DEMONCACY, RELIGION AND IDENTITY IN SOCIALIST GREECE:
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS UNDER PASOK, 1981-1989

by

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
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Abstract

This dissertation is an analysis of relations between the state and the Orthodox Church in Greece under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) which governed from 1981 to 1989. The main conundrum explored in the dissertation is the ability of the Church to influence the formulation and outcome of the state's religious policy during PASOK's tenure in office.

PASOK was formed in the wake of the country's transition to democratic politics in 1974, and was the first non-Right party to enter government in the history of Greece. The party was elected with an unprecedented majority, on a platform of socialist democratic transformation through the institutional restructuring of society. Within this context, the Church's influence on PASOK's religious policy was perplexing for several reasons. First, the dualist nature and mixed results of PASOK's agenda on religion suggested ambivalence about how to redefine Church-state relations in order to strengthen pluralist democracy in Greece. Second, the Church's influence on state religious policies took both an oppositional and a cooperative form, reflecting fragmentation within the ecclesiastical structure over how to negotiate the role of Orthodoxy within the country's fluid political conditions. Finally, actors in both the Church and the state discussed changes in the institutional relationship in terms of alternative conceptions of collective identity in Greece, suggesting the importance of the religious dimensions of culture in reordering the country's political system.

The dissertation uses an historical and institutional analysis to explain the puzzles in the agenda and outcome of Church-state relations under PASOK. This study also challenges the secularization thesis which has dominated social science analyses of religion and political change. The origins of the Church-state relationship in contemporary Greece are grounded in the historical experiences of Byzantine and Ottoman times, where Church-state relations were designed in an attempt to realize a particular vision for organizing society. However, the institutional relationship developed into a struggle over the public space, marked by state attempts to circumscribe the influence of the Church in politics and, most significantly, by competition over the sources and meaning of collective identity.

The reformulation of the institutional framework of Church-state relations with the establishment of the Greek nation-state formalized and perpetuated the cultural contradictions rooted in earlier historical experiences. The regime change in 1974 and, in particular, PASOK's democratization strategy provided a window
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of opportunity for renegotiating the links between politics and religion in Greece. Actors within each institution used new strategies for redefining the Church-state relationship. The PASOK leadership developed a dualist policy on religion, designed around a distinction between Church-state separation and Church-nation connection. In response to the inconsistencies in the PASOK stance, reformers and conservatives within the Church tried to use the mechanisms of politics to accomplish conflicting projects for the role of Orthodoxy in Greek society.

The dissertation explains the virtual status-quo outcome of PASOK's religious program as the unwillingness of the leadership in both Church and state to restructure the institutional relationship in ways which would require a reformulation of national identity according to either explicitly secular or sacred criteria. The thesis concludes that the Greek case shows that modernization does not inevitably lead to the marginalization of religion from politics. Indeed, the conditions of modernity and secularity create a range of possible representations for religion in public life, which cannot be understood simply in terms of traditional religious behaviors. The study also highlights the renewed debates over the sacred and secular dimensions of culture which may be provoked in the process of building pluralist democracy.

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Suzanne Berger
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
To my parents
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INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction to the Problem

The resurgence of religious issues in political life has been a phenomenon of unexpected expansive proportions and impressive diversity during the past two-and-a-half decades. The most recent changes in world politics which have begun to unfold in the Balkans, in the aftermath of the demise of Soviet-sponsored state-socialism, underscore the global revival of religion. The politics of developing countries have been shaped by forces as distinctive as the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism, the revival of Hindu nationalism, and the growth of radical, Catholic activism.\(^1\) Equally striking has been the resilience of religion, or what one scholar has called the deprivatization of religion,\(^2\) in the changing politics of advanced, industrialized societies such as those of the United States, Western Europe, and Asia.\(^3\) In all cases, the pervasive vitality and dynamism of religion in everyday life have created a new project for political scientists trying to explain the links between religious and political transformation and for policymakers trying to manage these links. Changes in the daily practice of both religion and politics have led to renewed debates about the meaning of secularity and modernity, the secular and sacred sources of meaning which inform culture, and the differential impacts of religious and political activities in generating social change.

