

Towards an Adaptive Culture: On the
Evolution of the Social Basis for Political
Choice in a Plural Society
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the sources of political behavior in culturally plural societies. It posits a model of political attitudes, behavior and coalition preferences which is evaluated using data gathered by the author in a country-wide survey of Nigeria carried out in 1974.

The predominance of cultural sources of political preference is found, and the differential role of ethnocentrism versus culture-centrism was investigated. The particular influence of social distance in influencing types and volume of coalition formation and preferences is seen as a basic parameter in the politics of Nigeria and probably in many other plural societies. The role of social mobilization in exacerbating ethnocentrism, and other culture-based differences, is evaluated and found to exist but to vary considerably across groups.

The implications of these differences are briefly discussed and the relative contribution of group versus individual status differences are considered.

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lucian W. Pye

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Preface

The preface is usually the place in the manuscript where: (1) those that have contributed to the work are thanked and (2) a note on why the work was undertaken is included.

The answer to the second point, why the work was undertaken, can be brief. In the late 1960's, I was convinced to join a project in an area that I had no expertise on, the analysis of political instability in African states. The research question was to analyze the reasons for the pervasive character of political instability in so many African states, and what public policies would be appropriate if these societies were to operate as open societies that were responsive to the demands of their citizens. This work is a contribution to that process which has already resulted in a number of analyses of politics in African states.

The answer to the first point is complicated by the sheer number of debts that I have, only a few of which can I enumerate here. The huge bibliography is citation to the influence of so many ideas that are dealt with in the text. The direct influence of personal contacts is ultimately the more fundamental reason for the work coming into existence, however.

First, the original group assembled at Northwestern as the African National Integration Project included John Paden, Robert C. Mitchell, H. Michael Stevenson and a long list of others who are already noted in our book, Black Africa. Michael Stevenson has played a major role because without his intellectual comradeship, I never would have trod the path towards political science as a profession.

At Ibadan, the late Professor Billy J. Dudley was an unparalleled example of the best of scholarship united with the common-sense wisdom of how to effect change once the problem is understood. He will always remain as a model to me and many others. The Rockefeller Foundation which sent me to Ibadan, and supported this research, and Mrs. Judy Asuni, who despite considerable field difficulties, supervised the extensive fieldwork are owed a great debt. The computer center at the University of Ibadan provided unlimited resources of computer time, something that has passed from the scene in North America.

At M.I.T., the list of people that have been important in my intellectual development includes Lucian Pye, my thesis supervisor, and Ithiel Pool. These men embody the intellectual standards and openness to new ideas that are best indicated by the prodigious quality and quantity of their students over the many years of their teaching careers. They set a model for all of us to follow.

Others to whom I owe much include James Short, Peter Steven, Richard Fryling, Hayward Alker, Wayne Cornelius, Ann Fryling, and Joshua Cohen.

There are several other scholars whose personal contact and collegueship shows up in these pages. Donald T. Campbell is most important in this respect as we have interacted at Northwestern and Harvard. I have learned much from him not the least of which is the generosity of time, intellectual curiosity and commitment to the succeeding generations of scholars that characterizes all of these men that I have mentioned above but no one more than Donald Campbell, a fact that I only add another piece of evidence to in a long line of personal testimonials to his intellectual and personal influence.

My wife, Jean Borgatti, and our children, Angus and Cecily, are not the reason for this work but they make the life around which the work exists a reason for being at all.

D.G.M.

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"sociocultural evolution is essentially a grand, intergenerational process of social learning."
(Langton 1981, 1419)

Introduction

This book is a study of the sociocultural basis for political development in a society with a plural political culture in an era of rapid social change.

Political development, in this sense, is a process by which states increase their ability to learn and adapt to a never-ending experience of change in the possibilities and constraints which confront them.[1] A society with a plural political culture is a state which has several historically independent political cultures which are spatially distinct in terms of their location and which possess a full range of cultural and political institutions. Descriptive, positive and normative elements are present, and the selection of Nigeria as the primary research site was guided both by the

[1] Of course, some equivalent of an ecological niche perspective would allow certain forms to be static for long periods of time. While development occurs when social learning takes place, a decrease in what is known (corpus of learning) is quite possible and even common.

theoretical relevance of this plural society and its openness to research, as well as the particular appropriateness of evaluating basic public policy options at this period in its history.[2]

The tale we have to tell here is one which contrasts with the classic story of Daniel Lerner (1958) who reported on his experience in two visits to a Turkish village near Ankara. Lerner's story and the theory that his book propounded quickly became a seminal statement on the modernization experience, and its source, the effects of wider communications, on the perspectives and expectations of men.[3] This theory of change has been widely confirmed in empirical social science. However, as in any story,

[2] The choice of Nigeria to test the credibility of the theory is not to be taken as an indication that this is a theory relevant only to Nigeria or to other African countries but that it is relevant to all culturally plural societies and to a decreasing extent to culturally more homogeneous societies.

[3] The key role of such 'stories' or exemplars as useful devices for capturing the essence of a theory is well known. The apple falling on Newton's head, for example, in physics. Such gestalt imagery is consistent with the notion of paradigm or the cultural relativism that the notion of paradigm implies.

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there were many elements left out of its telling which were not thought to be important. Our own contribution is to extend the story to societies in which the complexity and inconsistencies of the institutions, beliefs and norms which aggregate individual change to social change cannot be left out without seriously misleading us with regard to the effects of modernization.[4] This extension is not without many omissions on our part as well. Many details of individuals and groups, and of economic and historical forces, for example, are omitted. Our concern here is with political culture, the glue that makes communication across levels of aggregation possible and that forms the basis for political institutions. Further, we are concerned with the complexities of states that are organized such that their constituent parts differ fundamentally on the 'rules of the game'. We are particularly interested in situations where the several political cultures are so organized as to lead to conflicts in the context of the institutionally specific arenas of political mobilization in which they compete.

[4] This is what is referred to as specification error in polimetrics. This error occurs when estimation of the effects of variables included in an analysis are distorted because of omitted variables which affect the included measures.

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Nigeria, is a classic case where this complexity and institutional inconsistency have exacerbated the cultural pluralism, leading to disastrous consequences.[5] The recurrent ethnically-based riots, especially in the North directed against Southerners, particularly Ibos, and the many less visible elements of ethnocentric and culturcentric behavior are stories told many times over in most, but not all, plural societies throughout the world.

The results of such behavior are also a story familiar to all. Political instability has been endemic in Nigeria throughout her independence period. Four military governments and two civilian regimes, a civil war where deaths have been estimated by some to be in the millions, and much more that escapes the purview of the public, ranging from unreported coup attempts to pervasive small-scale ethnic discrimination have all been a part of recent Nigerian history. This familiar story, however, was not predicted by the specialists on the politics of Nigeria

[5] For example, Mann comments on the Yoruba with respect to the importance of the cultural base for understanding action. (In Triandis and Brislin:1980,180) See Post and Vickers (1973) for their model of Nigeria as a 'conglomerate' society.

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nor were similar outcomes predicted in many other plural societies. Many writers saw a different world, one more akin to Lerner's village or one where class conflict would be pre-eminent.

The present author saw that world also. While living and traveling in a country that is generally ordered and law-abiding although one in which summary punishment of crimes such as theft can be severe and immediate, it seemed that the orderly development of a more 'rational' and 'just' society organized on democratic principles could be conceived. But modernization produces interaction among cultural and ethnic groups with results not unlike paradigm conflicts in science, that is conflicts not generally resolvable by some appeal to an external truth or logic.

Thus our central objective is to understand the nature of conflict generation at both the individual and social levels, and the manner in which the institutional structure can have profound effects on the social usefulness and value of such conflicts. In particular, how do the micro (individual), meso (institutional), and macro (societal) levels of the political system interrelate and how can this

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be configured to produce an effective and responsive polity.[6] How should basic expressions of the political culture such as the country's constitution be configured? How can the 'kleptocracy' be avoided?[7] Of course, no single set of political institutions is appropriate to all societies but we assume that it is possible to configure institutions in such a way that the several political cultures can interact and change in a way that is beneficial to the society while still maintaining a process which aggregates and responds to individual demands. Such a configuration is intended to encourage the general social

[6] Harrison White (1981:44) notes that there is a "central weakness in much social science theory: the lack of effective description and accounting of concrete social structure at levels beyond the individual person or group but short of the levels at which culture comes into its own and provides crutches to the analyst." He proposes embedding the economist's view of the neoclassical theory of the firm into a sociological view of markets. Much of the perspective incorporated in this book reflects a similar goal although one that originated from another perspective. As with White the fashionable view of the importance of political economy is one that this author disagrees with. The importance of culture and status as reflected in the model-of-man as control-seeker where 'economic' elements are merely aspects of the larger set of statuses should make that apparent. Weintraub (1980) presents an economist's case for the relation between micro and macro phenomena. Robert Welch (1980) contrasts vertical and horizontal communications processes in economics.

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learning process. While this objective can be criticized as 'inefficient', such a criticism would be concerned with efficiency of the short-run variety. We see a trade-off between short-run and long-run efficiency as a political analogue to the Schumpeterian hypothesis in economics. That hypothesis holds that whatever the issues of static efficiency (as mirrored in the mechanistic views of neo-classical economics, for example), the role of innovation and change (dynamic efficiency) must be central to the social experimentation that is necessary if a polity is to continually adapt to new societal circumstances and possibilities, many of which are beyond the society's control or even its explicit comprehension.[6]

This argument stresses the key importance of the interaction between culture and institutional forms. It is not intended, however, to argue that an appropriate structure is sufficient for the socially useful channeling of conflict but that lack of it is generally insufficient.

[7] This is a term from Andreski (1968) which characterizes a country run by an elite for their own personal profit and centers around corruption as a basic political reality and the centerpiece of the informal organization of the political process.

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The role of participation and other elements of the adaptive process within the social structure are important both as an element of the political structure and the political process.

[8] This is also expressible as an open system versus a closed system approach. In the former, the issue is to be able to deal with external effects which are not known, or in many cases knowable, even to a probabilistic level. An Adaptive Culture is one where such learning processes are central to their *raison d'être*. A democracy is a classic form for such dynamic social efficiency and this 'experimental society' property may be one of the key justifications for democracy. In a sense this is analogous to the 'missing link' in economic analysis. In neoclassical economic analysis, the central issue is the allocation of input to the production process. One major critique of neoclassical theory is the concern for the role of the motivation of the actors in affecting the output from a given input is reflected in Liebenstein (1980). The neoclassical approach has virtually nothing to tell us about how whole industries come into or go out of existence. This issue of intertemporal allocation as an adaptive or innovative process has a clear analogy to our Adaptive Culture approach. We hold the view that the economic process should be seen as a special case of a sociological process. Note, however, that "the evolutionary trajectories seldom if ever lead directly toward global optima" (Lumsden and Wilson:1981,195) See Greenfield and Strickson (1981) on the relation between entrepreneurship and social change. See Granger (1980) on Forecasting and its limitations. Also see D. D. Anderson (1979). Cohen and Jaffray (1980) detail the notion of rationality under complete ignorance, a situation which leads to a decision process quite different from that under uncertainty.

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Since this complex process has not been adequately accounted for by an existing theoretical formulation, we need to build a 'better mouse trap'. We can summarize the aspects of an empirical theory of this process as an open systems, multi-level model that emphasizes the central role of culture as the basis for communication and therefore action. In the following we present a brief summary of the theory that is fully elaborated in Part I.

Social Change in the Plural Society -- A Theory

A plural political culture exists in a sovereign state in which there are several historically independent political cultures which are spatially distinct in terms of their primary location and which possess a full range of cultural and political institutions, including language and religion.[9] While the cultural variations in most of the industrialized countries are not minor, they are for the most part diminishing under the influence of standardized mass communications and a history generally dominated by a single culture, common language, and shared institutions.

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In a plural society this is not the case. In such states the members of these cultures have limited contact with non-members, at least historically. Their history as groups with at least some sense of corporate identity antedates the state, and no single group dominates all the others in terms of numbers, location or resources.[10]

Although we will not raise the issue of the vertical stratification of groups here, we will raise the issue of predicting when and how local assimilation takes place and its implications for the stratification of assimilated groups is a common phenomenon in many societies.[11] The plural political culture has been characterized as a

[9] A political culture is often understood to be bounded in the same way as the political system. While there are almost always one or more significant 'sub-cultures' in any state, many states have one culture which is sufficiently dominant that the approximation of assuming it to be the only one is not seriously inaccurate. The persistence of such sub-cultures in a society over long periods of time can be noted in almost all long established states. Berger (1977) discusses the Bretons of France, and Rokkan (Merritt and Rokkan:1966) writes of the 'eight worlds of Spain, for example. Much of these subcultures reflect the history of the country. For example, Spain was unified as a reaction to an external enemy, the Islamic Moors of North Africa, and thereafter its power was buttressed by the ensuing receipt of massive wealth from the exploitation of the New World.

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"conglomerate society" by Post and Vickers (1973). Marked by considerable heterogeneity, its population is organized into separate entities largely on cultural grounds, which contrasts with the 'corporate society' of Schmitter (and Durkheim) in which society is organized on functional grounds such that no group has all the elements of a complete social organization.[12]

In Figure 1.1 a schemata for the analysis of political behavior in the plural society is presented which relates sources of conflict to political behavior and coalition formation. Three sources of conflict are specified. First, the direct source of conflict which relates to external and technological forces is expected to be weak relative to the

[10] For example, Furnivall (1948) described this type of society in the Dutch colony which became Indonesia. Boeke (1953) also characterized such a plural society. More recently M. G. Smith (1969 in Smith and Kuper) has written on the plural society. Smith adds cultural stratification to the list of a plural society's characteristics, a concern which emanated with his experience with the West Indian colonial planter society which was dominated by a white elite.

[11] Note the Russians in the Soviet Union, the Tutsi in Burundi, and until recently the Americo-Liberians in Liberia, as examples of cultural stratification in plural societies.

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other two. External sources will manifest themselves politically via their effects on vertical and horizontal cleavages. Further, our Law of Cleavages argues that horizontal cleavages which reflect culturally based differences will dominate cleavages based on economic or other non-descriptive aspects of conflict.


Various modifiers to the effects of such conflict exist and play an important role in differences across states in political outcomes. We have labeled these exit, voice, and loyalty.[13] Exit, the dominant conflict modifier in some states allows individuals to escape or ignore their group constraints by social, spatial, or psychic mobility.[14] The modernization process while allowing such mobility

[12] Lijphart (1978) discusses those small European democracies which are plural societies, arguing for a form of government that he and others call consociational democracy. Indeed the plural political culture is a common social form found in African states, several south Asian countries (e.g. India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia), various Western Hemisphere countries (e.g. Canada, Guatemala, Guyana, and Bolivia), and many European states (e.g. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).

[13] These terms are those used by Hirschman (1970) although the meanings as they are used here are not the responsibility of Hirschman. These terms are defined in chapters four and five.

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Figure 1.1 Basic Schematic for the Analysis of
Social Change in a Plural Polity



[14] These states are few in number and tend to be the 'new nations' such as the United States where the reality of much of its early history included the difficulty of preventing people from exiting situations that they did not find desirable.

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processes tends to encourage many more to try for the prizes which are few in number. This encouragement is produced via social mobilization which is a process whereby people are exposed to new environments and ideas because of massive migrations, usually rural to urban; substantial expansion of formal education and the mass media; and the exposure to a purportedly new and often vaguely defined world view. That such forces produce reactions to the conflicts that such a process engenders is well known. We label these reactions 'voice' and further argue that social mobilization leads to greater political cognition and participation.

So far our statements have not deviated significantly from a situation which we would expect in a culturally more homogeneous state. It is our category of 'loyalty' which deals with this. We argue that not only does cultural conflict increase ethnocentric behavior in politics but that individual mobility and social mobilization while serving to decrease cultural variation also increases ethnocentrism at the same time. Consequently, we expect that the role of ethnocentrism as a basis for political mobilization is based both on 'real' cultural conflicts or inconsistencies (i.e. disputes over the 'rules of the game') and on grounds

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related to historical assertions of group identity which may reflect little real differences except for the identity of the actors.[15]

As we have noted, we expect that the arenas of political conflict, the context, will have a major and profound effect on how the conflicts, modified as they are by the forces of exit, voice and loyalty, will result in political outputs and outcomes. The notion of an Adaptive Culture plays a major role here since arguments for avoiding purely ethnocentric conflicts as well as encouraging social experimentation depend heavily on the arrangement of the various overlaps of boundaries with political arenas of conflict, such that conflicts will be, and be seen to be,

[15] Garrison (1977) provides data to support the idea that social mobilization 'creates' and solidifies ethnic boundaries. Lumsden and Wilson (1981:157) discuss ethnocentrism in the context of a biocultural model. They also link the propensity of the brain to rely knowledge to behavioral action such as ethnocentrism. (p 103) They cite Tversky's work on the tendency to ignore personal experience in decision-making and his view that individuals tend to choose an exemplar or ideal type as the basis for evaluation instead of actual experience. (p 88) Separating these different aspects of ethnically-based behavior is important because our assertions as to the appropriate political arrangements are fundamentally different in the two cases.

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variable-sum games in which cooperation is to the benefit of all or most actors.

While this book deals with a set of issues which are sufficiently diffuse in scope as to have a large number of hypotheses to test, there are some of central importance which can be summarized as follows:

- (1) In a plural society, horizontal cleavages based on cultural differences will be the dominant basis of political action and coalition formation over vertical and external sources of conflict. They will also be the principal basis for belief differences.
- (2) Social mobilization and modernization will act to mitigate cultural cleavages among similar cultures and to enlarge the differences between dissimilar cultures.
- (3) Modernization will increase ethnocentrism in plural societies just as it increases nationalism in culturally homogeneous societies. This process will lead to increasingly inflexible bases for political coalitions.
- (4) Context as a measure of history and sequence will exert an additional effect on the system biasing against change in the socio-cultural and political arrangements.

Objectives of Explanation - The Search for a Scientific
Theory of Democracy

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We want to provide a theory that accounts for the underlying dynamic of this development process. The first question that arises in that context is - What is wrong with the existing theories and accounts? We find them all inadequate explanations for Nigerian political history for reasons as summarized below.

First, we contrast our work with that under the headings of social mobilization and modernization theory, and their emphasis on the implications of changing communications patterns. Our concern here is not with many on the abundantly confirmed conclusions on the effects of such change on individuals, for most of which we find considerable support in this study (see Chapter 15). Rather, our concern is that such work did not adopt a model of man more in keeping with that of contemporary cognitive psychology which emphasizes the tendency of individual actors to try to reduce the complexity in their environments to something that they can manipulate with their limited or bounded rationality.[16] As a result of such a modified model we have an expectation that many of the values and beliefs as well as expressed identities that 'modernizing' man holds would be little different than his predecessors.

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Consequently, we emphasize both the development of an appropriate model of man and the role of ethnocentrism and culturcentrism in his action.

Secondly, we evaluate arguments that refer to 'tribalism' or other attachments to atavistic identities as 'explanations' of political outcomes in plural societies as seriously deficient in that they do not explain why such attachments persevere and how they function. Such explanations ususally lack a sense of the dynamic of a process in which identities either change or their salience to various arenas of conflict change. The inability to differentiate between and account for those identities that are maintained versus those that are not is crucial.

Another form of explanation is provided by the positive political theorists. Various forms of coalition analysis in this formal modeling tradition are advanced to account for the attaining and maintenance of power by competing groups.

[16] Gurr (1970) developed a model of man which emphasized relative deprivation as the motivation to act. Our model of man as control-seeker is generally consistent with his view but somewhat wider in scope and does not rest on the Festinger notion of deprivation.

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The minimum winning coalition model, for example, which predicts a coalition will be formed from all possible combinations which will be no larger than that which is necessary to attain and keep power, is an example of this approach. It treats the size of the group as the key characteristic and omits in its formulation fundamental aspects of coalition formation including affective bases for action. The lament by some that all would have been different in the First Republic if the Ibo-led NCNC and the Yoruba-led Action Group could get together omits the animosity between members of the two groups as well as the reality that the two groups as possessors of most of the high level manpower in the country were in the most direct competition for the power to allocate jobs to that manpower.

A related and common interpretation of Nigerian politics centers on the central role of elites in the determination of political outcomes. To the extent that this determination is within the confines of the 'possible' there is merit to the disproportionate role of elites. As in the positive political theory perspective, there is no notion here of the fundamental limits to action that the mass-base of these parties represent. An important aspect

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of the empirical research reported on herein is to document the strength of those constraints.

A common explanation of political behavior is to contrast classes of people in which the membership of the classes is defined in some manner with respect to economic or political power (e.g. ownership of the means of production, authority relations with others etc.). In Part I we develop a Law of Cleavages which argues for the priority of communal bases for political mobilization in culturally plural societies over other bases for mobilization including those centered on commonality in relation to the means of production. While this is a complex issue, and one where class conflict can be important within ethnic groups we do not believe that the evidence presented here or in the 1979 elections, for example, contravene this Law. Further, we believe that such a Law is basic to the explanation of politics in culturally plural societies.[17]

Related to class conflict models are extensions of some of this logic to interstate relations in which the manipulation of one country by another, or by its agents,

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(e.g. multinational corporations) is central to political outcomes. We see little evidence to support such a notion in Nigeria although external linkages clearly are not without effect.[18]

As Cohen has observed in his comments on the "maladaptive features of Nigerian (and possibly Third World) bureaucracies": (1980:85)

"the very infrastructure created to carry out development is, in fact, one of the main obstacles to its achievement." (1980:73)

Various forms of institutional analysis have prospered

[17] The history of class conflict among the Yoruba and Hausa is well known, for example. However, appeals to ethnic, religious and regional unity against other groups have been effective in Nigeria just as they have been elsewhere (in Europe during World War I, for example).

[18] Thomas Biersteker (1978) evaluates the case for external manipulation, particularly by multinational corporations, of the Nigerian economy. Of course, the dependency on oil revenues has a clear effect on the country and the recent decline in real prices for oil and the dramatic drop in production may have profound effects on Nigerian politics. Dietz (1980) reviews the theoretical issues in dependency theory and Cross (1979) describes some of the mobilization effects and pathologies in dependent societies in the Caribbean. Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) give an analysis utilizing similar concepts for Ghana.

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recently but usually in such forms as corporatism, patron-client models, or related theoretical perspectives. Many of these have developed out of empirical data bases which include culturally homogeneous societies (Portugal, for example, or many Latin American countries).[19]

The reason that these perspectives are unsatisfactory is twofold. Partly, of course, any monistic explanation is unsatisfactory because of the many social forces and levels of aggregation and explanation that are involved in the study of a complex polity. Consequently, we will feel free to call upon these other aspects of explanation where appropriate. The second reason lies more basically with many of the presumptions made in these analyses. The presumption that ethnicity is a form of identification that will wither as individuals become 'modern' is now known to be without clear empirical foundation. The Hobbesian notion that centralization of political power and institutions will

[19] Harrison (1980) characterizes the political evolution of modern democracies in terms of pluralism and corporatism. The rule by the bureaucracy in Nigeria is an essential ingredient in the country's political outcomes but one which reflects many of the conflicts between the several political cultures.

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be most effective in the speeding of modernization and the controlling of 'nasty and brutish' men is increasingly questioned, particularly as a strategy in the plural society. The reality that political analysts, as well as other humans, try to ignore is the unpredictability of much of the future, especially in detail, and the implication which follows that a more flexible and 'experiment driven' society (e.g. the Adaptive Culture) is necessary in such an open systems reality.[20] In the Adaptive Culture we would expect the political center to be more of an arbiter and referee on this process and a stimulator of new experiments.

We can summarize the objectives of the study as follows: First, we examine the content and boundaries of Nigeria's several political cultures looking at the process by which socio-cultural boundaries are formed and maintained; the processes of cultural transmission, socialization, and internalization of beliefs, values and identities. Second, we examine the ways by which social change influences social, psycho-cultural and political boundaries, and the mechanisms by which cleavages converge or cross-cut to affect political attitudes and behavior; to see how shocks to the system are resolved; to differentiate

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the effects of achievement, ascription and context in terms of their effects on the dynamics of culture-change and the bases for political mobilization.

Third, we want to evaluate the specifically political consequences of social change in order to identify the scope

[20] Such a view of the world and the bounded or limited rationality notions that accompany it have important implications for a theory of democracy and society. In this sense, the democratic model is an assault on Weber's notion that the most advanced sociopolitical form is the rational-legal bureaucracy. Indeed, most sociologists from at least Marx onwards have not differentiated the ability of knowers (individual and collective) to predict the future and therefore to plan for it, from the actual historical occurrences which are known only a posteriori. This denial of an open stochastic system prevents the evaluation of a central missing link in the development of social science explanation, since it does not concern itself with society and its component actors as learners and knowers. Following the stress on the limits to individual and by inference, group rationality, a rational-legal bureaucracy is useful only as much as it can continually reallocate its efforts to deal with an ever changing mix and volume of requirements and possibilities. Thus the role of 'ideal types' as a basic method for presenting and discussing political phenomena can have serious limitations and nowhere is this more true than in culturally complex societies undergoing change in an era of massive modifications of the technological, and international, constraints and possibilities. As Cohen (1980) noted above bureaucracies may be especially weak in facilitating this adaptive function unless their task is very well-defined and does not require innovative processes to operate.

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that various levels of political organizations should have in order to be both adaptive and effective. Fourth, we want to identify those aspects of change that are socially and/or politically manipulable. For example, issues such as multiple loyalties which many argue are basic to the democratic process, or the inconsistencies of pragmatic approaches to problem solving will be investigated with regard to their congruence with the observed structure of the several social organizations. A fifth objective is to develop a theory of the mechanisms by which social change operates to alter the course of a plural political culture in order to differentiate between adaptive and non-adaptive socio-cultural political patterns.[21]

Thus a central perspective in our analysis is the attempt to unite the cultural theory perspective of Weber in which the individual culture-bearers' culture is aggregated to the society level (e.g. the 'Protestant ethic') with the group perspective of Simmel where the force of the group's structure and institutions give form and direction to social and individual energy.[22] While it is useful to investigate the various levels of human behavior, it should never be overlooked that it is the interaction across and

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between levels of aggregation that account for the socio-political outcomes. Of course, in any specific situation the importance of one level over the others may be clear but to generalize this can be highly misleading. The failure to understand this fact is of more than academic interest since it has been the source of much human misery in recent decades.

As a result of this need to examine the interrelation between the various levels of the polity (micro, meso, macro), we need to provide explicit models of the actors at each levels and their linkages. In the following section we

[21] By emphasizing theory construction, we do not mean to avoid the imperatives of offering resolutions, partial as they may be, to the intense and often critical problems of large portions of the world's population. Because policy needs are so important, theoretical incursions which allow us to explore a maximally wide range of possibilities through gedanken experiments, theoretical explorations or computer simulations are highly desirable. Some reading this work may feel that the reader could have been told more about Nigeria or that more explanations of an ad hoc or situational nature could have been invoked. We are trying to avoid the failure of the area experts to fully understand the dynamics of the societies they studied by eschewing the use of "rich detail" and explanation by specific context cues etc. This is not to argue that such specificity does not play a role in all explanation but rather that we want to put as little of our explanation as possible in this category.

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summarize our views on those models (culture, models of man, political culture etc.) and then we summarize the theory that we develop around these concepts which is detailed in Part I.[23]

The Conceptual Coinage

Kaplan (1964) emphasized the conundrum between the need for well-defined concepts in order to produce good theory, and the need for well-specified theory in order to produce

[22] Another view is our attempt to provide an empirical demonstration of the structural sources of culture in individuals in order to modify the interpretive tradition in sociology which emphasizes the autonomy of individual action. Our data indicates a very strong link between cultural institutions and the actual beliefs carried by individuals.

[23] The concept of entropy can be used to characterize the information content of any system and therefore the change in such a system over time (the amount learned or 'forgotten'). We will use such a measure in our analysis of the Nigerian data. Entropy and its associated concept in communications theory are key concepts that are shared in much the same form across the physical, natural and social sciences. Issues such as degree of centralization in a society that Ross (1981) reports to have a fundamental bearing on inequality and hence on political outcomes are amenable to entropy analysis as are stochastic systems of all types.

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such concepts. Generally, the definition of concepts is done with as much brevity as possible so the analysis can get on to its objective, the evaluation of a theory in the context of some data set. We extend this process somewhat in Part I for two reasons.[24] First, the widespread use of key terms that are used in our analysis requires that the terms be clearly separated from the many and often vague uses to which they have been put. This process of definition is not an arbitrary one, however. We argue that our use of these terms is particularly appropriate and useful as a vehicle for understanding social change in a plural society. Thus chapters two and three offer an extensive introduction to these key terms. Second, we face a problem that is well articulated in the murder mystery genre. Namely, we don't need to provide a 'motive' in order to bring evidence to bear on a theory any more than the prosecutor in a murder trial needs, by law, to provide a motive for the murder. However, in both cases, it is unlikely that our minds will 'come to rest' in the Humean sense unless we find the motives for action credible.

[24] For those that want to get on with the analysis, chapters two and three can be skipped but not without the danger of some misinterpretation.

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Consequently, chapter three is concerned with models of culture-bearers including an analysis of why they act, that is their motivations. Since this issue differentiates a number of the competing approaches to social analysis, it is important to enter such a discussion in order to confront the reader's preconceptions.[25] Definitions for these terms can be summarized, as follows, however.

Culture

Culture permeates social existence like Emerson's 'Oversoul'. Societies are built on a long history of well-winnowed propositions and heuristics which provide the basis for a common conceptual coinage that allows and facilitates communications among the culture-bearers.[26] Mary Douglas (1975,xx) notes in her evaluation of Durkheim that it was his view that "the colonisation of each other's minds is the price we pay for thought." To this notion of culture as the 'rules of the game', we add the view of

[25] It is precisely the preconception as to the meanings of such terms that has played an important role in the problems of analyses of plural societies.

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Lumsden and Wilson (1981:86-87) on the limited ability of the mind to maintain more than a small number of basic elements (culturgens) of their culture. Our basic notions of culture are concerned with: (1) what actors are culture-bearers?; (2) What do these actors bear?; and (3) How do they transmit this culture to novices?

In response to the first question, we differentiate between two types of culture-bearers. First, the various aggregative institutions which bear and transmit a culture. This includes all social institutions but some of them have a particular responsibility with respect to cultural transmission which is well-known, language and religion being such examples. Culture-bearers of this sort possess

[26] The most fundamental boundaries which group and differentiate humans for the purpose of social activity are biologically based and usually small-scale in character. They relate to sex, reproduction and the family. However, most human groups, while derived from biologically based units, have via an intertemporal social evolutionary process been gaining in complexity, differentiation and the volume of knowledge possessed by the group relative to that possessed by an individual culture-bearer. Culture is the name of this cumulated knowledge Wassermann (1978) presents evidence on the neurobiological basis for psychological functioning. Goodenough (1981) gives a contemporary perspective on cultural anthropology.

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roles so defined that they include the responsibility for the articulation and transmission of culture. We refer to all institutional forms of the culture as the embodied culture-bearers. The second type of culture-bearer is the individual actor and we refer to him as the disembodied culture-bearer.

What is it that these culture-bearers carry with them? We want to stress the coherence of a culture and thus we find terms such as world view or belief system lacking in specificity and also lacking in the structure that cultures clearly possess. We see culture as possessing many of the properties of a scientific paradigm as developed in the writings of Kuhn. But we see important differences as well. While agreeing with many of its points, we go beyond the view of Lakatos where he responded to Kuhn in terms of a view about how the culture of science operates in which he advocated the notion of scientific research programs which consisted of a set of 'hard core' beliefs surrounded by various less strongly held views which were modified on the basis of empirical and logical analysis.[27]

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We define culture to be a set of hierarchically arranged heuristics that resemble formal theories at times in terms of their interdependence or interlocking character and which each culture-bearer carries in sufficient elaboration to quickly understand if another potential culture-bearer is 'one of us' or not.[28] These heuristics depend on an axiomatic basis which in turn rely on beliefs as to the nature of man, and the world that exists about each knower. Thus these highly organized set of heuristics are the basis for a shared symbolic map that governs the perceptions and pattern evaluations of the social and physical environment and that ensures via standard verbal and non-verbal communication that meanings of action will be standardized and shared by members of the culture.[29] This set includes the notion of appropriate 'rules of the game' that must guide a member of the culture in order for him to have participatory and comprehension competence with respect to the society, and the generative capacity to articulate new culturally consistent membership rules for novel situations and other challenges to the integrity of the

[27] See Gutting (1980) for an appraisal of the Kuhnian perspective.

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culture-bearers conception.[30] As with scientists, culture-bearers are generally unwilling to surrender their 'theory' even in the face of negative evidence without the advancement of a new, more encompassing theory which

[28] Cultures are not random occurrences. They exist only when a set of institutions exist to socialize new entrants into the population of the culture, and when those institutions are able to prevent socialization of perspective members into another culture. For example, it makes sense to talk of an elite culture only if there is a mechanism by which elites are produced as distinct from non-elites and which perpetuates the elite culture's values intergenerationally. This is not to imply that individuals shop in a 'culture market' for a culture. Fundamental perspectives and values come at an early age. Language, family, ritual, and religion provide for individuals a theory of the world that is significantly elaborated by the time the culture-bearer becomes aware of competing 'theories'. Thus we would expect that the most basic values and beliefs would be gained early in life (Primacy Principle) and the more ephemeral beliefs and attitudes which are more object and context dependent, would be gained at a later time (secondary socialization). See Searing, Schwartz, and Lind (1973,415) American Political Science Review 67,2 for a discussion of these issues. Hunt (1979:136) emphasizes that the first three years in human development are highly important to: (1) achievement of initiative (as the opposite of learned helplessness); (2) Trust (to help others and be aware of their needs); (3) compassion (empathy); (4) curiosity; and (5) learning sets which are important for later competencies. By adopting a model of culture as a set of interlocking heuristics we are taking an intermediate position between (1) the 'frame analysis' of Goffman (1973) which emphasizes the independence of the elements of belief systems, and (2) the strong 'deep structure' driven view of structuralists such as Levi-Strauss.

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increases net explanation or ordering of the perceived world. The more culturally competent the bearer is, the more difficult to alter the cultural component horizontally but the easier to integrate vertically.[31] This inertia with respect to change is present in all culture-bearers although it tends to be most severe at the embodied level.

We argue that the process of transmission from bearer to bearer is variously achieved by the embodied and disembodied culture-bearers, but the process of innovation or change in the cultural template is largely the role of the disembodied culture-bearers subject to the constraints on their actions by the embodied culture-bearers and other

[29] Bandura notes that there is "abundant evidence" that imitation is "extensively regulated" by its consequences. (1977:33-34)

[30] Culture serves many functions. It is a conflict regulator to Koch (1976). To Stevenson (1974:3), "Different views about human nature lead naturally to different conclusions about what we ought to do and how we ought to do it." Particular gestalts and decision rules are principally determined by cultural forces and basic recipes for action. For example, pragmatic or ceteris paribus approaches to decision-making may result in fundamentally different behavior patterns than more inflexible, consistent and integrated ideologies, or authoritarian cognitive styles. Perceptions of basic social groupings may reflect such differences.

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aspects of their environment.[32]

We argue that the dynamic of culture is directional and caused by humans searching for increased sense of efficacy and environmental control. We expect change to occur in spurts of 'revolution'. Hence, culture will change at a much greater rate during revolutions than in 'normal' periods. The process can be characterized as a shift from a normal period in which the ratio of things trusted or taken as true relates to those things that are doubted in a ratio of 99 to one, to a period in which this 'trust to doubt' ratio goes to 90 to 10 in the extremes of a revolutionary

[31] The dynamics of culture are not uni-dimensional. There are 'vertical' components which integrate disparate elements of the culture, and 'horizontal' components which differentiate and alter the boundaries of cultural inclusion. Cultures then learn in the direction of increasingly context-free, more abstract, more inclusive systems of thought. This is a common characteristic of science.

[32] Thus we are in substantial agreement with the perspective of Bandura who says, "the theory of behavioral transmission assumes that social behavior is, in large part, developed through exposure to modeling cues and regulated by reinforcement contingencies, many of which are prescribed by one's organizational affiliations." (1969:250-251) Bandura (1969:252) also suggests the need for a generative grammar of values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior.

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period. Hence, while major changes may occur in that portion of the culture and society which is doubted, it remains the case that the vast majority is not doubted. Hence, our expectation that cultures will only change slowly.[33]

Political Culture

This work is concerned with the part of culture which is relevant to the dynamics of political action and the political system. This part is political culture, and it is a key aspect in the analysis of social change in the plural society. Further, the culture is key to the adaptive

[33] Even in times of massive social change, most elements of a culture remain unquestioned or in the above terminology, trusted as being true perceptions of the world. Of course, some social structures strongly discourage innovation (doubt) because they are unable or unwilling to adjust to new and unpredictable situations. This is particularly true of both small-scale traditional groups as well as most hierarchical societies (perhaps including large corporations). Adjustment problems are pathological responses to change by cultures reified in their own past. An adaptive culture is one that both 'recognizes' such social pathologies and adopts a corrective procedure.

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character of the society. Historically, the convergence of social, political and cultural boundaries has motivated the genesis and maintenance of a polity as well as the tendency of a polity to expand to its cultural boundaries if they are larger than the original polity. The absence of such convergence can be a major element of conflict in a society.

The political culture mediates between outputs of the political system and the actual political outcomes. The role of culture in the control of perception and the guiding of action is underlined by Verba when he asserts that culture "regulates the ways in which formal institutions operate A new constitution, for instance, will be perceived and evaluated in terms of the political culture of a people." (Pye and Verba:1965,517)[34]

[34] Pye characterizes seven "universal problems or themes with which all political cultures must deal in one way or another." (Pye and Verba:1965,221-223) These themes include concepts of power and authority, status of politics and politicians, evaluation of performance, the balance between cooperation and competition, the scope and function of politics, and the affective dimension of politics. Other statements on the subject of political culture are made by Pye (1968) and Huntington and Dominguez (1975,10-30 in Greenstein and Polsby)

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Political culture has been widely recognized as a central aspect of political analysis. This tradition of analysis has developed under a variety of headings, including national character analysis which is often unsophisticated and tending to psychological reductionism. Almond's seminal 1956 paper gave a new impetus and focus to the field and it was followed by important empirical studies such as those by Banfield (1958), Pye (1962), and Almond and Verba (1963). In Africa, Hayward (1974), in a study of Ghana, finds "political culture" measures account for half of the variance in national integration measures. Wynia (1978) centers his analysis of Latin American politics around a political culture analysis which he refers to as the "Rules of the Political Game" and their interaction with the social and economic structure. Others such as Leites and George have done much to explore the 'operational codes' of elites, particularly in communist states. All of these studies have particular issues they deal with but all emphasize the roles of identity, trust, efficacy, and participation as key aspects of the political culture.

The political culture plays a key role in the determination of the legitimacy of the government outputs

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and actors. While elites are essential to the explanation of political outcomes, they must operate within the constraints as determined by the political culture. Further, the culture becomes increasingly important relative to other constraints on action in direct proportion to the fluidity of the situation.

Can various types of political systems be characterized in terms of their political cultures? Is there a mapping of the type of political culture onto the type of political system? The answer to that question is complicated by the fact that no political system has only one culture (although some come close to such an ideal type). Many scholars have attempted to define a culture-system link. Pye and Verba (1965:534) assert that a political culture most supportive of democracy is a system of multiple loyalties.[35] Dahl (1978) in a defense of the usefulness of his model of cross-cutting cleavages which he sees as essential for democracy clearly agrees. Whether the political system orientation is the product of a particular culture or an element of the culture itself is not clear. For example, a

[35] See Guetzkow (1955) on this perspective also.

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culture of pragmatists who habitually compartmentalize their mental representations of their activities and feel no need to be consistent across these activities may be necessary to the continued maintenance of memberships in cross-cutting organizations.

As with culture in general, political culture has both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The adaptive character of a political culture must cope with the often conflicting demands of (1) increasing the consistency and efficiency of the culture within the bounds of the existing system and (2) trying to increase the scope and range of its penetration.[36]

[36] One of the trade offs for the world as a whole is that states that are culturally homogeneous will be more aggressive externally while plural societies will be more fractious internally. Thus a world reflecting the Wilsonian ideal of a correspondence of culture and political boundaries may be both undesirable for the control of international conflict and for an adaptive or experimental society. This perspective also raises the question of the extent to which value consensus is necessary for a democracy. As Huntington (1981) argues the promise of disharmony between actual and ideal political forms and consequences may be necessary for a vital and dynamic society.

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Methodological Issues

We have characterized a culture as the shared and learned modes of communication, including language and belief systems, that members of a group use in order to provide a basis for human interaction. This definition poses severe problems from an empirical perspective, especially in terms of the evaluation of hypotheses. While we can verify claims about the level of certain indicators within a culture, we often need to use measures which are not appropriate to the statistical techniques available to us. Consequently, inappropriate and sometimes senseless quantitative measures have been used to meet arbitrary statistical requirements, and the usefulness of quantitative techniques for the study of culture has been denied with other epistemological devices such as 'thick description' (Geertz:1973) being substituted. The first approach is indefensible and we believe a better 'mouse-trap' exists than the second option particularly when the object is to study culture difference.

The essential methodological problem is that our epistemological devices for the empirical evaluation of hypotheses are 'variational'. They relate variation of one indicator to that of others and the important data (the

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shared values and hence the 'means') is eliminated) and the unimportant data (the 'noise' or the variation about the 'means') is central to the analysis. The obvious solution is to construct a data set such that the data reflects a mean as close to 'zero' as possible, hence one where the shared values across one culture are not those across other cultures in the sample and therefore the empirical conundrum is at least partially solved.

This requirement was one of the fundamental problems of the research design -- to find a research site that provides maximal variation in the relevant characteristics (e.g. culture) and minimal variation in the characteristics that we want to control (e.g. effects of different state organizations). The choice of Nigeria as the principal research site for this study was driven by a number of reasons but central among them was that it possessed one of the most culturally diverse populations in the world. Further, there is a considerable literature on virtually every aspect of the country written by both cultural outsiders and insiders so that emic and etic perspectives can[37] In addition there is a broad range of data at various levels of analysis available including a number of

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surveys in addition to the one carried out for this study.

Nigeria experienced seven regimes in twenty years, including a bloody civil war and about all the possible forms of political conflict. In addition the country found itself in an economic boom by the 1970's due to the country's position as one of the world's largest oil exporters. Thus Nigeria, a country of major importance, also is one that provides us with a good natural laboratory with which to evaluate our understanding of the dynamics of social change in a plural culture.[38]

[37] Pike (1967) defines these terms. Emic terms are culture universals while etic terms reflect the perspective of the insider or culture-bearer of any given culture.

[38] There are many empirical measures which point to the pluralism of Nigeria. Schmerhorn (1978:218-219) presents data on the extremely high degree of cultural pluralism in Africa compared to the rest of the world; Geertz (1963) refers to Nigeria as a type 4 society -- that is one gradated with several "large groups and many others diminishing in size to those of smaller and smaller magnitude." Ekanem (1972) documents variation on religion (p. 65), urbanization (p 60), ethnicity (p 67), labor force structure (p 55), and age distribution as reported in the 1963 census. Pell (1975:169) lists numerous incidents of ethnically related violence from 1950 to 1970. Additional information on the heterogeneity of the country is noted in an issue of Plural Societies (1971:2,1 p43).

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One other issue is that such research could actually be carried out in Nigeria whereas it could not in most other plural societies.[39]

We can summarize our methodological perspective which we elaborate in detail in Chapter Six as a multimethod, multitrait, multilevel approach which uses a number of data sources although particular emphasis is given to a nationwide survey that was specifically designed to evaluate this theoretical perspective.

Plan of the Book

[39] This is in large measure because of the commitment of Nigerian academics to this work, in particular, and to research in general. Most important in this regard was the late Professor Billy Dudley from the University of Ibadan who was one of the architects of the 1979 constitution and a man dedicated to the importance of truth in the affairs of the country. Also the military regime in the summer of 1974 represented a relatively open system where political prisoners were rare if not altogether absent and political repression was rarely experienced by most Nigerians.

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There are two parts to this book and several chapters in each part. The two parts are: (1) the presentation of a theory of social change in the plural society including a detailed discussion of the conceptual terminology that is necessary to this endeavor; and (2) the measurement and evaluation of the theory using Nigerian data.

The first part is divided into five chapters. In chapter two, the basic terminology that relates to culture, its transmission and culture's subset, the political culture, are discussed. The third chapter deals with models of the culture-bearers and the role of social change in the culturally plural society. We present a model of man as culture-bearer in some detail because most statements that we must make at the social-psychological, cultural, and political levels involve assumptions about how and why an individual acts that are often buried and/or ambiguous in discussions of political culture. The fourth and the fifth chapters develop a theory of social change and its effects on the political possibilities in the plural polity. The sixth chapter presents the methodological perspective that we will use in the testing of the theory.

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In the second part of the book various aspects of the theory are evaluated. In chapter seven the several dimensions of a political culture are defined, measured and evaluated. In the next chapter the implications of these dimensions for the Nigerian political cultures are dealt with in terms of this set of measures of the political culture. In the ninth chapter we turn to an examination of the boundaries of the political cultures. What groups of people constitute a culture-bearing unit? What relation between institutional determinants of culture and the culture-maps that individual culture-bearers possess is there? How does the culture relate to political phenomena and how important is it as a base of political mobilization. The tenth chapter is concerned with the secondary sources of these boundaries as the previous chapter was concerned generally with the primary sources.

In the eleventh chapter we turn to an analysis of the conflict modifiers. First we look at the role of ethnocentrism and its effects on group mobilization.[40] We

[40] See Brewer and Campbell 1976:74-78 for a discussion of this issue.

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expect such a process to be based primarily on cultural distance. In the twelfth chapter we detail more of the Nigerian evidence for the role of ethnocentrism in political coalition preferences. In the thirteenth chapter we turn to an analysis of an important source of the dynamicism in the system, individual mobility - social, spatial, and psychic. We want to evaluate how status changes have occurred, particularly intergenerationally, and in general how the political culture is affected by these mobility patterns. In chapter fourteen, we evaluate the effects of mobility experience on political coalition preferences.

The remaining three chapters in this part (fifteen through seventeen) examine the effects of social mobilization and locational and other contextual issues on political preference followed by a conclusion on the dynamics of Nigerian models of man.

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Introduction

Culture: Embodied and Disembodied

Definition of Culture

Culture: Its Transmission and Modification

Sources of Cultural Transmission

Enculturation: Timing and Sequence of Learning

Level and Integration of Learning

Environmental Context

Culture Modification

Political Culture -- Basis for Mobilization

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Summary

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CHAPTER 2

Culture and Its Transmission

Introduction

This book investigates social change as enacted in societies distinguished by plural political cultures, that is, societies with several significant ethnic, linguistic or cultural groupings. It presents a theory of such change and validates that theory with Nigerian data gathered from a variety of sources, including a large scale, country-wide sample survey designed specifically to subject the theory to empirical test.[1]

An empirical test of a theory of changing forms of political belief and action is impossible without first carefully establishing the empirical content of the basic

[1] See Chapter 6 for a full discussion of the data sources and methodologies. The survey was executed in Nigeria in 1974.

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concepts employed. The alternative is to acquiesce to a debasement of our conceptual coinage where terms lose their specificity and hence their usefulness in theoretical description and analysis. To guard against this situation, this chapter and the next define basic concepts which have been weakened by a too broad or conflicting usage and which are central to the statement of the theory. We also explore the relation of these concepts to our methodological choices and research design.

The intent of this study is not to describe a single country, although we hope the reader will come away with an enriched understanding of Nigeria and its political forms. Nor is our purpose restricted to countries at certain levels of economic development, such as the less developed countries (LDC's). Our basic concern is social change in any culturally or ethnically plural society. However, we will be examining plural political cultures from a certain perspective -- the perspective of public policy which requires an understanding of actual social dynamics in particular cultures. We wish to be responsive to the practical needs of the society and therefore we seek to generate testable predictive statements which can be

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confirmed, disconfirmed, or adjusted.[2]

The conceptual building blocks of the theory to be presented include: culture and its transmission; (culture - cultural transmission - political culture) in this chapter, and models of culture-bearers (man the disembodied bearer - plural political cultures - social change) in the following chapter. Each of these concepts carries an array of subsidiary concepts which will be developed in the course of the argument.[3] Our objective in delineating these notions at the outset is to ensure coherence and parsimony as we develop the equations of socio-political change.

The discussion follows the above outline of concepts seriatim. Following the discussion, we present a theory utilizing these concepts. In addition, chapter six presents the methodological approach and research design for the

[2] See Lakatos' chapter in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) for a discussion of theory construction. See Karl Popper on melioristic social science cf. Conjectures and Refutations; see Campbell (1969) on reforms as experiments.

[3] These are collected in a glossary at the end of the book.

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empirical evaluation of the theory.

Culture: Embodied and Disembodied

"'Culture' is . . . as essential to the understanding and prediction of events in the human world as is gravity to the understanding and prediction of events in the physical world."
(Kluckhohn:1967, 28)

But what is culture? Culture has been conventionally characterized as the totality of learned behavior, or as the way of life of a group of people in a society since the beginnings of cultural anthropology in the nineteenth century (Tylor:1871). More restrictive views of culture emphasize learned symbolic behavior, or the learned and shared pattern of behavior of a group of people living in a specific location and interacting socially. Although we are interested in the development of a more detailed, temporally dynamic, and theoretically relevant view of culture, these loose, all-encompassing definitions stand as a reminder that "the human biological design is open-ended" and that "its completion and modification through cultural learning make human life viable in particular ecological settings." (Keesing:1974, 74). Nevertheless, following Geertz's argument for cutting the "culture concept down to size", we

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restrict attention to the relation between social change and political culture (Geertz: 1973,4). The object is to define culture in a manner sensitive to the political dimension. We thus discriminate personality and social structure from culture. We adopt a definition of culture which accounts for the dynamic interaction and adjustment which transpires between culture and other aspects of human life and environment.[4]

To get a grasp on the concept of culture we should go to the beginning of cultural anthropology and the work of Tylor and in particular his definition in 1871 of culture as the central concern of anthropology-- "That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." (Alcock et al:1979, 9) Kroeber and Kluckhohn reviewing over 160 definitions of culture devised

[4] Kroeber and Parsons (1958) also called for the narrowing of the cultural concept. Murdock (1981) provides empirical evidence for the variety in the world's cultures. See Abrahams (in prep) for a discussion of changing cultures and Kaplan and Manners (1972) on culture theory. On the notion of culture in animals see Bonner (1980). For other discussions of the nature of culture see Schneider (1980), Bernardi (1978), and Plog and Bates (1980).

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since Tylor's time concluded that culture is a "set of attributes and products of human societies . . . which are extra-somatic and transmissible by mechanisms other than biological heredity" (1952:284) This statement becomes a starting point for viewing certain major changes in ideas about the nature of culture. The Chomskian 'revolution' in linguistics (Chomsky:1957) produced, for example, the resurgence of evolutionary thinking in approaches to social and cultural analysis that had been so strongly rejected by the previous generation of anthropologists, particularly Boas', and his students, Benedict and Sapir, as well as the British social anthropologists, especially Radcliffe-Brown.[5] Despite the variety of viewpoints and definitions of culture that we find it is possible to categorize them into two basic groups.

The first group of theorists are loosely identified as materialists. In their general agreement about the following points.[6] (1) Cultures are systems of socially transmitted

[5] Boas saw culture as the result of a random accretion of beliefs, values, practices, etc. (with perhaps the dynamic of integration or consistency behind the rejection or retention of particular innovations

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behavior patterns that relate human communities to their ecological settings; (2) culture change is primarily a process of adaptation and what amounts to natural selection; (3) the most adaptive and primary aspects of culture are technology, subsistence economy, and the social organization related to the production of goods where ideational systems such as religion, ritual, etc. are epiphenomenal adjustments to these primary aspects of culture; although (4) the ideational components of culture may have some significant independent adaptive consequences.[7]

[6] See the comparable discussion of cultural perspectives in Keesing. (1974:75-76)

[7] Representing various aspects of these views are Harris (1968) with his notion of 'cultural materialism', a Marxist oriented view of culture which nevertheless has been severely criticized by Marxist writers; Ogburn (1964) with his emphasis on technology as the engine of social change; Steward (1955) with his view of multilineal development path; Service (1968) with his "cultural evolutionism" and Barry (1976) with his recent articulation of the ecologically oriented tradition. While these views differ considerably, they all emphasize the primacy of ecology, technology, and observable 'real' or manifest phenomena. To the extent that these views are related to individual cognitive representations, they remain the causal forces which are fundamental to cultural formation. In other words, they represent the causal primacy of material over ideational elements in the explanation of culture.

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In sharp contrast to the materialist position is the perspective which emphasizes the ideational sources of culture. Representatives of this viewpoint believe that the biological, ecological, technological, and economic constraints on the formation of human culture cannot account for all or even most of the observed variations in cultures. They note that even when all material elements are held constant across groups, we can observe variations in cultures that cannot be ascribed to 'cultural drift' (Herskovits:1961) in which the differences are seen as merely epiphenomenal. There are three major traditions in the ideational viewpoint of culture, according to whether stress is placed on (1) cognitive systems, (2) structural systems, or (3) symbolic systems.

The first category emerged in the 1950's and it has been heavily influenced by the major advances in linguistics associated with Chomsky (1957, 1966, 1980) and by the emerging dominance of cognitive psychology over both the behaviorist model and the Freudian tradition each of which viewed man's conscious behavior as largely subject to unconscious determination.

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Other social sciences have also been influenced by the ideational perspective. For example, Parsons (1978) eventually accepted the need for explicit treatment of cognition in social analysis, an approach already clearly identified with the work of Ward Goodenough in the 1950's. Goodenough views culture as "whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members. Culture is not a material phenomena", but rather it is "the form of things that people have in their minds, their models for perceiving relating, and otherwise perceiving things, people, and behavior." (Goodenough:1957, 167) Thus culture provides the code that gives discreteness and sensibility to the material phenomena of the world. This perspective on culture has a clear analogy with Chomsky's contemporary view that language may be analyzed for its 'deep structure'. [8]

In contrast to Goodenough, a second category is represented by Levi-Strauss who evaluates cultures as shared

[8] As Peel (1973) notes, however, Chomsky's original view has been altered somewhat in response to various critiques and Bresnan (Halle, Bresnan, Miller:1978, ch. 1) argues for the need for increased emphasis on surface and lexical structures in the analysis of language.

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symbol systems that are "cumulative creations of mind" (Keesing:1974, 78) and his approach is to try to infer the principles of mind that generated such observed systems. For example, Levi-Strauss, in this second ideational approach, (1970) argues that men transform the 'raw' materials of the physical world into the 'cooked' of their culture via the variation of symbolic representation. The third ideational approach emphasizes cultures as shared codes of meaning. Its representatives criticize Goodenough as a reductionist, characterizing his search for a 'grammar of culture' as an impossible task, and argue that Levi-Strauss is premature in his conclusions about cultural universals derived from his ethnographic analyses.[9]

Major figures associated with the third approach are Geertz and Schneider, both former students of Parsons. In a 1973 anthology Geertz characterizes culture as residing in the public exchange of symbols and meanings shared by a set of social actors and emphasizes 'thick description' as a

[9] See Pettit (1977) for a review of this literature. Also see Kurzweil (1980) for a review of the French structuralist tradition. See Mayhew (1981) on structuralist interpretations of the world.

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method for its study. This attempt to incorporate the phenomenology and hermeneutics of Husserl, Ryle, and Wittgenstein into the analysis of culture asserts that culture, while located in time and space, does not exist exclusively in the minds of the individuals carrying the culture but that a culture exists independent of the imperfect manifestations of its individual bearers. This phenomenological approach emphasizes the centrality of actual human interaction rather than vicarious forms of learning experience. In contrast to Geertz, Schneider emphasizes the role of culture as a set of rules and norms that an actor uses to understand the world about him and which exist independently of the material world and its social institutions. This difference has generated important methodological disagreements between Schneider and Geertz. Indeed, the scholars taking the approaches outlined here not only view culture from quite different perspectives but they also adopt very different research methods.

To summarize, the materialists investigate the structure of economic and social institutions and other observable behaviors, and interrelate these with a general emphasis on the role of adaptation to such

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institutions.[10] Other scholars concentrate on language structure if ~~cognitivists~~ ; and if ~~structuralists~~ they study myth, art, kinship, as well as language; while scholars such as Geertz emphasize the importance of studying culture as it is embedded in actual social situations and Schneider argues for studying the 'map of the cultural system' possessed by the individual culture bearer.[11]

For us, there is a negative trade-off for internal validity at the expense of external validity (see Campbell and Stanley: 1963) when we want to investigate the dynamics of cultures. This is an issue not well suited to Geertz's hermeneutic-style approach of concentrating on a particular event or behavior (the Balinese cock fight, for example) as

[10] Moore (1966) and Kunkel (1970) represent this perspective in political analysis.

[11] We should point out that not only do research methodologies and epistemologies differ, but they also lead to important differences in policy. Although we will explore issues of policy later, we can, for example, (1) note the irony of Marxist thinking which emphasizes the generative role of material factors which is in stark contrast to the practice of Marxist governments' insisting that actual material phenomena conform to a disembodied and abstract vision of human action.

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a kernel of the embodied culture. All these viewpoints have something to contribute to a dynamic analysis of culture. However, we will avoid returning to any of these all-embracing views of culture that try to explain too much and end by explaining too little.[12]

Then what should our image of culture be? A good start would be a listing of the constraints and conditions that a satisfactory definition of culture should have in order to be useful.

First, the individual actor as a bearer of culture **actually** must carry some part of the set of behaviors that defines him as a member of the culture. Whatever the source

[12] We begin the construction of a definition of culture by asserting that the material and ecological constraints on individual and social behavior insufficiently account for the massively documented variations within different cultures. Peel (1973) presents a detailed examination of several materialist explanations of culture including Moore, Kunkel, Leach, and Cohen as well as others, ultimately rejecting their views as unsatisfactory accounts of cultural variation. We will not repeat those arguments here but refer the reader to Peel as well as to note the heuristic argument that the obvious cultural variations in almost any city in the world indicates that culture, at the very least, must have some independent explanatory power.

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of the culture, if individuals have not internalized parts of it as a basis for action, the source itself cannot account for the micro-macro link that culture establishes.

Second, it is clear that initial inputs to an individual's consciousness are external no matter how internal representations of cultural symbols are manipulated. In short, culture is learned. Therefore, it cannot be without some materialistic elements if learning has an important basis in direct and vicarious experience.

Third, socio-cultural elements such as language, institutionalized social interactions, rituals, and other non-material factors are important aspects of a 'map' of the outside world which an individual constructs.[13] These elements are basic to the shared portions of such a map. During periods of rapid social change, however, the influence of socio-cultural components decreases as more options occur for behavior that are not regulated or explained by previous cultural forms. Therefore, an

[13] On language and culture see Frake (1980), Hudson (1980), Blount and Sanches (1977), Mathiot (1979),

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approach such as Benedict's in the *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* which characterizes Japanese culture using information on Japanese socio-cultural institutions and assumes that individuals were all consonant with these forms will be useful only if socio-cultural change is slow, and if we can assume that the institutional forms map onto the actual cognitive processes of individual actors with little variation.

Fourth, culture always involves a joint understanding of society which supports the interaction and communication of its members.

Fifth, the culture includes a number of elements which describe what the world is. Beliefs as sets of categories define the world external to the individual. We might call these *axioms of perception*, internal models of reality, or simply the epistemology of an individual. Further, values in the sense of desired ends or appropriate procedures to gain desired ends which are interpretable as decision rules are a major element of culture and one particularly emphasized by Parsons as the topmost control of human action. Much of the analysis of 'modern man' (Inkeles and

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Smith:1973) and modernization theory, in general, emphasizes value differences between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. We hold that it is not values that primarily differentiate cultures but beliefs about how the world is constructed and how it can be acted upon. We hope that the myth of peasant 'irrationality', for example, should be laid to rest by now. Instrumental rationality, for example, may be one of the most pan-human, pan-cultural phenomena that we could enumerate.

Sixth, a definition of culture should at least imply how temporal continuity is maintained as well as why and how possibilities for variation in the culture occur and are adopted.

Seventh, the role of shared symbols and cognitions as elements of culture must be taken into account, for, as Geertz and others have emphasized, these are not abstract ideas but occur in actual social settings involving individual behavior. It is culture that gives meaning to such actions and objects of social life. Furthermore, social learning theory (Bandura:1977) indicates that culture not only defines the reaction to stimuli under various

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perceptual constraints, but it also decides to which stimuli people will react among the vast number of stimuli that impinge on them almost constantly. Not only is the culturally appropriate stimuli selected, but the response is also defined in terms of a future stream of expected results including possible alterations of beliefs about the world, or values operating in that world.

Definition of Culture

Given the preceding set of requirements, we can move towards a definition of culture which reflects our needs to:

" . . . understand how groups organize and sustain social life; how biology and experience interact as individuals become functioning members of society, and how the nature of that experience shapes personalities; how different--and how similar--are human modes of thought and perception in different times and places; how ways of life change, and what shapes the form they take in particular settings." (Keesing:1974,90)

Thus our definition of culture is that culture is a people's "theory" of how the world is constructed and how its parts are interrelated (beliefs); how decisions should be, and are, made; to what ends (teleology) (values); and what the beliefs and values are to mean for behavior (attitudes). This "theory" is shared and learned by the culture-bearers

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who are the actors who constitute the bounds of the culture. This "theory" is more accurately viewed as a nested hierarchy of heuristics (if-then propositions) whose conditions rest on a series of beliefs (axioms of perception) a 'true world'. The parentheses around theory are justified in the sense that culture as a fully developed axiomatic model is not what is intended although a progressive tightening of the logical connections occurs as individuals become better educated and more sophisticated.

Each actor, then, carries about a version of this "theory", or collective epistemology, to which each culture-bearer, embodied and disembodied, adds variation. There are two important culture-bearers to be considered in this definition-- the individual actor and the institutionalized one--which will allow us to differentiate culture from both personality and social structure.[14] First, the individual actor carries about a cognitive map with areas-- language, dress, thought patterns, etc.--

[14] We specifically disagree with any reductionist view that considers mankind, society or culture as a macrocosm of personality (see Smith 1973:147 for a treatment of this problem).

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variously 'filled in' representing this culturally determined theory. The mastery and elaboration of this shared theory is a function of the bearer's maturation, age, intelligence, and exposure to experience which tests and elaborates the theory. This view asserts that all humans are 'scientists' of a sort--always testing a shared theory, constructed unconsciously while young and partly determined through experience, by the mastery of language and non-verbal communication, and most importantly, by vicarious learning experiences-- by watching others who conform to the theory and by positing behavior from ideal typical role models (e.g. real or fictional heroes). As the individual matures, his ability to elaborate the theory grows and, following Piaget, "highly complex hierarchical cognitive systems are built . . . through the progressive unfolding of more and more complex 'theories' of the world" (Piaget in Mussen:1970, 803-812). Thus our individual holder of the theory has built unconsciously on inductive foundations a view of the world which looks like that held by other members of the culture. Hence it is a learned cognitive map and shared symbol system which directs the holder's perception, evaluations and emotional attachments but which is continually being tested and altered. This theory that

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we call culture has the property of all theories, however. It can generate many more configurations than the actual data base from which it grew. It has a 'deep structure' and the equivalent of a 'generative grammar' in that it can deductively produce new forms which are consistent with the theory although they have not yet been observed. Here lies the gap between the personality and the culture of an individual bearer. Because of the random variation that each person's cumulative life experience represents with respect to the culture, new variations on the theory are produced. Some of these are retained leading either to a theory which has a higher meta-level of integration as when a Freud unifies our views of dreams or a Newton our understanding of non-relativistic motion, or to one altered by the replacement of one element or another.[15]

Personality, then understood as an individual's cognitive map and symbol system, is logically composed of two parts: (1) an incomplete version of the culture-theory

[15] The vertical component of culture is important. Differentiation and higher order integration implies increasing anti-entropy of the system (negentropy). See J-A Miller (1978) for a review of the Freudian tradition.

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and (2) alterations of that theory which his experience has produced, including 'competing theories' from other sources.[16]

Thus, we would expect that where social change is the greatest, the range of competing theories would be the greatest. This idea is basic to an earlier generation of students of political culture who see social change as alienating to the individual actor. From our perspective, alienation would only occur if actors were not able to reconcile the competing theories. We will argue that not only are they able to reconcile such conflicts in most situations but they also are able to produce new theories which supercede and expand the explanation of the world afforded by the old ones. The rapid rise of the universalistic religions in Africa is no accident in these terms. It is because they offer a 'better' theory, one which facilitates social change and mobility as well as

[16] Note Parsons, p. 235 (1977) quoting Emerson "functional equivalence of gene and 'symbol', by which he meant for culture-level systems of behavior, which we here call action systems, symbolic systems have the same order of functional significance that genetic systems have at the organic level.

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offers a broader explanation of events.

According to our definition of "culture as theory" we are able to treat culture as existing both in the minds of individuals and as a phenomenon expressed by social institutions. However, institutions or standardized modes of co-activity in the society function differently as culture-bearers than do the individual actors.[17] First, they are slower to test the theory. In any society there are usually social roles occupied by people who are expected to perpetuate the theory, not test it, while the collective entity tends, as all aggregates do, to randomize out much of the variation that we would observe at the lower levels of aggregation. Second, because the socio-cultural institutions have longer lives than individuals they tend to represent a time slice of theory construction which has a high trust-to-doubt ratio over time, neglecting much variation that is no longer relevant. Third, the social structure has elements which are generated not by the theory but by other forces, such as from the coercive force of some

[17] A society is "a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating, and internally autonomous system of social relations." (Kuper and Smith: 1969, 30).

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group in or outside the society, by diffusion from elsewhere of elements not yet incorporated into the theory, and by random variation of experience, history, ecological change, and so on. Thus social structure reflects--as does personality--culture plus other components (including competing theories that are sometimes intended by elites to replace the theory as embedded in the institutions and the individual culture-bearers).[18] We can conclude that cultures, like other bodies of knowledge, advance (or decline) with no certainty as to their viability or truth content. They are generally adapted to past experience, but only partially, not to future ones, although many societies are consciously attempting to adapt to perceived future constraints.

In the above discussion, we characterized culture as the axioms of perception, and the theorems derived from them, existing in the mind of the individual as well as in

[18] As this analysis should warn us, changing a culture consciously is a task for someone who expects to fail for it can be done slowly, if at all, and then only with the replacement of one theory by a 'better' one--by one which explains more or expresses itself more parsimoniously. This accounts for the search for an ideology by elites concerned with change.

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socio-cultural institutions-- not 'in between' as Geertz would have it. In one sense Geertz has a useful perspective, however. In effect, he argues that culture is the outcome of the interaction between the embodied and disembodied cultures. Of course, the prime reason for this definition is to facilitate the examination of dynamic mechanisms rather than the static formulations that many students of culture prefer. Indeed, their choice may be quite reasonable as an approximation of reality, but not in the situations that we study. We have characterized culture at two levels which is appropriate to culture's function as a micro-macro link--it must exist at both levels.

This division does not originate with this characterization, however; Peel (1973) refers to a cultural-structural dichotomy; Pranger (1969) to objective-subjective culture; Berry to overt or explicit versus covert or implicit culture, (1973:9) following Krech et al. Other presentations of this duality posit it to be an ideational versus evolutionary/ecological split or an ideal versus material one. While many anthropologists and other students of culture have confined themselves to the implicit or individual ideational level, we believe that

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this circumscribes the range of sources by which new views are introduced into cultures as well as misses many of the culture's theory-holders, aspects particularly important to those interested in policy issues and the introduction of change into a system. Thus we consider that part of culture which exists as elements of socio-cultural institutions to be the embodied culture and that which exists as a cognitive map of interrelated symbols in an individual's psyche to be the disembodied culture. Both are important to the analysis of the dynamics of culture. We will argue that the key part of culture is the disembodied even though the most difficult part of culture to transform seems to be the embodied culture. The idea that culture is 'intractable', however, may be more the result of the observer's myopia, ethnocentrism or lack of empathy than any 'real constraints'. Nonetheless, the role of leadership is much more pronounced in social change in a system that requires belief change than in one that requires structural and technical change.

In this context, we think that the search for the culture-bearing-unit gives a misleading concreteness to the concept of culture, while failing to account for the changes

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that occur in actual systems. This is particularly true when emphasis is placed on the embodied culture. Naroll (1963), for example, searched for an indicator to define a culture, and chose a combination of three characteristics. He was dealing with fuzzy sets and we should not expect a single indicator to be satisfactory as a culture measure. This holds even for language, especially in plural societies, where, for example, people typically are multilingual. Assigning individuals to their 'cultures' will be difficult operationally and situational and issue specific factors may be major determinants of the outcomes. Even individuals may have a 'mix of cultures', not one or another, and this is especially true in situations where the bounds of culture are in flux due to social changes. Nevertheless, we still must ask--how does a person come to be a culture bearer? How does he come to adopt one theory of 'the way the world is' rather than another? We cannot assume that shared cognitions are automatic, but we should be surprised to find radical departures from randomness in a given culture. Our argument about the individual as culture-bearer rests on the premise that the new entrant must piece together a view of the world from the possibilities presented to him, and to do it in a way that

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makes communication with other culture-bearers possible. The categories and verbs that one's native language offers organizes our cognitions of the world in childhood. Moreover, much learning is vicarious in that it occurs in the child's observations of the performances of others, constantly testing his view of the world. Some authors argue for the relationship between ecology and culture others for the interrelationship of culture and cognitive style.[19] Do certain cultures produce authoritarian personalities or pragmatists? Do some encourage field independence and cognitive complexity?[20] While we cannot answer these questions we can observe that in any system there will be a range of possible variance for idiosyncratic reasons-- ecological changes, wars, droughts, diseases, as well as personal and family histories. As we mature, the world becomes increasingly fragmented. If we go to school, we may shift to another language, use unfamiliar materials, and, most important of all, may increase our awareness of

[19] Leach (1976:54) argues, for example, that a featureless territorial space implies a rigid and artificial social space.

[20] See Goldstein and Blackman:1978 and Goody:1977 for discussion of these issues.

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the potential for deduction, and develop a more elaborated culture view. Thus the more educated individuals will be the source of most cultural chauvinism in a plural society--a hypothesis we will evaluate in later chapters. A counter to this hypothesis is that those with more developed hypothetico-deductive senses will be more likely to create meta-level theories of the world which supercede learned culture as they are able to effectively use thought experiments to imagine and evaluate alternative possibilities not yet experienced.

Thus socialization occurs via a multiplicity of channels, some internal, others external, and a hierarchy of sources may be established with regard to the effectiveness of such a process. There seems little reason to doubt the signal importance of actual physical experience over other forms of learning, a source particularly associated with early socialization in the family, with one's native language categories, and with one's peers. The vicarious learning experience is a very important second source, however. There is too much for the culture-bearer to master for it to be completely or even principally learned by direct stimulus-response or operant conditioning experience.

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Other sources of knowledge, particularly formal schooling, tend to elaborate one's 'theory of the world' rather than challenge it although religion, travel to other cultures, and ideology can have significant impacts on the basic culture.[21]

The socialization process, however, does not unerringly produce a culture-bearer, but rather an individual with a system of beliefs, some of which are a learned and shared theory of the world but others of which are personal and idiosyncratic. Individual belief systems are part of the source of variation that is "an adaptive necessity; a crucial resource that can be drawn on and selected from in cultural change." (Keesing:1974, 88).

One particular kind of belief system which plays a major role in the modern world, particularly in places undergoing change, is ideology. Ideology is a special kind of cultural theory -- one which eschews inconsistency, which generally does not tolerate the pragmatist's solution of

[21] See Aronoff (1980) on the role of ideology in politics. But this is always done with a trust-to-doubt ratio that is high.

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'When in Rome . . .', and, from our perspective, throttles the sources of variation a system must produce in order to selectively adapt. We will encounter this issue again in Part III of this book. Here we will simply argue that processes which try to minimize variation in a system are maladaptive in the long run, whatever the short-term benefits in their selection and retention of a more limited set of possible innovations.[22]

By now in our discussion, our cultural entity may seem about as bounded as a jelly-fish, or perhaps it is more like Geertz's octopus-- a system which has certain loosely linked elements.[23] (Geertz:1973, 408) An individual culture-bearer carries elements which represent varying cultures, some less well integrated than others, as well as various idiosyncratic elements of a personal belief system. Thus, the empirical identification of an individual's 'culture' is in principal difficult, and in practice even more so. Since members of the same culture vary in terms of

[22] See Bluhm:1974 and Peel:1973 for a review of the role of coercion in the process of political change.

[23] Poincare had used this metaphor before Geertz.

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their mental elaboration and level of integration of the culture's world view, establishing the physical bounds of the culture is complicated and can be done completely only by reference to the sociocultural institutions, or the embodied culture. In conclusion, we view culture as the residue of the collective adaptation of humans to their environments. The actors, individual and corporate, each possess part of the culture which forms the basis of their perception of the world, and, in social interaction is analogous to money as a medium of exchange. The actors engage in an exchange process which produces considerable rewards for them, not the least of which is an interpretation of reality which is relatively coherent and powerful. Cultures also provide the norms which govern and limit the use of individual potential as well as that of institutions --a tradeoff that provides one of the basic anisotropies in the literature of political theory. Cultures are dynamic but move simultaneously in two directions. "On one side, culture creates diversity through modification: new forms differentiate from old. On the other side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, and surpass lower." (Sahlins and Service:1960, 12-13) We might add that the 'friction' (the resistance to change) in such a

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system is proportional to the relative role of embodied to disembodied culture-bearers.[24] An increased importance of embodied to disembodied culture implies decreased internalization of values and more rote practice of the 'correct' rules, resulting in more other-directed men (Reisman:1950) who in turn generate fewer innovations in the culture. Increased consistency among culture bearers, often via an ideology, serves to reduce the gap between actuality and aspiration, the gap being the very source of innovation. An adaptive culture is resistant to institutionalization, or at least not resistant to innovation.

Culture: Its Transmission and Modification

"From early childhood we are surrounded by an impressive symphony of declarations, commandments, dedications, confirmations, resolutions, and reaffirmations." (Boulding:1956, 73)

The nature and boundaries of culture are critical to an explanation of the mechanism by which social change affects

[24] The French bureaucracy may be an example of too high a ratio leading to a non-adaptive or inflexible system--see Crozier:1964.

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the dynamics of the political structure. Therefore, we agree with Rosenbaum that "any understanding of political culture must, at some point, explain the origin, development, and change of the particular system" (1975:13). Although these issues have already been introduced in our discussion of culture, a more detailed elaboration of the dynamics of the process is necessary, for while a culture often maintains a high trust-to-doubt ratio and thereby considerable continuity, transmission of culture is not a 'clone-like' process. Transmission is variable for many reasons. For example, endogenous sources of culture-change range from the profound implications of Godellian logic to the recognition of inconsistencies between elements of the culture and other more intuitively appreciable aspects of social systems.[25] However, exogenous sources of change such as wars, colonialism, and diffusion have often been of greater importance in the process of culture change.

Culture as a theory-set or cognitive mapping of a system is learned and shared, although there is considerable variation across members of a culture in the elaboration of their cultural knowledge. The transmission and modification of a culture which consists of interaction patterns with a

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high expectation of replicability is a subset of the socialization process which encompasses the transmission of all learned behavior, shared or otherwise.[26] Tindall (1976:195) has noted that there are no generally accepted theories of the process of cultural transmission although certain elements of a theory exist in the literature. For example, Dobbert (1975) emphasizes the acquisition of patterned behavior and implies the existence of a model of man similar in certain respects to the 'control-seeker' discussed in the next chapter. Gearing (1973) has been especially active in the search for a theory, concentrating

[25] See Nagel and Newman:1957 or Hofstadter (1979) for a review of Godel's incompleteness theorem. In brief the work is concerned with the fact (as Godel proved) that any formal system (such as an axiomatically based theory) is incomplete in the sense that there will always be theorems that are true in the system which cannot be derived from the axioms, and further that this cannot be remedied by adding to the axiom set. The implications for our view of culture as a theory is that culture also will have an incompleteness property that makes the derivation from any set of axioms an incomplete representation of actual characteristics of the culture. See Holy and Stuchlik (1981), and Lindfors (1977) for the role of folk tales in cultural transmission. The importance of childhood is developed in Goldstein and Oldham (1979), Lambert et al. (1980), and Munroe, Munroe, and Whiting (1981). For a review of a class of cultural transmission models see Rice, Cloninger and Reich (1978). On measurement see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1980).

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on two-person interaction as the basis of acquiring cultural knowledge which he considers to be the cumulation of transactions between members of a society. Spradley (1972:89) has also described the acquisition of knowledge by the individual culture-bearer in which perceptual knowledge is gained in units of observation referred to as percepts, and through direct sensory experience. This knowledge is then generalized into concepts and patterned into theories about the world.[27] Elaborating a theory to contrast with those of Spradley and Gearing is beyond the scope of this work. However, one comment should be made. Their tendency toward reductionist explanations of culture places emphasis on the learned aspects of cultural development rather than on the shared character of culture. Unlike Dobbert's and our own work, it virtually ignores the importance of pattern and system that exists in a culture, which is only very imperfectly reproduced in any individual culture bearer. As Naroll points out, people "are constantly constructing

[26] By 'shared', we intend to refer to a group of at least moderate size and temporal continuity which shares the culture.

[27] This view has significant overlap with some of the traditional views in psychology.

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theories, testing them against reality, and forming conclusions in their minds" (1970:27). We see individual culture-bearers as control-seekers who attempt to account for the perceived environment by inferring "the rules used by adults to construct and interpret messages" (Spadley:1972,26). These rules are inferred and tested vicariously by repeated observation, and decision rules for action are derived which then form the basis of social action. Given the process by which they are acquired they will have a significant shared component of meaning which forms an important aspect of the disembodied culture. The embodied culture also accounts for the continuity of culture, especially the conservative areas of cultural maintenance where changes in theory are resisted until they are found to be more than ephemeral 'noise' and are accepted as a true 'signal'. Other aspects of the transmission process which should be considered include (1) sources, (2) timing and sequence, (3) level and integration (4) primacy, (5) social motivation, (6) environmental context, (7) the mechanisms for modification and (8) the maintenance of inconsistency.[28]

Sources of Culture Transmission

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"Cultures are differentiated into subcultures which are coextensive with networks of communication" (Borhek and Curtis, 1975:52). These networks of communication function to transmit, modify and occasionally create elements of the culture.[29] Most analysts have been concerned particularly with basic patterns of communication which are established at an early age and which are thought to be relatively resistant to change in later life.[30] This relative import of early experience rests on the "conjecture that concrete human experiences provide a narrow base for creating strong identification and attachments that extend much outside the

[28] The discussion treats culture learning as a purely cognitive process and overlooks the affective dimension of culture acquisition. Affect plays a fundamental role in the determination of what is seen, an important element that makes this process somewhat different from the norms in scientific method.

[29] Modern experience with ideologically mobilized states centers on the attempt to change the culture via the changing of formal institutions. This has only been partially successful in a few societies.

[30] For a review of childhood socialization see Denzin (1977), Eikind (1978), Gibson (1978), Williams (1972). Discussions of early political socialization include Greenstein (1969), Hess and Torney (1968), Langton (1969), Torney et al (1975) as well as more general works on political socialization such as Dawson and Prewitt (1977), and Renshon (1977).

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small, specific, and idiosyncratic cluster of human beings with whom each of us is most intimately associated during the important occasions of our lives" (Dahl, 1978:193). The emphasis on the signal importance of early socialization seems reinforced when we examine cultural components since early socialization establishes the basic assumptions and beliefs upon which other ideas and views rest.[31] This phenomenon generally referred to as the Primacy Principle, has been questioned by a number of writers including Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz (1976) who argue that political values and attitudes seem to be malleable throughout a person's life.[32] According to their evidence, nevertheless, while a certain growth, development and variation does make the primacy principle less emphatic, the transmission of the culture seems to occur normally at an early age and primarily through a number of socializing agents to which a child is exposed. This primarily includes the family, language, peers, school and the child's

[31] As noted by Rosenbaum (1975:14), one view of the primary role of early political socialization is 'induction into the political culture'.

[32] Also see Jennings and Neimi (1975 and 1978) and Greenstein (1969) on this issue.

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immediate vicarious experiences. No clear pattern of the relative importance of the sources of early enculturation is discernable but the family generally plays a central role in the process.[33]

The central role of the family as an agent of cultural transmission is generally accepted although its role as a principal source of cultural values rather than as transmitter of those values is disputed.[34] Basic categories of cultural perception which are used to sort and classify experience are presented in the family context and an introduction is given to roles as "sets of normative expectations attached to social positions" (Hollis:1977, 70-71). There seems to be considerable evidence of the disproportionate role of the family. The role of the family as a transmitter and modifier of the culture is explored in

[33] For various views on this see Greenstein and Tarrow (1968) on France, Wilson (1974) on an American-Chinese comparison, and Stevens and Kofele-Kake (1976) for comparative evidence.

[34] See Peel (1973: 294), Jennings and Niemi (1968), Borhek and Curtis (1975: 50-51), and Beck and Jennings (1978) on this topic and van den Berghe (1979) for a review of the sociology of the family.

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the context of the case study.

The family structure operates within a system of constraints including the community, peers, and language. Constraints serve to encourage a 'regression to the mean' effect, that is, to encourage convergence or agreement among the agents.

The significant deviation from this general process of congruent socialization is formal education and a deviation which is particularly important in systems undergoing major social change. For example, it appears that "experiencing formal schooling brings about substantial (and cross-culturally replicated) changes in cognitive style" and that the interaction of formal education with the other socialization experiences is the source of "new forces of social change" (Draper:1974, 273).[35] The relative

[35] For a detailed examination of such evidence see Cole and Scribner (1974). Namunu (1973) discusses some of these issues with regard to Nigerian experience. A recent detailed empirical examination of these issues can be found in Scott, Osgood, and Peterson (1979). See Gearing and Sangree (1979) for a view of culture and education links, and Loflin and Silverberg (1978) on a view of enculturation.

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significance of such new forces will depend to a considerable extent on the level of development and integration of existing institutions maintaining the culture. Thus we might expect formal education to effect greater culture change in small-scale undifferentiated societies than in those where highly elaborated formal institutions for cultural maintenance exist along with a variety of specialized roles. Implied is that change and adaptation are easier and less conflictive in the former type of society. To state this another way, the more institutionalized the system, the less likelihood that it will be able to deal with drastic change in the demands on the system.[36]

[36] In this sense, modernization which produces institutionalization breeds its own destruction in the sense that major shifts in resource constraints may and frequently do find the institution unable to innovate in such a way that it is radically changed. Nevertheless, it seems to be an ambiguous situation since in many cases highly institutionalized systems are hypersensitive to the need for change, producing or encouraging all kinds of change - The American judiciary is more "institutionalized" than the US Congress and yet the judiciary has been more important than the legislative in facilitating change in US. Another model is that of the Maginot Line built by France to prevent another trench-war with their enemy, Germany, outflanked and made into a great monument to the solution of the problems of the past being inadequate in the face of significant innovation.

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One additional source of learning frequently neglected is the capacity of inductively cumulated knowledge to generate new information. As was indicated earlier, a major portion of an individual's knowledge is gained by vicarious experience in which the imitation of observed acts is generalized into rules of conduct. These rules, as parts of a belief system, have implications for other behavior and situations which have not been observed or experienced. This activity can be an important source for enculturation if such deductive generalizations are consistent with the culture. Consistency is a requisite for this process, however, and, consequently, it may be one of the most important sources of cultural adaptation and modification.[37]

Enculturation: Timing and Sequence of Learning

Although the primacy principle per se seems to be untenable, a modified version stresses the order or sequence

[37] The inability to explicitly state the rules, what Polanyi refers to as 'tacit knowledge' (Spadley:1972,20) emphasizes the potentially important facilitating role of formal education. Education and other external models as exist in countries such as Nigeria have especially important effects. See Tyler (1980) for a review of the relation of tacit knowledge and culture.

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of an individual's beliefs. For example, Pye (1962) notes that a childhood where trust in others is a reliable rule followed by an adult experience emphasizing the very limited range and applicability of such a rule, encourages adult cynicism, a sequence which is likely to produce different attitudes towards the political system (e.g. reformist strategy) than one where cynicism is acquired at an early age.[38] Another example of early childhood socialization relates to the development of group consciousness. Encouragement of autonomy in childhood facilitates attachment to larger, more inclusive groups while an early socialization to group consciousness appears to interfere significantly with later attachment to more inclusive groupings. This logic is consistent with Piaget's view that "highly complex hierarchical cognitive systems are built on minimally programmed foundations through the progressive unfolding of more and more complex 'theories' about the world" (Keesing:1974, 87). This process of generalization may be critically affected by some early experience, however, and fail to develop. Segovia notes this in his

[38] Such a sequence will have its most important implications for the actor's model of man in society.

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studies of Mexican children who show an early fixation on the presidential image which they retain in later life.[39]

The role of timing and sequence should be seen in other than the ahistorical terms of life cycle models. The specific historical experience of age groups at different periods in their lives and the sequence of experiences of each age cohort relates to 'generational' differences or cultural changes.[40] These three elements--age, cohort, and period-- are impossible to separate definitively although under some conditions they will be separable with relatively plausible assumptions.[41] A recent study further complicates this issue. Ferguson, Ferguson, and Bantourline-Young (1976) argue that age as it relates to physical development rather than chronology is a key to the process of acquiring political orientations. While such a

[39] (See Craig and Cornelius: In Almond and Verba: 1980).

[40] The immediate influence of a given period (e.g. war versus peace, boom versus depression, etc.) will have an independent effect as well as the sequence of these experiences.

[41] For part of the recent literature on this part of a dynamic analysis see Glenn (1976a, 1976b).

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complication will not affect this study, it is clear that age, period, and cohort as divisions may be too aggregative for addressing some significant issues. It is in recognition of this problem that a range of local and regional differences in period and cohort effects are evaluated in Part II.[42]

Level and Integration of Learning

Borhek and Curtis (1975) stress the significance of the role of commitment and validation in the development and maintenance of belief systems. Spradley (1972: 22-25) also emphasizes these issues, although he tends to conflate what Borhek and Curtis maintain as distinct analytic categories. They argue that there are five levels of rules for action that vary in cognitive salience and internalization. Action based on a higher level (more internalized) will take precedence over a lower level rule. We expect to find variation on the basis of age, period, and cohort in the level of commitment to given values and beliefs as well as

[42] See Langton (1974, 1975) for a review of these issues.

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to the rules of validation that are invoked (e.g. 'rational' calculus versus mystical justification).[43] In our analysis, we give particular emphasis to the assessment of beliefs and values rather than attitudes, since attitudes may be seen as the "fruit of an ongoing process of socialization, less a cause than an aspect of the system to be explained" (Peel: 1973, 293). Thus attitudes towards specific objects, political or otherwise, are the least internalized, (i.e. lowest level of commitment) aspects of culture and those most subject to higher levels of rule internalization as well as to other constraints of a pattern or gestalt nature at any given level.[44]

The integration of the culture is an important factor in the culture's ability to modify itself. The more integrated and consistent the culture, the less the information required to transmit it from one culture-bearer to another. Correspondingly, the greater the

[43] Black (1973:550) also notes the issue of levels of the 'cultural code' as a significant element of cultural description.

[44] This latter view is characteristic of Lewin's field theory approach. See Schellenberg (1978:70)

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control-increasing content (negentropy) of a potential modification, the more easily it would be accepted.

The importance of an intrinsic social motivation to learn is emphasized in our model of man discussion in the next chapter.[45] Because of this motivation, culture should become more elaborated (differentiated) over time as an individual matures. The process of differentiation requires the justification of earlier cultural commitments. As a result of this process many sets of social arrangements involve an escalating series of commitments to the culture and refusals to entertain contrary evidence.[46]

Environmental Context

Historical sequences and events further affect the transmission and modification of cultures. Consequently any empirical analysis, theory, and prescription must reflect an

[45] Also see de Charms and Muir (1978) and Kagen (1972) for a discussion of this view.

[46] Borhek and Curtis (1975: chapter 6) discuss the mechanisms that societies use to direct the validation strategies adopted by its members.

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awareness that the observed data is the product of an ongoing system that is in dynamic disequilibrium. That is, the product of social and cultural change is differentially reflected in a cross-section of the population. This awareness is minimally necessary to an evaluation of the bounds of applicability of our analysis, including the effects of historical direction and the constraints of a plural society.

Culture Modification

Smith (1973) criticizes the emphasis on endogenous sources of change in structural-functionalist thinking and argues that a shift in focus to exogenous sources in a theory of social change would be empirically more defensible. The former emphasis is generally concerned with processes of adjustment between different parts of the social system in response to a change--a differentiation of function of its meta-level integration.

[47] Drastic changes in world view, come principally from exogenous sources, frequently during periods of crisis, or through coercion from external sources. As a result of continual challenges a culture must not only maintain commitment from its culture-bearers but the culture must

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continually be tested and validated if its members are to remain committed.[48] This requirement is basic to the relative disparity between endogenous and exogenous sources of change.

Most culture-bearers invoke validation procedures which are not empirically refutable or which selectively use empirical evidence to support their cultural beliefs--as indicated in the model of man presented in the next chapter. Thus, internally or endogenously generated sources of culture change tend to be resisted effectively because direct reality-testing can be avoided or carried out selectively. In the case of changes from exogenous sources, including ideas from a single individual, especially those wrought through threat or coercion, such as under

[47] This suggests an analog with the Kuhnian perspective of scientific development in which 'normal science' is concerned with the solving of 'puzzles' as created within the current paradigm, and revolutionary science is concerned with the absorption of new views that are not contained in the current paradigm. Replace paradigm with culture and we have a view of the relative importance of exogenous and endogenous factors in culture.

[48] Following the perspective of Borhek and Curtis (1975).

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colonialism or defeat after a war, we expect the challenge to the culture to be more difficult to avoid and its ability to validate the current theory of the world to be seriously threatened. Consequently, the source of culture change is more likely to be exogenous than endogenous for the latter are generally opposed to change which is more than a perturbation on the current system.[49]

Although the external sources of change are several, we place particular emphasis on education, as well as social and physical mobility. The first is especially important because of the role it plays in the development of hypothetico-deductive cognitive capacities.[50] The second pair of processes emphasizes the role of increased exposure to new phenomena as a source of challenge to established beliefs and consequent variation in the culture. These elements of culture modification play a significant role in our theory of social change, especially in the definition

[49] In the sense of Lakatos' model of scientific research programs (SRP's). See Lakatos and Musgrave (1970).

[50] Spadley (1972:18) emphasizes the generative capacity of symbolic thought as "one of the primary factors in cultural change".

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and dynamics of cultural boundaries in the plural society.

Political Culture==Basis for Mobilization

"Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist." J.S. Mill (1958:230)

"No structure of political cognitions can persist unless others share it, reinforcing the common belief." Edelman (1977:29).

A discussion of culture, embodied and disembodied, and the construction of a model of man as control-seeker provide the necessary foundations for looking at political culture as an analytic subset of culture. We expect to observe political culture at both the embodied and disembodied levels and to find it to be a principal element in political behavior. When Almond (1956) introduced the concept of political culture as an explicit component to be analyzed in political systems, the subjective aspects of behavior were seen as a critical component that differentiated one polity from another.

The implicit recognition of the role of cultural norms as a primary determinant of political behavior certainly

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predates Almond's work, however. Most of the major social analysts of the nineteenth century devoted considerable energies to understanding the role of cultural and social norms in social and political behavior. Marx viewed culture norms as both the product and support of the class structure which was founded on the relationship of the individual to the 'means of production'. Political culture inhibited the historical process of the rise of class consciousness and retarded the predicted downfall of the capitalist economic system. Hence, Marx viewed culture pejoratively. Durkheim, in contrast, emphasized the role of cultural norms in the determination of behavior and social control on 'brutish' man. The breakdown of social norms caused by rapid social change in an industrializing Western Europe was responsible for great increases in what he called anomic behavior. To Durkheim, the role of cultural norms was to regularize interaction among individual actors so that their social and psychological needs could be satisfied in a manner consistent with the functions and development of the social system. Both Marx and Durkheim understood the role of culture as a conflict regulating force. The former, however, sees it as inhibiting the achievement of social development, while the latter sees it as facilitating social

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Integration.

Toqueville, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, placed major analytic emphasis on the ubiquitous commitments to social and political equality that he observed in America, and to their role in building the 'first new nation'.^[51] Bagehot in his work on the English constitution also emphasized the fundamental role which shared beliefs played in the construction of the British political system. However, it was not until such massive upheavals as the Great Depression and World War II that political scientists directed their attention to a field dominated by anthropologists in the intervening period. Anthropologists such as Mead, Benedict, and Malinowski had concerned themselves with the study of key features of personality (modal personality) as a basic element of culture.^[52] Their works were in the tradition of 'national character' studies and rested on certain reductionist assumptions, reasonable in stable, very small scale

[51] This is the title of a book by Seymour Martin Lipset (1963).

[52] See David Miller (1980) for a review of Mead's work.

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societies but, unfortunately, not in more complex, large scale societies.

Leites (1951, 1953) used a psychoanalytic perspective in studying the political culture of Soviet elites. He centered his analysis around the concept of an 'operational code'—a view of basic beliefs about the world that corresponds to the general notions of political culture. The issues of culture and social change attracted others as America's post-war economic and political dominance of the world generated a need to understand the processes of change that the world was undergoing. The development of a range of new theoretical tools in the social sciences such as Keynesian economics, capital theory under Harrod and Domar, and Parsonian social theory along with the large number of very able minds who were eager to test these and other theories, was coupled with the concurrent 'behavioral revolution' which put heavy emphasis on the empirical testing of theory and also provided novel and effective measurement techniques including the sample survey. Armed with these empirical and theoretical tools, and the realization that differential reactions to governmental processes, inputs, and outputs had clear cultural bases,

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Almond and Verba (1965) (1965), Pye (1962), and many others fashioned new and important studies that clearly evidenced the recognition of the importance of political culture.[53]

Almond and Verba (1965:3) stress that the "emerging nations are presented with two different models of the modern participatory state, the democratic and the totalitarian" and note that the "coming world political culture appears to be dominated by the participatory explosion." They characterize the culture of democracy (the 'civic culture') as an evolutionary culture, a view that we share in the model of an adaptive culture. Although the civic culture is described as evolutionary, its path of development is not an object of analysis for Almond and Verba. It is the single most important part of our objective in the search for an adaptive culture, however. Even though the civic culture is described as evolutionary, a more explicit identification of the nature of the adaptive society must permit a critical examination of competing views such as 'authoritarian solutions now, democracy later'. This simplified terminology represents a common

[53] See Table 2.1 for a list of political culture studies.

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argument made about policy options for the countries of the developing world, implying that the former is optimum for the short run, but the latter for the long run. It is precisely the study of culture that warns us that short and long term solutions or policies are interwoven.[54] It is not accidental that studies of political culture utilize considerable information about group and institutional history as well as the role of diffusion from external sources.[55] An analysis of the Nigerian data indicates that the political culture is not congruent with the political structure, in contrast to the civic culture model, and our concern is specifically with issues of public policy eschewed by Almond and Verba (1965:29) despite their concern with the development of a "scientific theory of democracy" (1965:10). But we will return to these issues later in the book. First, we need to examine political culture as a

[54] The Kuznets curve in economics has a similar inevitable character in development. Morawetz (1977) emphasizes the importance of initial income distribution on the final values over a 25 year period throughout the developing world.

[55] Almond and Verba (1963:8) emphasize such factors as (1) history and ideology, (2) institutional forms and ideological norms, (3) economic and social conditions, and (4) psychoanalytic approaches in their analysis.

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concept, to provide a useful definition, to evaluate analytic dimensions and to briefly review criticisms of the concept.

Political Culture--Definition

Political generally have not examined definitions of political culture in great detail in order to arrive at a useful definition for purposes of analysis.[56] As with culture, there are alternative aspects that could be appropriately stressed in a definition as a function of analytic requirements. For example, Almond states that every "political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action" (1956:35), but proceeds with Verba to "employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings: that of the psychological orientation toward social objects" so that where they "speak of the political culture of a society, they refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population." They conclude that the "political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political

[56] Verba does this in Pye and Verba (1965: 518)

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objects among the members of the nation." (1965:13) Verba writes that the political culture "provides the subjective orientation to politics" (Pye and Verba:1965, 513) while Pye gives a more detailed view of political culture as "the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system." (1968:218)[57]

Beer put particular emphasis on the normative aspects of culture in the explanation of political phenomena. He defined political culture as those "aspects of the general culture of a society" which "are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try to do" (1958:12). He considered political culture to be one of the four crucial variables in the political system. Lindsay extended this notion to include a concept actually in use in the world of observable behaviors. What Lindsay terms "operative ideals" (1962), Bluhm refers to as the "motor power of behavior" and characterizes it as political

[57] Pye's definition comes the closest to being consistent with the models of man and culture which we have developed.

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culture (1974:xi). Jowitt (1974:1173) says that political culture "refers to the set of informal, adaptive postures--behavioral and attitudinal--that emerge in response to and interact with the formal definitions . . . that characterize a society" and Lane (1973:85) states that "Cultural premises are the common fund of values, epistemologies, and beliefs of any particular culture; political belief patterns and ideologies draw upon these premises." More recent definitions of political culture refer to it as a "set of attitudes, beliefs and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" (Almond and Powell:1978,) or as the "set of cognitions, perceptions, evaluations, attitudes, and behavioral predispositions through which member individuals and/or subgroups order and interpret political institutions and processes and their own relationships with such institutions and processes." (Craig and Cornelius:1976,5)

While there are many alternative terms which could be developed here the above cover the range of ideas expressed in definitions of political culture. Excluded are the more bizarre definitions such as Devine's "input subsystem structure near the boundary between the environment and the

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system" (1973:24), and those which differ over the scope of groups and behaviors which are included in the definition. For instance, Verba denies that political culture includes institutions (Pye and Verba:1965, 513) while Fishel (1975) and Lehman (1972) both argue for the inclusion of institutions as part of the political culture. Pranger (1968) argues for a subjective and objective political culture, including institutions in the first category and most other aspects incorporated into political culture by others under the second category as does Lehman (1973).[58]

A definition of political culture should meet the following requirements. It must state: (1) the range of elements (values, beliefs, attitudes and so on) in the culture; (2) the focus of these elements; (3) the source and variation of these values, beliefs, attitudes, and so on--that is, the socialization process; (4) the situational and historical character of the values; and (5) the formal

[58] For other definitions see Kavanagh (1972), Chazam (1978:15), Jacob (1971), Hayward (1974), Stern et al (1973), Barry (1970), Bertsch and Zanionovich (1974), Elazar (1966), Richardson (1974), Mokken (1977), Nie, Powell, Prewitt (1969), White (1978), and Huntington and Dominguez (1975).

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and informal character of culture. Further, it must: (6) differentiate substantive from procedural values; (7) identify the culture bearers; (8) characterize the inter-relatedness of the values; (9) discriminate between cultural elements which do and which do not relate to political behavior; and (10) characterize the extent to which culture is pan-human as well as those parts that are culture specific.

Political culture constitutes those aspects of the culture-bearer's theory of how the world functions with respect to politically relevant phenomena. These shared and learned codes give meaning to the political process and generate specific attitudes as a function of the theory's axioms of political perception.[59]

The discussion of political culture by Huntington and Dominguez (1975) provides an example of the comparative statics orientation of many writers in this area. From their perspective, change occurs when political culture (beliefs, attitudes, values) is incongruent with the political structure (roles and structure). The gap is not seen as potentially adaptive but as 'strain' in the system,

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while the societies are seen as 'transitional'--descriptions stressing the aberrant nature of change as situation and implying that systems pass from one stable condition to another. Not only does the ghost of 'traditional man' lurk beneath the surface, but the habit of mind that is unable to see social change and dynamic disequilibrium as normal and the source of adaptive characteristics for the society is still very much with us.

[59] Most actual definitions do not communicate that there are particular types or characteristic patterns of political culture. Analyses of political structures and processes incorporate the idea of political culture under the guise of country 'types' which is extensively advanced in the literature. For example, Jowitt (1974) writes of three types of political culture: elite, regime, community, while Huntington and Dominguez state that political cultures "can be classed as consummatory or instrumental according to their response to cultural change, including, but not limited to, acculturation" (1975:18). Almond and Verba rather ambiguously characterize the civic culture as a mix of three ideal types of political culture--parochial, subject, and participant. They further type various political cultures with descriptors which are far from neutral. Italy has an 'alienated political culture', Mexico an 'alienated and aspiring' one, in contrast with the U.S.--a participant civic culture, and the United Kingdom a deferential civic culture. Typing political culture in this way tends to reify the model and prevent analysis of a culture's dynamics, the extent to which a shared culture forms a boundary for political mobilization, and the extent to which social change imposes a new template on society so that the original boundaries are altered.

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Huntington and Dominguez anticipate that change in the political system results from either acculturation, or social mobilization. In the first case, they expect the effect on the political culture and eventually on the political system will be related to the characteristics of the 'donor' and 'recipient' cultures, each seen in dichotomous terms.[60] In the second case, they see social mobilization occurring via economic modernization, increased communications, growth in education, and other social and organizational changes. That education is the most significant factor in changing culture is widely agreed upon in the literature--see, for example, Almond and Verba (1965:315-21) and Inkeles (1969:1131-34 and with Smith 1974:Part III). Attempts to use mass mobilization and participation to alter political structure have had mixed results, however.[61] The ultimate source of failure may

[60] The recipient culture is classified in terms of basic norms for the evaluation of social behavior, and the donor culture in terms of its socio-cultural stratification. For examples of these types, see Huntington and Dominguez (1975:18-26); Apter (1965:83-121); Eisenstadt (1966:156-167).

[61] See Craig and Cornelius (in Almond and Verba:1980) for examples in the Mexican context.

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live with the students of development. While they understand that rapid social change is becoming characteristic of most humans' lives and most humans have had to make the 'change to change', the analytic devices used by scholars have not yet made the corresponding 'change to change'. [62]

Political Culture==Operationalization

Lane reminds us that for "any society, an existential base creating certain common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts produces certain political ideologies." (1973:85) Hence, a model of political culture is embedded in a model of social relations, that is, it is a theory within a theory. It exists in (1) embodied forms such as language, religion, myth, ritual, economic organization, government, class, and other social organizations and, (2) in disembodied form in the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the individual culture-bearers. Therefore, we will need to look at both

[62] This phrase has been borrowed from the title of an influential article by Huntington (1971).

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the micro (individual) and macro (social and political aggregate) levels of society in order to understand the nature of political culture. We must also examine the play of ideology, especially as it acts to bridge an individual's reality and his expectations, and investigate why ideologies have proved relatively unsuccessful in the African context. We will argue that the plural political culture makes those ideologies which are both explicit and imported from the outside less satisfactory interpretations of the world than an implicit ideology, that is an ideology determined by the existing institutional structure and its influence on values and beliefs.

The correlates between social structure and variation in political culture are many, but only a few are really significant-- especially differential experience and socialization associated with elite/mass distinctions, formal and informal economic sectors, and religion. Although we will not discuss the source of the political culture and its dynamics here, reserving that for Chapters 3, and 5 through 9, we would like to comment on the dimensions of a political culture and their environment.

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First, examine the empirical evidence. The existing literature includes political culture studies of most countries as well as a number of prominent cross-national studies. Table 2.1 gives a representative sampling of these studies. The last column of the table, clearly indicates the distinct difference in the empirical level of observation found in the various works. Some studies concentrate on individual level measurement and a model which relates individual to group behavior. Others have analyzed various institutions not only those within the political sphere, but also other socio-political institutions.

Almond and Verba's 1965 study, based on a survey of about five thousand subjects in five countries stressed that a democratic system requires high levels of subject competence with high membership rates in organizations and high levels of perception of self-efficacy, resulting from family and educational socialization[63]. Pye (1962) in his Burmese study did in-depth interviewing as well as made other kinds of field observations, developing a model of political behavior based on the interaction of rapid social change (acculturation and modernization) with various

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Table 2.1
 Political Culture Studies
 Country Studies

Level of
 Analysis

Dimensions
 Emphasized

Country	Studies	Level of Analysis	Dimensions Emphasized
Botswana	Parsons (1977)		
Burma	Pye (1962)		
China	Pye (1981)		
	Solomon (1971)		
Canada	Presthus (1978)		
	Simon and Elkins (1974)		
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	Wriggins (1960) see Pye 1968 for citation		
Cuba	Fagan (1969)		
England	Domínguez (1978) Nordlinger (1967) Butler and Stokes (1976) Rose (1969) Jessop (1971) Kavanagh (1971) Rose and Kavanagh (1976)		
Ecuador	Martz (1972)		
France	Berger (1977) Milder (1970)		
Japan	Richardson (1974) Austin (1975) Nakane (1970)		
India	Carstairs (1958) Hardgrave (1969) Mayer (1973) Nandy (1973) Barrett (1976) Barth (1965)		
Israel	Halevy-Etzioni and Shapira (1977)		
Italy	Banfield (1958) Barnes and Sani (1974 b 1974a) Galtung (1971)		
Madagascar	Mannoni (1964)		
Mexico	Craig and Cornelius (in Almond and Verba: 1980)		
Norway	Eckstein (1966) (Distant democracy book)		

[63] They define democracy as a "political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites; and such control is legitimate; that is it is supported by norms that are accepted by elites and non-elites." (Almond and Verba:1965, 136). Although they state that the civic culture is not transmitted by education. (Almond and Verba:1965, 366). See van den Berghe (1979) on the sociology of the family.

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Table 2.1 continued	
Philippines	Grissholtz (1964)[See Pye 1968]
Portugal	Wiarda (1978)
United States	Converse (1964)
	Elazar (1966)
	Devine (1972)
	Formisano (1974)
	Johnson (1976)
	Litt (197?)
	Sharkansky (1969)
	Patterson (1968a 1968b)
	Broach and Mijeski (1977);
	Huntington (1979); Love (1959,
	1962, 1969, 1972)
USSR	Leites (1951)
	Barghorn (1972), White (1980)
Sweden	Anton (1969)
Chile	Moreno (1969)
Germany	Verba; Cassidy (1969)
Nigeria	Paden (1973) Kano
	Njaka (1974) Igbo
	Goldberg (1978) all
	Fischel (1975)
Peru	Alba (1977)
Sierra Leone	Barrows (1976a)
Senegal	Behrman (1977)
Yugoslavia	Bertsch (1971, 1974)
Comparative Studies	
U.S., Netherlands, Yugoslavia	
Nigeria	Verba, Nie, Kim (1978)
U.S., U.K., Mexico,	
Germany, Italy	Almond and Verba (1965)
Middle East	Lerner (1958)
Latin America	Harris and Alba (1974)
Six countries	Inkeles (1969a)
East Africa	Mazrui (1973)
U.S.-Canada	Presthus (1977)
World-	Prins (1970)

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Table 2.1 continued

W. Europe

Inglehart (1970, 1977a, 1977b)
Putnam (1971, 1976)

India, Japan, Israel

Benjamin (1972)

Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda

Barkow (1975)

Theory and Review

Rosenbaum (1975)

Bluhm (1974)

Bipoum-Woum (1976)

Berry (1976)

Clippinger (1978)

Huntington and

Dominguez (in

Greenstein and

Polsby, V 3(1955)

Kavanagh (1972)

Berry and Anis (1974)

Pye and Verba (1965) Kim (1974)

Ben-David and Clark

Lehman (1972)

Lucev (1974)

(1977)

Berman (1974)

Pranger (1968)

Padioleau (197?)

Love (1973)

Pye (1968)

Almond (1956)

Sattinger (1975)

Schubert (1977,

Beer and Ulam (1962)

forthcoming)

Country Studies

Indonesia

Emmerson (1976) Halt (1972)

Malaysia

Hagiware (1972)

Lebanon

Jabbara and Jabbara (1976)

Cameron

Kofele-Kale (1974)

Palestine

Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973)

West Indies

Smith (1965)

Ghana

Jeffries (1978), Austin (1976)

Zambia

Bates (1973, 1978b)

Note: Most 'country studies' of political behavior have aspects of political culture included although not always specified as such.

Measurement: Barton and Parsons (1977)

socialization agents causing widespread identity crises. He concluded that the threats to a sense of well-being produce individuals with a lack of trust in their compatriots and distrust in their own ability to control and influence

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others, resulting in a cynical view of the world. The cumulative consequences of these individual experiences is a lack of associational and organizational capacity both of which are viewed as prerequisites to effective organization, nation-building, modernization, and political development. Thus, the individual identity crisis is central to Pye's analysis and consequently to the politics of Burma.

Lerner (1958), one of the earliest figures in comparative empirical studies of modernization, also used large scale sample surveying techniques for his work on the countries of the Middle East. While his emphasis is on social change and acculturation rather than on political results specifically, his study remains a key work in terms of the analysis of the individual's experience of social change and its effects on his view of how to deal with his environment. An empathic 'mobile personality' is the central characteristic required for development according to Lerner, and it is produced by physical mobility (principally movement to urban centers from rural areas), the mastery of literacy, and exposure to mass communications.

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Other major studies have been based on more direct observation, frequently relying on the author's deep immersion in the culture, a methodology often more akin to the traditional ethnographic approach although there are significant variations in this literature. For example, Carstairs (1958) in a study of high-caste Hindus relates the psychology of individual anxiety to problems of efficiency and competence. Using similar techniques, Mannoni (1964) in a study of Madagascar identifies the "psychology of dependence" which he uses to explain the dynamics of political behavior in the country's political history, particularly the post World War II uprising against the French colonial regime. Banfield (1958) also searched in the personality of individuals for political explanation, arguing that the 'amoral familism' characterizing a Southern Italian village resulted from the interaction of structural and psychological factors. Interestingly, Galtung (1971) challenges Banfield's interpretation, arguing from Sicilian data that a more complex picture exists which is an artifactual composite in Banfield resulting from two countervailing forces in the rural communities.[64] Other major studies include those by Hagen (1962) and McClelland (1961), which while not oriented to political explanation,

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also center their analyses on the motives and socialization of those who occupy entrepreneurial roles.[65]

In sharp contrast to research strategies tied to the observation of individuals, that is those using either survey techniques or in-depth approaches, are those emphasizing the institutional level of culture-bearer. Eisenstadt (1964) writes that "processes of change are intimately linked to a society's institutional structure, and that they must be explained as the consequences of problems arising out of the need to establish or maintain these structures." [66] This perspective views the

[64] One of these is the desire and expectations of 'young mobiles' to act in a manner consistent with their expectation that they will leave the town in the near future. The other comes from the group that expects to stay in the town for the rest of their lives and therefore shuns the 'young mobiles' but acts in the interests of the remaining group. The point of the analysis is that if all the citizens are taken together it appears as if Banfield is correct even when each group taken separately does not correspond to his model. Clearly a problem like this exists in all changing societies where the young have generally evolved different expectations and even cultures than their predecessors.

