experience on policymakers' perceptions, see John Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), Chapter 3. Backer stresses that policymakers were greatly influenced by the history of events leading up to 1919, when policymakers ignored the warnings of John Maynard Keynes in his book on The Economic Consequences of the Peace. According to Backer, these historical perceptions of the mistakes made in the reparations policy of World War I had a detrimental impact on the political settlement in Germany. p. 28.
³ Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 327.
became convinced that the only way to prevent future rearmament was to completely disarm the military, dismantle all heavy industry, and prohibit reconstruction. As one account characterizes it, the Morgenthau plan was nothing short of "a program of industrial castration whose effect would be to change Germany's international voice into a weak falsetto."^4

The basic premise of the Morgenthau plan was the need for universal punishment of all Germans for the Nazis' crimes against humanity, with extensive outside intervention to fundamentally restructure and redirect the whole society.^5 In addition, he called on the United States to provide a postwar loan to the Soviet Union to facilitate recovery from the war and serve as a counterweight to prevent the resurgence of Germany in the future. Perhaps most important for the purposes of this study, Morgenthau called for placing responsibility for the long-term control of Germany in a UN body made up of forces from Germany's neighbors once US occupation forces withdrew.

From an organizational standpoint, the Morgenthau plan and its evolution are significant for their many unlikely attributes. First, the Treasury Department had little formal jurisdiction over the issue of the postwar political settlement of Germany. Technically, the department's involvement was limited to certain financial arrangements for the occupation. Second, the plan represented a dramatic departure from the way other organizations viewed the so-called German problem--in the extent of its punitive qualities, in its comprehensive program, and in its call for collective security arrangements to keep the peace following the withdrawal of US forces. In one historian's words: "Few things better demonstrate the human capacity for error...than the fact that Morgenthau

had a perfectly outrageous idea—to deindustrialize Germany—and it seemed to become policy. Many efforts to account for the plan offer little additional help, construing the plan as "the result of normal factors: confusion, ignorance, hatred, and even historical accident." Yet, notwithstanding some of the extreme features of the plan, Morgenthau's approach left an influential legacy on US policy toward Germany.

Why was Morgenthau so successful in promoting his plan for the dismemberment of Germany and what was the fate of this proposal? Morgenthau's success hinged on the period's fluid institutional circumstances and his personal persuasive power; to understand the fate of the plan, I examine the filtering of ideas within governmental institutions and the ways in which decisionmakers resolve controversies during periods of institutional upheaval and change.

This chapter will first examine Roosevelt's priorities for German policy which served to set the agenda and boundaries of debate over planning for the postwar status of Germany. More than anyone else, President Roosevelt determined the broad policy agenda. Rather than delegate decisionmaking responsibility through formal institutional channels, Roosevelt preferred to make decisions himself, relying heavily on his inner circle of advisors—known as the kitchen cabinet—for advice. This leadership style hindered the effectiveness and strength of the formal institutions vested with responsibility for German policy—particularly, the European Advisory Commission (EAC) which received guidance

8. Harry Hopkins was one of President Roosevelt's most respected advisors, along with Adm. William Leahy and James Byrnes.
from the Working Security Committee (WSC), an inter-departmental committee created to address the postwar settlement. I will then discuss the evolution of debate over the occupation zones and US occupation policy, focusing on the controversy over Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's plan for the dismemberment and pastoralization of Germany. Following a discussion of the debate surrounding the drafting of an occupation manual for US forces in Germany, known as JCS 1067, I will conclude with an analysis of the importance of institutional capacity in understanding the fate of various alternatives under consideration in the final throes of World War II.

Before analyzing these various possibilities in more detail, it is first necessary to identify the various institutions and actors that had jurisdiction over the postwar occupation and political settlement of Germany.

ORGANIZATIONAL JURISDICTION: INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

The problems of postwar security and the political settlement of Germany were intrinsically linked. For this reason, there is a good deal of overlap between those officials and agencies charged with planning for postwar security (see chapter 4) and the political settlement of Germany. What follows is a brief review of pertinent people and departments, including short descriptions of their positions and activities.

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9. Morgenthau circulated several versions of this plan, but the basic idea is reproduced in the forward to his book, _Germany Is Our Problem_ (NY: Harper, 1945); See also Memorandum to the President, "Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany, September 5, 1944, _FRUS, Quebec_, 1944, pp. 101-106.
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The Treasury

Prior to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's intervention in postwar occupation policy in the summer of 1944, the Treasury Department maintained only a peripheral role in postwar planning in the occupied territories. The institution promoted liberal capitalism through its monetary policy.\textsuperscript{10} Treasury officials were responsible for postwar international monetary policies and were periodically consulted on economic matters, but there were no departments directed to handle matters such as the powers of the occupation government. When Morgenthau did take up the issue, he relied on a close circle of assistants in his office.

Some historians have argued that the driving force behind Morgenthau's plan was his deeply rooted hatred of Germany and sense of moral outrage.\textsuperscript{11} At the same time, Morgenthau's proposals built on his decade of experience as Secretary of the Treasury during the New Deal. While punitive in nature, Morgenthau compared his pastoralization plan to the administration's Rural Resettlement and Farm Security Administration reform programs during the New Deal.\textsuperscript{12}

Morgenthau was the dominant voice of authority within the Treasury Department, and he was strongly supported by assistants who were remarkably loyal to their boss. Although differences were aired within the department, Treasury officials in this period maintained a high degree of "cabinet solidarity" in dealings outside the department.\textsuperscript{13} This unity amplified the Treasury

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\textsuperscript{10} Kimball, \textit{Swords or Ploughshares?}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid}, p. 25.
Department's influence, contributing to the perception that if a whole coalition within the Treasury Department could agree to the idea, there must be something to it. Proponents of the Morgenthau plan relied primarily on Morgenthau's personal persuasive power and close ties to President Roosevelt to promote the plan in Washington. When it came time to negotiate with the British, they used the Treasury's primary source of influence—postwar loans—to gain Churchill's support. In so doing, the department made skilled use of external forces—in this case Britain's economic problems—as a resource through which to further their plan.

A further factor that helped Treasury officials in their dealings with other departments was the fact that several Treasury officials were temporarily working in the Army's Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to help with postwar planning. These employees remained loyal to the Treasury Department, keeping Morgenthau and his assistant Henry Dexter White informed of developments in CAD. 14 Despite a lack of formal jurisdiction of postwar German policy, the combination of a clearly enunciated and unified position, a strong and persuasive advocate, and the financial leverage of Treasury policy tools, all worked to strengthen the Treasury Department's role in the second half of 1944.

The Executive

President Roosevelt's general foreign policy goals and support for the concept of collective security have already been detailed in the previous chapter. But it is useful to review Roosevelt's agenda and ideas as they pertained specifically to Germany. Three points stand out. First, Roosevelt remained committed to cooperative relations with the Soviet Union and the proposition that

the United States would not act unilaterally; as a result, major decisions on the
postwar settlement of Germany would have to be made in a postwar peace
conference or through direct negotiations with the Soviets. Second, Roosevelt
made the delineation of the zones of Allied occupation his first priority,
neglecting to take early action on numerous other matters concerning the
treatment of Germany. Third, at least initially, Roosevelt supported a harsh peace
settlement for Germany and minimal long-term US involvement in Europe.
Beyond the short-term requirement that Nazi forces be disarmed, fascist political
institutions dismantled, and a broad-based program of denazification undertaken,
however, Roosevelt did not approve any detailed planning for Allied action in
Germany.

Overall, Roosevelt's involvement in postwar German policy was limited
but, as President, he was the final arbiter. At several key junctures, Roosevelt's
input was critical: in drawing up the occupation zones, in his disapproval of early
drafts of the Army's Military Handbook for Germany, and in his strong feelings
about imposing a 'harsh peace' in Germany that culminated in the adoption of the
Morgenthau plan in a joint agreement with Churchill at the Quebec Conference in
September 1944. Roosevelt left his mark, too, through his subsequent disavowal
of the Morgenthau plan in the face of public controversy during the election
campaign in October 1944, leaving the policy essentially unresolved.

In German policy as elsewhere, Roosevelt lived up to his reputation for
procrastination, refusing to be pinned down on potentially ticklish specifics and
playing off subordinates against each other to maintain control over a broad
spectrum of issues. At the same time, officials in this environment worked hard to
persuade Roosevelt of the merits of their preferred alternatives or, failing that, to

manipulate the guidelines established by Roosevelt in the process of drawing up and implementing specific operational plans. This will be seen further on in the debate over the terms of the "hard" peace and most notably, in the fight over the occupation manual for Germany.

Roosevelt called for a policy that clearly punished the German population for the chaos and suffering wrought by the Nazi government, and he was a strong proponent of partitioning Germany. But Roosevelt's first-order concern about post-surrender German policy was the debate over the occupation zones—particularly which country would occupy the southeastern portion of Germany. The issue dominated his early attention to such an extent that it prevented other pressing issues from being addressed—an outcome that would have profound implications on postwar possibilities.

**War Department Planners**

There was little doubt that the military would take initial operational responsibility for the defeated territories under the control of the Allied armies. Nonetheless, the transition from war to peace posed troubling problems of how to reassert civilian control. For the War Department, the tension between civilian and military activities remained a central issue throughout discussions of occupation policy. At an institutional level, the War Department officials repeatedly asserted their institutional prerogative to maintain independent control over their field commanders, which meant that military autonomy was a key criteria for evaluating different alternatives. In addition, the War Department

sought to divest itself of post-conflict responsibilities in the Axis territories as soon as possible, viewing them as a distraction from its primary mission of warfighting. To minimize responsibilities in the occupation, War Department proposals universally called for circumscribed responsibilities and peripheral military involvement in a wide range of occupation activities.

Within the War Department, the central figures in planning for the occupation were Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Assistant Secretary John McCloy, and Director of the Civil Affairs Division, Maj. Gen. John Hilldring. Once Allied forces entered Germany in 1945, General Eisenhower became the military commander for the US occupation zone under the title, Military Governor, and General Lucius DuBignon Clay served as the Deputy Military Governor for Germany beginning in April 1945.

Despite Secretary Stimson's formal seniority, McCloy and Hilldring were the key players in overseeing occupation matters and the terms of the occupation directive. McCloy exercised primary responsibility for occupied areas and devoted considerable time to postwar plans for the occupation; he also drafted Stimson's policy memos on the subject. Although Stimson became closely involved in US postwar policy toward Germany during the fall of 1944 in response to Morgenthau's intervention, the responsibility for Army planning fell largely to McCloy who had firsthand experience with Germany and a strong interest in postwar affairs.

In general, middle-echelon War Department officials responsible for the advancing Allied armies strongly opposed any alternatives—apart from

17. Henry Stimson served as Secretary of War until September 1945.
disarmament—that called for sweeping action in Germany. The bulk of work in the War Department's Civil Affairs Division and other Army departments was devoted to addressing short-term practical problems such as distribution of food, clearing roads, closing down war-making industries, rounding up weapons, arresting war criminals and disarming pockets of resistance.\textsuperscript{19} War Department planners also drew up plans for the administrative structure of the occupation government—including its mission, structure, and chain of command. Notably, though, these planning efforts excluded any concrete measures concerning economic reconstruction or long-term political governance: presumably these policy issues were not considered part of the military's proper role.

But Army inaction in this area did not simply reflect the division of labor in the government. CAD officials were openly hostile to State Department efforts to draw up more elaborate long-term political and economic plans, viewing them as inappropriate civilian interference. From the military's standpoint, as long as the various Army departments involved with the problems of administering the immediate postwar occupation were addressing problems such as the military chain of command and rounding up war criminals, they would not tolerate any outside input, even if justified as promoting the US foreign policy goals of denazification or the economic reconstruction of Europe. Both McCloy and Hildring "were adamant that it was their responsibility to review policy proposals and to pass judgment on whether they could be successfully administered."\textsuperscript{20}

This turned out to be a significant power.

\textsuperscript{19} This assessment is based on a review of declassified documents by officials in the Civil Affairs Division, the JCS, the OSS, and the Office of the Secretary of War and Office of the Assistant Secretary of War at the National Archives (NA) and JCS documents at the Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).

The State Department

The institutional weaknesses that plagued the State Department have already been detailed in chapter 4. Suffice it to say that the numerous postwar planning efforts undertaken by various State Department committees were largely ignored when it came time for action.21

In contrast to War Department officials, State Department planners advanced alternatives that promoted the long-term goals of an economically secure, rehabilitated Germany. While State officials were committed to punitive measures that would assure German disarmament, they also advanced ideas favoring a greater level of involvement in the German economy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull pursued an ambitious program to foster free markets, US-style democracy, and gradual reconstruction in Germany and Western Europe.22 But Hull did not get very involved in policy until after the Morgenthau plan had been endorsed at the Second Quebec Conference in the fall of 1944. In the earlier stages of planning, two groups within the State Department were charged with planning for Germany: the Office of European Affairs headed by James Dunn, with H. Freeman Matthews, James Riddleberger, and Emile Despres as special advisor on German economic affairs; and the American Embassy in London which made up the US delegation to the European Advisory Commission, headed by Ambassador John Winant and a few advisors, notably Philip Mosely who

specialized in Central and Eastern Europe. Riddleberger was directly and often deeply involved in formulating policies relating to the occupation.

The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was the major formal structure with jurisdiction over negotiations among the Allies for the occupation of Germany. The EAC was housed in London, and the US delegation was headed by US Ambassador to Britain, John Winant. It continued meeting until August 1945, when it was disbanded following the agreement on Germany reached at the Potsdam Conference.

The European Advisory Commission had no authority to present a position without first receiving interdepartmental clearance. This requirement severely limited the power and effectiveness of EAC representatives—who received guidance and clearance for various proposals from the Working Security Committee (WSC), an inter-departmental committee chaired by James Dunn, with James Riddleberger taking over after the first two meetings. Riddleberger served as the division chief in charge of Central European Affairs (under Dunn). In addition, a changing group of State Department officials attended meetings,

24. The European Advisory Commission (EAC) held its first organizing meeting on December 15, 1944, and formally convened on January 14, 1945. For a more detailed account of the EAC, see Philip Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones were Drawn," Foreign Affairs Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1950), pp. 580-604. Mosely blames officials in the War Department's Civil Affairs Division for the failure of the EAC to carry out its mandate.

For a slightly different view, see Walter Dorn, "The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany in 1944-1945," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1957), pp. 486-489. Dorn argues that "apart from their difference over the scope and nature of military government and the independence of the zone commander, there was no serious disagreement between the State and War Departments on substantive occupation policy," p. 492.
25. As Paul Hammond describes it, the EAC's "mandate to 'study and make recommendations' was, of course, a term of art; EAC was a forum for negotiations where the three members, duly instructed by their governments, could present and discuss formal proposals, and, in accordance with instructions received, reach agreements." "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," p. 317.
while the "principal permanent representatives" included the chief of the Division of Territorial Studies and the Adviser to the Office of Economic Affairs.\footnote{Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," p. 329.}

The Working Security Committee suffered from major institutional weakness similar to that of the EAC: any proposal adopted by the group had to receive interdepartmental clearance. This requirement created major problems. The most obvious shortcoming was manifest in prolonged delays in instructing the US delegation on the EAC, pending approval by the various departments with jurisdiction (most frequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff). In addition, no one individual could "make policy"; the weak administrative structure exacerbated jurisdictional disputes among the different agencies. In a climate of heightened stakes and uncertainty over the postwar scenario, this contested balance of power paralyzed the decisionmaking apparatus.

Finally, in addition to the departments and committees listed above, a series of temporary committees tackled various aspects of planning as they arose, further adding to the period's sense of flux. The most influential of these committees was the Cabinet Committee on Postwar Germany. In August 1944, President Roosevelt authorized his special advisor Harry Hopkins to convene a series of Cabinet Committee meetings to resolve the conflict within the administration over the post-surrender treatment of Germany. The group--made up of Hopkins, Stimson, Morgenthau and Hull--was designed as a temporary, ad hoc structure in which two unconventional players--Hopkins and Morgenthau--played a central role. The Cabinet Committee superseded the EAC as the locus of high level attention to postwar matters in the fall of 1944.
POLICY FLUX AND MORGENTHAU'S INTERVENTION
IN POSTWAR PLANNING FOR GERMANY

On an August 1944 flight to Europe to review financial arrangements for the liberated areas of France, one of Morgenthau's aides handed him a State Department memo on reparations, the Acheson-Pasvolsky memo on economic policy. Morgenthau became infuriated with what he felt were the moderate terms of the memo. His concern was undoubtedly augmented by his Jewish heritage; his subsequent tour of the devastation of V-1 bomb attacks on London, the frontline battles in Normandy and eyewitness accounts of victims of Nazi rule made a deep impression upon Morgenthau, spurring his interest in the postwar treatment of Germany. In meetings with Foreign Secretary Eden, Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Winant, General Eisenhower, and others, Morgenthau discussed his idea of dividing Germany into autonomous agricultural provinces and closing down industrial production. Although he received quite mixed responses, Morgenthau concluded that Eden and Eisenhower basically supported his approach. Having pushed his ideas in Britain, Morgenthau returned to spearhead an effort to revise US policy that would culminate in a series of contentious Cabinet meetings and the shortlived acceptance of his plan by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944 in conjunction with a promise of US aid to England after the war.

Returning from Europe in August of 1944, Morgenthau inquired further about the status of governmental planning for the postwar political settlement of Germany and reviewed various documents being prepared for the occupation, including the draft of the "Basic Handbook for Military Government of Germany" prepared by Army planners in the Civil Affairs Division. Upon reading a draft of

27. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries.
the handbook, Morgenthau took it upon himself and the Treasury Department to force a reassessment.

Intended as a pragmatic guide to short-term military action, the military handbook was primarily concerned with achieving physical control of Germany and getting things back into working order to allow for efficient military control. Among its most controversial sections were those that cautioned about immediately removing every Nazi from positions of responsibility and one passage instructing that "Your main and immediate task...is to get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as possible the official functioning of the German civil government." The handbook included a number of different steps, including the attempt to "minimize the potential financial disorder and chaos that is likely to occur and thus assist the military forces in their operations and ease the burdens that will face the more permanent Allied Control organization." This approach was intolerable to Morgenthau, who called for much more severe measures.

To pursue the matter, Morgenthau met with Secretary of State Hull on August 17 to brief him on developments at the EAC and to attempt to enlist his support for a harsher policy toward Germany. Referring to the failure of the bureaucracy to follow through on the decisions reached at the Tehran Conference, Morgenthau expressed in exasperation:

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agree to the dismemberment of Germany, and all these people go ahead and make studies without taking that into consideration and without explicit instructions. It is like telling an architect to build a new house and not telling him where it should be built, how it should be built, or how many people it is to house.  

29. Published in April 1945. Copy in RG 218, JCS Files, NA.
The remark sums up the general pattern of postwar planning up through the end of the war. As mentioned earlier, the representatives to the EAC did not receive timely and useful instructions for negotiating a plan for Germany. And the WSC experienced fractious battles over jurisdiction between CAD and State Department officials. Meanwhile, having successfully delayed planning, military planners in the Civil Affairs Division were left to their own devices in drafting an interim directive for General Eisenhower's forces to use as they reached German territory over the summer of 1944.

Morgenthau's attempt to gain Hull's support was followed by a meeting with Roosevelt on August 19th. At the meeting, Morgenthau lobbied against the State Department's reparations plans and informed Roosevelt that no one was carrying out his instructions from the Tehran Conference for a tough treatment of Germany. 31 While Roosevelt was noncommittal at the meeting, Morgenthau took Roosevelt's comments in support of a harsh line towards Germany as an endorsement for his proposal. Morgenthau appointed a special committee within the Treasury Department, made up of Harry White, John Pehle, and Ansel Luxford, to analyze the German problem, and the group immediately set to work to provide supporting documentation for Morgenthau's proposals.

In a meeting with Roosevelt on August 26, 1944, Morgenthau again voiced his opposition to Army plans for the occupation and persuaded Roosevelt to look at the military handbook. Upon reading it, Roosevelt responded in a sharply worded letter to Stimson: "This so-called 'Handbook' is pretty bad." 32 Calling for the handbook's withdrawal and lambasting several of its passages, Roosevelt instructed Stimson that "the German people as a whole must have it

driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decency of modern civilization."\textsuperscript{33} By way of example, Roosevelt suggested feeding Germans from Army soup kitchens. By bringing to Roosevelt's attention the fact that the Army plan would maintain and restore civil and economic affairs in Germany, Morgenthau succeeded in drawing Roosevelt into the conflict and enlisting his disapproval for Army policy.\textsuperscript{34}

THE MAKING OF A SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVE

As with the more general debate over collective security detailed in the previous chapter, the character of the wartime debate over US policy toward a defeated Germany was largely the product of the fluid institutional environment and contested balance of power among various governmental agencies. President Roosevelt's reliance on \textit{ad hoc} institutional structures for German policy formation exacerbated policy differences as well as institutional rivalries.