This dissertation addresses in historical and institutional perspective one case of the survival and resurgence of religion in European politics: that of Greece during the 1981 to 1989 period in which the country was governed for the first time in its history by a socialist party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK). The main conundrum examined in the study revolves around the
capacity of the Orthodox Church of Greece to influence—both through obstruction
and cooperation—the state's religious policy during PASOK's tenure. The converse
of this problem is the failure of the state to clearly delineate and to implement
its policies on religion, in the face of tactics pursued by the Orthodox Church of
Greece. The dissertation examines the puzzle from both perspectives. Through
the lens of the Church-state relationship, I also explore a second, broader
problematic, namely the multiple venues and forms through which the Orthodox
religion continues to shape politics in Greece despite the country's condition as
a modern, secular democracy.

The dissertation takes issue with the secularization thesis which has dominated
the social science discourse and analysis of religion and political change. Indeed,
I claim that the Greek case shows not only that modernization does not inevitably
lead to the marginalization of religion from politics but that the salience of
religion in public life cannot be understood simply in terms of traditional religious
behaviors. I argue that the links between politics and religion are reflexive and
mutually transformative, that the conditions of modernity and secularity contribute
to a continually fluid set of possibilities for and representations of the role of
religion in public life, and that the interpenetration of politics and religion is
particularly evident in formulating and reconstructing cultural conceptions of
collective identity.

To test the above claims, the dissertation begins with an analysis of the
relationship between politics and the Orthodox religion over the country's historical
trajectory, and focuses on a case study of the Church-state dyad during the
democratic transition and consolidation (1974-1981) when PASOK had its formative development and during the party's tenure in government. Upon its entry into government with an historically unprecedented electoral majority, PASOK undertook what it described as policies of social modernization and democratic restructuring. With regard to Orthodoxy and the Church of Greece, state policies during the first PASOK administration can be summarized as a move toward separation of the political and religious spheres by liberalizing traditional social legislation on matters such as civil marriage, abortion, and adultery. The party was more ambitious in its second term in office, attempting to legislate the organizational restructuring of the Church along participatory, democratic lines designed to empower the popular (lay) strata of the faith and to diminish the decisionmaking authority concentrated in the hierarchy of the Church; according to the Ministry of Education and Religions, the democratic restructuring of the Church was a logical precondition for the ultimate objective of constitutional separation of Church and state. The party's policies in government were consistent with its stance in opposition to the conservative, New Democracy governments which managed the transition and consolidation phases of the democratization process. While largely succeeding in its first-term agenda, PASOK's religious initiative for the second term was unrealized.

In explaining the motivations for, process and outcome of the above events, the dissertation examines three broad sets of questions. The first question concerns the origins of the impetus for change, in terms of PASOK's policies on religious questions and, once engaged, the ways in which actors from each institution constrained the tactics and strategies of the other. Although it appears that the
state took the initiative during the party's first term in office, the motivations for change in Church-state relations under the second PASOK administration were driven as much by religious reformists as by the state itself. The most controversial portions of the state's legislation on ecclesiastical democratization were produced by the cooperative efforts of religious reformers and members of the Ministry of Education and Religions.\textsuperscript{4} Such cooperation raises the second set of questions, regarding the degree to which organizational and ideological-ideational factors played a role in the formulation and outcome of both state and Church policies. Neither institution should be mistakenly understood as a monolith and, indeed, the most critical aspects of the Church-state interactions were conditioned by contradictions in the organizational and ideological-ideational framework of each. The state's religious policies were the product of policymaking confusion derived from the party's socialist-versus-populist ideological confusion, and the organizational fragmentation resulting therefrom. Similarly, the Church's actions toward the socialist government reflected the intensification of an organizational split between the popular and ordained (primarily hierarchical) strata of the faith, which originated in a debate over how to make the message and ideas of Orthodoxy relevant to the modern, democratic context.