[65] An allied area, psychobiography is not dealt with here since it is not central to our analysis. For a review of the field, see Tucker (1977).

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directions of change as constrained and directed by the character of the institutional system and the process as being non-random and interpretable from an evolutionary or 'stage' perspective. In such analyses, history is a critical element since the system can only unfold and develop over time. Moore (1966) and Parsons (1966) also stress the group perspective in their studies, viewing the evolution of institutions as a ceaseless process although with some expectation of increasing complexity and differentiation occurring as part of that process. While the concept of evolution also characterizes some individual level analysis -- Piaget for example (1932, 1977)--it has not been an important element in the major individual-level surveys.

Huntington (1968) focuses on the role of institutionalization as central to the growth and 'decay' of political systems. Anthropologists such as White (1975) and Sahlins and Service (1974) also adopt an evolutionary perspective. Focusing on the nature of change in political systems, Borhek and Curtis (1975:68) make an interesting

[66] A. D. Smith 1973:30.

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observation on Mao's China. They note that the "power to implement a belief is bought at the price of compromise of that belief" arguing that governments which come to power by revolutionary means tend to become more conciliatory over time in order to carry out their programs. They observe that Maoist China seems to be an exception to this, but stated that if it follows the "usual script", the "death of Mao will trigger a power struggle that will end with the dominance of professional bureaucrats . . . a deemphasis of the Mao era. . . the reestablishment of rank and privilege . . . In the long run, the social gap between workers, peasants, and soldiers on one hand and the bureaucrats on the other (and their children) should become as great or perhaps greater as it is in the other industrialized nations".

Although there is a large body of literature concerned with Nigeria, the explicit literature on political culture is not extensive. Paden demonstrates the facilitating role of institutions in his work on Kano (1973) where religion plays a crucial role in the dynamics of the expansion and standardization of the political culture. Goldberg (1978) examines the political culture of Nigeria in terms of

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Barrington Moore's thesis and concludes that a more complex outcome than the predicted one occurs because of situational and historical constraints. Njaka (1974) presents a view of traditional Igbo (Ibo) normative political culture, but the data is not based on individuals' actual views or institutions' actual operating characteristics but on ideal models of these. Fishel (1975) urges use of the rich ethnographic literature on Nigeria to evaluate political culture in lieu of survey and other more appropriate data currently unavailable[67] Other particularly insightful authors on Nigerian political culture although their works are not specifically on the the subject are Coleman (1958), Sklar (1963), Dudley (1968, 1973), Whittaker (1970), and Smith (1960) to name but a few. The Nigerian experience will be presented in detail in later chapters. First it is necessary to examine the extant empirical evidence and how it relates to our search for an operational definition of the political culture.

[67] This book provides just that survey data that Fishel called for.

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There seems to be widespread agreement among those who investigate culture at the individual bearer level that humans are directed by some efficacy-seeking forms of behavior. Internalization of culture comes as individuals interact with their social and physical environments, first inductively, then deductively, which cumulates as a theory of the way the world is constructed which provides them with an interrelated set of beliefs, values, and attitudes about how the environment can be manipulated. Rapid social change significantly increases the unpredictability of this world, lessening the individual's ability to manipulate his environment.[68] Many writers have stressed anxiety and the desire to reduce uncertainty as an essential element in the process of control-seeking that we have emphasized in constructing a model of man. The driving force for system adjustment then is a reaction to imbalances, albeit variously specified and characterized, which is consistent with our model.

[68] Some groups like the Yoruba have been observed to be paranoid as an integral part of their culture--not as a disequilibrium reaction to change--see Lambert, Lambo et al (19??).

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The dynamics of institutional adjustments are less clear, descriptions depending on metaphor and analogies with analysis at the individual level. Nisbet (1969) has rightly questioned the viability of such explanations which depend on biological metaphor to account for social action.[69] However, the reality of social dynamics is not in question here, merely the specification of the mechanisms of change and development.

Political Culture--Dimensions

Since later chapters are devoted to an examination of the dimensions of political culture including their specification and measurement against Nigerian data, it is only necessary to delineate them briefly here. These dimensions will be utilized in the specification of the theory and methodological approach specified in the next chapter. Eisenstadt and others who concentrate on the study of institutions have expressed the view that changes

[69] The contemporary development of socio-biology is accused by some of also being guilty of the inappropriate use of analogy or of the ecological fallacy. See Ruse (1979), Wilson (1975, 1978), Gregory (1978). See Seligman and Hager (1972) for views on the subject.

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ultimately must be institutionalized to become part of the continuing culture. It should be expected that the disembodied culture normally becomes institutionalized and part of the embodied culture, as exemplified by language.[70] The scope and range of the embodied culture may have a fundamental bearing on the individual's need for a more consistent belief system. Indeed, the fact that one holds opinions at all may be the most important datum of all, Valler (1970:317) quotes Lerner. Certainly, it has been at the center of continuing controversy in the study of American politics (see Converse (1964), Pierce and Rose (1974), Sniderman and Citrin (1971)).[71] Understanding the complex of issues that threaten the validity of analysis is fundamental to our research design, and we will deal with these issues in a later chapter.[72]

[70] But this may not be a formal institution. For example, underground literature such as Monkey in China (A. Waley trans.) pictured the unapproved culture of the peasant. Attempts to ban such literature were always futile. Jack Goody (1977:37) views literacy as the prime embodiment of culture and the factor which allows man's intellectual life to be no longer dominated by the problem of memory storage.

[71] See Freeman (1980) on the debate about American publics.

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While a culture cannot completely be summarized by a few 'dimensions', additive or otherwise, there is sufficient convergence of empirical information and theoretical insight to indicate certain elements characteristic of the disembodied culture or the individual culture-bearer. There seems to be widespread agreement on the central role of efficacy or competence-seeking. Almond and Verba made it central to their analysis, stating that in "many ways, the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude." However, they did not clearly specify the arrangement of their ideal types on an underlying continuum of efficacy seeking.[73] The alternatives include achieving a sense personal efficacy through group activity. This argument has been emphasized recently by Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), and

[72] These issues include the age, period and cohort effects that bedevil all research which looks at cross-sectional data but which wishes to make statements that have a temporal dimension. See Glenn (1977) on these issues. Other major factors include the role of structural factors and the never ending problems of the relationship between empirical measures and theoretically useful concepts.

[73] The parochials are unaware of most external efficacy possibilities or see them as low probabilities of personal payoff; the subject uses group membership as a vicarious and sometimes real source of efficacy; and the participant uses groups to increase his own efficacy.

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Huntington and Nelson (1976). This is a view that the importance of politics lies in the conflict over resources that cannot, or are not, settled by non-authoritative allocation. Thus, efficacy-seeking may be seen as a multidimensional concept which includes personal efficacy, a sense of the regime's efficacy, and a sense of personal political efficacy (one's control over elites and regimes).[74]

A second dimension that has received considerable attention in the literature is the sense of identity. Huntington and Dominguez (1975) make it the central element of political culture in their review of the field, seeing efficacy as playing a secondary role. However, since identity is formed as a result of an individual's interaction with this environment, which includes control seeking behavior, it seems more appropriate for identity to be second to efficacy in importance. A third dimension almost universally noted is trust. Dahl (19??) sees it as

[74] Most studies have found some form of efficacy as central, see Lehman (1972), Jacon (1971), Pye (1962). This is particularly stressed in most studies to be an essential ingredient to a successfully functioning democracy.

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one of the four salient elements of political culture, while Pye (1962), Jacon (1971), Craig and Cornelius (in Almond and Verba:1980), Huntington and Dominguez (1975) place considerable emphasis on it or its complimentary concept, cynicism.[75] There are many areas where trust operates, however, (e.g. elites, other groups, friends, etc.) and there is no reason *a priori* to assume that they are not a part of the political culture.

Another dimension commanding a consensus concerns the legitimacy and appropriateness of authority. Pye (1968) emphasizes various aspects of authority as does Huntington (1970) in his interpretation of American political culture in terms of a strong underlying anti-authority syndrome in American culture. Other dimensions of political culture-- the more detailed aspects of decision rules, enforcement procedures, beliefs about the intent of action by the 'authorities', deference to authority, and political

[75] His four elements are (1) orientation to problem solving (pragmatic-rationalistic); (2) orientation to collective action (cooperative-noncooperative); (3) orientation to the political system (allegiant-non-allegiant); (4) orientation to other people (trust-mistrustful).

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cognition--will be discussed in a later chapter. Central to our general argument is the assumption that these elements or dimensions of a political culture are universal (etic) in character and that they exhaust most of the significant range of variance among cultures.

Criticisms of the Concept of Political Culture

One of the main questions posed in the literature of the last fifteen years is whether people, particularly "parochial" and "subject" types in Almond and Verba's terminology, hold any real beliefs at all or whether they merely possess a few basic orientations, responding randomly in a particular situation. If we assume that political culture is itself a theory that individuals hold, we can expect considerable variation in its elaboration by individual culture-bearers. Our concern will be to see if we can differentiate the signal (theory) from the noise (random variation).

In addition to Converse's point, critics have suggested that the literature on political culture is insensitive to the variation of cultures both within and between societies.

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While Almond and Verba (1965:26) clearly recognized that "most political cultures are heterogeneous", their analysis does not do justice to this observation.[76] Criticism includes the charge of inappropriate emphasis on early childhood experience as a source for adult behavior. However, most studies have not emphasized this. Furthermore, no one would deny the importance of childhood socialization for adult behavior. Since hypothetico-deductive skills do not tend to develop until the teens, adult experiences should be substantially important in determining behavior, particularly that which rests on conscious cognitive functioning.

Craig and Cornelius (1976:16-17, 37-41) have argued for the pre-dominance of structural sources over individual level psychological characteristics. Since their analyses depend on variational methods which undervalue cultural effects in a systematic way, their results cannot be accepted as they stand. Nevertheless a model that systematically incorporates cross-level effects linking

[76] They argue that the small size of their samples for each country makes this kind of analysis impossible which is to some extent true.

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various sectors of behavior (social, cultural, psychological, economic) as well as different levels (micro-macro) has not been offered in the literature.[77] We hope to demonstrate in this study that the culture concept is a clear micro-macro link which can be established. We are focusing on societies that have several significant political cultures--a condition that does not exist in all countries--for even some multinational societies, such as the United States, do not have ethnically or culturally distinct political cultures. Hence ethnic variation is not synonymous with cultural variation. Secondly, as Kelman (1969) has observed, when old identities and cultures survive it is generally because the new ones don't satisfy some social or psychological need, or to put it in our terminology, the new theory doesn't explain all that the old one did, even if it explains some things that the old one didn't. Lastly, for our purposes cultural differences within a society are of principal interest rather than a detailed analysis of the working of each

[77] Most empirical studies refer to a variety of levels in their explanations and imply if not suggest linkages. What may be lacking is a systematic statement of the relationships.

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Individual culture. The latter issue is beyond the scope of this work although it may be of substantial importance to political and economic outcomes.

Summary

In this chapter we have dealt with the notion of culture and its transmission. Before going on to a specification of our theory we need to identify the characteristics of the culture-bearers and the social processes that affect change. We turn to this in the next chapter.

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April 23, 1982

Chapter Three - Models of the Political Culture Bearers

Introduction

A Model of Man -- The Control-Seeker

Man as Knower (cognition effects)

Man as Evaluator

Man and Affect as Source of Action

The Plural Political Culture: Source of Conflict or Cooperation?

Pluralism's Two Strands Unified

Political Implications of the Plural Society

Social Change

Summary

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Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the construction of a model of how the individual culture-bearers function. We view man as a seeker after a sense of control of his environment. This process has cognitive, evaluative, and affective components. In an important sense the modernization tradition is concerned with the first two components, cognition and evaluation, as central and sufficient to account for action. That tradition also assumes that evaluative processes are straightforward and well-defined. This is not the case. The last component, affect, is not well understood in this information oriented perspective and therefore it is unable to assimilate a view of action that rests on 'non-rational' grounds such as ethnocentrism. In our view this seeker after control is utilizing a calculus that pays particular attention to the affective and evaluative dimensions. In the social world this translates to a status seeker.[1] However, the relation between each individual's own view of status rankings and the social 'standard' or consensus on such rankings is a difference that can be large and which we will

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explore.[2]

We also characterize the operations of the embodied culture-bearers, and the conflicts between cultures. The last section is concerned with the role of social change in stirring up the 'social' pile and keeping it in a consistently high level of disequilibrium.[3]

A Model of Man As Control-Seeker

In the previous chapter, we argued that a key aspect of culture, particularly with respect to its dynamics, is that

[1] See Nisbett and Ross (1980) on human inference in social judgement, Heath (1974) on the rational model of man, Boden (1977) and Banerji (1980) on artificial intelligence models, Mosse (1980) on nationalist perceptions of reality, Pendse (1978) on category perception, Goffman (1974) on his 'frame analysis' model for the categorical nature of perception, and Wickelgren (1979a, 1979b, 1980) on learning, cognition and 'chunking' phenomena. On other aspects of the categorical nature of cognitive functioning see Grosberg (1978), Halpike (1979) on primitive thought, and Heiss (1981) on the social psychology of interaction.

[2] See Coxon and Jones (1978, 1979) for an empirical test of this hypothesis using sophisticated empirical methods.

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it is borne by the individual culture-bearer in the form of a theory about how the world functions. We expect this theory to be organized and acted on by the bearer in such a way that he has a model of what other men are like which conditions his behavior. We would like to go beyond that model and ask what model of man do we, as analysts of human behavior, assume exists and what implications do our assumptions have for the analysis of man in the plural society.[4]

[3] The literature relating to models of man is enormous but diffuse since much of the literature is labeled in other ways. See, for example, Goldstein and Blackman (1978) who contrast five models, Hoffman (1977), Hunt (1979), Marcuse (1962), Simon (1957), Slovic (1972), Stevenson (1974), Moore (1979), Rhodie (1978:14), Harre and Secord (1973), Clippinger (1978:64), Mcnelly (1968) - a review of Hobbes view of human nature - London and Exner (1978:xiv) note how one's model of man leads to certain research techniques. Pettit (1977:78) reviews Levi Strauss' model of man.

[4] Carroll and Payne (1976:3) characterize the agreement across figures as distinct as Plato, Aristotle, and Freud in terms of their view of the hierarchical character of organization of the brain. The term, model, is used in this discussion in the sense Pettit (1977:100, 106-7) refers to a model as a 'systematic metaphor'. We should also remember that man as knower deals with several levels of reality and that a simple model may be insufficient to characterize the situation in some cases.

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One important question focuses on man's motivational basis for action and how it interacts with this social and cultural experience.[5] Durkheim, for example, views social organizations as necessary to control the insatiable inner desires of man. The utilitarians, conversely, see society as the expression of human will designed to produce the greatest good for all -- a Lockean view that emphasizes the role of internalized values for guiding action.

How much effect does an individual culture-bearer have on his culture? Moon asserts that the "emphasis on discovering the purposes of an individual actor has sometimes led people to neglect the intrinsically conventional character of all human action and to overemphasize its instrumental nature." (1975:167) While there is a point to be made here, Moon does not go far enough. The reason that much human behavior is

[5] One view on the predominance of values as a motivation to action is Parsons (1949). An excellent case study of the rise of capitalism in the eighteenth century is Hirschman (1977). Weber's 'Protestant ethic' is one of the classic studies relating individual motivation to behavior. It demonstrates that the individual often produces a social product quite different from his intent and even inconsistent with his wishes.

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'intrinsically conventional' is that it has been internalized as culture--as standardized meanings of action. Culture as a cognitive map is learned.[6] Therefore, we need to understand how it came to be learned and why individuals typically master their culture voluntarily and with alacrity.

Man as Knower

Learning takes place as an interaction between the individual's current 'theory' and the testing of it as performed in his external world--with the choice of tests actuated by the individual's motivation, epistemology, and related perceptual possibilities. The level (as well as the direction) of individual motivation differs but we expect variations in the level are influenced by experimental and environmental factors such as debilitating diseases and nutritional deficiencies, rather than from genetic sources.[7] Nutritional deficiencies not only sap energy

[6] Tolman (1951) is usually credited with the first use of this term, cognitive map, and he characterized rationality as proportional to the breadth of the 'map'.

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but prevent the physical development of the brain and reduce, for example, the number of people who develop their hypothetico-deductive and abstract reasoning powers--that is, who reach the last stage of the Piagetian development sequence.[8] Moreover, the effect of deferred gratification on motivation in systems where individuals typically have a short life span is relatively unstudied. This underlines the need to construct a model of man which is useful to the analysis of change in a plural political culture. Our emphasis is on the first principles of action--why does man act at all? We are particularly concerned with the importance of cognition in this process--a concern that was largely ignored until the last twenty years in American psychology with its emphasis on biological mechanisms, Pavlovian stimulus-response models, and the 'instinctual' drives and needs of analytic psychology. Nevertheless, as we make clear in our analysis, cognition leads to different

[7] See Lumsden and Wilson (1981) for an argument that genes are, in effect, culture carriers. They also note that their notion of 'culturgens' as units of culture is not fixed in number and they expect that the number will expand as a function of need and environmental characteristics. (1977:317-318) Note that the impact on a person's sense of efficacy because of their consumption of mass media can be considerable. (Bandura:1969,249)

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outcomes according to the largely independent roles of affect and evaluation.

The elucidation of basic drives or needs has been fundamental to the study of human psychology. Freud paid particular attention to sex drives, and Pavlov to hunger but they are only examples of a long list. We see all "basic needs" as sharing a common motive for personal control or efficacy--and that different manifestations of control-seeking behavior develop in interaction with varying social, cultural, biological, and ecological environments. Leach has observed that "a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is a very general motive in human affairs" (1954:100). Indeed most models of man do assume some such process. Does this imply that we are generalizing at the

[8] For discussions of this perspective see Neel (1977), Piaget (1977, 1970). Pye raises the issue that physical differences in such societies are far less varied than mental or emotional differences. On child development see Werner (1979), Winner and Gardner (1979), Super and Harkness (1980), and Rosen (1981) on the role of the family in achievement. Ten Houten (1978) presents a case for racial, sexual and socioeconomic status differences in 'types of cognitive performance' which may have some relevance in the cultural forms we observe. However, very little data is available on Nigeria. See Wober (1975) for a summary of evidence on African populations.

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expense of clarity and precision? The answer is no. We see many of the contemporary models of man deriving from the interaction of man as control seeker within a particular culture and therefore tending to be models of men in specific cultural contexts--a specificity which leads to confusion from our point of view.

We characterize man as having the following properties:

(1) He seeks control over his existence by controlling the environment and other actors, particularly as they are relevant to his 'world' or as they are 'significant others' who enforce reality testing on him.[9]

(2) He views the world as a stochastic process, that is, as a place of uncertain or even unknowable futures. Hence, he not only anticipates control as desirable but he also wants to maintain that variance or uncertainty within a certain range.[10]

(3) He is engaged in a search which is an ongoing process. Once control in one area is achieved, it is assumed to continue until it becomes untenable, and new opportunities for control are searched for, either in the same or in a different area such that maximum gains are expected from the choice--subject to uncertainty limits. This leads

[9] Pye note: control can be an ambiguous term when it comes to behavior. A baby 'controls' his mother just as much as the mother controls the baby. I agree, but this is not inconsistent with the notion that both are trying to control their environments. To the contrary, they both are!

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to a view that political efficacy is a result of general efficacy levels.

(4) He makes decisions to engage in control increasing (or maintaining) behavior as a function of his theory of the world-- which varies as a function of culture, personality, and situation.

(5) He has a priority sequence in control-seeking behavior -that control increment which gives the greatest gain is selected first--however, these gains are measured with respect to all future rewards. Hence, 'basic needs' like survival, food, rest, and so on are chosen first because they are necessary to maintain his existence for a long period of time not because they are more 'basic', although this is not to deny the 'semi-automatic' nature of many such physiologically related functions.

(6) He has a 'theory of the world' (his culture) which provides a mechanism to measure control, giving him some basis for deciding on a course of action. This measure of control is an evaluation of the order or predictability of events.[11]

[10] Kagan (1972) characterizes resolution of uncertainty, hostility, and mastery as the primary human motives. See Olds and Fobes (1981) on the central basis for motivation, Hunt (1979:121) comments on the notion of intrinsic motivation, Routtenberg (1978) on a view of the reward system of the brain, Colby (1978) on various models of the mind, Edelman and Mountcastle (1978) on the group-selective theory of brain function, Gerchwind (1979) on specialization in the brain, Fisher (1981) on a review of cognitive development theory, Boddy (1978) on brain systems and psychology, Hebb notes that this means that these thrusts are not to simply minimize but rather to maintain brain stimulation while avoiding overload.

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The above six points form, in our view, man's basis of action, but how does our model compare with others? There seems to be a good deal of convergent evidence which supports this view of man as control seeker. White (1959) indicates that the search for competence is basic to motivation, joining Hebb in emphasizing man as 'novelty-seeker', but adding biological justification to the neurological arguments of Hebb who feels that the brain requires neural activity level that is not only below a maximum value but also above a minimum value if a person is to feel 'happy' or comfortable.[12] This argues strongly against the notion of primary drives which are not under cognitive control, that is against drives which are 'hard-wired' or instinctual--a view that we agree with and that the current physiological evidence overwhelmingly

[11] This is what is called negative entropy (negentropy) in many fields of knowledge, most prominently in communications since Norbert Weiner (1948) demonstrated the definitional link between information in a system and its order or predictability. Coleman (1975) has tried to use entropy to characterize the workings of political systems at the aggregate level but here we are concerned with individual level behavior.

[12] See Neel:1977 for a discussion of Hebb's neurologically oriented work.

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supports.[13]

This simple model of man could be elaborated in a number of ways and we will discuss those areas such as psychological functioning which are the result of man-in-culture as a basic differentiator of action as pertinent to our discussion. For while Hobbes "maintains that all men seek to promote their own good whenever they act, and also that they ought to do so" (Lemos:1973, 12), the determination of 'good' is not unambiguous. We will add only that psychological functioning can be disaggregated into four areas: (1) perceptual--degree of field dependency; (2) cognitive attempts to overcome embeddedness; (3) social--sources of separate identity; and (4) affective--emotional controls and defense.[14] Qualitatively, learning progresses--going from lower-order

[13] For further evidence see Neel (1977) and Hebb (1949). The standard three-brain model which puts some drives under more direct control is acceptable to us as long as the ability for cognition to interrupt the process is allowed.

[14] Michael Bassesses has another perspective emphasizing motor orientation, form-orientation, meta-formal, and relational schemata (1978) which we will refer to later in the book.

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direct experience acquisition to increasing integration and veridical organization. Smith and Miller (1978) and Wicklund (1979) emphasize that this process occurs increasingly under cognitive control but confirm the view that the earliest experiences of learning and theory building are not generally available to cognition. However, as Estes (1978:23) indicates the "conception of conditioned responses . . . as the building blocks of higher cognitive activity. . . simply hasn't worked out." Birch, Atkinson, and Bongort (in Weiner: 1974, 71-98) also stress the 'cognitive control of action' in the human's interaction with the environment. It is this process of interaction which produces secondary motives and particular cognitive styles. Most cultural forms are stored in semantic memory (Minsky;1975) and associative memory (Neel: 1977, 607).[15]

We raised the question of what types of interactive person-culture processes there might be--e.g. do warrior societies exhibit high achievement motivation? If so, is it the peculiar combination of authority and independence characteristic of armies that produces high achievement and reinforces control-seeking behavior?[16] How does this correlate with field independence (Witkin and

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Goodenough:1977a, 1977b) as a motivational process, and what relationships are there between ego involvement, issue salience and control seeking? [17] It is clear that a person's theory of the world is a function of situational and ascriptive components of actor identification. As in any theory this one will include constraints on the scope of application of any part of the theory where the more pragmatic the cognitive style the less the attractiveness of competing ideologies. Thus the organization of the individual's cognitive map will be useful both as a 'normative and empirical model' (Axlerod:1976, 56).

[15] There is a vast literature on secondary motives emphasizing achievement (McClelland; 1960), power (Winters:1973 and McClelland: 1965), learned helplessness, and a long list of others. We will cite the literature as necessary later in our discussion as we look at (1) various sources of influence on cognitive development such as family, peers, environment, and history; (2) principles of learning resulting from control-seeking such as identification, vicarious learning, variance reduction and deduction; and (3) the personal characteristics which are consequences of these processes (cf. Staub: in press). Also see Oakley and Plotkin (1979) on the relation between evolution and behavior as it is reflected in the structure of the brain. See Hirst and Wooley (1982) for a review of the biology and culture link. Lumsden and Wilson (1981:245) note that the relation of episodic to semantic memory (inductive process) suggests the 'Ontogeny of Mind'.

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As man interacts with his environment, forming his beliefs about the operation of the world, what procedures does he use to construct tentative explanations and to direct his action? We have already emphasized that he chooses to respond to those stimuli which will give the highest gain in negentropy (as weighted by his expectation of variance). However, this model differs in fundamental ways from that presented in simple utilitarian marginalist economics. Only a few of these differences fall within the economist's traditional domain.

First, we expect the control-seeker to search for the parsimonious decision function, in general, and to value parsimony, *ceteris paribus*, in inverse proportion to the personal salience of the issue. Also, the more complex the

[16] See Della Fave (1980) on the relation between self-evaluation and perception of inequality and stratification. Bandura (1977:141) provides another perspective on the effects of low levels of efficacy when he writes, "Excessive self-disparagement, in fact, is one of the defining characteristics of depression." Also see Bandura (p. 80) for a view of the sources of efficacy.

[17] We will attempt to answer some of these questions in our discussion of the Nigerian data at a later point.

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situation, the more parsimony is valued. Further, we follow March in believing that man "is not smart enough to be rational" (1978: 588) and that humans, in general, recognize that they need to act in a manner that uses bounded rationality for if they do not simplify decision making in order to optimize their action making, they cannot function.[18] But herein lies the basic conundrum in our search for the form of the adaptive culture -- it appears that rational choice theory in concert with humans can produce a nightmare rather than optimality because 'rational' man is called upon to operate as a ceteris paribus creature in a world which actually functions on a mutatis mutandis basis.[19]

[18] See Simon (1979) on the nature of various approaches to thought processes. See Damon (1978) on social cognition, and Coulter (1979) on the social construction of the mind. Also see Bresnan (1980) on mental representations of grammatical relations, Boulding (1981) on the nature of human epistemology, Bateson (1979) on mind and nature, Halliday (1978) on the social interpretation of language, Hammond and Brunswick (1980) on Brunswik's view of perception, and Becker (1976) on a classic utilitarian view of behavior dominated by a pleasure maximizing calculus. Bentler and Speckart (1979) present models of the attitude-behavior link. The notion of 'fuzzy sets' from mathematics has some promise for elucidating this link and freeing the analyst from the rigid mappings that are characteristic of the models that are often invoked here. See Negoita (1981) and Wang and Chang (1980) on fuzzy sets.

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The limitations of man's bounded rationality and control seeking are the basis of many social institutions which are conveniently organized ways to provide routines to deal with uncertainty. For example, religion, work, school, and sex are complex ritual involvements that bind people together but these ritual "solutions may fail when a significant portion of the population questions their effectiveness" (Kagan:1972 57)--i.e. when cultural change takes place.

A particularly crucial aspect of this search for parsimony and efficacy is the use of labeling and classificatory devices applied to cultural group boundaries. Like other parts of a person's theory, once acquired, he prefers them to be proven 'true'. Not only is this the basis of ethnocentric behavior, but it also underlies social distance in its role as a determinant of political mobilization. The assessment of culture boundaries as outer limits for mobilization is not arbitrary. The negentropy costs for crossing boundaries can be high while the

[19] The need for a political structure that is adaptive results to a large extent from this paradox.

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parochial choice may be a 'local optimum' for many participants in a given system.[20] Moreover, the psychological costs for crossing the boundaries, temporary as they may sometimes be, can be extreme.[21] Since we have emphasized the attempt by individuals to construct their own version of reality in which an approach-avoidance procedure is used, we would expect that reality testing would be selective and biased towards confirmation of theories with the result that conflicts with other groups would speed the process of group consolidation and enhance the perceived contrast between groups.

[20] Entropy of the system is different from each person's entropy level-- which provides the basis for staying in one's own group--i.e. to minimize uncertainty. There is a considerable body of evidence to support these ideas, see, for example, Lumsden and Wilson (1981:89) on examples of 'chunking' in memory, (p. 44) on how colors are divided into categories at an early age, (Also see Rosch and Lloyd:1978 on such issues of perception) This categorical nature of memory and therefore action is further suggested by several quotes from Bandura; "Modeled events that are highly novel presumably cannot be incorporated." (1977:31); "As a rule, people do not pursue most activities that differ moderately from what they know or can do." (1977:164); "the unconventional is not only unexplored, but is usually negatively received from the more venturesome." (1977:91);

[21] Thus the importance of avoiding an imprinting of social distance in children, see Hoffman:1973, 527 (Psychological Review).

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Before concluding our discussion of how motivations direct action, we should note that efficacy or control-seeking is somewhat analagous to an inverse r-squared law--that is the less salient a value the less likely it is to be evaluated with respect to negentropy or alternatively the less likely it is to be seen as part of an individual's life-space. Hence, for most social participants, the most important efficacy confirming behavior will be those immediate experiences which are socially valued.[22]

Control-seeking appears to be an ongoing process directed by perceptions of reality. Thus as an individual ages, the gap between reality and expectations should decrease, the projected stream of future rewards should

[22] Of course, we expect that people will try to 'see' those elements of reality which confirm their sense of own efficacy. This is not to deny the cumulative importance of deviant information. Nevertheless, as Bandura (1977:167) notes there is difficulty of having behavior modified by experience since ideal typical models seem to have primacy in behavior. Such models depend on vicarious methods of learning more than direct experience. See Bandura (1977:20, 24, 91) and Lumsden and Wilson (1981:102) who state "Imitation and vicarious learning, deliberately by the procedures of formal education and religious indoctrination, constitute one of the primary mechanisms of culturgen propagation."

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decrease, and as a result of these dual processes and given that stimuli elicit less positive reaction, the 'coefficient of friction' in the system should increase. Allied to this issue is another characterized as adaptation-level theory, known as A-L theory, which asserts that persons adjust to a given level of stimulation and then take it as given with respect to negentropy calculation.[23] Thus we would expect pleasure seeking to be more ephemeral than many other aspects of behavior. A second 'theory' current in social psychology is Equity theory which asserts that individuals have a universal sense of justice and equity which leads them to compensate for actual rewards and punishments.[24] For example, those who believe themselves to be unqualified but who have been rewarded nonetheless tend to try to 'earn' their rewards by working harder. While many points of this theory bear closer inspection, it suggests that such ideas (which must be the products of culture) may be essential to

[23] See Brickman and Campbell (1971); Neel(1977:502); Appley(1971).

[24] See Berkowitz et al. Volume 9 for a thorough discussion of equity theory. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) is a basic source for the theory. This theory seems to have an important cultural bias, however, as we do not invoke it in our analysis.

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the successful functioning of democracy. An alternative to such a theory lies in the difference between a variable-sum game and a constant-sum game.[25] If participants in a society see themselves as playing a variable-sum game, the outcomes will tend to confirm their expectations. The converse is true for constant sum games. Many of the 'modal personality' explanations of behavior stress this issue.

If man is a control-seeker who structures his stimuli as much as possible to maximize apparent order as measured by negentropy, how does he engage in this process? What are its dynamics? Currently, the most popular theory and the one that replaces earlier theories of dissonance reduction and other versions of Thorndike's Law of Effect, which are

[25] A constant-sum game is one in which the sum of all the payoffs in the game are constant irrespective of the strategies of the players. Thus what one player wins must come from the potential winnings of the other players. In a variable-sum game the total of the payoffs is not constant so the strategies adopted by the players will have a significant bearing on the outcomes possible to each player. In such a situation it is important that the players recognize the cooperative nature of the game because if they do not they will act as if it is a constant-sum game and typically decrease individual and group payoffs. Colander and Guthrie (1980-81) discuss the fundamental ambiguity in the use of the term 'rational'.

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grounded in a behaviorist view of man, is known as attribution theory. It was developed by Kelley in the late 1960's and most recently elaborated in Kelley and Thibaut (1978). Attribution theory maintains that an individual's attributions of cause and effect, his articulated perceptions of the situation are the fundamental issues in his evaluation of control. As a result, social organizations often concern themselves with the maintenance of illusion of control, or with the continuity of Hirschman's 'tunnel effect' (1973) or the illusion that one controls the environment more than one does as Hirschman has noted so insightfully in his *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970) and "Exit, Voice, and the State" (1978).[26] All of this points up the concern of the polity with a model of man if public policy choices are to be effective in achieving their goals.

The search for efficacy, order, and control in terms of bounded rationality, parsimony, and the other perspectives outlined above can be seen from another viewpoint, one which

[26] This raises the 'catastrophe' of a sudden change of consciousness as a negentropy problem.

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emphasizes the higher order integration of thought and the movement from inductive processes of analyzing stimuli and effecting responses to a deductive orientation which stresses an hypothetico-deductive approach to knowledge of the world. This approach is most associated with the work of Piaget who characterized himself as a genetic epistemologist.[27] Piaget views individual maturation as a process whereby a childhood of revolutionary change is followed by an adult experience of 'normalcy' countered only by the development of higher order intellectual functioning.[28] This verticality of Piaget contrasts with the 'horizontal' character of Maslow's stages of development in which the salience of issues change, and as one level is satisfied the issues of the next level come to the fore. Maslow and Kohlberg (1970) will be discussed in a later section on the adaptive culture's structure.

[27] See Denzin:1977, 118 for a presentation of the major views of Piaget as well as Kohlberg and Cooley. Also see Piaget:1977.

[28] Hunt (1979:122) refers to Piaget's concept of 'mobile equilibrium'.

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Our concern at this point is how our model of man perceives other men and what formulas for action are implicit in these models which he himself constructs. His model is a cultural product reflecting a certain sequence of learning which in turn reflects his model.[29] His models further must reflect a view of the possibility and consequences of being socially efficacious which may be described in dichotomies such as individual vs. community maximizers; social mobility vs. social change; exit vs. voice; individual maximization vs. group efficacy; Lockean vs. Hobbesian men; variable sum vs. constant-sum games etc.[30] Our concern throughout this work is to identify those conditions that lead man to a view of social and political life as a variable-sum game and to explore the temporal dynamics of a certain model. The search for efficacy may produce men with an increasing external locus of control, a condition which may be incompatible with an

[29] Pye (1962) among others has noted that the sequence order is important--e.g. high trust childhood leads to the 'reformer' in low trust adults but low trust childhood leads to cynical low trust adulthood.

[30] This seems currently to be a dominant view --see Huntington and Nelson:1976 and Verba, Nie and Kim:1978.

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adaptive culture. However, the extent that control-seekers use group membership to effect control over their existence provides the structural balance that Durkheim saw as the source of balance between individual's ego-driven wants and social needs.

Sanjek (1977) gives an excellent empirical example of the cognitive maps of ethnicity in urban Ghana in which he notes the close relationship between experience, and cognitive salience and structure. While his interest is different from ours, his data appear to be consistent with the model of man we have constructed and the special role which ethnicity plays in our theory, although the great variety of ethnic characterizations point up the difficulty of the empirical estimation of bounds of culture.

Sanjek indicates that ethnicity and culture are different, although related, phenomena. While we expect some cultural variation within ethnic groups we also expect that some ethnic groups will have no more between-group variation than within-group variation with respect to the elements of their culture theory.[31] We also expect some elements of culture to be widely distributed and essentially

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pan-cultural. For example, it is frequently asserted that the African's model of political man is egalitarian, a view we will partially test in Part II of this book.[32] However, the model may use important ascriptive components which selectively view some 'others' as 'like us', and some as not. We will evaluate this at some length for we assert that the boundaries of ethnic identity are dynamic and context related and will only be relatively stable at the cultural boundaries. Nonetheless, ethnic boundaries have important political effects.

Man as Evaluator

[31] This implies that 'similar' cultures in this sense will be more likely to have affective relationships which extend to the political and social arenas.

[32] For a note on this subject see I. Kopytoff (1977). We might note that the Nigerian press and leadership expressed strong disapproval about the appearance of Yakubu Gowon, the deposed head of state, in a university cafeteria line in the United Kingdom where he was a student. It was felt to be inappropriate for a former Nigerian head of state to wait in line like other citizens!

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The model of man within the 'theory of the world' that each actor carries is a primary component of the way he reacts to social stimulation and attributes 'meanings' to given activities. The notion of rationality as used in many discussions lends weight to the ambiguity of the term. This ambiguity has both cultural and individual preference components. McClintock (1972) has advanced a set of propositions on the results of perception of the social motivation of others, and the ramifications of the motives which are ascribed to other knowers. He considers own-, relative-, joint-, and others-gain forms of maximization corresponding respectively to "individualism, competition, cooperation, and altruism." DeCharms and Muir (1978) note that culturally determined motives are fundamental aspects of usually self-fulfilling prophecies, a view reinforced by Banfield (1958), Galtung (1971), Atkinson and Raynor (1975), Weiner (1972), McClelland (1975), and Winter (1973). Thus the elements of rationality are not consistent across individuals or intertemporally. Individual culture-bearers are not the only source of the culture's dynamics, however. Koch, Sodergren and Campbell (1976) illustrate influences of social structure on conflict outcomes, warning us against a too facile reductionism. If we perceive social structures

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as well as individuals to be culture-bearers, we should expect variation of the model of man adopted across structures as well as across individual actors. This is not to make an etic versus emic distinctions (Pike:1967), but to make clear that there may be situational determinants of the actors' model of man which are manipulable for social purposes.

Before leaving this discussion of models of man, we should review several additional theories adding them to our 'tool kit' for use in later analysis. First, while we are concerned primarily with how group members constitute their belief systems, especially in terms of the "higher order principles or rules that govern the the way in which reality is experienced and responded to" (Clippinger:1978, 33), we also want to understand how attitudes to specific objects and issues are formed and how independent basic beliefs are from their more specific and immediate representations as attitudes. People may use a number of 'maps' which have considerable independence of application like the 'tentacles' of Poincare's octopus.[33] As we suggested earlier, the level of consistency or more directly, inconsistency, in a society--take Etheredge's (1979)

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"semi-confused thinking", for example--may be of considerable adaptive value. Second, Korman (1974, 1976) assembles an impressive array of evidence supporting the view that individuals try to construct environments consistent with their own self-image. While Donelson (1973) emphasizes the situational nature of attitude formation and maintenance, their research reinforces our view of the subjective nature of control-seeking behavior and the avoidance of reality-testing where possible.[34] Third, we should remember Geertz's exposition of the "Harvard Law" which asserts that "any well-trained experimental animal, on controlled stimulation, will do as he damn well pleases." (1973:1971) Last, the reader should understand that the

[33] Or Geertz's more contemporary use of this metaphor (1973:408). Tversky (1971, 1973, 1974) has been a leader in the empirical analysis of the judgement processes that individuals actually use to deal with complex, uncertain and even unknowable environments that are the commonality of experience in developed societies and increasingly in those societies that are developing a more articulated social and economic structure.

[34] See Jameson (1972:viii-ix) for a discussion which hints at the profound differences between a cognitive map constantly bounded by an external reality, and one that spends most of its time in the internal manipulation of symbols, many of them generated originally by vicarious experience.

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model of man as control-seeker differs in substantial degree from one using Thorndike's Law of Effect in any form and in particular as it is used in Homans' (1965:53) model of man.[35] Rather we expect that an activity that one is already in control of will be taken for granted and other areas of stimulation will be searched out. Consequently, we should expect that efficacious individuals will be more active politically as elsewhere ~~because~~ they are already more efficacious or 'in control'. Continuing to engage in the same activities gives little increment in a sense of control, it gives little negentropy gain and makes further investment in the activity marginally less attractive.[36]

The Plural Political Culture: Source of Conflict or
Cooperation?

[35] Homan's model reflects the Skinnerian view of the brain as subject to operant conditioning and therefore of humans as habit formers and followers. Our view here holds the use of 'habit' to be always under cognitive control and certainly not as unthinking as the Thorndike Law of Effect would have it.

[36] Peel (1973) also discusses the models of man used by Moore and Leach (p 289) as well as the tradition from Ferguson to Spencer (p 300).

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"The term 'pluralism' has many meanings. The kind of pluralist theory which is the concern of this study and which will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter, may be called 'sociological' pluralist theory. It focuses on the relationship between social conditions and political behavior. In contrast, what might be termed 'political' pluralist theory is primarily concerned with the distribution of political power." (Lijphart:1968,2)

Thus far in our discussion, we have yet to relate our definitions to the notion of the state, and political culture necessarily exists in the context of a state. In some cases, the boundaries of the culture and state are essentially coterminous but in many cases there are several significant and distinct political cultures within the confines of one state. This characteristic variability does not require a special theory for the plural political culture but it does demand a unified conceptual base for the analysis of states with varying characteristics of pluralism.

The "plural political culture", unlike other terms discussed, is used with considerable conceptual clarity. Nevertheless, there are two schools of thought about the use

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of this concept, and allied terms like pluralism and the plural society.[37] One school is associated principally with Anglo-American political scientists and in its empirical form, with American political scientists such as Dahl, Lipset, Truman, Pool and others. The second is associated with Europeans, particularly a number of Dutch writers. Each tradition probably reflects the respective cultural and historical experience of its holders' societies. When exponents of these traditions venture afield, as does Dahl in his work on European democracies (1966) in which he ignores the several plural democracies of Western Europe, they tend to bypass some of the more obvious challenges to their theoretical constructs.[38] Before we attempt to give a more general and dynamic picture of the structure of a plural society, the views underlying these two schools of thought must be briefly described.

[37] See Morris (1967) and Kuper and Smith (1969) for a review of the plural society concept. See Peacock (1981) for a review of Durkheim's view of culture and Collins (1981) for the microfoundations of macrosociology. Other work on the plural society concept includes Lijphart (1966, 1968, 1969, 1975, 1977), Smith (1965, 1974).

[38] This is most commonly done by the use of typologies.

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The first school of pluralist thought (the political version) is founded on the liberal theory of the state where the state exists to serve the needs of its citizens as they determined them, and particularly as the citizens articulate those demands through a large number of voluntary associations with non-ascriptively defined memberships. This view demarcates public from private interests and exhibits the expectation that the state exists to provide 'public' goods.[39] Further, under this perspective it is assumed that organizational membership is relatively volatile and existing groups act to articulate the interests of their members. This process by which the state adjusts its public policies in response to the demands of group formation of its citizens could underly the model of an adaptive culture if it were not so divorced from actual manifestations of the state.[40] In this model of the plural political culture, there are high levels of role differentiation and the probability of group membership in

[39] For a discussion of this tradition see Downes (1957) and Arrow (1963).

[40] And, as we will argue, possible manifestations of the state.

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one group is not related to the probability of membership in another group.[41] This situation has been described by Lipset as one of cross-cutting cleavages because of varying group interests. Membership in many different groups is expected to lead to moderation in demands with respect to the average.[42] Such a system is expected to have a unimodal distribution of political positions with most people in the center and few in the extremes, in short a relatively homogeneous political culture.

Consequently, except for income and status distribution, there are few fundamental issues to be decided in the political system, and politics as social exchange acquires a 'market-like' character.[43] In fact, this model bears a marked 'family' resemblance to the model of perfect competition in neoclassical economics. At what point these

[41] Formally stated as $p(m_i/m_j) = p(m_i)$ where m_i = membership in group i and $p()$ is the probability of membership. Note that an important point in the analysis of voluntary organizations is that they can act as support groups and mobilization groups or both. How they act is related to the environment from which they evolve and the resource potential of the members.

[42] A 'regression to the mean' effect.

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models intersect with the mass society of Kornhauser (1959) where there are no intermediaries independent of the state is not clear.

The above 'ideal type' ignores important psychological and sociological forces which result in the placement of high salience on internal consistency. Thus, ascriptively based memberships, culturally-derived identities, and other social forces such as location act to make an individual's mix of memberships highly non-random. Many analysts have been particularly lax in recognizing the role of ethnic and cultural identities, the first item in Pye's 1958 list of seventeen characteristics of the non-Western political process.[44] In a more recent statement, Connors (1972:319) observes that political theorists ignore "problems

[43] See Lindblom (1977) for an extensive review of the relations between politics and markets, and Pool and Kochen (1978) for a discussion of the probabilities that any given *i*th and *j*th persons will share a common social interactional network link. Also see Parsons (1977) for his view of the nature of social exchange. Munch (1981, 1982) provides a comprehensive examination of Parsons' theory of action.

[44] See Diamant's comments on this piece (1959) as well as Lijphart (1977:23).

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associated with ethnic diversity" or view them as primordial loyalties which will gradually disappear in the face of the forces of modernization and social change. That they do not disappear has been observed by many, including Dahl (1978) who writes of the enduring character of "conflictive pluralism".

The idea that fundamental cultural boundaries might characterize and divide the peoples of a state is not a new one as the previous quotation from J.S. Mill indicates. However, much of the impetus for recognizing the importance of this issue came from students of politics in Holland, one of the two significant European colonial powers which was itself a plural society.[45]

The second strand of pluralist thought (the socio-cultural version) is characterized by the work of Furnivall, one of the earlier analysts of the subject, in his definition of a plural society:

[45] France, Britain, Germany, and Spain had important sub-cultures but they were small relative to the dominant group and located on the periphery of the state. Belgium is the other colonial power that is also a plural society.

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It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. (1948:305).

The extreme form of pluralism described by Furnivall may not be as common today as half a century ago, but various approximations of such forms are ubiquitous.[46] In such societies, the emphasis is on the sociological character of group boundaries. Groups of voluntary origin and specific purpose in the homogeneous political culture give way to groups which dominate the political scene. Such latter groups have an ascriptively defined membership and a diffuse sense of purpose and obligations.[47] When such groups exist in a state, they seem to dominate other group memberships.[48] Geertz' collection of essays (1963) on the

[46] Another Dutch writer in this tradition is Boeke (1953).

[47] Olson (1965) disputes the assertion of overlapping memberships in the U. S. A. as does Domhoff (1978) in his restudy of New Haven

[48] See as an example in the Canadian political culture, Presthus (1973:18-20).

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subject, *Old Societies and New States*, emphasizes the centrality of the issue as does Migdal's (forthcoming) work, *Strong Societies and Weak States*.

Almond's classic statement (1956), often cited as the beginning of the modern study of political culture, emphasizes that plural political cultures' or, as he terms them, 'fragmented political cultures' are found in continental Europe among the developed states and are not restricted to coercive and especially colonial regimes. Lijphart also emphasizes the democratic plural society although he admits that in such societies "the salient social cleavages tend to be translated into party system cleavages; the political parties are likely to be organized political manifestations of the segments." (1977:61).

Contrary to this tradition which emphasizes the variety of plural societies is another which is more consistent with Furnivall's original conception. For example, Smith (1965) defines the plural society as one dominated by a small culturally distinct group, usually a colonial population.[49] Thus he adopts the view that plural societies cannot exist as democracies. This view is echoed

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by many scholars, most recently Ronen (1979) in his study of a number of plural societies in different historical epochs. Similarly, Van den Berghe notes that "pluralism is associated with despotic military rule and with relative lack of consensus on both values legitimizing the existing polity and norms regulating political behavior" (in Kuper and Smith, 1969:73). This recalls Furnivall's earlier statement that the plural society has "to be held together by some force exerted from the outside." (1948:459) The pessimistic conclusions resemble those arrived at by Rabuska and Shepsle (1972) via a very different analytic path. Rabuska and Shepsle use the formal modeling tradition of positive political theory, especially Riker's notion of the 'minimum winning coalition', to predict that plural societies cannot exist as democracies.[50]

[49] See Kuper and Smith (1969:14) for Kuper's summary of Smith's position as well as Smith's own chapter on the subject.

[50] See for example, Riker and Ordeshook (1973) Riker (1962) Brams (1976). Arrow's 'impossibility theorem' might make the same prediction.

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Such pessimism seems unjustified however, based as it is on the assumption that ethno-national and cultural boundaries are uniformly incompatible across groups, and that new political forms cannot be invented which are functionally equivalent to the institutions of homogeneous political cultures but different in institutional form.[51] In an adaptive political culture, dependence on explicit elite agreements should be minimized and the environment structured so that is to the elite's advantage to cooperate.[52]

While there are considerable differences among writers on this subject, most would approve of Kuper's definition of

[51] The adaptive political culture should not only accomplish this objective but also deal with the dynamics of cultural boundaries as they change over time. Rabuska and Shepsle (1972) typologize their societies in such a way as to prevent the construction of such a model.

[52] Lijphart's 'consociational democracy' emphasizes elite agreement and management of the society. We believe that this is unlikely to be adaptive in the long-run. See his work on the subject in Lijphart (1966, 1968, 1977, 1979). The term, consociational democracy, was used to describe Nigeria by Apter (1961) in a slightly different sense than Lijphart's. See Jackson (1977) for a review of this literature as well.

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pluralism as "a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice." (Kuper and Smith:1969, 27) The considerable empirical importance of this concept is underscored by various reviews of cultural variation in the countries of the world. Connor (in Rhodie: 1978, 59-60) observes that major pluralism occurs in the Third World as does Schemerhorn (1978: 218-219) who notes that Africa demonstrates the most extreme examples as compared with the rest of the world's regions.[53] Nigeria has an enormous range of cultural variation and is among the most plural of the African states. The country is aptly described as a 'multinational' state, and politics in the country have been called "little more than the intense rivalry of regional-communal groups to participate in 'sharing of the national cake'" (Jackson:1977, 19).[54]

Pluralism's Two Strands Unified

[53] For more extensive documentation of the phenomena, see Morrison et al (1972) especially Part III, chapter 3 and for an analysis of its implications see Morrison and Stevenson (1972a, 1972b).

[54] See Klineberg (in Muckey: 1975) for a review of the term multinational society.

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Much of the literature on political culture has been concerned with the place of political participation in the dynamics of politics. This concern relates to the expectation that democracy is not a viable form of government unless power in the society is decentralized through various voluntary private institutions and the empirical measurement of such a distribution of power is related to the character and frequency of the exercise of power, that is, participation.[55] In the model developed here we are more concerned with those bases (or cleavages) which are viable for political mobilization, and with the interaction, of the various units and levels of government within the political culture.

To be useful our concept of pluralism must reflect the mix of a polity's cleavages, those reflecting 'primordial sentiments', typically ascriptively defined, as well as those 'achievement' defined and reflect personal interests, experience, and location in the social matrix.[56] The

[55] Note that many writers have pointed out that participation in some environments is the exercise of power by the powerful to force the powerless to 'participate'. This is common in Latin America. cf. Cornelius:1975.

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analysis of the adaptive culture will emphasize the importance of the interaction between cleavage patterns and political boundaries and the resultant character of the political system.[57] We propose the following measure of pluralism for analytical purposes.

Our measure of pluralism covers the spectrum from the extreme where all group memberships reflect a single reinforcing cleavage to its opposite where no group membership predicts another, that is, to a situation in which cleavages are maximally 'cross-cutting'.[58] A political system may have more or fewer cleavages as a result of social change and development without affecting our measure since it is not dependent on the number of cleavages. Our measure may be described in a loose,

[56] Note Blau's (1977) work on inequality and heterogeneity here.

[57] For an excellent study in this genre see Hirschman (1977) in which he describes the role of the political process in the development of capitalism.

[58] Formally stated, one end of the spectrum, $P(I_j, I_i) = P(I_i)$ and where $I_i = i$ th institutional membership and $P(I_i) = 0$, $P =$ probability as n , $n =$ number of groups in society.

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heuristic manner as the ratio of reinforcing to overlapping cleavages. But more technically, it is a measure of system entropy, of 'order' in the system.

There are two emendations to the preceding definitions that are important for our analysis. First, the entropy or cleavage pattern over all cleavages does not imply that any given subsection of the system will display some cleavages which are highly patterned or predictable, and of high negentropy or 'order', while other subsets of the system display random patterns--low negentropy or 'order'. This is a formal characteristic of systems of signal importance to the adaptive culture model. Second, the balance of cleavages is not static. It can change over time for a number of reasons, including the failure of the bases of existing cleavages to be reinforced by the embodied culture, or the introduction of new cleavages.[59] In addition to the changing mix of cleavages, the salience of any given one may change as a result of structural changes in the society such as power realignments, or individual changes in

[59] Thus we expect that reinforcing cleavages tend to deteriorate, *ceteris paribus*, but strong social forces may overcome this tendency.

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'tastes' and values. In summary, the mix, salience and dynamics of the cleavages is a key to understanding the role of cleavages in the polity.[60]

Ascriptively-based cleavages are unlikely to simply fade in importance over time, however. All societies and especially plural ones based on ascriptive cleavages, will manifest strong social forces which, in conjunction with our model of man as control-seeker, produce negentropy effects to preserve and reinforce cleavages through such devices as restricting communications to validate existing boundaries as 'true'. [61] Insistence on consistency by social institutions may serve to restrict innovation, while consistency, if given a low or even negative value, may be a mechanism for adaptation. [62] The effect of these cleavages on political mobilization may be summarized as a kind of

[60] We would expect that a process of increasing role and institutional differentiation in a society would tend to increase cross-cutting cleavages.

[61] Especially as man searches for consistency and parsimony. Of course, consistency may be to a large degree a matter of social definition. Also see Emerson (1960:95-96) for a discussion of the importance of we/they distinctions in African states. Note for example, 'revival meetings' and jihads.

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'Gresham's Law' of cleavages.[63] In our Law of Cleavages, ascriptive sources of cleavage will tend to drive out achievement based sources as bases for political and social mobilization.[64] 'Countervailing' aspects of this process include increased randomness of group membership via social change and existing institutions' attempts to maintain themselves and the cultural boundaries they represent. A relatively homogenous political culture in which most of the participants share common institutions or an heterogeneous society in which most share some common or basic compulsory institutions but differ with respect to other institutions approximate the pluralism described in the Dahlian tradition.[65] Differences will be greatest among the disembodied elements of a political culture, and in the

[62] See Palmer (1977) for an excellent review of Dahl's views on these matters.

[63] Gresham's Law refers to the prediction in economics that 'bad' money drives out 'good'. That is if there exists multiple standards of monetary value such as gold and silver and if their relative official prices do not reflect the costs of obtaining them, then the relatively more valuable currency disappears from circulation.

[64] Sir Arthur Lewis (1965) was a prescient analyst of the forces of plural polities in West Africa. See Lijphart's comments on Lewis in (1977:143).

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plural political culture, the process of social mobilization and the increased consciousness it engenders will accentuate intergroup differences.[66]

Political Implications of the Plural Society

The plural society, particularly one in which the groups are largely territorially specific, generally suffers from inequalities in the distribution of power, status, and income.[67] The genesis of such inequalities may be relatively unimportant compared to the role they play in

[65] See Leons and Leons (1977:560) for their view of the plural society as a social corporation. Also note Connor (in Rhodie 1978,67) where he characterizes a "nation as a self-aware ethnic group."

[66] Note Grove's (1977) survey of the empirical evidence related to our Law of Cleavages. He ends on a pessimistic note because he fails to see that alternative political structures can avoid some of the conflicts. See Connor (in Rhodie:1978, 74) for arguments as to why this happens. His chapter is also a very useful discussion of key definitions in this area. Also see Lijphart (1977:175-176) for his observations on modernization's role. What social psychologists call 'enhancement of contrast' is remarkably similar to this process.

[67] This is the case for most plural societies. This is not always true, however. For example, see Barrera (1980) on the American Southwest.

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stimulating political mobilization. Since even a random distribution is likely to show some inequality, differences between groups may be politically significant.

Some polities have tried to deal with inequality by allotting fixed apportionments to contending groups, but such formulas have proved too rigid to survive indefinitely.[68] More generally, plural societies have adopted strategies that include a 'grand coalition', mutual group veto, proportionality of office holding, and some forms of segmental authority or federalism or authoritarian rule. Lipjhart characterizes systems involving these policies as consociational democracies.[69] Lijphart's strategy for democracy in the plural society depends not

[68] Examples would be the Conservative-Liberal agreement to share rule for sixteen years in Colombia, and the Christian-Muslim agreements that persisted in Lebanon for over 30 years although it became increasingly evident as time progressed that the preset proportional representation system based on communal and religious ties was too inflexible to survive considerable population shifts and general social mobilization. See Suleiman:1967 for a discussion of the fragmented political culture of Lebanon.

[69] All of them are regarded as necessary for a successful plural polity function as a democracy for an extended period of time according to Lijphart (1977:29-36).

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only on elite bargaining but also on strong "cohesion within subcultural segments" for this is an "important condition for successful consociational democracy." (Lijphart:1977, 116) Critical dependence on elite agreements may significantly limit these strategies.[70] The size of a given country and its physical topology qualify the effects of pluralism, as do population size and density pattern.[71] Furthermore, scale and hierarchical complexity of a given society has important implications for pluralism. For example, elite communication and trust is more likely in a small scale society than a large one.[72] But a view that 'small is beautiful' for the plural society is not necessarily the case since a certain minimum size seems necessary for the maintenance of viable social, economic,

[70] See Lijphart (1977:47-103) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of his recommended strategies.

[71] For example, many of the Soviet Union's cultural variations do not tend to be exposed to each other because of the physical isolation of many groups in the country which the government encourages. A similar story is true of China while Belgium is so crowded that interaction is generally unavoidable for many.

[72] Blau (1977) develops his axiomatic view of social interaction principally on this basis.

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and political institutions, suggesting an 'optimal' size range for the viability of plural societies.[73] Although this issue is beyond the scope of the present work it remains a possible consideration in the make-up of an adaptive culture. Arguments that structural explanations dominate cultural ones have implications for the plural political culture. Moore (1966) contends that a structural interpretation of the development of the modern state is necessary.[74] However, Moore uses examples to test his theory that are culturally homogeneous or have a single dominant political culture. Thus variation attributable to culture in a plural society was not a factor included in an examination of the relative importance of the two sources of political behavior. Perhaps his work is better characterized as portraying the process of adaptation rather than the role of structure versus culture.[75] The need for

[73] This size may not be large by world standards, a number of African countries have less than one million people and the average African country is about six to eight million population. The country's integrity with respect to adjoining larger countries may be an important part of the political 'glue' that holds small plural societies together.

[74] See Peel (1973) for a review of Moore's and related structuralist positions.

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Increased cultural analysis in the study of African societies as pointed out by Peel (1973) remains as does the need, from the perspective of political analysis, for increased understanding of the role of political culture. Cultural analysis does not obviate the necessity to study the interaction of culture, embodied and disembodied, with social and political structure. On the contrary, a society that generates high economic growth rates will tend to 'depoliticize' the system by convincing most actors that a variable-sum game is being played which most of them can 'win'. [76] For example, the plural societies of Europe in the post-1960 period may be seen as depoliticized. [77] Nor is a plural society synonymous with conflict, for potential conflict may be converted into rule-governed competition or certain cultural complementarities may exist, especially with regard to the production of goods and services. [78]

[75] Including ideology which exists to "handle the gap between actuality and aspiration." (Peel, 1973:300).

[76] By 'high', is meant rates consistently at or above 7-8% growth in per capita income. But this means they come to share culture on this issue.

[77] See Lijphart (1977:106) for a similar viewpoint on Europe.

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Nevertheless, while factors of development, mobilization and migration may mitigate the effects of cultural difference, the greatest stress remains between these groups whose culture varies most from one another.[79] Lijphart (1977:64) recommends "moderate Multipartyism" as the most favorable condition for consociational democracy".[80] In contrast, Nyerre (1963:199) argues that political opposition is not viable in a crisis situation and that a plural society is in crisis by its very nature. Nyerre's formula is largely based on his own experience in Tanzania where despite the large number of named ethnic groups, most of these groups share a common Bantu culture. Nyerre's problem

[78] The Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, or the Hausa and Ivory Coast's post-independence history may be a good example of this phenomena. Yoruba of Nigeria are examples. (Although not 'pure' ones.)

[79] We have not operationalized such a concept of difference yet but we will in Part III. Compare this with Shil's view of Center-Periphery where the greatest clash of values is between the center and periphery rather than between 'centers'. (cf. Berry and Annis:1974)

[80] This is for plural societies only and is under the assumption that all parties are minority parties--that is even one with a near majority is disruptive. This also agrees with Satori's view (1976:13-18).

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is not with plural culture, per se, but with ethnocentrism in a relatively homogeneous culture.[81] Underlying ethnocentrism in this situation is the 'enhancement of contrast' principle. Differences appear exaggerated when people are told that differences exist. From our perspective, a society is plural if and only if there are genuine and significant differences between the respective political cultures of the disembodied culture-bearers.[82] Nyerre's formula of prohibiting opposition will not be viable in a truly plural society, that is, in countries like Chad, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, and others. For cooperation to occur and a single political party to be viable, most participants must perceive the existence of a variable-sum game. This is highly unlikely in a genuinely plural society with a centralized socio-political system.

In summary, students of political culture have assumed a social reality which propels all social transformation in

[81] See Part III chapter 3 of Morrison et al (1982): for a discussion of ethnicity and culture.

[82] This is to beg the question of a person being a member of several political cultures or even what it means to make such a statement.

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the general direction of assimilation and culture congruence. The empirical basis for such a view seems totally lacking, however.

Since all humans have certain physical, linguistic, and social needs, it is not surprising that the solutions have been developed to meet these needs.[83] However, the character of a plural society is such that there are genuine differences which are not residual; they will not gradually disappear as more people become modernized. Rather the structure of the political system, social change, and the political culture will interact with varying political results. Because Lijphart's model rests so heavily on elite cooperation, it probably will work best in situations where cultural differences are moderate as he suggests. We see as necessary a political system with a structure that will displace elite agreement as the central requirement for a viable democracy in a plural society, and that will be adaptive to changing bases of coalition formation. This is the goal of an adaptive culture.[84]

[83] This is a kind of functionalism.

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Extreme cultural fragmentation is declining, however, as a result of modernization, and new and better defined groups are becoming the "building blocks for consociationalism". (Lijphart:1977, 172) Exoglossic languages which aid in the development of broader more empathetic views further facilitate the merging of several groups.[85] But it is social change itself which produces both increased differentiation and complexity, and a more well-defined pluralism.[86] This catalytic process is the key dynamic examined in our study.

Social Change

[84] Such structural components might include elements of the consociational democracy such as proportionality in office. This is exemplified by Gutteridge (1975) who maintains the importance of the composition and conduct of the civil service.

[85] This is not to deny that the empathy notion of Lerner may be more a requirement of the researcher than of the participant in a changing system.

[86] This is not to deny the importance of history or sequence of experience as critical to the country's development. But we do feel that social change and mobilization, and not colonialism, are principally responsible for the increased intensity and salience of cultural boundaries in many plural and ex-colonial societies.

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The empirical relevance of the study of social change to the contemporary experience of the world's population constantly surrounds us.[87] Within the last two-thirds of a century there have been wars and depressions on a global scale. Empires have peaked and crumbled as they became anachronisms. Scores of new sovereign states have formed. Some have passed out of existence already. Other countries have seen numerous regimes.[88] New social and political formulas have been invoked, profoundly affecting much of the world. Technological advances in almost every area of human existence have drastically altered the life styles of most people, and changed much of the animate and inanimate aspects of the planet we inhabit. Such changes involve

[87] For basic works on the issues in social change see Etzioni-Halevy and Etzioni (1973), Barringer, Blanksten and Mack (1965), Ishwaran (1966), Kunkel (1975), Bauer (1977), Hagen (1962), A.D. Smith (1973,1977), Schneider (1976), Ogburn (1964), Nordskog (1960), Nisbet (1972), Meadows (1971), Migdal (1974), R.J. Simon (1978), Zoltschan and Hirsch (1976), Appelbaum (1970), Balfour (1974), Barber (1955), Coleman (1968), Hernes (1976), Gusfield (1967), Wallman (1977), Bourdieu (1977), Evan (1976) presents a general view of how organizations function.

[88] For example, Bolivia is reported to have had 184 regimes since independence, and Italy has averaged about one per year since World War II.

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fundamental alterations in the boundaries of human groups and the ways in which interaction between and within groups takes place. Not only have the human costs of this process been enormous but the question of a possible pathology in the adaptive response of societies and cultures remains unanswered.

The rapidity of social change impels us to understand the nature of social dynamics in order to comprehend contemporary politics. The desire to explain the massive reorganization of social and cultural forms in the Western world and the relationship of these forms both to the environment and the individual, explicitly motivated major movements in the social sciences in the last two centuries. The 'invisible hand' of Smith, 'comparative advantage' of Ricardo, class conflict of Marx, social evolutionism of Spencer and Sumner, as well as the views of social change of Toennies, Maine, Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, Tylor, and Galton attest to this fact. As the West became industrialized and empires grew, as the world economy became increasingly interdependent, and the interests of social scientists turned from macro level studies to those emphasizing the study of small groups as pioneered by Park, to marginalist

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economics and the theory of the firm and individual utility maximizers (Marshall and Pigou), business cycles (Mitchell), and, in general, to the micro and particularistic.[89] This process of movement from grand theory, to more micro and often reductionist point of view was reversed in the second third of the century as major new threats to social continuity arose from the unprecedented success of the centralization of power in strongly hierarchically organized states. These states were based on a vast new power to control man and nature, and were legitimized with cultural forms which tolerated little individual variation.[90]

The Great Depression and the subsequent world war, altered the world's psychological, cultural, political, social, and economic maps. Such profound changes caused a new generation of social scientists to return to macro or 'grand theoretic' explanations in an attempt to understand these processes. Keynesian thinking replaced Marshallian.

[89] Boasian anthropology is an extreme case of this move as was the rise of Freudian thought and experimental psychology.

[90] See Duncan (1969) for a good review of major social thinkers of the last century.

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The spread of a world culture (Pye:1966), massive social mobilization and the restructuring of roles and values (Deutsch:1960) were seen as critical elements of analysis. Small-group theories in sociology gave way to the analysis of stratification, mobility and group dynamics. Most important of all from the perspective of this book, the range of peoples, cultures, and polities that came into existence and then came under the scrutiny of social scientists increased substantially. Comparative politics now involves the study of sovereign states numbering in the hundreds, rather than the few cases from a limited geographical area of previous eras.

The cycle continues, however, with the periodicity decreasing. We have gone back to micro considerations, but macro and grand theory interests appear to be reemerging. The Durkheimian contrast of a social dialectic of integration and disintegration seems reflected in the character of our attempts to account for change in our environment. This history should alert us to the analytic myopia that may be much more severe than our egos allow us to admit.

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Nevertheless, economic forces and technological innovations appear on almost any list of the basic and obvious sources of social change. Writers have emphasized economic imperatives as the generator of social structure (Marx); technology as the engine of social change (Ogburn:1964); entrepreneurship (Schumpeter); and changes in the capitalist division of labor and the resultant international terms of trade (Wallerstein:1976). While it is not problematic that economic changes are ubiquitous and important, the process of selection and institutionalization of such changes in any culture or society is not unambiguous, and the direction of change from one sector of a society to another is even less clear.[91] Many of the major social upheavals of the present era emphasize political and social changes as necessary precursors to the achievement of economic and technological advance. Morawetz (1977:71) argues that initial asset ownership, human and physical, was the "most powerful determinant of the income distribution" in developing countries from 1950 to 1970. In contrast, Adelman and Morris (1967) argued that the least

[91] For an economist's view see Winter (1971) on selection and innovation.

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developed countries were suffering from non-economic blocks to development and concluded that large scale financial aid was inappropriate.

Whatever the institutional source of change, another parameter fundamental to change is situation. Did innovation come from inside or outside of the society? Many anthropologists acting on the basis of their field experience as well as the archaeological record have emphasized the diffusion of ideas, and their embodiment from sources outside of the culture. Others, particularly structural-functionalist sociologists, have emphasized the process of internal differentiation and increasing system complexity. Many modernization theorists are associated with this latter emphasis.[92] Others (e.g. Lerner:1958) saw migration of people and the development of communications and culture contact as essential to the process of social change.[93]

[92] See the SSRC book series and Levy, Parsons, Apter etc.

[93] See Portes (1976) for a critique of these views.

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Whatever the derivation of new ideas, they must be diffused throughout the culture or some relevant part of it before they can be institutionalized. Such a process requires that individuals adopt new values and patterns of behavior. Typically, these changes occur gradually and frequently only over several generations. Some changes, as in the case of the 'new math' in the United States, occur with difficulty because the socializing agents, the teachers, are unable or unwilling to switch their own symbol systems even though those to be trained have no predisposition to the older system.[94] Some resistance to change may be in response to the cyclical nature of

[94] Karl Deutsch gives another comment on this process when he argues that quantum physics was not accepted in German universities until the 'older' professors died or retired. Resistance to change is observed not only in such environments, it is also seen in many areas undergoing challenges to their own culture-theory. Kolig (1981) writes about the modernization experience among the Australian aborigines, and Seagrim and Lendon (1981) is a study of cognitive development among the aborigines. Chu and Hsu (1979) indicate how difficult culture change can be in their discussion of Chinese culture. Robson (1980) provides a study of dietary practices and their resistance to change. While resistance to change is common, new realities do attract many to learn a new theory rather than the one of their predecessors. Kitching (1980) provides a view of this in his study of the rise of a Kenyan bourgeoisie, an example of the studies needed to understand change of such dimensions.

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phenomena. Humans recognize that many common processes are cyclic, or exhibit random variation. Thus change in reaction to each part of the cycle would be inappropriate. Common cycles are tied to time - daily, weekly, seasonal and annual occurrences - and to human processes - business or individual life experiences. Long cycles such as Kontradieff cycles (Lewis:1978) are linked to the rise and fall of empires and nations, or associated with major external physical forces such as sun spot activity, tides, and ecological shifts .

Social change has meaning only in terms of social structure and process, that is, as a characteristic of a social group. On the other hand, no social change takes place unless some individuals change their behavior or perception of the environment. This situation requires an understanding of the link between individual (micro) and group processes. This link is provided in the society's cultural content and forms. The interaction of social change and culture is a key element in the dynamics of social and political behavior. The search for patterns in such interactions and their political implications is a central theme of this work.

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Thus the process of social change has a major component of unknowable aspects in its future in terms of the effects of individual, ecological, external and technological forces. The implications of such a recognition are profound. They call into question the viability of much planning and development exercises and require states to develop strategies for change which are able to constantly incorporate new information and react to that information in a clear and consistent way. Thus the bureaucratic model can only play a limited role in a culture that wishes to be able to adapt to constantly changing realities.[95] The adaptive culture mode must be able to deal with just such variation and its implications.

In the next chapter, these terms which we have analyzed here are woven into a theory of social change in the plural political culture.

[95] Thus the importance of the future as an 'age of substitutibility' or the role of 'market-like' mechanisms to process and aggregate information in a never-ending fashion.

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April 23, 1982

Social Change in the Plural Culture == A Theory = Part I

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Summary

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"Any attempt to measure the likelihood of revolution should . . . encompass the social sources of strains and tensions present in the several societies and the social conditions that either encourage or balance extreme acts among the contending forces . . . The likelihood of revolutions is a function of both positive or conflict-generating factors and negative or conflict-controlling factors." (Feldman: 1964, 115)

With the definitions that we have constructed in the last two chapters, we can now turn to the elaboration of a theory of how social change and a plural society interact in a contemporary state. Our argument, in brief, is that (1) in many states several political cultures exist both at the embodied and disembodied levels and that they form the principal basis for political conflict and mobilization in those states. Therefore, they cannot be seen as mere 'sub-cultures' which do not have significant impact on the state's functioning. (2) Social mobilization and individual mobility act to break down parochialism and particularism within culture (e.g., to erode a certain class of identities) as we would expect from modernization theory, especially the communications/diffusion versions but at the same time the gap between cultures grows as dominant cultures tend to 'absorb' those cultures which are

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similar.[1] Hence, the development and direction of wider communications is dependent on cultural boundaries. The eventual result is a relatively small number of cultures which are quite distinct. This process tends to intensify political conflict particularly in the short run and is associated with views that a repressive regime is required in states with a plural culture if the state is to survive.[2] (3) Ethnocentrism not based on culture boundaries may continue as a result of aspects of the political, social, and economic structure other than the embodied culture. This further intensifies conflict levels. (4) These processes are not 'residual effects' in that the more socially mobilized groups and individuals are ~~more~~ advanced into this process than those who are less mobile and/or mobilized.[3] (5) Nevertheless, situational contexts such as historical conflicts, ecological complementarities,

[1] This view is particularly associated with the works of Lerner, Pool, Pye, and Deutsch. For reviews of contemporary social theory see Giddens (1979), Cicourel and Knorr-Cetina (1981), A.D. Smith (1973, 1977) and many others as noted throughout the text.

[2] If there is little cultural variation to begin with or if a majority culture dominates the embodied culture nationally and locally then we would expect considerable assimilation or a 'melting pot' phenomena.

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and life cycle characteristics may confound some basic processes. (6) Finally, it is possible to structure a polity's institutions such that political conflict on the basis of ascriptively defined elements is minimized and that the growth and development of a new composite culture to replace the disparate cultures is maximized, but in general not eradicated. Further, the polity's boundaries of conflict should be flexible enough to accommodate the gradual development of new cultural boundaries and politically relevant boundaries. A polity which has these latter properties we call an adaptive culture.

Almond and Verba in their classic study, the Civic Culture (1965), were asking questions similar to those we are asking in their search for a "scientific theory of democracy" (1965:10). However, not only did they eschew the study of sub-cultures in the states examined in the Civic Culture, their sample did not include any societies with significant plural political cultures.[4] Although there is

[3] This relates directly to the Nordlinger (1972) thesis that social change decrease the ability to regulate conflict by increasing awareness and resentment of ascriptively defined differences.

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a common concern with the ongoing significance of various bases for political mobilization, neither Almond and Verba, nor Verba, Nie, and Kim in their recent work (1978) articulate a model or theory which addresses the nature of politics in plural societies. These works concentrate on participation as the key element of political analysis and societies are labeled as to 'type' of political culture. No attempt is made to analyze the possible dynamics by which one type can be transformed into another. They merely conclude with the expectation that a certain ratio of subject competence to participation will produce a 'civic culture' -- in the end a Barmecidal banquet where the actors pretend something is happening that they both know is not.

We attempt to account for the dynamics of political culture at four of the seven levels James Miller has identified in living systems.[5] (1972:1) In particular we

[4] For a critique and update of the original work see Almond and Verba (1980). Verba notes, in this work, that the omission of the study of sub-cultures was one of the major weaknesses of the earlier work.

[5] His seven levels are the cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and supranational system.

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are concerned with the holders of the disembodied culture, the individual actor (Miller's 'organism'), and the several holders of the embodied cultures, which correspond to Miller's categories of group, organization and society.[6] We are particularly concerned with cross-level interactions since we have argued that transmission of culture occurs principally through the embodied culture while innovation originates principally in the disembodied culture. This is not meant to imply a reductionist analytic strategy applied either to the sociological or psychological level. Each level of organized complexity has implications for the other levels but each level includes information in its structure which requires that we recognize an embodied culture as a "group of entities at their own ontological stage of organization." (Buckley: 1979,1) Buckley argues that the most important challenge to the world today is the search for the "adaptive sociocultural organization of Intra- and Inter-societal groups." (1979:4)[7] This work is intended to contribute to that goal.

[6] For the present analysis we ignore Miller's supranational level.

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We assert that adaptive systems need not possess a shared basis of normative order. Although such a shared basis is a stand taken in much if not most writing on the subject, it doesn't seem empirically supportable except as a theoretical tautology.[8] We expect instead a solution similar to that proposed by Lijphart: a meta-level agreement is reached which minimizes the interaction of areas of possible disagreement.

A theory such as that advanced here posits that social change tends to both increase 'cross-cutting cleavages' within culture and increase 'reinforcing cleavages' between cultures. Such a theory leaves no immediate prospect of a 'civic culture' in a plural society since a civic culture requires that the political culture and political structure

[7] For views of how organizations learn, see Etheredge (1979) and Short (1978). On other aspects of how organizations function see Cummings (1982), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), and Britan and Cohen (1981).

[8] For example, see Heitowit's (1974) study of Pakistan where no evidence is found for shared values as a basis of political behavior. Also see Almond and Coleman (1960) and Homans (1974). Carroll (1981) tests some of these notions in a study of violence in Northern Ireland. See Honigmann (1973:1104) for a review of the literature on culture change and conflict.

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of the society be "congruent". (Almond and Verba: 1965, 30)
This can only occur in a society in which a single political culture is dominant. In a plural society we would expect perpetual political change since political change "occurs when congruence between political culture and structures erodes or breaks down." (Huntington and Dominguez: 1975,17)
Such Parsonian views ignore the "fact that territory, political authority, people and culture rarely coincide" (Wirth: 1945, 365) and further that value integration is not inevitably harmonious nor is conflict and change necessarily disruptive or undesirable.[9]

The theory advanced here is not intended to provide a complete explanation of outcomes either as a function of culture or of a culture-structural interaction. We earlier differentiated both embodied culture from structure, and disembodied culture from personality. This was to make clear that other aspects of the system must be considered

[9] See the work of Coser (1956) or Nicholson (1979) as examples of the useful role of conflict. See Schemerhorn (1978:34) for a contrast of cultural with structural factors in change and development. Also see Pateman (1971) and Leon and Leons (1977) who inquire as to the mechanism of how vertical corporations of a plural society are created, maintained and transformed.

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for a complete explanation of political outcomes. The source which is important in any given circumstance is not random, however. We expect structure to be predominant when changes are minor, culture to be significant when changes are great as in revolutionary situations.[10] Parsons, for example, notes that in his view, "the principal source of the turmoil in which many societies are involved in their current phase has to do with the initiation and spread of this extension of legitimate value-commitments to a new level of generality and hence inclusive toleration of variation ."
(1977:309)[11]

The relative importance given to structure versus culture by some analysts seems to be related not only to the substantive situation being analyzed but also to the ideological and political environment of the writers.[12]

[10] This would, of course, be the case in relatively homogeneous cultures as well. A possible analytic device to study some of these forms is the Edgeworth-Bowley box. See Schneider (1952).

[11] Parsons also states that he sees "institutionalized value-patterns as a primary, indeed in one special respect the most important single structural component of social systems." (1977:307)

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In summary, we expect cultural cleavages, social and political structure, and the relative importance of political decisions to interact producing a subset of the possible political outcomes which will be consistent with a viable democratic state, while other subsets of possible outcomes will be consistent with authoritarian systems. Figure 4.1 represents a possible range of outcomes.[13]

[12] Eisenstadt and Gurel (1976) provide a useful survey of such cross-national analytic ethnocentrism. Also see Mullins (1973) on American sociology and Rossides (1978) on the history of sociological theory, Thompson (1976) on Comte, MacKenzie (1969), Giddens (1979: Chapter 7) and Foster-Carter (1976) for some related issues in development theory. Structural analysis is varied but includes Kunkel (1970), Moore (1966), Merton (1975) and Blau (1977). For cultural sources of variation see Griffith (1956) on cultural requirements for democracy, Arensberg and Kimball (1965), Handel (1979), Goodenough (1970) and Lane (1970). Other works on social theory include Burt (1981) on status/role sets, Adams (1981) on natural selection and cultural materialism, Barth (1979) on scale and social organization, Burt (1981a) on a structural theory of action and Crozier and Friedberg (1980) on actors and systems. Also see Giddens (1979) on action and structure, Collins (1980) on Weber, Oppenheim (1981) on basic political concepts, Keat (1981) and Held (1981) on critical theory and particularly on Habermas, Ritter (1982) on Hegel's evaluation of modernity, Welner (1981) on a Marxist view of political sociology. Chilcote (1981) reviews most of the issues of competing theories.

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Figure 4.1. Relation between Cleavages, Differentiation
(Development) and Relative Importance of Political Decisions

Thus, social change is the 'engine' driving this system. For purposes of discussing the interaction between social change and the plural society we will not investigate the sources of social change before we discuss public policies and the adaptive culture. However, social change as manifest in status or spatial mobility patterns, social

[13] There is a correspondence with the logic of Moore (1966) here, but our potential coalitions are more numerous and complex. The potential actors are also not arranged in some unambiguous hierarchical fashion.

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mobilization, and technological and environmental change is not presumed to be primarily endogenous as emphasized in structural-functionalist approaches, nor to be primarily from exogenous intrusions. Sources of social change are numerous and the elements in the complex web of any social structure leads us to question a view that "organized society is built on the assumption that the individual and the collectivity have definite mutual relations, and that most individuals within the social group share a similar conception of this interrelation." (Laszlo:1963,3)[14]

Our theory posits that social change in the form of individual and group mobility acts on a highly fragmented and parochial society with only mild gradations across the groups to produce an increasingly rationalized system of communication and diffusion that is in part related to changes in technology, relative prices, and sociopolitical

[14] Note Laszlo's three functional processes as the basis of his ontological concepts. (1973:12) For reviews of social change theories see McLeish (1969) Etzioni-Halevy and Etzioni (1973), Eisenstadt (1964, 1970, 1976), Garner (1977), Mair (1969), Nisbet (1969), Smith (1973,1976), Parsons and Shils (1951), Parsons (1940, 1961, 1964, 1966, 1977, 1978), Schroyer (1973). For an empirical study see Nie, Verba, Petrocik (1976) and see Warner (1978) for a critique of Parsonian theory.

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goals. Nevertheless, change does not spread randomly like an 'ink blot' but rather, as we should expect with any system of communication, it develops along the easiest lines for expansion, that is, within culture boundaries. Therefore, social change produces fewer cultural variations as similar cultures tend to assimilate unless strong appeals to ethnocentrism prevents such an outcome. This may result in an equilibrium situation with reinforcing cleavages tending to cumulate at the culture boundaries.[15] Forces of changes producing individual status and spatial mobility as well as 'empathic' personalities and the differential mobilization of cultural groups do so not by the replacement of old values as Deutsch (1961) or Inkeles and Smith (1973) would suggest but by elaboration and segmentation of their existing cultural values, by increasing the elaboration of an already internalized 'theory of the world'. Thus, the appearance of increased ethno- or culturo-centrism is not a residual of the mobilization process but the result of that process! [16] Hence pluralism will not disappear as the

[15] Note here the non-equilibrium arguments of Nicolis and Prigogine (1978) and the ecological niche approach of Love (1977). See Bennett (1977) for an analysis of the dynamics of political culture and Smelser (1963, 1968) for sociological explanations.

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modernization process proceeds in a plural political culture.[17] The forging of a new culture spanning its predecessors is not precluded, but such a process is relatively slow compared to the speed of the other effects of social change and, its achievement more dependent on possessing the properties of an adaptive culture.[18] While we have emphasized the role of social change as an externally derived force we do not mean to imply that internal adjustment processes are unimportant or absent. Changing economics, tastes, and processes of cultural and institutional maturation all may play important additional

[16] Thus we would expect a model such as Shil's center-periphery analysis to be questionable in a plural society -- unless we recognize there are several centers with respective peripheries. We will later suggest that another political form is required under such circumstances.

[17] Some of the more important literature on plural cultures is Alcock et al, (1979), Jackson(1977), Lewis(1965), Lorwin(1971), Lehmbruch(1969), Neuman(1976), and Boeke (1953). For a critique of the general analysis of modernization see Portes (1974, 1976) and Migdal (forthcoming). For a Nigerian study see Nkendirim (1975). Also see Filmer et al (1972), Taylor (1979), and Horton (1966).

[18] For some work on the nature of culture change see Steward (1955), Poppendieck (1976), Murdock (1960), and Blute (1979).

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explanatory roles.[19]

The theory is diagrammatically summarized in Figure 4.2. Each link in the diagram provides the organization for a more detailed examination of the theoretical underpinnings. Through discussing the separate elements (or connections) in the figure, we will derive a number of hypotheses to be evaluated in Part II. These detailed hypotheses and the overall implication of the pattern of results from the data form the basis of our arguments for the analysis of plural cultures and the argument for their best organization as responsive polities, what we refer to as an adaptive culture. The discussions in this and the next chapter are divided in the following manner: (1) political culture and attitudes and behavior; (2) political culture and ethnocentrism; (3) political culture and social mobility; (4) political culture and social mobilization; and (5) political culture and environmental and historical context. Following these arguments is an examination of the potential

[19] We also do not mean to exclude intention, meaning and symbolism as parts of explanation. See on this aspect Daniel Bell's 1978 paper on dysfunctions in epistemology for a review of some methodological issues.

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implications of this theory for understanding the process of political development and a review of possible structural mechanisms for achieving various normative goals. Chapter Six advances an argument for the appropriate methods to evaluate this model.

The Plural Political Culture: Attitudes and Behaviors

Central to this analysis is the expectation that the various political cultures, both embodied and disembodied, in a given society will exhibit considerable variation in political beliefs and attitudes and, consequently, in political behaviors -- coalition formation, character of participation, and awareness of the system's inputs and outputs.[20] This is not meant to imply that all behavior

[20] Individuals do not experience society directly, rather their ideas of what society is and what they should expect to do for it and receive from it are transferred by the sequential learning they experience in a progressively enlarged set of institutional contexts. These different institutions such as the family, school, occupation, party or age-set, church or ritual organization, may or may not be very clearly differentiated, but in any national political system there are bound to be differences in the values imparted to individuals in these different environments.

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and attitudes derive principally from cultural premises only that behavior must be consistent with the premises of the several culture-bearers. Clearly the role of environment history, institutional structure and its functioning condition the interests of citizens and have important long-term implications for a society.[21] Issues of inequality, class formation, external dependence, and the stratification of groups will be discussed principally as they relate to the independent role of culture in political mobilization.[22] Although these and other issues undoubtedly affect the political process, we are principally concerned with the role of cultural content and boundaries in this process and only secondarily with their interaction with other bases of political activity.[23] [24]

[21] For an interesting study of environmental influences on culture see Euler et al (1979).

[22] For an excellent review of some of these points see M. G. Smith (in Kuper and Smith:1969).

[23] See Pierce and Rose (1974) for a review of the idea of whether people have attitudes at all. Also see Smith (in Knutson:1973) on attitudes.

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We have advanced a Law of Cleavages which posits that the outer bounds of mobilization will be at the culture boundaries and that this will override other cleavages (e.g., class) to the extent that they cross cultural boundaries. As we will discuss in the next section social mobilization plays a key role in developing and clarifying culture, particularly at the disembodied level.[25]

We are dealing with societies in which there are a number of political cultures which are numerically and politically significant. In this situation, the functionalist approach, which anticipates that a society has integrative mechanisms to ensure that values and beliefs acquired in various institutional contexts will not be abrasive or incompatible is not useful.[26] However, even in the most culturally homogeneous societies, individual

[24] See Rosenthal (1978) for another emphasis, a reward-punishment approach, to political behavior. See Schmitt (1976) for a discussion of the concept of the political.

[25] For reviews of culture as the basis of perception, see Pike (1967), Werner (1969), and Goodenough (1970) on language (and ethnoscience) and Winston (1977) for a review from the perspective of artificial intelligence. See Furnivall (1944, 1948) for empirical material.

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culture-bearers may have difficulty reconciling differential institutional experiences as when the son of an authoritarian father may be irreconcilably opposed to interacting in a democratic political system.[27]

Institutions, since they are systems of human coordination, have embodied cultures comprising those values regulating their interaction, and institutional differentiation implies a measure of cultural differentiation or heterogeneity. One source of political conflict arises, following this argument, from the degree to which individuals whose energies are concentrated in different institutional contexts hold mutually incompatible values. What we might call institutional pluralism -- i.e.,

[26] For an insightful view of this process see Leach (1976). Also see Adler (1956).

[27] This situation posits a gap between the embodied and disembodied culture-bearers, of course. Note however, that Niemi (In Knutson, 1973) reports that children tend to look like their own parents less than they do like their parent's generation. For a review of Parson's functionalism see Rocher (1975) and especially page 28 on the theory of action, page 34 on relation to Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau's self-interest, page 38 for relation of pattern variables to psychology (especially field dependence) and page 43 for a review of the AGIL system.

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the extent to which individuals receive different values in different institutions -- is a source of conflict, and eventually of possible political instability.[28] It is the relative lack of interaction between culturally different population groupings in a single state that distinguishes cultural pluralism from cultural heterogeneity. Depres has commented on this issue using a particularly relevant example:

"The distinction between maximal and minimal cultural sections (and between the plural and heterogeneous society) may be illustrated by comparing, for example, the United States and Nigeria. The United States is a heterogeneous society. It contains within it many cultural groups that are integrated at local levels (e.g., the Irish, the Polish, the French Canadians, etc.). We usually think of these as ethnic groups. There are practically no institutional structures (e.g., labor unions, political parties, religious associations, etc.) that serve to integrate each of these groups separately at the national level of social cultural integration.[29] In Nigeria, on the other hand, the Ibo, the Yoruba, and Hausa are not only culturally differentiated and locally integrated, but institutional structures exist (e.g., political parties) which serve to maintain their cultural differentiation at the national level. Compared to the United States, Nigeria is a plural

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society." (1967:22)

[28] This represents a contrast between the notion of rigid and stable regimes versus flexible and unstable ones. One of the clearest statements of this argument is Eckstein's A Theory of Stable Democracy (1965). Eckstein suggests that a major source of instability in democratic nations is the presence of different authority values in the political system and other sub-systems of the society -- "it stands to reason that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experiences with authority that men have in other spheres of life, especially those that mold their personalities and those to which they normally devote most of their lives" (p. III). This leads to the general hypothesis that "a government will tend to be stable if its authority pattern is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part" (p.6) and its elaboration: "Government will be stable, (1) if social authority patterns are identical with the governmental pattern, or (2) if they constitute a graduated pattern in a proper segmentation of society or (3) if a high degree of resemblance exists in patterns adjacent to government and one finds throughout the more distant segments a marked departure from functionally appropriate patterns for the sake of imitating the governmental pattern or extensive imitation of the governmental pattern in ritual practices" (p. 11) Eckstein's theory is an elaboration, like much contemporary theory of political life, of a proposition of Aristotle's: "But of all the things which I have mentioned, that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government. . . . The best laws . . . will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution; if the laws are democratic, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are oligarchy." (Quoted in Calvert: 1970, 37.) See Eckstein and Gurr (1975) for another elaboration of this view).

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Thus, plural societies contain populations which have mutually distinctive institutional organizations in terms of form and content, that is, in terms of their embodied cultures, and we call these groups ethnic units (i.e. embodied culture bearing groups).

The analysis of institutional pluralism or cultural heterogeneity is not the central issue in a plural society where each culture has a full set of institutions.[30]

Ethnic units share, relative to other sections of the population, a distinctive culture made up of values fostering distinctive institutional arrangements for family, economic, political and religious organization. Ethnic units defined in terms of culture clusters should be distinguished from ethnic groups defined in terms of

[29] There are some exceptions, of course. Jews and American Blacks may be examples and the list appears to be growing. However, they are only occasionally politically active as ethnic groups.

[30] As Rex (1959:116) has characterized individuals in such societies -- "He sees such a society as arising as a result of the extension of commerce and trade, so that a market situation of a new type emerges in which those who participate do not share common values, customs and social institutions, but live for other than economic activities apart from one another in separate groups."

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Identity.[31] If two identity groups share similar patterns of institutional life, we would group them into a single ethnic unit. In this we follow Van den Berghe's definition (1964) that "a society is pluralistic to the extent that it is structurally segmented and culturally diverse."

The major source of conflict in culturally plural states arises from the incompatible values acquired by individuals via socialization in different cultural subsystems or ethnic units within the country's population. The critical problem of how to obtain comparable measures of the extent of cultural pluralism in a country, i.e., how to describe and to differentiate ethnic units according to values, we shall leave until chapter Seven, and for the moment simply underline the argument that cultural pluralism

[31] Ethnic groups in the sense that Despres speaks of Poles and Ibo for example we call identity groups, although identity groups may also be culturally unique ethnic groups. See the discussion in Morrison et al: 1972, Part III, Chapter 4. The common definition of ethnic groups in terms of identity is typified by Shibutani and Kwan: "An ethnic group consists of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others." (1965, 47) See Cohen and Middleton (1970) for a review of the dynamics of ethnic identity. Also see Young (1976) and Kasfir (1979).

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produces conflict.

We expect that cultural pluralism, producing incompatible values among its culture-bearers, will be a fundamental and enduring basis for political, social and economic mobilization. There is an analogy with the Marxian view of class consciousness here since cultures with low levels of social mobilization will not be aware of the cultural boundaries. In the terminology of Almond and Verba (1965) they will be too parochial to be aware of their larger cultural context. Thus, the more developed, complex and differentiated cultures are expected to be disproportionately influential. As Kavanagh (1972:65) suggests, those groups which have more coherent and articulated belief systems and/or objectives and therefore they will have more effect on political systems than those who do not. For this reason elites have disproportionate influence in most systems. The most important implication of this hypothesis, however, is that the near universal trend to greater social mobilization will increasingly intensify ascriptively defined political conflict.[32]

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While there will be differential effects of cultures that are more mobilized and strategically located, new cultures rise out of systems undergoing massive social change.[33] The particular form of culture change varies from context to context. In some states, dominated cultures may 'exit' via migration (e.g., Celtic fringe in Britain) or selectively through social mobility; in other cases they may choose the 'voice' of social change and demand the maintenance of their culture.[34] The development of composite cultures may be one of the most difficult and least understood of social processes. Indeed questions focusing on this problem have been pre-eminent in the work of many major figures in the social sciences.[35] The

[32] See Van den Berghe (1973), Leon and Leons (1977), Smith (in Kuper and Smith: 1969), and Pye and Verba (1965) for various views and empirical studies related to these issues. For a view of American culture conflicts see Huntington (1979).

[33] See Chirot (1977) for a review of social change in the twentieth century from the world systems perspective.

[34] The exit and voice argument derives from Hirschman (1970) and Tajfel (1976). For empirical examples of such change processes, see Berger (1977), Heclio (1977), and Inglehart (1977), and a commentary by Baldino (1978).

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issues are somewhat more pronounced in societies where individual options are even more limited and institutional differentiation somewhat less.[36] Nevertheless, there seems to be much less disagreement among analysts over the direction of change than over the question of 'how long is the long run?', that is, of how long it takes to achieve a new culture.[37]

Individuals in culturally plural states acquire two competing sets of values. One set of values learned in the context of the individual's earliest and most emotional contact with society relates to those institutions and that culture which is part of his and his family's immediate social environment and history. He learns at this stage to value his origin, identity and, more generally, the

[35] For example, see Pye (1962, 1978), Vernon (1975), Dahl (1966). For an interesting example of possible planned change see Gould (1979) on the techtonics of Mickey Mouse.

[36] See Pye (1958) for a classic statement on this subject.

[37] See Voget (1975) for a description of cultural characteristics (745-6). He quotes from Linton on surface versus deep structures, and gives twelve points about the nature of cultural and social change (769).

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historically sanctioned ways in which men think about and react to peers, family, leaders, neighbors, work and their gods. The values acquired in this process may be called primordial attachments, and this early learning is the most important influence on the individual's value-orientation[38]

The individual citizen in culturally plural states also acquires, however, information concerning the national political system, its authorities, his role in it, and the cultural definition of other citizens. To the degree that he perceives national authorities or other groups of citizens as having values incompatible with his own, the

[38] "By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' . . . of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following social practices." (Geertz: 1963, 169) The early learning hypothesis has been given clear expression by Bruner: 1956, 194 -- "That which was traditionally learned and internalized in infancy and early childhood tends to be most resistant to change in contact situations which persists, i.e., kinship, role conceptions and values, was learned early, and the primary agents of cultural transmission were members of ego's lineage."

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Individual may feel personal conflicts about his loyalties and obligations to the nation vis-a-vis his 'primordial' community. This leads to the popular conception of the 'man of two worlds' in newly formed states. More importantly, however, groups of individuals who share the same primordial loyalties are likely to find themselves in conflict with groups of a different culture theory, or with the regime, once it is realized that the policies of the national government can significantly affect the distribution of rewards among different ethnic units and can determine which of a conflicting set of ethnic values shall be authorized and enforced.

It was one of the points of Furnivall's original presentation of the notion of cultural pluralism that, "Nationalism within a plural society is itself a disruptive force, tending to shatter and not to consolidate its social order." (1939, 468 quoted in Despres: 1967, 14) We found it useful to begin an analysis of plural cultures by concentrating on the intensity of conflict originating from a pattern of cultural pluralism at a given point in time, and then to assess the impact of social, economic and political change as they moderate or intensify that

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conflict. There are, however, clear limitations to this position. Culture is not static, and ethnic units are constantly incorporating new values and populations, as political systems are constantly attempting to integrate culturally diverse ethnic units or their members.[39] Nevertheless, it is our assumption that ethnic units are more resistant to change and political manipulation than other social phenomena. Therefore, the understanding of post-independence African politics must begin with an examination of variation in the likelihood and intensity of conflicts originating from the extent of cultural pluralism in different polities. Moreover, although we agree with Rosenthal (1978) on the reward-punishment nature of the determination of behavior and its evolutionary implications, we think that approach must recognize the subjective and cultural components of what constitutes 'rewards' and 'punishments'.[40]

[39] See the articles on the incorporating or integrating process in various African ethnic groups collected in Cohen and Middleton: 1970.

[40] Also see Rosenthal (1978) for a discussion of Dahrendorf's view of how the 'rules of the game' are established (pp. 34-35).

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This discussion leads us to a number of hypotheses which we will test in Part II. The guiding hypotheses for our subsequent empirical analysis are: (1) that variations in cultural pluralism, embodied and disembodied, will lead to variations in political attitudes, evaluations and behavior including coalition choices; (2) The more complex and differentiated the culture, the more likely that the group will direct the process of social and cultural change; (3) Smaller or less complex cultures will join 'like' larger cultures, if they are available, in coalition and assimilated behavior; (4) Members of smaller or less complex cultures will speak languages of similar cultures more frequently than other languages (except for exoglossic languages); (5) Smaller or less complex cultures will share political values with culturally similar larger cultures; and (6) Similar cultures will see each other as alike but the smaller more so than the larger. In general, then, we expect those who have similar political cultures to also have similar political values, attitudes, and behavior.

This is not a process that is without modification or countervailing forces in society, some of which arise in dialectical fashion as a response to change. In the

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following sections we explore four major modifiers to these basic relationships. They are (1) ethnocentrism, (2) status and spatial mobility, (3) social mobilization, and (4) situation or context. We have not made individual identities central to the analysis since the argument has rested on more direct attitudinal and behavior characteristics, but we also argue that ethnocentrism can be an important force, and a basis for social and political mobilization.[41] Processes of ethnocentrism should be differentiated from what Rosenthal (1978) regards as the increased tendency to pluralism in the sense of individuals increasing the number and specificity of identities that they hold.[42]

The 'Loyalty' of Ethnocentrism == The Enhancement of

[41] See Levine and Campbell on ethnocentrism (1972) for a review of the literature and the various hypotheses in that literature. Also see Brewer and Campbell (1976) for an empirical study of key hypotheses in this literature. Smith and Medin (1981) provide a view of why and how the brain establishes and uses categorical knowledge.

[42] This is consistent with various views in cognitive psychology. See Axelrod (1973) for a good review and integration of this thinking. Also see Merelman (1977).

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Contrast

"The ethnographer has often only managed to discern the existence of 'a tribe' because he took it as axiomatic that this kind of cultural entity must exist. Many tribes are, in a sense, ethnographic fiction." (Leach: 1954, 290-291)

The previous section considered actual value conflicts across the political cultures of a plural society which reflected differences in values and beliefs as one of the fundamental bases for political mobilization along with inequality and stratification.[43] This and subsequent sections of this chapter are concerned with how the character of that basis is modified or altered as a result of the influences of ethnocentrism, individual mobility, social mobilization, and environmental context to produce a mobilization pattern different from that which would otherwise be expected.

[43] The previous section dealt with what might be termed realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) which is sometimes considered part of ethnocentrism but for our purposes we separate it as one of the possible sources of ethnocentric behavior. See Levine and Campbell (1972) for an elaboration of sources of ethnocentrism and a review of the propositions in this literature.

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Ethnocentrism, a term introduced into the sociological literature by William Graham Sumner in his 1906 book *Folkways* has been characterized as a syndrome in which individuals positively evaluate ingroup characteristics and negatively evaluate outgroup characteristics.[44] Levine and Campbell (1972:12) list twenty-three elements in this syndrome. These elements can also be seen as conditions for the group's definition, maintenance and survival, especially as they provide a mechanism whereby holders of values know that there are others who share these values, and who, therefore, can be identified and communicated with. Such a labeling process goes far beyond the 'informational', however, and may be construed as a particular case of the general psychological process of 'enhancement of contrast' in which the differential evaluation of traits and behavior becomes the basis of identity differences.[45]

[44] Which also introduced the term ingroup and outgroup.

[45] For examples in Nigeria see Plotnicov (1967) on Jos, and A. Cohen (1969) on Ibadan.

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In this sense, 'enhancement of contrast' refers to the tendency of humans to 'see' greater differences than actually exists when they are informed that a difference exists and conversely to 'see' less difference than exists when told that no difference exists. Therefore, differential labeling into ingroup and outgroup plays an important role in the perception of a group's attributes. In a plural society this perception is especially correlated with actual group differences in social mobilization in terms of urbanism, occupational structure, and political and technological dominance and may occur even if there are no significant cultural differences.[46] Such a process means that politically relevant groups which are not culturally distinct but see themselves (or are seen by others) as different may have a continuing existence despite the tendency of modernizing influences to submerge such identities.[47] It does seem clear that culturally indistinct groups do not tend to be able to maintain distinct ethnic identities among their memberships, however.

[46] See Levine and Campbell (1972:156-7) for an elaboration of these ideas.

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The negative evaluation of outgroups is very far from a universal process, however, and reference-group theory as fathered by Merton, Sherif, Newcombe and Shibutani, and others, as well as cognitive congruity theories such as those found in the work of Heider, Osgood, Tannenbaum, Cartwright, Festinger and Newcombe emphasize that outgroups may be the recipients of positive evaluation and ingroups the recipients of negative evaluation.[48] From our perspective both this and the previous view are 'correct' in the sense that we expect some outgroups to be positively evaluated, especially some culturally-near groups and that there will be a tendency for a group to join other groups when affect and values are balanced or similar. Such a theoretical position seems empirically tenable and logically defensible. Thus the long-term tendency *ceteris paribus* ,

[47] See Moore (1979) chapter 11 for a discussion of persistent pluralism, and Wyer (1973) for a more technical view of an aspect of this process for attitude formation. Their conclusions seem consistent with the artificial intelligence literature in terms of how humans process information. See Schroeder, and Streufert (1967), Winston (1977) and Boden (1977).

[48] For a review of some of this work see chapters 11 and 5 of Levine and Campbell (1972) on cognitive congruity theories and reference group theory respectively.

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is for culturally similar groups to become less differentiated and culturally dissimilar groups to become more differentiated from one another.[49] Levine and Campbell in their summary of the ethnocentrism literature seem to agree with this view and even argue for a "trend toward greater ethnocentrism as human society has developed over the last ten thousand years." (1972:222-3) This argument was developed on the grounds that (1) greater conflicts of interest over resources have (2) produced cultural beliefs that exaggerate group differences which have been emphasized by wars carried out by increasingly larger and more efficient organizations which act to increase the physical bounds of ethnocentrism by conquest, extermination and provoked retaliation.[50] There seems to be no immediate end to this process although the rise of a 'world culture' and world modernization may in the very long run obliterate what will likely be a major determinant of inter- and intra-national politics for many decades to come.

[49] This is a 'relative' process in the sense that 'near' and 'far' are defined in situational contexts. See Chapter 4, part III of Morrison et al. (1972) for an elaboration.

[50] This is a summary of Levine and Campbell's conclusion.

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This process of ethnocentrism in which like cultures absorb like and the cultural distance between 'unlike' cultures increases has a considerable empirical literature although its political implications have rarely been drawn. In the Nigerian context the 'Hausalization' of the North, the coming into being of an Ibo identity for a disparate population, and the submerging of 'hometown' identity to a larger Yoruba identity are examples which can be multiplied in other contexts. Melson and Wolpe's 1971 book has many chapters which detail this process as does Wolpe's 1974 book on Port Harcourt which characterize Ijaw-Ibo conflicts. Tuden and Plotnicov (1970) give examples of this process throughout Africa.[51] Hence, both the perceptions and the reality of 'tribal membership' as bases for political mobilization remain staples for the analysis of African and other plural societies.[52] Such divisions often play a continuing role and individuals come to organize their

[51] One of the most ethnocentric aspects of some of American social science is its lack of recognition of ethnocentrism as an important and continuing factor in social and political organization.

[52] See the New York Times, June 19, 1973 for a report that Ghanaians voted on a tribal membership basis for a new president.

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perceptions according to group reference rather than message content. This is consistent with our view of man as 'control-seeker'.^[53] The tendency of ethnocentrism to increase perceptions of ethnic differences, has been widely decried but the true 'pity of it all'^[54] is that some conflicts may be avoided by establishing more appropriate intrastate political boundaries.^[55] The political structure forms arenas for conflict. A central feature of the adaptive culture is the goal of constructing arenas which minimize the usefulness of ascriptive bases for mobilization relative to other more flexible bases for mobilization.^[56] The contrast between British and French colonial history holds an important lesson in this respect.

[53] See Wyer (1973) for an example and Levine and Campbell (1972).

[54] This is from the title of Leo Kuper's 1976 book.

[55] See Adam and Gillonee (1979) for a study of South African ethnic politics. For theoretical issues see Snyder (1976) and Blalock and Wilken (1979).

[56] Such conflicts may degenerate into feuds and clique-based factional strife. It is such conflict that Hobbes was committed to eradicating in the world of the Leviathan.

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In the British system, the ideal model of an administrative unit was one created along presumed ethnic boundary lines and nominally ruled by a single figure such as a chief or emir. While this model was not always appropriate to the existing political culture, it was enforced throughout most of their African colonies. The French model eschewed such a process, arguing for more direct control, undercutting traditional authority by establishing political-administrative units to cross-cut ethnic group or traditional administrative boundaries. Ethnocentrism appears to be less the rule in domestic politics in ex-French areas compared with those which are ex-British.[57] While this result stems from a number of causes, the history of colonial politics appears relevant to this book's argument.

Some of the central hypotheses related to ethnocentrism may be summarized as follows:

[57] The costs of this policy were a much greater military force in French areas. Also after independence ethnocentrism has increased in most former French colonies.

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- (1) Ethnocentrism will be strongest among larger and more densely populated groups;
- (2) Ethnocentrism will be strongest among the most organized and mobilized groups;
- (3) Ethnocentrism will be strongest among the most mobilized individuals;
- (4) Ethnocentrism will be strongest at the realistic group conflict boundaries;
- (5) Greater ingroup coherence and congruence will lead to greater outgroup hostility;[58]
- (6) The direction of acculturation will be from the less complex group to the more complex, differentiated group;
- (7) Weakest groups will be least ethnocentric; and
- (8) As ethnocentrism increases political mobilization along ethnic lines increases.

In this discussion we have not dealt with the problem of defining the boundaries of ethnic groups. This is a major issue and one not dealt with in the Parsonian tradition where groups are seen as boundary maintaining systems, not as boundary altering systems.[59]

[58] See Levine and Campbell (1972:20). Also see Voget (1975:71) for an hypothesis, and Levine and Campbell, page 52 (hypothesis), page 12, page 23 for syndrome characteristics.

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Thus, though the effect of ethnocentrism on basic cultural boundaries may be fractious it will tend to decrease the number of competing groups. However, this view has a static bias in the sense that it does not allow individuals to significantly alter their culture through social and spatial mobility. We now turn to a consideration of the effects of these processes.

The 'Exit' of Mobility == Social and Spatial

The traditional American idea of success confirms the hold which exit has on the national imagination. Success -- or what amounts to the same thing, upward social mobility -- has long been conceived in terms of evolutionary individualism. The successful individual who starts out at a low rung of the social ladder, necessarily leaves his own group as he rises; he 'passes' into, or is 'accepted' by, the next higher group. He takes his immediate family along, but hardly anyone else." (Hirschman: 1970, 108-109)

The mobility of individuals, spatial, psychic and social, is a central aspect of the versions of the theory of social change or modernization associated with scholars such

[59] See Levine and Campbell (1972) chapter 7 for an extended discussion of defining group boundaries.

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as Lipset, Lerner, Deutsch, Pye, Inkeles, Pool and many others.[60] This viewpoint has a long history stretching from the nineteenth century origins of modern social science to the present time. Such views emphasize the loosening of the constraints on individual action that occur by individual 'exit' from their social network via migration (horizontal or spatial movement) and/or social mobility (vertical or status movement).[61] In such an environment, individuals can adopt new values and more differentiated roles, and engage in a more complex social, political and economic environment.[62] Modernization theory emphasizes the increasing interconnectedness of individuals and other social units in a developing society via increased communications and the ensuing diffusion of ideas,

[60] For a review of these theories see Smith (1977) and Giddens (1979). Appelbaum (1970:39) notes that in "general, scholars have failed to define modernization," however.

[61] For the most recent 'pure' sociological model of this process see Blau (1977). For examples of the internal contradictions of this process see Pye (1962).

[62] With respect to our current concerns, we are not concerned with persons who leave the system via permanent migration to other countries.

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technologies and the awareness of others.[63]

The literature associated with these views is extensive and presents an examination of the topic at various levels of aggregation. Studies at the individual level have concentrated on issues such as the development of instrumental rationality (e.g., Pye: 1962).[64] Other analysts have been concerned with such group characteristics as the critical role of the growth of the middle class as an anchor of stability and source of increasing 'cross-cutting' cleavages in the society.[65] This view of middle class growth can also be tied to the development of a single-peaked social preference function in which most active political participants occupy centrist political positions. However, since the middle class represents the

[63] These processes are often correlated. Lerner (1958) sees them as sequential. For example, first the spatial movement and then the social mobilization and mobility Cf. Hirshman (1970) and Tajfel (1976) for views of mobility as 'exit'.

[64] Also see Leites (1971) and Leites and Marwick (1977).

[65] What we might call the 'Doolittle Effect' or conservatizing influence of middle class status. Cf. George Bernard Shaw's *Pygmalion*.

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vanguard of increasing complexity, differentiation and equality in a society, it tends to lack cohesiveness and organization as a group. As a result, it often lacks the sense of common fate which drives ascriptively-defined groups as well as near-ascriptive groups such as a society's upper and lower classes. Still other views such as Lipset's (1963) emphasize the relationship of economic development to the democratization process (one view of the nature of political development).