Between 1944 and 1945, planning for the postwar period was in a state of flux. Faced with a number of daunting problems that required urgent action, policymakers were open to ideas from unconventional quarters. Morgenthau's ideas took root in such an open, even chaotic environment. Their success at having an impact on the debate about German policy illustrates just how open this period was--especially in light of Morgenthau's extreme views about Germany and his ambitious goals for collective security in Europe.

In addition to the period's flux, individual persuasive power played a role. The Treasury Department was only peripherally responsible for drawing up certain financial arrangements for the occupation, but Morgenthau's personal

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{FRUS 1944}, General, Vol I, p. 546.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," pp. 355-356.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
persuasive ability enabled him to intervene in postwar policy at a critical moment. Morgenthau's prospects were aided also by his close personal friendship with Roosevelt. They had first met as neighbors in upstate New York, and Morgenthau had been a key supporter throughout Roosevelt's political career. Known as a liberal, Morgenthau was a major figure in the New Deal economic reforms as Treasury Secretary (appointed in 1934) and was part of the select circle of White House advisors to Roosevelt.

In contrast to Morgenthau, Secretaries Stimson and Hull were not intimates of Roosevelt. A longstanding Republican, Stimson was first appointed by Roosevelt in an effort to achieve bipartisan unity at a time of national emergency. Although Stimson dutifully supported Roosevelt and they maintained good working relations, the President tended to withdraw to his inner circle, especially during an election year. For different reasons, Roosevelt kept Secretary Hull almost completely out of the loop during his tenure, usurping the bulk of the Secretary's powers under the guise of the exigencies of wartime.

With Morgenthau's great influence, the sudden input of the Treasury Secretary in occupation planning and the involvement of Treasury officials dramatically altered the universe of possibilities. Following Morgenthau's involvement, intervening drafts on occupation policy attempted to either set out a compromise or adopt the least objectionable components of the proposed Treasury program of pastoralization of Germany.

In addition, Morgenthau managed to exploit arguments stressing the parochial interests of the War Department. Because the Treasury Department was not responsible for specific decisions in the planning for the occupation, Morgenthau was free to focus on the larger goals throughout the changing facets

of the debate. Finally, Morgenthau was adept at bringing the institutional capacity of the Treasury to bear, gaining leverage to further his agenda, as indicated in his deal with Britain, offering a loan guarantee in exchange for Churchill's support of his plan for Germany.

BACKGROUND TO THE MORGENTHAU PLAN: DIVIDING A DEFEATED GERMANY INTO ZONES OF CONTROL

While the Allies firmly agreed that Germany should be jointly occupied, the question of which nation should hold which region of Germany became a major point of contention between Roosevelt and Churchill throughout most of 1944. The tenuous situation in France during the war fostered US worries of being drawn into the problems of postwar France, especially if a civil war erupted following the surrender of Germany. Roosevelt, wary of this contingency, insisted that the first order of business was to agree on which zone the Allies would occupy. In meetings with the Joint Chiefs en route to the Cairo Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt proposed that US forces occupy northern Germany, that Britain occupy southern Germany, and that the USSR occupy eastern Germany.36 Up until the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, Roosevelt adamantly pushed for the United States to occupy the northwestern sector of Germany, believing that occupation of the southwestern zone would lead to the United States being responsible for France.37 In his correspondence with Churchill, Roosevelt opposed any US commitment to

36. FRUS, Quebec Conference, 1944, Undated Memo by Assistant to President's Naval Aide (Elsey) on "Zones of Occupation in Europe." p. 148. The meeting took place on November 19, 1943; see also FRUS Cairo Conference, 1943, pp. 786-787.
postwar reconstruction of Europe quite bluntly. In early 1944, Roosevelt reiterated that the central working principle for US policy was "the political and military desire to be committed as little as possible in Europe after the defeat of Germany in order that our full attention can be devoted to the war with Japan" in a memo to Acting Secretary of State Stettinius.

Roosevelt's proposal on the zones of occupation met the opposition of the British, and there was a good deal of wrangling back and forth over the next several months. The British Chiefs of Staff would not accept Roosevelt's proposed reversal of the occupation zones that had been under consideration within the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC). In a reply to the US proposal advanced at the Cairo Conference in November 1943, the British Chiefs stated their opposition on the grounds that it would create insurmountable logistic difficulties involved in moving troops from their invasion positions to the occupation positions, forcing a postponement of the invasion. It soon became apparent that, while willing to toe the official line, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were somewhat sympathetic to the British arguments, as were officials in the State Department in light of the military deployment of troops in Europe. While the Joint Chiefs did not directly object to the President's proposal, the JCS recommended that, because of the ongoing war with Japan, the United States should occupy that territory requiring the smallest commitment of forces for the shortest possible amount of time.

38. See for example, Roosevelt's correspondence on February 7, 1944, February 29, 1944, and June 2, 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol I, pp. 166, 189, 232.

In one such message, Roosevelt asserted that he could not keep US forces in France. He reminded Churchill of his paternal responsibilities in supporting the schooling of Belgium, France and Italy, chiding Churchill that "In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!" From Roosevelt to Churchill, February 29, 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol I, p. 189, 39. FRUS 1944, Vol I.
The sharp disagreement over occupation zones stalled efforts to draw up formal plans for the occupation in the European Advisory Commission (EAC) and ultimately forced General Eisenhower to move forward with interim plans based on the British proposal when Allied advances in the summer of 1944 suddenly made a German defeat a strong possibility.\textsuperscript{40} With the imminent collapse of Nazi forces, the quickly changing military picture forced the issue to the top of the agenda.

The Churchill-Roosevelt disagreement over the occupation zones was finally resolved at the second Quebec Conference when Roosevelt bowed to pressure from Churchill and his own advisors and agreed to the allocation of the northwestern zone to British forces. This was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16, 1944, and codified in CCS 320/27 on September 20, 1944.\textsuperscript{41} The zonal agreement was then submitted to the EAC and finalized on November 14, 1944.

Some have argued that one explanation for the relative paucity of alternatives for allied control is that planners were held up by the British-US disagreement over who should occupy the northwest zone. While no doubt contributing to delays, disagreement over who should go where did not block the more general question of what should be the overall policy. To explain the relative void in developing options that addressed the overall problem of the postwar treatment of Germany, it is necessary to look to the dearth of strong

\textsuperscript{40} The Russians also did not want to discuss proposals on the control machinery for Germany until the zones of occupation had been finalized. See Status of Negotiations and Discussions on Germany, August 22, 1944, \textit{FRUS Quebec Conference, 1944}, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{FRUS, Quebec Conference, 1944}, pp. 365-367, 373-374, 391-392.

The text was forwarded by Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Winant for presentation to the EAC on September 20, 1944. \textit{FRUS 1944}, General, Vol I, p. 340.
in institutional structures to handle such unprecedented issues as US policy towards a vanquished foe.

**Partitioning Of Germany**

The idea of partitioning Germany into several small states was discussed at numerous points throughout the war. First formally presented at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, it was brought up at several subsequent conferences of the Allied leaders. While the prospect of permanently destroying the concentration of German power by dividing Germany into smaller states had strong appeal, advocates had a hard time persuading skeptics that it would actually work. Arguments vacillated over whether it would require more or less outside intervention to assure that a partition would remain in place. Many voiced concerns over the risk that Germans might rally around an imposed partition as a compelling grievance which would ultimately undermine a stable settlement.

Given Roosevelt's stated desire for partition, the State Department conducted numerous studies on the subject between 1942-1944. One of the primary advocates of partition was Under Secretary Sumner Welles. With his departure in the fall of 1943, earlier support for the partition of Germany gradually gave way to proposals setting out a decentralized, federal government with strict controls.

The State Department held a number of meetings concerning postwar planning for Germany. In a meeting devoted to the question in January 1943, the

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42. For a summary of these studies, see Reardon, "American Policy Toward Germany, 1944-1946."

43. Sumner Welles subsequently wrote a book advocating partition as part of his vision of a future peace settlement, called *Time for Decision*, published in the spring of 1944. Welles presented a "devil's theory of history," placing the blame on the German general staff for both world wars. Arguing that German unity was a threat to world peace, Welles maintained that "partition is the only way of offsetting the German menace in the future." The book outlined a plan for the partition of Germany into three states with East Prussia ceded to Poland. Welles' plan is similar to the Morgenthau plan. (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1944).
pros and cons of partition were debated. Advocates proposed dividing Germany into three states, based on an equitable division of resources, population, and production. The basic rationale for partition was that militarism in Germany was 200 years old and unless Germany was weakened by being physically divided, "recrudescence of militarism would present a danger to the world." The opposing view questioned whether a partition would work. This group stressed the potential for division to become a rallying point for German nationalism. Looking fifteen years down the road, it was argued, it would be unlikely for the US public to support intervention to uphold a division of Germany.

Ongoing debate within the State Department on the merits of partition culminated in a comprehensive policy summary on the subject, completed July 27, 1943. This report considered the pros and cons of various partition plans, including dividing the country along the lines of various religious, political, and economic boundaries into two, three, four, or multiple segments, as well as the question of the durability of a partition. While the policy summary did not officially endorse either position, the report implicitly endorsed the ultimate unity of the country rather than permanent partition.

During his trip to Europe in August 1944, Morgenthau reported that Philip Mosely, the State Department advisor to Ambassador Winant on the EAC, was "frankly hostile to the analysis, [saying] that any attempt to 'smash' the German economy would drive the Germans to dependence on Russia, which would in turn expose all of Europe to Soviet control." Although Winant was less outspoken

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44. Backer, *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 19, citing Policy Minutes 42, January 23, 1943, RG 59, Notter files, National Archives. The meeting was chaired by Under Secretary Sumner Welles and included Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, and Leo Pasvolsky.
47. Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries*, p. 338.
in his communications with Washington, he indicated that he was firmly opposed
to Morgenthau's thesis and made yet another futile attempt to receive policy
guidance from Washington following his discussion with Morgenthau.\footnote{Ibid, p. 338.}

Secretary of State Hull had also expressed serious reservations about the
merits of partition on several occasions. At one point, Hull warned Roosevelt in a
memo that "imposed partition would be little short of a disaster both for Germany
and for us."\footnote{Cover letter in reply to Roosevelt's request for Hull's comments on a proposal by Gerard
Swope. Cited in Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, p. 22.}

Instead, Secretary Hull pushed for an economic reorganization of
the country and accepted the idea of decentralization.

An intriguing twist to the story is that despite his prior opposition to
partition, Secretary Hull was initially supportive of Morgenthau's approach.
Stimson reported in his diary his alarm at Hull's vindictive stance during the
initial conversations with Morgenthau and of his efforts to change Hull's mind by
reminding Hull of how partition would undermine Hull's pet economic plans for
Europe.\footnote{In a September 3, 1943 letter to the editor in the New York Times, Gerard Swope (a
prominent New Dealer, a major industrialist and a friend of FDR) called for control of German
heavy industries and power development by the United Nations. Swope identified the domination
of the Prussian "military clique" as the source of trouble in Europe for the last 200 years.
"In Swope's opinion some of the essential factors of continuing peace were (1) the
breaking up of the German Reich into the original states, (2) the entire disruption and wide
emigration of the Prussian military caste, (3) placement of the voting control of German heavy
industry in the hands of the United Nations, and (4) rebuilding of invaded and destroyed territories
by a demobilized German army." Cited in Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, p. 21.}

Hull's weak standing with Roosevelt and poor health made him one of
the least influential cabinet players. Hull was reportedly sullen and idle
throughout the Cabinet Committee meetings to resolve the dispute; despite anger
over the matter and opposition to the Treasury proposal, Hull did not take on the

\footnote{Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (NY: Harpers
and Brothers, 1947).}
role of an outspoken critic. Yet, following the second Quebec Conference, Hull became a more determined detractor.

State officials opposed a policy of forcible partition on the grounds that such a measure would not offset the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate period, whether Germany is left united or is divided. It would, furthermore, probably lead to a preferred treatment for certain succession states and would create a situation whereby any policy based on 'spheres of influence' would have much greater chance of success. Furthermore, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole. Finally, the victor powers, by imposing partition, would take upon themselves the burdensome task of preventing surreptitious collaboration and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite.

In another account, Hull includes the proviso that "partition would not only have to be enforced but also maintained by force." 

The Terms Of The Morgenthau Plan

Under Morgenthau's direction, Treasury officials proposed a comprehensive program for the initial occupation and long-term status of Germany that touched on a wide range of issues. While several versions of the Morgenthau plan were considered during the fall of 1944, the following summary is based on the drafts considered in cabinet discussions immediately prior to the

52. Hull assessed the plan in his memoirs as follows, "Essentially, it was a plan of blind vengeance. It was blind because it failed to see that, in striking at Germany, it was striking at all of Europe." Hull, Memoirs, Vol II, p. 1606.
Second Quebec Conference and the Treasury memo submitted to the President in September, 1944. 55

The most controversial and problematic part of the plan was its terms of disarmament. The Morgenthau plan called for complete disarmament and deindustrialization, which included internationalization of the Ruhr industrial region of Germany governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. Other alternatives suggested by the State Department also endorsed internationalization of the Ruhr region, but Morgenthau went much further, calling for joint Allied action to destroy Germany's heavy industry and in doing so, transform the economy from an industrial to an agricultural base. In addition to giving land to Poland and France and creating an international zone in the Ruhr, the plan called for the partition of Germany into autonomous, independent states in the north and south. While other versions of Morgenthau's proposal circulated within the government, the memorandum submitted to Roosevelt at Quebec is known as the "pastoral letter." 56 This version, which was the basis for agreement at Quebec, includes a passage that espouses the goal of turning Germany into "a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character." It does not directly mention the permanent division of Germany into three states or a proposal for a customs union of Southern Germany with Austria.

An equally contentious point was Morgenthau's assertion that current plans to require reparations from future production would lead to rapid German

recovery of industrial power, thereby posing a threat of renewed aggression. Morgenthau insisted on limiting reparations to the removal of existing German resources and territories, rather than in the form of payment from future German production.\(^{57}\)

The program prohibited any active involvement in the German economy beyond assuring deindustrialization and political decentralization. This turned out to be one of the most enduring features of the plan in shaping actual occupation policy. The plan also specified continued controls over all foreign trade and capital imports by the Allies to prevent the establishment or expansion of important industries. Other sections outlined policies for the punishment of war crimes (including summary execution of "arch-criminals" and forced labor battalions to work outside Germany as punishment for other crimes).

The Treasury plans clearly distinguished the level of US involvement during the early stages of the occupation from the longer-term occupation. Following an initial period of joint Allied coordination to completely disarm the German Army and destroy all industries that might contribute to military strength, the plan called for subsequent policy to be carried out by a United Nations body. Concerning long-term US responsibility, Morgenthau proposed that the United States would be less involved than Germany's immediate neighbors:

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57. The plan specified the following sources of reparations:
   a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;
   b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;
   c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;
   d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and
   e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

*FRUS Quebec Conference, 1944*, p. 129.
Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian Soldiers. 58

This reliance on a strong international structure to uphold the peace is one of the few examples of a specific proposal to apply a collective security framework to a European security problem. This provision served as the centerpiece of Morgenthau's conception of international enforcement of a joint peace settlement.

Perhaps one of the least discussed aspects of this plan was the final point which specified the withdrawal of US troops "within a relatively short time." 59 This component was in keeping with Roosevelt's pledge to withdraw US troops from Europe within two years of the armistice and the general assumption that the United States would not maintain standing forces in Europe indefinitely. 60

Finally, although not included in the memo on Germany, Morgenthau's program for Europe called for a $10 billion postwar loan to the Soviet Union to help the Soviets recover from the war and overcome potential Soviet objections to

59. Text of Memo to President Roosevelt in Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is our Problem (NY: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945) np.
60. While there is some disagreement over Roosevelt's statements at the first session of the Yalta conference, Churchill's memoirs state that:
"At this first meeting Mr. Roosevelt had made a momentous statement. He had said that the United States would take all reasonable steps to preserve peace, but not at the expense of keeping a large army in Europe, three thousand miles away from home. The American occupation would therefore be limited to two years." Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (NY: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 353.

Stalin also believed that the United States did not intend to keep a large army in Europe and that the US occupation of Germany would last for only two years. W.W. Rostow argues that "the statement was so deeply etched in the Soviet records that Krushchev referred to it in his conversation in Vienna with Kennedy in 1961 when challenging the legitimacy of NATO. The Diffusion of Power (NY: Macmillan, 1972), p. 226.
his proposed plan of reparations. In lobbying for his program, Morgenthau was
driven by the dual motivations of a vindictive sense of retribution as well as a
sincere belief in collective action and that continued cooperation among the US,
Britain and the USSR was "an essential pillar of peace."\(^{61}\) In Morgenthau's eyes,
a policy of leniency toward Germany was clearly an anti-Russian smoke screen,
promoted by some disingenuous diplomats as a way to circumvent informed
public debate.\(^{62}\) According to Morgenthau, rather than come straight out and
take the line that "we must build a bulwark against communism," opponents
instead stressed the importance of Germany as the spark plug of European
economic recovery.\(^{63}\)

EVOLUTION OF THE MORGENTHAU PLAN:
THE ROUTE TO QUEBEC

On August 23, 1944, Stimson and Morgenthau discussed Morgenthau's
ideas; in response to this conversation, Secretary Stimson wrote a memo for the
President that he submitted during a meeting with Roosevelt on August 25th.
Stimson stated his opposition to Morgenthau's position and spelled out their
differences (which will be detailed in further on). Morgenthau also met with
Roosevelt on August 25th and gave the President a copy of the Army Handbook
described above. These two meetings were followed by a Cabinet meeting (of
State, War and Treasury Secretaries) where Roosevelt raised the question of the
control of Germany after the war and stated that he was "not at all satisfied with
the severity of the measures" proposed by the Army. Following up on Stimson's

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62. Henry Morgenthau devotes a full chapter to his charge that some policymakers use 'Germany
as an Anti-Russian Smokescreen' in *Germany is Our Problem*, Chapter VII, pp. 89-101.
63. Morgenthau tended to diminish the potential appeal of communism in democracies, arguing
that historically, fascism was more of a threat.
suggestion, Roosevelt asked that a special Cabinet Committee (made up of Harry Hopkins and the Secretaries of State, War and Treasury) resolve the dispute and oversee revisions of the military handbook.\textsuperscript{64} Hopkins organized three preliminary meetings with high-ranking officials in the three departments to prepare for the first official Cabinet meeting on September 5th.\textsuperscript{65} During these meetings, the officials presented the respective positions of their departments and tried to clarify the points of agreement and disagreement. State officials restated their opposition to an imposed dismemberment of Germany, calling for a federal system that would avoid the drawbacks of dismemberment while preventing a centralized government. Under Secretary of War McCloy stressed the need for an interim directive for General Eisenhower and endorsed the State and War Department's work on such a directive while pointing to the conflict with the Treasury's view.\textsuperscript{66} At the preliminary meeting on September 2nd, the alternative memos were discussed and James Riddleberger, the State representative, was charged with drawing up a possible compromise that would facilitate agreement on an interim directive for General Eisenhower. At the same time, Riddleberger attempted to delay decision on some of the most contentious points concerning partition and economic policy toward Germany.

Prior to the first Cabinet session, Morgenthau met informally with the President at Hyde Park and showed him a draft of the Treasury plan. Roosevelt voiced his support but suggested three additional measures: that Germany not be

\textsuperscript{64} In an earlier meeting with Roosevelt, Morgenthau had requested that the President create a cabinet level committee with power to set guidelines for German policy.

\textsuperscript{65} The participants included: Special Assistant to the President Harry Hopkins; Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs Freeman Matthews, and Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs James Riddleberger representing the State Department; Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy and Chief of the Civil Affairs Division General Hildring, representing the War Department; and Assistant to the Secretary Harry D. White, representing the Treasury Department.

\textsuperscript{66} Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," p. 362.
allowed any aircraft, that no one could wear uniforms and that all marching be prohibited.\textsuperscript{67} It is just such intimate access to Roosevelt at important junctures that helps to explain Morgenthau's success. When Morgenthau reported back to Treasury aides his conversation with Roosevelt, White and several others continued to state their objection to the extreme measures Morgenthau advocated in the Ruhr. Morgenthau remained adamant, but his subordinates still pushed for a softer line.\textsuperscript{68}

The Cabinet Committee met formally for the first time on September 5th, with Hull, Stimson, Morgenthau, and Hopkins attending. The first meeting addressed Riddleberger's memo attempting to reconcile the positions of the three departments. During the meeting, Stimson strongly opposed stopping production and making Germany a barren farm country.\textsuperscript{69} After a heated discussion, Stimson stated that he could accept the memo up to the last paragraph, which summarized a stern economic policy.\textsuperscript{70} While Hull was sympathetic to Morgenthau's position and even endorsed the summary execution of Nazi war criminals, Stimson would not accept the language of the memo and the meeting adjourned without agreement. Instead, they agreed to each submit their preferred plan to Roosevelt and meet with him the following afternoon. While there was consensus over virtually all the other points in the memo, (including the plans for

\textsuperscript{67} Blum, \textit{From the Morgenthau Diaries}, p. 352.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid}, p. 356.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid}, based on Morgenthau's briefing on the meeting to his staff, p. 359.
\textsuperscript{70} The paragraph Stimson opposed went as follows:

\textit{h. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population should be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such a manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.}

complete demilitarization of Germany, the dissolution of the Nazi party, the
punishment of war criminals, the need to apply extensive controls over
communications and education and exact reparations to go to other countries
besides the United States), the issue of destroying German industry deadlocked
the group.