The third set of questions examined in the dissertation concerns the meaning ascribed by both political and religious actors to the PASOK state's policies on religion. The discourse which framed the process of Church-state interactions over the course of the 1980s as well as during the preceding transition and consolidation phases underscores that actors within both Church and state conceived of the institutional relationship as representative of a particular
conception of collective identity in Greece. Historically, state and Church had come to stand for specific formulations of national community and collective identity; the institutional relationship between Church and state created a balance of power meant to stabilize the delicate consensus, albeit one wrought with contradictions, around such visions of collective identity. Insofar as the societal opening which came with the regime change and PASOK's entry into government called into question the institutional power balance between Church and state, this provoked a reexamination of concomitant issues about the meaning and sources of collective belonging and identity in modern, democratic Greece. In exploring the above constellations of questions, the dissertation deciphers the two main puzzles cited earlier, namely the capacity of the Church to affect the state's religious policies under the socialist government, as well as the range of methods through which religion and politics transform one another in the contemporary Greek public life.

Besides contributing to the debate over how to conceptualize the nature of the connections between political and religious transformation, why is it worthwhile to address the subject of the continuing salience of religion in contemporary Greek politics? Why focus on the highly specific issue of Church-state relations under nearly a decade of socialist government which was remarkable for a host of political, economic, and sociological reasons which seem quite unrelated to religion? The subject of this dissertation is worth consideration for two key reasons. First, study of Church-state interactions during the aforementioned decade-and-a-half help to illuminate the ways in which the political aspects of building modern, pluralist democracy frequently engage complex issues about the
place for religion in public life. PASOK's genesis and rapid rise to electoral
dominance were part of the broadening of the political space and the effort to
recalibrate state-society relations, both of which were essential elements in
constructing a genuine democracy out of the restricted parliamentarism and,
eventually, authoritarian structures that had defined the country's post-World War
II political system until that point. Both these political projects touched on the
role for Orthodoxy and the Church in the emerging democratic system, by
provoking political and religious actors alike to reassess the institutional
mechanisms and impacts of the Church's participation in the pre-transition system.
The resultant debate over the constitutional relationship between Church and state
and the need for organizational reform within the Church was part of the program
of democracy-building and modernization specific to Greece. Yet the Greek case
is extremely useful in suggesting how the general challenges of regime change may
involve religion, by virtue of efforts to define and to institutionalize secular,
pluralist arrangements which also take into account the particularities of national
historical experiences.

The Church-state relationship in contemporary Greece also offers an excellent
opportunity for studying the impact of religion in shaping culture and, especially,
collective identity. If culture is understood as a coherent set of ideas, values, and
beliefs which organize behaviors and structural actions, then the Greek case
demonstrates that the sources of and contradictions in culture exert an important
influence on the agenda, processes, and outcomes of politics. The evolution of
culture over the Greek historical trajectory points to Church and state as the
primary institutional fonts for the defining features of the national culture and,
specifically, for the conception of what it meant to belong to the national collectivity. Given the ideational inconsistencies between the two competing worldviews (Orthodox Christianity versus secular nationalism), as well as key questions of power tied to such competing visions, the Church-state relationship under PASOK developed into a struggle to resolve the contradictions in Greek culture and, most fundamentally, to establish the legitimacy of the institutional arbiter of collective identity under conditions of modern democracy. The Greek case, then, illuminates the ways in which the interpenetration of politics and religion influences the formation of culture, and the fact that what appear to be institutional conflicts over power are oftentimes rooted in questions of meaning and identity which ultimately constrain the options for and outcomes of institutional behavior in public life.

II. Theory: The Secularization Thesis as Backdrop

A study such as this dissertation, which deals with the nature of the relationship between religious and political change, necessarily occurs against the theoretical and methodological backdrop of the secularization thesis. The secularization thesis and its assumptions dominated social science studies on religion and politics for almost the entire post-WWII period up until the mid-1970s, and likewise have informed the majority of area-studies works on contemporary Greek politics and society. As mentioned above, this dissertation rejects the secularization thesis as a useful framework for understanding the Greek case and, more generally, for conceptualizing and explaining those questions common to most investigations of the links between political and religious transformation. Given the pervasiveness of the secularization perspective, it makes
sense to review its main assumptions before presenting the alternative approach—which, in certain key respects, is a critique of the secularization thesis--used in this project.

