

PRESTIGIOUS AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS' COVERAGE
OF AFRICAN POLITICAL CRISES EVENTS
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AMERICAN PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPERS' COVERAGE OF
AFRICAN CRISES EVENTS

by
MARSHA LYNNE COLEMAN

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
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requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ABSTRACT

This study investigates U.S. prestigious newspaper coverage of several important African crises situations that involved widely perceived threats to American geo-political and economic interests. The cases were: Cuban and South African involvement in the Angolan civil war; the assassination of Steve Biko; and Robert Mugabe during his election campaign. The theoretical problematique was to assess whether there were patterns of inaccurate, unbalanced, incomplete and/or differential excessive affective loading in the news coverage of contending parties in several key conflict situations, that would be subject to interpretation within the framework of prevailing theories of propaganda.

The data for the study was drawn from the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor, and from interviews with several reporters and a foreign desk editor associated with one or more of these papers. The contents of over 600 newspaper articles were analyzed in terms of eighteen categories of possible characterizations. The data and information was subjected to qualitative and statistical analysis and illustrated through the use of histograms.

The relevant literature concerning the theories of propaganda from Lasswell, Bernay's, Chomsky and Kecskemeti is presented in Chapter One together with an analysis of mechanisms and procedures of news coverage production. Chapter Two focusses on the methodology of this study including a description of the various levels of analysis pursued in the technique of content analysis utilized.

The study examines three cases of African crises events that revealed a complex pattern of unbalanced, incomplete, inaccurate and prejudicial reporting by the leading elements of the American prestigious press. In the

Angolan case, the U.S. press underreported the fact of South African intervention and when it did report this, failed to do so in the same negative and emotional terms in which it reported the Cuban involvement. This case also displayed a pattern of imbalance affective treatment of the three contending Angolan parties, MPLA versus the FNLA and UNITA. The American press coverage of the murder of Steve Biko revealed a pattern of incomplete and inaccurate presentation of the facts regarding the circumstances and perpetrators of his murder. The press also tended to reduce Biko's image and philosophy of "Black Consciousness" to a simplistic characterization which undervalued the impact of the man's influence and ideology. The coverage of the 1980 election of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe exhibited many of the same broad patterns of treatment, excessively coloring his image with negative, affectively powerful characterizations.

This study finds Lasswell's notion of propaganda to be a useful guide in analyzing the American prestigious press coverage of African crises events that involve serious challenges to perceived American geo-political and economic interests.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Willard Johnson
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Majestice Thompson Coleman-Prater for her moral, emotional and spiritual guidance.

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CHAPTER 1

THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE ISSUE

Introduction

This dissertation is an attempt to examine how newspapers are involved in shaping public opinion in American society. To what extent does the American press misinform the American public and what factors bear on such misinformation? Newspapers and the print media overall are intimately connected to the political culture and political milieu and thus are likely to shape not only elite attitudes and precipitate political consensus or dissent based on such information but also mass or individual political predispositions.

This investigation explores the structural and operational features which influence the newspaper functional apparatus and speculates on the likely consequences for both government, corporate interests, and the public.

To put the subject into its proper context of modern American intellectual history, Chapter 1 discusses the concept of "propaganda" as a theoretical framework for

explaining bias and distortion in the reporting of African news events by the American press. I will place my problematique within the intellectual landscape of Harold Lasswell, Edward L. Bernays, and Noam Chomsky as well as other scholars concerned with this area. An examination of how American newspapers have reported African events will contribute to the literature on public persuasion, impact of corporate and government interest on the print media, and African images in the western world.

The American press was presented with a challenge of reporting the advent of newly emerging sovereign African governments on the political scene during the early sixties. Recognition by the government and corporate interests of Europe and America of the possible impact of newly independent African nations on the world economy raised serious concern. Simultaneously in the United States, African-Americans were making organized demands on the political system to change racist notions and institutions that were existing. Their demands were carried on both in the courts (e.g., Brown vs. Board of Education) and through civil rights demonstrations in the streets. The government, corporate interest and the print media were being challenged to deal with these issues from Montgomery to Accra.

If there was a recognition among policy makers and other influential groups, that there was a possibility of being challenged both internationally and domestically, did

the press reflect those concerns in their coverage of African events? Did the press reflect the range of issues and questions involved in the African affairs?

This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the theories of propaganda presented by three influential social and political scientists: Lasswell, Bernays and Chomsky. Then we review the literature about newspapers as propaganda vehicles.

Harold Lasswell--The Role of Propaganda in a Democratic Society

Consider Lasswell's definition and specification of propaganda. In the holistic sense, "Propaganda...is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations."¹ In 1950 Lasswell collaborated with Abraham Kaplan (a philosopher) to write Power and Society--A Framework for Political Inquiry.² Lasswell and Kaplan continued to develop and define the conception of propaganda. The initial project ("the book was a spinoff") was a research project on "wartime communications" which was funded by the Rockefeller foundation. This project was

¹Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1934, s.v. "Propaganda," p. 521.

²Harold D. Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Power and Security--A Framework for Political Inquiry Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 1950.

organized with the Library of Congress before the Second World War. The project's scope was defined as : "to perfect tools of research on mass communication; to recruit and train personnel for service in the agencies of propaqanda, information and intelligence; to advise on matters of strategy, tactics, and organization; to describe and analyze certain phases of the history of the war crisis.³ Lasswell's earlier definition of propaqanda was expanded and focused to explain specific conditions.

Lasswell's definition of "propaqanda persuasion" is useful to my analysis of the news media. Lasswell defined this term as "...Many messages carrying a uniform emotional charge to achieve persuasion."⁴ Paul Kecskemeti elaborates this definition by stating: "...we may say that propaqandistic persuasion as an instrumental objective is predicated upon input homogeneity. This means that all the successive messages that reach the audience express the same positive or negative emotional attitude, when referring to one and the same object."⁵ This definition of propaqanda as a barrage of homogeneous symbols seems applicable to

³Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Power and Security--A Framework for Political Analysis, Ibid., p.v.

⁴Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Power and Security--A Framework for Political Analysis Ibid., p. 116.

⁵Ithiel de Sola Pool, et al., Handbook of Communication, "Propaqanda", Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago, Ill. 1973. p. 865.

procedures of American newspapers in reporting foreign events.

Lasswell attempted to change the concept and practices of the modern propagandist from one who acted out of personal convictions or an ideological predisposition to one who could be "objective" and carry out a task based on professional ability or financial considerations like a "lawyer or judge". Edward L. Bernays cites Lasswell's entry of "Propaganda" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1933 as an indication of the acceptance of the study and practice among the intelligentsia.

The era after World War I was a crisis period. Social scientists and businessmen were groping for answers to deal with the "willfulness" (to use Lasswell's term) of the age. It was soon realized that many of the propaganda techniques used during the war could be applied to the domestic situation. The 1929 stock market crash, followed by the Depression of the 1930's witnessed the beginning of workers' growing dissatisfaction with their working conditions, the clash between the government and the utility companies and the increasing European immigration with diverse political orientations all heightened the need for social stability. The government and private business hoped that propaganda or public relations would control the burgeoning dissatisfaction of these various societal groups.

The Social Science Research Council (S.S.R.C.) of

the United States enlisted a panel of scholars to review the role and techniques of propaganda. It is essential to connect the development of interest in propaganda in the social science community with the problems of social control. Indeed, the emerging concept of propaganda was a reflection of the historical period.

It was a period when the conflict between government and business on the one hand and the workers, the poor, the unemployed and immigrants had to be resolved or at least dealt with in some way. The historical period with its set of economic, political and cultural crises produced the conceptual soil that proved fertile for the growth of a technique which would act as a prophylactic to the unrestrained demands on the government by the public. Propaganda as a concept provided the basis for the unity of government and private business stipulating the technique of manipulating symbols and representations.

For Lasswell, propaganda was a vehicle through which modern society performed the "rituals" of socialization, acculturation and education of its citizens.⁶ The democratic propaganda system differed from the totalitarian and

⁶For example, according to Lasswell: "When lords fall out, commoners come into their own. Simultaneously with the fading away of old loyalties, the scale of collective activities has broadened.... propaganda attains eminence as one means of mass mobilization which is cheaper than violence or...other possible control techniques."

traditional societies in Europe in its margin of acceptable dissent and debate allowed by the political system of its participants. But this "margin" of dissent and debate by the democratic system had particular boundaries. For Lasswell the constraints and limitations were as fundamental to the successful functioning of a democratic system as the freedom it offered. The vehicle through which citizens were educated and learned the right questions, their limitations, what democracy was and how not to become a victim of it, would be the dissemination of propaganda.

Lasswell's theory of propaganda which focuses on political development issues is overshadowed by this theory of propaganda dealing with social control. Lasswell preceded his colleagues and students in the modernization school in developing a "crisis" approach to analyzing society. The studies in Political Development sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council school developed 33 years later to analyze communications and propaganda as aspects in persuading newly mobilized groups to "modernize." Lasswell's analysis of society was replete with a series of "crises" (although not as well defined as the S.S.R.C.) which society had to face in order to be propelled into the age of modernization. Among the studies undertaken by the S.S.R.C. was Pyc's

Communication and Political Development (1963)⁷ which asserted that the communications explosion in traditional societies irretrievably thrust old societies into the modern era. Old canons of society were challenged with new values and orientations. The demands of nation-building led to the establishment of new channels of communications. Lerner's (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society⁸ agreed with Pye's assertion. Lerner's study of the Middle East suggested that mass media exposure helped develop a "mobile personality" a person who could be "empathetic" and project himself into another situation, no longer confined to a myopic perception of the world or his place in it.

Lasswell's framework dwells essentially on the task of social control. He proposes a more sophisticated technique of governmental control and censorship; eliciting compliance of the governed with a minimum of overt violence:

...As proposals for action along new lines arise to compete for the moral and physical support of the masses, propaganda attains eminence as the one means of mass mobilization which is cheaper than violence, bribery or other possible control techniques.⁹

⁷Lucien Wilmot Pye, Communication and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1963.

⁸Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society--Modernizing the Middle East Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, England. 1958.

⁹Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "Propaganda,"

The creativity of a propagandist for Lasswell, is tested by his "selection of modes of representing a social object which will accomplish his ends." The propagandist must be able to redefine the value of various symbols so as to produce a high receptivity on the part of its audience. Lasswell, even cites that the role of the propagandist is his ability to manipulate the emotional cradle of society in order to persuade the population to acts against their better judgement. Lasswell writes:

To elicit acts severely condemned in the culture, such as lynching, the problem is to divide each conscious against itself, thus weakening its inhibiting capacity. Emphasis upon the aggressiveness, immorality and impropriety of the "enemy" is a sop which loosens the restraining grip on the conscious upon destructive impulses.¹⁰

The comment loses any academic sterility when considered in the context of the fact that during the year Lasswell wrote this article large numbers of African-Americans were being lynched in the southern part of the United States, and when the film "Birth of a Nation", which depicted the rise of economic and social mobility on the part of African-Americans after the Reconstruction period, sparked an increase in violence against the African-American community.

1934, v.s. p. 524.

¹⁰Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Ibid., "Propaganda," v.s. p. 524.

As mentioned perviously, Lasswell viewed propaqanda as a vehicle of modernization. He realized the importance of integrating many diverse nationalities and political orientations into "an amalgamated" whole if America was to be a stable and coordinated society. The role of propaqanda in attaining "influence" and "power" was central:

propaqanda is surely here to stay; the modern world is peculiarly dependant upon it for the coordination of atomized components in times of crisis and for the conduct of large scale "normal" operations..."propaqanda will in time be viewed with fewer misgivings."¹¹

Lasswell assures those worried about the traditional canons of American democracy that propaqanda is not in contradiction to its philosophy. The practice of propaqanda does allow for apparent flexibility and moral relativism:

(A)t first sight its practice by specialists would appear to clash irreparably with some fundamental canons of a society which calls itself democratic. Such is the theory that the individual is obliged to participate openly and continually in ascertaining the general will and the theory that one who regardless of his private opinion propaqates a view for a client commits a breach of obligation. The propaqandist can show, however, that even a democratic society permits exceptions. exceptions.¹²

Before, however, assuming that Lasswell's respect for the right of the individual overshadows his disposition

¹¹Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Ibid., "Propaqanda," v.s. p. 526.

¹²Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "Propaqanda," p. 526

to accept propaganda as a necessary feature in guiding a democratic society, we should consider Lasswell the behaviorist, who insists on man's basic inability to direct his destiny. He explains:

This regard for men in the mass rests upon no democratic dogmatism about men being the best judges of their own interests. The modern propagandist, like the modern psychologist, recognizes that men are often poor judges of their own interests, flitting from one alternative to the next without solid reason or clinging timorously to the fragments of some mossy rock of ages.¹³

Thus, the task of the propagandist is to discover "symbols" which "facilitate adoption and adaptation" and "elicit" those changes in conduct necessary to bring about adaptation.

The need for propaganda methods sprung from the new circumstances during World War I, from which sprung the need to enlist the imagination and spirit of the country to join the war efforts. Post-war conditions stimulated the need to continue and develop the vehicle of persuasion and manipulation. The process of modernization and nation-building presented the need to solidify all the diverse energies, talent, and labor to continue to develop America's potential. Lasswell, the pragmatist, in true Dewey fashion, decided that propaganda had beneficial consequences,

¹³Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "Propaganda," *Ibid.*, p.527.

therefore, it was "good," Lasswell writes "propaganda as a mere tool is no more moral, or immoral than a pump handle." How easily Lasswell forgot to apply to his study of propaganda the very question he asked in his first book in 1936, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.¹⁴ It is those who control the "pump," their interests, their aspirations and demands which determine societal preferences and beliefs. Bernays (1928:9) called the propagandist "the invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded our tastes formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we never heard of."

E. L. Bernays--The Engineering of Consent

Edward L. Bernays, a psychologist, and nephew of Sigmund Freud, developed a technique and field of study concerned with the manipulation and control of public opinion. He called the approach the "engineering of consent"¹⁵ and christened the new specialty "opinion study." Like Lasswell, Bernays viewed "the engineering of Consent" technique as a modernization vehicle, a technique to

¹⁴Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Meridian Books, New York, New York. 1958.

¹⁵Edward L. Bernays, "The Engineering of Consent," The Annals of the America Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 250, March (1947). p. 113.

facilitate mass socialization and adaption to the status quo.

Bernays defines the term engineering of consent as: "the application of scientific principles and tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programmes."¹⁶ He equates this persuasion technique with the fundamental principles of American democracy, "the engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest."¹⁷ Throughout history governments have practiced influencing their constituents, but the question raised by this issue is one of boundaries; and the access of different sectors to the means by which to disseminate their opinions. If the press and other mass media vehicles of persuasion are controlled by a self serving exclusive minority the issue of freedom of the press and democracy becomes denied to the rest.

The mass expansion of communications in the United States signaled for Bernays the opportunity for professional persuasion technicians to "penetrate" and "expose" every American home to this technique. No matter how "remote or isolated," Bernays wrote, "words hammer (my emphasis)

¹⁶Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent,"
Ibid., p. 114

¹⁷Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent,"
Ibid., p. 114.

continually at the eyes and ears of America..."¹⁸ The penetration, by the engineers of consent" of the public information system was rationalized on the grounds of the need to modernize. Bernays and Lasswell held little confidence in the ability of the masses of people to chart a "successful" development course for America. For example, Lasswell argued that propaganda was a "concession to the rationality of the modern world." He saw writers and reporters as being "drawn into the service of propaganda to amplify a master voice..."¹⁹

Bernays and Lasswell advocated governing by a small intelligentsia clique until the American public was sufficiently "educated" to direct themselves on the road to modernization. The problem is who will define modernization? Bernays implies it will not be the mass public:

(T)he average American adult has only six years of schooling... a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at even a general understanding... (therefore) democratic leaders must play their part in... engineering... consent to socially constructive goals and values.²⁰

¹⁸Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent," Ibid., p.113.

¹⁹Dwaine Marvick, ed. Harold Lasswell, On Political Sociology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1977. p. 127.

²⁰Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent," Ibid., p.114.

The ambiguity concerning a date as to when the people will be "ready" to direct their future becomes even more tenuous when Bernays elaborates:

...in a society of...perfectionist educational standards, equal progress would not be achieved in every field. There would always be time lags, blind spots, and points of weakness; the engineering of consent would still be essential...²¹

So there is no conceptual timetable in which the general public would be capable of controlling their political destinies without the intervention of "specialists." Bernays seems to have contempt and disregard for the majority of American citizens, the same group he ironically addressed in Speak Up For ²² (1940) where he called upon them to be the leaders of the free world!

Alex Carey questions why Bernay's options (totalitarian or engineering of consent):in his framework for the survival of democracy was so myopic, why didn't Bernays consider other frameworks? Bernays never raised doubts as to the desirability or legitimacy of a minority intellectual class's right to hold major influential positions in society. Carey contends: "Bernays (does not) in the long(est) terms, see- or look for-any alternative to

²¹Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent," Ibid., p. 115.

²²Edward L. Bernays, Speak Up For Democracy, The Viking Press, New York, N.Y. 1940.

calculated, "scientific manipulation of majority beliefs and values through the "creation of news" and of images of the world that will conform popular opinion and behaviour to a content judged desirable by a self-designated intellectual and moral elite.²³

Let us turn now to an examination of the Creel Commission, one of the most influential vehicles of mass propaganda operating as an internal organ of the American government during the First World War in which Bernays played a major role.

The Creel Committee and World War I

The Committee on Public Information (Creel Committee) was established at the beginning of world war I. Its purpose was to coordinate "various government agencies and mobilize every known device of persuasion and suggestion to sell our war aims to the American people, who were initially indifferent to the war efforts."²⁴ The American press played an important middleman role in these proceedings, "dissenting voices were stilled, either by

²³Alex Carey, "Edward L. Bernays, The Social Sciences, and the Manipulation of Public Opinion," (Unpublished paper) University of New South Wales, p. 9.

²⁴Edward L. Bernays, "Engineering of Consent," Ibid., p. 115

agreement with the press or by the persuasive actions of the Department of Justice, a formidable body of content result(ed)."²⁵ The Creel Committee was created by executive order and "financed from the \$100,000,000 appropriation granted to the President for the general promotion of the "defense of the country."²⁶ The committee was composed of the Secretary of the Navy and War Departments, the Secretary of State, George Creel and Edward L. Bernays. Lasswell comments that the Creel Committee was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for propaganda in fact, Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home and abroad."²⁷

The committee (the forefather to Bernays public opinion organization) was committed to intensifying the animosity and hostility of the American people toward Germans. An example, of the kind of propaganda work that was distributed was a film entitled: "Once a Hun, always a Hun." It first of all depicts two German soldiers in a ruined town in France. They meet a woman with a baby in her arms, and strike her to the ground." It was the Committee's

²⁵Alex Carey, "Edward L. Bernays", (Unpublished paper), The University of New South Wales, p. 1.

²⁶Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in World War I, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Ma. London, England. 1971. p. 42.

²⁷Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in World War I, Ibid., p-42.

aim to mobilize national hatred by representing the enemy as amoral, aggressive, and "satanic." Lasswell in 1927 wrote about the appropriateness of the press to this situation:

There is no doubt about the superlative qualifications of newspapermen for propaganda work. The stars in the propaganda firmament during World War I were mostly journalists...the the journalists who delivered the goods were not primarily, the editorial writers. They were men, whose primary business was reporting or editing the news. Newspapermen win their bread by telling their tales in terse vivid style. They know how to get over to the average man on the street and to exploit his vocabulary, prejudices and enthusiasms.²⁸

The importance of enlisting and encouraging journalists and editors to join the government information services and the public relations agencies is repeatedly emphasized in the literature. Not everyone supported the activities of the Creel Committee, however, Representative Gillette, disturbed because the Bureau "had not been conducted in a partisan" manner charged:

We must all admit that if any administration has in its power a Bureau of Public Information, as it is called but really an advertising bureau, a propaganda bureau,...to exploit the various acts and departments of the government, it is a very dangerous thing in a republic; because, if used in a partisan spirit or for partisan advantage of the administration, it has tremendous power...²⁹

His warning was not heeded--and the propaganda channels and

²⁸Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in World War I, Ibid., p.31.

²⁹Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in World War I, Ibid., p.14.

organizations had grown in scope and influence by the beginning of World War II.

For Bernays, the "creation" of news was an essential component of the engineering of consent technique. News shaped the attitudes and actions of the people. Thus, it was important to enlist the talents of writers and journalists and editors in their schemes. The development of news was predicated on a thorough knowledge of the problems to be addressed, the composition of the community, its leaders and the sensitive cultural and psychological innuendos of the people. The development and staging of events was one of basic functions of the engineers. All the planning would result in the "words becoming part and parcel of the people themselves." Even if naively, Bernays had claimed that the majority of the American people would benefit through the use of his technique one could rationalize its utilization but Bernays claimed no such exemptions. The engineering of consent was a technique designed and operated by private business, influential groups and a government committee.

The Post-War Period and World War II

The first-war period witnessed the spread of propaganda techniques originally localized in government service to the private sector. It was soon realized that many of the same techniques used during the war to rally support and enlist civilian participation could be utilized to see merchandise and ideas; the private advertising industry was born. Carey recalls that the men who had served on the Creel Committee once returned to "civilian life they applied publicity methods" learned during the war.³⁰ Bernays recounts that businessmen realized that the same methods developed during the course of the war could be "harnessed" to serve their cause. The public utilities, the streets and the railroad were some of the first companies to test propaganda and advertising to engineer public favors and support. The Second World War saw the further development and sophistication of this technique, both by the business community and by different branches of the government.

The propaganda techniques used in the First World War were primitive compared to what had developed by 1942. The press played an important role in communicating the war efforts and articulating its objectives to the public. The

³⁰Alex Carey, "Edward L. Bernays," Ibid., p.2

army conducted and commissioned its psychologist and social scientists to experiment with different kinds of persuasion techniques. The Studies in Social Psychology in World War II³¹ group produced four volumes of work. One effort Volume Three, concentrated on the effects of mass communication newspapers, pamphlets, films on civilian attitudes. The investigation was taken by the Army's Information and Education Division. It should not be surprising to learn that several prominent civilian social scientists were asked to consult, suggest and review the studies. Among the names mentioned are Paul Lazarsfeld, John Dollard, Robert K. Merton and Leonard Doob. The studies according to its authors, comprised a large-scale attempt to utilize modern socio-psychological research techniques in the evaluation of education and indoctrinational "films." The army, during World War II, extensively utilized films and newspapers and other mass communication vehicles for experimental purposes to test the effectiveness of these devices. Thus, with the advent of propaganda in world war I, the utilization of its techniques and methods by the business community in the post-war period, the growth and sophistication of persuasive techniques during and after the Second World War, propaganda

³¹Carl Hovland, et al., The Studies in Social Psychology in World War II--Experiments in Mass Communication Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1949.

was becoming an established fact of American political, economic and social life. It was argued by many in the military and the social science community that political and psychological warfare training had to continue outside of war times among the civilian population. The public had to be "indoctrinated" so as not to risk domestic subversion:

...planning and preparation for strategic propaganda in a future war must begin now. It must concentrate on a realistic exploration of the possibilities of judicious propaganda and its political aims so as to avoid the danger of cynicism, the wastefulness of moralistic chatter, the naive reliance on psychological tricks and over confidence the effects of good news of which material superiority is expected to produce.³²

Extensive training and planning was underway by this time utilizing propaganda techniques aimed not at the Germans (or Huns as the propagandists preferred for them to be called) but at the American people. The American people were effectively sandwiched between private corporations and government interests; propaganda output streaming from diverse sectors of American society.

It is estimated that between 1937 and 1956, the business community spent millions of dollars on propaganda.³³ Danl, writing in 1959 was puzzled to find out

³²Hans Speir, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," in Bernard Berelson, Morris Janowitz, ed. Reader in Public Opinion and Communication Free Press, New York, New York. 1966. pp. 393-394.

³³Alex Carey, "Propaganda in the USA: or from "Truth to "Credibility Gap," (Unpublished paper) University of New

that between the years 1925 and 1954 there was a paucity of literature on the relationship between business and politics. Or more specifically, the lack of concern about the consequences of vast propaganda dissemination and the operation of a democratic system Dahl notes:

...liberal theory tended to take individual preferences for granted preferences were in some sense the ultimate irreducible atom with which the liberal constructed this theory...But the atoms have proved to be reducible after all, to more primitive elements.³⁴

A fundamental issue was raised by Dahl, a question that should have been raised two decades previously by Social Scientists. He questioned the validity of the liberal notion of democracy in an environment of constant propaganda barrage:

How can we estimate the impact of institutional advertising on voters? How much of the generally favorable attitudes of Americans toward business can be attributed to deliberate efforts to manipulate attitudes. Observers differ widely in appraising the extent to which business propaganda has actually influenced attitudes...If one assumes that political preferences are simply plugged into the system by leaders (business or otherwise) in order to abstract what they want from the system, then the model of plebiscitary democracy is substantially equivalent to totalitarian rule.³⁵

South Wales, p. 5A.

³⁴Robert A. Dahl, Mason Haire and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Social Science Research on Business Columbia University, New York, New York. 1959. p. 29.

³⁵Robert A. Dahl, Social Science Research on Business, Ibid., p.37-38.

From 1937 to 1956, according to Dahl, no political scientist found this question of the influence of propaganda and American corporate "relations" and its political significance important enough to merit empirical investigation. Why was there a dearth of information, criticism, and or objection emanating from the social science community in regards to this phenomenon? Carey comments: "It would surely be surprising if the discoveries to be made about business propaganda activities in this period were not at least as remarkable as the unrelenting failure of the entire fraternity of political scientists to pay them an attention whatsoever."³⁶

In the next section, Professor Noam Chomsky investigates the American System of Thought Control and its techniques and implication for American foreign policy. This investigation of the news media takes place thirty-two years after the propaganda studies conducted by Harold Lasswell and Edward L. Bernays.

³⁶Alex Carey, "Propaganda in the USA; or from "Truth" to Credibility Gap," (Unpublished paper,) University of New South Wales. p. 5A.

Noam Chomsky--The Democratic System of Thought Control

The previous sections have covered briefly the tenets of thought by Harold Lasswell and Edward L. Bernays, two advocates of American propaganda. These sections also outlined the historical background in which American propaganda developed and grew in intensity and sophistication during World War I, the post-war period, and World War II. Next, we will investigate Noam Chomsky's propaganda framework of "American Ideological Thought Control."

Chomsky's theoretical framework is concerned with two aspects of propaganda and its use in indoctrinating the American public. First, the role of the "secular priesthood"³⁷ or intelligentsia who rationalize and justify the government's foreign policy adventures and efforts by means of requoting, filtering, and covering up stories, and occasionally fabricating news events. Secondly, the "reconstruction" of American foreign policy and its political and military activities in the post-Vietnam era. The press is selectively interested in reporting certain events while ignoring others, particularly events in

³⁷A term coined by Isaiah Berlin to explain a social role "of the group that speak positively of the institutions and objective of the state and dominant power interests within it in order to hold mobilize public commitment and loyalty."

countries which are considered "friendly" to American political and economic interest. The newspapers bombard the public with stories of Communist atrocities while ignoring right wing, pro-American atrocities in for example, Haiti. These problems, for Chomsky and Herman, give rise to a misguided, misinformed American public and gives the "ruling intelligentsia" a free hand to direct America for its own particular interests.

Chomsky and Herman's After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology Vol. II³⁸ is primarily concerned with the American press' attempt to "reconstruct" the facts, events, and intent of American foreign policy in South East Asia. One of the roles of the modern journalist, Chomsky and Herman feel, is to arouse hostility or sympathy within the American public for America's enemies or friends. This role has not altered drastically since Lasswell or Bernays wrote about "Hun atrocities" to encourage the support of world War I efforts. Chomsky remarks that it is "remarkable to see how susceptible intellectuals have been over the years, to the machinations of the atrocity fabrication industry".

In "The State and the Intellectual," Chomsky argues

³⁸Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Post-war Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology, South End Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 1979.

that the role and purpose of the intelligentsia (in this case journalists) in American society is their ability to produce:

...ideological control. They are, in Gramsci's phrase, "experts in legitimation." They must ensure that beliefs are properly inculcated, beliefs that serve, the interests of those with objective power, based ultimately on control of capital, in the state capitalist societies. The well-bred intelligentsia operate the pump handle conducting mass mobilization in a way that is, as Lasswell observed, cheaper than violence or bribery and much better suited to the images of democracy.³⁹

Debate proceeds within a "narrowly" defined spectrum and there are "presuppositions" which are adhered to religiously by the secular priesthood.

The intelligentsia's role in American society is that of a liason between the government and private business and the public. The journalist's first allegiance is to conform to the "interest" of the corporation he is employed by. These interests dominate the color and tone of the reporting. For instance, there is an incredible consensus among the print media in reporting foreign events:

There is a corresponding tendency to underestimate the significance of self-censorship and the strength of the under-lying factors that make for unified mass media support for foreign policy... Thus, if the dominant interests of a free society call for a policy of foreign aggression, the mass media will voluntarily mobilize the population as

³⁹Noam Chomsky, Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There, Pantheon Books, New York, 1982. p.67.

effectively as under a fully censored system.⁴⁰

The "democratic system of thought control" with its subtleties and passive-aggressive character penetrates the core of American society and persuades the general public that its interests are the same as those of the government and private business.

For Chomsky, the American press presents the range and scope of debatable questions and issues regarding foreign events that are defined by the priorities of the government and private business. One of the unique characteristics of social control in American is that it is operated on a voluntary compliance level. The government does not own the press nor can it force the media to take certain positions to support any of its actions. It is the voluntary recognition of common interests which links the press to the government and other large corporations. As a result of the minimal necessity for the government to resort to violence to inspire acquiescence from the governed, more debate is allowed in American society than in societies with weak institutions.

...The democratic system of thought control is seductive and compelling. The more vigorous the debate, the better... An independent mind must seek to separate itself from official doctrine and from the criticism advanced by its alleged

⁴⁰Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p. 23.

opponents... Any expert in indoctrination will confirm, no doubt, that it is far more effective to contain all possible thought within a framework of tacit assumptions than to try to impose a particular explicit belief with a bludgeon.⁴¹

Thus, for Chomsky, the democratic system of thought control differs from the totalitarian model in its technique of deriving mass compliance. The totalitarian system is a forceful, mechanistic technique which blatantly delivers the government's position; however, the people, while parroting the party line, may think as they wish. On the other hand, under the democratic system of thought control, the limits of thinkable questions and thoughts are defined. To think outside of the "narrowly" defined boundaries is to be castigated and isolated from the society.

The African-American experience is rich with examples of conventional leaders being castigated by the press for what they think and articulate; categorized as militant, fanatic, or mentally ill; then summarily dismissed. El Hajj Malik El Shabazz (better known as Malcolm X), the brilliant, articulate spokesman for a significant sector of the African-American community is only one such example. As a leader, Mr. Shabazz was constantly misquoted and misrepresented.⁴² There was an attempt to

⁴¹Noam Chomsky, " Towards A New Cold War, Ibid., p. 81.

⁴²Malcolm X, Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Grove Press, New York, New York. 1966. p. 238.

isolate Shabazz from the African-American community and the world community at large. In part, this isolation and misunderstanding of his ideology created a climate of fear and hostility which played no small part in preparing the milieu for his violent and brutal assassination. The relatively small reaction to his assassination was due in part to the manner in which the press reported the event. In the Shabazz example, the press played an extremely important role as a political force which actually shielded the political system by censoring and distorting a potentially dynamic opposition to American racism and its systemic base. The press also limited the spectrum of debatable issues and questions by "covering up" and filtering Mr. Shabazz's denunciations of the treatment of African-Americans by the American government. The press probably played a large part in creating the early satanic image of these organizations.

The scarcity (or non-existence) of recognized dissent within the intelligentsia, Chomsky notes, has created a climate of ideological uniformity and homogeneity. For example, America does not have a nationally known opponent of the free enterprise system contributing to any of the leading newspapers, journals, or magazines. During the war in Vietnam and its aftermath, the press engaged in wholesale "reconstruction" of the role American played as an interventionist country. With the exposure of biased,

distorted, and fabricated press reporting on Vietnam, the press, according to Chomsky, has had to re-legitimize itself as an objective bystander. It was badly "bruised" by the Vietnam experience because for the most part it compliantly accepted the government's version of what was taking place in Vietnam. In Language and Responsibility (1977) Chomsky observes:

It is notable that despite the extensive and well-known record of government lies during the period of the Vietnam war, the press, with fair consistency, remained remarkably obedient and quite willing to accept the government's assumptions, framework of thinking, and interpretations of what was happening.⁴³

For example, Chomsky continues:

...Take the peace treaty negotiations, revealed by Hanoi radio in October, 1972, right before the November presidential elections. When Kissinger appeared on television to say that "peace is at hand." The press dutifully presented his version of what was happening, though even a cursory analysis of his comments showed that he was rejecting the basic principles of the negotiations on every crucial point, so that further escalation of the American war--as in fact took place with the Christmas bombings, was inevitable.⁴⁴

The same indiscriminate reporting of the government's positions took place January, 1973, when Kissinger and the White House announced the peace treaty. The White House and Kissinger clearly indicated that they were rejecting the

⁴³Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility, translated by John Viertel, Pantheon Books, New York, N.Y. 1977. p. 10.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 10.

basic principles of the treaty, so that continued "war was inevitable...the press dutifully accepted the official version...even allowed some falsehoods to stand unchallenged."

The press has a tendency to "pick up" stories which conform to the image of American policy and what the American people have been "indoctrinated" to believe. Stories of communist atrocity, African savagery and political incompetence, and poverty in Third World countries are common themes in American reporting of foreign events. Critical analysis of events in the press is quite meager. Right-wing, pro-American governments (Haiti, Indonesia, the pre-revolutionary Iran) hardly get negative coverage in the newspapers. In The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism--Volume I by Chomsky and Herman, they observe:

People are dying today throughout Indo-China from starvation, disease, and unexploded ordinance that are one small part of the legacy of the U.S. war, but the new advocates of human rights seem to have little concern. There is not a whisper of protest in the press when the president states that we owe the people of Vietnam no debt and have no responsibility to rebuild what we have destroyed because the "destruction was mutual."⁴⁵

This outrageous statement was not met with astonishment or outrage by the press; it was barely emphasized.

The press' failure to criticize the President's

⁴⁵Noam Chomsky, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, Ibid., p.33

statement is quite illuminating when the facts that were at their disposal are considered. The American bombing of Vietnam took place over a period of seven years. According to Littauer and Uphoff (71), from "1965, ...to the end of 1971, the United States dropped 6,300,000 tons of bombs and other aerial munitions on Indochina." The Indochina region is only the size of Texas, yet the United States dropped three times the total tonnage of bombs that had been dropped on Europe, Africa, and Asia during World War II. "In the spring of 1972, the bombs were still falling on Indochina at the rate of about 55,000 tons a month..."* The human devastation can, of course, never be measured, but, for an American president to claim that the destruction was mutual and for the press to acquiesce was inexcusable.

A dialectical relationship exists between the press and government. At some points the press and government interest's converge; at other points, their interests conflict. The general trend in reporting government policy pronouncements or statements concerning foreign events has been a non-critical posture, in order to avoid offending those influential interests:

The mass media find it in their self-interest to portray government actions in a favorable light. On foreign affairs the government and business interests are major sources of news; and if their

*Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, The Air War in Indochina Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 1972. p. 1.

policies and interests are such that the daily murder of dissidents in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala is not only irrelevant but tends to discredit "friendly" regimes, they will not supply such information to the media and will even regard any featuring of such facts as offensive and contrary to the "national interest."⁴⁷

Chomsky and Herman implicate three general principles of the "free press" which aid in the indoctrination of the American public about foreign policy. Summarized they are: "...first...the averting of the eyes (of the public) from benign or constructive terror,...sympathetic understanding for the difficult problems faced by the ...elites backed by the United States." Second, "the intense and dedicated search for nefarious terror, which can be brought into focus without giving offense to any important groups..." Thirdly, the Free Press "...employs..." agent transference. "(T)hat is, the critical role of the United States in maintaining internecine conflict..."⁴⁸ An example of "agent transference" is the shifting of blame for the overwhelming destruction of Indochina to the Saigon government that took power in 1975 instead of the encounter with American military might.

⁴⁷Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and the Third World Fascism, Ibid., p.77.

⁴⁸Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman After the Cataclysm:
 1 Ibid., p. 55.

One of the subtle techniques of American propaganda is the shielding of certain stories from the public's knowledge. Certain issues and stories which drastically conflict with American government or business interests are never reported.

Literature Review--Newspapers as Propaganda Vehicles

The concept of the news media as a vehicle of propaganda for various interests is not a novel one. In Propaganda (1935),⁴⁹ Leonard Doob writes that it should not be surprising that "Americans are subjected to propaganda."⁵⁰ The emphasis on private industry, consumerism, guiding the public opinion, and generating support during and after wars make propaganda an indispensable tool. Like Lasswell, Doob insisted that propaganda was an important instrument of a modernizing society, a vehicle through which the modernizing elites could transform backward elements and attitudes on ones more appropriate for development. Doob used strong language in considering newspapers as vehicles of propaganda and declares, "Both fools and wise men know that the newspaper

⁴⁹Leonard William Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Techniques (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1935).

⁵⁰Leonard Doob, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Techniques, Ibid., p. 3.

with the possible exception of the radio in its present stage of development, is the most important vehicle of propaganda in modern life."⁵¹ Communications makes possible a common consensus among diverse social groupings which eventually gives them not only the character of an integrated society, but of a cultural entity as well.

Doob saw newspapers "as agents which try to influence the cultural setting through the use of propaganda."⁵² Bias and distorted reporting, however, were not seen as an inherent structural feature of news reporting, but attributed by Doob to the "peculiarities" of individual journalists. Shifting the blame for bias and distorted reporting to the journalist does not explain, however, why a journalist would persuade an audience to agree or disagree with certain positions which do not promise the journalist economic or political gain. Nor does his argument explain why journalists do not expose and resent on purely professional grounds the use of newspapers as vehicles of self-interested persuasion.

But whether the problem is due to structural inadequacies or individual failing, for Doob, newspapers have played an important role in American politics. Doob

⁵¹Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Techniques, Ibid., p. 333.

⁵²Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda, Ibid., p. 333.

points out that "the part the "yellow" press played in helping to bring on the Spanish-American War, for example, is now well known."⁵³ Newspapers, comments Doob, "furnish one of the explanations why people are so enthusiastic about many aspects of their society: the newspapers they read scarcely give them any alternative."⁵⁴ In this regard, Doob is commenting on the power of newspapers to act as agents of stability and uniformity in American society, which is an ability second only to the military's ability. Claus Mueller (1979) writes that political legitimacy is largely due to a supportive press. Mueller argues that all political systems must be seen as legitimate by the public if they are to rule non-militarily. Thus, the "public must be persuaded to voluntarily accept the claims to legitimacy by the power structure...If no legitimating rationales come into being, voluntary submission to political authority cannot be taken for granted and the use of force becomes necessary to insure some semblance of stability."⁵⁵ Daniel Bell (1955) posits that the "revolutions in transport and communication has brought men into closer contact with each

⁵³Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda, Ibid., pp. 336-337.

⁵⁴Leonard Doob, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Techniques, Ibid., p. 358.

⁵⁵Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication--A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization and Legitimation, Oxford University Press, New York, New York. 1973. p. 180.

other" and dulled the once sharp class stratification, and a new age of "mass society" had been ushered in.⁵⁶ Schiller disagrees with Bell's homogeneous conception of society and argues that it is still the elites who attempt to control and manipulate the attitudes and tastes of the majority. The press, in this regard, acts on behalf of the elite class. For Schiller, "the images and messages...with few exceptions (are) constructed to achieve similar objectives, which are, simply put, profitability and the affirmation and maintenance of the private ownership consumer society."⁵⁷ Ickes (1939), on the other hand, criticizes the press for not using more of its influence and leverage. Ickes would like the press to confront the problems Schiller raises and take more powerful stands. Thus, he comments: "We suffer from editorial inactivity and mental indolence. The press does not lack courage, but in many quarters it has grown rusty with disuse."⁵⁸

Alex Carey (1970) views the utilization of propaganda by the press and other agencies as inimical to

⁵⁶Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology--On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas on the Fifties Free Press, New York, New York. 1965. p. 21.

⁵⁷Herbert I. Schiller, The Mind Managers Beacon Press, Boston, Mass. 1973. pp. 2-22.

⁵⁸Harold L. Ickes, America's House of Lords Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, New York. 1939. p. 180.

democracy and modernization. Carey views democratic propaganda as a euphemism for lies and deceptions which lead to social and ideological control of the population by Schiller's "Mind Managers." Carey proposes that American propaganda protects the class privileges of the few and anesthetizes the demands of the many for more social benefits. Carey writes:

It is an axiom of conventional wisdom that the use of propaganda as a means of social and ideological control is distinctive of, if not peculiar to, totalitarian regimes. The most minimal exercise of common sense would, on the contrary, suggest that propaganda is likely to play at least as important a part in democratic societies where the existing distribution of power and privilege is vulnerable to quite limited changes in popular opinion--as under authoritarian regimes--where it is not. That the agencies of propaganda in affluent democratic societies have persuaded us for so long to eschew common sense in this connection is itself not an insignificant propaganda achievement.⁵⁹

In 1960 Daniel Boorstin, a historian, wrote a book entitled The Image: Or What Happened to the American Dream⁶⁰ Boorstin was concerned about the development of advertising and propaganda in American society. Boorstin was concerned with the "shift" from ideals to Images⁶¹ in American

⁵⁹Alex Carey, "The Decline of American Democracy" (Unpublished Paper), University of New South Wales, p. 1.

⁶⁰Daniel Boorstin, The Image: Or What Happened to the American Dream Atheneum Press, New York, New York. 1962.

⁶¹Daniel Boorstin, The Image or What Happened to the American Dream, Ibid.

society. The corporate image, Boorstin writes "...is, of course, the most elaborately and expensively contrived of the images of our age... (we) have underestimated the effect of the rise of advertisement (propaganda). We think it has meant an increase of untruthfulness. In fact, it has meant a reshaping of our very concept of truth."⁶² Boorstin was concerned with intellectual legacy of John Dewey and William James, the evangelists of "pragmatism." Boorstin argues that American preoccupation with "images" had distorted their perception of the world. He warns:

Now in the height of our power. we are threatened by a new and peculiarly American menace... It is the menace of unreality...the danger of replacing American dreams by American illusions of replacing the ideals by the images...We risk becoming the first people in history to have been able to make their illusions so vivid, so persuasive, so "realistic" that they can live in them. We are certainly the most illusioned people on earth. Yet we dare not become disillusioned because our illusions are the very house in which we live; they are news, our heroes...are very experiences.⁶³

The American preoccupation with "images" and "ideals" was characterized by Bertrand Russell, in a critique of Dewey and James, as a "certain kind of madness"⁶⁴ which he predicted would lead to inevitable

⁶²Daniel Boorstin The Image, Ibid., p.184.

⁶³Daniel Boorstin, The Image or What Happened to the American Dream, Ibid., p. 240.

⁶⁴Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, Simon Schuster, New York, New York. 1945. p.828.

social disaster for Western society.

Chomsky (1979), like Russell, Carey, and Schiller, views American preoccupation with "images" as leading to foreign policy misdirection and failure. Chomsky's investigation of the press's efforts to rewrite and "cover up" the events which led up to the war and its aftermath recalls that one: "device is to plant stories (news) in the foreign press, to be picked up by writing... journalist and others. The C.I.A. recognized long ago that foreign correspondents are particularly susceptible to such deceptions since they so often tend to rely on local contacts for their "insight." Chomsky relays the story of Joseph Smith (Portrait of a Cold Warrior), former C.I.A. agent in Vietnam, who describes how "he enlisted local newsmen in Singapore to file a fake story." He recounts "one of the contributions of this subordinate was to file a fake story, attributed to British defense official, reporting that the Chinese were sending troops and supplies to the Viet Minh just prior to the 1954 Geneva Conference; the purpose was to undermine the conception of the Viet Minh "as purely indigenous Vietnamese group of national patriots" by identifying them "with the world Communist movement." Thus, Smith explains, other C.I.A. stations were alerted "to have their press assets ready to pick (the story) up and make sure (it) was used in as many newspapers as

possible."⁶⁵

A tragic example of the misuse of propaganda using people as its pawns occurred during the Vietnam war, argues Chomsky, during the "Operation Babylift" the project tended to heighten sympathy for the American position by airlifting hundred of Vietnamese children for adoption by Americans. This "operation" would have the effect of enlisting hundreds of non-involved Americans in the war efforts as well as showing American benevolence on an international scale. The price for propaganda can be extraordinarily high, particularly for its victims, Chomsky writes.

"Operation Babylift" in a sense was a "fraud from the start," in which children who had been languishing for years in Saigon's orphanages "were, in effect, kidnapped and flown out of the country to the U.S., as expressed by Ambassador Martin, "that the spectacle of hundreds of Vietnamese babies being taken under the American wing would generate sympathy for the South Vietnamese cause around the world." Not all of them make it; over 200 were killed in the crash of a C-5 air transport.⁶⁶

The American propaganda system as a modern phenomenon is instrumental in the function of the political system; the vehicle through which this propaganda is often

⁶⁵Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, Simon Schuster, New York, New York. 1945. see also: Noam Chomsky, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology, South End Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 1979. p. 27.

⁶⁶Noam Chomsky, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology, Ibid., p. 29.

transmitted is the newspaper industry. Let us now turn our attention to the newspaper industry and examine some of its characteristics.

The Newspaper Industry--A Vehicle of Propaganda

It has been argued in this study, that the newspaper industry and other mass communications vehicles played an important role in persuading the public to various positions that were in either the interest of the government or private corporations. In the United States, the press is assumed to be an independent observer of events, a neutral bystander, however, as a privately-owned enterprise, the press is subject to the pressing demands of the marketplace, namely profit and the internal interests of its owners. The press was seen by the government and private industry as a body of sensitive "nerves" located throughout the society. It was also a "legitimizing" vehicle in which old and new groups, organizations, and government committees could have their opinions dispersed and enunciated without fear of being charged with selfish motives. Lasswell's analysis of the propagandists in this regard was that he "is like a wolf in sheep's clothing."

The supreme dependence by the press on its financial backing and its ability to make profit is key to any analysis of how "objective" or "interest-free" the American

press can claim to be. Coupled with the need for the government to utilize instruments of mass communications to pronounce its policies and maintain a legitimized status in the society, makes the ability of the press to report the facts responsibly difficult. Ben Bagdikian's study funded by the Rand Corporation voiced serious concerns in regard to the "social consequences" of this type of "free press." He observed:

There will be profound social consequences to the choices made in the news media. Involved are such things as the possible deepening of the cultural isolation of portions of the American population, if the new efficiency of mass media are available on strictly class lines; and invasion of personal privacy on a scale unknown to the most efficient police states of the past, in the creation of automatic accumulation of computerized data banks on every aspect of private lives available not only to government authorities but also to malicious or selfish private parties.⁶⁷

An indication of the scale and scope of the news corporation is given by Bagdikian, he notes that the newspaper publication industry "is the fifth-largest U.S. manufacturing industry in employment (360,000), tenth largest in value of shipments (\$6 billion), and is one of the ten fastest-growing industries in the country."⁶⁸ The

⁶⁷Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy and Other Crimes by the Press Harper and Row, New York, New York. 1972. p. 116.

⁶⁸Ben Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy and Other Crimes by the Press, Harper and Row, New York, New York. 1976. p. 116.

newspaper industry is a major chapter in the economic life of American society.

The owners of the major influential newspapers private entrepreneurial interests are intertwined with the upper class of American society: more than the people who patronize and are asked to have confidence in their product. Newspaper ownership in America is one of the few inherited industries left from the pre-World War II era. Two of the most prestigious and influential newspapers in America The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, Bagdikian reports, although parts of publicly held corporations are formally run by descendants of their founder.

It is doubtful that these individuals could or would separate the operation of news from the class interests they represent. They would be in essence committing a form of "class suicide" to do so.⁶⁹ The news media is one of the agencies which is responsible for creating the images and illusions of American economic, political, and cultural life. It is through the news media that the majority of the public come to aspire and internalize middle-class and, indeed, upper class values and material acquisitions. The public is "educated" to relate and feel more allegiance to

⁶⁹Amilcar Cabral Return to the Sources: Selected Speeches by Amilcar Cabral, Monthly Review Press, New York, New York. 1973. also see: Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts Monthly Review Press, New York, New York. 1969.

the members of the upper class than fraternity within their own economic sphere. The major news industries are fundamentally a monopoly composed of the wealthiest families. Entering entrepreneurs, if not defeated by the competition from the major publications would certainly face a tremendous financial burden.

Alan Barth (1947) stated:

...the investment requisite for a new publication has become so prohibitive that only millionaires need apply. Anyone who wants to start a new paper in a community with a trading population between 100,000 and 250,000 must have at least a million dollars available. If he aims to publish in a larger city, with a trading area population between a quarter-million, his investment is likely to run as high as two and a half million dollars...⁷⁰

This was the economic situation in 1947!

Henry Luce, the founder of Time-Life Inc. speaking before the American Association of Advertising Agencies, articulating his business philosophy as follows: Yours is the only court in the land to which I hold myself accountable, my only law is the concordat between advertisers. The strict adherence to business principles over the need of the public to be well informed should not be down-played. Peter Hamilton, a member of the Wall Street Journal Corporation, summed up the credo of the newspaper

⁷⁰Alan Barth, "Positions of the Press in a Free Society," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 250, March (1945), pp. 84-85.

industry by stating: " A newspaper is a private industry owing nothing whatever to the public... It is emphatically the property of the owner, who is selling a manufactured product at his own risk." The engineering of consent or public relations-advertising men were not naive to the utilization of newspapers for the benefit of their clients and class interests. As businessmen, both the newspaper owners and public relations industries realized that the growth of both of their respective industries depended on harmonious cooperation and mutual protection from intruders and critics. It was an unholy alliance, which left the public gullible to support private business, government interests, biased reporting, and misinformation.

Walter Cronkite, the influential CBS anchorman, once described the "relationship between newsmen and business leaders as "symbiotic." For Cronkite, the survival of newspapers and other print media agencies depends on the advertising revenues that business provides. Alternatively, business depends on journalism to broadcast vital advertising information thus stimulating profit-making. Chomsky points out that: this "symbiotic" relation fosters a media that will not focus "on matters which business does not want to discuss, for example, wage rates and labor conditions in the Dominican Republic or the use of police torture in states offering excellent opportunities to United

States business."⁷¹

The bureaucracy of the newspaper alone, presents a number of substantial difficulties in regards to unbiased and undistorted reporting of events. The bureaucracy can be likened to a funnel through which news is sifted. The questions not asked, the emphasis on certain news stories and not others, editorial preferences which are passed down to the reporters and stories that never go to the press are just as important an indication of the quality of news reporting as the events that reach the public. Baqdikian contends that the managing editor (sometimes referred to as the gatekeeper) acts as the decision maker. The gatekeeper decides which articles are to be printed. This process relays a definite signal to the reporters in the system as to "which stories in the future are likely to get printed and which ones it is pointless from them to report."⁷²

For the reporters in this system who want to practice their trade with an established newspaper or journal, these signals become redefined as his or hers passport to success or failure. The dilemma for the non-conformist reporter is one that leads to either conformity

⁷¹Noam Chomsky, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 1979. p. 76.

⁷²Ben Baqdikian, The Information Machine, Harper and Row, New York, New York. 1971.

or dismissal from the major news institutions. The space for news stories is "allocated only after it has been calculated how much space advertisement will occupy." The other "gatekeeper" within the corporation according to Bagdikian who holds an important position is the advertising editor. The advertising editor "determines total pages to be printed and only after this does news receive its allocation."⁷³ If one were to make a composite picture of the news bureaucracy or hierarchy, it would show the lowly position of the journalist, the professionals responsible for articulating and describing the outside world to the public.

Doob's work on Propaganda was also concerned with the newspaper bureaucracy. First, his work surfaced the dependency of newspapers upon news agencies. Secondly, Doob discovered that the "news agencies tended to reproduce the prejudices of their members or their owners... directly or indirectly..." and finally, he found that even a so-called "objective" treatment of news...reflected an attitude...(S)uch news is only a partial presentation of the "truth" and hence propaganda in some form." Travelling down the bureaucratic trail, Doob found further sources of possible distortion and mismanagement of news stories. Once

⁷³Ibid., p. 90.

domestic or foreign news reached the newspaper's office, it had to pass through the "rewrite" man and through the city editor both of whom, therefore, represented two additional and potential sources of distortion. Any item, Doob found, would also have to conform to the paper's policy..."⁷⁴

Before the news reaches the public domain, it has undergone political, economic and bureaucratic alterations. The metamorphosis, often are so drastic that the news has been irretrievably swollen and/or disfigured beyond recognition. The implications of this type of news for public consumption or for the public to influence foreign policy is one of the important issues that must be addressed in the 1980's.

⁷⁴Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Techniques, Holt and Company, New York, New York. 1935. p. 336.

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CHAPTER 2

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This chapter is an explication and justification of my methodology; it discusses the data base and the analytical scheme upon which the main analysis in the thesis relies. Chapter II provides definitional and analytic guidance for the subsequent chapters.

Section I presents the major hypotheses tested in this investigation. It discusses two types of distortions in American press coverage of African events -- distortion of characterization and distortion of appreciation.

Section II explores the usefulness of a content analysis approach in making "inferences" about newspaper coverage. Part A of this section explains the theme approach and provides a descriptive analysis of recurring topics highlighted in the American press. It also describes how a baseline historical account is to be constructed in order to contrast and compare press accounts. Part B of Section II examines the use

of the "crisis" approach in American press coverage of African affairs.

Section III isolates the "prestige" press as particularly relevant for understanding both the interactions of the U.S. press and U.S. policymakers as well as its influence on the African political elite who read the U.S. press for an understanding of American perceptions and of major trends and themes in American reporting.

Section IV is a discussion of the use I will make of perception-distortion analysis and the usefulness of this concept to understanding cross-cultural relations and the effects of culture and social climate on American reporting from overseas.

Section V describes the interviewing method; the interviews aid in understanding both the reporter -- input and policymakers' response -- output of news reporting. The interviews are useful, as well, in assessing the mechanics of news production and the possible existence of news management censorship.

Section VI elaborates on the categories analyzed by the content analysis approach. Section VII discusses the accuracy of American press coverage of the event as judge by deviation from a reconstructed-approximation of the event. The concluding notes of Section VII summarizes this chapter on methodology.

Section I -- Hypothesis Presentation

An examination of prestigious press coverage of the assassination of Steve Biko, the character and role of Robert Mugabe immediately before and after the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, and the conduct of the Angolan Civil War, indicates something important about how the American prestigious press functions in "crisis" situations when significant American corporate and governmental interests are involved. Can we depend on the press to give a fair account of such events? Did the American press adequately and accurately report the events of societies challenging internal and Western interests? More fundamentally, did the American press question the right of Western nations to intervene in African affairs? A study of the three cases will point out the major trends and themes in American press reports on crises in Africa that are important to future diplomatic relations with Africa and the Third World. My hypotheses are that:

- A. When reporting African political crises, the American press tends to function as a propaganda vehicle and quite often disseminates distorted, filtered versions of news that favors an interpretation of American interests from cold war and business perspectives.

- B. Perception-distortions frequently are transmitted through American newspapers.
- C. Inaccurate reporting by the American press may be affected by circumstantial factors such as the assignment of an inexperienced reporter to the African desk, or the lack of sufficient finances adequately to perform the research.

The significance of confirmation of these hypotheses would be to indicate that the American prestigious press contributes to the political isolation of America and distrust of it on the part of African countries because of perception-distortion of African affairs appearing in the American prestige print media. These distortions are likely to affect the views of the American public, its policymakers and African policymakers on African policy issues.

I will identify two types of distortions in American press coverage--1) distortions of characterization, and 2) distortions of appreciation:

1) Distortion of Characterization -- unbalanced and incomplete reporting in the American press. This element of the analysis is concerned with inaccuracies, omissions and material incorrectly presented as facts, which might result from undue reliance for information on official American-European sources and favor the objectives of these sources. Characterizations perceived through Western eyes only (without consulting African sources) are likely to be left

unchallenged.

Distortion of Appreciation can result from an inability to understand the significance of the event from the perspective of those involved in it. To appreciate an event to report fairly, a reporter must be sympathetic and knowledgeable about the details and reasons behind a confrontation for both sides involved in it. For example, when a correspondent reporting on the human death toll in the Shaba province in Zaire takes note only of the European death toll, it is safe to declare that he does not understand or appreciate the fact that excluding the African death count not only contributes to inaccuracy, but has an emotional impact as well. American readers are led to believe either that there were only European casualties or that only European deaths are significant. Consequently, the understanding and appreciation of the event is distorted.

The following methods test whether African claims that the American press filters and negatively colors crises is accurate:

- 1) Theme content analysis of four prestigious newspapers the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor,
- 2) Interviews with newspaper reporters and editors from

these major news industries.

- 3) A Constructed approximation of events used to compare and contrast with newspaper accounts. (see chart)

This method will be applied to article about the three case studies:

- a. The assassination of Steve Biko
- b. The Cuban Involvement in Angola
- c. The American Media's image of Mugabe

Section II - A Content Analysis Approach: Terminological Explorations

There are a number of definitions for content analysis in social science literature. H. Lasswell, N. Leites⁷⁵ and P. Stone⁷⁶ provide the definitional framework for this investigation of "American Prestigious Newspapers Coverage of African Political Events" Investigation. Lasswell defines the notion of content analysis as:

a precise means of describing the contents of any sort of communications -- newspapers, radio programs, films, everyday conversations, verbalized free associations, classifying the signs occurring in a communication into a set of

⁷⁵Harold D. Lasswell and Nathan Leites, Studies in Quantitative Semantics Language of Politics, (Cambridge, Mass. M.I.T. Press, 1949).

⁷⁶Philip Stone, et. al., The General Inquirer, A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, (Cambridge, Mass. M.I.T. Press, 1966).

appropriate categories. The results state the frequency of occurrences of signs for each category in the classification scheme.⁷⁷

Stone asserts that content analysis assists the social scientist in "making inferences" since "what is measured in content analysis depends on the theory being investigated."⁷⁸ When themes, symbols and words in any given category are reiterated continuously, a social scientist can use content analysis to make inferences about a topic's significance for particular groups, organizations, or individuals.⁷⁹

Part A Content Analysis: Quantitative and Qualitative.

This study will focus on identifying recurring themes in the selected case studies of the images of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the assassination of Steve Biko, and the Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War. One significant variable on the quantitative side is the frequency with which certain categories or themes appear. The theme content analysis approach is an attempt to identify certain attitudes, policies, positions, perceptions and images in

⁷⁷Lasswell, Leites, Language of Politics, p. 55.

⁷⁸Stone, The General Inquirer, p. 14,.

⁷⁹Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), p. 304.

the newspaper reporting of our cases. Stone, in the General Inquirer, indicates that: "In looking at themes in a set of documents, the political scientist is likely, for example, to ask, who sees which group as being aggressive toward which other groups?"⁸⁰ A second kind of question concerns attitudes held toward certain "political symbols, treaties, political programs, or countries. Are the symbols regarded positively or negatively? Are they seen as important or inconsequential?"⁸¹ Stone's approach provides a useful conceptual framework of theme content analysis for this study. The specific theme categories I use are presented briefly in Section VI and in greater detail in Section VI.

The qualitative aspect of our examination will focus on developing a baseline account of generally acknowledged facts about these historical events in order to make a comparison to press reports. This baseline account, called a constructed-approximation, is derived from historical, judicial, bibliographic records and government documents. Throughout my analysis of the patterns of theme representation in the content analysis of the articles I will compare the constructed-approximation to the account given in newsclippings of the events; data from my interviews of reporters help assess the accuracy of news

⁸⁰Stone, General Inquirer, p. 36.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 36.

coverage of the case studies, the meaning the reporters gave to certain facts, and their possible motives.

The combined use of the constructed-approximation of the events and a quantitative theme content analysis approach will facilitate a clear demarcation of patterns of reporting.

Part B Case Context - Crisis

The case-studies that will be examined focus on political crises where prestigious American newspapers are called upon to report crucial episodes in the lives of African nations. Some African leaders have complained that Western coverage of African events is "crisis-oriented." The American press frequently responds that the high cost of financing bureaus in foreign countries and the difficulties of supporting correspondents and their dependents overseas often forces American coverage of foreign news to be crisis-oriented. Journalists and communication researchers generally agree that "news" is "what is interesting or new" to the American public.⁸² Gitlin's definition of "news-worthy" introduces an even more controversial argument:

To begin with, reporters are rarely expert on the subject at hand. In the networks, vast parts of the country may be assigned to a bureau of three

⁸²Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, p. 268.

or four correspondents. On short notice from an assignment editor or a producer, a correspondent may have to fly into a city he or she has never seen before, film a story, and fly out the next morning to edit a piece for broadcast that night ... But even at the larger and more prestigious newspapers, daily deadlines, budgetary limits, and the unspecified quality of "news" combine to drop reporters into situations where information is abundant and understanding is scarce. Automatically, reporters are going to take their cues from their peers, from respected colleagues among the competition.⁸³

Gitlin further points out that it is during crisis episodes that "large scale" changes in policy are carried out within both the news media and the American political area. Where policy has previously not been defined, media and policymakers highlight deficiencies and assess how viable policy positions can be developed. Holsti defines a crisis as a "point of time when it is decided whether an affair or course will continue or be modified or reach a termination point..."⁸⁴ For Holsti, content analysis of crisis events aids the "systematic and comparative investigation ... in history [to] provide clues to the paths that lead to war, and [to] suggest alternatives to large scale violence as a mode of conflict. During political crises, according to Bagdikian,⁸⁵ the media relays "news to

⁸³Gitlin, *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸⁴Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, et. al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications For the Study of International Crisis. (Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1963). p. 4.

elites and protestors, rulers and ruled, all at once."

A crisis approach to American coverage of African political events is based on a journalistic paradigm of what constitutes news and of what is the Realpolitik of post-independent African policies. The choice of crisis oriented reporting is appropriate as an analysis of how the prestigious press perceives and reports African political events that could affect fundamental U.S. interests in foreign relations.

American Perceptions of African Crisis Events

I have selected three case studies through which to examine how the American prestigious press covers and perceives crisis events in Africa: the assassination of Steve Biko, the Cuban intervention in the Angolan Civil War, and the images of Robert Mugabe before and after the election in Zimbabwe. These three cases concern societies caught in the throes of political and economic change against internal as well as external interests. These events are unique because they represent three distinct crises in modern African political life and consequently demonstrate whether the American press transmits perception-distortions or accurate news coverage. I chose two of the

⁸⁵Ben Bagdikian, The Information Machine, (New York, Harper, Row, 1971), p. 1.

three cases because they represent episodes in which African elites have accused American foreign policy initiatives of being sympathetic to minority political leaders and configurations in opposition to mass-based political organizations.

For example, when discussing the Zimbabwean case, several reporters from the New York Times and Christian Science Monitor indicated that the American media was inclined to support the interim government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Mugabe was considered too radical and anti-West in his political orientation. June Goodwin of the Christian Science Monitor admitted that the anti-Mugabe predisposition was partially due to U.S. government officials' negative attitude towards Mugabe.⁸⁶ The Zimbabwean people, on the other hand, selected Mugabe in a plebiscite by an overwhelming majority.

In the Angolan case study, the United States supported Savimbi and the UNITA forces. The U.S. supplied financial support and intelligence forces to aid UNITA. But despite the support of the U.S., South Africa, Zambia, Zaire, and China for UNITA and FNLA, Augusto Neto of the MPLA became the first Prime Minister of independent Angola.

Repeated U.S. foreign policy miscalculations could

⁸⁶Personal interview with June Goodwin of the Christian Science Monitor, New York, New York, 1980.

endanger American credibility. Support of elite-based organizations has damaged the "image" of America as a moral leader, a champion of "human rights" and an advocate of African economic and political development. Such miscalculations could heighten U.S. political isolation and aggravate the already sensitive African-American relations. This also has serious implications for the Third World: other countries monitoring U. S. policy towards Africa might extrapolate that a pattern of miscalculations could be applied to them in similar political crises.

American actions in both the Angolan and Zimbabwean instances were unfortunate and politically premature. American officials assumed that once Neto and Mugabe became Prime Ministers they would be hostile to America and American business interests. This assumption, thus far, has been unsubstantiated. In fact, in Zimbabwe quite the opposite is true. Mugabe has reassured the West that its business interests are not endangered and has openly courted American and other western countries for foreign aid arrangements. On September 13, 1980, the Economist (in an editorial entitled "Give him his bread") wrote:⁸⁷

Is the West going to squander its most signal advance in modern southern Africa -- an advance achieved in the first place only by luck, by Marxist Mr. Robert Mugabe and by three unlikely

⁸⁷"Give him his bread", The Economist, September 13, 1980, editorial, p. 13.

British peers, Lords Carrington, Harlech and Soames? Yes, it will squander that achievement in Zimbabwe, won almost without a single western bullet being fired, if rich democratic countries go on acting as though they are poor... Mr. Mugabe himself still seems bravely intent on keeping baggage brought in by his ideologues and gunmen locked up, while trying to turn the key for Western aid and foreign investment in his country. His government has formally declared itself in favour of "a mixed economy, with state enterprise and private enterprise co-existing in harmony... We are pragmatists. We have seen --and we have learned from-- the mistakes of others. The application of our socialism will be pragmatic and mild." ... All this seems undeserved good fortune for the West, and it is far from secure ... The West's failure, if it happens, will not be the scale of this year's aid. It will be the sowing of damaging doubts whether Mr. Mugabe is going to get his bread next year and the year after that. For special Zimbabwean reasons, the commitments for that future aid needs to be given very soon if Zimbabwe is to remain a bastion in southern Africa worth giving aid to.

Considering the Western position before the election, Mugabe's inclination and policy to continue commercial and political relations with the Western world is--as the Economist article implies--both "lucky and undeserved." Mischaracterization and premature assessment could have needlessly antagonized and alienated this leader and his country from the West. As it is, Mugabe faces tough opposition to his reformist policies of pursuing a mixed economy, retaining ex-colonial administrators in key government positions, and courting Western nations for foreign aid. In fact, Mugabe's opponents are disturbed by the implications of the Economist article: Western aid will be used to shape policy and to keep the country out of the

Soviet sphere of influence. His critics charge that Zimbabwe is moving toward a neo-colonial relationship with the West, similar to the Kenyan experience. Foreign aid, Mugabe's opponents charge, is actually a web to entrap Zimbabwe into a greater reliance upon Western financial centers, thus making a mockery out of its newly-won independence. Clearly there is a need for Western, particularly American, foreign policy makers to discern the differences between reality and distortion in African political crises.