The meeting on September 6th was explosive, inconclusive and short--
lasting under a half hour. Roosevelt primarily addressed Stimson's memo. The
weight of support seemed to side with Stimson at this meeting, as Hull's position
shifted away from Morgenthau and Roosevelt said he did not favor the
dismantling of the Ruhr.71 At a follow-up meeting on September 9th, the debate
continued.72 Both Stimson and Morgenthau wrote additional memos, expanding
upon their views.73 In the face of the upcoming Quebec Conference where the
subject was expected to be discussed, Stimson urged the President to accept Hull's
State Department memo which left open the controversial economic questions.74
Roosevelt left for Quebec without making a final decision, but it was clear that he
was leaning towards Morgenthau's harsh terms.

71. There are no official minutes of this meeting. Morgenthau found the meeting "very
unsatisfactory" and reported back to his staff that the President "certainly gave aid and comfort to
Stimson." Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 362-363. Stimson wrote in his diary that:
There was quite an easing up in the attitude of Hull, and the President certainly
was not following Morgenthau...I wound up by using the analogy of Charles
Lamb's dissertation on roast pig. I begged the President to remember that this
was a most complicated economic question and all that I was urging upon him
was that he should not burn down his house of the world for the purpose of
getting a meal of roast pig. He apparently caught the point.

Diary, September 6, 1944. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 373-4.
72. No official minutes of this meeting have been found. For further information see Morgenthau
material in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 367-368, and Morgenthau Diary (Germany)
Vol. 1, pp. 608-611.
73. See Memorandum by Secretary of War, September 9, 1944, FRUS Quebec Conference, 1944,
pp. 123-128; Briefing Book prepared in the Treasury Department, "Program to Prevent Germany
from Starting a World War III," September 9, 1944, FRUS Quebec Conference, 1944, pp. 128-
143.
74. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 575.
Upon arriving in Quebec, Roosevelt cabled Morgenthau and asked him to
come as soon as possible to discuss future economic measures in Germany.
During a formal dinner on the night of September 14th, Morgenthau described the
Treasury proposals to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill was
quite critical of Morgenthau's program. In what Morgenthau recalled as a "torrent
of rhetoric, sarcasm and violence," Churchill indicated that he viewed the
Treasury plan with the same enthusiasm he would have for chaining himself to a
dead German.75 Despite this outburst, Churchill reversed his position the
following day, largely due to the influence of his advisor, Lord Cherwell (who
supported the policy in no small part because of Morgenthau's promise of a quid
pro quo of postwar loans to England).76 Churchill dictated the joint
memorandum and Roosevelt agreed to it with only minor changes. It was signed
on September 15, 1944.

PAROCHIAL AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS:
THE DEBATE OVER A 'HARSH' PEACE

As the debate evolved, the struggle during the war to develop a US
directive for the postwar treatment of Germany created a level of controversy
within the Roosevelt administration that far surpassed any Allied disagreements
over the conduct of World War II.77 While much of the controversy must be
understood in the context of the passionate feelings felt by many at the height of
the war, anti-German sentiment does not fully account for the range of positions
and shifting fortunes of various occupation policies. The intensity of the debate

75. Quoted in an article by Morgenthau several years later, Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries,
p. 369.
76. Kimball, Swords or Ploughshares? p. 39.
    Cordell Hull recounted that "This whole development at Quebec, I believe, angered me
as much as anything that happened during my career as Secretary of State." Memoirs, Volume II,
p. 1615.
reflected the high stakes involved: European economic and political instability presented very real dangers and opportunities for the United States.

Both within the United States and among the Allies, there was basic agreement over the need for a harsh peace settlement that assured comprehensive disarmament, demilitarization,\textsuperscript{78} denazification, and punishment of war criminals. Following surrender, Germany would be occupied by Allied military forces, pending international negotiations on a final peace settlement. Within the United States, the major points of contention were over the political and economic dimensions of the political settlement: whether to partition Germany into separate political entities or allow political unity; and whether and how the German economy should be rehabilitated. These differences surfaced in disagreement over the wording of the occupation directive for US military forces in Germany.

At one end of the spectrum, some, like Morgenthau, called for an extremely harsh policy, or a "Carthaginian Peace" in which a pastoralized, deindustrialized Germany would be divided into several separate states. To enforce this settlement, Germany would be jointly occupied by an international force made up of the wartime allies and neighbors of Germany. Officials in the State Department represented the other end of the debate, calling for a range of less-punitive policies that left Germany's economy more or less intact. By mid-1944, State Department planners had moved away from support for a partitioned Germany to favor a settlement based on four-power agreement on economic and political unity, with reparations to be paid to the victims of Nazi aggression. War Department officials viewed the debate in terms of their strong interest in

\textsuperscript{78} Demilitarization basically meant industrial disarmament and was based on the view that industrial concentration (especially in the form of economic cartels) was a cause of war.
maintaining complete autonomy for the military commanders charged with occupation duties and with minimizing their responsibilities in the post-conflict period. While equally committed to assuring adequate controls to prevent a renewal of German aggression, War Department officials stressed the need for minimal involvement in German affairs and favored more restrictive policies in a short-term military occupation. Another strategy endorsed by President Roosevelt called for delaying any firm plans until the postwar situation became more clear.\(^\text{79}\)

Morgenthau's ideas quickly attracted outspoken detractors. The plan was criticized on a variety of grounds: that it was impractical and unrealistic; that it reflected a vindictive spirit that would undermine peace, and finally, that it would not be supported by the Soviets. Although not a part of the formal critiques of the plan, there was a widespread view that the aggressive Treasury lobbying for the plan was an inappropriate intrusion on State Department responsibility. As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau met strong opposition from the military to the plan. Both Secretary Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy objected to the plan, but for different reasons. State Department officials opposed several features of the plan, especially the issues of exacting reparations and dismembering the German state and destroying German industry. Despite a history of conflict, when faced with the threat posed by the Treasury Department, State and War officials were able temporarily to create a united front of opposition to the Treasury program.

Morgenthau's critics charge that the plan was never fully thought out, but Morgenthau went to great lengths to document its implications in a series of memos and studies within the Treasury Department. Morgenthau and his coterie

\(^{79}\) Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," p. 324.
stressed the dangers of German economic recovery, the advantages of eliminating a strong economic competitor in helping Britain regain its economic footing after the war, as well as the benefit of continuing the alliance with the Soviet Union into the postwar period.

The War Department

While Secretary of War Stimson was no stranger to conflict, his memoirs characterize the battle over the Morgenthau plan as "the most violent single interdepartmental struggle" of his career.\(^{80}\) Stimson was on friendly terms with Morgenthau, but he was alarmed by Morgenthau's position and, after a series of heated discussions, concluded that "we were irreconcilably divided."\(^{81}\) Stimson felt vehemently that Morgenthau's approach would thwart any chance of a lasting peace. Stimson wrote in his diary about his strong opposition to Morgenthau's position on September 3, 1944, describing it as permeated by a very bitter atmosphere of personal resentment against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt and I am very much afraid that it will result in our taking mass vengeance... in the shape of clumsy economic action. This in my opinion will be ineffective and will inevitably produce a very dangerous reaction in Germany and probably a new war.\(^{82}\)

In stating his opposition to the idea of removing all industry, Stimson argued that it would probably require removing a lot of people from Germany, to which Morgenthau replied, "Well, that is not nearly as bad as sending them to gas chambers."\(^{83}\)

While voicing support for the general goals of the plan, Stimson opposed the Treasury's methods for several reasons. He opposed a policy of

\(^{80}\) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 566.
\(^{81}\) *Ibid*, p. 570
\(^{82}\) Cited in Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries*, p. 350.
\(^{83}\) *Ibid*. 
deindustrialization beyond removal of industries directly involved in war production, arguing that it was neither possible or effective and risked great evils. Stimson pointed to the economic importance of the coal and ore deposits of the Saar and Ruhr and argued that historically, all the European nations depended on German production. While Stimson supported strict controls on production and even supported a proposal to place the industrialized Ruhr and Saar regions under international control, he was adamantly opposed to the wanton destruction of valuable natural resources. Stimson summed up his objections in a memo to Roosevelt:

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it....

War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe....

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapons of complete economic oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.83

Stimson became an increasingly strident critic of the Morgenthau plan.

As it became clear that the Treasury proposals were receiving serious consideration, Stimson developed additional arguments to persuade Roosevelt.

Stimson and McCloy tended to focus on different time frames in thinking about the occupation and this difference brought a different tenor of objections to

84. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 571.
85. Stimson to the President, September 5, 1944, FRUS, Quebec Conference, 1944, pp. 98-100.
the Treasury plan for deindustrialization. Morgenthau reported after one meeting that

McCloy's interest is the immediate one--what is the Army going to do as soon as they go in there? Stimson's interest is the long-range one... He is thinking along the lines that you have to have a long Armistice or a period of at least twenty years to police Germany while the present generation is in control and until a new generation grows up. He was also very much interested evidently in a proposal made by [French Ambassador] Jean Monnet to internationalize the Saar Basin and have joint control by some international body and permit the Germans to work there but not to run it. They thought if we could control the Saar we could keep the Germans from going to war again.86

McCloy consistently took a conciliatory stance towards Morgenthau, leading Morgenthau to believe that their ideas were "fairly close together" while at the same time skillfully negotiating alternatives so as to maximize the leeway of the military in determining policy. As one account puts it, McCloy was at his best in these circumstances, successfully "hammering out a vague compromise policy that suited his objectives."87 In yet another instance, barring a clear policy decision, the way the issue was coordinated and administered by men such as McCloy proved critical to the outcome.88

Stimson and McCloy tried to revise the reparations program and the occupation manual for Germany on several occasions as a way of preventing wholesale adoption of the Treasury proposal. During Cabinet discussions, Stimson proposed several modifications and alternatives, suggesting stricter denazification measures and proposing that the Ruhr and Saar areas be placed under international control.89

86. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 344.
89. FRUS, 1944, Vol I.
General Eisenhower was reported by Morgenthau to be in support of a harsh treatment, but in fact, he remained largely outside the discussions. Throughout the war, General Eisenhower supported punitive action in Germany, especially following his tour of the concentration camps in the spring of 1945. In his memoirs, Eisenhower mentions his conversation with Morgenthau only in passing and states that he opposed destruction of the coal mines. While there has been some disagreement over how much Eisenhower supported Morgenthau's proposal, Eisenhower quickly distanced himself from the plan. In 1947, Eisenhower publicly challenged Morgenthau's assertion that he had suggested the idea to Morgenthau in discussions in 1944.

The State Department

Almost all senior officials in the State Department strongly opposed Morgenthau's plan for Germany. While largely on the sidelines throughout the war, the State Department had several committees at work on postwar planning. By mid-1944, the State Department had developed a position calling for "stern peace with reconciliation." Despite a range of views, State Department planning had moved away from the idea of a strict partition and instead developed plans for zones of occupation. The State Department had also drafted a policy on economic policy that was circulated in August 1944, calling for limited control

92. Sumner Welles was a notable exception, being an outspoken supporter of a harsh peace during the early stages of postwar planning within the State Department.
93. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 332.
94. Up until January 1944, a more harsh position in favor of partition was promoted by Sumner Welles, the senior official responsible for postwar planning. Subsequently, his replacement, Edward Stettinius, Jr. promoted a much more moderate approach to Germany. Within the State Department, the chief advisors on Germany were Philip Mosely and Leo Pasvolsky (a professional economist).
of the German economy and ending Germany's economic domination in international markets. The program also called for short-term reparations in kind, to be taken from current production.

The State's position on German policy, set forth in a memo presented during preliminary negotiations of the Cabinet Committee, drew on the past two years of internal working papers and the negotiations in the EAC.\textsuperscript{95} Summarizing the status of EAC negotiations, the memo reviewed the recommended terms of surrender and the tentative agreement on the occupation zones.\textsuperscript{96} The memo laid out the remaining areas to be decided, starting with the issue of partition.

Faced with Morgenthau's challenge, State officials crystallized their position in the course of three meetings in preparation for a September 5, 1944, cabinet meeting on Germany. In a memo drafted by Riddleberger and Matthews outlining State Department objections to the Morgenthau plan, the State Department restated the argument that Germany could not support its population under the conditions of the plan, that other European countries relied on important raw materials from Germany (coal and bauxite and other industrial goods) and pointed out the necessity for allowing industrial production in order to obtain reparations from Germany.


\textsuperscript{96} Earlier in the year, the US had presented a proposal at the EAC on the control machinery and military government. The basic outlines of the proposal called for tripartite administration of Germany through a 'Supreme Authority' made up of the commanding generals of the US, UK and USSR which would supervise essential governmental functions and economic activities was presented. After several months of delay, the Soviets had just submitted a proposal for the control machinery. The Soviet proposal was received by the State Department on September 2, 1944, for text, see \textit{FRUS 1944}, General, Vol I, p. 299.
While initially tentative, Secretary Hull became an outspoken opponent of Morgenthau's harsh peace. This was due to a combination of substantive disagreement over economic measures and bureaucratic pique at Morgenthau's usurpation of the State Department's turf. The debate over Morgenthau's approach to Germany continued after the Quebec decision. On September 29, 1944, the Secretary of State sent Roosevelt a memo that stressed its opposition to the opinions of Morgenthau. Among other points, the memo stressed the view that "no decision [should be made] on the possible partition of Germany (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principle Allies on this question." Hull goes on to suggest that the United States should encourage a decentralization of Germany's governmental structures.97 Hull also opposed any division of Berlin into separate zones of occupation, stressing that it should be subject to unified control.98

Significant institutional resources were devoted to the question of partitioning Germany as a number of committees developed various proposals. What stands out is the fact that the department had difficulty in achieving a consensus over policy and, once it did achieve consensus, it was unable to draw attention to its recommendations. Furthermore, the ambitious scope of the department's plans raised serious doubts about its feasibility. In contrast, Morgenthau presented a disarmingly straightforward proposal that capitalized on the intense emotions of wartime.

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97. Memo by Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, September 29, 1944, FRUS 1944, General, Vol I, pp. 344-346.
THE FATE OF THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

At the same time that President Roosevelt was giving his opening speech of the fall Presidential campaign, news of the cabinet split over Germany hit newspapers across the country.\(^9^9\) Suddenly German policy was a high profile public issue. A front-page story in the *New York Times* described the violent dispute within the cabinet as having "snarled up" the Treasury, War, and State departments' work on postwar control so severely that it had stalled negotiations on long-range planning in the EAC.\(^1^0^0\) Although none of the cabinet secretaries would discuss the split with the press, both Hull and Stimson made clear that there was still no agreement.\(^1^0^1\) The issue stayed in the news throughout the following week; while press reaction was divided, much of the criticism was directed towards Roosevelt's handling of the matter.\(^1^0^2\)

Public attention focused on two fronts: the merits of the proposal and the Treasury Secretary's undue influence on foreign policy. A *New York Times* editorial opposed the reparations plan and ran a letter to the editor that argued that Morgenthau's proposal should be compared to the man who burned a barn to kill a mouse.\(^1^0^3\) Many called for a return to 'common sense' and objected to the vengeful aspects of the plan. Other accounts complained of the way the affair was managed and called for the State Department to reclaim its rightful place in drawing up foreign policy.\(^1^0^4\)

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99. The *Wall Street Journal* first uncovered the story on September 23rd, with most leading papers reporting the Cabinet fight on September 24th, 1944.
In an effort to mute attention, Roosevelt first issued a statement that the Cabinet Committee had been dissolved and that the President and Secretary would develop long range policy. He subsequently firmly denied any differences between members of his cabinet and disavowed his support for the Treasury plan. Morgenthau's ideas did not survive public scrutiny during the campaign season. More than public opposition to the plan, Roosevelt feared that the Republicans could make it into a campaign issue, charging that his cabinet was in a state of disarray and was therefore not up to the task of negotiating the postwar settlement. In fact, Presidential hopeful Thomas Dewey and other Republicans claimed that the controversy helped to bolster German resistance at a critical juncture and would result in additional casualties of American boys. In light of the volatility of the issue, Roosevelt did his best to quell discussion and wait until later to resolve the problem.

Sobering assessments of how long it would take to advance into Germany also surfaced at this time, further facilitating a delay. Roosevelt's attitude is summed up in a memo to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on Oct 20, 1944: "In view of the fact that we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of Germany we want in every detail."105

105. Roosevelt, who built a reputation based on his passion for ambiguous commitments and playing off the positions of different officials, went on to write: It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany, but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed in these matters is not an essential at the present moment....I dislike making plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.... We must emphasize that the European Advisory Commission is 'advisory' and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if they do not remember that word 'advisory' they may go ahead and execute some of the advice which, when the time comes, we may not like at all.

In the end, Hull's tactic of delay seemed to work in the State Department's favor. Nonetheless, the Treasury was organizationally very successful in influencing occupation policy. While high-level decisions were delayed until the final completion of the directive for the occupation (known as JCS 1067), Morgenthau still attempted to influence the direction of policy through active Treasury participation in drafting the Army directive.106

If there was a winner in this episode, it was perhaps the War Department. Despite the fact that the Secretary and Assistant Secretary did not get their way and Morgenthau's intervention and continuing influence created significant roadblocks, the War Department succeeded in protecting the power of the zonal commander. The Army's position in translating guidelines into operational policies in Germany as well as the selective implementation of policy became increasingly powerful tools for control, up through the winter of 1946, as executive and public interest in the occupation subsided.

The debate between the State Department, on the one side, and the Treasury and War Departments on the other, was rooted in a disagreement over two issues: the scope of activity of Allied military government in the economic reconstruction of Germany and the need for genuine Allied agreement on policy toward Germany. This disagreement was only rarely couched in terms of the broader aims of collective security; nevertheless, the German occupation was intrinsically tied to the main tenets of future US security arrangements.

Many accounts identify the fundamental disagreement as being over whether the United States should enforce a 'harsh' or 'soft' peace. But this implies that the key point of contention was over how punitive the occupation would be.

106. See Backer on Morgenthau's memo stressing a series of "unassailable premises" in January 1945, The Decision to Divide Germany, pp. 34-35.
In fact, there was little disagreement over the need for disarmament, denazification, re-education and punishment of war criminals. The real disagreement was over economic policy—and the extent to which deindustrialization would hurt the prospects for economic recovery in the rest of Europe. While on the face of it, the argument was over Germany, in fact, the main point of disagreement was whether a pastoralized or revitalized Germany would contribute to the economic prosperity of Europe, which in turn would contribute to US economic well being. This hinged on a conception of Europe that included the Soviet Union, or one that was limited to Western Europe. The Treasury plan set out to foster economic reconstruction by removing Germany as a major player and including the Soviet Union, in contrast to the State Department program. The Treasury plan also removed US military forces as an important factor in stabilizing conditions in order to foster European recovery, leaving long-term occupation and control duties to Germany's neighbors.

Furthermore, the middle-level officials who were key players in German policy had little to do with negotiations over the patchwork of matters pertaining to collective security. Instead, one finds prolonged interagency fights over the mechanisms of control—meaning how much centralized authority and jurisdiction the occupation government would possess—seemingly devoid of the larger security context.

A memo prepared in the State Department in anticipation of Secretary Morgenthau's objections to a new directive on Germany at an upcoming Cabinet meeting on March 16th, 1945, summed up the differences: "The Treasury and War Departments advocate the same policy for different reasons: Treasury wants chaos; War wants decentralization and complete authority for its zone
commander." In what some State Department officials characterized as the "smash and run" approach, the Treasury and War departments pushed for a restrictive mandate that limited the occupation to a few basic tasks—denazification and disarmament—to be carried out in a few months by the occupation forces themselves. In virtually all other realms, the occupation would maintain a "hands of" policy, avoiding economic involvement and intending to withdraw "as soon as possible, leaving future developments in Germany to the Germans." By implication, the Treasury and War plans signified an end to Allied coordination and a commitment to reach agreement on the treatment of Germany. In highlighting the pitfalls of Morgenthau's plan, the memo ends by placing these policies in the broader context of postwar cooperation and a strong UN. The memo concludes that this approach "will be disastrous to Allied cooperation and to the achievement of our basic program for peace. Unless we go forward with the cooperation promised at Yalta the Dumbarton Oaks organization will not be brought to fruition."

While the Morgenthau plan caricatured the vindictive feelings of the time, it also captured a reformist vision of a new world. Yet it is just this wider context—of the importance of Allied cooperation and the need for joint planning and control—that was neglected in the face of conflict at home. Unfortunately, these broader concerns were lost in the controversy over deindustrialization and the ensuing bureaucratic battles over occupation policy.