The main argument of the secularization thesis, which is rooted in the modernization tradition in political development, can be summarized in the following syllogism: "modernization equals secularization equals the marginalization of religion in processes of politics and social change." In this view, development is conceived of as a process of modernization whereby the twin, leveling forces of efficiency and rationalization ineluctably push societies along a technologically-determined continuum from traditional to modern. Modernization theory posits the Western European experience as the paradigm for the developmental continuum supposed to be common to all societies.

The secularization thesis holds that secularization is the inevitable outcome of the modernization process described above. Secularization, or secularity, can be defined as the defatalization of history, the preoccupation with problems of temporal existence, and the relativization of religious worldviews. Secularization is the process which occurs as reason allows man to discover the underlying structure of the natural order, leading to the rationalization of all aspects of life and to the substitution of a technical order for a natural order. In short, secularization liberates man from religious, metaphysical control over his reason and his language, by supplanting traditional values and beliefs with rational concerns and efficient, specialized behaviors designed to satisfy individual interests and desires. With its rational structural and functional differentiation of the
social system, secularization renders faith a matter of individual choice amongst a range of worldviews and belief systems for organizing one's reality.

The secularization thesis holds that the relativization of faith and its disjoining from a whole cluster of political, economic, and social attitudes and practices with which it had hitherto been intertwined leads axiomatically to the peripheralization of religion in public life. Because secularization is premised on a change in worldview, or more accurately, on the multiplication of worldviews which makes religion a matter of individual choice, modernity offers alternative frameworks for bringing meaning and order to one's social existence. The result is a gradual but irreversible separation between the private issues and activities of religion, on the one hand, and the public issues and activities of politics, on the other. Further, the privatization of religion is supposed to intractably assign the Church to an insignificant, marginal role in shaping political outcomes in modern society. The scope of the Church's authority is reduced to apply only to the particular business of religion and to affect only those individuals who choose to participate in the Church's community.

Implicit in the secularization thesis is the normative assumption that secularization is a necessarily desirable outcome for politics. The desirability of secularization, understood as the marginalization of religion from public life, is based on the Weberian premise that the traditional teachings of religion and the workings of the rational, market economy and pluralist politics are irreconcilably contradictory. In support of the notion that the stability and legitimacy of liberal democratic politics depend upon the decay of a traditional religious order, secularization studies examined the examples of Church-state conflicts which fed
into disintegrative, anti-system politics, as well as those cases where alliances of religious and political conservatism militated against the strengthening of participatory democracy.

Some scholars made negative prognostications about the impact of religious decline on the nature and processes of politics, claiming that the disappearance of a traditional order meant an increasing unruliness for politics. According to this somewhat pessimistic interpretation of the equation of secularity and religious decline, the relativization of religion causes a disruption of traditional notions of community and an erosion of the sense of secure identity and unquestioned place derived from belonging to the religiously defined collectivity. As individuals come to define themselves by multiple criteria and particularistic interests, the reduction in identification with the religious collectivity leads to an erosion in the controlling impact of collective norms over individual desires and behaviors.\textsuperscript{11}

The standard, and most common response to the pessimistic interpretation of the impact of religious decline on politics came from the liberal vision of modernization, which posited that new constraints on individual actions would arise to replace those previously exercised by religious norms and values. Civic morality and the benefits of unlimited growth were most often cited as forces for the development of a new sense of solidarity to replace older, primordial ties based on religion. The material affluence generated by industrial capitalism and the civic consciousness derived from membership in a participatory democracy would cultivate individual identification with the larger community dedicated to cooperating in the perpetuation of the new political and economic order. But whether adopting an optimistic or a pessimistic tone\textsuperscript{12} in their views of secularity
and modernity, those scholars who adopted the secularization perspective shared an unquestioned commitment to the assumption that the peripheralization of religion from public life and the privatization of religion were the unavoidable (and desirable, based on the Western experience) outcome of secularity.