If American foreign policymakers learn the historical lessons Angola and Zimbabwe brought to bear, they may not repeat such miscalculations in South Africa. An examination of the American press coverage of the assassination of Steve Biko (the third case study) is significant then in gauging the future direction of U.S. policies, for much depends on their willingness to abandon their support of minority leaders and organizations over the vast majority of the population.

The necessity for Western reassessment becomes even more apparent when seen in the light of the shifting political order. Stanley Hoffmann (in Primacy or World Order -- American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War) and Cyrus Vance (in his Harvard University Commencement address of June 5, 1980) advance the notion that the U.S. in the post-Vietnam era cannot manipulate and reconstruct world

events as it could in the post-World War II era. Both maintain that the West's relationship to underdeveloped countries has undergone a substantial change. Thus American imagery and conception of African and other Third World nations will have to be transformed. This transformation will take place in both the political arena and the mass media.

Section III -- The Prestigious Press -- The News Gatekeepers

During periods of political turmoil and crisis, policy decisions become concrete actions, and distortions surface prominently. In the literature of social science (like that of the Hoover Institute Study Group for example), prestige newspapers are used to understand policymakers' decisions, elite orientations, and mass attitudes.

In the early fifties, the Hoover Institute Study Group introduced the study of prestige paper "editorials." This led to a more sophisticated understanding of policy issues and of political orientations in the more "popular" written media. Prof. Ithiel de Sola Pool, one of the forerunners in this field states:

In each major power one newspaper stands out as an organ of elite opinion. Usually, semi-officials always intimate with the government, these "prestige papers" are read by public leaders. They seldom have large circulations, yet they have enormous influence. They are read not only in their own communities, but also abroad by those

whose business it is to keep track of world affairs [my emphasis]. They differ among themselves; they are a distinct species. It is generally possible to name with fair confidence one paper in any given country which plays the role of the prestige paper at any given time.⁸⁸

In a study of African news content during crisis periods, examining prestige newspapers takes on an even greater importance, because such coverage is more subject to error than coverage of domestic news where the communications system corrects many gross errors. In Africa, officials and public sometimes await the ultimate verdict of the press on particular events. As Gitlin⁸⁹ has indicated, even the visual media takes their signals about the importance of an event from the prestigious written media. Stone contends that there is a rather "high correlation" between "the content of prestige paper editorials and the orientation of national political elites."⁹⁰

The focus of our investigation is to understand the patterns of distortion or accuracy in the American coverage of African events in crisis periods. I will identify what the reporters are trying to convey both in terms of facts

⁸⁸Itzhel de Sola Pool, et. al., The "Prestige Press": A Survey of Their Editorials, (Stanford University, The Hoover Institute Studies, 1952), p. 1.

⁸⁹Stone, The General Inquirer, p. 11.

⁹⁰Stone, The General Inquirer, Ibid., p. 11.

and attitudes in their assessment of the events.

In examining this problem, I will focus on the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor. From these newspapers, I will attempt to draw inferences about their coverage of African news events.

In Reporters and Officials, Sigal asserts that "because of their extensive readership among the politically influential, the [New York] Times and the [Washington] Post function as something akin to house organs for the political elites."¹ In The Whole World is Watching, Gitlin also explains that prestigious newspapers serve the "television networks and wire services ... The [New York] Times -- along with the Associated Press and UPI assume the role of gatekeeper and certifier of new reality."² Reliance on the Times for foreign news coverage portends a vicious "news" cycle, since the vast majority of regional and mass newspapers then rely on the A.P. and UPI.

The New York Times is often considered the newspaper of record and the vehicle of governmental interaction

¹Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Officials--The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking (Lexington, Toronto, London, D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), p. 47.

²Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, p. 300. Gitlin points out that "CBS commonly follows the [New York] Times lead." An informant pointed out to Gitlin in an interview that the [New York] Times reporting can certify reality decisively when news is itself divided on an issue."

between departments with "one agency informing, exposing, or supporting another." In Herbert Gans' examination of the news, Deciding What's News,⁹³ he reiterates that the Times functions as the gatekeeper for the other newspapers. In his paper, "Marks of Distinction: An Analysis of British Mass and Prestige Newspaper Editorials," Namenwirth comments that researchers often use national "prestige newspapers as an alternative source for estimating elite orientations."⁹⁴

The prestige press is a gauge for any analysis of African newspaper crisis coverage and for American perception of these events.

⁹³Herbert Gans, Deciding What's News -- A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1979) p. 180.

⁹⁴J. Zvi Namenwirth, (unpublished paper) Yale University. Namenwirth utilized the prestige newspapers because they also had the advantage of being readily comparable over time and of presenting relatively fully developed thought."

Section IV -- Perception-Distortion Analysis

Political and social scientists who are concerned with cross-national relations and the effects of the cultural and social environment on the individual and the state study images, perceptions, and perception-distortion. The concept of images and perception-distortion analysis is borrowed from social-psychology. Many of the original studies focussed on Soviet-American perceptions of each other. Deutsch and Merritt write in "Effects of Events on National and International Images" that "images serve as screens for the selective [my emphasis] reception of new messages and often control the perception and interpretation of these messages that are not completely ignored, rejected, or repressed..."

Herbert Kelman's International Behavior--A Social-Psychological Analysis⁹⁵ sees perception-distortion "growing out of the dynamics of inter-group conflict in general, and out of the conditions of Soviet society in particular." His interest lies in "distinguishing distortion from reality"⁹⁶ in our relationship with the Soviet Union. Within a similar

⁹⁵Karl W. Deutsch and Richard Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images" in International Behavior--A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. by Herbert C. Kelman, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London, Holt, Rinehart Winston, 1965), p. 134.

⁹⁶Kelman, International Behavior--A Social-Psychological Analysis, p. 236.

conceptual context, this study focuses on the significance of possible American news media perception-distortion of African political events.

Ithiel de Sola Pool in 1963 investigated the "Effects of Cross-National Contact on National and International Images." Here he examines how travel affects both the traveller and host. For foreign correspondents covering news events,⁹⁷

their assessment of the mood of the country is most often an interpretation of casual experience and suffers thereby from the bias that arises from their round of life... Even if ...impressions are formed on events having other purposes than information-seeking, the interpretation of such casual events occurs to a man whose mind is tuned to seeking answers to predetermined questions.

Pool's experiment concludes that the traveller "distort(s) his image of the host to make it fit his needs."

I am interested in determining the patterns of distortion: do they relate to cultural perceptions and ethnocentrism? These procedural patterns are related to organizational patterns of the press and news gathering in terms of the sources used.

Of course, any distortion by a prestigious U.S. newspaper is read by African policymakers and can have quite

⁹⁷Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in International Behavior--A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. by Herbert C. Kelman, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 104.

serious consequences on political formation. Accounts of African events in the U.S. press may also affect how U.S. policymakers perceive social change, racial situations, and cold-war conditions. Obviously, distortions can unnecessarily endanger relations between the U.S. and African peoples and can make it difficult for the U.S. to develop appropriate policies. Kelman asserts that such a research into perception-distortion can highlight how "relationship(s) of the individual to the nation-state... define his relationship to the international system."⁹⁸ The media participates in the international arena (Cohen, 58)⁹⁹ and sends back signals for policy analysts, planners, and the public. Consequently, the press holds a strategic position in the international system and helps interpret the difference between reality and distortion, while contributing to the formulation of policy alternatives.

Section V -- Interviewing Methods

In order to supplement the statistical data derived from a content analysis of the news' articles, I interviewed columnist and reporters from The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and the Los Angeles Times.

I interviewed Lewis Anthony, who for over two

⁹⁸Kelman, International Behavior, p. 236.

⁹⁹Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963)

decades has been a seasoned reporter and columnist for the New York Times. Mr. Lewis contributed a number of articles on the death of Steve Biko between September and December of 1976. To add to his credibility Mr. Lewis is also considered by many newspaper critics to be one of the most able, articulate, analytical, and thoughtful political commentators on the staff of the The New York Times.

I also interviewed Geoffrey Godsell, June Goodwin and David Anable of the Christian Science Monitor. Godfrey Godsell was the foreign desk editor of the CSM during the period of the Biko assassination; furthermore, Mr. Godsell interviewed Steve Biko in Kingswilliamstown only months before he was assassinated. June Goodwin was the foreign correspondent for the C.S.M. in South and Southern Africa and subsequently interviewed Steve Biko before he died; furthermore, Ms. Goodwin covered the Biko case from the funeral to the inquest hearings. David Anable replaced Mr. Godsell as the CSM's foreign editor, Mr Anable (as of this date) still manages the foreign desk. He presided over the editing and assigning of correspondents during the post-inquest hearings into Biko's death and ultimately supervised the coverage of both the Angolan civil war and Mugabe's election in Zimbabwe.

David Lamb, (the Kenyan bureau chief) for the Los Angeles Times was a Harvard University Neiman Fellow during the latter part of this investigation; therefore I

interviewed him while he was in Cambridge, Massachusetts. For the past several years Mr. Lamb has supplied west coast newspaper readers with frequent articles on Africa. Not only was Mr. Lamb a foreign correspondent, but he was also the bureau chief for African news stories shouldering the responsibility for selecting and assigning the various stories to be pursued and printed. For many readers on the West coast of the United States the Los Angeles Times is held in the same regard as the New York Times; therefore, Mr. Lamb's coverage of Africa gains additional importance if the readers view the L.A. Times as a West coast "surrogate" newspaper of prominence. Viewed in this manner the readers expect his coverage of African crises events to be accurate and reliable.

Mr. Lamb also holds the distinction of being the first American reporter allowed to enter and to file a story from Angola after the revolution. I also interviewed Mr. Lamb in order to gain an additional perspective on the kinds of information West coast Africa interested readers are receiving about the three case studies under consideration.

The five reporters, editors, and columnist whom I interviewed undoubtedly brought depth and additional understanding to this research. The interviews aided my analysis in bridging the gap between theory and practice and assist me, in comparing and contrasting the diverse perspectives of different actors in the political drama.

Perhaps, one of the most important reason for utilizing the interviews in this study was that they served to focus on the biases and perspectives or and pressures on those involved in the production process of the stories being reviewed. Their views helped us validate our criteria for ethnocentric and positive or negative affective symbolism.


Whenever possible a tape recorder was used to record the interviews with the reporters in order to ensure an accurate recall and a data base for additional information.

Section VI -- Content Analysis of Theme Categories

I documented five themes which recurred in American news coverage of African crisis events:

- I. Scope and Balance of U.S. Press sources used for the Coverage of the Event.
- II. Ethnocentric Themes and Symbols employed in the articles.
- III. The Balance in the Evaluation of African and non-African Lives in the reporting.
- IV. Balanced reporting of the context issues and underlying interests involved in the South African apartheid system, Rhodesian segregation, and Portuguese rule in Angola by African and American sources.
- V. Prejudicial usage of symbolic language.

For Holsti, the purpose of defining a category is to "permit a classification of data on the basis of selected concepts. It then becomes possible to measure the intensity



and frequency of occurrence of variables represented by each category."¹⁰⁰ The elaboration of the six categories of Section V will indicate the appropriate coding methods. Categories One, Three, Four, Five, and Six will receive both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Category Two will primarily be analysed qualitatively.

Category I. Scope and Balance of U.S. Press Sources for the Coverage of the Event

The subject matter or theme of the article dictates which utilization of resources, persons, or institutions are relevant. In an article on controversial government policy, for example, one expects various branches of government, politicians, or citizens to be consulted for information.

A reporter's decision to select certain resources and persons to contact for information may indicate an ideological or commercial interest is influencing the tone and analysis of the article. David Lamb, for ten years a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, was asked in an interview to identify the sources he would contact for a story on Tanzania's foreign policy. He indicated that the following embassies would be contacted for their version:

- A) The U.S. Embassy; (2)

¹⁰⁰Holsti, *ibid.*, p. 41.

- B) The Information Embassy of Tanzania; (2)
- C) The Embassies having less interest in the policy;
for example

The Canadian Embassy (1)

The Australian Embassy (1)

Lamb indicated that he would not contact other African embassies because they are usually "less helpful;" moreover, he says, "[I have] more of a cultural affinity with other European or Western embassies."¹⁰¹

Lamb's statement that contacting African sources is both cumbersome and culturally alienating is significant in what it may reveal about American reporters who cover the African desk. In a community where ethnic groups are in conflict the chances are greater for ethnocentric or subjective news coverage where a reporter doesn't consult a diversity of interested groups. Clearly, a reporter, if his goal is objective and balanced reporting, should not be intimidated or confined to contacting primarily European sources in Africa because he "feels" more cultural identity with them or because he perceives that African embassy officials are less helpful.

The articles are coded according to the number of sources utilized and the authority of the source. When a

¹⁰¹David Lamb [with] Marsha Coleman, personal interview, Cambridge Massachusetts, September, 1980.

correspondent investigating a crisis develops contacts with multiple parties or opposition groups, this indicates that:

- 1) he attempts to increase the scope, depth, and appreciation of the event;
- 2) he recognized that the quality of reporting is improved by utilizing more contacts, since a multiplicity of resources reduces the distortions and inaccuracies;
- 3) he acknowledges that the participants in the event represent divergent points of view;
- 4) he understands that diversifying the coverage and in particular utilizing domestic sources will probably result in less ethnocentric reporting.

Newspaper reporters who cover a crisis involving multiple contentious actors and who consistently consult only one of these actors as a source for information:

- 1) establish a pattern of journalistic neglect by failing to consult conflicting participants;
- 2) are likely to be seen as unsympathetic to at least one side of the conflict;
- 3) usually accept without verification the view of the crisis held by European or American analysts and thus leave themselves open to ethnocentric perspectives which are more likely to lead to distorted reporting.

There are alternative sources of information for a

reporter covering a crisis. In the chart which follows, the more authoritative the informant is considered to be, the higher the rating. For example, in an article on government policy, on U.S.-Angolan relations during the Angolan Civil War, the article would be coded a 2 if the reporter had interviewed the top government official or Secretary of State of either the U.S. or Angola. If the reporter talked about foreign policy with an "unidentified source" or a "person on the street" the article is coded 1. This coding allows one to: to make an evaluation of:

- 1) the quality of sources utilized to investigate an event which is divided into two types:
 - (a official sources, and
 - (b unofficial sources.
- 2) the extent of the use of types of sources used to compose an article.

The characterizations of possible sources for investigating a news story are analyzed by assessing the stories in each newspaper separately. One can then state with some assurance how many sources the New York Times or Washington Post generally use to investigate an event and which sources and authorities they are likely to consult. This information can then be applied to aggregate data on accuracy, ethnocentrism, endangerment of lives, or economic issues to determine if inaccuracies, are detailed reporting and certain patterns of source utilization are correlated.

One of multiple news sources involving diverse interests and conflicting points of view can be expected to result in a deeper inquiry and a more profound investigation of the problem. I will code reports on controversial issues which have contending political actors in the following manner:

A. for short articles

--articles of 24 lines or less will be considered diversified if the author quotes one source from the opposition party or organization and one source from the official organization. Of more significance is the reliance on one source, particularly if it is apparent that the source has an interest in distorting information. For example, if after the Biko assassination the South African Minister of Justice supplies all the information, the coverage is bound to be unbalanced.

B. for long articles

--24 lines or longer--at least four sources must be required to qualify it as diverse. At least two people contacted from the opposition movement and at least two from the official organization. If all the sources are spokesmen for the official organization, the report will merely set forth the party line, and similarly for exclusive reliance on the anti or non-governmental interests. Editorials will only be coded if they present a quote from

either side of the controversy. An editorial will be considered diversified if one member of the opposition movement is quoted and one member of the official government or organization is quoted.

A statistical analysis will be undertaken to give the frequency of resource persons utilized. This will then be broken down according to the individual newspaper and reporter. Articles which focus on one aspect of an issue, or undertake in-dept interviews of political personalities, or present facts about a situation which do not render necessary or appropriate the utilization of diverse sources will be coded zero. I will record the overall number of resource persons contacted and will apply the following coding system. Any story that uses a mix of number "2" (highly qualified resources) and number "1" (unofficial) sources or of government and opposition groups among the number "2" type sources will be considered diversified.

A two-integer scale will be used to code the articles. The more authoritative the source the higher the coding. All official policymaking or enforcing administrative officials are coded a 2. This coding will attempt to determine if foreign correspondents receive their news from high-level officials who enforce and administer civil obedience and develop the political trends in the country. We are interested to know if newspapers using limited authoritative sources also have a pattern of

inaccurate coverage, ethnocentric reporting, unbalanced coverage of African/European deaths, and/or prejudicial usage of language.

Articles which consult civil or non-official sources will be coded a one (1). Resource persons who would be designated a 1 would include, for example, the public, consumers, non-commissioned officers, local leaders, unidentified sources, etc. This coding would indicate how often reporters attempt to get a more general reaction concerning policies and policymakers' decisions. This coding would also be useful in determining a non-elitist perspective and reaction to the political crisis.

The following is a chart which describes the likely sources for investigator of crisis events that have contentious actors.

Possible Sources of Investigation for the Composition of News Articles Government Policy (Official)

- 2) The President or Prime Minister
- 2) M.P., Senator, House of Rep.
- 1) Other government officials
- 1) Unidentified sources in government
- 1) The public

Businesses

- 2) The business under consideration
- 2) Other businesses
- 1) Consumers
- 1) Foreign businesses

Opposition Party or Organization

- 2) Opposition leader
- 2) Secondary leader
- 1) Soldier or member in an opposition movement
- 1) The public

- 1) Unidentified sources in the opposition
- 2) Opposition organization
- 2) Local businesses involved with the opposition movement
- 1) The public

Military Concerns

- 2) The Commander in Chief
- 2) High level Commissioned Officer
- 1) Non-commissioned officers
- 2) The government

Popular Opinion

- 2) Individual opinion favoring the status quo
- 2) Mass-based organizations
- 1) State officials
- 1) Local leaders
- 1) Government officials

Opposition Military

- 2) Opposition Commander
- 2) High level officer in the opposition movement
- 1) Rank and file
- 1) People in the rural areas

Popular Opinion

- 2) Blue-collar workers or peasants
- 2) Mass-based organizations
- 1) Local representatives
- 1) Local leaders
- 1) Opposition leaders

Category II. -- Ethnocentrism

This category will attempt to establish patterns of foreign reporting by American newspapers when the political drama is set in a non-European environment and the society's aspirations and traditions differ drastically from the reporter's cultural background. Are American reporters able

to transcend political and cultural barriers in order to present and explain the crisis situation to the general America public and policymakers? Or has the American press emphasized and further projected archaic stereotypes of Africa and African cultural and political events? This category will attempt to judge how accurately American reporters cover African news.

Harold Isaacs and Herbert Gans have criticized the American tendency to measure other societies by American standards and values. In Idols of the Tribe, Issacs proposes the notion that group identity and national self-image determines how individuals and societies perceive the world. Often powerful societies will apply their perceptions with a missionary zeal as a rationale for their attempts to shape the world in their own image. Issacs proposes that groups of individuals or nation-states, in fact, build "Houses of Muumbi." This concept, borrowed from the Kenyan oath-taking ritual, commits its members to a tribal loyalty supreme to all other obligations. The "House of Muumbi" concept is applied to the modern nation states in competition to protect, expand, or consolidate their corner of the world. Isaacs uses this concept to discuss one aspect of ethnocentrism and the danger of using one's self-image as a measure of perfection:¹⁰²

¹⁰²Harold R. Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe -- Group

Out of the breakup of old power systems or the fragile instability of new ones comes the onset of turmoil and instability for all people in all their relationships. And out of this comes the great new confusions that surround us. Hence, the search for what was somewhere, somehow been lost. Hence the lunge back to the tribal caves, back to the Houses of Muumbi... (p. 24). The more global our science and technology, the more tribal our politics; the more universal our system of communications, the less we know what to communicate; ... (p. 2). It can be no wonder or surprise, as we stumble on our way toward new definitions and the new shapes of some new American pluralism, if many people in many groups begin to think their only real security may lie after all in the closer circle of their own tribal kin, in their own Houses of Muumbi, American style.

The American news media's manner of reporting may reflect Isaac's concern. This "House of Muumbi" would include ignoring the deaths of Africans, reporting only the official European version of the crisis, a mischaracterization of Black leaders to fit the prevailing stereotypes and images of Africa in America society, etc. Creating illusions and images about non-Western societies to fit preconceived ideas is a gross form of parochialism which leads to distortion and an inability to create and accurately assess a political situation.

Gans, in Deciding What's News, suggests that ethnocentrism is clearly evident in foreign news reporting. He maintains:¹⁰³

Identity and Political Change, (Harper Colophon Books, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London, 1975) p. 23-24.

Like the news of other countries, American news values its own nation above all, even though it sometimes disparages blatant patriotism. This ethnocentrism comes through most explicitly in foreign news, which judges other countries by the extent to which they live up to or imitate American practices and values, but it also underlies domestic news.

If Gans' and Isaacs' analyses are correct, America foreign policymakers and American reporters of foreign news may be viewing the world through a myopic and distorted lense. Thus, analysis of the ethnocentric dimension of the news coverage is concerned with:

- A) verifying if ethnocentric values and symbols are being transmitted through American news coverage of African events.
- B) locating the most frequent themes of ethnocentric articles.
- C) identifying what stereotypic attitudes are being propagated by the media.

The following is the definition of ethnocentrism that will be used to guide our research.¹⁰⁴

The view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Emotionally it finds expression in a sympathetic awareness and approval of one's fellows and their ways and, in

¹⁰³Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News -- A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time, (Pantheon News, New York, 1979.) p. 42.

¹⁰⁴"Ethnocentrism" The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1933, p. 613.

contrast, in a feeling of fear, suspicion and contempt toward outsiders and their ways.
Encyclopedia of Social Science.

I will code the articles referring to racial and group identities in the following terms: Non-Ethnocentric, Ethnocentric, and Neutral.

Non-Ethnocentric -- The American press coverage of African political and cultural institutions as legitimate and as expressions of national sovereignty and a developed social system. Under the non-ethnocentrism sub-category I will be looking for:

A) Articles which attempt to explain traditional African cultural values and how that affects the modern African political mores and shapes political configurations on the African continent.

B) Articles which explain the colonial period and its effect on the post-independence period.

C) Articles which place African underdevelopment within the context of the world economic system as well as the internal political conflictual relationships.

D) Coverage of African leaders with a description of their policies (both foreign and domestic) and information about the political parties.

Ethnocentric -- A) African leaders and countries judged by how pro-West their actions and policies are instead of how pro-African or nationalistic or Pan-Africanist.

B) Concentration of stereotypes of Africans without plausible verification (i.e. African men raping white women, cannibalism, sexual stereotypes, inadequate to administer governments, etc.)

The following are some of the themes of articles which would be considered ethnocentric:

1) Transition to Black rule is considered positive because it doesn't fundamentally tamper with the economic or political configurations in the society that existed before the change in government. There is no consideration for the continued existence of Africans under such a system.

2) Independence in Zimbabwe portrayed as a result of British initiative with no credit given to Zimbabwean soldiers.

3) Articles describing how unpleasant Africa is for whites because of the revolution or transition in government but no parallel made concerning how unpleasant apartheid, Portuguese rule in Angola, or segregation in Rhodesia was for the Africans.

4) Articles asserting without specific evidence that Africans were better off during the colonial period compared to independence.

5) Using American and European standards as a universal measurement for a superior quality.

Neutral --Not all articles will be judged as either ethnocentric or non-ethnocentric. In many instances, it

will be unfair and difficult to determine whether or not an article is either ethnocentric or non-ethnocentric. In such instances (for example, an article quoting how many people voted in the Zimbabwean election or the names of the defense witnesses at the Biko inquest), I will code these articles neutral.

An example of an ethnocentric article may clarify what is meant by this code. On September 4, 1980, the New York Times carried an article on journalism in Nigeria. The Times reporter charged that Nigerian reporters were inadequate when judged against the universally accepted standards of American and European journalism. Since this article regards Western criteria for journalistic achievement as superior to African standards and disregards variations in journalistic practices derived from non-Western historical and cultural experiences, it would be coded ethnocentric.

Category III - The Balance of Evaluation of Lives in Africa

When the American press excludes the African death count in its coverage of African crises, the result is a serious distortion. Such reports generally include the European or/and American death counts--and only those death counts. This ethnocentric bias towards one's own national group not only neglects the African perspective, but also

devalues the loss of human lives. Furthermore, such reporting develops an unbalanced and unjustified sympathetic response to the cause for which the Europeans and/or Americans died. Accurate and balanced reporting would present the crisis event from diverse perspectives and would cover the African, American and European death toll.

When questioned on how deaths counts are reported, foreign correspondents June Goodwin, Geoffery Godsell (Christian Science Monitor), Anthony Lewis (New York Times), and David Lamb (Los Angeles Times, Nairobi bureau), agreed that it is ethnocentric to report only European and American deaths and to mention only generally that a number of Africans were also killed. These correspondents agreed that such treatment of an event can be considered unsympathetic. Excerpts from David Lamb's interview provide interesting insights into this topic.¹⁰⁵

Coleman: Mr. Lamb, how would you report an event in Africa during a political crisis in which there were both African and European casualties?

Lamb: Like what happened in Zaire during the Shaba province? I learned a lesson from the criticism that the Western press got there. I probably would have described it like it was originally, the way the

¹⁰⁵David Lamb, personal interview by Marsha Coleman, September 1980, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Western press did. And that is say [report] 32 Europeans were murdered and then on paragraph two meanwhile lead under [start the paragraph with] Africans were found over there. Obviously, I recognize all the injustices and the bad professionalism of that approach.

Coleman: Would you define that [approach] as ethnocentric?

Lamb: I suppose it is--there again it is playing up to my stereotype and the readers' stereotype of Africa i.e., Africans are always killing Africans. What's unusual about that? But when they kill Europeans that is different! And (to some extent) you can make an argument on that (Africans are always killing other Africans).

The Lamb interview illustrates how American ethnocentrism can influence important media decisions. What aspects of the crisis are high-lighted and what facts are presented can affect the significance of political events. Herbert Gans cites the omission of foreign deaths in newspapers as one of the clearest expressions of American ethnocentrism:¹⁰⁶

The clearest expression of ethnocentrism, in all countries, appears in war news. While reporting the Vietnamese War, the news media described the

¹⁰⁶Gans, Deciding What's News, Ibid., p. 42.

North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front as 'the enemy,' as if they were the enemy of the news media. Similarly, weekly casualty stories reported the number of Americans killed, wounded, or missing, and the number of South Vietnamese killed; but the casualties on the other side were impersonally described as 'the Communist death toll' or the 'body count.'

An analysis of news stories under this category will indicate if Gans' belief that reporters describe the enemy dead as persona non grata is verified and will indicate which, if any, of the American newspapers considers African fatalities as newsworthy as American and European deaths. Items within this category are coded balanced or unbalanced. Balanced - Full or equally accurate press coverage of the African injuries and fatalities as well as European/American lives.

Unbalanced - Detailed press coverage of the fatalities and injuries of only Europeans and Americans.

A pattern of balanced reporting would indicate that there is an attempt by the American press to maintain a balanced position. The media then would not highlight the deaths and injuries of one particular group and would not load reports with the one-sided use of the powerful and sympathy-producing symbolism attached to death. Cases where only the European and African death count is considered newsworthy indicates an unbalanced, distorted, inaccurate picture of the event. It would reflect:

- 1) Unsympathetic reporting from the African perspective

- 2) Unbalanced sympathy for the Europeans and Americans who died.

Such reporting can alienate the African elite who depend on American newspapers for coverage of the event. For example, citing only Europeans and American deaths in the Angolan, Zimbabwean, South African cases is to consciously or unconsciously promote a sympathetic treatment of white minority regimes in Africa. A preponderance of unbalanced America reporting will result in a misinformed audience of policymakers and citizens and increase the alienation of African elites.

Category IV - Balance in reporting underlying interests and the context of people and events.

The African events under consideration are closely linked to crises of Portuguese colonialism and apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia. Economic issues figure prominently in all these crises. Newspaper treatments in this category are important for understanding how the U.S. press covers the causes of crises in the apartheid-segregation system and for examining its characterization of the Cuban involvement in Angola.

It would be difficult to isolate the death of Steve Biko from the nature of the system of apartheid. Newsclippings reporting Biko's death often link it to his

opposition to apartheid and his role as the founder of SASO and BPC. Similarly, the images of Mugabe in the Zimbabwe event may have been affected by Western concern that American or European business interests would be threatened by a drastic change in the form of government. To what extent have reporters consulted Zimbabwean and Western business interests about the crisis? In Angola, did the press investigate the Angolan reasons for inviting Cuban involvement?

In each case, economic issues are intricately woven into the fabric of the crisis situation. It would be significant if the patterns of distortion and emotional coverage tend to align with the investment and economic interests involved in these African crises events. According to a study prepared by the National Security Council,¹⁰⁷

U.S. investment in South Africa accounts for 40% of all American investment in Africa. Since 1972, the level of investment has grown at a rate of 20% a year, despite the increased tension in the area. At present, approximately 50% of American investment is in manufacturing industries and another 33% is in manufacturing and chemicals.

Briefly, I will review what the American economic interests are in two of the case studies. This short review of

¹⁰⁷Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, ed. The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39, (Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1976.) p. 63.

American economic interests in South Africa is not meant nor does it attempt to be an exhaustive treatment of U.S. involvement in the area, but simply indicative of an important factor which may influence American press coverage of political crises in the area. Since minority rule in Zimbabwe is relatively similar to the South African case, I will focus on South Africa and Angola.

The southern region of Africa is a lucrative area for investment and represents an important strategic area for Western political interests. Thus, much of the hostility, distrust, and conflict Africans feel towards Americans and Europeans result from the African perception that Euro-American businesses use Africa to 'dump' surplus products and to pick up labor as cheaply as possible. As Fortune magazine has pointed out:¹⁰⁸

South Africa has always been regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine, one of the rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labor is cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible.

South Africa has made it increasingly profitable for U.S. and European multi-national corporations to invest in its industrial development. Ann and Neva Seidman give the

¹⁰⁸Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1977), p. 40.

following account:¹⁰⁹

A handful of the biggest firms in the U.S. have provided over three-fourths of U.S. investment there [in South Africa]. They are linked with each other as well as with most of the nearly 400 other U.S. companies which have invested in South Africa through their boards of directors.

Additionally, the Seidmans' research details the involvement of U.S. multinational corporations and shows the substantial investment of U.S. businesses in South Africa¹¹⁰

In 1969, under the direction of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, a memorandum defining U.S. interest in South Africa was prepared by the National Security Council. It states:¹¹¹

... Our investments, primarily in South Africa, total about \$1 billion and our trade yields a highly favorable balance of payments advantage. This geographically important area has major ship repairs and logistic facilities which can be useful in our defense forces. An important NASA space tracking station is located in South Africa.

Seidman writes that the South African Financial Mail asked President-elect Jimmy Carter in November 1976 if he would encourage the expansion of U.S. private business interests in the region. Carter replied¹¹²

Yes indeed... Economic development, investment

¹⁰⁹Ibid, p. 82.

¹¹⁰Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations, Ibid., p. 82.

¹¹¹Ibid., Kissinger Study, p. 63.

¹¹²Ibid., Seidman, p. XVIII.

commitment and the use of economic leverage against what is, after all, a government of repression with South Africa, seems to me the only way to achieve racial justice here.

The Carter proposal asserts that U.S. private investment can provide a catalyst for social change in the private industry sector. This proposal is vehemently repudiated by many black South African leaders such as Steve Biko. In a personal interview with Bernard Zylstra of the Canadian Institute for Christian Studies, Biko asserts:¹¹³

Washington can exert such economic pressure on [South Africa] S.A. that it will become considerably less profitable to invest in South African industries. The argument is often made that loss of foreign investment would hurt blacks the most. It would undoubtedly hurt blacks in the short run, because many of them would stand to lose their jobs, but it should be understood in Europe and North America that foreign investment supports the present economic system and thus indirectly the present system of political injustice. We blacks are therefore not interested in foreign investment. If Washington wants to contribute to the development of a just society in South Africa, it must discourage investment in South Africa. We blacks are perfectly willing to suffer the consequences. We are quite accustomed to suffering.

The Carter-Biko viewpoints represent opposing solutions to the political problem of U.S.-European business interests in South Africa. It becomes important to examine how the U.S. press covers these issues and how they relate these crises to the issues of apartheid and segregation.

¹¹³Donald Woods, Biko, (Paddington Press New York, London, 1978.)

In cases where the U.S. press attempts to depict the crisis as a result of apartheid, U.S. multinational corporations, etc., I will code the articles "balanced" or "unbalanced", when examining the articles to see if both African and European-American perspectives are represented. A reporter's coverage of Southern Africa under this category may be influenced by diverse factors including economic and business interests, moral and ethical issues, cold war and security factors and ideosyncratic influences. I do not assess the causes for the patterns that are evident in the reporting analyzed here.

A preponderance of unbalanced reporting may have the consequences if not the intent of protecting Western business interests as opposed to the interests of the vast majority of people in the country. This, may reflect the writer's preference and his journalistic treatment of a crisis. It is important, then, to distinguish between balanced and unbalanced reporting. I will do so in the following manner:

Balanced - Press coverage of both the official South African, Zimbabwean, settler, and African reactions to the following issues when connected to the crisis.

- A) Apartheid
- B) Multinational corporations
- C) Alien troops

South African Apartheid Unbalanced - Press coverage of only

the official South African reaction and justification of crises in the following institutions.

- A) Apartheid
- B) Multinational corporations
- C) Alien troops

A preponderance of balance may indicate that the U.S. press is consulting Africans as well as European/Americans on issues that are at the core of many of the crises in Africa.

A preponderance of unbalanced reporting in this category may indicate that:

- A) the U.S. prestige newspapers are consulting only the ruling minority groups and organizations
- B) the economic issues in the Southern African region are being covered from a Western perspective; the African assessment of the relationship between Western business interests and the crisis situation is not being covered.

A pattern of unbalanced reporting in this category would indicate distorted reporting. Such misinformation is presented to the media's audience, policymakers, and the public and further isolates African elites who perceive America reporting to be favorable to the individuals and institutions which promote or enforce apartheid or other exploitative economic arrangements in Africa.

Angola - The Politics of Alien Troop Involvement

The Angolan sub-section of category IV will examine how Cuban troops were described using the coding schemes of: a) economic or bureaucratic stabilizers b) an unstabilizing cold war threat. The foreign intervention in the Angolan crisis necessitates a different standard of coding than the previous sections. For many American policymakers, Cuban troop involvement in Angola signals Soviet involvement in Africa. FRELIMO's (Mozambique Liberation Front) victory in neighboring Mozambique and its espousal of a pro-socialist orientation also caused American policymakers serious concern, because it was believed that the Soviet sphere of influence was ascending in black Africa.

The Nixon years were prosperous for U.S. business in Angola.¹¹⁴ Equal press coverage of the interests of both the African opposition and U.S. and European business interests would have allowed both the public and the policymakers to grasp an important aspect of the independence struggle and civil war, namely, the Angolans demand to control the economic basis of their society. It was thought at first that Cuban troops would endanger U.S. business interests in the area. The irony is that the Cuban forces were protecting Gulf Oil in Luanda during the war. By focussing primarily

¹¹⁴Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (National Security) Study Memorandum 39 (SECRET), Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1976, p.28.

on the cold war (Cuban/Soviet) aspects of the civil war the U.S. press was ignoring substantial U.S., European and South African business and political interests in the area. As the Kissinger study of Southern Africa points out,¹¹⁵

The Nixon years...witnessed the consistent growth of America private investment in Angola and Mozambique...Angola's potential mineral wealth was the primary object of investor interest. Portugal's encouragement of foreign capital resulted in much competitive activity by American and European multinational corporations for the exploration and development of possible deposits of iron ore, diamonds, sulphur and phosphates. In 1969, three American companies were granted concessions for diamond prospecting and exploration in southwestern Angola. The Rockefeller group, represented by the Clark Canadian Exploration Company, holds one-third of the share capital of the Companhia dos Fosfatos de Angola (COFAN), which began phosphate prospecting in Cabinda in 1969. In May 1972, the Great Lakes Carbon Corporation of New York applied for a concession to prospect for an exploit copper deposits in Cuanza (North Districts). That same year, Argo Petroleum Corporation of Los Angeles received a concession covering five areas totaling 12,189 square kilometers. In 1973, the Riberwood Corporation of Midland Texas was contracted by the Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola for the exploitation of rock asphalt.

Portuguese control over the political lives and economic destinies of the Angolan people was at the core of the civil war. American and western economic support for the minority regime and for FNLA-UNITA forces should have been an important aspect of U.S. press coverage of the crisis, for it to be accurate. During the civil war, the U.S. was

¹¹⁵El-Khawas, Cohen, Ibid., p.49.

allied with South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, and China in support of FNLA and UNITA forces. The USSR, Mozambique and Cuba supported the MPLA.¹¹⁶ U.S. military and political support for the FNLA-UNITA forces was intimidated by the supposed massive financial support given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union through its ally, Cuba.

The U.S. press and government blatantly highlighted the Cuban involvement in Angola. In fact, President Ford warned the Soviets that their involvement in Angola was endangering detente. Contrary to claims by the U.S. government that its commitment to the FNLA-UNITA forces was in reaction to Soviet-Cuban U.S. intervention, it started earlier than that of Cuba or the Soviet Union as Monamed A. Khawas states:¹¹⁷

... covert U.S. operations in Angola began as early as January 1975. The White House, on the basis of a recommendation by the National Security Council's 40 committee on covert intelligence, decided to provide \$300,000 and military equipment to the FNLA through the CIA.

Thus U.S. intervention may have been motivated by the more general concern for its economic interest in the country and in the region. I will examine press clippings to determine whether the U.S. press corrects government mistakes or continues to report unverified information. What is

¹¹⁶Ibid., EL-Khawas, Cohen., p.57-58.

¹¹⁷El-Khawas, Cohen, Ibid, p. 57.

significant for the economic interest category in how the press describes Cuban involvement. Did the U.S. press, for example, evaluate or even follow up on Former U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young's suggestion that the Cubans brought stability in the area (and thus was potentially a favorable factor even to U.S. economic interests) or did the press confine their analysis to cold-war aspects of this issue. In the case of Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War, I will code the articles according to whether they describe Cuban troops as:

- A) an economic or bureaucratic stabilizer,
- B) an unstabilizing cold-war threat, or,
- C) a threat to detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The Angolan case indicates how the American press describes Cuban involvement. This category describes whether the U.S. press attempts to understand Cuban involvement both from a national perspective and the Angolan point of view and examines if the U.S. press detected whether the U.S. had intervened prior to or simply in response to Cuban involvement or if the press communicated only the government's position.

Category V - Symbolic Language

Much of the coloration, tone, and style of news

articles come from the adjective and adverb characterization used to describe the actors, events, places and themes. The writer's pre-disposition and analysis creates sympathy or hostility, positive identification or hostile alienation. The tone of the articles signals to policymakers and public alike the seriousness of the situation and the moral character of the actors involved. For American and African policymakers, the U.S. press thus identifies, generates, and advocates problems and solutions both elites must consider in formulating additional policies and political activities. Hence, identifying and analyzing the affectively significant adjectives and adverbs are important in the assessment of coverage.

The emotional impact of words about political actors, situations, and places must be placed in the context of the effect those symbols have on the activities of international actors and on policy decisions. The symbolism that American foreign correspondence in Africa signals to American and African policymakers affects foreign relations outside of the legitimate institutions designed to legislate and formulate foreign policy. Edelman advances the notion that:¹¹⁸

political forms thus come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to

¹¹⁸Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1964) p. 47.

reassure themselves. It is the needs, the hopes, and the anxieties of men that determine the meaning.

The accuracy of the symbols and adjective-adverb connotations in newspaper articles help determine

- a) if American newspaper articles adequately describe the event to policymakers
- b) if America newspaper articles adequately describe the events to the general public
- c) if the America newspaper coverage alienates African elites by inaccurately assessing the political elites.

In this context, the symbols that I will be looking for are how political parties are described in newspaper articles.¹¹⁹ The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences describes a political party as:

a body of persons who are united in opinion or action, as distinguished from association. Parties therefore, are classified in the first instance in accordance with the kind of community or association to which they belong.

We code the adjectives and adverbs that the press uses to describe:

- A) Revolution organizations, such as:
 - (i) MPLA - People's Movement for the liberation of Angola

¹¹⁹In the most general sense of the word, a political party is: 'Political Party', The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1933, p. 590. Editor in Chief Edwin R. A. Seligman, Assoc. Ed. Alvin Johnson.

(ii) Unita - Union for the total liberation of Angola

(iii) ANU - Africa National Congress

B) Non-Combative organizations

(i) BCP - Black Peoples' Convention

(ii) SASO - South African Student Organization

Does the press describe these organizations and the leaders as:

Terrorist

One who resorts to violence in order to achieve desired objectives¹²⁰

Moderate

Characterized by an avoidance of extremes of behaviour, or of relating to a political or social philosophy or program that avoids extreme measures and violent or partisan tactics, middle-of-the-road. [p. 1451.]

Communist

The political organizations of the communist movement and aim to realize the ideal of communism by means of revolutionary action culminating in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their character is shaped by the ideology of modern communism which, like socialism, has its basis in the Marxist philosophy of history and

¹²⁰ Dictionary of the Social Sciences, p.719. 1978.

theory of class struggle. [Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. III-IV, p. 871]

Pro-west

To be in favor of or to support the economic, political policies of the United States and its European allies.

Extremist

Existing in the highest or greatest possible degree...
Marked by great severity or violence, most stringent:
Drastic desperate.

Liberal

Its primary postulate, the spiritual freedom of mankind, not only repudiates naturalistic or deterministic interpretations of human action, but posits a free individual conscious of his capacity for unfettered development and self-expression.

[Encyclopedia of Social Science, p. 435 Vol. IX-X.]

I will preserve the original terminology and count the frequency of the description of the person or organization. For example, I will count the frequency with which American newspapers characterized Biko as a moderate or as an extremist.

Symbolic Language Category Coding

I chose a three integral scale to explain the diverse opinion of press reporting, as well as to point out the difficulties of narrowing an article down to a specific point. My coding for the emotional language category is favorable, unfavorable, and neutral. Content analysis coding, like the political situations which the articles report, are complicated situations in which there are few clearly right or wrong descriptions. Nevertheless, our task is to use social science research techniques to cut through the obscurities to clearly define our coding procedures operationally so that the results can be replicated.

From an American perspective, which has its philosophy mores rooted in the European Judeo-Christian tradition, I have assigned the code favorable to: moderate, liberal, pro-West. I have assigned the code unfavorable to: terrorist, marxist, communist, extremist, as adjectives which would describe the person or situation in an unfavorable light to the American public.

An article coded favorable is defined as one clearly designed to cast the major subject in a "favorable" light to policymakers and to the American public at large. This would be done by using affectively potent adjectives like "peaceful, kind, gentle, handsome, pro-Western," to describe the person or affixing adverbs of a similar kind to the actions of their subjects. The ability to provoke a likeable image of the person consistently portrays a

sympathetic relationship of the situation. "Favorable" also indicates the accessibility of goods and services to the American government and to U.S. businesses. Consult the appendix for an example of a coded article.

Articles coded "unfavorable" depict the subject or event as unfavorable to U.S. interests by using adjectives like "violent," "Marxist," "anti-west," "Communist," "dogmatic," etc. Such articles would also concentrate on "communist threats," "governmental instability," "violent revolutionary movements," etc. I believe it would be relatively uncontroversial to interpret American cultural preference for stability, peace, and freedom, as positive thus movements that are the antithesis of these symbols are coded with negative designations.

The tone of unfavorable articles serves to warn the reader that this "trouble spot" should be paid attention too, because U.S. interests may be endangered. In extreme cases, such an article may infer some radical solution and hint that U.S. military intervention or a boycott of certain products is needed. A consistent pattern of "unfavorable" articles focuses attention on the need for a new policy or for a re-evaluation of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and political relations.

Neutral

Neutral is a residual category used to describe the


typically predominant grey areas of newspaper content. In some instances, this category represents the balance between the two poles: this in no way is meant to imply that the truth is "simply paired opinions" or in the middle of the two extremes. This category is designed for more subtle articles which cannot be coded "favorable" or "unfavorable." While this category makes the paired codings less precise, it makes the results more realistic.

Description of Diagram

The diagram is composed of six content analysis categories. Although the categories are analyzed separately, it is important to illustrate the dynamic inter-relationship between the variables. An examination of the relationship of the first category to the other variables provides an example of the inter-action between the other categories.

"Sources for the coverage of the Even," category one, is central to an understanding to two areas where distortions may occur: when an informant misinforms the reporter, and when the reporter, following his own investigation, presents an incorrect account. Because foreign reporters are rarely experts on all the various news assignments, the quality of informants (i.e., the President, Prime Minister, Police Chief), often determines the

FLOW DIAGRAM OF CONTENT ANALYSIS CATEGORIES : **CHART B**



sophistication, depth, and accuracy of the account.

The source category is inter-related and affects all the other categories. For a story to be accurate (category two), it must be based on reliable information about the event. For a story to avoid being ethnocentric (category three), and to insure balanced coverage of non-European/American deaths in a conflictual situation, the reporter has to be sensitive to foreign cultures and legitimate expressions of patriotism. The opportunities to make contacts with the domestic population and to forego reliance on State Department reports decreases the possibility of distorted, ethnocentric coverage.

Economic issues (category five), are related to the source category because of the many European and American business interests in Southern Africa which may possibly influence press coverage. European and American economic business interests are decisive factors. Apartheid, the exploitation of African labor, and minority regimes are central issues for the U.S. press in explaining both the background to and the reasons behind the crisis.

The emotional language category is related to the source category because of the multiplicity of opinions about the coloration and affective symbols attached to the people and institutions. For example, if a report consults the South African government for a description of Biko, the officials would call him a terrorist; conversely, a member

of SASO would describe Biko as an African hero. Unless the reporter has a primary relationship with the subject, the coloration is determined by the sources consulted.

The primary focus of an analysis of the categories is to determine the accuracy (category two), of the U.S. press coverage of African events. Although centered around the accuracy category, the five other categories interact independently; the aggregate data presents a schema for depicting the characteristics of press coverage on African crisis events.

Section VII. The Accuracy of American Press Coverage of the Event as judged by diviation from reconstructed approximation of the event.

This section would highlight the identifiable inaccuracies in the U.S. press coverage of African affairs. The coding will be:

Accurate - The test for accuracy will be substantial agreement between the constructed approximation account compiled from bibliographic reports, historical accounts, judicial findings, and interviews with relevant reporters and the newspaper coverage being analyzed here.

Inaccurate - The test the inaccuracy of the news articles will be discrepancies between the constructed approximation

it brought to power governments in Mozambique and Angola which had no reason to be thankful to the West and very solid reasons for being grateful to the communist nations;

It strengthened African belief in the value of armed struggle; and

it seriously undermined the old established power structure of the white regimes in southern Africa.

I contend Kissinger's miscalculation concerning the viability of Portugal and the ability of Angolan nationalists to enlist foreign aid and military strength to defeat and to force Portugal to withdraw was premised on three fallacious assumptions:

that Portugal was economically healthier than it actually was;

that there existed in Portugal a political consensus which agreed with government policy in the area--that political dissidents were in the minority;

that foreign nations, such as Cuba, would not intervene in the civilwar or at least that the U.S. could obfuscate their attempts.

We can assume that Portugal's defeat caught U.S. policy analysts by surprise because the guidelines provided by the Kissinger Study on Southern Africa suggested that white minority regimes in the area were secure, as a result of this ill-founded belief, "the U.S. government had suspended major subsidies to Holden Roberto in 1969 and closed its stations in Mozambique and Angola as an economic measure and

and the press accounts. In most cases, I will not have a basis upon which to assess the truthfulness or accuracy of the reporter's account but in the instances where the errors are identifiable they will be noted.

In this category it is important to make a distinction between:

- 1) inaccuracies that are attributed to the source where the reporter received his information, or
- 2) inaccuracies due to the reporter's handling and own interpretations.

For example, Anthony Lewis, a columnist for the New York Times, mis-reported a blatant act of torture executed by the South African security police to Steve Biko hours before he died. In "Too Late the Phalarope," September 15, 1977, Lewis wrote: "Steve Biko was flown 800 miles from a prison in Port Elizabeth to a hospital in Pretoria."¹²¹ Biko was supposedly flown to Pretoria after sustaining head injuries. The post-mortem examination by the Chief State Pathologist there determined five brain lesions as the cause of death. According to the inquest records, both Colonel Goosen, Chief of the Security Policy in the Eastern Cape, and Captain D. P. Siebert of the interrogation security team admitted that Mr. Biko was driven to Pretoria because of the

¹²¹"Too Late The Phalarope," The New York Times, September 15, 1977, p. A.27.

unavailability of military planes. The only "official" source supplying the information that Biko was flown to Pretoria for medical treatment was the South African police department officials before the inquest. Louis' reliance on South African government stories, in this instance, is particularly unfortunate because the rest of Lewis' reporting could be characterized as broad-minded.

The issue, then, is whether American reporters writing about serious political or economic questions accept unhesitatingly one sided points of view either through ethnocentric or national interests and ignore countervailing African points of view. The source of information has a direct bearing on the fundamental parameters of questions taken to be valid and pursued. The sources can make a difference between who is portrayed as the aggressor or the victim. Reliable news articles depend on accurate information as a basis for making an adequate assessment and analysis of the event. Concluding Notes

The methodology for this dissertation includes theme content analysis of news clippings from the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal, those are subjected to statistical analyses to determine the frequency and qualitative characteristics of the material where the specified categories/themes appear in the American prestigious

newspapers. A baseline account or "colligation" is constructed to contrast and compare press accounts.

Interviews with American journalists, including some of those who reported my selected case studies, were used to explicate editorial policy in regards to African political issues and journalistic parameters in reporting crisis events--particularly those which challenge Western involvement.

Another technique used to assess distortion and balance in the newspaper coverage, was an analysis of affective usage of adjectives and adverbs in relation to African events, leaders and organizations.

All these techniques were applied to the analysis of three case studies, used to examine how the American prestige press reports crisis events in Africa. The case studies were: the assassination of Steve Biko, the Cuban intervention in Angola, and the election of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 3

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN MARIA'S WAR

THE CASE OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL
WAR¹²²Introduction:

On November 11, 1975, the Portuguese, after five centuries of colonial administration, lowered their flag in the midst of a civil war--a civil war that developed first from an anti-colonial struggle against Portuguese rule; and then out of a domestic ideological squabble between diverse Angolan nationalist factions. The Angolan conflict among the three nationalist contenders for power developed into an international conflict between the two super-powers and their allies. Angola, like its predecessor and neighbor the Congo (now Zaire), had become the scene of Soviet-American rivalry, the "cold war".

As Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA movement in the Angolan war, once said: "When elephants fight the grass gets hurt . . . the elephants are the two world powers

¹²²Maria's war refers to a rural insurgency in Angola in 1960, responding to Portuguese forced labor regulations in the cotton-growing area of Kasanje.

(referring to the intervention of the U.S. and the Soviet Union) and the grass is the Africans." And indeed, the Angolan civil war was a devastatingly destructive war. Thousands of Angolans and Portuguese died in the course of the war.

Chapter III is an attempt to understand whether the U.S. press has a political orientation or a particular political perspective which can be assessed and diagnosed. Does the U.S. press have a particular political perspective when covering African crises? Ultimately, the Angolan war became a particularly difficult crisis for the American press to cover objectively, because of U.S. political and economic policies and interests. But more importantly for this investigation, how did the U.S. press report the activities of Cuba, South Africa and the United States?

This study will focus on answering the following questions: How did the U.S. press report the clandestine financial and advisory activities of its own government? Can we rely on the U.S. press to surrender an objective coverage of an event when its government or when its government's allies are endangered or involved? Considering how most African heads of state feel about South Africa--how did the U.S. press completely and fairly present South Africa's activities in Angola? Did the press report that South Africa and the U.S. were both supporting the FNLA and UNITA movements? Did the U.S. report that the Soviet Union

was supporting the MPLA? These are some of the questions which the empirical section will answer.

This chapter is divided into six sections. First, a background to the problem will be presented in order to provide a brief overview of Angolan/Portuguese history. The historical relationship between Angola and Portugal is intrinsic to an understanding of the development of the nationalist movements in Angola. Secondly, a section on the Portuguese policy of assimilation--the technique of 'divide and conquer'. Next, I will present comments on the economic conditions of Angola. The fourth section is a summation and identification of the nationalist contenders for political power in Angola. The fifth section concerns highlighting American foreign policy objectives in the Angolan case. The sixth section presents information on American allies in the civil war. Chapter Four is the presentation of the empirical findings of newspaper articles on the Angolan civil war, quantitatively discussed. The second half of Chapter Four is the concluding notes. Sections 1 through 6 are the most useful in providing a comparative framework in which to facilitate an analysis of the statistical data presented in Chapter Four. I shall begin this examination of American newspaper coverage of the Angolan civil war with section I, outlining the background to the problem of the Angolan Civil War.

Jose Craveirinha, a Mozambican nationalist, wrote of the colonial relationship during this period of cultural resistance: post W.W.II.¹²³

I am coal!
You tear me brutally from the ground
and make of me your mine, boss

I am coal
and you burn me, boss
to serve you forever as your driving force
but not forever, boss

I am coal
and must burn
and consume everything in the heat of my combustion

I am coal
and must burn, exploited
burn above like tar, my brother
until no more your mine, boss

I am coal
and must burn
and consume everything in the fire of my combustion

Yes, boss
I will be your coal.

Background to the Problem

Portugal, the first European power to establish colonies in Africa, occupied Angola for five centuries, yet two decades before the termination of Portuguese rule, scarcely one percent of the Angolan population could read Portuguese--the language of all commercial activities on an international

¹²³The African Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle For Southern Africa, Anchor Books/ Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1974. p.54-55.

scale and all educational institutions.¹²⁴ While Portugal claimed that she colonized Angola to facilitate the process of the civilization and assimilation of Angolan natives to European culture, at the end of her 500 years of residence in Angola less than 1% of Angola's population was considered "civilized." These statistics would suggest that for five centuries, Portugal imposed its rule in Angola in the name of Christianity, civilization and assimilation as a rationale for its economic exploitation and political domination.

An historical thread that links the great themes of Angolan history from its earliest contact with the Portuguese to November 1975 is its unrelenting resistance to this foreign domination. Angolans carried on the freedom struggle domestically when possible and in exile when political repression was intolerable.¹²⁵ In fact, John Marcum¹²⁶ argues that the investigation of Angolan politics offers the scholar the opportunity to understand the role of

¹²⁴John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. 1969. page 1.

¹²⁵Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York. 1972. page 130. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion. Ibid., pages 1-5.

¹²⁶John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1. Ibid., p. 10-11.

exile politics. This history of Portuguese rule and Angolan reaction in Africa has been well-documented, however. It is not my intention to provide even a brief historical overview, but rather a broad sketch of some of the events which precipitated and motivated the formation of the three principal nationalist movements: the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. This sketch is to provide a context in which to understand and appreciate the U.S. press coverage of the ensuing civil war and U.S. foreign policymakers' reaction to the crisis.

From Angola's earliest contact with the Portuguese its relationship has been one of exploitation and servitude. Although in 1446 Portugal was populated with approximately 1,000 African slaves, by 1575, 345,000 African citizens from the Kongo Kingdom had been captured into slavery in Portugal. In addition to seizing humans, the Portuguese sought to exploit the mineral resources of the area, such as ivory, gold, and an abundance of raw spices. The Portuguese found a flourishing imperial kingdom, well-developed African institutions, and stable kinship units upon their arrival in what is now known as Angola.¹²⁷

One of the most revealing episodes in Portuguese early colonial history occurred after the Portuguese discovery of the estuary of the Congo in 1482, when they found themselves in contact

¹²⁷Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements p. 189. There was the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo, and many other African communities. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 Ibid., page 2.

with the large Kongo kingdom, ruled over by a king, the Manikongo, from his capital at Mbanzakongo, the present-day Angolan city of Sao Salvador. The explorer Diego Cao returned to their native land four Africans who had been kidnapped a few years earlier and were much impressed by their stay in Portugal. This circumstance gained the Portuguese the confidence of the Manikongo, Nzingo-a-Cum, who, with the royal family and great chiefs, was converted to Christianity. His successor, Mbemba-a-Nzinga, became the Christian King of the Kongo, Affonso I. He turned wholeheartedly to his brother Christian monarchs King Manuel I and later King Joao III for assistance in westernizing his state. Portuguese missionaries, artisans, and traders were welcomed by the Kongo king, but he quickly discovered that most of the Portuguese were more interested in capturing the Congolese for slaves than in converting them to Christianity and introducing them to European science and technology. Although in 1446, Portugal was populated by approximately 1,000 African slaves,¹²⁸ by 1506 to 1575, 345,000 African citizens from the Kongo kingdom had been captured into slavery in Portugal. In addition to seizing humans, the Portuguese sought to exploit the mineral resources of the area, such as ivory, gold and an abundance of raw spices. King Affonso's pleading letters to Manuel I and Joao III about the behavior of the Portuguese in his kingdom often went unanswered. The belated Portuguese royal decrees against slaving were systematically sabotaged by the Portuguese authorities and plantation owners on Sao Tome. Affonso died a broken, disappointed man, and Portugal's "civilizing mission" in Africa was to remain essentially a cover for the greed of Europeans for black slaves and the exploitation of national resources.

Sexual Exploitation and Social Disintegration

¹²⁸Gerald J. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese- The Myth and The Reality, Ibid., page 13.

Within five centuries, the African kingdoms were destroyed, family units undermined, and the country torn asunder in a violent fratricidal civil war. Africans were displaced from their homelands to facilitate Portuguese economic interests and cash-crop production. The policy of assimilation defined as Portuguese rule over ". . . tropical, non-European territories . . . characterized by racially egalitarian legislation and human interaction." In reality this policy legitimized the fate of African women who were being raped, used as concubines, and sold into prostitution. However, many African women aborted themselves using blunt objects and herbs, and even "practiced infanticide rather than have children from the Portuguese."¹²⁹ This practice should be seen in the context of most African cultures which revere life. The children and the elderly hold highly-regarded positions in the African home. African women who committed infanticide and abortion should be seen as performing a daring and heroic act of resistance to Portuguese rule--no different from or less regarded than African male warriors, who, with spears and bare hands, fended off Portuguese armed with guns.

Still during the eighteenth century, the mulatto population outnumbered the Europeans by three or four to

¹²⁹Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese - The Myth and the Reality University of California Press-Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978 p.13 from footnote 33.

one, and enjoyed this numerical advantage well into the twentieth century. In May, 1966 Drew Middleton of the New York Times reported the unguarded comments of a Portuguese official who told him "bluntly, and probably realistically, that the presence in Angola of 50,000 troops from metropolitan Portugal would increase the birthrate of mulatto children," and who further predicted, with approval, that these mulattos would "have the future of Angola in their hands." To the same correspondent a "hard-bitten general officer" expressed his hope "that each Portuguese soldier [in Angola] would leave at least six mulatto children behind when he returned home." By creating a large mulatto class, the Portuguese were pursuing a tactic like assimilation-- creating a third class that further divided the society. In fact by 1950, with the advent of the contemporary national movements, one of the most important distinctions made by the people living in the villages between the Portuguese and Angolan soldiers during the course of the civil war was that the guerrillas did not molest or rape their women.

Portugal, in comparison to other European nations, was ranked as one of the poorest countries. Portugal's bleak economic picture made the exploitation of its colonies' resources a necessity rather than a luxury. So

when slavery was abolished in Angola in 1868,¹³⁰ it could only be replaced by a system of forced labor. If Portugal was to make a substantial profit from the colonies, laborers had to be abundant and labor costs cheap.

The Portuguese Practice of Forced Labor

The practice of forced labor or contract labor was not abolished until 1961 and then only under the impact and pressure of the nationalist movements. Forced African labor in Angola and the other Portuguese colonies was at the crux of African resentment of foreign rule and led to eventual development of the modern nationalist movements. British and French colonial administration also practiced forced labor, especially in the agricultural sector, but the Portuguese system was more pervasively carried out within the general public and violently enforced. The Portuguese government, under the guise of its "civilizing mission," forced everyone to work to support its government and to make the colonies not only profitable but also self-sufficient.

The colonial government issued an ordinance in 1899 titled the Native Labour Regulations for the colony. This regulation demanded:

All natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are

¹³⁰Bender, Ibid, page 30.

subject to the obligations, moral and legal, of attempting to obtain through work the means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition. They have full liberty to choose the method of fulfilling this obligation, but if they do not fulfill it, public authority may force a fulfillment.¹³¹

For the Portuguese, this was an attempt to "civilize" the institution of slavery, for under this system the indigena [African] could select his area of servitude and fulfill his obligations to the Portuguese state. Another method of involuntary labor forced upon the Angolan people was the system of "corrective labour," or "contract labour." Under this system, Angolans "could be seized by government officials, or the manager of private companies, and subjected to forced labour, for which he was paid a small wage."¹³² Under both systems of forced labor and "corrective labor," blatant acts of violence and humiliation were leveled against Angolans by the Portuguese. African chiefs were enlisted by the Portuguese to help organize a pool of laborers to fill the plantations of Portuguese ownership.

Because of such extremes repressive and violent actions by the Portuguese, African resistance was continual and increasingly more sophisticated with each new rebellion. Domestically, Portugal was in turmoil and when the

¹³¹Akintoye, The Emergent African States, Longman Press, London, England., p.47.

¹³²Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid, p.47.

republican government "achieved little or no success, the army seized power in 1926."¹³³ The army ruled Portugal for seven years, during which time no favorable social programs were implemented in either Portugal or the colony.

Akintoye asserts that one reason for such brutal repression in the Portuguese colonies was the crisis in Portuguese political leadership. Under the leadership of Dr. Antonio de Oliveria Salazar in 1933, Portugal itself was turned into

a ruthless police state, extending the same rule to the Portuguese colonies. It was a major part of Salazar's programme to use the colonies to rebuild Portugal economically and to give the Portuguese a feeling of national greatness. In 1968, when Salazar became too old and too ill to continue to rule, he was replaced by Professor Marcello Caetano, who promised to continue Salazar's colonial policies and did so until 1974.¹³⁴

The Portuguese Policy of Assimilation: The Technique of 'Divide and Conquer'

"God created the Portuguese and the Portuguese created the mestiso."--Bender, p. xxii.

Portugal's policy of assimilation went beyond simply accepting some Africans as assimulado. Portugal declared in

¹³³Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid, p.42.

¹³⁴Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid., page 42.

1951 that Angola was an "overseas province."¹³⁵ Portugal used the idea creating a multi-racial society in Africa as an instrument of foreign diplomacy to justify its colonial policies. "And to a certain degree, it worked." In 1923, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, attending the third Pan-African Congress, had noted without ever condoning colonialism, that "Between the Portuguese and the African and near-African there is naturally no 'racial' antipathy--no accumulated historical hatreds, dislikes, despisings."¹³⁶ U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers advised President Nixon that the declared Portuguese policy of racial tolerance was an important factor in the colonies' progress toward self-determination. It was thought, as late as 1970, that assimilation held genuine hope for the future.

Bender suggests, that to understand Portuguese rule in Angola, one must understand the ideology used to justify Portuguese government as opposed to British or French rule, [especially since they all claimed to be civilizing missions]. The Portuguese ideology was "lusotropicalism": the assertion that Portuguese colonialism was unique because it did not entail racist notions and "could be characterized by racially egalitarian legislation and human

¹³⁵Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese - The Myth and The Reality, Ibid., p.xx.

¹³⁶Gerald Bender, Ibid, p. xxii.

interaction."¹³⁷ But Portugal's claim to elevate Africans to the level of Europeans was in itself a racist notion. Lusotropicalism as the national foreign policy of Portugal was used to justify its interest in Angolan soil and its exploitation of its people and minerals.

Inside Angola, the government by 1950 had passed a series of regulations defining the legal status of Africans. Angolans were subdivided into two categories: the indigenous "uncivilized," and the assimilado "black-skinned Portuguese." These distinctions were felt not only socially but economically as well. The indigenas were not recognized as legal entities having civil rights, entitlement to property or a right to a minimum standard of living. Akintoye states:

In some cases, an indigena could not even slaughter, sell or give away his cattle, or withdraw money from his bank account, without permission. In short, Portuguese laws regarded the mass of Africans as savages without civil or human rights.¹³⁸

In other words, the indigena was on the lowest rung of the social and economic scale in Angola. This class provided the work forces of involuntary laborers or contract servants on the rural plantations of Portuguese businessmen.

The assimulado, defined as an Angolan who could

¹³⁷Gerald Bender, p.3.

¹³⁸Akintoye, Emergent African States, Longmans Publishing Company, London, England. 1976. p.43.

acquire the social amenities of the Portuguese, such as western dress, social and dietary habits and mannerisms and language, could qualify to become an assimulado. Many Africans became assimulado, needless to say, not because they cherished the ideals which such a humiliating concept justified, but because of the economic benefits to them and their family. An assimulado, unlike his indigena counterpart, was exempt from involuntary labor conditions and their children could receive an education. The assimulado class was always very small, approximately 1% of the population. Its real purposes in the colonial plan and administration was to act as a buffer between the African population and the Europeans.

The concept of divide and rule was actually used throughout the colonies regardless of the national origin of the colonial masters. But the Portuguese, by allowing more civil and human rights to the assimulado and mulatto, provoked envy and resentment, extending in some cases from the general population to the small class. This study contends that the mulatto and assimulado classes were to be used as middlemen to protect Portuguese interests and to justify their racial policy on a national level.

Ironically, it would be Angolans from the mulatto and assimulado class who would formulate and organize the MPLA, which eventually caused the demise of Portuguese rule in Angola. Nevertheless, one of the primary concerns and

criticisms, as articulated by Savimbi, was that the MPLA were mulattos and assimilados and should not be trusted with the future of the masses of Angolan indigenas. Savimbi devoted a large segment of his propaganda to instilling distrust in Africans towards mulattos. So that the Portuguese, in creating a new class to instill distrust among Angolans, were not altogether unsuccessful. However, the mulatto and assimilado problems presented by the leadership of the MPLA seemed minor to the general population of Angolans when compared to the major obstacles of continued Portuguese rule: compulsory labor, segregated and discriminatory work, low wage practices, violent punishments, inadequate schools and hospitals, sexual violation of Angolan women, land displacement and Portuguese control of the life and destinies of Angolans. These were some of the concerns that led to the development of the modern nationalist movements.