There is considerable empirical evidence that the broad outlines of modernization theory holds in many societies. However, the political outcomes which reflect the interaction of these general social forces with other aspects of political development has led some writers to despair of the usefulness of macro-theorizing in the face of apparently inconsistent evidence. The thrust of the argument advanced here is that modernization theory is critically incomplete, especially for plural societies, so that qualitatively different policies ensue from an analysis with appropriate specification.

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Such an analysis, and the development of an appropriate model should be cognizant of a large number of threats to validity which have been variously noted by many authors. First, reductionism at either the psychological or sociological level may result in ecological and composition fallacies.[66] Lack of concern with cross-level reasoning is not ubiquitous, however. Second, the assessment of which group or groups form relevant boundaries for political analysis is a key issue that is not well understood. However, it is clear that the differential shedding of group memberships and their associated identities is a fundamental aspect of political and social change. Modernization theory made the assumption that 'group' boundaries would expand up to the state level. This has not occurred in most plural societies. The assumption reflects an underestimation of ethnocentrism by many writers in this genre, while implying that exit from any group is available at a reasonable cost-benefit ratio.[67] Thus the fundamental nature of ethnocentrism, which has been widely misunderstood, is called nationalism in a state where the salient actors share

[66] See Galtung (1967) and Aker (1965) for a discussion of these concepts. See our discussion of sociobiology in chapter eighteen.

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culture, and called tribalism where they do not.[68] Third, there has been considerable confusion between the description of systems, on the one hand, and the explanation of the dynamics of change, on the other. An assumed uni-directional character of change (e.g., to more complex systems) has further confused such analyses.[69] Fourth, there are many sectors, or groups, in any society. They may be related in a status-equal (horizontal) or a status-unequal (vertical) manner, but various groups such as elites, the populations of key urban areas such as the

[67] The denial of the persistence of, and the human need for, group boundaries has not been emphasized in social psychology until recently. Schutz and Simmel were among the few early scholars who were concerned with this issue. Our model of man as control-seeker specifically incorporates this view, however. See Austin and Worchel (1979).

[68] In part this occurs because of the lack of emphasis on ethnocentrism in much of the American literature. See Austin and Worchel (1979). The two terms are treated quite differently. The first is treated positively and the second is treated negatively.

[69] This has put an unnecessary directionality on change, and attached a pejorative label to the word traditional. This seems to miss an essential empirical point, namely that most change is accomplished in stages that are inter- rather than intra-generational. See Cornelius (1976) for example.

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capital, certain groups based on ascriptive definitions such as religion, language and ethnic identity, or sectoral breakdowns such as private-public, or economic, social, and political, will have differential power and political effects in the country. We cannot assume that what happens in one sector will be positively related (and causal) with respect to another sector or group.[70] In fact, we expect the contrary to be the case. Thus the psychological stress, contradiction and inconsistency of social change experiences are more likely to result not in anomie, anger, and confusion but in an increased cultural reintegration or both, or the second as a result of the first.[71] In a sense, we expect that a mixture of 'exits' and 'voices' will characterize any political actor, and that exit and/or voice occurring at one level of analysis may not have a direct

[70] For examples of groups with unequal powers see Quandt (1970) on elites, Wirsing (1973) on culturally defined groups, and Burt (1977) for general power analyses in society.

[71] This is somewhat reminiscent of Durkheim's thinking although it derives directly from our views of man and culture expressed in chapters two and three. For works on psychological stress see Pye (1962) and Leites and Marwich (1977), and on contradiction/consistency see Gray and Von Broembsen (1976), Gittleson (1978) and Pye (1962).

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link to other levels of analysis. Other issues that arise in the evaluation of the literature on social mobility include (1) the insertion of ad hoc explanations; (2) the use by writers of exemplars, drawn from their own social and political experiences which are somewhat idealized; (3) the downplay of context in this process, including culture, even though appeals to ad hoc and contextual explanations are made by some of the most determined structuralists such as Barrington Moore (1966);[72] and (4) the role of history in the study of mobility in terms of period and cohort effects as well as the presumed ahistorical life cycle models.[73]

[72] Lerner (1958) evaluates the effects of radio and roads on a village but not the capacity for such changes in the larger society, while Huntington (1968) is concerned with institutions but rarely discusses the role of culture in this process. In a sense, a modern institutionalized society which in our terms has a large embodied culture can be differentiated from a modernizing society where the culture is mostly disembodied but very much in existence nonetheless.

[73] See Glenn (1977) and Mason, Mason, Winsborough, and Poole (1973) for a review of these methods, and Hauser and Featherman (1977), Boudon (1974), and Featherman and Hauser (1978) for major empirical studies of mobility processes.

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It appears possible that many of the writers on this subject experienced their own world in the manner described by Hirschman in the quote at the beginning of this section. It is clearly easier to leave a class for upward mobility than it is to leave many group commitments particularly those that are diffuse in scope and ascriptively defined.[74] Hirschman (1973) again provides us with an exemplar for this situation with his 'tunnel effect' in which a person driving a car through a two-lane tunnel is in a stopped lane and can only move when others in his lane do, although he will be affected by movement in the other lane (at first relieved that his 'turn' will come soon if the other lane begins to move, but later frustrated and angry if his lane does not begin to move). We can now turn to the construction of a model of mobility which is more in accord with our view of man in a plural culture.

[74] But not for downward mobility as works on such groups show. For example, see Nordlinger's Working Class Idioms (1967). In some industrial countries, working class culture is sufficiently strong that upward mobility (exit from the culture) is actively discouraged with threats of ostracism from the community, etc.

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We can start with what we might refer to as the 'Harvard' view of man in which individuals choose to act either on their own, or as a group member, depending on the expected future stream of benefits.[75] This view has a timeless character since it allows one to renegotiate one's commitments constantly. This is clearly not characteristic of the general human condition in which exit and voice often have considerable costs. But we want to go a step further and to argue that the individual culture bearer wants to maintain or if necessary marginally modify his culture or theory of the world. He wants to 'prove' his theory but at the same time it is important to establish differentiation with respect to other groups, in a sense to assert we are what we are because they are not what we are.[76] This tendency of persons is key to an understanding that the experience of social mobility may not affect such a

[75] This tradition follows in the social welfare analysis tradition such as in Arrow (1963) and Sen (1970) but more recently as captured in political science by Huntington and Nelson (1976) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978).

[76] See Hirshman (1973:553-54) with respect to the role of ethnic and religious groups for a related analysis.

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perception. We emphasize this issue by first constructing two polar opposite ideal types. These follow Tajfel (1976), whereby a social mobility belief system is "an individual's perception that he can improve his position in a social situation . . . as an individual ." Such a view implies little basic loyalty to groups that do not come with him and little resistance to entry into other groups by their membership. This individual therefore assumes that "the system is flexible and permeable." (Tajfel: 1976, 104) A social change belief system is seen as "the other extreme of the subjective modes of structuring the social system . . . It refers to his belief that he is enclosed within the walls of the social groups of which he is a member." (Tajfel: 1976, 104) The continuum of such views is rudimentarily represented as one dimension of a two by two table (Table 4.2). Thus, one's beliefs range from mobility unconstrained by current group memberships to a view that they completely constrain one's actions. Clearly an individual will perceive constraint or the lack of it in situational terms and we will be particularly concerned about the conditions in which actors see that

- (1) Spatial mobility increases expectations and awareness less than social mobility;

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(2) Social mobility leads to greater awareness of social rewards;

(3) Social mobility leads to greater culturocentrism but less to other elements of ethnocentrism;

(4) Socially and spatially mobile persons tend to move within culture-area/ when they move.

The 'Voice' of Social Mobilization

Social mobilization has been defined by Karl Deutsch as:

the process by which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior (1961:494).

Social mobilization in this sense refers to a pervasive process, or syndrome, of social change involving large proportions of groups in a society, in which certain basic social values and commitments, often acquired by individuals early in life, are displaced, augmented, or intensified by varying forms of later socialization and experience.[77]

[77] Thus social mobilization usually involves large scale mobility -- spatial, social, and psychic -- whose aggregate properties have important political implications.

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The value changes associated with social mobilization have been summarized as the acquisition of psychological and include activism, future-orientation, secularism, empiricism, instrumental rationality, individualism, tolerance, trust and interest in relationships with others, and the most general receptivity to change, which Lerner (1958) has called empathy.[78] These values are thought to be related to those kinds of behavior which are adaptive to, and productive of, a modern rationalized society whose embodied culture is characterized as industrialized, socially differentiated or specialized, culturally integrated and politically centralized. However, from the perspective of the macrotheory of social mobilization, these value changes are the assumed results of multifaceted societal changes such as urbanization, mass media and

[78] For examples of works in this genre see Inkeles and Smith:1974, Kahl:1968, and Peshkin and Cohen:1967. For reviews of the literature see Masannat:1973, and Welch:1971. There is a large critical literature on the subject. See Armer and Schnalberg:1971, Salcedo:1971, Simpson:1975, Portes:1976, and Migdal:1978 for critiques of this literature. One characteristic of much of this literature on modernization was that it was largely generated by researchers with considerable field experience which may not be typical of critics. For an empirical critique of Lerner, see Khalaf's (1968) prescient study of Lebanon.

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educational development, economic growth and political participation which move or mobilize individuals into new physical locations, new sources of information, new standards of living and new systems of authority.[79]

One of the central concerns of contemporary political analysis has been to evaluate the nature of the putative causal relationship between social mobilization and political attitudes and behavior. The theoretical assumption usually underlying this work is that mobilization leads to modernized societies, and that modernized societies are politically cohesive and stable. Although it is assumed that highly mobilized societies are stable, theorists of

[79] Although there is considerable evidence that individuals who are more urban, educated, mass-media oriented, wealthy, engaged in industrial occupations, and politically active are more likely to hold 'modern' attitudes, there is no clear causality illustrated in the statistical evidence and less concern with the cross-level implications of these views (see Inkeles:1969, Inkeles and Smith:1974, Nie et al.:1969, Verba et al.:1978). Further, the evidence is by no means conclusive. For an important critique of the assumption that there is a consistent relationship between 'modern' attitudes and mobility in industrializing society, see Feldman and Hurn:1966 as well as the previous section in this chapter. Olsen and Firebaugh (1976) in a cross-national analysis argue for the importance of intervening variables.

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social mobilization have in fact underlined the tendency toward political system breakdown in societies undergoing a process of rapid mobilization. Eisenstadt (1966) has stressed the dislocation attendant upon the process of modernization, and the development of social and cultural protest that results from this change. Black (1966) in his comparative history of modernization concludes that "it is more likely that there will be ten to fifteen revolutions a year for the foreseeable future in the less developed societies, in addition to the many forms of domestic strife in the societies that are more developed" (1966:166). Deutsch's major statement on the nature of social mobilization stressed the probability that increasing demands on governments stimulated by social mobilization are unlikely to be consistently satisfied (1961:498), and Huntington has argued that, *ceteris paribus*, social mobilization leads to political decay, and that strategies need to be developed to slow down the pace of modernization (1968).[80] Thus there is a fundamental theoretical and empirical problem posed by the analysis of social

[80] In particular for increased opportunities for social mobility. Kasfir (1976) makes a similar argument for Uganda in his study of 'departicipation'.

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mobilization, namely "the paradox that modernity produces stability and modernization instability" (Huntington:1968,47).

In this section, we explore the empirical and theoretical explanations of the relationships between social mobilization, and political culture and behavior, and suggest ways in which these relationships may be coherently stated in terms of the likely consequences of social mobilization in a plural society.

If it is true that social mobilization produces violence in the political system, then the study of social mobilization or modernization has replaced economics as the dismal science, and the prospect for most developing polities is either continued poverty by world standards, or a long future of political violence resulting from the pursuit of the benefits of a developed society. But the empirical evidence in support of this general statement is by no means unambiguous and deserves a brief summary.

The argument that economic development sustains democratic and stable political systems has been clearly

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stated by Lipset (1960) and subsequently modified by Coleman (1960), Cutright (1963), and Olsen and Firebaugh (1976), and others. Empirical research reflects the difficulty of maintaining such a conclusion however, Bwy (1968), the Felerabends and Nesvold (1969), and Fossum (1967), have evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a linear inverse relationship between economic development and political instability, but Putnam (1967), at least, reports a linear positive relationship between economic development and political instability. A variation of this argument, to the effect that economic development increases the size of the middle class and therefore reduces the probability of political instability, is supported by evidence reported by Parsos (1968). Huntington (1968:220), however, concludes that there is no justification for such an argument. Putnam argues that communications development and political participation, as opposed to economic development, inhibit political instability (1967), but Huntington (1968) focuses on the destabilizing consequences of "rising expectations" stimulated by these processes. Urbanization is frequently seen to be productive of alienation, frustration and a tendency toward political instability, yet Nelson (1970) argues that urbanization promotes integration rather than

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conflict in Third World countries, and Tilly (1969) states that the pace of urbanization is not directly associated with the intensity of political instability in France between 1830 and 1960.[81] The effects of increasing education, finally, are ambiguous: Gurr (1969) reports that increasing education decreases the probability of political instability, but the Felerabends and Nesvold (1969), in the same volume, report the opposite conclusion.[82]

The empirical ambiguities in the evidence relating social mobilization and political behavior may be accounted

[81] Cf. Cornelius:1976 and Abulughod and Hay:1977. Tilly points out that "France by no means became a peaceable nation as urbanization and industrialization transformed her: in this period, and that the periods of rapid urbanization and minimum political violence were also periods in which France was governed by "two extremely repressive regimes" (1969:29). But he argues that "the experience of France challenges the plausible presumption that rapid urbanization produces disruptions of social life that in turn generate protest. There is, if anything, a negative correlation over time and space between the pace of urban growth and the intensity of collective violence" (1969:33). While comparative survey research has generally found little or no relationship between length of urban residence and level of political activity (cf. Nie et al.: 1969, 368 and Inkeles:1969, 1137-38), there does seem to be reason to believe that there is substantial intergenerational change, that is the children of migrants become active politically and have much higher expectations than their parents (cf. Cornelius:1976).

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for in part by differences in the data and levels of analysis used by researchers to test their respective but similar hypotheses, differences in the countries on which these tests are based, and invalid operationalizations, and incorrect interlevel and intersectoral relational assumptions. Nevertheless, the confusion reflects a lack of clarity in the theoretical explanations offered to account for the relationship between social mobilization and political behavior. We will present later in this section a theory of the political effects of social mobilization which hinges on what we believe to be a more accurate and explicit social psychology than the ones offered in much of this literature, often crude and implicit versions of the reigning models of psychology of their time. Before doing that, however, we will turn to existing theories which may be broken down into five, not necessarily competing, arguments. The first four relate to the implications for political behavior of the internal dynamics, namely level, rate of change, balance and continuity. The final one involves the interaction of social mobilization with other

[82] Also see Gurr:1970, Gurr and McClelland:1971, and Morrison and Stevenson: 197 -- (SD paper).

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social processes.

Levels of Social Mobilization

The theory of social mobilization is concerned with the paradox that modern societies are politically stable, but that social mobilization has a tendency to produce political decay and instability. There appears to be a threshold at which the mobilization of people into urban environments, mass-media audiences, industrial and market economies, and participant political cultures, stops increasing the likelihood of political instability.[83]

The rationale for this argument is that at either very low levels or very high levels of mobilization the strains, frustration and conflict resulting from an 'erosion' of old values and behavior patterns are minimal. Individuals in societies that are unmobilized or highly mobilized either do not expect the rewards of social mobilization, or else

[83] There are direct analogies in other parts of the social sciences for this view. For example, see Rostow (1960).

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receive them in sufficient quantity already. The relationship between mobilization and negative system evaluation is justified by the assumption that mobilization produces expectations that the society cannot meet, as well as frustration at leaving the solidarity of traditional society and culture for the differentiated and culturally alien institutional structure of modern society. Applied to African states where few countries have achieved high levels of social mobilization, this argument suggests that continued and growing system disaffection will characterize these states. Such disaffection has certainly been widespread during the past two decades and Morrison (1979) argues that the future will bring little change in this pattern since the underlying causes themselves remain unchanged. However, it should be noted that some of the most mobilized states have had little observable political violence.[84]

The assumptions underlying this argument demand further examination, however, there is no clear reason to assume a priori that 'traditional' society is incompatible with

[84] For example, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon.

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'modern' society, or that from the perspective of the mobilized individual, traditional society is preferable to modern.[85] It could be argued on empirical grounds that many of those who move want to do so, finding the traditional environment confining. Those who remain may be more seriously disturbed by the process of mobilization, since they pay much of the net economic cost of this process, while many who move experience net psychic and economic benefits. In Pell's study of Ghanaian factory workers, for example, there is almost no mention of anomie, strain or frustration in the responses to questions probing sources of dislike of city life (Pell:1962, Chapter 6). Rosen (1973) found "positive" family interaction characterizes established city migrants rather than peasants in rural communities in Brazil. Looking at this evidence we might expect the aggregate effect of social mobilization to be less pronounced or moving in the opposite direction to that hypothesized by earlier writers.

Rates of Change in Social Mobilization

[85] See the discussion and empirical analysis of this in Simpson (1975). Unfortunately his evidence is centered on five largely non-plural societies.

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The theoretical link between levels of social mobilization is based on the assumption that conflicts in highly and minimally mobilized societies are adequately regulated by the ability of governments in such countries to satisfy the demands of their citizens. But social mobilization is a dynamic process, and it has become untenable after the experience of the last two decades to hold that political violence is not a feature of advanced industrial societies. Attention has therefore been focused on the impact of varying rates of change in social mobilization. The general theoretical statement has been that the faster the rates of change in social mobilization, the greater the probability of political violence. It is far from clear in the theoretical formulations why rapid social change accelerates the likelihood of political violence. If rapid social mobilization meant that more and more people came to accept modern values, it might be expected that the conflicts associated with changing values would be minimized by the sheer pace at which people came to share new values. The rationale, as with the explanation of the effects of levels of social mobilization, is to assume certain consequences of rapid rates of social mobilization in relation to the ability of societies to regulate

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conflict, frustration or strain. Two assumptions, in particular, lie behind the argument that rapid social mobilization produces political instability -- first, that rapid social mobilization produces "rising expectations", and second, that rapid social mobilization increases the lag between the expression of individual expectations and the ability of governments or economies to meet them.[86] These assumptions should not be unquestioningly accepted, however.

The notions that rising expectations are stimulated by rapid change in the level of social development, or as Durkheim put it, "the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfaction received only stimulates instead of filling needs", should be queried. Oberschall (1969), for example, has suggested that there is evidence to show that citizens in Uganda do not simply escalate their expectations in the face of social mobilization, but concentrate on the degree to which their narrowly limited expectations are satisfied. Peil (1972, Chapter 4) discusses data on factory

[86] For a more detailed rationale for the hypothesis that rapid social mobilization increases the probability of political instability, see Olsen:1963 and Olsen and Firebaugh:1976.

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workers in Ghana which indicate a rational accommodation of expectations to the achievement opportunities given by their occupational position and the generally high mobility in urban society in that country in the pre- and immediate post-independence period. Similarly, in discussing data from a panel survey of Puerto Ricans, Feldman and Kendrick (1968) reveal that individuals who have failed to achieve upward occupational mobility are more likely than those who have advanced or who have always occupied high status occupations to have greater expectations for their children's educational achievement relative to their own. However, these expectations do not seem to be at all unrealistic when measured against these children's actual achievement. The idea that rapid social mobilization creates, at least in the short run, a lag between the expression of demands and the ability of governments to distribute the goods demanded in sufficient time or in sufficiently equal proportion is perhaps more appealing, but again one should entertain the rival assumption that as long as citizens perceive that the goods are being distributed and that they are getting something, even though not at equal proportion, their expectations will be satisfied. Thus, two kinds of qualification to the hypothesis that the

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greater the rate of social mobilization the greater the probability of political instability are common in the literature. The first relates to imbalance in rates of social mobilization; the second to discontinuities in rates of social mobilization.

Imbalance in Social Mobilization

Empirical research on social mobilization has repeatedly remarked on the high degree of intercorrelation between measures of different aspects of the general process of social mobilization.[87] Though the high degree of intercorrelation between indices of social mobilization may indicate that the experience of one kind of social mobilization tends to create a need or desire for other kinds of social mobilization, there is no necessary

[87] Lerner, for example, reports the intercorrelation between measures of social mobilization in the Middle Eastern countries that he studied. The multiple correlation between literacy, media-participation, political participation and urbanization is $R=.61$; between literacy and the other three variables, $R=.91$; between media participation and the other three variables, $R=.84$; and $R=.82$ when political participation is the dependent variable (1958:63).

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consistency in the development of these processes. Furthermore, there is frequent mention in the literature of the destabilizing consequences of a failure to achieve congruent or balanced rates of social mobilization. Lerner, for example, argues that asynchronous change in the processes he is concerned with "tend to become circular and to accelerate social disorganization rather than self-sustaining growth". The balance between growth in literacy and urbanization, he suggests is particularly crucial for political stability, but "unphased growth" in general is productive of rates of psychocultural orientations which far outstrip the development of political and economic institutions capable of meeting new demands for employment and valued goods (1948:88 and 401). Political scientists have tended to emphasize the destabilizing consequences of a particular kind of imbalance in social mobilization -- the imbalance which occurs when growth in public demand (produced by media exposure and education, for example) outpaces growth in governmental and economic capability. This argument is clearly stated in Deutsch (1961:503), but there are numerous formulations of this point.[88]

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The explanation of political instability in terms of imbalances in processes of social mobilization is based on a specification of the expectation-achievement gap. The argument is that imbalanced social mobilization creates situations in which conflict is intensified rather than regulated as a result of the individual's perception that what he has received from one process of mobilization rightfully entitles him to rewards from some other process of mobilization, and that other things being equal, the conflicted or frustrated individual will seek to resolve his dissatisfaction in aggressive political action.[89]

Discontinuities in Social Mobilization

[88] Benson (1966) suggests an index of aggregate satisfaction in political systems measured by the difference between awareness (levels of media consumption, education, literacy and trade) and value distribution (per capita income). In very similar terms, Huntington (1968, 55) conceptualizes a measure of frustration as the ratio of social mobilization and economic development, and the Felerabends (1966) suggest a measure of frustration as the ratio of social want satisfaction and social want formation (p.250). Finally, one should mention the I:D ratio of Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), in which indulgence is defined as increase in influence, and deprivation as decrease in influence (p.61).

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In the same way that a lack of balance between rates of growth in different processes of social mobilization is expected to reduce the conflict regulating capacity of mobilizing societies, a temporal discontinuity in the rate of growth of a single kind of social mobilization is associated with increasing conflict, strain, dissatisfaction and political instability. The relationship between temporal discontinuities in social mobilization and political violence is best explained in terms of the J-Curve hypothesis as Davies relates it. The J-Curve asserts that revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable. The frustration that develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society,

[89] This argument is elaborated in theories of rank-disequilibrium or status inconsistency. If an individual, for example, enjoys a relatively high position in the societal distribution of education, but a relatively low position in the distribution of income, he will, it is argued, be more likely to resort to political violence than if he had a balanced position (either high or low) in both distributions. See Galtung:1964. for a cross-national comparison on Latin American and African data, see Morrison and Stevenson (1974).

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seeks outlets in violent action (Davies:1969, 690).[90] Discontinuities in social mobilization resulting in a negative deviation from an historical pattern of increasing social mobilization accentuate individual frustration, and, decrease, therefore, the capacity of political systems to regulate existing conflicts deriving from stratification or cultural pluralism.

Conflict and Social Mobilization

The discussion of the relationships between levels, rates of change, balance and continuity of social mobilization has presumed that societies are "equal" in terms of their internal conflict, and the rationale for the linkage between these concepts and political violence is based on the degree to which individual conflicts or frustration develops as a consequence of different patterns of social mobilization, and the way in which these conflicts and frustrations reduce the capacity of the political system for conflict regulation. Since countries do not begin their

[90] See also Davies:1962.

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experience of social mobilization with equal intensities of structurally produced conflict, the degree to which social mobilization intensifies or moderates conflict may be contingent on the degree to which the political systems in which social mobilization takes place are conflictive. Thus we stress the interaction effect between pre-existing levels of conflict and social mobilization and the consequent political outcomes.

This point is argued by Deutsch in his introduction to the analysis of social mobilization and political development (1961). Given our previous discussion of the origin of conflict in culturally plural societies, we need only underline Deutsch's point about the interaction between conflict and social mobilization. Intermediate levels of social mobilization, rapid rates of social mobilization, imbalanced and discontinuous social mobilization will be likely to interact with and intensify existing conflicts originating in culturally plural political systems, whose members inherit incompatible values from different languages, cultures and institutions. This interaction, and the consequent increase in the likelihood of political instability will not be as pronounced in culturally

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homogeneous political systems.

The view that social mobilization intensifies conflict between culturally disparate groups by superimposing lines of economic stratification on lines of cultural cleavage, i.e., by creating reinforcing rather than cross-cutting cleavages, is as old as the introduction of the theory of cultural pluralism. Furnivall (1948) argued that culturally plural societies arose "from the interplay of economic forces," because of the driving force of colonial, capitalist markets which brought different cultural groups into contact and economic interdependence. He further suggested that it was only the coercive and autocratic power of colonial government which kept the economic competition and contact between the constituent cultural groups in plural societies from becoming destructive of this essentially fragile political order. The introduction, therefore, of the nationalist revolution against colonialism was seen as a prelude to communal conflict over the economic and political spoils of independence. A continuation of this theme is found in Melson and Wolpe: 1970, where it is assumed that modernization necessarily increases ethnic stratification in culturally plural societies, thereby

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Increasing communal loyalties and conflicts. Reference to Nigeria, which we will examine in Part II, supports this assumption. However, why this relationship between modernization and ethnic stratification is necessary, or whether in fact it is generally in evidence in new states is not convincingly demonstrated. Thus we continue to regard the hypothesis about the interaction effect of conflict and social mobilization on political outcomes as tentative, and must bear in mind the rival hypothesis that social mobilization increases the conflict regulation potential of governments in culturally plural societies.[91]

SUMMARY

Social mobilization is a multifaceted process or syndrome of social change resulting from growth in urbanization, mass communications and transportation, industrialization, aggregate income, welfare, and political

[91] Walter Dean Burnham's work has a somewhat different perspective in which 'critical elections' occur where cumulative built-up deviations in political preferences suddenly come to power in a Kuhnian-like 'paradigm' shift.

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participation. The experience of social mobilization removes people from environments and institutions to which they are accustomed and with which they identify, and encourages a change in individual values more accommodating to the new milieu in which they either have to, or wish to, live. This process, therefore, creates three general kinds of tension which reduce the capacity of the political system to regulate existing conflicts: (a) ambiguity, or dissonance for many individuals with respect to the potentially competing values of traditional and mobilized environments; (b) conflict between groups of people holding these incompatible values; and (c) frustration or feelings of relative deprivation for those who receive inadequate or inconsistent reinforcement for the superordinate goals or values of the society into which they have been mobilized. Inasmuch as these assumptions are correct, the following hypotheses summarize our expectations about the relationship between social mobilization and political behavior.

1. The greater the level of social mobilization, the greater level of awareness of the political system and its inputs and outputs.
2. The greater the level of social mobilization the greater the level of ethnocentrism.
3. The greater the level of social mobilization,

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the greater the level of system dissatisfaction.

4. The greater the gap in expectations (social mobilization minus social mobility), the greater the system dissatisfaction.

5. Status level will be curvilinear with respect to the expectations gap (maximum in middle status) and therefore with system satisfaction

6. The greater the level of social mobilization the greater (or lesser?) individual sense of self-satisfaction.

7. The greater the imbalance in elements of social mobilization the greater the level of system dissatisfaction.

8. The greater the rate of social mobilization, the greater the level of system dissatisfaction.

9. The greater the level of social mobilization, the greater the class consciousness.

10. The greater the level of social mobilization the greater the level of individual modernity.

11. The greater the level of social mobilization the greater the perceived distance between groups.

12. The greater the level of social mobilization the larger the number of group memberships.

13. The greater the level of social mobilization the higher the social mobility.

14. The greater the level of social mobilization, the closer values and attitudes will be to the ethnic group mean.

15. The greater the level of social mobilization the greater the tendency to choose similar or same culture groups as desired partners and differing cultures as undesired partners.

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These hypotheses are all based on the assumption that social mobilization in developing societies produces anxiety, frustration and conflict. If, however, we emphasize the conflict regulation aspects of our general theory of political instability, we can phrase the hypotheses somewhat differently. Social mobilization in this context increases the differentiation and cross-cutting cleavages in societies, by increasing and complicating the division and specialization in labour; the concentration, variety and heterogeneity of residential units; the variety and rapidity of information, and the scope of political participation and association. This differentiation or complication increases the possibility of parties to one issue in some conflict (A) being split into opposing camps with respect to another conflict (B). Social mobilization, that is, allows for the cooperation or cooptation of groups deprived by the prevailing stratification system or segmented in culturally distinctive ethnic groups because either the process of social mobilization produces cross-cutting cleavages, or because individuals perceive increased opportunities for social mobility and a more favorable opportunity structure for goods and services created in the process of social mobilization. Evaluation

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of these hypotheses will be an important aspect of an evaluation of these issues.

Summary

We have argued for a conflict and conflict modification model of the process that results in the political outcomes in a plural society.

In the next chapter issues of context and an alternative social psychology are raised and a summary of the resultant theory is presented.

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Introduction

In the last chapter, we set out a theory which related sources of conflict and conflict modification to a view of political outcomes. This theory articulates a view of a positive link between social mobilization and ethnocentrism. In this chapter, we present a detailed social psychology to account for this link. Then issues of how and which contextual effects influence political phenomena are discussed. The theory as it has been presented in the two chapters is then summarized at the end of the chapter and normative and positive aspects of the theory are evaluated.

An Alternative Social Psychology

The previous discussion of the literature of the social mobilization -- political mobilization link is notable for generally vague consideration of the social psychological mechanisms that would make such a link more than a spurious correlation. Group organization, the identification, articulation, aggregation and representation of interests; legitimation of authority; and recruitment, socialization and mobilization to politics are generally assumed to occur

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via voluntary associations which have sometimes competing or partially incompatible interests and which tend to encourage compromise between groups.

Since it is assumed that individuals are members of a number of such associations, it is expected that the social-political system will tend towards a uni-modal distribution of political preferences with most persons in the center, and political changes tending to be relatively small over short to medium periods of time.[1] However, we are not even sure if this is an accurate depiction of the situation in the United States, whence the perspective derives. In a plural society, we expect social mobilization to produce a growth in various products of such a mobilization process including, in particular, voluntary associations. At the same time we do not expect membership in these associations to be random with respect to cultural boundaries even when they nominally are.[2] We predict that individuals will choose to work for their own and others' interests through the culturally most compatible

[1] A classic statement is Dahl (1959, 1970). But see Dahl (1978) for a modification of his own views, and Domhoff (1978) for an alternative analysis to Dahl's.

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Institutions. Since a plural society has such cultural institutions at the most aggregated societal level, we expect these existing and related novel organizations to be the bases of social, economic and most importantly, for our purposes, political mobilization.[3]

What is the role of social mobilization in all of this? We do not dispute that a syndrome of social change may frequently be identified which produces widespread socialization experiences which are characterized by increasing social/political awareness, strain due to many

[2] For a review of the literature on voluntary associations in the developing world, see Kerri (1976) and especially for West Africa, see Little (1965) and Kerri's specific discussion of West Africa. See Merelman (1977) for discussion of the theory of how group memberships are selected and maintained by individuals. See Armer (1974) for a review of social psychology literature on Africa.

[3] In Nigeria, for example, the various pre-existing ethnic unions became the basis for most political parties. See, for example, A.Smock (1971) on the Ibos, Magid (1976) on the Idoma, Dudley (1968) on Northern Nigeria and Sklar (1963) on Nigerian parties. Hamilton (1972) presents a model of class aspects of politics in a heterogeneous society (the United States) which contrasts with the model we are building for Nigeria. See Berger, Rosenholz and Zelditch (1980) for a review of status organizing processes.

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novel and inconsistent experiences, and increased expectations and demands on the political system. But the emphasis on vicarious learning experiences in our model of man, should remind us, that (1) a view of individual openness to change and innovation does not have any clear relation to how groups will form and continue, nor what choices individuals will make as to group membership, and (2) that our model has a major role for individual cognition and choice that the implicit mechanistic psychologies of earlier models do not.[4] We agree that "cross-cultural psychological research confirms anthropological findings of the universality of basic cognitive capacities" (Scribner and Cole: 1973, 553). At the same time we recognize that informal educational experiences, what Cohen (1971) terms socialization, tend to be specific and tacit -- that is it is learned by example rather than language -- and particularistic as a result, while formal education tends to create generalizing skills for complementary reasons.[5]

[4] See D.H. Smith's (1972) review of the relationship between modernization and voluntary organizations and D. H. Smith (1976, 125) for comments on understanding social change in Africa. See Warner (1978) on adding 'cognition' to Parsonian models and Parsons' reply.

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The diagnosis of the nature of the social mobilization process is not amiss. What is amiss is the failure to emphasize that such a process should encourage individuals to create and choose to belong to voluntary associations which are culture congruent and that this is particularly the case in plural societies where the larger system cannot, in general provide the desired congruence. However, we wish to add to this argument another view of the mobilization experience and that is the creation of a need for displacement of aggression directed by some perception of the sources of conflict.[6] Why are cultural boundaries more fundamental than class boundaries? Explanations follow our argument for a Law of Cleavages and the heuristic expectation that 'have nots' are both more likely and

[5] See Cole and Scribner (1974) for a summary of knowledge on the subject, and note Horton's experience with Nigerian children (Scribner and Cole: 1973,556) and Uka (1966) on Nigerian child-rearing especially p.87 on the encouragement of independence. Brainerd (1978) evaluates the stage question in cognitive development theory.

[6] For realistic group conflict theories see Levine and Campbell (1972). Also see Migdal's (1978) discussion of changing cultural roles, what Srinivas refers to as 'Sanskritization' and in Northern Nigeria is called 'Hausaization'. See Love (1973, 95-6) on the external functions of belief systems.

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willing to blame some other group for their situation than members of their own group.[7]

The implication of this argument for those who see inequality of various elements of status such as income, education, prestige, and so on as fundamental to political outcomes is that such inequality across individuals will be primary only when culturally based conflict is not present or significant. Hence, class conflict is not expected to develop in a plural society as one of the principal bases of political mobilization.[8] This is not to imply that status

[7] See Chapter 3. Also note Esman (1973) who expands on Nordlinger's (1972) view of social mobilization leading to increased intracultural communication and awareness. He presents an argument adding regime conflict to the other conflicts in a divided society. Also note Rabuska and Shepsle (1972) in their formal model of such processes, Frisbie and Clarke's (1979) view of the role of technology, and Simpson's (1975) data emphasizing culture primacy in mobilization. See Bigelow (1982) for a model of organizational change which is highly non-linear (i.e. a catastrophe model). Lloyd (1974) in his study of perception of inequality amongst the urban Yoruba of Nigeria argues that the mass of the people do not identify the wealthy as the source of the plight of the rest of the population.

[8] This is not to deny the possibility of such conflict within a cultural grouping and its salience at the societal level if few cultural variations exist. For examples, see Markowitz (1977).

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enhancement is not a pan-cultural motivation. Our model of man makes that expectation clear. But we expect that the gap between social mobilization as a measure of expectations, and social mobility as measure of achievement will not be directly proportional to mobility or status level but rather the gap will have a curvilinear form in a given culture as suggested in Figure 5.1. Further, as noted in Morrison and Stevenson (1974) there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature that suggestst this gap will be a principal direct cause of discontent and negative evaluation of a regime. Further, we expect that individuals who gain a modern status, for example, will use that status to acquire other forms of status, in particular, various forms of traditional status. The implications of this activity are consistent with the motivations posited for our model of man, and our expectation that cultures will become the fundamental cleavage lines in a society.[9]

Thus we agree with Simpson's view that countries do "not necessarily become more universalistic in the process

[9] For other evidence on cognition, see Niehoff and Anderson (1966) on peasant's 'cognitive maps' and Scott et al. (1979) on cognitive structure.

Insert Figure B here

of becoming industrialized" (1965, 202). In other words, ascriptive bases for action of either an explicit or implicit nature, are consistent with a society that is increasingly modernized, mobilized and meritocratic.[10] However, we want to take an even stronger position and one which will accord with that of Melson and Wolpe (1971) that modernization is in itself responsible for increasing communal conflict, what we identify as ethnocentrism.[11]

[10] Social mobilization creates greater variety initially but the society has temporarily lost its ability to select and retain new embodied elements. This is analagous to a Kuhnian paradigm shift. The problem is how to find a solution to multiple and conflicting objectives.

[11] Unfortunately, Melson and Wolpe (1971, Chapter 1) and Wolpe (1974) have confused tribalism and other aspects of ascriptively-defined self-identification in such a way as to confound the flexibility of identities within culture and their relative inflexibility between cultures. As a result, they see ethnocentric behavior as not fundamental and therefore entirely avoidable, in principle. It is precisely in such situations that the contrast between culture and ethnic identity becomes so important.

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Adelman and Morris (1967) have made clear in their empirical studies of development, that there is a strong correlation between the social and political aspects of a system, and its economic structure and growth patterns, especially at low levels of development.[12] Parsons, as Simpson (1975) has noted, expects that communities will be centered around a set of shared values and there will be large differences between communities. This view is consistent with ours and we expect that situations of rapid mobilization and the accompanying disequilibrium will tend to further a process of differentiating sectors such as the economic from political and to advance the process of absorption of like cultures before the mobilization process slows and resistance to such change re-establishes

[12] Also see Adelman (1963:2) for a view of the different emphases that various theories of the development process have. In this sense cultural systems evolve and develop in a Spencerian evolutionary process. Spencer who first developed the analogy between society and living organisms defines evolution as "a change from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a state of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations" (from Berry:1976, 21). Also note Schroyer (1973) on the view that modernization involves the increasing dominance of instrumental rationality (economics) over culture. See Weinstein's (1975) review of Schroyer as well as *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 16, 1-2, pp. 151-152.

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itself.[13] A period when the Law of Cleavages does not work may have important implications for assimilation of one culture to another but we expect this to be the case for similar cultures only. Otherwise we expect to see political expression not in a 'modern' versus 'traditional' party system, but one based on organizations founded on cultural bases such as language, religion, region and other aspects of a sense of common fate.[14] Mitchell's work on Central Africa and Srinivas' on India seems to confirm this view.[15]

[13] Note Galbraith's The Scotch (1964) as an example of the regrouping of an immigrant population in Canada. Note also the 'post-modern' hypotheses of Rozack (197?) and Inglehart (1977) to the effect that societies are becoming more particularistic, for example. The conservative-liberal 'swings' in many 'modern' cultures may also be relevant and suggestive here.

[14] As we appear to see in relatively homogeneous cultures especially of the industrialized states. For examples of this work in the industrialized countries, see Presthus (1973) on elite accommodation in Canada, and Lijphart (1977) on Holland and other countries.

[15] Note the work in Geertz (1963) as well, and the Teune and Milnar (1978) perspective.

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Before leaving our overview of the effects of social mobilization on the political system, a view of power might be useful to keep in mind. Power and especially legitimate power, or authority, is the set of all asymmetric social relations. The subset of all power relations where asymmetry is zero (i.e., symmetry prevails) are exchange or 'market' situations. To the extent that social mobilization tends to stimulate (at least in ideal terms) exchange mechanisms, it acts to increase net levels of symmetry in social relations and the possibility of development may have an important base in the nature of markets.[16]

Context == Uniqueness and the Reflexive Character of History

[16] Note however, that markets only tend to move towards increased equality but not to equalize it completely. Cf. Papanek (1978) for related arguments and Lane (1978) and Lindholm (1977). Also note Mueller (1979), Arrow (1977), and Heath (1976) on modeling of the public choice process. This process corresponds to the increasing equality that many observers emphasize as the endpoint of the development process.

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Our discussion up to this point has centered on how various social and social psychological forces act to produce political values and behavior in various cultural settings. This analysis is ahistorical in at least the sense that there has been limited recognition of (1) the reflexive or dialectical development of political life; and (2) the possible cross-cultural differences that the interaction of mobilization and culture will produce.[17] Neither have we been concerned with the unique elements of situations that influence political outcomes and which range from ecological and environmental effects (e.g., rain versus drought) to particular locally based feuds or other conflicts that dominate more general bases for political mobilization.[18] These issues cover many of the directions that political research has taken in recent years to deal with the failure of broad pattern analyses to account for

[17] Since culture itself is a precipitate of history, much 'history' is condensed into the cultural cleavages. For a discussion of dialectical perspectives see Basseches (1978) and Mefford (1979). Note Duncan (1979) on mobility tables in this sense. Almond and Verba refer to the Civic Culture as "evolutionary" (1965:6) thereby implicitly recognizing the cumulative and reflexive character of political cultures. Also note their characterization of African tribal societies as "parochial (1965:17) which would presumably be affected differently by change than other plural societies.

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changes in the political systems of many states in the contemporary world. However, we believe that a general recognition of the situational and reflexive nature of phenomena coupled with the methodological value of diachronic analysis should not lead us to abandon the search for general theories.[19]

In this work we are interested in political attitudes and behavior particularly as they result in the mobilization of groups for political activity.[20] We expect that every situation will have some local component reflecting

[18] Durkheim's Suicide considered the effects of environment on such 'social facts' as the suicide rate. See Pope (1976) for an evaluation of this approach. See Broach and Migeski (1977) for another example. This trilogy is often categorized in terms of age, period, and cohort effects in the social mobility literature. See Glenn:1977. As Mason et al. (1973) have noted, there is no possibility of a general solution which separates all these effects but in many specific situations particular constraints can permit parameter evaluations.

[19] For example, the argument of Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) tests the relative importance of a 'universal' relation between SES and political participation -- a kind of social Darwinism -- and countervailing forces which are brought into existence in a neoevolutionary framework to counter this basic relationship. See also Langton (1975).

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historical developments as well as purely local issues and we assume that individual and corporate actors have memories of such phenomena in such a way as to tend to maintain past behavior.[21] While we will not be able to adequately characterize all of these sources of deviation in our general model, we can use the following indicators of unique and historical factors:[22]

- (1) ethnic and religious homogeneity of the location and its state;
- (2) history of political factionalism;
- (3) ecological and environmental pressures;
- (4) political party conflict history;
- (5) minority status of respondent in location;
- (6) economic development level of community;
- (7) intensity of colonial penetration; and
- (8) environmental effects such as population density and weather conditions.

[20] A major attempt at an analysis of these elements is Almond et al. (1973). Note especially Cornelius' chapter on the Cardenas regime in Mexico. Also note Post and Vicker's study of Nigeria as a "conglomerate" society ((1973) and Dudley's game theoretic approach to the bases of Nigerian political mobilization (1973). Also see Coleman and Davis (1976).

[21] Note Wohlwill (1973) on behavioral development. Even though a new entrant might make different choices. In the terminology of economics these are different choices if the capital 'costs of entry' are to be assessed or not. This is frequently the reason for the slow introduction of new technologies in advanced industrial societies, for example.

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The need to recognize that a system will develop over time as a function of historical circumstances and that decision rules or system parameters may change is clear. Lack of such recognition has impeded our understanding of the process of social change. Being forced to wait for naturally occurring experiments which then occur under conditions that make them difficult to evaluate need not lead us to abandon the goals of a social science for those of a latter day historicism.[23] Although this is not the forum for such a methodological discussion, the tenability of this view can and should be empirically evaluated. Our concern is not only to evaluate how context systematically

[22] This is in addition to the comparative survey work that is being analyzed in the general model using survey data over a twelve year period for Nigeria. Note that with regard to the French village experience, the great emphasis given to the disembodied culture and a tradition of antigovernment views as compared to a minimal role for the educational system (Almond and Verba:1965, 269, and 36) and family (Kavanagh:1972).

[23] See Campbell (1969) for procedures to maximize the usefulness of contaminated experimental conditions. See Popper (1964) for a critique of historicism. Much of this discussion has value laden overtones as well as portraying a conflict between those who do not believe a social science is a possible or feasible enterprise versus those that see the search for theoretical expression as essential to our understanding of social phenomena.

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affects behavior, but also how it independently contributes to the culture rather than reinforces or reflects values already held by the relevant political actors.[24] Stage theories are important here, but are too teleological in character to fit any but the broad outlines of change and hence unable to account for slippage back to a 'lower' stage, for example.[25] These approaches may be useful, though, and we will examine them when they seem to present plausible rival hypotheses to our own.

We would prefer to limit variation due to context effects in our analysis in order to increase our explicit understanding of possible policy options. However, unique effects and historical processes testify to the adaptability of humans in society, which is of importance in our arguments for an adaptive culture.[26]

[24] Note Coleman and Davis' (1976) comments on situationalism.

[25] Lerner (1958) can be evaluated as a stage theorist -- see Thomas (1974) and Morrison (1980:Part III,Chapter 3). This applies to psychological stage models (e.g., Maslow's need hierarchy) as well as aggregate models (e.g., Rostow's stages of economic growth). Also see Howard (1978) for the role of colonization in Ghana, and Wolfe (1960) on Piaget.

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We advance the following hypotheses on the effects of context:

- (1) The more and stronger the within group conflicts, the more salient all political phenomena;
- (2) The more and stronger the local conflicts, the more all actors will disapprove of the regime and politicians;
- (3) The more and stronger the local conflicts, the more likely outside groups will be sought as allies; and
- (4) The more and stronger the local conflicts, the less ethnocentric the population.

Summary of the Theory

"In most of the developing world, identity patterns derived from shared language, culture, religion, or caste which are not coterminous with the territorial unit of sovereignty have been important, often crucial determinants of political alignments and conflict" (Young:1976,5).

Empirical Implications

[26] On these issues see B.G. Campbell (1974), Ruse (1979) and Mey (1972).

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With the statement of our theory complete, we can compare this perspective with other points of view, as well as review possible normative implications which will be considered more fully in Part III.

Our theory encompasses several basic sources of social and political cleavage which are cultural in origin, such as language, religion, and ethnicity. It is expected that these aspects of embodied culture will be the primary avenues of socialization into politically relevant values and beliefs, and that they will also be the principal bases for political mobilization. We advanced a 'Law of Cleavages' which argued that if such cleavages existed in a society they would dominate other social and economic cleavages as bases of political mobilization.

Relationships are not static, however, and we characterized a number of sources of modification to this basic process. The main elements of social change, social mobilization and social mobility, usually seen as the source of 'cross-cutting' cleavages and culture modification, have been examined from a different perspective. While we do not deny that social change may result in increased

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modernization and modernity, increased awareness of the potential role of politics and defensiveness from anxiety due to the rate of change also results in increasing ethnocentrism and especially cultur-centrism.[27] Thus cultural boundaries are strengthened and group inequality tends to increase. Consequently, we might expect modernization in a plural society to increase the 'reinforcing' cleavages between culture groups that act as bases for political mobilization and that the most mobilized and mobile individuals will be most advanced into this process.

The basic sources of cleavage, modified by mobilization, mobility and ethnocentrism, are filtered through the context in which the system is embedded. Elements of historical uniqueness and sequence often play important roles in political outcomes.[28] Such context

[27] Only in disequilibrium conditions such as very rapid mobilization and mobility does the Law of Cleavages appear not to work -- this occurs because information and organization in the system is unable to identify culture cleavages and give direction to them. Also there is a counterbalance theses (cf. Galbraith's countervailing power argument) so that, for example, as one potential group's demands as a group increase, the counterformation of other 'groups' begins in earnest.

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embeddedness may be fundamental to the definition of arenas of conflict and competition in the society, and must be understood as an important potential source of adaptation in the process of political development.[29]

This theory is intended to elaborate upon several existing theories but it presents novel features and combinations of elements that contrast with some well known alternative views on social change.

We can consider these alternate views seriatim: (a) modernization theories; (b) functionalism; (c) the Civic Culture; (d) the structuralists and conflict theorists; and (e) other views on the plural society especially those by Young (1976), Lijphart (1977), and Nordlinger (1972). We

[28] They also may appear to some observers to be due to the uniqueness of cultures but we reject the Whorfian extreme of cultural relativism as inconsistent with the apparent ability of humans to at least partly adapt to many other cultures, and we expect that such elements of explanation can be parameterized in most cases.

[29] Note here the shift of culture from an independent to a dependent variable. Note also the implicit emphasis on reality-testing as opposed to a naive view of reality as an arbitrary social construct. See Lasswell (1977) for a related view.

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will then examine this implication for normative issues.

Although modernization theory denotes a number of related neo-evolutionary perspectives, the current theory differs in several senses from the views held by most authors in that tradition. First, our explicit introduction of horizontal cleavages and ethnocentrism as bases for mobilization allows us to evaluate the expectation of most modernization theorists that ethnocentrism which is not coterminous with the state's boundaries would fade under the impact of massive social change.[30] occurred in some instances has masked the selectivity of the process, lending weight to the role of detail to provide understanding to the dynamics of the process.[31]

[30] When ethnocentrism is coterminous with the state's boundaries it is called nationalism and many writer's view ethnocentrism of this type as acceptable or even healthy. We are concerned with the typical problems of high external aggressiveness of such homogeneous states, however.

[31] See Coxon and Jones (1977) for a similar situation analyzed in terms of the literature of social mobility.

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An important element in this tradition is the center-periphery approach associated with Edward Shils in which a dynamic center propelled by modernizing elites acts to propagate modernization throughout the periphery with the expectation of an eventual modern society formed in an 'ink-blot' fashion.[32] To put our argument into Shil's terminology, the effect of social change in a plural political culture is to act in a centrifugal sense not to a common center but to multiple centers.[33] Thus center-periphery analysis must be expanded to allow some places to be both 'centers' with respect to some locations and 'peripheries' with respect to others and those various centers will not necessarily be hierarchically arranged with respect to each other.[34] We expect the center-periphery

[32] See Shils (1975). Also note the international relations analogue with terms such as North-South and developed-underdeveloped. One current view of the importance of regional powers as intermediaries in this process loosens the older view but still remains in that tradition. Formal and informal sectors as used in economic analysis also relates to this tradition.

[33] This is not our view of the most effective perspective but it may aid the reader's understanding.

[34] A partially-ordered space. Note the formal similarity with some views of dependency theory.

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approach to be more complicated in a plural rather than a non-plural society. The notion is that a centralized system has a greater need for consistency which suggests that minor variations in political culture will be less likely to persist leading to a decline in the number of centers. This basically optimistic view of Shils contrasts with the usual picture of conflict between centers that is considerably exacerbated by the process of social change leading to conflict, violence and, in Huntington's view (1968) political decay.[35]

Most authors writing in the tradition of modernization theory may be classed as structural-functionalists.[36] We have treated them as a separate group because their concerns are (1) somewhat more empirical and policy-oriented, and (2) because they are generally concerned with societies undergoing rapid social change.[37] Our perspective differs

[35] For other views see Eldersveld and Ahmed (1978) on Indian political development; Eisenstadt (1973); Bill and Hardgrave (1973); van den Helm (1973); Bannister (1969); and the classic work by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950).

[36] For example, Shils, Levy, Apter, Mitchell and Smelser were students of Talcott Parsons.

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significantly from that of functionalism in terms of functionalism's principally endogenous dynamic, equilibrium seeking or teleological characterization of behavior, its behaviorist psychology, its ahistorical frame of reference, its lack of an adequate theory of group mobilization and power, and its lack of a theory of variations or innovation.[38]

Our theory is intended to meet some of these weaknesses. We have articulated a view of the complexity in the source of elements of social change which places heavy emphasis on exogenous sources in contrast with the functionalists view that the primary engine of social change is reaction to social imbalances and disequilibria which are endogenous in origin or where external sources are no longer important.[39] However, in a plural society there may be

[37] In some sense, analagous to the nineteenth century sociologists' concern with studies of the now developed societies, although many of those figures also did work on other societies.

[38] For an excellent review of many of the weaknesses in structural-functionalism and their sources, see Gliddens (1979) and the development of his theory of "structuration".

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many changes endogenous to one culture but exogenous to others. Further, we treat technological change as exogenous to the society.

Such a multiplicity of changes brings us to the second point, the equilibrium seeking and teleological character of the social system. We agree with Giddens view that any "explanation of social reproduction which imputes teleology to social systems must be declared invalid" (1979:7). This view is especially appropriate in plural societies because they lack any obvious central norms towards which to move.[40] Moreover, the importance of culture for individual and institutional action is that it affects the social and political system in unintended ways. The functionalists are concerned with unintended consequences of an individual actor's behaviors or choice, because the functionalists deny the importance of cognitive control by

[39] See Smith (1977) for a critique of this tradition.

[40] Of course, functionalists frequently deny the viability of plural states, especially in democratic forms. See Almond (1956) for a view that only homogeneous political cultures can sustain stable democracy. See Lijphart (1975,1977) and Young (1976) for theoretical and empirical evidence to negate this view.

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the actors. They tend to opt either for Skinnerian behaviorism or a Freudian model of the unconscious. As a result, on the third point we choose to support a view that "every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member" (Giddens: 1979,5). This distinction will also assist the differentiation of the adaptive culture from one based on more neo-evolutionary lines, for the "consequences of actions chronically escape their initiators' intentions in processes of objectification" (Giddens:1979,44).[41] Equally, the behaviorist view envisions a set of social actors without historical memories or temporally evolved formal and informal constraints on their action. The dismissal of the temporal-spatial interaction is untenable. Our emphasis on cultural and contextual bases for political mobilization reflects a concern to counteract this bias towards ahistorical analysis.[42] Functionalists are typically lacking in recognition of the bases for mobilization and power in society, of those actualized and

[41] For additional perspectives on these issues see Powers (1978), Kuhn (1974), Zeitlin (1973), and Winch (1978). For critiques of the biological model or analogue in social theory see Sahline (1976), Campbell (1975), Ruse (1979), and Nisbet (1972, 1973).

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potential relations of autonomy and dependence which are essential to an adequate understanding of political behavior. Our emphasis on ethnocentrism as a selective enhancement of contrast in a world of individual control-seekers confronts this issue.[43] Concerned with the absence of a theory of variation in functionalism, we attempt to emphasize the distinctiveness of embodied and disembodied culture to allow a differentiation of the selection and retention process from that emphasized in embodied culture and that in functionalism. The need to understand the sources of innovation and variation is essential to a view of society as non-teleological in character. Consequently we reject a total dependence on a "Lamarckian" inheritance process, but still emphasize the

[42] A major reason for this is the positivistic goal to discover laws in social science which have the character (including ahistorical) of laws in the natural sciences. To some extent, this ignores the temporal character of natural science and is therefore a misunderstanding of the model to be emulated, and to some extent this reflects an inappropriate analogy as a goal for the social sciences. See Alker (1977), Bernstein (1976), Giddens (1970:Chapter 7) for comments on the subject.

[43] For recent works on the conflict perspective see Collins (1975). With respect to political change in Africa see Bienen (1968), and Apter (1973).

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importance of tradition and routinization of behavior.[44]

This summarizes our main critique of functionalism as a basis for understanding the nature of political behavior in plural societies and we would like to turn now to an examination, of the most well-known empirical study in that tradition, The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1965).

Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture remains a classic work and therefore one compared to our theory throughout this book. Almond and Verba lay primary emphasis on the quantity and quality of individual participation as the key to a democratic society in which an ordinary man is an "influential citizen" (1965:3). They assert that the "coming world political culture appears to be dominated by the participation explosion" (1965:3). They note two methods of participation: democratic and totalitarian. The term culture is used "in only one of its meanings" (1965:13) and the terms, nation and state, tend to be equated despite

[44] For other views on the dynamics of social change see Giddens (1971), Isard (1969), Brunner and Brewer (1971). Also see Bennett (1977) for his view of games as sources for maintenance and innovation in political activity.

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an assertion that "most political cultures are heterogeneous" (1965:26). Almond and Verba attribute the particular mix of cultural forms in a civic culture to high trust levels, therefore mitigating the necessity of active participation on the part of the citizens (1965:30). In addition to asserting that various elements of political participation have cumulative effects, they emphasize the role of general cultural support for the system (1965:244) and specifically note the influence of authority patterns in non-political areas on political authority patterns. They expect that these effects will be cumulative, substitutable, and that family and school experience (primary socialization) will dominate job experiences (secondary socialization) (1965:301).[45] In sum, Almond and Verba describe the civic culture as a "balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values" (1963:31-32). We both

[45] This is despite Inkeles and Smith's (1973) assertion that a secondary experience (i.e., factory work experience) is the dominant source of modern values. See Almond and Verba (1965:270) for a detailed list of sources of political attitudes. They further note that subjective competence is related to frequency of organizational membership and education (1965:154).

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differ and agree with views articulated in the Civic Culture indicating only the most important here since reference will be made to this benchmark work throughout the text. Some of our objections to this work have been articulated already in our discussions of functionalist and modernization thinking. Unfortunately Almond and Verba have defined culture in such a way as to eliminate much of what we believe to be relevant, particularly in plural societies. Consequently, we devoted a substantial part of chapter two to discussing the term culture in order to construct a useful conception for the analysis of plural societies. Our definition moves us away from Parsonian functionalist thinking represented by the civic culture as well as the mechanistic psychology current at the time and the notion that broadly shared values in a society serve as a basis for action.[46] Clearly a plural society cannot satisfy the latter requirement. Almond and Verba specifically eschewed the study of "sub-cultures". Therefore, they were not in a position to evaluate the tenability of their implicit

[46] Heitowitz (1977) discusses the cross-national evidence for the thesis that shared values are necessary for political development. In Pakistan, his survey analysis showed ascriptive values not to be related to political beliefs.

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assumption that such differences did not influence the form and process of the political culture system. In addition, the primacy of early socialization seems to be in question, as we noted in Chapter two, although it is true that culture in contrast to other values and attitudes is learned relatively early. One of the reasons that we expect early socialization to be insufficient as an explanation is that hypothetico-deductive reasoning capability doesn't develop until the early teens according to Piaget. Therefore, whatever the "primordial" attachments, the cognitive monitoring of activity can alter associated behaviors.[47] Finally, we want to consider the issue of participation. Representing participation in only two contrasting forms, democratic and totalitarian, seems an oversimplification. We see a continuum as more appropriate. In addition, we feel it is necessary to delineate dimensions which differentiate between real and perceived influence on the part of the citizens and the elites, for it is not at all clear that the typical villager in many societies participated more in the new state than in the previous political system of his village.[48] Ultimately the Civic

[47] Compare with Almond and Verba's statement (1965:267).

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Culture gives us only a limited perspective that is unable to account for many traditional explanations for the basis of political mobilization or for differences in political outcomes. The failure to deal with conflicting forces in society at both the embodied and disembodied levels is a major deficiency in the tradition of Parsonian functionalism which we attempt to remedy in the present model. It would be appropriate now to discuss those theories that do emphasize social conflict as the driving force in society.

The functionalist approach, modernization theory, and the tradition of the Civic Culture have afforded many key insights into the nature of political behavior and mobilization. However, these traditions have some demonstrable lacunae which place severe limitations on their usefulness for analyzing a plural society. A tendency to psychological reductionism results in the underestimation of significance of social, economic, or cultural groups as bases for political mobilization either as horizontally defined groups, vertical stratified ones, or ones external

[48] Note here Hayward's (1974,1977) work on Ghana, and Eldersveld and Ahmed's (1978) work on India.

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to the society.[49] Compensating for this falling in the traditions listed above is the corpus of work broadly classed as conflict theory and structural analysis. This tradition comprises several groups: those emphasizing internal social conflict include the European pluralists such as Boeke, Furnivall, Daalder, Lijphart and others who stress the role of horizontal cleavages.[50] The stratificationists who range from the Marxists, including such work as Dahrendorf's (1958) which was intended to bring Marx up-to-date, to Barrington Moore (1966) and others. Finally those emphasizing the intersocietal sources of intrasocietal cleavages encompass both the horizontal and vertical cleavage schools of thought, including the tradition of the theory of imperialism and dependency theory as represented by Frank, Cardoso, Rodney, Hobson, Palma (1978), and Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966). Horizontal cleavages relate to issues of war resulting from many

[49] Eisenstadt (1965) is an important exception in the modernization tradition with his emphasis on sociological reductionism.

[50] Refer to the literatures -- another mixed view of the dynamics of political culture could be generated using Hirschman's linkage model (1965).

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sources exemplified by the lateral expansion thesis of Choucri and North (1975).

The literature of conflict theory and structural analysis is too vast and varied to describe here. Suffice it to recognize that the focus of their arguments rests on the various economic, social, cultural, and political conflicts which characterize groups, countries, classes, and other institutionalized aggregates of persons, and which become the basis of political mobilization. Various cleavages play central causative roles in our analysis, but our Law of Cleavages asserts that horizontal cleavages, where they are significant, will always dominate vertical cleavages as bases for social and political mobilization. We have assigned external bases of cleavage a low priority in this analysis partly because we believe this to be the case in most situations and partly because we are not prepared to advance a model which will predict the occurrence of wars or other conflicts between states.[51]

[51] An example of such a model is Choucri and North (1975).

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The Law of Cleavages should not lead us to think of cleavages as being a simple dichotomy, either vertical or horizontal in type. Generally, there is an interaction between the two which exacerbates the situation ensuing from the existence of only one.[52] Nevertheless, Barrington Moore's model (1966) which indicates that differing vertically based cleavage coalitions affect political structure and culture in particular ways appears questionable in the plural society.[53]

Conflict theorists and structuralists like Moore are guilty of downplaying the role of mobility and social mobilization in altering the structure of the cleavages, and ignoring the importance of ethnocentrism as well as situational and cognitive factors.[54] Finally, conflict theory and structural analysis fail to explain the salience

[52] This is not always the case, however. For example, Lijphart observes that religion and class in Dutch society "do cut across each other at an almost perfectly straight angle" (1975:189).

[53] For even in Moore we need an ideology or culture which will bend under the forces of successful opposition. If this were not so he could not explain the success of Non-Conformism in 16th-17th century England, or that of early Christianity.

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of some cleavages as opposed to others rationalizing them by appeal to some vaguely defined psychology or social psychology, or by assuming that inequality in power or some other valued resource is the driving political force. Our attempt to detail a Model of Man and Law of Cleavages is meant to articulate an appropriate set of assumptions and raise them to the level of explicit recognition and discussion.

Thus far, we have contrasted our perspective with that of the modernization, functionalist, and conflict theory traditions. Now we would like to turn to a group of authors whose work is closer to our own. In particular, we would like to discuss the seminal work of Crawford Young and Arend Lijphart.[55] Both writers share our view that the received tradition of empirical democratic theory does not account for the existence of stable democracies in societies that do not appear to possess those shared characteristics presumed

[54] Lijphart (1975:Chapter X; and 1977) recognize this in Holland and other states, respectively.

[55] For other work in this genre see these authors' work and Nordlinger (1972) and Bell and Freeman (1974).

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necessary to support democratic forms and behaviors. That many plural societies have been able to maintain such governmental institutions is of considerable theoretical and practical interest.

Lijphart (1975, 1977) figures prominently in the effort to explain this anomaly whereby societies function as democracies despite deep cultural divisions. He states that a "multiplicity of associations and a high degree of affiliation can be conducive to democracy even when there is very little overlapping membership across basic social cleavages" (1975:191) and offers two propositions to account for this. First, "overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level" and second, he argues that "self-containment and mutual isolation can be more conducive to stable democracy than a high incidence of overlapping affiliations" (1975:184).[56] His analysis implies that certain cultural attitudes must prevail at the mass level, principally deference to authority and leaders, if the contacts and

[56] Lijphart (1975:184-186) notes the implicit agreement with these propositions in statements by Coser, Wright, and Deutsch and contrasts this with Lipset's work.

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contracts between elites are to be viable and stable. This argument represents one of the weaknesses in Lijphart's consociational political formula and underlines the fact that Holland, despite its segmental cleavages, has a substantial shared culture which fosters consistent attitudes toward authority rendering the segmental boundaries less basic than in other cultures.[57]

We will return to Lijphart's work frequently in contrasting the model of the adaptive culture with that of consociational democracy.[58] But first we would like to comment on his view of the dynamics of plural societies in relation to our own. While there is considerable overlap at the most general and aggregate levels, Lijphart does not articulate in a satisfactory way a social psychology which would account for the nature of the (1) relevant segments which divide plural societies; (2) the distinctive levels of

[57] Lijphart (1977) is well aware that this problem arises in extension of his work to other and particularly third world states. See his discussion in Chapter seven.

[58] In this statement, we are responding to the view in the last sentence of his book that the only alternative ideal-type to a consociational model is a "British" model (Lijphart:1977,238).

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aggregation and their relation to other elements of political power, authority, and structure; (3) the complexity of various status and power tradeoffs in society; (4) the difference between the role of cultural bases for segments and more ephemeral elements of ethnocentrism which give us a mechanism to analyze these differences; and (5) the role of modernization as it changes the nature and intensity of the cleavages.[59]

Crawford Young concentrates on Third World cultural pluralism and unlike our model gives the concept of identity a primary role in his explanation asserting that identity patterns "derived from shared language, culture, religion or caste which are not coterminous with the territorial unit of sovereignty have been important, often crucial determinants

[59] Lijphart gives us religion, language, and ethnicity without telling us why these are the important characteristics or how he knows. In some plural societies there are 'understandings' about such status tradeoffs. For example, in Malaysia, the economically dominant Chinese have agreed, in effect, to their underrepresentation in political and governmental positions and power. This agreement seems to be satisfactory to all concerned. This, of course, prevents him from predicting that certain cleavages are more fundamental than others. He does recognize the issue of "degrees of depth and intensity of segmental cleavages." (1977:225).

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of political alignments and conflict" (1976:5). Young in contrast to Lijphart emphasizes that cultural pluralism "is at root a subjective phenomenon" (1976:141). His emphasis on cultural identities as "subject to constant flux and change" (1976:98) differs from Lijphart's analysis.

Young continues, stating that not "all cultural maps are drawn with equal clarity' furthermore . . . they are subject to constant rectification and reordering through the process of assimilation, incorporation, differentiation, and rearrangement of cultural hierarchies" (1976:143-44). This difference between Young and Lijphart partly reflects the different societies from which their initial examples were drawn. Young's Third World examples demonstrate an experience of considerable variation in claimed identities, which suggests to him the extreme malleability of cultural identities.[60] However, we see this as following the argument made in our theory statement that identities not based on cultural cleavage tend to merge into more inclusive identities under the impetus of social change.[61] Lijphart

[60] Note, for example, Young's story of his encounter with the policeman in Zaïre during a period of violence (1976:3).

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derived his ideas from a primary encounter with societies that had already eliminated much of the more ephemeral, situational, and parochial identities. His cleavages reflect basic cultural differences where many of those referred to by Young do not. Thus Young's "illusion of the tribe" (1976:34) needs to be replaced by a sounder understanding of culturally-based as opposed to other types of group boundaries.[62]

Young expects much group mobility to occur through a process of incorporation and puts special weight on universal religions to facilitate or even force such incorporation.[63] He clearly demonstrates as well that processes of assimilation demand at least tacit agreement on

[61] This is the process of social change in a non-plural society that characterizes the modernization literature. Young notes three important lessons from that literature: (1) nationalism is a modern phenomena; (2) modernization produces nationalism; and (3) popular sovereignty changes the nature of the political community (1976:14) -- also note his review of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics (1976:75).

[62] Young severely criticizes those who attempt "to develop a rigorous set of objective criteria to distinguish what Naroll terms a 'cultunit' to permit quantitative comparison," saying that they "build upon sand" (1976:49).

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the part of both groups if it is to occur. Thus he accounts for the failure of 'detrribalization' to occur in the urbanization process in Africa. A prograssive weakening of ascriptive ties such as tribe had been widely expected by modernizationists studying developing societies.[64]

Young advances a set of categories of cultural diversity -- a typology -- despite his opposition to quantitative measures of pluralism[65] which should alert us to the possibility of different processes of interaction in the various types of systems. Given our preference to parameterize the level of cultural pluralism (and therefore to measure it), we find that the twenty propositions advanced by Young (1976:137-139) will function as a basic

[63] Young provides a number of data examples for this process. (1976:105) We find a modest tole for religion in our data.

[64] See Young (1976:37 -) for a discussion of this issue.

[65] The categories are (1) homogeneous; (2) one clearly dominant group; (3) core culture; (4) dominant bi-polar; (5) multi-polar; and (6) multiplicity of cultures. In this book, we are principally concerned with the last two of Young's categories although some points in the argument hold for all of the categories.

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set of hypotheses to be evaluated in any study of the plural society.

In sum, although we generally agree with Young's position we differ with him in several important ways. We feel: (1) his unwillingness to differentiate cultural from identity (which reflect ethnocentrism not based on cultural differences) confuses those social elements which change slowly with those that can be dramatically altered in very short periods of time; [66] (2) he appears to give disproportionate emphasis to ingroup ascription processes while devaluing the importance of outgroup ascription (1976:43), contrasting with our feeling that processes of assimilation and incorporation must be acceptable to both groups to actually occur - our view is that ingroup forces will be strong but because of the cultural forces that underly them; (3) he emphasizes subjective aspects of identity implying that social change will erase such bases of social action whereas we argue that this is not the

[66] Note Young's favorable quote of Singer on the formation of identity groups seems inconsistent with his general position (1976:143). Also note Pye's (1956) study of Malaya which shows near absence of Chinese-Malay contact (Pye:1956,207).

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case;[67] and (4) he gives an apparently well-defined typology of societal types which becomes increasingly ambiguous when an attempt is made to specify the criteria by which groups are characterized.

We concur with Young's statement that the "consociational politics of the model developed by Arend Lijphart are both indispensable and extraordinarily difficult" (1976:115) and that as cultural pluralism "becomes better understood the capacities of statecraft to achieve harmonious civil order within a culturally plural polity are thereby enlarged" (1976:505). Young unlike Lijphart does not give a particular political formula for the plural state since he apparently believes that no formula will be generally adequate -- a view with which we agree in terms of a system's detail. However, we feel it is a position that does not recognize the structural features which many states hold in common.

[67] Young in this sense appears to be trying to rescue modernization theory with its expectation of a unilinear path of cultural development.

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In the chapters which follow a research strategy is designed and invoked to test the viability of our theory in a specific plural society. Before turning to that analysis, however, we might briefly note that the alternative theoretical positions we have discussed hold normative implications for policy outcomes.

Many of the writers in the functionalist and modernization traditions may be termed "comparative static neo-evolutionists" -- meaning that though they expect to observe social change which will in turn influence and be influenced by political forms, they neither recognize nor deal with the dynamics of the process and its unending nature.[68] Paradoxically, this tradition expresses a confidence in the ability of 'Mandarins' to direct this process and places heavy emphasis on centralization and development through the use of markets to resolve resource conflicts. Criticism has come from many quarters, and includes an attack on the inadequate social psychology that many authors, especially Americans, use in their

[68] For various views on evolution see Mayr (1978), Ruse (1969), Quadagno (1979), and Spencer (1964, 1972). See Habermas (1975) for a view of the contemporary dilemma.

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analyses.[69] Some see centralization as insufficient in a plural society -- that a more authoritarian state is required -- while others argue for a loosening of the center's powers.[70] The various costs and benefits of such alternatives, (that is, who pays, and who benefits) are not well understood. In the following, we consider some of these issues in greater detail.

Normative Implications of the Theory

"The most important single condition of an interaction system is a shared basis of normative order" (T. Parsons:1977, 168).

"Plural societies are held together by regulation not by integration" (Kuper and Smith:1969, 13).

Our knowledge is always partial, corrigible and hypothetical.[71] Thus when we consider a theoretical

[69] See Bernstein (1976) and Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977) for a review of some of these issues.

[70] See Rabuska and Shepsle (1972) and Collier (1979) for perspectives on this issue.

[71] Cf. Campbell (1973).

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argument that is intended to replace or correct another theory's inaccuracy or incomplete specification, we must ask if the specification error makes a difference to any relevant consideration. In particular, does it make any difference to answers for the classic Laswellian questions, ('Who gets what, when, and how.') or to issues raised in the social choice literature.[72] Social choice literature has alerted us to the complexity of the nature of choice, while the experience of the last decade and a half in the United States has further sharpened our awareness of the logical and practical difficulties of satisfying multiple and often competing objectives.[73] In this section, we want to introduce the objectives to be presented in Part III, especially the need to recognize the temporal dimensions of the problem.[74]

The particular range of 'solutions' that a model generates has been and continues to be a basic element in

[72] Such as the work by Arrow (1977), Sen (1970), Mueller (1979), and others. See Brams (1976) on the counter intuitives in politics.

[73] For a discussion of multiple objective problems see Keeny and Raiffa (1977).

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both applied and theoretical work in political analysis although the two streams of analysis are often carried on independently of one another.[75] However, we find it difficult to accept many political formulas derived without imagination as solutions. For example, note Huntington's discussion (1968) of the common outcome of the modernization process is political decay and the application of this view to the analysis of an African state (Uganda) by Kasfir (1976) in which his positive evaluation of a policy of departicipation seems to us to be an anti-democratic solution as opposed to the possibility of restructuring the basic political arenas in the state. The authoritarian solutions advanced by a number of authors seem to be given credence as the only means of dealing with the conflicts of

[74] We are also interested in separating out what is possible and/or desirable from what is likely, in a sense differentiating Easton's 'outputs' from 'outcomes'. Also see Campbell on these and related issues (1975).

[75] For example, the comment by Wirth (1945) referred to earlier in this chapter was ignored in most development theory. For recent reviews of social and political theories including normative considerations see Bluhm (1978), Giddens (1976, 1977, 1979), Graaf (1969), Bernstein (1976), and Laslett (1970). Also see Horton (1966) on order and conflict theories of social problem as competing ideologies.

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a plural society, although it is an unacceptable solution to us.[76] Other models such as the corporatist state which is based on patron-client and functionalist relationships are proposed by many analysts but we believe that an overall balance of resources and demands can be achieved without such draconian politics. Nevertheless, authoritarian solutions may be preferable to the historically more common practice of groups annihilating one another.

Many solutions to society's political questions are more subtle, however. The selection of a development strategy will lead to changed terms of trade between sectors (social, spatial, and functional) and therefore tend to produce conflicts between choices based on efficiency which are typically short-run considerations or those based on equity considerations which may be related to efficiency in the long run.[77] A measure such as the Gross Political Product (GPP) suggested by de Schweinitz (197?) would certainly be useful since it would evaluate the political consequences of social decisions and be applicable as an

[76] Cf. Smith in Kuper and Smith:1969. Also see O'Donnell (1973) for his model of bureaucratic-authoritarianism and Collier (1979) for recent thought on the subject.

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essential element in public policy.[78]

If we believe that order or conflict as institutionalized competition are secondary rather than primary considerations of social existence, then what are the more basic elements of a democratic society and how can they be achieved in a plural society? Almond and Verba posit in the Civic Culture that participation is essential to democracy. Central to this concept of participation is "the belief that one has some control over political elites and political decisions" (1965:199) which follows logically from their definition of democracy as "a political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites; and such control is legitimate; that is, it is supported by means that are accepted by elites and nonelites" (1965:136). Implicit in this tradition is a view of (1) political

[77] See Lipton (1976) for an analysis of the overwhelming tendency for the 'poor to stay poor' in the development process where urban and industrialized areas tend to benefit disproportionately in almost all types of political and economic systems.

[78] As we have noted earlier, it is in this sense we disagree with Almond and Verba's (1965:29) decision to eschew public polity objectives in their analysis.

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participation as a measure of efficacy and (2) the nature of political authority relationships.[79] But there are many situations in which the relationship between 'participation' and 'authority' is equivocal. Note Cornelius' (1975) study of Mexico City and Paden's work on Kano (1975) which characterize the costs to individuals for not participating as high because of the patron-client nature of social organizations in which patrons reward those who support them at the polls and elsewhere and penalize those who do not. In our view the most important element in a political system is the symmetry of authority relations -- a view consistent with Almond and Verba's work as well as that of Dahrendorf, but which does not confuse patron-client or corporatist systems with ones that are democratic.[80] It is a view offering two additional advantages: (1) a sliding scale that

[79] The role of authority as critical to the nature of politics is agreed on by students of politics representing a wide range of political preferences. Note Dahrendorf (1958) in his attempt to redefine class categories in terms of interpersonal authority relations as compared to the Marxian tradition. For a view of the relationship between authority and participation, see Pye (1978).

[80] See Baldwin (1977) for a related view and Pennock (1979) for a review of formal democratic theory.

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allows for varying levels of 'democracy'; and (2) independence of certain forms or institutions as measures of democracy. There is the disadvantage, however, that measurement problems will be more severe than in the participation tradition. One additional comment on the tradition represented by the Civic Culture can be made -- namely, its tendency to examine individual participation rather than focusing on intergroup relations.[81] A functioning democracy should have this property of symmetry across aggregates of individuals especially in a plural society, according to our social-psychological model.[82] The issue of symmetry across groups is complicated by intertemporal asymmetry, a process difficult to deal with analytically and to which we now turn.[83]

[81] In culturally homogeneous states, groups may be based on class but in most societies they will represent horizontal cleavages. Not only do Almond and Verba miss specifying democracy as an adaptive system but they assert that the civic culture is not a modern political culture (1965:5).

[82] The concerns of interest-based groups for equal allocational results and assertions of their rights is of major contemporary interest in the industrial democracies as it is to others, including those analysts in the 'dependencia' tradition. See Biersteker (1978) for a study of Nigeria from this perspective.

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We are concerned with the dynamics of systems not only because of temporal trade-offs in consumption of valued goods and services, and the issues of convergence to some 'equilibrium' level of social action, but also in the more fundamental sense of the nature of the 'rise and fall' of societies. It seems that an organization must have three characteristics in order to survive and adapt to an only partially predictable future. First, there must be sufficient variation in demands and possible solutions presented to the society in order to ensure that the organization is aware of potential choices required for survival and growth. Typically young organizations have the capacity to generate such variation while history and environment may also serve in this capacity. The second characteristic, which often conflicts with the first, is the ability to select from alternatives that which is to be

[83] We will deal later with two related issues: (1) the 'social construction of reality' -- Cf. Berger and Luckmann (1966) and (2) the notion of politics as the study of asymmetric relations, and economics as the study of symmetric interactions. The view of which nations are civic cultures is interpretable in such terms with the alienated states (Mexico and Italy) and detached one (Germany) having much higher levels of asymmetry in social and political relations (and reaction in the form of radical parties) as compared to the U.K. and the U.S.A.

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retained. Unfortunately, the desire to ease this arduous task coupled with the limited rationality available to most individuals and groups makes maximal variation unwelcome and undigestable.[84] Further, the third characteristic the ability to retain and institutionalize selected variations, typically conflicts directly with interest in innovation and change. The resulting tension does not mean that organization is the enemy of adaptivity but that there exists, in principle, a trade-off between these forces.[85] The preceding argument implies that mixed centralized-decentralized systems have the highest potential for adaptivity, a point we will consider in detail in Part III.[86] Stressing the adaptive and non-mechanistic character of social systems, it also bears an important relationship to the nature of markets and social exchange

[84] See Simon (1978) and Etheredge (1979) for a discussion of these issues. Deutsch (1966) remains to us a non-adaptive system designer with a deterministic feedback model.

[85] Therefore, regrettable as it may be, systems tend to be more innovative in times of decline of institutions or tafter e.g. crises. Note here Barnett (1953) on innovation as the basis of culture change and Coser (1967) as representing the view of conflict as serving this purpose.

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systems.

The link between democracy and market mechanisms in the economy has a long history both in empirical analysis and as a key component in theoretical perspectives.[87] Lane (1978) has emphasized the efficacy-producing effects of market participation although Hirschman (1970) has characterized the illusion of individual control in many common market situations.[88] Lindblom (1977) has observed from another perspective that one mechanism useful for a

[86] Also see Bennett (1977) and note the Bryce comment to the effect that a persuasively high level of participation can only occur in a highly decentralized system with highly institutionalized mechanisms for system change (as cited in Almond and Verba:1965, 121).

[87] Note for example J.S. Mill (1957), Curry and Wade (1968), Mulkay (1971), Lindblom (1977), Rogowski (1978), and Barry (1970).

[88] Related to this issue is the point by Bryce cited earlier that participation at a low level, that is in small groups, ties in with conditions in psychology for high self-esteem, sense of control, etc. That is, hierarchical groups will be avoided particularly if other group memberships are available to the individual. Almond and Verba (1965:256) also note that "Organizations are, in a sense, small political systems that provide among other things alternative methods of recruitment into politics as well as other sections of the system.

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political system is the transfer of a large number of allocative decisions to the market thereby decreasing the load that the political system itself must support.[89] This mechanism has a serious drawback based on the assumption that market relationships between the various actors will be symmetrical. Since neo-classical economic theory argues that this at best only holds in the model of perfect competition, we might assume that all transactions could be characterized as having one component that is symmetric between the actors, and another component which is assymmetric. Thus, the optimal democracy would be one that maximizes and/or equalizes the number of symmetric interactions for each actor and group.[90] The attraction of such processes also seems related to the expectation of

[89] A common view of the current political environment in many of world's states is that the government is being asked to do more that it is able to do. Movements of decisions to markets lightens this load but the allocative results may be politically unacceptable in many situations, especially in plural societies.

[90] Note the link to equity theory here -- as the distribution of power flattens, equity theory becomes the optimal solution -- this is analagous to going from monopoly (dictatorship) to perfect competition (many sellers and buyers) economic models with elite rule between (oligopoly).

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Issue-based politics in democracies where actors do not see politics as responsible for the allocation of diffuse status rewards. The development of modern communication technologies and urbanization also tends to facilitate decentralization in this sense compared to the possibilities of only a few decades ago.[91] Markets, then, to the extent that they multiply the number of symmetric interactions in a society, increase the sense of efficacy and what we might term the propensity to democratic forms.

It is true that there are social choices that cannot be handled by market allocations, or alternatively that will be systematically underallocated. These social choices involve what are called public or collective goods.[92] For the sociologist, socio-cultural forms may have very different implications from group to group.[93] Indeed, Galbraith's

[91] Also note the link to the CED model (Complexity, Equality, Differentiation) of the Committee on Comparative Politics. See Binder et al. (1971). The increases in complexity and differentiation are likely to lead to increased numbers of symmetric interactions, hence to increased equality. However, as we note in our model, there are many mechanisms that lead to increased inequality between groups while leading to increased equality within each group. This is especially true between states and is reflected in dependency theory amongst other perspectives.

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model of compensatory power for establishing group equality may be a relevant issue for the model represented in our argument.[94]

In a sense, the optimal political formula may be to decrease costs of membership and to increase benefits or at least to decrease the ratio of the first to the second. Although this is too simplistic a view, the lesson it carries is that the system which allows participants to feel efficacious is the one most able to be both adaptive and

[92] See Head (1977) Howard (1971), Olson (1965), Samuelson (1955) and Mueller (1979) for a discussion of public goods. It should be recognized that those associated with the 'Chicago School' such as Buchanan and Friedman argue that public goods do not exist and therefore traditional neo-classical analysis and its relative in political analysis, utilitarianism, is analytically adequate.

[93] We should clearly separate the idea of adaptive value from survival value for survival is not the act of selection in cultural systems.

[94] This relates to a number of moral issues. See Wilson and Schochet (1977), B.R. Wilson (1970) and Mcneilly (1968). Also note the Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) contrast of the results of a social Darwinian process in conflict with forces of equality and symmetry. In what sense is the cultural equivalent of the survival of the fittest going on in any society? Should there be a field such as cultural economics?

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dynamically stable. While successful authoritarian states have also recognized this point, the difference is one of short term optimization versus long term. Authoritarian states will not be innovative according to our view, and models arguing for the necessity of authoritarian regimes are therefore unworkable. The consociational formula popularized by Lijphart is similarly unacceptable because it is too elitist and therefore, undemocratic, and depends, as Lijphart (1975) notes, on cultural forms that emphasize deference. In summary, most of the work on development, modernization and plural societies is not only static in its but maladaptive.

SUMMARY

In these two chapters, we have characterized the process of political mobilization in a plural society as one principally drawn on the lines of horizontal cleavages and as sometimes exacerbated by vertical cleavages. According to our model, this basic process is intensified by social mobilization and mobility because they not only lead to greater instrumental rationality but also to greater ethnocentrism. While ethnocentrism in a relatively homogeneous society manifests itself as what is usually

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called nationalism, this is not the case in the plural society. It was conceded, however, that context and historical patterns could exert counter-influences on this process leading to a deviation from this process. We expect this to be a not uncommon occurrence particularly in terms of the macro-political implications and that the construction of appropriate arenas of political conflict may be the key policy issue in the design of the institutions of a democratic society in a culturally plural state.

Contrasts were drawn between alternative models of development including the modernization, functionalist, conflict, and plural society traditions. Our model, while closest to that broached in the latter approach, attempts to deal with a conundrum still not successfully solved in that tradition, namely which horizontal cleavages matter and why. The role of culture and the different roles played by its embodied and disembodied forms are key to this explanation.

Finally, we raised the issue of the normative implications of competing models. Since Part III is reserved for that discussion, no comprehensive treatment was intended and an attempt was made simply to characterize the

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nature of democratic societies in an adaptive culture, and
to compare the implication of this perspective with other
approaches to the nature of democracy in a plural society.

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Chapter Six

The Analysis of the Plural Society

A Multilevel-Multimethod-Multitrait Approach

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analysis, log-linear methods, del-p,
etc.

4. Emphasis on converging evidence
5. Coalition analysis techniques

Introduction

In Chapters four and five, we presented a theory intended to account for political behavior, values, and coalition formation in a plural society. Here we address the question of how to empirically evaluate this theory. Our data is from a country that was under a military regime at the time of the survey. Therefore, most testing had to be indirect since formal political activity had been banned for eight years. In addition, values and beliefs could not be measured directly.[1] The chapter is organized into the following sections: (1) approaches to theory testing; (2) the design of an appropriate research strategy; (3) the key issues of survey research design; and (4) a consideration of data analysis issues.

I. Testing the Theory

[1] We do not mean 'indirect' in Norman Campbell's sense. See Ellis (1966) for a review and critique of that sense of indirect measurement. We mean indirect in the sense that the theoretically relevant variables are not actually measured (or in most cases measurable) but are the inferred results of such variables.

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A central concern of modern social science methodology has been to articulate theories in empirically testable and falsifiable forms. We review these arguments, and attempt to innovate in terms of methodology, statistics and measurement.[2] This concern with empirically testable hypotheses has been under attack during the last decade.[3] The critique has come from a number of independent sources including phenomenology,[4] critical theory[5], and analytic philosophy among others. Much of this critical work articulates a conception of social existence which is fundamentally different from that envisioned by the physical sciences. This difference results from the assertion that

[2] The literature on the controversies and disputes in this field is enormous. For a range of some of these issues see Guttman (1977), Abel (1970), Toulmin (1958), Holton (1973), Waddington (1977), Stinchcombe (1978), and Brown (1977). For a review of many of the issues of contemporary political science methodology see Aiker (1979).

[3] Note for example, Giddens' attacks on positivism (1974, 1975) and the Adorno et al. (1976) review of positivism in Germany. See Eisenstadt and Curelau (1977) for a review of theoretical perspectives in various countries. See Pierce and Pride (1972) for a more mainline positivistic view of the development process.

[4] See Zeitlin (1973) for a review of these issues as well as Bernstein (1976).

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the physical world is constituted independently of any theoretical perceptions which in turn could be invoked to understand it. Consequently, it is argued that there exists an independent reality with which to test physical theory.

In the social or cultural sciences, however, it is argued that there is not an independent reality against which to test our theories. This difference between the physical and cultural sciences lies in the role of institutional forces (including culture), individual actions which are conditioned by both meaning and intent, and the subjective perceptions and expectations of the actors.[6] While the issues raised in these works are important, we agree with Moon (1975) that the role of meaning of each action in most human activity has been overemphasized.[7]

[5] For views on critical theory and hermeneutics, and its principal methodology, see McCarthy (1978), Bauman (1978), Gadamer (1976), and Bernstein (1976). See Aiker (1978) and Morrison and Lerman (1978) for more sources on these issues.

[6] For a discussion of these issues, see some of the preceding notes. Also on the limits to rationality and the role of tacit knowledge in action, see Simonds (1978), on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, Nisbett and Wilson (1977), Heyting (1971), on intuitionism, Giddens 'New Rules of Sociological Method' (1976).

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Moreover, we are concerned with culture as a pervasive gestalt where individual actions and traits become indistinct against the cultural template.[8] We expect that humans search for patterns as bases for action as if there is a well-defined entativity about social as well as physical interaction.[9] This in turn leads us to adopt a methodology incorporating components of critical realism.[10] However, we expect that the "environment sets problems for the organism which are resolved on the level of the species" (Russell:1978, 11). Thus such a relation between ontogeny and phylogeny and its parallel between the

[7] See March (1978) for a review of rationality concepts and agreement with this view. This is also consistent with our view of the culture-bearers. We assume that they tend to prefer the ideal model as a basis for perception and evaluation often on the face of empirical evidence to the contrary.

[8] For a reply to Winch's (1958) classic statement on the impossibility of a social science, see Horton's (1976) view of his work in the African context.

[9] This does not rest on the assumption that individuals make maps of social space by using territorial space, as Leach (1976:54) holds, but it is in agreement with Popper about problem solving as the 'primal activity' (Russell:1978, 11)

[10] See Popper (1972, 1974) and Campbell (1975a, 1974).

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embodied and disembodied cultures emphasizes the importance of multi-level analysis as well as a systemic or holistic approach.[11]

Notwithstanding the need for a systems approach, we share with Hirschman (1970) a distrust of procedures which consciously search for paradigms.[12] The political scientist as 'detective' -- using formal and stochastic models -- has been central to our approach.[13] This is of especial importance in cross-cultural contexts where the search for an etic description necessarily precedes an analysis of the plural polity's political outcomes.

[11] See Naroll and Cohen (1973) for arguments for 'holistic' research. Note Weber's (1948) Economy and Society discussion of the necessity of using actual actor vocabularies to describe human action. See Runciman (1972) for a critique of Weber.

[12] Note Leach (1976:15) where he relates paradigms to linguistic syntax as symbols are to signs, and as metaphor is to metonyms.

[13] For other works on these issues, see Sanders (1976), Welmer (1979), Studdert-Kennedy (1975), Hirst (on Durkheim) (1975), Boden (1977), and Elster (1979:400). For formal modeling of social change see Galt and Smith (1976) and Doreian (1970).

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In testing the theory, the approach will be to evaluate a number of specific models using explicitly operationalized variables from several levels of analysis (multi-level approach). This in turn permits us to search for convergent and discriminant evidence in testing the theory, as well as dealing with observer and methodological bias (cf. Campbell:1975a). Where possible, we will evaluate using quasi-experimental forms.[14] We assume that single-factor explanations are generally untenable and therefore we present a set of jointly determined relations in Part II.[15]

Because of the need for multi-level evaluations of the theory, we cannot do an evaluation across polities using data at a single level (e.g. aggregate). Therefore, we

[14] These approaches are inferior to genuine field experimentation but that is not possible here. See Cook and Campbell (1976), Campbell and Baruch (1975), and Campbell (1969). On measurement see Baumrin (1975). Feldman (1981) provides a practical guide to field research in the social sciences.

[15] Simultaneous equation models are an example of this approach. For an interesting note on a particular argument on single versus multifactor explanations, see Gould's (1980) contrast of Wallace and Darwin on evolutionary theory.

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have opted to evaluate a single society in some depth.[16]

But which society and why?

Before turning to these questions, let us digress momentarily to discuss a related issue. The level of analysis appropriate to evaluating the components of political culture needs to be identified. We feel that the individual political actor constitutes the appropriate level. Individuals represent not only the socialized products of institutions which in turn are the distillates of past cultural adaptation, but also they are the sources of future cultural change. Institutions remain important, however. Institutional analysis or the evaluation of norms which socializing (institutional) mechanisms try to pass on from generation to generation is useful in the study of static political cultures and serves as a check for a dynamic model based on individual data. The "trust to doubt ratio" (Campbell:1978) is such that even in times of rapid transition, the culture and institutions change at a much

[16] Evidence from other plural societies will be presented though it will be less detailed than the Nigerian data. See Armer and Grimshaw (1973) for a review of comparative research strategies. Also see Eisenstadt and Curelau (1977).

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slower rate, the culture retaining most of what it possessed before transition.

2. Variance of Observations as a Requirement in Hypothesis Testing

We have characterized culture as a theory of the way in which the world works, developed from and expressed as shared and learned modes of communication, including language and belief systems, which individuals and groups use to provide a basis for social interaction. Methodologically this definition is problematic in terms of the verification of hypotheses. To verify claims about the absolute level of certain indicators within a culture, we often need to use measures which are ratio scales if the absolute score is to be meaningfully interpreted.[17] However, in most cases only ordinal or nominal scales are available. The net result is that less appropriate and sometimes senseless quantitative measures are used in order that a certain view of statistical 'requirements' be met.

[17] See Leege and Francis (1974) for a discussion of levels of measurement. Also note Marsh (1967) and Diesing (1971).

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Alternatively, the usefulness of quantitative techniques for the study of culture is denied and other epistemological devices such as 'thick description' (Geertz:1973) are substituted. The first approach is indefensible, and a better 'mouse-trap' exists than the second.

The 'case-study' approach presents certain problems, no matter how sophisticated the study or authoritative the methodological arguments marshalled in defense of its being done 'the right way'. [18] The single culture study reinforces the typological character of analysis, revealing a static view of society and culture. It further prevents the evaluation of theories about the relationships between aspects of culture which, because of their shared nature, cannot be easily verified.

Although the Geertzian solution is a good one, it represents the statement of a man paddling a canoe across the lake because he didn't see the motorboat. The 'thick description' approach recognizes that culture varies in any

[18] Campbell (1975) provides a sophisticated defense of how a case study can be constructed to avoid many methodological weaknesses.

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system, that repeated observations are possible, that a 'tacking' back and forth between observation and theory is a sensible way to produce information, and that this procedure will provide the variation necessary to test theories. What then, is the essential problem? It is simply, that our methods for the empirical testing of theories, our epistemological devices, are variational. They relate variation of one indicator to the variation of another.[19] As such we remain subject to the Humean problem shared by all inductivist logical procedures, although an appropriate mix of deductive and inductive reasoning is probably the best solution. However, this mix should be made in a manner that maximizes convergent and discriminant validity, i.e. we want the observed range of variance to be as close to the possible maximum as our experiments and quasi-experiments will allow.

This requirement then becomes one of the fundamental problems of the research design -- to find a research site

[19] Kavanagh notes that (1972:52) "comparison is basic to the delineation of a group's political culture." See also Levy (1972) and Pye (1975). See Darlington (1978) on reduced variance regression.

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that provides maximal variation in the relevant characteristics (e.g. culture) and minimal variation in the characteristics that we want to control (e.g. effects of different state political formulas). As such we need a site which varies widely in culture but which constitutes a single sovereign state.

The Choice of a Plural Society

In the social (or cultural) sciences, many of our methodological problems arise because of the non-experimental dictates of the field of study (i.e. we have to wait until nature performs an experiment before we can analyze it).[20] Not only is all knowledge "partial, corrigible, and hypothetical" (Campbell: 1973) but non-experimentally-gained knowledge is also more likely to produce misleading information. The preferred data source is one which has had as many natural experiments performed on it as possible. Furthermore, this source should permit

[20] See Kenny (1979) and Heise (1975) for sophisticated reviews of these problems and some partial solutions. For specific issues on studying plural societies, see Klineberg (1975), on culture analysis, see Levine (1974), and on the Toennies model, see Cahnman (1973).

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an inventive research strategy capable of constructing a number of quasi-experiments -- that is, analyses which can be made to 'look' like experiments (see Campbell and Stanley:1963 and Cook and Campbell:1979)

The choice of Nigeria as the primary research site was based on attributes of variation and uniqueness, among others. In Nigeria, there is maximal cultural variation. There is considerable literature available on virtually every aspect of the country, its history, culture, society, economy and polity -- and much of it by Nigerians so that insider and outsider perspectives are represented. There is a wealth of 'thick description' to draw on. And in addition, there is a broad range of concrete data at a variety of levels of analysis including the major surveys noted later in the chapter.

As such, the history of Nigeria provides us with a natural laboratory for political experiment. The period from January 1960 to January 1981 saw seven governments -- colonial, two civilian, and four military regimes. For three years (1967-1970) a bloody civil war was fought. In less than a decade (1966-1975) an agricultural economy was

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transformed into one based on major oil exports. And many other events affecting the political culture have occurred -- some localized or regional, and some of countrywide scope. For our analytic purposes there are few country choices as satisfactory for such a study from a methodological point of view.

The pluralism of Nigeria is emphasized in a number of empirical measures. Schmerhorn (1978:218-219) presents data on the very high degree of cultural pluralism in Africa as compared to most of the rest of the world; Geertz (1963) refers to Nigeria specifically as a type 4 society -- that is one gradated with several "large groups and many others diminishing in size to those of smaller and smaller magnitude." Ekanem (1972) documents the considerable variation in Nigeria in religion (p 65), urbanization (p 60), ethnicity (p 67), labor force structure (p 55), and age distribution, as reported in the 1963 census. Pell (1975:169) lists numerous incidents of ethnically related violence from 1950 to 1970.[21] With regard to our earlier

[21] Additional information on the heterogeneity of the country is presented in an editorial in *Plural Societies* (1971:2,1 p 43).

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discussion, it is clear that Nigeria meets most if not all of our research preferences and requirements. The final criterion was that a survey could successfully be carried out in Nigeria. In most other equally plural societies, this would not have been possible.[22]

Finally, developing general theory about plural political cultures demands comparative data be invoked from other states and regions as well as from countries at other levels of development. This will be done as appropriate, and as information is available.

Research Site - Access and Ethical Issues

Hermassi (1978:239) has asserted that "the study of the new nations has reached a state of acute crisis." While the lack of a coherent, comparative, theoretical paradigm is the principal reason advanced for this parlous state, related to and behind such dissensus are the problems of the

[22] This in large measure is because of the commitment of some Nigerian academics to the work in particular, and to research in general, most importantly, Billy Dudley, as well as the relatively open atmosphere under the military regime in the summer of 1974.

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researcher's free access to many societies, and the attendant ethical issues of who and what to study, and what research perspectives to employ.[23] An ultimate solution to these contrasting demands will not be attempted here. Throughout our study, the objectives of the work were open to all. The areas in which we were not allowed to interview were small in number (representing about 14% of the population), and in general they are the least mobilized parts of the country. As such, their loss is not likely to threaten conclusions that we might draw on the effects of social change.[24] Despite this slight loss in our country-wide sample, Nigeria, in 1974, was a country where social science research could be carried out in marked contrast with many other plural societies in the Third World, and especially in Africa.

5. Policy Relevance

[23] For example, Hermassi (1978) reviews four -- the liberal, managerial, historical, and neo-Marxist.

[24] For a review of issues relating to ethics and research, see Diener and Crandall (1978), Foss (1977), Homans (1978), and Harsanyi (1976).

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Taking seriously Dudley's (1973) witty criticism of the "leisure of the theory class", we embarked on this project with the explicit expectation that its results should be useful in contributing to the construction of an apposite as well as viable political system for Nigeria. This research was undertaken at a key turning point in Nigerian history, that is, in 1974 when the country was involved in the search for an appropriate civilian political regime to which the military government could relinquish power. As it happens, this report will come too late to alter the basic constitutional choices for Nigerians, though it does provide evidence to support the wisdom of at least some of them. Nevertheless, the study does purport to be relevant to future choices as well as to helping lay the groundwork for a long-term strategy for Nigerian development.[25]

II. Research Strategy and Data Sources

1. A Multilevel-Multimethod-Multitrait Approach

[25] On social experimentation as an approach to development, see Campbell (1969) and Rieken and Baruch (1974). For an earlier view related specifically to Nigeria, see Emina (1962). Also see Dudley (1965) on the role of political theory and political science in development.

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The emphasis on a multilevel set of data and the importance of cross-level interactions in our theoretical arguments make a choice of research strategy particularly difficult. Our concern with culture significantly increases the empirical difficulties since the latent or unobservable nature of the most interesting and key aspects of culture complicate the measurement process. In addition, the interaction of individual cognition, personality, and each individual's imperfect cultural template lead to complex behavioral patterns based on tacit knowledge which may not be knowable (in the sense of publicly communicable) even for the individual knower/actor.[26] Since action based on tacit knowledge requires understanding the process by which actors learn from exemplars, we expect that an appreciation of rhetoric and generative concept formation will be as indispensable to an understanding of the process as social and cognitive psychology.[27] Consequently, in this section we examine some of the threats to validity associated with various research strategies and argue for a

[26] Note Bateson (1972:446-) on effects of purpose on human adaptation. Also note Campbell(1974,1976b).

[27] Cf. Weimer:1979, especially 75-85.

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multimethod-multitrait design.[28]

Tacit Knowledge = Research Implications

"Tacit knowledge is the basis of normal scientific practice and it is manifested primarily in learning from exemplary puzzles and their solutions." (Weimer:1979, 74)

Baldwin and Baldwin (1978) have argued that most culture is carried by culture-bearers in the form of tacit knowledge and it should be studied by a *verstehen* rather than a behavioral approach.[29] While we agree that culture can be characterized as tacit knowledge and that the use of manifest indicators to evaluate culture may be difficult, we do not agree that a behavioral approach is not viable. To

[28] Despite the importance of tacit knowledge in action, humans may be subject to realist-based action more than we realize and hence to searching for parsimony and simplicity in ideologies, for example. For a range of views on this subject see Feyerabend (1975), Habermas (1972), Good (1962), Mullins (1974), Warren et al. (1979).

[29] See Weimer (1970,70) for a discussion as well as the work by Polanyi (1958,1960) that he cites. As Weimer notes, "Scientific concept formation . . . is a graphic illustration of the fact that we can know and do more than we can tell."

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the contrary, it seems that culture which does not result in manifest behavior is of less interest than that which does. However, we are concerned about the effects of shared values being 'washed out' in any explanation which uses techniques oriented toward the analysis of concurrent variation. Consequently, analyzing a large number of disparate cultures becomes the vehicle for examining this product of tacit knowledge rather than the strategies of *verstehen*, hermeneutics, or thick description.[30] In this sense we are not implying a rejection of the usefulness of *verstehen* as a methodological device.[31] Rather we choose to use a strategy that although potentially less powerful, is one in which we expect to have higher intersubjective reliability. Moreover, our concern is with several levels of aggregation and cross-level interactions, as they occur across cultural boundaries. This leaves us with a boundary measurement problem.[32] In addition, we do not want to assume that

[30] Cf. Bateson (1972b) and Campbell (1969).

[31] For a review of these techniques, see Dutwaite (1976), Abel (1975), and related work in interpretive sociology such as Goffman (1974), and Berger (1963). Also see Brown (1979), Fiske (1978), Douglas (1975), and Moon (1974, 1975).

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group labels which reflect group cultural institutions or norms, or even different group averages also reflect individual differences since a major defect of much work is to assume implicitly that all or most all actors hold the group's values.[33]

Galton's Problem

A central concern of cross-cultural analysis has been Galton's problem. This problem refers to the assertion that diffusion processes across cultures produce properties in one culture which originated from the other by a process of imitation or diffusion and therefore it is not an independent observation in the 'imitating' culture.[34] Our procedure of assigning entropy-like measures to each individual culture-bearer is intended to provide the basis for an examination of the dynamics of such cultural and

[32] See Levine and Campbell (1972: chapter 7) for a thorough review of these issues.

[33] On aggregate to individual level reasoning, see Firebaugh (1978). See Buckley (1968) for a systems perspective on social research and McPhail and Rexroat (1979) on a comparison of Mead and Blumer. Also note Harre and Secord (1973) and their model of behavioral change.

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value boundaries.

Theory-Observation Link

From a second perspective, Baldwin and Baldwin (1978) have raised doubts about the link between a set of symbols (theory) and a set of signs (observations) which are intended to interact within each set in analogous fashion.[35] We turn to a brief discussion of these points: first, cross sectionalism and the choice of cases to maximize the theory-data link.

Cross sectional data acquired in single pass surveys remain subject to difficulties enumerated elsewhere in this chapter. However, we can briefly note the relation between time series and cross sectional data here.[36] There has been a widespread assumption that cross sectional data is

[34] For a discussion of Galton's problem in the modern African context, see Ross and Homer (1976). Also see Warwick (1978) and Naroll and Cohen (1973). For one attempt at defining boundaries using factor analysis, see Bertich and Zaninovich (1974).

[35] See the chapter by Hubert Blalock in Blalock and Blalock (1968) for a discussion of the theory-data gap.

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weak because of difficulties of causal inference. There is no doubt that such difficulties exist but research work such as Milton Friedman's classic 1957 book on the consumption function should alert us to the fact that this is not uniformly the case. In addition, the implicit notion that time series will 'solve the problem' is not uniformly justified. The complexity of causal inference can confound time series at least as much as cross sectional data. A better solution is a mix of data sources, preferably with panel data. We have tried to approximate this better solution in the data collected for this work, as well as using varying methods to isolate effects which are due to the use of particular methods and/or techniques.

The second point concerns the choice of a data source (research site) that fulfills the requirements for a structured focused comparison as Alexander George (1979) recommends.[37] Although the choice of research site always involves a danger of unrepresentativeness, we believe that choosing an extremely plural society that continues to

[36] For a critique of cross sectional data, see Irwin (1977). Also see Firebaugh (1977).

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resist centrifugal tendencies is the best use of our research resources.

Empirical Procedures

Campbell and Fiske presented an approach to data analysis which not only recognized the effects of error which occur in individual indicators as a result of measurement problems, but also recognized the special significance of 'methods effects', that is, effects due to the particular methodology of gathering data (e.g., face to face interviews, structured or unstructured - formal questionnaires - participant observation - unobtrusive measurement- etc.).[38] Their approach deals with many issues that tend to confound the analysis of empirical information and its match with theoretical explanation.[39]

Other Issues

[37] See George (1979) for a very useful discussion of the methodological justification for case studies. Also see Campbell (1975) for a statement from another perspective but with a similar outcome.

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What other factors affect the research design? We want to avoid the use of typologies that reify the analysis and give it a static character implying (falsely) that systems undergoing rapid social change are in or near equilibrium.[40] The dynamic disequilibrium of such societies requires an attempt to identify basic elements of the system and their patterns of interaction, and from that information to characterize the cultural dynamics.

We should also note the methodological critique of some political culture studies raised by Craig and Cornelius

[38] Also see the very useful recent review of empirical evidence for the Campbell and Fiske position by Schmitt, Coyle, and Saari (1977). Note, however, the Campbell and Fiske procedure does not help us with regard to the issue of the appropriate unit or level of analysis. This is why we need to add the multilevel component. See Cook and Campbell (1979) for a more recent statement on the subject of validity. Sources for hermeneutics include Bauman (1979) and Dahlmayr and McCarthy (1977). Other sources on research method are Freese (1980) on the role of formal theory, the methodology volume (vol II) in Triandis and Berry (1980), Blumer (1980), Eckberg and Hill (1979), van den Berg (1980) on critical theory, Linneman (1980) on public goods, Horton (1976), Garfinkel (1981), Sullivan and Feldman (1979), Shively (1980), Tukey (1979), Bartels and Ketellapper (1979), O'Hear (1980) on Karl Popper, Thomas (1979), and Cronbach et al. (1980). Bobrow et al (1977) present an ensemble of useable methods to analyze how others treat crises.

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(1976:2), in particular those relating to problems of representative sampling, translation ambiguities, and cross-respondent and group comprehension of questions[41]

Also to be considered are the possible systemic oscillations that can dominate any system as Hirschman notes in his *Bias for Hope* (1971), and which Ball (1979) emphasizes as a methodological tool (i.e. dialectics). The role of elite analysis including psychobiography will be taken into account as well.[42]

Conclusion = Section One

[39] For related views, see Johnson (1978) on quantitative anthropology, Flora (1975) on quantitative history, Kumkel's (1978) review essay, as well as a number of interesting comments on the subject in Sinaiko and Broedling (1976). Also see Mitroff and Kilman (1978), Campbell (1959), Meehan (1968), and Neale and Liebert (1973).

[40] The analysis of disequilibrium systems is becoming more common in economics, for example.

[41] Also note Barker's (1977) insightful methods critique of gathering information in non-literate environments.

[42] See Tucker's review of 'the Georges' Wilson, for example.

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The measuring of elements of culture which are tacit or implicit and of which the actors themselves are often unaware has produced a number of approaches, including Geertz's thick description, Goffman's frame analysis, and the hermeneutical approach of Habermas, Gadamer and others. We have rejected such methods as central to our analysis because each is limited in the scope of issues and populations it can handle and each is questionable in terms of intersubjective reliabilities. Finally, there is the practical problem of characterizing such a large and heterogeneous system as the state of Nigeria. We will invoke throughout our analysis of Nigerian society evidence gathered by a variety of methods. These will almost always represent limited populations such as one or a few towns or cities or at most a single region or section of the country.[43]

We earlier rejected the view held by Converse (1964) and others, that people do not have beliefs (or at least

[43] Note Bennett's (1977) argument for improving on the methodological and substantive conflicts in the mass belief systems literature which was advanced in a Kuhnian framework.

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that some do not). We believe that individuals have a set of formulae (quasi-theories) derived from their respective models of man (and in particular of political man) and that these models direct their responses to the environment. Thus we expect that individuals are in fact culture-bearers, that culture directs and informs their behavior, and that behavioral observation, if appropriately designed, can elucidate the key components of that culture. The approach advanced here is an emendation to the Campbell and Fiske tradition -- the multimethod, multitrait approach -- to recognize the signal importance of cross-level interaction in the study of culture.[44]

Data Sources

The possibility of doing survey work in Nigeria, coupled with the existence of a number of published and unpublished surveys by others covering the period from the early years of the First Republic (1962) through 1974, meant that a data base sufficiently detailed and representative of the major periods in the country's independent history was

[44] See Argyris (1980) for a a critical analysis of 'rigorous' research method.

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available. The data covers the period beginning at the country's independence, received from Britain in 1960, to 1974 when the author's field survey work was carried out and encompasses the eras and events of the First Republic, the military coups of 1966, the civil war from 1967 to 1970, the oil boom and postwar reconstruction, and the infusion of vast new wealth as a result of OPEC's petroleum pricing policies.[45]

a. Survey Design and Theory Testing

While a large body of secondary work on Nigeria exists, no information was available which would link the key dimensions of the theory developed in earlier chapters. The purpose of our large-scale field survey was to provide an appropriate data base for analyses (see Appendices C and D for the survey questionnaire and interview sites). Details on the survey (including reliability measures) are presented in the following section (part III of this chapter).