A review of the literature on Greek politics and history, especially dealing with the period since the 1974 regime change, reflects an overriding tendency to subscribe to the assumptions of the secularization thesis and, more generally, of modernization theorists' view of the Western developmental experience as paradigmatic and necessarily worthy of imitation. Most area specialists working on Greece implicitly endorse the assumption that Orthodoxy and the Church were irrelevant in shaping the issues and processes of the regime change and in explaining PASOK's rapid rise to electoral power, as evidenced by the almost complete omission of any discussion of the institutional and cultural role of Orthodoxy in public life. The majority of the standard historical works on Greece make only cursory references to the role of religion in the national historical experience, even when discussing those episodes in which the Church was overtly involved in politics. The social science literature exhibits the same tendency. For example, Diamandouros' widely-referenced works on the mechanics of the regime transition and consolidation phases ignore the possible relevance of the cultural and institutional dimensions of religion in the formation of democratic values, ideas, and structures. In some of the most detailed analyses conducted on transformations in the clientelistic structure of the Greek party system in post-1974 period, both Lyrantzis and Mavrogordatos make no mention of religion as a possible factor in influencing the ideological orientation and social bases of
support for the parties.\textsuperscript{15} Likewise, in one of the most comprehensive studies which exists on the social bases of PASOK's organizational and ideological development,\textsuperscript{15} Spourdalakis fails to consider how traditional beliefs and behavior patterns deriving from religion may have informed the party's internal formation. In discussions of party platform, election promises, and voting behavior, both Katsoudas and Featherstone as well as Kalogeropoulou conclude that class-based issues and rural-urban dichotomies are far more relevant than traditional, religious factors as determinants of voting behavior.\textsuperscript{16}

Those scholars who directly address the secularization of Greek society as a factor in the politics of the PASOK period work from the assumptions of the secularization thesis and fail to consider the range of mechanisms through which religion frequently enters the public sphere. Indeed, the lack of a discriminating, rigorous analysis of religion is standard in most works which deal with secularization and modernity in Greece. For example, Limberis concludes that traditional attitudes and beliefs grounded in religion were relatively insignificant, versus modern values such as political participation and individual rights, in explaining voting patterns in the 1981 national elections which brought PASOK to power. He argues that "...all traditional attachments are losing their importance..."\textsuperscript{17} and that the PASOK government's social policies were successful in "...gradually converting a traditionally reactionary rural population into a progressive one."\textsuperscript{18} Petras makes no effort to clarify his terminology when he refers to "...the more general secularization of Greek society..."\textsuperscript{19} as an important factor in PASOK's success in implementing progressive reforms in Greece's social policies. In his widely-cited work on parties and elections in post-WWII Greece,
Clogg omits all mention of religion with the exception of a passing reference to the religious qualities characterizing PASOK's ideology and discourse, and he never develops the comment in any way.\textsuperscript{20}

For the few studies which offer a more than cursory treatment of the role of religion in social change in Greece, the arguments and assumptions of the secularization thesis are also explicit. In some of the most careful and historically-attuned analyses of the cultural transformations in Greek society since 1974, Diamandouros alludes to the influence of Orthodoxy in public life as a contributing factor to the perpetuation of a parochial cultural current (which he labels "underdog")\textsuperscript{21} which has impeded the modernization process. Likewise, in his study of the cultural dimensions of social and political modernization in early nineteenth-century Greece, Diamandouros identifies the Church and Orthodoxy as obstacles to the formation of an integrated, modern culture and state-society relationship.\textsuperscript{22} One of the few exceptions to either the implicit or explicit acceptance of the secularization thesis is Kent's study on the political influence of the Church in pre-transition period. Kent actually argues that

"[i]f, however, there is to be a return to a democratic form of government, one institution has the facility to precipitate such a transformation, the Orthodox Church of Greece...[which]...has not been able to forward its own immediate political goals, but despite this, the Church is not without political influence...Its latent power is there; it is not obvious, but it is there. When thinking along the lines of political influence, one pictures a group striving for short range goals by putting pressure on one of the branches of Government...The Church and its influence is much more fundamental for it is coterminous with the political culture of the society, and eventually this type of influence will be effective.\textsuperscript{23}

Kent's arguments are a clear rejection of the equation of secularization with the marginalization of religion in public life, and he also demonstrates a willingness to
move beyond one-dimensional interpretations of the nexus between political and religious change. Yet, because his study is highly descriptive and relies on an instrumentalist assessment of what he terms "the political influence of the Church of Greece", Kent fails to offer a compelling alternative to the overwhelming majority of studies which perpetuate the secularization thesis as the operative framework for understanding the role of religion in public life in Greece.