Economic Conditions

Portuguese colonial administration in its economic, political and cultural policies can be closely compared with the South African apartheid system. The Portuguese system of racial intolerance blunted and suffocated the participation of Angolans in every avenue of their national and, at times, personal lives. The extensive use of forced labor, brutal violence against dissidents, the humiliating

social strata of indigena assimilado policy, the sexual debasement and abuse of Angolan women and subsequently the development of an alienated mulatto community and the exploitation of Angola's rich national and mineral resources for the development of Portugal sparked the development of nationalist movements in Angola. The U.S. press would have to grasp the economic exploitation and political impotence that Angolans responded to in 1961 to understand their commitment to self-determination, which, given the structure of Portuguese administration, was their only alternative. George Jackson provides a statement which captures the great intensity of Angolan nationalist feeling when he stated, "we shall be free or the Earth will be levelled by our determination."¹³⁹ Nkrumah's message was that "Even good government can not be a substitute for self-government!" The U.S. press, in covering the Angolan civil war, was faced with understanding a very sophisticated level of nationalist sentiment--a level of hostility directed at the Portuguese that was so intense it could be likened to the activities of black women in Portuguese settlements who committed infanticide rather than bear a Portuguese child. For the most part, Angolan society convulsed at the sight of the Portuguese.

¹³⁹George Jackson, "Soledad Brothers: Prison Notes," Bantam Books, Toronto, New York, London, 1978.

The poverty of Portugal as a nation, in comparison with Great Britain and France during the colonial period, provides one explanation for why the exploitation of Angola's resources was so vitally important. Even though Angola is, next to South Africa, one of the most richly endowed areas in Africa, Portugal was too poor to solely exploit its resources.¹⁴⁰ As a result, Portugal invited foreign businesses into Angola to provide the capital and technology to participate in extracting the minerals while taking a share in the profits.¹⁴¹

Angola is very wealthy in national and mineral resources. Its oil deposits are in great demand by foreign multinational corporations.¹⁴² The largest company operating in Angola is the U.S. Gulf Corporation, its contract for prospecting and extracting oil not terminating in the year 2010.¹⁴³ The U.S., after extracting the unrefined oil from Angola, processed the product, then resold the oil back to Portugal. ¹⁴⁴ Seidman states:

By the mid-1970's. . . oil had become Angola's

¹⁴⁰Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid., p.44.

¹⁴¹Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁴²Southern Africa- The Escalation of a Conflict, Praeger Publisher - New York, Washington, London, 1976. Sweden. p. 43.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 43.

main export. Most of it was produced by U.S. Gulf Oil which had begun in the 1960s to exploit the very rich reserves of Cabinda, the isolated enclave cut off from the rest of Angola by the coastal tip of Zaire. By 1975, Gulf was producing close to 160,000 barrels a day from 120 wells, the second largest operating field in black-controlled Africa. There were recurrent reports that Texaco had pinpointed petroleum deposits off-shore from Angola proper that made the Cabinda fields look small. Gulf continued to produce oil until it reportedly was told by the U.S. State Department to close down rather than to pay royalties to the newly installed MPLA government.¹⁴⁵

The royalties from Gulf Oil, in 1969 amounting to \$11 million in taxes, actually helped finance the Portuguese government's military response to the nationalist movements during the initial period of revolt. The \$11 million that Gulf paid the Lisbon government was approximately half of the 1970 military budget of the Portuguese administration in Angola.¹⁴⁶

Angola's second and third most important exports were also controlled by foreign companies.¹⁴⁷ In 1972, the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (DIAMANG), a subsidiary of De Beers Consolidated Ltd. of South Africa, produced "over 2 million karats [of diamonds] valued at about \$110

¹⁴⁵Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and United States Multinational Corporation, Lawrence Hill and Co. Westport, California. 1977. page 199.

¹⁴⁶Ernest Harsh, Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Pathfinder Press, Inc. New York, New York. 1976, p.19.

¹⁴⁷Ernest Harsh, Tony Thomas, Ibid., page 19.

million."¹⁴⁸ Angola's migrant laborers, working at less than subsistence wages, picked coffee beans on Portuguese plantations and the land-owners sold the product to big coffee companies in the U.S. Seidman comments on the state of the Angolan economy at independence:

. . . Angola remained a typically warped, colonial-type of economy. Over 80% of its exports were still sold in unprocessed form, mostly petroleum, \$230 million in 1973; coffee, \$205 million; diamonds, \$80 million; and iron ore, \$49 million. Most of its imports were manufactured goods.¹⁴⁹

Oil, diamonds and coffee are only part of the list of valuable resources the Angolan nationalist movements sought to control in order to develop and enrich Angola instead of Portugal or other foreign countries. Angola is also rich in iron ore, manganese, phosphates (exploited by the Chromalloy American Corp.), copper, beryl, kaolin, granite, marble, sea salt, asphalt rock, gypsum, gold, mica, fuluminous slate, coal, sulphur, and silicate have also been discovered."¹⁵⁰

However, under Portuguese colonialism, the living standard and wage scale did not reflect the immense wealth or payments by the multinational corporations to Portugal.

¹⁴⁸Ernest Harsh, Tony Thomas, Ibid., p.19.

¹⁴⁹Seidman, South Africa and United States Multinational Corporations, Ibid., page 198.

¹⁵⁰Ernest Harsh, Tony Thomas, Ibid., page. 20.

For the Angolan workers and peasants, as well as the Portuguese workers, the wealth of Angola did not trickle down to meet their needs or demands. According to a study of income distribution in Southern Africa, The Escalation of a Conflict,

In 1960 minimum wages were established by law and varied in 1965 between \$34.00 to \$204.00 per month for [African] semi-skilled and skilled workers. The monthly rural wage paid for unskilled laborers in Angola averaged \$7.50 in cash and \$11.60 in allowances.¹⁵¹

We must remember, too, that many Angolans during this period were also forced to perform involuntary labor on Portuguese plantations.

The Portuguese rationale for administering its colonies in order to civilize the inhabitants cannot be substantiated by either its growth in educational facilities or land reforms that might have aided the entrance of indigenous Angolas into their own economy. In the educational sphere, Angola in 1950-51, one of the most developed Portuguese colonies, had only 13,586 children attending primary school, 2,277 in secondary schools, 1,548 in technical schools.¹⁵² In 1960, only eleven Africans from the Portuguese territory of Quisca had "acquired graduate

¹⁵¹Southern Africa, The Escalation of a Conflict, Ibid., page 30.

¹⁵²Akintoye, Emergent African States, Ibid., page 47.

status at University and high schools in Portugal.¹⁵³ As Walter Rodney points out in "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa," "Africans went into colonialism with a hoe and came out of colonialism with a hoe."¹⁵⁴

Prior to 1974, it was generally illegal for an Angolan to individually own land in the rural areas; land ownership was reserved for the Portuguese government and plantation owners. The "Study on Southern Africa" informs us that

. . . Europeans could obtain concessions of up to \$50,000 hectares and foreign companies still more. In Angola. . . the average European coffee farmer owning 100 hectares could have an annual income of \$28,000, but an African farmer was restricted to only one or two hectares, and consequently earned only around two percent of that amount. By 1971, 60 percent of the cultivable land in Angola consisted of large farms belonging almost exclusively to Europeans.

The proverbial "colonizing mission" of the Portuguese was an excuse to plunder, rape, exploit, and attempt to destroy Angolan society for five centuries. The resistance of Angolans to the Portuguese from one generation to the next is the miracle of human determination to exalt freedom and condemn slavery. The Portuguese history and practice of abusing Angolan wealth and labor should have been summarily

¹⁵³John Seiler, Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980. p. 32.

¹⁵⁴Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Howard University Press, Washington D.C., 1978. p.219.

condemned by the American press and American policy makers representing a country such as the United States which exalts freedom and liberty. The notion that an Angolan nationalist movement was fighting for "communist" ideals as opposed to the multitude of legitimate reasons provided so splendidly by Portuguese colonial practices, prompted Amilcar Cabral, a Guinean leader, to state:

The people are not fighting for ideas, for things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children."¹⁵⁵

Identification of the Nationalist Contenders for Political Power in Angola

Angolan wars of resistance to Portuguese influence and administration can be traced back as early as 1575. Riots, demonstrations, and strikes against Portuguese interests have marked a resilient Angolan history. Portuguese repression was so violent because Angolan resistance was so persistent. Angolans never accepted Portuguese rule, and the Portuguese, because of their demand for cheap or free labor and capital, desperately required their African colonies. The antagonism between Portugal and Angola was unsolvable and made eventual victory for the

¹⁵⁵"Southern Africa," Ibid., p.46

Africans of Angola very costly. One can only wonder if that energy had been directed towards economic, political and cultural development, what would have been the attainments of that society. In 1975, after five centuries of Portuguese rule, Angola was a nation torn asunder, its ethnic groups distrustful of each other, and Western nations using its fields and playgrounds to prove their national military supremacy. The nationalist movements arose out of the crevice of Portuguese colonialism to challenge the right of non-Africans to control the destiny of Angola and her resources. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led by Agostinho Neto, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) led by Holden Roberto, and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) led by Jonas Savimbi were the three most cohesive national organizations challenging Portuguese rule by 1961. The history of these movements has been well documented by John Marcum's, The Angolan Revolution, and other African and Africanist scholars.¹⁵⁶ The parameters of this investigation do not allow a detailed examination of the formation of these nationalist movements; rather this study will provide only a brief account of the three movements, their leaders, and ethnic representations necessary for an analysis of the

¹⁵⁶Basil Davidson, In the Eye Of The Storm, Doubleday and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York. 1972.

U.S. press coverage of these movements. Did the American press coverage favor one nationalist group to the exclusion of the others? How did the U.S. press label the different groups? How closely did U.S. press favorable coverage of particular movements conform to U.S. policy and backing of the nationalist movements? How objective was the U.S. press in presenting the motives and objectives of the three nationalist movements? A brief examination of the three groups struggling for power in Angola must be set forth. What was the character of the MPLA and its constituency and leadership?

A: "The Movimento para a Independencia de Angola"

The MPLA, founded in 1956, was influenced by the Portuguese Communist Party, which was the parent of the Angolan Communist Party (PCA). Its composition, ironically enough, was mestiso and some assimulado, the more favored classes; its base was in Luanda and other urbanized areas. At first, the MPLA was a clandestine nationalist party, because of Portuguese laws prohibiting African political organizations. Since, Portuguese administration, mestisos and assimulados were singled out to be educated, the MPLA's leadership was highly intellectual and informed.

The extensive arrests in 1959 of Angolan political dissidents and the 1960 incarceration of Dr. Agostinho Neto plunged the movement into thinking and intensifying its

strategy and direction. The arrest of Dr. Neto inspired a mass peaceful protest demonstration of approximately 1,000 villagers.¹⁵⁷ Portuguese soldiers and auxiliary forces policing the event responded violently. At the end, 30 were dead and over 200 wounded. On the following day these soldiers went to Icolo and Bengo and killed or arrested everyone who was found in the two villages, which were then set on fire. The villages were "totally destroyed, with not a single soul left in them."¹⁵⁸

In 1956, the MPLA had issued a "declaration to fight for independence" to all Angolans. This manifesto announcing the formation of the MPLA and requesting the "unification of the nationalist movement" said:

The objectives of imperialism's exploitation and oppression of the Angolan people are now, and will continue to be, the obtainment of maximum profits.

The entire administration of Angola is in the hands of the colonialist State. All aspects of Angolan social existence have been disorganized and annihilated. Our history has been reduced to silence, deformed and distorted.

We have been humiliated both as individuals and as people. Colonialism has injected the germs of destruction, hatred, backwardness, poverty, obscurantism, reaction into the Angolan body. The road we have been thrust upon is contrary to the higher interests of the Angolan people, to our survival, to our freedom, to rapid and free economic progress, to our well-being, our bread, our earth, peace and culture for all.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 39.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 39.

Seven years later, the MPLA implemented its first military attack for independence and against Portuguese colonialism. February 4, 1961, marked the beginning of contemporary struggle in Angola. Neto described the beginning of armed struggle in Luanda in this manner:

When the repression had reached its peak and many comrades had been arrested for their patriotic activities, several MPLA members in Luanda decided to attack the prisons and police posts in order to free those arrested.

First, they attacked a patrol and seized its weapons, then, so armed, they proceeded to attack the police posts and prisons. The operation was not altogether successful, as they did not succeed in setting the prisoners free, but it helped to awaken the people to the imperative need to fight, and the Portuguese were faced with an unexpected situation, the prelude to the difficulties they would begin to confront in maintaining their rule.¹⁶⁰

The MPLA had decided to release militarily its members held in prisons and police barracks. Before dawn, over 200 members of the MPLA converged on a police station and on Sao Paulo fortress.¹⁶¹

The Portuguese police were a worthy opponent, and African casualties were high: forty Africans were killed in contrast to seven Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese

¹⁵⁹The African Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle For Southern Africa, Anchor Books/ Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1974. p. 187.

¹⁶⁰The African Research Group, Ibid., 1974.

¹⁶¹Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976. p. 211.

retaliated violently on February 5th, after the funeral of their comrades, by murdering indiscriminately Africans in Luanda.¹⁶² The MPLA staged another attempted prison-break on February 10th, which was marked again by comparatively high African casualties. Again, the Portuguese retaliated, "in a full-scale massacre of Africans and mestizo."¹⁶³ Hundreds of innocent Africans were murdered by the Portuguese to set a precedent and issue a gloomy warning to political dissidents and opponents.

The man whose arrests sparked this activity and who would later become Angola's first prime minister, Dr. Agostinho Neto, was born in the village of Benço on September 17, 1922,¹⁶⁴ he was a member of the Mbundu ethnic group. His father was a Methodist pastor and held the distinction of being one of the few Africans educated at Licen Salavor Correia in Luanda.¹⁶⁵ Neto's first contact with radical politics came while he was a medical student in Lisbon, when he became actively involved in an anti-Salazar political group, and was jailed several times because of his poems and political activities. He returned

¹⁶²Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 221.

¹⁶⁵John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 37.

to Angola in 1955, determined to educate and arouse the masses to political action against the Portuguese and to play a leading role in that movement. On June 8, 1960, Dr. Neto was beaten in the presence of members of his family and again carted off to jail. But the repression and humiliation by the Portuguese only instilled more determination in the members of the MPLA to oust the Portuguese from Angola. Neto wrote that there was a new "realization" and strength of determination in the air.

Fear in the air!

On each street corner
 Vigilant sentries light incendiary glances
 in each house
 hasty replacement of the old bolts
 of the doors
 and in each conscience
 seethes the fear of listening to itself

History is to be told

Fear in the air!

It happens that I
 humble man
 still more humble in my black skin
 come back to Africa

to myself
 with dry
 eyes.¹⁶⁶

The similarities in philosophy between the
 Guinean Bissau liberation movement and the Angolan MPLA

¹⁶⁶Basil Davidson, In The Eye of the Storm,
 Doubleday and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York, New
 York. 1972. p. 39.

are interesting to note. Unlike the leaders of the newly-independent Tanzania and Nigeria, who believed in independence was a goal in itself and offered no program of development differing substantially from colonial goals, the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and in Angola under Neto's leadership produced a well-thought out concept of their "new society" after independence. The leaders articulated their goals and propagandized their program in quite sophisticated language. Humberto Traca, a MPLA representative, remarked:

. . . Many groups have formed to resist the Portuguese colonial presence. One response was the formation in 1956 of the MPLA. The MPLA is a coalition of political groups and individuals who joined together to rid Angola of its Portuguese oppressors and in the process to create a new society. Our aim is not only to free the country, but also to make a revolution. That is to say, not only to wipe out the Portuguese, but also the change all the existing structures in Angolan society. Today our fight is at the stage of a national liberation struggle; we think we'll have to go further when we have independence. But we'll have to continue our revolution, continue to change the structure of Angolan society thoroughly. We must start building toward that now. Let's say that it is in the liberated zones that we are trying to create the embryo of the Angolan society of tomorrow.

The Angolan people, a colonized people, like all the colonized people in the world, are a people who have had their minds distorted by colonization itself. In our particular case it's been even worse, because we've been colonized for five centuries. So it's rather hard to change the minds of a people who have been colonized so long. It's hard, and we often feel it, but it's possible.¹⁶⁷

The MPLA's basic aim then, was to depose of Portuguese rule and any possible neo-colonial relationship. In Fanonian terms, the leaders sought to create a new society, new possibilities in helping its members create a government where equality and dignity would replace the colonial structure of racism and humiliation. The MPLA repeatedly sought U.S. help in fighting Portuguese colonialism. Basil Davidson intervened unsuccessfully a number of times however, the United States government claimed that, because the movement was Marxist, it would not finance its operations. Conversely, the MPLA claimed that, while there were Marxists in the organization, it was fundamentally a mixed movement involving Marxist, socialist, and capitalist: In fact, one of the founding members, who later joined the FNLA, Da Cruz, was reportedly expelled because of his Marxist tendencies.

¹⁶⁷The African Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle For Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 184.

B: "Frete Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA)"

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was represented by Holden Roberto, a member of the Bakongo ethnic group. When the Congo (now Zaire) was declared independent in 1960, the Bakongo people who constituted a single ethnic group in both Zaire and Angola, were both joyous over Zaire's liberation and increasingly hostile to Portuguese administration of Angola. Roberto, according to Marcum, was educated in Leopoldville, and graduated from the BMS school in 1940. He met Patrice Lumumba, who eventually became Prime Minister of the Congo, at the Cercle des Evolves. Roberto was initially a Bakongo nationalist and helped organize the Uniao dos Populacoes do Norte de Angola (UPNA) which later became the UPA. At first, he envisioned a return to the throne by the king of the Kongo Kingdom, but when Roberto attended the First All-African Peoples Conference in 1958, he was convinced by George Padmore and other scholars that returning to pre-colonial political forms would only handicap the national development of Angola and Africa as a whole. Roberto was advised to lead an anti-colonial movement and seek consolidation and amalgamation of his organization with other movements fighting the Portuguese. Gibson writes that the

pressure for some unity was so great that in March 1962 the UPA entered into an alliance with the

smaller Partido Democratico Angolana (PDA), which was based on the Zombo tribe on the Bakonqo peoples. Together they formed the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) on 28 March, 1962, and month later set up the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), with Roberto as premier, Emmanuel Kunziha of the PDA and Msgr. Manuel Mendes da Neves, the former Vicar-General of Angola as vice-premiers, and an Ovimbundu, Jonas Savimbi, as foreign minister established a base inside Zaire formerly the Congo Kinshasa.

On March 15, 1961, the Unico dos Populacoes de Angola (UPA) commenced military offensives against the Portuguese in the countryside.¹⁶⁸ This attack occurred, possibly pre-maturely, while Roberto was preparing to deliver a paper on Angola before the UN Security Council. No doubt, the timing was deliberately planned to emphasize the gravity and seriousness of the situation. Roberto confirmed the reports of the attack and insisted that this was just the genesis of the crisis. The FNLA, like the MPLA, was ill-equipped to combat the Portuguese military forces. The FNLA incurred substantial casualties. Gibson states that

It is estimated that 750 Portuguese lost their lives in the first three months of fighting, while Portuguese forces killed some 20,000 Africans in a campaign to exterminate all who supported the revolution. Some 150,000 black survivors had fled to the Congo by the end of 1961.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, *ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁶⁹Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, *ibid.*, p. 228.

Franz Fanon wrote passionately about the heroic event on March 15, 1961. Fanon, a veteran of the African National Liberation Movement commented:

We may remember that on the 15th of March 1961 a group of two or three thousand Angolan peasants threw themselves against the Portuguese positions. Men, women and children, armed and unarmed, afire with courage and enthusiasm, then flung themselves in successive waves of compact masses upon the districts where the soldiers and the Portuguese flag held sway...¹⁷⁰

In 1965, a major breakthrough occurred for the FNLA, when Tshombe (Luuumba's successor) was over-thrown and General Joseph Mobutu became head of state in Zaire.

Roberto is related to Gen. Mobutu through his marriage, but the relationship between Roberto and Mobutu extends beyond family ties; it is an old friendship. Mobutu lifted restrictions on FNLA and GRAE activities and pledged his full "support for the Angolan revolution."¹⁷¹ Mobutu's support gave the FNLA a base from which to mount military raids deep into Angola. Later, during the period of foreign intervention, Zaire was a convenient point to unload military equipment earmarked for Angola.

C: "Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)"

¹⁷⁰Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, ibid., p. 228.

¹⁷¹Richard Gibson, Ibid., p. 228.

The UNITA organization led by Jonas Savimbi was the smallest of the three contending Angolan nationalist movements. UNITA's origins can be traced back to March 1966 in an area of Angola called Luso.¹⁷² The UNITA organization did not form an extensive exile organization like the FNLA and MPLA. Yet, considering its youth and inexperience, the UNITA organization after a relatively brief period was able to forge a combative unit and mount concerted military offensives against the Portuguese and, at times, rival nationalist groups.

Dr. Savimbi is from the Ovimbundu ethnic group, a member of a prominent family in the Bie district. He received a doctorate from the University of Lausanne in political and juridical sciences. Savimbi's political career started with the membership in the FNLA (GRAE), of which he was elected Foreign Minister in 1962, strategic and central position because he was one of the few non-Bakongo members. Savimbi's position and membership was a testimony to the multi-ethnic character of the FNLA leadership. Yet, despite appeals (both domestically and internationally) for greater unity among the Angolan nationalist groups, Savimbi vacated his position in the FNLA and opted to organize an independent movement. Savimbi's official resignation was

¹⁷²Richard Gibson, *Ibid.*, p.234.

given at the OAU summit conference in Cairo, July 16, 1964. In Savimbi's resignation, he complained of, "the deficiencies of the GRAE, and especially its failure to mobilize the popular masses inside Angola."¹⁷³

The UNITA organization was formally declared in March, 1966. Savimbi delivered a nine-point program which did not radically differ from the goals of the MPLA or FNLA.¹⁷⁴ In this program Savimbi outlined UNITA'S commitment to ". . . full independency, anti-imperialist solidarity, a planned economy, a programme of industrialization, and adherence to the U.N. charter and the principles of the Organization of African Unity." Savimbi, consistently throughout the civil war, requested conferences with the leaders of FNLA and MPLA made to form a united front against Portuguese military offensives.

Savimbi is reported to have been influenced by Marxism-Leninism and frustrated while a member of the FNLA at their political or non-ideological orientation. Savimbi, writes Gibson, "wanted more emphasis on more attention on the political indoctrination of the peasant masses: more stress on the teachings of great revolutionaries like Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh, less Protestant Bible

¹⁷³Richard Gibson, Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁷⁴Richard Gibson, Ibid., p.236.

readings."¹⁷⁵ Savimbi's position in 1961-1966 was inconsistent with Roberto's more conservative political orientation. A split between the two was inevitable.

Initially Savimbi's UNITA was organized based on his Leninist principle of democratic centralism.¹⁷⁶ The Party was divided into two parts: the central committee at the national level and on the local level--the cell. UNITA's military division was called the "Forças Armadas de Libertação."¹⁷⁷ The Central Committee of UNITA issued a platform entitled Angola--Seventh Year--which declared:

- 1) the systematic mobilization and organization of the peasants inside the country, as a main force of struggle.
- 2) integration of intellectual and military cadres inside and outside Angola in the struggle side by side with the broad masses
- 3) refusal to rely on military camps created in neighboring countries for the sake of external propaganda.
- 4) active participation of all the people from both rural and urban areas in the general resistance against foreign domination.
- 5) refusal to be led by big foreign powers. The big powers are trying today more than ever for another Yalta and this time through peaceful competition, faith in unity and cooperation of all the Angolans in this phase of national liberation.

The idealism that marked the Savimbi of 1961-1966 would soon fade. The liberation war in Angola was more sophisticated (in terms of strategy) and expensive than Savimbi had

¹⁷⁵Richard Gibson, *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹⁷⁶Richard Gibson, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

¹⁷⁷Richard Gibson, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

imagined. Generally, the power contest was between Neto and Roberto. Savimbi would be relegated to a third party begging for unity at every possible opportunity and aid from whomever would listen.

American Foreign Policy Initiatives in Angola

This section will focus on American policy objectives in Angola during the civil war. Unavoidably, larger issues concerning Southern Africa will be calculated into the analysis. The independence of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have forced American, European and South African policymakers to define their relationship and strategy in their interaction with these new political personalities, either defending their economic interests in Portuguese colonial areas or ridding themselves of political dissidents and liberation fighters in Namibia.

From South Africa's perspective, since all the former Portuguese colonies had declared themselves vehemently opposed to South African apartheid practices, and announced their inclination to pursue a socialist path to development, the independence of these nations has signalled its entrapment and inevitable or potential demise and forced it to take military offensive against African nations. South Africa claimed that its military missions were all defensive.

American foreign policy has alternately been

influenced by its relationship to European nations with former colonies, its (unofficial) relationship to South Africa, and its NATO partnership with Portugal. America's friendly relationship with Zaire and Zambia was a decisive factor in which political movement it supported during the Angolan Civil War. America's involvement in the tragic Angolan civil war was a logical progression of its anti-communist, anti-African nationalist, balance-of-power view of the world. American policy in Angola did not take into consideration the historical or political variables which propelled thousands of Angolan farmers, peasants, students, intellectuals, assimilados and indigenas alike to face death rather than to submit to continued Portuguese administration.

The importance of this section is twofold: first, to understand what American foreign policy in Angola was during this crisis, and second, to present enough information on America's policy in Angola to prepare this investigation for a subsequent section of the the U.S. press's presentation of events to the American public and policymakers. Did the American press attempt to render a balanced picture of the Cuban involvement in the crisis? Did the American press effectively describe one group more than another? These are some of the issues which can be discussed in the empirical section, after we sketch what the American role in the Angolan civil war has been reported to

have been. First, it would be useful to frame our discussion of political intervention by defining that term.

A brief scan of the literature on this topic immediately alerts one to the diverse perspectives, definitions and political paradigms within which one views this concept. Scholars on both ends of the ideological scale agree that the term is both value laden and subject to misinter-pretation and cultural interpretation. American scholars are skeptical or at best weary when third world scholars charge that intervention or neo-imperialism is simply a euphemism for imperialism.

What one finds with rare consistency is that Western analysts are generally more comfortable with the notion of intervention while Third World analysts conceptualize the problem as one of imperialism. Morgenthau, in his Politics Among Nations, is one of the rare exceptions to this rule. He argues that the "balance of power" issue is derived from European history in the early stages of the development of the capitalist system. Then nations vied over access to the resources of foreign territories. Morgenthau suggests that the formulators of American foreign policy have borrowed their analytical tools from this period. He argues that the principle of compensation is a result of the easy access European nations had to non-European peoples, their economies and resources in the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Morton Kaplan, in his System and Process, would

appear to agree with Morgenthau. He sees the same paradigm at work as Morgenthau, but is of the opinion that it was and is an essential policy tool.

The alternative paradigm, that of imperialism, comes to Third World analysts from the literature first developed in Europe in the late 19th century and early 20th century which mounted a critique of the expansion of capitalist relations. Figures like Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral and Andre Gunder Frank had their intellectual predecessors in Hobson, Lenin, Luxemburg and even Marx and Engels. This school analyzed imperialism, or the expansion of capitalism to non-industrialized societies, in terms of its exploitative characteristics, arguing that the more scientific approach to imperialism determined the system to be expropriative, transferring capital and surplus value to the metropolitan economies. To those analysts whose work followed the end of World War II, the ideologies of the post-bellum period, specifically Cold War rationales, were less than an explanation of the relations which developed than a rationale for the further intrusion of the dominant world powers into the affairs of their peoples. The issue, at the moment, was the liberation of their societies from colonialism and imperialism, not the balance of power between communist and capitalist nations.

Cohen's critique of this school, "The Question of Imperialism," challenging the approaches of Frank, Sweezy,

Lenin, and Nkrumah, conceded the fact of the domination of these nations by the industrialized ones, but he insisted that the dependency was mutual. Consequently, Third World nations liberated from the constraints of colonial administrations, can now freely and effectively bargain for position in the world market. Nicholas J. Spykman, in "American Strategy and World Politics," contends that nations are really not interested in a balance of power but an imbalance in their favor. He posits that; "There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. . . there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used."¹⁷⁸ The link between both camps of political thought is that balance of power is essentially achieved by one country intervening in another country's affairs to insure its national self-interest or the interests of its ally.

The chief architect of American foreign policy towards Angola, Henry Kissinger, belonged to the same political universe as Morgenthau or Kennan. They contend that in the absence of a world government, sovereign nations are best regulated by the threat of force. Thus, smaller nations are coerced into allying themselves with the two

¹⁷⁸Nicholas J. Spykman, American Strategy and World Politics, pp.21-22.

most powerful nations, in order to safeguard their fragile sovereignty and be guaranteed against intervention and domination by more powerful neighbors. Kissinger and Morgenthau incorporate many aspects of Machiavelianism philosophy in their analysis of world politics. Within this conceptual framework, one understands Kissinger's conception of Soviet "containment" in the Angolan situation.

But the conception of "Soviet containment" was only one aspect of Kissinger's concern--another issue was American political hegemony in the area and the attainment of additional allies in the southern African region. For Kissinger, if America could help establish a friendly ally in Angola, it could accomplish two tasks: first, it would have additional strategic and financial access to the natural resources in Angola; and, secondly, it would have an additional pawn on its chessboard with which to confront growing Soviet influence in Africa. For Kissinger, maintaining a balance of power between superpowers and their satellites was essential for world stability and U.S.-dominated power politics.

Kissinger's formulation of policies in Angola can be conceptualized then within the context of his global ideology. In this case, I am using "ideology" to define a consistent pattern of belief which ultimately is reflected in policy or political activities. Kissinger's policies in Angola were greatly influenced by four factors:

the war in Vietnam;

the concept of maintaining a balance of power;

anti-nationalist/anti-communist policy commitments of political containment;

the belief that American influence was declining in the world theater.

Kissinger was relatively indifferent to formulating American policy towards Africa in the initial period of his White House career, because his attention was sharply focused on attempting to win the war in (South) Vietnam and later disengaging American forces from Vietnam. The issue of Vietnam was jeopardizing the legitimacy of Nixon's administration and forcing the nation's policymakers to respond to difficult questions from many quarters on its role in Vietnam. America's involvement in Angola coincided with the termination of its role in Vietnam. From 1975 onwards, Kissinger and the C.I.A. became more entangled in the activities and conflict in Angola. For Kissinger, this was a period when his most cherished notions of "balance of power" and "international legitimacy" were being challenged. In his book, "A World Restored," Kissinger slowly and methodically argues that America must contain its main adversaries if it is to preserve its primacy in world affairs.¹⁷⁹ Angola represented to Kissinger an unstable

¹⁷⁹Stanley Hoffman, Primacy in World Order, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, London, Toronto, 1978, p.43.

political entity in which American political legitimacy was being challenged. We see clearly that, for Kissinger the concept of political legitimacy does not imply intruding on another nation's affairs for the sake of justice or morality, but simply the relationship of political systems operating within the context of global politics. Political legitimacy is based on establishing stability and equilibrium among the superpowers and their satellites. Stanley Hoffman supports this argument by stating:

Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and transportation of Cuban troops there demonstrated both the fact that its considerable effort at conventional rearmament now allowed the USSR to project its power abroad in a way that once was an American monopoly (one thinks of Russia's meager attempt to help Lumumba in 1960) and the assurance with which the Soviets now dared escalate a local conflict in order to have their side prevail. This was something only the U.S. had done successfully when it treated the Berlin crises as direct U.S./Soviets tests, not as an issue involving Cuba at all.¹⁸⁰

Within this framework, the Kissinger Study of Southern Africa--National Security Study Memorandum 39 and American foreign policy attitudes and activities should be viewed.

American Foreign Policy--The Angola Conflict

We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the

¹⁸⁰Stanley Hoffman, Primacy of World Order Ibid., p.59.

political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgement. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage and moral judgement, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. That this conciliation is nothing more than a modus vivendi, uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and to distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the soothing logic of a specious concord.¹⁸¹

Presidents Nixon and Ford relied on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for advice on the Angolan conflict. Kissinger's commissioned study of options in southern African regions provides an important insight into the motives and variables taken into account to formulate U.S. policy and eventual intervention in Angola. For the most part, the burden of American intervention fell on the Ford administration. Nixon was too preoccupied with the Vietnam conflict and later with the Watergate scandal to concentrate much of his attention on the developing conflict between Angola and Portugal. He favored maintaining the status quo for as long as possible, since any change would inevitably affect stability in Southern Africa.¹⁸²

The Study on Southern Africa was in five parts: 1.

¹⁸¹Han Morgenthau, "Scientific Man versus Power Politics," (1974 reprint of a 1946 edition), University of Chicago Press.

¹⁸²Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, The Kissinger Study Southern Africa (National Security Study Memorandum 39 (SECRET), Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1976, p. 28.

the U.S. interest in southern Africa; 2. views of the U.S. interest in southern Africa, 3. present policy; 4. the range of policy options; 5. the area: situation prospects, and U.S. interest. While Donald B. Kasum asserted that the Study was not implemented by either the Nixon or Ford administrations, Donald McHenry, later to be named U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated: "We have seen a coincidence between the recommendations contained in that study and United States actions."¹⁸³ The study points out the economic and political risks of majority rule in southern Africa and the U.S.'s attempted predictions of the possibility and consequences of black rule. The Study was supplied with data from various government agencies, such as A.I.D. and the Department of Commerce. The A.I.D. reported that financial assistance could be used to facilitate U.S. goals in the area. The Commerce Department supplied statistics on U.S. economic interests in the area and trade investment. One interesting point was that U. S. commercial interest in Black African countries (with the exception of Zambia and now Nigeria) was very limited. The majority of commercial activities involving American multinational corporations were located in white-minority areas of Africa. The study suggests that U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa had to take into consideration the following factors

¹⁸³Mohamad A. El-Kaawas, Barry Cohen, Ibid.

in calculating a position:

The strategic importance of southern Africa, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal following the 1967 Middle East War and the increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean: the U.S. need to use overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft heading to and from Indochina; significant investment and balance of trade advantages to Both Britain and the U.S. in South Africa; South Africa's status as the major gold supplier in the capitalist world and its importance in guaranteeing the useful operation of the two-tier gold price system.¹⁸⁴

The U.S. was faced with a mounting problem of attempting not to antagonize either the minority regimes in southern Africa by demanding majority rule or black nations by supporting colonial enclaves and settlements in that area. As the study points out the challenge was to ". . . balance its economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states with the political interest of disassociating the U.S. from the white regimes and their repressive racial policies." Such policies were consistent with Kissinger's paradigm of national self-interests and ability to manipulate diverse groups to ensure that U.S. interests would be safeguarded. Kissinger's paradigm of global politics or balance of power did not recognize the need for liberation movements, particularly in areas which are thought to be under the western sphere of interest. African liberation movements which fought against NATO partners

¹⁸⁴Mohamad El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, Ibid., p. 24.

would, of necessity, be considered by Kissinger as upsetting the balance of political forces in the area and, would thus have to be "contained" and if possible, eliminated.

In the Angolan case, Kissinger's policies lacked the predictive powers to foresee: the intervention of Cuban military forces into the cold war, the ineffectiveness of the FNLA; the Soviet commitment in terms of arms shipments to both the MPLA and Cuban troops; the efficiency of the MPLA and the amount of aid South Africa would need in order to sustain their troops in the war and thus avoiding major U.S. military responsibilities in the area.

Mohamad A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, commenting on the Kissinger Study, are inclined to believe that Option 2 was the strategy agreed upon by the Nixon administration. Options 1, 4, and 5, calling for South African economic and political embargoes, would, from Kissinger's perspective, endanger the national interest of American commercial and political concerns, and considering South Africa's strategic location and scientific contributions, would not satisfy American interest. Option 3's strategy was similar to the Kennedy/Johnson administrations position. This option maintained that American policy in South Africa should be to refuse to grant South Africa any political legitimacy, in order not to antagonize Black African states, but at the same time to continue relations with South Africa, in order, not to jeopardize U.S. economic or

scientific interests. Option 2, alternatively, under the Nixon/Kissinger administrations favored stability at the cost of the southern African liberation movements. The insistence on stability and being the political forces in the area in equilibrium, in reality meant support for minority regimes and repressive measures to enforce that balance. El-Khawas and Cohen write that

This policy was in keeping with Kissinger's view that, because of their growing reliance on the Soviet Union, Cuba and China for material assistance, most nationalist liberation movements were 'communist stooges' and, if successful in wresting power from a colonial regime, would inevitably pursue an anti-western policy. Kissinger deeply distrusted revolutionary groups, considering them a threat to his design for international tranquility, which depended upon stable relations among the big powers. His policy recommendation derived from three NSSM assumptions: (1) if violence in the area escalates, U.S. interests will increasingly be threatened; . . . (2) the whites are here to stay and the only way the constructive change can come about is through them; . . . (3) there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increase opportunities for the communists.¹⁸⁵

Kissinger's insistence upon an analysis which posited two poles in world politics necessitated a simplistic view of the world. Consequently, Kissinger's framework was severely vitiated in its ability to decipher the motivations behind national liberation movements. His policy, a natural outgrowth of his "realist" or "pragmatic" philosophy,

¹⁸⁵Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, *Ibid.*, p.28.

negated the possibility of being influenced by moral considerations or democratic principles.

Kissinger's policy options were also influenced by America's partnership in NATO with Portugal and the military importance of the Azores. El-Khawas quotes David M. Abshire's discussion of this issue:

Because of their pivotal positions, the Portuguese possessions could become economically and strategically important in certain conflict situations. Military patrol aircraft operating from these areas could effectively survey the eastern South Atlantic, the western Indian Ocean and the seas south of the Cape.¹⁸⁶

The Nixon administration's position in the late sixties was to discontinue the rhetoric against Portuguese involvement in its colonies and to encourage trade and investment in Portuguese colonies.¹⁸⁷ This decision allowed Caetano (Salazar's predecessor) enough time to stabilize the problem in its territories.¹⁸⁸ Nixon's policies were reflected in the position America took regarding Angola in the United Nations, where the U.S. voted against several resolutions sponsored by African nations to condemn Portuguese activities in the colonies. The U.S. also voted against several resolutions condemning continued foreign military and economic investments in Portuguese territories.

¹⁸⁶Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, *Ibid.*, p.45

¹⁸⁷Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁸⁸El-Khawas, *Ibid.*, p.46.

President Nixon signed an agreement with Portugal to allow U.S. use of the Azores base in exchange for a credit-loan to Portugal of \$436 million. This figure is four times the amount, according to El-Khawas, the Export-Import Bank had extended to Portugal between 1946 and 1971.¹⁸⁹ The U.S. voted consistently in the U.N. against condemning Portuguese activities in their territories, the administration also insisted as part of the Azores agreement that other NATO partners should stop condemning Portuguese policy, these initiatives implied that that American foreign policy was changing from the Kennedy/Johnson policy to a more conservative and active support of Portugal's policy in her colonies.

In 1970, the Kissinger/Nixon policy on southern Africa would be characterized by increased communication with white minority regimes and "selective involvement."¹⁹⁰ The policy was to relax its previous harsh condemnation of minority regimes and to pursue a more gentle diplomatic approach to the problem. This policy would also allow an increase in economic or financial access to these areas. El-Khawas states:

The Nixon-Kissinger policy was aimed at establishing bridges with white minority regimes through "selective relaxation" and with border

¹⁸⁹Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, Ibid., p.47.

¹⁹⁰Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, Ibid., p.29.

African states through a modest aid program (\$5 million) that would encourage them to modify their policies. . . . Such a policy would allow for some modification of the status quo by giving representation to the black majority without endangering white dominance.¹⁹¹

Nixon's departure from office did not substantially change American foreign policy in the area, since Kissinger served as Secretary of State under the both administrations. But Kissinger's involvement in the problems of Angola increased with the progression of the civil war and America's involvement. It is important to note that Kissinger rejected the idea that white minority governments could be unseated in the southern Africa region, or that blacks could organize a movement strong enough to force a serious realignment of political forces in the area.

Foreign Intervention in the Angolan Civil War.

The overthrow of the Portuguese government in 1974 was linked to its policies in its "overseas provinces". The economic costs, even with American assistance, was too expensive for Portugal to prolong its colonial adventure. Not only was the war costly in terms of economic expenditures, but thousands of Portuguese were killed in the course of this war. John Marcum explains that:

Portugal's African wars had been draining the

¹⁹¹Mohamad A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, Ibid., p.29-30.

country's spirit and resources. Emigration soared to 170,000 in 1971, including a major outflow of draft-age men. An estimated 100,000 draft resisters left the country; there were fewer than one hundred cadets attending Portugal's four-hundred place military academy; and during the last call-up before the coup, some 50 percent refused to report. The toll in Portuguese military casualties in Africa reached 11,111 dead and 30,000 wounded or disabled. Roughly 1.5 million Portuguese sought livelihoods abroad, leaving behind an internal work force of just 3.5 million and a total population reduced to 8.6 million. The country ran a \$400 million a year trade deficit, suffered Europe's highest rate of inflation (23%) and confronted mounting sabotage by anti-war underground movements unprecedentedly disciplined and effective.¹⁹²

For Portugal, it was necessary to surrender the "overseas province" it had held for five centuries and attempt to recover psychologically and economically from the after-effects of the war. This marked the end of Portuguese colonies in southern Africa. But for the United States, this marked the beginning of her involvement in Angolan affairs. After the Portuguese withdrew from Angola, then, the U.S. began its financial and economic commitment to two political parties in Angola, the FNLA and UNITA. Secretary of State Kissinger said before Dick Clark's African subcommittee:

. . . the overthrow of the Portuguese government in April 1974 and the growing strength of the Portuguese Communist Party apparently convinced Moscow that a 'revolutionary situation' was

¹⁹²John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962-1976), Volume II, Ibid., p. 237

developing in Angola.

Marcum remarks that Kissinger seemed blind to the reality that a "revolutionary situation had long since developed in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau..."¹⁹³

The Caetano government's collapse on April 25, 1974, signaled to Kissinger and Ford that there was a possible shift in the alignment of political forces in the southern African region. The collapse of the Portuguese regime contradicted Kissinger's study on southern Africa, which argued that white regimes in the area were stable, that blacks could not gain political power through violence and that constructive change had to come about only through the acquiescence of the whites. Stockwell, in his book In Search of Enemies, - A CIA Story, remarked:

Kissinger saw the Angolan conflict in terms of global politics and was determined that the Soviets should not be permitted to make a move in any remote part of the world without being confronted militarily by the United States. . . . Uncomfortable with recent historical events, and frustrated by our humiliation in Vietnam, Kissinger was seeking opportunities to challenge the Soviets.¹⁹⁴

As Colin Legum points out, the defeat of Portuguese colonialism had three profound consequences:

¹⁹³John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., p. 242.

¹⁹⁴John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A - CIA Story, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. New York, New York. 1978. p. 43.

a gesture of faith in Portuguese rule."¹⁹⁵

At the time of Portugal's defeat, America had no set of policy options on how to relate to a majority government in Angola. Kissinger decided to revive the "domino theory" in legitimizing his support for the FNLA and later the UNITA forces. Kissinger simply stated that the dominoes in Africa which might fall if America didn't intervene were Zaire, Zambia and South Africa."¹⁹⁶ The domino theory poorly thought out and applied to in the context of African politics began to frame the policy objectives of the Kissinger doctrine.

American financial support for the FNLA, according to Marcum, actually dated to 1962, though at a relatively low level. The United States government paid Roberto to supply it with information that would insure its political and economic interests in the area -- in case of Portugal's collapse. Roberto was a well-known supporter of Western interests and vehemently anti-communist in philosophy. Marcum reports that:

From 1962 until 1969 the United States C.I.A., using Congolese and other channels, provided

¹⁹⁵Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars. U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, South End Publishing Company, Boston, Massachusetts. 1978. p. 91.

¹⁹⁶Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Pathfinder Press, Inc. New York, New York. 1976, p.101.

Roberto with what was probably a modest supply of money and arms. Then with the advent of the Nixon administration, and the "tar-baby" option, the C.I.A. "deactivated" Roberto, though it left him on a \$10,000 annual retainer for "intelligence collection".

Harsh and Thomas recount that in the beginning of U.S. covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA forces, money was tunneled through Zaire's president Mobutu Sese Seko to increase the rebel forces' ability to purchase weapons.

American policymakers pursued only timidly the possibility of solving the conflict through diplomatic channels. Stockwell believes that, "Clearly, the U.S. wanted this war. Conspicuously, we had made no move to work through the O.A.U., the U.N. or bilaterally with the U.S.S.R. to end the arms race."¹⁹⁷ Marcum, in agreement with Stockwell's assertions, points out that not only didn't the U.S. work with any of the official organizations designed to arrest the clearly developing civil war, but it

would soon give that [arms] race another shove forward. There was no response to a suggestion by MPLA's Lucio Lara that the essential first step toward securing peaceful process would be an embargo on arms and personnel coming into Angola by air, sea, and land--that is, across the Zaire border that the Portuguese no longer even pretended to be able to monitor. There was no real effort to create a disinterested "third party" to carry out what the Portuguese had set out to do.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A - CIA Story, Ibid., p.54.

In late January, 1975, according to Marcum, the National Security Council's 40 committee, chaired by Kissinger, and composed of C.I.A. Director William Colby, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clement, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown, "reactivated" the flow of money to the FNLA in the amount of \$300.000.¹⁹⁹

The C.I.A. sent similar amount of money to Jonas Savimbi's organization UNITA a couple of months later. Additionally, the Forty Committee decided to send \$10 million in supplies to Angola.²⁰⁰ But that was just the beginning of America's escalation of its involvement in Angola. Marcum recounts that beginning with \$6 million, used partly to replace arms that could be provided quickly by Zaire and Zambia, American aid was repeatedly increased during the summer and fall. An investigation found that the reported figures on aid actually deflated. The amounts received by UNITA and FNLA were closer to approximately twice the figure of \$32 million eventually acknowledged.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 261.

¹⁹⁹John Marcum, Ibid., p. 256.

²⁰⁰Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Ibid., p.97.

²⁰¹John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 263.

Additionally, China, France, Great Britain, West Germany, South Africa and others provided financial support for the FNLA and UNITA. The MPLA on the other hand, was supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, Algeria, Guinea, and several eastern European countries, had received, according to the CIA, approximately the same amount of foreign aid that the FNLA received.²⁰² Marcus concludes that FNLA and UNITA forces received approximately the same amount of foreign aid that the C.I.A. reported that the MPLA received. He estimates that foreign powers contributed approximately \$80 million to each splinter group. I would assume that since the U.S. was supporting both the UNITA and FNLA forces, that figure would be divided for those organizations. Between the two movements there was no significant financial difference.

The Allies and the Metropole

The domino theory transported to Africa by Kissinger suggested that if the MPLA forces won the war, Zaire, Zambia, South Africa, and Rhodesia could be in jeopardy. Therefore, Zaire and Zambia's protection became a cornerstone in U.S. policy during this period. Mobutu was supporting FNLA forces; Zaire was their base from which they

²⁰²John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A - CIA Story, Ibid., p.191.

attacked MPLA forces, received military supplies and connected with Europe and South African mercenaries. Yet American relations with Zaire were delicate at this point. The U.S. certainly did not want to antagonize Zaire, where American investments were calculated to be over \$800 million dollars. Yet, conditions between the U.S. and Zaire had deteriorated by June 1975, when Mobutu accused the U.S. of complicity in "an attempted military coup and had evicted the American ambassador from Kinshasa. Zaire had also been negatively affected by the drop in world copper prices and a stagnating agricultural sector."²⁰³ Kissinger's strategy was to appease Mobutu, by supporting the FNLA and to assure Mobutu that America would stand by him during periods of political turmoil and crisis in the area. In this regard, clearly, the issue was not one of communist aggression, but, rather maintaining an important alliance which protected U.S. economic and political interests. Zaire was a trusted ally and America perceived it was in jeopardy from Mobutu's critics.

Mobutu expressed concern to the American State Department about socialists government being so close to his border. The New York Times reporter, Leslie H. Gelb, reported in September 1975 that "four official sources (told

²⁰³John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 262.

him) the main purpose for the cover American support in Angola was for President Mobutu, the man on whom Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is banking on to oppose Moscow's various international forums."²⁰⁴ Kissinger viewed Mobutu as an important pawn in the equation of southern African politics. Mobutu is the president of one of the wealthiest countries in Africa and whether Angola was eventually influenced by the socialist sphere of influence or not, Zaire remained a force to be reckoned with in that region. Kissinger, in arguing, this case before the Senate, January 19, 1976, said that:

The outcome in Angola will have repercussions throughout Africa. The confidence of neighboring countries, like Zambia and Zaire, would be severely shaken. . . if they see that the Soviet Union and Cuba are unopposed in their attempt to impose a regime of their own choice in Angola.²⁰⁵

For Kissinger, the Angolan civil war was a political chessboard; in order to protect or advance Zaire and Zambia, Angola had to be placed in check. Ultimately the real issue for Kissinger was the protection of South Africa. One move designed by Kissinger in order to protect Zambia and Zaire from "Moscow's influence" was to play antagonistic Angolan

²⁰⁴Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Ibid., p.102.

²⁰⁵Colin Legum, After Angola- The War Over Southern Africa- The Roll of the Big PowersAfricana Publishing Company, A Division of Holmes and Meier Publishing, Inc. New York, New York. p. 26.

groups off against each other. This tactic would have the effect of instilling distrust among the various nationalist groups, of spreading the war (which would disrupt communities inside the society), of weakening the whole fabric of the liberation movement against western or Portuguese rule, and of ultimately reducing the strength of Angolan resistance to western initiatives in the area. This tactic was a holistic approach to solving the problem as opposed to a particularistic or specific isolation of Angola. For Kissinger perceived the struggle in Angola as only part of a general problem which American policymakers would have to face with the independence of many formerly colonized areas. As a result of U.S. policy, Roberto was amply supplied with additional military weapons and American "technical advisors" via Zaire. In February, 1975, the FNLA moved to Luanda, according to Stockwell. In one instance FNLA forces gunned down 50 unarmed MPLA political supporters. The fight for control of Luanda was established and lobbying for foreign support to continue this fratricidal war occupied the attention of most of the nationalist leaders.

Despite the support by the United States and South Africa, the FNLA was poorly organized and managed. According to Harsh and Stockwell, the C.I.A. began recruiting mercenaries from Europe to aid the FNLA and UNITA organizations. Stockwell recalls:

the C.I.A. advisors were not enough for FNLA and UNITA needs. To supplement their efforts we searched the world for allies who could provide qualified advisors to put into the conflict. . . regular armies to crush the MPLA. Mercenaries seemed to be the answer . . . preferably European . . . as long as they were not Americans. The 40 committee approved . . . the mercenaries who were hired and sent to Angola were to be called "foreign military advisors."²⁰⁶

Although American policy officials claimed that the American military was not involved in actual combat in the area, David Anable, a staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor, reported on January 2nd, talking to: a "senior mercenary officer" who was "close" to the agency said "the C.I.A. is indirectly recruiting American ex-service-men, training them, dispatching them to southern Africa, contributing toward their pay . . . and providing them and the indigenous forces with light and heavy weaponry."²⁰⁷ Sage Magazine, which is devoted to advertising for American mercenaries for "overseas adventures", in 1980 began a series of articles on the Angolan affair. These mercenaries from the United States wrote about their work with UNITA and FNLA forces and their increased ability to inflict harm and devastation on MPLA troops using NATO weaponry.²⁰⁸ These

²⁰⁶John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story, Ibid., p.182.

²⁰⁷Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Ibid., p.39.

²⁰⁸Sage Magazine E.G. & G, Inc., Las Vegas, Nv. February 1981, p. 10.

soldiers of fortune are pictured with their African trophies-- dead Angolan nationalists. One year later, when Kissinger was questioned before the Senate concerning his policy in Angola and was asked to justify the use of covert and clandestine military and financial support of UNITA and FNLA, Kissinger replied:

We chose covert means because we wanted to keep our visibility to a minimum; we wanted the greatest possible opportunity for an African solution. We felt that overt assistance would elaborate a formal doctrine justifying the Great Power intervention--aside from the technical issues such as in what budgetary category this aid should be given, and how it could be reconciled with legislative restrictions against the transfer of U.S. arms to recipients. The Angolan situation is of a type in which diplomacy without leverage is impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve unnecessary risks. This it is precisely one of those grey areas where covert methods are crucial if we are to have any prospect of influencing certain events of potentially global importance.²⁰⁹

Actually, Kissinger and Ford chose to contribute to the FNLA and UNITA forces in a covert and clandestine manner because they were doubtful whether a war-weary Congress would agree to U.S. involvement in another conflict.²¹⁰ Additionally, the U.S. public in the post-Vietnam period would most likely have vehemently protested more "American boys" going to fight in a war which could possibly escalate into another

²⁰⁹Colin Lequm, After Angola- The war Over Southern Africa, The Role of the Big Powers Ibid., p. 26.

²¹⁰Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, Angola - The Hidden History of Washington's War, Ibid., 1976.

Vietnam.²¹¹ In reality, Ford and Kissinger had little choice but to sneak funds and military equipment to their allies.²¹² Only they and American businesses, who felt their investments might be in jeopardy if the balance of power in that region was altered, understood the imperative and crucial nature of the war. Mobutu and Kaunda were signalling to Kissinger and Ford that their power bases were tilting and could decompose unless American influence was forthcoming. The issue of communist aggression or of Angola becoming a Soviet satellite was an abstract and unimportant concern to these American policymakers compared to the stark realities of losing important allies to pro-African liberation forces and seeing the nationalization of American economic investments in the area. Long before Cuban involvement in this area, according to Stockwell, the C.I.A. was funneling money to the FNLA without the approval of the 40 Committee: "small amounts at first, but enough for word to get around that the C.I.A. was dealing itself into the race."²¹³

Yet with all this U.S. aid, The FNLA edge in the war

²¹¹Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977. p. 1257.

²¹²Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978, p. 345.

²¹³John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A - CIA Story, Ibid., p.67.

didn't last very long. By November 14, the MPLA had regained most of Luanda. The Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, attempted to lay the framework for a government of national unity comprised of the three nationalist groups. But, by March 15th, 1975, there was more reason to believe that a civil war could ensue rather than a unified government. During the month of March, fighting broke out between MPLA and FNLA resulting in approximately 20,000 Angolan deaths.²¹⁴ Neto accused Roberto of receiving massive amounts of arms from China and Zaire, and requested that the Soviets supply him with comparable equipment. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to furnish the MPLA with military gear. By June 1975, there was no chance for a negotiated settlement by the two nationalist groups. Roberto Holden authorized Daniel Chipenda to negotiate with the S.A. chief of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to "invite S.A. to join the conflict." Jonas Savimbi, concerned that S.A. military support of FNLA would ensure Roberto of a clear military advantage in the south, also enlisted S.A. assistance. In return for any assistance, however, S.A. requested Savimbi to supply them with information on the location of SWAPO bases.²¹⁵ The

²¹⁴Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid., p.13.
Inc.

²¹⁵John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 271.

civil war had undoubtedly become internationalized.

Three months prior to independence, the MPLA held twelve out of sixteen provincial capitals. Holding a strategic political and military dominance at that time, with independence so close, the MPLA could clearly claim its legal authority to assume leadership of Angola. Even more importantly, according to Legum,

the MPLA forces had succeeded in capturing the key ports of Loito, Mocamedes and Benguela; this cut off the possibility of any military supplies reaching their opponents from the sea, or from using the Benguela railway."²¹⁶

MPLA was still the dominant group by October when the situation was reversed and FNLA forces with South African backing appeared to be a substantial force.

With South African complicity, the FNLA was viewed by the MPLA as a real threat to their ability to control the capital city of Luanda. U.S. aid to FNLA, writes Legum, "began to flow again and on 24 October the State Department asked Congress to approve an urgent \$79 million military aid programme for Zaire, to be used for FNLA."²¹⁷ The turning point for the FNLA was the entry of highly efficient and organized South African soldiers. The South Africans made up the FNLA deficiencies, in regard to organization and ability to handle sophisticated weaponry. By October 26,

²¹⁶Colin Legum, p. 15. After Angola, Ibid., p.15.

²¹⁷Colin Legum, After Angola Ibid., p. 15.

the MPLA had fled from Sa la Bandeira, an important southern capital.²¹⁸ The MPLA was left with only four of the provincial capitals by the end of the month. Victory seemed possible for the FNLA by November, when they captured Labito and Benquela with the support of South Africa. Legum accounts that "the country was being flooded with arms. U.S. supplies were being flown in almost daily by C-30s from Zaire and South Africa was putting in more troops."²¹⁹

The set-back was only temporary for the MPLA, because the presence of South African troops, while gaining the FNLA a military stronghold in certain key cities, angered African and Third World countries. South Africa's entry into the war injected a sense of urgency to neutral forces and proNeto supporters. Neto requested immediate military support from Cuba, and by November there were thousands of Cuban forces in Luanda. One day before independence, the MPLA/Cuban forces had contained FNLA/S.A. troops 12 miles from the capital of Luanda.²²⁰

By late November it was clear that unless additional support poured in for the FNLA, it would lose to the MPLA. CIA covert funds were depleted by this time, so Ford was

²¹⁸Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid., p.15.

²¹⁹Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid., p.15

²²⁰John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 274

compelled to seek additional assistance from the Congress. In his proposal, he argued that communist forces would overrun the area if America didn't quickly forward financial and military support to the FNLA and UNITA.

Another decisive factor in the MPLA victory over FNLA was the Congressional decision to withhold additional U.S. funds. By an overwhelming vote "of 323 to 99", the House of Representatives rejected the Ford/Kissinger plan to support the FNLA.²²¹ For Roberto and Savimbi, U.S. aid was absolutely necessary for their political survival. Both leaders somberly accepted the inevitable fate, that the next leader of Angola would be from the MPLA. In a letter to President Kaunda, Savimbi requested that he shelter his mother and child for he would take to the "bush" and fight for freedom. The letter said:

UNITA lost 600 men in the battle of Huambo. The machine of war that Cuba and the Soviet Union have assembled in Angola is beyond the imagination. To prevent the total destruction of our forces we have decided to revert immediately to guerilla warfare. The friends (the CIA and the United States) that have promised to help us did not fulfill their promises, and we must face our own fate with courage and determination.²²²

But Savimbi was not the only ally that was disappointed by the decision to terminate aid to the FNLA. South Africa based its support for FNLA and UNITA on the assumption that

²²¹Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid., p.27.

²²²Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid. footnote 102.

the U.S. would "match" any weaponry made available to the MPLA". Prime Minister Vorster implied in an interview that America had solicited his support. Once American aid was terminated, South Africa decided to "pull its troops" out of the area. South Africa decided to disentangle its troops and resources from Angola in January 1976.

"A House Divided"

The United States had not really devised a policy on Southern Africa or Angolan liberation or nationalist groups prior to 1970. This was due in part to Kissinger's estimation of maturity of these organizations and their ability to challenge seriously white minority governments in the area. Thus, the American participation in the Angolan Civil War can be clearly identified as a Kissinger and Ford policy design. The activities of the C.I.A. or Committee of Forty cannot be said to represent a national consensus on this issue or even a consensus in the House of Representatives or even the C.I.A. itself. In this regard, Kissinger, Ford, and the Committee of Forty were acting as independent political entities not responsible to the American people, the Congress, or the State Department. To view the American policy as a monolithic body is to ignore the diverse interests which were, at times diametrically opposed to the other, but generally agreed upon a paradigm of protecting and supporting American self-interests in the

international arena when it does not impair the stability of domestic issues. Angola, it could be postulated, benefited indirectly from the Vietnam conflict, because, in part, the tragic American involvement in that war prevented American policymakers, like Kissinger and Ford, from being able to accumulate the necessary political clout to push for greater involvement in Angola. Even the Presidential warning about a communist take-over in Southern Africa did not prevent the Congress from voting to discontinue financial support in the area. The Angolan Civil War created substantial differences in the State Department, the C.I.A., and the Congress. It can be assumed, if the U.S. had intensified its activities in Angola, there would have developed sharp differences within the general public on its role in the conflict.

Kissinger's Bureau of African Affairs was directed by Assistant Secretary Nathan Davis. Davis strongly rejected further American military involvement in the Angolan Civil War. Primarily because, by mid-July it was recognized that the major flaw in the FNLA's organization was not lack of money, but disorganization. He suggested that the FNLA was likely to lose the civil war and thereby expose American involvement and jeopardize American relations with other black countries. This analysis was strengthened by the report that even if America increased its financial contribution by mid-July, the FNLA organization was extremely disorganized and torn with

internal disputes.²²³ David argued that Zaire and Zambia's relationship to the United States might be jeopardized and additionally the United States would be linked with South Africa.

U.S. involvement, stated David, might also lead to Soviet Union involvement.²²⁴ Ernest Harsh recalls that Davis told the administration, ". . . It won't work. Neither Savimbi or Roberto are good fighters--in fact, They couldn't fight their way out of a paper bag. It's the wrong game, and the players we got are losers." Legum writes that Davis was so strongly opposed to further U.S. involvement that, "he was relieved of his post in September." Clearly, this should have indicated to Ford and Kissinger that their perspective of the issue of Angola was not shared by all the members of the State Department.

Members of the African Division of the C.I.A. also had misgivings about their role in the developing Angolan civil conflict. The C.I.A. was particularly opposed to larger U.S. military programme being funneled through Zaire."²²⁵ The disagreement inside the C.I.A. was based on the analysis that Neto was not hostile to the U.S. and

²²³John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, Volume 1 (1950-1962) Ibid., page 263.

²²⁴John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I., Ibid., p. 263.

²²⁵Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid., p. 26

continued American involvement to support Roberto was really attaching ourselves to a movement which did not have the support of the majority of Angolans (FNLA) and was saddled with weak and incapable leadership and was disorganized. The C.I.A., from its first involvement in the Angolan war was doubtful that FNLA could win the conflict. Stockwell's account affirms this belief. He recalls that a member of the Africa division told him:

. . . the MPLA was the best qualified to run Angola and that its leaders sincerely wanted a peaceful relationship with the U.S. . . . It was only the C.I.A.'s historical relationship with Roberto that had us so close to the FNLA . . . I took up Kissinger's simplistic line that the Soviets had to be confronted anywhere they made a move, this time in Angola. (and Stockwell was told) . . . The Soviets did not make the first move in Angola. Other people did. The Chinese and the United States. The Soviets have been a half-step behind, countering our moves. And don't put all the blame on Kissinger, the C.I.A. led the United States into the Angolan mess...²²⁶

Although the C.I.A. was called upon to implement the Kissinger/Ford program in Angola there were questions concerning how wise the U.S. policy was in increasing involvement and possibly inviting a Soviet showdown. The administration's position was demonstrated by its reaction to its failures to obtain more funds for the FNLA in early 1976. When the President learned of the Congress's rejection of his proposal increase financial aid to Angola,

²²⁶John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A - CIA Story, Ibid., p.67.

Ford accused them of having "lost their guts." Kissinger did not receive the news of the congressional rejection of the President's proposal with any more grace. In his memoirs, "White House Years," Kissinger remarks:

Americans would have to learn to live with the geopolitical challenge of maintaining the global balance of power; it was our duty to block Soviet expansionism; these sober convictions animated our policy. . . . It remains to be seen whether, given our historical experience (meaning Vietnam) and the bitterness of our recent past, it is possible to walk this narrow path; whether we are doomed to oscillate erratically between excessive conciliation and excessive bellicosity.²²⁷

The Kissinger philosophy of balancing world powers and protecting important American political and economic interests was the real reason behind accusing Cuba of being Russia's substitute. In the next section, we will examine Cuba's role in the Angolan conflict.

OPERATION CARLOTA--CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

. . . . We the peoples of the countries of Africa, still completely dominated by Portuguese colonialism, are prepared to send to Cuba as many men and women as may be needed to compensate for the departure of those who for reasons of class or of inability to adapt have interests or attitudes which are incompatible with the interests of the Cuban people. Taking once again the formerly hard and tragic path of our ancestors (mainly from Guinea and Angola) who were taken to Cuba as slaves, we would come now as free men, as well as workers and Cuban patriots. . . . Thus we would

²²⁷Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, Ibid., p. 1257.

strengthen both all the bonds of history, blood and culture which unite our people with the Cuban people. . . . 1966 Amilcar Cabral 'The Weapon of Theory'.

The U.S. cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms can be used for a blatant intervention in local conflicts, in areas thousands of miles from Cuba and the U.S.S.R., and where neither can claim a historic or national interest. 1976, President Gerald Ford.

The Cuban military commitment in Angola substantially altered the fabric and nature of the Angolan civil war. Although South Africa and American "technical advisors" and indeed military staff were operating and allied with the FNLA and UNITA forces, the real crisis for American policymakers and the press coverage of this event was the actual massive Cuban intervention. The Cuban intervention in fact, decisively reversed the trend from a FNLA victory in mid-November to the MPLA; capturing the capital city of Luanda and subsequently becoming the political party in control of Angola. The political connotations of a Soviet/Cuban financed victory in contrast to the defeat of a pro-American supported movement was not lost to key policymakers whose advice was neither welcomed nor heeded during this crisis. It is particularly curious, that President Ford and Secretary Kissinger continued to covertly finance the war when among their intimate circle of

advisors there was tremendous opposition and doubt. Secretary of African Affairs Davis, argued that Angolan involvement was an unnecessary political risk, especially since the United States was not willing to match Soviet funds and machinery and the chances of an American victory were dubious.

Kissinger and Ford, viewing the world through the parameters of their political paradigm of balancing Soviet and American national interests in the world's arena, possibly didn't take into consideration the repercussions that ----America's image would suffer not only in Africa but the Third World generally by an alliance with South Africa -- a country that the international community as a whole has condemned. But possibly, there were other considerations which out-weighed the consequences of African and other Third World Nations criticisms, for example the protection of important allies in the area, such as Zambia, Zaire and South Africa and American financial obligations and investments in the area. Furthermore, possibly Ford and Kissinger didn't think that Africans would view U.S. involvement in the same manner as any other foreign nation meddling in the internal affairs of an African country.

For Ford and Kissinger, the Soviet Union was using Cuban troops in Angola rather than taking the risk of endangering detente by their actual military involvement. In the Ford proposal for additional funds to support the

FNLA and UNITA forces, Ford described Cuban soldiers as proxies for the Soviet Union. An American victory in Angola would have contained communism in that area of Africa and reassured U.S. allies of continued support during crisis periods, according to this theory. As discussed in the previous section, the Congress rejected the President's proposal to allocate more financial assistance to Angola which signaled the end of the FNLA and UNITA's ability to continue to compete with the MPLA and South Africa's involvement in the war which was predicated on U.S. involvement. Considering pre-mentioned factors, President Ford's argument that there existed no historical precedent for Cuba to intervene in Angolan affairs is obviously a fallacious notion as will be discussed in this section. What the administration and the U.S. press ignored, in their reaction to Cuban involvement in Angola was the long relationship between the two countries. The Ford Administration's argument that there existed no historical and contemporary political relationship between Cuba and Angola is to plead ignorance of the linkages between the two countries. An ignorance which would seem to be a surprising gap in the knowledge of professional diplomats and policymakers in an area where millions of U.S. dollars were being invested. It would be such a surprising gap in knowledge that it would suggest that the whole "Cuban issue" of containing Communism in Angola was a mere ploy.