The War Department stayed aloof on matters of diplomacy, preferring to tenaciously assert unbridled control over any issue in the military realm. Despite

111. Ibid.
the vocal advocacy of an internationalist economic outlook with respect to the terms of the occupation, Stimson, McCloy, Lovett, and others in the War Department were primarily concerned with preventing any policy that might hinder military action— in essence, keeping policy sufficiently open to maximize the Department's freedom of action. By stressing the parochial interest of maximizing independent authority on the part of the zonal commander, the War Department sidestepped the debate away from how to make joint Allied control and administration workable to focus instead on policies that maximized Army autonomy in administering the occupation as it saw fit. 112

Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy was one of the most persistent and effective advocates of Army autonomy throughout interdepartmental negotiations over Germany. While widely admired for his mild demeanor, McCloy nonetheless was a powerful advocate of decentralized control. McCloy, as well as others in the War Department, skillfully sidestepped issues of political and economic policy, focusing instead on whether an alternative was easily "administrable in so far as the Army was called upon to undertake the administration." 113 Yet underneath this practical concern with the feasibility of administration, lay more parochial institutional concerns that go far to explain McCloy's advocacy of certain policies over others. Most significant among them was the desire to maximize the military's control and influence. In addition, there

112. The British EAC delegate noted this difference in discussions on the US draft General directive following the Yalta agreements. "Strang alleged one important difference between the control machinery agreement and the US general directive; the former assumes agreed decisions while the latter postulates the case of no agreed decision. He concluded that the US General Directive was 'less optimistic.' Massigli felt that the US Directive erred in not impressing on the Commanders the paramount necessity for reaching agreed decisions and reconciling divergent views. He proposed rewording the second sentence to provide that the Commanders must, first, do everything possible to reach agreement in the Council and second refer disagreements to their governments; and, third, only later act independently in their zones." Winant to Secretary of State, May 7, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol III, p. 505.
lurked "less optimistic" expectations about the lack of Allied agreement on
control machinery.

In his later years, McCloy likened the military governor as "the nearest
thing to a Roman proconsulship the modern world afforded" because of its
dictatorial powers.\textsuperscript{114} While in many ways unanticipated, this control was
achieved by the War Department's advocacy of alternatives that appear
remarkably imprecise, calling for a so-called wait and see approach of
decentralized control and skillful manipulation of loopholes in the ultimately
approved policy instructions. Although by no means crystallized at this stage, the
net result of this approach was to jettison the shaky structure of Allied
coordination and the tenets of a collective security regime to prevent future
German aggression. This tendency was manifest in efforts to draft a joint
occupation directive for forces entering Germany.

CONCLUSION

The immediate postwar period is notable for the rare opportunity it
presented US policymakers to take significant action. While no doubt burdened
by the ongoing conflict in the Far East, the chance to oversee and assure the
destruction of the Nazi war machine afforded a unique chance to construct a
collective security regime. The first test of this regime was agreement on a stable
peace settlement for Germany.

At the same time, while governments are well designed to cope with
incremental change, more often than not, they are poorly equipped to respond to
new conditions. This is clearly evident in the wartime planning for the

\textsuperscript{114} Ninkovich, \textit{Germany and the United States}, p. 27.
occupation of Germany. Despite propitious circumstances, the government missed the opportunity for comprehensive action. Instead, senior officials focused on the more immediate problems posed by drawing up geographic zones for the occupation.

Within the bureaucracy, various intragovernmental working groups and coalitions vied to assert their policy preferences for the occupation of Germany. This struggle played itself out primarily in efforts to draft the policy directive for the occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{115} Disagreements over this task stymied any effort to formulate specific policy options regarding the nature and scope of occupation policy. Busy with the daunting task of preventing Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world, it was not until the rapid successes of Allied forces over the summer of 1944 and the prospect of imminent defeat of the Nazi forces that the military undertook a concerted effort to draft a clear occupation policy for Germany.

Until the spring of 1945, there was little specific technical planning for US postwar policy towards Germany. Instead, at the highest levels of policymaking, the United States lacked an agreed-upon strategy and program beyond the general goals of unconditional surrender, disarming of the aggressors and creating the United Nations. President Roosevelt's wartime policy mandated only limited discussion of the postwar settlement even after it became clear that it was only a matter of time before Germany's defeat.

Despite the remarkable opening on the governmental agenda, the decisionmaking agenda addressed a much narrower constellation of issues. Thus, officials in the War and State Departments focused on the issues of drawing up

\textsuperscript{115} See Paul Hammond for a detailed account of the many drafts and revisions of the occupation directive (culminating in JCS 1067/8 that was signed by Truman in May, 1945) during the war. "Directives for the Occupation of Germany," pp. 311-460.
the occupation zones, the instrument of surrender and, to a lesser extent, the
organization of tripartite control machinery, rather than overall Allied policy for
Germany in the postwar period. This is most apparent in the development of the
directive that actually provided guidance to US forces in Germany, JCS 1067.

The intensity of the debate over the occupation manual as well as the
drawn-out nature of governmental deliberations over the substance and scope of
occupation policy were a direct function of institutional flux. Absent stable
institutional structures to manage conflict and channel alternatives according to
accepted rules of the road, remarkable turmoil emerged amidst a wide-ranging,
free-wheeling debate over occupation policy. Taking the cue from Roosevelt's
desire to delay making any commitment until the situation in Germany and
Europe became more clear, policy entrepreneurs in the War Department and
Treasury sought to impose their preferred policy paths.

Thus at war's end, the EAC had reached agreement on plans for the
structure of Germany (the zones and control machinery) but lacked a common
policy. This lack of agreement had major implications. Although neither foreseen
or intended, the veto power of each member of the Allied Control Commission
effectively blocked joint action and pushed each camp further toward
independent, self-help measures with regard to German policy.
CHAPTER 6

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE: CONSOLIDATION OF A DOMINANT COALITION

"There is no middle ground which is not appeasement."

-- General Lucius Clay, March 31, 1948

The Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 was a critical catalyst in the emergence of a Cold-War consensus among US policymakers. In response to Soviet efforts in the spring of 1948 to force the western powers out of Berlin by blockading ground access to the city, the Truman administration and the US public rallied behind a firm Western response. In the United States, the Berlin blockade put German policy at the fulcrum of security decisionmaking. The struggle over Berlin scuttled even the pretense of seriously negotiating diplomatic initiatives with the Soviet Union, bolstering hard-line military alternatives, bringing in new participants and organizations during the crisis, and foreclosing certain diplomatic tools that might otherwise have been considered.

In the case study that follows, the United States and Western powers jointly adopted a hard-line policy of brinkmanship that, by most accounts, succeeded. US policymakers refused to be forced out of Berlin or to negotiate with the Soviets "under duress" as long as the blockade was in effect. The Western powers undertook an unprecedented airlift of supplies to the embattled western zone of the city, underscor

US military strength and commitment to democracy in Europe. In addition, the Western powers implemented a program of currency reform and established a separate West German government—the very prospects that had precipitated Soviet aggressive actions. By the spring of 1949, most observers agreed that the Western side had "won" in the court of international public opinion: the Soviet Union lifted the blockade, a federated government was established in the western portion of Germany, and a newly created military alliance linked the United States to Western Europe.

Yet, the dramatic events that followed the blockade have tended to diminish the fact that US policymakers stood deeply divided over the proper course to follow; while most US policymakers supported a firm stance against the Soviet Union, they disagreed over what actions should be taken to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The key point of contention was whether to return to the principle of quadripartite authority or continue with separate Western negotiations known as the London Program to promote economic recovery and pave the way for a German government in the western zone of Germany. In the United States, this issue translated into two competing approaches to the crisis. One approach rejected any accommodation to Soviet demands, calling for an independent Western policy that accepted the interim division of Germany along the east-west frontier of the Elbe River. The other approach sought to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union that would achieve a negotiated withdrawal of occupation forces, the signing of a peace treaty, and the neutralization of Germany.

One proposal developed within the State Department, known as "Program A," championed this latter course and, as such, is particularly significant for what it reveals about competing visions of US security policy. Even in 1948—a time that many scholars characterize as already fixed along the path of Cold-War confrontation—alternative visions of European security relations were considered at the highest levels of government in the United States. The comprehensive scope of Program A reflects the
expanded agenda of US decisionmakers during this unusual period. Meanwhile, the US
government's ultimate rejection of Program A offers important lessons about the
significance of institutional interests and marks the closing of a policy window during
this momentous period.

At the height of the Berlin crisis, Secretary of State George Marshall assigned
George Kennan, a respected senior advisor and head of the Policy Planning Staff, to draw
up a possible solution to the German situation. In the autumn of 1948, Kennan drafted
Program A—a detailed proposal for a transition to German self-government that included
security guarantees and the withdrawal of US, Soviet, British, and French occupation
forces to earmarked garrisons on the periphery of Germany. The proposal went through
several drafts as Kennan solicited comments from various mid-level officials in the State
Department, Army, and experts outside the government.

Program A set forth a US plan for a comprehensive German settlement to be
presented at a future meeting of foreign ministers. In an effort to overcome Soviet
intransigence, the plan called for new "control machinery" to supervise the workings of
the program that did not give each individual occupying country veto power—a feature of
the Allied Control Council (ACC) that contributed to its breakdown. Following the
establishment of a German provisional government, the plan advocated complete
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.

Program A immediately sparked debate. Detractors argued that another round of
talks with the Soviets would be fruitless and would only weaken support for the Western
Allies' efforts to endorse the so-called London Program. Nonetheless, Program A
presented a credible alternative course for US policy towards Germany and remained on
the sidelines pending further developments in talks with the Soviet Union. Program A

3. Technically, the proposal called for an interim arrangement in Germany, pending the signing of a Peace
Treaty. It was intended to be submitted by the Secretary of State to a new meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
incorporated important strands of existing US policy towards Europe, freed the United States from onerous obligations as an occupying force and drastically reduced US expenditures in Germany. Even more significantly, the proposal offered the hope of settling the central, outstanding problem of the Allied victory and helped soften the increasingly dangerous trajectory of US-Soviet relations towards a highly confrontational and militarized East-West standoff.

Why, then, did the government fail to adopt Program A? An analysis of the internal policy debate suggests that it was not simply because Program A was impractical or of marginal influence. Despite the emerging anti-Soviet consensus, policymakers were fully cognizant of the benefits of achieving a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union over the status of Germany and there was no reason to believe that delay would help the Western position. Indeed, at several points in the spring and autumn of 1948, Stalin indicated that a deal might be possible. Furthermore, the proposal for a comprehensive German settlement was developed and advocated by a highly respected specialist on Soviet and European affairs, and was the product of exhaustive analysis and interagency review.

Program A even received essential institutional support within the State Department at key moments--first by Under Secretary Robert Lovett in July 1948, then by Secretary of State Marshall in the autumn of 1948 and again in the spring of 1949 when Dean Acheson undertook a policy review of the German situation at the beginning of his tenure as Secretary of State.

In this case study, external developments proved critical in influencing outcomes as Soviet policies constrained the universe of possible action. With all eyes turned overseas to the dramatic events in Berlin, it was incumbent on various institutional actors to use these external developments to bolster their arguments over the costs and benefits of competing policies. Despite some important institutional support, Program A failed to
mobilize a significant coalition of backers from outside the Policy Planning Staff. And, most importantly, it challenged the prerogatives of a powerful new institutional force: the expanded peacetime jurisdiction of the Defense Department in matters of foreign policy. Once again, when it came to long term planning for postwar political relations, mid-level agencies in the State Department were sidelined by the newfound power of military institutions and the dominance of military actors in the political realm of foreign policy.

To understand why Program A faltered requires an examination of the changing balance of institutional power and the role of parochial institutional interests. The dominant role of military considerations in framing the policymaking agenda in the initial stages of the Berlin crisis is of special significance. In this regard, the debate over Program A illustrates the gradual closing of a policy window as the pursuit of a unified German settlement fell off the governmental agenda. Ultimately, Western governments repudiated efforts to include the Soviet zone in the transition to German self-government, opting instead for the establishment of an interim West German government and the continued division of Berlin into separate East and West sectors. Among US policymakers, a consensus gradually emerged around the tenets of containment of the Soviet Union that eschewed earlier ideas of collective security.

THE ORIGINS OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND PROGRAM A

Most accounts of the Berlin crisis start with the Soviet imposition of a blockade on all ground traffic into Berlin between April and June of 1948. But this starting point

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ignores a series of critical developments that precipitated the crisis, stemming in large part from key decisions made during the war to divide the defeated Germany into separate zones of occupation with Berlin designated as a special city, to be jointly administered by the four victors. The blockade grew out of seemingly interminable squabbles among the allies over the economic and political future of Germany. Two factors made it increasingly difficult to reach agreement on Germany's long-term political and economic makeup: the independent, unilateral actions taken in each of the separate zones of occupation, and the poor performance and eventual breakdown of the Allied Control Council (ACC) which was responsible for quadripartite government in the German occupation.

The Allied Control Council operated on the basis of unanimous consent which meant that any of the four members could veto a measure. This veto power was instituted at US insistence in 1945. At the time, US officials were afraid of being outvoted on the issue of German reparations. The Soviet Union demanded a fixed sum of $20 billion in reparations, while the United States insisted on imposing reparations as a percentage of German production. Despite the early positive working relationship among the allies in the ACC, the lack of agreement at the governmental level on the overall status of Germany hindered concrete action. Over time, the ACC became mired by disagreement over a number of issues, including the level and form of reparations to be imposed on Germany, the level of German industry to be allowed, and US and British

5. Berlin was set apart as a special area from the occupation zones and the city was divided into four separate sectors. The Allied military commanders reached a formal agreement over the air corridors, but did not bother with a written agreement for land access to Berlin. Instead, Soviet Marshal Zhukov gave the allied military generals an oral promise that allied personnel would not be subject to customs or border controls. *FRUS 1945, Vol III*, pp. 358-359; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 358.


action to merge their occupation zones and promote economic recovery. Until early 1947, coordinated action was blocked by repeated French vetoes of any proposals that might facilitate the reconstruction of a central German administration. The head of the US occupation government in Germany, General Lucius Clay frequently complained to Washington about French obstructionism. President Truman notes in his memoirs that the French "desire to see Germany dismembered led them to obstruct a number of joint-control measures at a time when such co-operation might still have been possible."

This inability to reach an overall plan of action among the Allies was exacerbated by the upheaval and devastation from the war. In each zone, occupation authorities worried about the possibly imminent threat of social and economic collapse. As negotiations dragged on in the ACC, each zonal commander took a number of steps to consolidate control and cope with the pressing problems facing the occupation. Meanwhile, over time, disagreement with the Soviet Union contributed to the difficulties in the ACC. Given its institutional weakness, the key to success rested on the willingness of participants to reach joint agreement. As US-Soviet relations deteriorated, virtually all substantive measures were blocked.

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7. The dire economic conditions in the western zones put added pressures on the Western powers to take some action to stabilize the German economy. In September 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes announced a change in US policy in a high profile speech in Stuttgart. In the Fall of 1946, the United States and Britain took steps to consolidate administration of two zones of occupation. This bizonal merger of the British and American zones, signed in December 1946, was intended as a temporary, interim measure to deal with the economic problems of the western zones. The bizonal alternative gained support largely by default: a merger of the British and US zones provided an acceptable—although not a preferred—alternative pending agreement on economic unification. The strongest pressure for the acceptance of the bizonal alternative came from within the US military government (OMGUS) under the leadership of General Clay and can be interpreted as an effort to blunt the growing criticism of the Army's performance in Germany. According to Clay, the merger of the US-UK zones was "started not in the interest of political reconstruction but as a practical step toward better economic conditions within the area, thus reducing the burden of support borne by the occupying powers." Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), p. 163.
8. France was not included in the 1945 Potsdam agreement among the three Allies on the principles of economic and political unity for Germany. As a result, the French government repeatedly used its exclusion from Potsdam as a justification for vetoing various measures in the Allied Control Council.
Between 1945 and 1948, the premise of US decisionmaking gradually shifted from four-power cooperation in Germany to hostility and confrontation toward the Soviet Union. The overall goal of joint agreement on a unified, disarmed Germany was overtaken by events in Germany and by independent US efforts to cope with problems in the occupation.

Most historians identify March of 1947 as a key turning point in US policy vis-à-vis negotiations over Germany. In the March 1947 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, the Allies were unable to reach agreement on joint action for Germany. Following this meeting, Secretary of State Marshall made the decision "to push toward bizonal economic self-sufficiency no matter what the political and economic costs might be." The next attempt to reach an agreement, in November 1947 at another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, also failed. Secretary Marshall did not aggressively pursue a resolution to outstanding issues, having basically adopted the view that 'you can't do business with the Soviets.' In direct response to this breakdown, Washington expedited several measures for the economic rehabilitation of the bizonal area as well as for increased German responsibility over governmental agencies.

During the winter of 1947-1948, the ACC was at a standstill. The United States and Britain criticized Soviet actions in the eastern zone (and in Eastern Europe) to consolidate its political and economic control and to impose a communist government. Meanwhile, the Western powers--France, Britain, the United States, and the Benelux countries--initiated a series of discussions in London to promote German economic and political recovery as part of the Marshall plan for economic recovery for Europe in

13. As Clay recalls, "Thus the London conference paved the way for another vital decision in German affairs--the decision to establish West German government." Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 349. John Gimbel describes the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting as "a watershed or a parting of the ways." The American Occupation of Germany, p. 194.
general. These discussions became known as the London Program. At the same time, officials in Germany pursued various unilateral steps to remedy the nagging problems of the occupation (moving towards currency reform and a separate interim West German government). In Washington, the bureaucracy remained divided about how far the United States should push the Soviet Union over outstanding problems in Europe.

By early 1948, most senior US officials actively sought a solution to the German problem that excluded the Soviet Union unless the Soviets would accept Western terms for the administration of Germany. For many in the United States, the *sine qua non* for unification was free popular elections throughout the four zones, including free operation of political parties under international supervision. Yet despite the emergence of a bipartisan consensus over Western terms for unification, ongoing clashes between the State Department and the Defense Department over issues of jurisdiction and oversight of German policy created barriers to developing a workable plan; many of the ideas that emerged from these two organizations advanced competing institutional positions about who would administer German policy.

The evolution of governmental policy between 1948 and 1949 is very complicated and can be divided into the following seven major stages or decisions:

1) US and UK actions during the winter of 1947 and early in 1948 to pursue an independent Western course and to introduce currency reform;

2) General Lucius Clay's institution of the airlift in response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the initial discussions in Washington on the crisis;

3) The July 1948 Cabinet discussions on how to maintain the airlift and whether to pursue direct talks with Stalin;

4) President Truman's proposal to send a special envoy (Justice Vinson) to Moscow in September 1948 and his subsequent repudiation of the idea;

5) Governmental consideration of the Policy Planning Staff's plan for Germany (known as Program A) in the autumn of 1948 and again in the spring of 1949;
6) The final push to establish a West German government in early 1949 and formal rejection of Program A;

7) Agreement on the terms for lifting the blockade and establishing the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949.

The London Program

By early 1948, the precipitous deterioration of US-Soviet relations surfaced in disagreements over various economic measures for Germany. In the western zones, Britain, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, France were proceeding with steps to jumpstart the German economy to reign in inflation and to allow some form of local German self-government. These efforts were the topic of a series of discussions held in London among the Western powers over the future status of Germany during the winter of 1947-1948. The London discussions gradually turned into negotiations over a separate trizonal agreement on the terms of German recovery and the formation of a new constitution. Both British and US officials (notably, Secretary Marshall and General Clay) found it "intolerable" to continue to "sit [at the occupation headquarters] in Frankfurt with folded hands" pending intergovernmental agreement on a final settlement. General Clay in particular pushed for immediate action to overcome the existing difficulties and undertook a number of independent steps within the combined US-UK zone to foster currency reform and economic recovery.

For US policymakers, the London Program grew out of frustration on three fronts: unilateral Soviet actions in Eastern Germany (and throughout Soviet-held territory in Eastern Europe) as well as Soviet intransigence in Allied negotiations for a German

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14. Tension revolved around Soviet opposition to the following measures: the US-UK bizonal agreement that fixed control over the German economy, signed on December 17, 1947; the terms of the European Recovery Program (otherwise known as the Marshall Plan); and discussions about establishing the Western European Military Union in the early part of 1948.
peace settlement; domestic criticism of the costs and conduct of the American occupation government in Germany\textsuperscript{16} and fears over the impact of continuing economic collapse on the political and economic makeup of Europe. In an effort to deal with these problems, the government pursued talks that would merge the three western zones of occupation and revise the existing military government while allowing greater German autonomy and political representation.

US officials viewed the London Program to establish a West German government as a calculated risk. The dire situation in Germany brought financial and political pressure on the occupying powers to try to improve conditions, yet independent action to lessen this burden greatly increased the likelihood of a confrontation with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{17} There was widespread disagreement over the potential costs and benefits of various measures among officials in both the State Department and the Army. The lack of consensus created a deepseated ambivalence that surfaced in numerous internal discussions on the future of Germany over the winter of 1947-1948. This ambivalence is often described as a problem of "indecisive" in Washington.\textsuperscript{18} But in using this word, historians have diminished the very real drawbacks and potential dangers of pursuing the London Program that contributed to this stalemate.