III. Recasting Theory: Beyond the Limits of the Secularization Thesis

Notwithstanding the formative influence of the secularization thesis on the social science literature on politics and religion as well as on the majority of the area studies works on Greek history and politics, the main theoretical claim that this dissertation aims to prove is that the central project of the secularization thesis is misguided. To study the relationship between political and religious change in contemporary Greece according to the "secularization syllogism" is to focus on the spurious dichotomy of "either secularization or religion."

I bypass the secularity versus religion dichotomy, by defining secularization in terms which accept and explain it simply as one component of modernization. I work from Cox's definition of secularization as cited above, where secularity is the defatalization of history, the preoccupation with problems of temporal existence, and the relativization of religious worldviews. Secularity thus defined means that human beings believe in their capacity to structure their own existence and to organize society, and that they confront a plurality of worldviews from which they can choose to order society and according to which they can interpret their own identity. In accepting that secularity thus defined is, indeed, a constitutive feature of modernity, I do not argue that the secularization process does not generate
resistance from both religious and political forces opposed to the emerging circumstances of secular modernity. However, I claim that the conditions of modernity and secularity do not necessarily lead to the peripheralization of religion in public life, and that the conditions of secular modernity affect religion and politics in two main respects: first, by creating fluid, porous boundaries between the realms of politics and religion, thereby allowing for their interpenetration in institutional and ideational forms; and second, in responding to the evolving circumstances of modernity and secularity, politics and religion undergo processes of internal transformation which, in turn, influence each other.

In assuming the need to examine the internal processes of both the religious and political domains, as well as their mutual interaction, the dissertation assigns pride of place to the analysis of history and culture, both of which are undervalued and narrowly conceived in secularization studies on politics and religion. Secularization theorists argue that the homogenizing effects of uniform technological progress drive all societies along a similar developmental continuum running from the polar opposites of tradition to modernity. National historical particularities are largely irrelevant in this view of the deep logic of developmental modernization, except as a means of explaining aberrations from the putative norm of Western Europe where the secularization vision of progress was first played out.

This dissertation rejects the ahistorical analysis of secularization studies. I work from the assumption that it is, indeed, impossible to explain the Church-state relationship during the PASOK period in Greece without appreciating the national historical preconditions which figure into current changes in the nexus
between religion and politics. Historical contingencies not only affect the establishment of the links between politics and religion, but also act as both constraints and enablers in effecting transformations internal to the political and religious domains. The imposition of the Western European religio-political template on the Greek reality, therefore, yields little in the way of meaningful explanatory results, since the historical context in which Church-state relations developed in Greece differed markedly from that in Western Europe.

Even an extremely abridged historical account indicates the methodological importance of the kind of discriminating historical analysis neglected by secularization studies. The process by which modernity has been negotiated over the Greek developmental trajectory by no means mimics a putative Western European prototype.\textsuperscript{25} One cannot ignore the impact of the longevity of the Byzantine imperial era,\textsuperscript{26} almost four centuries of Ottoman colonization,\textsuperscript{27} the imposition of a non-indigenous ruling class on the country's nascent national community,\textsuperscript{28} and a pattern of political-economic development integrally constrained by Greece's position at the periphery of Europe's industrial heartland.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover those features peculiar to the Greek historical path must be analyzed in terms of the ways in which they defined the relationship between politics and religion, especially regarding the role of religion in public life and those institutional arrangements between Church and state designed to foster secularity as a component of modernity.

The methodological emphasis on historical analysis in this dissertation is inspired by those studies which have developed as a revisionist response to the weaknesses of the conventional secularization studies to explain, much less to
predict, the powerful resurgence of religion in the public life of all form of society. Such revisionist scholarship, which has flowered since the late 1970s, views history as essential to developing a more accurate fit between theory and reality where the links between religion and politics are concerned. Revisionists assert that it is in the specifics of national history that one discovers the efficacy of traditional religious elements in the political development process and, likewise, the impact of political ferment on the existing stock of religious resources in any given society.