Cuba's intervention in the Angolan Civil War was a decisive turning point in the course of the conflict. It was clearly the event which prompted President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to take the Angolan case to the Congress and request additional funds for the FNLA. As noted in the previous section, Congress rejected by an overwhelming majority the President's proposal, and funding for FNLA and UNITA was discontinued by the United States. South Africa, which claimed it was in the war as a "back-up" for U.S. support, consequently removed its troops.

This section will be concerned with two major questions: 1) Is it accurate to state that Cuba was a proxy for the U.S.S.R. as Ford and Kissinger both indicated, or 2) whether Cuba's participation in the Angolan war was precipitated by its own foreign policy? The answer to the question about Cuban foreign policy will allow us to understand whether the American press distorted Cuba's role in the Angolan situation or if the U.S. press rendered a neutral picture of Cuba's activities. Equally important, we will be able to identify which (if any) division in the government the press allied itself with, since, as has been pointed out, there were substantial differences inside the C.I.A. and the State Department concerning U.S. involvement in Angola. Only Kissinger and Ford were completely in favor of increased U.S. involvement in Angola. Congress unequivocally took a negative position on the issue.

Clearly, if one must place all nations into political spheres of influence, as Secretary of State Kissinger would suggest, Cuba would fall within the Soviet orbit. But does this necessarily mean that all of Cuba's activities are dictated and defined by the Soviet Union? Is Cuba's independence really a neo-colonial relationship with the Soviet Union? Although neo-colonial relationships usually pertain to ex-colonial governments maintaining strict economic and political relationships with a former colony the concept of applying this term to a country which controls or can essentially manipulate another country's domestic and foreign policy can be appropriate. Did Cuba's foreign policy dictate that it should aid the MPLA and contribute arms and soldiers to reverse what would surely have been an FNLA victory in Angola?

It would be most difficult, if not impossible, to investigate any of the communications that took place between Cuba and the Soviet Union on the subject of Angola, but we can discern whether there was an historical or ideological basis for Cuba claiming that its involvement in Angola was consistent with its goals of internationalism. President Ford, on January 17, 1976, accused Cuba of intervening in a war in which they could claim neither "historic or national interest," implying that Cuba was intervening on behalf of the Soviet Union. However, scholars of African history have indicated that close ties

have existed between Cuban and Angola for four centuries.

Luanda, the modern capital of Angola, was a major slave port in the seventeenth century. The slaves from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau furnished workers for the plantations of Cuba and Brazil.²²⁸ That historic link is a theme which consistently occurs throughout the writings by Portuguese/Africans in their early relationship between Cubans. For example, an Angolan nationalist, da Cruz, expresses his feelings of solidarity with other blacks in the diaspora:

the voice of the sugarfields, the ricefields
 the coffee fields, the rubberlands
 the cottonlands. . .
 the plantations of Virginia
 the fields of the Carolinas
 of Alabama
 Cuba
 Brazil
 rising from the mills that grind the sugarcane
 the voice of Harlem District South
 wailing the blues, breasting the Mississippi
 Chanting the groan of wagon wheels. . .
 the voice of all America, of all America
 the voice of every voice united
 In Langston's splendid voice
 In Guillen's voice of pride.

da Cruz played a very important role in the nationalist movements of Angola. First he was allied with the MPLA under Neto, and then he worked with the FNLA under Holden.

²²⁸See: James Duffy, Portugal in Africa, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962. and James Duffy, A Question of Slavery, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967.

A split developed in the MPLA between revisionists and "hard-core" Marxists. Neto viewed da Cruz as too militant and da Cruz was eventually voted out of office.²²⁹ da Cruz's poem, however, represents a strong theme of Angolan fraternal feelings towards other blacks in North America. As Fidel Castro has pointed out: "Cubans are Latin-African people because African blood flowed throughout our veins."²³⁰

More recently, the relationship between Cuban and Angolan nationalist leaders can be traced back to 1965,

Che Guevara arrived in the Congo in April 1965 and made arrangements to meet with some of the guerrillas fighting Belgium colonialism. Guevara attempted to stress the historic link between Cuba and the Congo to the Congolese nationalists. In Revolucion da Cuba, the Peruvian writer explains this relationship:

The contact between the Cuban revolution and the MPLA was established initially and had been very close since 1965, when Che Guevara participated with the Congolese guerrillas. The following year [1966] Agostinho Neto himself was in Cuba accompanied by Endo, the commander and chief of the MPLA who later died in the war. Together, they met with Fidel Castro. Then because of the conditions of the struggle in Angola itself the

²²⁹Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, Ibid., p.219.

²³⁰Garcia Marquez Operacion Carlota - Los Cubanos En Angola El. Che Guevara En Africa - La Batalla Contra El Reich Sudafricana, Textos Del Sabueso Contemporaneo Mosca Azul and Horizonte, Ed. 1977.

contacts were eventually returned. . . . Only in May of 1975, the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their Angolan colonies when the Cuban commander Flavio Bravo found himself in Brazzaville with Agostinho Neto, and the latter [Neto] requested his help in transporting a shipment of arms, and furthermore, consulted him about the possibility of broader and more specific assistance.²³¹

In the early 1960's, Guilo Sanchez was instructed by the Cuban guerillas to travel to Nkrumah's Ghana to make contacts with anti-Portuguese "African" leaders in exile.²³² Castro and Guevara were especially interested in making contact with Amilcar Cabral, the PAIGC leader in Guinea-Bissau. In fact, Cuban soldiers were first sent to Guinea, to assist Cabral's movement against the Portuguese.²³³ In 1966, the MPLA was an active participant in the Tricontinental conference held in Havana. The MPLA was a member of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPS0). Paulo Jorge, a member of the MPLA, became a member of the OSPAAAL executive committee. Agostinho Neto and Amilcar Cabral were requested to speak and present the details of their nationalist movement to the conference. The Cubans omitted Holden Roberto from the list of visitors because they perceived him as friendly to American and

²³¹Translated from Spanish by Dr. Cedric Robinson, University of California, Santa Barbara, California. June 1981.

²³²Colin Lequm, After Angola, Ibid., p.20.

²³³Colin Lequm, After Angola, Ibid., p.20

parochial nationalist interests. Legum notes that as early as 1966, "a group of ninety MPLA recruits flew to Cuba for seven months' of military training."²³⁴

Thus, Cuban and Angolan leaders as early as 1960 were expressing and exchanging ideas about their movements. President Ford underestimated the bond of unity between these two continents and peoples. Perhaps he considered the break in history which occurred with the 17th century slave trade a termination of fraternal relations between Cuba and Angola, or perhaps his remarks that there existed no historical link between Cuba and Angola was made out of ignorance of African history. More likely, his remark was simply meant to assert that the Soviet Union was introducing puppets into Angola and to strengthen his request that that Congress increase its aid to the FNLA. Ford presumed that using the "communist scare" or insisting that Moscow was increasing its sphere of influence in Africa would move Congress to approve his proposal. Ford was as incorrect in his ability to predict congressional attitudes and predisposition toward funding another foreign war as he was in his reading of African history.

Clearly, there was a historical and political link between Cuba and Angola long before the Angolan Civil War.

²³⁴Colin Legum, After Angola, Ibid.,
, Inc. p. 225.

The relationship between these countries was maintained prior to 1975 outside of Soviet influence or probably its concern. It could be argued that when Agostinho Neto requested Cuban aid and Cuba did not hesitate, this was more of a continuation of policy rather than a Soviet-inspired plot against the United States.

From the African perspective, South Africa involvement changed the course of the war. Prior to known South African military support of FNLA and UNITA, African nations such as Nigeria had withheld recognition and complied with the OAU decision to favor a cease fire, free elections and a transitional government composed of all three nationalist movements. With confirmation of South African military commitment in Angola, countries like Nigeria, who had condemned Soviet activity in Angola, announced its recognition of the MPLA. In a bitter speech, reacting to South African military support of FNLA and UNITA, the Nigerian Head of State, M. Muhammad said:

The United States which now sheds crocodile tears in Angola, has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive U.S. administrations branded as terrorists, it even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American administrations continue to support the Apartheid regime of South Africa whom they see as the defenders of Western interest on the African continent. How can we now be led to believe that a Government with a record such as the U.S. has in Africa can suddenly become the defenders of our interests?²³⁵

After Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate political party in Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan and several other African states followed.²³⁶ African states now reversed Kissinger's and Ford's theory and saw the U.S. and South Africa, not the Soviet Union, as attempting to colonize them. Tensions were so high in Nigeria following the announcement of South African military involvement in Angola that Nigerian demonstrators "stoned the American embassy in Lagos, and the Nigerian government gave the MPLA \$20 million dollars."²³⁷

UNITA and the FNLA had essentially lost the war from an African perspective. For South Africa represents on the African continent the most despised and embarrassing government. It is seen as a monument to African powerlessness and European racism. Savimbi and Roberto, desperate to win the war at any cost, even to the extent of allowing South African and C.I.A. officers to operate with their troops and recruit mercenaries, couldn't have lost continental support more quickly. If Savimbi and

²³⁵Colin Legum, After Angola- The War Over Southern Africa,-- The Role of the Big Powers, Ibid.

²³⁶John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, (1962-1976), Volume II, Ibid., p.272

²³⁷John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962-1976), Volume II. Ibid., 272.

Roberto had been in touch with the aspirations and dreams of Angolans they would have realized that any relationship with South Africa would be considered traitorous. Attempting to expedite the war, they threw the MPLA its winning card. The MPLA claimed that Cuban forces were supporting their movement in opposition to South Africa.

Garcia Marquez' work, 'Operacion Carlota' addressed how the Cuban Communist Party responded when they learned of South African activities in Angola. Marquez reports that the decision had to be made in 24 hours whether or not to accept Neto's plea to intervene in the Angolan civil war. The Cubans were aware, Marquez states, that:

It was a decision of irreversible consequences, and a problem too massive and complex to resolve in 24 hours. In any case, the directorate of the Cuban Communist Party did not have more than 24 hours to decide, and it decided without vacillation, on November 5, in a long and calm meeting. To the contrary (in contradiction) to so much that has been said, it was an independent and sovereign act of Cuba, and it was after and not before it was decided that correspondence notification was made to the Soviet Union. On another November 5 (from that one), in 1843, a slave of the Triunairats plantation (refiners) in the Matanza region, called the BLACK CARLOTA, had risen up machete in hand to lead a party of slaves, and had died in the rebellion. In homage to her, the solidarity action in Angola bore her name: OPERATION CARLOTA.²³⁸

Marcum and Marquez are in agreement that it was South

²³⁸Garcia Marquez, Operacion Carlota, Los Cubanos En Angola El. Che Guevara En Africa La Batalla Contra El. Reich Sudafricana, Textos Del Sabueso Contemporaneo Mosca Azul and Horizonte, Ed.

African involvement which precipitated massive Cuban military involvement in the war. Furthermore, South African involvement was the major variable which turned continental African support against the FNLA and UNITA.

Shipments of arms and Cuban soldiers began to arrive in Angola. By Mid-October, there was only a skeletal group of 1,500 Cuban troops stationed in Angola. However, in response to the substantial South African military involvement in late October and early November it is estimated that over 10,000 Cuban troops were deployed to support the MPLA.²³⁹ By November 7 (four days before independence), Cuba was airlifting military units from Cuba to Angola in an operation known as Operation Carlota. By January 7, according to Marcum, the FNLA was destroyed as a fighting unit.²⁴⁰ The Cuban intervention had saved the MPLA and exposed the U.S. to unnecessary hostility and criticism from African nations. Massive Cuban involvement in the Angolan war was justified by and in response or retaliation to South African military initiatives. The evidence presented in this section would indicate that Soviet and Cuban forces worked together in supplying arms and equipment to the MPLA. However, that does not indicate

²³⁹John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, Ibid., p. 273.

²⁴⁰John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume II, Ibid., p. 274.

that Cuba did not have an independent foreign policy which converged in this area with Soviet policy. The relationship between Cuba and Angola since 1965 and their acknowledged ancestral link would indicate that there is a strong possibility that Cuba acted independently as a sovereign nation in her dealings with the MPLA. American foreign policymakers often do not recognize racial and political ties which transcend the "balance of power" thesis. Thus they are at a severe disadvantage in understanding national liberation movements. Unless the pattern of viewing all armed national liberation movements in Africa as a threat to American hegemonic interests is changed, we can expect South African and Namibian nationalist movements to be categorized as communist whether they are or not.

How did the U.S. press present these issues? In the next chapter, we will empirically examine the treatment of the Angolan civil war by the press.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION OF NEWS ARTICLES ON THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR.

Chapter III attempted to qualitatively define and frame the foreign involvement in the Angolan civil war. This chapter will empirically present the data from actual news clippings of the civil war. In particular, we have focused on the crisis period--the months October, November and December that reported massive Cuban military forces were introduced into the Angolan civil war equation and November 11th, the day war-torn Angola received its independence. Previous sections were also presented for comparative purposes. In the months that followed the Angolan civil war, massive amounts of literature were published by writers from every foreign country that participated in the war. American, South African and Cuban writers have attempted to recollect, explain and justify their countries involvements in the Angolan civil war. The literature and newspaper clippings then, formulate a framework within which I can analyze how balanced the U.S. press was in reporting foreign intervention in Angola.

Chapter II presented the methodology utilized to

code the newspaper articles. This section will attempt to answer the following questions:

How much coverage did the prestigious American newspapers give to the Angolan civil war?

How many editorials or background articles were presented to provide an in-depth analysis of the crisis?

Did the U. S. press clearly state which side the U. S. foreign policymakers were supporting?

Did the U. S. press report which side South Africa or Cuba were supporting?

Did the press indicate how much Cuban military involvement was present in Angola?

Was the MPLA presented in a favorable light as compared to the FNLA and/or UNITA?

How important was Cuban involvement, in Angola, in influencing U.S. detente with the Soviets?

Was Cuban involvement portrayed in a negative or positive light?

How much coverage of C.I.A. and State Department activities was presented by the American press?

Did the press attempt to report that Cuba and South Africa were both fighting at the same time?

How was the MPLA characterized--as communist or pro-Western?

How were UNITA and FNLA characterized--as communist or pro-Western?

The empirical section provides data that will ultimately suggest whether the United States press is able to report in a balanced manner when U.S. interests are involved. The information in this section will point out with whom the press is most closely aligned in the U.S. configuration.

Could American press coverage of the Angolan situation be compared to the Congressional position or does it nearly follow the executive branches? Can we contend that a hegemonic ideology is being transmitted to policymakers and the public through the U.S. press coverage of African events?

Angolan Key Definition

Each alphabet is assigned a qualitative meaning which correlates to the graph, coding sheet and histograms. The key was designed to make possible eighteen variables to be coded per article on the coding sheet. Please consult Chapter II for the methods and standards utilized to code the newspaper articles. The raw data is included in the appendix. In histograms 9 through 31 correlations between two or more variables were undertaken. The symbol PHI, i.e. ϕ is determined to mean a simultaneous occurrence of two or more variables appearing at the same time in a news article. For example, $\phi(m,n)$ means in one news clipping the article reported both (m), the U. S. claims detente is threatened by Cuban involvement in Angola, and (n), that South African involvement is reported.

Definition of the Variables

X = the number of editorials reported
 Y = the number of background articles published
 a = characterizes a movement being labeled as
 "Marxist-inspired or pro-Soviet"
 b = characterizes a movement being labeled "communist"

ANGOLA DATA OBSERVATIONS : TABLE 4A

| news papers | New York Times | | Washington Post | | Wall Street Journal | | Christian Science Monitor | |
|---------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|
| | number of articles | % of N | number of articles | % of N | number of articles | % of N | number of articles | % of N |
| x | 11 | 6.87 | 5 | 4.72 | 2 | 8.34 | 1 | 2.5 |
| y | 3 | 1.87 | 2 | 1.89 | 1 | 4.17 | 0 | 0 |
| Q | 131 | 81.88 | 60 | 56.58 | 16 | 66.72 | 31 | 77.5 |
| b | 8 | 5.04 | 3 | 3.83 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5.0 |
| c | 46 | 28.75 | 25 | 23.57 | 4 | 16.68 | 14 | 35.0 |
| d | 12 | 7.5 | 10 | 9.43 | 7 | 29.19 | 1 | 2.5 |
| e | 1 | 0.62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| f | 41 | 25.6 | 32 | 30.18 | 2 | 8.34 | 4 | 10.0 |
| g | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2.5 |
| h | 68 | 42.5 | 36 | 33.95 | 9 | 37.53 | 12 | 30.0 |
| i | 11 | 6.88 | 10 | 9.43 | 1 | 4.17 | 0 | 0 |
| j | 67 | 41.88 | 54 | 50.92 | 9 | 37.53 | 25 | 62.5 |
| k | 5 | 3.12 | 3 | 2.83 | 1 | 4.17 | 3 | 7.5 |
| l | 1 | 0.63 | 2 | 1.89 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| m | 33 | 20.6 | 20 | 18.86 | 11 | 45.87 | 5 | 12.5 |
| n | 62 | 38.75 | 44 | 41.49 | 9 | 37.53 | 12 | 30.0 |
| o | 19 | 11.88 | 10 | 9.43 | 3 | 12.51 | 1 | 2.5 |
| P | 16 | 10.0 | 20 | 18.86 | 4 | 16.68 | 2 | 5.0 |
| $\phi(h,n)$ | 32 | 20.0 | 25 | 23.57 | 3 | 12.51 | 3 | 7.5 |
| $\phi(a,f)$ | 15 | 9.4 | 13 | 12.26 | 2 | 8.34 | 2 | 5.0 |
| $\phi(h,m)$ | 18 | 11.25 | 12 | 11.32 | 5 | 20.85 | 2 | 5.0 |
| $\phi(f,n)$ | 21 | 13.13 | 19 | 17.92 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2.5 |
| $\phi(g,n)$ | 22 | 13.75 | 13 | 12.26 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 15.0 |
| $\phi(h,j)$ | 40 | 25 | 32 | 30.19 | 5 | 20.85 | 8 | 20.0 |
| $\phi(a,c)$ | 40 | 25 | 21 | 19.8 | 3 | 12.51 | 15 | 37.5 |
| $\phi(b,d)$ | 1 | 0.62 | 1 | 0.94 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| N | 160 | 100 | 106 | 100 | 24 | 100 | 40 | 100 |
| $\phi(g,a)/a$ | 64 | 78.1 | 53 | 93.67 | 7 | 10.49 | 20 | 25.8 |
| $\phi(h,n)/N$ | 9 | 5.62 | 12 | 11.32 | 2 | 8.34 | 0 | 0 |
| * | row | calculated as a percentage of a | | | | | | |

- c = characterizes a movement being labeled "pro-American, western supported, or pro-western"
- d = characterizes a movement being labeled anti-Soviet
- e = characterizes a movement being labeled "liberal or moderate"
- f = characterizes newspaper reports that "Western aid is being given to UNITA and FNLA in a clandestine manner"
- g = characterizes that Cuba's involvement in the Angolan Civil War is positive
- h = characterizes that Cuba's involvement in the Angolan Civil War is negative
- i = characterizes newspaper coverage of the MPLA as favorable
- j = characterizes newspaper coverage of the MPLA as negative
- k = characterizes the sources of news as the USA
- l = characterizes the sources of news as Portugal
- m = The U.S. claims that detente with the Soviet Union is threatened by Cuban presence in Angola
- n = U.S. newspapers report that South Africa is involved in the Angolan Civil War
- o = U.S. newspapers report that the U.S.A. is involved in the Angolan Civil War
- p = U.S. newspapers report that the C.I.A. is involved in the Angolan Civil War


NEWSPAPER OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR CASE

Figure 1(A)

Figure 1(A), is the histogram of overall number of articles examined, showing the number of editorials and background reports. The graph shows that the New York Times (NYT) devoted 160 articles to the Angolan issue in two months, which would indicate that the Times viewed this issue as important. The NYT coverage is approximately 50% more than that of the Washington Post (WP) and 4 times more than the Christian Science Monitor (CSM). Comparatively, the W.P. published 106 articles, the W.S.J. printed 24 articles and the C.S.M. presented 40 articles. The W.S.J. had the greatest number of editorials and background reports



Figure 1(A)



Histogram of overall number of articles (N) examined showing the number of editorials (X) and background reports (Y).


in terms of percentage. See the table for Angola.

Overall, in a two-month period, American newspapers devoted a significant amount of attention to the Angolan civil war. In fact, the U.S. press gave the Angolan issue a far more coverage than either the assassination of Steve Biko or the election of Robert Mugabe. Possibly this indicates that the American press viewed the civil war in Angola as more important to the interests of its readers. We discussed in Chapter one that the general readership of the "prestige" press is composed of middle and upper-income groups. Therefore, readers would be interested if the Angolan war possibly threatened Zaire where \$800 million dollars of American corporate money was invested. Possibly there was a frequent coverage of Angola because it was thought to be a stable white minority government that was being endangered by communism and that could signal a pattern of black guerrilla activity in the white ruled areas.

Figure 2 (A)

Figure 2 (A) represents the relative number of articles in which MPLA was described as Marxist. The Washington Post in terms of percentages is the most liberal in reference to MPLA. (Check the table for Angola.) All the newspapers recorded a high percentage of references to MPLA as a Soviet-backed, Marxist organization, despite the

Figure 2(A)



Histogram of the relative number "MPLA" was described as Marxist as a percentage of "N".

fact that Neto repeatedly said:

Our leadership is not Marxist-Leninist. We are a large organization with various shades of opinion and different types of groups united solely under the flag of liberation. As a heterogeneous organization, it contains both Marxist and other points of view. But it is true that many people in the world consider the MPLA as a movement linked with Moscow. Again, I say this is untrue. This image exists only in the imagination of outsiders.²⁴¹

The fact that newspapers consistently labelled Neto a Marxist would not have caused any concern but for the fact that Figure 3(A) recorded a low percentage of reference to UNITA or FNLA being Western-aided. For example, the NYT labelled the MPLA organization as Marxist 80% of the time; it labelled UNITA and FNLA as pro-Western only 30% of the time, suggesting that MPLA was colored almost three times as much as the FNLA or UNITA forces with an affective connotation. The NYT readers would assume from this kind of reporting that the pro-Soviet forces of the MPLA were fighting non-aligned and independent forces of the FNLA and UNITA. This amounts to biased unbalanced and subjective reporting by the four American newspapers regarding the MPLA.

The press is presenting an image of UNITA and FNLA forces as fighting the communists single-handedly. This

²⁴¹Thomas Hodges, How MPLA Won. This perception also persisted despite the fact that da Cruz was voted out of the MPLA leadership because Neto thought he was too militant.


would indicate for "cold war" advocates that Europe/America would possibly consider financially backing the UNITA or FNLA forces in order to contain the Soviet threat. We can actually calculate the extent of bias of this graph for the other newspapers as well. The Washington Post reported that the MPLA was a Marxist organization 56% of the time; compared to reports that the UNITA/FNLA organizations were Western-backed 24% of the time--a difference of 32% points! The Wall Street Journal was equally biased. The WSJ labelled the MPLA as Marxists 66% of the time, and the UNITA and FNLA as western-backed 17% of the time-- a discrepancy of 49% points. The CSM called the MPLA Marxist 77% of the time; on the other hand, it referred to the UNITA and FNLA as Western-backed only 35% of the time. This indicates a bias of 42% points toward the MPLA as a Marxist organization. Moreover, it was established by several historical accounts that there was U.S. State Department and C.I.A. presence in Angola long before Soviet involvement.

Figure 3(A)

The Wall Street Journal is the most guilty of the four newspapers, in not revealing that UNITA/FNLA were Western-backed, but clearly all four newspapers were presenting the MPLA in an unfavorable light. This trend is also revealed by the results of Histogram 12(A).


Figure 4(A)

Figure 3(A)



Histogram of relative number the National Front (UNITA and FNLA) was described as "Pro-West" or Western- back in relation to "N".

Figure 4(A)



Histogram of the relative factor f/N in percentage. F/N is overall number of articles describing clandestine U.S. aid to UNITA or FNLA

Figure 4 is a histogram describing clandestine U.S. aid to UNITA or the FNLA. The Wall Street Journal of all the newspapers least reported the clandestine U.S. aid to the national front (UNITA/FNLA). The Wall Street Journal in Figure 3 also was the most conservative in reporting that UNITA/FNLA were western-backed! While the WSJ comparatively doesn't cover the Angolan situation in great detail, a pattern is developing that it is quite often the most conservative journal. This is possibly due to its readership, largely conservative business interests. And since American business interests were perceived by some groups as being endangered by an MPLA victory, the reflected this concern. WSJ Overall, even the New York Times, who offered the greatest coverage of this variable, recorded only about 26%, which I consider quite low. This 26% coverage of clandestine U.S. aid to UNITA and FNLA by the New York Times has to be compared to Figures 2 and 3 where overall American newspapers refused to equally report that UNITA and FNLA were being supported by western powers, but didn't fail to report that the MPLA was being supported by the Soviet Union, considering especially, New York Times which called the MPLA Marxist-supported 80% of the time.


Figure 4:1 (A)

Figure 4:1 is a histogram of the relative number of articles describing Cuban involvement as positive. Only one

Figure 4: 1(A)

Overall number of articles for all newspapers.

Articles showing Cuban involvement is positive.




newspaper, the Christian Science Monitor, wrote one article out of four which could loosely be described as seeing Cuban involvement in Angola in a positive light. It is indeed curious that considering the political history of the Cuban and Angolan peoples, as discussed in Chapter 3, only one out of a total of 160 articles cared to explore the possibilities of a positive relationship between the two countries. After centuries of humiliating Portuguese rule and later the added degradation of South African intervention, one would have thought the U.S. press would have been more sympathetic to the passions of a nationalist movement fighting for independence. The same is true for the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. There seems to be a consensus among the reporters covering Angola that absolutely nothing was positive about Cuban intervention. How could such a statistic be indicative of a truly independent and free press? The Christian Science Monitor in this category is much more objective than the other three.

Figure 5 (A)

Figure 5 (A) represents a histogram describing Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war seen as negative. In contrast to Figure 4:1(A), all newspapers described a high level of Cuban involvement in the war to be negative about 42% of the time. The Washington Post, 40%, Wall Street Journal, 37%, and Christian Science Monitor, 30%. These figures are relatively high when one realizes that Cuba did not get involved in the first days of months of the coverage of the Angolan crisis, and that even in the Central Intelligence Agency, the institution that was carrying out the orders of Ford and Kissinger, there were doubts as to the legitimacy of American activities in the area. Figure 18(A) is a histogram representing the relative number of times that MPLA might have been described in unfavorable terms as a result of Cuban involvement. The parameters in Figure 18(A) are relatively high, ranging from 0.56 to 0.89. However, the comparative study prior to this section reported that the C.I.A. had been funnelling Holden Roberto (FNLA) money for intelligence information since 1962.²⁴² The unfavorable press coverage of MPLA because of Cuban ties has to be seen as a rationalization of the press's jaundiced

²⁴²John Marcum, p. 237. The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962-1976), Vol. II., M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, England 1969.

Figure 5(A)



Histogram of the ratio (h/N) in percentage points.
 h is Cuban involvement is negative.


position on the MPLA from the beginning of the crisis. One important question must be raised: if various members of the C.I.A. and State Department and Congress had grave doubts about our role in Angola, why didn't an equal number of foreign correspondents report those doubts?

Figure 6 (A)

Figure 6(A) is a histogram describing the MPLA as unfavorable. Consistent with the previous histograms, the MPLA is overwhelmingly described unfavorably. The Christian Science Monitor interestingly enough, represented the highest percentage. Histogram 27(A) displays the parameter describing a negative characterization of the MPLA as a result of its Soviet-backing or its Marxist orientation (as perceived by the press.) One would have expected the New York Times, or the Washington Post to have recorded the highest occurrences in this category. In other words, reference to the MPLA as unfavorable is based on its being Marxist-inspired. The ratio varies in histogram 27(A) from about .78 for the New York Times to as high as 90% for the Washington Post. So the American press was justifying its anti-MPLA coverage by labelling the organization's philosophy--Marxist. The press ignored Neto and Basil Davidson²⁴³ plea to discontinue labelling the organization

²⁴³Basil Davidson In The Eye of the Storm, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1972.

Figure 6(A)




Histogram of the ratio (J/N) in percentage points.
Relative number of articles describing MPLA as unfavorable.

in that manner. If one compares this account with the background section, perhaps one can argue that the American press was not anti-MPLA because it was a communist organization but could or would not contradict the Kissinger/Nixon interpretation that a MPLA victory might upset the "balance of power" in that area, American interests might be disturbed, white minority governments unsettled, and Mobutu's regime endangered.

Figure 7(A)

Figure 7(A) is a histogram indicating the relative number of times that detente was mentioned to be threatened by Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War. The Wall Street Journal's value is particularly high, in fact, it is twice as high as the New York Times. The Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post both had substantial concerns which are reflected in the statistics. The Wall Street Journal's high value is possibly due to its constituency. American businessmen certainly had a lot to lose if that area became unstable. This statistics points to the fact that the Wall Street Journal felt that Washington should put pressure on the Soviet Union (by threatening detente) to disengage from supporting the MPLA, a tactic which did not work. Figure 11(A) represents another parameter reflecting the dissatisfaction of the U.S. Press with Cuban involvement in Angola. Figure 11(A)

Figure 7(A)



describes the threat to "detente as a result of Cuban involvement." If one compares Figures 24(A) and 25(A) in which Cuban, South African and U.S.A./C.I.A. involvements were alleged, then one would have expected the values reflected in these two histograms to be substantially below 0.5 for a coverage fairly predisposed to the Angolans.

Figure 8(A)

Figure 8(A) presents the ratio in percentages describing South African involvement in the Angolan Civil War. The American press describes South African involvement in the Angolan Civil War as being high. The Washington Post reported the highest value.

Figure 9(A)

Figure 9(A) describes articles discussing U.S./C.I.A.) involvement in the Angolan Civil War. The values for all the newspapers are relatively high. The press justified this involvement by asserting that the U.S. and the C.I.A. was involved because the MPLA was a pro-Marxist organization and in reaction to the Cuban involvement. See Figures 2(A), 3(A), and 5(A). On comparing Figure 9(A) with Figure 20(A) the values are extremely low. This would indicate that the American press was avoiding reporting that American and South Africa were allies, although Figure 3(A) indicates that the U.S. press did

Figure 8(A)





Figure 9(A)




Histogram describing how often U.S./C.I.A. involvement in the war was discussed.

inform the public or policy makers that the U.S. and other Western nations were supporting the FNLA/UNITA forces. The public and policymakers who were relying on the U.S. press for coverage of this event were receiving a discolored and unreliable picture of the crisis. This probably has the effect intended or not of protecting the C.I.A. and the executive branch in this covert war.

Figure 10 (A)

Figure 10(A) is a histogram depicting Cuban involvement as negative and simultaneously characterizing South African involvement. Since it is a fact that Cuba as well as South Africa is involved in the Angolan Civil war, the comparatively low values for Figure 10(A) and both quantities of Figure 16(A) are unjustified. In Figure 15(A), which is a comparative histogram, we find the press using double standards. How can a report claim that Cuban involvement is negative when South African involvement is also reportedly involved? This histogram would indicate that the U.S. press is not against all foreign intervention, just intervention which Kissinger and Ford did not approve of in their policy. It is a curious fact that both the U.S. press and Kissinger agreed with South Africa and U.S. involvement in the civil war. This suggests that either the press and Kissinger were taking their clues from the other or that both were deriving their information from misleading

Figure 10(A)




Histogram of the correlation $\phi(h,n)$ between variables (h) = Cuban involvement is negative and (n) South African involvement in percentage points.

sources.

Figure 11(A)

Figure 11(A) is a histogram describing in percentage points the parameters that Cuban involvement is negative and that the U.S. is claiming that detente is being threatened by Cuban involvement. As stated previously, the U.S. is warning the Soviet Union that it will bring detente into focus if it does not remove Cuban soldiers and discontinue the supply of Soviet weaponry. Figure 3(A) shows that the U.S. press was aware of South African involvement. Then, why isn't the U.S. press questioning South African involvement? Interestingly enough, the U.S. press failed overall to see Cuban involvement as a response to South African military intervention or even as support for the Nationalist struggle for independence in Angola. If the press was truly unbiased, this would have been an important issue. How can the U.S. government threaten detente discussions and not threaten South Africa? The reason was because South Africa and the United States were allied in this war. But that does not explain the press' silence on this matter, unless it perceived its interests as coterminous with the Kissinger/Ford doctrine. For example, the New York Times, on December 14, 1975, printed an article entitled "Castro Rejects Reconciliation To Fight for the Cause" in which South African involvement was never

Figure 11(A)



mentioned as a participant in the war. Another New York Times article, appearing on December 14, 1975, asserted that "Soviet Tightens Grasp in Africa--150,000 Tons of Military Aid Reported Sent to Angola Pro-Moscow Faction" written from the South African desk in Johannesburg stated:

Soviet penetration of black Africa, now most visible in Angola, has now reached its highest mark since Western powers began the decolonization of the continent nearly two decades ago, according to intelligence sources here...Cuban troops lead units of the movement in clashes with pro-Western forces in the newly independent Portuguese territory...Angola would be the biggest prize in the Soviet Union's growing sphere of influence in Africa if the Popular Movement emerges victorious...Western diplomats are also concerned that Angola could be used as a base for subversion of Zaire, Zambia and other states. And with Mozambique, it could be used as a springboard for black guerrilla movements in Rhodesia, South-West African and even South Africa

Although the author was reporting from South Africa, he made no mention of South African military concerns in the war. Additionally, American readers were left ignorant of how African nations were reacting to South African vs. Cuban involvement in the conflict. Clearly, most African nations would react very positively towards Mozambique being used as a springboard for black South African liberation activities regardless of which world power provided its financial or military backing.


What this kind of one-sided reporting signals to Black African nations is that the American press had no respect for African nations unless they are considered

friendly to U.S. interests. This type of unbalanced reporting reflects that the emergence of democracy and self-determination in Angola holds a low priority on the list of American foreign policymakers and the U.S. press.

Figure 12(A)

Figure 12(A) represents the histogram describing how often the U.S. press labelled the MPLA as Marxist inspired and simultaneously described UNITA or FNLA as pro-American. If the American press was presenting an unbiased and balanced portrait of the civil war and foreign intervention, one would have expected the values in this figure to be around 90%. On the contrary, it ranges from 12% to 37%, the lowest value being recorded by the Wall Street Journal. A pattern has emerged concerning the Wall Street Journal's reporting of foreign intervention in the Angolan Civil War. Consistently the WSJ takes the most conservative positions. As alluded to previously, this is possibly due to its perceived responsibility of warning American businessmen when investment areas are endangered. The recorded values of figure 12(A) show that the reporters failed to mention that UNITA/FNLA are backed by western countries while always reminding the reading public that the MPLA was supported by the Soviets. This reporting can be seen as advocacy journalism. This development can be viewed as an attempt to persuade the U.S. Congress to authorize additional C.I.A.

Figure 12(A)




Histogram of the correlation $\phi(a, c)$ between the variables a and c in percentage points. (a characterizing a Marxist-inspired organization and c denoting a pro-American, Western-supported group.)

involvement and additional financial support for the FNLA and UNITA forces in order to increase their chances of sustaining a military victory over the MPLA forces.

Figure 13 (A)

Figure 13(A) is a histogram representing a movement being presented as pro-American or Western supported and indicating South African involvement. This figure symbolizes variables that are indicating a movement is being characterized as pro-Western and simultaneously referring to South African activities in the area. The values are extremely low. Again, one would like to emphasize the Wall Street Journal coverage. In this correlation, the value for the Wall Street Journal is zero. The other three newspapers were not substantially different, though with the NYT mentioning South African and American involvement simultaneously approximately 14%, the Washington Post 13% and the Christian Science Monitor the highest value of 15% respectively. These figures indicate poor "objective reporting." But such reporting is a wise strategy for pro-American involvement in Angola forces. Government and public critics of the South African government will be disturbed to learn that the U.S. is teaming up with South Africans in Angola to fight an MPLA government which has been recognized by many countries, including some prominent African countries. (specifically Nigeria, an indispensable

Figure 13(A)



economic partner for the United States.)

Figure 14(A)

Figure 14(A) is a histogram representing clandestine Western aid to UNITA and FNLA and South African involvement. This histogram explains how many times the U.S. press reported in the same article that Western countries were sending aid to FNLA and UNITA and that South Africa was involved. Again, as in Figure 13(A) the Wall Street Journal value is zero. None of the articles sampled mentions that western countries and South Africa were both aiding UNITA and FNLA. South Africa was backing these organizations. All the values are low for the three newspapers. It would be difficult to argue that such patterns represented by Figures 13(A) and 14(A) are accidents. There is a deliberate pattern of omitting information from news coverage which is not thought to be favorable or generally accepted, like an alliance with South Africa, from the public and elected officials.

Figure 15(A)

Figure 15(A) represents a histogram describing press reports that indicate Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War is considered negative and simultaneously characterizing the press' references to the MPLA in an unfavorable manner. This histogram shows that the press reported Cuban

Figure 14(A)





Figure 15(A)



Histogram of the correlation $\phi (h, j)$ between the variables h and j in percentage points. h characterizes Cuban involvement is negative. J refers to MPLA in unfavorable terms.



involvement in the civil war negatively. The American press referred to MPLA unfavorably many times. The high correlation of values represented in this figure is, therefore, not surprising. If you compare Figure 15(A) with Figure 18(A) the correlation were extremely high that, if the press referred to the MPLA, it would be unfavorable and that simultaneously, if it referred to Cuban involvement it would be negative. These two figures could possibly indicate that the prestigious press is consistently anti-communist and nationalist if those aspirations threaten or are inimical to U.S. interest.

Figure 16(A)

Figure 16(A) is a comparative histogram recording values on the occasions when a newspaper account simultaneously refers to Cuban involvement as being negative while also mentioning South African involvement. The values of figure 16(A) are comparatively high. One would have expected South African involvement to be treated negatively in at least some of these articles. Values below 10% would have been tolerable. Qualitatively there is little difference between the values represented in the comparative histogram 16(A) they are trying to reflect the same value. How could the U.S. press condemn Cuba or report that Cuban intervention is negative while South Africa was involved? It must be remembered that the coding does allow for the

Figure 16(A)

Legend



Comparative histogram of $\phi(h,n)/n$ and $\phi(h,n)/h$. The variable (h) characterizes Cuban involvement as negative and (n) characterizes South African involvement.

press to report Cuban activity in Angola to be regarded as favorable. And, if the American press had said that Cuban involvement was positive rather than that Cuban involvement was negative and simultaneously report South African involvement, the value would have been zero. Instead, the American press insists on calling Cuban involvement negative and thus there is a weak correlation between the variables represented in Figure 10 (A). Also, whether one emphasizes South African involvement or characterizes Cuban involvement as negative the relationship qualitatively is not substantially changed.


Figure 17 (A)

Figure 17 (A) is a histogram depicting the U.S. claim that detente is being threatened by Cuban intervention. Figure 17 (A) confirms what Figure 11 (A) implied. The high quantity represented by figure 17 (A) shows that almost any time Cuban involvement was mentioned, detente was inevitably reported to be an issue. Most quotes pertaining to Cuban involvement being a threat to detente can be traced back to Kissinger or the State Department.

Figure 18 (A)


Figure 18 (A) is a histogram portraying Cuban involvement as negative while simultaneously characterizing the MPLA in unfavorable terms. The values are high; varying

Figure 17(A)



Histogram of the correlation ratio $\phi(h,m)/h$.
The variable (h) characterizes Cuban involvement as
negative and (m) claims that detente is threatened.

Figure 18(A)



Histogram of the correlation ratio $\phi(h,j)/h$.
The variable (h) refers to reports that claim that Cuban involvement is negative while referring to the MPLA in unfavorable terms.



from 0.56----to----- 0.89. It seems that unfavorable descriptions of the MPLA were due to Cuban involvement. One would want to inquire at this point whether Cuban military support of MPLA decisively affected or changed the tide of the war. The answer from all available sources indicate that without Cuban support, the MPLA would have surrendered to the FNLA. The high value of Figure 18(A) reflects then the dissatisfaction or anger of the press at the advantageous effect of the support of Cuba to the MPLA. Thus it is appropriate to ask whether, if UNITA or FNLA had had the upper hand hand over MPLA in spite of Cuban military support, the denunciations or castigations of Cuba and MPLA would have been as vehement? My guess is that clearly the answer is no. The American press can be seen as advocating increased involvement in the Angolan civil conflict.

Figure 19 (A)

Figure 19(A) is a comparative histogram describing when the press characterizes an organization as "Marxist inspired" or as a "pro-American, western-supported political movement." The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor did not report simultaneously that the FNLA was being supported by the West and that the MPLA was being supported by the Soviet Union. The Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal are both distorting the news. Figure 2(A) showed that there is a very high

Figure 19(A)

Legend



Comparative histogram of the ratios $\phi(a,c)/a$ and $\phi(a,c)/c$. Variable (a) characterizes "Marxist-inspired" and (c) "pro-American, Western-supported."

percentage of articles labelling the MPLA as a Marxist organization. The CSM value was 40% and the WSJ was 24%. In contrast, in Figure 3(A), there were very low values assigned to labelling the FNLA and UNITA pro-American or western-supported. The newspaper reporting implied that UNITA and FNLA movements were independently fighting against the Soviet-backed MPLA. The findings of Figures 2(A) and 3(A) findings are confirmed in Figure 19(A).


Figure 20 (A)

Figure 20(A) is a comparative histogram. It is a plot of of the parameters referring to the U.S. press coverage of South African involvement in the Angolan Civil War and characterizing the amount of attention the American press paid to U.S. and C.I.A. involvement in the war. This histogram indicates that American newspapers seldom linked U.S. involvement in Angola with South African support of the FNLA/UNITA. The New York Times has the lowest correlation of South African and American involvement in this category.


Figure 22 (A)

Figure 22(A) is a comparative histogram which breaks down the way the three newspapers compare in relationship to the three variables. The variable (h) refers to Cuban involvement if considered negative; the variable (m) stands for U.S. claims that Cuban involvement is threatening

Figure 20(A)



Comparative histogram of the ratios $\phi(n, \alpha)/\alpha$ in percentages. The variable (n) refers to the U.S. Press coverage of South African involvement in the Angolan civil war.




detente; the variable phi indicates U.S. and C.I.A. involvement is being reported by the American press. The New York Times in all three instances recorded the highest value in regards to these three variables. Washington Post had the second highest values in regards to the forementioned variables. Interestingly, the Christian Science Monitor values are higher for the value h symbolizing that Cuban involvement in the war is negative than the WSJ, but alternatively, the Wall Street Journal's values are higher for the value m claiming that detente is being threatened than the Washington Post. The Wall Street Journal did report United States and C.I.A. activity in Angola almost 50% more often than the Christian Science Monitor. This indicates that while the American press was certainly aware of U.S./C.I.A. involvement in the Angolan Civil War, it chose to castigate only Cuban involvement in their coverage. This would show an unbalanced coverage of Cuban and American involvement in press coverage. Furthermore, this could also be an indication of the press attempting to justify American activities in the area. In this regard, you can view the American press as a communications vehicle translating and promoting executive policy decisions.

Figure 23(A)

This is a histogram indicating that very low

Figure 23(A)




Histogram of the parameter $\phi (h,m,\alpha)$ compared to the variable m .

references were made to USA/CIA involvement simultaneously with references to Cuban involvement described as threatening detente. Figure 23(A) should be compared with Figure 21(A) which describes that the press characterized Cuban involvement as negative and threatening detente with the Soviet Union while avoiding substantial announcements of U.S./CIA involvement in the civil war.

Figure 24 (A)

Figure 24 (A) is a histogram representing that "Cuban involvement is negative." but simultaneously reporting South African involvement in Angola. The interpretation for this figure would mean that the American press reported Cuban involvement as negative and indicated that the U.S. considered detente with the Soviet Union threatened, at the same time as it reported South African military activities. Considering how independent African states perceive South Africa (consult the previous section on how Nigerians stoned the American embassy when they learned of S.A. involvement in the Angolan Civil War) why would the U.S. government threaten Soviet detente and not threaten South Africa if they were really interested in Angolans independently controlling their country? African countries are just as concerned about South African activities in Angola as America was concerned about Cuban involvement.

Figure 24(A)




Figures 25 (A) and 26 (A)

Figures 25(A) and 26(A) are histograms referring to American newspapers' coverage of the MPLA as unfavorable. In Figure 25(A), the values are extremely high. The histogram would indicate that the American press is opposed to the MPLA because it is considered Marxist-inspired or pro-Soviet. The Washington Post attributes their anti-MPLA position to Cuban involvement at least 90% of the time. The Christian Science Monitor, with the second highest value in this category, attributes its high anti-MPLA presentation to Cuban involvement 80% of the time. The New York Times contributes its negative portrayal of the MPLA to Cuban involvement 50% of the time, with the Wall Street Journal at 56.25%.


In Figure 26 (A), The American press justified its opposition to the MPLA because it is Soviet-backed. However, using this standard, the press lacks objectivity because, as Figure 2(A) shows, that the MPLA is always affectively described. Conversely, the FNLA and UNITA are seldom linked to South African or American aid as shown in Figure 3(A). The Washington Post is the most outstanding, with almost 100% of its characterization of the MPLA due to its being Marxist-or Soviet-backed. The New York Times follows suit with 78.16% and the C.S.M. 28.80% and the Wall Street Journal 10.49%--all substantial figures. My analysis of the Wall Street Journal figure is that it is probably

Figure 25(A)



Histogram describing variables (j) and (a) in percentages. (J) refers to news reports casting the MPLA in an unfavorable light. (a) characterizes a "Marxist-inspired or pro-Soviet" movement.

Figure 26(A)



Histogram of the ratio $\phi(j,a)/a$. (MPLA is characterized as unfavorable and MPLA is described as Marxist, by/or as a result of the MPLA's characterization as a Marxist organization.)


very honest. The Wall Street Journal is not necessarily negative toward the MPLA because they are communist or alleged to be communist by the American press, but because of possible threats to business investments in the area and endangering of white minority regimes in the area.

More importantly, these values indicate unfortunately that American newspapers were so jaundiced against the MPLA because of its relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba that they did not appreciate the MPLA as a nationalist movement struggling against the exploitation and dehumanizing conditions brought on by Portuguese colonialism. I consider the high statistical values in this figure to represent a very myopic perception by the American press of the issues involved in this crisis. These values would also represent an unbalanced and distorted attitude toward reporting African liberation movements. Furthermore, this kind of reporting completely shifts the blame away from Portugal and its role in Angola to the Soviet Union.

Figure 27 (A)

Figure 27(A) is a histogram describing how the American press reported South African activity in Angola, and how the American press characterized U.S. and C.I.A. activity in the area. This histogram's low values showed that the U.S. press avoided reporting both U.S. and South African activities in Angola simultaneously. It is clear

Figure 27(A)



that the American press did not want to report simultaneous American and South African military or political activities in the Angolan civil war. Figure 9(A) confirms the same values in its description of these variables.


Figure 28 (A)

Figure 28(A) are comparative histograms describing the negative characterization of Cuban involvement and suggesting that this involvement threatens detente in comparison to the reportage of US/CIA involvement in the Angolan civil war. This histogram implies that U.S. newspapers view detente as the primary issue instead of questioning U.S. and C.I.A. involvement in this war.

Figure 29 (A)

Figure 29(A) are comparative histograms referring to "Cuban involvement as negative," that "detente is threatened by Cuban involvement," and simultaneously reporting South African involvement in the war. In the second histogram Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal recorded the highest values in this category. They report that Cuban involvements in Angola is negative while at the same time indicate that South African military forces are involved in the civil war. This reflects poorly on their ability to offer an objective account of the events. The Christian Science Monitor reporting in this category is reflected by a zero value consistent with Figure 4:1(A), which illustrated


Figure 28(A)



Comparative histogram of $\phi \frac{(h,m,\alpha)}{N}$ and $\frac{(m)}{N}$

for all newspapers. The variable (h) symbolizes Cuban involvement is negative, (m) detente is threatened, and (alpha) recognition of U.S./C.I.A. involvement.

Figure 29(A)



Comparative histogram of $\phi \frac{(h, m, n)}{N}$ and $\frac{(m)}{N}$ for all newspapers. The variable (h) symbolizes Cuban involvement is negative, (m) detente is threatened, (n) recognition of South African involvement.

that the Christian Science Monitor was the only newspaper within our sample which presented articles that described Cuban involvement as positive. Figure 7(A) indicates the frequency of reference to Cuban involvement as being a threat to detente. The Wall Street Journal, with a value of 45.83%, shows that it considers this issue central to the debacle. The other newspapers also have relatively high values for this variable. As is clearly seen, the newspapers laid the majority of blame on Cuban activity in the area, not South Africa. In fact, newspapers are not calling for sanctions against South Africa because of its role in the Angolan Civil War. This is another indication of the U.S. press being unbalanced and distorting and exaggerating consistently the role of Cuba in this war. Nor is it very complimentary to the African anti-colonial fighters, who are not credited with the ability to lead a fight against Portuguese administration without the prompting and agitation of Cubans. The U.S. press can be seen in this figure to be protesting and promoting the policies and political and economic interests of the executive office.

Concluding Notes on Chapter IV--The Angola Case

Chapter IV has analyzed the American prestigious press coverage of foreign intervention in the Angolan Civil War. This chapter presented quantitative data in order to

substantiate my hypothesis as outlined in Chapter II. Chapter III presented a brief historical overview of Portuguese rule in Angola. It has been established that the Portuguese ruled Angola for five centuries, during which, the Portuguese conducted the Atlantic slave trade, instituted forced labor requirements, legitimized the sexual abuse of Angolan women under the pretense of race mixing, and instituted a humiliating system of social stratification; the indigena/assimulado distinctions. It has also been established that the Angolans have resisted Portuguese rule since 1575.²⁴⁴ The contemporary Angolan nationalist movements of the 1950s through to the 1970s were one of the longest colonial struggles in Africa.²⁴⁵ The Angolan resistance to Portuguese rule outlasted even the Algerian War (November 1954 to July 1962).²⁴⁶ The only longer anti-colonial struggle was the Vietnam War.²⁴⁷ The Angolan nationalist movements of the 50s were a logical outgrowth of a prolonged battle against foreign intervention.

The data from the newspaper articles on Angola

²⁴⁴Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1976. p.202

²⁴⁵Ibid, p. 202

²⁴⁶Ibid, p. 202

²⁴⁷Ibid., p. 202

indicates what my hypothesis suggests--that American newspapers present an unbalanced and distorted portrait of Africa, in particular, Angolan crisis events, when American interests are at stake. Furthermore, this investigation of the American press coverage of the Angolan Civil War illustrates that the American press promotes a view of events conforming to the positions of the executive branch of the government (Kissinger and Ford). The American news media, I suggest, can be characterized as an advocacy press. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger pursued and advocated an interventionist position. The Press completely ignored opposition to the Kissinger/Ford policy coming from other branches or agencies. The American Congress voted overwhelmingly to oppose Ford's proposal to invest additional money and "military advisors" in Angola. Director of the African Bureau of the State Department, Nathan Davis was so vehemently opposed to further American intervention in Angola, although he was hand-picked by Kissinger, he was asked to resign in 1975. John Stockwell's account of C.I.A. activities in Angola also recalls that there was sharp division within the agency whether the U.S. should pursue a policy of political interference in Angola. In contrast, the American press presented a pattern of coverage that favored a prointerventionist stance consistent with the Ford and Kissinger policy.

The histograms graphically illustrate, for example,

that the New York Times consistently labelled the MPLA as Soviet-backed 80% of the time when in contrast only affectively loading the FNLA and UNITA forces 29% of the time. The Washington Post is least liberal in comparison with all other newspapers in reference to the MPLA. The Wall Street Journal, overall, tends to advocate that America confront the issue from an international perspective by threatening detente with the Soviets if Cuban forces are not withdrawn. This issue is represented by the values in Figure 7(A) representing that detente is being jeopardized and which shows particularly high quantities in the Wall Street Journal's reporting. American newspapers did report substantial South African involvement in the war efforts. However, the newspapers were much more concerned and negative towards Cuban involvement. This is particularly interesting, because most African nations take the completely opposite position. South Africa is negatively viewed by African nations because of its racial and economic policies. These findings may indicate that the American press and policymakers who pursue this line of analysis do not share the perceptions of African readers on the issue of South Africa or support of anti-colonial movements. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that the U.S. press was so completely against Cuban intervention when, in hindsight, available documents indicate that the U.S. was

involved as early as 1962²⁴⁸ in Angola, providing Roberto with financial assistance in exchange for intelligence gathering.²⁴⁹ For American newspaper coverage to be objective and report both the African and American sides of the event, it would have to detach itself from viewing the conflict from the self-interest of America and report the events from a balanced perspective.

My analysis of the Kissinger doctrine in the Angolan case is that Kissinger understood stability to be a prerequisite for the maintenance of minority white rule in the area. Since whites are such a minority in Southern Africa, any nationalist movement is viewed by them to be a threat to their existence and the American and western business interests that they represent. Henry Kissinger's policy in Angola was not sympathetic to the organic passions of a revolutionary nationalist movement fighting against Western domination. Unfortunately, Kissinger perceived American foreign policy interest in Angola as a fight for Western hegemony in Southern Africa. His policy had little concern for the human rights and the dignity of the Angolan peoples.

²⁴⁸Ann Seidman, *Ibid.*, p. 198

²⁴⁹John Marcum, *Ibid.*, p. 237

PRESTIGIOUS AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS' COVERAGE
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(VOL. II)

by

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CHAPTER 5

AMERICAN NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE

From Revolutionary to Pragmatist

...We have suffered too much for far too long. Patience we have had reasonable we have been. We have now drawn the line. Enough, we say. We have not been party to the decision to form the now defunct Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, nor its dissolution. We were never consulted in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, nor on the settlement now being made to legalize it. We have now said in the clearest of terms: no, no more...There is only one thing we want: our country...we shall have it, with or without another veto in this Council of any resolution on Zimbabwe. We shall have our country, by the only means that developments have left us: armed struggle...

A "Letter from Prison" by Ndabaningi Sithole

In Chapter Four an analysis of empirical data implied that American coverage of the Angolan crisis could be described as "advocacy journalism." The American press was decidedly opposed to the MPLA and Cuban involvement in that conflict, favoring instead the UNITA and FNLA forces and describing them as pro-American forces in the war. At the same time, the U.S. press reported that South African forces

were involved in the war, but did not report South African involvement in the same negative manner as it reported the Cuban military intervention.

Chapter Five will examine whether a similar journalistic bias affected coverage of events in Zimbabwe. Did the U.S. press report the events in Zimbabwe in a balanced and objective manner that would enable policymakers reading the prestigious press to assess the situation and intelligently and thereby avoid further errors in African policymaking? In the Angola case, the U.S. press continually referred to the MPLA as a Marxist-inspired group, when, in fact, the MPLA consisted of a heterogeneous political constituency. Did the U.S. press similarly characterize and label Mugabe as a Marxist, only to find out after the election that this label had been an inadequate and incorrect assessment? If this was the case, press representation added to the American public's confusion about Mugabe's policies when he became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. The U.S. might also have avoided unnecessary hostility and animosity from the new Zimbabwean government if the press had not judged the Prime Minister Mugabe so harshly.

Before considering the amount and quality of U.S. prestigious press coverage of the Zimbabwean conflict, we might benefit from a brief summary of the history of that conflict.

Background:

The Zimbabwean elections, held in February 27-29 and announced in early March 1980, gave Robert G. Mugabe an overwhelming mandate to lead the new nation in the southern tip of Africa. 2.7 million voted in the election. Approximately 94% of the electorate. Mugabe's party, ZANU (Zimbabwean African National Union), received 63% of the vote, while the other major contender, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU (the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union), obtained 24% of the vote and the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Bishop Muzorewa, and his organization the UANC, won only 8% of the popular vote.²⁵⁰ The ZANU leadership of Zimbabwe terminated 80 years of white-minority government in that country. Thus, Zimbabwe became the 53rd member of the General Assembly in the United Nations, leaving only two white-minority-controlled areas in Africa--South Africa and Namibia.

Zimbabwe and Angola both share a history of minority dominance and brutal colonial legacy. Both colonial masters regarded Africans as chattels and advocated the separation

²⁵⁰U.S. Congressional Subcommittee of Africa, March 27, 1980. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

of the races in a predominantly black society. The Portuguese and English ruled by military strength and attempted to instill in Africans a sense of inferiority and servitude to Europeans and the continent of Europe. Angola and Zimbabwe also share a long history of armed resistance to European domination. The liberation of Angola by the MPLA, defeating both the FNLA, and the UNITA forces supported by the U.S. and South Africa served as an inspiration and model for the nationalist struggle in Zimbabwe that had also resorted to armed struggle in the post-world war II era. U.S. reaction to the Zimbabwean situation was also markedly similar to its response to Angola: Secretary of State Kissinger was again concerned that certain rebel factions might request Cuban or Soviet aid, and was again fearful about a possible shift in the global balance of power.

The genesis of white-minority rule in Zimbabwe began in 1890 with an entrepreneur named Cecil Rhodes, who founded and directed the British South Africa Company. Rhodes became the first Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, leading a colony of 600 men into the area and establishing settlements and farming areas. The European domination of the area, now known as Zimbabwe, was militarily resisted by Africans. The Ndebele, in 1893 and 1896, fought courageously against better equipped European settlers, but

were defeated twice. From 1896 to 1897 Zimbabweans from the Shona ethnic group rose up to battle the Europeans and rebel against white domination, but also were defeated. Minority rule had entrenched itself in Rhodesia. Rhodes's company, the British South Africa Company (BSA), claimed that a treaty was obtained from Lobengule, the king of the Ndebele, but this contract was repudiated in a letter to Queen Victoria on August 10, 1889. The Lobengule pleaded, "The white people are troubling much about gold. If you have heard that I gave my whole country to Rhodes, it is not my words. I have not done so; Rhodes wants to take my country, by strength."²⁵¹ By military strength, then, Rhodesia became a white-supremacist country built on the cheap (and at times free) labor of Africans and the resulting high profits for Europe and European business.

The settler population grew exponentially in Rhodesia: in 1890 the colony consisted of 200 settlers, by 1904 2,000 and by 1911, 24,000. But by 1974 whites still comprised only a small fraction of the total population, numbering 273,000 compared to 5.8 million Africans.²⁵² The European enclave in Rhodesia has always remained less than 5% of the

²⁵¹Gwendolyn Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, London, 1977. p. 17.

²⁵²Southern Africa, Praeger Publishers, London, Paris, New York., pp. 11-13, 136.

overall population, a major concern for the colonies. The extremely small size of the European population has always been one of the major factors in such strict regulation of African participation in electoral politics and political involvement. The differences between South African apartheid and Rhodesian separate development is superficial or at best merely technical. In the Rhodesian case, separate development and Black exploitation was by statute instead of a constitutional amendment. In reality, South African apartheid and the Rhodesian segregation system were identical for Africans.

The Rhodesian government under successive leaders began to implement a series of repressive legislations designed to insure minority political entrenchment and African impotence and poverty. The Land Apportionment Act of 1941 was amended allocating 38% of the total area of Rhodesia for the use of whites only. Twelve years before independence, the government passed a law entitled the Land Tenure Act, similar to the South African Bantustan policy, which allotted certain separate areas for African habitation. Two Rhodesian separate development areas or "Bantustans" were established in November 1973.²⁵³

²⁵³Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 131.

Unlike the Portuguese, the Rhodesian colonists did not indulge in the rhetoric of "civilizing" Africans or "assimilating" them to European culture or lifestyles. The Rhodesian relationship to Africans was straightforward: Africans were the employees and Europeans the employers. Godfrey Huggins, the leader of the United Party which ruled Rhodesia from 1933 to 1956, characterized the black/white relationship as a partnership "of the -black- horse and the -whiterider."²⁵⁴ Carter and O'Meara in Southern Africa in Crisis conclude that several factors influenced the shape and character of European society in Rhodesia. "The settlers' struggle against a hostile environment; their conflict with the Ndebele and Shona; and the fact that African interests were not to be primary in the development of the area." Many of these variables are identical to the problems faced by the white South Africans and the Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau which led to the adoption of apartheid measures and a humiliating stratification system. Still, in 1923, Rhodesia decided not to join with the Union of South Africa and integrate with the small white enclave there, however, the Afrikaners were and remained a substantial political force in Rhodesia.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 20.

²⁵⁵Carter and O'Meara Southern African in Crisis, Ibid., p. 18.

In 1953, Rhodesia became a part of the larger British Empire under the Central African Federation, which included Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the decolonized states of Zambia and Malawi.²⁵⁶ Rhodesia, under the British Empire, now became known as Southern Rhodesia. The decision to become a part of the British crown was entirely a minority decision since Africans in Rhodesia were denied the franchise from 1959 to 1973. A series of "racial" legislations or regulations were passed in Rhodesia to protect minority interests. In 1959, the Unlawful Organizations Act was passed, and in 1960, the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. After 1973, increased pressure mounted to segregate university education.²⁵⁷ These policies were transforming Rhodesia swiftly into a completely segregated society like South Africa. The colonial policy in Rhodesia was equally as brutal and violent as Portuguese rule in Angola.

African Franchise and Employment Distribution

In Southern Rhodesia, as in Angola, an African had to pass certain vigorous tests for the right to vote for a minority representative. In Angola, the African had to

²⁵⁶Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 7.

²⁵⁷Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 29.

become a member of the Assimilado class: in Rhodesia the regulations supposedly applied to both Europeans and Africans, but in reality these qualifications excluded most Africans--only 51 Africans were permitted to vote, according to Rhodesian qualifications. In 1912, if a citizen wanted to participate in electoral politics, Carter reports that he had to "fill out the whole claim form... [and] if asked to do so write fifty words in English dictation. The minimum property ownership was raised to 150 [pounds] and the minimum annual wage to 100 [pounds]." The 1923 constitution made no changes in the franchise. In 1928, however, the dictation clause was removed, possibly because of the increase in the number of white non-English immigrants from Europe, but the financial restrictions were sufficient to exclude most Africans from participating.

In 1951, the mean requirement was increased to an income of 240 pounds per annum and occupation of property valued at not less than 500 pounds. The prospective voter also had to be able to complete and sign the necessary forms and speak and write English.²⁵⁸ In 1958 Sir Edgar Whitehead succeeded Garfield Todd as Prime Minister. Whitehead, cognizant of growing strength of African dissident organizations and leaders, introduced the dual-role voting system in 1961.

²⁵⁸Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 21.

The system functioned by dividing voters into two rolls: the A Roll and the B Roll. The A Roll voters (usually synonymous with "white,") had to fill higher qualifications than the B Roll voters. African hostility to this white-minority token gesture began to grow during this period.

Zimbabwean nationalists concluded that the 1961 constitution's emphasis on "income and educational franchise" made a mockery of African political participation in either in the immediate or eventual future, because of the continuing, inequitable economic structure of the country. In the 1960s, African wages were below subsistence levels: "only about 608,000 of Southern Rhodesia's approximately 3,970,000 Africans were in paid employment in 1963, even less than the 622,000 in mid 1962. The average African wage in 1964 was \$315 a year, while the average white wage was approximately \$3,300. Earnings for whites were \$8,278 and for Africans \$758.²⁵⁹

By 1970, despite yet another new republican constitution, the basic discriminatory statutes remained unchanged. In the Rhodesian Parliament, of the 66 representative seats, 50 were exclusively for white members.²⁶⁰ In 1974 only 10,000

²⁵⁹Carter and O'Meara, Southern African in Crisis, Ibid., p. 25.

²⁶⁰Southern Africa Ibid.,

Zimbabweans and the right to vote out of a population of 5.8 million. The conservative party, the Rhodesian National Party, was clearly more dominant and powerful than the two liberal parties, "The Centre Party" and "The Rhodesia Party."²⁶¹

The Independence of Rhodesia

In 1963, the Rhodesian Front Party (RF), under the leadership of Winston Field (who later became Prime Minister), discussed the issue of Rhodesian independence with British Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.²⁶² The British outlined five principles, the Nibmar Principles, which would constitute the conditions for granting Rhodesian independence: "the principle of unimpeded progress toward majority rule, guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the Constitution to retard African advancement and increase in African political representation, and an end to racial discrimination."²⁶³ The British proposal ignited serious internal disagreements within the government and eventually Winston Field stepped down as Prime Minister to

²⁶¹Southern Africa. Ibid., p. 38.

²⁶²Southern African in Crisis, Ibid., p. 26.

²⁶³Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 26.

be replaced by Ian Smith. The politically conservative Smith advanced and advocated the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The 1961 referendum held on the issue of Rhodesian independence granted Smith an overwhelming mandate of 89% to negotiate with Britain. Four years later, on November 11, 1965 Rhodesia defied Britain, and indeed the world community, by declaring itself a sovereign nation. The Security Council of the United Nations condemned Rhodesia's flagrant disregard and violation of international law and imposed "selective economic sanctions, which prohibited investment or transfer of funds to Rhodesia."²⁶⁴

With Rhodesian "independence;" the necessity of advancing African civil liberties was terminated. Rhodesian whites in the post-UDI period solidified their economic and political privileges, and African nationalists realized that the possibility of legislatively manipulating the ruling minority for increased black participation was diminishing daily. Additionally, new legislation was being proposed which would suffocate any possibility of majority rule in Rhodesia. A new constitution, accepted in a referendum in June 1969 with 54,724 votes in favor and 20,776 against, reinforced a segregated society in which the possibility of majority rule was all but eliminated. On March 1, 1970,

²⁶⁴Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 27

Rhodesia declared itself a republic, claiming to end its "Eighty-year link with the British crown." The Land Tenure Act of 1969 redivided Rhodesia into two parts: 45 million acres for Africans and 45 million for whites. (The 1961 constitution had set up tribal trust lands which expanded the reserves by 19 million acres. By the end of 1966, tribal trust lands were 40,020,000 of Rhodesian area of 96,600,000 acres.)