[45] OPEC, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries, a cartel which controls world crude oil prices, dramatically escalated crude oil prices in 1973, and has continued to raise them since that time.

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b. Other Surveys

In addition to the author's countrywide survey conducted in the summer of 1974 (N=3748; weighted N=8627), the following field data will be utilized in further analysis: (1) a recently published study by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), reporting on a survey carried out in 1966, representing the southern half of the country's population (N=1769), and relating to issues of participation and inequality; (2) a survey by Margaret Peil on post-military government expectations carried out at various times during 1971 and 1972 in several parts of the country (Peil: 1976; N=831); (3) an unpublished survey conducted for Donald T. Campbell and Robert Levine in 1966 covering twenty sites in the country (N = 1002);[46] (4) an unpublished study carried out by Fishel, during the civil war in Nigeria, of administrators from the Western Region of the country and their expectations for a future civilian regime (Fishel:1969; N=70); (5) a survey carried out by Inkeles and

[46] The Campbell and Levine survey concentrated on issues of ethnocentrism and social distance. However, because of doubts about the quality of the data (specifically the known falsification of responses in two sites), it has never been analyzed or published.

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his colleagues in the southwestern part of Nigeria in 1965, a study which is not a representative sample of Nigerians, but nevertheless posed several relevant questions with regard to social change and which the author's survey attempted to replicate in part (Inkeles and Smith: 1973; N=800); (6) two substantively restricted studies conducted in 1963 and 1972 on the role of communications in Nigeria -- although large in scale, they concentrated on a limited number of issues (N=1900 in 1963; N= 2936 in 1972); and finally (7) a study by Lloyd Free reporting on the "hopes and fears" of Nigerians in 1962 (1964: N=1200; weighted N= 2876). Only the 1974 survey by Morrison will be used in the present analysis. The other data will be analyzed in a second analysis.

c. Stratified Sampling Frames and Panel Studies

Most of the survey work cited above represents "single-pass", individually-based field surveys. Referring to the latter point, in order for individual-level analysis to be useful, the data base should include survey information which represents the variation across all political cultures within the State. To the extent that varying parts of the society can be expected on an a priori

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basis to have different variances (and means) across important dimensions of the culture, the sampling frame should be stratified in order to maximize the efficiency of the sample.[47]

In terms of the "single-pass" survey design, a primary criticism is that inference about a system's dynamic properties are made from data collected from a number of individuals at one point in time.[48] The problem of such inference are well known.[49] In general, designing the survey as a panel study mutes these problems. In this procedure, a group of people representative of the sampling universe of adult Nigerians are to be re-interviewed at periods sufficiently far apart to allow for changes that are expected to occur.[50] If it is not possible to carry out a panel study, then research studies must be used as

[47] See Cochran (1977) for a full discussion of sampling techniques.

[48] Intertemporal analysis, often termed diachronic, has strengths which can complement cross-sectional analysis. See Maddala (1978) for a discussion.

[49] See Verba (1970) for a review of the issues.

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'benchmarks' even if their own sampling frames are flawed.

d. **Other Data == Aggregate and Published**

As analysts of political culture would agree, we need more than individual-level survey data to understand the role of political culture as the micro-macro link between the individual, the group and the state. Data at the macro level must be available to provide additional tests and checks on threats to validity from inappropriate reductionism.

In following the dictum set down by Prezworski and Teune (1970), our analysis will invoke other data which represent various levels of analysis and aggregation.[51] Such data includes governmental budgets, social aggregate measures of public services and education, and various measures of particular groups such as elites, who play

[50] This process is actually somewhat more complicated since rules for adding representatives of new people joining the population 'universe' and cancelling those leaving it, need to be instituted.

[51] They argue that only cross-level data can effectively evaluate most common propositions at the national level.

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important roles in the country's social and political life. Comparative reference is also made to data on other countries which are appropriate to the general theoretical aims of our work. Indeed, a key consideration in the design of the questionnaire was in maximizing the links (where theory and instrument length allowed) to other major studies.[52]

In terms of both theoretical and policy-relevant issues, our large and temporally broad data base will allow more detailed examination of Nigerian political culture than was heretofore possible.[53] With the exception of certain studies in the United States, Europe (e.g. Ingelhart:1977)

[52] (e.g. Almond and Verba (1965); Inkeles and Smith (1974); Lerner (1958); Verba, Nie and Kim (1978); Cornelius (1975); and Brewer and Campbell (1976)). As well, the African National Project's (ANIP) data sources provided important comparative information (Morrison et al. (1972,1974,forthcoming); Morrison and Stevenson (1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1974a, 1974b, 1976)). See McCain (1976) for a review of quantitative materials on African states.

[53] Such a study has not been done for any country in Black Africa. One possible exception is the study of Kenyan school students by Prewitt (1972a,1972b,1972c). However, each survey was on a pre-voting age population, which may not be a reliable guide to the current voting population (or for each group when they become adults).

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and Japan (e.g., Richardson:1974), very few large-scale surveys have been analyzed using intertemporal data. However, collecting a large volume of data was not the only goal of this study; there are a number of methodological issues in a study of this scope and intent. Indeed, methodological considerations prompted the development of certain aspects of the research design which extended the validity of the study, and minimized various threats to validity (especially internal validity).

c. Observation and Other Forms of Validation

Brunner (1977) has argued for the inclusion of situational factors in the analysis of survey data, and we agree.[54] Our incorporation of the secondary research work on Nigeria is one response to this dictum. Another is that specific parts of the questionnaire relate to 'context' or situational factors which may be important in the determination of various political outcomes.

III. Survey Design

[54] See Brunner (1977) for a contrast of 'conventional' survey approaches and the inclusion of situational measures in the analysis.

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The basic questions in survey designs are; who is to be asked what, how, when, and with what reliability and validity. These issues can be broken down into (1) the sampling frame of respondents; (2) the design of the survey instrument; (3) the testing and execution of the survey; and (4) the evaluation of the quality (reliability and validity) of the information contained in the responses. In this section, we consider these issues seriatim.[55]

SAMPLING FRAME

[55] For sources on the design and analysis of large surveys see Moss and Moss and Goldstein (1979) on recall problems in surveys, Andersen, Kasper, Frankel et al (1979) on survey error, Babble (1973) for a general review of methods, Alwin (1978) on error models, Hopkins and Mitchell on special problems in African contexts, Hogarth (1982) on wording problems, Goldstein (1979) on intertemporal studies, Cassel, Sarndal and Wretman (1977) on probabilistic foundations, Brewer (1979) robustness in large-scale designs, Jessen (1978), Gordon (1980) on interviewing, Namboodiri (1978), Survey Research Center (1978), Featherman (1980), Alwin and Jackson (1980), MacLean and Genn (1979), Kalsheek (1980), Jackson (1979), Hoinville and Jowell (1978), Freedman, Thornton and Camburn (1980) on intertemporal response rate problems, Duncan and Schuman (1980) on question wording effects, Center for Human Resource Research (1979) on American resources, Schaeffer on interviewer race effects (1980),

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The intent of the survey was to get a sample of households which accurately represented the range of views of all Nigerians.[56] In order to decrease item variance and to insure coverage of all politically relevant aspects of the country's population, a stratified sampling procedure was used.[57] Given the resources available, an *a priori* decision was made to interview the head of household in 4,000 homes throughout the country.[58] This choice was based on reports which indicated low within-household variance on political and social values.[59] As a reference check on this expectation additional interviews were held as follows: (1) in every fifth household beginning with a random first selection, an additional adult (voting age)

[56] While a random sample of households in the country would seem to be the straightforward solution to such a goal, this would not guarantee other substantive objectives of the study, nor would it minimize the standard errors for various items in the survey.

[57] See Cochran (1978) for a discussion of sampling techniques. Also see Sudman (1976) and Jessen (1978). For more detailed analyses of the problem of which variances are relevant in the choice of stratifying levels, see Walter (1979) and Achen (1976). For reviews of appropriate interviewing techniques, see Cannell (1977), Survey Research Center (1972) and especially for Nigerian procedures, Pell and Lucas (1972). Other sources on sampling are Emerson (1980) on field methods, and Kalton (1979) on cluster sampling, .

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male was randomly selected from the group of adult males in the compound and interviewed, and (2) in every tenth household, an adult woman was interviewed.[60] These additional interviews produced an expected total of 5200 interviews.[61]

The households were divided among the then twelve states of Nigeria according to their proportion in the national population as of the 1963 census. One exception was Lagos State, which was assigned four hundred interviews to reflect its known rapid growth with respect to the rest

[58] Since there was no single or even small set of indicators to evaluate an optimal number of households, four thousand was selected with the expectation that this would be large enough for analytic purposes. This is the largest such comprehensive survey on political matters ever carried out in Africa (so far as this writer is aware). Note the head of household would in all cases be male.

[59] See O'Barr, Spain and Tessler (1973), McCain (1976), and Hopkins and Mitchell (1974).

[60] Selected so that the starting point for female interviewing did not coincide with a household that had an additional male interviewed. In the first Nigerian Republic, women were not enfranchised in the Northern Region. In the Second Republic there were some women elected to office in the 1979 elections.

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of Nigeria since the 1963 census. The additional interviews assigned to Lagos over its expected 1963 census based proportion were subtracted from the total originally allocated to the Northeast State on the basis of the baseline 1963 population figures.[62]

Eighty percent of the assigned number of interviews for each state were given in urban areas, and twenty percent in rural villages. Urban oversampling was expected to decrease the standard errors of key social change measures. Further, the total number of urban interviews were then allocated to three urban strata in proportion to the percent of the urban population represented in these strata in each state. Cities from 20,000-49,000; 50,000- 99,999; and over 100,000 in population were represented. When a stratum had only one

[61] As we will later explain, the final usable number of interviews was 3748.

[62] The reasons for these choices as well as the next stratification choices were founded on the expectation that social change occurred principally in the urban areas. Consequently, a very rural area should be undersampled in order to oversample areas such as Lagos, where massive social change was occurring. Final results are weighted to reflect these sampling differences, and thus to yield an unbiased picture of Nigerian households.

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city in it, the number of interviews for that stratum was allocated to that city. When there were more cities, a random sample was drawn which gave a 'reasonable' minimum number of interviews to each city.

Rural areas were randomly chosen subject to the requirements; (1) that the area be sufficiently far from a large urban center to be relatively undisturbed by that area; and (2) that the village not be so remote that it would involve inappropriate expense or hardship for the interviewing staff. This procedure resulted in the identification of 158 cities, towns and villages in which interviewing was scheduled and each location was assigned a specific number of interviews.[63] In each location, various methods of random designations of interview households were followed. In the rural villages, a crude map was drawn and each household on the map was numbered. A random number was chosen as a starting point and every Kth numbered household was interviewed.[64] In urban areas with available maps, grid areas were randomly selected; within

[63] See Appendix B for a more detailed description of this process.

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each grid area the numbering procedure was followed as in the villages. If no maps were available, a crude approximation was executed and the above procedure invoked.[65]

Some variation on this expected plan occurred. In some cases, individual interviews were simply refused.[66] But the principal difficulties came when certain areas or states refused to allow any interviewing to take place. In these cases, the areas were underinterviewed or, if this were not possible, they were omitted from the study.[67] What are now known as Sokoto and Gongola States were omitted entirely and the eastern half of Borno state was also omitted.[68] We estimate that these areas represent about

[64] Where K is chosen to be the ratio of total number of households to the number of households to be interviewed.

[65] See Appendices A, D, and E for more details.

[66] This, however, was not common (4.8%) and they were substituted for.

[67] Some areas in the former Northern Region were those principally affected.

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13-15% of Nigeria's population. Therefore the survey purports to represent the views of about eighty-six percent of the households of Nigeria.[69]

Survey Instrument Design

The issues of what questions to ask and how to ask them include decisions on: (1) the length of the survey instrument; (2) the language of the survey instrument; (3) the choice of interviewers; (4) the form of questions (e.g. unstructured, open versus closed-ended, polar choice versus Likert form, etc.); (5) the content of the questions; (6) the comparability with other studies, on Nigeria and elsewhere; and (7) the comprehensibility over the wide range of respondent backgrounds encountered in Nigeria.

In terms of the first three issues, it was felt an average interview time of two hours was not excessive for

[68] These are the areas as they are known under the nineteen state system.

[69] See the later part of this section for a review of basic reliability measures that were attached to the survey questionnaire.

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most Nigerian environments, but that greater length would disproportionately tire both interviewers and respondents.[70] The interview questions were designed in English and then translated into Yoruba, Ibo, Efik, Hausa, Bini, Ijaw and Kanuri by native language speakers. The various versions were then back-translated and adjusted as was necessary.[71] The interviewers were, with one exception, students at Ibadan and Amadu Bello Universities. Most were political science majors, and all were native language speakers of the dominant language of the location(s) in which they were interviewers. In order to avoid personal conflicts and reactions, interviewers were not sent to the town of their home residence.

Although issues of the form and content in questionnaires used in cross-cultural surveys remain

[70] Inkeles' study in 1966 (Inkeles and Smith:1973) reports an average interview time of four hours. This seemed excessive and unnecessarily long to us and likely to produce 'tiring effects'.

[71] See Brislin et al. (1977), Sechrest (1972) and Kyengar (1976) for evaluations of this technique, and Cotton and Klatzky (1978) for insight into the basic cognitive problems underlying this issue. Also see Brislin in Triandis and Brislin (1980).

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unsettled, we made certain choices, rationalizing them as follows.[72] First, it seemed impractical to introduce an unstructured interview environment as this would substantially decrease inter-interview and inter-interviewer comparability. Moreover, responses to open-ended questions are highly sensitive to the experience and education of the respondent. Therefore, we adopted a structured, close-ended questionnaire format.[73] The interviews were conducted by an interviewer reading from the questionnaire and coding directly on to the form. The interviewer appended various observations on the reliability and validity of the responses to the end of each interview. We varied the response format to close ended questions both to prevent ennui and response set, and to reflect what was felt to be the appropriate form with respect to the substantive concepts in each case. Consequently, the questionnaire

[72] For a general bibliography on comparative survey research, see Almsy et al. (1977). On question wording see Bishop et al. (1978)

[73] With the exception of one two-part question (105) and additional uncoded information on questions 88 and 104. Only the responses to 105 have been coded and analyzed. See Schuman and Presser (1979) for a discussion of the open-closed ended issues and note the issue of interviewer bias. See Shapiro (1970) as well.

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includes polar choice, Likert direct answer, vignette evaluations, and comparative evaluations in various forms.[74]

Theoretical issues directed the choice of question content, but the choice remains a complicated problem. Attempts to measure values, beliefs, evaluations, affect and similar non-objective phenomena involves forming questions that are a 'sample' of all possible questions which could be asked on the subject. In contrast to the drawing of the sample of households to be interviewed, it is not possible to define the universe of all relevant questions, and, therefore, we cannot speak of a sample of this unknowable universe. Our solution to this basic conundrum of survey work has been to utilize modified forms of question sets developed by other investigators both in and out of Nigeria. This provides an added advantage of comparability with other important studies not only with those done in Nigeria in the 1960's, but also with major studies elsewhere.[75] The addition of the survey data to that already available will

[74] See Appendix C for an English language version of the questionnaire.

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further cross-national comparison.[76] By using the same question across cultures, we are attempting to use etic (culture independent) rather than emic (culture specific) terms. However, the ultimate evaluation of our success in this matter must wait for better cross-national information to become available. This remains a significant issue as Jacob's (1971) article on American subcultures indicates.[77]

Finally, we need to consider how comprehensible the questions are to those being interviewed. In general, we have tried to follow the Weberian dictum (1948) of using terms which describe action which would be used by the actors themselves.[78] In addition, the non-response rate was very low making the interpretation of non-response rate insignificant for this study.[79] Nevertheless, the

[75] Included here are the surveys reported on by Inkeles and Smith (1973) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) for Nigeria and other countries. We also drew on Rose (1971) and his study of Northern Ireland, another clearly plural society.

[76] This survey reported on here will be available through the Roper Center - University of Connecticut, Storrs Connecticut in the future.

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difficulty of cross-cultural interpretation of survey responses is not to be underestimated, as Budge and O'Leary (1971) have demonstrated. At the same time, dependency on the Geertzian (1973) solution of 'thick description', that is, to empathically analyze a single culture as opposed to cross-cultural methods, seems to suffer, as pointed out by McClelland, from the lack of falsifiability criteria that have reasonable intersubjective reliability.

Pilot Study

[77] See Lingenfelter (1977) for four basic transformational rules which form the fundamental propositions from which all other emic rules are generated. See Pike (1967) and Black in Hongman (1973:525) for further discussion of the concepts. The literature on cross-cultural survey work is vast but often inconclusive. See, for example, Jorgensen (1979), Scheuch (1968), Frey et al. (1969), Hanna and Hanna (1966), Rokan et al. (1969), Verba (1969, 1971a), Inkeles (1971b), Vermeulen (1975), and Szalai and Petrella (1977). For other issues in comparative method, see Smelser (1976), Driver (1973), Lijphart (1971), Brislin et al. (1973), Campbell (1972), and Chase-Dunn (1978). Also see Tuden and Marshall (1972) for an institutional comparison exercise.

[78] See Berger (1976) for a review of Weber's theory of concept formation.

[79] See Rubin (1977) on the issue of non-response as a source of bias in sample surveys. Also see Daniel (1975) and Schuman and Presser (1978).

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In order to test and refine the questionnaire, a pilot study of fifty interviews was carried out in Ibadan in March 1974. This resulted in some reformulation of questions as well as the elimination of a number of items to achieve the two hour time limit.

Survey Experiment

The survey was designed as a panel so that re-interviews of these respondents could take place at a later time in order to mitigate the major criticism of cross-sectional surveys used to test causal and therefore temporal relations. This panel remains to be attempted and the work in this book is intended in part to refine the instruments used in such a second wave. Nevertheless, we do have considerable data over time as earlier noted, even though it represents a less desirable body of information than a genuine panel.[80] We have chosen a multimethod approach emphasizing the massive secondary literature on Nigeria to increase reliability which reports on many of the

[80] For works on panel surveys, see Markus (1979), Wiggins (1973), and Shingles (1976). Also note Wilcox and Wilcox (1979).

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issues we address here but at a more micro level and which usually stress other basic methods of observation and analysis.[81]

Survey Reliability Measures

Table 4.2 summarizes the evaluation of the interviews by the interviewers after each interview session. The general conclusion is that interviewer reports indicate a high level of perceived face validity in the questionnaire responses.[82]

[81] See Reinharz (1979) for a review of alternative methods.

[82] Note the survey was carried out with 50 interviewers, each completing about 100 questionnaires in one or a few locations. Note Gonzalez et al. (1975) for a review of standards of error reporting in surveys. Note Anderson, Kasper and Frankel (1979) for an approach to reliability estimation.

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**Table 4.2 = Responses to Interviewer Self-Report Evaluation
 of Survey Quality**

1. Time of day of interview	1. Morning	33.1%
	2. Afternoon	32.4
	3. Evening	33.3
	4. Not Recorded	1.2
2. Language of interview	1. English	42.0%
	2. Yoruba	18.5
	3. Hausa	17.6
	4. Ibibio, Efik	6.0
	5. Ibo	6.0
	6. Etsako	2.6
	7. Tiv	1.3
	8. Pidgin	1.3
	9. Ijaw	1.2
	10. Idoma	.9
	11. Bini	.8
	12. Kanuri	.6
	13. Urhobo	.4
	14. Not reported	.8
3. Interview time - see Figure II		
4. Interview continuity	1. Without interruption	71.5%
	2. One or more interruptions	26.4
	3. Not Completed	1.3
	4. Not recorded	.9
5. Interview location	1. Respondent's house	74.8%
	2. Respondent's workplace	19.4
	3. Public place	3.0
	4. Other	1.9
	5. Not recorded	.9

Threats to Validity

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Table 4.2 continued

6. Interview situation	1. No one else present	53.4%
	2. Others present but took no part in interview	41.9
	3. Others present and took part in interview	3.8
	4. Not recorded	.9
7. Respondent's attitude	1. Very cooperative	74.1%
	2. Generally cooperative	21.0
	3. Somewhat cooperative	3.5
	4. Very uncooperative	.6
	5. Indifferent	.1
	6. Not recorded	.6
8. Respondent's frankness and sincerity	1. Very sincere	67.4%
	2. Generally sincere	29.5
	3. Insincere	2.5
	4. Not recorded	.7
9. Respondent's understanding of the questions	1. Good understanding	61.5%
	2. Fair understanding	35.0
	3. Poor understanding	2.7
	4. Not recorded	.8
10. Sample status	1. Original sample	87.5%
	2. Substitute	9.4
	3. Not recorded	3.0
11. Reason for sample mortality	1. Absence after two calls	6.9%
	2. Refusal to interview	4.8
	3. Not applicable	88.3
12. Number of callbacks	1. First visit	62.4%
	2. One callback	23.1
	3. Two callbacks	9.3
	4. Three callbacks	2.5
	5. Four callbacks	.6
	6. Five or more callbacks	.3
	7. Not recorded	1.8
13. Frequency of respondent's change of mind	1. Often	3.2%
	2. Frequently	3.1
	3. Occasionally	43.4
	4. Never or almost never	48.9
	5. Not recorded	1.3

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14. State in which interview took place (unweighted data)

1. Lagos	6.6%
2. Western	17.2
3. Kwara	5.5
4. Midwest	8.2
5. East Central	14.6
6. Rivers	4.2
7. Southeast	11.4
8. Benue Plateau	9.7
9. Northeast	5.0
10. Kano	8.8
11. North Central	6.3
12. North West	2.6

Some theoretical issues of validity will continue to plague our analysis despite the adoption of a multimethod and multitrait approach. One of the most important of these issues is that of age, period, and cohort effects which are ultimately unresolvable as Glenn (1978) has demonstrated. However, as Palmore (1978) and Mason et al. (1973) have demonstrated, the resolution is an issue of model identification and if sufficient estimation restrictions can be invoked, then partial solutions to the estimation problem may be available.[83] Furthermore, issues like differential response pattern as a function of culture can confuse interpretation in a fundamental manner.[84]

IV. Statistical Methods and Data Analysis Approaches

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In one sense, it is true that behind every complicated statistical exercise stands a simple model. Nevertheless, the bewildering array of techniques and models, and the epistemological differences they may reflect, deserves comment here.[85] We review (1) concept operationalization; (2) scaling methods; (3) statistical procedures; (4) the basis of evidence; and (5) the analysis of coalition behavior. Before we turn to the problems of operationalization and measurement it would be useful to first differentiate the two terms used in the title of this section. In our view, which is shared by a growing population, the classical statistics of R. A. Fisher is

[83] See Fischer (1966) for a discussion of the identification problem. Other issues in the General Linear Model tradition include Borgatta and Jackson (1980) on the problems of aggregate data analysis, Hausman (1978) and Leamer (1978) on specification error, Hale, Mariano and Ramage (1980) on the analysis of specification error, Thursby (1981) on separating autocorrelation errors from specification errors, Bentler and Weeks (1980) on the analysis of latent variables in linear equations, Smith and Sasaki (1979) on multicollinearity, Smith and Campbell (1980) on problems in regression analysis, Lee (1980) on constrained regression, Hultema (1980) on ANCOVA and alternatives, Gray and Schucany (1972) on the Jackknife, Granger (1980) on testing for causality, Blaug (1980) on economic statistics, Clogg (1979) on latent structure models, Hastings and Berry (1979) discuss cohort analysis.

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the handmaiden of Kuhnian 'normal science' in the sense that the tradition is centered on the falsification of a *priori* hypotheses usually centered on an 'equal ignorance' principle.[86] In this analysis a theory is advanced to be tested in just this fashion but we also will use the data analysts' approach throughout our empirical analysis. The latter approach uses the available evidence not only to test the hypotheses but to generate new hypotheses. Data analysis emphasizes the role of speculation, innovation, and discontinuous jumps in our learning processes.

[84] See Bielby, Hauser, and Featherman (1977) for respondent's reaction and Beck (1973) for effects on interviewer performance. Response effects are documented in Sudman and Bradburn (1974). See Warwick and Osherson (1973) and Schoenberg (1977) for the problems of misspecification of temporal relationships. Jackman and Boyd (1978) emphasize the importance of multiple sources in the analysis of events data. Note also Wei's (1976) critique of studies of Chinese political culture. Fitzgerald provides an example of the difficulty of measuring such complex phenomena.

[85] For a review of research method issues see Morrison and Lerman (1978). On statistical models, see the extensive bibliographies in Morrison (1979a, 1980b).

[86] That is the tradition associated with R. A. Fisher and which has dominated statistics until recently. See Kuhn (1970) for a review of these terms, and Lakatos and Musgrave (1971) for an evaluation and the alternative approach of Imre Lakatos.

Concept Operationalization

Detailed operationalization and measurement procedures are provided for variables throughout the chapters of Part II. Therefore, we make only a few brief remarks about our strategy here. As Blalock (1979) has stressed, measurement as the connective device between theory and statistical evaluation remains a weak link in empirical social science while the interactive 'Catch 22' situation which exists between concept and theory (a connected set of concepts) remains a basic conundrum (as Kaplan (1962) has noted) and a block to the development of social science.

In this work, measures of culture were created which reflected some assumed underlying continuum in order to evaluate dynamic models of the change process. In framing questions, our intent was to have items that will form part of such scales. These items have been designed to have largely Likert or polar choice formats.[87] In the next

[87] We would like to have used the semantic differential of C. S. Osgood but no adequate pretesting could be carried out so it was omitted. See Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum (1957), Snider and Osgood (1968), and Osgood, May and Miron (1975).

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chapter, we construct scales to represent dimensions of culture as carried by disembodied culture-bearers.[88] Several other measures of higher levels of analysis are also used.[89] None of the foregoing is intended to convey the notion that culture is the sum of its parts (or 'traits'). To the contrary, we expect that a 'grammar' of culture will be of a higher order of complexity than even that of a human language grammar.[90] Nevertheless, our approach is first to characterize individual beliefs as "general propositions about the world (consciously) held to be true" (Hahn in

[88] See Smelser (1967) on the relation of subjective and objective measures. See Verba in Vallier (1970:328-329) for a discussion of the importance of 'second order' comparison.

[89] See Smithson (1979) on measures of concentration; Frisbie and Clarke (1979) on measurement of dynamic processes at the societal level ; Uslaner (1976) on population standardization; and Fleiss (1981) for a sophisticated review of appropriate statistical procedures for proportions; Jowitt (1974) on institutional approaches to the study of political culture. For other measurement issues see Drew (1974) on domestic violence; Koch, Sodergren, and Campbell (1976) on a cross-cultural analysis of political and psychological correlates of conflict management; Roeder and Hazelwood (1976) on alternative measurement strategies and their analytic impact, and Gibbons, Dikin and Sobel (1977) on the problems of selecting and ordering populations. See Coombs and Avrunin (1977) on preference theory and measurement assumptions.

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Black:1973,554), and then to observe patterns among these components.[91]

Scaling Methods

In recent years, the tendency in scaling approaches has been towards multi-dimensional scaling procedures (MDS) which deal with the contingent character of most preferences and attitudes.[92] We feel that a more appropriate strategy in this case would be to form summed-score scales for each dimension, since these recognize the frequent low signal-to-noise ratio in survey data, and then to correlate these dimensions in an MDS format where the individual measures used in the MDS procedures would have significantly greater reliability.[93]

[90] Compare with Black (1973:554-5).

[91] Using various clustering algorithms. See Hartigan (1975) and ALSCAL User's Guide (1979). Additional sources on clustering include Bery (1979) on clustering criteria Woodward and Bentler (1979), Spath (1980) on algorithms, Milligan (1979), Milligan (1980) on Monte Carlo evaluations of competing algorithms, Lancy and Strathern (1981), Jenkins, Russell and Suci (1958), and Gordon (1981).

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The cross-cultural content of the study makes scaling an especially hazardous undertaking but we argue that certain data characteristics such as relative item difficulty will be constant across cultures and therefore comparability is more likely.[94] We have also investigated the use of sociometric procedures for the analysis of coalitions and group behavior.[95]

Critical to our argument is the notion of culture-bearers as possessors of a 'theory of the world'. To recognize the internal logic, consistency, and pattern of such a theory is appropriate to an understanding of

[92] See Morrison (1980b) for a section on scaling sources and readings. Also see Mokken (1971) for a defense of unidimensional scaling approaches. Also note Davison (1979). See Green and Carmone (1970) for a readable and example-studded review of MDS. Also see ALSCAL User's Guide (1979). Other MDS sources include Schiffman, Reynolds and Young (1981), Kroonenberg and de Leeuw (1980), Carroll, Pruzansky and Kruskal (1980), Borg and Lingoes (1980), Ramsay (1980), Sands and Young (1980), Weiss and Davison (1981), Torgerson (1958), Dayton and Macready (1980).

[93] For example, hypotheses such as by Goldstein and Blackman (1978) -- e.g. authoritarians are less tolerant of ambiguity, or field dependent persons are less able to discriminate and synthesize -- can be evaluated.

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culture. Following this logic we construct measures of patterns which are similar to entropy measures.[96] These 'entropy' measures are used to define cultural membership which is essential if our theoretical argument is to be effectively operationalized.[97]

Statistical Procedures

[94] See Malpass (1977) on cross-cultural psychology. On scaling issues including terms such as item difficulty, see Mokken (1971). Other scaling sources are Greene (1980), Beniger (1979), Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1979), Taagepera (1979), and Smithson (1979). We also investigate the perspective of Louis Guttman and colleagues as reflected in Shye (1978). Also note Vincent (1971) on scaling countries on a range of dimensions. Other sources for testing unidimensional scales include Davison (1979) on unfolding models, Strauss (1980) on chance reproducibility in Guttman scaling, Kim and Rabjohn (1980) on the problem of scaling binary variables, Piazza (1980), Anderson, et al (1980) on comparative statistical methods, Zeller and Carmines (1978, 1980). Factor analytic approaches involve a huge literature across a set of approaches. For recent work see Clarkson (1979) on estimation of standard errors of factor loadings, Jennrich and Clarkson (1980) on maximum likelihood analysis, Jackson and Tweed (1980) on the use of squared multiple correlation as a lower bound to communality, Steiger (1979) on factor indeterminacy, Rozeboom (1979) on weighting of items, Joreskog and Sorbom (1979) on multidimensional scaling using maximum likelihood techniques, Greene and Carmines (1980) on composite reliabilities,

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Chapter Six - A Multilevel-Multimethod-multitrait Approach

Our objective in Part II is to build a model of political man and his culture that is describable in terms of a set of jointly determined processes. The general linear model (GLM) and its extensions to sets of simultaneous equations is the most obvious choice in order to achieve this objective but the discrete and frequently nominal character of our data and theory require a wider range of approaches.[98]

In particular, we do not want to get 'nothing for something' by virtue of the incorrect use of various statistical procedures.[99]

[95] See David (1977), and Holland and Leinhardt (1975, 1976).

[96] For the use of entropy in political analysis at the aggregate level, see Coleman (1975). Also see Wilson (1971) for examples in modelling and Krishnan in the American Sociological Review (June 1981, p. 368) on entropy based measures of inequality. Also see Coombs and Smith (1973) on this subject. For an excellent review of key issues, see Barker (1977).

[97] Varying models of man or basic epistemologies may mean that the appropriate entropy measure may vary from group to group. Note Rivett (1977), and Northrop (in Black:1973, 536) as well as the point of Schuessler, Hittle, and Cardascia (1978).

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We have survey data sets that were collected beginning in 1962, and go through 1963, 1965, 1966, 1969, and 1971-72 to 1974. Since none of these are panel studies, even though similar questions were asked on some of the surveys, we cannot expand the power of our data sets by any process of pooling time and cross-sectional data and other statistical relations over time. While this will have less force than a proper panel study, we expect this to be an important part of the converging evidence with respect to the theoretical argument. This data will not be analyzed in this current version of the manuscript.[100]

[98] For an introduction to path techniques, see Stokes (1974), and Hadden and De Walt (1974). Also see Specht (1975) on the evaluation of causal models and O'Brien (1979) on the uses of Pearson's R with ordinal data. See Morrison and Lerman (1978) for sources which discuss the causal issues, Morrison (1979a) for GLM techniques, and Morrison (1980b) for a discussion of other statistical procedures appropriate to this work. Other sources include Emery and Barron on conjoint measurement, Igra (1979) on composite of variables, Raju (1979), Jackson (1979), Feldt (1980), Bentler and Woodward (1980), on coefficient alpha. See Levin and Brown (1979) on scaling a proximity matrix, Jennrich (1979) on using gamma in oblimin rotation, Healy (1979) on Kristoff's test, Tilly (1981) on the sociological analysis of history, Stoline (1981) on multiple comparison tests, Shrout and Kandel (1981) on dyadic analysis, Bond (1979) on measures of change, Brinberg and Kidder (1982) on validity in research, Boyd (1979) on contextual analysis,

Converging and Discriminant Evidence

Campbell has emphasized (Campbell and Fiske:1959, Campbell:1969, 1978) that evidence derived from the convergent results of a number of perspectives is much more likely to have eliminated a wide range of plausible rival hypotheses than that derived from other approaches, especially under quasi-experimental conditions such as those we face in this work.[101] Consequently we tend to use

[99] See Moul (1974) for a related discussion. See Grizzle, Stamer and Koch (1969) for a classic statement on the analysis of categorical data, and Landis, Heyman and Koch (1978) on the notion of partial correlation in contingency table analysis. See Morgan and Messenger (1973), Kuechler (1980), Chamberlain (1980), and Hubert (1979) on concordance. See Morrison (1980b) for key sources in discrete multivariate analysis. In particular, for contingency tables, see Upton (1978) and Everitt (1977), and for log-linear methods, see Fienberg (1978). Agresti (1981) provides a summary of measures between nominal and ordinal variables. Bartlett (1975) presents techniques for the analysis of spatial patterns. Other sources on categorical data analysis methods include Rao and Scott (1981), McCann (1977) on social mobility tables, McConaghy and McConaghy (1981) on blockmodeling, Swafford (1980), Greysides (1980), Bollen and Barb (1981), Connor (in Leinhardt) (1981), American Sociological Review (December 1978) for a discussion of categorical data analysis issues, Allison (1980), Andersen (1980), Stuart (1980), Harber (1980), Swafford (1980), Daymont and Kaufman (1979), Crittendon and Montgomery (1980), Kritzer (1980), Smith et al (1981), Goodman (1981), and Hensher and Johnson (1981). See Gordon (1981) for classification methods.

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converging (and discriminating) procedures rather than more elegant and complex statistical methods which assume that errors of specification and measurement are minor. Since these assumptions are frequently at variance with our data, we will invoke other procedures as we feel necessary.[102]

Coalition Analysis

"Current theories of coalition formation in decision processes of systems at the level of the group lack generality in that some theories do not predict which coalitions are likely to form while others make predictions in only a narrow range of conditions." (Komorita:1979,369)

[100] On the problems of model construction when theoretical knowledge is scarce, see Wold (1979). Also note Berge and Zegers (1978) on reliability .

[101] For an introduction to some of these issues, see Sullivan and Feldman (1979) and Carmine and Zeller (1979). On applications and variations, see Bennett and Lumsdaine (1975) and Singer (1978). A more complex and sophisticated presentation of some of these issues is in Burks (1977). For a caution on statistical procedures, see Wilson (1979) .

[102] See Mundlak (1978) on pooling limitations. Morrison and Stevenson (1972a) utilize a converging evidence argument as well.

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Komorita (1979) and Miller (1979a,1979b) in their work on coalition formation in groups indicates that a weighted probability model approach is the best under all conditions except when there is no difference among the possible minimal winning coalitions with respect to their size. Since there are almost always significant differences between the sizes of possible coalition partners in our material, we build our coalition analysis on the basis of these weighted probability models and utilize the E measure by Bonacich (1979) to choose between alternative coalition predictions.

Summary

This chapter has summarized the basic approach to data analysis that we intend to follow in this work. We now turn to Part II where the analysis of the Nigerian data is presented.

Towards an Adaptive Culture: On the
Evolution of the Social Basis for Political
Choice in a Plural Society
(VOL. II)

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The Elements of Political Culture

Introduction

Elements of the Culture as Belief System

Elements (or Dimensions) of a Political Culture

1. Efficacy -- Personal, Political, Systemic
2. Trust
3. Cognition and Political Awareness
4. Political System Affect
5. Evaluation of Government Performance and Responsiveness
6. Scope and Function of Government
7. Authority Perceptions
8. Decision-Making Procedures
9. Salience of Politics
10. Basic Value Orientations
11. Social Distance
12. Identity

Conclusions

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"You know, the Northerners are very corrupt. We gave them money and they refused to vote for us."
(Dudley: 1973, 45) -Comment by a Nigerian politician from the South in the First Republic-

Introduction

This chapter begins the test of the theory presented in Part I, using the research strategy detailed in the last chapter. Robert Lane in a paper on belief systems (in Knutson: 1973, 83) listed forty terms, including "political culture", dealing with a similar substantive concern, that is, the nature of the shared beliefs, values, and attitudes that are such an important determinant of the actions of group members.[1] Such a variety of terms describing this phenomenon indicates the difficulty of designing measures to span or characterize a culture. A yawning gap separates culture as a 'theory of what the world is and how it functions', and its operationalization in terms of a small set of traits or characteristics. Measurement at the individual level is clearly necessary. However, many aspects of culture or belief system can only be measured

[1] For other general reviews, see the section on political culture in Chapter Two. Also see Eisenstadt (1971), Dowse and Hughes (1972), and Bill and Hardgrave (1973).

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indirectly because they are 'unobservable'. Therefore, we propose to develop and measure sets of indicators which 'span' the culture and serve as surrogates for the essential differences between political cultures.

Before presenting our modes of operationalizing these elements of the political culture, we briefly review: (1) the nature of belief systems; (2) the 'dimensions' used in other empirical studies; (3) the necessity for defining and measuring political culture; and (4) the dynamics of political culture and the individual's role as culture-bearer and innovator.[2]

Elements of the Culture as Belief System

Borhek and Curtis (1975: 8-15) list the following as elements of a belief system: (1) values; (2) criteria of validity or truth content; (3) logic of interrelatedness of beliefs; (4) cognitive map; (5) substantive beliefs; (6) prescription and proscription; and (7) technology. They

[2] We differentiate these aspects of social behavior from structure and interests, noting the hierarchy of values related to behavior, and their effect on participation as models and schema.

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designate as variable characteristics: (1) systems; [3] (2) empirical relevance; (3) willingness to take on innovation; (4) tolerance; (5) degree of commitment demanded; and (6) style of belief organization (e.g., onion, front, stratified belief system, folk beliefs, elite and mass system, and specialized system (1975: 26-38). We are concerned principally with values, substantive beliefs, and prescription and proscription as elements of the belief system and with empirical relevance, tolerance, and style of belief organization as variable characteristics. Finally, Borhek and Curtis present five general propositions about belief systems defining a belief system as, "a set of related ideas (learned and shared) which has some permanence, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit

[3] Note Fried and Molnar (1978: 150) with their argument that the system does not need to be 'integrative' or consistent to function. This idea writ large is a source of the idea of an adaptive culture. Also note the analogy with the logic of gene 'splicing' where information transmission from the DNA requires some segments that must be present even when they are not transmitted via the RNA which 'splices' segments of the original DNA together omitting other segments. See Crick (1979) for a discussion of this phenomena. Also see Abelson (1973) on the structure of belief systems, and Schank and Abelson (1977) on 'script processing'. For a critical view of the belief system perspective, see Cobb (1973).

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some commitment." (1975:5) We discussed these propositions in Part I.[4] Here we would like to emphasize that the fourth and fifth propositions -- that belief systems are adaptive to strain or disorder, and that they are driven by an internal logic and consistency -- underlie our assumption that, for purposes of explaining and predicting political behavior, individual culture-bearers can be characterized by a relatively parsimonious set of indicators.

In considering the dimensions of political culture, Verba (in Pye and Verba: 1965) emphasizes four dimensions: (1) national identity; (2) identification with one's fellow citizens, especially noting trust; (3) government output expectations, including the right of government to authoritatively allocate resources; and (4) the process of making decisions or 'input processing'. Pye (1968) advances seven 'themes' of political culture.[5] Lane (in Knutson: 1973, 110-113) stresses the significance of culture,

[4] Note that the connectedness of ideas is not dealt with in the definition nor is the scope of the belief system or the level of institutionalization discussed.

[5] For Pye's seven themes of political culture, see Chapter Two.

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averring that, "one has a better understanding of what a man believes if one knows the way he thinks than if one has a map . . . of his beliefs." [6] In a more recent statement, Huntington and Dominguez (1975) stress three dimensions: (1) identity as the most crucial belief; (2) trust or empathy and associational capabilities; and (3) efficacy or the individual's real or perceived impact on government outputs. In contrast to the above authors' attempts to characterize fixed or relatively constant aspects of a culture, others have emphasized individual cognitive control and the tendency of individuals to alter basic behaviors as a function of situation or context. [7] As Clippinger (1978: 3) articulates it,

"Rather than trying to describe the beliefs of some groups in terms of what they do or do not believe, the intent here is to describe how the

[6] See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of Pye and Lane's views. Note Lane's view that the decline of societies may be linked to a value that denies the importance of deferred gratification. It is not clear whether a decline in an individual's responsibility for their actions is not a better summary of these elements of culture.

[7] Abelson (1976), Minsky (1975), and Shank and Abelson (1977) are examples of this approach.

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group constitutes its beliefs; in other words, what are the higher order principles or rules that govern the way in which reality is experienced and responded to." [8]

We sympathize with this perspective here but find the advancement of artificial intelligence models as empirically unworkable at this point in their development, as the attempts of ethnoscience to characterize language have been to date. Moreover, a tradition emphasizing individual cognition and choice implies that humans are considerably more pliable and variable than most empirical information would support. Some lack of human variability is structurally determined but cultural perspectives are central to an understanding of much behavior that does not exhibit the random pattern that we would expect if individual actors followed a 'rational actor' calculus. [9] Since our concern is less with describing an individual

[8] See Clippinger (1978: 38) for his diagram of the structure of belief systems.

[9] Perhaps the lesson of the general failure of social choice theory to account for empirical data is that individuals need to be members of groups in order to actually find a social solution to their demands. Indeed the notion of what is rational is not well-defined either intra- or inter-culturally.

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culture than with describing some effective measure to differentiate cultures and characterize 'distance' between them, we select what appear to be the key elements of culture that have political ramifications and examine their pattern of relationship.[10]

To examine such a pattern it is necessary to define and measure component 'dimensions' or elements of the political cultures.[11] The body of this chapter is concerned with that process. One of the main issues in this work is that of 'non-attitudes'. Since Converse's seminal paper in 1964, there has been a widespread attempt to deal with the methodological and substantive implications of responses to

[10] We assume that the separation of political culture from the general culture in which it is embedded is not useful or even possible. See Almond and Verba (1965:249) for a similar view. We are concerned here with the elements which differentiate cultures not with their shared epistemic universals although it is possible that these may be essential to a full understanding of the plural society. On this subject, see Pinxten (1974:117-176). On quantitative measures of cultural dimensions, see, for example, Stern, Dobson and Scholl (1973), Linden (1976) and Miller (1972). See Shapiro (1981) for a useful discourse on the role of language as a constraint in the political culture.

[11] For additional work on this subject see Barton and Parsons (1977) and Rokeach (1968; 1973).

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survey questions that clearly have very high rates of error, including for example, respondents who have definite opinions on non-existent issues or legislation.[12] We have no new insights to offer regarding this dilemma. However, we expect that the nature of our purpose obviates the need for detailed attitude measurement. We want to analyze the "culturemes" of the cultures rather than surface properties. Moreover, the information from the interviewers presented in Table 6.1 indicates a relatively clear understanding of the questions among respondents and high levels of sincerity of response which seems inconsistent with any pervasive 'non-attitude'. Nevertheless, attitude measurement usually has high error rates even amongst the 'best' studies as measured by the typical reliability statistics.[13]

[12] See in addition to Converse (1964) the work of Achen (1975), Grant and Peterson (1975), Schuman and Presser (1980) and LeBlanc (1977). Judd and Milburn (1980) offer a simultaneous equation model to analyze such problems. Also see Judd, Krosnick and Milburn (1981) on the role of political involvement as a determinant of political attitudes.

[13] See Poyatos (1977) for a discussion of this term. See Chun, Cobb, and French (1975) for a review of 3,000 studies in social psychological measurement. Also note Meddin (1975) for a classification of attitude and value concepts.

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Since our principal concern is the dynamics of political culture, interest in the sequence of change both within and across populations necessarily follows. For example, Paden summarizes the developing political culture in the Kano area of Nigeria, emphasizing the political integration which can follow the integration of other sectors such as religion. He says that "two aspects of Kano political culture have emerged: the valuing of religious-based charismatic authority over the traditional or dynastic authority in situations where there is a choice, and the association of charismatic authority with religious brotherhood leadership rather than legal leadership." (1973: 389) In Kano, clearly, religious leaders have been more important than others in the formation of the contemporary political culture.[14]

Concern with the dynamics of culture underlies the importance attached to motivation in the model of man

[14] Peel (1973) also emphasizes the central role of religion in cultural development and change. See Nelsen (1981) for a study of American teenagers in which the contextual effects have an important bearing on religious belief. This seems to reflect a classic Weberian model of movement from traditional to charismatic to bureaucratic authority patterns.

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presented in Part I, and underlies our expectation that certain temporal sequences are likely in change processes.[15] First, we expect that the basic cultural 'rules of the game' are acquired in early childhood. Though changeable, these remain an important element of individual belief systems, causing some of the difficulty in cross-ethnic integration.[16] Second, we anticipate that some analogy with the 'crises and sequence' perspective (see Binder et al., 1971) will be typical of most systems and that change will be effected primarily across generations.[17]

[15] Winter (1979) emphasizes the importance of motivation in culture although he downplays the search for a single basic motive (p. 24), but offers some views on the measurement of motives (p. 30). See Aberbach (1977) for a comparative analysis of power consciousness.

[16] See Paden (1973: 397) for a Nigerian example. Also note Paden's view that a belief system must have three characteristics: (1) credible universality; (2) internal justification for adaptation; and (3) criteria for choosing elites and decision makers.

[17] Note Lieberman (1969) on the issue of measuring population diversity and breaking it into components that reflect sequential processes.

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The implications of the concern with the dynamics of the process are several. We must be able to identify when an actor 'belongs' to a particular culture; how deviant he is from the modal form; and how close he is to 'other' cultures. These goals have at least two initial measurement requirements. First, we must be able to characterize the modal properties of a potential culture group and compare them with those of other groups.[18] Second, we must advance a comparison of individual values with the modal group properties -- creating a measure of entropy, for we expect cultures to contain both individuals who accommodate to their embodied-culture defined roles as well as those who do not.[19] We anticipate variation about the mode to be a

[18] Various attempts to define the boundaries of cultural units have been made. Most well known is Naroll's *cultunit* (1964) which Czudnowski has criticized as too small-scale in its orientation (1976). Morrison et al. (1972: Part III, Chapter 4) demonstrate how group boundaries change as the criteria change.

[19] For an example of such a process in another plural society, Canada, see Presthus (1978). Also note Weber's view that "people look for and respond to guidelines which suggest to them how to behave." (1975: 159) We are concerned with culturally specific behaviors, etc., rather than the enumeration of cultural or cognitive universals. See Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition (1979: 161).

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significantly non-random component resulting from the interaction of individuals and political structures in situations of rapid social change.[20]

Before turning to the elements chosen to characterize political culture, we note several issues germane to the discussion. Of signal importance is the conflict between value-oriented versus structural explanations. While we emphasize the former, we do not follow the Parsonian path of cultural determinism (see for example, 1966:113) or the earlier Weberian tradition it represents.[21] Rather, we expect values and structure to interact in the adaptive culture as it accommodates to new situations and attempts to

[20] Note here the Borhek and Curtis view that, "(1) to understand a belief it is necessary to place it in a context of meaning because beliefs are compressed. (2) As compression increases, 'face validity' (what is interpretable apart from the context) decreases, and a visual or auditory symbol is the ultimate in compression." (1975:79) Also note Wober's report on Polinac and Robbins' study in Uganda where they found low to moderate (1977:28) correlation between measures of behavior and expressed attitudes (towards modernization).

[21] For a major new interpretation of Weber's seminal statement see Weber (1978) edited and translated by Roth and Wittich.

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generate solutions to new problems.[22] Second, we want to separate the notion of "interests" from "cultural values", seeing the two as distinct phenomena.[23] Specific interests and the political mobilization that identifies and articulates such interest is based typically on the redirection and channeling of latent or existing values; when value change actually takes place, it is rarely revolutionary or even explicitly understood. Third, we expect a hierarchy of values with some taking precedence over others.[24] Hierarchy need not imply a unimodal structure, however. We noted this in Part I and see it as one mechanism which allows value orientations acquired by inductive and affective means to be maintained in the face

[22] See for example Serpell (1976) for an analysis of culture's influence on behavior. Also note Smelser and Smelser (1970).

[23] Note Rokeach (1973) in this regard. Also Hirschman's (1977) study of the rise and triumph of capitalism in Britain.

[24] See Abelson (1973) on the structure of belief systems. Maslow and Loevinger's work in this regard has already been noted. Inghart's study of European political culture (1977) explicitly follows a Maslowian model. Ekstein and Gurr (1975) lay special emphasis on authority norms and expectations.

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of cognitive and evaluative dissonance.[25] Finally, what are the implications of such an analysis for political behavior and participation? Verba (1971), for example, discusses four models of participation: (1) socio-economic; (2) group consciousness; (3) personal relevance of government; and (4) a partisan mobilized model.[26] Although we clearly differentiate our measures of culture from participation our measures will be defined to allow an evaluation of this as well as other sets of models.[27]

Ia. Elements (or Dimensions) of a Political Culture

Most writers in the political culture literature advance a list of dimensions or elements of political culture. The list varies in length as well as specificity. Some writers give general lists or 'themes' of the elements of political culture while others differentiate the object of the attitude, and still others concentrate on particular

[25] See our model of man in Part I for a much more extensive view of this process.

[26] See Satorl (1969) for a discussion of this model. Lloyd says start chapter here.

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dimensions of culture.[28]

In what follows we advance twelve elements that seem to encompass the 'dimensions' that have been advanced in the literature. We have used the term elements to describe these 'dimensions' in part because we are not concerned about the certain overlap and possible causal connections between the components.[29] We are concerned with the elements that 'span' the culture in the sense that all the significant variation within each political culture will be reflected in these indicators. This will allow us to differentiate cultures and culture-bearers in order to evaluate the various hypotheses advanced in Part I.

[27] Others include, for example, Martinussen's (1977: 8-9) description of the working of the socio-political system and his four conditions that are felt to be necessary for someone to participate. They are: (1) material conditions; (2) intellectual conditions; (3) social foundations; and (4) motivational foundations. Note also Nie, Verba and Kim (1974) on life cycle and participation, Crespi (1971) on the attitude-behavior nexus, and McClintock on motivation and models of man. On reviews of empirical studies of participation, see Cornelius (1975: 85), Huntington and Nelson (1976: 91, 97) and Kasfir (1976: Chapters 9 and 10, especially p. 231). Triandis in Austin and Worchel (1979:331) advances four basic dimensions of social behavior: (association vs. dissociation; intimacy vs. formality; superordination vs. subordination; overtness vs. covertness).

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The list of these elements is presented in Table 7.1. In the following discussion, the elements are taken seriatim and the questions related to each element are presented along with their frequency distribution and intercorrelations.[30] A review of the empirical evidence for the internal consistency of each element is then presented.

In the next chapter, we review various models of political man which are advanced in the literature and examine the likelihood of their observation in the Nigerian

[28] For example, Stern et al. (1973) concentrate on issues of efficacy and trust, but break them down into four objects (self, government, fellow citizen and community). Bollen and Grandjean (1981) evaluate the notion of pattern in the dimensions of democracy and their evidence supports the gestalt character of the phenomena as well as the close link between equality and democracy. Finifter (1970) examines alienation in detail (meaninglessness, powerlessness, anomie, political isolation), for example, and Inkeles (1969) advances five subscales of active citizenship (allegiance, interest, information, and rationality as bases for action and participation as a measure of action -- then he relates them to anomie, government effect and group hostility.

[29] Cole (1973), for example, causally relates efficacy to trust and Sniderman (1975) causally relates personal efficacy to political efficacy.

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Table 7.1 Elements (or Dimensions) of Political Culture at Individual Level

Most Basic Elements	Behavioral Manifestations of Basic Elements	Salience H - L	Pri-macy P - S	Abstr-act/ Concr-ete A - C
1. Efficacy				
a. Personal	Dependency Fatalism Submissiveness vs. dominance Need for efficacy (Renshon) Internal-external locus of control Need for power			P S
b. Personal Political Efficacy	Deference Political efficacy Mobility expectations (age related especially) Citizen vs subject competence			
2. Trust				
	Cynicism Alienation Distrust Legitimacy Attitudes towards elites Empathy Trust of political objects Rationality of politicians			P

[30] The empirical evaluations of these elements are based on the entire survey's data weighted to give a representation of Nigeria. The weighted sample size is 8627.

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**Table 7.1 Elements (or Dimensions) of Political Culture
 at Individual Level**

3. Cognition and Political Awareness	Awareness of govern- ment performance Knowledge of world in general Level of complexity and differentia- tion of awareness
4. Affect for Political System	Attentiveness towards political objects
5. Evaluation of Government Performance and Res- ponsiveness	Future expectations of government Evaluation of government per- formance Rationality of perception of power-holder's behavior Evaluation of system, regime outputs, incumbents, subunits, e.g., civil service, policy, etc.
6. Scope and Function of Government	Scope and function of politics Role of cooperation and conflict Private versus public regarding Expectations of government outputs Procedural norms Cooperative vs individualistic Sacred vs secular Freedom of expression

P

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**Table 7.1 Elements (or Dimensions) of Political Culture
 at Individual Level**

7. Authority Perceptions	Concepts of power and authority Authority orientation (e.g., patron client) Deference 'Rules of the game' including explicit/implicit dichotomy Cooperation and Competition (social contract) Norms of authority Social control function of government Image of Leaders as strong vs benevolent Social political responsibility Machiavellianism Ethnocentrism	P S
8. Decision-Making Procedures	Intolerance of opposition Attitudes towards violence Attitudes towards compromise Freedom of expression 'Rules of the Game' Rules of interpersonal bargaining Instrumental rationality Consensual-authoritarianism	P

data.

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- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| 9. Sallence of Politics | Diffuseness of values over political and non-political events
Political Interest
Political alertness |
| 10. Basic value orientations | Human nature orientations
Man-nature orientations
Time orientation
Activity orientation
Relational orientation
Modernization (psychic)
Future expectation |
| 11. Social distance | General ethnocentrism
Sallience of ascriptive boundaries |
| 12. Identity | Nature of social relations (e.g., class id)
Obligations of citizen
Intolerance of opposition
Duty (citizen) subject participant
Class consciousness |

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1. Efficacy

Almost all analyses of political culture in one way or another stress the individual's sense of competence, control or efficacy. Some see it as a generalized sense, others emphasizing only the expectation of ability to influence political action and elites, others such as Hart (1978: 15-16) discuss efficacy as two-dimensional. While efficacy is undoubtedly a complex 'umbrella' concept with a number of 'dimensions' and levels of detail which could be elaborated, we have selected three aspects for our purposes. These aspects are; first, to characterize and measure a generalized sense of personal efficacy; second, to measure the subset of personal efficacy which relates to the political system, and third, to measure the evaluation of each individual's sense of efficacy that results from citizenship in the polity, and more generally from political membership.[31]

Sense of Personal Efficacy

[31] Note Coleman and Davis (1976) on the structural context of politics in the study of political efficacy.

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"In many ways, the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude." (Almond and Verba: 1965, 206-207)

Sniderman has asserted that "high self-esteem most often appears to be the cause and not the consequence of participation in politics." (1975:317) Indeed, the importance of the individual actor's sense of self-esteem, self-reliance, and competence as the basic motivation for action occurs as a common element in social science ranging from the 'pop' to more scholarly works.[32] Our model of man as 'control seeker' reflects this assumption of the importance of a sense of personal efficacy, an assumption supported by Nigerian data. For example, according to Wober, Nigerians display high correlations between indicators of self-esteem and happiness. (Wober: 1975, 151).

[32] Sniderman (1975) challenges the view that people engage in political behavior in order to gain or strengthen confidence and competence. He believes that competence leads to a decision to participate. Note for example, Broach and Mijeski (1977:19-20) and Gurin and Gurin (1976). Bandura has published seminal work on the subject -- see (1977a, 1977b, and 1969).

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Renshon's argument (1974) for the importance of a 'need for efficacy' as a basic motive for political participation is in the tradition of McClelland's work (1960) on achievement motivation.[33] Much of the work in this tradition linking personality to social and political action emphasizes the diffuse motivating role of high levels of a sense of personal efficacy, and we expect this to be an important element in the determination of political behavior.[34]

Although a sense of personal efficacy relates to a broad spectrum of cultural and structural characteristics of a society, we will defer our examination of the structural sources of efficacy until Part III. We anticipate a relation between efficacy and personal locus of

[33] See Atkinson and Raynor (1978) for more recent work on the subject and Chapter 3 of this work. For an interesting attempt to relate power motivation to physiological measures, see McClelland (1979).

[34] Note that low efficacy as manifest in apathy has the converse effects of high levels of efficacy. See DiPalma (1970) and the classic work by de Grazia (1948). See Maslow (1970) for an important view of the relation between motivation and personality and the choice of action target as a stage process.

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control.[35] However, any such relation is complex and not well understood. For example, we expect segmental or acephalous social systems to have a positive relation between efficacy and internal locus of control while hierarchical systems demonstrate an inverse relation.[36]

There also appears to be a link between the concept of a sense of personal efficacy, and the psychological concept of field independence which may be an important summary cultural measure.[37] As Witkin has noted, "secure

[35] See Rotter (1966) for the classic statement on the subject. See Rothberg (1981) for a review of the idea and a case study. For recent politically related work, see Sigel (1975), Sniderman and Brody (1977), and Sniderman and Citrin (1971). See Reismanis (1977) for a comparative study of locus of control on American and Nigerian (Northeastern) students. See the Annual Review of Psychology 1980 for a discussion of locus of control and efficacy (pp. 535-).

[36] See Berry (1967) on independence and conformity in subsistence level societies. See Winter (1973) for a review of the need-for-power concept and evidence for its existence and effects. High levels of litigiousness in societies as measured by legal professionals may be an index, as well as result, of high levels of personal efficacy. Note the United States has the highest level of lawyers-per-capita in the industrial world and one that is growing rapidly. (The U.S. had 450,000 lawyers and 100,000 law students in 1978 (New York Times , December 10, 1978)).

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affection, rationalized and moderated punishment, and emphasis on individual competence and self-reliance (starting with early encouragement for the child to dress himself, play without parental supervision, undertake jobs and assignments, and so on) are likely to produce children who are 'field independent'." (from Wober: 1975, 184).

In Table 7.2, the items used in two personal efficacy scales are presented. The first scale is intended to measure the view that success is a function of one's own will and determination. This scale is represented by four original questions, numbers twelve through fifteen. The items have varying distributions, but none of them is markedly skewed.[38] The composite index, PEREFFOW, has been constructed using factor score coefficients that were generated after the items were found to be consistent with the hypothesis of single-factorhood.[39]

[37] See Robinson et al. (1968) for measures of personal competence (especially internal-external locus of control).

[38] Severe skewing of the distributions of ordinal data with only a few categories has the effect of artificially inflating most measures of association and therefore measures of scalability.

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The second scale is intended to represent the individual's sense of personal efficacy as it is affected through group membership, ranging from informal to formal groups and from voluntary social grouping to less voluntary political, class and ethnic ties. There is more variation in these items than in the first scale, but extreme skewness is absent and the items were found to be consistent with single-factorhood. The remaining items that have been included as related questions have substantial skew

[39] For the classic statement on unidimensional scaling, see Lord and Novick (1968). Also see Mokken (1971) and Gorden (1977). For a computer program to evaluate single-factorhood, see Morrison, Campbell, and Wolins (1968). The factor score procedure constructs indices as weighted combinations (weighted with factor score coefficients) of the standardized items-- standardized by subtracting the mean from each observation and dividing by the standard deviation. The formula is as follows:

$$\text{PEREFFOW} = \text{fsc12 } Z_{12} + \text{fsc13 } Z_{13} + \dots + \text{fsc15 } Z_{15}$$

where x = raw data for question i ; fsc = factor score coefficient for the i th variable, $i = 12, 13, 14, 15$ in this example, $Z_i = (x_i - \bar{x})/s_i$, com_i = final community estimate. All of the scales were constructed using principal components analysis using squared multiple correlations vs initial communality estimates. Multidimensional scaling is an important alternative to the more standard unidimensional procedures. See Schiffman, XXX, and Young (1981) for a review of computer packages available for these procedures. See Takane for an algorithm that is particularly useful for categorical measures.

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indicating that the overwhelming majority of Nigerians perceive the existence of cooperation in community programs, that working with a group is more efficacious than individual efforts, and that they expect their children's lives to be better off than theirs.[40]

[40] Note some of the items used here are shared with the items in Table 7.4. This reflects the difficulty of strictly separating the elements of efficacy from other elements.

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Table 7.2 Personal Efficacy Questions

Personal Efficacy == Own Will

12. a. Everything is so uncertain these days that it almost seems as though anything could happen.
b. In spite of everything, it is really not hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next.
48% (1) a. 15 (2) Not sure - no opinion 37 (3) b. .04
13. a. A person can pretty well make whatever he wants out of his life.
b. No matter how much a person tries, it is hard to change the way things are going to turn out.
54% (1) a. 4 (2) Not sure - no opinion 41(3) b. -.08
14. a. No matter how hard some people try, it is difficult for them to get ahead in life.
b. Most people who do not get ahead just do not have enough willpower.
46% (1) a. 6 (2) Not sure - no opinion 48 (3) b. .80
15. a. The secret of happiness is not to expect a lot and to be content with what comes your way.
b. One should make any sacrifices in order to succeed in life.
65% (1) a. 5 (2) Not sure - no opinion 30 (3) b. .05

Personal Efficacy -- Through Groups

1. Some people say the way things have been going in Nigeria recently, the rich will get richer while the poor will get poorer.
77% (1) Agree 5 (2) Not sure - no opinion 18 (3) Disagree -.07
2. Other people say that those who are rich in Nigeria today are only rich because they have been corrupt.
46% (1) Agree 22 (2) not sure - no opinion 32 (3) Disagree -.001

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Table 7.2 Continued

11. a.	You can always count on someone to help you out if things get bad enough.	
b.	When you get right down to it, no one is going to care much about what happens to you.	.12
61	(1) a. 9 (2) Not sure - no opinion 31 (3) b.	
78.	How about the officials in the . . . state government? Do you think that they are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?	
	20 (1) Good, 55 (2) Fair, 15 (3) poor, 3 (4) Very poor 6 (5) No opinion - don't know	.33
79.	How about the Federal government? Do you think the officials in Lagos are doing a good, fair, poor or very poor job?	
	27 (1) Good, 49 (2) fair, 8 (3) Poor, 2 (4) Very poor 15 (5) No opinion - don't know	.38
89.	Do you think the government fails to pay attention to the needs of some people?	
	57 (1) Yes, 18 (2) No answer - not sure, 25 (3) No	-.18

Related Questions

5. Now comparing your self with people who were like you ten years ago (1964), which of these describes your present status?
- 41 (1) I am much better than most of them.
 27 (2) I am about the same.
 32 (3) Most of them are much better than yourself.
6. What about your children: will their lives be better or worse than your or about the same?
- 83 (1) Better 12 (2) About the same - or not sure
 5 (3) Worse

Sense of Personal Efficacy

"Influence on political decisions is one important

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mode of exercising control over one's life."
(Martinussen:1977,7)

The individual's beliefs about his ability to exercise some control over the decisions of political elites is widely agreed to be an important aspect of the functioning of any political system.[41] That the literature on the subject is voluminous can be taken as an indicator of the broad agreement on the importance of the dimension.[42] In the classic study of political culture by Almond and Verba (1965) the progression of individual culture-bearers from parochial to subject to participant levels was seen to reflect an underlying continuum of increased competence-seeking and efficacy.

[41] Political efficacy, in this sense, should be differentiated from civic obligation (or civic duty) since the latter is independent of a perception by the actor that his act matters. For a review of the role of efficacy, see Milbrath and Goel (1977).

[42] Recent examples of this literature are: Abravanel and Busch (1975) on students; Rodgers (1974); Abramson (1977) on American blacks; David and Coleman (1975) Coleman and Davis (1976) on Mexico; Muller (1970) on the efficacy-participation link using cross-national data; Iyengar (1978) on definitions of efficacy and trust in Denmark. Also note Watts (1973a, 1973b), Weisberg (1975), Welch and Clark (1975), and Jacob (1975) on community dynamics.

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An important aspect of efficacy level, is the view that high levels of efficacy tend to lead to cooperative behavior and therefore to more competitive and democratic systems. Almond and Verba (1963: 202-213) stressed this in the form of cooperative competence, and Winter (1979) has also argued that possessors of high achievement motivation engage in more cooperative behavior.[43] Craig and Cornelius (1980) have argued that where the structure of rewards is such that cooperative action is required to achieve them, then cooperative action occurs. This latter point is important in that it emphasizes culture-structure interaction effects, but, as Stroebe, Eagly and Stroebe (1977) have noted a person's level of self-esteem plays an important role in how he perceives and reacts to a given situation. Thus basic predispositions may be an important determinant of behavior. Nevertheless, one of the important expectations of social mobilization theory is that substantial changes (increases) in efficacy will result from increasing role differentiation, entry into a market economy, urbanization and other novel and control-increasing experiences.[44]

[43] While those with high 'need-for-affiliation' are more defensive and volatile.

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Pell (1975: 56) notes a high level of political efficacy among her Nigerian sample, asserting that it results from the pervasiveness of corruption and the belief that one can always buy what one wants.[45]

The items used in the political efficacy index are consistent with Pell's observation, and indicate a moderately high sense of political efficacy that we might not have expected in a country that had not seen elections or a civilian government for nine years.

[44] See the later chapter on social mobilization in this Part for more on the results for Nigeria. Note, for example, Takel and Kleiman (1976) on participation and feelings of political efficacy.

[45] Also see Pell's other notes on political efficacy (1975: 146-147). See Robinson et al. (1968: 459) for scales on political efficacy -- p. 178 on political utility and pp. 448-452 on satisfaction with voting.

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Table 7.3 Sense of Personal Political Efficacy Questions

Personal Political Efficacy Index

75.	In general if you had a problem to take up with a government department or a local government office, would you do it yourself or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some other person or organisation?	
	30 (1) Do it myself.	
	48 (2) Would get help from another person or organization	
	19 (3) Would get help from both person and organization	
	4 (4) No opinion - no answer*	.07
85.	Since Nigerian independence there have been increased welfare activities in the country. Do you think that ordinary people are better off/worse off/or the same as before independence?	
	59 (1) Better off, 21 (2) Same - no opinion	
	21 (3) Worse off	.41
86.	There have been various economic development activities in the country since independence. Do you think that you have personally benefitted from such programs?	
	61 (1) Yes 11 (2) Not sure - no opinion 28 (3) No	.41
103.	Do you think the local public servants do their best to serve the local community?	
	57 (1) Yes, 25 (2) Not sure, 17 (3) No	.16

Percent of variance first factor

*Treated as missing data in the analysis.

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Other Relevant Questions

4. Other people say the ordinary working men in Nigeria will never do better unless they are prepared to band together to oppose the exploitation of the rich.
60 (1) Agree 12 (2) Not sure - no opinion
27 (3) Disagree
9. a. In the long run, we ourselves are responsible for having bad government.
b. Someone like me does not have any say about what the government does.
53 (1) a. 13 (2) Not sure - no opinion 34 (3) b.
70. Suppose you found out that a health official was not performing his job properly, could you do anything about it?
45 (1) Yes 10 (2) Don't know - no answer 45 (3) No
76. Some people think that knowing the right person plays an important part in whether the government will help a person with some problem that he has. Other people do not think so. What is your opinion about it?
59 (1) It is important 17 (2) Is sometimes important
16 (3) It depends 5 (4) Hardly matters 4 (5) No opinion

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION* -- PERSONAL POLITICAL EFFICACY

Var	Ques	10	160	165	166	176	177	201
#	#	9	70	75	76	85	86	103
10	9	-						
160	70	.10	-					
165	75	.03	.10	-				
166	76	.02	.09	-.01	-			
176	85	.13	.26	.07	.04	-		
177	86	-.03	-.02	.07	.04	-.14	-	
201	103	.05	.00	.06	.13	.26	-.07	
5	4							

*Gamma Coefficients

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Sense of Political System Efficacy

Swanson (1978) refers to people as 'users of groups', that is, group membership is viewed by the actors not only as defensive behavior but as utilitarian or efficacy seeking behavior. Further, as Useem and Useem (1979) note, reporting on American data, low confidence in government is strongly associated with protest support among groups whose interests are being actively promoted by visible protest movements.

The most important aspect of political efficacy relates to perceptions on the part of the citizenry that the political system is effective in the delivery of services, maintenance of predictability in the environment, and in general the fulfillment of conditions which increase the legitimacy of the system, and increase the probability that the individual will experience greater feelings of efficacy when they identify with the state.

A principal criticism aimed at measures of political efficacy is their tendency to vary widely over short intervals or as a function of item wording. This problem in

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the measurement of political efficacy is shared with more diffuse measures of personal efficacy.[46]

2. Trust

"Political trust is the belief that the government is operating according to one's normative expectations of how the government should function." (Miller:1974,969)

The central significance of aspects of efficacy in the characterization of political culture seems widely agreed upon. Often associated with, or causally related to, efficacy is the element of trust.[47] If causal

[46] For a review of these issues, see McPherson, Welch and Clark (1977) on stability and reliability; Wright on acquiescence bias; Asher (1974a, 1974b) on measurement error; Balch (1974) on the role of multiple indicators; Le Duc (1975) on measurement equivalence in Canadian populations Robinson et al. (1968) for a review of scales — see especially Chapters 8, 9, and 13.

[47] Cole (1973), for example, specifically evaluates the hypothesis (using American data) that level of trust is a result of efficacy levels. Also note Abramson (1977) on trust and efficacy amongst Black Americans. Abramson and Finifter (1981) probe the problem of wording effects in survey items relating to trust. See Chapter 11 in Austin and Worchel (1979) especially p174 on a trust-distrust view by social psychologists.

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Table 7.4 Sense of Political System Efficacy

26.	In your opinion do you think that the new twelve-state system in Nigeria is going to prevent future troubles in Nigeria or do the new state boundaries not really solve our problems?	
	49 (1) Will prevent future troubles	
	19 (2) Not sure - no opinion	
	33 (3) Will not solve our problems	.08
29.	Compared with the situation under the previous civilian government, some people feel that the present government has done a better job. Do you agree or disagree?	
	67 (1) Agree 12 (2) Not sure - don't know	
	21 (3) Disagree	.11
67.	We would like to ask you about health services and facilities. Do you think that the officials in charge of the nearest dispensary or hospital are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?	
	26 (1) Good 45 (2) Fair 18 (3) Poor	
	7 (4) Very poor 4 (5) No opinion	.14
73.	What do you think of teachers in the schools in this area: are they doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?	
	37 (1) Good 47 (2) Fair 10 (3) Poor	
	2 (4) Very poor 5 (5) No answer - not sure	.18
74.	How about the roads and public transportation facilities in this area: do you think that the government has done a lot or only very little to improve the quality of roads in this area?	
	32 (1) A lot 6 (2) No answer - not sure	.12
	62 (3) Little	
78.	How about the officials in the . . . state government? Do you think that they are doing a good, fair, poor or very poor job?	
	20 (1) Good 55 (2) Fair 15 (3) poor	
	3 (4) Very poor 6 (5) No opinion - DK	.29
79.	How about the Federal government? Do you think the officials in Lagos are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?	
	27 (1) Good 49 (2) Fair 8 (3) Poor 2 (4) Very poor	
	2 (4) Very poor 15 (5) No opinion - DK	.15

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Table 7.4 continued

81.	Do you think the police would listen to you fairly or unfairly?	
	55 (a) Fairly 24 (2) Not sure - no opinion	
	21 (3) Unfairly	.12
82.	What kind of Job do you think the police are doing in this area: good, fair, poor, or very poor?	
	23 (1) Good 51 (2) Fair 14 (3) Poor 7 (4) Very poor 4 (5) Not sure - no opinion	.21
83.	The various governments of Nigeria are undertaking several social welfare activities, such as health and education. Considering all the circumstances, do you think that those governments are doing:	
	55 (1) The best they could 34 (2) Not too well 6 (3) Are doing badly 1 (4) Doing very badly 5 (5) No opinion - don't know	.13
89.	Do you think the government fails to pay attention to the needs of some people?	
	57 (1) Yes 18 (2) No answer-not sure 25 (3) No	-.09

Other Related Questions

3. Other people say there's really not much Nigerians can do to develop this country because foreign countries are dominating our whole economic life.
- 28 (1) Agree 17 (2) Not sure - no opinion 56 (3) Disagree
71. How about the activities of the Ministry of Education in this state? Do you think that there is sufficient opportunity for people to go to school in this area, or do you think that better schooling ought to be provided?
- 24 (1) Sufficient opportunity 7 (2) DK - no opinion 69 (3) Need better schools
101. If you had an idea about some improvement which could be made in your town, what persons or groups of persons would you take the idea to?
- 27 (1) Community Council
 21 (2) Community Development Officer
 11 (3) The communal improvement union
 14 (4) The Divisional Officer
 25 (5) Traditional Leaders
 1 (6) Others
 3 (7) Don't know

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Table 7.4 continued

Measures of Association -- Gamma coefficients

Var	Ques	4	32	35	156	161	163	164	168	169	172	173	179
4	3	-											
32	26	12	-										
35	29	-05	23	-									
156	67	12	09	06	-								
161	71	02	-10	14	05	-							
163	73	08	23	28	34	06	-						
164	74	30	19	30	25	18	33	-					
168	78	13	23	29	41	14	41	54	-				
169	79	02	11	36	25	13	33	22	48	-			
172	82	03	19	09	30	08	23	31	29	24	-		
173	83	06	06	31	23	08	30	51	40	33	23	-	
179	89	-07	-12	-20	-23	-11	-17	-29	-20	-23	-21	34	-

relationships exist between efficacy and trust it is almost certainly complicated by the expectation of varying patterns across class or authority lines. A democracy, for example, may have a mass population with low levels of a sense of political efficacy, but high trust and an elite possessing high levels of efficacy but low levels of trust. Lijphart (1977) argues for the importance of high trust levels among the mass public in order to maintain consociational democracy. That this is important is not a universally held concept, however, and Hart (1978:xii) asserts that "distrust

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is democratic and thoughtful." [48]

Trust is also closely interwoven with the concept of legitimacy, implying an element of situational determinism. [49] Furthermore, trust may operate with respect to objects that are not only situationally defined but that also represent many levels (e.g., individuals, groups, state) which are not necessarily cumulative or consistent cross-level. The elements of this complexity will be less important than the pattern of trust in most cases, and we stress this in our analysis.

[48] Note Hart's empirical work is on non-plural societies, Britain and the United States. She argues against the equivalence of distrust, and anomie and alienation, however. In contrast, Inkeles and Smith (1974) view trust as non-modern in their seminal work on five societies including Nigeria. Pell (1975: 48) concludes that the Nigerian mass public has a high trust level. These surveys were carried out in 1971 and 1972. Also note Parry (1976) for another discussion of trust, distrust and consensus. See Breyer and Gigliotti (1980) for a review of the relation between empathy and respect of the rights of others. See Burstein (1981) for a review of the sociology of democratic politics. Luhmann (1980) presents a useful discussion of the key role that trust plays in human interaction.

[49] Note Fraser (1974) and the contents of his measure of legitimacy. Also note Rogowski (1974) and his model of the nature of legitimacy.

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Running through much analysis of social change is the theme that various structural changes, principally mobility and social mobilization, lead to more democratic individuals and societies.[50] How trust is affected by change is not clear, however. We might expect urbanization to lead to lower levels of trust in people and as a result to more political participation.[51] Or we might expect to observe defensive behavior in low trust situations and cooperative behavior in high trust ones. However, the source of legitimation of the political culture, whether it is sacred or secular, may be the most important determinant of the consistency of trust across objects and other stimuli. Nevertheless, there will be, in general, some variations across trust levels depending on the stimulus object.

[50] Appropriate analysis of this subject is made more difficult by a number of interactive effects. See the discussion in Part III, Chapter 2 of Morrison et al. (1972).

[51] Smock (1973) reports on 1963 data in which the obverse relation occurs. Enugu (Nigeria) urbanites were more trustful and democratic than their rural Ibo counterparts. This could be related to the selection process of migration as well as to other phenomena such as efficacy, however.

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Variation in trust levels may be associated with political and non-political authorities,[52] issues,[53] ingroups and outgroups,[54] and generalized trust of elites versus trust of actual holders of power.[55] The question of whether or not trust, no matter what the stimulus, actually predicts to political values or influences the salience of politics remains unclear at this time.[56]

Scholars do not agree upon the nature of the obverse of trust, in part because of a confusion between the actual absence of trust and what this implies. Alienation and cynicism have been widely interpreted to be the results of lack of efficacy and trust in individual actors, although these processes are complicated by maturation or 'loss of innocence' phenomena. The tendency for cynicism to increase

[52] For an analysis of this phenomena in France, see Ambler (1975).

[53] Cf. Miller (1974)

[54] Cf. Cohen (1961) in which he notes that cross-cutting friendships threaten group solidarity. Hence, he expects the instrumental use of friendship to be socially divisive but 'modern'. Simpson (1975) argues that this is not modern, in contrast.

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with age or in periods of great social stress such as depression is well known.[57]

Measurement of Trust

The questions used to measure trust are listed in Table 7.5 along with their intercorrelations. The items used in the index are intended to tap a general attitude of trust but principally towards political system objects -- regime incumbents, the state, and political actors in general. While there is no extreme skew, the expectation of 'high

[55] The latter may be healthy for a democracy while the former may not. Note Barrington Moore's coalition arguments as they bear on this point (1966). The discrimination between trust and dependence often becomes especially blurred in this situation. For a provocative view of the conflict of trust and authority in the political economy arena, see Frankel's study (1977) of two contrasting philosophies of money and their political effects. Also note Gamson (1971) and Aberbach and Walker (1970).

[56] Cf. Kavanagh (1972:31).

[57] For discussions of alienation and political behavior, see Schwartz (1973), Dilman (1976), Thomson and Horton (1960), Filnifter (1970, 1972), Citrin, McCloskey, Shanks and Sniderman (1975). Also note C.L. Davis (1976) and Nilson (1978).

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levels' of trust seems not to be overwhelmingly confirmed although the evidence is mixed with more positive evaluation on the more concrete or personally affected questions.

3. Cognition and Political Awareness

There has been consensus on the importance of the individual actor's awareness of the nature of the political system, the political issues, and the identification of system actors for the functioning of a political system. Conventional wisdom holds that increasing cognition of larger political arenas was a critical ingredient of political development.[58] However, data on Ghana (Hayward:1976) and Kenya (Barkan:1976), for example, indicate that such an expectation may not be empirically supportable. Not only do these African studies imply much higher levels of cognition and awareness among traditional rural people than the 'traditional' modernization literature allows but there may also be a considerable degree of

[58] Almond and Verba (1965:chapter 3) are characteristic of this view. Also see Almond and Powell (1978).

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Table 7.2 Trust Questions

11.	a.	You can always count on someone to help you out if things get bad enough.	
	b.	When you get right down to it, no one is going to care much about what happens to you.	
		61 (1) a. 9 (2) Not sure-no opinion 31 (3) b.	.07
93.		The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past.	
		68 (1) Agree 15 (2) Not sure - no opinion 18 (3) Disagree	.10
94.		The government will usually do what is right.	
		43 (1) Agree 18 (2) Not sure - no answer 39 (3) Disagree	.73
95.		Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	
		39 (1) Agree 18 (2) Not sure - no answer 43 (3) Disagree	.11
98.		Some people say the government is run just for the benefit of those in power; others say that it is run to benefit the people. What do you say?	
		35 (1) For those in power 9 (2) No answer-not sure 56 (3) For the people	-.07

NOTE: The original question numbers are retained to facilitate access to the original full questionnaire.

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION* AMONG TRUST ITEMS

Var	Ques					
#	#	11	93	94	95	98
12	11	-				
184	93	.13	-			
185	94	.21	.39	-		
186	95	.12	.05	.40	-	
196	98	-.14	-.21	-.16	-.04	-

*Gamma Coefficients.

Illusion or misinformation about the nature of the political

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system even among the supposedly well-informed.[59]

The link between competence and knowledge is often assumed but not clearly substantiated by empirical evidence.[60] As Lane has noted, among "the masses, belief systems are more likely to be organized according to attitudes towards social groups" (1973:98) and thus to reflect predispositions to political action which are not based on knowledge or awareness of facts but on socially defined 'truths' to which our measures of cognition will not alert us.[61]

The questions used to access political cognition are contained in Table 7.6.[62]

[59] This relates particularly to our view of man as 'control-seeker' where he adjusts his perceptions of the world to one that increases (or maintains) his perceived control level. Note Luria (1976) on models of cognitive development as well as the discussion in Chapter 3. Also note Bennett (1975) and Forgas and Melamed (1976).

[60] See, for example, Abranavel (1975) and Barkan (1975).

[61] This is one reason for including general measures of social distance in the cultural elements and this view of Lane's seems to be especially relevant to plural societies where ethnocentrism is so important.

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The awareness of such a key figure as the state governor and the use of Federal resources are basic to an understanding of this political culture. Since 89% can name their state's military governor (0.57) in a system where no active political competition has existed for nearly a decade, it is clear that Nigerians are well informed at least about state level figures. The choices on the Federal budget use (0.99) also reflected considerable information. Since there is some ambiguity about the largest item, we can consider it to be correctly answered by responses 5, 6, or 7 -- 84% of the respondents chose one of these answers. The scale appears to be unidimensional although this scale has considerable skewness in two of the three items and may be less reliable than most of the other scales.

4. Political System Affect

[62] For measures of this element in the literature, see Robinson et al. (1968) - mass media (pp. 616-21), cognition, exposure to politics, information, range of political opinion index, and political communication (pp. 448-452) and political information scale (414).

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Table 7.6 Cognition of Political System Questions

57. Who is the governor of your state?
 89 (1) Correct 5 (2) Incorrect
 6 (3) Not sure - no answer
84. Do you think that people like you have the same reactions to these governmental social/welfare activities?
 46 (1) Yes 33 (2) Not sure - no answer 21 (3) No
99. What do you think the Federal government spends the most money on? (READ OPTIONS)
 8 (1) Industries 2 (2) Small farmers 0 (3) Villages
 7 (4) Towns 28 (5) Development projects
 17 (6) Government expenses 39 (7) Defense

NOTE: Question 99 recoded in the scale as (5,7=1)
 (6,1=2) (2,3,4,0=3).
 Question 57 recoded in the scale as (2,3=2)

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION* -- COGNITION QUESTIONS

Var	Ques			
#	#	57	84	99
114	57	-		
174	84	.10*	-	
197	99	.16*	.05*	-

Note: Correlations are on the original question codings.

* = contingency coefficients

As frequently noted by Osgood and his colleagues,[63] affect towards various objects is a fundamental and often independent dimension of action behavior,[64] a view

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supported by the studies of Brewer and Campbell (1976) on ethnocentrism in East Africa. The independence of this dimension may be related to contemporary views of brain functioning. Actual information appears to be encoded in the brain symbolically (and hence digitally) while signalling for motivation and emotion appears to be analogical and continuous.[65]

Table 7.7 represents a set of items which partially tap affect although this dimension is probably reflected in most other elements of the culture in the sense that it is difficult to explicitly separate out for measurement.[66]

[63] See, for example, Osgood, May and Miron (1975) and Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957).

[64] See, for example, Trilling and Lindquist (1975), Sigel and Haskin (1977), and Samaan and Samaan (1976). The latter source is about the Nigerian Ibo who are not 'average' in many respects.

[65] H.A. Simon:1979,383-384. This appears to be physiological confirmation of the attitudinal and behavioral data.

[66] See Robinson et al. (1968) for scales on output affect (448-52).

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Table 7.7 Affect Towards Political System Questions

84.	Do you think that people like you have the same reactions to these governmental social/welfare activities?			
	46 (1) Yes 33 (2)Not sure-no answer 21 (3)No			.15
102.	Do you think that the people in your community cooperate in carrying out community programmes?			
	80 (1) Yes 11 (2)DK -- not sure 9 (3) No			.38
103.	Do you think the local public servants do their best to serve the local community?			
	57 (1) Yes 25 (2) Not sure 17 (3) No			.39

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION* -- AFFECT QUESTIONS

Var	Ques			
#	#	84	102	103
174	84	-		
200	102	.25	-	
201	103	.23	.52	-

*Gamma Coefficients

5. Evaluation of Government Performance and Responsiveness

Evaluation of government performance and responsiveness is related to the individual's sense of government efficacy but we have separated it to distinguish generalized evaluation of government from the sense of efficacy an individual derives from his use of government to serve his own needs. This dimension usually is found to be distinct

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from the dimensions of affect. Included is the assessment of various levels and functions of government in order to determine whether or not patterns or syndromes of such evaluative processes exist.[67]

Table 7.8 includes measures of the evaluative process.[68] We have divided the evaluation items into those that relate to government outputs as the first scale and those that relate to inputs to the governmental process as a second scale. With respect to the first scale there is a reasonable distribution of responses with a slight tendency to positively evaluate government outputs although a clear disinterest (in 1974) for the incumbent regime to continue in power after 1976. The second scale reflects evaluation of sources of influence on government decision making. It makes quite clear that less influence was preferred for the military, police, and businessman, and more was sought for others, including the "common man" and

[67] Note that the evaluative dimension has both symbolic and material components. On this issue, see Kohlberg (1964) and Edelstein (1972).

[68] See Robinson et al. (1968) for related measures on aspirations.

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Table 7.8 Evaluative Process Questions

1. Evaluation of Government Output Processes	
27. Some people think that the present government has done a good job in keeping peace in Nigeria. Do you agree or disagree?	.23
84 (1) Agree 6 (2) Not sure - don't know 10 (3) Disagree	
28. Some people feel that the government has allowed citizens sufficient freedom of speech. Do you agree or disagree?	.14
58 (1) Agree 11 (2) Not sure-DK 32 (3) Disagree	
29. Compared with the situation under the previous civilian government, some people feel that the present government has done a better job. Do you agree or disagree?	.32
67 (1) Agree 12 (2) Not sure - don't know 21 (3) Disagree	
30. How would you react if the present government was to stay in power beyond 1976? Would you approve or disapprove?	.15
40 (1) Approve 12 (2) Not sure - no opinion 49 (3) Disapprove	
77. Some people feel that they pay more taxes than they should considering what they get from the government. Do you agree or disagree with that opinion?	-.10
65 (1) Agree 11 (2) Not sure - don't know 24 (3) Disagree	
82. What kind of job do you think the police are doing in this area: good, fair, poor, or very poor?	.12
23 (1) Good 51 (2) Fair 14 (3) Poor 7 (4) Very poor 4 (5) not sure - no opinion	
85. Since Nigerian independence there have been increased welfare activities in the country. Do you think that ordinary people are better off/worse off/or the same as before independence?	.20
59 (1) Better off 21 (2) Same - no opinion 21 (3) Worse off	
86. There have been various economic development activities in the country since independence. Do you think that you have personally benefitted from such programmes?	.20
61 (1) Yes 11 (2) Not sure-no opinion 28 (3) No	

[69] The realization of these facts by the Nigerian army officers may have been instrumental in their decision to overthrow General Gowon and return to civilian rule as soon as possible. When the survey was carried out in the summer of 1974, 1976 was the official target date for return to civilian rule but Gowon cancelled this date in October 1974 replacing it with an indefinite time.

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Table 7.8 continued

2a. Evaluation of Government Input Processes

65. Some people say that some groups have too much power and influence in this country, and that other groups have too little power and influence. I'm going to read a list of groups. Please tell me for each of these groups whether you think they should have more power and influence or less power and influence than they have now in politics and public affairs.
- (1) More (2) Same or no opinion (3) Less
- | | | |
|----------|-------------------------|-----|
| 60-30-10 | a. University students | |
| 55-33-12 | b. Labour union leaders | .11 |
| 40-31-30 | c. Businessmen | .20 |
| 36-34-30 | d. The police | .27 |
| 45-36-19 | e. Civil servants | .26 |
| 30-34-36 | f. Military officers | .32 |
| 78-15-6 | g. The common man | |
| 62-24-14 | h. Traditional leaders | .13 |
- (could be scaled)

Additional Relevant Questions

34. Other people have said that if the government does not give a better share of Nigeria's wealth to the poor people, then the poor may have to revolt against the rich. Do you agree or disagree?
 48 (1) Agree 14 (2) Not sure - no opinion
 38 (3) Disagree
87. Which type of people do you think are benefitting most from state power?
 32 (1) Civil commissions
 12 (2) Senior civil servants
 37 (3) Senior military officers
 2 (4) Professionals -- such as doctors and accountants
 1 (5) Farmers
 5 (6) Business people
 2 (7) Other educated people
 1 (8) Ordinary people
 10 (9) No answer -- don't know
88. Do you think the government shows favouritism towards any groups in the population?
 35 (1) Yes 33 (2) Not sure-no opinion 32 (3) No

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Table 7.8 Measures of Association (Gamma) (* = contingency coefficient)

Var	Que	2	27	28	29	30	77	82	85	86	87	88
3	3	-										
33	27	-12	-									
34	28	-06	52	-								
35	29	07	49	27	-							
36	30	04	25	24	53	-						
167	77	05	-22	-05	-30	-15	-					
172	82	-16	22	09	09	16		-				
175	85	-08	31	12	35	16	-26	24	-			
176	86	-07	28	18	30	16	-34	18	51	-		
177	87	17*	16*	20*	13*	20*	19*	21*	20*	18*	-	
178	88	10	-28	-17	-30	-16	31	-14	-13	-13	19*	-

Measures Part 2

var	Que	2	27	28	29	30	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
147	65	12	-07	-14	-09	02	-							
148	65	-07	08	05	-04	-02	40	-						
149	65	-11	25	25	-10	03	28	29	-					
150	65	-02	12	16	00	12	06	20	29	-				
151	65	-01	16	25	05	06	31	34	42	41	-			
152	65	-05	26	36	12	27	09	15	37	61	44	-		
153	65	03	15	06	00	-13	43	37	28	-10	33	-20	-	
154	65	09	14	16	06	02	28	25	36	25	32	31	41	-

Measures Part 3

Var	Que	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
167	77	-07	-13	-05	12	-08	-03	-01	03
172	87	05	07	13	20	11	15	-07	09
175	85	00	16	-02	09	05	11	02	18
176	86	08	21	08	13	19	20	12	11
177	87	-01	00	-09	-10	-08	-11	05	04
178	88	-01	-03	-06	02	-10	-12	07	-01

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traditional leaders.[69]

6. Scope and Function of Government

Recent secular trends throughout the world have been in the direction of an increased scope of human activities for which government assumes responsibility and considerably augmented functions that the government is expected to perform. Such issues are ubiquitous in the development literature although varying views are held on the role and value of such activities. The close connection between changes in scope and function, and political participation seems clear and has been widely commented upon.[70]

In a country such as Nigeria where traditional authority patterns are still omnipresent, the role of traditional leadership tends to be an important element in the conflict between 'Western-educated' elites and others. Odetola, for example, reports on a survey in Nigeria that

[70] See Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and Huntington and Nelson (1976). Pye (1968) included notions of the appropriate scope and function of government among his seven themes of political culture.

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supported the notion that the chiefs should play an important role in future government functioning.[71]
(1978:35)

7. Authority Patterns -- Perceptions

Authority relations which are formalized and enforced by the police power of the state are an important element in any political culture, embodied and disembodied. Questions in Table 7.10 focus on the perception of how authority relations function across a range of hierarchical political and social situations. Not only are we concerned with perceptions of authority systems, but also with views of the nature of elites and leadership as well as individual world views on authority. We expect attitudes towards elites, authority and legitimacy to be reflected in these items as

[71] Note Asmelash (1974) on Ethiopia's authority patterns for a similar although possibly dated conclusion. Our own survey also supports a view of the continuing legitimacy of traditional authority. Note that fear of authority and the consequent attempt to limit the scope of government has been a major factor in Anglo-Saxon political thought and systems of belief and such limitations may play a more important role in the maintenance of democratic institutions than acceptance of a particular form of authority.

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Table 7.2 Score and Function of Government Questions

31.	It has been suggested that after 1976 the country should be governed by civilian and military officials in coalition. Would you approve or disapprove? 39 (1) Approve 9 (2) Not sure - no opinion 52 (3) Disapprove	.21
85.	Since Nigerian independence there have been increased welfare activities in the country. Do you think that ordinary people are better off/worse off/or the same as before independence? 59 (1) Better off 21 (2) Same - no opinion 21 (3) Worse off	.17
86.	There have been various economic development activities in the country since independence. Do you think that you have personally benefitted from such programmes? 61 (1) Yes 11 (2) not sure-no opinion 28 (3) No	.28
89.	Do you think the government fails to pay attention to the needs of some people? 57 (1) Yes 18 (2) No answer-not sure 25 (3) No	-.19
90.	Some people feel that it is alright for public officials to use their position to help their relatives or people from their home area. Do you agree or disagree? 38 (1) Agree 5 (2) No answer - not sure 57 (3) Disagree	.26
91.	With respect to the problem of corruption, some people have told us that it is part of the normal life of Nigeria, and no one should bother about it. Do you agree or disagree? 20 (1) Agree 5 (2) No opinion - don't know 75 (3) Disagree	.19
well.[72]		

[72] For a review on measures and scales in the literature, see Robinson et al. (1968) -- authoritarianism (p. 110-11); conservatism (96-97); and democratic attitudes (170-172).

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Table 7.9 (Continued)

Other Issues

100. Suppose this town wanted a social amenity like a hospital, who should be responsible for such a project -- the government, the townspeople or both together?
 50 (1) The government 4 (2) The townspeople
 43 (3) Both together 4 (4) Don't know - not sure
101. If you had an idea about some improvement which could be made in your town, what persons or groups of persons would you take the idea to?
 27 (1) Community Council
 21 (2) Community Development Officer
 11 (3) The communal improvement union
 14 (4) The Divisional Officer
 25 (5) Traditional leaders
 1 (6) Others
 3 (7) Don't know

The question used in this scale are presented in Table
 7.10.[73]

Table 7.9 continued
 MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION** -- SCOPE AND FUNCTION

Var #	Ques #	31	34	85	86	89	90	91	100
37	31	-							
40	34	-.07	-						
175	85	.05	-.23	-					
176	86	.15	-.20	.51					
179	89	-.20	.19	-.27	-.27	-			
180	90	.31	.10	.07	.21	-.12	-		
181	91	.35	.03	-.06	.10	-.15	.56	-	
198	100	-.01	.03	-.11	.05	.03	.17	.19	-
199	101	.10*	.18*	.19*	.13*	.18*	.16*	.18*	.21*

* = cont. coef.

**Gamma coefficient unless otherwise marked

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Table 7.10 Authority Questions

8. a. Any leader should be very strict with the people under him in order to gain their respect.
 b. Being respected as a leader comes only from treating one's followers well.
 19 (1) a. 7 (2) Not sure - no opinion 74 (3) b. -.12
10. a. It is essential for effective work that our bosses tell us just what is to be done and exactly how to do it.
 b. We can usually get the job done just as well without any instructions from our bosses.
 75 (1) a. 5 (2) Not sure - no opinion 20 (3) b. .54
75. In general if you had a problem to take up with a government department or a local government office, would you do it yourself or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some other person or organisation?
 30 (1) Do it myself
 48 (2) Would get help from another person or organisation
 19 (3) Would get help from both person and organisation
 4 (4) No opinion - no answer -.07
104. Suppose the government wants to join hands with your town in undertaking a project and you are given the option of choosing between a social service project like pipe-borne water, post office, maternity home; or an economic project like farm settlements or small scale industries. Which one would you prefer?
 50 (1) Social service projects
 42 (2) Economic projects
 2 (3) Others (specify) 6 (4) Don't know .10
- NOTE: Ques. 104 recoded (1=1) 4, 3=2) (2=3)
 Ques. 75 recoded (4=0)

[73] For a comparative study of a Nigerian (Yoruba) and Upper Voltan group (Mossi), see Adelaja (1976). For a major statement on the study of authority patterns as a basis for political inquiry, see Eckstein and Gurr

(1975) and Eckstein (1973). For its relation to political culture, see Kavanagh (1972:17-18). See Sennett (1980) for a very useful essay on the nature of authority in society. Schonfeld (1976) provides an analysis of French attitudes toward authority. On leadership perceptions, see Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron (1975) on the 'malevolent leader' and Massey (1975) on the 'missing leader' (in Japan). Also note the issue of patron-client relations here. See Flathman (1980) on the nature of political authority. Central to this discussion is the widely reviewed concept of authoritarianism. See Reyna and Wehnert (1977) for its role in Mexico; Schonfeld (1976) for a study of France; Kilson (1973) on Africa; Sahlén (1976) on Nigeria; Washburn (1975) as it relates to political participation; as well as more general issues in Harris (1976), Haupt (1976) and Gebennesch (1972). Also note Keehn (1974).

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Table 7.10 continued

9. a. In the long run, we ourselves are responsible for having bad government.
 b. Someone like me does not have any say about what the government does.
 53 (1) a. 13 (2) Not sure - no opinion 34 (3) b.
69. Do you think that all people are treated fairly and properly by health officials?
 29 (1) Treated fairly 13 (2) Not sure-no opinion
 58 (3) People treated unequally
80. If you were wronged by another citizen, would you feel disposed to call in the police?
 49 (1) Yes 29 (2) Not sure - depends 22 (3) No
100. Suppose this town wanted a social amenity like a hospital, who should be responsible for such a project -- the government, the townspeople or both together?
 50 (1) The government 4 (2) The townspeople
 43 (3) Both together
 4 (4) Don't know - not sure
101. If you had an idea about some improvement which could be made in your town, what persons or groups of persons would you take the idea to?
 27 (1) Community Council
 21 (2) Community Development Officer
 11 (3) The communal improvement union
 14 (4) The Divisional Officer
 25 (5) Traditional Leaders
 1 (6) Others
 3 (7) Don't know

8. Decision-Making Procedures

The previous section was concerned with the question of citizens' perceptions of how authorities carried out policies. We now turn to the positive and normative aspects of decision-making. A range of issues is involved here -- democratic vs. authoritarian systems, attitudes towards the

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Table 7.10 continued

106. After finishing communal work for a member of the family clan, the whole group was thanked by the calling of a feast and the donation of a cow. It was time to decide how to share the cow. (1) One group of people said the cow should be divided equally among all those who took part in the work. (2) A second group preferred to give unequal shares, with older members receiving more than the younger ones. (3) And yet a third group argues that those who worked hardest should get the largest shares.
- a. Which of the three methods of sharing do you favour most?
 28 (1) 26 (2) 46 (3)
- b. Which method do you disagree with most?
 34 (1) 44 (2) 22 (3)
- c. Which is the way the tradition of your tribe would favour?
 11 (1) 89 (2) 11 (3)

		Measures of Association Table 7.10										
var	Que	8	9	10	69	75	80	100	101	104	106a	106b
9	8	-										
10	9	00	-									
11	10	-29	01	-								
159	69	-07	-06	-04	-							
165	75	-03	03	13	-01	-						
170	80	02	10	10	06	-01	-					
198	100	15*	12*	07*	15*	22*	14*	-				
199	101	15*	09*	08*	13*	16*	12*	21*	-			
202	104	07*	15*	11*	08*	17*	07*	14*	22*	-		
213	106a	10*	12*	15*	09*	09*	18*	24*	16*	08*	-	
214	106b	13*	13*	08*	11*	12*	10*	27*	13*	11*	55*	-

* Starred coefficients are contingency coefficients.

use of violence, expectations on freedom of expression and dissent, and mobilized versus autonomous participation.[74]

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We expect that views on these subjects has considerable relationship to these and other dimensions. For example, Almond and Verba (1965:361) note a negative correlation between measures of trust and hierarchy.

Table 7.11 contains the basic statistics and the wording of the questions for this aspect of the political culture.[75]

9. Saliency of Politics

The tendency to be actively concerned about political outputs and outcomes appears related to issues of both interests and culture. The saliency of politics may have permanent and transient components where the latter component is more variable according to the individual's (or

[74] Note Huntington and Nelson (1976) on these issues.

[75] One dimension of political culture must be attitude towards equality -- equity theory may be of some relevance here. Note Adorno et al. (1969) a classic work on the authoritarian personality, and D. Miller on ideologically based variations in conceptions of social justice (1974). Martinnusen (1977:4) provides a definition of democracy and politics -- although his use of the term 'equal' is problematic.

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Table 7.11 Decision-Making Questions

Scale Questions

7. a. Listening to all the different points of view on something is very confusing; it is better to hear just one point of view from somebody who is informed.
b. Before making a decision, it is good to consider the opinions of as many different people as possible.
29 (1) a. 5 (2) Not sure-no opinion 66 (3) b. .34
8. a. Any leader should be very strict with the people under him in order to gain their respect.
b. Being respected as a leader comes only from treating one's followers well.
19 (1) a. 7(2) Not sure-no opinion 74 (3) b. .45
33. Some people feel that important changes in Nigeria will be brought about only through violence; others say violence is not necessary. What do you think?
11 (1) Important changes brought about through violence
6 (2) Not sure - no opinion
83 (3) Violence is not necessary .13
35. There are some people who say that violence should never be used to settle personal quarrels or disputes -- that is, those involving relatives, friends, neighbours, co-workers, and so forth. Others say that in some cases it may be necessary to use violent means to settle a dispute.
With which position do you agree?
68 (1) Never use violence
4 (2) Not sure - no opinion
29 (3) Sometimes violence is justified -.10

Other Related Questions

9. a. In the long run, we ourselves are responsible for having bad government.
b. Someone like me does not have any say about what the government does.
53 (1) a. 13 (2) Not sure-no opinion 34 (3) b.
his group's) current interests and the former changes only very slowly.[76] Thus though we expect processes of social mobilization and mobility to affect the levels of salience

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10. a. It is essential for effective work that our bosses tell us just what is to be done and exactly how to do it.
 b. We can usually get the job done just as well without any instructions from our bosses.
 75 (1) a. 5 (2) Not sure - no opinion 20 (3) b.
16. Is it better to work for one's goals by working with others as a member of a group, or is it better to work alone?
 83 (1) Work with others 4 (2) Not sure-no opinion 13 (3) Work alone
17. Suppose two men are talking about some problem of this town and the best way of solving it.
 The first man says: "It is better for each person to form own opinion of what should be done and to defend his point of view before his neighbors. If there are large differences of opinion among the residents of the town, then the matter should be decided by taking a vote."
 The second man says: "As soon as you begin deciding questions like that by taking a vote, you will see that some people are with you and some are against you, and in that way divisions and quarrels develop. It is best to get everyone to agree first, then you do not have to vote."
 With which of these two men are you in agreement?
 68 (1) First man 6 (2) Not sure - no opinion 27 (3) Second
28. Some people feel that the government has allowed citizens sufficient freedom of speech. Do you agree or disagree?
 58 (1) Agree 11 (2) Not sure - don't know 32 (3) Disagree
32. In your opinion should people who disagree with government be free to express their disagreement?
 88 (1) Yes 4 (2) Not sure-no opinion 8 (3) No

[76] Work on this element includes Czudnowski (1968, 1976), Pierce (1975), and Levy (1977, 1978). Mokken (1971) writes about the idea of controversial versus non-controversial attitudes, beliefs etc., as well as controversial versus non-controversial subject matter. Himmelstrand (1960) reviews the attitudes associated with saliency, interest and alertness.

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Table 7.11 (Continued)

106. After finishing communal work for a member of the family clan, the whole group was thanked by the calling of a feast and the donation of a cow. It was time to decide how to share the cow.
- (1) One group of people said the cow should be divided equally among all those who took part in the work. (2) A second group preferred to give unequal shares, with older members receiving more than the younger ones. (3) And yet a third group argues that those who worked hardest should get the largest shares.
- 28-26-46 a. Which of the three methods of sharing do you favour most?
 34-44-22 b. Which method do you disagree with most?
 11-78-11 c. Which is the way the tradition of your tribe would choose?
107. When a community has to make arrangements for some major work (e.g., building a new school) there are three different ways that they can decide such things as, where to build it, and who should work.
- (1) In some communities, the older or recognized leaders of important families decide the plans. Everyone usually accepts their decision without much discussion, since the elders are the ones used to deciding, and have the most experience.
- (2) In other communities, most people in the group have a part in making the plans. Lots of different people talk, but nothing is done until almost everyone agrees as to what should be done.
- (3) There are some communities where everyone holds his own opinion and they decide the matter by vote. They do whatever more than half of the community decides, even though there may be still a large number of people
- 34-27-38 (a) Which way do you think is usually best in such a case?
 69-16-14 (b) Which way do you think the tradition of your hometown would favour?
- of politics, we also expect there to be differences not

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Table 7.11 continued

108. In a certain community, a very important decision has just been taken. The majority agreed with the decision, but a number of people being very much opposed to this decision had walked out of the meeting, and refused to participate in the action recommended. To resolve this conflict, which of the following three methods do you approve most?

(1) Send a delegation to this group, and try to make them comply to the will of the majority by threatening them with severe consequences.

(2) Send a delegation to this group and try to arrange a compromise which would meet some of their views but most of the majority's views.

(3) Completely ignore their opposition, and go right ahead with the action already decided upon.

If your first choice does not succeed, which of the other two methods would you approve?

FIRST CHOICE

SECOND CHOICE

8-82-10

34-13-53

accounted for by such analyses.[77] One important issue may be that of personal efficacy, however. Is the individual apathetic towards the political system because the system is not important to the person, or because he feels it is important but that it cannot be affected by his behavior.[78]

[77] One of the functions of ideologies may be to break the inertial tendencies in most systems by changing the political culture or important parts of it.

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Table 7.11 Measures of Association

var	que	4	7	8	9	10	16	17	28	32	33	34	35	106
5	4	-												
8	7	04	-											
9	8	-01	57	-										
10	9	07	07	00	-									
11	10	-02	-22	-29	01	-								
17	16	-02	-03	-12	16	17	-							
18	17	-08	05	26	06	-08	00	-						
34	28	09	13	10	17	19	14	-06	-					
38	32	-13	-30	-13	04	01	27	09	02	-				
39	33	-01	26	28	04	-23	-11	11	10	-30				
40	34	33	02	00	04	10	-08	14	01	18	06	-		
41	35	05	-06	-17	01	02	00	00	08	-12	-49	-21	-	
213	106	14*	11*	10*	12*	15*	05*	13*	10*	09*	12*	18*	09*	
214	106	07*	11*	13*	13*	08*	09*	10*	07*	08*	09*	06*	09*	55*
215	106	04*	12*	16*	10*	10*	09*	09*	06*	19*	17*	04*	15*	24*
216	107	09*	16*	02*	16*	12*	16*	20*	16*	05*	10*	19*	09*	12*
217	107	12*	14*	08*	13*	08*	09*	13*	15*	04*	15*	11*	09*	11*
218	108	09*	11*	04*	12*	09*	12*	09*	05*	14*	10*	09*	04*	19*
219	108	06*	16*	05*	16*	12*	12*	11*	09*	12*	15*	08*	10*	17*

measures of association part 2

var que 107 108

214	106	-												
215	106	33*	-											
216	107	12*	15*	-										
217	107	13*	27*	35*	-									
218	108	12*	11*	12*	05*	-								
219	108	13*	13*	13*	12*	62*	-							

Note * equals a contingency coefficient

[78] Another version of this may be an identification of the costs and benefits for participation and interest in politics. See Beck (1974) on this point. For an argument on the relation between 'basic' political attitudes and attentiveness, and affective and normative content of opinions, see Pye and Verba (1958:431). Also see Cornelius (1975).

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Table 7.12 contains the questions used to evaluate the element of salience.[79]

10. Basic Value Orientations

Table 7.12 Salience of Politics Questions

68. a. Have you or anyone in your family gone to the dispensary or the hospital in the past year?	
89 (1) Yes 4 (2) Don't know - no answer	.51
8 (3) No	
b. If yes, how often in the past year would you say that you or a member of your family has gone to the dispensary or the hospital?	
10 (1) Never 60 (2) Occasionally	
19 (3) Sometimes 10 (4) Frequently	-.36
72. Are there members of your family enrolled in the schools in this area.	
84 (1) Yes 4 (2) No answer 12 (3) No	.07
80. If you were wronged by another citizen, would you feel disposed to call in the police?	
49 (1) Yes 29 (2) Not sure - depends 22 (3) No	.01
83. The various governments of Nigeria are undertaking several social welfare activities, such as health and education. Considering all the circumstances, do you think that those governments are doing:	
55 (1) The best they could 34 (2) Not too well	
6 (3) Are doing badly 1 (4) Doing very badly	
5 (5) No opinion - don't know	-.01

Other Related Questions

105. When you think of Nigeria,
- a. What are the things you are proud of?
 - b. What things are you ashamed of?

[79] See in Robinson et al. (1968) on the impact of government on daily-life questions (pp. 448-452).

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Measures of Association for Table 7.12

Var	Que	68a	68b	72	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105
157	68a	-											
158	68b	-63	-										
162	72	39	-23	-									
203	105	17	17	19	-								
204	105	19	21	19	55	-							
205	105	13	26	24	53	55	-						
206	105	19	40	23	53	61	60	-					
207	105	40	57	40	73	68	79	73	-				
208	105	10	20	13	32	37	42	50	54	-			
209	105	22	21	19	35	46	40	54	58	28	-		
210	105	19	29	22	36	48	58	63	77	34	40	-	
211	105	29	38	27	54	50	63	66	72	51	29	49	-
212	105	29	44	48	83	78	82	76	74	77	50	55	74

note all coefficients between variables 203 to 212 are contingency coefficients

Central to the thought of a number of anthropologists is the idea of a basic underlying set of orientations towards existence.[80] The contemporary manifestations of these ideas are reflected in the empirical work of scholars such as Inkeles and Smith (1973), and the theoretical

[80] For example, the work of Kluckhohn (1970) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). See Jones (1977) on the validity of tradition vs. modernity measures.