\textsuperscript{16} US occupation costs for Germany were $500 to $600 million per year. Additional US expeditures to Germany up until June 30, 1948, under the 'Disease and Unrest' formula, were $821 million. This does not include funds from the European Recovery Program. Memo on major aspects of current US policy in Germany, prepared for Mr. Thorp, February 27, 1948. Papers of Howard Trivers, State Dept File Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).


As the London discussions progressed, the government kept a low public profile about the extent of its commitment to these plans and continued to express a willingness to reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union over the German problem.\footnote{See, for example, Secretary Marshall's statements on the status of London discussions on November 27, 1947, and December 15, 1947, in \textit{Germany 1947-1949}, pp. 192-193. John Backer captures the view of many historians in writing that "The likelihood of unification seemed more and more remote, but the State Department nevertheless insisted that appearances had to be preserved." \textit{Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay} (NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, 1983), p. 167.} Privately, however, Secretary of State Marshall, General Lucius Clay, and other high ranking officials were firmly resolved to move forward with a settlement that allowed for the \textit{de facto} division of Germany.\footnote{Marshall sent a memo to the President on the subject of US security measures toward Germany on February 11, 1948, that argued that "the four-power disarmament and demilitarization treaty previously proposed by us [the Byrnes 25 Year Disarmament Plan] is unworkable in the absence of four-power agreement and does not provide a basis for tripartite discussion. Although we maintain an active interest in the subject we do not contemplate further specific proposals at this time." See \textit{State to Pres, February 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol II}, p. 63.} Yet it remained to be seen how agreement on such a division could be accomplished without seriously undermining US security interests.

Responding to the initiative of General Clay, State Department negotiators launched into a volatile mix of technical negotiations over an ambitious program of economic and political reform in the Western occupation zone, while senior policymakers remained quite conflicted about how hard the United States should press for a resolution to the German problem in the face of Soviet opposition. While the goal of establishing a separate West German government continued to be the primary focus of US governmental planning, this position attracted few strong supporters among mid-level officials in the State Department due to the numerous compromises necessary to reach agreement.

On March 8, 1948, the London Conference issued a communiqué that stated that the three Western powers would cooperate to include Germany in the economic
reconstruction of Western Europe, based on a "federal form of government." This announcement further exacerbated tensions with the Soviet Union and within a few weeks, the Soviet delegation withdrew from discussions in the Allied Control Council. While up through 1947 the Soviet Union had undertaken numerous actions in the Eastern zone that contributed to the current impasse, at this particular stage the Soviets were primarily responding to Western initiatives to create a separate West German government and to carry out currency reforms. While the Soviets were alarmed at various facets of the London discussions, the effort to implement currency reform in the western zones and Berlin became the focal point for Soviet ire.

As the Soviet Union stepped up its harassment in Berlin in early 1948, US officials anticipated the possibility of confrontation, yet little was done to formulate a US response. By the end of April, it became increasingly clear that the Soviets were trying to force the Allies out of Berlin. Yet when the Soviets finally made their move after three months of growing tension, Washington still had not drawn up any clear policy regarding whether to stay in Berlin and under what conditions. At the heart of this failure to set a clear policy was disagreement over whether currency reform was an important enough goal to risk war.

At the time of the Berlin blockade, Washington was locked in a stalemate as a result of this basic policy dilemma. All the potential courses of action considered

22. The possibility of a Soviet blockade of Berlin was anticipated. At a NSC meeting in the fall of 1947, both Ambassador Smith and General Clay warned President Truman and others attending the meeting that the US should be "prepared for Soviet action to force our withdrawal from Berlin." Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 239. This risk was reiterated in subsequent cables. Robert Murphy recalled in his memoir that "The Russians certainly gave us plenty of warning about the Berlin blockade." Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), p. 313.
   As Avi Shlaim notes, "Although the exact timing of the blockade was not predicted, the Americans were well aware, from December 1947 onwards, of the possibility and increasing likelihood of a Russian move to oust the Western powers from Berlin." Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 11.
23. In a teleconference on April 10, 1948, Clay documented Soviet actions and raised the question of how far the United States was willing to go to remain in Berlin. Smith, Papers of Lucius D. Clay, p. 622; Davison, The Berlin Blockade, p. 90; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 313-315.
entailed tremendous risks. Secretary of State Marshall had basically given up on the possibility of a negotiated settlement of German problems with the Soviet Union, emphasizing instead the work of the London Program. But these efforts were bogged down in the perennial French opposition to the creation of a federated German government and the inclusion of Germany in the European Recovery Program, as well as other points of contention among the allies.

Suddenly, the Soviet imposition of a land blockade of Berlin changed everything. The months of incidents and harassments reached a breaking point when the Soviets stopped all freight traffic and shut off most of the electricity to the western sectors of Berlin on June 24, 1948 claiming "technical difficulties."

The Soviet actions in Berlin demanded an immediate response. But at the outset of the blockade, both military and diplomatic officials were divided over whether to remain in Berlin. Once the United States and Western allies decided to try to stay, debate centered on whether to use military force to break the blockade, expand the military airlift effort to undermine the blockade, or negotiate either a partial or complete settlement of outstanding German issues with the Soviet Union. In addition, a series of other measures were considered, such as reinforcing Western trains with armed guards, sending B-29 aircraft (known to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons) to Europe, and imposing retaliatory economic sanctions on the eastern zone.

**THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS**

The dramatic expansion of governmental responsibilities following World War II brought a frenzied pace of institution-building, prompting changes in organizational structures, resources, and norms. The balance of power both within and between government institutions shifted even though the President and his Cabinet officers
retained control over the governmental agenda. While others have chronicled the institutional development of the State Department, the transition to peacetime operations by the Department of Defense,\textsuperscript{24} and the creation of the National Security Council and CIA, the unusual constellation of power between the State Department and the Defense Department is often overlooked. Of particular note is the fact that by the summer of 1948, Lucius Clay, a mid-level Army official serving as the US Military Governor in Germany, had ascended to the inner circle of power. The enormous influence of General Lucius Clay, virtually unprecedented in peacetime, further strengthened the military's position and institutional influence in the formation of policy alternatives.

Within the United States, a number of other officials also contributed to policy. Members of the larger policymaking circle included: Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, and State Department Political Advisor in Germany, Robert Murphy. The next most influential officials were: State Department Counselor Charles Bohlen, Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith, and Policy Planning Staff Director George Kennan. Outside the administration, a changing constellation of domestic actors influenced the agenda, notably, the presidential candidates Henry Wallace and Thomas Dewey, liberal critics, and various important members of Congress.

President Harry Truman

In contrast to the Roosevelt administration, President Harry Truman cultivated a clear institutional hierarchy in the executive branch that clearly delegated responsibilities

\textsuperscript{24} The War Department formally changed its name to the Department of Defense in July, 1947. For simplicity, this chapter uses the latter term.
to various departments and left the ultimate decisions on major issues to the President. In what has been described as a formalistic model of presidential policymaking, Truman adopted an orderly policymaking structure, with well-defined procedures and hierarchical lines of communication.25 Despite his personal modesty, Truman shared with his predecessor an expansive view of the office of the presidency and sought to strengthen its institutional power.26

Perhaps Truman's greatest difference from Roosevelt, however, was his predisposition towards confrontation with the Soviet Union. Preoccupied throughout his presidency with what he described as "the threat of Russian totalitarianism,"27 Truman decisively shaped the political agenda. Truman viewed relations with the Soviet Union as an ideological confrontation between two ways of life,28 and with the launching of the Truman doctrine in 1947, he advanced a policy of firmness toward the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1948, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia heightened tensions with the Soviet Union. Truman placed full responsibility for the Czech crisis on the Soviet Union and, in public speeches, he frequently called on the democratic world to struggle against communism.29

While the President shaped the political agenda with his strongly anti-Soviet stance, he was only minimally involved in day-to-day German policymaking, leaving the development and implementation of US occupation policy to General Clay and specialists in various government departments. This hands-off approach changed somewhat at the outset of the Berlin blockade, when Truman took charge of decisionmaking. Truman remained committed to keeping US forces in Berlin and

25. Adapted from Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview, 1980), pp. 151-152.
28. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 82.
carrying out the London agreement. This decision was followed immediately by the order to establish a full-scale airlift. In response to conflicting advice from his military advisors, the President sided with General Clay, asserting that "If we move out of Berlin we have lost everything we have been fighting for."30 Yet beyond dictating the overall US position in the crisis, neither Truman or the White House staff were closely involved in the day-to-day decisionmaking on Germany.

Although committed to the path of containment by this time, Truman also worried about the risk of war, noting in his diary on September 13, 1948, for instance: "Berlin is a mess. Forrestal, etc., brief me on bases, bombs, Moscow, Leningrad, etc. I have a terrible feeling afterwards that we are very close to war." Such fears made Truman careful to veto policies advanced by his more hard-lined advisors that might risk heightening tensions.

Finally, President Truman's uphill struggle in the 1948 presidential elections exerted a strong influence on policy options towards Germany. US foreign policy received widespread public support and did not become a campaign issue, but the elections undoubtedly colored the President's approach to the problem because Truman was widely perceived as holding only weak powers. The conventional wisdom was that Truman was already a lame duck in 1948; both Time and Newsweek reported that only a miracle or some unforeseeable political blunder could prevent Republican hopeful Thomas Dewey from winning the election in November.31

31. For an excellent account of Truman's 1948 campaign, see McCullough, Truman, Chapters 13 and 14.
The State Department

Between 1947 and 1949, the State Department underwent a dramatic expansion of influence and jurisdiction as it changed from an aristocratic to a bureaucratic institution. While still in many ways a fledgling institution which lacked control over key issues such as German policy, it had greatly enhanced its prestige and influence. This was largely due to the presence of the Army war hero, General George Marshall.

During the tenure of Secretary George Marshall (from 1947 through the end of 1948), the State Department greatly improved its morale and effectiveness. A very warm and respectful working relationship between Truman and Secretary Marshall further strengthened the State Department's influence. This positive working relationship continued with Marshall's successor, Dean Acheson, who took over in January 1949.

Both Marshall and Acheson were skilled managers who maintained good morale within the department. Marshall adapted the institutional lessons of the military's chain of command to his new post; in a similar vein, Marshall viewed his relationship with the president as that of a soldier to a commanding officer.32 He delegated extensive authority to his Under Secretary Robert Lovett who ran the department on a day-to-day basis.33 Marshall and Lovett had a very close and collegial working relationship; Marshall relied on Lovett to supervise policy development, requiring him often to submit completed policies for approval.34 In addition, Lovett served as Acting Secretary of State during Marshall's frequent travels that kept him out of the country roughly one third of the time.35

33. Dean Acheson served as undersecretary until mid-1947, when he returned to private practice and Lovett took the job.
34. In an oral history of his work for Marshall, Dean Acheson describes his job in a similar vein. Acheson also notes the drawbacks to this approach as being the failure of the Secretary to influence the development of ideas within the department. Cited in Pogue, pp. 147-8.
Marshall possessed a rare combination of strong military leadership, impressive competence and unquestioned personal integrity. Twice selected by Time Magazine as "Man of the Year", and later a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and the Congressional Medal of Honor, Marshall was a towering figure who commanded deep respect. While far from a typical Army general, Marshall's socialization and experience in the armed forces profoundly colored his approach to foreign policy. He frequently referred to Europe as the European theater, for example, and punctuated his memos and speech with a variety of military terms and imagery.36

Marshall delegated authority along the lines of traditional military command structure. For better or worse, he relied heavily on the department's career foreign service staff who, in general, were staunchly anti-Soviet, preoccupied with European recovery, and sympathetic to British and French interests. This reliance (or what some critics described as dependence) on mid-level experts within the bureaucracy for the development of policy proposals was of great importance in explaining the specific developments of the London Program.

Importantly, Marshall did not believe in accommodating to Soviet demands and maintained a firm line that foreclosed a range of possible compromise solutions to the Berlin crisis. Marshall opposed direct talks, citing the "long and bitter experience with such efforts."37 In truth, as more than one scholar has noted, despite his role as Secretary of State, "Marshall greatly undervalued the role of diplomacy, and had neither the talent nor the taste for negotiations."38 Nonetheless, Marshall consistently pursued a somewhat contradictory policy of advancing rapid tripartite action while at the same time arguing for eventually establishing the economic and political unity of Germany.39.

Despite, or perhaps because of, his hard-line views Marshall was a calming influence on more bellicose voices in the government.\textsuperscript{40} While, on the one hand, he fought against more alarmist calls for putting the United States on wartime footing, behind the scenes he worked to strengthen US defense capabilities. Believing that a military association could be created along the lines of the European Recovery Program, Marshall actively pushed for the establishment of a North Atlantic defense pact. As he claimed in later years, "I started NATO."\textsuperscript{41} In both cases, Marshall was the critical initiator and organizer within the United States.\textsuperscript{42}

From an institutional vantage point, the State Department was a weak player in the debate; what success it did achieve piggybacked on the Defense Department's capacity as officials began to accept the military's expanded role in foreign policymaking.

There was frequent tension between the State Department staff and General Clay's office over both substantive and bureaucratic differences with regard to the German occupation. The General's authoritarian tendencies and unyielding character made compromise difficult. Clay felt that State Department officials were inclined to modify policy in response to French objections; this belief sparked many angry communications between the agencies.

Another important source of jockeying for power stemmed from the fact that the State Department was scheduled on July 1, 1948 to take over responsibility for the administration of Germany, finally getting control from Army hands.\textsuperscript{43} While the Berlin blockade ultimately forestalled this plan, the expectation of the shift contributed to the desire by State officials to assert greater input and control over policy.

\textsuperscript{40} Cray, pp. 646-647.  
\textsuperscript{42} For Marshall's role in the discussions over the formation of NATO, see Pogue.  
\textsuperscript{43} FRUS 1948, Vol II, p. 23; On transfer of control to State Dept, see Backer, Winds of History, pp. 206-207.
While State officials were engaged in a daunting array of foreign policy issues throughout the world, the department's central preoccupation was on the upheaval in Western Europe. With this in mind, a key institutional interest was to promote greater public support for expanded US involvement and assistance in economic recovery. An important institutional innovation was Marshall's reorganization of the State Department and creation of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS). In its inaugural years, the PPS had a formative role in launching a new era in US-European relations.

**New Institutional Structures: The Policy Planning Staff**

Created in 1947 with a mandate to develop US policy toward pressing foreign policy problems, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) had a far-reaching impact despite its small size (it was made up of only ten officials, headed by Kennan). The PPS quickly became a major player in developing US policy towards Europe. Perhaps its greatest accomplishment was the development of the Marshall Plan between 1947-1948, although it was also influential in the Far East, Eastern Europe and US-Soviet relations. This power was quickly eclipsed starting in 1949, with the tenure of Secretary Acheson. Contrary to Marshall, Acheson was quite conversant and confident in his grasp of the spectrum of foreign policy issues and increasingly relied on his own judgment. Kennan soon found that he was less influential on the Secretary and the Policy Planning Staff lost its direct access to the secretary as it was required to operate within the old clearing system again.

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44. Kennan and Clayton were primarily responsible for the specifics of the European Recovery Program.
The PPS benefitted from both its strong institutional position—it had the ear of the Secretary and was not hindered by State Department protocol—and the individual persuasive power of its head, George Kennan. Kennan was a well-known analyst of the Soviet Union, with the special distinction of being one of the first advocates of a policy based on firmness.

In 1946, Kennan wrote a long telegram on the sources of Soviet conduct that had a profound impact on US policy towards the Soviet Union. Intended for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the document extremely influential and was widely discussed within the government. Kennan presented a similar analysis that was published in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* a few months after the launching of the Truman doctrine of firmness towards the Soviet Union in 1947. Although the article appeared under the pen of a "Mr. X," it was common knowledge that Kennan was the author; Kennan's subsequent appointment to head the PPS was seen as further evidence of his influence.

In addition to his reputation as a hardheaded and insightful expert of Soviet foreign policy, Kennan was also widely respected as a German expert. He spoke flawless German, closely followed German affairs and served in Germany—first as vice-consul in Hamburg, then in Berlin just prior to the outbreak of war.

Outside of the Policy Planning Staff, the Ambassador to London and other State representatives were deeply involved in talks with other European governments. Although careful not to state it publicly, the negotiations were premised on opposition to a four-power agreement and inclined toward establishment of a separate West German state. As historian Melvyn Leffler has written, this group, in close collaboration with the

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British, was attempting to speed West Europe's recovery, blunt the appeal of communism, co-opt Western Germany and undermine Soviet aims. The main obstacle to this ambitious program was French opposition to any policy that might strengthen Germany.

**General Lucius D. Clay**

Lacking the formal power and stature of General Marshall in the State Department, Lucius Dubignon Clay's key strength was his administrative power over policies in Germany. Clay's ideas and personality were critical in framing policy toward Germany, especially in the economic realm. Clay's efforts in 1946-1947 to address the immediate economic problems in the occupation had a profound impact on the future of Germany.

In 1945, Clay left for Germany with limited governmental authority and an even more restrictive mandate for the US occupation, first penned as JCS 1067. Within four years, Clay had achieved what some described as near dictatorial control over policy in a wide range of matters affecting not only Germany, but European recovery and US-Soviet relations.

The US Occupation Government in Germany (known as OMGUS) was organized to implement occupation policy drawn up in Washington, but OMGUS suffered from major organizational problems throughout its existence. The Army's task was one that no one else wanted; Clay was plagued with frequent frustration over delays from the US government, mediocre personnel and limited resources.

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Clay was quite resourceful in adjusting to the rapidly changing circumstances and demands of the occupation. In an interview in later years, Clay, stressing that he took it upon himself to take the ball and run with it, stated, "I think it was something I had to grab and do...We were initiating the things that had to be done, but without Washington approving and supporting them, we'd not have been able to do them." 49

It is important to briefly sketch Clay's transformation from being the leading advocate of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union and the rapid reunification of Germany to his later hawkish views and calls for a massive airlift of supplies to Berlin and provocative call to send an armed convoy through the Soviet sector during the Berlin blockade. 50 Early on, Clay was a strong advocate of continued cooperation with the Soviets and he pushed for Allied collaboration in the occupation. Clay continued to push for a joint settlement longer than many in Washington, but once he changed his mind, he became the leading spokesperson for an economically strong West Germany and spearheaded the policy of brinkmanship against the Soviet Union during the Berlin blockade. Clay's change of heart came following talks in Washington in the spring of 1947 when he realized that the Truman administration had adopted a policy of firmness and, as one historian describes it, "the winds of history had shifted." 51 At the same time, Clay had become a vigorous advocate of German reconstruction and sovereignty (with continued controls). But this was a gradual process that evolved out of various failed efforts at making the zone he was responsible for economically viable.

Despite his second tier rank, Clay played a crucial role in formulating and implementing US policy toward Germany. As time went on, Clay pursued an administrative policy of taking on more responsibility, making OMGUS "more and more

a one-man show."52 He strongly resented any outside interference by the State Department and asserted that he would only clear policies through his direct superiors at the Pentagon.53

Kennan strongly resented the power of occupation officials and repeatedly tried to push the Secretary to transfer operational control of the occupation to the State Department.

The Defense Department

Still flush with its stunning victory in the Second World War and its atomic monopoly, the Defense Department faced an intriguing paradox: at a time of unparalleled power, it perceived itself as a vulnerable giant trying to awaken the nation to the twin threats of a reduced defense budget and the absence of a standing army in a dangerous and unpredictable world.

The military's key preoccupation during the Berlin crisis was the possibility of war. Given the very real basis for this concern, the military demanded and received direct control over German policy. The key constraint stemmed from the lack of a clear consensus over policy within the department. Despite significant opposition from members of the JCS over Clay's handling of the blockade, Defense officials favored direct and immediate action to resolve tensions in Berlin. Some military planners were opportunistic about the crisis, seeking to greatly increase the Defense Department's


On the effort to improve State and Defense Department channels of instruction, See Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 57.
budget from its slated $22 billion to $33 billion. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal called for a massive increase in the department's 1948-1949 budget.

Despite grave doubts about the wisdom of Truman's decision to remain in Berlin, officials devoted themselves to various measures to support the airlift and prepare for the possibility of conflict. Defense officials carefully evaluated a range of military options and utilized their institutional expertise to design and expand on the airlift while other avenues were pursued.

The JCS position was shaped by the military's underlying concern that the United States had inadequately maintained its defense capabilities. It saw its options as follows: either withdraw or prepare for war. Due to Clay's repeated appeals, the department carefully analyzed the option of sending an armed convoy through the Soviet zone.

The key institutional preoccupation of the Defense department between 1948-1949 was the $15 billion cap on defense spending and the difficult task of developing a postwar force structure that provided the capabilities to back up the emerging foreign policy of containment within the current fiscal limits. The upheaval in the Pentagon brought disarray and intense interservice rivalry (most notably between the Navy and the Air Force over the merits of strategic bombing versus a supercarrier).