The economic situation for Africans was also steadily worsening. By 1974, in one of the richest countries in Africa, Africans, who were responsible for producing the wealth in Rhodesia, were literally starving to death. According to the Finance Minister Wrathall, the discrepancy between black and white wages was as high as 11 to 1 in the urban sector. The report showed that in 1965, the "per capita annual income for African workers was...\$359.00 but the per capita annual income for Africans living in the rural areas was only \$28.00."²⁶⁵ The University of Rhodesia's social science department published a report in 1974 detailing a poverty datum line for African workers. The figures are dismal: "the average wage ranges from £83 a month in the manufacturing industry to \$118 for school teachers. The poverty datum line in Salisbury in January

²⁶⁵Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 31

1974 ranged from \$61 for a family of two to \$162 for a family of eight." The African response to these developments was to organize a diverse range of organizations such as trade unions, political parties, and professional groups to counteract the growing conservative, anti-African wave. It is within this context of a completely repressive exploitative system that the contemporary nationalist movements must be viewed. Without a minimum level of understanding of such a context, how could the American public or policymakers understand Mugabe and ZANU and accurately analyze the conflict. Yet the U.S. press did not devote much coverage to explaining the background of the conflict to the general public and policymakers.

Nationalist Contenders for Political Power in Zimbabwe

The political independence of neighboring states, such as Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola, greatly inspired the Zimbabwean nationalists to confront the illegal Smith regime militarily. The liberation movements in neighboring countries proved that European powers could be defeated by African nationalist movements, even when diverse ideologies and international rivalries were involved. In this section, I will briefly trace the development of these nationalist movements, a background essential to understanding the U.S.

press reports of the two major groups.

The first stages of the nationalist movements were not military, but legislative. The early nationalists attempted to work within the confines of the political system and to solicit constitutional changes by appealing to the humanity of the Rhodesian settlers. However, through the conservative measures discussed in the last section, access to the political system grew narrower and chances for African participation virtually disappeared. In a sense, the Rhodesian government forced Africans to participate in politics in a non-institutional manner, outside of the traditional governmental means of addressing and redressing grievances.

African nationalists, prior to the formation of ZANU and ZAPU, exhausted every legal and legislative possibility before reverting to non-institutional activities. The 1940's ANC (African National Congress), under the direction of Rev. T. D. Sankange, advocated the repeal of racially discriminatory legislation.²⁶⁶ Rev. Sankange's and ANC's efforts were truncated and frustrated. The Post-World War II period witnessed the emergence of a number of still non-violent African nationalist organizations--for example, the British African Voice Association, founded in 1947 and led

²⁶⁶Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 22.

by Benjamin Burembo. The Rhodesian government restricted this group's growth, however, by a "banning" order in 1952. Zimbabweans, in spite of the continual limitations placed on their ability to organize movements to meet their demands persevered in forming resistance movements in 1950. Current leaders of contemporary Zimbabwe began their political careers organizing disgruntled workers. Starting with Charles Mzingeli's organization, The Reformed Industrial Council of Unions (RICU). Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU was the general secretary of the Railway African Worker's Union at one time, and the African Teachers' Association included in its membership Ndabaningi Sithole, who actually organized ZANU, and Robert Mugabe, the current Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and leader of ZANU. The Rhodesian government, true to its policy of ignoring African grievances, refused to negotiate or address the issues raised by these organizations.²⁶⁷

The movements became slightly more militant in the 1950s. The Youth League (YL) was organized in August 1955. Its goals to "infiltrate secretly into urban and rural areas." This organization was the parent of the 1950's African National Congress, directed by Joshua Nkomo. The new ANC, like the British African Voice Association, was banned by

²⁶⁷Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p. 23.

the government in February 1959 because of its political effectiveness in the rural areas.

The nationalist movements after 1957, became aggressively more militant and their demands more related to challenging minority political power in Zimbabwe. The ANC was reorganized under the political label of the National Democratic Party (NDP) by Micheal Mawema on January 1, 1960. Unlike its predecessor, the NDP demands went well beyond requesting legislative favors to demanding fundamental changes in the structure of white Rhodesia's political life. Mawema's organization demanded, for example, "majority rule, higher wages for Africans, land for the people displaced by the Native Husbandry Act, facilities for the education of African children, and better housing in the urban areas." The demands articulated by the NDP were substantially more profound in attacking the basis of white privilege in Rhodesia than the previous nationalist organizations. In 1961, Joshua Nkomo reorganized the NDP and founded ZAPU, the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union, one of the two main political parties contending for political power in 1980.

The other nationalist contender for political power in Zimbabwe was the ZANU organization. ZANU was founded by Ndabaningi Sithole on August 9, 1963 and was later joined by the present Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, Morton Malinanga, and others. ZANU emerged partly in

response to Nkomo's decision to move ZAPU's base to Tanzania and to conduct the resistance campaign in exile--a situation parallel to the Angolan case with the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA organizations. The initial ZANU political platforms included:

the establishment of a national democratic, socialist, and pan-Africanist republic; adult suffrage; repeal of all color discrimination and repressive laws; national control of all land with the government as the peoples' trustee; amnesty for all political prisoners; free health service and unemployment relief; and compulsory secondary education to the level of form two.²⁶⁸

The constituency of ZANU included mainly intellectuals, such as Mugabe and Sithole, but they attempted to attract students, farmers, and peasants in order to broaden their base of support.

The movement now became overtly military. At first, the ZANU fighters used conventional military tactics, which proved unsuccessful and led to many unnecessary casualties. Guerrilla tactics were then adopted and were successfully being implemented by 1972. The government began to mount its own resistance.

The British-led economic sanctions against Rhodesia after UDI in 1965 made the country dependent on South Africa for most of its current military equipment needs. . . . Most such shipments were organized by private arms dealers, frequently under rather spectacular circumstances, because

²⁶⁸Carter and O'Meara, Southern Africa in Crisis Ibid., p. 28

secrecy had to be maintained. . .

Dovi Afesi contends that Rhodesia received arms secretly through South Africa.²⁶⁹ Nationalist guerrilla actions, however, greatly curtailed these secret arms shipments. The inability to receive sufficient arms necessitated brutal constraint techniques in Rhodesia. For example, the death penalty was re-established for terrorists.²⁷⁰

The ZANU and ZAPU military forces increased their attacks considerably during the early 1970s. The Smith regime reluctantly admitted that the local populations were participating in attacks and aiding the liberation forces. The border areas were closed to restrict ZANU and ZAPU forces from moving to and from Zambia. The government began to incarcerate large sections of the population in areas called euphemistically "protected villages." These protected villages were supposed to protect innocent Zimbabweans from ZANU and ZAPU attacks and harassment, but in reality they were designed to terminate ZANU and ZAPU recruitments and food supplies from the rural area. By 1974 there were over thirty-five "protected villages" containing approximately 100,000 inhabitants.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa,

²⁷⁰Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 107.

²⁷¹Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 189

By 1974, Rhodesia's budget was well inflated with military expenditures. In Southern Africa, the Praeger Study indicates that:

Military allocations in 1974 rose well above the budgeted sums over one million was allocated for installation of alarm systems on farms in the northeast and other security measures in the same area were estimated at \$29 million. Road construction work along the border with Mozambique increased by 50%. At a cost of \$12 million, even excluding public construction work, the sum of related expenditures for defence and security approached \$128 million... This forced the government to raise taxes by 10%.

By 1976 the military budget had increased from the previous year by 40% to \$152 million and 300% from 1972 when the nationalist movements first began their offensives.

As nationalist activities increased, Smith unrealistically assured Rhodesians that military conscription would decline by 1976. However, as early as 1974, the government had to double its draft quotas to compete with the increase in the ZANU and ZAPU forces. Since the white population in Rhodesia has never comprised more than 5% of the population, and it was virtually impossible for Smith's government to contend with an organized majority of Africans challenging his authority militarily without outside assistance. The limitations imposed by Britain in 1965 after the announcement of the Rhodesian U.D.I. and the U.N. sanctions of 1968 which made selling arms to Rhodesia illegal also made Smith's task

difficult. South Africa ultimately came to Rhodesia's aid. The Praeger study on South Africa contends that Rhodesia secretly received arms through South Africa from private European businesses.²⁷²

But Rhodesia's transition to majority rule, actually placed South Africa in an ambiguous position. For if, majority rule in Rhodesia would divert attention from apartheid, it would also practically isolate South Africa in the midst of several newly independent countries, all espousing some version of Marxism. Surrounded by Black countries and guerilla bases in a number of adjacent countries, South Africa assigned 2,500 paramilitary troops to guard the Zambezi valley and an additional 1,000 troops to patrol the interior of Rhodesia. ZANU and ZAPU estimated as early as 1972 that, at least 8,000 South African troops were guarding the borders of Rhodesia. Considering the incredibly small size of the Rhodesian regular army of 4,700, the South African troops were a significant contribution.

With increasing military attacks by Africans, white emigration became another potential problem for Smith. To stem further loss of an already small white population, the 1976 budget drastically curtailed "emigrant allowance" from

²⁷²Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 52.

\$8,000 to \$1,600 and travel allowance from \$700 to \$440.²⁷³ South Africa did its part during this crisis to discouraging white emigration from Rhodesia by placing numerous obstacles and technicalities before emigrants attempting to enter South Africa. Nevertheless, by 1976 over 2,280 whites had emigrated from Rhodesia, compared to a migration rate of 1,600 the previous year.

In September, 1976, Ian Smith, who once asserted that Rhodesia would never be ruled by Africans in his lifetime, conceded victory to the ZANU and ZAPU forces, and the rule of Zimbabwe to the majority of its population. Prime Minister Vorster and Secretary of State Kissinger played an important role in convincing Smith to accept defeat by the nationalist forces. Carter and O'Meara contend that Kissinger showed Smith "three separate U.S. intelligence reports which indicated the weakness of the Rhodesian position and [was said] to have stated firmly that Rhodesia could not look to the U.S. and South Africa for support."²⁷⁴ Ultimately, if the war in Rhodesia continued to escalate, the borders between Rhodesia and South Africa would have begun to fade, and the war might have begun to

²⁷³Carter and O'Meara Southern African in Crisis, Ibid., p. 34

²⁷⁴Carter and O'Meara South Africa: The Continuing Crisis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, London, p. 34.

spread to South Africa. The crisis in Rhodesia was weakening the defense of South Africa, so Rhodesia had to be sacrificed in order to preserve the stability of South Africa. South Africa also hoped that a Rhodesian transition to majority rule would alleviate some of the pressures on South Africa to liberalize its domestic racial policies.²⁷⁵

Rhodesia's problems also spilled over into black African countries. President Samora Machel ordered the borders closed between Zimbabwe and Mozambique in reaction to the invasion of Mozambique by Rhodesian troops. President Machel announced:

To support the liberation struggle of the Zimbabwe people in accordance with the decisions of the UN and the OAU...with effect from today, 3rd March 1976, the Mozambique People's Republic closes all its frontiers with the British colony of Southern Rhodesia; prohibits any form of communications with the territory dominated by the racist regime; bans the passage through its territory and air space of any traffic of persons and goods originating from or bound for Southern Rhodesia. The PRM fully applies the sanctions against the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. The PRM confiscates all assets belonging to the illegal regime, to firms with headquarters in the territory of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia and to citizens living in our territory who recognize the illegal regime.

President Machel's mandate closed Rhodesia's access to the ports of Beira and Maputo which made Smith's government economically as well as militarily dependent on South

²⁷⁵Southern Africa, Ibid., p. 109

Africa. Rhodesia was forced to rely on two railway systems in South Africa, one running through Botswana to Mafeking in South Africa and the other railway from Rutenqa to the South African border at Beitbridge.²⁷⁶

President Machel reported five months after he confiscated Rhodesian property and closed the border areas that Rhodesian troops again had penetrated into Mozambique, supposedly in retaliation for an attack in which five Rhodesian soldiers were killed. From all indications, the Rhodesian troops killed aimlessly and indiscriminately on these raids. A Mozambique official claimed that 670 people died as a result of the Rhodesian attack. A study by the United Nations Commission for Refugees claimed that the Rhodesian soldiers had massacred a refugee camp and not a nationalist stronghold.²⁷⁷

There were several attempts made during the mid-seventies to negotiate with the Smith regime: the Victoria Falls conference in 1975, the Geneva Conference, and several Anglo-American proposals. For the most part, until the late seventies, these meetings between one or several nationalist leaders were unsuccessful in forcing Smith to agree to the

²⁷⁶Carter and O'Meara Southern African in Crisis, Ibid., p. 86

²⁷⁷Carter and O'Meara Southern Africa in Crisis, Ibid., p.36.

majority of the nationalists' demands. This was partly due to the fact that the initial effectiveness of the nationalist movements in Rhodesia was becoming seriously undermined by the diverse personalities and ideological differences.

Yet, because of economic problems and the diminishing white Rhodesian population, and despite the lack of unity among black nationalist groups, the Smith regime finally conceded defeat in September 1976. This was only the beginning of the second stage of the Zimbabwean struggle for political control of the new nation. Joshua Nkomo, formed a "patriotic front" ZAPU before the Geneva Conference on October 25, 1976. The Geneva conference was mandated to discuss the transition from minority to majority rule. Bishop Abel Muzorewa eventually held the political position of prime minister, but his African National Congress was the weakest part of the nationalist triangle, with his constituency located primarily in the urban centers and virtually non-existent in the guerilla camps. The third figure was, of course Robert Mugabe, of ZANU. In a Times interview, he commented on the differences between ZANU and ZAPU:

ZAPU is less revolutionary than ZANU. They may have promised that Western vested interests will continue to be respected, which we cannot do. I do not like to speak ill of my partner, but we have not taken kindly to the deviationism that Nkomo has demonstrated in the past. He departed

from the accepted position of the Patriotic Front to negotiate with Britain and Britain alone when he met with Ian Smith without our knowledge last August.²⁷⁸

When Mugabe was questioned about the continued warfare despite the election of a black prime minister, Abel Muzorewa, he responded:

We've said that our war is not aimed against whites as whites, but because they constitute the oppressive class. If blacks are going to step into the shoes of the whites, they too are going to become our target. They will be perpetuating the old system and will have to go. There will be no prolongation of the war because a black stooge is now in power.²⁷⁹

The black "stooge" that Mugabe referred to was, of course, Bishop Muzorewa.

The internal election that brought Muzorewa to power in June 1979, was boycotted by the "patriotic front" which, in effect, invalidated the results, even for most western observers. Although white Rhodesians favored a Muzorewa government because of its moderate policies and philosophy, the ANC government was never formally recognized by the majority of African states or by the United States or Britain. One example of African reaction to the internal government was that Nigeria's threat to discontinue its oil supply to Britain if it recognized the new prime minister.

²⁷⁸("Foes in a Black Versus Black Struggle"), Time Magazine, Inc. April 30, 1979.

²⁷⁹Times Magazine, Inc. Ibid., 1979.

The political stage was actually set by 1977 for either Mugabe or Nkomo to capture political power. It was also in 1977 that American foreign policy initiatives were set in motion. In the attempt to understand the Zimbabwean negotiating process, one must not forget that the guerrilla movements of Nkomo and Mugabe were the motivating force behind American diplomatic involvement and Smith's acquiescence to majority rule.

American Foreign Policy in Rhodesia

Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia. With radical influence on the rise, and with immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders--firm proponents of peaceful change--began to conclude that there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence...We were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan. There was no prospect of successfully shaping events in the absence of a positive political, moral, and economic program of our own in Africa.

From the testimony of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, May 13, 1976

American foreign policy in Rhodesia was affected by three major factors; the possibility of Cuban and Russian involvement, the effects of a prolonged war in Rhodesia on South Africa, and the welfare of white Rhodesian citizens and U.S. and European commercial investments. Five years

after Cuba intervened in the Angolan Civil War and ushered the MPLA to power, American foreign policymakers feared that Rhodesia might become the new cold-war testing ground. Henry Kissinger, in March 1976 issued a stiff warning to Cuba against its involvement in Rhodesia. American relations with Africa had suffered a series of important setbacks in the Angolan civil war when the U.S.-supported FNLA and UNITA parties were defeated. It was obvious, by 1977, that the Smith government could not endure a protracted civil war. Furthermore that the war in Rhodesia was possibly endangering the security of South Africa, with nationalist organizations making contact and exchanging combat information. The economic and political priorities of the Smith government were military expenditures, the exodus of hundreds of white Rhodesians, and the difficulty of receiving military equipment because of the UN sanctions against Rhodesia and the advancing ZANU and ZAPU military forces which were gaining momentum by the day.

The termination of Portuguese rule in Angola and the Cuban-supported victory of the MPLA forced American policymakers to review and reconsider the validity and fruitfulness of the National Security Study Memorandum 39 on Southern Africa requested by Secretary of State Kissinger. Clearly both America and South Africa had to adjust to a new balance of power in the Southern Africa region. In fact,

one of South Africa's greatest political phobias was being isolated in the sub-continent surrounded by black Marxist governments. The Kissinger strategy in Southern Africa changed as a result of its inappropriateness for Rhodesia in the post-Angola era from Option II (discussed in greater detail in Chapter II). The various studies' prior findings were that minority regimes were in Southern Africa to stay and that the ability of Africans to gain political rights through violence was immature. The Kissinger strategy in 1976 had changed from accepting white-minority rule and taking a flexible attitude towards Smith to advocating an "African solution" to the problems facing Rhodesia in 1978, for example in a Newsweek, article entitled "Mission Impossible", which stated that:

The frontline states, South Africa and Smith's regime are [also] not anxious to negotiate rather than allow the guerrilla struggle to escalate into a war involving Cuban troops. "If Cuban troops entered the fighting, there is the danger that the Rhodesian government might ask for South African troops also, and then there would be a dangerous escalation and internationalization," said a British diplomat.²⁸⁰

Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 25, 1977, chiefly in response to the inevitable demise of the Smith regime, said:

Africa in this decade is a testing ground of the

²⁸⁰("Mission Impossible"), Newsweek, April 17, 1978.

world's consciousness and vision. That blacks and whites live together in harmony and equality is a moral imperative of our time. Let us prove that these goals can be realized by human choice, that justice can command by the force of its rightness instead of by force of arms. These are ideals that bind all the races of mankind. They are the mandate of decency and progress and peace. This drama will be played out in our own lifetime. Our children will inherit either our success or our failure. The world watches with hope and we approach it with confidence. So let it be said that black people and white people working together achieved on this continent--which has suffered so much and seen so much injustice--a new era of peace, well-being, and human dignity.

This statement should be viewed within the context of a change in American foreign policy toward the Southern African region. It is also an attempt by American foreign policymakers to respond to the realities of Southern Africa. The tone of Kissinger's speech is remarkably different from his suggestions on the Angola crisis where he and President Ford had recommended that the Congress provide additional funds to help support the FNLA forces. Years after Angolan independence, Secretary of State Kissinger was taking a conciliatory position towards black rule instead of a militaristic stance. It is curious that it was not until 1976 that Secretary of State Kissinger realized that Black-White relationships were being endangered by white supremacist policies. American policy officials must have realized before 1976 that blacks in Rhodesia were being denied the franchise, relocated from their homelands, forced to work for wages far below poverty level, and denied the

rights to a decent education. Why in 1976 was an American Secretary of State concerned about blacks and whites living in harmony when before American foreign policy had not been concerned for the previous eighty-six years whether blacks in fact survived at all in Rhodesia. In fact, Kissinger was still more concerned about black-white relationships than the 1976 devastation and oppression that had befallen most Africans during the European occupation era. It seems clear, that Kissinger's speech in Lusaka, was more concerned about stabilizing power relationships in the area and protecting white minority interests in Rhodesia, than in the ability of blacks and whites to live peacefully together. Kissinger's statement above has to be seen within the context of American foreign policymakers attempting to adapt their rhetoric and reverse their strategies that had fallen out of synchronization with the historical realities of the situation.

Colin Legum concludes that Kissinger came to four decisions about the sub-continent in the post-Angola period which were.

First, that the balance had to be tilted the other way--towards support for majority rule. Second, that no initiative on his part could succeed without the cooperation of the FLPs and especially of its chairman, Nyerere. Third, that the South Africa Prime Minister was the key factor; and fourth, that close [sic] Anglo-American cooperation was important.

In 1971, the Nixon-Kissinger administration approved legislation allowing the importation of Rhodesian chrome. This legislation was entitled the Byrd Amendment. This act could be seen as defiance of the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia passed as a result of the UDI in 1967. The American violation of the UN sanctions, then, must be viewed as a political act rather than one pursued out of economic necessity because the United States had an abundance of chrome for defense needs. The surplus of chrome reserves was confirmed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness in August 1970 when it reported that: "The domestic ferroalloy capacity continues to be sufficient to meet emergency defense and civilian requirements."²⁸¹ By 1976, however, Secretary of State Kissinger, in response to the crisis in Rhodesia promised African Nations that the Ford Administration would work towards repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Kissinger also promised aid for African countries whose "economies would suffer" as a result of terminating trade with Rhodesia. Furthermore, American visitors and businesses were advised that the American embassy would not provide protection while they were in Rhodesia. The American foreign policy in Southern Africa

²⁸¹Mohamad A. El-Knawas, Barry Cohen, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (National Security Study) Memorandum 39 (SECRET), Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Conn, 1976, p.42.

had been disrupted by the Angolan crisis. Kissinger in 1976 was attempting simultaneously to reassemble the pieces, save white minority interests in Rhodesia, and possibly rescue South Africa from the Angolan and Rhodesian experiences.

Kissinger's tour of Africa during the Rhodesian crisis in 1976 brought him into contact with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU. The Secretary of State's talks were framed and presented as a peace-keeping mission to avoid bloodshed in Rhodesia and racial war in southern Africa. President Nyerere, however, in response to Kissinger's rhetorical change in policy towards Southern Africa called for genuine political commitment from the American government:

I believe Dr. Kissinger is right in saying, if you want to work for American interest--or Western interests in Southern African throw your weight on the side of those who are working for majority rule. If you don't and the war goes on, we have said, we can't give these people arms to fight; they will achieve their independence only through the support which they can get from the communist countries, and this is not in the interests of the western powers. So I suppose he is right in doing this, but I am saying, so what? I want his pressure. I want American pressure. I want American pressure on the side of majority rule. And I have no intention of quarreling with the Americans. What I'm interested in is majority rule in Southern Africa.²⁸²

For African leaders, such as Nyerere, the issue was not the

²⁸²Colin Lequm, The Year of the Whirlwind, Africana Publishing Company, New York., p. 9.

ability of blacks and whites to live peacefully together in Rhodesia, or South Africa for that matter, but the implementation of majority rule and the American ability to place pressure upon the Smith regime to surrender political power.

African leaders enlisted thus Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's help in negotiating with Prime Minister Vorster to bring pressure to bear on Smith. It seems that the African presidents felt that South African pressure was necessary to convince Smith that his fight against the nationalists was pointless. It was clear by 1976 that economically the minority government could not survive without drastic financial and military assistance. However, African leaders felt that diplomatic pressure needed to be applied by Vorster to terminate any hopes by Smith of overriding this crisis. Termination of all South African arms and fuel supplies to Rhodesia would surely break the spirit and resistance of Smith's forces; and American assistance in contacting Vorster was important for this strategy. President Nyerere argued:

South Africa supports Smith. Without South Africa, Smith is not likely to last for very long. The Americans have the necessary power to say to the South Africans, "You are the supporters of Smith. Stop supporting Smith or else."

Vorster himself was interested in ending the war in Rhodesia because of the possibility of such militancy spreading into

South Africa. Additionally Vorster was of the opinion that the longer the war continued the greater the chances were of getting a more radical government in Rhodesia, possibly one not willing to take a "pragmatic" position towards South Africa. Colin Legum comments in Southern Africa: the Year of the Whirlwind, that Kissinger, "... unhesitatingly... signalled his readiness to become involved."²⁸³

The Anglo-American Proposal

The front-line Presidents advocated a meeting between the Smith government and the Zimbabwean nationalists. Joshua Nkomo was the only leader who was either available or willing to have a dialogue with Smith. The meeting was held at the Victoria Falls in 1975 with President Kaunda and Vorster in "close attendance."²⁸⁴ Bishop Muzorewa, Sitole and Mugabe opposed Nkomo's negotiations with Smith viewing them as counter-productive. Due to Smith's inability to face the historical realities of eventual majority rule, the negotiations were terminated. Even President Kaunda, the front-line member most reluctant to endorse armed struggle, agreed that negotiations were useless with Smith. Britain

²⁸³Colin Legum, Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind, Ibid., p. 10

²⁸⁴Colin Legum Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind, Ibid., p.10.

attempted at one point to avert the termination of the Smith/Nkomo talks by requesting that the European Common Market take a stand condemning the system of apartheid in South African and upholding the right of self-determination for the peoples of Rhodesia and Namibia. Despite British assistance the Smith-Nkomo talks collapsed on March 19.²⁸⁵ Smith again requested Britain to outline its proposals for a settlement in the crisis. Britain, on March 22, cited two demands: first, "acceptance of majority rule and elections within 18 to 24 months; second, "negotiations about the independence constitution itself. There would be no independence before majority rule."²⁸⁶

NIBMR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) was a term first coined by President Nyerere in 1966 and was considered at that time as quite radical--by 1976 it was a foregone conclusion.

The failure of the negotiations at Victoria Falls and the request by Smith for Britain to outline its proposals provided a convenient opening for Secretary of State Kissinger to make the Anglo-American proposal. The Anglo-American proposal focused on seven major points

1. the surrender of power by the illegal regime to Britain;

²⁸⁵Colin Lequm, Ibid., p. 13

²⁸⁶Colin Lequm, Ibid., p.14

2. transition to independence in the course of 1978;
3. elections based on universal suffrage;
4. the establishment of a British transitional administration to conduct the elections;
5. a United Nations force to keep peace during the transitional period;
6. an independent constitution providing for a democratically elected government;
7. a development fund to revive the Rhodesian economy;

The Anglo-American proposal held enough attraction for both the nationalists and Smith for the parties to view negotiations as a worthwhile option. From the Zimbabwean perspective, the proposal was tempting because it included the surrender of the Smith government and the extension of universal suffrage to Africans, who constituted at least 95% of the population. From the Rhodesian perspective, the Anglo-American proposal was attractive because the "democratic constitution" mentioned as one of the options ensured the minority population of less than 4% that their property would be protected under a black government, that they would have the right to conduct private schools, and "that pensions...can be freely remitted abroad by civil servants."²⁸⁷ This proposal also provided amnesty for Smith

²⁸⁷U.S. Military Involvement, Ibid., p. 51

and members of his government who had overseen years of discrimination and, at times violence against the black population in Rhodesia. Courtland Cox cites that the Anglo-American proposal also allowed for greater "multinational corporate interests in Rhodesia." the lifting of sanctions, and a development fund to "encourage commercial flows, especially in the extractive, processing and manufacturing industries."²⁸⁸ The Anglo-American negotiations continued for two years involving the highest policy officials of both Britain and the United States. An interim government was established before the election, and abolished March 1980 with the overwhelming victory of Robert Mugabe of the ZANU party becoming the second Prime Minister of Rhodesia but the first Prime Minister of the new Republic of Zimbabwe.

The American press focused on three major nationalist personalities during the course of the independence struggle: Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU; Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the ANC; and Robert Mugabe, leader of ZANU. Out of these three leaders, Mugabe was chosen to become the second Prime Minister of Rhodesia. This section will focus on Mugabe as a political leader in order to contrast and compare the different images projected of him

²⁸⁸U.S. Military Involvement, Ibid., p. 51

by the American press.

Mugabe was incarcerated from 1964 to 1974 under the Smith government. In fact, People Magazine, reported that while Mugabe was in prison, his four-year-old son died of cachalities, and he was forbidden by the prison officials to attend the funeral. During his prison term, Mugabe developed the political philosophy and tactics which would be implemented in the ZANU--the tactic of armed struggle. From the beginning of Mugabe's leadership he had the confidence of the rural guerrilla fighters. As an intellectual, Mugabe articulated the frustrations as well as the demands of a growing sector of young Zimbabweans who decided to cross the borders into Mozambique and Tanzania to join the guerrilla forces.

Mugabe first gained international prominence at the Geneva conference, although he had been active in Rhodesian politics since his return from Ghana in 1960. ZANU was formed by Mugabe and Sithole in opposition to Nkomo's decision to move the headquarters of ZAPU to Tanzania. Despite Mugabe's political opposition to Nkomo, these leaders formed a "patriotic front" before the Geneva conference in order to unify the nationalist force and have a stronger and more meaningful bargaining position in the Anglo-American negotiations. For Mugabe, an alliance with Nkomo under the umbrella of a "patriotic front" was solely

tactical.

It is possible to enter into an agreement with your political opponents to fight your enemy; but it is never possible to ally yourself with the enemy to fight your political opponents.

The relationship between Mugabe and Nkomo was always a tenuous one and with the abolition of the interim government, Mugabe opted for separating ZANU and ZAPU on the election ballots.

Mugabe insisted, both before and after the election, that he was not a Marxist, but a socialist. In a MacNeil/Lehrer interview, after the election Mugabe was asked to clarify his political orientation for the American public.

...we have never denied that we have derived certain principles in our political thinking from Marxism and Leninism. We have never denied that. And we shall never deny it. We are proud we have derived certain fundamental principles which we believe are humanitarian in character. But we have never said that they are the only principles which matter. We've always added that such principles as we derive from any philosophy must be adapted to our Christian principles from our own traditions. A blend of the three makes our own socialist outlook and socialist philosophy. This is how we have approached our problem here, and this is how we are adapting ourselves. We don't have any bluebook from anybody, nor bluebook at all, except that which we conceive to be based on the realities of our own country.²⁸⁹

Assistant Secretary of African Affairs in the Department of State, in reply to a question on Mugabe's Marxist affiliations, would agree with my analysis that the Prime

²⁸⁹Sub-committee on Election, Ibid., p. 28.

Minister's political orientation is rooted in the African experience.

His rhetoric has, on occasion, been strident. I believe, however, that we should judge him in an African context and on the basis of his presently stated and his future actions. As a leader of a guerrilla nationalist movement he accepted assistance wherever he could obtain it. The People's Republic of China was a principle supporter, as were Yugoslavia, Romania, the OAU, and some African states. However, the Soviet Union did not forge a close relationship, primarily because of Mugabe's insistence on being independent and also because the Soviet Union was a staunch backer of Nkomo and ZAPU.²⁹⁰

Mugabe's articulation of socialism would actually bring him into the same political camp as President Nyerere of Tanzania. Their form of socialism is based on the humanitarian notion of communalism, a mode of production which existed in some pre-colonial societies in Africa. It would therefore be incorrect, or at least unbalanced, for the American newspapers to label Mugabe a Marxist, without explaining the African interpretation of that concept.

Mugabe's position on many issues has also undergone a metamorphosis since the election--in particular, his positions on land resettlement, nationalization, and South Africa. Before the Geneva Conference, Mugabe insisted that

Not an inch of land would remain in private ownership. All of it would be nationalized and the black majority will not give a penny in compensation to any of the white landowners.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰Sub-committee on Elections, Ibid. pp. 28-29.

However, with the acceptance of the Lancaster House Agreement, a post-election Mugabe revised his stand on nationalization:

No, really, we don't intend to [nationalize the land]. I've already stated that we have no intention of nationalizing private property...The socialist principles we'd like to apply in respect to land, I think, will find application as we start our land land resettlement...²⁹²

Before the Lancaster House Agreement, Mugabe also took defiant and adamant stands against trade and relations with South Africa. After the election Mugabe became more conciliatory and "pragmatic." Moose, in his testimony before the Sub-committee hearing assessed Mugabe as a "political realist" who understood the importance of American aid to the development of a new Zimbabwe. Mugabe addressed the same issue in these terms:

...In respect to our immediate neighbors, we would like to pursue a policy of co-existence, and hence in respect to South Africa, we would pursue a policy of non-interference in each other's affairs. As long as South Africa is prepared to refrain from interfering with our internal affairs, we shall accordingly reciprocate and not interfere in their internal affairs...If we say we shall pursue a policy of co-existence with South Africa, we are not necessarily accepting the philosophy of apartheid. We know that apartheid is abominable. It is repugnant to the whole international community. It is repugnant to the generality of the people of Zimbabwe, and we cannot therefore actually espouse it. Nor can we

²⁹¹Legum, Ibid., p. 21.

²⁹²Mugabe Interview with MacNeil-Lehrer, printed in Sub-committee Report, Ibid., p. 28

condone it. But we accept that South Africa is a geographical reality, and as such we cannot ignore that reality, and we cannot ignore the historical ties that have existed between them and ourselves, and we cannot ignore the economic realities that our country has been linked with South Africa over years, you see, in trade and commerce.

Assistant Secretary Moose, also posited that the American financial support promised at Lancaster House was another variable which would help convince Mugabe that a "pragmatic" political orientation was in the best interests of both countries:

I believe Prime Minister Mugabe will move cautiously and will seek Western cooperation as he charts his country's future. He understands that to succeed, his government must enable the people of Zimbabwe to improve their own well-being. The expectations of his people will be high. He is looking to us and others in the West to help. He has spoken of his high esteem for us. He will be looking to us to honor the pledge which we made at Lancaster House.²⁹³

Moose concluded from his analysis of the post-election Mugabe that Zimbabwe was "still within the free enterprise system" and that basic "economic structures in the country had not been altered. Mugabe's political metamorphosis between 1978 and 1980 led Moose to report to the Subcommittee that from an American standpoint, the new Zimbabwe administration looked "very encouraging." To punctuate how "encouraging" Mugabe was from an American viewpoint, Moose stressed that Mugabe "has indicated...his recognition of the

²⁹³Subcommittee Report, Ibid., p. 4

important role which whites will play in Zimbabwe and his desire for them to remain." The issue of black/white relations both within Zimbabwe and across its borders was important to American policymakers in assessing how "encouraging" Mugabe would be to their political initiatives. Mugabe's post-election position on South Africa indicated his "pragmatic" policies towards a country very important to western commercial interests.

The racial themes in the Rhodesian crisis was certainly an important factor for American policymakers. This concern with the welfare of white Rhodesians so affected how Americans would perceive the crisis that President Ford, in his memoirs, A Time To Heal, confides that he understood that he would lose significant support for his re-election by backing majority rule in Rhodesia:

For the past several months, the situation in southern Africa had been worsening, Political stability was crumbling everywhere and it was imperative to send Henry Kissinger to the continent to see if he could deal off a race war...My political advisors warned me that the timing of the trip was poor. Here we were about to contest Reagan in several key southern states. Did we have to remind voters--as Henry's mission would do--that we favored majority rule where whites were in the minority?...In Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27, Henry declared that the U.S. would support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all peoples of southern Africa."...When he added that our policy towards continued white minority rule in Rhodesia would be one of "unrelenting opposition," conservatives hit the ceiling.²⁹⁴

After the election in Zimbabwe, Assistant Secretary Moose, was requested to appear before the subcommittee on Africa to report on the results and implications of the Mugabe victory. One outstanding feature of the transcript of this sub-committee hearing was the committee's apparent overwhelming concern for white Rhodesians living in Zimbabwe and foreign investments in the area. Indicative of this American concern are the first sixteen pages of the forty-page report which primarily concentrate on how whites will fare in Zimbabwe under a Mugabe administration. In fact, there is little mention throughout the hearings on the conditions of Africans or their welfare after the termination of European occupation and a brutal civil war. The Anglo-American proposal was also extraordinarily focussed on the condition of white Rhodesians who constituted a privileged group of less than 5% of the population. It seems plausible, however, that all this emphasis on the rights of the white minority was really directed towards the protection of the rights of foreign commercial interests in the area. By ameliorating his position, Mugabe certainly soothed, or tried to soothe some basic economic fears in the United States.

Mugabe's image as a "pragmatic leader" who was willing to

²⁹⁴Gerald Ford, A Time To Heal, Ibid., p. 381

negotiate and compromise on certain key issues generally surfaced after the election. But the press was slow in publicizing this image. Newsweek and Time magazines forecasted political doom and disaster, not only for the white minorities in Zimbabwe, but for the entire country. In the small sample of articles reviewed in Newsweek it should be noted that the racial issue remained extremely prominent. The titles of some of these articles characterize their content. For example, on January 14, 1980, Newsweek presented an article entitled, "Playing with Guns," focussing on how young some of the guerrillas were and how many were not reporting to the "rendezvous points" during the cease fire. Secretary of State Vance's negotiations with Nkomo and Mugabe were captioned in Newsweek April, 17, 1979 as "Mission Impossible." Newsweek published another article on February 25, 1980, less than one month before the election, entitled, "A Bloody Valentine for Salisbury," focussing on assassination attempts between the different factions. Another pre-election article on February 18, 1980, was entitled, "We'll Cut Off Your Heads," and described a reported ambush carried out by Mugabe forces. This article was printed with the picture of a dead child captioned, "Mugabe's guerrillas were the worst offenders." Yet another article announcing the Mugabe plans (March 17, 1980) was entitled "Black Power and White Fears." This article gave an abundance of space to articulating the

fears of white Rhodesians about a Mugabe government. The author attempts to give both the black and white reaction to the election.

News of the outcome sent thousands of jubilant blacks into the streets--and prompted outspoken fears among whites of communist dictatorship and bloody retribution. "My God," exclaimed a shocked civil servant, "how did we delude ourselves that this couldn't happen?"

This article quotes several white public reactions to Mugabe, but doesn't provide any black comments or reactions. In "Zimbabwe--A New Reign of Terror" (Newsweek, October 6, 1980), Mugabe's cabinet ministers were ridiculed and criticized in some instances very harshly. Minister of Health Herbert Ushewokunze for example, was nicknamed, according to the article, "Herbie the Herbalist," because of his strong

belief in traditional medicine--recently exposing himself to international ridicule by leading 8,000 grunting and belching witch doctors in a primitive ceremony calculated to call up the spirits of their forefathers.

In that same post-election article on Mugabe's government, the author reported that

At Rushinga, near the Mozambique border, ten ZANLA irregulars kidnapped a twelve-year-old girl and kept her prisoner in their assembly camp. The girl, already pregnant from a previous rape by former guerrilla in that area, was repeatedly raped over several weeks until her captors grew tired of her and threw her out. The police were not allowed into the camp to make any arrests.

I would consider the remarks about Ushewokunze ethnocentric, because of its characterization of African medical practices

as primitive. It is doubtful that this writer would consider any traditional medical practices as useful. The report concerning the rape victim is unsubstantiated; no source is listed. The preceding examples of quotations from Newsweek and Time indicate the tone and orientation these two national American magazines took towards the election of Mugabe and his transition to power. The general sample of articles were not complimentary to Mugabe or his administration.

The next section will focus on how American newspapers covered the Mugabe participation in the election. The symbolic language will concentrate on what image Mugabe was assigned by the press. This section will help determine whether newspaper coverage of Mugabe aided the general public and policymakers assessing his leadership qualities and the conflict in Zimbabwe from a non-ethnocentric and balanced perspective.

The election of Robert Mugabe as prime minister of Zimbabwe occurred five years after the Angolan Civil War. Had the same U.S. press, after covering the Angolan Civil War, revised its approach in 1980 to investigating the Zimbabwean political crises? I will also answer the following questions in this section of the press coverage of Robert Mugabe and ZANU during the Zimbabwean crisis:

How much coverage did the prestigious American newspapers give to the election of Robert Mugabe

and ZANU during the two crucial months before the election?

How many editorials or background articles were presented to provide in-depth analysis of the crisis?

Which sources did the U.S. press contact for information?

Could the coverage of Robert Mugabe be described as ethnocentric?

Did the U.S. media equally report black and white casualties in the war?

Did the U.S. press contact both African and European sources when investigating Rhodesia's segregation policies?

The following empirical data will supply the content for our analysis of the accuracy and balance of U.S. press coverage of Robert Mugabe during his campaign to become prime minister. This section will also indicate how sensitive the American press, as well as American foreign policy makers, are to the aspirations of African nationalists fighting against colonial rule.

Mugabe/Zimbabwe Key Definition

Each alphabet is assigned a qualitative meaning which correlates to the graph, coding sheet and histograms. This key was designed so that each article might be coded and analyzed for the presence of thirteen different variables. (Please consult Chapter II for the methods and standards used to code the newspaper articles.) The raw data is

included in the appendix. The symbol $\text{PHI}(a,b)$ is determined to mean a simultaneous occurrence of two or more variables appearing at the same time in a news article. For example, $\text{PHI}(X,Z1)$ means that the article being examined was an editorial (X) and contacted sources on both sides of the issue (Z1). Similarly, $\text{PHI}(T2, C1, D1)$ describes articles which are simultaneously non-ethnocentric in content, (T2), balanced in reporting the casualties of both black and whites (C1), and scrupulous in consulting both black and white informants when discussing Rhodesian segregation policies (D1). By examining the interaction of these variables, we may understand how the U.S. press covered the Zimbabwean election and specifically the role of Robert Mugabe.

Definition of the Variables

X = the number of editorials reported

Y = the number of background articles published

Z1= the number of articles in which the reporter consulted both the official and opposition opinions.

Z2= the number of articles in which the reporter consulted only the official or the opposition opinion.

Q1= articles which consult local or unofficial sources for information

EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS ON ROBERT MUGABE : **TABLE 5A**

| MUGABE Var. | NYT | | WP 3.03 | | WSJ 12.5 | | CSM 3.44 | |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|---------|-------|----------|-------|----------|--------|
| | count | %of N | count | %of N | count | %of N | count | % of N |
| x | 1 | 1.64 | 3 | 9.09 | 1 | 12.5 | 2 | 6.88 |
| y | 7 | 11.48 | 4 | 12.12 | — | 12.5 | 3 | 10.32 |
| z ₁ | 43 | 70.5 | 26 | 78.78 | 4 | 50. | 19 | 65.36 |
| z ₂ | 18 | 29.5 | 7 | 21.21 | 4 | 50. | 9 | 30.96 |
| q ₁ | 7 | 11.5 | 9 | 27.27 | 3 | 37.5 | 7 | 24.08 |
| q ₂ | 53 | 86.9 | 24 | 72.72 | 5 | 62.5 | 19 | 65.36 |
| t ₁ | 16 | 26.2 | 7 | 21.21 | 3 | 37.5 | 10 | 34.4 |
| t ₂ | 10 | 16.4 | 3 | 9.09 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10.32 |
| t | 35 | 57.4 | 22 | 66.66 | 5 | 62.5 | 15 | 51.6 |
| c ₁ | 7 | 11.48 | 4 | 12.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| c ₂ | 4 | 6.6 | 1 | 3.03 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| d ₁ | 2 | 3.3 | 2 | 6.06 | 1 | 12.5 | 5 | 17.2 |
| d ₂ | 7 | 11.48 | 6 | 18.18 | 2 | 25. | 4 | 13.76 |
| d | 52 | 85.3 | 24 | 72.72 | 5 | 62.5 | 19 | 65.36 |
| $\emptyset(x, z_1)$ | 1 | 1.64 | 3 | 9.09 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3.44 |
| $\emptyset(x, q_2)$ | 1 | 1.64 | 1 | 3.03 | 1 | 12.5 | 0 | 0 |
| $\emptyset(x, t_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3.03 | 1 | 12.5 | 1 | 3.44 |
| $\emptyset(x, t_1, q_2)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12.5 | 0 | 0 |
| $\emptyset(z_1, t_2)$ | 7 | 11.48 | 2 | 6.06 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6.88 |
| $\emptyset(q_2, t_2)$ | 7 | 11.48 | 2 | 6.06 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\emptyset(z_1, q_2)$ | 40 | 66 | 6 | 18.18 | 4 | 50. | 14 | 48.16 |
| $\emptyset(t_2, c_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\emptyset(t_2, d_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3.44 |
| $\emptyset(t_2, c, d_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| N | 61 | | 33 | | 8 | | 29 | |

Q2= articles which consult official or policy-making sources for information

T1= articles which are ethnocentric in content
(consult Chapter II methodology for detailed definition of ethnocentrism)

T2= articles which are non-ethnocentric in content
(consult Chapter II methodology for detailed definition of non-ethnocentrism)

T = articles which cannot be judged either ethnocentric or non-ethnocentric
(consult Chapter II methodology for discussion on neutral)

C1= articles which reported both black and white war casualties

C2= articles in which casualties of only one race were reported

D1= articles which report both African and European opinions of Rhodesian segregation


D2= articles which report the opinion of only one racial group on Rhodesian segregation.

N = total numbers of articles.

Empirical Observations on the Election of Robert Mugabe

Figure 1(M)

Figure 1(M) is the histogram of all the articles examined showing the number of editorials and background reports. The graph shows the data from 61 New York Times articles on Mugabe's election as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. This is a substantial drop from the New York Times coverage of the Angolan case where I found 160 articles for a comparable time period. The New York Times coverage of the Angolan Civil War was approximately 55% greater than its coverage of Zimbabwe and Mugabe, which would indicate that the New York Times viewed the Angolan crisis as substantially more important than the Mugabe case. The Washington Post published 33 articles on Mugabe compared to 106 on Angola; the Wall Street Journal printed 8 articles compared to 24 on Angola; and the Christian Science Monitor published 29 articles compared to 40 on Angola. The four newspapers presented a total of one hundred thirty-one articles in a two-month period on Mugabe and the up-coming election. All of the prestigious newspapers examined apparently decided that the Angolan case was more significant to their readers than the Mugabe case. This is possibly due to their perception that Angola was one of the first southern African countries to challenge the concept of minority rule as well to substantially utilize Soviet weaponry and advisors. The Angola case also involved major foreign intervention, while

Figure 1(M)

Histogram of total number of articles (N) examined.


in Zimbabwe, there was only a minor threat that Cuban forces would become involved and the United States and Britain were active participants in the negotiations which protected European property and interests in the area.

The Wall Street Journal, which presented the lowest amount of coverage, had the greatest percentage of editorials. This is similar to our findings in Chapter III where the W.S.J.'s coverage was again discovered to include the greatest percentage of editorials on the Angolan case. (See tables for Angola.) The statistical discrepancy in background coverage of Mugabe is slight between the N.Y.T., W.P., and C.S.M.. The Washington Post devoted 12.12% of its coverage to background studies, the N.Y.T. 11.48% and the C.S.M. 10.32%. We should note that the W.S.J. articles examined did not include one background article, an interesting fact given their high percentage of editorials on the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Figure 2(M)

Figure 2(M) represents the histogram depicting the relative number of articles characterized as "consulting both official and opposition sources" as a percentage of the total number of articles. The Wall Street Journal's consultation of both sides seems the most narrow in terms of

Figure 2 (M)



Histogram of the Percentage of Diversified Articles.


percentages, but all the newspapers recorded a high percentage of such articles. The Washington Post showed 78.78% of all its coverage to be balanced in consulting both sides. One would assume that with such high percentages of balanced sources in the articles, the news coverage of Mugabe's election would be less susceptible to the filtered or distorted reporting characterizing the Angolan case.

Figure 3(M)

This histogram depicts the relative number of articles classified as "2". Articles classified as "2" the reporter quoted an official or policymaking source on the election crisis. This official could either be an opposition leader or a state official. As in Figure 2(M), all the newspapers recorded a high percentage of contact with "2" sources. The Wall Street Journal had the lowest percentage of "2" references, compared with the New York Times who contacted the most official sources of all the newspapers--approximately 86.9%. Both Figures 2(M) and 3(M) would suggest thus far that in the Mugabe case, unlike the Angola case, the U.S. press attempted to present more balanced coverage.


Figure 4(M)

Figure 3(M)




Histogram of the Percentage of Articles Which Quoted Unofficial Sources In Newspaper Articles.

Figure 4(M)



$T1/N, T2/N, T/N$



Broken Histogram Comparing The Percentage Ethnocentric, Non-Ethnocentric, and Neutral Newspaper Articles.

Figure 4(M) is a comparative histogram of variables representing ethnocentric, non-ethnocentric or neutral articles characterizing either Mugabe or ZANU during the election. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded the highest percentages of ethnocentric articles concerning the election of Robert Mugabe (check the table), but all of the newspapers had high levels of ethnocentric reporting. The Wall Street Journal in terms of percentages, was the most ethnocentric in its coverage of the election of Robert Mugabe, ethnocentricity marking 37.5% or almost 40% of its coverage. With regard to this factor, the Christian Science Monitor's coverage of Mugabe does not substantially differ, in terms of percentages, from the Wall Street Journal's coverage. Thirty-four percent of the Christian Science Monitor articles were found to be characterized by ethnocentric attitudes towards either Mugabe or ZANU. Such high percentages from such two respected newspapers indicate that they were presenting a biased or negative image of Mugabe to their readership. This might be influenced by the fact that the readership of the Wall Street Journal is predominantly conservative businessmen, and Mugabe advocated land reform, majority rule, some nationalization of industry, and abolition of all racially discriminatory laws. Mugabe was also represented during the course of the election as a Marxist or socialist, which might cause apprehension among the readers of the Wall

Street Journal. The Christian Science Monitor's high percentages of ethnocentricity might have been influenced by its' conservative, religious leanings, which might be offended by Mugabe's Marxist or socialist positions.

The New York Times and Washington Post were the most liberal newspapers in respect to ethnocentric reporting, but even the New York Times and Washington Post percentages of 26.2% and 21.21% respectively are relatively high for newspapers claiming objectivity in covering the election of Mugabe. These figures would indicate that the American public and policymakers, who depended on the four newspapers under investigation as primary sources of information, were receiving unaided and distorted presentation of the facts surrounding the election of Mugabe. Judging by Figures 2(M) and 3(M), which represented articles which were balanced in sources and consulted high officials in either the government or the opposition movement. One would also assume that a truly independent and objective newspapers would have a very low percentage of ethnocentric articles.

One should note, however, that the somewhat lower percentages of ethnocentric articles in N.Y.T. and W.P. coverage are consistent with their higher percentage of balanced articles (Figures 2 and 3(M)). This suggests that consulting a limited range of sources for information and not consulting officials or policymakers will have an effect

on ethnocentricity. Accordingly, the Wall Street Journal, recording the lowest percentage of balanced high-quality sources, registered the highest percentage of ethnocentric articles. The Wall Street Journal's pattern, thus far, is consistent with its coverage of the Angolan Civil War. In Figure 4, we have presented a histogram of non-ethnocentric articles. Consult Chapter II for a complete discussion of what defines a non-ethnocentric article. but briefly, this would indicate,

The American press coverage of African political and cultural institutions as legitimate and as expressions of national sovereignty and a developed social system.
Chapter II.

Within this context, all the newspapers recorded very low levels of non-ethnocentrism. The Wall Street Journal recorded the lowest value of non-ethnocentric articles. Only 10.32% of C.S.M. articles were non-ethnocentric and 9.09% of the Washington Post articles. Again, the N.Y.T. was the most liberal although the value is still extremely low at 16.4%. This value would reflect that American newspapers rarely, if at all viewed ZANU or Mugabe as legitimate institutions or leaders in the Zimbabwean case. I would have expected, if American newspapers were sincerely attempting to cover the elections in Zimbabwe from a balanced and objective stance that the level of non-ethnocentric articles in percentages would have been substantially higher, at least ranging from 35 to 45%. If

the articles were, at least, 35% non-ethnocentric, the readership of the American press would have had a chance to view African leaders and institutions as legitimate and responsible.

Figure 4(M) represents articles coded as neutral in relationship to the issue of ethnocentrism. In this context, articles were coded neutral if they could not be judged as either ethnocentric or non-ethnocentric. In those instances when it would have been unfair or difficult to determine whether or not an article was ethnocentric or non-ethnocentric, an article was coded "neutral" (from Chapter II) All of the newspapers recorded a high percentage of neutral articles. The Washington Post's coverage of the election was neutral 69.69% of the time; the Wall Street Journal 62.5%, the New York Times 57.4%, and the Christian Science Monitor 55.04%. This could have indicated adequate newspaper coverage of the election in Zimbabwe, except that the percentage of ethnocentric articles, was very high and non-ethnocentric articles was comparatively low, especially for the W.S.J. who recorded a zero percentage of non-ethnocentric articles. If one examines the comparative histogram in Figure 4(M) contrasting neutrally ethnocentric articles with histograms characterizing ethnocentric and non-ethnocentric articles respectively, these histograms would indicate that, while many articles were coded as


neutral, when newspapers did present an opinion on the election, it was overwhelmingly ethnocentric. Thus, the ethnocentric quality of many of the articles (in the Wall Street Journal's case almost 40%) could possibly overshadow neutral articles. Thus, the readers either received a neutral picture or an ethnocentric image of Mugabe. Clearly, neither he nor ZANU was regarded by the U.S. press as qualified to replace the illegal government of Ian Smith or Muzorewa. Rarely did the readership of the prestigious press receive a non-ethnocentric interpretation of the election.

This kind of ethnocentric coverage of Mugabe by the U.S. press is particularly dangerous when one realized that Mugabe later became the leader with which the United States and Americans would have to negotiate and work. We can assume that U.S. policymaking officials and the American public who relied on the American press for adequate and accurate information on the election of Mugabe or the crisis in Zimbabwe in 1980 received an ethnocentric perspective which would have made them uneasy with the Mugabe victory.

Figure 5 (M)

Figure 5(M) is a histogram describing how often an

Figure 5(M)



editorial was ethnocentric. The New York Times had the most liberal editorial policy. A third of the editorials in the Washington Post were ethnocentric; the only editorial examined in the Wall Street Journal was determined to be ethnocentric and one half of all editorials in the Christian Science Monitor on the situation in Zimbabwe was assessed as ethnocentric. The editorial policy of the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post reflected by Figure 5 is consistent with and should be compared with Figures 2, 3, and 4 where these two newspapers have demonstrated a consistent pattern of unbalanced articles that used inadequate sources for information and a remarkably high rate of ethnocentric articles. I would suggest that this pattern indicates that the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post articles examined reflect editorial policy and possibly the political position taken by the two newspapers. Such high consistency among the variables makes the possibility of an accidental correlation unlikely. In fact, a social scientist would be remiss in not questioning to what extent the objectivity of the reporter had been sacrificed and actually subordinated to the policy of the editorial boards. And if reporters are actually being influenced by the editorial policies of the various newspapers, we can assume that objectivity is vitiated.

Figure 6 (M)

Figure 6(M)





Figure 6(M) is a histogram indicating how many editorials quoted official sources for their information. Three out of the four newspaper, when quoting a reference, used a number "2" source for information. The N.Y.T. did not use an official source in its editorials nor were the estimates ethnocentric, as reflected in Figure 5(M). The fact that the N.Y.T. produced a higher percentage of balanced articles than the other newspapers, could indicate that the New York Times is possibly less prone to blatantly ethnocentric connotations in this case, and simply presented its own perspective without quoting any sources to substantiate its policy or opinion. The three newspapers, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor quote official sources (either pro-government or opposition) in their editorial comments.

Figure 7(M)

Figure 7(M) is a histogram representing "balanced" newspaper articles and articles qualified as emanating from an official source. The Washington Post was most guilty in not using a combination of opposition and official sources in covering the election of Mugabe. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal were the most diligent in contacting

Figure 7(M)




Histogram Showing That Reporters Consulted A Diversity of Sources And Quoted " Unofficial " Informants.

both a variety of opposition and official sources. The New York Times recorded a rate of 66% and the Wall Street Journal 50%. The Christian Science Monitor contacted both sources less than half or 48.16% of the time. Since most of the newspapers showed a relatively high rate of ethnocentric articles, this figure may indicate insignificant correlation between how many sources are contacted, who the official sources are, and if the article is ultimately ethnocentric in content.

Figure 8 (M)

Figure 8(M) is a histogram symbolizing articles in which reporters consulted official sources for information which are also non-ethnocentric. The values are extremely low. Figure 8 describes what Figure 7 suggested, that there is only a slight correlation between reporters consulting official sources and the articles being non-ethnocentric. For the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor there is no correlation between the high quality of a source and the articles being non-ethnocentric. In the New York Times out of 60 articles only 7 (or 11.48%) were non-ethnocentric and had used a substantial number of official sources. This histogram possibly indicates that the quality and number of sources do not make the articles less ethnocentric or more sensitive to the crisis developing

Figure 8(M)




in Zimbabwe. Thus, it would seem, that reporters are contacting a diversity of sources because it is a formality rather than a way to increase their range of information. Thus, there is a prevailing paradigm operating in the news media which is not affected by the diversity of sources or the quality of information.

Figure 9 (M)

Figure 9(M) is a histogram of describing unbalanced reporting of Rhodesian segregation policies. This histogram represents the number of articles in which reporters consulted both Zimbabwean and European views when covering some aspect of the segregation or racial policies in Rhodesia. The numbers are extremely low for all the newspapers. The Wall Street Journal offered the highest percentage, but this was only 25%. The Washington Post followed the Wall Street Journal with 18.18%, and the Christian Science Monitor came next with 13.76% and the New York Times recorded the lowest value at 11.48%. The histogram really describes how many Africans were being consulted on racial policies in Rhodesia. The low numbers reflect poorly on American reporters' attempts to receive an African perspective on the racial issue. This would indicate that American reporters did not respect or care to consult black opinion on policies which were affecting the

Figure 9(M)




Histogram Showing Articles Which Did Not Consult Azanian and White South Africans to Investigate the Issue of Apartheid. (In numbers)

African population the most. The low percentages from the four newspapers suggest that American readers were receiving only the white perspective on the segregation policies in Rhodesia. Since the white population in Rhodesia at the time of the crisis was less than five percent of the total national population, this type of reporting would constitute an unbalanced, incomplete investigation.

Figure 10 (M)

Figure 10 (M) is a histogram describing newspaper coverage which reports both African and white casualties during the Zimbabwean crisis. The Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor were both completely remiss in their obligation to report equally the deaths of both blacks and whites--a peculiar position for newspapers who claim objectivity. This figure could represent ethnocentrism in its most callous form, the inability to perceive the value and dignity of all human life. Thousands of people, black and white, died during the Zimbabwean Civil War. If newspapers cannot be objective in reporting those deaths, the reporting of other, less emotional issues, is immediately subject to question. Furthermore, this figure may indicate the depth of commitment of the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor to leading its readership into sympathizing with either the Smith regime or

Figure 10(M)


Muzorewa. Either way, the zero percentage by both the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor indicates a misrepresentation of the events in the war. The Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor values of zero have to be viewed in comparison with the New York Times and Washington Post, whose rates are also extremely low, but are at least measurable (11.48% and 12.12% respectively). In reality, although the New York Times and Washington Post did provide a degree of coverage, all of the newspapers are extremely guilty of disregarding black deaths in the course of the struggle in Zimbabwe.

Figure 11 (M)

Figure 11(M) is a histogram portraying balanced reporting of both Zimbabwean and European opinion on the issue of Rhodesian segregation. All of the newspapers have presented extremely low levels of investigating black and white opinion on segregation equally. As pointed out previously, in the Zimbabwean case, this is quite significant when one realizes that the population is 95% black and the Rhodesian leaders represent only about 5% of the population. This histogram would indicate that American reporters did not respect the opinions of Africans or consider them important enough to contact. In contrast, however, to the other figures, the Christian Science Monitor's coverage gave its

Figure 11(M)

D1/N




Histogram Describing The Reporters Consulted Both African And European Opinions on Rhodesian Segregation

readers over 75% more balanced news of segregation than did the New York Times's. Even the Wall Street Journal ranked higher than the Christian Science Monitor, an odd situation considering the previous unbalanced and colored reporting by the W.S.J. was indicated from figures 3 to 9. My analysis of this minute change is that the Wall Street Journal was attempting to give a limited account of the segregation issue in order to analyze the potential danger in the area for U.S. investments. In other words, the W.S.J. does not allow its ethnocentric orientation to obscure or obfuscate its ability to analyze a situation in a country where its readers have commercial investments. It seems that the W.S.J. and C.S.M., unlike the N.Y.T. and W.P., realized that an investigation of segregation policies was not complete or accurate without an African perspective. The W.S.J. might favor integration as a policy in order to ease political tensions in the area. A productive investment climate depends on political stability. It is obvious from the Wall Street Journal's coverage of the Zimbabwean crisis, that it recognized that Smith would have to abdicate power. The readership of the Wall Street Journal would most likely advocate a quick settlement of the crisis in order to provide a good climate for business transactions.

Figure 12 (M)

Figure 12 (M)




Histogram of the relative number of editorials which consulted both sides of the conflict.

Figure 12 (M) is a histogram of the relative number of editorials which consulted both sides of the Zimbabwean conflict. Again, all the values are extremely low. The fact that all the values are low for the figure would not have caused any concern, unless we consider the very diverse opinion in the U.S. surrounding the issue of Mugabe. It is curious in this light that U.S. newspapers editors did not bother to contact or quote pro and con sources. The Washington Post presented the highest level of balanced editorials at 9.09%, the Christian Science Monitor follows at 3.44%, and the New York Times at 1.64%, and Wall Street Journal at 0%.

Figure 13 (M)

Figure 13(M) is a histogram referring to editorial reports, that are ethnocentric and contacted official source ("2") for information. The wall Street Journal's editorials were ethnocentric and listed official sources. An analysis of the N.Y.T., W.P., and C.S.M. in this context is difficult because of the diverse variables which may have affected this correlation. But seemingly, they fared a little better than the W.S.J.. The W.S.J. was high in both ethnocentrism and in the use of quality source (2). Again, with the W.S.J., it doesn't seem that contacting an official source affected its ethnocentric content. It's hard to

Figure 13(M)




determine whether contacting an official source is a detriment or cause of ethnocentric reporting.

Figure 14 (M)

Figure 14 (M) is a histogram of articles that are balanced in terms of consulting both sides of an issue while at the same time being non-ethnocentric. Figure 13 (M) becomes more focused in the light of Figure 14 (M). In fact, Figure 14 (M) is the "mirror image", or exact opposite, of Figure 13 (M). Nevertheless, the figures are dismally low in terms of percentages. For example, Figure 14 (M) should be compared with Figure 8 (M), describing non-ethnocentric articles in which official sources were consulted for information. The pattern in Figure 8 (M) is similar to that of Figure 14 (M), where the values are extremely low. While the Wall Street Journal is clearly the least liberal in comparison to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Christian Science Monitor, the statistical values do not reflect a significant difference in non-ethnocentric reporting of Mugabe being related to the reporters contacting official sources for information. As in Figure 8 (M) or Figure 13 (M), Figure 14 (M) suggests that ethnocentrism is a more independent or dominant variable than either the quality or the identity of sources. It seems in the Mugabe case, the press could have interviewed either a diversified sector of people or top-level officials as a formality, not because it would affect


Figure 14(M)



the press's views or perceptions of the election in Zimbabwe.

FIGURE 15 (M)

Figure 15(M) presents articles determined to be non-ethnocentric and balanced in counting black and white casualties. One would assume that an article that is non-ethnocentric would correspond perfectly with a reporter counting both black and white deaths during the crisis, but in this histogram, none of the four newspapers registered a correlation between the two variables. This may indicate either a very deep-seated racist or anti-marxist tendency of viewing black deaths as insignificant while simultaneously viewing certain African institutions as legitimate. Or the reporter may not have placed great value on what the Zimbabwean nationalists were dying for, but could still perceive some value in African institutions as a whole. Nevertheless, the values were extremely low in both Figure 4 and Figure 10(M). These figures could be reflecting the overriding theme of the Mugabe case-- that the American press was both ethnocentric in its coverage of the Zimbabwe crisis and that it did not particularly value the cause for which the nationalists were fighting and dying. Figure 15(M), like Figures 4 and 10(M) is an unfortunate reminder of American racial attitudes toward Africans. For African nations, this might indicate that the American press is

Figure 15(M) $\Phi(T_2, C_1)$ 

Histogram describing an article determined to be non-ethnocentric and balanced in counting black and white casualties.

unsympathetic to African liberations movements against colonialism and do not perceive Africans in 1980 as completely human as Europeans.

FIGURE 16 (M)

Figure 16(M) is a comparative histogram describing articles that are non-ethnocentric and consulted both African and European sources on the issue of Rhodesian segregation policies. The percentages are almost non-existent. The Christian Science Monitor was the only newspaper presenting such articles. Even for the C.S.M., the value is extremely low, 3.44%. There was only one article out of 130 which was non-ethnocentric and consulted both black and white sources. This histogram indicates that reporting on the election of Mugabe was inevitably unbalanced. By reading the N.Y.T., N.P., C.S.M. and W.S.J., the American public and policymakers had an extremely limited chance of understanding any of the real issues involved in Mugabe's election to prime minister from an African perspective, a perspective which ultimately would have made the reporting balanced.

FIGURE 17 (M)

Figure 17(M) is a histogram depicting articles which are non-ethnocentric, balanced in reporting the casualties of both blacks and whites, and responsible in consulting both



Figure 16(M)

Figure 17(M)



black and white informants when discussing Rhodesian segregation policies. Even the C.S.M.'s small percentage from Figure 16(M) was eliminated when we included the criterion of reporting both black and white casualties. This is surprising because of the C.S.M. religious orientation which one would assume also meant a commitment to humanistic values like equality. Figure 17(M) is consistent with Figures 4 to 15. The American press did not attempt to inform objectively the American public or policymakers on the crisis in Zimbabwe. Figure 17(M), like Figure 4(M), has shown that the press overwhelmingly applied ethnocentric standards to Mugabe and ZANU. The American press did not give a balanced report of both the black and white deaths during the crisis and, when discussing segregation policies, consulted only one race.

Figure 17(M) is perhaps a perfect graph to conclude this part of the empirical section because it clearly describes the total inability of the press to report on Mugabe and ZANU in a sympathetic or at least balanced manner. The press coverage of Zimbabwe also has to be seen in the context of the country's history, a history marked by European incursion and oppression. Rhodesian society assigned Africans to the lowest rungs of both its economic and social ladders. Yet, even after covering the civil rights movement in the United States, the U.S. press was

completely unsympathetic to the deaths of blacks. Figure 17(M) also represents many of the most fundamental issues involved in the Zimbabwe fight for majority rule. We can perhaps conclude from Figure 17 that the American press was opposed to many of the issues Mugabe stood for, such as majority rule, African control of the major industries in the country, land reform, the elimination of racial barriers, the abolition of white privilege and political domination. If we could understand now what the U.S. press itself stood for, it would make our task of understanding why they were so adamantly opposed to Mugabe's becoming prime minister of Zimbabwe substantially easier.

SECTION III: The Symbolic Language Category

The symbolic language section, combined with the presentation of news articles in section I of the empirical study, provides a part of the overall picture of how the American press reported the election in Zimbabwe in 1980. Specifically, the symbolic language category is designed to help us understand how the American press characterized Mugabe in its coverage of the Zimbabwean election in 1980. This category focuses on coloration and tone that result from the use of certain adjectives and adverbs to describe Prime Minister Mugabe. The adjectival coloration of Mugabe will aid our investigation in understanding the journalist's

adjectives and adverbs used to describe Mugabe these articles and coded the words. I chose a three integral scale to explain the affective loading of the press representation of Mugabe: favorable, unfavorable, and neutral. As defined in Chapter II, an article coded favorable is defined as one clearly designed to cast the major subject in a "positive" light to policymakers and to the American public at large. This would be done by using affectively potent adjectives such as "scholarly", "soft-spoken", "well-dressed", "Christian", etc. Producing a likeable image of a person consistently creates a sympathetic reaction in a reader to the subject. Articles coded as unfavorable depict the subject as clearly negative to U.S. interests by using adjectives such as "Marxist", "Marxist-oriented", "terrorist", "radical", etc. As indicated in Chapter II, these words would indicate possible threats to American diplomatic or commercial interests in the world. Also, because of the American cultural preference for stability, peace, and freedom, movements marked by the antithesis of these qualities are considered "unfavorable".