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developments in the work of writers in the ethnoscience tradition,[81] linguistics,[82] and artificial intelligence,[83] using various versions of 'generative grammars' or ideas of 'deep structure'.

We accept such ideas in principle with the less 'basic' values such as the previous dimensions in our list of fourteen acting as the link between the basic values and actual behavior. For example, values which may vary as a function of an individual culture-bearer's time perspective repeatedly occur. Expectations of the future, deferred gratification and planning for the future are amongst the most common manifestations of temporally characterized indicators of basic values. Other such basic orientations could be characterized as field independence, achievement

[81] Ward Goodenough (1981) is a leading example of these writers.

[82] See, for example, the seminal work of Chomsky (1957, 1965).

[83] See Minsky (1975) and Winston (1977). Also see chapter 3 for a more detailed explication and critique of these developments in cultural anthropology, cognitive psychology, and sociology.

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orientation and need for power.[84] We do believe, however, that the lesson that many writers advance with respect to the interaction effect of an individual culture-bearer with his environment is critical to an understanding of outcomes.[85]

The examination of the effects of basic value orientations is complicated by the possibility that the contents of what are basic values may vary across cultures. For example, the shared values of one society may only be expressible in terms of meta-values of another such as a commitment to novelty of expression.[86] Religion plays an important role in this process. This is especially the case as the massive and ubiquitous changes occur in which people

[84] See Witkins (1962), McClelland (1960), and Winter (1973) for statements on the subject. See chapter 2 and 3 for a review of these concepts.

[85] For example, Cottle and Klineberg (1974) detail the experiences of Tunisians and Americans under different environmental conditions which lead to results heavily conditioned by the possibilities facing the groups concerned. This should not be taken to mean we expect all cultures to react similarly with a given environmental condition. Cultural orientation is important in the maintenance of behavior patterns often long after the actual causes of the original behavior have disappeared.

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Table 7.13 Basic Value Orientation Questions

6. What about your children: will their lives be better or worse than yours or about the same? 83 (1) Better 12 (2) About the same-or not sure 5 (3) Worse	-.07
18. If schooling is freely available without cost, how much schooling do you think children of people like you should have? 3 (1) None 2 (2) Primary 4 (3) Secondary Modern 7 (4) Full secondary 38 (5) University 47 (6) More than university	.10
19. Two men are talking about the best way to grow food. The first man said: "We should continue the ways that we have always used." The second man said: "We should try to find better ways." Which man said the wiser words? 16 (1) The first man 7 (2) Not sure-no opinion 78 (3) The second man	.07
20. What should most qualify a man to hold high office? 6 1. Coming from a distinguished or royal family 6 2. Devotion to the old and time-honoured ways 21 3. Being the most popular among the people 64 4. High education and special knowledge 3 5. Not sure - no opinion	.72
Other Related Questions	
21. What is most important for the future of this country? 35 1. The hard work of the people 35 2. Good planning on the part of the government 28 3. God's help 1 4. Good luck 1 5. Not sure - no opinion	

[86] Hence the previous affecting values may not affect culture-bearers' actions as they previously did. Note Blau (1977:77) characterizes plural societies in terms of differential groups accorded status, or different rankings from group to group.

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Table 7.13 continued

23. Scientists in the universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or girl, and how it is that a seed turns into a plant. Do you think that these studies are :
- 63 1. All very good (beneficial)
 20 2. All somewhat good (beneficial)
 10 3. Not sure - no opinion
 5 4. All somewhat harmful
 2 5. All very harmful
104. Suppose the government wants to join hands with your town in undertaking a project like pipe-borne water, post office, maternity home, or an economic project like farm settlements or small scale industries. Which one would you prefer?
- 51 (1) Social service projects
 42 (2) Economic Projects
 2 (3) Others (specify) 6 (4) Don't know
- Could you give some reasons for your choice?
110. When thinking of marriage, one should choose and look for certain qualities in a spouse. In what order would you choose a wife (or husband) who:
- 16-24-42-19 (1) Can achieve social prestige and win admiration of others
 16-34-26-24 (2) Likes to help other people
 25-25-22-28 (3) Is basically religious in attitude
 44-17-10-30 (4) Is economical and knows how to make money

The percentages given to the left of the question numbers reflect the percent of times that the response was preferred as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th respectively.

move from traditional animist religions to universalistic religions such as Islam and the various versions of Christianity. [87]

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Table 7.13 continued

Var #	Ques #	7	19	20	21	22	24	202	221	222	223
7	6	-						104	110		
19	18	.08	-								
20	19	-.07	-.09	-							
21	20	-.13	.25	.31	-						
22	21	.06	.08	-.06	.02	-					
24	23	.19	-.11	-.01	-.01	.25					
202	104	.07*	.11*	.20*	.12*	.12*	-				
221	110	.15	.10	.20		.12	.12	.08	-		
222	110	.10	.15	.21		.11	.10	.10	.54	-	
223	110	.10	.12	.18		.09	.04	.09	.52	.51	-
224	110	.13	.12	.18		.12	.10	.13	.52	.51	.54

note: all coefficients are contingency coefficients in this table

Modernization has often been characterized as a syndrome of values which reflect changes in an individual's basic value orientation. We have noted aspects of that literature previously. Our theoretical view is less sanguine about the pervasiveness of value change under the forces of social change.[88]

Table 7.13 contains the questions that are used to characterize this element although many of the previous

[87] See Barnes (1978) on religion in Lagos, Barkow (1973) and Paden (1973) on religion in Northern Nigeria.

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questions can also be seen to be relevant.

11. Social Distance

In all human moral systems, moral strictures are applied differentially according to whether the object of the moral question is within or outside of the group covered by an actor's moral norms. Hence, we expect a generalized sense of social distance to be related to differences allowed other actors in the political system.[89] We expect role expectations to be central in an environment of high

[88] Some of the more recent modernization literature includes Kahl's (1968) study in Brazil and Mexico, and Cohen and Tili's (1977) review of that evidence along with other studies (Inkeles and Smith:1973 and Armer:1974). Coughenour and Stephenson (1972) also review measures of modernity as does Portes (1973), Whiting (1971) and Doob (1967). Godwin (1975) relates measures of individual modernity to societal modernization. See Haranne and Allardt (1974) for a study on Finland, and P. A. Jones (1977) on cross-cultural measurement of modernity. Berry (1976) and Berry and Anis (1974) also add insight into this matter. Spenner and Featherman (1978) comment on some of these issues in the context of achievement motivation. In this respect, Professor Ayandele (West Africa 21 August 1978, p. 1642) argues that Nigerian worker's demands are high and their work ethic low. Simpson (1975) reviews some of the evidence linking the notions of universalism and modernity.

[89] See Staub (in press) on this issue.

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social distance and individual and institutional memories to perpetuate such a process.

In Table 7.14, various indicators of a general level of social distance are advanced.[90]

12. Identity

"The need to know who one is appears to be one of the most deeprooted in our humanity." (R.D. Laing)

Humans characteristically identify themselves in terms of some group identification.[91] The character of this process has been central to the thinking of many writers. Erikson (1968) made the dynamics of human maturation central to his psychological perspective, while Pye (1962) in his classic study of Burma has argued that nation-building is a function of personal identity. The Social Science Research

[90] See Robinson et al. (1968), page 244, for indicators of social distance. More detailed data on social distance is covered in chapter eleven.

Table 7.14 Social Distance Questions

37.	Suppose you had money to start a business. Would you join with people from other states to start a business?	
	70 (1) Yes 8 (2) Not sure-no opinion 21 (3) No	.46
38.	Do you think the government of your state should join with other state governments in starting jointly owned business enterprises (e.g., the proposed saw-milling enterprise between the Midwest State and Kano State)?	
	76 (1) Yes 12 (2) Not sure-no opinion 12 (3) No	.47
45.	Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are economically better off, worse off, or about average?	
	28 (1) Better off 54 (2) About average - no opinion 18 (3) Worse off	.004
46.	Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are politically more powerful, less powerful or about average?	
	32 (1) More powerful 50 (2) Average - no opinion 18 (3) Less powerful	.002
Other Related Questions		
22.	If you were to meet a person who lives in another country a long way off (thousands of miles away), could you understand their way of thinking?	
	30 (1) Yes 20 (2) Not sure-no opinion 50 (3) No	
40.	Suppose education were free and you were also free to send your child to any school in the Federation. Would you prefer to see your child attend a school in your own state?	
	67 (1) Yes 5 (2) Not sure-no opinion 28 (3) No	

[91] Such as citizenship, town of origin, family, rural-urban birth, ethnicity, region, language, religion, and other aspects of principally ascriptive definition. The conflicts of identity are replete in the literature. See, for example, the issue of primacy of loyalties in the battlefield speech by Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita. See Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) for a definition of identity. Laitin (1978) writes on the primacy of ancestral city identity for political mobilization in Yorubaland (SW Nigeria). See MacKenzie (1978) for a critique of the concept of political identity.

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Table 7.14 continued

41. Would you say that in general the different ethnic groups in Nigeria are much the same, or are they very different from one another?
 13 (1) Same 8 (2) Not sure - no opinion
 79 (3) Very different

126. What other ethnic or tribal groups are most like your own?

127. What other Nigerian ethnic or tribal groups are most different from your own?

(Data not presented here for Questions 126 and 127 -- see Chapter 7).

Var	Ques	23	48	119	50	57	250
#	#	22	37	38	40	41	126
23	22	-					
48	37	.09	-				
49	38	.16	.71	-			
56	40	.10	-.03	-.10	-		
57	41	.16	.02	.09	-.15	-	
250	126	.37*	.38*	.35*	.29*	.29*	-
253	127	.23*	.24*	.18*	.28*	.23*	.71*

Council's Committee on Comparative Politics viewed the expansion of complexity of personal identity as a characteristic of development and the individual level counterpart of the macro-process of increasing complexity, equality, and differentiation that is at the heart of their model.[92] Indeed virtually all major analytic traditions assume that identification with group is fundamental to social existence.

[92] See Holt and Turner (1976) for a critical review of the work of that committee.

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But why does any given identity make it a basis for political or social mobilization? Obviously most identities don't matter in this respect or are at least irrelevant to a country's politics. Our approach to this conundrum has been to make identity a secondary concept. This is not because it is unimportant but because the very number and dynamic of identities that culture-bearers possess requires an explanation in terms of the clear variation in importance of such identities. Identity is a function of one's roles, statuses, socialization, history, and memory which in turn implies that it is a product of culture. Hence we want to account for political behavior in terms of the bases for identity, their latent or deep structural sources. We expect that important variations in identity will occur at such cultural cleavages.

Nevertheless, we include indicators to inform us of the basic level of strength and awareness of identification.[93]

[93] Note Robbins (in Honigman: 1973,1200) view that identity is best seen as a "motivating concept". We have argued for a more specific motivational basis for action in our 'Model of Man as Control-Seeker'. See Chapter 3.

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A discussion of identity which did not recognize the importance of the reflexive properties of social interaction would be deficient. This is especially true in environments where we expect the social psychology that we emphasized in part I to be important. In that section we noted that individuals interact in a manner whereby each treats the other in terms of their perceptions of the group identification of the other. Thus identity has an important element of social determination that not only depends on ingroup socialization but is also formed by outgroup reactions.

One final comment on identity relates to the abstractness level of identity. We expect that varying levels of field dependency in individuals will lead to important variation in the character of identity.[94] Wober (1975:201) argues that this relates to the reason that people in 'slum' housing in Lagos did not want to move to

[94] Note especially forms such as the Bricklin hypothesis that states that when parents' are not a source of affection, this will produce field dependent persons who tend to be authoritarian and concrete in their thinking. This apparently can be modified by education. See Wober (1975:172, 165, 187) on this issue.

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newer quarters in another area (see Marris:1961) and notes that field-dependent persons tend to be less flexible in changing environments. Wober (1975:207) also notes the effect of field dependence on the effectiveness of elites who determine the character of many social institutions and therefore the attractiveness of correlating identity with such institutions.[95]

Table 7.15 contains the questions used in this element and their correlations.[96]

The indices which have been constructed in this chapter will be evaluated in succeeding chapters. In the next chapter we will characterize the apparent cultural forms in the largest culture groups in Nigeria.

[95] It should be noted that field dependence is not exclusively a product of socialization and may have important physiological and nutritional components. This is important in areas where large sections of a population may have suffered brain damage from poor nutrition early in life. (See Wober:1975, 210-211) on this issue.

[96] See Robinson et al. (1968) for measures of citizen duty (p. 461) and civic obligation (p. 448-452).

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Table 7.15 Identity Questions

7. a. Listening to all the different points of view on something is very confusing; it is better to hear just one point of view from somebody who is informed.
 b. Before making a decision, it is good to consider the opinions of as many different people as possible.
 29 (1) a. 5 (2) Not sure-no opinion 66 (3) b.
45. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are economically better off, worse off, or about average?
 28 (1) Better off 54 (2) About average-no opinion
 18 (3) Worse off .49
46. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are politically more powerful, less powerful about average?
 32 (1) more powerful 50 (2) Average - no opinion
 18 (3) Less powerful .36
47. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are culturally more prestigious, less prestigious, or about average?
 56 (1) More prestigious 38 (2) Average-no opinion
 6 (3) Less prestigious .15

Other Relevant Questions

8. a. Any leader should be very strict with the people under him in order to gain their respect.
 b. Being respected as a leader comes only from treating one's followers well.
 19 (1) a. 7 (2) Not sure-no opinion 74 (3) b.

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Table 7.15 (Continued)

48. Do you think that conflicts between different ethnic groups will always be a problem in Nigeria, or that they will gradually become less of a problem, or that they have never really been a problem?
 7 (1) Never a problem
 61 (2) Gradually become less of a problem
 32 (3) Always will be a problem
49. Do you think Nigerians should strive to preserve ethnic group identities or that they should stop talking about their ethnic differences and concentrate on the things that unite them?
 18 (1) Preserve 4 (2) Not sure-no opinion
 78 (3) Concentrate on uniting
123. What is your religion?
 41 (1) Muslim 41 (2) Christian Protestant
 11 (3) Christian Catholic
 3 (4) Independent-Aladura, C&S
 4 (5) Traditional 1 (6) Other
125. Of what ethnic or tribal group are you a member?

126. What other ethnic or tribal groups are most like your own? -----/
 -----/-----/-----
127. What other Nigerian ethnic or tribal groups are most different from your own? -----
 See chapter 11 for distribution on questions 125-127.

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Measures of Association Table 7.15:

var	Que	7	8	45	46	47	48	49	123	125	126	127
8	7	-										
9	8	51	-									
102	45	22	07	-								
103	46	21	05	56	-							
104	47	07	-17	39	34	-						
105	48	18	09	04	13	-10	-					
106	49	21	15	-17	-13	-13	02	-				
247	123	24*	14*	29	23	04	16	-04	-			
249	125	40*	34*	51*	46*	45*	36*	27*	*	-		
250	126	37*	31*	41*	43*	45*	39*	22*	68*	*	-	
253	127	31*	24*	32*	29*	24*	30*	27*	54*	*	71*	-

* = contingency coefficients

Chapter Eight

Models of Political Man and Culture: Nigerian Evidence

Introduction

Models of Political Man - Nigerian Evidence

Pattern Matching - The Disembodied Culture-Bearer

Hierarchy of Patterns

Consistency and the Change Process

Empirical Issues - Scaling and Clustering

Disembodied Political Culture Profiles

- a. Yoruba
- b. Hausa
- c. Igbo
- d. Fulani
- e. Ibibio
- f. Tiv and other Benue peoples
- g. Ijaw
- h. Bini
- i. Northern Edo
- j. Idoma
- k. Urhobo
- l. Kanuri

Conclusions

II Models of Political Man and Culture - Nigerian Evidence

"Paradoxically a useful general typology of beliefs seems both necessary and impossible."
(Borhek and Curtis: 1975,19)

The construction of a number of elements of a political culture which we expect will span the culture was the object of the previous chapter. In this chapter we turn to the issue of what patterns are characteristic of the Nigerian respondents. We want to determine if there are typical sets or 'gestalts' of these elements. We expect that such gestalts will be modal properties of various disembodied cultures.[1] There are many examples of analyses of culture which offer labels for the gestalt for a given society.[2]

[1] In the next chapter, we will relate measures of the embodied culture to these measures in order to evaluate the relations between the two sets of indicators. The attempt to establish patterns of culture has a long history although quantitative approaches using trait measures of culture (usually embodied or ideal forms) is more recent. Cattell (1949) was a pioneer in the effort as was Cantril (1965). Rokeach (1972, 1973) has been a recent contributor to this activity. We expect that there will be gaps between the embodied and disembodied cultures. For example, cleverness may be highly valued in some disembodied cultures but not in their embodied cultures. Such discrepancies may have important implications for trust levels in the society, and for issues of public versus private regarding behavior, and most importantly for adaptive behavior.

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Chapter Eight: Political Culture: Nigerian Evidence

This section proceeds with an evaluation of: (1) the pattern-matching process among the disembodied culture-bearers, including hierarchies of pattern; (2) the embodied culture and pattern matching; (3) issues of consistency and change; and (4) empirical methodologies for the evaluation of patterns. The last part of this section will evaluate the patterning of the elements that were developed using the Nigerian data in the first section.[3]

Pattern Matching - The Disembodied Culture-Bearer

"A belief system may be defined as having represented within it, in some organized psychological but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about physical and social reality."
(Rokeach:1972,2)

- [2] Our interest is less with the characterization of each culture in terms of the basic rules or 'mapping sentences' the culture-bearers use, and more with the characteristics that differentiate cultures. Thus we are only interested in a set of cultural elements that contains or 'spans' the culture not with a set of independent dimensions of the culture. Nevertheless, the persistent search for a term or a phrase for the description of a culture both reinforces our view of culture as a theory-set, and the expectation that key variables can be characterized to accomplish such a task.

That pattern matching is an essential in distal knowing (Campbell:1966) seems widely agreed upon.[4] Thus it is not only academics who try to economize on thought by the use of labels and typologies.[5] This appears to be part of the basic human cognitive process.[6]

The difficulty of empirically identifying such patterns is obvious. It is the classic dilemma of anthropology - how to name a pattern and how to construct an algorithm to identify that pattern. The issue of identifying cultures is

[3] At this point we have not resolved the issues raised by Pike (1967:3) where he aims to isolate languages into *etic* and *emic* parts which in turn raises the question of the possibility of cross-cultural analysis. But we would argue that most cultures are sufficiently heterogeneous that the question of what constitutes 'cross-cultural' becomes unclear. In effect, we believe that the *etic* character of terms dominated country-wide political forms but the interaction with *emic* forms comes with differences in distributions of values, attitudes and beliefs not in their different constitutive principles. For classic statements on this subject see Chase (1948) and Cassirer (1944).

[4] Note the work of Abelson and Schank (1977) and Axelrod (1973) as an example of this agreement. Also note Padloleau (1975) and his work on "codes politiques".

[5] Note Boulding's provocative 1956 work, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* as well as his more recent work *Ecodynamics* (1978).

especially complicated as Baldwin and Baldwin (1978:344) have noted:

"As a person gains greater discriminative ability from first-hand experience or rule guidance, the person will attach different meanings to the same verbal stimuli, and rely on context cues, non-verbal indicators or past experience to make the discrimination."

Thus the more an individual masters his own culture, the less obvious it is what is being done. When the 'context cues' are ascriptive characteristics such as ethnic identity this is not only complicated but critically important to many issues in politics.

While these patterns of belief interact and interlock to some extent they also possess a certain 'octopus' property, that is, some perceptions and beliefs are

[6] This cognitive characteristic has been demonstrated in dramatic fashion by the computer chessplaying programs. The first generation of these programs was a 'brute force' approach which calculated the results of all possible moves three or four plays ahead of the current move. Even at nanosecond instruction speeds, this process was unable to beat moderately good players. It was then 'discovered' that good human players do not attempt to perform such calculations but look for the pattern of pieces on the board and match that to some memorized, but large, set of 'great' games and play according to that game's schema.

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relatively independent of each other. Part of the reason for this is that one major device that is used to deal with inconsistencies is for the individual to expect that under one set of conditions, e.g., A, a given rule should be used, and that under another set of conditions, e.g., B, another rule, etc. Even such a classification is modifiable over time.[7] Such modification may also reflect interaction with the environment that varies over space as well as time.[8] Such complications as these may be overshadowed and certainly confused with the notion that some values or beliefs can override others -- a hierarchy == but this seems

[7] Such modification is consistent with and expected in the cognitive development models of Piaget or the life cycle model of Erikson, for example. Such flexibility does not mean that humans can, or will, be extremely flexible. The rule splits must still be consistent with yet more basic rules and perceptual cues.

[8] For examples of insights into this process, see the work on Machiavellianism by Christie and Gels (1970) and Stone and Russ (1976). For a relation between the dominant image of society and political stability, see Castles (1974) and for a review of the classic Lewinian view of the interaction of behavior and environment, see Rivera (1976). Douglas and Kaberry (1971) provide studies on African peoples. Others such as Radford and Burton review particular cognitive models or styles (1974:240-247) thought to vary between cultures (this includes a review of Piaget). Note Black (1973) and her equation of belief systems and culture.

to be widely agreed upon.[9] We now turn to that issue.

Hierarchy of Patterns

We have already introduced elements into the measures of culture which influence the relative weights and areas of relevance attached to certain beliefs and values.[10] We have also noted an increasing hierarchy of attitudes, values and beliefs that condition, constrain and motivate action. Here we wish to add the point that values and beliefs occur in nested hierarchies such that some may override others, or that some spring from more basic values and beliefs.[11]

[9] For a review of some of this literature, see M. B. Smith (1973) (definition of political attitudes, pp. 58-59 and comments on model of political man, pp. 80-82).

[10] Salience, affect, trust and other elements discussed in section 1 of this chapter influence relative weights. See Lane (1973) for a review of hierarchy.

[11] It is just this relational character that gives credence to the observation of anomie and alienation that some suffer when basic values or beliefs are destroyed which in turn affects many other values and beliefs. See Meddin (1975) for a system of attitude etc. Classification is based on the "three themes of hierarchy, tripartite division, and normative-appetitive struggle.

One manifestation of such views is the number of stage-theorists in this field. Maslow's need hierarchy,[12] Loevinger's ego development, Piaget's cognitive development,[13] and Kohlberg's moral development scale are examples which attest to this reality as does the search for the description of culture in terms such as 'need for power', 'amoral familists', 'Hobbesian men' and so on. In order to evaluate such possibilities, we will evaluate the correlation pattern between the cultural elements of Nigerians later in this chapter and contrast views of political modernization as a syndrome with other views which establishes that only certain functionally defined areas of individual activity are involved in political change.

Embodied Culture - Pattern Matching

[12] Note Inglehart's (1977) test of a Maslowian model on European survey data. See Klingemann (1978) for a review and critique of Inglehart's perspective. See Wober (1975:205-206) for data on need hierarchies in Africa. Note McCain (1977) for a study of Ghanaian attitudes towards socialism.

[13] See Keats, Collis and Halford (1978) for recent work in the Piagetian tradition.

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Table 8.1 Models of Political Man in the Disembodied Culture

Type	Model of Political Man	Characteristics
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"Human organizations carry and embody systems of belief, thus giving them life and necessarily affecting their development." (Borhek and Curtis:1975,38)

The embodied culture represents all the institutionalized culture-bearers who possess roles and incumbents who are concerned with socializing the disembodied culture-bearers into a certain set of values and beliefs. These institutions include religion, language, family, socio-political organizations and ideologies, and other institutions such as formal schooling.[14] The relative success in such socialization attempts will be reflected in the congruence between the two levels of a culture.[15] The congruence of the two is referred to as an allegiant culture but we expect that such an all-embracing

[14] Berger (1977) argues for the fundamental importance of marriage as a nomic phenomenon because it gives meaning to existence. This contrasts with our avoidance of 'meaning of action' as central to explanation. In the next chapter we will evaluate the links between embodied and disembodied culture. Ryan (1975) in a study of Uganda places central emphasis on the embodied culture to account for variation in political outcomes.

[15] Regan and Fazio (1977) argue that consistency of attitudes and behavior is a function of the learning process.

Table 8.2 Models of Embodied Political Culture

1. Hobbesian vs. Lockean models of man (models of the nature of man)
2. Explicit vs. Implicit
3. Expressive vs. Instrumental (sacred vs. secular)
 not necessarily polar choice, see Verba page 547
 in Pye and Verba (1965)
4. Models of the nature of the state
5. Traditional vs. modern (many writers, e.g. Toennies)
6. Elite vs. mass (Weiner)
7. Parochial, subject, participant (Almond and Verba)
8. Three types of political culture elite, regime, and community
 see Jowitt:1974, 1173 for definitions
9. Polarized and consensual political cultures
 Almond and Powell:1978
10. Fragmented vs. cohesive
 Allegiant vs. alienated
 Integrative vs. isolative
 Parochial, subject, participant see LaPalombara
 in Pye and Verba, 283
11. LaPalombara in Pye and Verba (1965) characterizes Italians as "Hobbesian"
12. Elazar's moralist, individualist, traditionalist
13. Machiavellian
14. Issue of allegiant culture where full congruence between culture and institutions exists versus non-allegiant cultures
15. Internal vs. external locus of control
16. Types of modal authority patterns
 - a. Authoritarians
 - b. Egalitarians
 - c. Pluralists
17. Huntington and Dominguez (1975:18) consummatory vs. Instrumental

term is too simplistic to reflect the reality in any society but especially in a plural society.[16] Nevertheless, we expect that differing "modes of institutionalization in

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Table 8.2 continued

18. Deferential, trust, Lockean vs. participant, lack of trust, Hobbesian
19. From Pye and Verba 4 (5) themes of political cultures Lockean (trust, hierarchy, liberty, level of loyalty and commitment, political style compromising) Hobbesian (distrust, equality, coercion, particularism, authoritarianism)
20. Machiavellian type - 1. lack of affect in interpersonal relations
 2. lack of concern with conventional morality
 3. lack of gross psychopathology
 4. low ideological commitment (Christie and Geis) 1970:8

different cultures produces unique characteristics in the social and intellectual life of each society." [17] (Borhek and Curtis:1975,56). Further, many social organizations function well precisely because of lack of 'allegiance'. For example Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is a classic case where a universal set of individual beliefs and actions (i.e. utility maximization) not only does correspond to the embodied culture (where social welfare maximization occurs)

[16] Note, Benedict's study of Japanese culture (1959) was done assuming such allegiance. This seems a reasonable approximation to reality in Japan but in only a few other culturally homogeneous countries would we expect this to be the case.

[17] In the modernizing man tradition, we have research such as that by Grant who confirms that increased abstract abilities "go with increasing 'civilization'" (cited by Wober:1975,154).

but which is the result of the very opposite individual motives for action.[18]

Some writers have emphasized that increasing complexity and differentiation of societies multiplies the number of 'cultures'. The precise nature of such a process can be disputed but it does tend to occur only after the ascriptive basis of cultural mobilization has declined. Pye (1962), for example, contrasts the functionally-derived perspectives of bureaucrats and politicians and the implications for their divergence.[19]

[18] Thus individuals by maximizing their own welfare also maximize social welfare. Weber's 'Protestant ethic' is another example of this phenomena.

[19] Durkheim expected the reintegration of society after social upheaval to be along functional and occupational lines. Such 'culture' boundaries may influence governmental forms, e.g., functional differentiation leads to corporatism or bureaucratic authoritarianism. Note the report on a survey on the future of government forms in Ghana here. (West Africa 1978 March 6, 428-430) For a provocative view of the subjective basis of perception, see LeShan (1976). The continuation of and the adaptive roles of old forms is well illustrated in a study of beggars in Ibadan by Bamasaiye (1974).

One important issue remains which is the role of the embodied culture as a control on socio-political learning and as the conditioner of perception.[20] "Belief systems are more or less useful for a given purpose, depending on their characteristics qua belief system." (Borhek and Curtis:1975, 38) In contrasting ideological from pragmatic belief systems we observe distinct requirements for 'consistent' systems on the part of individuals and society.[21] This can range over a wide variety of issues. Wober notes examples such as sex differences which seem more important than urban-rural variations in the accounting for psychological variation (1975:186), and late weaning which produces severe problems caused by feelings of rejection. (1975:167)[22]

[20] See Lewis (1978) for a study of the 'culture of inequality' in the United States.

[21] This also seems to be related to the sequence of attitude acquisition, e.g., identity which leads to trust which leads to efficacy et al. for an example in authoritarian systems, see Brown (1977) on political culture and change in communist states.

[22] The processes of change are pervasive in the systems we wish to understand and we often are evaluating behavior in *ceteris paribus* fashion when actual human behavior will be *mutatis mutandis* .

Consistency and the Change Process

The implicit assumption that social actors are in disequilibrium if the various aspects of their attitudes, behaviors, values and beliefs are not 'consistent' is ubiquitous in most social science analysis. That such a view should be held in the face of so much evidence to the contrary, even in systems undergoing relatively little change, seems to us a remarkable fact. We have observed the 'octopus-like' character of elements of culture previously on the part of both individuals and groups. We wish to amplify that point here. We expect that individuals will try to economize on their cognitive demands not only by the use of labels and gestalts, but also by compartmentalization of their activities and that affected groups may act in a similar fashion although for different reasons.[23]

Although political culture may have apparent (or real) conflicting parts, the interesting dynamic may lie in the tension between the parts rather than the patterns themselves. As we have suggested in Part I, individuals may desire certain minimum levels of tension and inconsistency leading us to expect that social change may not only be

desired but that it is actually sought after by the system's actors.

[23] That this is so in the African context is amply noted by Wober (1975) where he cites Powdermaker on the ability of individuals to maintain inconsistency and incompatibility, or not to 'recognize' it (p. 147) and Segall (p. 153) on the observation that people become Westernized in a selective way. However, Doob was cited as one who expects changing people to be more discontented (p. 148). Wober (1967) has further noted that cognitive style may be inconsistent (or different) over varying activities. Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this lies in the Hirschman 'tunnel-effect' where expectations are changed. Expectations are wont to produce many paradoxes, however, as Weber's analysis of Calvinism demonstrated. There seems to be many paradoxes in analyses that depend on levels of actor expectations. High variance in individual actors' expectation levels over time would lead us to expect ascriptive identification would intensify since such labels are unchanging. See Gross and Niman (1975) for a list of reasons for inconsistencies between behavior and attitudes, and Berger (1977:58) for a summary of choices for change open to cultures. Also note Fried and Molnar (1978). For other works on consistency and change, see Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969) for a review of theories; Kirkpatrick (1970) for the relation between attitude structure and component change, Satori (1976) for the role of ideology in political belief systems. Also note Nie with Andersen (1974) on mass belief systems; Regan and Fazio (1977) on the relation between how attitudes are formed and their consistency with behavior; also note Liska (1975) for a review of the attitude-behavior link and Stimson (1975) on the role of constraints and complexity in belief systems. For consistency across time in terms of the expectation that all developing social systems are converging to similar forms, see Williamson and Fleming (1977). See Schubert (1977a) on political attitudes and ideologies.

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Therefore, the search on the part of the culture-bearer for cultural consistency is a process that involves certain basic and unquestioned beliefs along with a number of more peripheral beliefs and attitudes which are continually subject to testing and which are either rejected or continue to be accepted.[24] Such processes are the basic mechanisms for social and psychological adaptation and 'inconsistency' in this process may be in the eye of the beholder who is trying to impose inappropriate etic concepts when the reality demands emic perception.[25]

Empirical Issues - Scaling and Clustering

In order to evaluate the disembodied cultures we cluster the observations across the indicators developed in the first section of the chapter.[26] We also present some variations in the clustering as the measures used for the

[24] This corresponds to Imre Lakatos' view of the scientific knowledge process (see Lakatos and Musgrave:1970) as well as to Campbell's evolutionary epistemology (1978). We also expect that sheer complexity makes inconsistency inevitable. See Hofstadter (1979) for a review of this issue as well as the earlier work on Godel's incompleteness theorem by Nagel and Newman (1958).

analysis are varied. Several issues are addressed using multidimensional scaling.[27]

Disembodied Political Culture Profiles

In the remainder of the chapter, we will provide a brief summary of the characteristic form of responses to our questionnaire for members of the largest ethnic groups.[28] These responses should constitute the modal pattern of the

[25] Therefore, culturocentrism biases perception. Note the issue of metric conversion as an example of cultural blocks when cognitive maps are already 'occupied'.

Before leaving these issues, we should mention the problem of change over cohort, or intergenerational change. Note Christie and Geis (1970), for example, who posit Machiavellianism scores to be functions of early socialization which implies that a changing society produces generation gaps which are distinct from normal maturation or age-related changes. This problem in the boundaries of who shares the culture and the relation of embodied to disembodied may be far more important than the intra-individual inconsistencies. One of our concerns in the following analysis will be to partially disentangle age, period and cohort effects.

[26] See Hartigan (1975) for a review of hierarchical clustering techniques, and Carroll and Arable (1979) for a model of additive (non-hierarchical) clustering.

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Table 8.3 Correlation Between Indices

Index	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Sense of personal efficacy through own efforts	1	-														
Sense of personal efficacy through group memberships	2	06	-													
Sense of personal political efficacy	3	05	37	-												
Perception of efficacy of the political system	4	03	77	45	-											
General sense of trust in political objects and actors	5	03	31	24	29	-										
Political cognition	6	-04	15	11	17	00	-									
Affect towards the political system	7	04	19	39	30	18	15	-								
Evaluation of government outputs	8	-04	42	62	58	27	06	26	-							
Evaluation of government inputs	9	02	16	17	26	24	-05	10	18	-						
Scope and Function of Government	10	07	43	67	43	38	04	23	50	24	-					
Perceived authority patterns	11	08	04	-02	05	11	06	-02	-02	13	04	-				
Preferred decision procedures	12	-07	-11	-07	-14	-04	-07	-11	-06	-07	-08	-28	-			
Sallience of politics to respondent	13	-03	00	02	05	-07	13	06	04	00	-05	05	-05	-		
Basic value orientations	14	01	-02	-04	01	00	-01	00	-02	-02	04	-01	03	00	-	
Generalized social distance	15	-03	12	12	11	09	07	10	11	06	10	00	-01	06	-01	-
Strength of Identity feelings	16	07	08	02	02	13	00	02	01	-01	10	01	09	-04	-02	03

[27] For works on multidimensional scaling (MDS), see Morrison (1980a). Important sources include Green and Rao (1972), Schiffman, Reynolds, and Young (1981), and Kehoe and Reynolds (1977). For related literatures in factor analyses, see McDonald and Mulaid (1979) and Burt (1973). Guttman and his colleagues represent another perspective (non-stochastic) in the analysis of such data. See Levy and Guttman (1975), for example, and Shye (1978).

[28] The data for the following discussion is presented in Table 10.14.

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political culture that each disembodied culture-bearer possesses. We contrast this with the embodied culture as it is characterized in chapter Ten. Later we evaluate the deviance from this modal pattern by the disembodied culture-bearers.[29]

Yoruba Patterns

The Yoruba are one of the most complex societies that we could observe.[30] The wide range of ecological

[29] See Mezzich and Solomon (1980) on the problems of grouping. Dudewicz (1981) provides a survey of entropy-based formulas for testing group uniformity. For general surveys on the cultures of Africa see the classic work by Murdock (1959) and the more recent work by Schneider (1981). See Farber (1980) on kinship conceptions and Emeneau (forthcoming) on language areas as important aspects of the embodied culture that are transmitted through disembodied culture-bearers. On the issues of cultural definition of political response, see Parkin (1978) on the Luo, and Comaroff and Roberts (1981). For a review of the relationship between attitudes and behavior see Ajzen Fishbein (1977). Zucker and Rosenstein provide a perspective on taxonomies of institutional structure. Thernstrom, Orlov and Handlin (1980) in a monumental work on American ethnic groups provide many of the kinds of evidence that we would like to have for Nigeria, but it is not available. See Friedman (1981) on a notion of the importance of a political and territorial link in the development process.

adaptation, the greater length of substantial Western contact, the lengthy history of urbanization which antedates European contact, the highly developed culture - both political and otherwise, and their complex social structure are elements which would lead us to expect substantial variation in measures of the disembodied political culture-bearers and we do observe such variation. Nevertheless, there is a clear modal pattern which corresponds generally to the anthropologist's view of the Yoruba. In terms of our political culture measures they seem to score low in personal efficacy through their own efforts, have a high sense of efficacy through group efforts, are moderately high in feelings of political efficacy and the efficacy of the political system, have lower levels of political trust than most, are average in political cognition, low on affect for the political system, give government moderately high scores on their outputs (services) while giving the government an average ranking on approval of government input processes, and tend to be ambivalent with respect to decision processes, being split between hierarchical and democratic procedures. They tend

[30] On the Yorubas see Ayandele (1977), and Eades (1980).

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to have modern values relative to most others in the country.[31] The Yoruba also have a strong sense of social distance from other groups and a clear generalized sense of identity. This picture leads to a conclusion that the kind of political behavior that has been observed in the Yoruba areas (highly organized, distrustful and therefore faction-ridden, democratic but with a strong authoritarian core, and high ethnocentrism with respect to non-Yorubas) is widely held among the population and thus unlikely to be fundamentally altered in the short to medium term by structural changes.

Hausa Patterns

The Hausa have been established in what is now Northern Nigeria for at least a millenium. For most of this time they have been at least nominal Muslims. The Hausa are not only the largest ethnic group in Nigeria but they are found across the Sahelian zone of the continent especially as

[31] This would imply that the Inkeles and Smith (1973) study which includes only Yorubas in their Nigerian sample should be put in the context of an atypical group with a long tradition of 'modernizing' influences.

traders. Indeed, their language is not only a lingua franca for Northern Nigeria but it is a principal trading language throughout the Sahel. The Hausa unlike the Yoruba have a moderately strong sense of personal efficacy both as individuals and through groups, have a strong sense of their personal political efficacy and the efficacy of the political system, have a markedly strong sense of political trust and affect for the political system while being about average on political cognition. They see the government as a basic provider of goods and authority - a clear welfare view of the state. They see appropriate authority patterns as hierarchical and have moderately conservative basic values. Their sense of social distance is low while their sense of identity is high. This last pair of characteristics differentiates the Hausa from the Yoruba in one politically and socially important sense. That is while both groups have a strong sense of identity, one (the Hausa) has a low sense of social distance which is consistent with the well-documented process of assimilation (known as 'Hausalization') which has gone on for some time and continues. The other (the Yoruba) group which has a high level of social distance does not tend to be assimilative of other groups. The political implications of this opposed

pair of tendencies has been and probably will continue to be basic to the political preferences of other Nigerian groups, especially the 'minorities'. [32]

Igbo Patterns

The Igbo-speaking peoples live in one of the most densely populated areas in Africa, and therefore, they have been more likely to migrate than most other Nigerians in order to survive. [33] The Igbo (or Ibo) have average levels of a sense of efficacy and political trust but score very low with respect to evaluations of their own efficacy through groups or in politics and of the efficacy of the political system. This is hardly surprising given the events of the years previous to the survey, although their sense of efficacy may have been only temporarily decreased from its apparent earlier high level. They tend to be slightly better informed than the previous two groups, with

[32] See Paden (1973) on the recent political culture development of Kano and the Hausa and Fulani peoples.

[33] On the Igbo see Ottenberg (1971) and Afigbo (1980).

average affect for the political system, but with very strong negative evaluations of both government outputs and input processes. They want a more limited government but also more strongly than the previous two groups support a democratic decision-making process. They have a low sense of identity and only average levels of a sense of social distance which may be an important reason for the fact that in both the first and second Republics the Ibo-led party was the principal coalition partner to the dominant party (in both occasions from the North). In both cases, however, the coalition eventually broke down. Differences in the norms of decision processes seem to have been important in the public explanations of these differences and are consistent with the data we see on their strong differences across the disembodied culture-bearers.

Fulani Patterns

The Fulani are far from being the largest ethnic group in the country nor the most educated or mobilized, but they have been of enormous importance in the country's history. The current president is from this group and many of the ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria have traditional rulers

who are Fulani.[34] In our data the Fulani are marked as being very distinctive in terms of almost all the characteristics of political culture that we have measured. They have a very strong sense of personal efficacy, on their own or through groups, but a moderately low sense of their own political efficacy and the efficacy of the political system. They have moderately low levels of political cognition and average affect for the political system, and while they do not have a very positive evaluation of the outputs of government services they do favor broadened participation in the input processes. They have a moderately strong preference for hierarchical decision making procedures and a very strong conservative score on basic values. They have an average level of social distance and identity which may be an important aspect of the central role they have and continue to play in coalition building in the politics of Nigeria.

Idoma Patterns

[34] There are many historical reasons for how this came to be but we will not discuss those here. For a detailed view of the Fulani and their base of conquest see Adeleye (1977).

The Idoma are largely a rural people who depend on agricultural pursuits for their livelihoods, and who have been outside of many of the profound changes that have affected Nigeria in recent decades.[35] The survey data from the Idoma is certainly consistent with their experience. The sense of efficacy - personal, political or systemic - is moderately low. Trust is low and cognition is average, system affect is low, while evaluation of government outputs and inputs is average. They want a broadened range of government services and a democratic decision-making process. They have a strong sense of social distance from others but their strength of group identity is low.

Ibibio Patterns

The Ibibio are one of the largest 'minority' groups in the country and often neglected despite the considerable

[35] For information on the Idoma see Armstrong (1980) and Magid (1976).

mobilization and outmigration to other parts of the country. They have average senses of personal efficacy through their own or group effort but see themselves with considerable political efficacy and efficacy of the political system. They are very well informed and have strong affect for the political system while they strongly support the output of government services yet would like to see a broadened range of input processes. They strongly support democratic decision processes, but have relatively conservative basic values. Their sense of social distance is average and their group identity is quite low. Their joining with a Northern coalition probably reflects these values and their search for a more powerful ally through which to articulate their political demands.

Tiv and related groups

The Tiv are one of the dominant groups in the 'middle belt' of the country although an acephalous group with very little non-rural population and low levels of education and social mobilization compared with southern groups but more

than those groups to the North. They have a low sense of personal efficacy on their own, an average sense of efficacy through groups, personal political efficacy, and perception of system efficacy. They have moderately high levels of political trust, average levels of political cognition, low system affect, a strong positive evaluation of government outputs but dissatisfaction with input procedures, and average notion of scope of government operations. They are moderately democratic in their orientation, tending towards conservative values, average social distance with a strong sense of identity.

Ijaw Patterns

The Ijaw inhabit one of the most difficult climates in Nigeria, the dense rain forest areas of the Niger River delta. The area is a patchwork of forest and mangrove swamp and creeks. The ecological imperatives of the area are more significant as a constraint on social organization than almost any other area of the country. The area is also the principal source of the country's primary source of income,

oil, both on and off-shore.

The Ijaw score very high on a sense of personal efficacy, and moderately high on efficacy through groups, political efficacy, and perceptions of the efficacy of the political system. They are a little above average on trust in the political actors, but not well informed about politics. They positively evaluate government outputs and are in favor of democratic decision processes and are moderately high on a modernity scale. They have a strong sense of social distance from others but a low sense of their identity as a group. This is consistent with their history of anti-Ibo feelings but fractious internal politics.

Bini Patterns

The Bini of the area in and around Benin City are one of the oldest and best known groups in Nigeria. Their early contact with the Portuguese (in the sixteenth century) brought them to the attention of Europeans. The group's

traditional history traces their migration from the Yoruba areas and their political culture reflects that with the considerable congruence between the two groups.

Our sample had a very low average score on sense of personal efficacy, high scores on personal efficacy through groups, personal political efficacy and perceptions of system efficacy, and moderate sense of trust in political actors. They are well informed about politics, have moderately high evaluation of government outputs, see no need for changes in input processes nor changes in the scope and function of government, tend to be authoritarian in their decision processes, have modern values, and see politics as highly salient. They have a moderate level of social distance with a low sense of internal social identity. This does differentiate them from the Yoruba with a much stronger sense of social distance and group identity.

Northern Edo Patterns

The peoples to the north of the Bini share language (but not closely enough for mutual intelligibility in most cases), and an oral history that traces their origins from Benin City. There is considerable reason to believe that their origins are much more complex resulting to some considerable extent from their location on the boundaries of several distinct culture areas. Their eclectic cultural norms and wide variety of religious loyalties are indications of this diversity.

The northern Edo have a moderately low sense of personal efficacy, but have a strong sense of efficacy through groups, political efficacy, and efficacy of the political system. They have a very low sense of trust in political actors, have average political cognition, have moderately strong system affect, and approve of government outputs as well as input processes. They favor an extended role for government, are highly democratic in their decision process preferences, have strong modern values, moderate levels of social distance, and a low sense of group identity.

Urhobo Patterns

The Urhobo are located to the north of the Ijaw in the Niger River delta but in somewhat less daunting environmental conditions and also just to the south of the Bini and the center of the old Benin kingdom with its powerful tentacles.[36]

The Urhobo exhibit low levels of personal efficacy and political efficacy although they do perceive the political system as effective and have a moderately high level of trust in political actors. They are moderately well-informed, feel about average with respect to evaluation of government outputs and would like to see an expansion of the input processes to government. They are relatively authoritarian in their preferences for decision processes and have a very strong sense of social distance although a relatively low sense of corporate identity. This seems compatible with a group that has been associated with difficulty in terms of coalition building with other groups.

Kanuri Patterns

[36] See Otite (1973) for an ethnography of the Urhobo.

The Kanuri of northeastern Nigeria are a Islamized people who historically withstood the attempt of the Fulanis to unify the North under their suzerainty in the nineteenth century and therefore remain with a distinctive sense of their group identity. Nevertheless, we find that their cultural measures indicate a clear closeness with the adjacent Hausa and other Islamic peoples.

The Kanuri have a moderate sense of their own personal efficacy, a strong sense of their political efficacy and the efficacy of the political system, and a very high level of political trust. Their political cognition is low and system affect high while they positively evaluate government outputs and the expansion of government services. They prefer hierarchical authority systems, tend to moderately conservative values, have low social distance from others, and a strong sense of their group identity.

Conclusions

The most prominent conclusions to be gleaned from these modal patterns is how much they coincide with the general literature of these groups although this data may give more insight into the group interaction issues that individual ethnographies are usually not concerned with. A second conclusion that comes from the measures of variance about these modal patterns is that there is significant variation on all of these measures throughout all of the populations. Clearly, the question of what systematic pattern, if any, can be found to account for this variation is one of our tasks.

Another significant finding is the interrelation of several indicators. Social distance seems to be an important element in the ability of a group to effectively enter the coalition-building process that is necessary for any federation-wide government in this highly plural society. The commitment to particular decision processes also seems to be an important element in the congruence of political cultures and political coalitions.

In the next two chapters we turn to evidence on the basis for some of this variation.

Chapter Nine

**The Culture-Bearing Unit: Institutional Determinants
of Variations in Political Culture
Nigerian Evidence**

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Summary

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Introduction

In the previous chapters, we constructed indicators of the elements and pattern of the political culture carried by the disembodied culture-bearers. In this chapter, we begin the search for the sources of variation among these culture-bearers by evaluating the links of the disembodied culture-bearers with the putative sources of culture, the embodied form.

The evaluation of the embodied-disembodied link is particularly important since almost all analyses of plural societies consider the relationship straightforward and have failed to empirically examine it.[1] However, it is

[1] Most such analyses such as those by Young (1976), Lijphart (1977) and Furnivall (1948) have a model of individual action and belief that, while untested, plays an important role in their explanations of group behavior. Note, however, that high correlations between indices of the disembodied and embodied cultures does not inform us about those at the margin of social change since variation about the mode may be due to systematic aspects of individual's experience of social change. In contrast to these elements in culturally plural societies a relatively homogeneous society like China can be contrasted in many ways including the predicted development of factions and conflict based on non-ascriptive elements. See Ahern (1981), Pye (1981), and Parish and Whyte (1976).

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difficult for analyses based on aggregate measures to detect directions of change since individual and cohort shifts are integral to the dynamics of the process. Yet without an evaluation of such effects we can only conjecture about the nature of the social change process.[2]

Change tends to occur slowly.[3] We expect that disembodied culture-bearers will strongly feel the effect of their early socialization experiences particularly with regard to that corpus of values and beliefs that define culture (i.e. their 'theory of the world'). This view, known as the Primacy Principle,[4] asserts that early learning is both more basic than later (secondary) socialization and more difficult to modify. This does not

[2] Of course, a large corpus of 'pop' literature exists to analyze such changes when they are at an incipient or early stage of development. For sources on how such changes take place, see Lewin (1936, 1951), Dolre (1979), Harris (1968), Gould (1974), and Naroll and Naroll (1973).

[3] The slowness of such change has been emphasized by many. See Keynes' General Theory (1936) on the role of long-dead economists on current policy, and related comments by Marx in the Eighteenth Brumaire (1863). The psychological reasons for such resistance are reviewed in Reed (1973).

mean that values and attitudes do not change, especially in relation to educational experience, spatial mobility, and occupation, but we expect that these alterations principally contribute to culture change intergenerationally as new entrants to the society are not already equipped with a particular 'theory of the world'.

'Primacy' of culture is by no means the sole or principal explanation of variation in political choice.[5] As emphasized earlier, we expect political culture to establish certain constraints which come into play as a function of the particular arenas of conflict in which actors find themselves.

[4] Recent work has challenged this principle, however. Of course, in the terminology of Chapter 2, culture as a theory of the world is formed early, principally by an inductive process constituted largely of vicarious experiences and only rejected when a more comprehensive theory is advanced and accepted. This, in part, accounts for the influence of a coherent 'theory of the world' such as Marxism and the relative inability of less deterministic theories, e.g. pluralism, to capture the imagination of individual culture-bearers.

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In this chapter, we: (1) review the empirical relations between measures of the disembodied and embodied cultures; (2) operationalize measures of political attitudes, behavior and coalition preferences; and (3) relate our measures of the culture-bearers, both disembodied and embodied, to these political measures. In particular, we examine the role of language, religion, ethnicity (as identification of a socialization syndrome), state of origin (in Nigeria) and sex as basic indicators of embodied culture, and how these indicators relate to our indices of disembodied culture. Both sets of measures are assessed in relation to several measures of political behavior and choice.

A. Primary Sources of Cultural Transmission:

Disembodied: Embodied Culture Link : Empirical Evidence

[5] However, we agree with Peel (1973) that cultural bases of explanation are particularly relevant in the analyses of African (and plural society) politics. This is also consistent with Pye's (1958) characterization of non-Western peoples although we believe it is more universally applicable. For example, see Leites (1969) for the role of culture in Paris, and Campbell (1963, 1965) for a more general theoretical view. See Thorp (1966) and Schwarz (1968) for a view of Nigeria over the last century. Our intent is not to take a structuralist position in the Levi-Strauss sense, however, since its essence is "the primacy of culture; its credo is that code or symbolic system." (Bergman:1977,1009).

Introduction

We have argued that cultures consist of learned and shared ideas, values and, especially, beliefs; that culture is patterned and provides basic orientations; that cultures change slowly relative to other aspects of human society, such as technology, and respond less readily to the pressures of events because of their character as a theory-set; and that culture-bearers tend to be aggregated into sub-cultures which are "co-extensive with networks of communication." (Borhek and Curtis:1975,51-52).

Agreement on a general outline of the properties of culture does not provide us with the means to 'know one when we see it', or to recognize the unit or aggregation of individuals that bears a given culture.[6] Naroll (1970) has reviewed a number of bases for determining the appropriate boundaries for a culture-bearing unit (CBU) and conversely for classifying an individual as to his culture. He makes the following points: (1) a CBU must have a

[6] We assume at this point that there exists sufficient reinforcing cleavages to be able to assign most individuals to a given culture.

mechanism for reproducing itself, (2) its boundaries must be relatively stable and convergent in terms of political attitudes and beliefs (and perhaps social distance?); (3) boundary change will tend to be associated with periods of rapid social change (such as the SSRC 'crises') and be observed in cohort differences in values and beliefs that cannot be ascribed to maturation or aging effects.

We concluded above that a close relation exists between disembodied culture-bearers and some institutionalized socio-cultural structure that is all or in part dedicated to the transmission of that culture.[7] In this section we turn to an examination of those institutions, organizations, environments, and other sources of early socialization that play key roles in transmitting culture. These sources usually have significant responsibilities and defined roleholders to carry out their activities. However, we are more interested in those elements that transmit culture early in a person's life than in whether that activity is an end of the organization as is religion or a means such as a

[7] See Voget (1975) for a thorough review of the history of the empirical examination of cultures and ethnology. See Guillemin (1980) for recent work on the subject.

social club or sports group.[8] Since cognition can be directed/controlled by a range of devices from religion to language use, we must review the effects of these sources of culture in both their specific and diffuse aspects.[9] In general, we expect that institutions structure the socializing process which produces the disembodied culture-bearers and thereby transmits cultural knowledge.

[8] These two groupings can be distinguished as associations and fellowships, respectively. The first tends to be structured and goal-oriented in its belief carrying capacities and distinguished between the group's leadership, specialized roles and employees on the one hand, and the community of believers (generally larger than the fellowship) on the others (see Borhek and Curtis:1975,66) while the fellowship tends to be more diffuse and less goal-oriented, with belief systems that may not be well-developed or the role-defined responsibility of anyone to transmit. Further, as Borhek and Curtis (1975:60-66) note, fellowships deal with general and socially applicable beliefs which are not presented in isolation from other interests and generally there is high personal commitment to the group. Since there is no authoritative organization to settle differences of belief, low consensus is also characteristic of such groups. In general, organizational solidarity is traded off for purity of belief.

Considerable redundancy in this process across a number of institutions makes the process independent of any particular component unit in the society. However, some institutions are expected to have more coherent patterns across a culture area than others, while some have less effect on political culture.[10] For example, families as socializers and the general environment are more important than technological and economic forms although there are varying views on this issue.[11] The ability of the study to evaluate the specific roles of early socializing influences will depend on the analysis but we do not expect independent effects always to be clear given the redundancy generally found in any socializing process.

Diffuseness and redundancy are to be anticipated within the CBU. Moreover, cultural boundaries will occur when there is some relative convergence of institutional effects compared to other CBUs,[12] The CBU is ascriptively defined

[9] For specific examples of a range of such phenomena see Mary Douglas(1968) on jokes and the many examples in Cole et al. (1971) and Cole and Scribner (1974). For a review of structuralism, see Petitt (1977).

[10] See Jorgenson (1979) on this issue.

to the extent that an institutional identification is a measure of the existence of a cultural transmission mechanism.[13] The view that achievement (or secondary) sources of culture are more important than ascriptive sources will be evaluated later in this chapter. However, we expect that variance attributed to secondary socialization is partly due to a specification error which ignores the importance of systemic and external constraints since the possibilities of achievement in any society are constrained and defined by the institutional structure.

[11] For example, Kavanagh (1972:29) argues that French culture is not carried primarily by the family. He does argue, however, that where politics is relatively undifferentiated from other spheres of activity (social, etc.) that authority and behavior patterns tend to be transferred between political and nonpolitical culture. For other issues, see Gastil (1976) on U.S. cultural regions, Freedman and De Boer on cultural differences in early childhood development (1979) and a statement on modal personality by Inkeles and Levinson (1969). On other sources of early socialization, see Slegler (1978) on what develops in children's thinking, and Mussen (1970) for an extensive source of ideas on the subject. For a classic study in political culture, see Pye (1962).

On what evidence do we base such an expectation for Nigeria? As Table 9.1 illustrates, neither the respondent's occupation, education, nor the occupation of his father produces groups that discriminate well on the basis of the measures of the disembodied culture, while various measures of the environment, religion and language do.[14] Thus the tendency in most plural and nonplural societies for people to identify themselves in terms of ascriptive institutional labels may have a considerable 'real' base.[15] Given the apparent overall evidence of the discriminant analyses as

[12] Note Blau's notion of concentric and intersecting circles (1977:128). Some boundaries may be weak -see a review of Mary Douglas' work in the American Journal of Sociology (January 1976:1016). Durkheim, on the other hand, could assume the existence of fundamental boundaries of societies and of group socializing experience, although his expectation was that eventually occupation would play a fundamental role in the organization of society -we do not expect this to be true with respect to culture in societies that maintain institutionally separate groups.

[13] There is no expectation that this institution will be the same across cultures. However, language and religion should play important roles in most societies since they are fundamental to communication, and social organization and interaction.

[14] For other evidence on this subject but for a nonplural country (Botswana), see Alverson's (1978) study of the Tswana.

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summarized in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 we expect that a more detailed evaluation is in order. After operationalizing our embodied culture-bearer measures and noting certain threats to the validity of the groupings, we turn to such an analysis.

The sources of the embodied culture chosen will include the gamut of sources of early socialization which we consider the primary period of cultural transmission from both the embodied and disembodied culture-bearers to the cultural novice.[16] The choice of indicators is affected by the difficulty of gathering specific details concerning an individual's experience. However, it is equally

[15] Note Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) for a useful definition of identity

[16] See Wright (1975a) for a discussion of the primacy principle in political socialization work. See M.B. Smith (1969) on social psychology and values, Bates (1978) for early cognitive development, Gollob (1979) on a view of social cognition -- the subject, verb, object approach, Rosenthal and Zimmerman (1978) on cognition and social learning, and Dobbert (1975) on a systems model of cultural transmission. For a view of the fundamental importance of literacy in such a process and in an African context, see Goody (1977) and for Nigerian data, see Adamu (forthcoming) on the 'Hausaization' process and Price-Williams (1975, 1961) on some detailed studies of cognition in Nigeria.

Important to recognize that culture is syndromic, and that isolated experiences though important to individual culture-bearers occasionally are simply 'noise' to the system which is filtered out by the randomization process of unshared experience.[17]

We have included two types of indicators, those that differentiate according to characteristics reflecting diversity within groupings, such as sex differences, and those reflecting temporal (period and generational cohort) effects as suggested by the age of the respondent.[18] Thus our cultural transmission agents are not necessarily coterminous with ethnic, religious or linguistic boundaries. As already suggested in Table 9.1, intra-group variation in culture due to sexual differences in socialization may be significant for the adaptive needs of society.[19] We will explore this difference later in this report.

[17] Note Pye's (1976) study of Mao as an example of the importance of individual experience.

[18] See Pelto (1975) for a discussion of intra-cultural diversity, and Mason et al. (1973) and Glenn (1977a, 1977b) for a discussion of the problem of separating out the effects of age, period and cohort.

Table 9.1

Discriminant Analyses of Measures of the Disembodied
 Culture as a Function of Various Groupings

GROUPING CATEGORY	RUN NUMBER	PERCENT CORRECT CLASSIFICATION
1. Respondent's Occupation VAR230	1132 (1)	16
2. Father's Occupation VAR234	1132 (32)	11
3. Respondent's Age (deciles) AGRDUP	1144 (1)	26
4. Number of languages spoken (multilinguals only) VAR243	1144 (11)	27
5. Respondent's Education VAR229	1133A (1)	28
6. Religion x Region (12 categories)	1145 (1)	31
7. Religion (8 mixed religion groups)	1147 (1)	33
8. Religion x Region (9 categories)	1145 (6)	34
9. Religion VAR247	1133 (1)	37
10. Language Group* Dalby codes 8 groups	1149	38
11. Ethnic Group (linguistic) VAR249 Largest 14 Groups	1143 (13) Also 1129 (57)	40

*Basic language groupings as defined by Dalby
 see Table 9.4.

** Ethnic groups as labeled in the study and
 in the subsamples of the data base.

NOTE: Interview administered in thirteen languages although
 most (90% in weighted sample) were given in one of five
 languages. Discriminant analyses using other independent
 variables (as noted on the description of each run) are
 included below.

[19] While systems analysis has taught us the importance of the search for appropriate boundaries in the determination of units of analysis (see Buckley:1968), we often forget to evaluate whether the general condition of 'systemness' is met. That is, if interaction within groups is high relative to that across boundaries. While many political culture studies infer the culture from socialization practices (e.g., Solomon:1972) they may not always choose the appropriate socializing agents.

Table 9.1 continued

P			
12.	State of Origin VAR235	1132 (18)	41
13.	State of Interview (12 states) VAR271	1143 (40)	46
14.	Ethnic group VAR249 (linguistic) (largest 10 groups)	1143 (28)	47
15.	State of Interview VAR271 (19 states)	1129 (39)	49
16.	Ethnic Group** 8 groups	1148	50
17.	Urban-Rural Residence (Urban gt 20,000) URBRUR	1143	61
18.	Sex of Respondent VAR225	1144 (21)	62
19.	State of Interview 19 states on 51 orig. variables	1101 (1)	71
20.	Assets on 56 orig. variables	1102 (1)	29
21.	Assets on 50 orig. variables	1103 (1)	34
22.	State of Interview 12 states	1104 (1)	72
23.	Respondent's Education 51 orig variables	1105 (1)	48
24.	Respondent's Education 56 orig. variables	1105 (7)	42

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Table 9.2 Two Discriminant Analyses and their Predicted Group Membership

I. Grouped by Respondent's Occupation
 Percent Correct Classification = 15%

Table includes X's in every cell comparing actual group membership to predicted which were at least 10% (from Run 1132:14-18).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	X	X													
2	X	X											X		
3		X				X									
4									X		X				
5		X			X										
6						X							X	X	
7							X				X		X	X	
8						X								X	X
9									X				X		X
10											X				
11							X				X	X		X	
12							X					X		X	
13	X												X		X
14															
15															

Our selection of sources for the embodied culture includes language, religion, and ethnicity, i.e., the general background clearly shared by all those aspects of the embodied culture which vary across members of a given culture area, sex, age, mother and father's home area,

Table 9.2 continued

II. State of Origin

(Run #1132:30-33)

All categories with 8% or greater correspondence of actual and predicted are noted.

Percent Correct Classification = 41%

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Lagos	1	60			12							
Western	2	14	22	8		8					11	
Kwara	3		28						10			
Midwest	4	10		34	12							
EC	5				53							
R	6				11	48						
SES	7						54					
B.T	8						19	16	12			
NE	9								44			10
K	10									56	14	
NC	11									14	2	13
NW	12											74

multilingualism, respondent's and father's occupation, and respondent's and parent's education.[20] We hypothesize that the experiences of early socialization will dominate those of later experience, in terms of the acquisition of

[20] We evaluate the entropy-based measure of culture-bearing in the following section. See Levine and Tribus (1979) on the entropy formalism, Harary and Batell (1978) on negative information, and Hodges (1973) on adding and averaging models for information integration. See Klecka (1980) for a discussion on problems of interpretation of discriminant function coefficients.

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culture. We first evaluate the primary sources and then consider alternative hypotheses which reflect secondary socialization experience.[21]

A. Disembodied=Embodied Culture Link =Empirical Evidence

Language Evaluation

Table 9.3 Embodied=Culture Questions*

- 111. What is your sex?
 92(1) Male 8(2) Female
- 112. On your last birthday, how old were you (in years)?
- 120. What town are you from?-----
 b. What towns were your parents from?
 Father -----
 Mother -----
- 121. What is your mother tongue?-----
- 122. What other Nigerian languages,
 including English and pidgin
 do you speak?-----Number -----
- 123. What is your religion?
 41(1) Muslim 41(2) Christian Protestant
 11(3) Christian Catholic 3(4) Independent-Aladura,
 C and S
 4(5) Traditional 1(6) Other
- 125. Of what ethnic or tribal group are you a member?-----

*Question numbers refer to their designation in the original questionnaire.

[21] For a view of the Nigerian experience, see Uka (1966) on growing up in Nigerian culture, and Nelson (1972) for an overview of the ranges of embodied culture in Nigeria.

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There is widespread agreement that language is basic to a culture although there is considerable variation in explanations of why this is true, and how it works. Certainly, language differences can pose a barrier to communication, although in many linguistically plural environments either: (1) some lingua franca or 'creole' language develops (such as Swahili in East Africa and Pidgin in West Africa); or (2) individuals come to learn several languages e.g. for religion, trading and market etc. - a common phenomenon in Nigeria.[22] Those agreeing on the importance of language range from the structuralists following Levi-Strauss,[23] to cognitive psychologists[24] and anthropologists (cf. Werner:1969), as well as

[22] Sometimes each language is associated with a specific function such as home or marketplace. Murdock as quoted by Jorgensen: 1979) considers language communality as the best indicator of culture communality. Language used in the conduct of political business, both in practice and officially, continues to be a highly salient issue in the country. See West Africa 13 April 1981 page 83.

[23] See Pettit (1977) for a review of structuralism.

[24] Cf. Estes:1978. The development of language and cognition are temporally intertwined, however. See Moore (1973) for a review. Also see Miller (1976) on Johnson-Laird.

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linguistically oriented anthropologists like Goodenough (1957), and a variety of sociolinguists (Rubin:1973, Dittmar:1976).

Language, however, does not exist apart from other spheres of human action, although it both precedes and conditions responses to events. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, basic to a number of investigations, constitutes an extreme view of language as the controller of cultural possibilities.[25] Nevertheless, the view that linguistic distance is related to cultural distance appears justified generally and is consistent with our expectation that culturally-near groups tend to merge, becoming more distant from other groups.[26] In this process of assimilation, language acquisition appears to precede cultural and identity changes.

[25] Laitin (1977) has tested the hypothesis as it affects Somalian politics. For discussions of current evidence, see McCormack and Wurm (1977) and Pinxter (1976). See Ferguson (1971) on the relation between language structure and its use. Also see Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Dieron (1977).

[26] See Haugen (1972) on the ecology of language development. See Sanches and Blount (1975) on the sociocultural dimensions of language use.

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Nigeria's linguistic complexity is enormous, even using as a yardstick the variation which occurs throughout the central third of Africa. Nevertheless, most of the population can speak one of four languages in this multi-lingual population.[27] The major language spoken in the country is Hausa with about half of the population speaking it as a first or second language.[28] For most of the northern states, Hausa is the *lingua franca*. In the southern part of the country, English, the second most commonly spoken language in the country, serves as the *lingua franca* along with Pidgin. Yoruba and Igbo dominate

[27] See Dalby's (1977) African language map as well as Hansford's (1976) on Nigeria.

[28] Note that this sample represents about 86% of the country's population and therefore these figures are generally overestimates of the country's population percentages. The corrected estimate is .86 x the figure given in the table plus the percentage of the 14% in the country who were not represented in the survey. The unrepresented portion is not random with respect to language coverage, however. The areas unrepresented are heavily Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri speaking and hence those languages are actually more common in the country than these data indicate. Upper limits on these might be Hausa (51%), Fulani (17%), Kanuri (7.5%) for the entire country. Few languages spoken in the South are represented in these areas, except for some English and a sprinkling of other languages, and therefore they can be assumed to be close to zero.

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as first languages in their home regions. However, most Igbo-speakers also speak English as do many Yoruba-speakers. The extent of multilingualism has never been documented for the entire country.[29] Nearly three-quarters of the population speak more than one language. However, only seven languages are spoken by at least five percent of the population although using the 1974 estimate of Nigeria's population, 60 million, there were seventeen languages with at least one million speakers.[30] In Table 9.4 the mother tongue of the survey respondents is given along with Dalby's (1977) codings for linguistic affinities.

We have two propositions to explore relating language to political culture: (1) the relation between language distance and political culture differences for which we will use Dalby's codings for linguistic distance (or affinity); and (2) the effects of multilingualism.[31]

[29] To this writer's knowledge. Note the survey did not specifically test claims by respondents to speak other languages although some of this is known indirectly since interviews were often carried out in other than first language.

Table 9.4 Respondent's Language Distribution

(Languages ordered by Dalby codes of linguistic closeness)

Language	Mother Tongue		Additional Speakers		Total Speakers		Dalby Code
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
1. Hausa	1499	17.4	2587	30.0	4086	47.4	03A
2. Gwandara, Gade (Hausa spkrs)	30	.4	6	.1	36	.4	03A
3. Angas, Suru, Miriam, Tali, Ankwe	18	.2	8	.1	26	.3	03B
4. Bura, Rabur	87	1.0	0	0	87	1.0	05B
5. Kilba, Margi,	1	0	3	0	4	0	05B
6. Bachama, Bata	16	.2	0	0	16	.2	05D
7. Yanuri	122	1.4	296	3.4	418	4.8	11B
8. Fulani, Ffulde	442	5.1	872	10.1	1314	15.2	201
9. Ijaw, Kalabari	221	2.6	35	.4	256	3.0	35
10. Yoruba	2071	24.0	635	7.4	2706	31.4	47
11. Itsekeri	47	.2	47	.5	64	.7	47
12. Kabba(Yoruba)	14	.2	0	0	14	.2	47
13. Igala	23	.2	47	.5	70	.8	47
14. Gbari	107	1.2	114	1.3	221	2.5	48
15. Nupe, Ibewa	33	.4	176	2.0	210	2.4	48
16. Rini	142	1.6	97	1.1	239	2.8	49
17. N. Edo (Etsako, Ake Kukuruku, Ishan, Afenmau	185	2.1	33	.4	218	2.5	49
18. Isoko	4	.1	12	.1	16	.2	49
19. Urhobo	84	1.0	24	.3	108	1.3	49
20. Ora	4	.0	23	.3	27	.3	49
21. Igbo	1461	16.9	587	6.8	2048	23.7	60
22. Alago	8	.1	12	.1	20	.2	61
23. Idoma	192	2.2	36	.4	228	2.6	61
24. Ibibio, Efik, Anang	642	7.4	138	1.6	780	9.0	620

[30] Note that a number of closely related languages from 557
the fragmentation belt, running from the Jos plateau to
Rendel State, have been grouped to avoid details which
we believe are not significant at the level of
inclusiveness of our analysis. Also some languages such
as Igbo have not had a standardized vocabulary and
pronunciation until recently and there is often
considerable difficulty in Igbo-speakers communicating
to each other than by shifting to some other language,
usually English. See Anafulu (1971) on the Igbo
language. See Adekunle (1972) on some aspects of
multilingualism in Nigeria. Also Bishop (1974) on
language in Kano, and Brann (1973) deals with
multilingualism in Nigeria, particularly in the
fragmentation area. , Brann (1980) has more recently
discussed the implications of language on the
constitution in Nigeria. Erikson (1981) discusses the
role of networks as channels of attitude construction.
Clearly language networks can be analyzed in a similar
manner to other networks. Giles (1979) discusses ethnic
and language relations and their interrelation and
Silverman and Torode (1980) investigate the limits of
linguistic analysis on social outcomes.

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Table 9.4 continued

Language	Mother Tongue		Additional		Total		Dalby Code
	N	%	Speakers		Speakers		
			N	%	N	%	
25. Ekoi	9	.1	7	.1	16	.2	62
26. WarJawa, Waji	13	.1	0	0	13	.1	62
27. Bauchi	1	0	0	0	1	0	63C
28. Katab, Kagora, Kaje, Jaba	18	.2	25	.3	45	.5	63E
29. Birom	14	.2	4	.0	18	.2	63H
30. Mada, Eggon, Ninzam	21	.2	12	.1	33	.4	63H
31. Jukun	19	.2	27	.3	46	.5	64A
32. Igbara(Ebira)	64	.7	24	.3	88	1.0	604
33. Tangale, Waja, Tura, etc	235	2.7	0	0	235	2.7	65A
34. Tiv, Ugbe, Utange etc.	290	3.4	87	1.0	277	3.2	61
35. Jarawa	1	.0	1	.0	2	.0	84
36. Tera, etc	146	1.7	148	1.7	292	3.4	?

Non-Indigenous Languages

37. English	1	.0	3647	42.3	3648	42.3	99E
38. Arabic	0	.0	63	.7	63	.7	01A
39. Pidgin	0	.0	1841	21.3	1841	21.3	?

[31] Note that such a relation may not be uniform across the country -in this respect note Murdock's comment with respect to the Plateau (around Jos, etc.) area of Nigeria -"in this region cultural and linguistic differences reveal an extremely low degree of correlation." (1959:91)

Table 9.5 Number of Languages Spoken by Respondents

Data Source: VAR243 from Run 1048, p. 300

Number of Languages	Weighted Frequency	Percentages
1	2440	28.3
2	2249	26.1
3	2298	26.6
4	1219	14.1
5	326	3.8
6	58	.7
7	19	.2
8	17	.2
9	0	.0
10	1	.0

We have already seen that language (Table 9.1) will give moderately good discrimination on the political culture measures. However, our first analysis depended upon the use of named languages which are not always coterminous with ethnic identity. For example, the Gwandara, speak a dialect of Hausa, while most urban Fulani speak Hausa as a first language. Another example is the Kabba who are a Yoruba-speaking group. Using linguistically more well-defined categories, we have run both a regression model and a discriminant analysis.[32] We conclude that the

[32] By 'well-defined' we mean languages which are accorded distinct numeric categories by Dalby (1977).

ability of language to act as a summary of cultural content remains considerable.[33] This is consistent with both our own view expressed earlier and the views of cultural anthropologists such as Murdock and Naroll.

The second category of primary socialization, religion, is widely used as a basis for political mobilization in both inter- and intra-state relations. Even though language is acquired first, religion may be even more important as a basis for political action. Religious differences typically underly political conflict in monolingual plural societies.[34] The reasons for the importance of religion

[33] This relation may be 'spurious' in the sense that linguistically 'near' groups are, in general, also geographically close as well. This complex of issues will be evaluated as we progress in the evaluation of the data.

[34] Such as contemporary Northern Ireland, Holland, and Northern India (Urdu and Hindi are very close), and historical France (Huguenots), the Crusades and the many Jihads (Muslim holy wars) throughout history. Multilingual societies on the other hand, often have a religious element that is partly correlated with linguistic differences. Examples include contemporary Canada, Belgium, the Soviet Union, Israel, Sudan, India, and historic examples were the Ottoman Empire (with respect to the conflicts with the Greeks and Armenians) and the Russian Empire. See Gal (1979) on bilingualism in Austria.

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are complex. In addition to the existence of institutions and roles which allow it to recruit and mobilize adherents, religion serves to provide a world view and ideology which purports to provide moral norms and justification for virtually every area of human activity. This is particularly true of the universalistic forms. Religions in competition with one another also provide status for their members, including titles and other valued honorifics. Thus, religion may be used to legitimate ethnocentrism and to provide the basis of political mobilization against the 'non-believers'.

We do not mean to imply by our previous argument that the universalistic religions dominating contemporary Nigeria (90% of the population) and most of the countries of the world are not flexible with regard to political forms. Except for explicitly communist states, few countries eschew religious legitimation. Modernization and social change have often been carried out under the banner of an existing religious system, usually when religion, culture and state are coterminous or approximately so.[35] In a plural society, religious divisions are unlikely to play a positive role, politically or socially, although such divisions may

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play a role in economic development, stimulating group competition in the marketplace. To the extent that this happens, such divisions can be positive with respect to the

- [35] Of course, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the two largest countries in the world, do discourage religion although not always successfully. In those countries to a considerable degree "as Verba says, the state functions as a religion." (See Lipsitz:1968 for a comment on this view). Also see Lamont (1969) on the role of religious legitimation in pre-revolutionary 17th century England, and Gran (1979) on the Islamic roots in 17th and 18th century Egypt. See Smith on the role of religion (1974) in the modernization process. Examples of case studies include Barnes (1974a) on Italian politics, Weekes (1978) on Muslim peoples throughout the world, Jackson (1979) on Indonesia, Oded on the role of Islam in Africa (1975), de Craemer and Vansina (1976) on religious movements in Central Africa, Fernandez (1978) on African religious movements, Grindal (1973) on Islam and urban adaptation in Ghana, Fisher and Fisher (1971) on slavery and Islam, and Laitin (1978) on the theoretical links between religion and political culture. For work on Nigeria, see Barnes (1978), Laitin (1978), Idowu (1962) Gbadamosi (1979), Lucas (1948), Peel (1968), and Van den Dreisen (1972) for works on the Yoruba; Shelton (1971), on the Igbo-Igala borderland; Downes (1971) on the Tiv; Ifeka-Moller (1974) on religion in Northern Nigeria. Also see Dudley (1968) and Sklar (1963) for evidence on the role of religion in Nigerian politics. Parsons (1964) studies the role of religion of the Kono in Sierra Leone. Lewis (1980) gives an overview of the increasing role of Islam in Africa. See Gbadamosi (1979) on Islam among the Yoruba. Mol (1978) links religion to identity in a cross-national study and McIntosh and Alston (1980) review the Lenski position on the linkage role of religion. Peel (1973,298) cites the work of Lamont in 1969 and Thomas in 1970 and compares them with outlines of Christian and Muslim movements in the twentieth century in Africa.

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adaptive character of a society.

Nigeria is a country of many religions. Variations on Christianity and Islam co-exist with hundreds of localized traditional religions which usually center around ancestor worship. Increasingly the population is coming to identify with a small number of religions, principally Islam and various Christian sects, although some practices and ritual forms from older socio-religious forms remains such as secret societies, or masquerade rituals converted from religious to social purposes.[36] Table 9.6 shows the population's overwhelming identification with Islam and Christianity, a process that has accelerated enormously in the last few decades for both major religions. Islam, however, is an old religion in Nigeria having been established in the North since the Eleventh century while Christianity is principally a product of European

[36] We use the word 'identity' to characterize religious membership even though there may be significant variation between the number of adherents (officially enrolled members) of a church, and those who respond to a census taker or this survey. In any case, there are no rolls or membership lists in Islam although the Islamic brotherhoods do have memberships which are in some sense analagous to Christian church membership.

colonialism during the last century and particularly the last fifty years.

As we can see in Tables 9.6 and 9.7 the Nigerian states and ethnic groups vary considerably in religious homogeneity with some states (e.g., Cross River, Kano) and some ethnic groups (e.g., Ibibio, Hausa) being homogeneous (i.e., essentially all Christian or Islamic, respectively) while other states (e.g., Lagos, Plateau) and ethnic groups (i.e., Yoruba, Gbari) show considerable variation in religious affiliations.[37] The question of what effect religion has on the political culture and political behavior remains.

As we have seen in Table 9.1 there is evidence to support the belief that religion plays an important role in the formation and maintenance of the political culture. It is not clear, however, if religion is being confused with other aspects of culture such as language and ethnicity. In Table 9.7 we present the results of a discriminant analysis on religion based on ethnic groups which are religiously

[37] In chapter 16, we investigate the role of the religious environment, particularly homogeneity, on the political culture.

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Table 9.6 Religious Distribution by State in Nigeria 1974

Data Source: VAR247 in run# p.
 (See Table 9.8 for religious distribution by
 ethnic group)

State	Muslim %	Protes- tant	Christians Catholic	Afri- can Indepen- dent	Trad- itional	Index of Religious Fraction- alization
1. Lagos	39	53	7	1	0	0
2. Oyo	36	53	4	3	2	2
3. Ogun	32	39	15	11	0	4
4. Ondo	20	64	9	6	0	0
5. Kwara	46	35	18	0	0	0
6. Bendel	35	17	21	7	19	1
7. Imo	4	63	20	6	11	0
8. Anambra	3	46	42	6	3	0
9. Rivers	0	72	11	2	14	2
10. Cross- River	0	78	19	1	2	0
11. Plateau	47	37	15	1	0	0
12. Benue	0	64	23	0	13	0
13. Gongola (estimate)	100					
14. Borno	100	0	0	0	0	0
15. Bauchi	71	24	2	2	2	0
16. Kano	92	6	2	0	0	0
17. Kaduna	88	10	2	0	0	0
18. Niger	61	36	3	0	0	0
19. Sokoto (estimate)	100	0	0	0	0	0
Country Total*	41.2	40.8	11.4	2.5	3.6	.5

* Note this is for the 86% of the country represented by the sample. Since most of the remaining 14% are Muslims with a small percent of traditional religion in Gongola State, the Muslim percentage for the country as a whole will reach about 47%. The country total for Christians is about 47% as well making Nigeria about evenly split between Islam and Christianity.

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Table 9.7 Test of Religious Role In Group Differentiation
 Discriminant Analysis of Ethnic Groups with Heterogeneous
 Religious Identifications (Runs 1147, 1148, 1149)

- | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|
| 1. Grouped by religion | 33% | correct classification |
| 2. Grouped by ethnicity | 50% | correct classification |
| 3. Grouped by Dalby codes | 38% | correct classification |

Groups included are:

Yoruba, Ibo, Tive et al., Tangale et al., Bini
 Etsako, Gbari, Urhobo.

plural. There is a decrease in predictability from the overall sample which is consistent with the view that religion in religiously plural states plays a less important role than in religiously homogeneous states.

Since there does appear to be a moderately strong link between religion and disembodied political culture, the next question focuses on the relation between religion and political choice. As we can see in Table 9.8, it does seem that religion plays a role in the respondent's preference for those states with which he would or would not like to see his own state ally in the running of the central government. The choice displays a non-linear pattern.

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Ethnic groups with either low or high levels of religious pluralism show a relatively low relationship between respondent's religion and preference of states for alliance while the moderately plural groups show the highest levels of correlation between religion and choice of state with which to ally. This suggests that when religious differences are a significant intra-group issue that external alliances will be sought with religiously similar areas.[38]

Ethnicity

We have considered two specific aspects of the embodied culture which have a clear relationship with disembodied culture. We now turn to an indicator of a more diffuse set of elements in the embodied culture as it is represented by asserted ethnic identity. Unlike language which can be compared in terms of structure or corpus-distance, or religion which can be compared on grounds of socialization and organization, the ethnic patterns are more difficult to identify since they are usually passed on via small groups

[38] We need more empirical analysis to determine the effect of religion.

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Table 9.8 Religion Versus Preferred State for Alliance by

Ethnic Group Contingency Coefficients

Data Source Run 1049

Group	Most Prefer	2d Most	3d Most	Least Prefer	2d Least	3d Least
1. Yoruba						
34-54-5-5-1-1	.24	.33	.37	.32	.39	.35
2. Hausa						
99-1-0-0-0-0	.35	.41	.37	.25	.50	.34
3. Ibo						
1-57-28-6-8-0	.57	.62	.57	.65	.60	.52
4. Ibibio						
0-79-19-1-1-0	.30	.40	.35	.45	.34	.30
5. Fulani						
95-5-0-0-0-0	.41	.49	.59	.58	.55	.32
6. Tiv et al.						
3-57-35-0-5-0	.75	.58	.76	.68	.76	.74
7. Tangale et al.						
58-42-0-0-0-0	.18	.41	.29	.52	.39	.50
8. Ijaw						
0-70-11-2-15-3	.49	.61	.63	.71	.62	.58
9. Idoma						
0-67-18-0-0-0	.67	.56	.73	.82	.73	.60
10. Etsako						
67-12-19-0-0-3	.65	.57	.66	.61	.48	.55
11. Tera et al.						
71-14-0-0-14-0	.73	.58	.67	.72	.73	.73
12. Bini						
3-22-29-10-36-0	.78	.78	.67	.70	.77	.66
13. Kanuri						
85-15-0-0-0-0	.60	.36	.63	.41	.65	.58
14. Gbari						
57-43-0-0-0-0	.53	.65	.64	.49	.58	.70
15. Bura						
86-14-0-0-0-0	.61	.48	.66	.64	.51	.69
16. Urhobo						
1-56-28-0-0-0	.79	.79	.79	.69	.75	.61
17. Igbira						
61-12-28-0-0-0	.74	.67	.80	.78	.79	.67
18. Nupe						
91-9-0-0-0-0	.56	.55	.53	.47	.57	.58
19. Angas et al.						
0-76-19-0-5-0	.67	.67	.64	.69	.69	.47
20. Ekol						
7-20-74-0-0-0	.71	.74	.67	.71	.77	.77

Note: Below each ethnic group their religious distribution is given in the order Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, African Independent Christian, Traditional, Other.

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such as the family, peers or local networks. In this section ethnic identification is used to refer to this complex but syndromic set of sources for cultural transmission. It is not used to represent the respondent's sense of identity which we will study at length in a future chapter.[39]

There are not only a large number of ethnic groups in Nigeria but they also vary widely in their institutional practices. Surprisingly little is known about the actual effects of the embodied cultures on the disembodied culture-bearers particularly once the 'anthropological present' is left for the chronological present and contemporary social change.

Table 9.9 Preference for Alliance with Specific Other States as a Function of Religion

Data Source: Run #1050(?)

	Most Pref	2d Most	3d Most	Least Pref	2d Least	3d Least
Contingency Coefficient	.46	.39	.34	.34	.32	.30

General conclusion: Strong regional effect of religion but unclear as to religion's specific role Would like to know if Muslims in 'non-Muslim' areas (states) prefer Muslim states

Table 9.10 Discriminant Analysis by Ethnic Groups on
 Political Culture Indices Data Source Pun 1143. p. 36.

Discriminant function centroids for first function

Hausa (-1.0)	Tangale -.15	Tiv et al .10	Ibibio .81
	Fulani -.18	Idoma Etsako .21	Ibo .74
	Yoruba -.10	Ijaw .26	

-1.0	-.5	0	.5 1.0

[30] Some of the traditional ethnography on Nigeria is Talbot (1967) on the Niger River delta peoples; Talbot (1969) on Southern Nigeria; Temple (1967) on Northern Nigeria; Whitaker (1970) especially p. 411 on values on Northern political culture. For individual ethnic groups, see on the: Yoruba: Fodipe (1970), Baldwin and Baldwin (1976), Awolalu (in preparation), Forde (1962), Clarke (1972), Djigbo (1973), Lloyd (1971, 1974), Smith (1960), Barrett (1972, 1974, 1977), Aronson (1978), Bascom (1969). Igalas: Boston (1968). Tiv: Bohannon and Bohannon (1960, 1969), Bergsma and Bergsma (1969). Igho: Green (1964), Isichei (1976), Njoku (1970), Nsugbe (1974), Nzimiro (1972), Smock (1960), Anafulu (1971, 1977), Ollisa (1971), Ottenberg (1971), Uchendu (1965), Henderson (1972), Njaka (1974). Hausa: Fuglestad (1973), Levine and Price-Williams (1974), Smaildone (1977), Salamone (1975c), M. G. Smith (1960), Muffet (1975), Cohen (1969), Hill (1972, 1977), Whitaker (1969). Ijaw: Leis (1972). Nupe: Nadel (1942). Rukuba: Muller (1975). Fulani: Azarya (1976, 1978), Flesman (1977). Jukun: Rubin (1960) (Nadel wrote on Jukun). Idoma: Magid (1976). Note concept of bureaucratization central to his analysis. (See Armstrong rev., *American Journal of Sociology* (May 1979): 1500.) Northern Mid-West (Ukpilla): Borgatti (1976), Bradbury (1957). Urbobo: Otite (1972, 1973).

See Nitecki (1972) for a complete list of Nigerian ethnic groups. Other general sources on Nigeria are Schwartz (1965) for the entire country; Forde (1970) on the Niger-Benue confluence peoples. Related issues in other societies, see: Parkin (on the Luo) (1978); Geertz, Geertz, and Rosen (1979) on Morocco; Horowitz (1971) on ethnic politics; Hsu (1961) on culture and personality and Lambert, Hamers and Frasure-Smith on a cross-cultural study of child-rearing values and practices. See Robbins (1973) for a review of the links between identity, culture and behavior; Nelson (1979) for a view on ethnic sources of political participation in the U.S.; and Elliot (1979) on ethnic sources of politics in Canada.

Ethnic labels present certain difficulties implying a homogeneity of population which does not exist. For example, some groups, vary widely within their populations with respect to socialization practices while others do not, while some groups, although labelled distinctly, resemble closely neighboring groups in their practices but analysis tends to treat these groups as discrete entities.[40] Similarities between groups with respect to certain parameters does not imply the same for other parameters, with the result that groups may be alike and unlike with respect to different parameters. For ethnicity, unlike religion, we cannot look at groups that vary with respect to the parameter in terms of interest, but remain constant on other parameters. However, we can take the norms for each ethnic group as reported in the ethnographic literature and compare them to responses actually given in the survey.[41] Thus we expect respondents to express positive values about hierarchical decision-making procedures in societies where

[40] Hence the ratio of between-groups variance to within-groups variance is low. Our own data gives us some indication of this relative spread in variation.

[41] Which is summarized in Murdock's *Ethnographic Atlas* (1967).

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that is observed, although the pervasiveness of social change may affect this expectation significantly.[42]

Turning to the empirical evidence, we first examine the discriminant analysis of the ethnic groups. The analysis of the ten largest ethnic groups (over 90% of the country's population) shows one of the highest discriminating results of any grouping of the data. In general, (Table 9.10) the summary indicates results that are consistent with our expectations. For example, in the prediction results (Table 9.11) most groups can be successfully discriminated from other groups. When there is overlap it generally appears as expected. For example, groups with at least a 10% prediction for being Hausa, besides Hausa (56%), are Fulani (12%)—and for being Fulani (44%), are Hausa (17%), and Tangale et al. (17%). For certain groups, like the Ibo, discrimination is not as good as for the above groups but the 'nearest' groups are still the expected ones (i.e., Ijaw and the Tiv). In general, we find the southern groups to be

[42] Thus those closest to the survey' group's norms should be closest to the embodied norms and those who have experienced the most social change will be farthest away.

less predictable than the Northern groups reflecting not only the division between high and low social change, a fact that adds evidence to our expectations that social change does have an effect on values and beliefs, but also the greater communication and interaction between southern groups given the considerable communication network and population density.[43]

State of Origin

We have examined the effects of language, religion and ethnicity on the disembodied political culture according to a continuum from the most specific experience (language) which the culture-bearer engages in, to that which is less personally specific -- religion and ethnicity. Now we turn to the milieu of early socialization. For our respondents, this is denoted by state of origin.

We expect the environment to have an important effect on cultural development and change especially in terms of: (a) ecology and spatial organization; and (b) varying political norms and occurrences to which individuals, in particular migrants and minorities, adjust.[44] The states of contemporary Nigeria are of recent origin. Hence, there should be no *prima facie* reason to expect them to be useful discriminators of the embodied political culture, but this is not the case. The reason for this lies deep in the history of the colonization of Nigeria and the politico-cultural groupings which the British perceived to exist as they

progressively took control of the area they later named Nigeria.[45] The importance of these area groupings stems from the model of indirect rule that Lord Lugard utilized to govern this large new colony using only a small staff. The procedure which was generally followed was to govern through the existing leaders of each group. These leaders made use of British military power to support their authority against claimants to their respective positions. Pursuant to this model, the traditional units of governance were determined, districts and provinces established, and a colonial officer (the District Officer or D.O.) with formidable powers placed in charge. One of the more significant

[44] On cultural ecology, see Netting (1968) on the Kofyar of the Jos Plateau of Nigeria; see Hodder (1978) on the spatial organization of culture; Bamisaye (1974) on the social organization of begging in Ibadan; Smith (1960) on the history of government in a far northern Nigerian area, and Whitaker (1970) for the effects of social change in the North; Hill on the history of central Hausaland (1972, 1974, 1976); O'Connell (1971) on the authority-community link in Nigeria; Watson (1952) on acculturation amongst the Ibo; and Hair K.K. (1972) on politics and society in Southeastern Nigeria during the establishment of colonialism. We explore the situation of nature of belief at greater length in chapter 9.

[45] See Temple (1967) for reports by British officers on Northern Nigeria in the second decade of this century.

mechanisms by which the effects of the colonial (and pre-colonial) period survive in Nigeria, is through the contemporary political boundaries of both states and local authorities. With minor exceptions these are based on the provinces and districts delineated during the colonial period according to 'political intelligence reports' submitted by officers trained in anthropology. Thus it is reasonable to expect these boundaries to reflect basic socializing influences that go beyond language, religion and ethnicity while still intertwined with them.

We expect migrants to attempt to maintain their culture (we denote their culture with a surrogate, state of origin in this part of the study) usually by migrating within their own wider culture area, but also by recreating their cultural forms in the new place.[46] Of course, the counter-hypothesis that a person's context is more important than his state of

[46] For example, the 'Sabon Gari' areas of Northern Nigerian cities were set up to house the non-Muslims, usually Southerners, and their businesses. Note Margaret Pell's work on migrants in Lagos (1973).

origin is a reasonable one and we will explore that in more detail in chapters 13 and 16. We turn to our survey evidence for the role of state of origin in the embodied-disembodied link.[47]

Sex

All societies have some sexually distinctive elements of cultural transmission and sexually specific roles and institutions.[48] Not only are the sexes subject to differential socialization, but they are also the holders of differential status. Sex-related status differentials are closely related to development level, that is, the status and power gaps between the sexes declines as levels of economic and political development increase.[49] Characteristically women are more politically conservative, less politically informed and

[47] Note ethnic link to disembodied culture here.

[48] See the work by the Tiger (1970) for a review of evidence on this issue. White, Burton and Dow (1981) provide insight into the sexual division of labor in African agriculture. McCabe (1980) discusses the ubiquitous confounding effects of sex with other effects which makes unique isolation of the role of sex difficult.

more parochial in their interests than men in their respective societies. To the extent that a less developed form of the political culture is characteristic of women compared to men, we would expect to find no significant political culture differences among respondents if we controlled for the elements of status, education and experience. If, however, these differences are a function of socialization in different institutions, that is, a product of sexually distinctive embodied cultures, then such differences would not disappear. While this study does not possess the data to resolve this controversy, it will provide some evidence on the subject.[50] Specifically, we evaluate the variation of the indices of political culture as a

[49] For example, this can be seen in the characteristic process of educational expansion. First higher status men are educated and then the higher status women and the next status of men, etc., i.e., higher status women lag equivalent status men in the development of more egalitarian societies. On the experience of aristocratic women in eighteenth century England, see Trumbach (1978).

[50] See Levine (1966) on sex differences in the brain; Ten Houten (1978) for sex differences on cognitive tests and evidence on female students at Nigerian universities by O'Connell and Beckett (1976).

function of sex. Within household as well as between household information is used to evaluate the hypothesis raised in chapter 4 pertaining to within-household and particularly sex-based variation on political culture measures within household. We expect that the more egalitarian the environment, the greater within-household variance will be observed.

Food and Other Social Patterns

While the broader and syndromic aspects of the embodied culture have been emphasized so far in our discussion many conflicts exist between groups over specific and seemingly inconsequential issues. The very ferocity of the conflict indicates that the superficial cause gives specific substance to broader based issues which reflect the 'deep structure' of cultural differences. For example, riots in the Nigerian universities and residential secondary schools have focused on 'food' norms. In multi-cultural schools, conflict frequently relates to culturally specific norms on consumption patterns, of which food is a central concern.[51]

Although we will not investigate such differences in this study and have not gathered data on the subject, we do wish to draw attention to the visible processes which help maintain ethnic consciousness and ethnocentrism concerning ostensibly unimportant and mundane issues. These processes reflect real differences between groups in terms of unacceptable variations from their norms (e.g., hot and peppery versus bland food, sweet foods first in the meal as opposed to last, etc.).

The study contains little information on the specific social patterns underlying experiences. However, we do know how many wives and children each respondent has. We expect the family structure in such situations to relate to certain key aspects of political culture.[52] Among ethnic groups, the character of the household unit differs significantly. Some groups (e.g. Ibo, are essentially monogamous and some (e.g., Yoruba, Hausa) polygamous. The total number of children in the

[51] See Chang (1977) for a review of the role of food in Chinese culture, for example.

polygamous household is higher but the number per wife is actually lower.[53]

When the relationship between political culture and family structure is studied, considerable variation is accounted for by measures of difference in family structure.

The Changing Embodied Culture: Maturation, Period, and Cohort

[52] For studies relating family to social and political behavior, see Swanson (1978) on family structure and openness to new experiences; Levine (1960) on the family's role in authority systems; Ellis, Lee and Petersen (1978) on parental supervision and conformity of children; Hart (1979) on experience of place; Oppong (1974, 1975) on family status role in individual opportunities and choices. On related issues, see Oppong, Adaba and Bekombo-Priso (1978) on marriage, fertility and parenthood in West Africa; Smith and Welch (1977) on the peasant family in Africa; Burdin (1974) on social factors in nutrition in southwestern Nigeria; Dawson (1967) on cultural influences on perception; Frantz (1978) on the relation between social organization and ecology amongst the Fulani; and Miller (1972) on the cultural dimensions of parental verbalizations as they influence self-concept in the child. Soremi (1975) also notes the role of family/social structure in technological change in southwestern Nigeria.

Respondents in the survey received their primary socialization over a period of sixty years which included almost the entire 'colonial period' beginning in the late nineteenth century and going through the first years of independence (the late 1950's and early 1960's). The length of this time period and the events which occurred make it essential that we recognize the roles of maturation, period and cohort in our analysis. "Maturation" refers to a process related to developmental stages in the human life-cycle so that, for example, a person's understanding of his culture would be more elaborate and sophisticated as he ages.[54] We might expect that conservatism would increase with age after some point in early adulthood because: (1) mature persons become more cynical and informed as compared to those younger and more under the control of blood relations (same would be true for organizations); and (2) physical deterioration leads to a decline in innovative capability, ability to make changes, and an investment time horizon that is

[53] The figures for children are supposed to be those alive when they were interviewed. It appears that some respondents gave a figure of all live births, however.

progressively shorter.

A central issue analyzing the life-cycle revolves around the sorting out of issues which relate to the historical specificity of the sequence of socialization experiences. In analysis this is often referred to as the 'generational' or cohort effect.[55] Period effects are those due to the events of a specific time period which affect all age cohorts in that period regardless of their previous experience or lack of it—a major war, for example. The difficulty of analyzing period, cohort

[54] The notion of life-span in the analysis of social economic, psychological, and political behavior is common. Blau and Duncan (1967) and Hauser and Featherman (1978) follow in the analysis of social stratification; Erikson (1968) in his stages of development model pictures a person's life follows it in psychology; Modigliani amongst others has developed a life-cycle model of the consumption function in economic behavior; for political socialization in these terms, see Stacey (1977). See O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) for a psychologically based analysis of cognition; Elder (1968) on adolescent socialization and development, and Okonji (1971) on the role of culture in children's understanding of the spatial concepts of geometry.

[55] For a variety of views on the generation 'gap', see Levine (1967) on its effects on African political leadership; Langman (1973), Eisenstadt (1956) and Mead (1978) also consider this issue.

Table 9.12

Correlations between political culture and primary measures

runs 1201-1224, analysis of variance

	Ethnic Group	Religion	Sex	Age	State Origin (12 St)
1. Pereffow	.29	.11	.02	.08	.26
2. Pereffgp	.36	.06	.06	.13	.32
3. Perpoeff	.36	.11	.03	.11	.36
4. Syseffil	.39	.18	.04	.09	.36
5. Trust	.33	.19	.01	.09	.31
6. Cognition	.16	.10	.02	.07	.15
7. Mysaffect	.29	.04	.02	.03	.25
8. Evalgout	.42	.10	.02	.03	.39
9. Evalginp	.38	.32	.01	.07	.33
10.					
11.					
12.					
13. Salipol	.21	.07	.04	.08	.17
14. Basicval	.29	.13	.04	.09	.32
15. Socdist	.24	.10	.04	.06	.23
16. Identity	.18	.28	.02	.09	.45

and maturation effects results from their being intertwined. As Mason et al. (1973) have demonstrated, it is impossible to uniquely estimate their respective specific effects unless constraints are put on the estimation procedure to eliminate the underidentification problem that occurs in the

unconstrained case.[56] To generate sufficient constraints on the estimation process for purposes of identification is neither routine nor generalizable. For our study, we can estimate only some probable effects. The contrast between the ahistorical character of life-cycle models and the specifically historical character of cohorts presents certain methodological problems although understanding it is of considerable importance to social scientists.[57]

General expectation: Change occurs by generation effects (cohort) but some life-cycle component exists because as persons move on to new stages of their lives, the period's opportunity structure leads to different behavior from the previous generation as they were going through that stage.[58]

Summary

[56] See Fisher(1966) on the identification problem. See Scott, Osgood, and Peterson (1979) on some of these substantive issues.

[57] Maturation period cohort analysis here.

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Chapter Nine Primary Sources of Cultural Transmission

This chapter has been concerned with the relation between the measures of disembodied culture that individuals possess and the relation with measures of their putative sources of embodied culture including language, religion, ethnicity and other ascriptively-based sources. The links between these two sets of measures is very strong and it is clear that the continuity of the political culture that individuals evince is not minor.

In the next chapter we are concerned with the role of secondary sources of the political culture including education and occupation. These issues will also be investigated in later chapters. But in this next chapter it will be useful to get an early benchmark on the role of secondary socialization experiences.

[58] One of the principal period and cohort effects comes from the time and intensity of European colonial arrival. For the history of Western Yorubaland in this period see Asiwaju (1976). Burnham (1981) tells about the experience of a more isolated society as it comes into contact with outside forces.

Chapter Ten

**The Culture-Bearing Unit: Institutional Determinants
of Variations in Political Culture**

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Introduction

In this chapter we expand the examination of the embodied-disembodied culture link to include secondary socialization sources for the political culture link. We have already found in the previous chapter that some of the primary sources account for significant and consistent variation in political culture. These sources are those particularly related to ethnic group, geographic location, and to a lesser extent religion. We found that age and sex were of very little import, in contrast. One general deviation from this process was that the elements of the political culture that were most directly affected by increasing mobility and mobilization had the weakest link to the sources of the embodied culture. This is consistent with our view that the modernization process has its effect on the cognitive and to a lesser extent on the evaluative dimension of behavior and belief, but that the affective dimension is not altered but rather tends to be enhanced. Consequently, as we will examine in later chapters, we expect the links to community and the perceptions of differences from others to increase as mobilization occurs

where genuine difference exists, and to decrease where it does not. Thus we expect the secondary socialization process to decrease real cultural differences but to increase ethnocentrism and therefore the relative importance of the socio-cultural basis for politics.

In this chapter we then turn to an examination of these secondary socialization sources for the political culture.
Secondary Socialization - Alternative Explanations for the Empirical Evidence

The preceding chapter has explored the relationship between elements of the embodied culture which socialize new entrants into the culture at an early age. The evidence indicates the significance of the embodied-disembodied link at the primary socialization level. In this section, we explore alternative explanations for the observed data, and, in particular, explanations that center on secondary socialization experiences.[1] The sources of the political

[1] We delay the consideration of alternative explanations that reflect aspects of social mobility and mobilization until chapters 13 through 15, and evaluate ecological explanations in chapter 16.

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culture just examined may be surrogates for differential levels of education, occupational possibilities and spatial movement.[2] Although we will explore these issues in greater detail in subsequent chapters, we want to examine briefly the plausibility of these explanations, as both alternatives and complements to our previous accounts. Inkeles and others have argued that structural changes exemplified by contemporary factories are the 'schools' for individual modernity; other scholars (Dore:1973) have argued that structurally equivalent but culturally distinct factories can produce significant variations in behavior.[3] This is not to argue that structural change does not have significant social and political effects. On

[2] Of course, these are some of the key variables that are used in the analysis of social change by most authors. See Lerner (1958) for a classic statement and theory about the sequencing of steps in the change process. See Morrison (1983: Part III, chapter 3) for more evidence on this issue. For evidence on the Piagetian model of individual cognitive development as it has been tested cross-culturally, see Dasen (1977) and see Goodnow (1970) on cultural variations in cognitive skills. Draper (1974) reviews comparative studies of socialization and Azarya(1976, 1978) shows how the Fulani have dealt with social change and the threats to their hegemony in generally successful ways.

[3] Also note Paul (1979) on the cultural limits to revolutionary politics.

the contrary, however, it does raise the question of the speed, character and universality of those effects on culture.[4]

In this section, we briefly examine the roles of education, occupation, spatial mobility and differential political structures as both alternatives and complimentary sources of explanation for the political cultures of Nigeria.[5]

Education

Education "leads to the acquisition of new intellectual skills" and "a change in the situation to which the skills are applied." (Coles et al.:1971,224).

[4] In the Nigerian environment, see Abernathy (1969) for a study of educational effects; Akinsanya (1976a, 1976b) and Ajibola and Oyejide (1975) on local government in the Western States; Amucheazi (1973) on the link of local government to traditional legitimacy and of the church as a pressure group (1973a); Adu (1965) on the civil service in Africa; and Adamolekun (1977) on government reforms in Benue Plateau State. Also note Pauline Baker's excellent review of political change in twentieth century Lagos (1974) and Abdi (1977) on banks and development.

[5] At the state and local government levels, not in terms of traditional ethnic group structure.

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The usual textbook definition of the formal education process emphasizes the institution as a mechanism for reproducing culture. This is not the case of much of the developing world.[6] Rather, the educational system exists to bring individuals into a culture that may be distinctly different from the one in which their early socialization took place. Nowhere is this more true than in sub-Saharan Africa where the experience of European colonialism brought with it missionaries who used schooling as a mechanism for proselytization. Colonial school systems were based on curricula, schedules, and practices largely unchanged from those of the metropole schools. In fact, the examinations at the secondary level are still largely set in the ex-colonial country (e.g., Britain or France) and are the same exams as given to the children in that country. While this is slowly changing, educational systems which attempt to transmit the metropole's culture still pervades most of Black Africa.[7] Because of this lack of congruence between education and the rest of the sociopolitical environment, we

[6] In some critical sense, such reproduction may not even occur in the 'developed' world either but the gap is probably much less marked than in most developed countries.

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expect the educational system to play a more limited role in cultural transmission in Nigeria than it might in some other country.[8] Nonetheless, we still expect the educative process to affect each individual's political culture and we expect it to be similar in some respects to the effects of education observable in almost all societies. Specifically, increases in the level of education tend to increase an individual's participation, political cognition, efficacy, and general interest and awareness.[9] The effects of education on social mobilization is not the issue here; rather it is the relationship between education and the disembodied culture.

[7] See Morrison et al. (1972: Part I, chapter 5 and 1983:Part I, chapter 4) for further discussion of this issue.

[8] Note that we expect this to be true in most plural societies unless (as in Northern Ireland, for instance) the conflicting cultures maintain their own separate school systems that maintain their culture and usually encourage ethnocentrism.

Turning to the Nigerian evidence, we find that level of formal education varies considerably across the country as a function of state of origin, ethnic group, and age of respondent. Since there is a certain correspondence between education and these elements of the embodied culture already examined, we should expect the discriminant analyses (Table 10.1) results to show that the disembodied culture measures predict the level of education well. This is not the case. Indeed, only occupational measures are worse predictors than education. Education accounts for a 28 percent prediction rate which compares poorly with the rate of religion as

[9] We explore this issue at greater length in chapter 9. Examples of this evidence can be found in the work of Van Den Berghe (1973) on a Nigerian university Keller (1980) on Kenyan educational effects; Kimball (1974) on the general culture-education link; Greenfield (1966) on Senegal; and Omoruyi (1973) on political learning in Nigeria. Nigeria as in most African societies which until recently were largely illiterate populations have a general populace with extremely good memories, a characteristic of non-literate societies. The implications of this characteristic and how it changes with increasing education is not clear but the book by Luria (1968) on the mind of a mnemonist may be suggestive for detailed studies of this process. Also see Landrum (1978) for a review of various stage theories of cognitive development and Coles et al. (1971) where they argue for the importance of situational factors rather than 'cultural deprivation' and genetic explanation for differential performance on tasks by race and culture group.

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Table 10.1

Highest Level of Education Begun (Percent)

Run 1037

Ethnic Group	None		Kor.	Pri	Post		Post	Univ	Post	N
	Sec	Mod			Prim	Sec				
1. Yoruba	24	3	25	8	10	14	11	6	1	2055
2. Hausa	4	44	17	8	16	5	5	1	0	1410
3. Ibo	16	0	40	6	8	10	12	7	1	1452
4. Ibibio	20	0	52	6	6	10	6	0	0	641
5. Fulani	3	52	15	5	7	7	10	1	0	474
6. Tiv et al	34	7	28	3	21	1	2	3	0	289
7. Tangale	6	43	19	0	25	6	1	0	0	235
8. Ijaw	21	2	33	1	5	19	12	8	0	221
9. Idoma	41	0	11	1	20	10	14	4	0	192
10. Etsako	31	15	23	9	1	6	13	2	0	185
11. Tera	20	50	0	0	20	0	10	0	0	146
12. Bini	28	0	24	11	7	18	8	6	0	142
13. Kanuri	33	34	7	0	6	1	20	0	0	123
14. Gbari	10	55	8	10	6	0	6	6	0	107
15. Bura	17	51	18	0	0	5	10	0	1	87
16. Urhobo	37	0	37	9	11	6	1	0	0	84
17. Igbira	0	0	15	0	38	8	26	7	6	64
18. Nupe	2	3	9	0	2	47	21	15	2	34
19. Gwandar	20	0	60	0	0	0	20	0	0	30
20. Igala	0	3	44	1	19	4	0	23	0	23
21. Mada	0	37	29	0	0	2	30	2	0	21
22. Jukun	4	81	4	0	2	2	7	0	0	19
23. Angas	8	0	24	2	6	9	42	9	0	18
24. Katab	0	57	13	2	13	10	5	0	0	18
25. Itseker	55	0	13	3	13	7	3	7	0	17

predictor -- the lowest of the previously examined elements of the embodied culture. That most education is in the hands of co-ethnics despite formal content and examination

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standards may play an important role in minimizing its effect on political culture. [Note: Does discrimination work better in the South?]

Occupation

Table 10.2
Secondary Socialization by Political Culture Indices
Measures of Association (Eta coefficients)
Runs 1201-1224

Intercorrelation Matrix Education Measures			
Political Culture Indices	Respondent's Education	Occupation	Urban-Rural
1. Pereffow	.23	.11	.06
2. Pereffgp	.17	.13	.10
3. Perpoeff	.12	.15	.10
4. Syseffi	.06	.12	.08
5. Trust	.15	.19	.04
6. Cognition	.12	.18	.05
7. Sysaffect	.12	.11	.04
8. Evalgout	.07	.14	.14
9. Evalglnp	.29	.27	.03
10. Scfungo			
11. Authorpa			
12. Deciproc			
13. Salipol	.10	.16	.05
14. Basic values	.21	.27	.05
15. Social distance	.13	.12	.01
16. Identity	.17	.20	.02

Durkheim expected that functionality structured groupings would be the basis for modern society, and therefore that such groups would be primary socializers and culture-bearers.[10] This view has been shared by many sociologists although not always with the same expectations for its implications. Thus it is reasonable to expect occupation to play an important role in a person's culture and political culture. However, Durkheim dealt with a society that although not homogeneous, was highly centralized and not appropriately described as a plural society in the sense that we are using the term.

Occupation does not relate to culture by any logical necessity. However, it is not uncommon for there to be a cultural division of labor in plural societies. Furthermore, as societies industrialize and the 'basic groups' in the society move from those based on situs (e.g., ethnic groups) to those based on status (e.g., class), the cultural history is often reflected in the new groups as well as the old (cf. Hechter:1978). These issues can be

[10] For example, we are used to terms such as 'middle class values' or 'working class values'.

observed in 'traditional' societies as well as industrialized ones as Wiseman's (1979) work on a Hausa village in Northern Nigeria indicates.[11]

This occupational status-related view of culture has been prominent in the development literature. Myron Weiner has characterized change in India in a top-down fashion in which elites move first into a modern secular and national culture. The rest of the society encompasses a number of mass-based cultures -particularistic, emotional and populist -which slowly change and follow the elite culture.[12] While this view has been challenged, there does seem to be a continuing expectation that change is directed and desired in terms of elite values.[13]

[11] For other examples of this phenomena, see Hill (1978), Paden (1973), and Lubeck (1976) for Northern Nigeria.