While of major concern to the military, the State Department was not brought into the internal debate within the Defense Department over military expenditures, missions, and roles. As historian Melvyn Leffler notes, State Department officials did not concern themselves with either the size or composition of US forces needed to pursue foreign policy: "Confident that the ongoing contest for preponderant power was political, they

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54. Cray, General of the Army, p. 646.
55. October 1948 policy review.
continued to pursue national security goals through economic aid, military assistance, political alliances, and shrewd diplomacy."\(^{58}\)

E V O L U T I O N O F P R O G R A M A

In the early months of the blockade, debate within the administration over what course to take in Berlin was inconclusive. As all were aware, the basic problem was not primarily an issue of what currency would be employed in Berlin, but what would happen to the principle of quadripartite authority.\(^{59}\) The mood during the summer of 1948 was tense due to fears that actions in Berlin might precipitate another war. As Kennan describes it,

Night after night, several of us gathered in the communication center of the department to receive the latest news from Germany and to exchange views with General Clay and his advisors about our next move. No one was sure, as yet, how the Russian move could be countered or whether it could be successfully countered at all. The situation was dark, and full of danger. A tremendous premium appeared to rest on any new arrangements that would free Berlin from the virtual embrace of Russian military forces and make impossible the imposition of another blockade.\(^{60}\)

While the military focused on the operational requirements of remaining in Berlin, the State Department pursued the diplomatic options for the Western powers.

As a prime example of this mandate, Program A was developed by an interdepartmental working group in the State Department operating under George Kennan's direction in the summer and autumn of 1948. This working group included representatives of the Office of European Affairs, the Division of Central European Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for

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59. This was reiterated in communications between the Secretary of the Army Royall to General Clay on June 28th, 1948, *FRUS 1948, Vol II*, p. 929.
Occupied Areas, the Legal Adviser on Military Affairs and Occupied Areas, and the Plans and Operations Division of the Department of the Army.61

At the time, many US policymakers were unhappy with the direction that negotiations with the French and British were taking in the London Program. In Kennan's view, the London Program provided no basis at all for negotiation with the Russians, and meant in effect the abandonment of hope for any early removal of the division of Germany and the continent. But it was also because this program was, intellectually and in concept, the child of our occupational establishment in Germany. It was to be implemented under supervision of that establishment. It allowed for the establishment's continued existence and authority, even after the new West German government had been set up. This was an establishment for which I had an almost neurotic distaste.62

In contrast to these efforts, Program A incorporated previously espoused US security goals into a comprehensive policy initiative, offering an intriguing amalgam of ideas and official negotiating positions that had been circulating since World War II. Interestingly, although it differed in important respects, Program A manifested some of the same features as the Morgenthau Plan which also called for the neutrality of Germany, joint allied oversight, and the eventual withdrawal of forces.63

The plan envisioned a disarmed, unified Germany under strict controls in keeping with the US war aims first espoused in the Atlantic Charter. It also held out the prospect of negotiations to resolve the precarious predicament of Western forces in Berlin. Finally, it offered the hope of achieving a peace settlement and a negotiated withdrawal of foreign forces from central Europe (including Soviet forces). Program A also included prohibitions on German rearmament that were similar to the disarmament treaty previously set forth by Secretary of State James Byrnes in early 1946. Furthermore, it

61. Covering memorandum to Secretary for PPS 37/1. RG 59, National Archives (NA).
63. The Morgenthau Plan, calling for the pastoralization of Germany, was subsequently discredited in the spring of 1945. The two key objections that were raised against the Morgenthau plan were its demands for the dismemberment of Germany and its punitive economic constraints. Program A can be seen as a response to these objections in its support for German unity and economic recovery.
was compatible with the earlier efforts of the US occupation government (OMGUS) to achieve joint policy, German political representation, and economic reconstruction.

Finally, it was consistent with the professed goals of US foreign policy: to negotiate a general settlement that would improve the prospects for stability and economic recovery in Europe.

Through 1949, US officials still publicly espoused the goal of unity and four-power agreement. In March of 1948, for example, Secretary Marshall reiterated the US commitment to obtain Four Power agreement on policies for Germany.\(^{64}\) And in July of that year, the three Western governments each restated a willingness to reach a four-power agreement, as long as the blockade was first lifted.\(^{65}\) Even in the spring of 1949, Secretary Acheson reiterated that agreements concerning Western Germany did "not in any sense preclude agreements on Germany as a whole" and were instead "provisional" pending agreement on Germany as a whole.\(^{66}\)

Yet despite these various attributes, Program A failed to garner the necessary support of key players within the Truman administration. As Kennan recalls,

> In view of this preoccupation of our senior figures with the airlift and the London Program...[Program A] was placed, over the winter, on the 'back burner.' No formal decision was taken as to which course we would follow. Actually, of course, our position was being determined for us, from day to day, by the steady growth in the degree and solemnity of our commitment to the London Program.\(^{67}\)

Some officials opposed Program A because they viewed it as too risky: the Allies might not agree to it, they argued, and the Soviets might not comply with the terms even

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65. This commitment was expressed in a formal exchange of notes between governments in July 1948 which stated that: "The United States is ready as a first step to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied Occupying Authorities for the settlement of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of Berlin. It is, however, a prerequisite that the lines of communication and the movement of persons and goods between the United Kingdom, the United States and the French sectors in Berlin and the Western Zones be fully restored." "The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948," Department of State publication 3298.
if they did agree to it in principle. But apart from these concerns, a careful review of the internal debate over Program A suggests that an important source of opposition to the idea was the fact that the approach challenged the prerogatives of the Army. Program A demanded a structural change in the administration as well as the direction of US security policy. Not only did it call for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union, it also demanded the dismantling of OMGUS and a disengagement of US forces in Germany.

Throughout the occupation, the Army largely determined day-to-day policy. Although Marshall had revitalized the State Department and made it a much stronger institution, by mid-1947 he had basically given up on negotiating with the Soviets and was tied up with other foreign policy problems—most notably the European Recovery Program and a series of crises and coups in Europe—prior to the blockade. Program A sought to remove the military from the crux of administrative power. Even more contentious, it impinged on military autonomy in its plan for garrisoning troops.

The Drafting Of Program A

In light of continued skepticism over the substance of the London talks and growing fears about the dangers posed by the unresolved status of Germany, the Policy Planning Staff was urged to find a workable solution to the problem. In response, Kennan developed a proposal that advocated a far-reaching resolution to "the German problem" in a "package" of proposals that could be set forth if the US government decided to push for a general German settlement.

1. The arrangement envisaged, under proper safeguards:
   - a new control machinery agreement to be worked out by Council of Foreign Ministers' deputies, to govern relationships among the Allies, and between them and the Germans, pending the final peace settlement;
- the early election and establishment of a provisional German government;
- the simultaneous termination of military government throughout all of Germany;
- the withdrawal of all occupying forces to specified garrison area.

2. The safeguards would include:
- free elections under satisfactory supervision;
- safeguards against any misuse of German police;
- provision for complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany;
- avoidance of any economic arrangements which could give the Russians undue influence over the German government or constitute an undue burden on Germany;
- timing or phasing of the successive stages of the plan in their proper order; for example, forces would not be withdrawn until a duly elected German government was prepared to function;
- effective elimination of the veto by any individual power.

3. This arrangement would be intended to function until the conclusion of a peace treaty.68

The first draft of the proposal was circulated in mid-August of 1948. Kennan reports that his superiors did not express a view on the question of what the United States might propose if a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting was called to resolve the Bertin impasse.69 The US Ambassador to Moscow was in communication with Stalin, but Secretary Marshall was not inclined to initiate high-level talks at this time on the principle that the United States would not negotiate under duress.

Program A was extensively debated and modified within the State Department in consultation with the Defense Department and National Security Council. It was

68. Technically, the proposal calls for an interim arrangement in Germany, pending the signing of a Peace Treaty. It was intended to be submitted by the Secretary of State to a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. "A Program for Germany," submitted November 12, 1948, RG 59 Department of State, National Archives (NA).
69. Instead, Kennan reports that "The query evoked, so far as its substance was concerned, only a troubled and thoughtful silence." Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 422.
approved in an interdepartmental working group with the important caveat that it would be presented as a potential course of action, but only if the United States decided to pursue a comprehensive settlement at the upcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. This caveat proved significant in the end, because the Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, decided that the United States would not seek such a comprehensive settlement in the autumn of 1948.

After a period of internal debate within the State Department and the NSC, the plan was shelved over the winter of 1948. Although it was still a possibility into the spring of 1949, it was never adopted as the official US position and, as Secretary of State Acheson recalls, "interest in the approach waned." 70 Perhaps the key reason for this lack of interest was the surprising success of the airlift. As Kennan noted, during the "winter of 1948-1949 the operational levels of our government were fully occupied with the mounting and maintaining of the airlift as a means of frustrating the blockade, and with the implementation of the London Program." 71

Despite the fact that the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained skeptical of the benefits of separate settlement and most senior officials voiced serious reservations about the wisdom of delaying efforts to achieve a final peace treaty indefinitely, the move towards a separate settlement proceeded.

At Acheson's request, Kennan visited Germany to get a better idea of the problems in March 1949. Despite waning interest in Program A at home, Kennan returned from Germany in March 1949, "more convinced than ever that unless the

70. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 292. Acheson goes on to state "Other conclusions of our preparatory studies and my talks with the President were that the council meeting would probably not produce more than a modus vivendi on Berlin and an easing of the dangerous tension brought on by the open hostility of the blockade and our response. We could accept this without alarm, but we would like more. A good opportunity to get more should not be rejected on the theory that a better opportunity would surely come. Our reading of the future held no such assurance."

invaders withdrew and Germany was reunited, the country would become a war zone once again."72

Asking him for a firsthand report on the situation in Germany, Acheson told Kennan that he was almost persuaded by Kennan’s argument, adding that he wondered whether the decision to establish a Western German government had "been the brainchild of General Clay and not a governmental decision."73

**Opposition To Program A**

Over the course of debate over Program A, a number of different objections were raised that merit review. During the initial crisis period, some US officials opposed the plan on the grounds that it was too risky and would leave the United States in a weaker position in Germany and possibly jeopardize the economic recovery of Europe. John Hickerson, director of the State Department Office of European Affairs, summarized his view of the plan in a memorandum to Kennan on August 31, 1948, as follows:

> An agreement with the U.S.S.R. as we all know, is respected by that country only so long as it suits Soviet interests to do so. The other side must possess sufficient strength to make it unprofitable to the U.S.S.R. to do violence to the agreement. It seems to me that it would be highly dangerous to agree to unite Germany along the lines you propose until Western Europe is stronger, both economically and militarily. This is the basis of my fundamental objection to the bold and imaginative proposal in your paper."74

Foy Kohler, US Charge d'Affaires in Moscow warned that this settlement would "induce complacency in the west, eroding the public’s willingness to be taxed in support of military preparedness."75

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73. Memorandum of Conversation, "Policy with respect to Germany," March 9, 1949. Microfiche, National Archives.
75. Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 54, National Archives.
Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) championed the Defense Department view that the advantages of the troop withdrawal proposed in Program A would be 'illusory', given that preparations for war could be carried out in Poland or in the USSR.\textsuperscript{76} General Bradley, Chair of the JCS, argued that "the result of such an effort would be to back British and US forces into indefensible positions in port areas, while Russian forces would not be moved far enough eastward to make much difference."\textsuperscript{77}

Marshall reiterated that the blockade must be lifted \textit{before} the Western Powers would agree to convene a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. While Marshall's thinking was premised on continuing with the present London negotiations to reach an agreement with Britain and France for a settlement of the western zone, he was also profoundly concerned about the danger that Soviet provocations in Berlin might lead to war. Marshall repeatedly reiterated that the United States wanted to settle the Berlin question by securing the lifting of the blockade, rather than stressing that his primary goal was to seek a political solution. He also warned that "We will not buy such settlement through appeasement or through repudiation of our basic thesis that we will not resume negotiations under duress."\textsuperscript{78}

While Marshall's thinking is difficult to assess because he did not give interviews or publish memoirs, a review of the Secretary's correspondence and cables suggests several possible reasons for his opposition: (1) the analogy to the origins of World War II and an abiding fear of appeasement; (2) the view of the Soviet Union as the enemy; and (3) his desire to maintain maximum US flexibility. Marshall stressed that he did not want to be locked into a specific plan. One example of this concern came in a cable

\textsuperscript{76} In the summer of 1948, the West had a total of 6,500 troops in Berlin: 3,000 American, 2,000 British, and 1,500 French, while the Soviets had 18,000 troops in the city with an estimated 300,000 in the eastern zone of Germany. McCullough, \textit{Truman}, p. 647.

\textsuperscript{77} Other responses to the memo can be found from the following sources: Johnson to Acheson, May 14, 1949, \textit{FRUS 1949. Vol III}, pp. 875-876. See also Kennan, \textit{Memoirs 1925-1950}, pp. 444-445.

providing instruction for the UN negotiators in Paris on US policy with respect to the
settlement of the Berlin question before the UN. Marshall emphasized in a cable
message that the "process of obtaining our assent in principle to a proposal before
acceptance in principle by Sovs tends to put us at disadvantage of having accepted
proposal which is then rejected by Sovs but is thereafter used as starting point for new
round of negotiations." 79

Debate Over Program A in the Spring of 1949

Kennan determinedly plugged the plan during State department discussions of the
US position in the planned Council of Foreign Ministers, following the lifting of the
blockade. The idea was still in circulation within the administration, prompting a letter in
May 1949 from Secretary of Defense Johnson to Secretary Acheson. Johnson states the
military's objections to the PPS program for Germany. 80

When the plan surfaced again in May of 1949, Clay responded that the plan was
"suicidal" because it ignored the importance of providing a "security screen" in Germany
and the value of West Germany to the European Recovery Program as well as to Western
Europe. 81 But most dramatically, after so many years of effort, it demanded that Clay

81. Clay stated "the West has two important tools: Its security screen in Germany and the economic
assistance it is giving Germany. Therefore, my apprehension over the State Department paper comes from these two major points:
(a) The withdrawal of the security screen so that it will no longer be effective to stop fear;
(b) The complete omission of any reference to the economic problem. The withdrawal of British
and American troops from their forward positions leaves western Europe separated form direct contact with
the Red Army only by unarmed Germany. Troops located in Bremen and Hamburg would be quickly by-
passed if there should occur a Soviet thrust in western Europe. Obviously this will arouse fear in western
Europe. Moreover, it will discourage the resistance movements in the satellite countries as the withdrawal
will imply doubt as to immediate Anglo-American participation should a Soviet thrust take place.
abandon his goal of establishing a West German government. In a Teleconference that discussed the plan, Clay stated, "If you really want to turn Germany over to the Soviets, then this is the way to do it... With all sincerity, I urge abandonment of this idea." To underscore his objections, Clay concluded his cabled response the following day by saying, "We have won the battle but under the State Department proposal [we] are writing an armistice as if we had lost the battle. It would place us in a disadvantageous position in the unending and continuing struggle between Communism and freedom."

Clay received a cable from Murphy in the State Department on May 7th reassuring him that the proposal was not in accord with the official State Department view and that Acheson supported going ahead with a West German government and keeping troops deployed until European stability was assured. In his memoirs published in the Cold War atmosphere of 1950, Clay notes his "dismay" with the idea and stressed the view that the Soviets might have agreed to an "all-German government on our terms so that they could work from within to destroy it."

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I recognize that these forces present no real military security against Soviet attack but it is because of their presence that the fears of two years ago no longer exist. They do provide security against fear. In the economic field, Germany is not yet independent and withdrawal of our aid will result in an immediate economic slump. It may indeed destroy a democratic new government... I am certain that no sound agreement can be reached which does not include provision of Germany to belong to OEEC and to be included in the ERP program. Actually this program was started because of our realization that sound political stability had to be based on economic stability and we must not forget this object lesson." Clay, May 6, 1949 teleconference, Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of Lucius D. Clay, II* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 1152.

Clay goes on to argue that a withdrawal of troops should not take place until western Europe has been rearmed. *Ibid.*, p. 1154.

82. Backer describes Clay's response to the idea as exhibiting "unusual restraint." *Winds of History*, p. 277. While the transcript of the discussion might lead one to believe that Clay was vigorously opposed to the idea (he describes the State Department program as stupid), Clay's position can be interpreted as quite restrained compared to his usual tone when referring to the State Department.


Program A was considered at two key junctures of the US effort to end the blockade. The reaction of some officials in the military the second time the idea was set forth as an option raises some intriguing questions about whether other senior officials in the military had ever seen the earlier drafts of the plan. In a May 5, 1949 teleconference with Clay, Assistant Army Secretary Tracy Voorhees reported that he had just seen the proposal the day before and that the JCS was considering the military aspects at a State official's request. The JCS planned to consider the plan on May 6, 1949. On May 4th, 1949 however, the four powers announced their agreement on lifting the blockade—the crisis was finally ending and a West German government was about to be established; finally, Clay could carry out his wish to retire and leave on May 15, 1949. 88

The plan was again discussed during preparations for a planned Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris (held May 23-June 20, 1949). On April 15, 1949 Kennan held a meeting with the following State officials: Ambassador Robert Murphy, John Hickerson, Jacob Beam and Ware Adams to discuss the clearance of Program A. 89 The other participants then reviewed the proposal.

The proposal was still undergoing revisions on various technical questions while it awaited endorsement from the Secretary. In a memo on the meeting, a PPS official distinguished between certain "reserved matters" that would not rely on unanimous consent among the allies, notably with regard to security and demilitarization arrangements. Instead, there would be certain "flat prohibitions upon the Germans, subject to four-power inspection." 90 The participants also agreed that the Bonn basic law for German self-government would provide the model of any provisional constitution for Germany as a whole.91

89. Memo by Ware Adams of PPS to US Ambassador at Large (Jessup) April 15, 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol III, p. 856.
91. Ibid.
In an April 15, 1949 memo Kennan reiterated that although there was disagreement within the department over whether the United States should endorse a four-power agreement, "Subject to this overall decisions, there was unanimous agreement among all the working levels of the Department that if such a meeting did occur the ideal position for the United States would be one identical with, or substantially similar to, 'Program A'."\(^2\) During this time, Kennan continued to lobby for institutional support for the idea. In advocating Program A, Kennan asserted that its "principles are practically identical with those now being implemented in Western Germany under the London Program." Kennan went on to recommend that the ideas be discussed with the French and the British to coordinate proposals for an upcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In a meeting with Secretary of State Acheson on April 18th, 1949, two different views were debated over US policy, summarized as follows:

1. It would be to our advantage to maintain the split in Germany for a rather long period of time. This would be true because Western Germany is a more manageable unit which might be integrated in Western Europe. It would not be a viable entity in itself and the attraction from the West would therefore be more potent.

2. It would be to our advantage to end the division of Germany provided that the division of Europe could be ended at the same time. This would be true because it would involve the withdrawal of the Red Army to the East.\(^4\)

In a surprising but all too familiar twist, the proposal was leaked to the press as a possible US negotiating position in the upcoming Paris talks a few days before the meeting was to convene. This embarrassing breach of protocol enraged the British and French governments and brought a quick renunciation by the State Department.\(^5\)

\(^2\) Memo by Director of PPS (Kennan) "Position of the United States at Any Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on Germany That May Occur." April 15, 1949, \textit{FRUS 1949, Vol III}, pp. 858-859.
\(^3\) While there is no transcript or formal listing of participants at the meeting, \textit{FRUS} editors note that a memo on the meeting suggests that Jessup, Acheson, Webb, Bohlen, Kennan, Murphy, Rusk, and Thompson all participated. \textit{FRUS 1949, Vol III, fn.} p. 859.
RESPONDING TO THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

Along with the London decisions, the problem of the transfer of control from the Army to the State Department was a key issue for the Secretary of State. As Military Governor, Clay was responsible for managing the military government in the US occupation zone of Germany. He reported to the military, not the State Department. Given Clay's increasing power and autonomy in Germany, Secretary of State Marshall was faced with the question of whether to allow Clay a "carte blanche" in Germany. 96 Marshall opted for transferring administrative control of the occupation government from the Army to the State Department by the spring of 1949. Final plans for Berlin would wait pending this transfer.

The Soviet imposition of a blockade in Berlin starting on March 31, 1948 served as a catalyst for a high-level effort to undertake a comprehensive review of US policy towards Germany. While there was some debate over Soviet intentions, most elite US policymakers at the time believed that the prime objective of the blockade was to force the suspension of the steps agreed to in London to create a Western German Government. 97

In the course of Cabinet level discussions of US actions in response to the blockade, the basic question hinged on the fundamental choice between abandoning

97. Bohlen Memorandum to: Secretary, Lovett, Hickerson, Kennan, August 4, 1948, RG 59, National Archives (NA). A review of the CIA briefings for the President and members of the National Security Council shows that despite the generally negative tone about Soviet actions, the CIA saw only a small likelihood of the crisis turning into a great power war.

In May of 1948, the CIA reported that "it is still improbable that the USSR has any present intention of provoking a war. Its most provocative conduct, that in Germany, is actually evidence that war is not intended." "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the US," NSC Meetings Index, Box 203, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).
Berlin, or remaining in Berlin by airlifting supplies. Yet beyond this basic choice, policymakers faced a large number of possible policy options. Despite fears over the indefensible nature of the US position in Berlin, there was little support for evacuating Berlin.