The following are the seventeen most commonly used terms to describe Mugabe from our sample of new clippings in the four newspapers. I have also indicated how these adjectives are coded. Histograms and a table represent the data

pre-disposition and possible political orientation in covering the election. This category will also identify whether reporters were attempting to create sympathy or hostility towards Mugabe by their use of affective adjectives and adverbs. The press's use of powerfully affective words can subtly convert policymakers and the public to particular political positions. Thus, it is important that words used to describe a person or organization be as objective and as accurate as possible, that they hold no hidden connotations--that is, it is important if a balanced report is the journalist's goal.

In the Mugabe case, I am interested in investigating what image the American press assigned to Robert Mugabe. Chapter II, provides a detailed description of the symbolic language category, but briefly this section will help determine if American newspapers faithfully and objectively informed the American public and policymakers on Robert Mugabe and if American newspapers alienate themselves from African sources because of inaccurate assessments of political leaders like Mugabe.

Mugabe Key Definition:

The American news coverage of the election of Mugabe for a two-month period produced approximately one hundred and thirty articles. I systematically abstracted all of the

graphically. Concluding notes will concentrate on both sections I and II of the empirical section.

DEFINITION-OF-THE-VARIABLES

Adjectival and Adverbial Characterization of Robert Mugabe
in American Newspapers.

- a) Marxist/Marxist-oriented.....unfavorable
- b) self-professed Marxist/socialist.....unfavorable
- c) black leader.....favorable
- d) guerrilla leader.....neutral
- e) ZANU leader.....neutral
- f) nationalist leader.....favorable
- g) scholarly, soft-spoken.....favorable
- h) well-dressed, conservative.....favorable
- i) diminutive.....favorable
- j) co-leader of Patriotic front.....neutral
- k) terrorist, radical.....unfavorable
- l) age, 51, 55, 56 (Mugabe's age).....neutral
- m) deals well with small groups, personable.....favorable
- n) devote Catholic, Christian.....favorable
- o) courageous, brilliant, patient, intelligent...favorable
- p) prime minister designate.....neutral
- q) revolutionary.....unfavorable

Each letter is assigned a qualitative meaning which correlates to the graph and histograms. Please consult

TABLE 5B

SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE CATEGORY

MUGABE

NEW YORK TIMES

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | |
|-------|---|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|---|------|-------|---|-------------|
| 23.72 | 0 | 8.47 | 47.45 | 13.55 | 6.77 | 5.08 | 3.38 | 32.20 | 8.47 | 5.08 | 3.38 | 1.69 | 0 | 3.38 | 15.25 | 0 | <u>in %</u> |
| 14 | 0 | 5 | 28 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 19 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 0 | <u>in N</u> |

WASHINGTON POST

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-----|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-------------|
| 51.72 | 3.4 | 6.8 | 62.06 | 31.03 | 17.24 | 13.79 | 6.08 | 0 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 6.8 | 17.24 | 3.4 | <u>in %</u> |
| 15 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | <u>in N</u> |

WALL STREET JOURNAL

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|---|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|-------------|
| 50 | 12.5 | 0 | 37.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | <u>in %</u> |
| 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | <u>in N</u> |


CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|------|------|----|------|------|---|------|---|---|---|------|---|---|----|---|-------------|
| 30 | 6.66 | 3.33 | 36.6 | 10 | 6.66 | 3.33 | 0 | 3.33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6.66 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | <u>in %</u> |
| 9 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | <u>in N</u> |

Chapter II for the methods and standards used to code the adjectives and adverbs.

Figure 18 (M)

Figure 18(M) is the histogram of descriptions of Robert Mugabe as either Marxist or Marxist-oriented. All the newspapers scored a high percentage of such references. The Washington Post assigned this label to Mugabe 51.72% of the time when reporting his role in the election, and the Wall Street Journal affixed this term to Mugabe 50% of the time; I consider both rates very high. The New York Times rate is low when compared to the W.S.J. and the Washington Post, less than half those of the W.S.J. and W.P. I consider the New York Times values of 23.72% in figure 18 consistent with the figures in section I of the empirical section, where the New York Times was more balanced (figure 2(M)), used a greater amount of official sources for their information (figure 3 (M)) and had a comparatively large percentage of non-ethnocentric articles. This would indicate a comparatively liberal pattern of reporting the election in Zimbabwe for the New York Times. The Washington Post's high percentage is surprising because, like the New York Times, it did show a pattern of liberal reporting of the election in Zimbabwe when compared to the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor. For the Washington

Figure 18(M)

Histogram indicating reports that Mugabe is a
" Marxist/ Marxist - oriented ".


Category A

Post to describe Mugabe as Marxist more often (in percentages) than the Wall Street Journal, who has a record of conservative coverage, is an interesting development. The Christin Science Monitor was third with 30%.

Figure 19

Figure 19 is a histogram of descriptions of Mugabe as a "self-professed Marxist or socialist." The Wall Street Journal consistently labelled Mugabe as a Marxist. If one combines the percentages recorded for the W.S.J. in figures 18 and 19, this paper called Mugabe a Marxist or socialist 62% of the time. I consider this rate extremely high in comparison with a zero rate of describing Mugabe alternatively as a "black leader" (figure 20). Such high percentages are possibly due to the Journal's concern that a Mugabe victory could alter power relationships in the area and endanger foreign investments. I would consider the Wall Street Journal's consistent labeling of Mugabe as a Marxist presenting him unfavorably to the American public and policymakers. The Wall Street Journal's value in figure 19 should also be compared with the New York Times's zero percentage. The New York Times's coloration in this regard is significantly lower than the Wall Street Journal's., consistent again with the findings of section I. The Washington Post's value of 3.4% is very low compared to the

Figure 19(M)




Histogram describing Mugabe as a self-professed Marxist/ socialist.

Category B

value in Figure 18 of 51.72%. While the Washington Post called Mugabe a Marxist over half the time, it apparently did not use every opportunity to assign this label to him. The Christian Science Monitor, which had a relatively high percentage in figure 18, is almost twice as high in values than the Washington Post. The Christian Science Monitor is obviously very concerned about the possibility of a Marxist (Mugabe) becoming prime minister in Zimbabwe. If you combine the percentages of both Figures 18 and 19 for the C.S.M. it is revealed that the Monitor called Mugabe a Marxist 36.66% of the time, a value which I consider high. Again, one should consider Figure 20 where the C.S.M. called Mugabe a black leader only 3.33% of the time. Like the Wall Street Journal, the C.S.M. seemed to report the election of Mugabe from a very conservative perspective. The conservative nature of the C.S.M.'s coverage is possibly due to its constituency of white, middle-class readers and also to the fact missionaries were reportedly being killed in Zimbabwe by black nationalists. Furthermore, many American religious communities view a Marxist government as incongruent with religious freedom and fear that such governments may impose an atheist state. The New York Times and the Washington Post recorded the lowest rates in Figure 19 of 0% and 3.4% respectively.

Figure 20 (M)

Figure 20(M)


Histogram describing Mugabe as a black leader
Category C

Figure 20(M) is a histogram assigning the label of "black leader" to Mugabe. All of the values are low for the four newspapers. The Wall Street Journal recorded a zero percentage in this category. The Christian Science Monitor's value is extremely low, a percentage of only 3.33. The low values in Figure 20 of the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor are quite a contrast to the high percentages in Figures 18 and 19 (assigning the image of Marxist to Mugabe). The fact that the Wall Street Journal labelled Mugabe a Marxist over 50% of the time would not have caused any concern but for the fact that Figure 20 showed a zero percentage. This would indicate that the W.S.J. is more concerned with assigning "cold war" or "East-West" connotations to Mugabe than with his nationalist African orientation. This is a very serious misrepresentation of Mugabe's pro-African stance. Another interpretation of this figure is that the W.S.J. was attempting to influence U.S. aid or involvement in Zimbabwe, as it had in the Angola case, although, from the values in section I, it would seem that the W.S.J. was more interested in terminating the crisis in Zimbabwe than in increasing and prolonging the situation. United States investments are endangered by all unstable and turbulent political climates. In Zimbabwe, unlike Angola, a black

prime minister was already elected and had taken power. It was obvious that the next prime minister of Zimbabwe would also be black. The issue in February and March 1980 was which nationalist leader would be chosen. Within this context, the W.S.J. and C.S.M. by effectively leading Mugabe's name with Marxist associations instead of using a neutral term like "black leader," were more likely attempting to persuade public opinion against Mugabe. The New York Times and Washington Post, while their values are extremely low, 8.47 and 6.8% respectively, do at least present Mugabe as both a black leader and a Marxist leader. The New York Times and Washington Post are clearly more liberal in terminology surrounding Mugabe.

Figure 21

Figure 21 is a histogram describing the labelling of Mugabe as a "querrilla leader." All of the values are extremely high. The Washington Post percentage was the highest, characterizing Mugabe in this way 62.06 of the time. In fact, the Washington Post called Mugabe a querrilla leader as often as it called him a Marxist. (see figure 18) I consider the Washington Post values to be extremely high in assigning this term to Mugabe. The New York Times called Mugabe a querrilla leader 50% as frequently as it called Mugabe a Marxist. Comparing figures 18 and 21, we see that

Figure 21(M)

Histogram describing Mugabe as a guerilla leader.

Category D

the New York Times assigned the label "guerrilla" to Mugabe, while the Washington Post described him overwhelmingly as a "Marxist guerrilla." Since "Marxist" has been coded as an unfavorable term and guerrilla as neutral, it would seem that the Washington Post was less favorable to a Mugabe victory than the New York Times.


The Christian Science Monitor also presented a relatively high frequency of calling Mugabe a guerrilla leader: 36.6%. The 36.6% should be contrasted to figure 18, Mugabe was assigned the label of "Marxist" 30% of the time, and to Figure 20 where he was labelled a "black leader" only 3.33% of the time. Thus, the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post seem to characterize Mugabe as a Marxist guerrilla 50% of the time. But the Washington Post labelled Mugabe a black leader 50% more times than the Christian Science Monitor, which is quite significant.

The Wall Street Journal described Mugabe as a Marxist leader 50% of the time and as a guerrilla leader 37.5% of the time (see figures 18 and 21). This would seem to indicate that the Wall Street Journal viewed the issue of Mugabe being a Marxist as more important than the issue of the Zimbabwe struggle. In fact, the Wall Street Journal's position in this regard is very similar to what Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen's analysis was of the Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, that in NSSM 39 " [there] is a

complete lack of concern over the aspirations and fate of the African people." The Journal's concentration on the issue of Marxism diverted attention from the Zimbabwean struggle for majority rule in Zimbabwe. The Wall Street Journal, in comparison with the other three newspapers, is the least liberal in describing Mugabe.

Figure 22

Figure 22 is a histogram of the characterization of Mugabe as "leader of ZANU." This is coded neutral describing Mugabe as a leader of a legitimate organization, as opposed to a very loosely organized political configuration. In order to have a large and dedicated following, Mugabe would have had to display leadership and organizational abilities. In figure 22 the Washington Post recorded the highest rates of describing Mugabe as a leader of ZANU: 31.03%. The Washington Post actually called Mugabe a ZANU leader two and a half times more in percentages than the N.Y.T., which registered a percentage of only 13.55% in this category. These percentages by the New York Times and Washington Post are consistent with their pattern of presenting a comparatively more liberal view point than either the Wall Street Journal or the Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor presented Mugabe as a ZANU leader 10% of the time, a relatively low value, and


Figure 22(M)

the Wall Street Journal never described Mugabe as a ZANU leader, which should be compared to their coverage of Mugabe as a "Marxist leader" 50% of the time, a "self-professed Marxist-socialist" 12.5% of the time. In fact Figure 22 is consistent with the Wall Street Journal's rate in Figure 20 (describing Mugabe as a "black leader"), which was also zero percent. For the Wall Street Journal there is little ambiguity that Mugabe should be referred and described as a Marxist rather than a black or ZANU leader.

Figure 23

Figure 23 is a histogram describing to what extent U.S. newspapers described Mugabe as a nationalist leader. The Washington Post characterized Mugabe as a nationalist leader over two and a half more times that did the New York Times. In fact, there is little difference in this category between the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, who recorded values of 6.77 and 6.66% respectively. The Wall Street Journal, however, recorded a value of zero percent, which again, would indicate that the Journal's consensus on Mugabe was that he was a Marxist leader.


Figure 24

Figure 23(M)

Histogram describing Mugabe as a nationalist leader.

Category F

Figure 24(M)




Histogram describing Mugabe as scholarly, soft-spoken.

Category G

Figure 24 is a histogram depicting the percentages of articles representing Mugabe as a "scholar," or "soft-spoken." For all the newspapers except the C.S.M. there is only a slight difference between Figure 23 and Figure 24. The Christian Science Monitor recorded the largest discrepancy between Mugabe being described as a nationalist leader or as a scholar. For the Monitor, Mugabe was described as a nationalist 50% more times than as a scholar. For the New York Times and the Washington Post the difference is less than 3%. While both terms "nationalist" and "scholar"--are coded "favorable," it would seem that Mugabe's depiction in American newspapers as a scholar would imply a less militant or less political connotation than the term "nationalist." So the C.S.M.'s emphasis on describing Mugabe as a nationalist rather than as a scholar may well be consistent with the Monitor's more conservative pattern.

Figure 25


Figure 25 is the histogram of those articles assigning the label "welldressed, and conservative" to Mugabe. I have coded this description "favorable". The The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded zero percentage. Again, one should compare this with the W.S.J. and C.S.M. percentages in figure 18 and 19, where both newspapers labelled Mugabe as a "Marxist-inspired" with very

Figure 25(M)

high percentages. Neither the Wall Street Journal nor the Christian Science Monitor attempt to balance their images of Mugabe. The values are also low for both the New York Times and the Washington Post, recording a rate of 3.38 and 6.8% respectively. The New York Times and the Washington Post percentages are low, but, considering the W.S.J. and C.S.M. 0/ ratings, the N.Y.T. and W.P. are the most liberal in respect to this variable. The C.S.M. and W.S.J. concentrate mainly on strongly affective political labels, such as "Marxist", or "Marxist-inspired leader" leader.

FIGURE 26

Figure 26 is a histogram of articles assigning the label of "co-leader of the patriotic front" to Robert Mugabe. This term is designed as "favorable". The The New York Times described Mugabe as a "co-leader of the patriotic front" 32.20% of the time, a higher percentage than that found for instances in which the Times described Mugabe as a "Marxist", which was 23.72%. Comparatively, the Wall Street Journal called Mugabe a "Marxist" 50% of the time (see Figure 18) and "co-leader of the patriotic front" zero percent of the time. Similarly, the Washington Post viewed Mugabe as a "Marxist" 51.72% of the time and as "co-leader of the patriotic front" zero percent of the time. Thus, the two newspapers with the highest percentages of calling

Figure 26(M)


Histogram describing Mugabe as co-leader of Patriotic front.

Category J

Mugabe a "Marxist" also had the lowest ratings for balance. The C.S.M. labelled Mugabe a "Marxist" approximately ten times more than it called him the "co-leader of the patriotic front". These figures are consistent with the results in Figures 18,19,20,22,and 25. Combined with Figure 26, these graphs possibly show that while most newspapers singled out Mugabe as a Marxist leader, the New York Times attempted to project other images of Mugabe, such as "well-dressed", "scholarly, a "nationalist leader", a "ZANU leader", etc. The New York Times, thus far in the symbolic language category, emerges as the most liberal newspaper in assigning a diverse range of images to Mugabe. The Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor, as in section I, remain very conservative. However, in the symbolic language category, the Washington Post is also showing a very conservative pattern.

FIGURE 27

Figure 27 is a histogram describing how often in percentages American newspapers called Mugabe a "terrorist" or "radical", a label I have designated as unfavorable. This category offers surprising results. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor values are both zero. Alternatively, the newspapers with the most liberal pattern, the New York Times and the Washington Post, describe Mugabe in their articles as a "terrorist" or

Figure 27(M)


Histogram describing Mugabe as a terrorist, radical.

Category K

"radical" 8.47 and 3.4% of the time respectively. First, I would have expected the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor to display percentages consistent with the previous figures. Secondly, the Washington Post seems more liberal (or less conservative) than the Times in this graph. Although the percentages here are close, there is a significant difference. Although the New York Times and Washington Post comprise the most liberal newspapers of the four examined, the Washington Post, actually shows a more conservative pattern than the New York Times. For example, in figure 18, the Washington Post assigned the label "Marxist" to Mugabe, over 50% more often than the New York Times. In figure 19, the Washington Post described Mugabe as a "self-professed Marxist or socialist", 3.4%, compared to the New York Times' zero percentage. In figure 20, the New York Times, termed Mugabe as a "black leader" 8.47% of the time as compared to the Washington Post's 6.8%. The figures are close, but an overall pattern has developed, which is confirmed by more impressive differences in other graphs. The Washington Post labelled Mugabe as a "guerilla leader" 62.06% of the time, a very large rate, as opposed to the New York Times' percentages of 47.45% (see Fig. 21). The New York Times, described Mugabe as a "co-leader of the patriotic front" 32.20% of the time, as compared with the Washington Post's zero percentage in that category in that category (see Fig.

26). This pattern would indicate that while clearly the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor are the most conservative, it would be unfair to view the New York Times and the Washington Post as equally liberal. Also, if one examines most of the figures, the Wall Street Journal is more likely to assign "unfavorable" terms to Mugabe than the Christian Science Monitor. FIGURE 28

Figure 28 is a histogram of those articles that made references to Mugabe's age: 51, 55, or 56 years old. This category is important because, by describing how old Mugabe is, the reporters are attempting to make his image more human. In many instances of war reporting, if reporters attempt to describe leaders negatively, they may use very impersonal terms to describe the person, almost projecting a machinelike image rather than personal qualities that many people can identify with, such as age. This category represents then how often in percentages American newspapers attempt to "personalize" their coverage of Mugabe. All the values for the newspapers are low, however, the Washington Post and the New York Times recorded the highest values, 3.4% and 5.08% respectively. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor produced a zero percentage in this regard. This category reflects another area where the Wall Street Journal and or the Christian Science Monitor produced a zero percentage in this regard. This category is

Figure 28(M)


another area where the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor could have diversified their representations of Mugabe. For example, the C.S.M. and/or the Wall Street Journal could have described him as a 51 year old black leader of ZANU rather than a Marxist leader, or they might have used the two labels in conjunction.

FIGURE 29

Figure 29 is a histogram describing reports that Mugabe "deals well with small groups," and is "personable." I have coded these descriptions "favorable." The values for all four newspapers are extremely low. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded zero percentages. The New York Times and the Washington Post recorded values of only 3.38 and 3.4% respectively. This graph is consistent with Figure 28.

FIGURE 30


Figure 30 is a histogram describing reports that Mugabe "is a devout Catholic", or "Christian." I have coded this variable "favorable." The Wall Street Journal is the only newspaper which recorded a zero percentage for this category. Perhaps because of its business orientation, The Journal is less interested in religious affiliations than the Christian Science Monitor, which is part of the Church of Christ, Scientist and accordingly recorded the highest

Figure 29(M)

Histogram describing Mugabe as personable and able to relate to small groups.

Category M


Figure 30(M)



percentage, 6.66%. the New York Times and the Washington Post recorded values of 1.69 and 3.4% respectively. One wouldn't expect the N.Y.T. and W.P. to emphasize Mugabe's religious affiliation as much as the Christian Science Monitor; nevertheless they did report that Mugabe was a Christian. Has Mugabe's religious affiliation been reported, it is possible that his Marxist identity would have been weakened in reader's minds. These figures, however, are too low to suggest that the public received a balanced, human, multi-faceted image of Robert Mugabe.

Figure 31

Figure 31 is a histogram describing reports of Mugabe as a "weak leader." The Washington Post is the only newspaper which published reports for this category-3.4%. Surprisingly, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal did not assign the image of weak leader to Mugabe in their articles. The New York Times did not portray Mugabe as a "weak leader" either. Possibly this is due to Mugabe's obvious leadership among the guerrilla fighters and to the extreme likelihood of his winning the election by February or early March. Actually they presented a picture of Mugabe as a weak leader to the American public only weeks before the election which Mugabe won by a landslide. According to the Sub-Committee report on the Zimbabwean election, Mugabe won the election

Figure 31(A)

Histogram describing Mugabe as a weak leader.

Category .0


specifically because ZANU was well-organized and Mugabe was regarded as a strong leader.

Figure 32

Figure 32 is a histogram representing American newspapers' description of Mugabe as "courageous", "brilliant", "patient", or "intelligent". I have coded this variable as "favorable." All the values for all the newspapers are extremely low. The Washington Post, however, displayed the highest values in the category: 6.8%. The New York Times described Mugabe in this manner 3.38% of the time. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor registered zero percentage in this category. The zero percentage displayed in this category by the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor is significant because of these newspapers' high ratings in the "Marxist" category (See Figure 18 and 19) and because of the issues of ethnocentrism that I discussed in the previous empirical section where the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded either zero or extremely low values for non-ethnocentric articles.


FIGURE 33

Figure 33 is a histogram indicating how often Mugabe was referred to as "Prime Minister Designate" by the four

Figure 32 (M)

Histogram describing Mugabe as courageous, brilliant, patient and intelligent.

Category P


Figure 33(M)

Histogram indicating how often Mugabe was called "Prime Minister Designate" by the four newspapers.

newspapers. This variable is coded as "neutral." All of the values are relatively high. The Wall Street Journal records the highest value of 25% and the Monitor 20%. This figure is interesting because of both the Journal's and the Monitor's previous refusal to diversify their images of Mugabe. My analysis of this chart is that the Journal and the Monitor are reporting that the war is over and that business can now proceed. The symbolic language and the empirical sections clearly show that the Journal and the Monitor did not favor a Mugabe victory. Once Mugabe is in office, however, the newspapers' negatively affective label of "Marxist" changed to the neutral "P.M. designate." The New York Times and the Washington Post statistics do not differ significantly 15.25 and 17.24% respectively. It seems that after the election, all the newspapers reassessed the situation and changed the tone and adjectival coloration of their reports to conform to the realities of Zimbabwe. The change might also be due to Mugabe's election speech which emphasized conciliation and political compromise. Mugabe's post-election orientation may have had a large impact on press coverage.

FIGURE 34

Figure 34 is a histogram reflecting how often, in percentages, the U.S. press called Mugabe a "revolutionary." I have coded this variable as "unfavorable." The Washington

Figure 34(M)

Histogram indicating how often Mugabe was called a revolutionary.

Post is the only newspaper which recorded a rating in this category: 3.4%. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor all registered values of 0% in this regard. The Washington Post, it would seem from this category, attempts to diversify it's image of Mugabe only in the unfavorable categories. For example, the Post did not emphasize that Mugabe was a "scholar," or "intelligent," or "well-dressed" but it does not associate Mugabe with "Marxist-inspired," "revolutionary," "terrorist," etc. Thus, while the Post can be said to present a number of images of Mugabe, for the most part these are negative or unfavorable characterizations.

In the background section of Chapter V, we discussed the subcommittee hearing by the Department of State in which the Assistant Secretary of African Affairs, Richard Moore stated that Mugabe's socialist philosophy must be viewed within the African context. Moore, emphasized in his presentation that Mugabe's form of socialism has its roots in the African experience. It is indeed curious that a member of the State Department would argue for viewing Mugabe as primarily an African leader and that foreign correspondents would present such a myopic perception of this same leader to the American public.

SUMMARY

The data collected for this research suggests that Robert Mugabe was unfavorably characterized by the U.S. press during the 1980 Rhodesia/Zimbabwean electoral campaign for the Prime Ministry. Even though the newspapers consulted a variety of sources including both opposition and official spokesmen, this however, did not seem to affect the percentage count for ethnocentric reporting of the campaign. The statistics in figure 8(M) also suggest that the levels of ethnocentricity is not significantly altered by reporters consulting with "official" sources from either opposition or government offices. It would seem that reporters contacted a diversity of sources more from a sense of professional duty rather than a firm commitment to investigating substantive issues.

Essentially, the newspapers failed to present both African and European opinions of Rhodesian segregation policies. In the Zimbabwean case, reporters who did not consult a spokesman from the minority government and a representative of one of the major black organizations presented a biased and indeed inaccurate coverage of the crisis. In the areas where we coded for balanced coverage between black and white spokesmen on the issue of apartheid, overall the values are extremely low.

Robert Mugabe was characterized generally by the U.S. press as either a Marxist or guerilla leader. The New York

Times, characterization of Mugabe differed from the trend of the other three newspapers by labeling him the "co-leader of the patriotic front" 32.02% of the time, their highest value in the symbolic language category. The Washington Post described Mugabe as a Marxist 51.72% of the time, the Wall Street Journal followed the Post by labeling Mugabe as a Marxist in 50% of its coverage, and the CSM assigned this description to Mugabe in 30% of its coverage. For the most part, Mugabe's name was hyphenated labeling him Marxist or guerilla interchangeably.

Overall the press coverage of Mugabe was not favorable. In viewing the reports by American journalist from Salisbury the data found the accounts were neither diversified nor a sympathetic non-Western interpretation of the crisis. To further blur the issue, Mugabe's Marxist tendencies were emphasized to the near exclusion of his religious, academic or nationalist proclivity. Mugabe's characterization by the press is in stark contrast to the amiable characterization of Steve Biko, the young leader, of the black consciousness movement in South Africa. It is obvious that differences in style and philosophy clearly abound between the two leaders. At the time of his death, Biko was certainly not a mass leader, nor was he the director of a guerilla movement. Biko's embryonic movement in 1975 was not the potential threat to Western interest that Mugabe's organization ZANU

was in 1980. Furthermore, Cuban intervention was not threatened in Biko's South Africa as it was in Mugabe's Zimbabwe and the internationalization of armed conflict was not being discussed in South Africa as it was in Zimbabwe on the eve of the Lancaster House dialogue and subsequent agreements. We suggest then, that the differences in how the U.S. press labeled and characterized Mugabe and Biko lies in its perception of these two African leaders. Obviously, Mugabe was the more powerful leader in his country primarily because of his strength within the guerilla segments of the struggle making him a serious potential threat to certain Western interest. We posit that the differences in press treatment between a leader like Mugabe or Biko actually relates to how the U.S. press perceives the threat they pose whether it be real or imagined to Western business or political interest and European settler safety.

CHAPTER 6

STEVE BIKO

A Theologist of National Culture as a Force for Liberation
in South Africa: American Newspapers' Analysis and
Description of An African Revolutionary.

We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principal dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called fascism, in Germany National Socialism, and in South Africa Christian Nationalism.²⁹⁵

Describing an interrogation episode Biko in an interview told an American businessman that a South African policeman said... "I will kill you." And my answer was "How long is it going to take you?"...My attitude is...if they were to beat me five times, they can only do so on condition that I allow them to beat me five times...So I said to (the policeman) "Listen, if your guys want to do this your way, you have got to handcuff me and bind my feet together, so that I can't respond. And I'm afraid you may have to kill me in the process even if its not your intention."²⁹⁶

On August 18, 1977, Biko and Peter Brown were stopped

²⁹⁵Alex Callinicos, John Rogers, Southern Africa After Soweto, Pluto Press, 1977. p. 7.

^{296A}. Stubbs, Biko: I Write What I Like, Harper and Row, Publication. New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London. 1978.p.152-153.

at a roadblock near Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape Province, arrested and taken to the Port Elizabeth Security Police Headquarters. They were not charged with having committed a crime²⁹⁷

On September 6, 1977, the South African security Police escorted Steve Biko to Room 619 in the Sanlam Building on Strand Street. Biko was then handcuffed, put into leg irons, and chained to a grill. For twenty-two hours, the South African security Police tortured and beat Biko until he lapsed into a coma from brain damage. On September 12, 1977, the South African security Police reported that Biko had died while on a "hunger strike." Biko's name was thus added to those of over forty-six other Africans who had died under mysterious circumstances while under police protection without being charged with violating a specific ordinance or law.

Biko had been found naked, lying face down on the floor in the corner of a damp concrete cell,²⁹⁸ in a state which condones and aggressively pursues a policy of social violence against blacks on a massive scale--South Africa. Anthony Lewis of the New York Times alludes to this in an article on Biko's death entitled "State of Violence", that

²⁹⁷Donald Woods, BIKO, Paddington Press, LTD., New York, New York, London. 1978.

²⁹⁸Donald Woods, Ibid., p.283.1978.

"A man charged with no crime was kept shackled hand and foot for four days on a urine-soaked mat, smashed, [and] allowed to die without mercy."²⁹⁹

This chapter will examine how American newspapers reported the assassination in 1975 of Steve Biko, founder and leader of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa. Biko's leadership and his assassination by the South African government was affected by the historical climate and context of the liberation of Angola and Mozambique from their colonial master, Portugal. The late 1970's was a turning point in Southern African history and U.S. policy towards Africa. After the Portuguese defeat in Angola by the MPLA, American foreign policy was altered to deal with the changing political realities of Black rule in Southern Africa.

According to a study commissioned by Secretary of State Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum 39,³⁰⁰ American foreign policy officials, as late as 1970, assumed that white control of Southern Africa was not threatened by black liberation activities. But as the 1970's proceeded, Portugal was defeated by its colonies and it was becoming

²⁹⁹("State of Violence"), Anthony Lewis, The New York Times, December 5, 1977, p. 37:1

³⁰⁰ed. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (National Security Study Memorandum 39) (SECRET), Lawrence Hill and Co. Westport, Conn. 1976.

increasingly clear that the Zimbabwean liberation forces of ZANU and ZAPU were destined to win their battle against the Rhodesian army. So American policy in the area began to shift from supporting white-minority regimes to encouraging detente and communicating with African leaders. It was in the midst of this volatile, shifting political climate that Steve Biko emerged as a leader of "Black consciousness" in South Africa.

The victories of Mozambique and Angola spurred on young South Africans, such as Biko, who intently watched with interest the humiliation of South African forces being captured by the MPLA and being displayed as trophies of war in Luanda and other African countries.³⁰¹ Callinicos and Rogers report that:

the message of the South African defeat spread among black people like wildfire. An eyewitness described to us how in Cape Town huge black audiences would watch the television news in coloured hotels and cheer every report of South African casualties in the operational zone.³⁰²

Despite the barrage of South African propaganda, it was evident that colonial governments could be militarily constrained by African liberation forces. More importantly, the Angolan crisis brought hope that South African military

³⁰¹The Africa Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle For Southern Africa, Anchor Books'- Anchor Press, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1974. p.

³⁰²Alex Callinicos and John Rogers, Southern Africa After Soweto, Ibid., p. 157.

forces in particular considered the most technologically sophisticated and well-trained in Africa, could be intimidated and perhaps even defeated by African and Cuban soldiers.

Surely, for Biko and other South African activists, South Africa's lackluster performance in Angola indicated that a successful domestic revolution was possible. The South African defeat in Angola produced a dramatic effect:

South Africa had lost the war; the last time black people inflicted such a heavy defeat on the white rulers of South Africa was in 1879 at Isandlwana when the British colonial army invading Zululand was destroyed by the Impis of Cetiwayo. This is the message that is now spreading through the shanty-towns, the all-male workers' hostels, the farm and mine compounds into which the black working-class of South Africa are herded by their white masters: black people can defeat the apartheid regime... The black rebellion within South Africa itself began in Soweto in June 1976 and spread throughout the townships in the following months. Triggered off by the issue of compulsory Afrikkans teaching in Soweto schools, and fuelled by the courage and militancy of black youth, who braved the guns, tear-gas, helicopters, armoured cars, dogs and tracheons of one of the most effective and ruthless security forces in the world, the explosion undoubtedly owed much of its forces to MPLA's victory over the regimes troops in Angola.³⁰³

Steve Biko's role in South African history was to continue, consolidate, and intensify the nationalist struggle in his country.

Biko's development of and leadership in the South

³⁰³Alex Callinicos, John Rogers, Southern Africa After Soweto, Ibid., 1977.

African Student Organization (SASO) and later the Black People's Convention (BPC) filled an important vacuum created by the incarcerations of Robert Sobukwe of the Pan African Congress (PAC) and Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC). The philosophy of SASO and BPC also attempted to bridge an ideological gap between past political movements and the contemporary, revitalized national organizations. And the constituency of the Black Consciousness Movement had a new, different attitude. Like the generation of Sobukwe and Mandela, they had grown up under the repressive National Party and had witnessed the emergence of independent African states during the 1960's. Steve Biko in the tradition of Sobukwe and Mandela was able to brilliantly articulate the frustrations and demands of a new resilient generation.

The announcement of Biko's assassination shocked the world and triggered massive international criticism of the South African apartheid system. In fact, despite the government's attempt to censor press coverage of the Biko inquest, the legitimacy of and support for the Vorster regime was severely jeopardized and shaken. A national election was held in the aftermath of the inquest in order to determine if the National Party still had a clear public mandate to continue its brutal policies. The election results were undeniable: the white population gave the Party a clear mandate to continue its policies.

This chapter will examine how the U.S. elite press reported the assassination of Steve Biko and the involvement of the South African government. It will also assess what images the U.S. press assigned to Biko and the analytical framework they used to understand the issue inherent in a study of South Africa and the historic role of the Black Consciousness movement. Conversely, the U.S. press clearly presented a "favorable" image of a young, black, moderate South African leader who they perceived as amenable to Western interests, didn't advocate a violent solution to the racist practices of the Nationalist Party and preferred negotiation as opposed to confrontation. For example, Anthony Lewis in an interview said he characterized Biko as a moderate because he was not an "advocate of armed struggle" and wasn't teaching black people to hate whites. In hindsight, Lewis viewed his characterization of Biko as a "moderate" to be incorrect. His purpose for reporting Biko's ideology as moderate was:

to send a kind of signal...to my readers -that Biko- was not an advocate of armed revolution as the way out of the South African problem... and I thought that I would sort of signal to readers in America that he wasn't in favor of armed revolution by calling him a "moderate."³⁰⁴

I asked Mr. Lewis whether black South Africans could achieve freedom in South Africa without blood-shed, he said:

³⁰⁴Interview with Anthony Lewis, New York Times columnist, by Marsha Coleman, 1980.

If you asked me if there is any way that life is going to change in South Africa except by revolution, I would have to tell you I can't think of it.³⁰⁵

Additional interviews with Godfrey Gossell and June Goodwin of the Christian Science Monitor clearly reveal that Biko was characterized as a moderate because his ideology advocated a peaceful and conciliatory solution to the South African problem although all of the reporters I interviewed on the Biko assassination agreed that considering the unbending Afrikaner policy on Apartheid violence was inevitable for transforming and transferring power to the majority of the population.

Background: The Arrest and Assassination of Steve Biko

It was inevitable that unless he went underground or abroad Steve Biko, who was regarded as a symbol of Black humanity and pride, would be killed by the South African government. It was certainly not in the interest of the South African government to take for granted any movement which advocated human rights or to leave any potential Black "messiah" alive. Clearly the Vorster regime was threatened by Biko, but not only by the man; it was threatened by the man's ability to articulate and conceptualize the internal

³⁰⁵Interview with Anthony Lewis, New York Times Ibid., 1980.

dynamics and weaknesses of the apartheid system. Perhaps more importantly, the South African government was threatened by Biko's ability to instill hope and direction among the masses of black South Africans. It is important to understand the degree of Biko's militancy and how he was perceived as a serious danger by the South African government. It will be argued in this investigation that the numerous comments from Donald Woods and other biographers of Biko's career that Biko was a moderate undervalues and indeed reduces the full impact of Biko's central ideology and undercuts the man's influence and effect. Biko's ideology continued that of Sobukwe and Mandela on a conceptual level, and it was this fact that made him as dangerous to the South African government as other leaders who were organizing small bands of men for the purpose of direct sabotage. In fact, it is doubtful whether Biko could have amassed such a broad constituency of both students and workers if he had been propagating a "liberal" or "moderate" ideology in the wake of the revolutions in Angola and Mozambique. Clearly, the South African masses were ready for a radical solution and a revolutionary leader in the mid seventies to lead the fight against the apartheid system. For example, Callinicos and Rogers write:

Under Biko's leadership (SASO and BPC) organized demonstrations in support of the revolutionary struggles in Angola and Mozambique. After the April coup in Portugal, SASO and BCM organized a demonstration in solidarity with FRELIMO. They

declared their support of the MPLA while South African troops were still in Angola. Their school-student wing, the South African Student Movement (SASM) was active in the Soweto schools before the June 1976 uprising. There had been indicators of the explosion to come; in March 1978. A militant bus boycott against fare increases had won massive support from the workers of Kwa Thema Township near Johannesburg and a small 500-strong demonstration outside the Rand Supreme Court in Johannesburg, was joined by black workers on the way to catch trains home from Johannesburg Central Station nearby. The demonstration rapidly swelled to 2,000 or more, chanting black power slogans and throwing stones and bottles at the police and passing cars. The police had to draw their guns to disperse them.³⁰⁶

To understand this violent reaction by the South African government to Steve Biko and his work requires that we understand the ideology Biko represented, the core of his "Black consciousness" philosophy, and its implications for the South African establishment. The significance of Steve Biko and SASO must be placed then within the context of the historical realities of Southern Africa during this period. Clearly, Biko's philosophy and political activities were understood by the South African masses as a potentially liberating force within their society. The government, for its part, viewed Biko and SASO as a potentially dangerous force which could disrupt and destroy their economic and political base. Biko himself believed that SASO and BPC as only embryonic organizations that, unlike ANC or PAC, did

³⁰⁶Alex Callinicos and John Rogers, Southern Africa After Soweto, Ibid., 163.

not directly advocate sabotage or terrorism and that therefore could operate openly "above ground." He also felt he would find safety in his wide base of popularity with the South African people. Whenever friends or advisors expressed concern about Biko's welfare, he would reassure them that probably the police would not dare to "take any chances" with him, because of his following among young blacks. Unfortunately, Biko underestimated how quickly the South African regime would be intimidated by his leadership and move against him.

The South African government "banned" Biko to King William's Town. A "banned" person in South Africa is not allowed to enjoy the company of more than one person, to make public appearances, to be quoted (even posthumously) or to travel freely.³⁰⁷ Despite the banning order imposed on him, however, Biko was still able to conduct an incredible amount of SASO and BPC business and to give the movement mature ideological direction from King Williams Town.

The South African government's perception of Biko's organizations--and history itself--precipitated a different strategy in handling the Black Consciousness Movement from what Biko would have imagined. From the government's perspective, it would be against their interest to take any Black social movement, no matter how young, for granted,

³⁰⁷Donald Woods, BIKO, Ibid., p.10.

especially a movement founded on promoting concepts and programs that would eventually undermine basic mechanisms for social control, like the perpetuation of Black inferiority complexes. Although participants in a social movement might, like Biko, see their organizations as embryonic and benign, those in power will perceive that movement as an avenue for rebellion and thus a part of continuous stream of historical movements with the same basic goals.

After both ANC and PAC were banned by the government, Mandela and Sobukwe organized a small band of revolutionary activists who were committed to sabotaging government buildings and agencies. The Mandela and Sobukwe strategy was aimed at demystifying South African military strength and security in major areas of commercial activity, such as Johannesburg, by demonstrating that the South African military was not omnipotent and invulnerable. Sporadic bombings and strikes were successfully implemented by both the ANC and the PAC. By exposing the weaknesses in the South African apparatus, the activist groups, according to this philosophy, would teach an important political lesson to the Azanians that "the system" was not infallible and, indeed, could be destroyed. The Angolan victory against South African troops and other western powers was crucial in developing the basis and impetus for Azanians to challenge the South African system.

Biko, on the other hand, aimed his challenges not only at the South African government but also towards the masses of Azanians. He challenged them to face the "enemy from within", the enemy of fear and racial inferiority complexes. Biko's political and historical analysis of Azanian "consciousness" in 1970-1977 led him to believe that, without first waging a philosophical or ideological revolution, the conceptualization and thus participation in armed struggle by the masses would be impossible.

The South African government, viewing this problem from a historical and administrative position, realized that the implantation and conceptualization of ideas are initially more important and volatile than sporadic acts of sabotage. Biko's political activities in SASO, propaqating and instilling the basic ideas of black pride, made him a profound threat to the government because not only was Biko an activist but also more importantly a generator of ideas which fundamentally exposed the government's policies. The South African government viewed the development of Azanian organizations and the Black Consciousness Movement as the first steps toward a mass consensus on armed resistance to the minority regime. The BPC's and SASO's articulation of black pride, self-reliance, and the dream of a new Azania combined with community projects, demonstrations in support of other Southern Africa liberation movements, development and leadership of high school students demands to effect

these ideas, was one of the greatest threats that could have developed in 1975.

Black Consciousness: An Ideology of National Culture

... Now we believe we are mere agents of history.
Steve Biko, 1977.

... A national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify, and praise the action and thoughts which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence.

Frantz Fanon, "On National Culture", 1959.

This investigation suggests that it is within the context of "national culture" that Biko's conceptualization of "Black Consciousness" should be viewed. Biko's political program, at the time of his death, was oriented towards attacking and removing the psychological barriers which hindered Azanians from uniting and confronting the South African government. It is important to note, however, that Biko was murdered in his intellectually formative years. In fact, his political framework was really in its gestation period. We can only assume from the direction and activities of SASO and BPC in 1977 and the continuing legacy and development of the Black Consciousness Movement since his

death that Biko's philosophy would have developed from a psychological attack on the problems of Azanians to a military one similar to the movements of Sobukwe and Amílcar Cabral of Guinea.

In understanding Biko's philosophy, we must realize certain limitations and contradictions in that philosophy, some resulting from Biko's philosophical context, others from his limited role as a student leader. Biko's developing ideology for liberation Black Consciousness, belongs within the political paradigm associated with writers such as Frantz Fanon, Memmi and Césaire. Fanon and Memmi, for example, devoted the majority of their work to the psychological aspects of colonialism, attempting to assess the psychological damage inflicted by the colonizers on the colonized.

Still, the commitment to overthrowing the white minority regime in colonized countries propounded by this school is indeed revolutionary. More specifically, the Black Consciousness Movement was dangerous to the South African government because it forced Azanians to re-evaluate their inferior position in the society. The Black Consciousness Movement urged Africans to feel pride in their past and present achievements. The enemy was clearly identified as the white minority government and its African middlemen.

The conceptual framework of national culture,

therefore emphasizes the importance of colonized people confronting various psychological problems. Biko is clearly intellectually located within this domain. He argued that before an advanced level of political struggle could be achieved, Azanians would have to confront their feelings of racial inferiority and submission to white authority. Thus, it was not surprising that the SASO manifesto in June 1977 declares Black Consciousness "is a state of mind, a way of life." For Biko, the movement would first have to address itself to the African "state of mind" and then the struggle for political power.

The Black Consciousness Movement was first challenged with defining what constituted a black person. Under the South African apartheid system, racial identification forms a very important point of reference, since, economic and political privileges in South Africa are meted out to non-whites depending upon their proximity, both real and artificial, to European racial groups. Biko's use of this term Black Consciousness or "blackness" was clearly influenced by the African-American struggle in the United States for, unlike Lembede of the ANC Youth League who argued against interracial cooperation with Indians and coloreds,³⁰⁸ Biko advocated that all non-white people should

³⁰⁸Gail Gerbert, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, London. 1978. p. 75.

unite and declare themselves Black. Biko argued that if someone as light-complected as Malcolm X (whom he greatly respected) could relate to being referred to as black, then complexion was not an obstacle to a black identity. Black identity referred to a state of mind and not a physical manifestation.

The South African government, like all colonial governments, attempted to control its indigenous population by dividing diverse ethnic and racial groups among themselves, employing essentially the "divide and rule" tactic. Biko declared that although race formed an important divisive point of reference for exploitation, it could be used as well to unite and organize different sectors of the non-white community in South Africa. When Biko was asked to interpret and define "blackness", he said:

...-that- black(ness) -is- not a matter of pigmentation -being black is reflection of a mental attitude.

2) [that] merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation, you have committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being.³⁰⁹

Biko's writings indicate that he was struggling with how to combine his conception of "blackness" with his denunciation of capitalism. But, at the time of his death,

³⁰⁹Alfred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p. 49.

Biko had not solved this basic problem in his philosophy. There is a consistent pattern in Biko's writings of separating the issue of black exploitation from that of the structure and operation of the economic system. There are even instances where Biko parallels, but does not connect, the issue of political struggle with that of developing a psychological acceptance of "blackness." Biko, it seems, did not understand what Fanon spent years struggling with intellectually, that one cannot separate the decolonization of the mind from the actual process of the struggle itself, the struggle against capitalism. Black Consciousness, therefore, could not be struggled for in a vacuum or outside of the actual struggle for power over the means of production and the State in South Africa.

Fanon, for example, states:

We believe that the conscious and organized undertaking by a colonized people to re-establish the sovereignty of that nation constitutes the most complete and obvious cultural manifestations that exist. It is not alone the success of the struggle which afterwards give validity and vigour to culture; Culture is not put into cold storage during the conflict. The struggle itself in its development and in its internal progression sends culture along different paths and traces out entirely new ones for it. The struggle for freedom does not give back to the national culture its former value and shapes; this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between men cannot leave intact either the form or the content of the people's culture. After the conflict there is not only the disappearance of colonialism, but also the disappearance of the colonized man. 310

For Fanon, it was through the course of political struggle that egos were inflated and dignity achieved and developed. President Sekou Toure expressed the same sentiment this way:

To take part in the African revolution, it is not enough to write a revolutionary song. You must fashion the revolution with the people. And if you fashion it with the people the songs will come by themselves.³¹¹

Cabral, in his speech before the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, entitled "Weapon of Theory", continues where Fanon and Toure's analysis terminates by precisely stating

That every practice produces a theory, and that if it is true that a revolution can fail even though it is based on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet made a successful revolutionary without theory.³¹²

Although Biko in his article 'The Definition of Black Consciousness' does direct attention to the economic structure of South African society as one basis for the exploitation of Azanians, more central to his analytical framework is the issue of racism. This is clearly evident in his definition of Black Consciousness

Black consciousness is in essence the realization by the black man of the need to rally together with his brother around the cause of the

³¹⁰Ed. Martin Minogue, Judith Molloy, African Aims and attitudes: Selected Documents, Cambridge University Press, 1974, page 150.

³¹¹Ibid., p. 7.

³¹²Amilcar Cabral, The Revolution in Guinea: Selected Speeches by Amilcar Cabral, Monthly Review Press. New York, London, 1969. p.93.

operation--the blackness of their skin-- and to operate as a group in order to ride themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the lie that black is an aberration from the "normal" which is white. It is a manifestation of a new realization that by seeking to run away from themselves and to emulate the white man, black are insulting the intelligence of whoever created them black. Black Consciousness, therefore, takes cognizance of the deliberateness of God's plans in creating black people black. It seeks to infuse the black community with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion, and their outlook on life.³¹³

Biko fails to discuss the economic basis of apartheid in this article, and instead indites the symptom of racism as the primary motive in black exploitation in South Africa. If Biko had integrated the economic basis of apartheid with the system's psychological effects such as self-hatred or racial inferiority complexes, his analysis would have possibly been different. An analysis combining both the economic and psychological variables would have shown that the masses of Azanians had not really lost pride in themselves or their history but that the economic structure limited the extent to which any external signs of resistance or human dignity could be tolerated or displayed. In fact, one could view public displays of deference and submission by Africans to whites as a survival technique. African displays of deference of white authority figures is not necessarily

³¹³Aelred Stubbs, Biko I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.49.

unique to South African experience but to all black people who have experienced military or political defeat.

Biko's challenge to Azanians to redefine themselves as black and have pride in their historical achievements is not particularly revolutionary in itself. But clearly the basis for Biko's advocacy of Black Consciousness was his conviction that once Blacks had regained a sense of pride in their history and their achievements, they would be committed to struggle rather than acceptance of the humiliation of apartheid. For example, in an interview Biko stated that one of the primary contributions of the black consciousness movement was that the people were no longer afraid of death and willing to martyr themselves by struggling and dying for the movement in which they believed. Biko explains:

We have been successful to the extent that we have diminished the element of fear in the minds of black people. In the period '63-'66 black people were terribly scared of involvement in politics...Through our political articulation of the aspirations of black people, many black people have come to appreciate the need to stand up and be counted against the system. There is far more political talk now, far more political debate and far more condemnation of the system from average black people than there has ever been since possibly 1960 and before... Now the response of the students then was in terms of their pride. They were not prepared to be calmed down even at the point of a gun...Some people were killed. These riots just continued and continued. Because at no stage were the young students-nor for that matter at some stage their parents-prepared to be scared...Now this is the kind of lack of fear one is talking about which I see is a very important determinant in political action (since last June)

"499" young blacks were killed.³¹⁴

Black Socialism--The Economics of Black Consciousness

Like the Tanzanian African National Union, the ruling party of Tanzania, the Black Consciousness Movement took a non-aligned stance with respect to the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and their industrially developed allies. The BCM rejected an alliance with the U.S. because of its vast economic and political interests in South Africa and with the U.S.S.R. because of its interests in developing satellites in Africa. It was clear, however, to the membership of the Black Consciousness Movement that American foreign policy was shifting in the aftermath of the Angolan Civil War towards developing relationships with African leaders instead of European colonial powers.

The Black Consciousness Movement advocated that the South African economic system should be transformed from a capitalist to a socialist system. In an interview, Biko submits that the new Azania will be a socialist society.

Q: You speak of an egalitarian society. Do you mean a socialist one?

B: Yes, I think there is no running away from the

³¹⁴Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I write what I Like, Ibid., p. 146.

fact that now in South Africa there is such an ill-distribution of wealth that any form of political freedom which does not touch on the proper distribution of wealth will be meaningless.³¹⁵

Biko viewed the pre-colonial Africa political system of "communalism" as more human, sophisticated, and relevant to African society than its European counterpart. Biko, however, carefully distinguished African communalism or socialism from the economic system that is practiced in the U.S.S.R. Because of the BCM's non-alignment policy, every effort was made to distinguish its type of socialism from the Russian model. In July 1977, Bernard Zylstra in an interview with Biko asked him to explain "black communalism":

The Black Consciousness Movement does not want to accept the dilemma of capitalism versus communism. It opts for a socialist solution that is an authentic expression of black communalism. At the present stage of our struggle, it is not easy to present details of this alternative, but it is a recognition of the fact that a change in the color of the occupier does not necessarily change the system... In our writings we at times speak of collective enterprises because we reject the individualistic and capitalistic type of enterprises... . It is impossible to present details about the transition stage that will be here after the dissolution of white dominion. It is far too early for that.³¹⁶

It is obviously difficult to determine whether Biko was purposely being ambiguous in this interview because he

³¹⁵A. Stubbs, *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³¹⁶Donald Woods, *Biko Ibid.*, p. 100.

possibly did not trust Zylstra or if he considered a direct answer which would be reported in international paper as endangering the movement's ability to operate "openly" in South Africa. In all likelihood, Biko was in the process of struggling with the issues raised in the Zylstra interview. The ANC and PAC had pronounced strong positions on what the economic and social character of a majority-ruled South Africa would resemble. Biko, before his death, was probably attempting to independently assess the needs and demands of South Africa in its present historical period.

Black Consciousness: The Genesis of a Mass Movement

Biko's use of the term "Black Pride" has been generally distorted and misunderstood. Many writers, such as Donald Woods, have interpreted Biko's advocacy of this term as meaning that Biko was more interested in the esoteric or transcendental aspect of this concept, (Black is beautiful) rather than its potential revolutionary reference. We posit here that for Biko this term was a tool to counteract the South African government's Bantustan policies and ameliorate the divisions among the various non-white ethnic groups in society.

The South African government's Bantustan policy continually aggravated and promoted hostilities between various African ethnic groups. Biko clearly wanted to use

the term "black" as an umbrella concept in order to unite a very divided non-white population. In the tradition of other writers concerned with the issue of developing a national culture, such as Frantz Fanon and Memmi, Biko realized that only through organizations which could articulate a theme of unity could a movement be constructed to challenge and defeat colonialism. Biko's advocacy of Black Pride or Black Consciousness was in reality laying the foundations for a mass political party. This need for unification distinguished the Black Consciousness Movement from a parallel movement in the United States.

Gail Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa³¹⁷ posits that the Black Consciousness Movement's use of the term "Black" was inspired by the Black Power movement in the U.S. during the 1960's. Gerhart's analysis is accurate, but Biko's use of this term was also affected by a different set of historical realities than his organization's sister movement in the U.S. In the African-American experience, as in the South African situation, the white ruling and privileged groups re-defined, labelled, and ranked Africans by reference to a white standard: Negro, Coloured, non-white, etc. Nevertheless, the difference between the two movements surfaces when one examines the issue of ethnic

³¹⁷Gail Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, Ibid., 1978.

identity. In the American experience, the era of slavery eradicated different individual identities based upon ethnic origin. In the African situation, however, instead of integrating ethnic bonds, the white nationalist government solidified and reinforced ethnic differences by forcing African groups and leaders to vie for a limited amount of economic opportunity and political privilege. The Afrikaner policy of "divide and rule" inspired hostility among Azanians and created serious barriers to the organization of a political movement which could mount a serious challenge to the South African government. While the participants in the African-American Black Power Movement of the 1960's and the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1970's both advocated identifying themselves as Black people, there were some substantially different reasons for doing so that were based on their unique historical experiences.

The call for unity among Azanians hints at Biko's revolutionary stance, but it is a stance Biko deliberately obscured because of his historical situation. An initial reading of Biko's work would lead one to believe that indeed he was espousing a liberal or moderate philosophy. However, the basic themes and ideological overtones which develop after a more careful analysis of his work and the nature of his organization's projects indicate that he was proposing fundamental changes in the South African system. The subtlety of Biko's language was a result of his desire to

organize Azanians openly or "above ground" instead of being forced to organize "underground", like the ANC, which would have undercut the effectiveness and persuasiveness of the Black Consciousness Movement. Thus, Biko always couched very sophisticated ideas and programs of action inside seemingly benign rhetorical language. This has led liberal writers such as Woods to write that fundamentally Biko wanted Azanians to feel pride in themselves and their history. These writers suggest that Biko could not have participated in an armed struggle against the South African government because of his moderate and conciliatory nature. Undoubtedly, Biko was sincerely attempting to instill and propagate the importance of Black pride, but more importantly, he also realized that the fundamental task confronting the movement was the formation of a mass political party composed of all non-white groups capable of challenging the minority government. In fact, Biko repeatedly explained the importance of the Black Consciousness Movement in terms of oppressed national groups uniting in South Africa in order to struggle against the apartheid regime. For example, in the middle of a speech on "black pride", Biko said:

The last step in Black Consciousness is to broaden the base of our operation. One of the basic tenets of Black Consciousness is totality of involvement. This means that all black must sit as one big unit, and no fragmentations and distraction from the mainstream of events be allowed. Hence we must resist the attempts by protagonists of the

bantustan theory to fragment our approach. We are oppressed not as individuals, not as Zulus, Xhosas, Vendas, or Indians. We are oppressed because we are black. We must use that very concept to unite ourselves and to respond as a cohesive group. We must cling to each other with a tenacity that will shock the perpetrators of evil.³¹⁸

Frantz Fanon would argue that Biko's concept of "blackness" was an important prerequisite to the development of a national culture. Fanon and other black writers who were concerned with understanding the psychology of the oppressed, posited that unity could be achieved once Africans realized the historical and political similarities among all Black people.

Colonialism did not dream of wasting its time in denying the existence of one national culture after another. Therefore the reply of the colonized peoples will be straight away continental in its breadth... the "black world" will see the light and Busia from Ghana, Birago Diop from Senegal, Hampate Ba from the Sudan and Saint-Clair Drake from Chicago would not hesitate to assert the existence for common ties and a motive power that is identical ...³¹⁹

Writers who would characterize Biko as a "moderate" would have to account for his consistent pattern of advocating Black unity as a tool to organize mass opposition to the South African regime. In an interview, June Goodwin of the Christian Science Monitor, stated that foreign

³¹⁸Alfred Stubbs, Steve Biko, I write What I Like, Ibid., p.97.

³¹⁹Minoque, African Aims and Attitudes, "Frantz Fanon on National Culture", Ibid., p.248.

correspondents have to carefully consider how they describe foreign leaders and situations in order to keep peace with their editors and readers back home. Although, for example, Goodwin considered Biko a radical leader she labelled him as a "moderate" in her coverage of the assassination in order to conform to the norms of "objective journalism". She accounts that reporters have to walk a "tightrope" in order to ensure that their editors will trust their judgement and non-emotional account of a situation. Goodwin states:

words like...fascist... you don't use because [of] what the reaction back home will be. You get Steve Biko and you think here's a guy whose pretty good, how can I indicate that he's not shooting people or whatever, you say um...moderate. [Because] you know what the reaction will be to that, you see. I suppose, if I were being truly honest, and I didn't have to think about what the editors would say...[anyway] I'm not writing an article [about Biko] now,...I would describe him as extremely astute about the political pressures and power blocs---especially in South Africa, but he was getting a pretty good grasp of them internationally. I would call him a radical in thinking, in the very best sense of the word. I happen to think that being a radical in the true definition of the word is a very good thing because the basis of the Latin word is root, going to the root of something ...³²⁰

In another interview, Anthony Lewis, also confided that labelling Biko a "moderate" was a mistake. He said:

John Burns wrote a piece based on an interview he had with Biko in which Biko took -a- pretty strong-stance-, I don't remember the details of

³²⁰Interview with June Goodwin, foreign correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, by Marsha Coleman, 1980. New York, New York.

it, but he didn't sound so moderate. So I concluded that I used the wrong word.³²¹

The interviews with Goodwin and Lewis reveal that Biko's characterization as a "moderate" or "young black leader" was their attempt to signal to the American public and policymakers that Biko was not advocating "shooting people" or armed struggle as Goodwin stated in the interview but rather that he was amenable to legislatively addressing the political issues in South Africa. Also, Goodwin and Lewis were attempting to project Biko to the American public in a favorable light instead of being descriptively correct. Both of these writers based their characterizations of Biko on the premise that he was not an advocate of armed struggle or opposed to Western interests in South Africa.

One of the few instances where Biko does not attempt to equate black identity with solidarity and the need to build a mass movement is at the SASO/BPC Trial May 1976. Biko's comments to the court were very guarded. The lives of nine of his comrades were at stake. For astute political purposes, Biko defines his usage of the term black in a rather benign manner when he answers the judge's question of why should actually brown or colored people refer to themselves as black; Biko defensively answers:

... I think ... historically, we have been defined

³²¹Interview with Anthony Lewis columnist for the New York Times, by Marsha Coleman, New York, New York. 1980.

as black people, and when we reject the term non-white and take upon ourselves the right to call ourselves what we think we are, we have got available in front of us a whole number of alternatives, starting from natives to Africans, to kaffirs to bantu to non-whites and so on, and we choose this one precisely because it is most accomodating.³²²

A comparative study of how Biko defines "blackness" before an audience of SASO members and his articulation and definition of its meaning during his 1976 trial indicates that Biko was acutely aware that once the South African government realized the revolutionary potential of this term, SASO and BPC would be banned and forced to operate underground. Indeed, Biko's assumptions were correct, for after thousands attended a rally organized by SASO and BPC to celebrate the independence of Mozambique and over 6,000 Azanians defied massive South African military barricades to attend Biko's funeral, the South African government banned SASO and its leaders in 1977.

Next, we will examine Biko's conceptualization of racial integration and the role of white liberals in the struggle for the liberation of Azania.

Biko: The Politics of Integration

... We must learn to accept that no group, however benevolent, can ever hand power to the vanquished

³²²Alfred Stubbs, Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.104.

on a plate. We must accept that the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. As long as we go to whitey begging cap in hand for our own emancipation, we are giving him further sanction to continue with his racist and oppressive system...The system concedes nothing without demand, for it formulates its very method on the basis that the ignorant will learn to know the child will grow into an adult and therefore demands will begin to be made. It gears itself to resist demands in whatever way it sees fit. When you refuse to make these demands and choose to come to a round table to beg for your deliverance, you are asking for the contempt of those who have power over you.³²³

"Clearly black people cannot respect white people, at least not in this country."³²⁴

Steve Biko,

Steve Biko's idea of a South African political movement designed to remove the apartheid regime led him to disregard "integration" as an important goal or issue of the liberation movement. Furthermore, Biko regarded white liberals in South African as hypocrites and disguised racists who wanted only to relieve themselves of the guilt they experienced living in a state that created and enforced the apartheid system. Biko's analysis of integration in South African and the role of white liberals in the liberation movement is one of the clearest areas of this philosophy.

³²³Alfred Stubbs I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.91.

³²⁴Alfred Stubbs, Ibid., p.76.

Biko's initial contact with white liberals occurred in 1966 while he was a member of the multi-racial organization NUSAS, the National Union of South African Students. At that time, Biko was a medical student at Natal University. Biko's observations of the interaction between black and white members of NUSAS convinced him that the formation of an all-black movement was a necessity for white liberals led and directed this and most other African organizations. In effect, white liberals defined the problems of Azanians and proposed the "appropriate" solutions and goals for a new majority-ruled South Africa without consulting their African colleagues.

SASO, the South African Student Organization, was formally launched at Turfloop in July 1969 after Biko and other black leaders attending a NUSAS convention at the University of Rhodes, were forced without protest from their white colleagues to reside in segregated housing. Biko's analysis of the housing crisis at the NUSAS convention led him to contend that irregardless of how sincere white liberals were in promoting civil rights for Azanians, because of their privileged position in South African society they could not completely separate themselves from the oppressors' camp.

At the helm of SASO, Biko began to formulate and implement his philosophy and policies in regards to white liberal participation in the movement. Biko's most profound

theoretical contributions on the issue of white liberalism can be found in two articles, "Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity" and "Black Souls in White Skins?" Biko painstakingly analyzes the historical and political obstructions to the black movement in South Africa as a result of white liberal participation.

From Biko's perspective, the difference between white racists and white liberals was that the Nationalist Party supporters clearly involved themselves in the continued oppression of blacks, while white liberals, disguised as friends, divided the movement by redirecting its energies from destroying the South African regime to integrating Azanians into South African society. Therefore, SASO and BCP rejected white liberal members because of their potential to undercut the strength of black movements. Indeed, Biko argued that white liberals were a dangerous political force in South Africa. Biko used strong words to describe these groups:

We are concerned with that curious bunch of nonconformists who explain their participation in negative terms: that bunch of do-gooders that go under all sorts of names--liberals, leftists, etc. These are the people who argue that they are not responsible for white racism and the country's "inhumanity to the black man." These are the people who claim that they too feel the oppression just as acutely as the black and therefore would be jointly involved in the black man's struggle for a place under the sun. In short, these are the people who say that they have black souls wrapped up in white skin.³²⁵

Biko argues other reasons why white liberals are an intricate and important part of the apartheid camp. One reason is that white liberals perpetuate the myth that black are incapable of leading and determining the course of a liberation movement. Another is that white liberal leadership and direction of black people and organizations promote the false conception that the racial situation in South Africa is, in fact, a black problem. Biko continually asserted that if white liberals were really interested in solving the racial problem in South Africa they would attack the real source of exploitation, the minority government and their own white communities. Biko characterized white liberals who were attempting to lead black movements as "irksome and a nuisance." White liberals should prepare South African whites to support and accept a majority-ruled government. Liberal South Africans, according to the BCM manifesto, should begin to organize the white communities against the governments economic and political policies. Biko's philosophy in regards to white liberal South African participation resembles the sector of the Black Power movement in the United States which rejected even white members in predominately black organizations. For example, the Nation of Islam under the leadership of the Honorable

³²⁵Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko, I write What I Like, Ibid., p. 20.

Elijah Muhammad rejected any notions of a multinational society and his organization advocated that African-Americans should separate from the United States and establish an independent state.

Biko compared white participation in black movements to the "slave-master's son working together with the slaves to eradicate the basis of his privileges."³²⁶

Biko, asserted that the relationship between white liberals and black must be "killed", :

... I want to kill it because... it forms at present the greatest stumbling block to our unity. It dangles before freedom-hungry black promises of a great future for which no one in these groups seems to be working particularly hard... As long as we go to whitey begging cap in hand for our own emancipation, we are giving him further sanction to continue with his racist and oppressive system.³²⁷

Biko also condemned white liberals for their proclivity to attempt to limit the scope of black organizations. He maintained that since an overthrow of the South African state would theoretically eliminate minority privileges, thus it was logical that white liberals consistently were the "procrastinators" within the movement. This was particularly evident, for Biko, when liberals

³²⁶Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.21.

³²⁷Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.64.

simplistically defined the solution to the complex problems facing South Africa as "integration." Biko asserts:

... in adopting the line of a nonracial approach, the liberals are playing their old game. They are claiming a "monopoly on intelligence and moral judgement" and setting their pattern and pace for the realization of the black man's aspirations. They want to remain in good books with both the black and white worlds. They want to shy away from all forms of "extremisms", condemning "white supremacy" as being just as bad as "black power." They vacillate between the two worlds, verbalizing all the complaints for the black beautifully while skillfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive pool of white privileges.³²⁸

Thus, South African whites could never provide adequate leadership for Azanian freedom movements. Their privileged position within South African society Biko argues, gave them a reason for continuing a repressive regime.

In addition, white liberals, according to the black consciousness movement's perception, viewed the oppression of black as an isolated problem which could be solved without endangering the modus-operandi of capitalist production in South Africa. It was evident to the members of the BCM, that white liberals held allegiance to both the white and black worlds. Liberals in South Africa are loyal to white interests so that they may protect their privileges in the society; they have a "commitment" to Azanians because that reaffirms their humanity. From the liberal perspective,

³²⁸Alfred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I write What I Like, Ibid., p. 21.

apartheid could be abolished by negotiations with the National Party or a legislative adjustment. For example, Donald Woods, displaying the typical naivety of a white liberal postulated that if the government had not murdered Biko, Biko could have "negotiated" with the Nationalist Party to repeal the apartheid laws. Obviously, the relationship between cheap black labor and extravagant profits escaped Woods' understanding of the necessity to South Africa's economic system of apartheid. It is very doubtful whether any amount of discussion of dialogue explaining the inhumanity of apartheid could convince multinational corporations operating in South Africa to reduce their profits in order to become more socially responsible.