[12] For a specific critique of Weiner's view of this process, see Mayer (1973:400).

The Nigerian data on the role of occupation indicates that it plays only a modest role in the development of political culture, since neither respondent's nor father's occupation discriminates among the political culture indices in more than a very marginal way. Occupation differentiates the culture-bearers less well than any other elements of the embodied culture that we evaluated. In Table 10.2 we see that occupation does have some relevance to the elite socialization and leadership arguments since the more educated clearly are more efficacious, have more modern values, and want a broadened range of inputs to government decision processes.

Spatial Mobility

[13] To some extent this is a truism since elites have more power and prestige than others in the society by definition. This tendency for change to come from elites first may also have a physiological base. Note Kohn and Schooler (1978) on their evaluation of substantive complexity of work and intellectual flexibility. See Searing (1969) and Searing and Schwartz (1973) on elite socialization evidence and the structuring principle. There is also the expectation that younger elites are more flexible in the acceptance of new ideas. This has been the conventional wisdom in some areas such as science but this view has been challenged -see Hull, Tessen and Diamond (1978).

The increased level and pervasive character of migration from places of birth to sometimes distant and permanent new homes is one of the hallmarks of the contemporary age. Even transient migrants feel the effects of environmental changes in significant ways.[14] Students of social change have long commented on this phenomenon as basic to the acquisition of new (and modern) values.[15] Hausas, for example, are not only spread across Northern Nigeria and found in most Southern Nigerian cities, but they trade across West Africa and Hausa is used as a lingua franca across the Sudan from Senegal to Chad. The Hausa are also to be found from Nigeria to Saudi Arabia as those making the Hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca) settled enroute.[16] Africans have not only moved permanently, they have also come to derive prestige in their own culture from having

[14] These are hardly the first mass migrations in human history but never before has it become such an ongoing process.

[15] See Lerner (1958) for the classic work on the subject as well as Deutsch (1960) See Morrison (1983), Part III, chapter 3 for a test of this theory on comparative Black African data.

[16] See Works (1977) on the pilgrimage to Arabia.

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been to a distant place, usually Europe or North America.[17] There are those who are seasonal transients as well, farmers who go to the city to work in the dry season, or as the Yoruba traditionally do, live in large cities and go to the farming areas annually.[18] Spatial movement characterizes those whose occupations involve patterns of travel, regular or irregular, such as traders,[19] lorry drivers, army and police units, pastoral cattle herders, etc. The movements of such individuals or groups may be the results of natural disaster (such as the droughts of the mid-1970's in the Sahelian region) or of long-term trends of rural to urban migration. The movement of groups often leads to conflict although accommodations can be artfully achieved if appropriate leadership and motivation exist.[20]

[17] See Sofola (1970) on the victims of forced repatriation from other areas of West Africa.

[18] See Krapf-Askari (1969) for a discussion of Yoruba towns, their characteristics and history.

[19] See Egboh (1976) on Igbo traders.

[20] See Cohen (1969) on Hausas in Yoruba cities and Alba (1978) on ethnic networks and tolerance.

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Socio-Political Structures: Period and External Effects

We will defer analysis of the effects of values reflecting situational issues of either a temporal or spatial nature in the interests of sketching some of the ideas germane to alternative explanations for differences in political culture. For example, we have avoided examining the issue-basis for political mobilization and beliefs, even though we expect development and bureaucratic knowledge to result in individuals tending to more rational and therefore more issue-consistent behavior. Such fundamental ideas as issue-based power cleavages, government coerciveness, ideological constraints and political myth, and influences from other systems (e.g., demonstration effects such as political movements elsewhere) all affect political culture in ways that can be partially evaluated, although the lack of explicit time series information precludes the examination of certain issues.[21]

Summary -First Section

Alternative explanations for the variation in political culture observed in the respondents do not provide and/or do not have an adequate empirical basis to account for a substantial, let alone the same, variation in the political culture measures. Thus our expectation that there is a strong link between the disembodied culture and the embodied culture remains credible although deserving of further examination. Before continuing with this, however, we want to evaluate in what ways the political culture indices bear any relation to measures of political behavior, choice and preference. To this end we turn to the evaluation of questions that reflect political attitudes, behavior, and coalition choices (the ABCs of politics).

[21] See Meisel (1974) on politics, cleavages and values (in Canada); Fejerabend, Felerabend and Sleet (1973) on government coerciveness; Geertz (1964) on Ideology; Lloyd (1964) on African and Nigerian data relating choice behavior and social structure; Martinussen (1977) on inequality and political influence; Tudor (1972) on political myths; Tilly (1975) on European state-building and its influence on the views of its constituents; Tocqueville's (1969) classic study of the American political environment; and Lincoln, Olson and Hanada (1978) on cultural effects on organizations. Katz and Kahn (1978) characterize a social psychology of 'open systems' which is useful as a framework to organize many of these individual ideas.

The Political ABCs -Indices

In the first part of this chapter, we evaluated the links between aspects of the embodied and disembodied cultures. We now want to investigate the extent of the relationship between the political culture and the respondent's political attitudes, behavior, and coalition preferences.[22] To conduct such an investigation we must construct indices of these aspects of political behavior. With a few exceptions, our indicators could not be measures of actual or even reported behavior because the time period reflected by this survey was one in which all party and electoral activity had been banned by a military regime. (This ban extended for a 13-year period (1966-1978).) The questions underlying these indices are listed in Table 10.3 along with the distribution of responses. In Table 10.4, the responses to question 24 for members of several ethnic groups are represented to illustrate the considerable variance as a function of one's ethnic group, and Table 10.9

[22] We do not assume that the respondent's views bear a specific relation to those views of elites as espoused in their various publications and speeches or the reigning ideologies. For a review of the latter material for Africa, see Minogue and Malloy (1974).

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reports the data for state preference by the state of origin of the respondent.[23]

In the first of these three tables, the preferences for state coalition partners evinces a clear country-wide picture. First, the Western State and all of the states of the former Eastern region evidence strong negative feelings in the country-wide sample while Lagos State, the Midwest State and all of the states of the former Northern Region have positive net preferences.[24] With some slight variance this pattern is repeated in the preference of respondents for job location in other states, and their preferences for cooperation arrangements among state governments. An opposition to the state's being the basis for party formation clearly exists along with an assertion that violence is not necessary for change. Nevertheless, the people indicate the apparently contradictory opinion

[23] We have not attempted to define culturally specific questions throughout the questionnaire. Standardization of measures seems appropriate here since all respondents operate in the same political system. See Moles (1977) on standardization in cultural anthropology.

[24] The short-lived Biafran Republic was made up of the former Eastern Region.

Table 10.3 Political Attitudes, Behavior and Coalition
 Choice Questions

24. Suppose parties were to be formed on a state basis before the return to civil rule in 1976 as promised by the Head of State. Since no one state party can have enough members to form a government, which state would you like to see your state party entering into alliances with? Name three states that you would most prefer and three states that you would least prefer.

	Percent Preferred*	Not Preferred	(P-NP)
1. Lagos	30	16	14
2. Western	15	35	-20
3. Kwara	30	13	17
4. Midwest	39	13	26
5. East Central	13	54	-39
6. Rivers	10	37	-27
7. Southwest	9	31	-22
8. Beune Plateau	26	12	14
9. Northeast	25	23	2
10. Kano	36	15	21
11. North Central	35	17	18
12. Northwest	27	21	6
	N=7499	N=6864	

*Up to three responses were allowed so percentages do not add to 100%. (Note percentages are based on the number of total observations which includes the respondents that come from any given state who are not allowed to choose their state of residence. Hence the numbers should be adjusted.) (Problem is missing data documented as to state.)

- 25. When political parties are allowed to form, would you like to see them formed on a state basis?
37 (1) Yes, 12 (2) Not sure no opinion, 51 (3) No
- 33. Some people feel that important changes in Nigeria will be brought about only through violence; others say violence is not necessary. What do you think?
11 (1) Important changes brought about through violence
6 (2) Not sure no opinion
83 (3) Violence is not necessary.
- 34. (More equality of poor revolt)
48 (1) Yes
14 (2) Not sure no opinion
38 (3) No

Table 10.3 continued

35. There are some people who say that violence should ~~never~~ be used to settle personal quarrels or disputes -that is, those involving relatives, friends, neighbours, co-workers, and so forth. Others say that in some cases it may be necessary to use violent means to settle a dispute. With what position do you agree?

- 67 (1) Never use violence
- 4 (2) Not sure no opinion
- 29 (3) Sometimes violence is justified

36. Were you to take up a job in a state other than your own, in which states would you most and least prefer to work in? If you are already working in a state outside your own state, name three other states in which you would like to work.

	Preferred	Not Preferred	P-NP
1. Lagos	33	22	11
2. Western	16	25	-9
3. Kwara	27	14	13
4. Midwest	39	12	27
5. East Central	10	57	-47
6. Rivers	12	38	-26
7. Southeast	7	30	-23
8. Benue Plateau	31	9	22
9. Northeast	24	25	-1
10. Kano	37	13	24
11. North Central	32	14	18
12. Northwest	23	25	-2
	N=7538	N=7000	

39. If yes, which states would you most prefer and least prefer to see your government cooperate with in forming such enterprises

Government cooperation.

State	P	NP	P-NP
1. Lagos	30	21	9
2. Western	16	31	-15
3. Kwara	26	18	8
4. Midwest	48	10	38
5. East Central	13	52	-39
6. Rivers	15	36	-21
7. Southeast	7	32	-25
8. Beune Plateau	27	10	17
9. Northeast	20	24	-4
10. Kano	38	12	26
11. North Central	25	17	8
12. Northwest	20	24	-4
	N=6509	N=5785	

Table 10.3 continued

50. Do you think that religion or religious organisations influence politics in Nigeria to a great extent, to a very little extent, or not at all?

- 39 (1) Not at all no opinion
- 28 (2) Very little
- 34 (3) Great extent

51. Would you say that relations between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria are better than they were five years ago, worse, or about the same now as then?

- 58 (1) Better
- 36 (2) About the same
- 6 (3) Worse
- 0 (4) Don't know

92. Some people say that we should try to forget the troubles of the past in Nigeria and look only to the future. Others say that, like it or not, we cannot ignore what has happened in the past, and past troubles are still likely to recur. What do you think?

- 82 (1) Try to forget and look to the future.
- 5 (2) No answer not sure
- 13 (3) Cannot ignore the past and troubles will recur

96. Now I am going to read a list of some kinds of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you are a member of any of these:

	yes	na	no
Religious association	72	6	22
Social group or club	30	8	62
Sports club	21	8	71
School association	29	8	63
Cooperative	24	8	68
Credit association	20	8	72
Public affairs group	19	9	72
Other groups	15	14	72

97. Have you ever tried to get the government or the council or an official to do something that you wanted done?

31 (1) Yes 5 (2) No answer 65 (3) No

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Table 10.3 continued

109. Imagine that in your hometown you owned the only bar, and your bar was doing very well indeed. Suddenly a stranger opens a second bar near to yours, thus taking away some of your customers. In competing with this new trader, the following three methods are possible
- 41 (1) Lessen your prices a bit and add to your bar those things you know he does not yet have in his bar, such as good music or a refrigerator.
- 1 (2) Hire a few rascals to go to his bar often to cause trouble; thus frightening away most of his customers who would then come to your own bar.
- 58 (3) One night, go over secretly to him and try to convince him that the only way to survive is

for both of you to cooperate closely on prices and maintenance of order. Which one of the three methods would you approve most?

STATE PREFERENCES FOR:			
	Party Coalitions	Employment	State Economic Cooperation
Rank	Midwest	Midwest	Midwest
	Kano	Kano	Kano
	North Central	Benue Plateau	Benue Plateau
	Kwara	North Central	Lagos
	Lagos	Kwara	North Central
	Benue Plateau	Lagos	Kwara
	Northwest	Northeast	Northeast
	Northeast	Northwest	Northwest
	Western	Western	Western
	Southeast	Southeast	Rivers
	Rivers	Rivers	Southeast
	East Central	East Central	East Central

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Table 10.4 Preferences for State Coalition Parties by Selected Ethnicities of Respondents

Hausa Preferences for Coalitions by State			
	P	NP	P-NP
1. Lagos	19	22	-3
2. Western	10	56	-46
3. Kwara	10	20	-10
4. Midwest	7	20	-13
5. East Central	6	53	-47
6. Rivers	8	35	-27
7. Southeast	5	32	-27
8. Benue Plateau	23	19	4
9. Northeast	58	9	49
10. Kano	47	8	39
11. North Central	57	4	53
12. Northwest	49	15	34

Yoruba (Unweighted) State Coalition Partner Preferences

	P	NP	P-NP
1. Lagos	68	5	63
2. Western	22	2	20
3. Kwara	59	5	54
4. Midwest	71	6	65
5. East Central	13	59	-46
6. Rivers	8	35	-27
7. Southeast	5	30	-25
8. Benue Plateau	12	14	-2
9. Northeast	5	41	-36
10. Kano	11	24	-13
11. North Central	10	31	-21
12. Northwest	4	36	-32

that there should be more equality or the poor will revolt.

Responses further buttress the expectation that religion is an important issue in politics despite its rare enunciation in political fora.

Table 10.4 continued

Bini Preference for State Coalition of Parties			
	P	NP	P-NP
1. Lagos	39	27	12
2. Western	36	25	11
3. Kwara	28	19	9
4. Midwest	6	2	4
5. East Central	18	62	-44
6. Rivers	6	50	-44
7. Southeast	5	38	-33
8. Benue Plateau	21	5	16
9. Northeast	26	19	7
10. Kano	35	13	22
11. North Central	44	13	31
12. Northwest	28	17	11

Participation in voluntary organizations with the prominent exception of religious associations is somewhat lower than in developed countries. Participation in religious organizations is very high reinforcing our expectation that religion is both a key aspect of the political culture and is important to an understanding of Nigerian politics. The notion of collusion that characterizes economic behavior as evidenced in question 109 would lead us to expect a propensity for a less competitive politics just as people preferred a less price-competitive economic solution. As we will see in the next chapter considerable variation in ethnic patterns of response to

these questions characterizes these as well as our other indices.

Culture and the Political ABC's

Our discussion of the data up to this point has been concerned with the identification of elements of the disembodied culture and an evaluation of its relation to the institutionalized or embodied culture. In the last section we identified some elements of political behavior which we labeled as measures of political attitudes, beliefs and coalition preferences. We now intend to evaluate the patterns of correlation between our measures of political culture and behavior.

We expect to be able to classify: (1) the sources of political attitudes in terms of their syndromic character ; their multidimensionality (e.g., affect, cognition and behavior, primacy, and centrality) and their functions as they relate to perception and selection of interaction

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arena; and (2) the effects including ecological on the objects of these attitudes, especially as it affects legitimation of behavior or its inhibition.[25] In these senses we see attitudes as less basic to behavior than culture but more immediate as a measure of the disposition to act. Culture as a theory of the world was characterized as generating a set of basic values and beliefs that in turn generate attitudes to specific objects and institutions, and often inform cultural values. For example, Snock (1971:234) characterizes Ibo political culture in terms of attitudes when she states.[26]

"Political participants looked upon the system as a resource distributor not as a social contract to regulate themselves.

[25] See Lauer and Handel (1977:45-77) for a review of the definitions of attitudes and socialization processes and their relation to behavior.

[26] Talcott Parsons has also warned of to much instrumental rationality as a source of instability in a social system.

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We expect that such attitudes as well as political behavior and coalition preference will be significantly affected by variations in both the embodied and disembodied cultures.[27]

We turn first to the embodied culture-political behavior link. An important aspect of the functioning of social organizations embodying culture is: (1) to maintain or create commitment by limiting alternative behavior, social isolation via involvement in the group, and in-group centered participation; and (2) to validate the culture by providing protection against disconfirming evidence and events, and by rationalizing environmental strains that are inconsistent with the embodied culture.[28] Thus we expect behavior to relate closely to the embodied culture of the respondents.[29]

[27] We have cited much of this literature on the cultural aspect of political cleavages and behavior in chapters 2 and 3. Some examples are Kerr (1974) on Switzerland; Knight (1978) on the Caribbean; Dutter (1978) on the Netherlands; Njaka (1974) on the Ibo embodied culture; Barrows (1976) on pluralism and political instability in Black Africa; and on a more general and theoretical level, Eisenstadt (1974) on cultural models and political systems; Mackey (1975) on the multinational society; and Balandier (1970) on the general issues of political anthropology.

These apparent relations do not address the issue of whether the cleavages in the various cultures are cross-cutting or reinforcing in their effects.[30] Cross-cutting influences include those where boundaries are not coterminous even in principle -e.g., country and ethnic memberships.[31]

We have argued that those groups whose embodied cultures resemble one another are likely to choose each other as coalition partners. This is supported by the data thus far in terms of the coalition preferences set out in Table 10.4 on the basis of objective measures of group similarity. The subjective measures confirm the pattern established with the 'objective' variables.

[28] See chapter 6 in Borhek and Curtis (1975) for a fuller discussion of these ideas. Also see Mannheim (1956) on the sociology of culture, and Rivera (1978) on a sociocultural interpretation on Latin America.

[29] This includes identity as a measure of the basis for mobilization as an ethnic group. See Miller, Gurin and Gurin (1978) for a contribution to the increasing awareness of group identification in the study of American politics. See Morrison and Stevenson (1972a) for a study of culture and political instability in Black Africa, and Morrison (1983:part III, chapter 2) for further work on the subject.

However, culture nearness is not the sole basis for the choice of coalition partners. An 'ecological niche' theory argues that the complementarity of different cultures fosters cooperation.[32] Netting (1968), for example, uses the 'ecological niche' approach to characterize the place of the Kofyar in central Nigeria. The pastoral (or Bororo) Fulani move their cattle herds through Northern Nigeria in ways designed to interact positively with the sedentary agricultural non-Fulani population.

Present an analysis of this issue here.

[30] Of course, the view of those in the polyarchy tradition or pluralists associated with Dahl, Lipset and many others is that as cleavages multiply the likelihood of reinforcing cleavages declines monotonically. Our view that this is much less likely in societies in which ethnocentrism and culturoethnocentrism are institutionalized or embodied. For a comparative analysis of cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages, see Grove (1977).

[31] Dwyer (1976) has discussed this in the Moroccan context especially as it relates to cultural notions of the nature of conflict. Also see Price-Williams (1975) for a review of cross-cultural psychology; Hoggart (1971) for the culture-communication link; Triandis et al. (1976) on a monumental overview of cross-cultural psychology; and Northrop and Livingstone (1964) on issues in cross-cultural communication. For a representative view that does not deal with the cultural bases of human behavior, see Harsanyi (1977).

Another kind of intercultural relation which affects political forms is an accommodation between groups that results in a patron-client relationship, where complementarity is hierarchical rather than horizontal. The Fulani-Nupe link, and to a lesser extent, the Hausa-Fulani relationship reflect clearly this element of differential status. In contemporary terms, hierarchical complementarity does not make for a stable relationship. Patron-client linkages characterize much of Nigerian life, however, and its extension from within group to between groups is neither uncommon nor without political implications. Although the universality of Europeans being higher status as a group than any other has declined dramatically, other intergroup differentials remain. Nonetheless, we expect that 'client' groups not only take their 'patron' groups as reference groups, but over time become increasingly close to them in a real cultural sense. The reference group's level of ethnocentrism then becomes important in terms of how far the process of group incorporation may go. The Hausaization of Northern Nigeria and the development of larger Ibo and

[32] See Love (1977) for a discussion of this approach to sociocultural analysis.

Yoruba identities exemplify this process in Nigeria. Hence, we expect the patron-client relationship to act as a cultural filter to political change, affecting both the difficulty of change as well as the relative 'weights' attached to individual attitudes.[33]

We do not expect that institutional and embodied cultures will be the only or even the major explanands of variation in political behavior and coalition preference. Rather, we expect that cultural outcomes of the embodied culture, that is, socialized man, will differ from cultural outputs in their effects on behavior and preference. Moreover, we expect the disembodied culture-bearers to account for behavior and preference much more closely than the embodied culture measures. Table 10.5 characterizes the disembodied-behavior link in the data.[34]

[33] We have not been concerned here with the effects on the 'client' group in terms of the relationship between dependency and development. Such an analysis perhaps incorporating the ideas as articulated by Cardoso and Faletto (1979) would be a very useful complement to this work. Okpu (1977) details some of the ethnic minority problems of Nigeria during the First Republic.

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Table 10.5 Political Behavior versus Disembodied Political Culture Indices All Nigeria

Pearson Product Moment Coefficients

(Run 1050, p. 6)

	Ques	25	33	34	35	50	51	92	97	109
1. Personal Efficacy -Own Will	.00	.02	-.02	-.02	.01	.05	-.02	-.02	.06	
2. Personal Efficacy --Through Groups	-.05	-.01	-.12	.09	.01	.24	.07	.03	.04	
3. Personal Political Efficacy	-.02	.03	-.17	.05	-.01	.27	.11	.07	.01	
4. System Efficacy	.08	-.04	-.12	.09	.06	.30	.09	.03	-.01	
5. Trust	.03	.05	-.01	.05	.06	.15	.11	.03	-.03	
6. Cognition and Political Awareness	-.08	-.10	-.02	.02	-.13	.07	.05	.11	-.02	
7. Affect for Political System	.02	-.08	-.10	.19	.04	.14	.04	.02	.07	
8. Evaluation of Government Output Processes	-.01	.00	-.16	.12	.04	.29	.12	.00	-.02	
9. Evaluation of Government Input Processes	.08	-.01	.01	.01	.14	.17	.10	-.05	-.06	
10. Scope and Function of Government	.06	.14	-.11	-.01	.08	.27	.03	.11	-.08	
11. Authority Perceptions	.03	-.09	.05	.01	.08	.08	.09	-.01	-.07	
12. Decision Making Procedures	.12	.33	.03	-.24	-.03	-.11	-.04	-.04	-.02	
13. Saliency of Politics	.03	-.09	-.02	.01	-.05	.06	.06	.01	-.03	

14. Basic Value									
Orient.	.15	.04	-.07	.03	.05	.00	-.06	.02	-.04
15. Social									
Distance	-.12	-.05	-.07	.00	-.03	.17	.08	.03	.03
16. Identity	.01	.09	.14	-.05	.06	.09	-.02	.04	.00

[34] See Barker (1977) for a good review of the culture-cognition link, and Spiro (1968) on culture and personality.

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Question wording table

Question

- 25 - Favor Parties on State Basis
- 33 - Violence Necessary for Change
- 34 - Poor Will Have to Revolt
- 35 - Use Violence to Settle Personal Quarrels
- 50 - Importance of Religion in Nigerian Politics
- 51 - Improvement in Christian-Muslim Relations in
last Five Years
- 92 - Should Forget Past Troubles of Nigeria
- 109 - Best Way to deal with New Bar in Town

Table 10.6 characterizes the links between the culture of the disembodied culture-bearer and his coalition preferences.[35]

Implications for Culture=Change Theory

"Finally, there is enormous variety in belief and if the range of types is not infinite, it is

[35] Magsud (1978) discusses social interaction and moral judgement in Northern Nigerian adolescents.

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Table 10.6

Disembodied Culture - Coalition Choice relation

certainly very large. In part, such variety results from an endless history of schism and syncretism as groups endeavor to distinguish themselves from, or identify themselves with, one another. Hence, a substantive typology of beliefs could be as long as history." (Borhek and Curtis:1975,25)

Central to our concerns in this work is an evaluation of the dynamics of culture-change and an explanation of the evolutionary character of that change and its development process. In conjunction with this, we will evaluate culture-bearers to characterize those features of their culture(s) which are 'hard' or 'soft'. Hard features are elements of culture which are difficult to change, and soft ones are those that are not.[36] Further, we will evaluate those aspects of social change which appear responsible for cultural change, thus altering the bases for political behavior and coalition formation.

'Culture' encompasses such a wide range of elements that simply to speak of 'cultural change' is not to designate precisely what is changing. First the population boundaries of groups that share values at both the disembodied and the embodied culture level can change. Second, the actual beliefs of the culture can change to a greater or lesser degree. Third and finally, the relative salience of beliefs, or mix of emphases, can change across

[36] These relate to Bartlett's notion as quoted by Wober (1975:139).

and within individual culture-bearers.[37] The first category of change involves the spread of ideas and world views from one group to another, usually when the receptor group sees the donor as a positive reference group. Center-periphery relations form this pattern, and Pye's notion of 'world culture' takes this direction. The process may involve recognition of previously existing shared values hitherto obscured by ethnocentrism, the growth of a more catholic worldview with a superordinate set of values allowing reinterpretation of the old, or, finally, the development of a wholly new culture drawing on elements of pre-existing forms. We will argue in the chapters that follow that 'all of the above' occur at differential rates, producing strains in the pattern of accommodation to social change.[38]

[37] See Buss and Paley (1976) on the study of individual differences.

[38] Currently Nigeria is as Geertz has noted, a society gradated with "several large groups and others diminishing in size to those of smaller and smaller magnitude." (Quoted in Schemerhorn:1978,276, footnote 1.) See Lambert and Weisbrod (1971) for a comparative perspective on social psychology, and Schellenberg (1978) for a discussion of Lewin and the ecological and environmental effects on culture and behavior.

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The issue of deciding which culture-bearers share a culture is extraordinarily difficult,[39] especially if we believe an individual may belong to a number of apparently mutually inconsistent cultures.[40] Such inconsistency could be empirically observed as a low level of discrimination among the respondents on the basis of any common source of embodied culture such as ethnicity, language, and religion. Choosing a set of criteria to resolve the dilemma of assigning individuals to 'their' culture may be impossible.

The easiest cultural forms to identify are those associated with small, highly mobilized groups, especially those whose existence is threatened from external sources, the Hottentotts of South Africa, for example. However, most of the ethnic groups considered here present a more complex

[39] Levine and Campbell (1972) devote an entire chapter to the issue of ethnic boundaries with little firm conclusions about how to handle the problems. For an African example, see Dwyer (1976) on Moroccan ethnic boundaries.

[40] As we have emphasized in chapter 2, we expect that culture-bearers may be 'octopus-like' in the sense that behaviors are seen as situation and location dependent.

web of institutions with moderate to pervasive differentiation and stratification processes at work, and a societal-level status of active membership. Under circumstances of social change, we expect institutional rates of change in cultures like these to exhibit considerable variation within groups and, therefore, for boundaries to change at differential rates, although slowly. We expect culturally-near groups to come to recognize their shared culture. We do not see this as a smooth process but one with an uneven but directed development.[41] Certainly we expect the boundaries of perceived commonality of culture to alter in Nigeria in such a way as to decrease substantially the number of functioning culture groups.

[41] We have already mentioned examples of this phenomena in Nigeria. In the Ivory Coast, the 'enlarging' of ethnic groups to include a wider identity is also occurring. (See Nelson, *Area Handbook for the Ivory Coast*) Salamone (1975a, 1975b) has documented this phenomena for areas in Northern Nigeria, and the seminal work by Barth (1969) deals explicitly with the nature of ethnic boundaries and the social organization of culture difference. The anthropologist Spradley (1972) also deals with this subject. Cortese, Falk and Cohen (1976) deal with the measurement issues that have promise for analytic attacks on the problem.

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While boundary changes in a plural society often have profound effects on a political system's basis for mobilization and development, they are not the only vehicles for such change. The other mechanisms all involve actual alterations in values or beliefs.[42] Changes may: (1) stem from outside sources; or (2) be internally generated or (3) be the results of a supracultural creation, that is, a new level of cultural inclusion; or (4) involve changes in the use or disuse of parts of the culture, including the 'unlinking' of some values (differentiation) or the articulation of previously nascent aspects of culture as social and technological conditions warrant.[43]

The role played by change stimulated by sources external to the culture is enormous, particularly in this century. The diffusion of ideas and technology is omnipresent and serves as a key source of generational

[42] See Sorokin (1969) for a seminal statement.

[43] See Ratcliffe (1978) on a theory of memory retrieval. It is no accident that some see culture as a play (Bennett:1977) or drama (Cohen:1979, 106) -this is part of the evolutionary vehicle of dealing with both change and socialization into the culture.

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differences. In the Nigerian sample, for example, the young are much better educated and generally much better off than their parents. The young identify overwhelmingly with one or other of the universalistic religions originating outside the society. The young copy and modify modes of dress and expression from their foreign generational counterparts (usually European and American). The young enter occupations generated in the contemporary urban industrial and government bureaucracies. In the final analysis, it will be the young who fashion a re-creation of this new world.[44]

While the ultimate source of change is frequently external to a given society, the ramifications of change depend on the manner in which the society's members incorporate new values and beliefs into the existing fabric

[44] See Spindler (1968) on psychocultural adaptation, and Service (1968, 1971) on the materialist sources of cultural change. A. Smith (1973) and Giddens (1978) provide elaboration on the modernization and structural-functional perspectives, and their analytic weaknesses. Also see Pizzorno (1971) for the political ramifications, and Entelis (1974) on the emergence of a 'counter-culture' in Tunisia. See Pye and Verba:1965, 51 for another statement on the role of imported political culture.

of culture.[45]

The resulting mixture of externally and internally stimulated change provides an environment where culture as a theory of the world must change, and eventually evolve into a new theory.[46] How this affects the survival of traditional societal structure is unclear, however.

[45] The orthodox view of the 1950's and 1960's was that such incorporation involved 'shedding' of old values and replacing them with new. We have argued throughout that we expect that to be the least likely occurrence in most environments although long-run changes that are not noticed by the culture-bearers, particularly the embodied culture may have profound effects. A catalogue of the mechanisms by which change is articulated and spread through a system is long and complex -see Scott (1979) for such a list of diffusion processes. For a general view of how this process has been analyzed by Nigerian novelists, see Taiwo (1976). Ukaegby (1976) provides a specific case study in rural Eastern Nigeria of change as it relates to traditional norms. There are many examples of the working out of political change in African societies, that is, of their adaptive capabilities, Ryan (1975) on Uganda clearly demonstrates this and countries such as Nigeria, Upper Volta, Senegal and others that have gone from authoritarian military or single-party regimes to multiparty representative democracies emphasize their evolving search for appropriate matches of the political culture to their embodied institutions. See Goddard (1973) on the dynamics of family structure among the rural Hausa; Chailfoux (1976) on the relation between ritual and political change; and Erinasho (1978) on sociocultural change and traditional responses through the vehicle of 'magical thinking'.

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Although colonialism clearly affected traditional social and political structures, such changes appear to have had less effect in Nigeria than in other plural societies--the Ivory Coast, for example, where French cultural norms have partially supplanted the traditional norms of various Ivorian groups.[47] Most contemporary African states, including Nigeria, are attempting to build new overarching 'national' cultures. Since they have failed to eradicate either the embodied or the disembodied culture-bearers, the prognosis is for slow change and a tendency towards the maintenance of sociocultural forms even as surface technology and life-styles change.[48]

[46] See Ben-David and Clark (1977) for a review of sources of cultural creation.

[47] For a review of some operative principles, see Wallace (1960, 1961) and Triandis, Malpass, and Davidson (1973) on psychology and culture.

[48] See Low-Beer's (1978) view of such developments in Italy, and Post's (1972) view of some of the undesired effects of change in West Africa, peasantization, and their political implications. Also see Barrows (1976) on Sierra Leone, and Sofola (1973) for a sociolinguist's view of African cultural forms.

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An important mechanism for accomodating cultural inconsistency in plural societies is to compartmentalize it. While this may seem facille as an explanation, bracketing or compartmentalizing is probably the most commonly used device for cultural adaptation. Just as the Japanese businessman leaves his nearly automated factory to return to a near-feudal lifestyle at home or in a geisha house, or as individuals readily accept the principle of 'When in Rome, do as the Romans do', so do people in areas of rapid change make a considerable effort to maintain cultural forms while other changes go on apace. Furthermore, the sociology of modernization, i.e., adopting new technologies and life-styles, may be the politics of a continuing culture.[49] The pragmatism manifest in such a policy may be an important characteristic of the new culture which still exhibits key elements of the old in its political institutions.

A Strategy for Measurement of Disembodied-Culture Change

[49] Elster (1979) deals with the issues of what is and is not rational.

Although the modal characteristics of a group's disembodied culture-bearers may have a particular set of characteristics relative to those of other groups, the individual culture-bearer is a source of that dynamic which makes cultures change. Therefore, analysis of variations on the mode become essential to an understanding of the actual dynamics of culture-change. A strategy for such an analytic is given below.

To evaluate each individual culture-bearer's 'nearness' to his own putative culture as well as to others requires measures relating an individual's characteristics in terms of political culture to the characteristics of various groups. Such measures should not be built upon any particular relational model of measurement since we have no basis for assuming the relevance of any particular metric.

Therefore, we propose that negentropy, a measure of order or 'predictability', be used to relate each culture-bearer's observed measures to the distribution of elements of political culture shown by his own and other groups.[50] The measure for each culture-bearer will be calculated as follows:

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$$M_{ij} = -2 \sum_{k=1}^p \frac{\log(p_{ijk})}{ijk}$$

where: M_{ij} equals the culture nearness of the i th person for culture J . p_{ijk} has average deviations from culture J 's distribution over the k cultural measures that equal or exceed person i 's scores assuming a normal distribution of observed scores. In Table 10.7, we list the observed means and standard deviations for all 16 scales and for the 34 ethnic groups that have more than minimal observations.[51] In Table 10.7 we characterize for each group of identifiers their most predicted identification averaged over all the

[50] Applications of entropy in political science are few and not of the form that we advance but include Darcy and Aigner (1980), Coleman (1975) and Thell (1969). See Coleman for a definition of entropy (pp. 24-25).

[51] Note that a small number ($N = 109$) of these respondents did not identify themselves with respect to an ethnic group and we therefore will use this device to guess what group or groups they appear to be close to in terms of political culture. For related literature on individuals as they relate to actual group norms, see Barker (1977) on peasant's knowledge of their environments; Luttborg (1971) on an attempt to classify internal variations of the American states; Sankoff (1971) on the analysis of shared versus unshared beliefs in a cognitive model of behavior; Triandis et al. (1972) on the analysis of subjective culture; Szalay and Deese (1978) on subjective meaning and culture. Farebrother's (1979) test for misspecification is relevant to any solution to the problem of disentangling the elements of shared and unshared culture as well.

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Table 10.7 Means and Standard Deviations for Political
 Culture variables for 34 Ethnic Groups
 (Run # 1051)

	Weighted N = 2073	1467	1461	642	474	289	235
	Yoruba	Hausa	Ibo	Ibibio	Fulani	Tiv	Tangale et al. et al.
1. Personal							
Efficacy--	-.21	.10	-.01	.04	.48	-.38	.15
Efficacy	.82	.81	.86	.86	.67	.76	.84
Own Will							
2. Personal							
Efficacy --							
Through	-.16	-.16	.17	-.06	.43	.05	.42
Groups	.54	.72	.72	.71	.80	.81	.41
3. Personal							
Political							
Efficacy	-.07	-.15	.46	-.24	.14	-.09	.11
	.69	.65	.72	.65	.72	.69	.73
4. System	-.13	-.35	.56	-.21	.28	.03	.05
	.65	.87	.79	.76	.85	.86	.41
Efficacy							
5. Trust	.11	-.40	-.05	.35	.03	-.10	-.09
	.82	.73	.87	.83	.72	.83	.53
6. Cognition							
& Political							
Awareness	.02	.00	-.04	-.22	.15	-.01	-.10
	.63	.59	.56	.41	.76	.68	.14
7. Affect for							
Political	.15	-.19	-.03	-.31	.03	.17	.42
System	.68	.55	.65	.59	.63	.50	.84
8. Evaluation							
Government							
Outputs	-.18	-.08	.68	-.30	.26	-.36	-.16
	.77	.75	.96	.63	.82	.62	.63
9. Evaluation							
Government							
Inputs	-.05	-.29	.23	.40	-.39	.95	-.54
	.77	.87	.79	.83	.76	.65	.75

group's respondents by this method.[52]

[52] This is equivalent to summing M over i $M = \frac{\sum_i M_i}{n}$ where n equals number of respondents (weighted) in group j .

Table 10.7 (Continued)

	221	192	185	146	142	123	107	87	84
	Ijaw	Idoma	Etsako	Tera et al	Bini	Kanuri	Gbari	Bura	Urhobo
1	.38 .72	-.16 .83	-.11 .86	.30 .76	-.39 .74	.07 .79	.53 .61	.35 .78	-.43 .77
2	-.17 .81	.11 .75	-.67 .66	.63 .40	-.18 .52	-.14 .81	.23 .54	.78 .70	-.01 .79
3	-.27 .58	.08 .81	-.37 .55	.21 .76	-.41 .52	-.30 .75	.31 .70	.60 .41	.29 .86
4	-.10 1.16	.04 .82	-.59 .68	.31 .33	-.32 .56	-.48 1.06	.29 .68	.39 .55	-.18 .81
5	-.07 .68	.16 .85	.55 .9	.66 .56	.05 .73	-.56 .69	.54 .53	.41 .65	-.13 .67
6	.28 .88	.03 .78	-.25 .22	.07 .66	-.15 .36	.26 .86	.27 .87	.26 .73	-.10 .47
7	-.01 .61	.17 .81	-.13 .61	.17 .66	-.20 .55	-.31 .41	.48 .92	-.03 .60	-.04 .51
8	-.23 .77	-.16 .76	-.45 .76	.36 .51	-.43 .65	-.19 .62	.21 .88	.28 .56	-.05 .69
9	.08 .49	.09 .63	-.34 .55	-.37 .66	-.38 .55	-.15 .88	.47 .59	-.51 .57	-.26 .51

Table 10.7 (Continued)

	64	34	30	23	21	19	18	18
	Igbira	Nupe	Gwandari	Igala et al	Mada	Jukun	Angas et al	Katab
1	.22 .76	.08 .90	-.40 .66	.41 .81	-.78 .29	.54 .50	-.17 .83	.50 .67
2	-.07 .41	.16 .49	.12 1.21	.68 .70	.29 1.38	.67 .53	-.11 .57	.19 .33
3	-.47 .45	-.25 .34	-.55 .15	.17 .45	-.54 .22	-.57 .32	-.47 .53	-.05 .41
4	.05 .46	.27 .51	.06 1.01	.99 1.24	.20 1.69	.15 .46	-.14 5	-.26 .34
5	.13 .89	.31 .65	-.10 .90	.48 .46	.01 .74	.14 .47	.27 .72	.56 .35
6	-.23 .11	-.19 .36	.04 .79	.22 .91	.40 .91	-.04 .35	-.24 .30	-.15 .07
7	.01 .64	.09 .66	-.33 .42	.33 .34	-.12 .41	-.33 .39	-.15 .66	-.27 .52
8	-.42 .66	-.14 .57	-.57 .49	.34 .84	-.76 .29	-.26 .38	-.41 .82	-.17 .32
9	.23 .55	.40 .76	-.21 1.02	.18 .35	.03 1.06	-.14 .41	-.16 .84	.54 .32

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Table 10.7 (Continued)

Weighted N = 2073	1467	1461	642	474	289	235	
Yoruba	Hausa	Ibo	Ibibio	Fulani	Tiv et al	Tangale et al	
10. Scope and Function of Government	-.05 .64	-.29 .72	.23 .59	.40 .54	-.39 .74	.95 .61	-.54 .62
11. Authority Perceptions	.00 .56	.08 .65	-.17 .45	.23 .65	-.10 .55	-.21 .43	.00 .74
12. Decision Making Procedures	.11 .58	-.36 .70	.23 .56	.26 .48	-.15 .74	.14 .72	-.29 .63
13. Sallence of Politics	.15 .86	.01 .71	-.02 .72	-.24 .74	-.04 .52	-.09 .34	-.23 .38
14. Basic Value Orientations	.27 .58	-.14 .90	.06 .74	-.20 .94	-.40 .72	-.10 .78	-.31 .79
15. Social Distance	.19 .90	-.23 .58	-.03 .79	-.01 .77	-.11 .63	.00 .85	.09 .81
16. Identity	-.30 .62	-.45 .69	.29 .88	.71 .68	.02 .48	-.20 .64	.29 .39

Conclusions

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Table 10.7 (Continued)

	Ijaw	Idoma	Etsako	Tera et al	Bini	Kanuri	Ghari	Bura
	221	192	185	146	142	123	107	87
10	-.21	-.08	-.23	.49	.03	-.31	.62	.59
	.46	.69	.47	.57	.57	.68	.51	.42
11	-.13	.13	-.30	-.23	-.13	.36	.98	-.19
	.43	.64	.30	.39	.54	.65	.52	.29
12	.20	-.21	.33	.19	.29	-.11	-.83	-.55
	.56	.82	.57	.47	.46	.83	.83	.75
13	.12	-.13	.00	-.31	-.13	.37	-.33	-.12
	.76	.93	.61	.39	.75	.72	.23	.14
14	.16	-.08	.47	.01	.19	-.12	-.10	.18
	.70	.69	.42	.49	.71	.90	.48	.45
15	.29	.47	-.05	-.39	.09	-.30	-.44	.01
	.80	.98	.69	.42	.72	.60	.25	.72
16	.33	.45	.42	.19	.32	-.42	-.47	.25
	.53	.82	.94	.29	.63	.58	.73	.34

In this chapter, we have taken the sixteen measures of disembodied political culture developed in the previous chapter and evaluated them using competing explanations for variation observed especially between primary and secondary socialization. There seems to be clear evidence that 'the passing of traditional society' does not adequately describe the situation which has occurred in Nigeria and other developing countries implying as it does that the cultural

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Table 10.7 (Continued)

	64 Igbira	34 Nupe	30 Gwandari	23 Igala	21 Mada et al	19 Jukun	18 Angas	18 Katab et al	
10	.11 .49	.20 .36	-.05 .38	.13 .32	-.38 .45	-.34 .28	-.01 .40	.33 .31	
11	.11 .71	.90 .46	.28 .59	.08 .32	.53 .55	-.18 .26	-.04 .52	.34 .47	
12	.17 .56	-.16 .70	.40 .00	.42 .88	-.06 .61	-.84 .37	.04 .80	-.66 .48	
13	-.40 .22	-.17 .35	-.06 .01	.22 .61	-.03 .05	-.25 .78	-.41 .78	.23	.67
14	.37 .27	.16 .42	-.50 .03	.32 .26	-.52 .23	-.30 .40	.22 .54	.33 .31	
15	-.31 .40	-.11 .57	.06 .75	-.23 .52	-.52 .84	-.46 .28	-.21 .64	-.32 .46	
16	.43 .65	.13 .80	.58 .63	.17 .38	.04 .53	-1.08 .63	.76 .93	.11 .89	

mainsprings of the disembodied culture-bearers have run down. Indeed, we find little variation in political culture accounted for by secondary socialization processes such as occupation, physical mobility, and formal education. Furthermore, our examination of the relationships between their culture with measures of political behavior and coalition preferences revealed links from moderate to strong between culture and coalition preferences.

Table 10.7 (Continued)

	16 Bachama	14 Kabba	14 Biom	13 Warjara	11 Ishan	9 Ekoi	8 Alago	4 Isoko
10	-.16 .34	.57 .58	.44 .41	-.11 .10	.40 .46	.01 .70	.70 .63	-.06 .49
11	.93 .30	-.20 .43	-.31 .48	.32 .70	.28 .61	.18 .61	1.06 .44	.14 .79
12	-.24 .42	.39 .38	-.20 .28	.61 .00	-.06 .65	.17 .36	-.25 .30	-.03 .79
13	-.06 .05	-.20 .57	.01 .38	-.06 .01	.75 1.17	.59 1.40	-.01 .24	-.21 .34
14	1.30 .50	.46 .42	.11 .31	-.05 .43	.48 .18	.33 .41	-.60 .58	.46 .11
15	-.50 .19	-.15 .49	.07 .32	-.47 .24	.26 1.06	.38 .46	-.40 .39	.56 .99
16	-.43 .49	.52 .38	-.20 .77	1.18 .40	-.06 .82	.18 .87	.94 .63	.33 .76

These conclusions concern the modal character of the process. Our analysis took a further step in order to provide a measure of how close each individual respondent is to the several important culture groups of Nigeria. This measure will assist us in evaluating the manner in which secondary socialization processes act to change disembodied culture and account for some of the dynamics of the culture-change process.

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CHAPTER 11

Social Distance, Ethnocentrism, and Other Elements of a
Sense
of Shared Fate

"The moral claim of ethnicity or kinship upon political behavior, or that of sheer self-interest, almost always outweighs ideological or policy convictions in African political systems." (Jackson:1973,399)

"Although the system of potential responses toward a given group may be complexly differentiated, the activation of response is apparently accompanied by marked cognitive simplification." (Brewer in Austin and Worchel:1979,84)

"For the masses, belief systems are more likely to be organized according to attitudes towards social groups." (Lane:1973, 98)

"Interest grouping [in Southwestern Nigeria] appears to coalesce on communal and ethnic bases, rather than along lines of economic class." (Harris and Rowe in Melson and Wolpe:1970, 158).

We see, "a trend toward greater ethnocentrism as human society has developed over the last ten thousand years." (Levine and Campbell: 1972,223)

Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the basis for political mobilization in terms of: (1) 'real' cultural differences that affect political behavior; and (2) individual preferences for coalitions among the states of the Federation. Now we turn to the influence of ethnocentrism on political behavior. Ethnocentrism is a phenomenon which has been widely misunderstood, but in the simplest terms it results from the tendency of almost all humans within a socio-cultural context to experience themselves as part of an ascriptively defined world (usually an ethnos or nation) in which individuals feel that they share their fate with one another, and more importantly, they view this group boundary as a diffuse limit of interaction and obligation, especially moral obligation.[1] Thus, these typically ethnic boundaries determine the bounds of group members' moral norms, and in this contemporary "age of ethnicity"

[1] Of course, there may be historic and situational factors which influence the boundaries at any point in time. We leave discussion of that issue to a later section. These ethnic boundaries are usually less inclusive than cultural boundaries to which the members of the group belong. See Cramer and Schuman (1975) on the we-they distinction.

(Said and Simmons:1976,19) such bounds will have profound implications for both intra- and inter-national politics for the foreseeable future.

An acute understanding of the nature and dynamics of a theory of ethnocentrism has not been a notable part of the literature in political science. It has been an important concern of other social scientists, however, despite some temporal variation in the intensity of interest in the subject.[2] This chapter is concerned with the political effects of groups whose members reflect significant ethnocentrism, i.e., a sense of shared fate, a resultant social distance from members of other groups, and those aspects of diffuse loyalty and moral obligation which differentiate these groups from other kinds of voluntary associations usually included in group theories of politics.[3]

[2] See Brewer in Austin and Worchel (1979) and Rokeach (1979) for reviews of the history of ethnocentrism as a concept in the social sciences as it is traced from Sumner's 1900 book Folkways .

In what follows, we will: 1. attempt to clarify the use of terms appropriate to this discussion; 2. advance various hypotheses on the subject; and 3. evaluate these hypotheses using the Nigerian data.

Assimilation versus Ethnicity

William Graham Sumner's Folkways (1906) is the source for the terms 'in-group', 'out-group', and 'ethnocentrism' in social scientific analysis, and the work has stimulated a massive literature.[4] However, the tradition begun by Park and his colleagues at the University of Chicago has dominated the study of ethnocentrism in America. In this tradition, ethnic boundaries are seen as the products of

[3] Pool (1976) comments on notions that are aspects of both ethnic and non-ethnic based perceptions but does not attempt to differentiate their implications. Funk et al. (1975) also deals with stereotyping but does not recognize the peculiar character of ethnocentrism which generates often overwhelming and diffuse loyalties. See Schroeder (1970) for a discussion of the usage of the term stereotype which he defines as referring to "repetitious, invariant acts or action sequences whose reinforcement contingencies are unspecified or are non-contingent and whose performance is considered to be related to pathology."

[4] See Levine and Campbell (1972) for a review of this literature and an attempt to derive testable hypotheses.

social structure which leads to expectations that non-dominant embodied-cultures will gradually disappear as individuals participate in the institutions of the dominant embodied culture and become assimilated.[5]

Thus, the concern of most American scholars has focused on issues of prejudice and stereotyping-- i.e., those mechanisms which 'block' the assimilation process. Further, reflecting the tradition of Park, Lipset and Dahl until recently discounted ethnic factors as continuing and growing socio-cultural forces. Thus the 'pluralist views of the liberal democratic state have suffered with the result that group theories of politics have declined in recent decades.[6] Although the Park position expresses a number of varying viewpoints, Shibutani and Kwan propound the following:

"Viewed in broad historical perspective the study of mankind consists of a succession of contacts of ethnic groups, their conflicts, their accommodations to one another, and their eventual fusion into new ethnic groups. When the newly formed groups come

[5] Spatial issues become important in such a discussion since pockets of cultural difference can be maintained even when they are quite deviant from a society-wide dominant culture if the 'deviant' culture is the local or neighborhood norm.

into contact with still other ethnic groups, each similarly formed, the cycle appears to start all over again." (1965:116)

This version goes beyond earlier ones which assumed that assimilation to the dominant culture would occur in an eschatological manner rather than as an ongoing and neverending process.[7] Much of the liberal theory of democracy was based on the notions that: 1) economic development was central to social and political development; (2) social order was necessary to this process and (3) such order was inhibited by the existence of ethnic and cultural divisions which would gradually disappear if no social processes (such as discrimination or prejudice) delayed the eventual assimilation.[8]

The discussion here does not disagree with many of the points in this tradition in terms of very long-run historical tendencies, especially the expectation that

[6] Said and Simmons (1976:10) have commented on the liberal theory's "distaste for ethnicity" -- this is to be expected since it prevents the operation of their preferred model of democracy. For other statements on these issues see Deutsch (1966), and Deutsch and Merritt (1970) -- a bibliography on nationalism. Emerson (1960) provides a classic view on the process in From Empire to Nation. See Garson (1978) for a review of group theories of politics.

social change in plural societies tends to propel individuals into a composite and usually secular culture which eschews its atavistic bases of identity.[9] Our analysis of a plural culture differs from this tradition with respect to our expectations that: (1) this assimilation process will not be random with respect to direction, and (2) that it will be predictable in terms of its resultant groups.[10] The expectation that a common culture will

[7] For example, Lieberson (1963) quotes Park:

"Assimilation, as the word is here used, brings with it a certain borrowed significance which it carried over from physiology where it is employed to describe the process of nutrition. By a process of nutrition, somewhat similar to the physiological one, we may conceive alien peoples to be incorporated with, and made part of, the community or state. Ordinarily assimilation goes on silently and unconsciously and only forces itself into popular conscience when there is some interruption or disturbance of the process." (Park:1950,209)

[8] Stronger versions of this view see these components as a development syndrome. See Heitowitz (1974) for a cross-national evaluation of the link between state homogeneity and levels of violence. He finds no evidence to support this thesis although Morrison and Stevenson (1972a) found moderate support for the hypothesis. There are several elements to such pluralism, however, and as Weiner (1965) makes clear with a list of five types of integration, there may be variations on some dimensions while not on others.

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result from social change is corroborated in the visions of most disciplines in social science -- the behaviorism of Watson and the rationality of neo-classical economics are cases in point. Social psychology is particularly prone to the use of perjorative terms such as 'stereotype', 'prejudice', and 'outsider' which implies that cultural deviance is an unstable phenomenon.[11] Parsonian concepts like the parochial-universalistic dimension also contribute to a devaluation of cognitive processes which function by the establishment of boundaries for classes of objects as bases for perception and social interaction. One insight derived from this literature, however, is that the direction of acculturation "depends more upon prestige than upon power." (Shibutani and Kwan:1965:471).

[9] Note that in a culturally homogeneous society such a secular tendency is not a clearly expected result of the change process since no new culture need be created which spans the populace. The Tuarags of Mali and Niger, before French colonial penetration, separated their slaves' children from their parents (who were of a different ethnic and cultural group, the Bela) with the result of an almost complete acculturation of the Bela to the Tuareg ways. (See Shibutani and Kwan:1965,478 on the Tuareg).

The tendency to treat 'primordial attachments' and ethnic boundaries as ephemeral is not only a characteristic of theoretical views and empirical studies by and about Americans, however. Colonialism has also been charged with the creation and 'freezing' of ethnic boundaries, as well as with stimulating the development of ethnocentrism where none existed before.[12] As Mercier has noted:

"Colonization and modernization have thus been indirectly able to accent ethnic contrasts and assertions. Besides these unwitting effects, colonization has sometimes contributed to a crystallization of ethnic units and to a rigidification of traditionally moving boundaries as a matter of policy. In this respect, the British policy of indirect rule has probably had the most marked consequences. The British reinforced tension between local people and "foreigners" by drawing, as far as possible, district boundaries according to ethnic criteria

[10] Lieberman (1963:10) defines an assimilated ethnic population:

" . . . as a group of persons with similar foreign origins, knowledge of which in no way gives a better prediction or estimate of their relevant social characteristics than does knowledge of the behavior of the total population of the community or nation involved. Thus, we should not call an ethnic group assimilated if they are highly segregated residentially from the remainder of the total population of a given city."

See Elkin and Panning (1975) for a study of blocks to assimilation in English cities.

(often in following the old zones of exercise of traditional power), and by giving to the "native authorities" the right to control the settlement of immigrants on their territory." (1965:493)

This view is shared in part by Ottenberg (1966) in his discussion of the evolution of political and social forms in the Ibo town of Abakaliki in Nigeria. Here, he credits the British with the imposition of a Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy. This example, reflecting the experience of a single ethnic group, as it does, only partially informs an analysis of the country-wide effects of colonial policy.

Some writers advance the view that ethnocentrism is a defensive reaction to the aggression of other groups, affecting status inequality in particular, which will recede

[11] For examples of these usages, see Merton (1972) on insider-outsider distinctions; Korten (1973) on stereotypes as cognitive constructs; Allport (1958), M. Jackman (1977) and Curtis and Fairbank (1979) on the role of prejudice; Glazer and Moynihan (1975) present data on the subject; and Pool (1976) comments on the need for humans to "organize the buzzing confusion of reality into simplified representations." (p. 36) Schroeder, Driver and Strenfert (1967) buttress the Pool perspective in terms of human information processing characteristics. Also see Ember (1977) on cross-cultural cognitive studies. Levine and Campbell (1972) provide a counter to the general use of these pejorative terms. Campbell (1964) deals with the subtle issues of the complexity of such processes.

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as its cause disappears.[13] Ethnocentrism is seen as a block to assimilation processes in which individuals come to identify with a new reference group transcending their original identities.[14] However, as Warren (1977) notes with respect to Indians in Peru and Guatemala, denial of ethnic identity may be followed by a voluntary reaffirmation of that same identity at some later time.

It appears that those who observed the growth of tribal associations have done so with the expectation that they were a transient vehicle towards identification with a larger unit (the state).[15] Some authors, Mercier (1965:493-4), for example, paint a picture in which acute social tensions are always "expressed in tribal language" while viewing ethnicity as a defensive reaction. "[16]

[12] Iliffe (1979) comments on this issue particularly with respect to British East African colonial policy. Southall (1970), Kasfir (1979), Cohen (1969), Mercier (1965) among others, have commented on the fluidity of ethnic boundaries before the colonial powers arrived in Africa. As we have noted previously we think these authors confuse fluidity and randomness -- the fluidity of boundaries is not in dispute but the randomness of such boundary movement is. Note Morrison et al. (1972) Part III Chapter 4 observe that the differentiation of group boundaries is clearly a function of the variables used in the classification.

Similarly, Jackson (1973) details the case for expecting ethnocentrism to remain at high levels in African states.[17] Although there are aspects of social change which cut across ethnic lines in their effects, such as intergenerational differences, even these are frequently attributed to other causes.[18] Many changes, those involving migration, for example, affect systems of ethnic stratification.[19] In addition, Wallerstein notes the differential effects of social change and the confusion of some forms of change with others.

"Writers speaking of tribal loyalty often confuse three separate phenomena which it would be useful to distinguish: loyalty to the family; loyalty to the tribal community; and loyalty to the tribal government, or chief. Often what a writer means by detribalization is simply a decline in chiefly authority. It does not necessarily follow that an

[13] See Mercier (1965:495) for a view of this type although note the apparent paradox when he argues that ethnic diversity can be a strength (p. 486). Cohen (1978) presents a view of ethnicity as an arbitrary division of identities in a state where identity is fluid and situational in nature. This view is too simple to account for the reality, however. Blau (1977), in contrast to Cohen, presents a model where identities can be seen as part of either concentric or intersecting circles thereby recognizing the lack of inclusiveness of peoples within a social unit. See Marenin (1978) on the use of university graduates in a national service corp in Nigeria and its effects on their national consciousness. See Ronen (1979) on ethnocentrism as a reactive process.

Individual who is no longer loyal to his chief has rejected as well the tribe as a community to which he owes certain duties and from which he expects a certain security." (1960:130)

All societies are to some degree plural. Networks of communication and associated identities are generally somewhat smaller than the society and therefore it appears to be unreasonable not to expect some ethnocentrism in all but the most homogeneous states.[20]

Ethnicity as a Continuing Phenomenon

"This growing ethnic self-consciousness is a world-wide phenomena." (Lefever in Rhodie

[14] This process may involve higher levels of ethnocentrism before reference groups on other bases (e.g., occupation) are formed. As Southall has noted with respect to urban tribal associations:

"We have remarked that three phases may be seen, the first in which the stake of most Africans in town is too fleeting for effective tribal associations to be formed, but in which both kinship and tribal bounds are seized upon situationally for mutual aid; the second phase in which tribal associations are formed for general welfare purposes, and the third phase in which Africans begin to move beyond a tribal basis to form associations for common interests and to express similar achieved status, occurring across tribal lines." (1961:38)

(1978:17))

The lack of theoretical understanding of ethnocentrism in the literature on development has been challenged by reality -- a reality that has brought into question much of the thinking incorporated in previously established models of development. Paradoxically, misunderstanding the nature of ethnocentrism stems from the ethnocentrism of the authors themselves. These individuals shared the viewpoint of their

[15] Many of these writers, such as Little (1959) and Gutkind (1962), observed these events in the context of a traditional versus modern society perspective which assumed a shift away from ethnic identity using the tribal associations as 'adaptive mechanisms'. Curtis and Fairbank, for example, (1979) fail to find a correlation between ethnocentrism and lack of social participation, however.

[16] Glickman (1966:263) also asserts that the "African is always tribalized." See the New York Times, April 27, 1981 on the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia as an example of the prevalence of such conflicts outside of Africa.

[17] Korten (1973) provides a cognitive argument for such stereotyping and presents data on American and Ethiopian students in which stereotypes conform closest to known members of the stereotyped group. See H.A. Simon (1979) and E.R. Smith (1978) for comments on the cognitive basis for such action. Lumsden and Wilson (1981) argue that the idealized 'member' is what people actually use in the determination of their own behavior.

own cultures which categorized ethnocentrism as primitive, primordial, atavistic, and a passing phase for groups in the process of becoming members of societies like those of the writers.[21] Considerable evidence indicates that issues of ethnocentrism are not ephemeral, and that atavistic and parochial as such behavior is considered to be by some observers, it is universally observed in human societies.[22]

[18] Pye's (1962) model of acculturation argues that those unable to acculturate will have their identities threatened which will produce a widespread ambivalence towards the traditional and modern if modern benefits are not clear and widespread. We expect that a plural society will result in heightened ethnocentrism because of this. Therefore, ethnic identity is strengthened in the modernization process with important political ramifications.

[19] Lieberman (1963:11-12) comments on the importance of intergenerational mobility as it affects ethnic stratification. See Bawker and Carrier (1976) for other perspectives. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) propose a model in which left in a Darwinian social world, the less able will disappear (or be put to work for the more able) which generates counter measures within social organizations to protect group interests. Huntington and Nelson (1976) also have a similar view. Nowhere is it more apparent than in many African states that such processes exist.

Although the political relevance of ethnicity is frequently defined in terms of external threats to the group,[23] there are other reasons for ethnic cohesiveness related to issues of shared culture and language,[24] and internal objectives of the groups themselves,[25] Additional reasons relate to our discussion in chapter 2 of a model of man as control-seeker.[26] It is pointed out that individuals try to increase their control over others by invoking loyalties of a diffuse nature, that is, those

[20] See Singer (1966) for an axiomatic treatment of the ubiquitousness of some degree of pluralism in all societies. He also traces the manner in which the parochial peasant society came to identify with the Ceylonese state and the role of ethnocentrism in this process. While we will not press the issue here, we expect to identify nationalism as a form of ethnocentrism and therefore that ethnocentrism is omnipresent since only a few individuals are not loyal to some group if groups include states as well as ascriptively based social groupings.

[21] This was not universal, of course, and writers such as Pye and Geertz and other cultural relativists while not specifically invoking the ethnocentrism literature were consistent with it. In addition, the group theories of politics include ethnic bases for politics and while in decline as explanations for political behavior in American politics, group theories have been recently brought to the fore again. See, for example, Miller et al. (1978) and note the continuing interest in the field of sociology in indicators of status and status mobility which are ascriptive in nature such as religion, national origin, race and language.

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loyalties that typically are linked to an ethnos and are associated with the limits of moral obligation.[27]

But What is an Ethnic Group ?

"Ethnic Ideology, in his (Barth's) opinion is, in fact, the very foundation for social interaction and embracing social systems." (Hlophe:1973,239)

[22] See Smooha (1975) on the extent of cultural pluralism in the world, which pluralism provides the most lasting basis for ethnocentrism. For some of the case literature, see Griffin (1980) on Quebec; Osei-Kwame (1977) and Price (1973) on Ghana; Naidu (1978) on India and Malaysia; Katz, Rogers and Harned (1975), Mccagg and Silver (1980), and Azrael (1978) on the USSR; Hamer (1977) and Brown (1967) on Ethiopia.

[23] For example, see Otite (1975) on Nigeria; Katzenstein (1979) on Bombay; Adam and Gillomee (1979) on South Africa; Smooha (1978) on Israel; Van den Berghe (1974) on Peru and (1975) on Africa; Paden (1971) on Kano, Nigeria; Lloyd (1970) and Salomone (1976) on ethnic sources of the Nigerian civil war; Freeman (1979) on the reaction to immigrants in post-World War II France and Britain; Weinstein (1976) on Burundi; Connor (1972) on the role of the modern state in the raising of ethnic consciousness in plural societies; Esman (1977) on ethnic conflict in the West; Liddle (1970) on Indonesia; Cummings (1980) on white American 'ethics'; Honigman (1973:496-497) quotes Das Gupta on how Indian leaders deliberately exaggerated differences between Hindi and Urdu (languages spoken in India and Pakistan) to develop ethnic consciousness. This corresponds to our view of ethnocentrism as 'enhancement of contrast' effects.

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We have referred to ethnic groups in our discussion without defining them; explaining their functions both as culture-bearing units and organizational types; without noting their boundaries of membership and how such boundaries are affected by ecology, demography, and level of dependence on other ethnic groups; and without specifying the role of variation and stratification within and between ethnic groups or dynamics of sociocultural and technological change as it affects the evolution of group boundaries and perceived ethnic group identities. It is our intention here to identify the nature of ethnic groups focusing on the group as providing a basis for ethnocentric behavior and to characterize the implications which ethnic groups hold for

[24] See Spicer and Thompson (1972) on the American Southwest; Nielsen (1980) on the Flemish in Belgium; Khalaf (1968) on Lebanon; Herskovits (1972) on the general issue of cultural relativism; Gellner (1975) on the history of the Magreb; Eades on the Yoruba; Middlebach and Moore (1968) comment on the role of occupation and generation effects in maintaining endogamy among Mexican-Americans and its role as a conserver of culture and language. They found that occupational mobility was the most important factor in exogamy and therefore assimilation among Mexican-Americans (i.e., ethnic self-reference); Okediji (1965) on Nigerian students in the U.S.; Singer (1972) on social change in India; Onwubu (1975) on the Ibo diaspora; see Gordon (1964) on an earlier view of assimilation in the U.S.

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the political culture and behavior of a state. Some see ethnic identification as arbitrarily determined and subject to rapid changes over short periods of time or, alternatively, as fixed by social context, [28] and varying accordingly. Others view ethnic identification as an expression of cultural uniformity. [29]

However, whatever the group's stability or basis for its membership, we expect individual social actors to have a self-defined identity which is fundamental to their membership in a group. [30] We further expect such an

[25] On the role of identity ties as internally generated group consciousness see Schwartz (1974) on Canada; Schneider (1968) on America; Krausz (1980) on Israel; Ottenburg (1976) on a Nigerian (Ibo) town; A. Smock (1969 and 1970) on ethnic unions in Eastern Nigeria; Suttles (1968) on ethnicity and its relation to territory in Chicago slums. Ethnicity is also used as a device to limit entry to occupations. Enloe (1980a, 1980b) and Ellinwood and Enloe (1980) provide many insights into this process with respect to the key institutions of the military and the police. [NOTE: Warrior societies are also ones that use empirical evidence to demonstrate their power, etc.]

[26] In addition to the discussion in chapter 2, see H. A. Simon (1967) on motivational and emotional controls on cognition; Honigman (1973:1218) points out that the usefulness of identity is based on assumptions about the nature of man.

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identity to be an important and somewhat culture-bound determinant in an individual identification of problem-structures and their potential solutions. While identities do change, and they do have certain situationally defined components,[31] These variations are neither random nor arbitrary.[32] We expect identities to be changed either by the assumption of a super-ordinate identity which

[27] Of course, this suggests the reason that religion is frequently singled out as a central factor in such analyses. See Magid (1972) for an example of ethnic secret societies and their role in politics especially at the local level. Also see Segall, Doornbos, and Davis (1976) on Ugandan perceptions of political identity; Siebel (1967) on inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria; Himmelstrand (1973) provides further insight into the Nigerian situation; see Cohen (1974) on ethnicity in urban areas; a classic statement by Mitchell (1960) on ethnocentrism in a plural society. Also note Bates (1973) on the political use of ethnicity; Parenti (1967) on the relationship of ethnic politics and ethnic identification; Salem (1975) evaluates the persistence of ethnic identities in the one-party state of the Ivory Coast; Lauwagie (1979) on ethnic boundaries in modern states; Singer (1966) on Ceylonese ethnocentrism; Bustin (1975) on ethnic politics in the Belgian Congo; and Borgadus (1968) compares racial distance in Ethiopia, South Africa, and the U.S.; Dashefsky (1975) examines four theoretical orientations to the study of ethnicity in terms of methodology and ontology.

		Sociological	Methodology
	Macro	Sociocultural	Psychological
Ontology			Group Dynamics
	Micro	Interactionist	Psychoanalytic
			Behaviorist

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encompasses the previously held identities, or by assimilation to a culturally similar group considered a positive reference group because of its power, status, or other desirable characteristics. We expect that such processes as migration will affect most dramatically intergenerational changes in identity because the new generations are socialized in the context of the new culture rather than the environment of their parents' culture. The relative success of this process depends on other factors, however, such as the importance of the disembodied

[28] Barth (1969) views identity as an arbitrary calculation. Cohen (1978) views it as dependent on context or situation. Wallerstein, as previously noted, has commented on the complexity of ethnic identification.

[29] Karl Deutsch and Rupert Emerson articulated the view that cultural uniformities precede state building. Of course, much of the developing world as well as a number of developed states have turned this process on its head by trying to create a common culture after the state is created. It is precisely this group of states that are the concern of this study.

[30] See Blessing (1980) for a discussion of ethnicity and identity. Salzen (1978) reviews the causal basis for such choices in terms of security, and Witkin et al. (1962) emphasize the role of categorization and contrast enhancement in which humans engage for the purpose of dealing with their environment (as control seekers).

culture-bearers in the socialization process, and the success of assimilation, especially via exogamy. Internal structural reasons as well as external threats may serve to strengthen identities.[33] However, our Law of Cleavages asserts that ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses and, as Barth states, it "defines a way an individual operationalizes and externalizes his reference group norms," (from Said and Simmons:1976,22). Thus we anticipate change in identity to occur slowly within the dominant area of a given ethnic group.[34] We expect such identities to have major effect on the nature of political conflicts and their outcomes in a plural society.

[31] See, for example research on African students studying outside of their country where ethnic differences that are fundamental in their own country are minimized while they study overseas, e.g., Klineberg and Zavalloni (1969).

[32] We do not intend to include in this statement those groups which are formed as coalitions but which maintain separate constituent identities

[33] See Possony (1976) for a lament for passing ethnicities.

Since Hobbes, the thrust of much major work in political theory has followed the view that central state power is necessary to counter the conflict generating effects of tradition, religion, and ethnic-based violence. The Hobbesian view is to replace these more localized and focused motivations for social and political action with ones more secular and objective. That this has been a less than successful strategy is especially apparent in plural societies today and suggests that effective communication and legitimacy among the citizenry is "predicated on a certain degree of community" (Said and Simmons:1976,22).[35] In addition, as previously noted in our discussion of 'man as control-seeker', group behavior can be more violent in a plural society than individual behavior because of the principle of 'risky shift'.[36] In

[34] Note, for example, Hair, who states that "the ethnolinguistic units of the Guinea coast (West Africa) have remained very much the same for three, four or five centuries (the period depending on the date of the earliest documentation)." (1967:247) While this does not mean that the identities have been the same it does imply that their outer limits have changed little if at all for at least several centuries. We further expect that the continual elaboration of more detailed identities will also occur. Under some circumstances this may lead to cross-cutting changes but it also may reinforce cleavages.

other words, individuals in groups are willing to engage not only in a wider range of activities than they would as individuals, but also in activities they would eschew as individuals. Thus, we conclude that ethnic identities are neither random nor without major political consequences.[37] We agree with Said and Simmons' argument that an "ethnic group is a culture" and that such groups "have an inner logic that determines behavior, values and attitudes" (1976:21) and that a group's culture "may belong to a larger culture" and therefore be liable to merge with that larger (encompassing?) identity.

[35] Note that there has been a rise in proposed alternative political formulas for such societies, the most notable being Lijphart's four principles of consociational democracy (grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional elite, segmental autonomy) (in Rhoads:1978,33-35). See Bevan (1976) for a review of bases for group conflict.

[36] The social psychological literature on this subject suggests that straightforward prediction is difficult, however.

[37] Of course, ethnic identities may be latent until some mobilization produces a sense of 'us' or alternatively a sense of who are not 'us'. See Mitchell (1974) on the nature and dynamics of social networks.

This last point leads us to an issue that needs evaluation. There has been a widespread tendency for social scientists to characterize the tribal or ethnic group and the presumed ethnocentric behavior which underlies the individual actions as different in kind from that of a member of a modern state with its associated affective elements of nationalism and patriotism.[38] As Connor has stated:

"The most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with the feeling of loyalty to the state rather than loyalty to the nation." (in Rhoades:1978,54)

[39] We expect that the social psychology of group loyalty will limit the extension of loyalty and moral obligation to a credible, shared culture group. This is an important issue. Countries like Germany, for example, consist of a set of culture-bearers who share a common culture.

[38] White (1975) for example, argues that the tribe and nation are the two fundamental social units. A.D. Smith (1971, 1972, 1979) has reviewed modern notions of nationalism and contrasted them with ethnocentrism. On the possible arbitrariness of group identities (within a shared culture group), see Paicheler (1979) and the discussions in Austin and Worchel (1979). See M. Armer (1974) on African social psychology data. Gluck (1978) presents a view of how social understanding or the notion of group identity develops cognitively.

Therefore, we would expect their loyalty to nation not to strongly differ from their loyalty to the state.[40] This behavior does not differ significantly from the Yoruba's loyalty to ethnos with the distinction that the Yoruba ethnos is not coterminous with the state. The difference in terms of politics concerns the political organization of the world's cultures, and the consequences can be profound.[41]

Central to our analysis here, however, is the notion that shared culture (allowing a certain range of variation) is an element that is necessary but not sufficient to

[39] See this article for useful definitions of nation, ethnic group, primordialism, tribalism, regionalism, parochialism, and subnationalism. Note Pell's (1975b) study of interethnic contacts in several Nigerian cities. See Isaacs (1975) for a view of group identity and its political effects, and McCormick reviews ethno-cultural interpretations of American nineteenth-century voting behavior. (1974)

[40] This same process can lead to attempts to unify a people 'split' by international borders, of course. German history is an example of this phenomena.

[41] Of course, the adaptive culture will be one organized to minimize the pathologies of such pluralism, but this also raises the issue of how the countries of the world should be organized to deal with a comparable problem. Perhaps a well known view should be rephrased to read, 'Ethnocentrism is the last refuge of the scoundrel'.

constitute ethnic group identity.[42] An ethnic group requires of its members, in addition, the perception of a common ancestry, real or mythical, and generally the recognition by non-members of its credibility. In Table 11.2 we present the basic list of ethnic groups that we used in the study.[43] We further expect that members of an ethnic group will have a sense of shared fate -- a property basic to the particular salience of this identity, and one essential to the determination of the ethnic group as the field within which moral obligations are operative for at least a large class of activities.[44]

A sense of shared fate with its concomitant bounding of moral obligation is central to the kind of group-centered

[42] Thus, we expect ethnic groups to possess the properties of Naroll's *cultunit* where members are speakers of mutually intelligible dialects and also belong to the same state or contiguous contact group.

[43] Note a number of ethnic identities have been collapsed in our codings. This was unavoidable if a reasonable number of groups of more than minimal size was to be maintained.

[44] See Kelley and Thibaut (1978:171) for a discussion of a sense of shared fate as a principal reason for in-group loyalty.

behavior that Sumner (1906) labels ethnocentrism.[45] Ethnocentrism is that behavioral syndrome in which individuals' perceptions differ according to the association with one- group and other group -- an enhancement of contrast effect.[46] It is basic to the process of ethnic group formation and maintenance.[47] Nor does this process depend on 'real' cultural difference.

[45] See Levine and Campbell (1972) and Brewer and Campbell (1976) for a review of the history of the term.

[46] See Campbell (1967) on stereotypes and group perceptions.

[47] See Tajfel and his colleagues work for more recent elaborations of the notion of ethnic group interaction (1971, 1968, in press). Ethnicity links all of one's most basic interpersonal networks -- i.e., family, local community, usually schoolmates particularly at the primary level of school.

Table 11.1 Definitions of Ethnic Group and Ethnicity

1. "Ethnicity, then can be summed up as an ideology of and for the maintenance of exclusive boundaries, which are ascriptive and highly imperative in the sense of restricting the number of roles and statuses open to an individual for the purposes of pursuing a specific set of major values which are not shared by others who do not ascribe to this affiliation." (Hlophe:1973,240)
2. "An ethnic group consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type. With very few exceptions they speak the same language, or their speech is at least intelligible to each other, and they share a common cultural heritage. Since those who form such units are usually endogamous, they tend to look alike. Far more important, however, is their belief that they are of common descent, a belief usually supported by myths or a partly fictitious history." (Shibutani and Kwan:1965,40)
3. "(An ethnic group is identical with the theory which its members have of it.) We must add that the bases of this theory are not everywhere the same; they are related to the social structure and the culture of the group in question." (Mercier:1965,487)
4. "An ethnic group consists of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others." (Shibutani and Kwan:1965,47)
5. "By ethnicity, we mean the feeling of loyalty to this new ethnic group of the towns." (Wallerstein:1960,133)

Table 11.1 continued

6. "a tribe can be thought of as a society that is morally, though not conceptually self-sufficient: All moral obligation is exhausted within the community and no rights or obligations exist without it." (Gellner:1965,107)
 7. "The term 'tribe' is often used for linguistic-cultural groupings too small, too archaic, or too lacking in self-consciousness to fall into the category of 'nation'. For these groups, the French employ the useful term *ethnie*." (Gellner:1965,107)
 8. "The tribe is nothing if it is not a religious unit just as much as it is domestic, economic, and political. From this derives the power of its morality." (Turnbull:1964,29)
 9. "It is understandable that the co-existence and the sharing of human interests is not possible with people who do not share one's faith . . . Religion was (in ancient civilizations) made an affair of the tribe or the state. With a few exceptions, the deity was identified with the interests of the political group, and the duties toward Him were identical with the all-embracing duties toward the latter." (Simmel:1955,157)
 10. "The tribe is, in a sense, then, a church: it is a community bound together in common allegiance to a common ancestor in whom its members believe." (Turnbull:1964,25)
 11. "Since ethnic categories are believed to consist of people who are alike by virtue of common ancestry, hereditary marks such as hair and skin color quite naturally become the symbols of identification." (Shibutani and Kwan:1965,68)
- As Barth has noted:[48]

Table 11.1 continued.

12. "The internal cohesiveness of a group and its ability to act as a unit in competition with other groups depends to a large extent upon the degree to which the members are aware of their identity. This conviction that they are fundamentally alike enables people in some ethnic categories to become cohesive groups and to engage in effective concerted action. Men more easily believe they are alike when they think they are descended from the same ancestors." (Shibutani and Kwan:1965,42)
13. "Even those tribes that have evolved into centralized states, nations, or empires have made full use of the family principle." (Turnbull:1964,27)
14. "For, by yet another extension of the family system, two neighboring tribes that need to cooperate for pragmatic political or economic reasons only have to introduce the myth of an earlier ancestor who was father to the present tribal ancestors. By thus making the tribal ancestors brothers, all members of both tribes become interrelated, and what was a tribe now becomes a lineal subdivision of the greater unit." (Turnbull:1964,28)
15. "This leads us to insist on the relative character of ethnic reality in most cases. Two ethnic groups oppose one another, and stress the differences which separate them, only when the two of them are in presence. When they define themselves vis-a-vis a third group, they underplay their contrasts, and present themselves as akin to one another, if not similar (Mercier:1965,489)

[48] Haaland (In Barth:1969,58) does show an example of the process of cultural change leading to incorporation of a new identity with his example of Fur incorporation into the Nomadic cattle-herding Arabs in the Sudan. See Hlophe (1973) for a discussion on Barth and Geertz' model of ethnicity. For other works relating perception to we-they boundaries, see Douglas (1970a, 1970b) ; Rose (1964) on 'they and we', Rosch (1973) on the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories.

TABLE 11.2 LIST OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE STUDY

Code # Orig- inal	Renum- bered	Name(s)	No. of	Daiby	Cluster 12	State(s) 19 States
24	01	Yoruba	2073	47	L,W,Kw	L,Oy,On
08	02	Hausa	1467	03A	Dg,kw	S,Kad,
10	03	Ibo	1461	60	NE,NW	Ka,Bo
09	04	Ibibio, Efik,Anang	642	62C	NC,K	I,An,
06	05	Fulani	474	201	EC,MW	Ben
21	06	Tiv, Ugbe Utange Munchi	289	81	SE	CR
37	07	Waja, Tura Billiri, Tula,Tangale Tangarewaso, Kamo	235	65A	NE,NW	S, Kad, Ka, Bo
16	08	Ijaw, Kalibari	221	35	BP	Ben
11	09	Idoma	192	61	MW	Ben, Pla
05	10	Etsako Kukuruku Ake Ivbiesakon Afenmai	185	49	NE	Ben
32	11	Tera (Terana) Jara Terawa	146	05A	MW	Bau
03	12	Bini	142	49	NE	Ben
19	13	Kanuri	123	11A	NW,RP	Bor
07	14	Gbari	107	48	NE	Nig, Pla
33	15	Bura, Babur	87	05B	MW	Bau
22	16	Urhobo	84	49	Kw	Ben
13	17	Igbira	64	604	NW,KW	Kw
20	18	Nupe Abewa	34	48		Nig,KW

*a drastic reduction of cultural differences

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Table 11.2 continued

34	19	Gwandara, Gade	30	03A	BP	Pia	
12	20	Igala	23	47	W, Kw NW	Dnd, Kw Nig	
36	21	Mada, Eggon, Ninzam	21	63 H, J	BP, NE	Pia, Bo	
18	22	Jukun	19	64 A	BP		
01	23	Angas Sura Miriam Tal, Ankwe	18	03B	NE	Bau	
38	24	Katab, Kagora, Kaje, Jaba	18	63E	NW, NC	Kad, NI	
17	25	Itsekeri	17	47	MW	Ben	
31	26	Bachama	16	05D	NE	Ba	
41	27	Owe, Kabba	14	47	Kw	Kw	
28	28	Biom	14	05D	NE	Bau	
note Birom numbers incorrect							
23	29	Warjawa Waji	13	84	BP	Plat	
14	30	Ishan	11	49	MW	Ben	
04	31	Ekoi	9	102	SE	CR	
43	32	Alago	8	61	BP	Plat	
15	33	Isoko	4	49	MW	Ben	
30	34	Ora	4	49	MW	Ben	
02	35	Bauchi	1	63C	NE	Bauchi	
25	36	English	1	99E	All States	All States	
42	37	Kilba, Margi, Chibak	1	05B	NE	Bauchi	
29	38	Jarawa	0	84	BP	Plat	
26	39	Plogin (Language Only)	NA	NA	NA	NA	
27	40	Arabic	NA	01A	NA	NA	

Source: TBI-Run #1016 pp.5-6.

between ethnic groups does not correlate in any simple way with a reduction in the organizational relevance of ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary maintaining processes." (1969:32-33)

Moreover, we expect that the characteristics of a given

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ethnic group's social organization will have an important bearing on the general level of ethnocentrism in the population. We hypothesize that the more elaborated the institutionalization of the ethnic group's culture (that is its embodied culture), the less likely it is that its members will devote time or interest to other groups and the more ethnocentric its members will be.[49]

If substantial real differences in control over income and wealth occurs between groups, or if one ethnic group controls the means of income generation of another, a situation of ethnic (and perhaps cultural) stratification exists. We would expect this to aggravate such ethnocentrism as exists already.[50]

[49] This is also consistent with Blau's formal sociology (1977). Bergesen in his review of Mary Douglas' work refers to this process as the Erikson effect in which "a strongly bounded system will generate more of a ritual response (manufacturing deviance and dirt) than a society with weaker boundaries and less corporate reality." (1978:1016) Hence, the more a culture is institutionalized the more ethnocentric it will be. See Ugmuegbu (1976) on a study of Nigerian's views of moral behavior.

[50] See Barth (1969:27) for another discussion of ethnic stratification.

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TABLE 11.3 ETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS

Group	Percent Multi- lingual	Violence for Personal Quarrels (% yes)	% Lived Else- where	% Poly- gamous	Preferred Areas	Least Preferred Areas
1. Bini	67	38	44	33	North, West	East
2. Etsako	84	10	55	>50	Kano, NC, West	East (West)
3. Fulani	>90	27	44	63	North	Wst, Ea
4. Gbari	100	57	90	44	North, MW	Eas, We, North
5. Hausa	67	34	66	59	North	Eas, We
6. Ibo	100	27	53	20	BP, South	Rivers, SE, La, Wes, Nort
7. Ibibio	75	21	large	16	North	EC, Riv West
8. Idoma	>80	51	53	21	North, MW	South
9. Igbira	100	52	84	19	North & South	Big Groups
10. Ijaw	>90	20	>50	24	MW, Minorities	East, West
11. Kanuri	>60	28	41	31	North	South
12. Nupe	100	28	67	7	Mixed	?
13. Tangale	100	50	26	62	North	South
14. Tiv	High	46	80	40	North, East	East, West
15. Urhobo	>80	25	52	44	N.E, W.	East West
16. Yoruba	95	25	60	50	West	East, North

As noted in Part I, ethnocentrism is not solely a group property but relational, it varies with respect to different out-groups, and that certain out-group(s) become positive

Table 11.3 continued Ethnic Distributions

Group	Father's Literacy Percent	Mother's Literacy Percent	Literacy
1. Bini	24	21	72
2. Etsako	15	3	54
3. Fulani	20	8	40
4. Gbari	11	0.4	36
5. Hausa	11	8	>50
6. Ibo	23	11	74
7. Ibibio	44	27	90
8. Idoma	5	2	59
9. Igbira	20	7	100
10. Ijaw	30	18	77
11. Kanuri	5	7	23
12. Nupe	35	2	94
13. Tangale	13	13	50
14. Tiv	9	3	60
15. Urhobo	11	2	63
16. Yoruba	25	12	77

referents to members of an in-group. We have posited that when this happens it will be between groups that are culturally-near and politically and/or economically powerful.[51]

Table 11.4 Social Distance Scores

Respondent's Social Distance From									
Respondent's Group	Hausa	Ibo	Yoruba	Tiv	Ibiblo	Kanuri	Bini	Ijaw	Nupe
1. Bini	65	109	39	52	30	65	17	39	62
2. Etsako	46	184	71	74	163	70	37	33	80
3. Fulani	61	180	202	133	164	73	147	145	99
4. Gbari	34	186	101	40	165	35	130	164	34
5. Hausa	40	168	170	140	129	57	130	112	100
6. Ibo	71	12	72	63	77	68	40	67	59
7. Ibiblo	40	64	58	33	8	35	40	39	40
8. Idoma	113	134	135	123	66	94	90	93	103
9. Igbira	20	10	2	19	22	32	28	20	10
10. Ijaw	30	45	22	16	13	15	9	13	45
11. Kanuri	46	216	254	125	82	47	146	140	116
12. Nupe	52	68	51	56	56	42	60	64	50
13. Tangale	95	125	101	106	125	93	118	129	100
14. Tiv	105	192	181	24	150	103	157	154	111
15. Urhobo	83	77	84	82	68	82	96	91	85
16. Yoruba	140	162	0	144	158	163	106	146	161

We expect ethnocentrism to be reinforced as social mobility and political mobilization occur, and as the

[51] See Tajfel and Turner (1979) for a discussion of reference group theory and note their view (p. 44) that one's self-esteem is highest when making favorable comparisons with one's own group. This would mitigate against the eventual merger of groups. Hence, as noted before, the arrangement of arenas of political conflict, social organization, and reward structure will tend to produce ascriptive bases for political mobilization. The intent of the Adaptive Culture, of course, is to identify such bases and to minimize their actual or potential effects.

Table 11.5 Social Distance Scales by Ethnic Group
 1. Bini

Bini Ibibio-Yoruba-Ijaw Tiv-Kanuri-Hausa-Nupe Ibo

2. Etsako

Ijaw-Bini-Hausa Kanuri-Yoruba-Tiv-Nupe Ibibio-Ibo

3. Fulani

Hausa-Kanuri Nupe-Tiv-Ijaw-Bini Ibibio-Ibo-Yoruba

4. Gbari

Nupe-Hausa-Kanuri-Tiv Yoruba-Bini Ijaw-Ibibio-Ibo

5. Hausa

Hausa-Kanuri Nupe-Ijaw-Ibibio-Bini-Tiv Ibo-Yoruba

6. Ibo

Tiv-Bini-Nupe-Ijaw-Kanuri-Hausa-Yoruba-Ibibio

7. Ibibio

Ibibio-Tiv-Kanuri-Ijaw-Bini-Nupe-Hausa Yoruba-Ibo

8. Idoma

Ibibio Bini-Ijaw-Kanuri-Nupe Hausa Ibo-Yoruba

9. Igbira

Yoruba-Nupe Ibo-Tiv-Hausa-Ijaw-Ibibio Bini-Kanuri

Table 11.5 continued

10. Ijaw

Bini Ijaw-Ibibio Nupe-Kanuri-Tiv Yoruba-Hausa-Ibo

11. Kanuri

Hausa-Kanuri Ibibio-Nupe-Tiv Ijaw-Bini Ibo-Yoruba

12. Nupe

Kanuri-Nupe-Hausa Tiv-Ibibio Bini-Ijaw-Ibo-Yoruba

13. Tangale

Kanuri-Hausa Nupe-Yoruba-Tiv Bini-Ibo-Ijaw

14. Tiv

Tiv Hausa-Kanuri-Nupe Ibibio-Ijaw-Bini Yoruba-Ibo

15. Urhobo

Ibibio-Ibo Tiv-Kanuri-Yoruba-Hausa Ijaw-Bini

16. Yoruba

Bini Tiv-Hausa-Ijaw Ibibio-Nupe-Ibo-Kanuri

realization of inequality between one's own group and other group(s) becomes clear. Even though we expect that personal interest and intergroup hostility are elements of

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Table 11.6 Ethnic Group Preferences

Ethnic Group	B I n I	E t a k o	F u a r n	G a r i	H a s a	I b i l	I b o	I d o	I g o	I J b m a	K a n u e r	N u p e	T a n g	T i v	U r h o b o	Y o r u b b a
Question																
Political Par. on a state basis(% no)	68	69	44	80	48	45	67	44	78	59	34	84	19	70	24	53
Current arrange will solve Nig eria's problems. will solve Nigeria's (% no)	26	22	34	34	27	55	28	31	59	26	25	57	6	45	24	36
Prefer educate child in own state(% yes)	68	23	63	53	39	77	49	92	65	85	67	44	50	64	73	75
Ethnic conflict will decrease over time (% no)	19	15	36	24	17	23	47	47	21	33	18	10	12	45	61	47
Is religion important in Nigerian politics (% no)	25	35	35	29	32	39	49	39	77	29	22	79	19	52	10	25
Resp. has lived outside state (% no)	56	44	56	10	0	47	37	47	16	49	59	33	74	20	48	40
Respondent traveled out state (% no)	23	8	20	5	0	26	15	21	8	21	33	3	37	13	43	24
Own group economically better off than others (% yes)	13	25	22	38	38	23	10	11	2	11	49	8	6	31	6	40
Own group politically more power. than others(%yes)	10	20	22	57	54	44	9	18	14	2	41	38	0	38	0	35
Own group culturally more prestlg. than others (% yes)	79	81	49	75	70	44	70	32	30	47	63	35	0	35	57	57

Table 11.7 Ethnic Group Behavior

Ethnic Group	B I n l o	E t s a k o	F u a n l	G b a r l	H a s l a	I b s l o	I b o	I d o m a	I g b m l a	I J a w a	K a n u e r l	N p e r l	T a n g a l e
--------------	-----------------------	----------------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-------------	-----------------------	----------------------------	-----------------------	---------------------------------	-----------------------	---------------------------------

Percent tried to get government to do something for them	28	29	39	19	36	33	31	40	53	27	41	29	19
Choose collusion for business competition (1)	82	78	70	39	69	51	56	39	27	48	39	41	99
Education as qualification for high office (%)	74	92	51	50	61	62	63	65	91	69	65	86	25
Average number of voluntary associations belong to	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	2	1	3	2
Religion distribution													
Percent muslim	3	69	95	57	99	1	0	5	58	0	66	90	50
Percent protestant	24	11	5	43	1	58	72	64	9	72	14	10	50
Percent catholic	29	17	0	0	0	29	22	17	34	11	0	0	0
Percent independent christian	11	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	2	0	0	0
Percent traditional religions	34	0	0	0	0	7	1	16	0	13	0	0	0

ethnocentrism, we agree with Tajfel and his colleagues who concluded from a series of experiments that "neither calculations of individual interest nor previously existing attitudes of hostility could have been said to have determined discriminative behavior against an outgroup." (1971:150)[52] Furthermore, we expect the structure of

Table 11.7 continued

Ethnic Group	T	U	Y
	i	r	o
	v	h	r
		o	u
		b	b
		o	a
Percent tried to get government to do something for them,	31	11	29
Choose collusion for business competition (%)	43	48	58
Education as quali- fication for high office	63	77	80
Average number of voluntary associatio belong to	2	2	2
Percent Muslim	3	0	35
Percent Protestant	61	32	54
Percent Catholic	29	25	?
Percent Independent Christian	0	20	?
Percent traditional religions	7	21	?

interaction between the social, political, and economic
 realms to significantly affect the dynamics of ethnic group
 boundaries as well as ethnocentrism and its relation to

[52] For some examples of the effects of ethnocentrism on
 social and political mobilization, see Osei-Kwame (1977)
 on Ghana's 1969 election; Ragin (1979) on the Welsh; and
 Rose (1976) on the general issue.

social and political mobilization.[53]

Ethnocentrism -- Its Mechanisms and Effects

Thus far in our empirical analysis we have concerned ourselves with the links between culture areas and political values and beliefs, and the relationship between embodied and disembodied culture on the one hand and the political ABC's on the other. However, we have argued that ethnocentrism as an independent phenomenon influences political outcomes in a fundamental manner. In plural societies, a constant reference of individual behavior to group expectations is essential. Such ethnocentrism tends to intensify as well as fractionate the cultural determination of political behavior.

[53] See Shibutani and Kwan (1965) on ethnic stratification; Nagata (1976) on ethnic identity in Malaysia and Latin America; also see Paine (1974) for a review of Barth's work, and Paicheler (1979) for a review of what is called the 'polarization effect'. That is the enhancement of contrast effect as it relates to group members' behavior towards each other.

Ethnicity is frequently "more, not less, salient in modern nation states because there is increased competition for scarce rewards." (Cohen:1978,397) This argument does not account satisfactorily for ethnicity being the basis for mobilization, however. Economic forces may influence the salience of ethnic boundaries,[54] as well as spilling over into other arenas of social activity, principally political, but their effect is not made clear in the literature in those cases where observed coalitions between ethnic groups either are maintained despite ethnic antagonisms, or reflect a decline in ethnocentric feelings.[55] Individuals acquire most ethnocentric attitudes at an early age and ethnocentrism appears relatively resistant to change. Moreover, it seems to spring from deep psychological need for group identification and protection, leading individuals to engage in activities that are often reward maximizing for neither themselves nor their groups, but rather magnify

[54] See Cohen (1978:396) on salience; Schildkrout (1978) on the transformation of ethnic identities in Ghana; and Van den Berghe (1973:226) on the fluidity of ethnic boundaries.

[55] See Van den Berghe (1973:260-) for examples of ethnic bargaining.

Intergroup differences in rewards.[56]

While there appear to be a number of forces which stimulate those behaviors which limit social and political competition on ascriptive grounds and which also meet important psychological needs, there are many mechanisms that are invoked to mobilize individuals and groups to act as well. The most common is religion which is typically fundamental to an embodied culture. In the Nigerian context this is less clear, however. In the areas of Nigeria where Islam is long established, religion is central to culture and has been important in the country's political history. In the rest of the country, universalistic religions are largely patinas covering complex combinations of traditional belief systems and religions, and we should expect these to be relatively unimportant bases for mobilization.[57]

[56] See Turner, Brown, and Tajfel (1979) for a report on this phenomena. Also see Brewer (1979).

[57] In other plural societies, religion often tends to play a more important role. See Hechter (1975) on the role of religious differences between core and periphery in Britain as a mechanism that has maintained ethnic solidarity and boundaries for centuries. See Paden (1973) for a study of the effect of religion on political culture in Nigeria.

Various symbolic forms are important mechanisms for effecting ethnocentric behavior. Surface symbols such as dress, presentation of self, and speech patterns are important indicators for stereotype labels.[58] These symbolic forms extend to conscious ethnic signaling whereby a member communicates to other members in mixed member-nonmember environments through the use of words or mannerisms which are understood differently by ingroup and outgroup members. Such procedures are especially important to dispersed minority populations.[59]

Authority and stratification in society are often mechanisms for maintaining ethnocentrism despite their acting to vitiate elements of ethnocentrism under certain circumstances. These elements may be articulated or

[58] Note that stereotypes are complex -- some are well organized, while others are partial or conditional -- some are conscious while others are not -- See Shibutani and Kwan (1965:86-95) on stereotypes. See Goffman (1981) for a discussion of frame analysis, a key approach to the analysis of these types of behavior.

[59] See Plotnicov and Silverman (1978) on American Jewish ethnic signaling; also see Farber (1979) on elements of the same issue; Alba and Kessler (1979) review American Catholicism and ethnicity. This phenomena is sometimes referred to as an example of Aesopian communication.

Justified on grounds that do not match the reality-testing commonly involved in the execution of authority. Nevertheless, a high correlation between horizontal social dimensions such as ethnicity and vertical dimensions such as class or authority is substantial evidence of ethnocentric perception and behavior.[60] Other devices for maintaining ethnocentrism include the invocation of ethnic obligations, language barriers hindering communication with other groups, and external threats to the group's existence.[61]

[60] See Enloe (1977) on the relation between ethnicity and bureaucracy in state building (see p. 4 for African examples). Also see Busch (1978) on legitimacy and ethnicity in Malaysia, and Nachmias (1979) on the role of structural context. See Oloko (1972) for a study of the relation between management nationality and productivity. See Hess (1970) on the relation between social class and ethnic influences on socialization. See Warren (1977) on the role of ethnicity as class identification in Guatemala and Peru. Also see Moussnier (1973) on social hierarchies. See Van den Berghe and Primov (1977) for another view on Peruvian inequality.

[61] See on these issues Tessler, O'Barr and Spain (1973) on Africa; Taylor, Bassils and Aboud (1973) on identity in Quebec; Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1975) on its dynamics; Sanjek (1977) on Ghana; O'Toole (1973) on South Africa; and Sanda (1974a, 1974b) and Kamau (1977) on the Yorubas of Nigeria. See Lieberman, Dalto, and Johnson (1975) and Lieberman and Hansen (1974) on language effects on politics.

The mechanisms which give rise to, or sustain ethnocentrism tend to have political effects in terms of an escalating sequence of boundary-defining and maintaining steps as Rabuska and Shepsle (1972) have outlined. These processes become self-perpetuating independent of the original stimulus, preventing issues or other groupings of the population from exerting a significant effect on political outputs and outcomes.[62] In the end, it seems unlikely that Sklar has been proven correct in his observation on Nigerian politics that by and large, "ethnic affinities are outweighed by class interests." (1966:297)[63]

[62] Bandura (1969) reviews the social-learning theory of identificatory processes, and Gallagher (1974) traces the process of definition and maintenance of the Ndendeuli identity. See Mawlana and Robinson (1976:55-56) for a review of Rabuska and Shepsle's work. See Booth (1979) for another view.

[63] Other sources on ethnicity and political conflict include Petersen (1979), Mirowsky and Ross (1980) on American minorities, Luebke (1980) on American prairie areas, Kleiss (1980) on Igbo ethnicity in the Cameroon, Khleif (1980) on Wales, Khuri (n.d.) on Bahrain, Keyes (1980) on the Thai frontier peoples, (see Science, 2 April 1982, 48-49 v 216 for a review of this book) Grillo (1980) on national minorities in Europe, Gaines (1981) on ethnic boundaries in Strasbourg, Foster (1980) on European minorities, Feld (1981) on the tendency to develop convergent cleavages, Gordon (1978) on horizontal versus vertical cleavage effects, Bayor (1978) on ethnic groups in New York, Bentley (1981) on an extensive bibliography on the subject of ethnicity, Burgess (1981) on Zimbabwe, Hirschman (1975) on Malaysia, Holloman and Arutinov (1978) on competing views of the nature of ethnicity.

Other sources are Tajfel (1978) on group differentiation, du Toit (1979) on ethnicity in Africa, Sugar (1980) on ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe, Sipes (1981) on cross-cultural hypotheses, Semyonov and Tyree (1981) on the economic costs of segregation, Rosenstein (1981) on ethnicity in Israel, Rothchild on a framework for the analysis of ethnic politics, Ra'anan and Roche (1980) on ethnicity in the modern democratic state, Ennew (1980) on the Scottish Hebrides, Epstein (1978), Brenner and Kiefer (1981) on the economics of the diaspora, Echols (1981) on inequality and ethnicity, Billigmeier (1979) on Swiss ethnicity, Bonacich and Modell (1980) on the economic base for ethnic solidarity, Bertelsen (1977) on national minorities as they effect international politics, Pcioffi-Revilla (1981) on the notion of not well bounded (fuzzy) sets, Banks (1976) on identity in southeast Asia, and Baker (1981) on methods for the analysis of interaction data.

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Properties of Intergroup Activity
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"It appears inevitable that Africa's further advance should be punctuated by a series of contests between tribal groups, each newly aware of its communal identity, such as those which marked the transition of Nigeria and the Gold Coast to independence and lay behind the bloody riots in Brazzaville in February 1959." (Emerson:1960,113)

"There are four principal ways in which ethnicity serves to aid national integration. First, ethnic groups tend to assume some of the functions of the extended family and hence they diminish the importance of kinship roles; two, ethnic groups serve as a mechanism of resocialization; three, ethnic groups help keep the class structure fluid, and so prevent the emergence of castes; fourth, ethnic groups serve as an outlet for political tensions." (Wallerstein:1960,134)

"Tribalism, far from being opposed to unity, could become one of the greatest forces toward unity." (Turnbull:1964,29)

"The translation of nationalism to non-European peoples has brought no lessening of the contradictions which it harbors. The plural society is a characteristic phenomenon of great stretches of the world; the 'crazy quilt of the Balkans' is generally more typical than the model nations of England and France. Even the disappearance of colonialism in its various guises would remove only a fraction of the plurality. Indeed, the transition from colonial status to independence will probably serve to aggravate rather than alleviate the problem. The colonial governments have often played a role akin to that of the monarchies which developed the centralized territorial states in Europe." (Emerson:1960,112)

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In this chapter, we evaluate several hypotheses concerning ethnocentrism and test them using the Nigerian data. The object of this analysis is to assess the nature of a viable representative government in a society marked by high levels of culturcentrism and ethnocentrism.[1] It is also our intent to examine those differences in political behavior associated with ethnocentrism existing as it does in both culturally plural and heterogeneous societies. Some scholars do not view ethnic allegiance as a barrier to political development, but others, like Kuper (1965) and M.G. Smith (1969), do.[2] Still others have expressed the opinion that cities have been "graveyards for traditions" in which sentimental ties to one's group are weakened, and new patterns of conduct attempted. (Shibutani and Kwan:1965,346).[3] However, situations in which ethnic stratification occur contain forces which stimulate ethnocentrism.[4]

As noted earlier, the very structure of the Institutional forms of the interacting groups are also

[1] For another study of the possibilities of 'democracy without consensus' see von Vorys (1975).

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important. Highly institutionalized groups will tend to re-form their institutions in new environments such as urban areas. Segmental groups with less coherent institutional forms will have greater difficulty maintaining their identity. Their coherence as an ethnic group is less clearly established and usually only with reference to outgroups, principally those outgroups which are seen to be threats to the group's existence.[5] The character of social organization of outgroups and the sociopolitical and

[2] For example, Mercler (1965:490). Himmelstrand (1966:2) has also argued that modernization is essential to the ending of ethnically-based conflicts. Mazrui (1966:28) refers to the term 'plural society' as a contradiction although Mitchell's definition that Mazrui is citing -- "A plural society typically arises when people of widely different cultural backgrounds become linked together in a common economic and political system." (1960:294) -- does not preclude diversity in one sector (culture) and unity in others (economic and political). Kuper (1965:114) also recognizes the complex nature of pluralism's boundaries while at the same time asserting the centrality of force and regulation to the continuance of a plural society. He further notes that totalitarian "trends in plural societies, as elsewhere, express attempts by one segment to impose its rule on the plurality; but perhaps plural societies, because of the sharp antagonisms between segments, are more prone to 'totalitarian' forms of government." (1965:116). M.G. Smith recognizes the incipient violence between groups in plural societies and notes the "coexistence of incompatible institutional systems" in plural societies, differentiates it from a class society and makes such societies more difficult to rule without significant coercion.

economic environments in which such groups interact also will have an important role to play.[6] Ecological and geographical factors will play a major long-run role in the intertemporal dynamics of this process, and under some conditions, even short-run effects may be of major importance.[7]

The number of relevant and useful hypotheses about the effects of such pluralism on social and political behavior is very large.[8] We subdivide our ethnocentrism hypotheses

[3] This statement is a general summary of the experience of ethnicity in new environments. Our concern is, in part, ~~when~~ and ~~why~~ such assimilative processes do not consistently work in this direction. Gluckman (1966:260) also asserts that various urban studies (done at the time) "emphasize that various tribal associations in these towns do not dominate political life." Gellner (1965:113) agrees adding the positive role of government pressures to the other 'negative' reasons which emphasize the decay of institutional supports. Therefore, we would expect that long-time urbanities will be the least parochial, but if our earlier stated view is correct, these mobilized people will be more, not less, ethnocentric with respect to their larger ethnic identity.

[4] This is the type of plural society that M.G. Smith has examined. Our emphasis is on plural societies where elements of ethnic stratification are not an ~~overwhelming~~ factor in the political and social structure.

into six groups, focusing on: 1. properties of the group; (2) properties of individual group members; (3) characteristics of intergroup activity; (4) dynamics of group boundary changes; (5) outgroup properties; and (6) the results of ethnocentrism especially on politics. We discuss these groups of hypotheses seriatim.

Group Properties as Sources of Ethnocentrism

- [5] Ronen (1979) emphasizes the role of external threats in ethnic group maintenance, as does Gellner (1965:113), but both are principally concerned with segmentally-structured groups with low levels of development of embodied culture-bearers and where most culture is carried at the disembodied level. Galbraith (1967), in commenting on the Scots immigrants to Ontario, notes how they reformed their communities (and clans) when they arrived.
- [6] Note, for example, that during the colonial period, the British aim was to maintain ethnic communities and identities, while the French goal was to destroy traditional bases of organization. The length of time that the colonial penetration lasted also played an important part in this process.
- [7] For example, much of the central area of Nigeria was rainforest several centuries ago, but now is referred to as derived savanna, mainly grassland with moderate tree growth and rainfall. The environmental changes have in turn required adaptations in social organization. The contemporary desertification of much of the Sahelian area, including some extreme northern parts of Nigeria, is also having similar disruptive effects.

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As with culture, we find it most useful to characterize ethnocentrism at both the individual and corporate levels. In this section, we consider the latter level of aggregation, the corporate level, in terms of: 1. group structure; (2) socialization practices; (3) levels of mobilization -- social, political, and economic; and (4) its effect on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of belief structures as a result of social change.

We expect that cultural homogeneity will lead to lower variation in other more immediate behavioral dispositions, and the role of participation tends to motivate individuals to more positively evaluate the group. This is a well-established axiom in the literature on political participation and legitimacy. Second, we expect that group members will intentionally distort information in order to influence outcomes to favor their group. Third, biased evaluations of the ingroup self-enhancement will be made in order to improve the rater's standing among remaining

[8] For example, Levine and Campbell (1972), in their review of the ethnocentrism literature, characterize several hundred distinct hypotheses on ethnocentrism that they had culled from the literature.

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Ingroup members. Fourth, group members will make overly positive evaluations of the ingroup and its members in order to encourage a sense of 'we' versus 'they' and to stimulate group morale. Fifth, biased evaluations of ingroup members' behavior will be made in order to maintain the group's motivation to compete against other groups.

I. Properties of the Groups

A. Structure

1. The more culturally homogeneous the group, the less the variation in values and political preferences, and the more ethnocentric
2. Greater ingroup institutional coherence and congruence will lead to greater outgroup hostility.
3. Ethnocentrism will be stronger among both larger and more densely populated groups.
4. Least organized and institutionalized groups will be the least ethnocentric.

B. Socialization

1. Groups with high average trust levels will have members who are generally less ethnocentric than members of groups which have low trust levels.

C. Mobilization

1. Ethnocentrism will be strongest among the most mobilized and organized groups.

Table 12.1 Summary of Ethnocentrism Hypotheses[9]

[9] (insert Barth:1969,10 quote here)

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D. Belief Variation

1. The more that social change affects a group's belief system, the more uniform their attitudes towards outgroups will be.

II. Properties of Individuals

A. Mobilization

1. Ethnocentrism will be strongest among the most mobilized individuals.
2. The less the real differences between elites of different ethnic identities, the greater the ethnocentrism and social distance between them.

Two remaining hypotheses about individual behavior are: (1) that negative (or positive) evaluations of outgroups will be generalized across all (or most) areas of human activity; and (2) that high levels of ethnocentrism will be accompanied by low levels of public-regarding behavior and correspondingly high levels of both private-regarding behavior with respect to outgroup actors and ethnic-group-regarding behavior with respect to ingroup members. The first hypothesis has broad support in the literature and the second is consistent with our expectation that the ethnic group will be the limit of moral obligation in the plural society. The second hypothesis is, of course, of considerable importance to the viability of the polity in a plural state.

Table 12.1 continued

B. Man as Control-Seeker

1. Participation: group members will enhance their evaluation of the in-group through participation in its creation.
2. Propaganda: group members will make distorted evaluations (knowingly) in order to influence decisions of Judges in their group's favor.
3. Self-enhancement: biased ratings of in-group will be made by a group member in order to enhance his/her status within the group.
4. Solidarity: group members will make biased evaluations in order to bolster in-group morale and 'we' feeling.
5. Motivation-maintaining Communications: biased evaluations will be made by members in order to maintain the group's motivation to continue subsequent competition.
6. The more field independent a person is, the more ethnocentric they will be.

C. Generalization

1. Negative evaluations of out-groups will be generalized across all areas (or most) of activity.
2. High levels of ethnocentrism will be accompanied by low levels of public regarding behavior and high levels of private regarding behavior with respect to members of outgroups and ethnic group regarding behavior with respect to ingroup members.

III. Properties of Intergroup Activity

A. 'Realistic' Group Differences

1. Ethnocentrism will be strongest at the realistic group conflict boundaries.
2. Perspective: situational character of intergroup context will influence ingroup bias.

Table 12.1 continued

3. Ethnocentrism will be greater between groups in competition over real resources (or political power).
4. The greater the linguistic difference even when other elements of culture are shared, the greater the social distance.
5. Among outgroups perceived as similar to an ingroup, adjacent groups will be held at less social distance than nonadjacent groups, but among dissimilar outgroups, adjacent groups will be held at greater social distance than nonadjacent groups.
6. High advanced outgroups will be held at less social distance than low advanced outgroups.
7. Among outgroups perceived as similar to the ingroup, high advanced groups will be held at less social distance than low advanced groups, but among dissimilar outgroups, high advanced groups will be held at greater social distance than low advanced outgroups.

B. Social Conflict Generation

1. Evaluation apprehension: open expressions of ethnocentrism will not be given if they are seen as socially unacceptable by some group's members.
2. Groups on the spatial and political peripheries of the society will be less ethnocentric than those at the center.
3. Outgroups perceived as similar to ingroups will be held at less social distance than outgroups perceived as dissimilar.
4. Adjacent outgroups will be held at greater social distance than nonadjacent outgroups.
5. Adjacent outgroups will be held at less social distance than nonadjacent groups. (This contradicts prop. III.B.4)

Table 12.1 continued

6. High advanced outgroups will be held at less social distance if they are adjacent to the ingroup than if they are nonadjacent.
7. There will be a positive correlation between social 'nearness' and liking for outgroups.
8. There will be a positive correlation between social 'nearness' and familiarity with outgroup members.
9. Breakdown of ethnic stratification leads to conflict between groups.