In the early days of the blockade, a broad set of options on the decisionmaking agenda addressed the immediate situation. The Defense Department and General Bradley of the Joint Chiefs were unsure about whether to remain in Berlin. In fact, Bradley and others in the department favored US withdrawal given the extremely vulnerable position of US troops and the presence of twenty-seven divisions of Soviet forces in the region.

On June 27, 1948, senior diplomatic and military officials met at the Pentagon to discuss the Berlin situation. The meeting considered three alternative courses of action: to withdraw from Berlin (in conjunction with the meeting of a Berlin constituent assembly for a West German government on September 1st); to remain in Berlin using all possible means, including the possibility of supplying Berlin by convoy, (attempting to use diplomatic and other means to avoid war, but accepting the possibility that this action might lead to war); and to maintain a firm stand in Berlin by pursuing a diplomatic solution that delayed a decision on remaining in Berlin. The group also considered employing a show of force by sending a group of B-29 bombers to Europe as an implicit nuclear threat.

The meeting ended without reaching a firm decision, pending a conference with the President the following day. This meeting is rather remarkable on a number of fronts. First, it was not in keeping with standard bureaucratic procedure and instead relied on an ad hoc meeting that bypassed the formal channels specified in the Security Act. Secondly, it glossed over the implications of the military action that was already underway, i.e. the operation of a military airlift. The topics left out of the discussion are almost as striking as the gravity of the agenda. Yet from the outset, all within the
military understood that if a shooting war started, it would likely begin with an incident involving the airlift.

But President Truman, with the coaching of Clay, decided to remain in Berlin. In the first full-fledged Cabinet meeting on the crisis on June 28th, Truman cut short discussion of a possible withdrawal from Berlin with the order that "We are going to remain in Berlin. Period."98 Truman's firm decision would hold, but many senior officials (notably in the Army and Joint Chiefs) continued to express their reservations for some time to come.99

Once the decision was made to stay in Berlin, policymakers considered:

- dispatching US Army surface convoys prepared to overcome alleged "technical difficulties" cited by the Soviets;
- sending B-29 bombers either to England or to Germany;
- suspending the current currency reform program in Western Germany;
- agreeing to quadripartite discussion of the entire German problem at the governmental level;
- refusing to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union until the blockade is lifted;
- moving ahead with the establishment of a separate German government;
- challenging the blockade by moving the American garrison in Berlin or bringing other forces into the region;
- breaking the Berlin blockade through a preventive war (or a nuclear attack);100
- exchanging diplomatic notes to explore the potential for compromise with Stalin over the currency issue;
- bringing the issue up for consideration in the UN in an effort to impose sanctions;
- consulting with Britain, France and other European nations on a possible course of joint action;
- negotiating a comprehensive settlement for Germany.101

100. Throughout this period, Forrestal and officials in the (soon to be renamed) War Department were negotiating custody of the atomic bomb; these discussions concerning authority over nuclear weapons were linked to the immediate problems in Berlin and the risk of war, Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 458-463.
Clay's Institution of the Airlift

Convinced that the United States should not bow to Soviet pressure, General Lucius Clay, the senior military commander in Germany, strongly endorsed a tough allied response that the United States would not budge on its right to remain in Berlin. Within days of the outset of the Berlin blockade, Clay independently began a military airlift of supplies to Berlin in an effort that came to be known as "Operation Vittles." On June 25th, Clay contacted General Curtis LeMay to discuss the feasibility of expanding the airlift to the city to include coal and other essentials. At the time, there were enormous doubts about whether existing airlift capabilities would be able to adequately supply Berlin. Clay's proposed airlift received a skeptical hearing in Washington and Clay did not receive any real encouragement at the outset.

In addition to doubts about the feasibility of transporting sufficient supplies, some US policymakers worried that the confrontation might lead to war. Upon hearing Clay's initial report on the Blockade, Army officials proposed delaying the introduction of the Western currency in Berlin if there was any indication that it might provoke an armed conflict. In fact, Clay's own staff was initially divided about whether the United States should remain in Berlin. As one official who argued against remaining reportedly

that the US nuclear monopoly was a constraining force for the Soviet Union during the blockade.) For discussions with Clay over the feasibility of an armed convoy, see pp. 459-460.
102. Clay cable to Army, June 25, 1948. The possibility of using an airlift was first raised by General Clay in a March 31, 1948, teleconference, although at the time he did not endorse it. The following day, on April 1st, Clay proposed to use the airlift as an interim measure and reported that he was seriously considering sending a guarded truck convoy through the contested zone. The Papers of Lucius D. Clay, pp. 604, 607.
103. At the time, US transport capabilities relied primarily on C-47 aircraft, with only a three-ton capacity. This meant that at least 400 flights of C-47 aircraft would be needed per day to supply Berlin. The larger C-54, with its ten-ton capacity, improved the prospects of meeting minimum requirements, but it was not immediately available. At the outset, Clay estimated between 500 and 700 tons as the maximum. Davison, The Berlin Blockade, p. 105. (Note: a C-47 aircraft could transport two and a half tons per trip.)
105. Secretary Royall opened his comments with this cautionary order. Teleconference, June 25, 1948, The Papers of Lucius D. Clay, p. 699.
said, "If your hand is in the fire, why not pull it out."\textsuperscript{105} Few could dismiss the serious danger posed by the Soviet action. Yet, those who supported Clay's position argued that the Soviets were bluffing and could be forced to back down.\textsuperscript{106} Even without the recommendation of his staff to remain in Berlin, Clay stood his ground and ordered the airlift of cargo.

In his report to Washington, Clay exaggerated support for his plan and vigorously lobbied for a strong Western response.\textsuperscript{107} Along with expanding the airlift, Clay pushed for using ground forces in an armed convoy to overcome the "technical difficulties" alleged by the Soviets as the reason for the blockade.\textsuperscript{108} And above all, Clay opposed any compromise in the US position while the blockade was still in effect, because it would be negotiating under duress.\textsuperscript{109} He argued that "remaining in Berlin means much to our prestige in Germany, in Europe, and in keeping high the courage of western Europe. To retreat now is to imply we are prepared to retreat further."

Clay's force of will and initial actions served to frame the terms of the US debate about the Berlin crisis. The idea of an airlift had been discussed in several quarters,\textsuperscript{111} but it was Clay's immediate and determined support for the idea that helped it gain acceptance. More than anyone, Clay was the galvanizing force at the outset of the crisis, with the close cooperation and leadership of the British occupation chief, General Sir Brian Robertson.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{105} Backer, 1983, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{106} Davison, \textit{The Berlin Blockade}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{107} Most of Clay's correspondence was directed to his immediate bosses in the Pentagon, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley.
\textsuperscript{108} Clay telegram to Bradley, July 10, 1948, \textit{The Papers of Lucius D. Clay}, p. 734; Clay telegram on July 19, 1948, p. 743-746. Clay summarizes these cables in his memoirs, reiterating his conviction that "In my view the chances of such a convoy being met by force with subsequent developments of hostilities were small. I was confident that it would get through to Berlin and that the highway blockade would be ended... I shall always believe that the convoy would have reached Berlin." \textit{Decision in Germany}, p. 374.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid}, p. 703.
\textsuperscript{111} Davison, \textit{The Berlin Blockade}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{112} In an April 10th teleconference with Army officials on the crisis, Clay gave an impassioned defense of remaining in Berlin, stating:
Before going further, it is helpful to explain why Clay was so influential. Clay's influence stemmed from the institutional capacity of his office on the ground in Germany, his personal energy and competence as a leader, and the extant policy flux in Washington regarding German policy.\textsuperscript{113} The obvious institutional source of power stemmed from Clay's position as head of both the European Command of the US Army (EUCOM) and the Office of Military Government of the United States in Germany (OMGUS). General Clay reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Chief of Staff, US Army, concerning matters pertaining to the European command. On issues of policy in the occupation, Clay reported directly to the Department of the Army. Clay's position as military governor afforded enormous discretionary power. Although ostensibly charged with implementing policies developed in Washington, by this time Clay was virtually a one-man-show. He had very good working relations with his colleagues at the Pentagon and he had a "close and friendly working partnership" with General William Draper, Undersecretary of the Army with special responsibility for overseeing occupation affairs in Germany.\textsuperscript{114}

Following the initial letter from Sokolovsky protesting the implementation of currency reform and notifying the Western powers of restrictions on travel to and from Berlin, Clay responded with a letter to Sokolovsky inviting the Soviets to four-power talks on the Berlin currency situation. At the same time, Clay asserted the right of US forces to remain in Berlin and notified the Soviets that US troops would remain, even if they were denied access to land routes to the city.\textsuperscript{115} In the letter, Clay informed

\textsuperscript{113} Shlaim, \textit{The United States and the Berlin Blockade}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{114} Shlaim, \textit{The United States and the Berlin Blockade}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{115} Davison, \textit{The Berlin Blockade}, p. 93.

"We have lost Czechoslovakia. Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, western Germany will be next. If we mean...to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge. We can take humiliation and pressure short of war in Berlin without losing face. If we withdraw, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not understand this now, does not know that the issue is cast, then it never will and communism will run rampant. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay." Quoted in Clay, \textit{Decision in Germany}, p. 361.
Sokolovsky that, if necessary, the United States could supply their forces by air indefinitely.

Clay endorsed a policy of brinksmanship in the crisis—arguing that the Soviets would back down from the blockade if the West responded with a forceful display that they were willing to go to the brink of war to defend their right to remain in Berlin. In communications with Washington, Clay stated, "It is my intent to instruct our guards to open fire if Soviet soldiers attempt to enter our trains." Throughout the crisis, Clay was confident that the Russians did not want a war over Berlin. Clay understood the Soviet action as an act of desperation in response to the success of US policy in Europe such as its European Recovery Program. Because of this conviction that the Soviets were bluffing, Clay willingly endorsed various armed measures such as reinforcing trains with armed guards, launching an armed convoy, and sending B-29s to bases in England.

Back in Washington, Clay's response to developments in Berlin was the subject of intense debate within the US government. In a June 25 teleconference, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall firmly instructed Clay that "I would not want any action taken in Berlin which might lead to possible armed conflict" and suggested that currency reform should be delayed if it was necessary to avoid conflict. As Royall stated later on in the conversation, "There is no thought that decisions of currency were unsound or that your course has not been both proper and authorized, but I do feel strongly that the limited questions of Berlin currency is not a good question to go to war on."

119. In an April 10, 1948 teleconference between General Bradley and Clay, Bradley reminded Clay that "with our passenger trains completely stopped, Russians in effect have won the first round" and that short of war, they could make the US position untenable. In response, Clay gave a spirited defense of his policy. Bradley ended the conversation saying that "Our questions reference withdrawal from Berlin designed to explore situation which is subject of much discussion in Government circles," *The Papers of Lucius D. Clay*, pp. 623-25.
Concerning the merits of pursuing diplomatic means, such as a letter of protest to the Soviet Union, both Royall and Clay aptly reflect the military's skepticism towards such efforts. Royall worried that a governmental protest "may just lead to a typewriter campaign, instead of definite retaliatory action," while Clay asserted that it would be almost certainly rejected by the Soviets and was therefore of no value except "for the record."122

Early on, Secretary of State Marshall expressed doubts about whether the United States should attempt to remain in Berlin, despite his strong support for a firm stance against the Soviet Union. While largely in agreement with Clay on the need to stand up to Soviet intimidation, Marshall wanted to avoid provocative measures that might lead to armed conflict.123 In many ways, though, Clay and Marshall held similar positions. Marshall publicly stated on April 30th that "We intend to stay in Berlin and will meet force with force."124 For Marshall, military power was the only basis for relations with the Soviet Union.125 Throughout his tenure as Secretary of State, Marshall viewed the Soviet Union as an expansionist power and this view contributed to an unwillingness to compromise on US interests in an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.126

Both Marshall and Clay remained committed to the London Program and believed that opening up the German problem to four-power discussions was too high a price to pay for ending the blockade.127 Yet as tensions increased, Marshall was more fearful than Clay of provoking a war. This fear moderated his strong-arm position and

122. Ibid, p. 703.
125. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 94.
opened the possibility of delaying action on the London Program. But it did not make Marshall more inclined towards negotiations as a way out of the crisis.

In communications with Britain at the outset of the blockade, Marshall described the United States as maintaining "the present unprovocative but firm stand in Berlin, utilizing to the utmost the present propaganda advantages of our position." Marshall also reported that the Army and State Departments were considering sending a strong three-power note of protest to Moscow. Despite these hardlined beliefs, Marshall was privately wary about remaining in Berlin.

Marshall maintained a relatively consistent position throughout. It can be summarized in one of his last directives on what course of action the United States should follow on the German problem as Secretary of State. Marshall set out the following terms:

(1) the United States would not be forced out of Berlin; (2) the United States wanted to solve the Berlin situation by ending the blockade; (3) the United States would not negotiate under duress; (4) the United States would accept the Soviet ostmark for Berlin if there were a proper Four Power supervision of currency; (5) recent Soviet actions made currency problems harder to work out, and the coming municipal elections in Berlin threatened to split the city further; and (7) they must, with the aid of neutrals, work out the means to prevent the Russians from disregarding the rights of the Western powers.

Again and again, the question was raised of how far the United States, along with France and Britain, would be willing to go short of war to remain in Berlin. The British and French supported a more conciliatory policy and expressed fears of US willingness to go to war. In an account of his first meeting with Stalin to discuss the blockade, Ambassador Smith recalls that from the Soviet standpoint, they had "confronted us with

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130. On British General Robertson, see Pogue, George C. Marshall, pp. 302-303.
the flat alternative of getting out of Berlin in ignominious defeat or of staying on under sufferance and abandoning our announced plan of setting up a separate government for Western Germany."131 Smith goes on to reflect that "at the time the situation did not look too hopeful to me... I had serious doubts whether we could feed and supply a huge city by air for a prolonged period, especially during the winter months, when flying conditions in Eastern Germany were notoriously uncertain. Nor was I by any means sure that the morale of the German people would stand the strain. I knew however, that General Clay was confident and determined."132

Following the blockade in 1948, the shared premise of most senior governmental officials was that accommodation with the Soviet Union would only invite further aggression. As a corollary to this view, there was also a growing belief that the best guarantee of peace and security was through US military strength. In the words of the Secretary of Defense, "The greater our ability to defend ourselves, the less likelihood that we or they [referring to free peoples] will be attacked."133

ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE FATE OF PROGRAM A

To succeed, the airlift needed to supply 2.2 million people. It is difficult to imagine the magnitude and complexity of such a feat. The technical problems were enormous and ranged from determining priorities of cargo to developing the requisite packaging for all goods to be transported.134

For Program A to succeed, the wartime Allies would need to put disagreements behind them and embark on lengthy negotiations over the timing and terms of a final

peace settlement. The project required terminating the occupation governments, holding German elections, and withdrawing military forces within a relatively short time. Comparable negotiations had been successfully carried out for Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Finland.

While there were drawbacks and dangers associated with such comprehensive negotiations, Program A set forth a collection of steps that could provide a useful starting point for discussions. The lessons of the failed peace treaties of World War I, the geopolitical significance of Germany, and the damage and suffering wrought by the Nazis were all testament to the urgency of the task. Why then, was this policy path rejected at the outset of the Paris talks in May of 1949?

According to the incremental model of governmental decisionmaking, Program A failed because it demanded too great a break from the current proposals being pursued in London. Yet, this perspective does not explain the major breaks and innovations in policy, from the daring program of draconian currency reform, to the instigation of the airlift. A truly incremental response would have been to seek modest modifications or a delay in the London agreements as well as to seek Soviet concessions on ground and air access to Berlin. While the incremental approach gives insight into the slippery slope that helped to create the Berlin dilemma, it cannot explain the bold measures adopted over the winter of 1948 and spring of 1949 to launch a new West German government.

Similarly the rational actor model fails to explain the absolute nature of opposition to talks with the Soviet Union. While in many respects the high-level Cabinet meetings on the crisis present exemplary cases of a rational evaluation of costs and benefits, there was little systematic review of the available options nor was there a systematic evaluation of the risks of war. Instead, Truman and Marshall were willing to risk it all in an effort to avoid inviting further aggressive initiatives by the Soviet Union through weak Western resolve.
A more useful approach starts with an analysis of institutional relationships as they pertain to governmental choice. In the foregoing study, a serious drawback with Program A is its bold challenge to the prerogatives of the Army's occupation government. From the very start of postwar planning, the Army had demanded autonomy and control over its oversight and governance of Germany. Program A threatened such core institutional interests as preserving the Army's jurisdiction and control. Perhaps of even greater significance, the proposal shifted the agenda from one domain where the military had considerable expertise and competence (i.e., the airlift) to uncharted territory. Another argument stressed by Army officials was that Program A exposed the West to the military threat posed by the deployment of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. While few could guarantee that Western forces could successfully resist this threat if shooting broke out, failure to attempt such a defense would appear tantamount to appeasement. Perhaps then, questions about the (in)feasibility of Program A are grounded in the tendency of organizational decisionmakers to look to the available tools at hand and the capacity of various agencies to actually carry out the job. Such capacity provides important leverage in organizing a winning coalition.

As General Clay succinctly summed up the situation "the military people were thinking about this in terms of military decisions...This was the time when I thought the decision should have been made by the State Department, not the military. But, of course, the State Department at that time thought just like the military did." From an institutional perspective, it is little surprise that the Defense Department would devote its resources to making the airlift workable. It is also understandable that a structurally weak State Department would adapt to the new balance of governmental power and align itself with the military. This is especially understandable, given Marshall's military background.

Despite the widespread opposition to the idea, it would be a mistake to characterize Program A as the lone voice of an influential dissident. The plan grew out of the concerns of a number of officials who were unhappy with the direction of US policy. Within the State Department, a number of earlier versions of such an Allied agreement had existed since the middle of 1947. The resurfacing of this type of proposal was a response to widespread unhappiness and fears over the wisdom of emerging US government policies that solidified the bipolar division of Europe.

The proposal also grew out of the State Department's ongoing and thus far unsuccessful efforts to wrest control from the Army on questions of foreign policy. This effort was marred by institutional weakness and division among State personnel over a course of action for Germany. In addition, State lacked any operational infrastructure to carry out policy goals for the German occupation.

By the time Program A was set forward as a possible negotiating position, the United States was already largely committed to establishing a separate West German government. After months of discussion, the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others opposed Kennan's approach and argued against any serious negotiations with the Soviets unless the blockade was first lifted. While Plan A required direct negotiations with the Soviet Union, the London Program avoided the potential that the West would negotiate under duress. Instead, senior officials advocated continued opposition to the Soviet Union, European reconstruction and the creation of a West German government as the best means to achieve a Soviet withdrawal.

Program A was a feasible alternative for a number of reasons. First of all, like it or not the United States and the West had to reach a deal with the Soviet Union over the long-term status of Germany (as well as Austria and other remaining issues from the end of the war). The blockade showed the perils of unilateral action—the Soviets could make
the Western position untenable in areas where the West had a major stake and was most vulnerable. This was of special concern to the military which was charged with backing up US policy with force where necessary and was all too aware of current fiscal constraints and its weakness because of the postwar demobilization.

The US ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith and the Western ambassadors all recognized the possibility for some kind of conciliation in the initial negotiations with Stalin in Moscow. As Smith notes, "I felt quite sure that we could have produced an agreement in fifteen minutes at any time by an offer to abandon the London decisions. This, of course, was impossible from our side."136

At the outset of the blockade, most analysts believed that the Soviet Union did not want to go to war. Despite a palpable fear that the conflict could result in an unintended war, numerous analyses by the CIA and General Clay's office concluded that while willing to increase tensions, the primary aim of the Soviet leadership was to stop the London decisions from taking effect. Further bolstering this interpretation was the fact that Soviet officials presented several proposals during this period that indicated a willingness to reach an agreement over Germany, notwithstanding their harsh rhetoric in public. One such proposal concerned the procedure for a peace treaty.137 Later Soviet Foreign Minister Malenkoff confirmed Soviet willingness to reconsider the German issue in his 1953 proposal for a final peace settlement.

In contrast the airlift was never viewed as a feasible solution to the problem of Berlin. At the outset, the airlift was judged a stopgap effort designed to buy some time and had serious opponents within the military who objected to the diversion of scarce resources to supply a vulnerable city in the heart of the Soviet zone. Even as it became

136. My Three Years in Moscow, p. 253.
137. See January 27, 1947 letter from Murphy to Clay, where Murphy reports that "The Soviets have now come forth with what I consider to be a really important proposal regarding procedure for the preparation of the peace treaty for Germany.... there is a lot to be said for the Soviet proposal which thus far is the most concrete that has been offered." RG 200, Box 2, Personal Clay papers, NA.
evident that an airlift was succeeding in provisioning the city and denying the Soviets victory, no one thought it could serve as a permanent solution. Yet, an unintended consequence of the airlift is that its very success served to foreclose consideration of a negotiated settlement. As the airlift succeeded in supplying the western zone of Berlin and the Soviets were put on the defensive, organizational preoccupation with the airlift's technical demands sidetracked diplomatic proposals that would achieve US interests and provide a face-saving device for the Soviets, most preferably in the form of a meeting of foreign ministers.