A reading of Woods' biography of Biko suggests that Woods never understood the revolutionary potential of the black consciousness philosophy. Woods' naivete and lack of political sophistication are clearly revealed by the following remarks:

Steve Biko was the kind of leader the government should permit to function openly even in their own interests, because the government had no genuine and significant leaders to negotiate with if the younger blacks should turn to violence in the townships... If the Nationalists had allowed Steve Biko to operate unfettered, within the bounds of normal law, apartheid could have been negotiated out of existence within five years. (my emphasis) for the benefit of all South Africans of every race. Not only the black, but the Afrikaner Nationalists themselves, could have been liberated from the crippling fears which

imprison them within the laager they have erected.³²⁹

It is difficult to believe that Donald Woods really believed that apartheid could have been "negotiated" out of existence. But it is clear from Woods' biography, that white liberals in South Africa have dual allegiances. Negotiating with the Nationalist government at this time would have to include compromise because Azanians have not composed a strong enough liberation movement to force major changes in the structure of the system. Woods' advocacy of Biko negotiating with the South African regime has to be viewed therefore as mere "ductive" rhetoric or naivete. Practically, all liberals advocate a negotiated abolishment of apartheid, supposedly to avoid bloodshed, but in reality, a negotiated settlement between black and white South Africans at the present level of the struggle could only result in preserving the basic structure of South African society.

Biko's scorn extended past white liberals in South Africa to liberals in America. Biko's political sensibilities were insulted by the Carter's administration's selection of Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations. He perceived Young's appointment as a token gesture on the part of the U.S. government to placate and deceive

³²⁹Donald Woods, BIKO, Ibid., 1979

African leaders, who would assume they were negotiating with a black man, when, in fact, Young was an apologist for U.S. policy in Africa. Biko rarely attacked political figures outside of South Africa, but he made an exception in Young's case:

... Carter chose Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations--because Carter...hopes to develop a new complexion, acceptable to the Third World in general and South Africa in particular. Carter uses Andrew Young's color as a special passport to the Third World. But Young has no program except the furtherance of the American system. That's why he plays tennis in Soweto. Carter is doing more skillfully what Nixon and Ford did: to make the American system work more efficiently.³³⁰

Within Biko's political framework, Andrew Young's diplomatic role in the Carter administration, particularly in regards to the South African negotiations, placed him in the same category as a black policeman in the South African security forces. Biko had little patience or tolerance for blacks who allied themselves with white interests or the capitalist system:

I must state categorically that there is no such thing as a black policeman. Any black man who props the system up actively has lost the right to being considered part of the black world: he has sold his soul for 30 pieces of silver and finds that he is in fact not accepted by the white society he sought to join... They are extensions of the enemy into our ranks...³³¹

American and European writers who attempt to

³³⁰Donald Woods, BIKO, Ibid., p.100.

³³¹Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p. 78.

classify and label Biko as a "moderate or non-violent" leader are clearly denying his basic abhorrence of liberal policies and representatives such as Andrew Young. Biko publicly denounced liberals and the philosophy of liberalism. It is a distortion of Biko's theoretical framework to place him in the same political camp as Dr. King or Ambassador Young. Biko was actually closer to Malcolm X than to the American leaders he was consistently compared with in news articles.

From the SASO perspective, the liberal suggestion of "integration" as a means and an end to South Africa's problems was seen as a ploy to compensate or appease blacks, while whites maintained political and economic power. The neo-colonial experience of most "independent" African nations had not gone unnoticed by Azanians, and certainly not by Biko:

The myth of integration as propounded under the banner of liberal ideology must be cracked and killed because it makes people believe that something is being done when in actual fact the artificial integrated circles are a soporific on the blacks and provide a vague satisfaction for the guilt-stricken whites. It works on a false premise that because it is difficult to bring people from different races together in this country, therefore, achievement of this is in itself a step forward towards the total liberation of the blacks. Nothing could be more irrelevant and therefore misleading. Those who believe in it are living in Fool's Paradise.³³²

³³²Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like,

Clearly, Biko was not attempting to enlist white support, because he was a moderate or an integrationist, but because he wanted to provide white liberals with the analytical skills necessary to educate their white communities in South Africa. Also, Biko thought that white liberals could possibly protect and intercede on behalf of the Black Consciousness Movement in certain circumstances. Biko's image as a "young black leader" is based on this supposedly close relationship with white people (whether South African or European), and it must be viewed within the context of this position on integration and white liberalism.

Steve Biko: The Portrait Of A Freedom Fighter.

...The white man's integration -is- an integration based on exploitative values. It is an integration in which black will compete with black, using each other as rungs up a step ladder leading them to white values. It is an integration in which the black man will have to prove himself in terms of these values before acceptance and ultimate assimilation, and in which the poor will grow poorer and the rich richer in a country where the poor have always been black. We do not want to be reminded that it is we, the indigenous people, who are poor and exploited in the land of our birth. These are concepts which the Black Consciousness approach wishes to eradicate from the black man's mind before our society is driven

to chaos by irresponsible people from Coca-Cola and hamburger cultural backgrounds.³³³

Black Man... you are on your own...

In eulogies, Western writers like Donald Woods have suggested that Steve Biko was not a revolutionary, but a man of peace and moderation. Biko's leadership and style is often compared to those of the American civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King. While it is true that during Biko's short lifetime and political leadership, there is no evidence of his personal participation in acts of sabotage or guerilla warfare, it is clear from his writings that he was focussing on the immediate situation and desires of his people rather than describing the ultimate solution to the problem in South Africa. Biko did not labor under any false illusions that freedom for blacks would come through anything other than a "protracted" political struggle.³³⁴

My premise has always been that black people should not at any one stage be surprised at some of the atrocities committed by the government. This to me follows logically after their initial assumption that they, being a settler minority, can have the right to be supreme masters. If they could be cruel enough to cow the natives down with brutal force and install themselves as perpetual rulers in a foreign land, then anything else they do to the same black people becomes logical in terms of the initial cruelty. To expect justice from them at any stage is to be naive.³³⁵

³³³Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.91.

³³⁴A. Stubbs, Steve Biko, Ibid., p.148.

It is likely that Biko never expected a negotiated "peace" with the minority government, or a non-violent resolution to South Africa's apartheid policies. So why did many of the same Western writers who labelled Mugabe a "Marxist" describe Biko as a "moderate" or "young, responsible black leader?" Surely, his political framework did not parallel the generally accepted political orientation of most liberals. For example, most liberals advocated in multi-racial societies, policies which ensure social integration, mixed organizations, miscegenation, working within the system, black capitalism, and the acceptance of white leadership in black organizations. Under Biko's leadership, the BPC and SASO rejected all the generally accepted tenets which usually characterize the philosophy of liberalism. In fact, black organizations, under Biko's direction, opted for exclusively black political movements, rejecting white liberal leadership, support and development of revolutionary struggles. To label Biko a moderate required that Western writers overlook much of Biko's statements.

For Biko, the most fundamental task confronting SASO and BPC was the transformation of psychologically and physically defeated Africans into freedom fighters. Without the scenario of struggle, Biko asserted, Azanians were devoid of a political personality, destiny and raison

³³⁵Aelred Stubbs, *Ibid.*, p.74.

d'etre. Until Azanians could imagine defeating whites and changing the economic foundation of their oppression, Biko claimed that they were simply "shells, shadows-of-men-, completely defeated, drowning in their own misery, slaves-, oxen-bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity."³³⁶

Before the struggle in South Africa could take on a revolutionary character and thrust, Azanians would have to claim their rights and privileges as members of the human community.

Powerlessness breeds a race of beggars who smile at the enemy and swear at him in the sanctity of their toilets; who shout "Baas" willingly during the day and call the white man a dog in their buses as they go home...³³⁷

Black Consciousness would, "pump back life into [the black man's] empty shell;... infuse him with pride and dignity, ... remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth. This is what we mean by an inward-looking process... This is the definition of Black Consciousness.

For Biko, Black Consciousness, or black pride was not the termination point for the masses but the fertile soil to develop a revolutionary movement to to prepare the black

³³⁶Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.29.

³³⁷Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, Ibid., p.78.

masses to confront the South African regime.

Summary:

This investigation has attempted to understand if Biko was amicable to western interests and not a "militant" or "revolutionary". After examining the basic tenets of his theoretical framework, we would argue that although Biko's philosophy has widely been described as moderate he may accurately be described as a radical or revolutionary leader. Liberal writers such as Donald Woods possibly failed to recognize this because of their privileged position in South African society, or perhaps their need to hope for a peaceful outcome. These liberal writers may be acting out of a need to create a "black leader who will verbalize the frustrations of township dwellers but not actively and aggressively pursue a program designed to destroy the South African system. Woods's interpretation of Biko's political framework and the contrasts with evidence from Biko's articles and interviews.

The Constructed Approximation of Steve Biko's Murder

Steve Biko's murder in 1977 must be considered no less than a state execution. The cast of characters in this drama included such top officials as the Minister of Police, James Kruger; Colonel P.J. Goosen, a security police member; and Doctors Ivor Lang and B.J. Tucker. Mr. Marthinus Prins,

James Kruger; Colonel P.J. Goosen, a security police member; and Doctors Ivor Lang and B.J. Tucker. Mr. Marthinus Prias, the presiding magistrate for the inquest proceedings, imprinted the seal of the State of South Africa on a document which stated:

"the deceased was Bantu Stephen Biko, a black man aged 30, that he died on September 12 and that the cause of death was brain injury which led to a renal failure and other complications"; "the head injuries were probably sustained on September 7 in a scuffle in the Security Police offices in Port Elizabeth"; That "on the available evidence the death cannot be attributed to any act or omission amounting to a criminal offense on the part of any person.

With this verdict, the murder of Steve Biko, like those of 45 other Azanian political detainees who were held under the "terrorist" act without being accused of committing a crime, was dismissed.

By killing Biko, the South African government had succeeded in eliminating a potential enemy, providing an example for other black activists of how the state tortures its opponents, and exonerated their employees. The very day the verdict was announced, Biko's brother was arrested by the South African security police, without being accused of committing any crime. Within eight weeks, two other black

detainees, arrested under the "terrorist" act, had committed, according to the same officials that murdered Biko, "suicide." This section will qualitatively and quantitatively "re-create" how the U.S. press presented the South African execution of Steve Biko.

The reconstruction of Biko's last days is taken from the South African government's inquest hearings, begun November 14, 1977, in the Old Synagogue building in Pretoria, and from the Biko family brief. The inquest hearings lasted fourteen days, during which time South African security officials recounted gruesome and horrid details of Biko's treatment while in their custody. What becomes frighteningly clear through reading the inquest transcript is that Biko's treatment during the interrogation proceedings was routine for black prisoners. The extent of the physical and psychological torture endured by Biko at the hand of the police can only be surmised by the bruises, cuts, and tears on his skin and brain, but we can safely assume that, after being tortured for over fifty hours by the South African security forces, death must have been a welcome relief for Biko. Biko was tortured, left naked for over a half month, transported 750 miles away, then left to die in a prison cell on a cold concrete floor without the comfort and sympathy of family and friends. As the Biko family stated to the court, "He died a miserable and lonely

death on a mat on a stone floor in a prison cell."³³⁸ It is through the reconstruction of Biko's murder that we get a glimpse of the horror, the obscenity that is known as the Republic of South Africa.

The Biko's family attorneys submitted a brief presenting their arguments and interpretation of how Biko was murdered. As would be expected, there were obviously gross differences between the Biko family account and the police version of the assassination. I have grouped the Biko and police interpretation of the assassination under the seven categories. After describing the Biko and police construction of Biko's death, I will compare these accounts with those the U.S. press presented to the American public.

³³⁸Hilda Bernstein, No. 46-Steve Biko, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1978. p. 99.

The Assassination ScenarioI. Biko's Treatment During his IncarcerationThe Biko Family Account:

... He (Biko) was left in solitary confinement from 19 August to 6 September. He was deprived even of the negligible rights he had as a section 6 detainee. His clothes were removed and he was left naked in his cell ... He was brought to the interrogation room on the morning of 6 September 1977. At night he was handcuffed, and shackled by leg irons on his feet which in turn were locked on to walls... He remained shackled on the mat after he was seen by Dr. Lang, for the whole day of the 7th and during the night of the 7th/8th and during the morning of the 8th. Security policemen say that he had not made use of toilet facilities offered, but the fact is that he was found in urine-wet trousers and blankets, on a wet mat, and was left there, shackled, until he was removed to the prison hospital about 21.00 hr.

The Police Account: [The attorney for the Biko family, Mr. Sydney Kentridge, questioned Sgt. P.J. Van Vuuren, Major Snyman and Colonel Goosen during the government inquest about the security police's basis for forbidding Biko clothing.]

Kentridge: Why naked?

Van Vuuren: On the instructions of Colonel Goosen, head of Security Police in Port Elizabeth.

Kentridge: Was Biko kept naked to humiliate him?

Van Vuuren: I cannot say. From 18 August to 6 September Biko was not allowed out of his cell.

Kentridge: Why naked?

Snyman: On instructions given to prevent a recurrence of suicide in police cells.

Kentridge: Are you suggesting a man can commit suicide with a pair of underpants?

Goosen: There was a clear pattern of suicide among detainees during the past few years; everything with which the detainees could hurt themselves, including the clothes of male detainees, were taken away.

Kentridge: The warrant under which Biko had been arrested made provisions for personal clothing to be kept available for him.

Goosen: There had been incidents where detainees had used their clothes to commit suicide...

The South African police in charge of Biko admitted to keeping Biko handcuffed and shackled for two days:

Kentridge: From the time of the morning of the 7th, excluding the time of interrogation and the examination by the doctors, Biko remained in chains. What right did you have to keep a man in chains for 48 hours?

Goosen: I have the full power to do it. Prisoners could attempt suicide or escape.

The Biko family and the South African police testimonies are in complete agreement with the fact that Biko was kept shackled and chained for at least 48 hours during his detention. Attorney Kentridge asked Goosen if he would keep a dog chained up as Biko had been and Goosen

answered that if the dog was dangerous, he would probably do it.

II. The Extent of Medical Treatment Given to a Dying Biko

The Biko family claimed that Biko received inadequate medical treatment while in police custody. The South African police officials however, asserted that Biko was given the finest medical treatment possible, especially considering that they thought that he was "shamming" his illness. Drs. Lang and Tucker were called in to examine Biko and diagnose his condition. Both doctors repeatedly reported to the police officials that Biko was healthy and did not require medical attention. The Biko family claimed that it was only after Biko had collapsed that serious medical attention was considered. The Biko family and the police story are juxtaposed here for comparison.

The Biko Family Version:

... Colonel Goosen's statement made after [Biko] death, that everything was done for the comfort and health of Steve Biko, is as cynical a statement as any heard in a court of law... [After the injury took place,] for contradictory and inadequate reasons, he was moved from the prison hospital to a police cell, ostensibly to make it easier for Dr. Lang to see him regularly. In fact, this meant that he was removed even from the semi-skilled care of the prison warders; removed from a bed to a mat, and again left naked. In a few hours he was found in a state of collapse on the floor. The senior officers and Dr. Tucker were again hurriedly called in. Again there was insistence on only a prison hospital, even if it was 1,299km. away, and even if only a van was

available as transport.

The Police Story:

Goosen: ... If a detainee complains of only so much as a headache, a doctor is called... Biko's health had been of the greatest importance. Because of information in my possession, I realized that it was of primary importance to bring this "peaceable" man before a court...

Colonel Goosen requested that Dr. Lang examine Biko after the assault of the prisoner. Dr. Lang's statement reads:

"This is to certify that I have examined Steve Biko as a result of a request from Col. Goosen of the Security Police who indicated that the above-mentioned would not speak. I have found no evidence of any abnormality or pathology on the detainee." This was signed by Dr. Lang at 10.10 a.m. on 7 September.³³⁹

South African police doctors were requested several times to examine the dying Steve Biko, and each time, until Biko lapsed into a coma, they reported that he was in good health.

III. Biko's Journey to Pretoria's Prison Hospital

Prison officials and doctors concurred that Biko should be moved to a Pretoria prison hospital and that Biko's physical condition was stable enough for him to survive the twelve-hour journey to Pretoria. Hilda Bernstein's investigation of the Biko assassination contends, however, that the South African officials removed Biko from his home town of King Williamstown not for his health but in

³³⁹Hilda Bernstein, No.46-Steve Biko, International Defence and Aid Fund, London. 1978. p. 48.

order to avoid a violent reaction from that community. South African officials admitted that Biko was taken to the prison hospital for precautionary medical treatment rather than actual concern over his immediate physical condition.

The Biko Family Version:

He was transported approximately 1,200 kilometers lying naked in the back of a Landrover without any medically qualified person and with nothing more than a bottle of water by way of equipment. No medical reports were furnished by the doctors of Port Elizabeth, nor were they asked for by the security policemen who took him to Pretoria. Although he had to be carried into prison by four men using a mat as a stretcher, a further attempt was made by the security policemen from Port Elizabeth to persuade officials at the Pretoria Prison that he might be feigning illness, and that he was on a hunger strike. He was sent all the way to Pretoria Prison because there, according to Colonel Goosen, there were "outstanding medical facilities." For Biko these facilities proved to be a mat in the corner of the cell, the attendance of a newly qualified G.P. 6 hours after his arrival at the prison, diagnosis based on false reports of a hunger strike, a drip and a vitamin injection, and nothing more.

The Police Version:

Goosen: ... When I could not get military plane I asked Dr. Tucker if I could convey Biko by road. Dr. Tucker said that provided they allowed Biko to lie on a soft mattress there was no reason why not.

Kentridge: What facilities was Biko to have?

Goosen: A relatively luxurious Land-Rover was used. Seats were removed to put the mattress on the floor.

Kentridge: We understand that the only facility available was a container of water.

Goosen: We still thought he was shamming. The

doctors did not prescribe anything.

Kentridge during his cross-examination of Siebert asked him to justify transporting a dying man 750 miles to Pretoria naked in the back of a van with only a container of water. Police officers contended that Biko was kept naked in order to thwart any possible escape plans.

IV. Biko's Death:

Steve Biko expired on September 12, 1977 in the prison hospital in Pretoria as a result of brain damage inflicted by the South African security forces. The only medical treatment given to Biko during the period of his illness was a vitamine-filled intravenous drip, administered in the prison hospital in Pretoria. Dr. Andries Van Zyl, who examined Biko at the prison hospital, stated at the inquest that he was told that Biko was on a hunger strike and that other doctors could not find anything medically wrong with him. The dead Biko was found lying naked in the corner of a prison cell at some time in the evening of September 12th.

V. Notification of Family of Biko's Death

Members of Biko's immediate family were not notified of his deteriorating physical condition, were not notified, in fact, until after he had expired. The norms of most civilized states require that family members be informed when prisoners are extremely ill or dying. In the Biko

case, Mrs. Biko did not learn of her husband's illness until after he was dead and then not from a state official but from her sister:

Mrs. Biko: No policeman informed me, nobody told me, and it was only through my sister-in-law and my sister that the news reached me. I was numb with shock. But I kept telling myself, and will continue to tell myself, that my husband died in a struggle, during a struggle for the liberation of the black man in South Africa.

Under cross examination during the inquest South African officials claimed that the Biko family was not notified of Steve's condition, because, until he died, they thought he was pretending to be ill.

Kentridge: The prison regulations say that in cases of death, serious illness, and injury, the prison department has to notify the next of kin of the prisoner. Biko's illness had been serious enough to warrant examination by a specialist and to send him 700 miles to a hospital in Pretoria. Why didn't you notify his next of kin.

Goosen: After the doctors had examined him it was their opinion that there was nothing physically wrong. I had no reason to inform his family. I had reason to believe he was shamming. Biko was sent to Pretoria for diagnosis.

VI. Charges of A Cover-Up by the South African Police

With the announcement of Biko's death, South African officials began immediately to protect the officers in charge of the interrogation procedures. Jimmy Kruger proclaimed, even before the autopsy results were published, that Steve Biko had starved himself to death. Kruger,

speaking before the Transvaal Congress of the Nationalist Party, joked about the recent death by saying, "Biko's death leaves me cold," meaning that his death was inconsequential. One member of the conference, Christoffel Venter, applauded Kruger for his devotion to "democratic principles." Venter said Mr. Kruger was so democratic he allowed his detainees "the democratic right to starve themselves to death" if they wished. For example, during a cross-examination, by Attorney Kentridge of Major Snyman, who was on duty the night Biko was injured, the attorney asked him if the policemen working at night were there to interrogate Biko or simply to guard him. Snyman's answer is obviously fabricated:

Kentridge: And at 6 p.m., after your first day of interrogation, you were relieved by Lieutenant Wilken's night squad of three?

Snyman: Correct.

Kentridge: Did you report to Lt. Wilken how far your interrogation of Biko had progressed?

Snyman It wasn't necessary, as they were only there to guard him while he rested.

Kentridge: Oh come, come, are you saying that those three men simply came in to watch Biko?

Snyman: Correct.

Kentridge: Oh come, Major Snyman, you know that must be nonsense. Isn't it obvious that these three men were there for the purpose of night interrogation?

Snyman: Certainly not.

Kentridge: Then why did you agree with me a few minutes ago that they were the night interrogators?

Snyman: No, I didn't agree with you.

The court record was then re-read , and the court agreed that Snyman had in fact stated that the men were night interrogators.

Kentridge: Although you have the right, of course, to have the question interpreted into Afrikaans, did you understand my use of the English word "interrogators?"

Snyman: I understand the word.

Clearly, the police involved in the Biko assassination attempted to cover up their participation in the event.

Magistrate Prins, at the end of the thirteen-week inquest, announced the incredible but predictable verdict that Biko's death "cannot be attributed to only act or omission amounting to a criminal offense on the part of any person."

Data Analysis of the Constructed Approximation

Introduction

The constructed approximation of Biko's murder allows us to focus on seven broad areas of the U.S. Press Coverage of Biko's assassination for assessment of accuracy and bias. papers:

- I) Biko's treatment during his incarceration;
- II) The extent of medical treatment given to a dying Biko;
- III) Biko's journey to Pretoria's prison hospital;
- IV) Biko's death;
- V) The discovery of Biko's body;
- VI) Notification of Biko's family of his death;
- VII) Charges of a cover-up;

These seven categories reflect the range of newspaper coverage of the assassination. This section will also include histograms and statistical charts to illustrate graphically the accuracy or inaccuracy of the news coverage. The next section will present how the U.S. press described the scenario of Biko's assassination to the American public.

For every variable we have assigned a number which correlates to an aspect of the reconstruction of Steve Biko's treatment while in police custody and subsequent murder.

- I. Biko confined to a small cell in Police headquarters
- II. Biko was kept naked or handcuffed while in detention
- III. Biko was seen by doctors.
- IV. Biko was refused medical attention.
- V. Biko driven to Pretoria.
- VI. Biko was driven naked to Pretoria.
- VII. Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical attention.
- VIII. Biko died as a result of a hunger strike.
- IX. Biko died of brain damage.
- X. Biko died of brain damage or injury inflicted by South African officials.
- XI. Biko died by hitting his head then brain damage occurred
- XII. Biko was beaten to death by police.
- XIII. Biko was tortured to death by police.
- XIV. Biko was found dead.
- XV. Biko was found dead on the floor.
- XVI. Biko died while in police custody.
- XVII. Biko died in Prison Hospital.
- XVIII. Biko was found dead on a concrete floor of his prison cell.
- XIX. Biko's family was not notified of his condition until death.
- XX. Police or government attempts to cover-up their role in Biko's murder.

The graphs and tables are divided into three different time periods coinciding with newspaper reports of certain key events of the assassination. Since most American reporters were covering the assassination from within South Africa, news reports from South African newspapers were also used to assess when certain facts were made known to the general South African public. The first period (from September 12 thru September 17th) describes how often American newspapers reported that, "Biko died of a hunger strike". This version of how Biko died can be directly attributed to James Kruger, Minister of Police in South Africa who initially gave this account when addressing a Nationalist Party Congress on September 14, 1977: 340

I am not glad and I am not sorry about Mr. Biko. It leaves me cold (Dit laat my kou). I can say nothing to you. Any person who dies ... I should also be sorry. If I die (Laughter) ... But now, there are a lot of scandal stories and all sorts of positions are not taken against the South African police. And even if I am their Minister, Mr. Chairman, if they have done something wrong I shall be the first man to take them before the courts. They know it ... But what happened here? This person was arrested in connection with riots in Port Elizabeth. Among other things they were busy with the drafting and distribution of extremely inflammatory pamphlets which urged people to violence and arson... Now I mention this fact, not because I want to criticise someone who is dead. I have respect for the dead. But I mention this fact to prove that we were justified in arresting this person. ... On [the] 5 September they were finished with (the questioning of) the other man and then they came to him (Mr. Biko).

340 Donald Woods, Biko, Ibid., p. 166.

And they began to question him. Then he said he would go on a hunger strike. He first said he would answer their questions. They should give him a chance for a quarter of an hour. After a quarter of an hour, he said, no, he would go on a hunger strike...And indeed, he began to push his food and water away that were continually given to him so that he would freely eat or drink. It is very true what Mr. Venter (a congress delegate) said about prisoners in South Africa have the 'democratic right' to starve themselves to death. It is a democratic land... We are not asked 'When you saw he went on hunger strike why didn't you force him to eat? (laughter) ...Mr. Chairman, can you imagine that these people who smear the police day and night because they touched this man - and there's a mark on his foot, and there's a mark on his ankle, and here's a mark behind his ear and it must be the policedo you think the police must still force that man to eat?

Many U.S. newspapers reported Kruger's assertion that Steve Biko succumbed to voluntary starvation. In the initial coverage of Biko's death by the New York Times the stories usually began with the government version. Secondary explanation by BPC members or Biko's lawyers were located near the end of the article. For example, on September 14, 1977 the New York Times, printed an article entitled 'Young Black Leader Dies In Detention in South Africa, Raising Fears of New Unrest'. In this article, John Burns states:³⁴¹

Steve Biko probably the most influential young black leader in South Africa died while in police detention last night, allegedly after a hunger

³⁴¹(" Young Black Leader Dies In Detention In South Africa, Raising Fears of New Unrest") The New York Times, September 14, 1977.

strike, and there were fears that his death could increase racial tension. Justice Minister James T. Kruger said in a statement that Mr. Biko, who was 30 years old, had died in a hospital in Pretoria, the administrative capital, after refusing food and water since September 5.

As late as October 1, 1977, the New York Times in its 'World News Briefs' column was reporting that:³⁴²

"Mr. Biko died in a prison hospital September 12 after a week long hunger strike". The article then adds, "Black leaders have accused South African's whiteruled Government of responsibility in Mr. Biko's death."

This article fails to mention that Biko's body was visibly bruised and injured. In a Washington Post article, entitled "South African Dismisses Death of Activist", the reporter cited only government officials in the first half of the news article in explaining the death of Biko, for example:³⁴³

Kruger criticized American U.N. ambassador, Andrew Young, and other world leader who condemned the death of Biko leader of the South African Student's Organization, Monday. Biko the 20th black to die while in police custody in 18 months had been on a hunger strike for eight days at the time of his death.

Anthony Lewis, the noted columnist for the New York Times, in the first week of news coverage after Biko's death mistakenly reported:

³⁴²New York Times, World News Brief', October 1, 1977.

³⁴³("South Africa Dismisses Death of Activist"), The Washington Post, September, 1977.

The night before his death, after doctors found that he "appeared to be unwell," he was flown 800 miles from a prison in Port Elizabeth to a hospital in Pretoria.³⁴⁴

Police officers testified during the inquest into Biko's death that he had in fact, been driven to Pretoria. Dr. Andries Van Zyl the doctor, who treated Biko in Pretoria only hours before he died described Biko's residence in the prison hospital as a cell rather than a hospital room.

The Christian Science Monitor published an article on September 15, 1977 in which only government officials were quoted as responsible sources of information on the assassination. The article was entitled 'Probe Promised of Biko's Death':³⁴⁵

The government is preparing an inquiry into the death of Steve Biko, the founder of South African's black consciousness movement, who the authorities say died in jail during a hunger strike. In a television statement, Police Minister Jimmy Kruger asked his countrymen to accept the results of the inquiry. "For certain people in the country let me assure you that no inquiry in the world will satisfy them excepting a finding of guilty on behalf of the police or something like that." Mr. Kruger said. The Police Minister said Mr. Biko was detained August 18 at a roadblock after information was received he had violated a banning order restricting him to King Williams Town, 450 miles south of Johannesburg. "He was arrested in connection with activities related to the riots in Port Elizabeth, among other things for the drafting and

³⁴⁴ ("Too Late the Phalarope"), Anthony Lewis, the New York Times, September 15, 1977, p.A.27.

³⁴⁵ ("Probe Promised of Biko's Death"), the Christian Science Monitor September 15, 1977.

Table 6A-I : CONSTRUCTED APPROXIMATION OF THE BIKO ASSASSINATION
FIRST PERIOD -- SEPTEMBER 12 TO SEPTEMBER 17 --

| | New York Times | | Washington Post | | Wall Street Journal | | Christ. Science Monitor | |
|-------|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage |
| I | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| II | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| III | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| IV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| V | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VI | 2 | 28.57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VII | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VIII | 2 | 28.57 | 3 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| IX | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| X | 1 | 14.28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XII | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIII | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XVI | 6 | 85.71 | 4 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 100 |
| XVII | 1 | 14.28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIIX | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIX | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XX | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 7 | | 4 | | 0 | | 5 | |

Table 6A-II : CONSTRUCTED APPROXIMATION OF THE BIKO ASSASSINATION
SECOND PERIOD -- SEPTEMBER 18 TO NOVEMBER 13 --

| | New York Times | | Washington Post | | Wall Street Journal | | Christ. Science Monitor | |
|-------|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage |
| I | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| II | 1 | 3.12 | 7 | 41.17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| III | 6 | 18.75 | 2 | 11.76 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| IV | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| V | 0 | 0 | 3 | 17.64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VI | 5 | 15.62 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VII | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VIII | 2 | 62.25 | 1 | 5.88 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| IX | 8 | 25 | 6 | 35.29 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| X | 2 | 62.25 | 2 | 11.76 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XI | 0 | 0 | 8 | 47.05 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XII | 1 | 3.12 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 60 | 0 | 0 |
| XIII | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIV | 1 | 3.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XV | 1 | 3.12 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XVI | 22 | 68.75 | 14 | 82.35 | 5 | 100 | 4 | 100 |
| XVII | 1 | 3.12 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIIX | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11.76 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIX | 1 | 3.12 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XX | 0 | 0 | 3 | 17.64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 32 | | 17 | | 5 | | 4 | |

Table 6A-III: CONSTRUCTED APPROXIMATION OF THE BIKO ASSASSINATION
THIRD PERIOD -- NOVEMBER 14 TO DECEMBER 31 --

| | New York Times | | Washington Post | | Wall Street Journal | | Christ. Science Monitor | |
|-------|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage | Number of Art | Percentage |
| I | 4 | 18.18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| II | 13 | 58.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| III | 6 | 27.27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| IV | 3 | 13.63 | 2 | 11.76 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| V | 8 | 36.36 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| VI | 5 | 22.72 | 2 | 11.76 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| VII | 2 | 9.09 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| VIII | 1 | 4.54 | 2 | 11.75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| IX | 17 | 75.27 | 11 | 64.70 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 50 |
| X | 3 | 13.63 | 4 | 23.52 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| XI | 10 | 45.45 | 3 | 17.64 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 75 |
| XII | 1 | 4.54 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| XIII | 1 | 4.54 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIV | 1 | 3.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| XV | 1 | 4.54 | 1 | 5.88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XVI | 17 | 77.27 | 10 | 58.82 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 100 |
| XVII | 0 | 0 | 3 | 17.64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIIX | 2 | 9.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XIX | 1 | 4.54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| XX | 8 | 36.36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 50 |
| TOTAL | 22 | | 17 | | 0 | | 4 | |


distribution of pamphlets which incited arson and violence," Mr. Kruger said. He added that Mr. Biko "appeared to be unwell" two days after beginning his fast, but a doctor's examination "could not find anything wrong with him". "On September 12, Mr. Biko was again examined and medically treated by the district surgeon in Pretoria. He died the same night," Mr. Kruger said.

The following articles represent a sample of how the American press reported government allegations concerning Biko's death, in the initial period of the assassination coverage. In all of the articles cited, the governments' allegations were given primary coverage with alternative versions of the assassination (if presented) cited in the second half of the article or in the concluding remarks.

I. Biko's Incarceration


Tables 6A-I, 6A-II and 6A-III indicate how the U.S. press presented Biko's incarceration to the American public. Tables 6A-I and 6A-II, represent the first two periods of the news coverage. Many of the details of Biko's treatment during his incarceration did not become general knowledge until the inquest hearings, corresponding to the third study period (November 14 to December 31, 1977) of our Figures A-1 describe how often the press told the American public that Biko was "confined to a cell". The percentages in all these figures are below 30% points. While the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal both recorded values of 0%, the New York Times and the Christian Science

Figure AI-1




Histogram describing that Biko was confined to a small cell in Police headquarters during the first period.

Figure AII-1



Histogram indicating that Biko was confined to a small cell in Police headquarters -- second period.


Figure AIII-1



Histogram describing that Biko was confined to a small cell in police headquarters-- third period.


Monitor recorded 18.18 and 25.00 points respectively. These percentages represent four articles out of twenty-two by the New York Times and one article out of four by the Christian Science Monitor (see table--6A-III). Overall, press coverage by American newspapers presenting Biko's incarceration was not substantial. In Figures A-2 we see the values of how often the press reported that Biko was left naked and/or handcuffed while in detention. Reports of category II began to appear during the second period. Overall, the values are relatively low, considering how barbaric police treatment was in this situation. The low values in this category are particularly curious when one considers the U.S. press's usual appetite for such a "colorful" story as a man being shackled hand and foot to a wall and left naked for half a month, refused soap and water to wash himself, or even the right to comb his hair. Undeniably, if Biko had been a white American and had received this kind of treatment under Idi Amin's or Robert Mugabe's governments, the American press would have exposed and exploited every detail of the gruesome affair. Only the Washington Post during the second period and the New York Times during the third period presented a relatively high degree of coverage, with values of 41.17 and 58.09% points respectively. The values in Figure AII-2 for the second period was New York Times 3.12, W.P. 41.17, W.S.J. 0/, and the Christian Science Monitor, 0/ points respectively. In the third period, the values for

Figure AI-2




Histogram describing that Biko was kept naked or handcuffed while in detention.

Figure AII-2



Histogram indicating that Biko was kept naked or handcuffed while in detention -- second period.

Figure AIII-2



Histogram indicating that Biko was seen by doctors--
third period.

this category are, the New York Times 58.09%, the Washington Post 0/, the Wall Street Journal, 0/ and the Christian Science Monitor 25%, points respectively . (See Figure AIII-2)

The Washington Post presented the highest percentage of coverage in this category in the second period but failed to continue their coverage of Biko's incarceration during the inquest proceedings represented by the third period. During the third period the Washington Post, recorded a value of zero for category II. The New York Times, virtually ignored the reports of Biko being kept naked and handcuffed during police detention in the second period but gave this issue significant attention during the third period. The Christian Science Monitor produced values of under 30% points in all the periods. The Wall Street Journal, however, failed to report at all that Biko was confined to a small cell or that he was kept naked and handcuffed while he was in jail during the various stages of the investigation. Thus, Wall Street Journal did not present any information to their readers on Biko's living conditions while in police custody. Presenting the details of how blacks, who are opposed to apartheid and western investments, are treated in South Africa would not be conducive to indifferent attitudes towards further investment. The Wall Street Journal was the most blatant in omitting information which could have tainted investment in South Africa. Since the New York

Times and the Washington Post alternated their coverage of this event, the reading public would have had to consult both newspapers to receive a complete scenario of the unfolding events between September 18 and December 31.


Despite reports in South Africa from September 18 to November 14 that Biko had been kept naked and handcuffed while in jail, the New York Times reported this issue only 3.12% times of its coverage in this period compared to the Washington Post's 41.17% of the time in the second period. The trend for the New York Times and the Washington Post was reversed in the third period. The Washington Post recorded a rate of 0% in the third period and the New York Times 58.09%. With the exception of the Washington Post, the press initially refused to describe the scenario of how the South African police tortured Biko before he died is particularly interesting because the U.S. press presented Biko in very favorable terms (see Category A of the symbolic language category). If the U.S. press was willing to omit such important details about a black leader they viewed as favorable, one is led to wonder how often important information is omitted about leaders the press views as unfavorable. Clearly, the U.S. press found itself in an ambiguous situation, placed between exposing the barbaric treatment of a black leader they considered favorable to Western interests and exposing the South African government and its treatment of Azanians. When the U.S. press

of the was presented with a choice between masking the activities South African government and exploiting a "colorful" story which might have deleterious effects on Western investments and conscience, generally the press chose to keep silent on the facts surrounding the Biko murder. The preceding analysis represents a very unfortunate commentary on American press standards of "objectivity" when it comes to reporting the suffering, abuse, and torture of people who should command the international community's highest interest and sympathy.

II. The Extent of Medical Treatment Given to a Dying Biko


Figures A-3 and A-4 depict how often the press described that either (fig.A-3) "Biko was seen by medical doctors," or (fig.A-4) that "Biko was refused proper medical attention." In the first period, the Washington Post was the only newspaper which reported that Biko was seen by doctors. Initially none of the newspapers reported or questioned the adequacy of Biko's medical attention. In the second and third period, the New York Times had the highest rating in respect of variable III, 18.75 and 27.27% points respectively. The New York Times didn't give equal coverage, however, in respect of variable IV in the second and third period, the values were 0 and 13.63%. The Washington Post followed the New York Times in respect of the coverage of variables III and IV in both the second and third periods of

Figure AI-3




Histogram describing that Biko was seen by doctors.

Figure AII-3



Histogram depicting that Biko was seen by doctors.

Figure AIII-3



Histogram indicating that Biko was seen by doctors--
third period.

Figure AI-4






Figure AII-4



Histogram indicating that Biko was refused medical attention during the second period.

Figure AIII-4



Histogram indicating that Biko was refused medical treatment -- third period.

the investigation, showing values of 11.76 and 0% for variable III in the second and third periods respectively; and 5.88 and 11.76 for variable IV correspondingly. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded zero percentages for the three periods of the investigation; implying that these two newspapers omitted any coverage of medical treatment of Biko while in confinement. Except for the New York Times, the coverage of Biko's medical attention is very low. This would indicate, an extreme insensitivity by the U.S. press in fully covering the assassination. From the doctor's testimony, which was presented during the third period, it is clear that they completely neglected a man who had been tortured and was obviously dying. The doctors that attended Biko in his final days never protested or questioned the cuts, tears, and bruises they found on Biko's body. It was the doctors in charge of Biko's welfare who gave the permission for a man suffering from brain damage to be driven 750 miles without medication or medical attendance. Why did the U.S. press fail to expose these details? Although the U.S. press was certainly prepared to posthumously praise Biko, they adamantly refused to expose the torture inflicted by representatives of the South African government.

III: Biko's Trip to Pretoria

In category III, I coded articles to examine how

often reporters told their American readers the details of Biko's transfer to Pretoria's prison hospital. I made distinctions among press reports which stated, that:


Figures A-5 "Biko was driven to Pretoria," that;

(Figures A-6) "Biko was driven naked to Pretoria," or that

(Figure A-7) "Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical treatment."


In Figures A-4 the statistics indicated that the press rarely (the percentages were less than 14% for all of the three periods) informed the U.S. public that Biko was denied adequate medical attention. During the first period (September 12 thru September 17) of American press coverage the press failed to report what is symbolized by variables V, VI, VII. However, the press can only be held responsible for not reporting that "Biko was driven to Pretoria," since the evidence for reporting in what condition or the extent of medical attention given to Biko was made public during the second period (September 18 through November 13). Nevertheless, the U.S. press, even during the second and third periods of the investigation curiously again ignored the sensational aspects of this case, by giving variable V the highest coverage, which simply reported that "Biko was driven to Pretoria." The New York Times, during the second and third period recorded values of 0 and 36.36 respectively. The Washington Post, had a higher rating in this category

Figure AI-5




Histogram indicating that Biko was driven to Pretoria. -- first period.

Figure AII-5



Histogram indicating that Biko was driven to Pretoria.

Figure AIII-5




Histogram describing that Biko was driven to Pretoria.
(third period)

than the New York Times in the second period with 17.64% but its values declined drastically in the third period to 5.88%. The Wall Street Journal, did not inform its reading public that "Biko was driven to Pretoria", it displayed a zero percentage in both the remaining time periods. The Christian Science Monitor's values in the second period was 0% and in the third period 25%.

Figures A-6 chart the coverage of, if "Biko was driven naked to Pretoria" and Figures A-7, depict, if Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical treatment, the values are less than 16 in the second period and less than 25 in the third period. The Wall Street Journal simply refused to cover this aspect of the assassination. Considering that variable V received the greatest amount of attention during the two periods that the information was available, the U.S. press clearly favored the "official" and less sensational version of the event than any of figures A-6 and A-7 would have indicated. It should be noted, that the percentages overall are relatively low in all of the categories. The majority of Americans reading the prestigious press were kept practically ignorant of the event surrounding Biko's incarceration, the inadequate medical attention he received after being tortured, and the fact that a dying man was driven across the country, naked and medically unattended, by the South African police.


In fact, Anthony Lewis, in an article entitled "Too

Figure AI-6




Histogram indicating that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria in the first period.

Figure AII-6




Histogram indicating that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria-- second period.




Histogram indicating that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria -- third period.

Figure AI-7




Histogram depicting that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical attention in the first period.

Figure AII-7



Histogram depicting that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical attention-----second period

Figure AIII-7



Histogram depicting that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria without medical attention -- third period.

Late the Phalarope," reported that Biko was "flown eighty miles" to Pretoria. Where did Lewis get this kind of incorrect information? Even South African police officials didn't report that Biko had been flown to Pretoria. What the South African officials said was that they had attempted to procure an aircraft for Biko, but that one was not available that night. Not only did Lewis fail to report in that article that Biko was terribly abused, but also the behavior of the South African officials in transporting a dying man in that inhuman manner. Clearly, South African officials were attempting only to get Biko out of Kings Williamstown before he died. The South African police were successful for Biko died twelve hours after he arrived in Pretoria. A subsequent article by Anthony Lewis, in the New York Times, focussing on the Biko assassination entitled, 'State of Violence', December 5, 1977, corrected his earlier report that Biko was flown to Pretoria. Lewis states, in that article:

... The colonel in charge of questioning him said in a police telex message that injuries had been "inflicted" on Mr. Biko at 7 a.m. on Sept 7. He was driven 700 miles to Pretoria, naked, despite doctor's advice that he had symptoms of brain damage...

Lewis' report that Biko was driven naked to Pretoria coincides with the largest coverage of that aspect of this scenario offered by the New York Times during the third period.

IV: Biko Expires


Category IV is composed of variables VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, revealing how the U.S. press reported Biko's death to the American public. I coded for six different versions of how the press reported that Biko died:

- A) Biko died as a result of a hunger strike;
- B) Biko died of brain damage;
- C) Biko died of brain damage or injuries inflicted by South African officials;
- D) Biko's brain damage was a result of his "hitting his head" during a scuffle with police;
- E) Biko was beaten to death by police;
- F) Biko was tortured to death by police.

The Minister of Police Jimmy Kruger, as noted earlier, claimed that "Biko had died as a result of a hunger strike." Newspaper articles which reported the Kruger version of Biko's death are captured in Figures A-8. In the first period, from September 12 to September 17, James Kruger and Donald Woods offered contradictory hypotheses to explain the death of Steve Biko. Within hours of the announcement of Biko's death Donald Wood issued a statement to South African newspapers which read:³⁴⁶


³⁴⁶Donald Wood, Biko, Paddington Press, LTD. New York, London, 1978. p. 165.

Figure AI-8




Histogram describing that Biko died of a hunger strike in the first period.

Figure AII - 8



Histogram describing that Biko died as a result of a hunger strike -- second period.

Figure AIII-8



Histogram describing that Biko died as a result of a hunger strike-- third period.

... The basic facts are that barely three weeks ago, when he was detained, he (Steve Biko) was completely fit and healthy (I know because I was with him a day or two before his detention) and that this healthy and strong young man was imprisoned without trial by political police, and that he died three weeks later still in such captivity... . Therefore, whatever the cause-I hold responsible all those who were associated with his detention, because his death occurred while under their control, and control exercised through morally wrong powers such as detention without trial is control that is morally unjustifiable, making those who exercise it morally accountable for all that occurs in terms of it.

Thus, immediately after the confirmation of Biko's assassination, there were reports in South African newspapers which cast doubt on the Krugerhunger-strike theory and in fact, were accusatory towards the police. So clearly Kruger's hunger-strike theory was questioned from the beginning by Mrs. Biko, Woods and associates of Biko. When Woods' and Mrs. Biko viewed Biko's body at the mortuary he stated that:³⁴⁷

What I saw was a gross caricature of his features. There was a large bump on the forehead, the features were distorted and the entire area above the nose and eyes was abnormally raised... .There was certainly no sign of malnutrition-both Ntsiki and I noted how full and normal the body looked but this was no surprise, because by this time even Kruger realized that the hunger strike theory was dismissed as nonsensical.

In the first period of the investigation there were two primary versions of how Biko died.

³⁴⁷Donald Woods Ibid., p. 168.

I coded articles which were dated between September 12 and September 17:

Category VIII: "Biko died as a result of a hunger strike; or

Category X: "Biko died of brain damage or injuries inflicted by South African officials.

The New York Times reported "Biko died as a result of a hunger strike", 50% more times than it reported that Biko died of brain damage or injuries inflicted by South African official" in the first period. The Washington Post reported that Biko had died of a hunger strike 75% of the time as compared to its coverage that Biko died of brain damage or injuries by the police, 0%. The Christian Science Monitor followed the Washington Post and reported that Biko died of a hunger strike 20% of the time, compared to assertions of his death through injuries inflicted by the South African police, 0% of the time.

The second period of the investigation revealed that the New York Times was reporting the hunger strike theory as often as the allegation that Biko had died as a result of brain damage or injuries inflicted by South African officials. The Washington Post reported that Biko had died of a hunger strike 5.88% of the time, the Wall Street Journal, 20% and the Christian Science Monitor, 0% respectively. The Washington Post reported that Biko died

of brain damage 35.29%, of the time while reporting that Biko died of brain damage or injury inflicted by South African officials 11.76% in the second period. The Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor recorded 0% in respect of the two variables in the second period.

The statistical values increased for variable X in the third period and this coincided with the inquest proceedings. The New York Times reported that Biko died of brain damage or injuries inflicted by the South African police over 30% more often than the hunger strike theory. The Washington Post reported variable X over 50% more than variable VIII. The Christian Science Monitor, dropped the hunger strike theory in the third period and only reported that Biko died from either brain damage or injury 25% of the time.


Despite the New York Times, Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor's increased allegation that "Biko died of brain damage or injuries inflicted by South African officials" in the third period, the percentages are remarkably low, 13.63, 23.52 and 25% respectively. Clearly in aggregate terms, for the three time periods Kruger's assertions were emphasized and given significant prominence within the parameters of possible options. The press' predisposition in this category is particularly unfortunate when one considers that from the initial point of the crisis, Kruger was callous, even humorous, when he spoke

about Biko's death. As the inquest transcripts show, Kruger was a part of the conspiracy to "break" Biko both physically and spiritually. For U.S. newspapers to have relied so heavily on Kruger's version of the murder, shows an incredible amount of bias in terms of accepting official statements as objective and an equal amount of insensitivity to Biko and all Azanians.

Figures A-9 describe how often American papers cited "brain damage" as the reason for Biko's death. Besides the version studied in Figures A-8, later a version proven to be a falsification. Figures A-9 represents one of the most incomplete versions of the scenario offered by the press. In the first period, (from September 12 to September 17), the press didn't offer variable IX as a possible option. As stated earlier, the press during the first period cited primarily official versions of the assassination which alleged that (variable VIII) Biko died as a result of a hunger strike. The facts brought out in the inquest were not yet available to the public.


In the second period, when these facts were suspected the percentages for (variable IX) which states that Biko died of brain damage significantly increased, but is not yet the dominant version. The New York Times reported this version of the assassination, 25% of the time, the washington Post 35.29%, the Wall Street Journal, 20% and the Christian Science Monitor, 0%. In the third period,

Figure AI-9




Histogram describing that Biko died of brain damage--
first period.

Figure AII-9



Histogram describing that Biko died of brain damage--second period.


Figure AIII-9



Histogram describing that Biko died of brain damage -- third period.


corresponding to the period of the inquest hearings from November 14 to December 31, the version that Biko died of brain damage received the highest ratings of the six versions. The New York Times gave the highest ratings in this category, 75.27% followed by the Washington Post value of 64.70%. The Christian Science Monitor described Biko as dying of "brain damage" 75% of the time, corresponding to both variables IX and X. Yet they still do not always report those important facts that clarify Biko's care in the hands of the police, for example, The Wall Street Journal curiously did not offer any explanation of how Biko died in its coverage in the third period. The significantly larger focus on variable IX, corresponding to "Biko died of a brain damage as opposed to variables, VIII, X, XI, XII or XIII, suggesting, for example, that (variable VIII), "Biko died as a result of a hunger strike"; would indicate that generally newspapers were reluctant to directly blame the South African police for causing the "brain damage". The American public was left to wonder how the injuries occurred, whether they were the result of a prison riot or were self-inflicted. These figures suggest an extremely incomplete coverage of this event. More importantly, these figures can be viewed evidence of the style of reporting by the U.S. press which served to protect whether it was intended or not. Figures A-10 cites the frequency of press reports indicating that "Biko died of brain damage or injury

Figure AI-10




Histogram indicating that Biko died of brain damage or injury inflicted by South African officials in the first period.

Figure AII-10



Histogram describing that Biko died of brain damage or injury inflicted by South African officials.

Figure AIII-10



Histogram indicating that Biko died of brain damage of injury inflicted by South African officials--third period.

inflicted by South African officials". The percentages are dismally low in the first period. The New York Times was the only newspaper which displayed a percentage in this category of 14.28%. In the second period, the New York Times, reported the version of the assassination 62.25% of the time, followed by the Washington Post's low percentage of 11.76%. The Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor did not cover this version of the assassination in the second period. In the third period, in which confirmation of police abuse and misconduct was publicly attested to during the inquest hearings, surprisingly, the New York Times reduced its coverage of Category X from 62.25% in the second period to 13.63% in the third period. Alternatively, the Washington Post doubled its coverage from the second to the third period from 11.76% to 23.52%; still relatively small considering the wide publicity given to the inquest. The Christian Science Monitor, increased its coverage of Category X from 0 in the second period to 25% in the third period. The Wall Street Journal didn't cover Category XX in any of the three time periods. The percentages in the third period are incredibly low considering the wealth of information furnished at the inquest hearings. These figures substantiate what Figures A-9 suggested, that the U.S. press generally refused to indict or implicate South African police in Biko's murder. The press was covertly allowing the American public to

misunderstand how Biko was murdered.

The overall numerical discrepancy between Figures A-9 and A-10 in the third period attests to the unbalanced and biased position of the press. In Figure AIII-9, the New York Times in the third period, (the period in which the most information was available concerning how Biko died) reported that Biko "simply died of brain damage" 75.27% of the time. In Figure AIII-10, during the same time period, the New York Times cited that Biko had died of brain damage or injury inflicted by South African officials only 13.63% of the time. The American newspapers reporting this incident played an important part in relieving the pressure on the South African officials and the Government itself, by obscuring the facts about Biko's death.

Figures A-11 describe American newspaper reports that "Biko's brain damage resulted from his hitting his head during a scuffle with police." Figure A-11 represents one of the two stories offered by South African officials to explain Biko's injuries (the other is shown in Figure A-8: Biko succumbed to a hunger strike). In the first period, the four newspapers ignored this version. But in the second and third periods, significant coverage was offered. In the second period the Washington Post was the only newspaper which featured this version, with a percentage of 47.05, a relatively high degree of emphasis in Category X. In the third period, the New York Times, and Christian Science

Figure AI-11






Figure AII-11



Histogram describing that Biko died by hitting his head then brain damage occurred --second period.

Figure A III-11




Histogram describing that Biko died by hitting his head than brain damage occurred -- third period.

Monitor offered significant coverage of this version with percentages of 45.45 and 75% respectively. The Washington Post percentage declined in the third period to 17.64%. And the Wall Street Journal did not offer coverage for this version of Biko's death.


Figures A-12 describe how often the press reported that "Biko was beaten to death by police". Overall, the percentages for this version, during the three periods are dismally low. Alternatively, the Biko family postulated that Biko was tortured or beaten to death by security forces from the first time period in which Donald Wood and Ntsiki Biko examined his body in the mortuary. During the first period, all of the newspapers ignored Woods and Mrs. Bikos' remarks that Biko body showed signs that he had been possibly beaten or tortured to death. In the second period, the Wall Street Journal gave the highest rating of the four newspapers to the version held by Woods and Mrs. Biko with 60% of its coverage in this period. The New York Times followed with a percentage of 3.12% and the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor presented percentages of zero. In the third period, during the inquest hearings, except for the C.S.M. the percentages were all extremely insignificant. The New York Times offered this explanation 4.54%, the Washington Post 5.88%, the Wall Street Journal 0% and the Christian Science Monitor 75%, respectively. The New York Times devoted the same amount of attention in the

Figure AI-12




Histogram describing that Biko was beaten to death by police in the first period.

Figure AII-12



Histogram describing that Biko was beaten to death by police -- second period.

Figure A III-12




Histogram describing that Biko was beaten to death by police-- third period.

third period to variable XII, (Biko was beaten to death by police) as it did in respect of variable VIII (Biko died as a result of a hunger strike.) The Wall Street Journal's ratings of 60%, in the second period in this category represents its highest percentage for all the different explanations of this event... The NYT in the third period, devoted greater attention to variables IX, "Biko died of brain damage" and XI, "Biko's brain damage was a result of his hitting his head during a scuffle with police" than it did to the explanation that "Biko was beaten to death by police." Both categories XI and IX are relatively non-descriptive versions of how Biko died in police custody. In fact, category XI, was the police version of the Biko scenario when the "hunger-strike" theory failed to be verifiable.


Figures A-13 represent press reports that "Biko was tortured to death by the police". All four newspapers examined in the first two time periods did not present to the American public that Biko was possibly tortured to death. The New York Times and the W.P. were the only two newspapers which used this language in the third period with an insignificant rate of 4.54% and 5.88%. June Goodwin, the Christian Science Monitor's reporter in Johannesburg at the time of the Biko assassination, told me in a personal interview that she felt that the South African police had tortured Biko. When I asked her if she thought the police

Figure AI-13




Histogram indicating newspaper reports that Biko was tortured to death by police in the first period.

Figure AII-13



Histogram indicating newspaper reports that Biko was tortured to death by police---second period.

Figure A III-13



meant to kill Biko, she replied:

Goodwin:...Is torture a mistake? If you're going to torture there's always the chance that you are going to kill. So it certainly is not a mistake that they are torturing. So to me it's not a mistake.³⁴⁸


It should be noted that many of the articles written by Ms. Goodwin concerning the assassination of Steve Biko were usually sympathetic and insightful. Interestingly however, despite the fact that Ms. Goodwin thought that Biko was tortured to death, this issue did not appear in the C.S.M. articles examined. Possibly Ms. Goodwin viewed the versions described by variables XII and XIII as synonymous. The Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor did not report the assassination scenario that implied that Biko was tortured to death.

Category V--Biko is Found Dead in Pretoria

Figures A-14 through A-18 describe where Biko was found dead. Newspapers that did not want to implicate the South African government in Biko's death simply stated without explanation that "Biko was found dead". (Figures A-14) or that (Figures A-16) "Biko died in a prison hospital" (Figure A-17), or that "Biko died while in police custody". These explanations are so ambiguous that the American public is free to interpret these statements in a


³⁴⁸Interview with June Goodwin of the Christian Science Monitor, by Marsha Coleman, New York, New York, 1980.

Figure AI-14




Histograms indicating reports that Biko was found dead in the first period.

Figure AII-14




Histogram indicating reports that Biko was found dead
— second period.

Figure A III-14




Histogram indicating reports that Biko was found dead -- third period.

Figure AI-15




Histogram indicating that Biko was found dead on the floor-- first period.

Figure AII-15




Histogram indicating that Biko was found dead on the floor -- second period.

Figure A III-15




Histogram indicating that Biko was found dead on the floor-- third period.

Figure AI-16




Histogram describing that Biko died while in police custody during the first period.

Figure AII-16




Histogram describing that Biko died while in Police custody,-- second period.

Figure A III-16



Histogram describing that Biko died while in police custody — third period.

Figure AI-17



Histogram describing that Biko died in a Prison Hospital during the first period.

Figure AII-17






Figure A III-17




Histogram describing that Biko died in Prison Hospital--
third period.

Figure AI-18




Histogram indicating that Biko was found dead on a concrete floor of his prison cell-- first period.

Figure AII-18



Histogram indicating that Biko was found on a concrete floor of his prison cell-- second period.

Figure A III-18



Histogram indicating that Biko was found dead on a crete floor of his prison cell--third period.

number of ways. The American public would not necessarily question the behavior of or assign the responsibility for Biko's death to the South African security police after reading a statement such as "Biko was found dead." In fact, on September 14, 1977 two days after Biko's death was announced, John Burns, the New York Times correspondent in Johannesburg singularly reported only Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger's, explanation for Biko's death: "Justice Minister James Kruger said in a statement that Mr. Biko, who was 30 years old, had died in a Hospital in Pretoria... after refusing food and water since September 5." This statement by Kruger is a complete reconstruction of the true events which was later contradicted by his own police officers at the inquest hearings.

Figure A-18 on the other hand, comes close to implicating the South African police in Biko's murder. Figure A-18 describes Biko's body being found "naked, on a concrete floor of his prison cell." Obviously, the version described in variable XVIII is more challenging and threatening to the South African police than the variable described by XVI. For a prisoners' body to be found naked, on a concrete floor in a prison cell at least suggests police negligence. And inquest transcripts do precisely state that Biko's body was found naked on the floor of his cell. For the press to have reported less than the South African officials involved in the murder was a flagrant

omission of the facts in this case.

Variables XIV ("Biko is found dead") and XV ("Biko was found dead on a floor") received very low coverage from the press. In the first period, all the newspapers did not give coverage to these versions of where Biko was found dead. In the second period, in respect of variable XIV the New York Times was the only newspaper which presented this detail, showing 3.12%. In respect of variable XV, the New York Times, presented a percentage of 3.12% again, followed by the W.P.'s 5.88%. Both the C.S.M. and the W.S.J. recorded zero percents in the second period for these variables. In the third period, the percentages are generally dismally low, with the NYT recording a rate of 3.12% for variable XIV, and the CSM, 25% while the W.P. and the W.S.J. recorded 0%.

Variable XVI, "Biko died while in police custody" received the most attention from U.S. newspapers. Undoubtedly, variable XVI, represents how American newspapers described the situation in which Biko was found dead. In the first period of coverage, the W.P. and the C.S.M. reported that "Biko died in a prison hospital" 100% of the time, the N.Y.T. followed with 85.71% and the Wall Street Journal, 0%. It is noteworthy that the W.P. (with 0% coverage) did not publish any article within this time period. In the second period, the W.S.J. and C.S.M. both recorded 100% for variable XVI, with the W.P. displaying a

percentage of 82.335 and the N.Y.T. 68.75% (See figures A-16). In the third period, the C.S.M. still focused its attention on variable XVI as the best description of where Biko was found dead, the N.Y.T. followed with the high percentage of 77.27 and the W.P., 58.82%. The W.S.J. recorded a zero percentage in the third time period. Certainly, the report examined in Figures A-15 is a more precise characterization of the event than either of the reports represented by Figures A-14 or A-16, when South African officials themselves are willing to admit prejudicial information about their negligence, it is quite curious that the U.S. press was not prepared to report this information. Variable XVII, reporting that "Biko died in a prison hospital" received 14.28% coverage in the N.Y.T. (the only newspaper which presented this version) during the first period. The version of where Biko was found was negated at the inquest hearings by the doctors who treated Biko in his final hours of life. Dr. van Zyl stated in response to a direct question from Attorney Kentridge, that he found Biko on "mats on the floor".³⁴⁹ In the second time period, the New York Times and W.P. reported this version, 3.12 and 5.88% respectively. The C.S.M. and the W.S.J. recorded values of 0%. In the third period, the W.P. was the only newspaper which continued to report this detail,

³⁴⁹Donald Woods, Biko, Ibid., p.249.

with a value of 17.64%. Variable XVIII, which indicates reports that Biko's body was found naked on a concrete floor of his prison cell, represents a minute percentage of this news coverage. Even though what is symbolized by variable XVIII's version of this event agrees with both the Biko family and the police report, all of the values, during the three time periods are below 12%. The W.P. had the highest rating, of 11.76% in the second period followed by the N.Y.T.'s value of 9.09 in the third period of the scenario. The W.S.J. and the C.S.M. failed to report this version of the event altogether.

VI: Failure to Notify the Biko Family of Biko's Condition Until He Died.


The results in Category V are in agreement with the findings in Categories III and IV. The U.S. press coverage of the Biko assassination scenario is very ambiguous when it might implicate the South African police. In fact, the U.S. press presents less harmful information than the South African officials involved in the crime. The pattern which had developed from this case study is that the U.S. press clearly chose to be ambiguous in its coverage of Biko's death because of its reservations about criticizing the South African government. While the press characterized Biko as a "young black leader," inferring that he would not endanger Western interest in South Africa, the press was not

prepared to report on the government that killed him in a derogatory manner. The U.S. press allegiance to the South African government and Western interests is as evident in the Biko case as it was in the Angola and Mugabe crises.

Figures A-19 and A-20 are histograms describing how often newspapers reported that "the Biko family was not notified of Biko's condition until after his death" and that police and government attempted to "cover up" their responsibility in this case. For the South African government to refuse to notify Biko's family of his deteriorating physical condition before he was transferred to a prison cell in Pretoria indicates the unconscionable behavior that is characteristic of the South Africa government. If the U.S. press was really interested in communicating the moral decadence and viciousness of the South African police as evidence in their treatment of Biko, it could have clearly utilized this callous omission. The consistent pattern of U.S. press reports in these categories show that the reporters never intended to present the complete facts about the Biko assassination. The Wall Street Journal is the most negligent in its coverage of the scenario, presumably because of its ideological orientation. The other three newspapers, however, are not significantly different.


Figures A-19, represent U.S. news reporting that the Biko family was not notified of his deteriorating condition

Figure AI-19




Histogram describing that Biko's family was not notified of his condition until his death --first period.

Figure AII-19



Histogram describing that Biko's family was not notified of his condition until his death -- second period.

Figure A III-19




Histogram describing that Biko's family was not notified of his condition until his death -- third period.

until he had expired. The W.P. during the first period, was the only newspaper to report this issue, the Post gave this issue 25% of its Biko coverage. In the second period, the Post's coverage dropped to 5.88% followed by the N.Y.T's 3.12% and the W.S.J. and C.S.M 0% respectively. The N.Y.T. was the only newspaper, to report that Biko's family was not notified in the third period with an incredibly low rating of 4.54%. Overall, American newspapers failed to report that the South African government refused to inform Biko's family that he was near dead. More importantly, the officers in charge of the terminally beaten Biko refused him the comfort and support of his family during his last hours of life.


Figures A-20 represent the same basic pattern as the previous histograms. It describes how often the U.S. press indicated that the South African police were trying to cover up their responsibility in Biko's murder. The values are all below 51%. This unfortunate figure has to be viewed in the context of the events that were unfolding. A few days after Biko's body was found, Mrs. Biko and Donald Woods viewed his body in the mortuary. Immediately after the body was viewed, Mrs. Biko and Mr. Woods accused the police of murdering Biko. These accusations by Mrs. Biko and Woods appeared in several South African newspapers. It was immediately clear that the police and the government were attempting to hide their responsibility for Biko's death.

Figure AI-20




Histogram indicating that the police or government attempted to cover-up their role in the Biko assassination.

Figure A-20



Histogram describing the police or the government attempting to cover-up their role in Biko's murder.

Figure A III-20



Histogram describing reports of police or government officials attempting to cover-up their role in Biko's murder. (third period)

Even before the autopsy reports were published, Kruger announced that "Biko had starved himself to death." Kruger's statement was just the first in a series of government justifications and explanations for Biko's death designed to blunt international criticism. The Wall Street Journal as usual, was the most blatantly negligent in reporting that the police were attempting to cover up their part in the assassination, showing a rate of 0% in this category. The Washington Post in the first period, recorded a rating of 0%, the second period, 19.64% and in the third period 0%. The New York Times, highest rating, for this option comes in the third period displaying a moderate percentage of 36.36%. The Christian Science Monitor had the highest rates for this figure describing the government's attempt to cover up the facts of the Biko case in the Third period 50% of the time (see figures A-19 through A-20). In large part, this probably can be attributed to June Goodwin's sensitivity to the Biko case. Overall, however, the aggregate figure were extremely low. The U.S. press characteristically refused even to inform the American public of information that was common knowledge in South Africa.

Balance and Affective Loading of
News Articles on the Assassination of Steve Biko

In the months that followed Biko's assassination, a

limited amount of literature was smuggled out of South Africa, including Biko's own records of his work, various speeches and documents outlining the activities and philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement. The South African inquest hearings have also been published and details of the last days of Biko's life. The literature has helped formulate a framework within which I can analyze how balanced the U.S. press was in reporting the assassination of Steve Biko and describing his philosophy.

The previous sections of Chapter 6 have attempted to describe Steve Biko and his ideology as seen in his writings and speeches and to examine how the U.S. press perceived Biko in its reports of his assassination. This section will present data from actual news clippings of the assassination. In particular, we have focussed on the crisis periods -- the months September, October and November when Biko's death was first announced by the South African government and the period of the funeral, international criticism of the South African government and the inquest hearings.

This section will attempt to answer the following questions:

- (1) How much coverage did the prestigious American newspapers give to the assassination of Steve Biko?
- (2) How many editorials or background articles were presented to provide an in-depth analysis of the crisis?

(3) Did the U.S. press use the Biko assassination to expose and explain the apartheid system to its American readership?

(4) Did the U.S. press explain the philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement?

(5) Did the U.S. press contact both African and European sources when investigating South African's apartheid policies?

(6) Could the coverage of Steve Biko be described as ethnocentric?

The following empirical data has supplied the content for our analysis of the accuracy and balance of U.S. press coverage of the assassination of Steve Biko. This section will also indicate how sensitive the American press, as well as American foreign policymakers, are to the aspirations of African nationalists fighting against apartheid.