IV. Properties of Group Boundary Changes

A. Direction

1. The direction of acculturation will be from less complex groups to more complex, differentiated groups and therefore the more complex group will be a reference group for the less complex but not the reverse.
2. The more a group's culture is embodied, the more resistant to boundary changes and the more ethnocentric it will be.

B. Modernization

1. As social mobilization increases ethnocentrism will decrease.

V. Properties of the Outgroup

A. Preferred

1. Balance: Individuals give higher evaluations towards groups that they like.
2. High advanced outgroups will be held at greater social distance than low advanced.

Properties of Intergroup Activity

Table 12.1 continued

3. If group members identify with a group not speaking the member's first language, they will be a more prestigious group. (Cf. Salamone:1973)

VI. Results of Ethnocentrism

A. Mobilization Patterns

1. The more ethnocentric the group, the more political mobilization along ethnic lines will take place.
2. Ethnocentric bounds are limits of moral obligation.

Many writers have emphasized the reactive or reflexive characteristics of ethnocentric behavior (e.g., Ronen:1979 and Schmerhorn:1978) by which one group's ethnocentrism stimulates that of another. This is especially true of ethnocentric behavior characterized by real differences in status or class rewards to the group. Most relatively stable groups, in terms of intergroup distribution of status, have developed mechanisms for assimilation, incorporation, or ritualization in order to avoid outcomes of conflict which are unacceptable. (Cf. Shibutani and Kwan:1965,335 and Himmelstrand:1966,2.) At the same time, such intergroup situations may be used to displace internal tensions to outsiders (Cf. Mercier:1965,496), in order to

provide a 'common enemy' to unite the group (Cf. Shibutani and Kwan:1965,220) or to otherwise shift the conflict to populations beyond the limits of moral obligation.

Rapid social change and concomitant changes in the valuation and distribution of status within and between groups generally leads to circumstances where appeals are made to the existence of a common enemy or other mechanisms are invoked for coping with real, perceived, or expected losses in relative status.[10] Individuals becoming members of a favored group (assimilating) or joint group (incorporating) may defuse conflicts. Since the search for maximal comparative advantages for one's own group would be diluted by such a process, elites are likely to oppose assimilation into their group in large numbers.[11] The

[10] While some conflicts which social change may generate can be described in the frustration-aggression format, we do not expect such a form of explanation to be especially useful or enlightening.

[11] The notion of 'whose ox is gored' in such a situation is important but we do not expect that elites who profit from such shifts would be sufficient to alter outcomes since this process has a significant element of individual voluntarism involved which could be difficult to enforce if they did not wish to follow the elite's lead.

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benefits to the group clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Group interaction may vary in its intensity and range, however. Symbiotic use of ecological resources evidenced in nomad-farmer interactions may provide a situation which is quite stable. Even market interactions of a certain kind may prove undemanding on the interacting groups. As the range and intensity of interaction increase, however, the need arises to have more deeply rooted and elaborated procedures to deal with a considerably expanded basis for conflict.[12] Hypotheses associated with these intergroup activities fall into two categories: 1. those arising from 'realistic' group conflict over resources or from challenges to the culture, i.e., the group's "theory of the world", and (2) those arising from social conflicts over group status or from situational factor between contending groups (e.g., my enemy's friend is also my enemy) as characterized in balance theory.

[12] On some of the Nigerian experience, see Aboyade (1966) on the country's economic history and development; Dike (1967) on the Niger delta history; Afunku (1976) on a guide to the makeup of the nineteen states; Temple (1967) on the Northern ethnic groups as they were ca. 1910-1920; Talbot (1967, 1969) on the Southern ethnic groups; and Ajayi and Smith (1971) on the intense nineteenth century warfare between Yoruba city-states.

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Realistic Group Differences as Sources

Our first and most basic hypothesis is that ethnocentrism will be in proportion to the level of realistic conflict between groups with respect either to cultural practices, or competition over economic or political resources. Further, such differences are likely to be cumulative in character so that competition over real resources will exacerbate culturally-based differences.[13] The context, historical and contemporary, will also influence significantly such interaction.[14] For example, in Africa, ethnocentric attitudes of very long standing were submerged temporarily by anti-colonial feelings, enabling groups to deal with the common issue. That deep structural bases of conflict continued to exist between groups was often ignored by writers on Africa, motivated more by hope,

[13] See Blau (1975: especially pp. 240-) for comments on the role of inequality as a basis for intergroup activity. Kohn (1977) evaluates the 'cultural' aspects of class difference.

[14] Anaba (1969) reviews the history of trade unions in Nigeria. Note their inability to break ethnic bases for mobilization although they did modify the situation and political outcomes.

than by a frank evaluation of ethnocentric behavior.

But all 'real' differences are not equally salient. Language appears to be a particular and universal barrier to interaction. Even when languages are structurally close (e.g., Urdu and Hindi) they are often not allowed to be seen as close or mutually intelligible by one or both of the groups involved.[15] There are other differences that are also especially salient such as religion but that seems to us to be secondary in most situations to language as a differentiator.[16]

Group differences are always of the character of 'when does a difference make a difference?', that is, what is a substantial difference in one situation may not be in another. Thus we expect that variation in differences will become the basis of evaluation of similarity-dissimilarity. An important corollary of this view is our next hypothesis.

[15] See Brann (1973:6) for a note on this phenomena and his appendix which gives an estimate for the percentage distribution of languages in Nigeria.

[16] As Plotnicov and Silverman (1978:426) note, " 'He talks like us' is equivalent to saying, 'He is one of us'."

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We expect that adjacent groups which are similar will be at less social distance than similar but non-adjacent groups which are 'different' by virtue of their physical distance.[17] Further, we expect that among dissimilar groups that adjacent groups will be held at greater social distance than non-adjacent groups because the range of differences between the groups will be more apparent and relevant with contact groups than between groups where non-contact mitigates the perception and implication of real differences.[18]

Important in our analysis is an expectation that more elaborated and embodied cultures will be in the direction of assimilation of culturally similar but less articulated or technically advanced groups. But for this to be facilitated

[17] This includes the view that groups close in levels of development will have more permeable boundaries with respect to each other's identities than those who are not close. (Cf. Foa and Foa:1973,48).

[18] An important reason for this is the importance of the group as a repository of cultural knowledge which it passes on effectively unless it is visibly challenged. Blau (1975:143) Also note Gould (1979) where he notes the evidence for the attraction of infantile features and the repulsion of opposites in humans.

such groups should be positive references or at least maintained at insubstantial social distance.[19] If we combine the last two basic hypotheses, we get an even more complex set of possibilities as characterized by hypothesis III.A.7.[20]

Social Conflict Generation

One of the central public political statements in Nigeria, in general, and among the more educated, in particular, is the view that open appeals to ethnocentrism or even discussion of the ethnocentric behavior of groups or individuals should be forbidden.[21] The 'One Nigeria' slogan and syndrome should prejudice responses to certain types of questions where we expect that public expressions

[19] See Blau (1975:145) for a view of the role of technology in social change.

[20] See Hechter's (1975:18-19) discussion of types of integration (cultural, economic, and political) and models of development (diffusion, internal colony, and structural change) as it relates to these arguments.

[21] The execution of the survey reported herein encountered certain opposition in some parts of the country because of the large number of questions devoted to the subject.

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of ethnocentrism (in ethnically mixed environments) will not be given because they are seen as socially unacceptable. This does not mean that there are not sharp definitions of boundaries and consciousness of kind. Indeed, the accentuation of status symbols, and the use of economic competition as a basis of symbolizing the conflict is often confused as the cause of the conflict. But as Shibutani and Kwan note, this "is not true, for many people who are locked in competition do not fight, and people have been attacked who were not regarded as economically threatening." (1965:382) This is not to deny that hostility towards minorities is often disproportionate among the unsuccessful, and they are often the source of violence against such groups.[22] But our expectation is that while certain masks may be adopted with respect to ethnocentric feelings they will not entirely hide the reality. In addition to the foregoing view, we assume that the more mobilized will be more ethnocentric, and therefore that groups on the spatial

[22] For a review of some of this literature and a discussion of a Nigerian case, see Oberschall (1972). Also note Depres (1975) and Turner and Singleton (1978, 1981). Aluko (1976) discusses the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana, and Bienen (1979) summarizes some of the evidence on income inequality in Nigeria.

and political peripheries will be less ethnocentric ~~because~~ of less relevance of the center to the lives of the periphery. This view has to be modified to some extent when highly mobilized centers make it difficult or impossible for peripheries to function in their previous mode.[23] This is particularly the case when the political distinctiveness of a region is based on cultural factors, what Hechter has called peripheral sectionalism (1975:209) as opposed to functional sectionalism.[24]

We expect that outgroups that are ~~perceived~~ as similar will be less threatening and conflict-generating, and therefore will be held at less social distance. On related grounds, we expect that non-adjacent groups will be less threatening and therefore will be held at less social distance although modern communications and the boundaries of the sovereign state significantly alter the notion of

[23] See, for example, the work of Hechter (1975) on the Celtic fringe in Britain, and S. Berger (1977) on the role of center-periphery relations in the comprehension of ethnic politics in France.

[24] For a view of some similar phenomena, see Berger (1975) on industrialization in Nigeria, and Berry (1975) on the development of the cocoa industry in Western Nigeria.

adjacency in a complex manner. Further, since adjacent groups tend to be culturally similar and in economic relationship with the group we also find it plausible that ethnocentrism should be especially directed towards non-adjacent groups. Technologically advanced groups will tend to act as reference groups and the ones that are adjacent would serve as reference groups and should therefore be held at less social distance than a relatively unknown similar but non-adjacent group.

While real evaluative bases for conflict, and affective or emotive bases of behavior are distinct in kind and implications, we expect them to be correlated so that social nearness and liking for outgroups or familiarity with outgroup members will be positively correlated. These expectations are again modified somewhat by balance theory expectations. A common enemy lowers social distances, and the ability to displace ingroup conflicts onto outgroups is a fundamental device used by almost all groups.[25] Of course, we expect that social change which reallocates

[25] For more on these topics, see Laumann (1973); Brehm (1966) should be consulted on psychological reactance.

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relative statuses between groups and therefore alters paths of ethnic stratification may intensify conflict between groups will lead to more severe enhancement of contrast effects.[26]

Properties of Group Boundary Change

Levine and Campbell (1972) devote an entire chapter to the issue of group boundary definition and are not able to characterize any unequivocal procedure to demarcate groups. An important reason for this problem is that boundaries are not uniform across activities and statuses even in static or equilibrium situations and under conditions of social and cultural change there may be manifold ambiguities on the location of boundaries. Some of this will be the cultural equivalent of 'genetic drift'. We expect that maximal variation will occur in the least structured or institutionalized environments and therefore in ones where the significant embodied culture is low relative to the disembodied culture. In such environments, cultural

[26] Cf. Bandura's (1969) social learning of moral judgements view and Brand, Ruiz, and Padilla (1974) on ethnic identification and preference.

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'mutations' are many and there is little group control over retention of cultural bases for action. Therefore, we expect the boundaries to change in an 'ink-blot' center-periphery process whereby the center progressively extends its boundaries thereby producing a situation where the periphery is less ethnocentric than the center.[27] If this is not the case, ethnocentrism will prevent group assimilation and incorporation.

The expectation of most of those writing in the first two decades of political development theory is that 'old ways' would be eroded and replaced with rational-legal procedures. That was taken to mean that since atavistic bases for mobilization were thought to be irrational bases for action, ethno-religious bases for political mobilization would decline as mobilization processes developed.[28] That this has not been the case seems clear.[29]

Properties of the Outcome

[27] Note Salamone's (1973) work on Hausaization where he notes " 'prestige' is first a result of one's identity" (pp 3-4) and further that while some become Hausa, the Fulani (a high prestige group) do not do so.

There are some properties of the outgroup that play an independent role in the ethnocentrism process. First, we expect that affect and evaluation are in balance. Second, we expect that identification with a group speaking a different language will always be towards the more prestigious group. Third, we expect that advanced outgroups will be more threatening and held at greater social distance than less developed groups.

Results of Ethnocentrism

Since the political implications of ethnocentrism will occupy much of our later discussion we will only deal with basic issues here. First, we expect that the more

[28] See Mawiana and Robinson (1976) on Deutsch's model of social mobilization and nationalism. Note their view that Deutsch reflects a concern with ethnically stratified societies not with horizontal cleavages. (p 52) Also note their citation of Emerson who refers to an ethnic group as a "terminal community". For a social psychological view, see Triandis and Triandis (1960).

[29] The functionalists view functional bases for social action as a process that would lead to the decline of ethnicity and ethnic solidarity although the reactive approach to ethnic analysis saw ethnocentrism as a reaction to the stratification system imposed on them by others. See Hechter (1974:312 and 349)

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ethnocentric the group, the more mobilization along ethnic lines will take place. Second, we expect ethnocentrism to establish the outer limits of moral and social obligations.[30] As Shibusani and Kwan note:

"Those who develop consciousness of kind also become convinced that outsiders are basically different from themselves. This is a matter of decisive importance, for if outsiders are different kinds of creatures, obviously they should be treated differently. The contrast shows up most clearly in moral codes. (1965:43)

Ethnocentrism Indicators -- Data and Scale Construction

In order to evaluate the hypotheses detailed in Table 12.1, we need to agree on some measures to characterize levels of ethnocentrism. An overall impression of the data distribution might be appropriate to give credence to the detailed data.

[30] Note the concern by respondents in answer to the question of what you were ashamed about in Nigeria. The overwhelming response to these open-ended questions were issues of fraud, theft, corruption, and bribery. (Question 105 on the questionnaire - see Appendix C) See our pluralism propositional inventory (34) for more detailed hypotheses.

Table 12.2 Ethnocentrism Questions

41. Would you say that in general the different ethnic groups in Nigeria are much the same, or are they very different from one another?
 12 (1) Same
 9 (2) Not sure/ No opinion
 79 (3) Very Different

42. How many different ethnic groups do you know of in Nigeria?

Number /_____/_____/

Name these groups.

/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
8	9	10	11	12	13
/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
14	15	16	17	18	19
/_____/	/_____/	/_____/			
20	21	22			

43. Do you usually think of yourself as a Nigerian
 (name of respondent's ethnic group), as a member of
 (name of respondent's state), or how do you usually think of yourself?
 (1) Nigerian (2) Ethnic group (3) State
 (4) Other _____

44. If you think about the Hausa/Yoruba/Ibo/Tiv/Ibibio/Kanuri/Bini/Ijaw/Nupe people,
 (a) Would you feel comfortable talking to them about things in Nigeria?
 (b) Would you feel interested in taking food with such people?
 (c) Would you be unhappy if one of them was the President of Nigeria?
 (d) Would you be unhappy if some member of your family married one of them?
 ASK QUESTIONS (a) through (d) FOR EACH MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP
 (1) Yes (2) Not sure/No opinion (3) No

Hausa	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	24	25	26	27
Ibo	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	28	29	30	31
Yoruba	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	32	33	34	35
Tiv	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	36	37	38	39

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Table 12.2 continued

Ibibio	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	40	41	42	43
Kanuri	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	44	45	46	47
Bini	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	48	49	50	51
Ijaw	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	52	53	54	55
Nupe	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/	/_____/
	56	57	58	59

45. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are economically better off, worse off, or about average?
25 (1) Better off
57 (2) About average/ No opinion
19 (3) Worse off
46. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) politically more powerful, less powerful or about average?
26 (1) More powerful
53 (2) Average / No opinion
21 (3) Less powerful
47. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the . . . (name of respondent's ethnic group) are culturally more prestigious, less prestigious, or about average?
53 (1) More prestigious
40 (2) Average/No opinion
8 (3) Less prestigious
48. Do you think that conflicts between different ethnic groups will always be a problem in Nigeria, or that they will gradually become less of a problem, or that they have never really been a problem?
8 (1) Never a problem
55 (2) Gradually become less of a problem
36 (3) Always will be a problem

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Table 12.2 continued

49. Do you think Nigerians should strive to preserve their ethnic identities or that they should stop talking about ethnic group differences and concentrate on the things that unite them?
 18 (1) Preserve
 4 (2) Not sure/No opinion
 78 (3) Concentrate on uniting
50. Do you think that religion or religious organizations influence politics in Nigeria to a great extent, to a very little extent, or not at all?
 39 (1) Not at all/No opinion
 28 (2) Very little
 34 (3) Great extent
51. Would you say that relations between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria are better than they were five years ago, worse, or about the same now as then?
 58 (1) Better 36 (2) About the same DK no opinion
 6 (3) Worse
92. Some people say that we should try to forget the troubles of the past in Nigeria and look only to the future. Others say that, like it or not, we cannot ignore what has happened in the past, and past troubles are still likely to recur. What do you think?
 82 (1) Try to forget and look to the future
 5 (2) No answer/Not sure
 13 (3) Cannot ignore the past and troubles will recur
88. Do you think the government shows favouritism towards any groups in the population?
 35 (1) Yes 33 (2) Not sure/No opinion 32 (3) No
- If yes, which groups are these?

36. Were you to take up a job in a state other than your own, in which states would you most and least prefer to work? If you are already working in a state outside your own state, name three other states in which you would like to work.
- | | | | | |
|--|--------|----------------|--------|----------------|
| | Most | 1st: /___/___/ | Least | 1st: /___/___/ |
| | | 52 53 | | 58 59 |
| | Prefer | 2nd: /___/___/ | Prefer | 2nd: /___/___/ |
| | | 54 55 | | 60 61 |
| | | 3rd: /___/___/ | | 3rd: /___/___/ |
| | | 56 57 | | 62 63 |

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Table 12.2 continued

37. Suppose you had money to start a business. Would you join with people from other states to start a business?
70 (1) Yes 8 (2) Not sure/No opinion 21 (3) No

38. Do you think the government of your state should join with other state governments in starting jointly owned business enterprises (e.g., the proposed saw-milling enterprise between the Midwest and Kano state)?

76 (1) Yes 12 (2) Not sure/No opinion 12 (3) No

39. If yes, which states would you most prefer and least prefer to see your government cooperate with in forming such enterprises?

Most	1st: /___/___/ 66 67	Least	1st: /___/___/ 72 73
Prefer	2nd: /___/___/ 68 69	Prefer	2nd: /___/___/ 74 75
	3rd: /___/___/ 70 71		3rd: /___/___/ 76 77

40. Suppose education were free and you were free to send your child to any school in the Federation. Would you prefer to see your child attend a school in your own state?

67 (1) Yes 5 (2) Not sure/No opinion 28 (3) No

126. What other ethnic or tribal groups are most like your own?

127. What other Nigerian ethnic or tribal groups are most different from your own?

89. Do you think the government fails to pay attention to the needs of some people?

57 (1) Yes 18 (2) No answer/Not sure 25 (3) No

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In the entire sample, an overwhelming proportion of the respondents saw ethnic groups in Nigeria as 'very different' (79%). [31] Most (two-thirds) named between four and eleven as the number of ethnic groups in the country, and when asked to specifically name groups tended to name adjacent groups plus the large and politically prominent groups in the country. So the population is clearly aware of the diversity in the country both with respect to its quantity and major specifics. When asked if the ethnic conflict that has characterized the country's history will decline, slightly over half say 'gradually' (only eight percent said it was never a problem), but 36% thought it would 'always' be a problem. This partly gloomy view of future ethnic relations is not accompanied by a decline in the prestige of their traditional leaders, though, as only 14 percent thought traditional rulers should have less power, and 57

[31] On measurement procedures, see Hooper (1976) on the structure and measurement of social identity; Mapp (1972) on cross-national comparison of ethnocentrism; Howell (1977) on Hawaiian data; and Holland and Leinhardt (1979) on recent social network research. See S. E. Taylor in Carroll and Payne (1976:70-71) on the assertion that the hypothetical question format (a S-R procedure) is inappropriate to the measurement of a procedure which requires a specific stimulus (a S-O-R procedure). Note Kempf and Repp (1977) for possible mathematical models for this process.

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percent thought they should have more.[32] (30% favor same) They do seem to feel that the new state system will be of some help in dealing with Nigeria's problems (47%) but a strong minority (37%) are not so sanguine about the twelve state system - now expanded to nineteen.[33]

When asked to evaluate their own group's standing against other ethnic groups standing in the country in terms of economic well-being, most said that they were average while the rest split about evenly (better or worse-off). Similarly, when asked about political power the results were analagous. However, when asked a question about the cultural prestige of their own group, 40 percent said their group was average while 53 percent said their group was culturally more prestiglous than others. (Only 8 percent said 'less'.)

[32] This contrasts with a general feeling that most other elites (military, politicians, businessmen, police, and others) should have the same or less power.

[33] Of course, subsequent to the survey new states were added to the system by breaking up several of the larger states and the nineteen states may be more acceptable to the population although agitation for additional states continues into the nineteen eighties.

We can see in Table 12.3 more evidence of a tendency to prefer adjacent states as political partners, for jobs, for state government cooperation, and to see ethnic groups unlike their own as being from another region while those like one's own group were from the same region. These various indicators lend confirmation to the expectation that ethnocentric feelings are quite strong in Nigeria.[34] But they do not provide a measure of each individual's level of ethnocentrism, and how various respondents as both individuals and group members evaluate other specific groups. While the many measures that are listed on Table 12.2 provide a good deal of such detail, we need to construct a more economical composite measure which will reflect an individual's ethnocentrism with respect to the largest nine ethnic groups in the country.[35] We used the Borgadus social distance scale modified to fit the Nigerian environment and the political nature of our research. The

[34] The regional definitions used in these statistics were Region 1 (Lagos, Western, Kwara, Midwest); Region 2 (East Central, Rivers, Southeast -- sometimes the Midwest); and Region 3 (Benue Plateau, Northeast, Kano, Kaduna, and Northwest).

[35] These nine groups account for over 90% of the Nigerian population.

Table 12.3 Data Distribution on Ethnocentrism Questions
 (unweighted data)

	L	W	K	MW	EC	EC'	R	R'
1. Percent favoring regional political partners	78	86	65	45	12	78	16	46
2. Percent not wanting non-regional partners	87	94	86	78	61	59	30	27
3. Percent prefer jobs in other states to be in their region	75	79	60	58	7	59	15	51
4. Percent of least preferred states for jobs outside region	89	90	87	89	63	61	47	40
5. Percent prefer states for government cooperation in own region	72	79	59	41	8	65	9	48
6. Percent with states least preferred for govt. cooperation to be from outside region	88	88	87	73	68	66	50	48
7. Percent lived in other states that are in own region	75	77	39	67	15	27	42	54
8. Percent want traditional leaders to have more power	31	65	60	71	54		21	
8a. Percent want traditional leaders to have more or same level of power	75	87	93	93	82		85	
9. Percent who see the ethnic group most unlike their own to be from another region	93	94	88	68	88		96	
10. Percent who see the ethnic group most like their own region	95	93	90	84	86		65	94
11. Percent who say there are no ethnic groups like their own.	74	63	63	9	64		10	39

Primed regional designators (e.g. EC') include the Midwest (Bendel) State in the 'eastern region'. L=Lagos, W=Western State, K=Kwara, MW=Midwest, EC=East Central, EC'=East Central plus Midwest, R=Rivers, R'=Rivers plus Midwest,

Table 12.3 continued

	SES	SES'	BP	NE	KAN	NC	NW
1. Percent favoring regional political partners	23	54	58	77	79	66	51
2. Percent not wanting non-regional partners	48	45	77	89	77	85	56
3. Percent prefer jobs in other states to be in their region	36	61	70	79	77	82	63
4. Percent of least preferred states for jobs outside region	60	56	79	85	75	86	62
5. Percent prefer states for government cooperation in own region	41	73	47	72	72	68	26
6. Percent with states least preferred for govt. cooperation to be from outside region	64	60	76	88	76	83	72
7. Percent lived in other states that are in own region	55	62	60	46	84	77	68
8. Percent want traditional leaders to have more power	75		58	58	72	48	29
8a. Percent want traditional leaders to have more or same level of power	88		84	83	90	95	77
9. Percent who see the ethnic group most unlike their own to be from another region	92		36	78	81	71	61
10. Percent who see the ethnic group most like their own region	94		58	94	90	92	63
11. Percent who say there are no ethnic groups like their own .	39		36	0	10	9	5

SES=South East State, SES'=SES plus Midwest, BP=Benue Plateau, NE=Northeast, Kan=Kano, NC=North Central, NW=Northwest.

questions asked are the set of 44 on table 12.2 and the results of the scaling are reported in Table 12.4 The

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Table 12.4 Guttman Scaling - Borgadus Social Distance Scale
Ethnic Group Questioned Ethnic Group as Object

Ethnic Group Questioned	Ethnic Group as Object									
	Hausa	Ibo	Yor	Tiv	Ibi.	Kanuri	Bini	Ijaw	Nupe	
1. Yoruba	1.	83	83	97	84	85	85	87	85	84
	2.	27	25	16	28	27	30	21	28	29
	3.	61	59	83	64	64	66	61	65	65
2. Hausa	1.	95	82	81	84	81	87	85	85	87
	2.	11	27	25	29	23	10	27	26	27
	3.	66	59	57	64	55	43	64	64	69
3. Ibo	1.	88	98	88	91	91	91	95	92	93
	2.	08	03	10	11	14	15	10	13	18
	3.	41	63	44	55	60	61	66	62	73
4. Ibibio	1.	93	92	91	93	98	91	92	93	93
	2.	02	10	02	02	03	03	04	05	06
	3.	20	56	16	25	59	27	36	43	45
5. Fulani	1.	86	76	80	86	80	87	79	77	85
	2.	05	10	19	15	19	07	12	18	13
	3.	26	44	49	52	50	34	35	45	46
6. Tiv et al.	1.	85	87	83	99	88	82	88	88	85
	2.	12	28	24	05	25	07	26	26	13
	3.	43	68	59	86	68	29	69	69	47
7. Tangale et al	1.	94	75	90	91	81	94	81	84	81
	2.	20	11	25	20	17	20	19	17	17
	3.	76	30	72	68	48	76	50	53	48
8. Ijaw	1.	85	86	85	89	86	88	90	94	88
	2.	07	13	03	05	06	05	03	02	09
	3.	31	48	16	30	30	28	24	27	41
9. Idoma	1.	91	74	76	90	97	92	95	95	90
	2.	18	12	09	18	28	24	24	25	22
	3.	68	32	28	66	91	76	83	84	68
10. Etsako	1.	92	91	95	91	92	92	99	97	91
	2.	05	38	14	12	36	11	08	08	14
	3.	37	81	75	57	82	58	84	75	62
11. Tera et	1.	95	100	100	90	95	100	100	100	90
	2.	03	30	20	05	33	05	30	35	08
	3.	35	100	100	34	87	100	100	100	43
12. Bini	1.	91	92	98	93	97	90	99	96	86
	2.	09	21	09	08	08	07	05	08	05
	3.	49	73	80	53	74	41	84	69	26

Note 1. Guttman CR; 2. Improvement over chance reproducibility;

3. Coefficient of scalability.

overall results indicate a high level of reproducibility of

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Table 12.4 continued

13. Kanuri	1.	97	93	94	89	88	96	89	95	94
	2.	13	26	23	27	20	09	20	17	29
	3.	81	80	80	71	63	68	65	76	83
14. Gbari	1.	97	97	99	97	97	94	97	97	94
	2.	06	18	13	15	18	08	09	18	03
	3.	67	86	95	83	87	33	75	87	33
15. Bura	1.	90	92	95	95	91	87	99	99	96
	2.	01	31	26	23	29	04	34	35	23
16. Urhobo	1.	85	83	87	86	85	86	91	92	87
	2.	13	14	14	14	14	15	20	20	16
	3.	48	46	54	52	49	52	69	70	55
17. Igbira	1.	93	91	100	100	97	97	100	100	99
	2.	01	05	06	13	10	13	12	10	09
	3.	18	54	10	97	75	79	97	100	94
18. Nupe	1.	100	89	85	89	88	99	87	87	100
	2.	13	18	09	15	15	14	16	17	13
	3.	100	62	38	58	55	94	55	57	100
19. Angas et	1.	93	92	91	95	91	92	93	91	92
	2.	11	11	21	11	11	14	11	08	17
	3.	62	57	69	68	54	66	60	45	68
20. Ekoi	1.	97	97	97	98	97	98	98	98	98
	2.	21	20	20	22	21	25	22	22	25
	3.	87	87	87	92	87	94	93	93	94

Note 1. Guttman CR; 2. Improvement over chance reproducibility;
3. Coefficient of scalability.

most scales although some (Ijaw and Ibibio) have very high levels of chance reproducibility.[36] Therefore, we expect to use the composite Guttman score to indicate each

[36] For a discussion of these techniques, see Torgerson (1958) and Gorden (1977).

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respondent's ethnocentrism relative to each of these groups, and further, we will composite each individual in terms of the following measures:

- (a) ethnocentrism with respect to adjacent groups;
- (b) ethnocentrism with respect to non-adjacent groups;
- (c) ethnocentrism with respect to dissimilar groups;
- (d) ethnocentrism with respect to all groups
(other than their own).

The above scales provide measures to test the various hypotheses from Table 12.1. But before examining the details of such tests we can evaluate the general levels and patterns of ethnocentrism.

Review of Ethnocentrism

The overall results of the scaling procedures make clear that ethnocentrism is not uniform with respect to outgroup, and that there are clear patterns within each group with respect to affect and evaluation of other groups. In this section we turn to our evaluation of the Borgadus scales and their patterns, as well as associated measures contained in Table 12.3. We will then turn to some of the possibilities of these variations.[37] Tables 12.4 and 12.5

[37] We will use the entropy measures and approach of Darcy and Aigner (1980) here. Peter Steven has programmed this procedure on the Multics system at MIT.

are intended to provide a summary of each ethnic group's social distance from the nine groups evaluated in our social distance scales. There are certain overall impressions to be gathered from these tables. First, the almost universal feeling of social distance from the Ibos and Yorubas. This one fact may be fundamentally important in any account of coalition choices in the country. Second, the groups selected as 'near' are usually physically adjacent and culturally similar. Therefore, it appears that distance and cultural similarity play an important role in perceptions of social distance in Nigeria.[38] This occurs despite the fact that the large majority of the population have lived outside their state of origin. However, this physical mobility is not a source of preference for other locations since most prefer that their children be schooled in their own state, see ethnic conflict as a continuous phenomena, and generally prefer political allies who are culturally near.[39] While no group reports themselves to be economically better off than other groups, or with exceptions, none see themselves as politically more powerful

[38] Brewer and Campbell (1976) provide evidence on this issue for East Africa.

than other groups, most groups see themselves as culturally superior to other groups.

Preferences for coalition partners

The previous section has dealt with individual's ethnic outgroup preferences and the nature of the measurements of ethnocentrism. Now we turn to the analysis of what states

Table 12.5 Average Group Social Distance
 Average Group Social Distance From:

	-----Adjacent----- Groups	---Non----- Adjacent Groups	-----Similar----- Groups	---Dissimilar Groups
1. Yoruba	138	155	134	154
2. Hausa	79	142	79	142
3. Igbo	62	68	69	62
4. Ibibio	45	43	45	43
5. Fulani	78	162	67	153
6. Tiv	171	135	165	131
7. Tangale et al.	94	115	121	111
8. Ijaw	22	27	25	28
9. Idoma	124	91	106	106
10. Etsako	97	78	98	67
12. Bini	62	55	39	64
13. Kanuri	46	154	81	161
14. Gbari	34	117	68	123
15. Igbira	13	22	13	22
16. Urhobo	88	81	85	81

[39] This seems inconsistent with the conclusion of Wolpe (1974) that leads us to expect groups will be better thought of if they are not geographically closest and not in competition with their own group.

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Table 12.6 Perceived Group Similarities

Group-----Groups Like Them-----Groups unlike Them

1. Bini	none	Ibo, Hausa
2. Etsako	Hausa, Bini	Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa
3. Fulani	Hausa, Kanuri	Yoruba, Ibo, Tiv, Ijaw
4. Gbari	Hausa, Fulani	Yoruba, Ibo, Ijaw, Bini
5. Hausa	Fulani, Kanuri	Ibo, Yoruba, Tiv
6. Ibo	Ibiblio, Ijaw, Bini, Tiv	Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani
7. Ibiblio	Ibo, Ijaw	Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Tiv
8. Idoma	Hausa, Ibo, Tiv	Yoruba, Hausa, Ibo, Ibiblio
9. Igblira	Idoma, Yoruba,	Yoruba, Fulani, Hausa, Ibo
10. Ijaw	Ibo, Bini, Ibiblio	Hausa, Yoruba, Fulani
11. Kanuri	Hausa, Fulani	Ibo, Yoruba, Ijaw
12. Nupe	Hausa, Yoruba, Kanuri	Ibo, Yoruba, Tiv, Bini
13. Tangale		
et al.	Ibo, Yoruba	Tera, Fulani, Hausa
14. Tiv et		
al.	Hausa, Ibo, Idoma, Fulani	Yoruba, Hausa, Ibo
15. Urhobo	Etsako, Bini, Ijaw	Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba
16. Yoruba	Bini (mostly no ans.)	Ibo, Hausa, Fulani

respondent's want their state to be in coalition, with and

which states were not preferred for coalition partners. We

then will examine the relation between preferred partners,

groups that are thought to be similar to the respondent's

own and various measures of social distance, and evaluation

of other groups.

Measures of Ethnocentrism - Overall

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Table 12.8 One Way Analysis of Variance - Political Culture

Measures

Migrants versus non-migrants

Variable list

1. Personal efficacy - own
2. Personal efficacy - own group
3. Personal political efficacy
4. Feeling of system efficacy
5. Trust (generalized)
6. Political cognition
7. System affect
8. Evaluation of government output
9. Evaluation of government input
10. Scope and function of government
11. Authority
12. Decision processes
13. Saliency of politics
14. Basic value orientation
15. Social distance
16. Identity

Table contains probabilities of F ratio's significance (e.g. .00 equals low probability of no difference between migrants and non-migrants).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Yoruba	00	00	19	00	00	00	52	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	02
2. Hausa	01	00	02	00	00	04	07	00	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
3. Ibo	11	23	00	00	73	00	01	00	19	00	30	94	00	00	00	01
4. Ibibio	87	17	44	00	07	41	00	04	00	01	25	17	00	01	26	14
5. Fulani	51	03	19	00	00	10	23	23	61	06	88	36	00	36	04	14
6. Tiv et	00	00	00	00	00	07	00	00	05	00	00	00	00	40	39	00
7. Tangale	28	37	43	13	13	05	24	55	41	70	93	25	98	20	84	00
8. Ijaw	05	47	91	73	14	28	71	60	00	12	36	47	42	00	10	50
9. Idoma	02	17	95	05	52	50	78	94	01	77	54	09	90	17	31	75
10. Etsako	10	00	35	65	19	00	02	25	00	00	00	00	01	36	46	51
11. Bini	00	33	00	00	04	95	00	00	00	44	00	84	00	00	00	00
12. Kanuri	14	59	00	77	00	51	03	04	03	78	96	59	33	02	01	60
13. Bura	98	00	80	00	00	00	01	00	00	40	35	04	00	00	06	32
14. Urhobo	00	01	00	25	01	21	06	02	28	06	84	35	00	03	00	00
15. Igbira	00	54	61	57	06	00	17	41	00	12	03	90	00	14	00	00
16. Nupe	00	09	18	16	51	17	00	40	10	35	07	00	00	20	86	00
17. Igala	49	02	00	06	76	20	72	00	00	00	18	07	53	37	19	30
18. Angas	23	18	29	21	89	89	31	16	02	15	80	12	40	78	72	35
19. Katab	04	12	04	15	03	00	12	00	18	76	96	70	01	58	02	00
20. Itseker	83	25	37	17	85	09	00	81	11	13	54	67	72	66	14	39

Source: Run # 1056

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The measurement of ethnocentrism is complicated by its dependence on stimuli and situation. Thus differences across elites, elites versus masses, generations, and party identification play a role. But we find some agreement in the literature that there does tend to be an ethnocentrism syndrome from which qualifications are constructed with situational and stimuli-specific qualifications. In this section we advance a specific notion of a measure of ethnocentrism for each individual on an overall basis. We take the means and variances for each group versus each of the measured group stimuli. For example, we know the mean score for ethnocentric feelings of Yoruba respondents towards the Kanuri. We also have a measure of dispersion for these responses. Each individual can then be characterized as being a given number of standard deviations from his group's mean for each group stimulus and collectively over the nine groups as a gross measure of ethnocentrism of the individual.[40]

Ethnocentrism and the Political ABC's

"Tribalism is nationalism, but, faced with a real need for unity, it is a broad-minded, expansive, adaptable nationalism that could be well be the basis of a much wider nationalism." Turnbull (1964:29-30)

As we have seen there is a strong relation between ethnocentrism and political culture.

In this section we want to evaluate the relation between the strength and direction of individual ethnocentrism and their political culture and coalition preferences. We also want to observe any ethnic group and regional differences in this relations.

[40] We are for the moment ignoring the gestalt character that we had earlier referred to as a 'social change' belief system in which the actor believes his fate to be closely shared by other members of the group and thus whatever happens to them happens to him. Such people we expect to have more uniformity in their attitudes towards outgroups and less differentiation. See Austin and Worchel:1979,36 on this issue. See this source on hedonic relevance (p. 146), vicarious personalism (p. 150), enhancement of contrast effects (p. 78) and their basic assumptions about individual's behavior (p. 40). On the relative ethnocentrism of elites versus the mass see Nie et al. in Finkle and Gable: 1971,431. Also see Gordon (1978) on ethnicity. For other sources on ethnocentrism see Weiner and Katzenstein (1981), Tajfel (1982) on his most recent statement on the issue of intergroup relations, Starr (1981) on the dynamics of social distance, Schermerhorn (1978) on Indian pluralism, LaCoursiere (1980) on group development stage theory, Kemper (1981) on the role of emotions in action theory, and Helse (1979) on the role of affect in behavior. Other sources include Dofny and Akiworo (1980), Lemert (1979) on homocentrism, Stark (1978) on the social bond, Flood (1980) on ethnic politics as it appears in political science, and Wasserman and Maryon (1976) on ethnic information sources for the United States.

Table 12.9

State of Origin vs. State Most Preferred for Coalition

State of Origin	State Most Preferred for Coalition											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Lagos	4	66	11	7	3	2	3	0	0	3	0	0
2. Western	48	2	20	17	5	1	1	4	1	1	1	0
3. Kwara	7	24	3	22	1	0	0	13	4	13	12	2
4. Midwest	13	18	6	5	22	2	0	4	3	15	10	2
5. East Central	5	6	8	48	0	9	5	13	2	2	2	0
6. Rivers	18	3	5	26	14	0	7	9	6	3	5	5
7. Southeast	7	2	0	16	18	11	0	11	9	14	11	1
8. Benue Plat.	4	4	9	11	7	0	0	2	9	30	22	2
9. Northeast	2	0	3	1	1	0	2	17	2	49	3	19
10. Kano	3	1	0	3	2	0	0	5	42	1	18	26
11. North Cent	10	7	1	1	1	0	0	6	4	46	17	7
12. Northwest	0	14	19	16	4	0	0	5	0	12	27	3

 contingency coefficient = .76
 run 1019,25

Compare with ethnic links, government cooperation, and with desired travel patterns.
 Ethnocentrism Re Group and Coalition Preference

The process of creating a wider ethnicity and reference group clearly is aided by living away from one's home area but it also sharpens the strongly held ethnically-characterized antipathies. One reason for this

is likely to be the role of voluntary organizations that have grown up in the towns and cities to help migrants. Paradoxically, the organizations which facilitate accomodation to the new environment also are the principal mechanism for the maintainance and growth of ethnocentrism. This is widely observed in many societies. In Florida, for example, the Greek-American community has been maintained for a long period of time through a common set of voluntary associations and related economic activity.[41]

(Un)shared coalition Preferences and (Un)shared
Ethnocentrism

Comparison with 1979 Election results

[41] See S. Smith (1980) for a study of Tarpon Springs, Florida. Note the problems of ethnic studies using other than individual level data. See the discussion in the American Sociological Review December 1980, p. 1028- by Lutz on Ragin's Welsh data.

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The 1979 election results have a very close resemblance to the preferred patterns that were expressed in the 1974 survey. We find this indicative of the strong 'real political culture' base of this preferences and thus expect that the lines that were drawn will have a certain longevity.

The major differences we would expect in the 1983 elections are to see culturally near groups which were split by the candidacies of 'favorite sons' to come closer together. This means that the North will become much more strongly an NPN area. No substantial change in the Yoruba domination of their homeland states should occur and the minorities of the South will continue to see their interests served by alliance with the North rather than either of the two dominant ethnic groups of the South. In particular, Bendel state, narrowly won by the UPN in 1979 should go strongly for the NPN in 1983.[42]

Conclusions

"At a lesser level obstacles to nation building are intruded whenever communalism comes to official recognition, as in the systems of election and representation in India prior to independence, in Ceylon at one stage, and in East

Africa. A still different variant was the plural society of Malaya where, within the carefully preserved framework of the Malay Sultanates, the several racial communities lived largely separate lives with a varying political and legal status and with different school systems and languages." (Emerson:1960,121)

"At the extreme, tribalism can be dealt with in two fashions -- either use of the tribes as the building blocks of the nation or eradication of them as completely as possible, replacing them by a single national solidarity." (Emerson:1960,105)

[42] All these predictions are predicated on an economy that does not collapse. The oil price situation remains volatile but it does not appear that the government will be the recipient of blame. Sandra Barnes in a talk notes that Yoruba kinship patterns are becoming 'regionalized' and less localized to the traditional pattern of city-state based conflicts among the Yoruba. See Schoen and Cohen (1980) on ethnic endogamy, Schoffeleers (1978) on religion and nationalism in the writings of Durkheim and Weber, McCagg and Silver (1980), Azrael (1978) on Soviet ethnic issues. Other sources include Alexander (1980) on a multidimensional model of ethnic inclusion in modern societies, Jha (1980) on a model of stages of nationalism, Gross (1978) on ethnic borderlands, the annual Research in Race and Ethnic Relations, Robertson and Holzner (1980) on identity and authority, Van der Merwe and Welsh (1980) on South Africa, Giles (1978) on language's role, Bash (1979) on ethnicity, Bergesen (1978), and Moe (1980) on group membership. Hirschman (1975:11) notes the importance of Islam to bounding one's 'Malayness'. In contrast to the general assumption that ethnic groups are 'here to stay' on the part of many, Haas (1980) argues for the lack of any fundamental notion of tribe as an evolutionary niche.

Cultural proximity seems to overwhelm other factor in the determination of coalition preference. Among culturally-near states those which are adjacent are most preferred and among those the states that are most developed economically are preferred. Those of the same ethnicity are preferred over those who are just culturally similar but the difference is slight.

Mobility in the Plural Society

Introduction

Spatial Mobility

Social Mobility

Psychic Mobility

Conclusions

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"Consolidated parameters inhibit structural change." (Blau:1977,122)

Introduction

As we have observed in the previous chapters considerable temporal and spatial continuity exists within cultures. Nevertheless, change in human societies has been dramatic in recent centuries, and the engine of contemporary social scientific analysis has been fueled by an attempt to account for the dynamics of this change process. Central to this analysis has been an attempt to account for the relation between change at the individual actor (micro) level and change at the societal (macro) and organizational (meso) levels.[1] Micro level accounts of this process of change are a centerpiece of much contemporary sociological

[1] Of course, various approaches to these basic questions of social science have been characterized by an emphasis on one level to the total or partial exclusion of the other. Our model is concerned with culture as a dynamic process that links the three levels and hence accounts for the process of innovation and institutionalization (change and continuity). Most branches of social science (including economics) have macro and micro divisions that are not well linked. Our notion of embodied and disembodied culture-bearers and the links between the two and their respective links to politics is intended to expand the purview of such analyses.

theory and the perspective with the most clearly articulated research program is mobility, defined by Sorokin as "the phenomenon of the shifting of individuals within social space." The objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between mobility, political culture and several aspects of social structure and political choice.[2]

The relation of the mobility process to changes in structure and culture cannot be adequately analyzed unless we have some view of the basis for social action. We have already discussed in chapter three a model of man as control-seeker that has some important similarities to other views that emphasize status striving and status inconsistency as central motives for action.[3] Further, while mobility does affect beliefs and evaluation of possibilities, it also generates stronger feelings of differentiation, and most especially for our purposes, of

[2] For an important statement on the need for meso-level analysis see Harrison White (1981), especially his summary statement, "I hope to have focused your mind on a central weakness of much social science theory: the lack of effective description and accounting of concrete social structure at levels beyond the individual person or group but short of the levels at which culture comes into its own and provides crutches to the analyst." (p 44)

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ethnocentrism. It is this interactive dynamic of culture change and attempts to preserve atavistic forms and loyalties that makes the analysis of the political effects difficult and their specific histories so dependent on temporal and environmental conditions. This interactive process means that rationality of the parts of the system (individuals) does not lead to rationality of the system and vice versa - indeed what rationality means in the context of a stochastic process with unknown probabilities is unclear.[4]

While the causal dynamic of this interactive process is complex, we prefer to start an analysis of the cycle with an evaluation of the disembodied culture-bearer's mobility because (1) we believe that no culture change can be

[3] Status is a many faceted concept. However, as Blau notes all "forms of differentiation among people can be subsumed under two generic forms on the basis of whether or not they entail hierarchical distinction of status - inequality or heterogeneity." (1977:77) Especially important to our analysis here is the interaction between hierarchical distinctions (culture difference) and vertical distinctions (class or occupational status).

[4] See Garfinkel (1981) for a review of these issues.

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effected without change at this level, and (2) consistent with our view of an Adaptive Culture, we expect the learning and experimentation necessary as part of a society's adaptive character emanates principally from the disembodied culture-bearers.[5] This is consistent with the views of many students of culture and organization who give central place in their analyses to the form and character of participation although they are typically not clear as to the reasons for this choice if indeed any are given.

An analysis that tries to characterize the mobility path of individuals must confront the several sources of variations in the data which derive from genetic and historical sources. In particular, the effects of maturation (the ageing process or life cycle), period (particular historical epoch or condition, especially that which derives from external sources), and cohort (any given age group's sequence of group history) may fundamentally affect the ability of the analyst to generalize about any relation between measures of individual experience and their

[5] As we have noted earlier, social conflicts are presented at the individual level and resolved at the corporate or group level.

political culture. In what follows, we will make attempts to partially examine these effects but as Mason et al. (1973) have shown, such a full analysis is not possible unless enough parameters can be constrained to make the system identifiable.[6] Other effects such as Hirschman's 'tunnel effect' which was discussed earlier involve expectations which are partly related to age, period, and cohort effects. In general, expectations formed by changing awareness and environments are difficult to analyze even though they are one of the most common sources of explanation for changes in political demands or behaviors when the apparent 'real' situation does not seem to be so changed.

Expectations and actual experiences have often been confused by layman and scholar alike. For example the notion of dichotomy between modern and traditional societies that evolved in nineteenth century social science has persevered in various guises. Such a view of 'us and them' is inconsistent with what we now know about the history of

[6] See any standard econometrics textbook on the identification problem for a review of the profound limitations to our analytic devices.

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most areas of the world.[7] The traditional societies were not static although they may have operated in an atmosphere of expectations that were relatively unchanging. That is, the world was seen as was one which was much more capricious and uncontrollable than the modern industrial state (which indeed it was for most). This view remained 'constant' in most societies. The 'change to change' (Huntington:1971) may be an important aspect of life in the more developed societies but the 'risk aversion' that seems characteristic of behavior in LDCs is not solely a property of those societies, it is a property of all societies, but in some societies the individual risk averter is unable to act in concert with other risk averters to prevent change.[8]

[7] See the preface in Mary Douglas (1975) for a discussion of this issue.

[8] The market mechanism is one of the principal social devices for preventing a freezing of the present into the future. Cognition of the possibilities for action is bound up with levels of development in a society and is probably why so many authors emphasize (cf. Almond and Verba:1965) cognition as a precursor to action. This relates to the literature on the apparent differential use of cognitive capabilities as a function of the situationally determined need as opposed to the earlier view of some writers that is related to more or less 'superior' peoples.

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It is our view that individual mobility is affected by changes in the expectations of individual actors as well as by actual changes in an environment. In fact, we expect that changes in expectations will be the principal engine of sociological action.

But to empirically analyze this process of mobility as a whole is not possible because it is a massively underidentified system.[9] This accounts for the tendency to try to account for only small parts of the process thereby implicitly constraining the estimation procedure in order to establish identifiability.[10] One of the most promising approaches to constraint is to establish a sequence in the mobility process which eliminates many possible interactions, then to impose constraints due to certain latent variables (such as class effects, for example), which provide further constraints on the estimation procedure. This is our methodological approach

[9] Which explains why several competing explanations and analyses can have such longevity.

[10] Unfortunately most authors in this area seem unaware of this methodological conundrum.

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and we follow the Lerner sequence of mobility which is one of the most widely verified processes in development theory.[11] In this sequence there tends first to be spatial mobility followed by various aspects of social mobilization and mobility which in turn is followed by a basic change in the individual's psyche and behavior. This process from spatial to social to psychic mobility will be treated in the three sections of this chapter. Central to what we want to demonstrate in this chapter is that while this mobility process does indeed lead to a narrowing of the political culture gaps between peoples it leads at the same time to increases in social distance and ethnocentrism in relation to the amount of mobility.[12]

In the following we consider these three types of mobility (spatial, social, and psychic) in order, evaluate

[11] Lerner (1958). See Goldthorpe(1980) for a review of this process and competing arguments.

[12] See Austin and Worshel (1979:40) for one of the basic reasons that individuals tend to become more ethnocentric as they become more mobilized. They have greater needs to classify seriatum to deal with complexity. See Bates (1981) for a view of the ethnocentrism process from the perspective of the neo-classical economist.

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the principal hypotheses that we have generated about these processes, and analyze their relation to political culture and choice.

While mobility can and does facilitate change in general, its political effects may, and commonly do, generate strong resistance to change. The Adaptive Culture must be able to separate out the two effects from one another and to facilitate the real changes from the reactive and maladaptive ones. Thus the issues surrounding mobility assume central importance since they are both central to social change and generally manipulatable by policy and structural choices of the polity.

Spatial Mobility in the Plural Society

"...Tiv legend consists almost entirely of various accounts of migration..." (Bohannon:1953 (1962),54)

The nineteenth century image of non-Western society by Western writers was of a static social organization peopled with parochial individuals. What we now know is that the movement of groups and individuals in Africa before the

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colonial period progressed sometimes on an enormous scale and was considerable almost everywhere. Nowhere was mobility greater than in the area now called Nigeria.[13] Migrations in search of new land or to escape unacceptable social or political constraints have been a fixture of life in much of Nigeria for centuries. Only in the centralized empires was mobility somewhat curtailed but the aggressive war policies of most of these states led to movements of people based on larger political and religious ends such as the Yoruba civil wars, the Fulani jihads, and the Nupe invasions of the northern Edo areas. All of this flux and movement was reduced to a trickle as British colonialism froze perceived ethnic boundaries when they arrived in each area of the country.[14] British colonial attitudes and policies of racial exclusivity in conjunction with the stability of the Pax Britannica further decreased motivation to move.

The advent of the colonial period did have one major influence, however, which was the switch from mobility which

[13] Nigeria as a political unit was created in the early twentieth century by Britain and named by an English journalist, Flora Shaw.

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was largely rural to rural, to one that was principally rural to urban. At first, this mobility was slow but increasingly through the colonial period the city as the laboratory of social change facilitated and made possible the diffusion of new technologies which urbanization had made economically feasible. In this sense, the 'passing of traditional society' was the movement away from a society centered around one basic technology, farming, where each man was 'Jack of all trades' to one of considerable variance in the commonality of experience that men shared in a given society.[15]

[14] This process was directed by a British theory of rule called 'indirect rule' developed by Lugard in which the British authorities ruled through the 'traditional' authority. This process required that there be a traditional authority structure that would accommodate this theory or that it be created if necessary and that the boundaries as they were found should be maintained. Many indictments of colonial rule in Nigeria and elsewhere fail to recognize that these internal boundaries that the colonial power created or froze have generally not been altered since then and the colonial legacy may be as important because of the effect of bounding arenas of conflict that were created in this way as in any other way. Nigerian states today are all made up of one or more of these colonial provinces with little more than minor variations. For a digest of the actual reports that were used in the boundary making process, see Temple(1967) and Talbot(1969). See Migdal (1981) for a review of the effects of colonialism on the political process in Sierra Leone. Note that population growth was close to zero before the nineteen twenties.

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Whatever the change in some effects of migration, it is clear that migration has been a characteristic of Nigeria for many centuries and a central aspect of such movement is its demographic effect on political culture. Migration is generally age, sex, and skill selective and Nigeria is no exception.[16] Commenting on West African migration patterns, Zachariah and Conde note one of the "most direct economic consequences of migration is the redistribution of the working population." (World Bank:1980,19) The implication of such movements for political culture in a plural society may be of considerable importance as we will examine. This is especially true as these migrants tend to settle permanently in the areas of migration.[17]

[15] Although moderate specialization did exist around a core of farming shared by all.

[16] This is generally found to be true in migration studies. See Cornelius (1977) and the New York Times (30 October 1980) on Mexican migrants to the United States who are male (86%) and young (71% 15-34 years old). Essang(1975) notes the rural outmigration in Nigeria is of younger men. Kingsley Davis notes the general decline of fertility in migrant sending areas and Zachariah and Conde (1981) draw similar conclusions in a comprehensive study of migration in West Africa (not including Nigeria, however).

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Generally, it has been found that permanency of migration has a constraining effect on patterns and volume of political demand-making relative to longer term, or native, urbanites.[18] But the process of urbanization changes many goods from ones that were private (essentially free in most cases) to those that are no longer free and generally have become collective (e.g. crowding, air, water, sewerage, time use etc.) In such a situation the usefulness of collective action becomes clearer although the ease of being a 'free rider' also increases.[19]

[17] Earlier views of migration in Africa had emphasized the strength of ties with the rural sending areas and the lack of a permanency in migration plans. See Gugler (1977) on West Africa, Cohen(1969) on Hausas in Yorubaland, Piore(1979) on migrant labor in the U.S.A. A possible reason for the tendency towards stronger urban-rural ties in West Africa is the closer relation to community and the land in rural West Africa where, unlike most of the rest of the world, the land does not tend to be alienated from the general population. Zachariah and Conde (World Bank:1980,19) note the change to more permanent moves as do Brown and Neuberger (1977). See Aronson (1971, 1978) for some insight into the migration process in southwestern Nigeria, and Tuden and Plotnicov (1970) on migration to the city of Jos.

[18] There tends to be relatively low political involvement by the migrants in most countries. In Iran, for example, "the level of migrant's political awareness, organizational involvement, and political participation tends to be relatively low." (Kazemi:1978,14) See Cornelius (1975) for a review of many of these issues.

We utilize the Brown and Neuberger definition of migration as "voluntary movement through sociocultural space" (1977:13) although we realize the limits of the descriptor term, voluntary, - e.g. do refugees from desertification and conflict who become permanent residents play no role in the study of mobility?[20] In what follows we are only interested in internal migration although the role of emigration can often be an important 'safety valve' for internal dissent as it has been in Mexico and Yugoslavia, for example.[21] However, as Lipton(1977) has argued, the urban sector disproportionately benefits from development and this may lead to greater spatial

[19] Fred Hirsch (1976) presents a sophisticated view of this problem and its implications for industrial societies. We feel that such an analysis has much to say about non-industrial societies as well.

[20] There are millions of such people on the African continent.

[21] See Elam's (1979) argument on nomadism as a substitute for rebellion argument. The inflow of migrants can also be a problem as it historically has been in Ghana and now is in Nigeria. Many of the riots in Northern Nigeria from the 1950's through the 1960's were aimed at non-Muslim migrants to Northern cities. See Weiner(1978) for a review of such problems in India, and Saha and du Toit (1975) on African migrants and ethnic reaction.

inequality.[22]

Our question can be summarized as follows:

(1) Are there differences in political culture (efficacy, cognition, authority orientation), participation, and perceptions of the legitimacy of government between urban and rural areas that reflect the assumption that exposure to urban living inculcates 'civic virtues'?

(2) Does rural-urban migration promote these qualities directly -- i.e. expand political awareness, decrease ethnocentrism, increase optimism about economic advantages and findings about the legitimacy of the State -- or are these characteristics associated with recent migration but 'tarnished' by frustrated expectations (tunnel effect) after more lengthy habituation to the economic and social problems of urban existence, or is recent migration conducive to political confusion and ignorance, which is only converted to political identification or rebellion as a consequence of life experience (particularly economic) after long exposure to urban society.

(3) Are there contextual characteristics of the rural and urban situation from and to which migrants move that affect the general relationship between migration and political culture. For example, is migration from greater geographical distance associated with greater confusion and political alienation; does migration over greater 'cultural' distances have this effect -- i.e. migration from one culture area to a city dominated by the population group of another culture area; does the extent of economic differentiation and the employment opportunity

[22] For other works on Nigerian migration see Adepoju(1979) and Imoagene (1976a)

structure of the destination area affect these things?[23]

Yap (1975) in a review of the literature on the causes of migration finds the economic basis for migration to be paramount in most of the literature. There seems little doubt that economic incentives to move are common to most migration. However, there are often other incentives that have important consequences for the nature of the sending and receiving communities. Little (1973) emphasizes the change in social constraints motivating women to migrate to West African cities. Indeed while much motivation to migrate has an economic base to it, a wider view of status inconsistency and status possibilities in which economics is one but only one of many statuses involved may be a more useful guide to understanding migration, especially in plural societies.[24] In short, we believe that the sociological drives for migration (status drives) include

[23] See Borhek and Curtis (1975:ch 7 and 8) for a number of hypotheses on the effect of rural-urban migration. For other pieces on the motivation for, and consequences of, spatial mobility see Imoagene (1967) on non-economic factors in Nigeria migration, Collier and Green (1978) on a socio-economic factors approach; Shaw (1979) on the role of construction, and Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) on issues of self selection.

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most economic ones but put them into a much more sophisticated and theoretically rich perspective.[25] Bohannon and Bohannon, for example, give reasons for Tiv migration as 'in our nature', 'desires for new or more land', and 'to escape political influence of a man or group considered to be tyrannical' (1953:54). Since both economic and status striving perspectives have similar modeling perspectives, we can in either case utilize the breakdown of the causes of migration and their differential implications as factors, (1) pushing migrants from their place of origin,

[24] See Davis (1977) for a bibliography on African migration and Todaro (1976) for a more general review. See Rothenberg (1976) on the microeconomics of internal migration, and Nelson (1976) on the causes of permanency of migration. Berrier and Wolf (1975) provide an extensive bibliography on internal migration. Godfrey (1973) provides some evidence on the role of economic variables. Caldwell (1969, 1975), Byerlee (1974), and Gugler and Flanagan (1978) provide African data on rural urban migration.

[25] See Margolis in Brown and Neuberger (1977) especially p. 142 where he emphasizes sociological issues in migration, and see Rothenberg in Brown and Neuberger (1977) on various public goods issues in migration as well as individual costs (e.g. moving costs, transition, loss of friends and relatives, changes in life style, and uncertain prospects in the city). This view is consistent with Harrison White's view of economic forces being a special case of sociological drives.

(2) pulling or attracting migrants to a destination, and (3) the nature of the calculus that is used in making decisions.[26]

While we concentrate in our report on the characteristics of the movers and their motivations, it is clear that the impacts on the sending and receiving communities are considerable. For example, the selective character of migration ensures that there is less pressure for change in rural areas than there might otherwise be although the strong link with the sending area that is maintained in African countries and the tendency to retire to one's 'home town' ameliorate this conservatizing and polarizing tendency to some extent.[27] But as Nelson (1973) has observed there is a tendency for this migration

[26] Other sources on migration include Fields (1979) on place to place migration, Steinberg (1979) on labor mobility, Bartel (1979) on the role of job mobility, Cebula (1979) on a review of the determinants of migration, Hay (1980) on a formal model of migration in Tunisia, and Godfrey (1979) on rural-urban migration. Also see Todaro (1980) on migration and employment, Silvers and Crosson (1981) on Mexico and migration's effects on sending and receiving communities, Scott (1981) on Mexican urbanization, Newman (1981) on the Okun-Richardson migration model, Grant and Vanderkamp (1980) on Canadian data, and Cole (1979) on American and Japanese results.

to become permanent, although this is less pronounced in Africa than in Latin America where migration is generally expected to be permanent from the outset. Political participation is a direct function of this strength of commitment as Nelson (1973:69) has noted although we expect that migration within one's own culture area will have quite different patterns than migration to culturally distinctive areas. Mabogunje may be recognizing this when he argues for a decentralized development policy for Nigeria (1977:12).[28]

Nigerian Evidence

Who Migrates?

The most basic answer to this question is that movement is ubiquitous throughout the country including some considerable seasonal migration and that it is at high levels throughout the country. The mobile are better

[27] See Zachariah and Conde (1981) for a review of West African migration patterns, and see Anderson and Leiserson (1980) for an assessment of the considerable growth in non-farm employment in rural areas of LDCs. Spengler and Myers also note this lack of emphasis on the effect of migration on social structure (in Brown and Neuberger :1977,12).

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educated, more informed and active, but less satisfied with their situation than the non-mobile population. The mobiles give more negative evaluations of their town of residence and evince less commitment to stay than non-mobiles. The migration from poorer to richer areas lends credence to the underlying economic motivations of migration. (See Table 13.1)[29]

Status Mobility - Nigerian Evidence

The principal evidence that man-as-control-seeker has increased his control is via status appreciation, and the empirical literature tends to concentrate on

[28] The particular form of these proposals may be too rigid to be compatible with the notion of an adaptive culture as we will later develop it. See Ross and Welsner (1977) for a study of rural-urban migrant networks in Kenya. On return migration see Gmelch (1980). Sanders (1977) presents a general picture of the sending society, and Schack and Skinner (1979) particularly emphasize migration to culturally disparate environments. Goldlust and Richmond (1974) have a general model for adaptation of new migrants (in Canada) and De Lancey (1973) provides a picture of just how social attitudes change in the context of life in an Cameroonian plantation staffed by migrants. Also see McNeill and Adams (1978) for a general overview of human migration -- its problems and its adaptive character.

Mobility Model

**Size of City
in Which R
Lives**

**Cultural
Homogeneity
or Minority
Status of R
in City**

**Economic
Development
of R's city**

Migration

SES

**Family
Size**

**Length of Job
Occupancy**

**Relative
Deprivation**

Ethnocentrism

**Political Alienation/
Participation**

**Approval of
Government Policy**

**Radical/Conservative
Response to Regime**

Operationalizations:

I. Migration

Could we devise a scale from questions 60, 120, and 143 as follows:

- A. Father's town (question 120) same as R's (question 120)
(yes=0, else=1) i.e. Father=migrant
- B. Mother's town same as R's (question 120)
(yes=0, else=1) i.e. Mother=migrant
- C. R's home town (question 120) same as question 143
(yes=0, else=1) i.e. Respondent=migrant
- D. R's home town (question 120) same as question 60
(yes=0, else=1) i.e. Respondent=double migrant

[29] For example, 75% of the respondents (weighted) have taken trips outside their state of residence, 56% have lived outside their current state of residence, 54% have work which brings them in contact with people from other states. All of these questions were asked in the context of the twelve state system of Nigeria in 1974. Since there are now 19 states, these figures would be higher given that the new states were with minor exceptions created by breaking up some existing states into two or more pieces. For works on Nigerian migration patterns see Onokerhoraye (1976), McCain (1972), Adepoju (1974, 1975, 1976), Amin (1974), Iro (1980). Collier (1979) has done a model relating migration and employment for Tanzania. In our own data the mobile are the young, well-educated, unmarried and generally the least satisfied with government while expecting the most of government officials compared to others. They tend to be more radical with respect to inequality and more prone to recommend violence for the solution of problems, personal or political. They are also more ethnocentric than their non-migrant counterparts which is consistent with our theoretical expectations. Those living outside their state of origin do not want parties on a state basis. This may be self-interest since such a policy effectively restricts mobility. Note that movers are more ethnocentric than non-movers. More mobile into the West seem especially anti-North for when asked about which states they would not ally with it tends to be the rural North, particularly Northeast and Northwest states. Note the key role migrants play in the informal sector in some of the urban areas. Ninety-five percent of informal business in Lagos is run by migrants (of course, many of these are from Yoruba areas to the north of Lagos state) and 35 percent of the informal sector in Kano is run by migrants. (source - West Africa 1981:2173-2177).

comments on Figure 13.1

We could possibly use a single index or a variety of combinations of these elements. II. SES (questions 114 and 115) III. Family size (question 113) IV. Length of job occupancy (question 116) V. Relative deprivation (questions 5, 6, 85, 86, 66) VI. Ethnocentrism (questions 41, 43, 45-49) VII. Political alienation/Participation (questions 97, 98, 100, 101, 70, 75, 80) VIII. Approval of government policy (questions 26-30, 67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86) IX. Conservative/Radical Responses to legitimacy of regime (questions 31-35, 93-95).

Intergenerational occupational mobility as the best summary measure of a status syndrome and itself the central aspect of such a syndrome.[30] While migration frees individuals from at least some of the constraints imposed by the status systems of their sending environment, it does not inform us as to the possibilities and facts of change particularly with respect to political culture. Nor does it tell us what the disembodied culture bearer brings with him. Our theory would predict that he brings a great deal and that a basic perception of the world will remain for some time changing

[30] See Blau and Duncan (1967) and Featherman and Hauser (1978) for classic statements on this issue.

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Interstate Migration Table 13.1 (run no. 101)

State Respondent resident in at time of interview versus state of birth. (States ordered as rows and columns in decreasing order of estimated typical state government budget per capita ca. 1981) (unweighted data) data percentages of persons from each state of origin who are resident in a state

State of Interview	State of Origin											
	Kw	RI	MW	BP	La	NE	We	SE	EC	NC	Ka	NW
1. Kwara	90	0	3	0	0	0	7	0	1	0	0	0
2. Rivers	0	96	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0
3. Midwest	1	0	95	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
4. Benue Plat.	1	0	6	76	1	2	4	2	8	1	1	0
5. Lagos	5	2	5	2	33	0	44	5	3	1	1	1
6. Northeast	6	0	1	2	0	73	5	1	3	6	4	0
7. Western	1	0	2	0	1	0	93	0	2	0	1	0
8. Southeast	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	98	1	0	0	0
9. East Central	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	95	0	0	0
10. North Cent.	3	0	1	12	1	9	3	0	4	60	3	4
11. Kano	4	0	4	0	0	3	3	0	4	1	78	1
12. Northwest	12	1	0	3	1	2	16	0	4	13	3	44

* Note: because of a tradition of giving one's family town instead of the actual town of birth in response to such questions there may be some slight overstatement of migration rates but we expect this to be small for several reasons including especially the tendency to 'go home' when the baby is due, returning to the city some time after birth.

primarily through intergenerational shifts in life experiences and life chances.[31] The issue of status change has been central to most of the writing in sociology for the last two centuries, and no clear consensus on the relative impact of the individual on the environment versus the environment's impact on individual mobility and change

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Table 13.2

State of Origin versus First Other state Lived In (Run

1019,9)

State of Origin	First Other State Lived In											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1.Lagos	8	66	4	4	3	0	3	1	11	5	6	0
2.Western	28	28	10	13	2	2	1	4	1	6	5	2
3.Kwara	9	15	18	4	0	0	0	14	1	8	27	4
4.Midwest	24	21	3	13	21	3	5	2	0	4	4	0
5.E.Central	27	5	2	4	12	18	11	8	1	4	6	5
6.Rivers	20	7	3	15	40	4	3	3	0	0	6	0
7.S.East	22	2	1	8	38	18	3	2	0	2	4	0
8.Benue Pl	6	5	3	1	7	0	2	5	8	17	41	5
9.N.East	5	4	1	0	10	0	0	50	2	20	8	0
10.Kano	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	28	30	9	25	0
11.N.Central	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	7	12	64	11	1
12.N.West	0	5	9	0	0	0	0	41	5	10	27	3

contingency coefficient = .75

Note the numbers above refer to the percent of people from each state of origin who have lived in each of the several states. This is only the first answer. Some have lived in more than one other state and this table does not include them. Further if they were interviewed in a state other than their state of origin, that does not appear on the table. However, if they were interviewed in another state they could name their state of origin as another state lived in. This accounts for the fact that this is not a zero entry in each row.

has evolved.

[31] There is, of course, an enormous literature on such issues which we will cite only as relevant to our arguments. Much of the nineteenth century sociology was concerned with the anomie that was expected to ensue from such location and indeed our data do show the physically mobile to be more dissatisfied and demanding than the non-migrants.

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Table 13.3 Ethnic Group versus States Lived In (run 1019,13)

Ethnic Group	First Other State Lived In											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1.Yoruba	24	30	11	11	1	1	1	3	1	6	8	2
2.Hausa	1	2	1	0	3	0	0	16	17	41	17	1
3.Ibo	25	7	1	5	14	16	11	7	1	3	5	4
4.Ibibio	22	2	0	8	39	18	2	2	0	2	4	0
5.Fulani	1	1	16	4	5	0	0	11	8	26	26	4
6.Tiv et a	11	2	1	0	5	1	5	7	5	16	44	5
7.Tangale e	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	64	0	34	1	0
8.Ijaw	24	8	3	10	37	4	3	3	1	1	7	0
9.Idoma	1	20	6	1	23	0	1	0	0	8	40	0
10.Etsako	35	23	3	0	16	6	0	3	0	12	3	0
11.Tera et	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	40	0	20	20	0
12.Bini	19	16	4	23	15	0	8	0	0	1	14	0
13.Kanuri	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	2	32	15	1
14.Gbari	7	11	1	0	0	0	0	32	6	8	37	0
15.Bura	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	85	0	11	2	0
16.Urhobo	37	14	6	2	21	9	8	1	1	0	2	0
17.Igbira	3	9	0	0	1	0	0	51	0	0	27	9
18.Nupe	3	3	5	2	0	0	0	23	5	34	23	4
19.Gwandara	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	33	0	0
20.Igala	0	23	48	0	0	0	0	5	0	18	6	0

contingency coefficient = .73

Note states are numbered as in Table 13.2

Social stratification systems do differ substantially across societies of both similar and dissimilar levels of development, and a convergence to a single structure or form seems unsustainable.[32]

In most developing societies, substantial change in the structure of the labor force is taking place in terms of the elaboration of occupational and employment structures.

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Table 13.4 Mobility (Interstate) versus Education (Run

1019,24)

Highest Education Level Started	Spatial Mobility	
	non-migrant	migrant
1. Illiterate	95	6
2. Koranic	86	14
3. Primary or literate	84	16
4. Secondary Modern	80	20
5. Post Primary Technical	89	11
6. Secondary School Cert	72	28
7. Post Secondary Technical	78	22
8. University	72	28
9. Post Graduate	79	21

contingency coefficient = .18

Nigeria is no exception to this and as can be seen in Table 13.8 there has been enormous intergenerational change that has even accelerated in recent times in large part due to the oil boom and its structural implications for vastly

[32] Hauser and Featherman (1977) argue that stratification processes are similar across industrialized countries but are 'lagged' with respect to each other - that is one country being in the same development process but 20 years behind the other (France versus the United States, for example.) The Kelley et al (1979) data while cross-sectional seem inconsistent with this view, however, beyond the fact that developed countries devote more resources to non-farm activities than do LDC's. Convergence theory has apparently only a half-truth character to the basic thesis that the world is converging to similar economic structures. Elementary comparative advantage theory should have alerted us to the likelihood that such variation would be a permanent feature of the world landscape but its lesson seems to have been lost on many writers.

Table 13.5 Interstate Mobility versus Ethnicity
 run 1019,19

Ethnic Group	Spatial Mobility	
	non-migrant	migrant
1. Yoruba	76	24
2. Hausa	82	18
3. Ibo	83	17
4. Ibibio	96	4
5. Fulani	98	2
6. Tiv et al.	89	11
7. Tangale et al.	99	1
8. Ijaw	93	7
9. Idoma	98	2
10. Etsako	89	12
11. Tera et al.	100	0
12. Bini	70	30
13. Kanuri	72	28
14. Gbari	100	0
15. Bura	69	31
16. Urhobo	85	15
17. Igbira	84	16
18. Nupe	66	34
19. Gwandara	100	0
20. Igala	26	74

contingency coefficient = .24
 eta = .25 with migrant dependent
 expanding the growth possibilities. As the Tables in 13.9 indicate there is considerable interethnic, and by implication, interstate and interregional variations in mobility.

The analysis of mobility is especially complicated by the existence of several sources of variation in mobility. Clearly substantial portions of change in intergenerational occupational distributions occur because of the changed

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Table 13.6

Mobility versus Political Culture (within ethnic group) (run
1056)

Ethnic Group	Political Culture Measures											
	Per eff ow	Per eff gp	Per po eff	Sys eff p	Tru st	Cog ni tio	Sys aff ect	Eva ig out	Eva ig inp	Sc fun go	Aut hor pa	Dec lpr oc
1. Yoruba	+00	+00	-19	+00	+00	-00	+52	+00	+00	+00	+00	-00
2. Hausa	+01	+00	-02	-00	+00	-04	+07	+00	-06	+00	+00	+00
3. Ibo	-11	+23	-00	-00	+73	+00	+01	-00	+19	-00	+30	+94
4. Ibiblo	+87	+17	-44	+00	-06	-40	+00	-04	-00	-01	-25	-17
5. Fulani	+50	-03	+19	-00	-00	-10	+23	-23	+61	-06	+88	+36
6. Tiv et	+00	+00	+00	+00	+00	+07	+00	+00	-05	+00	+00	-00
7. Tangale	+28	-37	-43	-13	+13	+05	-24	+55	-41	-70	+93	+25
8. Ijaw	+05	-47	-91	+73	+14	-28	+71	-60	+00	-12	+36	-47
9. Idoma	+02	+17	+95	+05	-52	-50	-78	+94	+01	+77	-54	+09
10. Etsako	+10	-00	-35	-65	-19	-00	+02	-25	+00	+00	-00	-00
11. Bini	-00	-33	+00	-00	+04	+95	+00	-00	-00	-44	+00	-84
12. Kanuri	+14	-59	+00	+77	+00	-51	+03	+04	+03	-78	+96	-59
13. Bura	+98	-00	+80	-00	-00	-00	-01	-00	+00	-40	-35	+04
14. Urhobo	+00	-01	-00	+25	+01	+21	-06	-02	+28	-06	-84	+35
15. Igbira	+00	+54	+61	+57	-06	-00	-17	-41	-00	+12	-03	+90
16. Nupe	-00	+09	+18	-16	-51	+17	-00	-40	-10	+35	+07	+00

Note : this is for interstate migrants versus noninterstate migrants Note: Elements in the table are (1) number is the probability that the null hypothesis that there is no difference between migrants and non-migrants is true; (2) the sign indicates where migrants are higher (+) or lower (-) than non-migrants.

social structure of occupation in any society. This is especially true of states undergoing rapid modernization such as Nigeria in recent years. Such aspects of mobility are referred to as structural mobility.[33] The other

Table 13.6 continued

Political Culture Measures

Ethnic Group	Sal	Bas	Soc	Ide
	len pol	val or	dis t	nti ty
1. Yoruba	+01	-00	-00	-02
2. Hausa	-00	+00	-00	-00
3. Ibo	+00	+00	+00	-01
4. Ibibio	+00	+01	+26	-14
5. Fulani	+00	+36	-04	+14
6. Tiv et a	+00	+40	-39	+00
7. Tangale	-98	+20	+84	+00
8. Ijaw	+42	-00	-10	+50
9. Idoma	-90	+17	-31	+75
10. Etsako	-01	+36	+46	-51
11. Bini	+00	-00	+00	-00
12. Kanuri	+01	+02	+01	-60
13. Bura	+00	-00	+06	-32
14. Urhobo	+00	+03	-00	-00
15. Igbira	-00	-14	+00	-00
16. Nupe	+00	+20	+86	+00

Note : this is for interstate migrants versus noninterstate migrants Note: Elements in the table are (1) number is the probability that the null hypothesis that there is no difference between migrants and non-migrants is true; (2) the sign indicates where migrants are higher (+) or lower (-) than non-migrants.

[33] See Baron (1980) on intertemporal structural analysis of mobility.

Table 13.7 Father's versus Son's occupation (run 1080,3 -

men only) Father's Occupation	Son's Occupation (% for each row)													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Laborer	3	29	16	8	0	3	7	7	20	4	2	1	0	1
2.Sub. Farmer	5	29	16	10	4	1	1	7	4	16	4	2	2	1
3.Small Trader	4	9	26	11	9	1	2	11	7	11	5	4	0	1
4.Artisan	1	14	8	14	6	1	0	16	13	15	9	4	0	1
5.Clerical	1	13	8	10	4	0	3	5	5	9	24	19	0	0
6.Lg. Farmer	1	4	25	9	2	32	0	4	5	11	3	2	2	0
7.Mil./Police	0	0	5	7	0	0	20	12	4	5	16	32	0	0
8.Civ.Ser. Jr.	1	6	5	1	3	0	0	43	1	18	10	14	0	0
9.Business	0	16	0	7	24	0	6	2	16	17	6	5	0	0
10.Teacher	0	8	4	4	6	0	5	16	3	32	14	0	0	0
11.Admin/Mana	0	1	2	1	19	5	0	24	4	6	13	25	0	0
12.Professional	0	31	9	0	1	8	0	8	1	4	9	28	0	0
13.Trad. Ruler	0	19	8	2	13	1	0	12	3	15	13	1	9	2
14.Clergy	0	0	1	1	32	0	2	3	11	30	13	6	0	0

 contingency coefficient = .57
 element of this process is referred to as circulation
 mobility and this term characterizes the movement within the

Table 13.8 Father's versus Son's education (run 1080 page

18- % Of sons going to each grade level) Father's Education	Son's Education								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Illiterate	29	3	35	5	9	8	9	3	0
2. Koranic	4	60	14	6	7	2	6	0	0
3. Primary	2	0	22	7	21	21	16	9	2
4. Sec. Modern	0	0	12	1	1	36	14	31	5
5. PostPri Tech	1	0	0	7	32	13	16	21	10
6. School Cert.	0	0	4	0	7	33	21	33	3
7. Postsec Tech	7	0	10	0	2	30	41	10	0
8. University	7	0	1	0	74	12	3	4	0
9. Post Grad.	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

 contingency coefficient = .66

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Table 13.9 Intergenerational occupational mobility for six large ethnic groups - Yoruba, Hausa, Ibo, Ibiblio, Fulani, and Tiv - men only Run 1084

Father's Occupation	Yoruba													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Laborer	1	38	32	0	0	11	0	3	1	8	2	0	0	3
2.Sub Farmer	2	19	26	11	6	1	1	6	4	4	13	5	3	2
3.Sm Trader	1	3	21	13	3	2	4	13	5	17	10	6	1	2
4.Artisan	4	16	12	18	4	0	0	4	8	6	21	6	0	1
5.Clerical	0	3	0	0	0	0	5	1	8	12	42	28	0	0
6.Lg Farmer	2	17	25	0	3	7	0	1	0	22	8	6	8	1
7.Mil/Police	0	0	0	18	0	0	18	19	0	0	38	7	0	0
8.CivSr Jr.	3	18	2	1	3	0	0	36	0	1	14	22	0	0
9.Business	0	0	0	0	47	0	9	4	18	0	14	8	0	0
10.Teacher	0	0	13	2	18	0	6	0	2	3	17	28	0	0
11.Ad/Manag	0	0	3	2	13	0	0	22	0	6	18	37	0	0
12.Profess.	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	11	5	0	11	69	0	2
13.TradRuler	0	49	21	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	19
14.Clergy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0

contingency coefficient = .61

for raw numbers table.

mobility table when effects due to structural changes are held constant.[34] These aspects can be seen as a zero-sum game component (circulation) and a variable-sum game component (structural) which suggests some reasons why most societies concentrate on the variable-sum elements (either of the whole process or the structural part). Indeed, it is not clear how the individual or group can or would effectively differentiate the two forces, although the notions of 'times are good' or 'times are bad' seem effective explanations for mobility opportunities in many

Intergenerational Mobility continued

Ibo data

Father's Occupation	Son's Occupation													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Laborer	2	34	3	15	0	0	13	2	29	2	0	1	0	0
2.Sub Farmer	5	29	12	11	5	2	0	8	2	14	7	1	2	2
3.SmTrader	22	17	22	6	4	0	1	6	9	2	2	8	0	1
4.Artisan	0	0	3	21	12	0	0	37	7	15	1	5	0	0
5.Clerical	0	0	0	65	2	0	0	5	5	10	0	13	0	0
6.LgFarmer	0	0	70	0	8	0	0	0	8	12	4	0	0	0
7.Mil/Police	0	0	10	5	0	0	0	5	0	7	10	63	0	0
8.CivSer Jr	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	6	2	53	1	31	0	0
9.Business	11	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	31	0	0	38	0	0
10.Teacher	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	21	0	72	2	4	0	0
11.Ad/Manage - none														
12.Profession.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0	0	33	0	0	0
13.Trad Ruler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	28	6	10	0	44	0
14.Clergy	0	0	3	2	82	0	0	3	0	5	2	3	0	0

contingency coefficient = .71

Hausa data

Father's Occupation	Son's Occupation													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Laborer	17	7	70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.SubFarmer	5	41	14	7	2	0	0	8	7	13	1	0	3	0
3.SmTrader	4	21	19	10	24	0	0	0	10	11	0	0	0	0
4.Artisan	0	0	17	38	25	0	0	0	10	4	0	5	0	0
5.Clerical	0	0	74	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	0	0
6.LgFarmer	0	0	25	24	3	41	0	2	4	2	0	0	0	0
7.Mil/Police	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	76	0	0	0	0	0	0
8.CivSer Jr.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	95	0	0	2	1	0	0
9.Business	0	7	0	0	11	0	0	0	62	13	4	3	0	0
10.Teacher	2	49	5	4	0	0	3	0	0	39	0	0	0	0
11.Ad/Manage	0	17	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	17	32	12	0	0
12.Profession	0	98	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
13.TradRuler	0	2	14	3	26	3	0	25	0	25	0	0	3	0
14.Clergy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	93	0	0	0	0	7

Note Professionals seems to have been miscoded.

[34] Of course, this distinction is an analytic one. In practice, these two processes are intercorellated and also causally related. Other terms are also used to describe these elements of mobility such as relative and absolute mobility. Sources on mobility include Stryker (1981) on religio-ethnic effects on attainment, Sobel (1981) on lifestyle effects, Spenner (1980) on occupational definitions and characteristics, Sewell, Hauser and Wolf (1980) on sex and schooling effects, Mosteller (1981) on education, Corcoran (1980) on sex effects, Collins (1979) and Faia (1978) on the use of educational certificates to filter employment opportunities, and Cohen (1980) on this tradition in Nigeria, and see Clogg (1981) on latent structure models for testing some of the key hypotheses.

[35] See for principal sources on mobility research Pullum (1975), Coxon and Jones (1975, 1978, 1979), Lenski (1966), Lenski and Lenski (1974), Littlejohn (1972), Leigh (1978), Matalon (1965), and Sorokin's classic study (1959). For research on specific countries see Slowczynski (1978) - on Poland; Wild (1978) - on Australia; Yanowitch and Fischer (1973) - on the Soviet Union; Goldthorpe et al (1980) - on Britain; Simmons (1975) - on Colombia; Turner (1975) - on Australia; Halsey et al (1979) - on Britain; S. Eckstein (1976) - on Brazil; Westergaard and Resler (1976) - on Britain; Thernstrom (1964) - on a nineteenth century American city. Numerous studies exist on the United States and they are extensively cited throughout the chapter. Other sources include Mare and Mason (1980) on children's reporting of parent's socio-economic status, Kaufman and Spilerman (1982) on the effect of age structure of the population, Kaelble (1981) on historical research on mobility, Jenks (1979) on mobility in America, Hyman and Wright (1979) on the effect of education on values, Humphreys and Berger (1981) on theoretical issues, and Coxon and Jones (1979) on the social meaning of occupations.

Table 13.9 continued
 Intergenerational Mobility
 Fulani data

Father's Occupation	Son's Occupation													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Laborer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0
2.SubFarmer	0	26	38	8	0	0	0	12	0	4	0	4	8	0
3.SmTrader	0	0	78	0	0	0	0	14	0	9	0	0	0	0
4.Artisan	0	50	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	49	0	0	0	0
5.Clerical	none													
6.LgFarmer	0	0	35	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.Mil/Police	none													
8.CivSer Jr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	47	0	2	47	3	0	0
9.Business	0	95	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
10.Teacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0
11.Ad/Manage	none													
12.Profession	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0
13.Trad Ruler	0	0	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	30	44	2	0	0
14.Clergy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0

contexts to the participants.[35] This dichotomization is not the only element to be considered, however. For example, age, period, and cohort effects can also be of major importance for an adequate characterization and comparison.[36]

The differentiation of structural from circulation mobility is implicitly based on the notion that the ranking

[36] See Pullum (1977, 1980) for an example of dealing with these problems. Also see Glenn (1977)

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of occupations by status is either: 1. constant across individuals, or 2. sufficiently well-formed in the embodied culture that they significantly affect the control that individual disembodied culture bearers seek. Coxon and Jones (1977, 1978) have demonstrated the considerable case for rejecting the first hypothesis and while the second one has greater a priori likelihood, we must be prepared for statuses as perceived by individuals and accorded by the embodied culture not to be constant in systems in considerable flux. However, there appears to be some widely shared basis of status ranking across the world's cultures as the work of Treiman (1977) argues.

As has been noted previously status mobility is a complex web which defies straightforward analysis. What empirical procedures can be used to evaluate social mobility and what the policy implications of various results will be is unclear. It is clear though that the various measures of status mobility and the benchmarks to which they are compared have such variation and lack of congruence that some have complained of an atheoretical character in much of this research.[37]

There is certainly some credibility to the view that some analysts have concentrated on aspects of mobility which are manifest, objective and easily measurable, while others have taken analytic positions which emphasized subjective or latent sources of mobility. The first tradition has emphasized occupational prestige as the central status in mobility research and asserted that this status can be measured on a uni-dimensional scale.[38] This quantitative tradition has emphasized individual intergenerational occupational mobility usually at the expense of evaluating the interaction of social structure and individual change. The emphasis on social and class structure as determinants of mobility spans the range of analytic and empirical methods from elementary descriptive statistics to complex multiway contingency table analysis.[39] The most common element of structure that is modeled is to break down mobility into that part accounted for by change in the

[37] See, for example, Horan (1978) and Featherman (in Short:1981) on this issue.

[38] Duncan, Blau, Blisshen, Hauser, Featherman and many others have contributed to this tradition in sources already cited. See Shorrocks (1978) on measurement, Sorensen (1975) on models of mobility.

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structure of the labor force (structural), versus that due to intergenerational changes (circulation). Some writers such as Breiger, Goldthorpe, and others have been trying explicitly to incorporate other elements of structure such as class into individually oriented models and to compare the results with the absence of such additional structure.

Central to the use of a uni-dimensional measure of occupational status is the assertion of its importance either as a measure in itself and/or as a surrogate for a larger number of statuses.[40] Treiman (1977) argues with considerable empirical evidence from several dozen countries

[39] On these writings see, for example, Goldthorpe (1980), Hope (1972), Horan and Stout (1977), Spaeth (1979), and Levine (1972). On the range of methods see Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980), Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980) and Goldthorpe et al. (1980). For comparative elements of mobility see Kerchoff (1974) on American versus English differences, and Seeman (1977) on a French and American comparison. See Andersen (1979) on the statistical models used in the more statistically sophisticated of these works, and McCann (1977) on interpretation of mobility tables.

[40] See Duncan (1961) for a classic statement on this position. An important rationale is to maximize comparability but the cost may too high. For a more recent statement see Featherman, Lancaster-Jones, and Hauser (1975).

that similar indices can be constructed throughout the world with respect to occupational status. Others such as Wolf and Fligstein (1979) argue that equality in occupational status should imply equality in authority (if it has been appropriately measured) over oneself and others in any given occupation and job.[41] There is good reason to believe that authority which gives "an organization its formal structure" (Simon:1976) is a major element of status. We have chosen to construct a composite of education and occupational categories to partially reflect this situation.[42] Caston, for example, proposes an index of stratification based on an individual's education, income, occupational prestige and other indices, an argument consistent with the view of stratification in Stewart, Prandy, and Blackburn (1980).[43] In environments such as

[41] Of course, a number of authors associated with various non-quantitative and ideological perspectives have centered their analyses on the presumed uni-dimensional aspect of industrial society's stratification systems. See, for example, Marcuse (1964) and Bell (1979) on the consumption ethic as the central element of status in capitalist society. See Lasswell and Kaplan (1950:87) for a much more sophisticated view of the complexity of elements of status. Dahrendorf (1959) gives central place to the role of authority in determining class membership in industrial society. See notes by James Short (1980) on power and authority.

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Nigeria, elements of status from the traditional societies such as the obligation to the extended family have important effects.[44]

That there may be many objective elements of status that are not highly intercorrelated with occupational status is credible, but our concern does not end there. Much worse in terms of the problems of our analysis is the subjective perception of statuses and expectations about future possibilities for status change.[45] Burrage and Corry (1981), for example, detail "dramatic change in the status of occupations" from the 14th to the 17th century in London.

[42] It is, of course, the case that the Duncan scale has certain implicit educational differentials built in since educational qualifications are necessary for entry to many occupations. See Meyer (1977) on the effects of education, and Collins (1979) on the legitimizing effects of education on status and occupation. See Johnson (1979) on the relative role of specialized education in occupational mobility.

[43] For another view, see Freedman, Strayer, and Mark (1979) for a bio-cultural explanation. See Crouse et al. (1979) on the role of latent variables in the status attainment process, and Hornung (1977) on status and status inconsistency.

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We expect that as a result of the intentionality of system actors as 'control-seekers' there will be a tendency for culture-bearers to reorganize their perception of statuses to maximize the relative ranking of their own role-set subject to the external constraints of their environment, and also subject to the limits of the culture's epistemology.[46] That such variations exist and change over time is certain, and they probably play a significant role in maintaining the stability of the social fabric.[47]

The plural society undergoing social change is necessarily one where some wide variations in status ranking

[44] See Olusanya (1975) on the extended family in Nigeria; Day (1965) on prestige ratings; Zelditch, Lauderdale, and Stubiarec (1980) on the resolution of perceived status and ability differences; and Abrahamson (1980) on sudden changes in one element of status (e.g. wealth) and its effects on other aspects of status and status striving.

[45] footnote Social Forces (?) article comparing elements of status over several countries. This is an important aspect of our 'man as control seeker' argument and a major aspect of an explanation of why systems of considerable inequality can be quite stable. This includes the 'tunnel effect'. See Tajfel and Turner (in Austin and Worchel:1979,43) on the issue of the importance of the subjective perception of social mobility possibilities on status searching and satisfaction.

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should be expected.[48] We conclude that such variations represent an important threat to the validity of mobility analysis, but that the evidence for such an effect in Nigeria is not such as to overwhelm the usefulness of our analysis.[49]

The analysis of both objective and subjective measures of status change is complicated by the existence of complex

[46] That is, what role does empirical information play, minor or major, in truth testing. See Oppenheim (1981) on the notions of intentionality in political thought. See Armer (1968) on some of these intrasociety status ranking variations in the Nigerian context, and Peil (1973) on the role of education. See Goode (1978) on the role of prestige as a social control mechanism. Balkwell, Bates and Garbin (1980) have evaluated the intersubjectivity assumptions with respect to the model as used by Hauser and predecessors, and Leigh (1978) analyzes the reasons for occupational status change. See Blau (1977:117-120) for the role of different types of structural change on the dynamics of such a process. Glenn (1971) also comments on this process and Leik et al. (1975) give a social exchange view as the basis for the dynamic of the stratification process. Most of these works reflect industrial societies and especially American data, but Stavenhagen (1975) reviews agrarian societies. McRoberts and Selbee (1981) provide a test of the evidence for similar circulation mobility in Canada and the U.S., and Spaeth (1978) reviews status in a limited, non-representative population.

[47] As, for example, a 'one-dimensional' society would have less ability to do.

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mobility paths where an individual's social origins not only affect the amount of mobility but also the path of mobility possibilities. In the Nigerian data, situational and ethno-cultural sources are significant as are the tendency of occupations associated with education as primary elements to have intergenerational links and other occupations, such as business and those of artisans, to have similarly strong intergenerational links.[50] In general, one's interaction with peers is not only a function of present status but of past status as well as of parent's status.[51]

Many of the confounding effects in mobility analysis are caused by, or reflective of the nature of, maturation, period, and cohort effects. As we have previously noted,

[48] We cannot provide data to support this for Nigeria, but feel such an analysis should use techniques such as non-hierarchical clustering procedures because our view of culture maintenance is one where we would expect more continuity over these boundaries than many other writers would. Indeed, personal control of a situation (which is therefore context dependent) seems to unify most of these differences into one sense of status. See Austen and Worchel (1979:157) for a diagrammatic treatment of vicarious personalism which relates to this view.

[49] We would expect those groups with the highest rates of exogamy to be the most sensitive to this problem.

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Glenn (1976) has shown the fundamental indeterminacy of an analysis which attempts to separate these effects. Indeed, the socio-economic life cycle model by Biau and Duncan and their students is perhaps only justified in a relatively stable society, not one undergoing considerable structural change as are most LDC's.[52]

Thus there are potentially serious problems in the estimation of mobility.[53] Our expectations are that social categorizations are sufficiently under cognitive control so that when they segment, classify and order the

[50] For example, see Hoffman (1979) on black-white life cycle earnings; Bridge, Judd, and Mook (1979) discuss the complex sources of educational outcomes; Wright (1979) characterizes much movement of mobility to be within and between classes (as defined by a set of occupations); comparative evaluation of these ideas can be found in Smelser and Lipset (1966); Crouch and Pizzorno vols 1 and 2 (1978) on Europe; Cole (1979) on an American - Japanese comparison; for theoretical statements see the seminal work by Sherif (1967), Taubman (1977), and Crompton and Gubbay (1972). Broom et al (1978) raise the question of possible substantial misreporting of parent's as well as respondent's education and occupation, an issue that we have not dealt with in any length here except to use broad categories in our educational and occupation variables.

[51] See Rothman (1978) for a review of some of these issues in the American context.

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environment in order to facilitate social action, they will do it with considerable attention to the reality of the institutional and environmental systems - e.g. the market, socio-cultural institutions etc. Thus, while the previous paragraphs have emphasized the fractious nature of status systems (and hence their adaptive capabilities), there is also a strong counterforce to those centrifugal elements. The macro stability of a society is in no small part related to how the society deals with these countervailing forces.

Thus it is difficult to characterize a widely shared view of status rankings among the social actors, and even more forbidding to comprehend their situational and temporal dynamic. How then can we discuss the effects of change when change itself is difficult to conceptualize and measure. Our answer to this conundrum is twofold - first, there does

[52] See Inglehart (1971) on a test of intergenerational (cohort) change versus maturation (life cycle) change, and Cutler and Kaufman (1975) on a cohort analysis of US political attitudes.

[53] Of course, there are also institutional disagreements on status, as well, which we have not dealt with, e.g. anti-education bias of military recruitment versus educational requirements for clerks, etc.

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appear to be sufficient commonality of status ranking across and between individuals and groups to make these significant issues in political competition (albeit principally among elites), and second, since policy most directly affects objective aspects of the society, the relation between these objective and subjective measures should be clarified.

Our first question is 'what are the patterns of change'. As Tables 13.8 and 13.9 indicate there has been massive intergenerational change in the occupational structure of Nigeria, although the process of change is not random with respect to individual, group, or spatial properties of the country. Development and its associated mobility has been largely concentrated in the southwest of the country where the indigenous population has benefited disproportionately, and among those peoples, the more educated have increasingly captured a larger share of the resources and appear to maintain these privileges intergenerationally.[54]

The issue of who benefits and who loses from change and development is a central and complex issue that has several aspects whose maximization may be in conflict. The most

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common issue is the possibility of a tradeoff between inequality as a motivator and result of economic activity and resource allocation on the one hand, and inequality as a major element of justice and legitimacy along with the associated viability of the state.[55] As the tables make clear, there is a substantial basis for the perception of economic inequality in Nigeria, although as Morrison (1981) has shown, the perception of that reality is not proportional to the level of income for the richest and poorest both perceive less inequality than the middle level income and status holders who tend to be the most status

[54] On the more advanced methods for the analysis of structural change see Bonacich and McConaghy (1980) on blockmodeling; Laumann (1970) and Laumann, Siegel and Hodge (1970) on stratification processes; and Fienberg and Picard (1979) on time series analysis of categorical data.

[55] For a major economist's view of this issue see Okun (1975). On inequality measurement and description problems see Pereira and Salinas (1978), Shorrocks (1978), Brittain (1978), Adelman and Robinson (1977), Allison (1978), Champernowne (1973), and Menchik (1979). On the political ramifications see Griffin and James (1979), Marceau (1977) on France, Grundy (1964) on the 'class struggle' in Africa; Amin (1976), Ayemi (1979), Bendix (1974), and Abrahamsom (1972, 1975). On the political economy and economic efficiency issues see Berry (1976) and Kalleberg and Griffin (1980). On a major collection of papers on inequality in Nigeria see Bienen and Diejomaoh (1981)

inconsistent. But this seems consistent with the economic rationale for inequality, namely that it motivates the transfer of resources, human and physical, to new uses and employment. The migration directions bear this out as do the directions in terms of occupational movement.

The political effects of such movements involve issues of justice, legitimacy, and distribution that are often primary sources of political conflict and decay.[56] As we have noted before, the tunnel effect of Hirschman, or the 'social mobility' versus 'social change' model of society held by the actors in Tajfel's work, indicate that economic inequality may entail different political consequences in a fluid class structure than in one where the stratification system is relatively static. (cf. Merlewan:1973)[57]

[56] A major element of Huntington's (1968) thesis involves the 'balance' between expectations for economic rewards produced by social mobilization, and the ability of the state to deliver such rewards.

[57] Note Heller:1969 on structured social inequality. See Tyree et al (1979) for a comparative study. Also note a critique of this work by Urton in the February issue of the American Sociological Review (1981:128, 46,1)

Table 13.10

Correlations Between Evaluation and Inequality in Nigeria

- 1. Some people say the way things have been going in Nigeria recently, the rich will get richer while the poor will get poorer. Do you
77 (1) Agree 5 (2) Not sure No opinion 18 (3) Disagree
- 2. Other people say that those who are rich in Nigeria today are only rich because they have been corrupt. Do you
46 (1) Agree 22 (2) Not sure No opinion 32 (3) Disagree
- 3. Other people say there's really not much Nigerians can do to develop this country because foreign countries are dominating our whole economic life. Do you
28 (1) Agree 17 (2) Not sure No opinion 56 (3) Disagree
- 4. Other people say the ordinary working men in Nigeria will never do better unless they are prepared to band together to oppose the exploitation of the rich. Do you
59 (1) Agree 12 (2) Not sure No opinion 29 (3) Disagree
- 5. Now comparing yourself with people who were like you ten years ago (1964), which of these describes your present status?
41 (1) I am much better than most of them
27 (2) I am about the same
32 (3) Most of them are much better off than me

question #	1	2	3	4	5
1	-	.34	.14	.37	.01
2		-	.18	.22	-.06
3			-	.23	-.42
4				-	-.05
5					-

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Central to much thought of both liberal and Marxist varieties is the idea that various ascriptive bases for political mobilization will at least be randomized if not disappear because of the effects of social change and mobilization on membership in voluntary organizations. This cross-cutting influence acts to make status-ranking on the basis of ascriptive elements difficult, leading in the liberal tradition to a model of the autonomous individual political actor, and in the Marxian to the centrality of economic class membership. The peoples of the world, most of them acting in considerable ignorance of their 'intended direction' have with increasing intensity displayed commitment to ascriptively defined bases for political action.

Nevertheless, crosscutting cleavages do grow in societies undergoing change and Nigeria is no exception, although as we have argued the growth is not random with respect to boundaries of family, ethnicity, culture, generation, class or other groups.[58] Much of the contemporary analysis of such problems tends to follow the multiple network approach of Harrison White and his colleagues but we will not attempt to utilize the full

breadth of such models here.[59]

Hauser and Featherman have argued that empirical data from several industrial societies supports the Lipset-Bendix-Zetterberg hypothesis that all industrial societies have or are converging to, similar patterns of mobility.[60] The evidence from Kelley et al. (1979) on fourteen countries indicates that such a position is hard to justify although the circulation component of mobility does appear to be more similar than that from structural sources, a reasonable result since each society faces different ecological, historical, and other resource constraints.[61] Thus the evidence for industrial societies is unclear as of this writing and even less clear in the case of developing

[58] See Hauser's (1976) review of Boudon's model on the resistance to cross-cutting cleavages in Europe; Reid (1977) writes on social class differences in Britain; also see the special issue on stratification in Africa of the Canadian Journal of African Studies (1973:7,3); Wober's (1975:160) report of the tendency of university students (Africans) to relate to 'class'; see evidence on intergenerational change in Japan in Ike (1973); on socio-economic groups in Mexico see Van Ginneken (1979); see Coleman and Rainwater (1978) for an expansion on the notion of status in America; see Sweetser and McDonnell (1978) who investigate intra-familial differences in mobility compared to social origins and educational sources.

societies where much less data exists. However, we find it difficult to believe that there is not an interaction effect between circulation and structural mobility - that is that the nature of inequality has a significant influence on the possibilities of structural change. In any event, the influence of inequality and economic growth on political events is well known in the aggregate if not in the causal sense. The counter to some of these views is the functional theory of stratification which argues that the inequality in societies results from processes of allocation and incentive

[59] See commentary on this work in the American Journal of Sociology (86,1 (1980:159)). Empirical evidence by Kelley et al (1979) on social mobility in fourteen countries is consistent with a model that puts considerable emphasis on the lack of convergence to similar forms of occupational structure and society as compared to the considerable continuation in previous paths of social organization. Note Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980) where class and status differences seem quite marked in the British population that they studied. See p101 where they note that income inequality does not lead to cross-cutting cleavages, p194 class versus status differences, and 277-283 on their conclusions.

[60] This is called the convergence hypothesis. See Mayer (1979:10) for a discussion of this theoretical perspective.

[61] See Matras (1980) for data on comparative social mobility.

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and the dynamic processes of adaptation to new allocative requirements.[62] Another major view of mobility processes is that mobility leads to value change. We will pursue this in a later section of the chapter.[63] Another view is referred to as the 'closure' thesis in which the elite-mass gap grows and mobility between the two groups steadily decreases. Goldthorpe (1980:chapter 2) displays data from Britain which leads him to reject this hypothesis. He also evaluates the 'buffer zone thesis' (page 47) in which interclass mobility has a specific structure emphasizing the tendency towards small mobility movements as opposed to larger jumps.

The hypotheses about mobility causes and effects cited above can be contrasted with the issue of consistency across the various elements of status in terms of which an individual can be characterized. Are status-inconsistent

[62] See Davis and Moore (1945) for the classic statement on the subject, and Wesolowski (1979), Dahrendorf (1979), Broom et al. (1980), Broom and Cushing (1977) for critiques of this position.

[63] For example, on the embourgeoisment thesis see Brathwaite (1976). On intergenerational value change see Skvoretz and Kheoruenromne (1979).

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people more dissatisfied? Is there a push towards status consistency?[64]

Most theories that we have mentioned above have been essentially deterministic or static in the sense that expectations for the future are not the central basis for explanation. But one's expectations for the future and for possibilities of change are most directly related to behavior even though current or past realities have an important role as indicators of future possibilities. Some models emphasize the life cycle as a set of shared expectations of future career growth.[65] Some have used different techniques for the analysis and usually varying assumptions.[66] Other models, include the dual labor

[64] See Hope (1979), Wilson (1979), Zurcher and Wilson (1979). See Angle, Steiber and Wissman (1980) on education and occupational achievement.

[65] See Featherman and Hauser (1978), Halaby (1980), Treiman (1978), Holland and Lieinhardt (1979).

[66] For categorical; data models see Goodman (1979), Duncan (1979), and Hauser (1978); for cluster analysis models see Vanneman (1977) and Mortimer (1974); for stochastic non-stationary models see Marshall and Gorman (1975), Sinha and Prasad (1979), Tuma (1976), Tuma and Hannan (1979a, 1979b), and Stewman (1976)

market model[67] the related authority differentiated model of the occupation structure,[68] the effects of mobility on fertility,[69] and White, Boorman and Breiger (1976) on network modeling. For data on Africans see Klineberg and Zavalloni (1975) and Goody (1971). The notion that different cultures will be affected in distinctive ways by such processes is consistent with our theoretical model but the literature on such processes is almost nonexistent. For some groups with high levels of group identity and altruism seeing your group do well may satisfy their desires but in other groups this may not be the case. The notion of a general expectation of the possibility of individual mobility where people do not 'see' structural change as responsible for occupational mobility (social mobility society) is clearly quite different from one where mobility is seen as caused by structural change and therefore best subject to group or class action. That stratified groups

[67] See Harrison and Sum (1979) for a description .

[68] See Fligstein and Wolf (1978) on sex differences as an example.

[69] See Bean and Swicegood (1979) on this.

may have disparate cultures and therefore dissimilar views of this mobility process would not be unexpected.[70]

The Twentieth Century has seen vast increases in the expectations by the peoples of the world for government control and manipulation of social, economic, and political outcomes. Occupation and other forms of mobility are some of the prime indicators of a government's 'success' in 'such manipulation. Therefore, we should expect mobility analysis to be rife with indeterminacy as to the source of mobility or even the amount of it. On the one hand, there is the implicit view in much of the political literature that to the extent that the provision of mobility opportunities satisfies demands it should also lead to increased system satisfaction. Since, in general, this mobility occurs over a number of years, it is also associated with the tendency for the older to be more conservative than the younger. This at first seems consistent with our model of man as control seeker but it is as far as it goes. What it does not say is what happens to

[70] We have already reviewed the rank equilibrium theories and will not repeat that here.

expectations and desires for future increments of control once an individual is embarked on a path of change. The answer appears to be that desires escalate.

Summary

In this chapter we have reviewed evidence for the effects of mobility on social change. In the second part of this evaluation of mobility effects which is in the following chapter we evaluate in more detail the specifically political effects of the mobility process. We continue to find as we have in previous chapters that mobility has clear effects on increased cognition of a larger world and along with this awareness a new calculus of possibilities for individual change. This increased expectations across a broad range of the population are held despite the low probability of them being achieved for most of the population. But low as these probabilities are, they are not so low as to be far from zero for much of the population. That the stratification process is closing up seems clear as the middle class grows and increasingly is

able to absorb the higher levels of education and the employment with which it is so closely associated.

We also find a consistent relation between mobility and political culture but one that is always somewhat smaller than the ethnicity and mobility relation except in the case of measures that relate directly to cognition such as media consumption. Since various aspects of mobility are closely tied to ethnic location one of the central tasks of the next chapter is to examine the problem of disentangling these effects. We further will examine the link between ethnocentrism and mobility, and its effects on political mobilization.

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Chapter Fourteen

Political Effects of Social Mobility in Nigeria

Introduction

Nigerian Data Analysis Results

Psychic Mobility and Political Preference

Mobility and Ethnocentrism

Mobility and Politics

Mobility and Inequality

Mobility and the Development of Inequality

Conclusions

Introduction

In this chapter we relate the Nigerian data on mobility to an evaluation of its apparent or probable political implications. We are particularly interested in linkages between the 'real' and 'perceived' mobility, and the implications of these linkages for the immediate and future political process in the country.

In what follows, we (1) summarize the Nigerian mobility data results, (2) examine the perceptions of mobility and their link to the political process, (3) evaluate the links between mobility and ethnocentrism, (4) characterize the effects on the political process via mobility's effects on political culture, and (5) review mobility's effects on the political process through effects on inequality of rewards (vertical cleavages) across individuals and groups.

Mobility - Summary of the Nigerian Evidence

Spatial, social and psychic mobility are high and ubiquitous in Nigeria as noted in previous chapters. Mobility of whatever kind generally involves the exposure of

individuals to a much less certain world than that they had faced before. Such mobility is often motivated by the desire to leave a 'certainty' which is not thought to be desirable. Nevertheless, such changes mean leaving a world which was usually more predictable than the one that is to be entered. The political and social implications of such uncertainty include the expectation that migrants will attempt to search for destinations that will minimize such uncertainty. That such considerations emphasize the choice as a function of expected economic opportunities and their cost is clear, but it is also clear that this explanation is insufficient to account for the patterns of movement. Following the logic of our model of man as control-seeker, we expect that the mobility destination would be clearly related to individual and group socio-cultural origins and we find this view to be upheld.

A key ramification of these origin-destination linkages is found in our data on intergenerational occupational mobility where there is a clear duality. There is one sequence which is the 'educational' path and another which utilizes and develops skills which relate to business, trading and associated skills. Thus the children of the

relatively well-educated (secondary school or higher) go into occupations that require education. The children of the remaining parents go into fields where education is not required for advancement such as business and trading. Not only does mobility appear to have such a dual character but there is a clear 'ladder' effect which means that while there is considerable upward mobility there is little downward mobility in either path.[1] This means that changes in the structure of the labor force account for virtually all of the intergenerational mobility. Thus the political history of Nigeria has been dependent on the ability of the country to substantially increase the relative size of the higher status part of the occupational spectrum.

[1] See Tables 14.1 and 14.2 for the mobility questions and the distribution of responses. In contrast to our evidence, Lloyd (1973) asserts that mobility among the Yoruba is largely random. This view rests on the expectation that trust in Yoruba families is low between family members and therefore the children must fend for themselves. This is not sustainable, in fact. The reality is that there is considerable correlation between father and son in both education and occupation that is at least as strong among the Yoruba as in any other group in the country.

However, there are considerable interethnic variations in the volume of mobility although the dual path model of occupational mobility seems to hold up for all groups. Spatial mobility is highly selective with respect to destination of the peoples of the North and West who overwhelmingly stay in their own regions, going to the areas in the region which represent economic opportunities. The Easterners leave their densely populated but largely rural region to go to the cities of the North and West, especially Lagos, and, in addition, to certain areas where the supply of technical skills is low relative to demand such as the 'middle belt' areas of the country.

It is with respect to psychic mobility that the most important results occurred. First, the mobile are slightly more informed about, aware of, and interested in a larger world than the less mobile. But these results are not universal. The spatial migrant is as likely to be less well informed than more so (see Table 13.6). While the occupationally mobile are clearly more cognizant of their world, the results are not uniform. With these reservations the general pattern is for the spatially and socially mobile to be better informed, have a higher sense of personal and

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political efficacy, be less trusting, more dissatisfied and critical of the environment and the political system.