While the Soviets posed a threat to US interests, few thought the United States could successfully act unilaterally and most believed that, faced with a determined US stance and evidence of US military strength, Stalin wanted to cut a deal. The big question was how long the Soviets would try to drag out the negotiations in the hope of getting into a stronger position as a result of developments in Europe and growing US pressures to withdraw from Europe. Marshall believed that Soviet delaying tactics worked entirely in their favor.138 Tempering this concern was the realization that despite the tremendous public appeal of communism in the aftermath of wartime turmoil, most policymakers assumed that Europe would stabilize and eventually Soviet military and political power would retract.139 In this regard, one of the motivations for Program A was the desire to weaken Soviet influence in Eastern Europe by getting them to withdraw their military forces.

The second reason for Program A's appeal was that it furthered longstanding US policy goals and was in keeping with various proposals set forth by US negotiators. The United States still formally asserted that it was abiding by the Potsdam agreement with regard to the economic unification of Germany. Presented in a variety of forums and at

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different times, the overall US position was to seek a unified Germany, with the ultimate
withdrawal of US forces from Europe; even more importantly, policymakers sought to
foster stability and economic reconstruction in Europe. Outside of the administration,
most experts and pundits called for the withdrawal of US forces from Europe. This
required a demilitarized and neutralized Germany.\footnote{140}

Third, as stated earlier, the fact that George Kennan was endorsing this program
gave it further legitimacy.\footnote{141} Finally, Program A was significant because it had few
rivals; it was one of the few proposals that offered a comprehensive approach to German
policy and was set forth at a time when none of the existing policies were working and
prospects were dim that they might succeed. The other major competing alternative, the
London Program, had major drawbacks and faced major objections both within the
United States and on the part of the French and British, making it appear unlikely to
succeed.\footnote{142} While French objections to various economic components of the plan
attracted a lot of attention, the most serious problem with the initiative was that it did not
solve the long-term security problem of the threat posed by a revived Germany. A
further concern was that prolonging division of the defeated country could foster a
German backlash and revival of nationalism. Many policymakers feared that Germany
could turn East, or play off East and West.\footnote{143}

Meanwhile, the formulation of Program A must be considered in light of
widespread worries on the part of US policymakers about the viability of the West

\footnote{140. As Walter Lippmann argued, a demilitarized and neutralized Germany was the essential condition for
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\footnote{141. Some historians disagree with this interpretation and argue that Kennan's earlier position did not
necessarily add credence to his proposal for Germany. See, for example, Issacson and Thomas who write:
that this "sharp reversal did not enhance Kennan's credibility." Issacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p.
471.}

\footnote{142. For a discussion of French fears about German recovery, see Leffler, A Preponderance of Power,
pp.202-3.}

\footnote{143. This concern is voiced in a paper prepared by Kennan, March 8, 1949; FRUS 1949, Vol III, pp. 96-99.
For background, see Gimpel, The American Occupation of Germany, pp. 186-257.}
German economy. The country suffered an enormous deficit, damage from the war, disarray, and a demoralized population.

Most scholars have mistakenly treated Program A as a sidelight to the main story. As one scholar notes, for instance, "Program A was never seriously considered as a viable alternative to United States policy toward Germany." 144 Yet, Program A was in fact considered at the highest levels of government. As mentioned earlier, Program A was basically in keeping with earlier US proposals for the settlement of Germany. It can be argued that the dangers associated with Program A were no greater than those posed by the London Program, and they must be considered also in the context of the enormous undertaking required for the Berlin airlift itself. Having raised the West’s investment in the success of the enterprise, its failure would have been a humiliating blow.

Another significant obstacle was the prospect of foreign objections to the plan. Indeed, Kennan recognized that it probably would not be accepted by the Soviets and that the French would raise major objections. Yet, this was also the case for the London Program. At the time, Soviet intransigence was widely noted as the primary rationale for the Western independent program. The French were continuing to obstruct British and American efforts at stimulating German recovery or carrying out currency reform and there was widespread uncertainty over whether the French would sustain their lukewarm support, despite the Berlin blockade. The default status quo was to proceed with the London Program and efforts to carry out currency reform.

By 1948, key external forces altered the climate of decisionmaking, changing the way policymakers framed the German problem. The breakdown of four-power talks and Soviet attempts at intimidation that culminated in the imposition of a land blockade transformed the political agenda. Suddenly, the status of Germany attracted the attention

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of the President and high-level policymakers; at the same time, the military took greater responsibility for the status of Germany and the Defense Department was the central arena for action. Press briefings moved from the State Department to the Defense Department. There was a rallying of public and elite opinion around the United States remaining in Berlin. There was also a renewed fear of war in March 1948 (ushered in by the death of the Czech leader under suspicious circumstances and the walkout of the Soviet delegate from the Allied Control Council on March 20, 1948).

CONCLUSION

As debate over the Berlin Blockade unfolded, the city increasingly came to be seen as an extremely important symbol of Western resolve. Germany was an important foreign policy issue—the stakes were high. Control of Germany was of both symbolic importance and geostrategic importance. Symbolically, it was at the center of Europe and the capital of a recently vanquished foe. Geographically, its size, central location and industrial potential made it exceedingly important in the overall balance of power. As State Department officials portrayed it, "Berlin has become an important symbol of the determination of the U.S. and the other Western powers to contest the Soviet claim to mastery of Germany and of Europe; withdrawal would be a great blow to Western prestige in Europe and to the strategic position of the U.S. and its associates vis-a-vis the USSR."145

The Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 was pivotal to a transformation of US security policy, reversing the process of demobilization after World War II and spawning the North Atlantic defense pact—a precursor to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). Most importantly, the crisis prompted the United States to back up its

increasingly harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric with action. In its response, the United States operationalized and eventually institutionalized the policy of containment.

In many scholarly accounts, the striking emergence of a Cold-War consensus overshadows the fact that the consensus was born of profound uncertainty, extensive debate, and sharp disagreement among US policymakers during this period. As I have attempted to show, the successful airlift of food and supplies into Berlin through the winter of 1948-1949 contributed to a transformation in the agenda for US policy towards Germany. The US response marked an unmistakable commitment to Europe and manifest a clear shift to a policy of containment of the Soviet Union. The joint agreement with France, Britain and the United States set the terms for a separate democratic federated state within the framework of the European association.

The division of Germany after World War II represents a case study in the disintegration of trust and the rapid militarization of conflict. And in many ways, it was the unintended outcome of the inability of the governments to resolve the pressing, yet difficult outstanding problems at the highest levels of governments. In the face of this high-level impasse, a number of smaller decisions were taken that served to undermine a comprehensive settlement. In the absence of an overarching framework, various governmental agencies pursued their parochial interests. Ideas moved foreword in separate policy streams that were largely autonomous and not well-integrated, despite official proclamations to the contrary. Hence, at key junctures, a number of contradictory policies were pursued simultaneously which served to undermine efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement.

Program A demanded a structural change: from acceptance of the division of Germany into two hostile camps and from asserting US military might and the willingness to use force to defend Western interests, to a more cautious force posture and foreign policy that relied primarily on traditional diplomacy to effect a negotiated
withdrawal of Soviet forces in Europe. At the time, senior policymakers determined that such a shift (or what they termed reopening the German question) was too risky. But despite the eclipse of the idea itself, the shortcomings that Program A attempted to address remained.

During the Berlin blockade, the option of relying on an airlift to supply Berlin was deemed more workable than the option of reopening diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union. The US military occupation government and the administration of bizonia (or the western zones of occupied Germany) provided the essential infrastructure on which to establish the airlift. The airlift was an unprecedented feat, developed and undertaken within the existing command of the newly formed Air Force and drawing upon the wartime functions of the War Department.

From the vantage point of governmental institutions, the debate over Program A illuminates the altered climate of decisionmaking. The blockade created intense fear and uncertainty over how to respond. Soviet actions, or an external event catalyzed a review of alternatives—but this time, the thinking was primarily along military lines. Despite the recurring proposals for a diplomatic initiative to Stalin, most of the proposals concerned alternative courses of military action.

Following the imposition of the blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council become increasingly involved in the drafting of policy alternatives for Germany in a series of interdepartmental meetings devoted to the German crisis. The alternatives developed by these two organizations focused on maintaining the airlift and military courses of action in case the Soviet Union attempted to disrupt the airlift or war broke out.

Between 1947 and 1948, the governmental agenda shifted as President Truman's policy of firmness emerged. In response to rising tensions and frustration with the lack of progress in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on a final peace settlement, this
new agenda was premised on unilateral action in the western occupation zones and a changing conception of the German problem as it became linked with the more general preoccupation with fostering economic recovery in Europe. The level of east-west hostility gradually increased evolved over the spring of 1948 in a series of crises that included a coup in Czechoslovakia.146

In the final analysis, a key shortcoming was the inability of proponents of Program A to overcome organized opposition and competing organizational interests. While often downplayed in accounts stressing the formidable Cold War consensus that emerged during this time, a critical dimension of the proposal was that it fundamentally challenged the Army's institutional interests.

As described in previous chapters, postwar circumstances had created tremendous flux in governmental institutions. Yet by 1948, the shifting balance of power among governmental institutions was starting to solidify. While at an institutional level, there was an expanding role for both the State and War Departments, the defense establishment (including the NSC) clearly came to dominate.

As one scholar has written, "If Germany was a microcosm of the Cold War, then Berlin was the microcosm of the German problem. And the Berlin crisis was a symbol and a watershed in both contexts. It marked the 'great divide' in the postwar history of Germany." 147

146. Most identify the real starting point of the blockade as March 30th when the Soviets delivered a letter to the Military Governors of the western occupation zones announcing that "certain supplementary regulations" for traffic between Berlin and the western zones would take effect in 24 hours. In effect, all road and rail passengers (both military and civilian) were required to present individual documentation and all belongings were subject to Soviet inspection. In addition, all freight traffic was subject to Soviet authorization.
147. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 36.
CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The development of US security policy in the immediate postwar period sheds new light on the study of government decisionmaking processes. In the early stages of the debate over various postwar collective security measures and the political settlement of Germany between 1944 and 1945, the haphazard institutional structures of newly created and often temporary governmental agencies and working groups created an unusual and contested balance of power. This chaotic institutional setting fostered a wide range of alternatives and a reduced capacity to translate these ideas into viable policies. As a result, governmental actors responded with an intriguing patchwork of bold initiatives on the political agenda and glaring lapses in decisionmaking that left many important issues unresolved.

The breadth of the US political agenda during this period is striking. In the final year of World War II, wartime planners in the United States struggled with the problem of how to create a stable postwar international system that would foster peace and prosperity. At the core of this fundamental security problem was the issue of planning for the Allied occupation of Germany. Debate over the occupation of Germany was widely premised on the conviction that future security rested in continued cooperation and agreement among the Allies,
especially the Soviet Union. Other than this general mandate, however, the security agenda was open to a wide range of options.

The volatile international situation put extraordinary external pressures on the US policymaking apparatus. In such times of flux, when the status quo falls away, institutional structures and interests are often exhibited in clearer relief. During this period, international circumstances influenced and constrained the development and fate of various alternatives. Yet this study has focused on the internal policy process—the way the broader policy environment is used as a resource by various individuals and coalitions as competing ideas are funnelled and filtered into possible courses of action. In the absence of agreement over the rules of the road both within and among governmental organizations, there is greater emphasis on a given institution's capacity to carry out a feasible policy.

The case studies examine three major policy decisions in order to understand how the debates in question were shaped by the formulation and consideration of alternative paths. In particular, discussion has focused on what types of alternatives were considered, and the decisionmaking processes that led to their rejection or acceptance.

Why study the losers in the debate? First, to counter the overabundance of research in political science (and in the field of history) that is so concerned with policy outcomes that it discounts and devalues the processes that shape them. Governmental policies are driven by a complex web of forces, but they also represent choices made by people, not inevitable, ineluctable processes.

The debate over collective security and the settlement of Germany in the immediate postwar period offers the important and hopeful message that the ensuing Cold War may have been overdetermined, but it was not an inevitable process. As posited earlier, the United States could have adopted a variety of
strategies, ranging from support for a UN military force, to a preemptive war, to a more nuanced policy of cooperating with the Soviet Union on some issues while "standing firm" or maintaining an adversarial position on others.

Second, this thesis has contended that a careful study of the alternative policy options under consideration illuminates the process of governmental decisionmaking. A focus on the alternatives highlights the process through which governmental organizations filter and channel information and choices in the process of making decisions. This approach identifies aspects of the policymaking process that are not adequately explained by existing decisionmaking theories.

Some political theorists have offered the compelling theory of incremental decisionmaking—that governments tend to take existing programs as a starting point, and then suggest only minor alterations. In this way, alternatives can be best understood as the outcome of small, marginal adjustments to current programs and actions. Incrementalist theories explain much about policymaking in normal periods. But occasionally, policymakers face a significant challenge to the existing premises that underlie the conduct of security relations that result in major breaks and innovations in policy. During such periods, new ideas emerge more readily on the governmental agenda. In addition, with the alteration of normal decisionmaking processes, the emergence of new problems creates more opportunity for input by unconventional coalitions and peripheral institutions. Taken together, these unusual circumstances can foster significant shifts in security policy that can not be explained by incrementalism alone.

Rational actor explanations offer the useful insight that the preferences of key decisionmakers help to explain what ideas are taken up and adopted. But the rational actor model fails to take into account the institutional context of governmental decisionmaking that can lead to policies that are quite different
from what a rational choice analysis might predict. For example, based on rational analysis one might expect widespread support among governmental actors of steps to achieve a final peace settlement of Germany. Germany was and remains the key to the wellbeing of Europe. Yet, such a criteria for choice does little to explain the ultimate success of the London Program—a policy that was largely the result of compromise and incremental action.

In the realm of national security, where the stakes are high, one might expect choices to be based on a comprehensive analysis of the problem. Yet, such a systematic evaluation of alternatives is rare, as seen in the study of governmental action during the Berlin blockade. Instead, the one serious effort undertaken by the Policy Planning Staff for a comprehensive settlement of Germany did not get onto the decisionmaking agenda until the final stages of the Berlin blockade; and when it was finally presented as a negotiating position it was dismissed by Truman and senior officials in the State and Defense Departments.

An institutional approach to decisionmaking offers valuable insight into the transformation of policy at the outset of the Cold War. This approach starts from the premise that institutions shape as well as impede the formation of policies. The makeup of institutional structures, the balance of power between different institutions, and the promotion of institutional interests all contribute to the likelihood that a particular policy will succeed in mobilizing support.

In the transformation of roles from wartime to peacetime, the existing structure and capacity of the military and other agencies with jurisdiction over US security policy significantly affected the filtering and channelling of different alternatives. More than the ideas themselves, it is the ability of key participants to gain institutional backing for a policy that distinguishes a winning alternative.
War Department officials successfully lobbied for minimal terms for the occupation of Germany and delayed decisions on controversial matters. But most importantly, they were the best positioned to persist in the fight over policy (due to their influence and access to the President) and translate their ideas into viable policies for the occupation of Germany (through the institutional capacity of the Army).

At the end of the war, when policymakers faced a daunting array of urgent decisions of far-reaching importance and the prospect of radical change was most likely, the decisionmaking process was in disarray, hindered by a haphazard combination of centralized power that rested in a few key individuals and dispersed organizational power based on a diffuse, confused institutional structure. In this setting, advocates pursued a range of strategies to promote their ideas—hence a wide range of ideas were promoted from some unusual sources. Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, this less-structured policy debate ultimately benefitted those policies advanced by the War Department largely because of the perception, enhanced over time by Soviet actions, that it would be unlikely to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union except through the threat of the use of force. Given this view, the War Department's capacity to handle the complex problems posed by the occupation came to hold crucial importance. The War Department had a well-defined chain of command and forces in the field that had developed in response to the extraordinary demands of mobilizing and fighting a world war; this structure was adapted to the different demands of the occupation, enabling the Army to take charge.
The concept of institutional capacity needs to be examined closely and made more rigorous. Stephen Skowronek and others have offered some help in delineating and measuring administrative capacities in an expanding state.¹

As evidenced in the historical data presented in Chapter 4, for example, a surprising number of proposals in circulation in the immediate postwar period favored some form of collective security arrangements. Despite the intense competition that would follow in the emergence of the Cold War to come, collective security was a surprisingly robust tenet of the political agenda as the war came to a close.

Meanwhile, the discussion of the Morgenthau plan and the debate over the postwar political settlement of Germany presented in Chapter 5 showed a governmental process altered in a time of flux. The result was an ad hoc set of processes that increased the opportunity for alternatives such as Treasury Secretary Morgenthau’s to surface for high-level consideration.

The early wartime debate over the administration of the occupation pitted two divergent policy paths against each other—representing distinct institutional interests; the military's insistence on protecting its autonomy and the military's skepticism about dealing effectively with the Soviet Union through diplomatic means, tending instead to utilize available military capabilities and the threat of force.

Paradoxically, however, the climate of flux that ushered in new ideas also raised major jurisdictional disputes that brought more parochial and conflicting organizational interests to the fore of the debate, often stifling the possibility for

meaningful change. Absent strong administrative control and established "rules of the road," greater weight is afforded to the institutional capacity of specific governmental agencies to carry out a proposed policy. In other words, the governmental organization that can deliver a solution finds itself in a stronger position to leverage what that solution should be.

Finally, the discussion of the governmental response to the Berlin blockade between 1948-1949 and the fate of Program A illustrates the power that can accrue from the consolidation of a dominant coalition of governmental actors and organizations. In this case, the Defense Department was able to exert a strong influence over the shape of the debate. The expansion of the military's influence in the realm of foreign policy arose out of the changing agenda of the Truman administration; it arose through the solidification of a hard-lined stance; and it also arose because of the Army's enormous administrative powers in the occupation and its institutional capacity to carry out the attractive self-help measure represented by the airlift.

The Policy Planning Staff program for Germany, or Program A, provided a credible possibility to extricate the former wartime allies from a potentially deadly confrontation over Berlin. Less than four years later, albeit following the death of Stalin and a shake-up of Kremlin leadership, Soviet Foreign Minister Malenkoff was to propose a very similar settlement for Germany. Again, the proposal did not survive the test of public airing, leaving great uncertainties over the seriousness of the offer and its feasibility. Nonetheless, the fact that Malenkoff formally proposed such a similar plan sustains the argument that Program A offered a credible alternative that had a fair chance of eventual acceptance by the Soviet government.
RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

Today, on the edge of the reunited German city of Berlin, an expansive park called Teufelsberg--Devil's Hill--is a popular destination for picnics and kite flying. Amassed from the rubble of the city at the end of World War II, the now-verdant, tree-lined park actually marks the city's the highest point.

Teufelsberg's origins may not have been forgotten, but a visit to the site today makes their memory seem dim and distant. A divided Germany has been unified, the Cold War has ended and, as Teufelsberg so remarkably illustrates, life goes on.

What relevance, then, can a reexamination of an anachronistic, 50-year-old policy debate hold in such a changed world?

Today, with the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, policymakers in the United States once again find themselves in the midst of another profound change in both foreign and security policy. The current transition, or turning-point period, has called into question long-held tenets regarding the US national interest, its military forces, and strategy. Significantly, the underlying rationale for the bulk of US military forces--to confront the threat posed by the Soviet Union--has all but vanished. Meanwhile, a diffuse and troubling array of problems have surfaced on the governmental agenda, prompting debate over a wide range of possibilities for US security policy.

The range of policy questions now under contention reflects a breakdown in the elite consensus over security policy. The substantive issues debated today include such issues as whether to greatly expand US involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations through the United Nations or to limit US commitment; whether to dismantle the existing arsenal of US strategic nuclear forces or to
support selective nuclear programs and ballistic missile defenses. Both the tenor and substance of these debates stand in sharp contrast to those of the Cold War.

In essence, US policymakers now confront a whole new set of tensions and conflicts, posing uncharted new threats to the peace. At this juncture, it remains unclear what path the United States will follow. What is certain, though, is that a rare opportunity has emerged for a major shift in strategic relations and that decisions made today are likely to have far-reaching impact.

As this thesis has attempted to show, decisionmaking does not necessarily reflect a meritocracy of ideas; some form of "bounded rationality" is often at work. That is, within the constraints of the way they envision the problem at hand, policymakers do normally opt for "rational" choices that fulfill broad mandates and specific goals. But "good ideas" do not always thrive in the institutional decisionmaking context. Many forces frequently conspire to stifle innovation and to further parochial organizational interests at the expense of agreed-upon, overarching goals. In addition, the opportunity to create long-term, proactive policies often must yield to the reactive expediencies that tend to dominate institutional decisionmaking.

As stated at the outset, characteristic of such historical moments, the stakes in the current turning-point period are high. Once again, the opportunity has emerged to restructure international security arrangements in a collective and defensive manner. And once again, the threat grows daily that we will miss our opportunity and fall into security arrangements based on fear and competition.

Like the historical period this work has considered, the real danger today is not that US policymakers will lack farsighted alternative options but that government institutions will fail to nurture them. A careful consideration of the
institutional forces at play in such unusual periods offers our best hope to forestall tomorrow's missed opportunity.
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