Steve Biko--Key Definition

This section will present how American newspapers reported and analyzed the death of the South African leader Steve Biko. Each letter has been assigned a meaning for the purposes of tabulating and graphing. The key was designed so that fourteen variables might be coded per article on the coding sheet. Please consult Chapter Two for the methods and standards utilized to code the newspaper articles. Because the UNIX computer system cannot produce fractions, the graphs are drawn to the nearest decimal

DATA OBSERVATIONS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF STEVE BIKO : TABLE 6B-1

| | New York Times | | Washington Post | | Wall Street Journal | | Christian Science Monitor | |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------------|-------|
| | Number of art. | Perc. | Number of art. | Perc. | Number of art. | Perc. | Number of art. | Perc. |
| X | 3 | 4.29 | 13 | 20.54 | 2 | 12.5 | 2 | 8.68 |
| Y | 1 | 1.43 | 3 | 4.74 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 34.72 |
| Z ₁ | 25 | 35.75 | 17 | 26.86 | 4 | 25 | 7 | 30.38 |
| Z ₂ | 44 | 62.92 | 40 | 63.2 | 9 | 56.25 | 11 | 47.74 |
| Q ₁ | 12 | 17.16 | 25 | 39.5 | 2 | 12.5 | 2 | 8.68 |
| Q ₂ | 58 | 82.94 | 35 | 55.3 | 11 | 68.75 | 18 | 28.12 |
| T ₁ | 6 | 8.58 | 7 | 11.06 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4.34 |
| T ₂ | 1 | 1.43 | 9 | 14.72 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 30.38 |
| T | 63 | 90.09 | 47 | 74.26 | 16 | 100 | 15 | 65.1 |
| D ₁ | 3 | 4.29 | 8 | 12.64 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13.02 |
| D ₂ | 6 | 8.58 | 6 | 9.48 | 12 | 75 | 6 | 26.04 |
| D | 61 | 81.23 | 49 | 77.42 | 4 | 25 | 14 | 60.76 |
| $\emptyset(X, Z_1)$ | 1 | 1.43 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4.34 |
| $\emptyset(X, Q_2)$ | 2 | 2.86 | 2 | 3.16 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3.14 |
| $\emptyset(X, T_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4.74 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3.14 |
| $\emptyset(X, T_1, Q_2)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\emptyset(Z_1, T_2)$ | 0 | 0 | 11 | 17.38 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13.07 |
| $\emptyset(Q_2, T_2)$ | 1 | 1.43 | 4 | 6.32 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 26.04 |
| $\emptyset(Z_1, Q_2)$ | 24 | 34.32 | 11 | 17.38 | 4 | 25 | 7 | 30.38 |
| $\emptyset(T_2, D_1)$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1.58 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8.68 |
| Total =N | 70 | | 63 | | 16 | | 23 | |

TABLE 6B-2

| var | NYT | WP | WSJ | CSM |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| \bar{x} | 3 | 13 | 2 | 2 |
| $\emptyset(x, z1)/x$ | 0.33 | 0 | 0 | 0.5 |
| $\emptyset(x, q2)/x$ | 0.67 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.5 |
| $\emptyset(x, t1)/x$ | 0 | 0.23 | 0 | 0.5 |
| $\emptyset(x, t1, q2)/x$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| z1 | 25 | 17 | 4 | 7 |
| q2 | 58 | 35 | 1 | 18 |
| $\emptyset(z1, t2)/z1$ | 0 | 0.647 | 0 | 0.429 |
| $\emptyset(q2, t2)/q2$ | 0.017 | 0.114 | 0 | 0.33 |

number.

The newspaper observations are divided into two parts. The first section will characterize the U.S. press presentation of the assassination of Steve Biko. The second section presents the "symbolic language" category. The symbolic language section examines how the press described Biko and his organizations, SASO and BPC, to the American public. Overall, this section will consider the U.S. press's observations of Biko in both the qualitative and symbolic areas of news coverage.

DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES

- X = the number of editorials reported.
- Y = the number of background articles published.
- Z1 = characterizes "diversified" articles.
- Z2 = characterizes "undiversified" articles.
- Q1 = characterizes articles which qualified as "1".
- Q2 = characterizes articles which qualified as "2".
- T1 = characterizes articles which were coded "ethnocentric".
- T2 = characterizes articles which were coded "non-ethnocentric".
- T = characterizes articles which were coded "neutral" (vis-a-vis ethnocentric).
- D1 = Articles which consulted both African and

- white South Africans on the issue of Apartheid.
- D2 = Articles which consulted only one South African racial group (either black or white) on the issue of Apartheid.
- D = characterizes articles which are coded as "neutral" in regards to Apartheid.
- N = total number of news articles.

Data Observations of Steve Biko

Figure I(B) is the histogram of overall numbers of articles examined, showing the number of editorials and background reports. The New York Times devoted approximately 70 articles to the Biko issue in three and one-half months of coverage, which would indicate that the Times viewed this issue as less important than the Angolan war and Mugabe's election, which both received a significantly larger amount of news coverage. The New York Times coverage, however, is four times more than the Wall Street Journal and 3 times more than the Christian Science Monitor. Comparatively, the Washington Post published 63 articles, the Wall Street Journal printed 16 articles and the Christian Science Monitor presented 23 articles. The Washington Post had the greatest number of editorials in terms of percentages, while the Christian Science Monitor had the greatest number of background reports in terms of percentage. See the table for Biko.

Overall, in a three and one-half month period, American newspapers devoted a surprisingly small amount of attention to the Biko assassination, burial, and the South African inquest hearings. The amount of American newspaper attention is indeed curious when one considers that Biko had filled the vacuum in political leadership created by the incarceration of Mandela and Sobubwe.

If American newspapers had viewed Biko, a South African freedom-fighter, in the same light as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a dissident from the USSR, or Bobby Sands, an imprisoned dissident in Northern Ireland, one would have expected more U.S. press coverage. The insignificant amount of newspaper attention is also curious when one considers that South Africa is one of the chief violators of human rights in the twentieth century. In South Africa, with the support of various Western nations, 20 million blacks are held in bondage by 4 million white; over 12, 586, 752 blacks have been arrested or prosecuted for not carrying a pass book since 1948; and more blacks have been executed each year than in all the Western nations combined.³⁵⁰

³⁵⁰Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1981, Randall Robinson,

FIGURE VI-1B: BIKO





Figure 2(B) represents the percentages of diversified articles. The percentages, are again surprisingly low, considering how accessible SASO and BCM spokespeople are

to the American press. It should be noted that the American press contacted more diversified sources during the Zimbabwean war than in peacetime South Africa. Clearly, if the American press could seek out sources during a war, it seems uncanny that Black Consciousness representatives who are eager to have American news coverage, eluded Western reporters. The newspapers in this category have consistently low ratings. The N.Y.T. pursued diverse sources 35.75% of the time, the C.S.M. 30.38%, the W.P. 26.36%, and the W.S.J. 25%.

Figure 2(B) is placed in its proper perspective when one views Figure 3(B). Figure 3(B) is a histogram representing the percentage of articles which were undiversified. For a reporter to have neglected consulting a Black Consciousness member when writing on South African politics clearly violates all standards of reportage. The values in this category are extremely high. The N.Y.T. is the quiliest of the four newspapers in not consulting diverse sources, both Azanian and European. However, all four newspapers inadequately presented the black perspective on the Biko assassination. The New York Times articles were undiversified 62.92% of the time, the Washington Post 63.2%, the W.S.J. 56.25% and the C.S.M. 47.74%. These figures would indicate an incredible amount of insensitivity on the part of the U.S. press. Not only did the U.S. press inadequately cover one of the most brutal assassinations of


an African leader by a repressive, heinous regime, but it then consulted an inappropriate sample of South African representatives to compose the body of information covering the event. Such results, as found in Figures 1(B) and 2(B), could indicate that the U.S. press had ambiguous and conflicting loyalties in covering this case.

FIGURE VI-2E: BIKO

HISTOGRAM SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF DIVERSIFIED ARTICLES.

FIGURE VI-3B: BIKO

(Σ2/N)
in
%





HISTOGRAM SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF UNDIVERSIFIED ARTICLES.

Figure 4(B) represents the data for the degree to which ethnocentric, non-ethnocentric and neutral articles were presented in the U.S. coverage of the Biko assassination. Most of the articles presented a neutral coverage of this category. Only the N.Y.T. had a relatively large amount of ethnocentric articles as compared to their non-ethnocentric coverage. The wall Street Journal recorded neither non-ethnocentric nor ethnocentric articles. The wall Street Journal's coverage of the Biko assassination, in regards to reporting positive comments about African organizations (represented by the "non-ethnocentric" category), was the same value (zero) percent as in the Mugabe case. The C.S.M. had the highest percentage of non-ethnocentric articles, 30.38%. The Washington Post had the second highest percentage of non-ethnocentric articles with a rating of 14.22%. The N.Y.T. and W.S.J. had the lowest rates of 1.43 and 0% respectively. I would have expected significantly higher ratings from the N.Y.T., W.P. and W.S.J. in the non-ethnocentric category.


If the U.S. press had really opposed the apartheid regime, it could have used the Biko assassination to inform the American public about the daily atrocities being committed by the South African government. In the Angolan case study, the U.S. press presented the M.P.L.A. as compared to the F.N.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A. in such negative

FIGURE VI-4B: BIKO



terms that one could describe the news coverage as initially advocacy reporting. When contrasting the Angolan and Mugabe coverage to the Biko reporting, it is indeed curious that the U.S. press decided to take an overwhelmingly neutral position. In the Angolan case, the press unrelentingly presented a negative image of the M.P.L.A. In the Mugabe study, the press presented a very high degree of "ethnocentric" articles, and characterized Mugabe as a "Guerilla-Marxist" an unfavorable characterization. But, the U.S. press in the Biko case, represented a neutral picture of the crisis. The Biko case poses the problem of a white, western-supported, government sadistically murdering the most important African leader in South Africa since Mandela. Yet the American readership of the N.Y.T., W.P., W.S.J. and C.S.M., were left without a clear picture of the horror and blatant racism experienced by Azanians in South Africa which Biko's death symbolizes. Unlike the Angola and Mugabe examples where Western business interests and peoples were thought to be endangered, in the Biko case the press stepped back to observe neutrally the heinous crimes of the South African regime. It is apparently easier for the U.S. press to be neutral when Black lives and interests are being endangered than when white lives and interests are being threatened.


FIGURE VI-5B: BIKO



HISTOGRAM OF ARTICLES QUALIFIED AS EMANATING FROM AN OFFICIAL SOURCE
1) -

FIGURE VI-6B: BIKO

Q2/N
in
a/o



HISTOGRAM OF ARTICLES QUALIFIED AS EMANATING FROM UNOFFICIAL SOURCE
(2).

Our investigation coded newspaper articles to determine how often reporters consulted official and unofficial sources in their research of the Biko assassination [Figure 5(B) and 6(B)]. Our data shows that the U.S. press used a high percentage of number 2 or official sources in their coverage of the Biko assassination. The N.Y.T. presented the highest value in this category: 82.94%. The Christian Science Monitor followed the N.Y.T. in the number of times official sources were consulted with a value of 78.12%. The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post recorded the lowest values for this variable, showing 68.75 and 55.30% respectively (see Figure 6B). respectively.

Generally, with the exception of the Washington Post, American reporters preferred using official sources to unofficial sources. The New York Times used unofficial sources for their coverage of the Biko Assassination only 17.16% of the time, the W.P. 39.5%, the W.S.J. 12.50% and the C.S.M. 8.63% (see Figure 5B). These figures would indicate that the U.S. press attempted to get primarily "official" versions of the Biko assassination, and rarely diversified its coverage of the assassination [see Figures 2(B) & 3(B)]. For the most part, only white South Africans were contacted for information concerning the Biko case. However, the press, by consulting South African officials, were in fact, interviewing the very officials who were


attempting to "cover-up" the details of the assassination. For example, initially, James Kruger, Chief of South African Police, claimed that Biko had died as a result of a "hunger strike." The coroner's report and the testimony at the inquest proved that Biko, had in fact died of brain damage inflicted by the South African police. Thus, American reporters who relied on the South African officials for accurate information about the Biko case were consulting, the institution responsible for Biko's death. American reporters would have had to consult African officials in the Black Consciousness Movement for balanced assessment of the assassination.

In examining Figures 7(B), 8(B), 9(B), if a reporter consulted both an Azanian and a white South African on the issue of apartheid, we determined that the reporting was balanced. Our data suggests that, the reporting on apartheid issues by the U.S. press was primarily "unbalanced". For example, the C.S.M. presented the highest degree of balanced reporting with a percentage of only 13.02%. The W.P. devoted 12.64% of its coverage to both black and white South Africans views of this issue. The N.Y.T. and W.S.J. recorded the lowest percentage of balanced articles on apartheid with 4.29% and 0% respectively. These percentages substantiate and confirm what figures 2 and 3(B) suggest: that American reporters did not pursue or procure a diversity of informants for the composition of their articles on Biko or the issue of apartheid.

Figure 8(B) describes how often reporters did not consult both Azanian and European sources for information regarding apartheid. The Wall Street Journal is the most deficient in providing both Azanian and white views on apartheid, recording a rate of 75%. The W.S.J. value would indicate overwhelmingly that their coverage is unbalanced and inaccurate. This statistic represents an interesting departure for the W.S.J. which is usually very accurate and careful in presenting facts about a situation or a potential

FIGURE VI-7B: BIKO


D1/N
in
%



HISTOGRAM SHOWING THAT REPORTERS CONSULTED BOTH AZANIANS AND WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS TO INVESTIGATE THE ISSUE OF APARTHEID.


FIGURE VI-8B: BIKO

D2/N
in
[%]



HISTOGRAM SHOWING THAT REPORTERS DID NOT CONSULT AZANIAN AND WHITE AFRICANS TO INVESTIVAGE THE ISSUE OF APARTHEID.

FIGURE VI-9B: BIKO



HISTOGRAM SHOWING THAT AMERICAN REPORTERS DID NOT CONSULT EITHER A WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS TO INVESTIGATE THE ISSUE OF APARTHEID. THIS HI IS CODED NEUTRAL.


crisis which might lead to hazards in investment. Considering how large American and European investments are in South Africa, one would have thought that the Wall Street Journal would be very careful in providing a balanced view of apartheid, an potentially explosive issue.

Most American newspapers did not report a source when describing the apartheid issue, and this is indicated by a neutral rating (see Figure 9 (B)). This situation is very unfortunate, when one realizes that all the American reporters covering South Africa were white, and lived in exclusively white communities. The limitations of their research are predictable, but would not be apparent to their readers.

Figures 10(B), 11(B) and 12(B) are histograms representing the number of editorials concerning the assassination of Steve Biko that were simultaneously diversified, consulted an official source and were ethnocentric. Figure 10(B) describes how often editorials used diversified sources for their analysis when they used quotations in their presentation. All of the values in Figure 10(B) are low. The New York Times used diversified sources in their editorials 1.43% of the time and the Christian Science Monitor 4.34%. Figure 10(B) confirms what Figure 3(B) suggested, that American newspapers rarely consult a diversity of sources when investigating their news stories. Figure 11(B) depicts news articles which are editorials and quote from an official source. As in Figure 10(B), the values are extremely low. The C.S.M. records the highest value in this category with only 4.34%, the Washington Post 3.16%, the New York Times 2.86% and the Wall Street Journal 0%. Figures 10(B) and 11(B) indicate that the four American newspapers, when quoting in their editorials, did not diversify or consult official sources in their articles. Figure 12(B) describes how often editorials are ethnocentric. Figure 12(B) confirms the results of Figure 4(B) which indicated that the Washington Post presented the highest rate of ethnocentric editorials with a value of 4.74%. The Christian Science Monitor followed with 4.34%, and the N.Y.T. and W.S.J. both recorded 0%.

FIGURE VI-10B: BIKO


phi (X,Z1)
in
-x-



HISTOGRAM SHOWING THAT EDITORIAL REPORTS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY DIVER

FIGURE VI-11B: BIKO


phi (% Q2)
in
[%]



HISTOGRAM OF EDITORIALS WHICH USED UNOFFICIAL SOURCES.

FIGURE VI-12B: BIKO

phi(X,T1)/N
in
[%]



HISTOGRAM SHOWING EDITORIALS WHICH WERE CONCURRENTLY ETHNOCENTRIC.

Figures 10, 11, 12(B) seem to indicate that there is a near correlation between the contents of the articles and the newspapers' editorial policy. These figures echo the earlier findings on newspaper coverage in regards to ethnocentrism, the use of official sources and diversity of sources. This would seem to indicate that the foreign correspondents and the editorial staff, of the major American newspapers were severely deficient in their attempts to render an objective account of this crisis.


In Figure 13(B), describing editorials which were ethnocentric and used official sources, the rating was 0% for the four newspapers. Clearly, this indicates the very low rates in respect to the ethnocentric category, because the values for (Q2), representing quotations from official sources, were extremely high. Thus, Figure 13(B) suggests that editorials about the Biko case were not simultaneously ethnocentric and loaded with official sources.³⁵¹ The editorials were probably coded "neutral" in the ethnocentric category and loaded with quotations from white South African officials.

Figure 14(B) describes how often news articles were marked by a lack of ethnocentricity, a diversity of sources and the use of policy-making informants. In Figure 14(B), the Washington Post and the C.S.M. recorded the highest percentage of articles that were non-ethnocentric and used both a government and an opposition official for their information. The Washington Post rate in this category was 17.38% and the C.S.M. 13.02%. The N.Y.T. and W.S.J. both recorded 0% for this variable. Figure 14(B), is completely consistent with Figure 4(B), which indicated that the W.P. and C.S.M. had the highest degree of non-ethnocentric articles, 14.22 and 30.38% respectively. This would seem to

³⁵¹As outlined in Chapter II, this research only coded editorials that used quotes from either the opposition group or the government.

FIGURE VI-13B: BIKO

phi (X, T1, Q2)
in
[%]




HISTOGRAM SHOWING EDITORIALS WHICH WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY ETHNOCENTRI.

and used UNOFFICIAL SOURCES.

FIGURE VI-14B: BIKO

phi(Z1,T2)
in
[%]



HISTOGRAM SHOWING ARTICLES USED DIVERSIFIED SOURCES AND WERE
NON-ETHNOCENTRIC.


suggest that when newspaper reporters consult both a government official and a representative of Biko's organization, the article tends to be less ethnocentric. Figure 14 (B) is also consistent with the low values for the N.Y.T. and W.S.J. in Figure 4 (B). In Figure 4 (B), the N.Y.T. and W.S.J. had extremely low ratings for non-ethnocentric articles: 1.43 and 0% respectively. Similarly, in Figure 14 (B), the N.Y.T. and the W.S.J. both recorded a value of 0% for this category.

This investigation also coded news articles to determine if there was a correlation between the use of "official" sources and the degree of ethnocentricity and diversity of sources. Figures 15(B) and 16(B) are compatible with the results described in Figures 4 and 14(B). In Figure 15, the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post appear to be effective in contacting a diversity of sources and policymaking officials for their research of the event. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal, however, had extremely low rates in the non-ethnocentric category, and those values are affecting the findings in Figures 4, 14, 15(B). It would appear that when newspapers print a significant amount of non-ethnocentric articles, a pattern of consulting a diversity of sources and contacting policymaking officials has been established.

Figure 16(B) describes articles which are diversified and use unofficial sources. The New York Times displayed the highest value, 34.32, followed by the Christian Science Monitor displaying a value of 30.38%. Both the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post have presented values less than 26% in this category. I consider these percentages to represent an extremely important problem in U.S. coverage of the assassination, namely that journalists did not attempt to consult a wide assortment of opinions and views on the assassination. In the South African case, the U.S. press would have benefited greatly from contacting and

FIGURE VI-15B: BIKO


phi (Z1, T2)



HISTOGRAM SHOWING THAT REPORTERS CONSULTED UNOFFICIAL SOURCES FOR THE INFORMATION AND THE ARTICLES WERE NOT ETHNOCENTRIC.

GRAPH V-16B: BIKO

phi(Z1,Q2)
in
[%]




HISTOGRAM SHOWING THE REPORTERS QUOTED A DIVERSITY OF UNOFFICIAL

interviewing Azanians who would have given them an alternative viewpoint from the governments. The results in this category are concurrent with the Mugabe findings in the same area.

In Figure 17(B), the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post were the only newspapers which recorded articles which were simultaneously balanced in their coverage of apartheid and non-ethnocentric in content. The Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor scored rates of 1.58 and 8.68% respectively. The rates in this category, like those in Figures 14(B), 15(B), 16(B) are very low. Actually, in numerical terms, we are discussing one article out of sixty-three in the Washington Post and two articles out of twenty-three in the Christian Science Monitor. The values in statistical terms are indeed negligible.

GRAPH V-17B: BIKO



HISTOGRAM OF ARTICLES WHICH WERE NON-ETHNOCENTRIC AND QUOTED BOTH AND WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THEIR INVESTIGATION OF APARTHEID.

SUMMARY

The Biko assassination received less attention than the other two case studies by the U.S. press. Biko's death, unlike the election of Robert Mugabe or the Cuban intervention in Angola, did not signal to American and South African policy officials an immediate threat to Western political and economic interests. American newspapers also recorded very high rates of undiversified news articles, which indicates that American reporters investigating Biko's death didn't consult both Azanian and European views of this event. American reporters were negligent in contacting Black sources for their investigation of the tragedy. The New York Times, in fact, had a rate of over 60% in the undiversified category. American newspapers consulted mostly "official" sources in investigating the assassination. Because most American reporters did not contact Azanian sources, the press had to rely on the very officials who were responsible for Biko's death and were in the process of "covering-up" their responsibility. I would have expected American reporters to contact SASO and BPC leaders, but instead the American press relied on the "official version" of the assassination, and thus became vulnerable to distortions and incomplete facts. Most of the papers examined seemed to exhibit no particular degree of ethnocentricity or non-ethnocentricity. However, it is

important to note that the Christian Science Monitor, unlike the other three papers, took a firm pro-African or non-ethnocentric stance in its coverage of the assassination, perhaps Ms. Goodwin should be credited with outcome of this data. The C.S.M.'s coverage of Biko's death was 30.38% non-ethnocentric in content is contrasted with the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and the New York Times whose rates were all under 15%. The neutrality of the American press in the Biko case, deviated drastically from the norm set by the Angolan and Mugabe cases. The American press in the two previous case studies acknowledged and propagated very firm positions on the role of U.S. policy and which political party it endorsed in the election or the civil war.

One must question why the U.S. press decided to remain neutral in the Biko case in contrast to its positions in the Angolan and Zimbabwean crises. It would be most curious if the American press had completely changed its political orientation in two years from the pattern it had established during the Angolan crises. Why didn't the U.S. press, that claims to condemn South African apartheid, use the assassination of Steve Biko to persuade the American public, businessmen and policymakers to terminate all political and commercial ties with the South African government? Clearly, the press attempted to use its influence to persuade the American public and policymakers against Cuban involvement in Angola and Mugabe's candidacy.

But not even an assassination of a young Black leader could force the American press to take a position against the South African regime. The American press, in the Biko assassination, abided by South African law, and refused to publish the words of a "banned" man. The American press did not report even Biko's political activities until he was murdered. Afterwards, the American press attempted to cleanse and disentangle itself from the South African government by eloquently eulogizing the leadership of Steve Biko, but in the end, the U.S. press and the U.S. government continued to take a neutral position in regards to Pretoria.

In the next section, we will examine and describe how the American press characterized Steve Biko by the symbolic language category.

The Symbolic Language Category--Steve Biko

The symbolic language section, combined with the presentation of news articles in Section 1 of the empirical study, provides a picture of how the American press reported the assassination of Steve Biko in South Africa. Specifically, the symbolic language category is designed to help us understand how the American press characterized Biko in its coverage of the assassination in 1977. The category focuses on coloration and tone that result from the Press' use of certain adjectives and adverbs to describe Biko. This adjectival coloration of Biko will aid our investigation in understanding the journalists' predispositions and possible political orientations in covering the assassination. This category will also determine whether reporters were attempting to create sympathy or hostility towards Biko by their use of affective adjectives and adverbs. The press' use of powerfully affective words can subtly convert policymakers and the public to a particular political position. Thus, it is important that words used to describe a person or organization be as objective and accurate as possible, that they hold no hidden connotations--that is, it is important if a balanced report is the journalist's goal.

In the Biko case, I am interested in investigating

what image the American press assigned to Steve Biko. Chapter II, section VI provides a detailed description of the symbolic language category, but, briefly, this section will help determine if American newspapers faithfully and objectively informed the American public and policymakers on the assassination of Steve Biko and if American newspapers alienate themselves from African sources because of inaccurate assessments of political leaders like Biko.

Biko Key Definition:

The American news coverage of the assassination of Steve Biko for a two-and-one-half month period produced approximately 173 articles. I systematically isolated (or extracted) all of the adjectives and adverbs used to describe Biko in these articles and coded the words. I chose a three-integral scale to explain the affective loading of the press representation of Biko: favorable, unfavorable, and neutral.

As defined in Chapter II, an article coded favorable is defined as one clearly designed to cast the major subject in a "positive" light to policymakers and the American public at large. This would be done by using affectively potent adjectives, such as "moderate", "handsome", "Christian". Producing a likable image of a person consistently provokes a sympathetic reaction in a reader. Articles coded as "unfavorable" depict the subject as

clearly contrary to U.S. interests or values by using adjectives like "Marxist", "terrorist", "militant". As indicated in Chapter II, these words would indicate possible threats to American diplomatic or commercial interests in the world. Also, because of the American cultural preference for stability, peace, and freedom, movements marked by the antitheses of these qualities are considered "unfavorable" by the American public.

The following are the seventeen most commonly used terms to describe Biko from our sample of news clippings in the four newspapers. I have also indicated how these adjectives are coded. Histograms and the table represent the data graphically. Concluding notes will concentrate on both the data observations and the empirical section.

Definition of the Variables

Adjective and adverb characterization of Steve Biko in American newspapers.

- A) Black leader.....favorable
- B) Foremost young black leader/
most influential/most impressive.....favorable
- C) Detainee who died in custody.....neutral
- D) Advocate of non-violence.....favorable
- E) Leader of BCM.....favorable
- F) Leader of SASO.....favorable
- G) Black activist.....favorable

- H) Black nationalist.....unfavorable
- I) Target of police harassment.....neutral
- J) Tall, muscular.....favorable
- K) Soft-spoken.....favorable
- L) 29 or 30-year-old vigorous.....favorable
- M) Figure of major importance.....favorable
- N) moderate and responsible leader.....favorable
- O) Powerful, personal appeal.....favorable
- P) Militant.....unfavorable
- Q) other.....neutral

Each letter is assigned a qualitative meaning which correlates to the graph and histograms. Please consult Chapter II for the methods and standards used to code the adjectives and adverbs.

Figure 18(B) is the histogram of the relative number of articles that described Biko as a "black leader". All the newspapers consistently labelled Biko as a "black leader". The Wall Street Journal recorded the highest rate in this category, 100%. This category contains the highest percentages of the remaining fourteen categories. The New York Times referred to Biko as a "black leader" 81.53% of the time, the Washington Post 70.58% and the Christian Science Monitor 33.33%. Figure 19(B) represents the percentage of how often these leading U.S. newspapers described Biko as the "foremost young black leader", "most

influential", "most impressive". The New York Times and the Washington Post recorded the highest rates in this category, with percentages of 32.30 and 29.41% respectively. Biko's image as the "foremost young black leader" is rarely indicated by the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor, with both newspapers showing low percentages of 16.66 and 4.26% respectively.

Comparatively, U.S. newspapers presented a more favorable "image" of Biko than of either Mugabe or the MPLA in Angola. The fact that Biko posed no real threat to the South African regime and to the economic and political interests of the Occidental powers neutralized his importance and the impact of his death for American newspapers. Biko's death had been extremely important for the anti-apartheid movement since it created stagnation and disillusionment in SASO and BPC, infant organizations. The fact that both organizations were given birth through Biko's genius made it virtually impossible for a new charismatic leader of Biko's calibre to emerge. The South African government's banning of SASO and BPC after Biko's death forced these organizations to continue their political work underground and in exile.

TABLE 6C

SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE CATEGORY

STEVE BIKO

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | |
|-------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|------|---|-----|---|-----|-------------|
| 33.33 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 28.57 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 0 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 4.76 | 0 | 9.5 | 0 | 9.5 | <u>in %</u> |
| 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | <u>in N</u> |

WALL STREET JOURNAL

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 100 | 16.66 | 16.66 | 16.66 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | <u>in %</u> |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | <u>in N</u> |


WASHINGTON POST

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|---|---|-------|---|-------|------|------|-------|-------------|
| 70.58 | 29.41 | 32.35 | 5.88 | 38.23 | 11.76 | 14.70 | 26.47 | 2.94 | 0 | 0 | 20.58 | 0 | 23.52 | 5.88 | 2.94 | 14.70 | <u>in %</u> |
| 24 | 10 | 11 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 5 | <u>in N</u> |

NEW YORK TIMES


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|---|-------|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|-------|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|-------------|
| 81.53 | 32.30 | 12.30 | 0 | 32.30 | 1.53 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 1.53 | 4.76 | 1.53 | 30.76 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 4.6 | 1.53 | 13.84 | <u>in %</u> |
| 53 | 21 | 8 | 0 | 21 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 9 | <u>in N</u> |

Figure VI-18B: SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE OF STEVE BIKO
 CATEGORY A



Category A
 Histogram of newspaper reports describing Biko as a "black leader".

Figure VI-19B



Category B

Histogram of newspaper articles portraying Biko as "Foremost young black leader/most influential/most impressive".


Figure 20(B) suggests how U.S. newspapers accounted for Biko's death. The Washington Post indicated that Biko had died in detention, in police custody, over 50% more often than the N.Y.T. and 300% more often than the C.S.M. The Wall Street Journal reported that Biko had died in detention only 16.66% of the time.

Figure 21(B) indicates the frequency of newspaper references to Biko's philosophy of "non-violence". The percentages for all the newspapers are quite low, with the Wall Street Journal having the highest rating in this category, describing Biko as non-violent 16.66% of the time. While the W.S.J. comparatively did not cover the Biko situation in great detail, it still showed the most obvious pattern of conservative reporting of the event. The highest rating in this category probably indicates that the Wall Street Journal was attempting to advise its readers, largely from conservative business interests, that SASO and BPC, founded by Biko, had a philosophy of non-violence. When, in the Angolan and Zimbabwean crises, a degree of concern was raised by some segments of the business community that American interests would be endangered by a Mugabe and MPLA victories in their respective countries, the Wall Street Journal was alerting its readership that there are black groups in South Africa who hold a non-violent philosophy. A non-violent solution to the problems in South Africa would be preferred by westerners over the economic disturbance

that would certainly result from a violent revolution in the area. What the W.S.J. failed to recognize, as discussed in an earlier section, was that Biko perceived of the Black Consciousness Movement as only a stepping stone to a mass political party that might consider revolution.


Figure 22(B) is a histogram describing the relative number of times Biko was referred to as the "founder of the Black Consciousness Movement". The Washington Post reported Biko as the founder of the BCM 38.23% of the time which I consider relatively high when compared to the other categories. The New York Times acknowledged Biko's role in the BCM 32.30%, and the C.S.M. 28.57%. The Wall Street Journal, interestingly enough, represented the lowest percentage, zero, in this category. Figure 23(B) indicates how often U.S. newspapers described Biko as the leader of SASO. The Washington Post has the highest rate in this category with a frequency of 11.76%, which I consider quite low. Comparatively, the New York Times and the Washington Post rates are below 5%. The Wall Street Journal did not characterize Biko as either a leader of the BCM or of SASO. The Journal chose to describe Biko in very simplistic terms, using only one characterization (figure 21(B)) to represent the man, his organization, and his philosophy.

Figure VI-20B



Category C
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "Detainee who died in custody".


Figure VI-21B



Category D

Histogram of newspaper articles portraying Biko as "Advocate of non-violence".


Figure VI-22B



Category E

Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "Leader of Black Consciousness Movement".


Figure VI-23B



Category F


Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "Leader of SASO".

Figure VI-24B



Category G
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as a "Black activist".

Figure VI-25B



Category H
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "Black Nationalist"

Figures 24(B) and 25(B) are histograms depicting the frequency with which U.S. papers described Biko in political terms. Primarily, American newspapers attempted to avoid assigning any ideological label to Biko, preferring instead to de-politicize Biko's movement and his ideological orientation by simply calling him "black leader". For example in Figure 24 (B), a histogram describing how often Biko was referred to as a "black activist," the rates for the N.Y.T., W.P., and C.S.M. were all under 15%. The W.S.J.'s percentage in this category is consistent with its rates in Figures 22(B) & 23(B); The Journal refuses to describe Biko in aggressive ideological terms. Figure 25(B) indicates the extent to which American newspapers referred to Biko as a "black nationalist". The Washington Post again presents very diversified images of Biko, unlike the other three newspapers. The Post labelled Biko a "Black nationalist" 26.47% of the time; the C.S.M. 4.76%, the N.Y.T. 3.0%. The Wall Street Journal's value in this category, as in Figures 21(B)-24(B), is zero, indicating a pattern of undiversified reporting. For most American newspapers, Biko was perceived and described as a passive benign, political leader in South Africa whose leadership did not immediately threaten the political configurations in South Africa.

Figure 26(B) indicates that very few newspapers reported that Biko was the target of South African police harassment. When we consider that Biko died at the hands of the police, the values in this category represent a serious omission on the part of U.S. newspapers. Police brutality is a daily reality for most Azanians and this was particularly true for Biko. The system of apartheid, in fact, depends on strong military control in the black townships to ensure compliance with the laws of South Africa. American newspapers who failed to report that Biko was the subject of police brutality were deliberately ignoring the South African government's continual harassment of Biko before his death. The South Africa officials attempted to cover up their role in Biko's murder by feeding incorrect information to the American press, stating that Biko had been "flown to Pretoria" or that "Biko died as a result of a hunger strike". Because American newspapers, in general, did not care to consult a diversity of sources for their information, the government's incorrect facts appeared in the U.S. news coverage of the assassination.³⁵²

The values in this category are all below 3%. The


³⁵²For example, Lewis Anthony reported that the South African police had flown Biko to the hospital and over 25% of the articles presented to the American public during the first period stated that Biko had died as a result of a hunger strike.

Washington Post has consistently presented the most diversified images of Biko and information about his political ideology, but their rate in Figure 26 was only 2.94%. The N.Y.T.'s score was 1.53% and the C.S.M. and the W.S.J. both failed to present any information about Biko's brutal and sadistic treatment by the South African police. The W.S.J. not only consistently ignored any sophisticated treatment of Biko's ideology but also his mistreatment by the South African government.

We cannot be sure of the cause behinds these patterns. Speculation would lead one to note the fact that a substantial number of the W.S.J.'s readership have investments in South Africa and this may have influenced the paper's suppression of Biko's assassination, which could have aroused ambiguous feelings in U.S. investors. An expose of Biko's murder by the W.S.J. would have possibly forced U.S. businessmen to reexamine the wisdom of their investments in a country that is as likely to explode as Angola and Zimbabwe. And possibly, although this is unlikely, if American papers had exposed the circumstances surrounding the Biko murder to their readerships, Western investors in South Africa who have a social conscience might have considered terminating their relationship with the apartheid state. Surprisingly, the C.S.M., too, did not report that Biko suffered police brutality while in detention. This is inconsistent with their relatively

diverse coverage of the assassination. However, the Christian Science Monitor's readership includes a large number of white South Africans who possibly influenced the Monitor's editor's to suppress an extensive coverage of the police brutality of Biko.


Figure VI-26B



Category I
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as a "target of Police Harrassment".


Figures 27(B), 28(B), and 29(B) are histograms representing Biko's "physical characteristics". Figure 27(B) indicates how often newspapers described Biko as being "tall and muscular," Figure 28(B) Biko as being "soft-spoken," and Figure 29(B) Biko as being of a certain age. I have labelled the variables in Figures 27(B), 28(B) and 29(B) as presenting a favorable image of Biko to an American audience. All of the percentages in Figures 27(B) and 28(B) are below 5%, which I consider extremely low. Figure 29(B), which represents how often newspapers reported Biko's age, are comparatively much higher. The Washington Post included Biko age 20.58% of the time; the N.Y.T. 30.76%. Overall, most American newspapers did not concentrated on describing Biko's physical characteristics, with the exception of his age. American newspapers, did not describe the more human aspects of Biko as well as any negative features about South African society. (see Figures 24(B), 25(B), 26(B)). Thus, the American public was not encouraged to relate to Biko as a human victim of the South African government, but instead to view Biko only as a young black leader who died in South Africa. The American public was not given the opportunity to use the Biko case as a magnifying glass, to understand the wider issues of police brutality and dehumanization perpetrated by the South African government on Azanians.

Figure VI-27B



Category J
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "tall and muscular"


Figure VI-28B



Category K

Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "soft-spoken".

Figure VI-29B



Category L

Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "29 or 30 years old or vigorous".


Figure 30(B), when compared with Figure 1(B), confirms that U.S. newspapers limited their coverage of Steve Biko by looking down upon him as insignificant in South African politics. The New York Times reported Biko as a "major political figure" only 4.6%, the C.S.M. 4.76%, and the W.S.J. and the W.P. not once. Judging from the American newspapers examined, we can conclude that reporters assumed Biko's position a micrology which did not merit a large amount of news coverage.

My coding of newspapers in Figure 31(B) was to determine the frequency of news references to Biko as "moderate and/or responsible leader". The W.P. has the highest rating in this category with 25.52%, followed by the N.Y.T. with 6.1% and ending with the W.S.J. and the C.S.M. who avoided completely the use of "moderate" or "responsible leader" in their assessment of Biko. In the W.S.J. the term "moderate" or "responsible leader" in describing Biko was replaced by the term "black leader," which can be looked upon as inter-changeable with the former terms due to Biko's perceived non-violent, non-radical stance. So in retrospect, as long as Biko's philosophy served as a peaceful alternative or solution to the South African problem of apartheid, "moderate," "responsible leader," and "black leader" can be looked upon as a similar label. The C.S.M. can be seen as taking the same ideological position as the W.S.J. referring to Biko as a "young black leader"

and meaning he was considered non-threatening.

Figure 32(B) is a histogram describing how often newspapers called Biko a "powerful" and "personable" leader. The rates in this category are all under 10%, which I consider extremely low considering the large following Biko had among young Azanians. The Christian Science Monitor credits Biko with these attributes more than the other three newspapers, displaying a rate of 9.5%. The Wall Street Journal did not consider Biko "powerful" at all, and I consider this a gross mischaracterization and an important omission.


Figure VI-30B



Category M

Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "figure of major importance".


Figure VI-31B



Category N

Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "moderate and responsible leader".


Figure VI-32B



Category 0
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "powerful" with "personal appeal".


Figure 33(B) indicates that American newspapers did not label Biko as a "militant". It is clear that most American reporters assigned to the Biko assassination perceived Biko's leadership and his philosophy as benign and passive. Figure 34(B) represents a diverse range of variables which were used to describe Biko in newspaper coverage. This miscellaneous category is also very low, with ratings of less than 15%.

Figure VI-33B



Category P
Histogram of newspaper articles describing Biko as "militant".

Figure VI-34B



Category Q
Histogram of newspaper articles in which Biko was described by "other references".

Conclusion:

Steve Biko was the kind of black leader prepared to negotiate with whites, able to lead a substantial part of the black community with whom any sensible white would want to consult..".³⁵³

... We are glad to read that Mr. Mondale has pulled back from his public advocacy of "one man one vote;" a worthy objective but an extreme demand at this stage...³⁵⁴

His (Biko's) death Monday night while in the custody of the police deprives South Africa of yet another moderate and responsible voice for evolutionary change.³⁵⁵

The American press coverage of the assassination in 1977 of Steve Biko by the South African security police was characterized by many blantant inaccuracies and the omission of important details surrounding his murder. In fact, often the U.S. press failed to report as completely and precisely as the officials who did have the most to lose from revealing the gruesome details of the murder. Although elled while the U.S. press continually praised and lab Biko as a "young black leader," infering that he was receptive to Western interests (see symbolic language category A), they simultaneously refused to condemn or implicate the South

³⁵³Washington Post editorial, 4 December 1977

³⁵⁴Christian Science Monitor, 20 October 1977

³⁵⁵New York Times editorial, 15 July 1977

African officials who were responsible for his death. It can be clearly stated in the Biko case that whether the U.S. press intended to or not its coverage of Biko's assassination protected and concealed the extensive and extreme brutalities of the apartheid regime. If the American press had wanted to expose the inhumanity, brutality, and viciousness of the South African regime, the assassination of Steve Biko would have provided an excellent opportunity. But although Biko was seen by the press as possibly friendly to Western business interests the friendship of the South African government was ultimately more valuable. So, as they had in the Angolan and Zimbabwean crises, the U.S. press apparently turned a deaf ear to the grossly unfair situation in South Africa, having the result of protecting Western economic interests.

It has been argued in this chapter that Biko was an important figure in South Africa. His philosophy should be placed in the same political paradigm as those of Fanon and Memmi, advocates of national culture and psychological liberation who believed that colonized people had to undergo psychological transformation and break the mental gap of inferiority complexes and racial hatred taught by decades of European colonial exploitation. Biko's leadership in SASO and BPC filled an important vacuum created by the incarceration of Robert Sobukwe of the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress

(ANC). The philosophy of SASO and BPC also attempted to bridge an ideological gap between past political movements and the contemporary revitalized nationalist organization. The U.S. press apparently emphasized Biko's pacifist philosophy to their readership to the near exclusion of exploring his revolutionary tendencies.

There may be certain limitations and contradictions inherent in that framework, some resulting from the philosophy itself, others from his limited role as a student leader. It is important to note, however, that Biko was murdered in his intellectually formative years. We can only assume from recent events which is deeply rooted in his Black Consciousness philosophy, such as the Soweto rebellion that Biko's philosophy would have developed, like the movements of Robert Mugabe and Amilcar Cabral, from a psychological attack on the problems of Azanians to a military one and indeed provided an important stimulus to the general popular support for the African National Congress' guerilla campaign which had developed dramatically since 1976.

Clearly, Steve Biko should be characterized as a revolutionary. He was anathema to both liberals as well as proponents of apartheid, because he rejected the simplistic concept of integration in South Africa as the political goal for Azanians. He viewed the fight for integration as a misuse of important intellectual energy and a misdirection

of the movement for total liberation. Biko considered the white liberals disguised racists, no less dangerous for the movement than the members of the racist Nationalist Party.

Although Biko did attempt to enlist white liberal participation in the movement in order to lobby in government circles on behalf of the incarcerated SASO and BPC members,-- Biko asserted that the most important contribution white liberals could make to the movement could be to begin propagandizing in their communities about the need to overthrow the government and to prepare the path for a new South Africa, Azania. Some American reporters, apparently ignoring the more sophisticated and analytical side of Biko, admitted to describing him in the bland terms of a "young black leader", because he seemed amiable to American and European interests and peoples. Consistently in my interviews with American reporters, they replied that Biko was labelled a "moderate" or "young black leader" (interchangeable terms) because they felt he wasn't an advocate of armed struggle and was amicable to Western interests.

Although Biko was also to manipulate and convince white liberals that he was "harmless," the South African government was not as easily deceived. The South African government realized the enormous revolutionary potential of Biko's literary work and his political organizations, and when banning him to King William's Town did not stop his

leadership and ideas of black humanity, from developing and spreading throughout South Africa in the shape of rebellions and threatened strikes, the South African government tortured, humiliated, then smashed the body of Steve Biko until he died on September 12, 1977.

Of course, one cannot destroy an important idea by killing its creator's body. As long as Biko's thought remains, Biko himself, even dead, is still a threat to the South African government and society. With the eloquence that is characteristic of his writings, Biko has once asked us to remember:

... We have in us the will to live through these trying times over the years we have attained moral superiority over the white man; we shall watch as time destroys his paper castles and know that all these little pranks were but frantic attempts of frightened little people to convince each other that they can control the minds and bodies of indigenous people of African indefinitely... We have set out on a quest for true humanity, and somewhere in the distant horizon we can see the glittering prize. Let us march forth with courage and determination, drawing strength from our common plight and our brotherhood. In time we shall be in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift possible--a more human face.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶Aelred Stubbs, Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, Ibid., p. 72.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The task of this research was to investigate American press coverage of the assassination of Steve Biko, the Cuban and South African intervention in Angola and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe immediately before the 1980 election. My theoretical problematique was to assess whether there was biased and incomplete reporting of African affairs and, if so, to determine if Lasswell, Bernay's, Chomsky and Keatskemeti's theories of propaganda could be applied in the news media in order to understand "unbalanced" and incomplete reporting of African events. This study endeavored quantitatively and qualitatively to document five themes or categories which recurred in American news coverage of African crises events, namely: The scope and balance of U.S. press sources used for the coverage of the event; Ethnocentric themes and symbols employed in the articles; Balanced reporting in the evaluation of African and non-African lives; Balance in reporting underlying interests and the context of people and events and, finally; The prejudicial usage of affective

language.

I examined a total of 633 articles concerning the Angolan civil war, the assassination of Steve Biko and the election of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. I coded eighteen possible characterizations in the articles as outlined in Chapter II. The data was subjected to statistical analysis and then illustrated through histograms. A very low percentage of the articles in reference to the three cases was devoted to highlight background articles, which characterizes the low level of the effort made by the four newspapers at educating its readership about background issues.

The contents of 330 articles on the Angolan crisis from the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal articles were taken from a critical three month period, October, November and December of 1975, which saw the Cuban military airlift and the granting of formal independence. Compared to the Biko and Mugabe press coverage the U.S. press devoted a significant amount of attention to the Angolan Civil War.

The volume of coverage devoted to the Angolan case is about 3 times that of the Mugabe case and about 180 percent of the coverage of the Biko case. This curious result has several possible explanations. For example, the press in foreign reporting usually has an easier time with wars than with complex political manouvres. Also, Angola

was one of the first southern African countries to militantly challenge minority rule. The Angolan case also involved major foreign intervention involving the threat of an East/West confrontation. In contradistinction, there was no immediate threat of external intervention in Biko's movement, namely Black Consciousness, which had not developed into a guerilla movement such as the MPLA. Indeed, it was conceived to be an alternative to the established liberation movements, ANC and PAC. The Mugabe case received almost 50 percent less coverage than the Biko case. This can be attributed to the fact that the Zimbabwean crisis surfaced after the death of Biko and the Angolan civil war and, as such, did not possess the "excitement" or the novelty of the other two cases.

In the Angolan case, the four U.S. newspapers examined consistently labelled the MPLA as "Soviet-backed", "Marxist-inspired" or "pro-Soviet" more than 55 percent of the time, while affectively loading descriptions of the FNLA and UNITA (opposing factions to the MPLA) as "pro-American" or "Western-supported" less than 35 percent of the time, and leaving them free of affective loading in the remainder of the articles. In particular, the N.Y.T. made reference to the MPLA as a "Soviet-backed" organization in 80 percent of its coverage, while affectively loading descriptions of the FNLA and UNITA forces as "pro-American" only 29 percent of the time, meaning that the MPLA was colored almost three

times as much as the FNLA and UNITA with a designated "unfavorable" connotation. Similarly, the W.P. denoted 56 percent of its coverage to describing the MPLA as "Marxist" while only coloring the UNITA and FNLA "pro-American" in 24 percent of its coverage. Correspondingly, the W.S.J. devoted 67 percent of its coverage to labelling MPLA as "Soviet-backed", 17 percent of its coverage to UNITA and FNLA as "pro-western" while C.S.M. denoted 77 percent of its coverage to describing the MPLA as "Marxist" and only 35 percent to describing UNITA and FNLA as "pro-Western". These figures suggest that the U.S. press' affective coverage of the MPLA was generally loaded with "unfavorable" connotations while at the same time a substantial portion of its coverage portrayed the UNITA and FNLA (MPLA's warring factions) in "favorable" terms - a clear case of unbalanced reporting.

American newspapers' coverage of U.S. clandestine aid to the FNLA and UNITA forces in Angola was generally low despite the critical importance of this involvement. For instance, U.S. Clandestine support for the FNLA and UNITA was reported in only 26 percent of the N.Y.T.'s coverage, 24 percent of W.P., 8 percent of W.S.J.'s and about 9 percent of the C.S.M.'s reports. The contrasting values of the coverage devoted by the N.Y.T. and W.P. on the one hand as against that of the W.S.J. and C.S.M. reports of U.S. clandestine aid to UNITA and FNLA clearly reveals the

inadequacy of the press coverage since it is clear that the information about the involvement was available. In other words, the N.Y.T. or W.P.'s coverage of U.S. clandestine aid to UNITA/FNLA was 3 times as much as the C.S.M. or the W.S.J.'s coverage; this is an indication of a knowledge on the part of the U.S. press of this clandestine war, but failure to give a major (i.e., greater than 50 percent) coverage to this issue. (See Chapter 3).

In all the 330 articles examined, only 1 article characterized Cuban involvement as positive. This fact is clearly revealed in Figure 4:1(A). In contrast, however, more than 30 percent of the coverage of each of the 4 newspapers described Cuban involvement as negative. In particular, 42 percent of the N.Y.T.'s coverage, 40 percent of the W.P., 37 percent of the W.S.J. and 32 percent of the C.S.M.'s coverage described the Cuban involvement as negative. This histogram in Figure 7(a) depicts the percentage of articles reporting detente as being threatened by Cuban involvement, (the highest value was 47 percent) while Figure 8(a) depicts articles that reported South African involvement, (the highest value in this case was 41 percent). Figure 10(a) represents the histogram depicting articles in which South African involvement was reported simultaneously with Cuban involvement being described as negative. Most Africans and many other observers regarded the South African involvement as justification for the Cuban

intervention. The values recorded in Figure 10(a) are comparatively high, thus clearly indicating biased (against Cuban involvement) and unbalanced reporting in terms of foreign intervention. The U.S. press displayed a selective "blindness" by not sufficiently reporting South African involvement or affixing a "South African - supported" label to UNITA/FNLA.

The Angolan case study displayed a pattern of unbalanced coverage in reference to affectively describing the MPLA versus the FNLA and UNITA forces.

The Biko case involves a lonely protest figure in South Africa. The question here is, what was the nature of the empathy the press developed? Steve Biko's emergence as an African leader in South Africa has to be seen within the context of the Angolan, Zimbabwean as well as South African political struggles. The Blacks in South Africa realized they could achieve emancipation through mass struggle just as in Angola and Zimbabwe. Biko's leadership in SASO and BPC filled an important vacuum in the political leadership of South Africa after the incarcerations of Robert Sobukwe and Nelson Mandela at Robbings Island. Steve Biko died on September 12, 1977 while in custody of the South African Security forces.

Generally, the American press described Steve Biko affectively as either a "black leader," or "leader of the Black Consciousness Movement"; both can be designated as

"favorable" colorations. They are favorable because they do not convey aggressive images relative to other terms often used. (See Chapter 3.) Only the W.P. denoted a substantial proportion of its coverage, 29 percent, to describing Biko as a "black nationalist" (which is coded as "unfavorable"). This reference is unfavorable because of its militaristic (i.e., guerilla-inspiring) connotations to the U.S. press readership. Even though Biko's philosophy of black consciousness was quite sophisticated and even complicated (considering the danger of being black and advocating the demise of apartheid in South Africa) the press overall rendered a simplistic description of his character and political program. The simplistic and reductionist coverage of Biko undervalues the full impact of his central ideology and undercuts the man's influence and effect outside his own community.

The data observations on the assassination of Steve Biko indicated that a large percentage (more than 40 percent) of articles examined were undiversified with regard to the use of both official and opposition sources. For instance, 56 percent of the W.S.J., 48 percent of the C.S.M., 44 percent of the N.Y.T. and 40 percent of the W.P.'s coverage used sources from only one of the contenders. Newspaper reporters who cover a crisis like the Biko assassination involving multiple contentious actors who consistently consult only one of these actors as a source of

information are establishing a pattern of journalistic neglect by failing to consult conflicting participants and are likely to be seen as unsympathetic to at least one side of the conflict. The reporters covering the episode, with a fairly high degree of consistency, consulted only one or two official sources for their information.

A greater percentage of the articles examined can be categorized as neutral with regard to ethnocentrism. However, the quantity of non-ethnocentric articles surpassed the ethnocentric articles, as regards articles published by the W.P. and the C.S.M. The N.Y.T.'s ethnocentric articles outweigh non-ethnocentric articles 6 times. All the W.S.J.'s coverage was neutral in terms of ethnocentrism.

Similarly, in terms of articles which consult both black and white South Africans on the issue of apartheid, most articles were found to be neutral in this category, which we are labelling "balanced"; 75 percent of the W.S.J.'s coverage, 26 percent of C.S.M.'s and 9 percent of the N.Y.T.'s coverage can be categorized as articles that reported consulting only one South African racial group on the issue of apartheid. In contrast, with a value of 0 percent by the W.S.J., 4 percent of the N.Y.T.'s and 13 percent of the C.S.M.'s coverage can be categorized as articles that consult both African and white South Africans on the issue of apartheid. The remainder of the articles did not indicate any source. Only the W.P. recorded a

greater percentage of balanced articles (in terms of the issue of apartheid) greater than unbalanced articles. Clearly, the U.S. press failed to report neutrally in this regard. Furthermore, there are few articles (less than 5 percent) that could be simultaneously described as diversified, non-ethnocentric, and consulting official sources for their information.

The comparative evaluation of the press coverage in relation to the constructed - approximation of Biko's assassination is presented in Tables 6A-I, 6A-II and 6A-III. The issue of accuracy that are important for the scope of coverage are:

- a. Biko's incarceration
- b. The extent of medical treatment given to a dying Biko
- c. Biko's journey to Pretoria's prison hospital
- d. Biko's death
- e. Notification of family of Biko's death.

In the first period (September 12 - September 17), during which the press had not had information about the facts, none of the newspapers examined gave coverage to Biko's incarceration. In the second period (September 18 - November 13), during which the information about the mistreatment had come out and Kruger rescinded the hunger-strike story, the W.P. gave a high coverage to Biko's incarceration and reported that Biko was kept naked on

handcuffed while in detention. In the third period (November 14 - December 31) when the inquest revealed the facts, the W.P.'s coverage of this category dropped from 42 to 0 percent, while the N.Y.T.'s coverage increased from 3 to 58 percent. So, as the N.Y.T. increased its coverage the W.P. decreased its own. The C.S.M. gave no coverage to this category (i.e., Biko's incarceration in the first and second period) and registered 25 percent in the third period. Again, a curious finding, suggesting selective attention by the press to details.

In terms of medical attention given to Biko while in detention, the W.P. was the only newspaper which reported that Biko was seen by doctors. The C.S.M. and the W.S.J. did not give coverage to the medical attention received by Biko in the three times periods, while the N.Y.T. and the W.P. continued coverage in the second and third periods. The N.Y.T. gave more emphasis to the mere fact that "Biko was seen by doctors" than that the medical treatment they gave him was inadequate. The W.P. maintained varied coverage between the version carried by the N.Y.T. and the claim that "Biko was refused proper medical attention." This clearly demonstrates incomplete reporting on the part of the N.Y.T.

The American press coverage of the 1980 election of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe displayed many of the patterns and trends of the 1975 Angolan case. The Zimbabwean case

study focussed on the election of Robert G. Mugabe, who was the country's second Prime Minister. The Zimbabwean elections were held in February and the results were announced in March 1980. Nearly 3 million people voted in the elections, accounting for 94 percent of the electorate. Mugabe's party ZANU (Zimbabwean African National Union) received 93 percent of the popular vote and terminated eighty years of white-minority rule in that country.

Robert Mugabe was generally characterized by the press in terms that create unfavorable responses among the American public, for example, "Marxist," "guerilla" leader and sometimes as a "revolutionary" - (the third most frequently used description). The W.S.J. similarly called Mugabe a Marxist in half of its coverage, the C.S.M. followed with a percentage of 30 and the N.Y.T. gave the lowest value of 24 percent in this category. Overall, there are more unfavorable characterizations of Mugabe than favorable. One of Mugabe's highest values among the favorable categories was in reference to his role as the "ZANU" leader. The W.P. gave highest value of 31 percent, the N.Y.T., 14 percent, the C.S.M., 10 percent and the W.S.J., 0 percent.

The Mugabe and Biko cases present an interesting comparison. Generally, Biko was described in very favorable terms while Mugabe was described in less favorable terms. Overall, the W.S.J. loaded Mugabe's name with more

"unfavorable" terms than the other three newspapers. The W.P. has the highest incident of favorable terms applied to Mugabe. For example, in 14 percent of the references he was called "scholarly." In the great majority of cases he was designated as the "leader of ZANU", a description which perhaps reflects well on his leadership qualities in addition to simply identifying his role. In some instances, of course, negative connotations were applied to "ZANU" itself but generally the affective connotations were applied to the person. The C.S.M. has a fairly even spread between the "unfavorable" and "favorable" descriptions of Mugabe.

The analysis of the empirical observation in the election of Robert Mugabe is characterized by articles diversified in terms of the official or policy-making officials consulted for information. The W.P.'s articles covering the Rhodesian crisis revealed consultation of both official and an opposition group in their coverage 80 percent of the time. Similarly, 70 percent of the N.Y.T.'s articles can be characterized as diversified in this manner, while the C.S.M. recorded 65 percent and the W.S.J. 50 percent. In terms of articles which were coded as No. 2 (that cited only official and policy making sources), the N.Y.T. again has the highest value of 87 percent, W.P. recorded 73 percent, W.S.J., 63 percent and C.S.M. 65 percent.

The W.S.J., in terms of percentages, was the most

ethnocentric in its coverage of the elections of Mugabe, with a value of 37.5 percent. The C.S.M.'s coverage of Mugabe does not differ substantially, in terms of percentage, from the W.S.J. The N.Y.T. and W.P. were the most liberal newspapers in respect to ethnocentric reporting, but even the N.Y.T. and the W.P. produced percentages of 26 and 21 percent, respectively.

High frequency of articles that consulted both the official and opposition opinions and articles in which officials are contacted for information apparently did not have any effect on making the articles less ethnocentric. The analysis also revealed that the number of articles in which reporters consulted both Zimbabwean and European views on some aspect of the segregation or racial policies in Rhodesia was very low. This shows unbalanced reporting.

Overall, the press affectively loaded Mugabe's name with unfavorable connotations. Also there was a significant amount of ethnocentric reporting in the Rhodesian case despite the high level of communications between reporters and various sources.

In the three cases examined, various evidence of unbalanced and incomplete reporting was revealed. Various patterns of American coverage of African crisis events have emerged. In the Angolan case, the U.S. press clearly did not characterize the S.A. involvement in the same negative terms as it did in reference to the Cuban involvement. The

W.S.J. took the most adamant anti-Cuban stand of the four newspapers. Overall, the C.S.M. and the W.P. were also more concerned about Cuban involvement than the effects and consequences of South African intervention into the war, despite the fact that the C.S.M. was the only newspaper of the four which published one article attributing a positive quality to the Cuban assistance in Angola. Generally, the N.Y.T. presented the lowest proportion of articles that considered Cuban involvement as threatening to detente.

The Mugabe and Biko cases are interesting because of the contrast in press treatment between these two liberation fighters. Mugabe was portrayed in the press as a "Marxist" or a "guerrilla" while Biko was characterized in the favorable or neutral terms as a "young black leader." Ethnocentric rates were particularly high in the Mugabe case, as opposed to the Biko case where the ethnocentric values were relatively low. In the Mugabe case, the articles cited more policy making sources and were more diversified, in terms of contacting both sides of an issue, than in the Biko case where I found indications that fewer of the articles were diversified in terms of contacting both sides of an issue and cited several official sources for information less often. But the level of ethnocentric articles is relatively low compared to Mugabe's case. In the final analysis, the real similarity between the Biko and Mugabe cases lies in the narrow affective characterization

of these leaders. The press, generally, described both Biko and Mugabe by using very simplistic and shallow adjectives to describe very complicated and complex political personalities.

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APPENDIX

BIKO INQUEST WITNESS REBUTS POLICE New York Times,

11/26/77. By John Burns

Pretoria, South Africa

An expert who studied the brain of Stephen Biko testified today that the late black leader must have become unconscious immediately after incurring the head

injuries that ultimately proved fatal.

Dr. Neviles Proctor, a prominent South African neuropathologist, also asserted that the five brain injuries incurred by Mr. Biko almost certainly were caused by at least three separate applications of force to his head. He said the blows had occurred at about the same time, roughly five to eight days before Mr. Biko's death on Sept. 12.

The testimony caused a stir in the courtroom, Y since it conflicted sharply with police evidence. In the account by the police of a struggle with Mr. Biko that they have tendered as a possible explanation for the head injuries,- no mention was made of a period of unconsciousness, and the witnesses Shave accounted for only one blow to his head, when he allegedly fell against a wall.

Dr. Proctor's dating of the injuries also appeared to rule out a second possibility raised by the police, that Mr. Biko suffered his injuries in a series of bizarre incidents that occurred after then allowed him to be moved from their custody to a prison hospital. The incidents, including one in which the black leader was found fully clothed in a bathtub full of water, occurred on Sept. 9, only four days before this death.

Dr. Proctor, head of the Pathology Department

at the South African Institute for medical research, was summoned at the request of Sydney W. Kentridge, counsel for the Biko family. Mr. Kentridge has contended that the security police unit holding Mr. Biko in detention assaulted the black leader, then conspired to cover up his injuries, contributing to his death.

The prospects of the court accepting the police version appear to depend heavily on the conflicting testimony offered earlier by Dr. J. D. Loubser, The Chief State Pathologist, who was in charge of the autopsy on Mr. Biko. Dr. Loubser, who is not a brain specialist, commissioned Dr. Proctor to do a separate study of the black leader's brain after the main autopsy was completed.

Yesterday, Dr. Loubser told the inquest he thought it probable that Mr. Biko had incurred all five brain injuries from a single impact.

MOST SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES SEEM READY TO ACCEPT BIKO
INQUEST RULING The New York Times December 4, 1977, 3:1
by John Burns,

Johannesburg, -- A great many of the whites of South Africa, fresh from an election in which they overwhelmingly endorsed the government, seem disposed today to accept the official version of the death of Stephen Biko.

Yesterday, only 36 hours after an election that gave the biggest majority in the country's history, the inquest into Mr. Biko's death in police custody rendered the exculpatory verdict that the Government had predicted all along.

To the black majority, the ruling was an outrage. But among the 4.4 million white's the verdict appears to have been received more with relief than chagrin. For most, the presiding magistrate's finding that the security policy bore no responsibility for the black leader's death was a comforting vindication of the Government and the system they had just endorsed.

WHAT DO YOU WANT?

"Hell man, what do you want?" a salesman in a

record shop asked this morning, when a discussion with a customer turned to the inquest. "You put the police in the witness box, you go through their story with a fine-tooth comb, and you come up with nothing. Can we just leave it at that?"

Among others, the issue has not been so easily resolved. For them, evidence produced at the inquest that indicated questionable practices on the part of the security police posed fundamental problems. The fact that the Government has given no public indication that it intends to put a halt to such practices has compounded the concern.

The concern is felt by some who voted, with reservations, for the Government. But it is centered in the liberal community, among the 17 per cent of the country's 1.1 million voters that supported the Progressive-Federal Party, the only one of six parties to campaign actively for the abolition of the security laws under which Mr. Biko was held incommunicado until his death.

At the height of the inquest, someone scrawled a question directed at motorists passing a wall in the well-to-do northern suburbs of Johannesburg, a bastion of the Progressive-Federal Party.

'WHO KILLED BIKO'

"Who killed Biko?" it asked in letters four

feet high. Underneath, an answer was provided: "the South African Police."

Last night, within hours of the magistrate's ruling absolving the police and all other involved of any responsibility in the affair, another dauber set out to expunge the verdict on the wall. With painstaking care, he converted each letter into a flower pattern, leaving the original protest effectively obscured.

The gesture was symbolic. After 12 weeks in which the Biko affair was rarely off the front pages of the generally antiGovernment English-language press, and prominently displayed toward the end even in papers supporting the Government, many whites are eager to wipe it from their minds.

For some, it is not altogether easy. Testimony at the inquest showing that the security police treated Mr. Biko in a fashion that one officer likened to the way in which he would have treated a dangerous dog has been difficult to stomach, even for those who believe strongly in the system of racial separation and subordination that Mr. Biko opposed.

Yet, even those who concede uneasiness at the practices of the police often provide a ready justification. Usually, this takes the form of an assertion that policemen everywhere tend to excesses,

particularly where subversives are involved, and that the local force is different from those elsewhere only because its excesses have been exposed.

"Well, maybe they were a little rough on him," the record salesman said when his customer demurred at the suggestion that the affair should be forgotten. "But what's to get excited about in that? Remember what the Germans did to those Baader-Meinhof people who 'hanged themselves' in their cells? Same thing. You can't threat these terrorist like little lambs, or you'll end up in real trouble." He was referring to West German urban guerrillas who were reported to have committed suicide in prison after an unsuccessful attempt by other terrorists to win their release.

Another line is taken by some of those who oppose the Government and condemn what it did to Mr. Biko. While expressing horror of how the police kept Mr. Biko naked and shackled for long periods, then prevented his hospitalization even when symptoms of brain injury emerged, some liberals take comfort in the fact that the excesses were exposed.

"The verdict was obviously wrong," said a lawyer who monitored the inquest daily in the Pretoria courtroom where it was held. "But remember, the Government did institute a judicial inquiry, just as it said, which is more than would have happened in any

other country in Africa. Of that, at least, we can be proud."

LITTLE HOPE FOR FUTURE

Among the more pessimistic, such arguments are dismissed as illusory. One of the losing Progressive-Federal candidates in the election, campaigning in a desultory fashion a few hours before the polls opened, admitted that the Biko revelations had been a crushing experience for himself and his family, almost extinguishing their hope for the future of the country.

"Maybe the best thing that could happen to me would be to lose," he said. "That way, I would be forced to make a decision about our future. After everything we've learned in the last few weeks, I really wonder whether anything is going to save us from the ultimate catastrophe. When that happens, do I want my family to be here?"

The view was not uncommon among those who have professions that are portable. Emigration, running at record levels since rioting broke out in black communities across the country last year, has quickened in recent months. For the first time in years, more whites are leaving the country than are coming in.

Since public criticism of the inquest verdict carries the risk of citation for contempt of court, few of the anti-Government newspapers today offered any

assessment. But the Rand Daily Mail, consistently one of the most vigorous of the opposition papers, said that the findings "is probably going to have as much of a shock effect, at home and particularly abroad, as Mr. Biko's death in detention did to begin with."