There are important differences in the pattern of preferred decision processes. Spatial movement and occupational mobility seems to have no clear effect on these views but education does have a clear democratizing effect. Spatial mobility does not have any clear results with respect to 'modern values' while education does, but all forms of mobility appear to increase the sense of generalized social distance while producing mixed results with respect to strength of group identity.

One important and perhaps central aspect of psychic mobility is the relation between perceptions and actual experiences. There are a number of questions throughout the study that ask about 'objective' conditions (e.g. various objects which the respondents own), and related perceptions of their current condition - (e.g. how well they are doing in comparison to others), and possible political action as a function of objective conditions. We have with considerable consistency found that the relation between objective and subjective measures by an individual in his current

condition are weak so that the dissatisfaction of the mobile that we noted earlier is paradoxically the dissatisfaction of the comparatively well-off materially.[2] Further, the link between subjective perception and political preferences is strong, although the link appears to be clearly secondary to preferences which are consistent with a model which stresses choice as a function of affect for similar or same culture-groups. Clearly the view which stresses the role of group identity as a minimizer of uncertainty seems credible. These elements of psychic mobility and the general issue of perception can be fundamentally far-reaching and we turn to a more detailed evaluation of that data.[3]

Psychic Mobility and Political Preference

The expected path of the modernization process is: (1) migration which frees men from their previous environmental

[2] See Morrison (1981) in Bienen and Diejomaoh for more detail.

Table 14.1

Social Mobility Questions

64. I would like to ask about a few things to see if you have them. Please tell me, do you now own any of the following things?

(1) Have (2) No answer (3) Do not have
numbers attached to options are the
percent who own the item

70 a. A radio	77 b. A wristwatch
11 c. A gas cooker	11 d. A refrigerator
19 e. Sewing machine	25 f. An electric iron
13 g. A vehicle	65 h. A house or some land
20 i. Electric fan	63 j. A clock

113. How large is your family?

a. Number of wives (or husband)
average = 1.5

stan. dev. = 1.0

b. Number of children

average = 5.3

stan. dev. = 4.4

114. What was the highest level of your schooling?

18 (1) Illiterate	16 (2) Koranic
27 (3) Primary/literate	6 (4) Sec. modern/middle
11 (5) Post primary tech. or teacher training	
9 (6) Secondary school certificate	
9 (7) Post secondary tech., teacher training	
4 (8) University degree programme	
.5 (9) Post-graduate	

115. What is your primary occupation at present?

4 (01) Labourer	
23 (02) Subsist. farmer	16 (03) Trader (small)
9 (05) Artisan	5 (05) Clerical
2 (06) Large-scale farm	1 (07) Military/police
8 (08) Civil servant below executive level	
5 (09) Business	16 (10) Teacher
5 (11) Administrative/managerial	
3 (12) Professional - doctor, lawyer, engineer	
1 (13) Traditional ruler	1 (14) Clergy

[3] This is an extraordinarily complex subject, and issues of the basic epistemology of the culture may have great import for such an analysis. For example, cultures that emphasize magic or mystical testing of hypotheses may have fundamentally different resistance to 'reality' than more empirically oriented cultures. The number of hypotheses that should be evaluated in an appropriate study of mobility is quite large including not only those relating occupational mobility to ethnicity, but also effects due to change in social structure and culture and their age, period, and cohort effects which we have cited earlier. These include, for example, (1) "Complete Homogeneity" Thesis, (no effect); (2) "Quasi-Homogeneity Type I" (indirect effects which are consistent across occupational class) ; (3) "Quasi-Homogeneity Type II" (indirect effects which are not consistent across occupational classes) ; (4) "Quasi-Heterogeneity" (direct effects consistent across occupational classes) ; (5) "Complete Heterogeneity" (direct effects inconsistent across occupational classes) Our analysis will follow the schema below: 1. A log-linear analysis of the two-way (father-son etc.) occupational mobility table - testing the Hauser (see Sociological Methodology 1980) and Duncan models. 2. A three way table introducing ethnicity and its effects on an interpretation of the Hauser and Duncan models. 3. A logistic analysis evaluating ethnicity and age effects when occupational class is a function of age and ethnicity (see DuMouchel notes on drug usage). 4. An extension of the logistic analysis using an AID clustering of occupational class by ethnicity by age (region, state, or religion). 5. Mobility versus ethnocentrism (or physical mobility - state of residence, other states lived in; cross-cultural mobility - language travel etc.) 6. Model of Dual mobility path (education and business) 7. Step model of migration and push-pull model For various models for testing see models in Short file. On the notion of a mobility ratio see Hauser (1981) and Hope (1981).

Table 14.1 continued

116. For how long have you been doing this? (in years)
117. What was your father's education?
(use categories from question 114.)
118. What was your mother's level of education?
(use categories in question 114.)
119. What is your father's primary occupation?
(use categories in question 115.)
124. What occupation do you expect your oldest son
to follow?
(use categories in question 115.)

constraints which leads to; (2) social mobilization, which provides an awareness of opportunities for the individual including formal education, urbanization, and a new range of occupations which have cognitive implications in terms of the development of (3) psychic mobility, a fundamental change in the cognitive processes of the individual whereby they become more empathetic with respect to others, and more flexible in response to their environment.[4]

It was expected that this process would make the persons involved less likely to base their political actions or behavior on ascriptive bases such as ethnicity, sex, or region but this has not been widely observed. Indeed much of our analysis shows on a logical as well as empirical base

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Table 14.2

Spatial Mobility Questions

58. Do you plan to stay in this town or to move later?
 54 (1) Stay 12 (2) Not sure - NA 34 (3) Move
59. All things considered, what do you think of (name of town) as a place to live?
 68 (1) Good place 24 (2) Average - no opinion 8 (3) Not good (bad)
60. Have you ever lived outside this place? (name of state)
 55 (1) Yes 2 (2) No answer 43 (3) No
 If yes, where did you live?
 (name of town or region)
61. Have you ever taken trips outside of this state?
 73 (1) Yes 2 (2) No answer 25 (3) No
 If yes, where did you live?
 (name of town or region)
62. Are there any places in Nigeria that you have not been to that you would particularly like to visit?
 82 (1) Yes 3 (2) No answer 15 (3) No
 If yes, what places would those be?
63. Does your work bring you into contact with people living outside of your state?
 43 (1) Yes, often 11 (2) Yes, occasionally 8 (3) Don't know - not sure 38 (4) No
 If yes, where are these people from?

[4] Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1960) refer to changing value orientations, and Inkeles and Smith (1973) refer to modern man, for example. The writings by Inkeles are extensive. They include Inkeles (1969a, 1969b, 1970,

1971a, 1971b, 1973a, 1973b, 1977). Other sources using this data are many. See Oloko (1972, 1973, n.d.) on the Nigerian data from the Inkeles study. Contemporary cognitive psychology has emphasized the changing usage of cognitive capacity ranging from heavy use as a MEMORY DEVICE in persons from non-literate societies to the more characteristic use of the brain as a symbol processor in literate environments where memory functions can be largely shifted to 'peripherals' such as books, newspapers, and other such devices. Thus 'modern' man has become psychically mobile - more rational and instrumental in his behavior and effectively able to be much more efficacious.

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that there is good reason for individuals to use ascriptively defined labels as key information sources.

One of the principal results of the analysis in terms of its political implications is the differential effects of religion. In Nigeria today as in most of the rest of Black Africa, adherence to traditional religion has been largely replaced with at least nominal adherence to Islam or Christianity. Throughout our analysis Christians (Protestant and Roman Catholic) have tended to give 'modern' responses to most questions, and followers of Islam, traditional religions and African Independent Christian churches with 'traditional responses. Thus, it is with some surprise that we find that the Muslims rather than the Christians have a strong sense of personal efficacy, trust in the system and a relatively low sense of generalized social distance from others. That this should be observed might not seem unlikely to some, but its theoretical political implications are several. First, the people and groups which are modern in terms of possessing education, a modern occupation and expectations for ongoing social change and development are heavily Christian. But it is clear that the Muslims neither see themselves as paochials or

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uninvolved. They are conservative in terms of support for existing authority but not in terms of a view of themselves as being in control of their existence within the limits of the preordained 'will of Allah'. The Weberian 'protestant ethic' model is striking as a similar kind of argument in which ideologies which stress the inability of man to act outside of a preordained life can still be consistent with actual behavior which appears to be contrary to such norms. This split in which the two major religions act as potential bases for political mobilization is not a current important base for politics but various events have indicated that it well may be in the future. The fact that the Muslims are much poorer and have much lower intergenerational mobility may be the germ for an increasing division between Christian and Muslim communities. For the present, however, ethnic and regional boundaries dominate the religious base for political mobilization.[5]

Mobility and Ethnocentrism

Mobility in the Nigerian context as in most societies involves the construction of, and individual participation in, more complex, differentiated social and economic

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systems. Such increased differentiation leads to a greater need for individuals to categorize their cognitive maps of social activities. As a result we should expect that the more mobile persons are more likely to look for 'anchors' to tie their perceptions of the world to, in order to avoid an anomic situation. Ethnicity in a plural society is an obvious candidate. They are linked, as we have shown, to a culture and its associated theory of the world. It is in this very direct sense that Durkheim understood the principle but thought that occupational boundaries would form the principal basis of categorization and mobilization. As we can see in Table 14.3, this appears to be inconsistent with the Nigerian data where occupation and ethnicity have strong links while we have seen before the links with

[5] Our theoretical perspective on the importance of ascriptive bases for mobilization relates to the view of bounded rationality that we have discussed in part I. Other sources on psychic mobility include Becker (1973) on the brain's encoding process, Berger et al. (1977) on the role of expectations in status analysis, Armer and Issacs (1978) on modernity in Costa Rica, Langton (1975) on situationalism, Ogionwu (1977) on innovative behavior in Nigeria, Turner and Martinez (1977) on mobility and the Machiavellian personality, Otto and Haller (1979) on the status attainment process, Penn (1978) on measuring intergenerational change, Rushing (1979) on status and mental illness, Kessin (1971) on the psychological effects of mobility, and Pearlin and Kohn (1966) on mobility and values.

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father's education, respondent's occupation, and one's own ethnic group are low. This is what we would expect under our model of man as control-seeker and the Law of Cleavages.

Despite the strong link between feelings of ethnocentrism and mobility we expect that ascriptive bases of mobilization will decline over a sufficiently long period (several generations) as the middle class becomes more well-defined and self-reproducing and therefore a major political force whose interests diverge too much from the ethnic bases of politics. Our view of this outcome is to some extent attended by a view that their culture is also changing over such a period and therefore the ethnic link has a steadily decreasing base in reality.[6] [7] Thus the

[6] See Bates (1978) on people in villages (Zambia) about some of these issues.

[7] For some related points on the mobility-ethnocentrism relationship see O'Sullivan See (1980) on ethno-nationalism in Ireland and Canada; Lauman and Senter (1976) on a cross-national study; Lieberman (1970) on US stratification and ethnic groups; and Lieberman and Carter (1979) on Black-white differences in the US. Also see Katz, Kahn and Adams (1980), Heltowitz (1977) on Pakistani data, Chattopadhyay (1978) on India, and Gurak and Fitzpatrick (1982) on Hispanics in New York.

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Table 14.3

Occupation vs. Ethnocentrism

run 1007,633

Occupational categories list

1. Laborer
2. Subsistence farmer
3. Small trader
4. Artisan
5. Clerical
6. Large scale farmer
7. Military/police
8. Junior civil servant
9. Business
10. teacher
11. Administrative/managerial
12. Professional - lawyer, doctor, engineer
13. traditional ruler
14. Clergy

Ethnic Group	Occupation													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Yoruba	2	15	23	9	5	1	1	7	4	16	8	6	1	2
2. Hausa	4	32	16	7	6	3	0	7	9	14	1	0	2	0
3. Ibo	5	22	11	11	6	1	1	9	4	17	6	4	1	2
4. Ibibio	1	15	17	19	3	9	0	10	7	9	3	0	0	0
5. Fulani	3	19	30	9	2	0	0	10	0	16	4	3	3	0
6. Tiv et al.	0	39	13	3	1	1	1	4	6	25	2	1	4	0
7. Tangale	12	25	12	6	6	0	0	1	12	25	0	0	0	0
8. Ijaw	6	19	9	12	5	2	1	18	2	20	5	2	0	0
9. Idoma	0	34	6	5	1	0	0	6	4	29	8	2	0	6
10. Etsako	0	47	3	1	1	0	2	2	12	13	3	3	4	0
11. Tera et a	0	40	20	10	0	0	0	10	0	20	0	0	0	0
12. Bini	3	26	12	11	7	3	8	4	7	10	4	4	2	0
13. Kanuri	8	38	23	1	1	0	0	6	1	21	0	1	0	0
14. Gbari	0	0	21	0	10	45	0	1	0	6	12	6	0	0
15. Bura	1	67	0	17	4	0	0	1	0	8	0	1	0	0
16. Urhobo	1	24	36	12	4	4	1	6	5	7	2	0	0	0

contingency coefficient = .63 (for all ethnic groups
 only first 20 in table)

model developed by Blau and Duncan and their students
 emphasized the 'life cycle process which eshewed the
 political effects of mobility especially as mediated by

class or ethnic identification.

Nigerian Studies of Stratification

The number of studies of stratification in Nigeria is substantial. However, they all cover either one region or ethnic group, or occupationally specific group, or an even smaller population, and none of them utilize more than rudimentary empirical and statistical procedures. Most of the studies are on Yoruba population.[8] Other work on Nigeria does exist but it is sketchy and often not generalizable.[9] Work on other parts of Africa is generally less available than for Nigeria, however.[10]

Conclusions

[8] For a classic study of the Yoruba stratification system, see Bascom (1951). More recent work includes Imoagene (1976), Lloyd (1974), Williams (1971), Levine, Klein, and Owen (1967), and various chapters in Bienen and Diejomaoh (1981).

[9] See on the Hausa, Polly Hill (1969); Nzimiro (1965) on the Ibos; Plotnicov (1967) on various individuals in the context of the city of Jos; Nore and Turner (in press) on the effects of the oil boom on mobility; Patel and Morrison (1975), the Human Resources Research Unit (1973), and Nnoli (1976) on the role of education in the stratification process and Beckett (1978) on an important survey of university students.

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We find the better educated to be personally and politically more efficacious, more democratic in their orientation (majoritarian), more critical of the political system and its services, far more likely to consume mass media (although paradoxically not much better informed about political leaders), and likely to see their success as ~~deserved~~. While they are generally not revolutionary in a political sense, they do have a ~~slightly~~ greater belief in violence as necessary to reduce inequality and are much more sensitive to ethnic identity, more ethnocentric, and less optimistic about the future of interethnic relations in the country. This occurs despite their clear increases in the characteristics associated with modernity - more mobile and active in orientation, and clearly products of the 'revolution of rising expectations'. [11]

[10] On the stratification process in Africa see Mamdani (1976) on Uganda; McKown and Finlay (1976) on Ghana; Morrison (1976) on Tanzania; Zolberg (1976) on Mali; Madu (1978) on Central Africa; and generally on Africa and other LDC's see Heyneman and Currie (1979), Miller (1974), Simmons and Alexander (1978), and Tuden and Plotnicov (1970).

[11] Note Beckett (1978) also finds both educational transmission and communalism high among university students in Nigeria.

Mobility and Politics

Although desires escalate, there seems to be a process by which the very high status actors tend to have rewards increased fast enough to satisfy increasing levels of desire resulting in the U-shaped curve in which satisfaction is highest at the extremes of the reward distribution and lowest in the mid-sections.[12] In general, following the logic of man as control-seeker, we should expect that mobility would lead to greater feelings of efficacy and control and ~~therefore~~ to the expectation of further control-seeking behavior including greater political involvement and awareness.[13]

To the extent that mobility in one status dimension is not matched by mobility in another, there will be dissatisfaction and we believe this to be the underlying reason for the U-shaped satisfaction curves. In these curves, the bottom and top groups are status consistent and many of the 'in-betweens' are not.[14] In general, we are

[12] See Mueller:1972 for a discussion of U-shaped functions of this type. See Morrison (1981) for an analysis of inequality in Nigeria.

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examining a society in flux in which the forces producing changes in the political culture need not, and are not, institutionalized.

Nigerian Data

The link of occupation to political culture measures in the Nigerian data is illustrated in Table 14.1. The link between occupation and coalition preferences is the subject of Table 14.6.

A central notion in much analysis of the links between mobility and politics is the role of the status inconsistent person, that is those who hold statuses that are not all at

[13] Most theories of political participation have focused on macro-level statements in which greater levels of socioeconomic development are associated with broader, more diverse, and more autonomous patterns of political participation. The basic argument is that development increases status levels and organizational complexity (that is, structural mobility), and higher status and greater organizational involvement lead to increased and diversified behavior. This work is associated with Pye, Almond, Verba, Huntington, Deutsch and others. Apart from their macro-level statements, however, there is little specific empirical work relating stratification to political behavior. Etzioni-Halevy (1977:143) does stress in her analysis of Israel's political culture that mobility is associated with those who have socialist preferences. See Ramsay (1976) for a review of some of the issues in the study of social mobility.

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Table 14.4 Occupation versus Political Culture measures
 runs 1201-1224
 Eta coefficients - occupation independent variable

Political culture measure	Eta coef. with Occupation
1. Personal efficacy - through own effort	.11
2. Personal efficacy - through groups	.13
3. Personal political efficacy	.15
4. Sense of system efficacy	.12
5. Political trust	.19
6. Political cognition	.18
7. Affect for the political system	.11
8. Evaluation of government outputs	.14
9. Evaluation of government inputs	.27
13. Sallience of politics	.16
14. Basic value orientations	.27
15. Generalized social distance from others	.12
16. Sense of group identity	.20

[14] See Abramson (1972, 1975) for the relation between intergenerational mobility and political choice; Foner (1974) on age stratification effects; Fleischman and Marwell (1977) on the Galtung model of nations' status inconsistency effects; Davies (1970), Krauss (1976), Mayer (1979, 22), Sewell (1978), Parkin (1971), Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972) for various aspects of the mobility-participation link; also see MacLaren (1976) on mobility in Scotland over recent centuries, and the classic work by Marshall (1964) on class and citizenship. On African materials see Jackson (1973) and Prewitt (1971) on the role of education.

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Table 14.6 Mobility versus political coalition pref (by state)

Mobility versus political coalition preference (by level of development)

Preferred other state for job vs. preferred state

Preferred State for alliance	for coalition run 1053,65											
	Preferred other state for job											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Lagos	52	1	13	11	3	2	1	3	0	10	3	2
2. Western	11	47	1	4	2	1	2	8	0	17	8	0
3. Kwara	15	4	33	11	0	6	1	12	3	8	7	0
4. Midwest	13	3	5	55	2	2	0	8	1	2	4	3
5. East Central	16	3	5	12	38	5	1	5	4	8	2	2
6. Rivers	18	0	1	13	5	52	0	1	1	10	0	0
7. Southeast	11	2	7	7	12	0	20	6	7	27	0	1
8. Benue Plat.	7	2	3	9	1	3	1	41	5	19	7	3
9. Northeast	5	3	0	4	6	0	2	14	43	8	11	4
10. Kano	11	2	0	4	0	0	0	5	3	70	3	2
11. North Cent.	6	3	3	6	1	1	0	12	8	29	28	3
12. Northwest	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	28	20	10	34

data is percent who favor alliance with state who also would prefer employment in each of the 12 states.
 contingency coefficient = .81

the same relative level. For example, there are those who hold high status because of advanced education but low income levels, or those who hold moderately high income positions but low social status such as sanitation workers in some American cities. The frequent conflicts between students and the state in African countries is evidence for

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the power of this view. Students riot because the food is not of sufficient quality for persons of their status, or they complain that employment is not available to persons of their accomplishment (in terms of some assumed right to employment) which is consistent in status to their educational status. Notice that the individual usually tries to resolve inconsistencies by adopting a behavior pattern that would be congruent with the higher status(es) ambiguity exists they hold. There are some cases where ambiguity exists but generally such a pattern appears to hold and to be the basis for the rising expectations of socially mobilized individuals.[15] Our data makes it abundantly clear how ubiquitous this view of the central importance of education is to status. Virtually everyone wants their children to achieve very high levels of education. Indeed the expectations are not only much higher than the reality of the most highly educated African country let alone Nigeria but they are higher than in any wealthy country which already has high educational levels. Further,

[15] Age, period and cohort effects make the analysis of much data on mobility especially difficult. See Pullum (1980) and Campbell (1978) for some ways to deal with the problem.

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when asked what characteristics suited somebody to hold high office, education was the overwhelming choice as the most important. Our Nigerian data also makes clear the clear empirical foundation for this view. Occupation and education have a .92 correlation (contingency coefficient).[16]

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[16] On the models of ethnic political mobilization see Ragin (n.d.). See Sargent (1980) on the hardening of cultural differences along social status lines which is a common phenomena in Africa. Gutkind (1975) describes some of the elements of the creation of class lines in Ibadan, and Hayward (1977) discusses perceptions of well-being in Ghana in two time periods, 1970 and 1975. Short (1979) discusses political participation and its links to social change in Mexico.

Mobility and Inequality

One of the central unanswered questions about the process of development remains the nature of change which is built into the process of change and development. The role of culturally relative perceptions may have an important role in the interaction of development and income distribution.[17]

[17] Kasfir (1975:80) argues that class rather than ethnic boundaries are fundamental. For other sources see Atkinson (1980-81) on Britain, Duncan (1979) and Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan (1972), McClendon (1977), Breiger (1981), Kluegel (1981), on stratification beliefs, Jacobs (1981) on a theory of mobility. Mazumdar (1976) shows that the informal sector in urban areas is not the first step for migrants on their way to formal employment as some models would suggest. Hirschman (1978) offers a view of the effect of ethnicity in social change and inequality. Champernowne (197?) on models of income distribution, Bonacich and Hiratan(19??) provide a model of labor migration, Wood (1981) on competing models on migration, Schweitzer (1980) on social mobility studies Goldthorpe (1980), and the exchange between Hauser and Beck et al. in p702- in the 1980 American Sociological Review.

VOICE:

Social Mobilization and Political Culture

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"Twenty-odd years of mass communication research have identified some tendencies . . . most basic and widely confirmed is the finding that mass communication ordinarily serves as an agent of reinforcement for such attitudes, opinions, and behavioral tendencies as the individual audience members already possess." (Klapper:1967,297)

We have examined the effects of individual mobility patterns on their political beliefs and preferences. But one of the most important aspects of the contemporary era is not that mobility takes place but that it is so pervasive and widespread that fundamental changes in the structural possibilities open to individuals are created. This social fact has been widely acknowledged and confirmed. Lerner's classic work (1958) observed that not only were profound changes occurring in the fabric of most societies but that there was a pattern in that change that could be captured as a stage model where urbanization changes were followed by dramatic increases in education and literacy and these in turn led to new economic and political activities. While technological and structural changes in most of the world's societies may make the sequence less distinct in the future, there is ample evidence that this modernization process continues to have profound effects on the world's peoples

and their political arrangements and interactions.

This process of modernization has as a central aspect the social mobilization of large parts of a country's population through rural to urban migration, development of mass communications, education and literacy, and participation in a more complex social environment especially through membership in voluntary organizations and wage employment.

In this chapter we want to investigate the political consequences of these changes. For it seems clear that these processes do lead to a more informed and economically rational population. But the political effects of such changes are unclear. We feel that our theoretical models of culture-bearers and man should lead us to an understanding of politics in a culturally plural society that will not be based principally on a view of individual self-interest that has been defined independently of group membership. The Law of Cleavages that we advanced in Part I led us to predict that social mobilization processes will produce more communalism than before even as the other aspects of this process continue to be observed. We conclude that social

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mobilization principally affects the cognitive and evaluative components of behavior but these components cannot be analyzed independently of the affective basis for mobilization which is not so clearly impacted by these changes except perhaps to intensify feelings of affect.

In what follows we investigate these issues of the structural aspects of change in terms of communications, education and literacy, employment and income, voluntary association memberships and the political preferences that result.

Communications and Politics

Communications theory is basic to much of the analysis of social mobilization since the principal change that occurs in this process is that people become aware of a broad range of new possibilities and realities in society. This occurs via migration to urban areas and in more vicarious but perhaps more important ways via consumption of mass communications. As Table 15.1 indicates the

consumption of such mass media and the breadth of interest particularly of the urbanized population is overwhelming in Nigeria.

Table 15.1 Communications Consumption in Nigeria by Ethnic Group

"Of all the sources of conflict among socializing agents, the independent role of the mass media is potentially the greatest." Bill and Hardgrave (1973:108)

Ethnic Group	News	Radio	Travel	Nat. News
1. Yoruba	55	81	72	85
2. Hausa	40	75	71	48
3. Ibo	51	71	74	77
4. Ibibio	38	72	89	42
5. Fulani	30	80	76	43
6. Tiv et al.	31	48	71	86
7. Tangale et	26	87	63	63
8. Ijaw	45	62	83	77
9. Idoma	46	71	84	76
10. Etsako	52	61	92	76
11. Tera et al	30	80	40	60
12. Bini	49	84	77	86
13. Kanuri	43	86	74	65
14. Gbari	13	93	100	85
15. Bura	14	81	50	66
16. Urhobo	24	52	58	32
All Nigeria	45	76	73	69

News = percent who read a newspaper (in any language) at least 2 to 3 times a week; radio = percent who listen to radio at least 2 to 3 times a week; travel = percent who have traveled outside their state; Nat. News = percent who are principally interested in national or world news.

While there are substantial differences across the country, the rates even in the more remote areas of the country are impressive and attest to the pace of change and the low real cost of owning devices such as a transistor radio. The recent elections of 1979 showed just how rapidly the use of mass media had permeated most aspects of Nigerian political life, for example. Notice how some groups with low newspaper readership (generally low literacy rates, as well) have substituted the radio as a means of receiving communications and report high listener rates. That mass media consumption acts as an effective reinforcement of many existing behavioral tendencies seems clear as Table 15.2 indicates. Klapper (1967) in a summary of the twenty years of mass communications research concludes that this is so although he points out that in areas in which individuals do not already hold views the mass media can be very effective in forming views. Since political culture measures especially in terms of the nature of political trust, decision making procedures, government outputs etc. are usually well-formed before such mobilization takes place we might expect political views to be among the least affected by the media. This appears to be true in the Nigerian data.[1]

Table 15.2 Political Culture Measures versus Media Consumption

Political Culture Measure	Pearson product moments		
	Radio Use	Newspapers Use	News of Interest
1. Pereffow	.00	-.01	.01
2. Pereffgp	.08	.07	.05
3. Perpoeff	.12	.14	-.01
4. Syseffi	.10	.02	-.02
5. Trust	.00	-.07	-.07
6. Cognition	.10	.10	.02
7. Sysafect	.05	.05	-.09
8. Evalgout	.10	.01	.05
9. Evalglnp	.04	-.17	-.13
10. Scfungo	.02	-.01	-.12
11. Authorpa	-.05	-.05	-.01
12. Declproc R	-.05	.04	.06
13. Salipol	.06	-.01	-.01
14. Basvalor R	.08	.15	.15
15. Socdist	.10	.06	-.01
16. Identity	.02	-.06	.02

For measures on communications consumption in our questionnaire see questions 52, 53, 54, 55, 56. On the huge increase in mass media consumption see the UN Research Institute for Social Development report in 1976 Volume III.

- [1] On the political role of communications see Nimmo and Sanders (1981), Habermas (1979), Edeani (1980) on the importance of communications in African development, Shimanoff (1980) on communications rules, Appelbaum (1973) on communications concepts, Salomon (1979) on the media, cognition and learning interaction, Cherry (1980) on a classic statement of communications among humans, Davis (1968) on how cultural perceptions affect reactions to communications, Pool (1973) on a broad survey of communications effects, Opubor and Hobbs (1975) have an annotated bibliography on development communications, Kraus and Davis (1976) discuss the political effects of mass communications, Ogunbi (1975) has a bibliography on mass communications in Africa, Omu (1978) on the political role of the media in Nigeria up to the second World War, Davis (1977), Pye (1963) for a classic position on the role of communication processes in development, Rogers (1969) for a study of modernization in Colombia, Grant (1975) on post-independence politics and the press in Nigeria, and Laudon (1977) on the relation between communications technology and democratic participation.

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The mass media has two principal forms, that which requires literacy (printed word) and that which does not (radio, cinema, television). In the earlier models of modernization, literacy was given special consideration both because most media was available in that form and because it was felt that literacy in and of itself led to different cognitive functioning.[2]

The data from Table 15.2 has one very important lesson. That is, media consumption does have an important impact on some elements of the political culture but not on most of them and especially not on those that relate to affect, social distance and the notion of the proper normative procedures under which governments should operate. Thus we should conclude that the media do have a role in development but it does not seem to play a role in changing the culture-bearer's theory of the world.

Urbanization

[2] Of course, now there is a substantial literature on this issue. See Scribner and Cole (1981) on the psychology of literacy and other sources which we cite in the education section below.

The study of migration has absorbed the energies of a huge number of social scientists over the last several decades. While the resources devoted to this activity seem to be somewhat in excess of the theoretical or even applied importance of the issue, there is no doubt that the movement of peoples has been one of the fundamental mechanisms by which much social change has been facilitated throughout the world.[3]

In Table 15.3 we see the distribution of urban population by states, and in Table 15.4 by ethnic group.

Education and Literacy

Underlying much of the literature on traditional societies is the notion that people in non-literate societies function in a cognitively distinctive way from those that are from literate societies. The basic assumption is that if the brain is used principally as a memory storage device then it cannot be also used as an analytic machine. The well known memorizing capabilities of

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Table 15.3 Urban population by state

State	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1. Lagos	82	18
2. Oyo	67	33
3. Ogun	27	73
4. Ondo	55	45
5. Kwara	28	72
6. Bendel	22	78
7. Imo	10	90
8. Anambra	28	72
9. Rivers	19	81
10. Cross River	14	86
11. Plateau	15	85
12. Benue	9	91
13. Gongola	6	94
14. Borno	12	88
15. Bauchi	5	95
16. Kano	11	89
17. Kaduna	19	81
18. Niger	8	91
19. Sokoto	11	89

Estimates by Morrison for ca. 1975 based on earlier census data and estimates of growth rates.

- [3] For sources on rural-urban migration and urbanization effects in Nigeria see Adepoju (1974), Ajaegbu (1976), Aronson (1971, 1975, 1978), Awa (1973), Smock (1971), Williams and Walsh (1968), Plotnicov (1967), Baker (1974), Mabogunje (1965, 1968), Essang and Mabogunje (1975). On other parts of Africa see works cited in chapter 13 and Hull (1976), Aldous (1968), El-Shakhs (1974), Skinner (1973), Sethurman (1977), Hanna and Hanna (1980), Peel (1980), and a classic work by Miner (1967). Also see Sabot (1978) on Tanzania, Little (1974) on Africa, Kroll (1972), International African Institute (1956), and Heisler (1974). On other aspects of urbanization see Periman (1976) on Rio, Kentor (1981)

on the effects of international linkages, Renaud (1981) on urbanization policy, Walton and Masotti (1976) on current research, Lipton (1977) provides an argument on why cities are able to maintain favorable terms of trade with respect to the rural hinterlands. On issues of political geography see Johnston (1979) and Ordeshook and Winer (1980). The role of concentration and scale is covered by Barth (1978) and Blau (1975, 1977a, 1977b). Also see Roberts (1978), Abu-Lughod and Hay (1977), Breese (1966), Firebaugh (1979), and Cameron et al. (1972) for other aspects of the urbanization process. Note Herodotus saw the city as a necessary condition for civilization to exist. Barrett (1972) provides a picture of the rural hinterland during processes of change that we conventionally evaluate from the perspective of the receiving areas but, of course, they have important effects on the sending areas as well.

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Table 15.4 Urban population by ethnic group

Ethnic Group	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1. Yoruba	54	46
2. Hausa	30	70
3. Ibo	25	75
4. Ibibio	17	83
5. Fulani	34	66
6. Tiv et al	94	6*
7. Tangale et al	1	99
8. Ijaw	26	74
9. Idoma	100	0*
10. Etsako	14	86
11. Tera et al.	0	100
12. Bini	34	66
13. Kanuri	40	60
14. Gbari	27	73
15. Bura	17	83
16. Urhobo	35	65

* Actual weighted data in terms of where respondents were interviewed. The Idoma were all interviewed outside of their home area in urban areas, and the Tiv were largely interviewed in small urban areas Tivland. These are the only groups with percentages which are significantly at variance with their probable true urbanization rate. persons from non-literate societies seemed to confirm this view. Students of Africa such as Goody (1977) argued in this vein and viewed literacy as necessary for complex societies with their extensive role differentiation to exist. Otherwise social knowledge would be lost as it would be too complex for any individual culture-bearer to carry about in his head. Similar views underlie the 'modern man'

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thesis in which literacy leads to greater abstracting skills which in turn leads to a requirement for greater feelings of empathy and a broader perspective on the world. The effects of literacy remain in dispute for a number of reasons including the uncertainty of whether the literate by virtue of being a nonrandom sample of the population may therefore be confounding literacy measures with measures of the more able part of the population.[4]

Armer (1979) reports on the literacy effects in Northern Nigeria. In general he found that literacy in either Hausa or English to be strongly related to awareness of the world and consumption of media (cognitive effects) and to the evaluation of the environment. Literacy did not appear to affect affective senses such as sense of well-being, trust, and affective bases for action. Table 15.5 contains some of the country-wide measures of education across our political culture measures.

[4] For other literature on this issue see Scribner and Cole (1978, 1981), Schuman, Inkeles and Smith (1967), Graff (1979) on the 'literacy myth', Walsanen and Kumata (1972) on literacy and participation, and OsaJI (1977) on language effects.

Table 15.5 Education versus measures of the Political Culture

Eta coefficients

Political Culture Measure	By Education (Eta)
1. Pereffow	.23
2. Pereffgp	.17
3. Perpoeff	.12
4. Syseffi	.06
5. Trust	.15
6. Cognition	.12
7. Sysaffect	.12
8. Evalgout	.07
9. Evalginp	.29
13. Salipol	.10
14. Basvalor	.21
15. Socdist	.13
16. Identity	.17

In Table 15.5 we continue to see the complex pattern of relations between mobilization and political culture. Education affects individual's sense of personal efficacy, democratization, modern values and social distance directly, that is all increase as education increases.[5]

[5] Note Salcedo (1971) finds no evidence from Nigerian data to support the view of the central importance of literacy on 'innovativeness' as we would expect.

Education as distinct from literacy has a much more complex interpretation in terms of its presumed effects on development and political outcomes. There are at least four different roles which it plays in change. These are the formation of human capital, mass mobilization, elite formation and national integration (or political socialization).

Education clearly is associated with important elements of social change. As we have seen in previous chapters, it is an important although not the only vehicle for occupational mobility. It is clearly associated with significant differences across a wide range of attitudes and beliefs. Thus its role in terms of human capital formation and mass mobilization is clear. We observe a clear relation of father's education to son's education so the role of elite formation and maintenance seems clear. Further, as we have noted in chapters 11 and 12, ethnocentrism seems to be stimulated by education. Thus education seems to both be an important and central element in the development of cognitive functions but this development is not one that leads to a political position that is different from the less educated.[6]

Table 15.6

Education versus specific political questions
 Question Gamma
 Coefficient

1. Rich will get richer	.25
2. Rich are corrupt	-.11
3. Foreign countries dominate Nigeria	-.15
4. Poor need to band together against rich	.05
5. Respondent's status versus 10 years ago	.14
6. Expect own children will be better off	-.03
7. Better to one view (1) or many (3)	.27
8. Leader should be strict (1), treat well (3)	.04
9. Resp. can (1) or cannot (3) influence govt.	-.10
10. Need (1) or don't need (3) bosses	.09
11. Can count on others (1) no one cares (3)	.07
12. World uncertain (1) ordered (3)	-.08
13. Person can (1) cannot (3) influence life	-.15
14. Getting ahead function own work 1 no 3 yes	.08
15. Accept one's lot (1) make any sacrifice (3)	.14
16. Relative value of group (1) versus alone (3)	.10
17. Majority (1) versus consensual (3) decision	-.11
18. Traditional vs. Innovate (3)	.29
19. Understand thinking of foreigners yes 1 no 3	-.27
20. Major pol. parties on state basis yes 1 no 3	.20
21. Twelve states will 1 will not 3 prev. trouble	.21
22. Present govern. keeps the peace no 3 yes 1	-.10
23. Govt. allows sufficient free. speech 1 yes	-.19
24. Present govt. better than previous agree 1	-.04
25. Want present govt. to stay 1 yes 3 no	-.14
26. Approve union govt. 1 yes 3 no	-.21
27. Should be free to disagree w/govt 1 yes	.15
28. Violence nec. for important changes 1 yes	.07
29. More equality or poor revolt 1 yes	.11
30. Approve violence for personal qua. 1 yes	.20
31. Know name of state governor 1 yes	.17
32. Plan to stay in town 1 yes	.35
33. Town good place (1) or not (3)	.22
34. Lived outside of the state 1 yes	.34
35. Qualities best for high office educa high	.17
36. Ingredient for future god's help 1 govt 3	.24

- [6] On other effects of education see Dkonji (1971) on the view that certain kinds of abstract knowledge seems to be gained only through formal education; Simmons and Alexander (1978) on a survey of the educational literature who conclude that length of exposure, textbooks, library, and teacher motivation are the key ingredients in the outcomes of the educational experience. Also see the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition (1979), Scribner and Cole (1973), Holsinger and Theisen (1977), Inkeles and Holsinger (1973), Inkeles (1974) and Wober (1975:154) who notes that education is associated with lower alienation.

Education as a distinct measure is difficult to disentangle from ethnicity since there are substantial correlations between the two measures (gamma = ??).[7]

Our data is very clear with the cognitive aspects of formal schooling. Education and associated occupations requiring education were more strongly associated with differences in the consumption of the mass media than any other elements we evaluated. The more educated are consistently better informed and more substantial consumers

[7] See the following on education in Nigeria, Beckett and O'Connell (1977), Beckett (1978), Coleman (1965), Bowles (1969), Williams (1973), Oloko (n.d.), Peshkin (1972), Lloyd (1966), Abernethy (1969), Armer and Youtz (see Wober:1975). On other African countries see Foster (1965) on Ghana, Klineberg et al. (1979) on African students, Keller (1978) on Kenya, Langlands (1977) and Heyneman (1977) on Uganda, Garrison (1979) on Zambia. Barkan (1975) presents a comparative study of university students in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda. Non-African sources include Simmons (1979) on education for development, Ritzen (1979) on growth vs. equity considerations in education, Bourdieu and Passerou (1977), Boudon (1974) on the relation between education and equality of outcomes - Aker (1976), Fararo and Kasaka (1976), Ramsay (1975), Elster (1976) all comment on this book, and Boudon answers the criticism of Hauser in Boudon (1976). The issue of the role of education in development is still unclear. See Simmons (1978) and the annual Research in Human Capital and Development (Greenwich) for further issues. See Bishop (1976) on the effects of education on ideological consistency.

of the media, particularly the printed word.[8] [9]

Who Is Affected?

The mobilization of peoples is not similar across the country as we would expect. Nor is it similar across age, sex, ethnicity, religion, and father's background. We can

[8] This is nearly universally reported in the literature. Kazemi (1978:15) says the "better educated . . . were more likely to listen to news programs" in Iran, for example. See Hicks (1978) for a discussion of the issues of cohort analysis in the study of education effects. Simmons (1976) in a study of Tunisians found that the retention of cognitive skills in terms of reading comprehension was considerable (33 percent declined in either Arabic or French, 25 percent incurred total loss of their French). See Wheeler (1980) and Coldough (1980) for reviews of the literature on the role of education in economic development and the dated review by Ogunshye in Coleman (1965) on Nigerian education and its role in political development. For a summary of the relation between income and education see King et al. (1980).

[9] For other works on education and social change see Thompson and Fogel (1976), Thompson, Fogel and Danner (1976), Jahoda (1976), Grindal (1972) on education in Northern Ghana, Altbach and Kelly (1978), Anderson, Spiro and Montague (1978) and Carnoy (1974) on the role of education as cultural imperialism rather than as a reinforcer of indigenous culture.

only present a few results here but the pattern of differential mobilization is a major aspect of the variance in income and opportunity that will be an important element in Nigerian politics for years to come.[10]

Labor Force

The report by Zachariah and Conde (1981) emphasizes the importance of the redistribution of the labor force - the young men going to the cities - as the overriding aspect of the migration patterns in West Africa. We find the same phenomena but there remains considerable ambiguity about the political implications of the process.[11]

Issues of Income Distribution

[10] On age, period and cohort issues see Beck and Jennings (1979), and Abramson (1979). Note Kavanagh (1972:35) states that affect declines with age.

[11] See Stanley (1978) for a bibliography on labor force participation in Nigeria. Morawetz (1974) surveyed the implications for employment in the industrialization of LDCs.

The implications of development for the distribution of income and other elements of vertical stratification has been one of the principal issues in the literature, particularly by economists. Despite the massive literature, the answer to the simple question of what development does to income distribution remains without any clear answer. Papenek (1978) notes that the starting point of a country may be fundamental (e.g. a feudal system like Ethiopia with extreme inequality seemed to improve as development took place despite its formal lack of commitment to do so, while Tanzania, a country with a very flat income distribution initially has worsened since independence despite their commitment not to do so!). Others emphasize the Leontief curve where inequality is a curvilinear function of income.[12] The principal reason that income distribution remains an unresolved puzzle' (see Ranadive:1978 on this term) is the difficulty of measuring inequality and of constructing statistically identifiable models. We have earlier suggested that this is more because of the theoretical 'softness' of the work than anything else. That is the real issue in stratification involve the interrelation and 'tradeoff' between many elements of status of which income is only one and not always the most

Important.[13]

Social Mobilization and Ethnocentrism

We have argued that social change has the effects of mobilizing people in plural societies such that strong ethnocentric behavior is manifest between culturally disparate groups and culturally similar groups will at the same time exhibit increased assimilation.[14]

The link between social mobilization and ethnocentrism has been made by a number of writers. Huntington and Nelson

[12] See Chenery (1979) for a statement on these topics. Much of the literature is pessimistic on change however. Bergsman (1980) notes little change in Mexico and Morawetz in a general review of development (1977) finds a similar pattern. Bienen and Diejemaoh (1981) conclude that income distribution in Nigeria has changed little in recent times. See that work for studies by Morrison, Ayeni, Diejemaoh and Anusionwu, and others. See Adelman (1980) for the relation between economic development and political change by an economist. See Parvin (1973) on the economic determinants of political unrest. Grandjean and Bean (1975) comment on the perceptions of stratification in the context of the functional theory of stratification.

(1976:59) note that social mobilization leads to increased communalism. Katzenstein notes that

"The relatively higher number of Shiv Sena supporters expressing less tolerant attitudes towards other religious and linguistic communities, as was argued earlier, appears not to be based on economic competition." (1979:92)

"In the ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, Shiv Sena would fare particularly well." (1979:92)[15]

[13] See Griliches et al (1978), Robinson (1972), Sahota (1978), Rapkin (1979), McDonald and Jensen (1979) and Bourguignon (1979) for reviews of some of these issues. Also see Cornelius and Trueblood (1975), Altimir (1979), Altimir and Pinera (1977), Formby and Seaks (1980), Gramlich and Wolkoff (1979) for other pieces on the subject. Arnold (1977:19) cites Awolowo, one of the principal Nigerian politicians, on his view on inequality and its ramifications. Birdsall (1980) summarizes the literature on the relation between population characteristics and poverty in the developing world.

[14] For sources on social mobilization and ethnocentrism see Parming and Cheung (1980), the classic statement by Deutsch (1961), Onokerhoraye (1977) on Benin City, Nigeria, Sigelman (1979), Nash (1977), Murray (1977) on Thai villages, Lubeck (1976) on Kano, Coulter (1975) for cross-national evidence, and Hopkins (1973). For other sources on Nigeria see Teriba and Kayode (1977), Kulp (1977, 1979), and Pell (1973). Other sources on Africa include Kilson (1975) and Hayward (1974). Also see Laumann (1966), Herskovits (1961), Delacroix and Ragin (1978), Shupe (1979) and Rottomore (1979).

Voluntary Organizations

The pluralist model of politics gives central place to the role of voluntary organizations to facilitate cross-cutting cleavages and the resultant construction of a composite culture and moderation of demands across the population of the polity. The problem in the plural society is that actors tend to join (or be excluded from) such organizations in ways that build reinforcing cleavages. Such a process has just the opposite effect as the pluralist model would predict. Institutional separation is encouraged and strength of ethnic and other ascriptively-based identities are encouraged. This occurs for two reasons. First, individuals who face the complexities, demands and uncertainties of a new urban world utilize such groups as support to counter the anomie and alienation caused by their existence in this new environment. Second, another use for

[15] Katzenstein notes that most Shiv Sena politicians (in Bombay) "had never traveled outside Maharashtra" (the state that Bombay is in), however. Also note that Katzenstein gives India-wide data on preferential programs on pages 160-190.

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organizations often involving a largely distinct group of individuals are to use groups to mobilize people for various political, economic and social ends. While individuals may belong to both types of groups and the same group may perform both functions, this tends to be atypical in most environments including Nigeria.[16]

Political Mobilization

Political mobilization and social mobilization are major concerns to many writers but the form and even direction of the relation is not clearly established in the literature. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) argue that social status and political participation are positively related and have a similar form across countries. They argue that the political mobilization of groups is what acts to alter this basic underlying constancy across societies.[17]

[16] For sources on voluntary organizations see Thomson and Armer (1979), Goldstone (1980), Barnes (1973, 1975, 1978) on Lagos, Thomson and Armer (1979) on Kano, and Pool and Kochen (1978/79) on the general issues of contacts and interactions of individuals.

Some of the literature on social mobilization relates to the structural changes which come about as societies become more complex economically. This situation leads to a much larger population whose active cooperation is required for the society to function (particularly the new 'middle class'). This change in structure then becomes an important element which causes government to become more responsive to an increasingly wide constituency. This view has not been especially successful on an empirical base except over the very long run. We believe this occurs because of basic cultural differences which continue even when substantial 'real' changes have occurred in the society's distribution of power and status.[18]

Conclusions

[17] For sources on these issues see Cornelius (1975), Baker (1973) on Nigeria, Ananaba (1969) on Nigerian trade unions, the annual Research in Political Economy, Lewis (1970) on Sierra Leone secondary students, Hanna and Hanna (1969), Grew (1977), Tilly (1978), Clignet (1976) on the Camerouns, Clute (1974) on Sierra Leone, O'Donnell (1973) on the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of response to political demands, Epstein (1958), Lorence and Mortimer (1979) on work experience and political orientation, Sandbrook and Aru (1977) on Accra, Ghana, and Sandbrook and Cohen (1975) on class formation in Africa.

In this brief review of the evidence of social mobilization effects, the general pattern is revealed to be similar to evidence from other countries. First, the process does increase cognitive and evaluative processes, and develops a majoritarianism value. However, it also increases a sense of social distance which in a plural society is potentially divisive. This is especially the case as the development process increases both the fact and awareness of inequality between groups although as we have noted, the gap between actual and perceived inequality can be large and have profound political implications.

[18] For sources see Blissman (1969) on East Africa, Standing and Sheehan (1978), Stanley (1978), Ozbudun (1976) on Turkey, Portes (1971) on class consciousness, and Sievers (1975) on Indonesia. Also note Lieberstein (1978) on x-efficiency, Fadayomi (1975), and Salamone (1980).

Towards an Adaptive Culture: On the
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Chapter Sixteen Environmental Effects on Political Change

Chapter Sixteen

Environmental Effects on Political Change

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Does the real world edit socio-political
existence?

Introduction

There is a substantial literature in the social sciences in which the environmental constraints and/or possibilities are given the prime role in explanation of social and political outcomes. There are explanations of development which concentrate on the importance of temperate climates with abundant rainfall, models of the political history of nations which emphasize their proximity to other nations or lack thereof, models which emphasize the natural resource possibilities, models which emphasize the difficulty of dealing with the environment as a source of high achievement motivation, and in most specific case studies models which invoke many ad hoc and specific characteristics to account for observed behavior. As we have noted we find the use of specific or ad hoc considerations in explanation to be unsatisfactory. The reason for this is simple, of course. We want to develop an explanation that will be useful over time and in other socio-political environments. Thus we try in this chapter

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to characterize some of these contextual arguments that appear to be useful and generalizable. However, we will not evaluate these arguments using the survey data at this time.[1]

The categories of situational and structural elements of context that we examine are: (1) Groups in relation to the local (or state) dominant culture; (2) Historical traditions of conflict, cooperation, coalition formation, and consensus; (3) Ecological constraints of the environment; (4) Constraints which originate external to the local environment such as technological possibilities, foreign manipulation, world economic situation etc.; (5) Resource availability in the local environment (irrespective of source); and (6) Natural phenomena such as the climate or physical topology. We consider each of these in what

[1] Diffusion of ideas and material phenomena from one area to another are both common if not even ubiquitous and the source of a major analytic problem called Galton's Problem. Galton noted that the assumption of most statistical procedures is that the observations are independent of each other. If one society imitated another then that is not true. This issue has had a profound effect on the course of cross-cultural studies. See Zucker, and Strauss and Drans in March 1977 Current Anthropology (117-) and a followup in the June issue.

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follows.[2]

Our study includes interviews from most areas of the country and from more than one hundred individual survey cities, towns and villages. Thus we have a data base which should be well suited to the evaluation of many of the theories of contextual effects on outcomes. We remain committed to the idea that these theories should be as inclusive as possible in their range of applicability.[3]

We now turn to a discussion of each of these elements of context.

Stratified Cultures

The existence of a dominant culture in any given location implies that there are individuals who are not

[2] The sociobiology perspective gives particular emphasis to the role of interaction with the environment. See Lewontin (1979) for a view of sociobiology as an 'adaptationist program' which has some similarity to our own views.

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members of the dominant culture but who live in the environment that is largely constructed and directed by members of other cultures. This phenomena is common in Nigeria and a substantial literature exists.[4] The implications of communities living as minorities in a dominant culture are complex. If the 'outsiders' are

[3] Mitchell (1979:245) argues that personality explains little of the variance in observed behavior compared to situational measures. See Triandis (chapter 21 in Austin and Worchel:1979), Bowers (1973) on situationism in psychology, Clarke and James (1967) on the effect of situation on information seeking, Medin and Schaeffer (1978) on a context theory of classification learning, Adamson 1978) on multilevel modeling in Nigeria (in a sense that is the principal issue in much contextual modeling), Wentworth (1980) on the role of context in interaction, Jenks (1980) on the 'nature-nature' debate and public policy options, Feldman (1975) on issues of environment and culture interaction in ethnological thought, and the work of Lewin in field theory with its explicit model of behavior as a function of individual preferences interacting with the environmental constraints and possibilities. For the economist's view of situational factors see Haache (1980). Also see Frey (1978a, 1978b) on political economy models, Murningham (1978) on models of coalition behavior and A J Jones (1980) on mathematical models of conflict. Kastenbaum (1980) provides a discussion on the index of dissimilarity which is useful when we discuss notions such as cultural distance. Many of these works reflect a view on situational effects as a learning experience and in an important sense the change of context is a major aspect of most theories of development and change. Perhaps we should label social change more accurately as 'revolutions through evolutionary epistemology' or 'political development as a learning experience'.

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culturally close to the 'Insiders', then we would expect them to establish the dominant group as a reference group and to assimilate to a considerable extent. If they are culturally distant, then we would expect the social distance between the groups to grow and for various ways of segregating the communities to develop. This is a typical process in much of Nigeria. In the North, the Southerners lived in a Sabon Gari (a Hausa term for new towns), as Northerners did in Southern towns where they were substantially represented. Of course, this follows the model of the colonial officials who explicitly set up government reservation areas (GRAs) where the Europeans lived separately from the indigenes.

A dominant culture is not only important in terms of understanding minorities living in their midst but the dominant (or even exclusive) populations of one area are in

[4] See Cohen (1969) on the Hausa in Ibadan and other Yoruba cities, for example. See Cole (1975) and Baker (1974) on Lagos. Such environments produce considerable multilingualism as we have already observed in our survey results. See Adekunle (1972) on multilingualism. The dynamics of such processes are difficult to disentangle because of statistical and methodological limitations. See Fienberg and Mason (1979) on aspects of such analysis.

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many cases minorities in the context of the state or country minorities. A situation like this may be an important reason why the model advanced by Barrington Moore (1966) does not seem to work well in plural societies. For example, Goldberg (1978) in trying to evaluate Moore's model using Nigerian data concludes that a more complex outcome occurs because of situational and historical constraints on action.[5] Note that the existence of minorities in an area tends to stimulate brokers or intermediaries to deal with the dominant community which in turn reinforces or develops a patron-client structure. This tendency can be seen from a Moore (1966) perspective as one not likely to generate democracy (which comes from an alliance of the rulers and the middle class).

[5] See Lieber (1971) on Ibo village communities, Daudu (1974) on ethnic conflicts in Northern Nigeria in the 1968-73 period, Tekiner (1980) relates need achievement to income growth, and Hakes explores the notion of weak institutions (parliaments) and regime instability. Other sources of interest are Kaufert (1977) on situational ethnicity in Ghana, Schildkrout (1978) on Ghana, Smich and Tilman (sp?) (1980) on institutional effects on critical theory perspectives, and Harries-Jenjins (1977) on military institutions. On Nigerian local government see Ajibola and Oyejide (1975) and Adedeji and Rowland (1972). Abaelu and Cook (1975) discuss rural wage labor markets in Western Nigeria.

Historical conflicts

History remains a fundamentally important justification for the perceived legitimacy and continuation of conflict. This includes conflicts over continuing 'real' issues such as power as well as issues where the source of the issue has long since been replaced by one where the cummulation of wrongs has to be righted for 'honor's sake'.

In the former category, some of the most important issues relate to political boundaries which are left from the colonial period. For example, almost all the basic political boundaries drawn up by the British earlier in the century survive as basic boundaries in the local authorities and states of the Nigerian Federation. Along with the freezing of boundaries, which had been much more fluid before the Pax Britannica, the traditional leadership structure was largely frozen. This leaves a continuing legacy of conflicts over land and leadership which remains one of the most intractable sources of disputes in Nigeria and other ex-British territories in West Africa.[6]

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One of the tragedies of much ethnically based conflict is that whatever the original basis of the conflict there is characteristically a point after which it becomes an 'historical enmity' which is an ongoing conflict. This situation is very common in Nigeria and occurs especially within towns, cities or even small villages. As Peil (1975:108) notes the intensity of local conflicts is often the greatest because they are so directly experienced on an ongoing basis. Such kinds of conflict can produce long term changes in the structure of the societies involved which eventually appear as structural changes in the society and culture. These changes then become part of the 'theory of

- [6] See, for example, Crook (1973) on the Ashanti in Ghana, Crowder (1960, 1973) on Nigeria and Crowder and Ikime (1970) on West Africa, Gordon (1975) on Sapele (Nigeria), Jenkins (1967) on Ibadan (Nigeria), Egharevba (1968) on Benin, M G Smith (1978) on Daura (Northern Nigeria), Klein (1980) on African peasants, Birnberg and Resnick (1975) for an econometric model of colonial development, Berry (1975) on Western Nigeria, Lloyd (1977) on the Ijebu Yoruba, Lloyd, Mabogunje and Awe (1967) on Ibadan, Lemarchand (1977) on African kingship, Swartz and Dumett (1980) on West African culture dynamics, Lewis (1981) on Somaliland, Dudley (1968) on Northern Nigerian politics, and Cohen (1976) on conflict in a Kanuri (Northeastern Nigeria) emirate. See Firebaugh (1978) on the problems of equivalence in cross sectional studies versus time series or historical analysis. Levine (1974) discusses the underlying stability in many African political systems despite their rhetoric.

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the world' and as such are incorporated into a larger set of beliefs about the world.[7] The authoritarian mode of colonial rule may also show up most clearly in the structure of the civil service which continues as the colonial tradition long after the colonial power has departed. This process may be most marked where the traditional culture was also authoritarian but it seems to be observed everywhere.[8]

Ecological Constraints

[7] Cataclysmic events such as disastrous wars etc. may produce a generation of children who are cognitively distinctive. For example, World War II was a period when men were away from their children for long periods in huge numbers. Children brought up in an environment of warmth but low authority would tend to have low need for achievement. These issues are all tied to the separation of age, period and cohort effects as we have noted on several occasions. For work on these issues see Dalton (1977) on generational versus life cycle issues, Binder (1971) for a crises and sequence model of the Committee on Comparative Politics, Shively (1979) on age and cohort effects, Akerodolu-Ale (1973, 1976) on the development of indigenous entrepreneurship amongst the Ijebu-Yoruba in Nigeria, Barrett (1977) on a remote Yoruba community, and Ajayi and Smith (1971) on the history of Yoruba civil warfare.

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Environmental constraints and their implications have long been a major concern of social scientists and a frequent 'explanation' for variance in behavior across ecological zones. Climate, land topology, agricultural carrying capacity, size of space and population, disease possibilities, links with other communities and environments, occupational possibilities, and various demographic factors have all been invoked in attempts to account for variation in human behavior. There can be little doubt that the evolution of cultures has been significantly affected by ecological constraints and Nigeria is no exception. Many of these effects become incorporated into the culture and then assume an existence of their own which tends only to be broken intergenerationally. Nevertheless, this is not always or even mostly true as people who migrate adapt themselves to new possibilities etc.[9]

[8] For other sources on Nigerian political history see Adeniran (1974) on the Agbekoya uprising, Akinyemi (1971) on the question of political change after military rule, Akiwode (1971) on military rule from 1966 to 1970, Awolowo (1966, 1968) on his analysis of the basic set of political possibilities in Nigeria, Bienen (1978) and Bienen and Morell (1976).

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Many of the effects which we could label as ecological also appear under other categories. For example, the rural-urban dichotomy, structure of local employment possibilities, and other aspects of level of development have been considered. One of the fundamental conundrums in

- [9] See Gross et al. (1979) on ecology and acculturation in Brazil, Cornelius (1973) on political learning among migrants to Mexico City, Duncan, Schuman and Duncan (1973) on social change in an urban area, Langton and Rapoport (1975) on urban workers in Chile, and Yayde (1969) on environment and cultural behavior. See Oster and Wilson (1978) on insect populations. On networks and their implications see Laumann et al. (1977), Laumann and Pappi (1976), and Leinhardt (1977) on networks and their implications. See Galaskiewicz (1979) on community networks. For size and population effects see Espenshade and Serow (1978), Duval and Thompson (1980), Keesing and Sherk (1971), Taeuber et al. (1978), Cohen (in Burns and Buckley:1977), Adejuyigbe (1973, 1975), and Vilsaria (1979) on the interaction of income and demographic factors. On region-wide effects see Homans (1969), Grünh (1979), Hechter and Brustein (1980) and Ladouceur (1979). Also see Aboyade (1976) on the economic forces facing the country, Adelaja (1976) on power in Yorubaland, Lovejoy (1979) on the nineteenth century plantations in Sokoto, Nigeria; Dogan and Rokkan (1969), Stokols (1978) on environmental psychology, Volkonen (1969) on the role of community context in political mobilization. Barrett (1974) analyzes change of a Yoruba community that lives in an unusual ecological setting (over a lagoon). See Saizman (1980) on the process of nomadic peoples becoming sedentary, and Akeredolu-Ale (1972) on environment effects in the development of entrepreneurship. Also see la Barre (1980) on contextual effects, Marris (1962) on social change in Lagos, and Alexander (1977) on situational identities.

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analyses of this type is the extreme difficulty of separating the effects of the many sources of contextual and other effects. We present the various results which appear to be credible but proper caution should be exercised throughout since even with respect to the empirical results which reconfirm results that have been widely observed we may still be missing the basic dynamic of the process. Our inability to predict many social phenomena only encourages us in such a view.

External Constraints

Constraints external to the society have been a major source of reasons for the differential growth and development of their political and economic resources. Dependency theories, imperialism, technological backwardness, a narrow economic base, foreign exchange constraints, geopolitical considerations and the influence of cultural, political and economic ideas from the outside appear in the literature through the last two centuries. Recent history has seen even more emphasis on the notion

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that societies have relatively little degrees of freedom within the larger world in which they function. Much of this literature has been under attack for its failure to account for substantial differences in political outcomes across societies which seem to relate to internal processes and possibilities much more than external.

Nigeria, of course, has a peculiar characteristic that is both a strength and weakness. Its large oil revenues mean that it has considerable resources with which to pursue change and development but at the same time this means it is dependent on a single source of income for this process. When oil production declines or prices drop the result is a crisis for the government and economy.[10]

Natural Resource Availability

Many explanations of country differences center on the relative availability of resources. This issue has a certain surface appeal but there is too much conflicting evidence for it to be taken as likely to hold in its

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simplest form. Japan, with no natural resources, is wealthy while Zaire with enormous resources is one of the world poorest countries, for example. Nevertheless, the development possibilities for Nigeria are quite different than for Upper Volta since the former does have considerable natural resources while the latter apparently has none.

Natural resources in Nigeria include good climatic conditions for supporting a wide variety of agricultures from tomatoes to date palms. Further, minerals such as tin, coal, limestone and iron are there in substantial quantities. The effects of such resources can be

[10] See A. D. Smith (1980) on the transmission of cultural models from the West to other states. On models of dependent development see Kennedy (1980) on Ghanaian entrepreneurship, Biersteker (1978) on Nigeria, Evans (1979) on Brazil, Johnson (1979), Berman (1974) on Africa, Arighi (1978) on imperialism, Arrighi and Saul (1973), Evans and Timberlake (1980), Rodney (1972), Banks (1979) on the international economy, Chenery (1979) on foreign exchange constraint, and Sawyer (1979). Hechter (1975) deals with a model of internal colonialism as do Havens and Flinn (1970). Also see Flynn (1974) on internal dependency, Falayan (1974) and Fika (in prep.) deal with aspects of the construction of the colony of Nigeria. Abalu (1975) shows how responsive individual farmers were to price stimuli from outside markets in the case of groundnuts (peanuts). Filnifter and Abramson (1975) relate city size to feelings of political competence.

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substantial on any given locale.[11]

Natural Phenomena

Pulliam and Dunford (1980) in their work on culture posit an example of a population in a remote Himalayan valley that is uninfluenced by outsiders. Natural phenomena have important effects on the transmission of culture, goods and people. Rivers that are difficult to cross or deserts that cannot support agriculture are common examples. Nigeria with its range of phenomena which includes two major

[11] See Frey (1978) for a review of the politics and economics relationship and its implications for an adaptive culture. On factor endowment see Davidson (1979). On land scarcity see Von Hekken and Von Velzen (1972) on Tanzania. Delacroix (1977) writes on the export of raw materials and Gottman (1980) is a source for internal center-periphery relations and exploitations. See Chana and Morrison (1975) on Kenya's informal sector, Haward (1977) on theories of income distribution, Kiihy (1965) on the bread industry in Nigeria, Adegboye (1966) on farm structure in Western Nigeria, Hill (1977) on rural Kano over three quarters of a century, and Graen and Ginsburgh (1977) on situational factors as they influence leadership behavior. The local political resources are described by Oyediran (1972, 1973, 1974a, 1974c), and Mabogunje (1962) describes Yoruba towns.

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rivers which divide the country into three parts, mangrove swamps and dense rain forests, arid areas, mountainous borderlands with Cameroon and numerous smaller rivers all contribute to the importance of natural phenomena in the political culture of the country. Some of these phenomena act as nodes of transportation, Lagos, for example, while others act as barriers, the rain forests, for example.[12]

Conclusions

This chapter has raised a series of environmental effects which can threaten the validity to conclusions which we can draw from the study. We have not investigated these effects here but have designed the study that some of them with additional information can be evaluated on this data at a later time.

[12] Richards (1978) writes on spatial organization and social change in West Africa.

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Models of Political Man

Conclusions on the Social Basis for Politics in Nigeria

Introduction

Introduction

In this book we set out to analyze the working of a plural polity. What have we learned? To begin with, we developed a model of the political process in a plural society in which cultural cleavages dominate economic interests in the determination of basic political coalitions and beliefs. We argued that the individual disembodied culture-bearers would be closely tied to their traditional institutional sources of culture, the embodied culture-bearers, despite substantial social and technological changes in the society.

We evaluated this model with a country-wide survey of Nigeria which was designed to test various aspects of the model. The evidence from this survey indicated that the expected culture to political choice link was to be found, and that ethnicity and language, for example, consistently differentiated between individuals in terms of the elements of political culture held by these individuals while secondary socialization measures such as education and especially occupation did not. This is not to argue that education and occupation do not have an effect. They do.

But it is largely confined to an increased awareness of, and interest in, the larger world, an acceptance of majoritarian decision principles, and a greater sense of personal efficacy. Conversely, a generalized sense of social distance was increased and most other aspects of the disembodied political culture were not affected. In sum, a process was ongoing whose long term effects pointed towards a more uniform culture within broad areas of the country although not over the country as a whole, and short-term effects which pointed towards a continued or increased differentiation based increasingly on identity differences rather than real cultural differences.

In our model of the dynamics of politics, the socio-cultural sources were imbedded in the context of three groups of modifiers to the role of cultural conflict as the dominant source of political outcomes in the country. The first of these was ethnocentrism which acts as an enhancement of contrast effect. It was expected to exacerbate existing divisions, and even to prevent or slow down the bridging of identities by groups or sub-cultures who shared a common political culture but not a sense of common fate. Thus, ethnocentrism, which we characterized as

loyalty , was expected to increase the intensity of culturally-based divisions and even to create new subdivisions. Such a process would facilitate the establishment of reinforcing cleavages which we find to parallel political coalition preferences.

Second, it was expected that individual mobility (spatial, social and psychic) would act to establish the kinds of cross-cutting cleavages that are a key feature of pluralist models of politics. What we find is that mobility or social exit processes are associated with changes in aspects of individual's political cognition and to a lesser extent their evaluative processes but that they are only weakly associated with basic affective processes, if at all. Mobility is also associated with increased participation in voluntary organizations. Such participation tends to increase intracultural participation relative to intercultural because of the nature, especially geographic, of most organizations in the country. This is particularly true of those organizations that have the most impact on culture and its transmission. The result of such selective changes in a culturally plural environment is to increase the cross-cutting effects within culture and thus to broaden

the socio-cultural limits to political mobilization within culture area and to establish reinforcing cleavages at culture boundaries.

At the same time that culturally similar groups are becoming less differentiated, the processes that created a more homogeneous political culture also created more definition between the political cultures. Thus like disparate paradigms in science, affect becomes an important basis of perception, and we expect that the distinct political cultures will manifest basic conflicts over an extended period.

Third, this process is exacerbated by the social mobilization of large parts of the population, what we refer to as the source of sociopolitical voice. This mobilization process acts to increase demands on the political system in a format that has been widely observed in many other countries. What has been less clear is who was demanding what and why. We find that it is not the demonstrably worse off citizens many of whom are living at a lower standard of real consumption than at independence. Rather, it is the status discrepant individuals such as the

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educated who are both more well informed than others and more in search for reasons for their status rewards being 'unequal'. Thus the greater ethnocentrism or social distance of such populations is consistent with the 'scapegoat' role as well as with the increased awareness of real differences across groups in the country.

This process is complicated by the social context which reflects the historical and ecological constraints on group and individual action which exist in every situation.[1]

Models of Political Man

In the evidence that we examined about the political culture borne by the disembodied culture-bearers, certain general conclusions can be drawn and a number of competing political models identified. With respect to the first set

[1] We interviewed in over one hundred locations throughout the country, and will evaluate the contextual factors in subsequent work in order to determine various confounding factors of this nature.

of issues, we concluded that there was consistent cultural variation in terms of the several aspects of the political culture between ethnic groups even though there was in all cases considerable intra-ethnic variation. We also found that various social change processes tended to act on selected cognitive and some evaluative aspects of the culture but not on other aspects, or at least not at the same rate or intensity with respect to other aspects, of the political culture.

From the second set of issues, we can report on some distinct political models which seem to be observed. One model that we observe is associated with individual culture-bearers who have moderate levels of political trust, a high sense of system efficacy and a low sense of personal efficacy, low system affect but who have average political cognition, who positively value government outputs and input processes, and possess a strong sense of social distance. The people tended to be politically mildly authoritarian, to possess modern values, and to have a strong sense of group identity. A second observed model is one with high levels of trust and sense of personal efficacy, high levels of sense of system efficacy, low to moderate cognition, low

sense of social distance, and more conservative and hierarchical views of appropriate political decision making.

A third model shows moderate levels of sense of personal efficacy, political cognition, trust and social distance but considerable disaffection with the larger political system. There are a number of further models which we could elaborate but the essential point is that there are several such models which can be identified and systematically related to embodied culture-bearers.

The Political Implications

The political implications of a society with such a range of systematically distributed political models is that conflict in the society may be highly variable depending on the relation of the political actors to the various political boundaries. Thus the cultural and political boundaries of the system will have an important interactive component which will be of key importance to the political outcomes of the country.

Therefore we argue that a political system that exists in such a milieu should be so constructed to keep conflict which results from culture and political boundary interactions to a minimum or at least low. This is not to maintain that such a process is frozen in time, however. Clearly, the real basis for such a construction will change over time and an Adaptive Culture will not only have appropriate boundaries at one point in time, it will also recognize that the ongoing presentation of natural experiments that history represents will require a corresponding modification of the mechanisms for political mobilization, aggregation and articulation.

The notion of an Adaptive Culture as a 'learning culture' rests on the principal of an experiment-driven polity. It also rests on the notion that it is important that such an experimental society be one that is constrained to perform as many 'natural experiments' as feasible. Thus the notion of decentralizing much of politics in order to minimize culturally based conflict is at the same time one intended to stimulate innovation.

It is important to understand the implications of such a view of political learning. It reflects an epistemological position that maintains that we have a large area of ignorance with respect to the evaluation of future possibilities. This results from an inability to predict social and technological changes with much confidence. Thus the authoritarian models which are based on an epistemological position that views the future as knowable at least up to the level of a probability distribution is inadequate for the view that we have of such large amounts of ignorance.[2] While some parts of the future may fall into the class of know to at least a probability distribution, it is clear in retrospect that large parts do not. Therefore, it is clear that innovation and adaptation to new circumstances are conditions under which extrapolations from the past are especially likely to err.

If we accept this view of the role of the adaptive or experimental culture, then the next question is how can such

[2] The term ignorance is used here in the same way it is in decision theoretic models, that is we are ignorant when we cannot even specify the probability distribution of possible outcomes to an event.

experimental situations be constructed, and how can the experiments be performed and evaluated?

Our answer to this question must await a detailed response in a later work but the outline that we propose can be stated in brief. First, a policy which decentralizes a substantial amount of political decision-making is fundamental. As we noted, the bounds of the decentralized components are of great significance. Such decentralization allows considerable political conflict to disappear, decrease or at least to be moved away from the political center, and therefore to a less consequential outcome for the country. It also allows many 'experiments' or differing approaches to various problems to be tried and retained or discarded. This means that the 'cost' of experimentation is lower than for the entire country, and that it can be tailored to the needs of the various communities.

Second, distribution of resources across groups becomes less important than across individuals or classes of individuals. Thus we expect a situation which has a closer approximation to a unimodal preference distribution. Such a situation reflects a more homogeneous culture, one that

pluralists expect to result from their cross-cutting cleavages model and one that probably has a fundamental stability because of that distribution.

The issue of the appropriate boundaries remains a significant one, however. The boundaries that relate to political conflict may change slowly but they will change. They will change in some predictable ways such as to more class related bases for political conflict, but they will also change in unpredictable ways such as because of major resource or environmental change such as desertification. Consequently, we not only argue for a substantially decentralized set of political institutions in an electoral atmosphere which can select or retain parties, politicians and programs. We also argue for an electoral method that is not geographically constrained such as single-member constituencies are. Instead some formula that includes a significant proportional representation element will not only reflect the various constituencies of the country at one point in time but there would be much more flexibility to modify and change constituencies. Such a political form is not without charges of instability but it has been and is working in a number of contemporary states. Thus the

movement of peoples or the change from ascriptive to achievement bases for political mobilization would be facilitated.

In this sense, the Law of Cleavages would not cease to exist but the political arenas would have a much higher proportion of conflict which was within rather than between culture. This is important for many reasons but not least among them is that the moral limits which extend only to the boundaries will not be thrown aside but will be part of the political process.

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SOCIAL CHANGE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND NATIONAL UNITY
IN NIGERIA

Department of Political Science
University of Ibadan

Good morning (afternoon). I am from the University of Ibadan, working on a study of the needs and opinions of the people of Nigeria. We are asking a sample of Nigerians from all over the country to help us in this study by answering some questions about themselves and their views. The answers will only be used in combination with those of other people. We will not use your name. We would be grateful for your help in this study. We wish to direct questions to the head of the household first.

Identification Number / _ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ /
(1-4)

Card Number / 1 _ /
(5)

Social Mobility

The following statements are some of the things that people have told us about life in Nigeria today. Would you tell us whether you agree or disagree with these statements, or whether you don't have an opinion about them.

1. Some people say the way things have been going in Nigeria recently, the rich will get richer while the poor will get poorer. / _ _ _ _ /
(1) Agree (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Disagree (6)
2. Other people say that those who are rich in Nigeria today are only rich because they have been corrupt. / _ _ _ _ /
(1) Agree (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Disagree (7)
3. Other people say there's really not much Nigerians can do to develop this country because foreign countries are dominating our whole economic life. / _ _ _ _ /
(1) Agree (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Disagree (8)
4. Other people say the ordinary working men in Nigeria will never do better unless they are prepared to band together to oppose the exploitation of the rich. / _ _ _ _ /
(1) Agree (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Disagree (9)
5. Now comparing yourself with people who were like you ten years ago (1964), which of these describes your present status?
(1) I am much better than most of them. / _ _ _ _ /
(2) I am about the same. (10)
(3) Most of them are much better than yourself.

6. What about your children: will their lives be better or worse than yours or about the same? /-----/
 (1) Better (2) About the same- or not sure (11)
 (3) Worse

Here are some questions about different aspects of life and work. Each question has two parts, or statements. For each question, we would like to know which part you believe is more true. In some cases you may believe that both parts are true. In other cases you may think that neither part is true. But for every question, we want you to choose the part which you believe is more true.

7. a. Listening to all the different points of view on something is very confusing; it is better to hear just one point of view from somebody who is informed.
 b. Before making a decision, it is good to consider the opinions of as many different people as possible. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (12)
8. a. Any leader should be very strict with the people under him in order to gain their respect.
 b. Being respected as a leader comes only from treating one's followers well. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (13)
9. a. In the long run, we ourselves are responsible for having bad government.
 b. Someone like me does not have any say about what the government does. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (14)
10. a. It is essential for effective work that our bosses tell us just what is to be done and exactly how to do it.
 b. We can usually get the job done just as well without any instructions from our bosses. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (15)
11. a. You can always count on someone to help you out if things get bad enough.
 b. When you get right down to it, no one is going to care much about what happens to you. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (16)
12. a. Everything is so uncertain these days that it almost seems as though anything could happen.
 b. In spite of everything, it is really not hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (17)
13. a. A person can pretty well make whatever he wants out of his life.
 b. No matter how much a person tries, it is hard to

- change the way things are going to turn out. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (18)
14. a. No matter how hard some people try, it is difficult
 for them to get ahead in life.
 b. Most people who do not get head just do not have
 enough will power. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) (19)
15. a. The secret of happiness is not to expect a lot and
 to be content with what comes your way.
 b. One should make any sacrifices in order to succeed
 in life. /-----/
 (1) a. (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) b. (20)
16. Is it better to work for one's goals by working with
 others as a member of a group or is it better to
 work alone? /-----/
 (1) Work with others (2) Not sure- no opinion
 (3) Work alone (21)

Modernisation

17. Suppose two men are talking about some problem of
 this town, and the best way of solving it.
 The first man says: "It is better for each person
 to form his own opinion of what should be done and
 to defend his point of view before his neighbours.
 If there are large differences of opinion among the
 residents of the town, then the matter should be
 decided by taking a vote."
 The second man says: "As soon as you begin deciding
 questions like that by taking a vote, you will see
 that some people are with you and some are against you,
 and in that way divisions and quarrels develop. It
 is best to get everyone to agree first, then you do not
 have to vote."
 With which of these two men are you in agreement? /-----/
 (1) First man (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Second (22)
18. If schooling is freely available without cost, how much
 schooling do you think children of people like you
 should have? /-----/
 (1) None (2) Primary (23)
 (3) Secondary modern- teachers college
 (4) Full secondary
 (5) University (6) More than university
19. Two men are talking about the best way to grow food.
 The first man said: "We should continue the ways that
 we have always used."
 The second man said: "We should try to find better
 ways."
 Which man said the wiser words? /-----/
 (1) The first man (2) Not sure- no opinion (24)

(3) The second man

20. What should most qualify a man to hold high office? / ___ /
 1. Coming from a distinguished or royal family (25)
 2. Devotion to the old and time-honoured ways
 3. Being the most popular among the people
 4. High education and special knowledge
 5. Not sure- no opinion
21. What is most important for the future of this country? / ___ /
 1. The hard work of the people (26)
 2. Good planning on the part of the government
 3. God's help
 4. Good luck
 5. Not sure- no opinion
22. If you were to meet a person who lives in another country a long way off (thousands of miles away), could you understand his way of thinking? / ___ /
 (1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No (27)
23. Scientists in the universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or girl, and how it is that a seed turn into a plant. Do you think that these studies are: / ___ /
 1. All very good (very beneficial) (28)
 2. All somewhat good (beneficial)
 3. Not sure - no opinion
 4. All somewhat harmful
 5. All very harmful

Political Structure

24. Suppose parties were to be formed on a state basis before the return to civil rule in 1976 as promised by the Head of State. Since no one state party can have enough members to form a government, which state would you like to see your state party entering into alliances with. Name three states that you would most prefer and three states that you would least prefer.
- | | | | | | |
|--|---------|-------------------|--|---------|-------------------|
| | Most | 1st / ___ / ___ / | | Least | 1st / ___ / ___ / |
| | Prefer: | (29-30) | | Prefer: | (35-36) |
| | | 2nd / ___ / ___ / | | | 2nd / ___ / ___ / |
| | | (31-32) | | | (37-38) |
| | | 3rd / ___ / ___ / | | | 3rd / ___ / ___ / |
| | | (33-34) | | | (39-40) |
25. When political parties are allowed to form, would you like to see them formed on a state basis? / ___ /
 (1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No (41)
26. In your opinion do you think that the new Twelve-State system in Nigeria is going to prevent future troubles in Nigeria or do the new state boundaries not really solve our problems?

- (1) Will prevent future troubles /---/
 (2) Not sure- no opinion (42)
 (3) Will not solve our problems
27. Some people think that the present government has done a good job in keeping peace in Nigeria. Do you agree or disagree? /---/
 (1) Agree (2) Not sure- don't know (3) Disagree (43)
28. Some people feel that the government has allowed citizens sufficient freedom of speech. Do you agree or disagree? /---/
 (1) Agree (2) Not sure- don't know (3) Disagree (44)
29. Compared with the situation under the previous civilian government, some people feel that the present government has done a much better job. Do you agree or disagree? /---/
 (1) Agree (2) Not sure- don't know (3) Disagree (45)
30. How would you react if the present government was to stay in power beyond 1976? Would you approve or disapprove? /---/
 (46)
31. It has been suggested that after 1976 the country should be governed by civilian and military officials in coalition. Would you approve or disapprove? /---/
 (1) Approve (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Disapprove (47)
32. In your opinion should people who disagree with government be free to express their disagreement? /---/
 (1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No (48)
33. Some people feel that important changes in Nigeria will be brought about only through violence: others say violence is not necessary. What do you think? /---/
 (1) Important changes brought about through violence
 (2) Not sure - no opinion
 (3) Violence is not necessary (49)
34. Other people have said that if the government does not give a better share of Nigeria's wealth to the poor people, the the poor may have to revolt against the rich. Do you agree or disagree? /---/
 (1) Agree (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Desagree (50)
35. There are some people who say that violence should never be used to settle personal quarrels or disputes- that is, those involving relatives, friends, neighbours, co-workers, and so forth. Others say that in some cases it may be necessary to use violent mean to settle a dispute. With which position do you agree? /---/
 (1) Never use violence (2) Not sure- no opinion
 (3) Sometimes violence is justified (51)

Social Distance

36. Were you to take up a job in a state other than your own, in which states would you most and least prefer to work in? If you are already working in a state outside your own state, name three other states in which you would like to work.

Most	1st: / ___/ ___/	Least	1st: / ___/ ___/
Prefer	(52-53)	Prefer	(58-59)
	2nd: / ___/ ___/		2nd: / ___/ ___/
	(54-55)		(60-61)
	3rd: / ___/ ___/		3rd: / ___/ ___/
	(56-57)		(62-63)

37. Suppose you had money to start a business. Would you join with people from other states to start a business?

(1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No / ___/ (64)

38. Do you think the government of your state should join with other state governments in starting jointly owned business enterprises? (eg. the proposed saw-milling enterprise between the Midwest State and Kano State) / ___/

(1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No (65)

39. If yes, which states would you most prefer and least prefer to see your government cooperate with in forming such enterprises?

Most	1st: / ___/ ___/	Least	1st: / ___/ ___/
Prefer	(66-67)	Prefer	(72-73)
	2nd: / ___/ ___/		2nd: / ___/ ___/
	(68-69)		(74-75)
	3rd: / ___/ ___/		3rd: / ___/ ___/
	(70-71)		(76-77)

40. Suppose education were free and you were also free to send your child to any school in the Federation. Would you prefer to see your child attend a school in your own state?

(1) Yes (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) No / ___/ (78)

Now we would like to ask you some questions about the many different peoples that live together in Nigeria.

41. Would you say that in general the different ethnic groups in Nigeria are much the same, or are they very different from one another? / ___/

(1) Same (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Very different (79)

CARD 2

I.D. / ___/ ___/ ___/ ___/ (1-4)

/ ___/ (5)

42. How many different ethnic groups do you know of in Nigeria?

are politically more powerful, less powerful or about average?

- (1) More powerful (2) Average- no opinion (3) Less powerful /_____/ (61)

47. Relative to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, would you say that the ... (name of respondent's ethnic group) are culturally more prestigious, less prestigious, or about average?

- (1) More prestigious (2) Average- no opinion (3) Less prestigious /_____/ (62)

48. Do you think that conflicts between different ethnic groups will always be a problem in Nigeria, or that they will gradually become less of a problem, or that they have never really been a problem?

- (1) Never a problem (2) Gradually become less of a problem (3) Always will be a problem /_____/ (63)

49. Do you think Nigerians should strive to preserve their ethnic identities or that they should stop talking about ethnic group differences and concentrate on the things that unite them?

- (1) Preserve (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Concentrate on uniting /_____/ (64)

50. Do you think that religion or religious organisations influence politics in Nigeria to a great extent, to a very little extent, or not at all?

- (1) Not at all- no opinion (2) Very little (3) Great extent /_____/ (65)

51. Would you say that relations between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria are better than they were five years ago, worse, or about the same now as then?

- (1) Better (2) About the same (3) Worse (4) Don't know /_____/ (66)

Communications

52. How do people in your area find out about local and state news? Name the most important source.

- (1) Radio (2) Newspapers (3) Government publications (4) Local people (5) Television (6) Other_____ (7) none or no answer /_____/ (67)

53. How do you find out about the national news? Name the most important source.

- (1) Radio (2) Newspapers (3) Government publications (4) Local people (5) Television (6) People who travel to other areas (7) Other_____ (8) None or no answer /_____/ (68)

54. How often do you listen to the radio?

- (1) Everyday (2) 2-3 times a week
(3) Occasionally (4) Never (5) No opinion /_____/ (69)
55. How often do you read a newspaper or have one read to you?
(1) Everyday (2) 2-3 times a week /_____/ (70)
(3) Occasionally (4) Never
56. Which one of these kinds of news interests you most?
(1) World events (happenings in other countries)
(2) The nation
(3) Your home town (or village) /_____/ (71)
(4) Sports
(5) Religious (or tribal, cultural) events, ceremonies, or festivals
57. Who is the governor of your state?
(1) Correct (2) Incorrect (3) not sure- no answer /_____/ (72)

Physical Mobility

58. Do you plan to stay in this town or to move later? /_____/ (73)
(1) Stay (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) Move
59. All things considered, what do you think of (name of town) as a place to live?
(1) Good place (2) Average- no opinion /_____/ (74)
(3) Not good (bad)
60. Have you ever lived outside this place (name of state)? /_____/ (75)
(1) Yes (2) No answer (3) No
If yes: where did you live?
(name of town or region) /_____/_____/ (76-77)
/_____/_____/ (78-79)

CARD 3

I.D. /_____/_____/_____/_____/ (1-4)
/_____/_____/ (5)

61. Have you ever taken trips outside of this state? /_____/ (6)
(1) Yes (2) No answer (3) No
If yes: what places would those be? /_____/_____/ (7-8)
/_____/_____/ (9-10) /_____/_____/ (13-14)
/_____/_____/ (11-12) /_____/_____/ (15-16)

62. Are there any places in Nigeria that you have not been to that you would particularly like to visit?
(1) Yes (2) No answer (3) No /_____/ (17)
If yes: what places would those be?

/---/---/
(20-21)/---/---/
(22-23)/---/---/
(18-19)

63. Does your work bring you into contact with people living outside of your own state?

(1) Yes, often (2) Yes, occasionally /---/
(3) Don't know- not sure (4) No (24)

If yes: where are these people from? /---/---/
(25-26)

/---/---/
(27-28)/---/---/
(31-32)/---/---/
(29-30)/---/---/
(33-34)

64. I would like to ask about a few things, to see if you have them. Please tell me, do you now own any of the following things? (READ LIST)

(1) Have (2) No answer (3) Do not have
a. A radio /---/ b. A wristwatch /---/
(35) (36)

c. A gas cooker /---/ d. A refrigerator /---/
(37) (38)

e. A sewing machine /---/ f. An electric iron /---/
(39) (40)

g. A car or lorry /---/ h. A house or some /---/
(41) land (42)

i. An electric fan /---/ j. A clock /---/
(43) (44)

65. Some people say that some groups have too much power and influence in this country, and that other groups have too little power and influence. I'm going to read a list of groups. Please tell me for each of these groups whether you think they should have more power and influence or less power and influence than they have now in politics and public affairs.

(1) More (2) Same or no opinion (3) Less
a. University students /---/ b. Labour union /---/
(45) leaders (46)

c. Businessmen /---/ d. The police /---/
(47) (48)

e. Civil servants /---/ f. Military /---/
(49) officers (50)

g. The common man /---/ h. Traditional /---/
(51) leaders (52)

66. Do you think that most people in Nigeria are getting their fair share or less than their fair share of the good things in life. That is, the things that are needed to live happily and comfortably? If less than fair share: is it much less or only a little less?

(1) Much less (2) A little less /---/
(3) Fair share- no opinion (4) More than fair share (53)

Services

Now we would like to ask you some questions about your dealing with various government agencies.

67. We would like to ask you about health services and facilities. Do you think that the officials in charge of the nearest dispensary or hospital are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?
 (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (4) Very poor (5) No opinion /_____/ (54)
68. a. Have you or anyone in your family gone to the dispensary or the hospital in the past year?
 (1) Yes (2) Don't Know- no answer (3) No /_____/ (55)
 b. If yes: how often in the past year would you say that you or a member of your family has gone to the dispensary or the hospital?
 (1) Never (2) Occasionally (3) Sometimes (4) Frequently /_____/ (56)
69. Do you think that all people are treated fairly and properly by the health officials?
 (1) People treated fairly (2) Not sure- no opinion (3) People treated unequally /_____/ (57)
70. Suppose you found out that a health official was not performing his job properly, could you do anything about it?
 (1) Yes (2) Don't Know- no answer (3) No /_____/ (58)
71. How about the activities of the Ministry of Education in this state? Do you think that there is sufficient opportunity for people to go to school, in this area, or do you think that better schooling ought to be provided?
 (1) Sufficient opportunity (2) Don't know- no opinion (3) Need better schools /_____/ (59)
72. Are there members of your family enrolled in the schools in this area.
 (1) Yes (2) No answer (3) No /_____/ (60)
73. What do you think of teachers in the schools in this area: are they doing a good, fair, poor or very poor job?
 (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (4) Very poor (5) No answer - not sure /_____/ (61)
74. How about the roads and public transportation facilities in this area: do you think that the government has done a lot or only very little to improve the quality of roads in this area?
 (1) A lot (2) No answer - not sure (3) Little /_____/ (62)

75. In general if you had a problem to take up with a government department or a local government office, would you do it yourself or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some other person or organisation?
 (1) Do it myself
 (2) Would get help from another person or organisation
 (3) Would get help from both person and organisation / /
 (4) No opinion - no answer (63)
76. Some people think that knowing the right person plays an important part in whether the government will help a person with some problem that he has. Other people do not think so. What is your opinion about it?
 (1) It is important (2) Is sometimes important / /
 (3) It depends (4) Hardly matters (5) No opinion (64)
77. Some people feel that they pay more taxes than they should, considering what they get from the government. Do you agree or disagree with that opinion? / /
 (1) Agree (2) Not sure - don't know (3) Disagree (65)
78. How about the officials in the.....state government? Do you think that they are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?
 (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor / /
 (4) Very poor (5) No opinion - don't know (66)
79. How about the Federal government? Do you think the officials in Lagos are doing a good, fair, poor, or very poor job?
 (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor / /
 (4) Very poor (5) No opinion - don't know (67)
80. If you were wronged by another citizen, would you feel disposed to call in the police? / /
 (1) Yes (2) Not sure - depends (3) No (68)
81. Do you think the police would listen to you fairly or unfairly? / /
 (1) Fairly (2) Not sure - no opinion (3) Unfairly (69)
82. What kind of job do you think the police are doing in this area: good, fair, poor, or very poor?
 (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor / /
 (4) Very poor (5) Not sure - no opinion (70)
83. The various governments of Nigeria are undertaking several social welfare activities, such as health and education. Considering all the circumstances, do you think that those governments are doing:
 (1) The best they could (2) Not too well / /
 (3) Are doing badly (4) Doing very badly (71)
 (5) No opinion - don't know

84. Do you think that people like you have the same reactions to these governmental social/welfare activities? /---/ (1) Yes (2) Not sure - no answer (3) No (72)
85. Since Nigerian independence there have been increased welfare activities in the country. Do you think that ordinary people are better off/worse off/ or the same as before independence? /---/ (1) Better off (2) Same - no opinion (3) Worse off (73)
86. There have been various economic development activities in the country since independence. Do you think that you have personally benefitted from such programmes? /---/ (1) Yes (2) Not sure - no opinion (3) No (74)
87. Which type of people do you think are benefitting most from state power? (1) Civil commissioners (2) Senior civil servants (3) Senior military officers (4) Professionals- such as doctors, accountants (5) Farmers (6) Business people (7) Other educated people (8) Ordinary people /---/ (9) No answer - don't know (75)
88. Do you think the government shows favouritism towards any groups in the population? /---/ (1) Yes (2) Not sure - no opinion (3) No (76)
If yes: which groups are these?

89. Do you think the government fails to pay attention to the needs of some people? /---/ (1) Yes (2) No answer - not sure (3) No (77)
90. Some people feel that it is alright for public officials to use their position to help their relatives or people from their home area. Do you agree or disagree? /---/ (1) Agree (2) No answer - not sure (3) Disagree (78)
91. With respect to the problem of corruption, some people have told us that it is part of the normal life of Nigeria, and no one should bother about it. Do you agree or disagree? /---/ (1) Agree (2) No opinion - don't know (3) Disagree (79)
92. Some people say that we should try to forget the troubles of the past in Nigeria and look only to the future. Others say that, like it or not, we cannot ignore what has happened in the past, and past troubles are still likely to recur. What do you think? (1) Try to forget and look to the future (2) No answer - not sure /---/ (3) Cannot ignore the past and troubles will recur (80)

CARD 4

I.D.

/----/----/----/----/
(1-4)/----/
(5)

93. The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past. /----/
(1) Agree (2) Not sure - no answer (3) Disagree (6)
94. The government will usually do what is right. /----/
(1) Agree (2) Not sure- no answer (3) Disagree (7)
95. Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country. /----/
(1) Agree (2) Not sure - no answer (3) Disagree (8)
96. Now I am going to read a list of some kinds of groups and organisations. Please tell me if you are a member of any of these: (READ THE LIST)
- (1) Yes (2) Don't know - no answer (3) No
- a. A religious association /----/ (9)
- b. A social group or club (eg. one that sponsors social gatherings, dances, etc.) /----/ (10)
- c. A sports or recreation club /----/ (11)
- d. An association or club related to school /----/ (12)
- e. A cooperative /----/ (13)
- f. An association for credit, savings, or loans /----/ (14)
- g. An organisation or groups that is interested in public affairs /----/ (15)
- h. Any other kind of group or organisation /----/ (16)
97. Have you ever tried to get the government or the council or an official to do something that you wanted done? /----/
(1) Yes (2) No answer (3) No (17)
98. Some people say the government is run just for the benefit of those in power; others say that it is run to benefit the people. What do you say? /----/
(1) For those in power (2) No answer- not sure (18)
(3) For the people
99. What do you think the federal government spends the most money on? (READ OPTIONS)
- (1) Industries (2) Small farmer (3) Villages
(4) Towns (5) Development projects /----/
(6) Government expenses (7) Defense (19)
100. Suppose this town wanted a social amenity like hospital, who should be responsible for such a project- the government, the towns people or both together? /----/
(1) The government (2) The town's people
(3) Both together (4) Don't know - not sure (20)

101. If you had an idea about some improvement which could be made in your town, what persons or groups of persons would you take the idea to? /-----/

- (1) Community Council
- (2) Community Development Officer
- (3) The communal improvement union
- (4) The Divisional Officer (21)
- (5) Traditional Leaders
- (6) Others
- (7) Don't know

102. Do you think that the people in your community cooperate in carrying out community programmes? /-----/

- (1) Yes
- (2) Don't know- not sure
- (3) No (22)

103. Do you think the local public servants do their best to serve the local community? /-----/

- (1) Yes
- (2) Not sure
- (3) No (23)

104. Suppose the government wants to join hands with your town in undertaking a project and you are given the option of choosing between a social service project like pipe-borne water, post office, maternity home, or an economic project like farm settlements or small scale industries. Which one would you prefer? /-----/

- (1) Social service projects
- (2) Economic projects
- (3) Others (specify)
- (4) Don't know (24)

Could you give some reasons for your choice:

105. When you think of Nigeria, /-----/

a. What are the things you are proud of? /-----/

- /-----/ (25-26) /-----/ (27-28)
- /-----/ (29-30) /-----/ (31-32)
- /-----/ (33-34)

b. What things are you ashamed of? /-----/

- /-----/ (35-36) /-----/ (37-38)
- /-----/ (39-40) /-----/ (41-42)
- /-----/ (43-44)

106. After finishing communal work for a member of the family clan, the whole group was thanked by the calling of a feast and the donation of a cow. It was time to decide how to share the cow. (1) One group of people said too part in the work. (2) A second group preferred to give unequal shares, with older members receiving more than

the younger ones. (3) And yet a third group argues that those who worked hardest should get the largest shares.

- a. Which of the three methods of sharing do you favour most? /_____/ (45)
- b. Which method do you disagree with most? /_____/ (46)
- c. Which is the way the tradition of your tribe would favour? /_____/ (47)

107. When a community has to make arrangements for some major work (eg. building a new school) there are three different ways that they can decide such things as where to build it, and who should work.

(1) In some communities, the older or recognised leaders or important families decide the plans. Everyone usually accepts their decision without much discussion, since the elders are the ones used to deciding, and have the most experience.

(2) In other communities, most people in the group have a part in making the plans. Lots of different people talk, but nothing is done until almost everyone agrees as to what should be done.

(3) There are some communities where everyone holds his own opinion and they decide the matter by vote. They do whatever more than half of the community decides, even though there may be still a large number of people who voted against the decision.

- (a) Which way do you think is usually best in such a case? /_____/ (48)
- (b) Which way do you think the tradition of your hometown would favour? /_____/ (49)

108. In a certain community: a very important decision has just been taken. The majority agreed with the decision, but a number of people being very much apposed to this decision had walked out of the meeting, and refused to participate in the action recommended. To resolve this conflict, which of the following three methods do you approve most?

(1) Send a delegation to this group, and try make them comply to the will of the majority by threatening them with severe consequences.

(2) Send a delegation to this group and try to arrange a compromise which would meet some of their views but most of the majority's views.

(3) Completely ignore their opposition, and go right ahead with the action already decided upon.

If your first choice does not succeed, which of the other two methods would you approve?

- FIRST CHOICE /_____/ SECOND CHOICE /_____/
- (50) (51)

109. Imagine that in your hometown you owned the only bar, and your bar was doing very well indeed. Suddenly a stranger

opens a second bar near to yours, thus taking away some of your customers. In competing with this new trader, the following three methods are possible:

- (1) Lessen your prices a bit and add to your bar those things you know he does not yet have in his bar, such as good music or a refrigerator.
- (2) Hire a few rascals to go to his bar often to cause trouble; thus frightening away most of his customers who would then come to your own bar.
- (3) One night, go over secretly to him and try to convince him that the only way to survive is for both of you to cooperate closely on prices and maintenance of order.
- (4) Which one of the three methods would you approve most? / / (52)

110. When thinking of marriage, one should choose and look for certain qualities in a spouse. In what order would you choose a wife (or husband) who:

- (1) Can achieve social prestige and win admiration of others First: / / (53)
- (2) Likes to help people 2nd / / (54)
- (3) Is basically religious in attitude 3rd / / (55)
- (4) Is economical and knows how to make money 4th / / (56)

111. What is your sex?

- (1) Male (2) Female / / (57)

112. On your last birthday, how old were you?

/ / / (58-59)

113. How large is your family?

- a. Number of wives (or husband) (60) / /
b. Number of children (61-62) / / /

114. What was the highest level of your schooling?

- (1) Illiterate (2) Koranic
- (3) Primary or literate (4) KSecondary modern/middle
- (5) Post primary technical or teacher training,
- (6) Secondary school certificate
- (7) Post secondary technical, teacher training, diploma, NCE or HSC / / (63)
- (8) University degree programme
- (9) Post-graduate

115. What is your primary occupation at present?

- | | | |
|--|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 00 Not given | 01 Labourer | |
| 02 Subsistence farmer | 03 Trader (small) | |
| 04 Artisan | 05 Clerical | |
| 06 Large-scale farmer | 07 Military/ police | |
| 08 Civil servant below executive level | | / <u> </u> / (64/65) |
| 09 Business | 10 Teacher | |
| 11 Administrative/ Managerial | | |
| 12 Professional - doctor, lawyer, engineer | | |
| 13 Traditional ruler | | |

14 Clergy
15 Pensioner

16 Fishermen

116. For how long have you been doing this? /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(66-67)
117. What was your father's education?
(use categories in question 114) /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(68)
118. What was your mother's level of education?
(use categories in question 114) /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(69)
119. What is your father's primary occupation?
(use categories in question 115) /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(70)
120. What town are you from? ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(72-73)
- b. What towns were your parents from?
FATHER ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(76-77)
- CARD 5 I.D. ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(1-4)
- MOTHER ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(5)
(6-9)
121. What is your mother tongue? ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(10-12)
122. What other Nigerian languages, including English and
pidgin, do you speak? Number /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(13-14)
(15-17)
(18-20) /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(21-23)
123. What is your religion?
(1) Muslim (2) Christian Protestant
(3) Christian Catholic (4) Independent-Aladura, C&S /-----/ /-----/
(5) Traditional (6) Others (24)
124. What occupation do you expect your oldest son to
follow? (use categories in question 115) /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(25-26)
125. Of what ethnic or tribal group are you a member?
----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(27-28)
126. What other ethnic or tribal groups are most like
your own? ----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(29-30)
----- /-----/ /-----/ /-----/ /-----/
(31-32) (33-34)

127. What other Nigerian ethnic or tribal groups are most different from your own? ----- /-----/ (35-36)
 ----- /-----/ (37-38) ----- /-----/ (39-40)

128. What is your name? /-----/-----/-----/-----/

 ADDRESS:

Post Interview Questionnaire

129. Time of day of interview /-----/ (41)
 (1) Morning (2) Afternoon (3) Evening
130. Primary language of local area in town /-----/ (42-44)

131. Language of interview /-----/ (45-57)

132. Duration of interview (minutes) /-----/ (48-50)
133. INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED:
 (1) Without prolonged interruptions
 (2) With one or more prolonged interruptions /-----/ (51)
 (3) Was no completed
134. INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IN:
 (1) Respondent's house
 (2) Respondent's place of work /-----/ (52)
 (3) Public place (4) Other
135. PERSONS PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW BESIDES THE RESPONDENT:
 (1) No one else (or only children under age 16)
 (2) Other present, but took no part in the interview:
 did not appear to influence respondent's answers
 (3) Others present and did participate in interview /-----/ (53)
 or appeared to influence respondent's answers
136. RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE DURING THE INTERVIEW:
 (1) Very cooperative (seemed actively interested in helping)
 (2) Generally cooperative (answered cooperatively but
 did not seem actively interested)
 (3) Somewhat uncooperative (reluctant to answer some
 questions, suspicious of the interviewer intent)
 (4) Very uncooperative (reluctant to answer numerous
 questions, highly suspicious of interviewer intent,
 openly hostile) /-----/ (54)
 (5) Indifferent (preoccupied with something else)

137. FRANKNESS OR SINCERITY OF RESPONDENT

- (1) Very sincere (gave frank answers to all or almost all questions)
- (2) Generally sincere (gave frank answers to most questions)
- (3) Insincere (not speaking his true opinions, gave insincere answers to numerous questions) /_____/ (55)

138. RESPONDENT'S OVERALL UNDERSTANDING AND SENSITIVITY TO QUESTIONS:

- (1) Good (understood most questions without difficulty, most responses well formulated)
- (2) Fair, average (understood most questions but with some difficulty; occasional difficulty in formulating responses)
- (3) Poor (considerable difficulty in understanding most questions and formulating responses, showed insensitivity to question content) /_____/ (56)

139. SAMPLE STATUS

- (1) Respondent is original sample element /_____/
- (2) Respondent is substitute for original (57)

140. REASONS FOR SAMPLE MORTALITY

- (1) Absence of original after 2 or more callbacks /_____/
- (2) Refusal of original to grant interview (58)

141. NUMBER OF CALLBACKS

- (1) Interview obtained on first visit
- (2) One callback
- (3) Two callbacks
- (4) Three callbacks
- (5) Four callbacks /_____/
- (6) Five or more callbacks (59)

142. HOW OFTEN THE RESPONDENT CHANGED HIS MIND IN THE MIDDLE OF ANSWERING A QUESTION

- (1) Often - most questions
- (2) Frequently - many questions but less than half
- (3) Occasionally /_____/
- (4) Never or almost never (60)

143. Interviewer's name -----

Interviewer's number /_____/ (61-62)

Address or location of interview -----

City of interview /_____/

(63-66)

State

City or Town

/_____/ /_____/

SOCIAL CHANGE SURVEY DATA
(By Towns)

	CITY	12 STATE	19 STATE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ
LAGOS STATE					
1.	Lagos City	Lagos	Lagos	178	4.7
2.	Epe	Lagos	Lagos	51	1.4
3.	Village 1	Lagos	Lagos	12	0.3
4.	Village 2	Lagos	Lagos	5	0.1
WESTERN STATE					
5.	Ibadan	Western	Oyo	55	1.5
6.	Abeokuta	Western	Ogun	77	2.1
7.	Ado Ekiti	Western	Ogdo	58	1.5
8.	Oshogbo	Western	Oyo	45	1.2
9.	Ilaro	Western	Ogun	39	1.0
10.	Owo	Western	Ondo	60	1.6
11.	Ijebu Ode	Western	Ogun	44	1.2
12.	Ondo	Western	Ondo	53	1.4
13.	Ipetu	Western	Ondo	10	0.3
14.	Eruwa	Western	Oyo	37	1.0
15.	Owenna	Western	Ondo	17	1.0
16.	Awe	Western	Ogo	15	0.4
17.	Ipele	Western	Ondo	15	0.4
18.	Omi Adio	Western	Oyo	13	0.3
19.	Oba	Western	Ogun	12	0.3
20.	Osiele	Western	Ogun	14	0.4
21.	Oka	Western	Ondo	14	0.4
22.	Aiyetero	Western	Ogun	13	0.3
23.	Lanlate	Western	Oyo	13	0.3
24.	Iloro	Western	Ogun	39	1.0
KWARA STATE					
25.	Ilorin	Kwara	Kwara	79	2.1
26.	Offa	Kwara	Kwara	35	0.9
27.	Lokoja	Kwara	Kwara	23	0.6
28.	Kabba	Kwara	Kwara	22	0.6
29.	Okene	Kwara	Kwara	21	0.6
30.	Alapa	Kwara	Kwara	12	0.3
31.	Molete	Kwara	Kwara	13	0.3
MIDWEST STATE					
32.	Benin	Midwest	Bendel	69	1.8
33.	Warri	Midwest	Bendel	39	1.0
34.	Sapele	Midwest	Bendel	40	1.1
35.	Auchi	Midwest	Bendel	39	1.1
36.	Adeji	Midwest	Bendel	19	0.5
37.	Oluku	Midwest	Bendel	13	0.3
38.	Ughonoba	Midwest	Bendel	21	0.6

39.	Agenebode	Midwest	Bendel	13	0.3
40.	Agbede	Midwest	Bendel	20	0.5
41.	South Ibie	Midwest	Bendel	20	0.5
42.	Jattu	Midwest	Bendel	13	0.3

EAST CENTRAL STATE

43.	Enugu	East Central	Anambra	78	2.1
44.	Aba	East Central	Imo	77	2.1
45.	Onitsha	East Central	Anambra	77	2.1
46.	Owerri	East Central	Imo	100	2.7
47.	Umuhia	East Central	Imo	36	1.0
48.	Ihiala	East Central	Anambra	39	1.0
49.	Nsukka	East Central	Anambra	28	0.7
50.	Okigwe	East Central	Imo	23	0.6
51.	Abagana	East Central	Anambra	14	0.4
52.	Enugu Ukwu	East Central	Anambra	21	0.6
53.	Oraifite	East Central	Imo	18	0.5
54.	Asaba	East Central	Bendel	12	0.3
55.	Okpuala	East Central	Imo	13	0.3
56.	Umueze	East Central	Imo	13	0.3

RIVERS STATE

57.	Port Harcourt	Rivers	Rivers	91	2.4
58.	Omoku	Rivers	Rivers	19	0.5
59.	Erroma	Rivers	Rivers	17	0.5
60.	Eleme	Rivers	Rivers	7	0.2
61.	Okrika	Rivers	Rivers	7	0.2
62.	Village 1	Rivers	Rivers	16	0.4

CROSS RIVER STATE

63.	Calabar	Southeast	Cross River	93	2.5
64.	Ikot Ekpene	Southeast	Cross River	57	1.5
65.	Opobo	Southeast	Cross River	62	1.7
66.	Oron	Southeast	Cross River	59	1.4
67.	Uyo	Southeast	Cross River	63	1.7
68.	Etinan	Southeast	Cross River	14	0.4
69.	Nung Udoo	Southeast	Cross River	22	0.6
70.	Ikot Obong	Southeast	Cross River	14	0.4
71.	Ikot Akpabio	Southeast	Cross River	14	0.4
72.	Ikot Akpa Inyara	Southeast	Cross River	14	0.4
73.	Indidip Odoro	Southeast	Cross River	14	0.4

BENUE PLATEAU STATE

74.	Jos	Benue Plateau	Plateau	65	1.7
75.	Makurdi	Benue Plateau	Benue	43	1.1
76.	Lafia	Benue Plateau	Plateau	45	1.2
77.	Panskhin	Benue Plateau	Plateau	41	1.1
78.	Oturkpo	Benue Plateau	Benue	35	0.9

79.	Gboko	Benue Plateau	Benue	36	1.0
80.	Keffi	Benue Plateau	Plateau	35	0.9
81.	Garaku	Benue Plateau	Plateau	12	0.3
82.	Shabu	Benue Plateau	Plateau	13	0.3
83.	Ijami	Benue Plateau	Benue	14	0.4
84.	Igbor	Benue Plateau	Benue	11	0.3
85.	Wamune	Benue Plateau	Benue	12	0.3

NORTHEAST STATE

86.	Bauchi	Northeast	Bauchi	21	0.6
87.	Combe	Northeast	Bauchi	41	1.1
88.	Gashua	Northeast	Borno	36	1.0
89.	Kanio	Northeast	Bauchi	21	0.6
90.	Deba	Northeast	Bauchi	30	0.8
91.	Bukarti	Northeast	Borno	12	0.3
92.	Jajiamaji	Northeast	Borno	13	0.3

KANO STATE

93.	Kano City	Kano	Kano	70	1.9
94.	Gumel	Kano	Kano	66	1.8
95.	Hadejia	Kano	Kano	78	2.1
96.	Birnin Kudu	Kano	Kano	57	1.5
97.	Takai	Kano	Kano	12	0.3
98.	Wudil	Kano	Kano	10	0.3
99.	Dan Ladi	Kano	Kano	8	0.2
100.	S. Tankaka	Kano	Kano	11	0.3

NORTH CENTRAL STATE

101.	Kaduna	North Central	Kaduna	46	1.2
102.	Zaria	North Central	Kaduna	85	2.3
103.	Katsina	North Central	Kaduna	67	1.8
104.	Funtua	North Central	Kaduna	15	0.4
105.	Jibiya	North Central	Kaduna	7	0.2
106.	Kyanyaki	North Central	Kaduna	16	0.4

NORTHWEST STATE

107.	Minna	Northwest	Niger	60	1.6
108.	Kontagora	Northwest	Niger	33	0.9
109.	Zungeru	Northwest	Niger	5	0.1

TOTAL				3748	100.0
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SOCIAL CHANGE SURVEY DATA
(BY STATE)

12 STATE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ
1. Lagos	246	6.6
2. Western	645	17.2
3. Kwara	205	5.8
4. Midwest	306	8.2
5. East Central	549	14.6
6. Rivers	157	4.2
7. South East	429	11.4
8. Benue-Plateau	362	9.7
9. Northeast	186	5.0
10. Kano	328	8.8
11. North Central	236	6.3
12. Northwest	98	2.6
TOTAL	3748	100.0