Although initially provoked by and dealing with the explosive impact of religion on the political changes in developing countries in Latin America and the Middle East, historical sensitivity is a hallmark of the most representative revisionist works on European societies. Emblematic studies include those by Alessandro Pizzorno, Paschalis Kitromilides, and Suzanne Berger. Pizzorno traces the origins of the differentiation of the political realm from the religious realm in Western Europe to the Investiture Conflict of medieval times. He argues that the Church's success in distinguishing itself as unique vis-a-vis lay governments began as a process of functional dissociation of the spiritual from the temporal which, ironically, created the conditions for the invention of the modern state. The Church eventually lost to the state the exclusive right to define its own enemies and to induce collective devotion. Pizzorno explains the shifting demarcation between politics and religion as a contest between groups identified by their position and functional specialization and, most importantly, as an ideational debate over the nature of "...the ties and boundaries that identify that collectivity to which ultimate ends are assigned." Church-state relations represent the
convergence of power politics with cultural debates, and contribute to broader forces of societal change.

Kitromilides\textsuperscript{34} draws similar conclusions in his exploration of the politics of Church-state relations during the embryonic stages of the formation of the Greek nation-state. Beginning with an examination of the historical evolution of differing conceptions (cultural, religious, linguistic) of the nation from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century in the Balkans, he narrows his focus to the Greek case and considers the crucial role of the modern state in the construction of collective identity. The study concludes that the state, in its project of forging a national collective identity, was forced to confront and to manage what Kitromilides presents as the basic antinomy between Orthodox Christianity and secular nationalism as competing visions of the basis of community and solidarity; the historical load of religious experiences bore directly on some of the most fundamental aspects of the emergent political order of the new Greek nation-state, including the elaboration of an ideological doctrine of national unity and irredentism. Kitromilides alludes to the fact that, in the confrontation with the nascent secular ideology and culture of the Greek state, the Eastern Orthodox Church underwent a process of internal self-examination and debate, which culminated in the reorientation of its own religious mission.

Berger is also preoccupied with the connections between reformulations in the traditional Catholic socio-religious order and the ideological recomposition of French politics, in the period since the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{35} Her analysis points to the centrality of battles between the Catholic Church and the new French state in determining the dominant axes of partisan alignment in nineteenth century French
politics—namely, a tight association between religion and the Right, on the one hand, and anti-clericalism and the Left, on the other. Claiming that the unravelling of these long-time affiliations originated primarily with changes within the Catholic Church, Berger offers an historical analysis of shifts in Church doctrine, organization, and practice which, although initially developed by the hierarchy as a means of re-Christianizing the rapidly modernizing French society, ultimately produced a new breed of politically active Catholics who contributed to a change in both French politics and French Catholicism. Far from supporting either of the conventional arguments about the links between religion and political change, Berger concludes that the disintegration and recomposition of the traditional Catholic religious worldview has played a formative role in expanding the range of ideas and issues up for debate in French politics.

As the above narrative shows, revisionist studies also concentrate on culture as an important factor in analyzing the links between religion and politics. This dissertation shares a similar conviction regarding the centrality of a particular conception of cultural analysis\textsuperscript{36} for explaining the Greek case as well as the dynamics of religious and political interaction, yet another significant methodological difference with studies done in the secularization tradition. I will use culture in this dissertation to mean "...the 'order' corresponding to meaningful action. Subjective, antimechanistic order is conceived of as followed for voluntary reasons than because of necessity in the mechanistic, objective sense."\textsuperscript{37} I work from the premise that experience and the meaning of experience are central to the notion of culture; in historical analysis, it is possible to find the origins of culture. I also see culture as a relatively autonomous sphere, not contingent on
politics but relating to politics. In contrast, secularization studies building on the deep logic, narrow track conception of historical development, view culture as simply a residual category, an ephemeral reflection of the social structure.\textsuperscript{38} In one of the most representative (and, probably, most widely known) statements from the secularization perspective on culture,\textsuperscript{39} Marx observed that modernization changes

"...the...whole relations of society...All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life."\textsuperscript{40}

Rejecting a definition of culture that is contingent upon a conception of progress conceived of in technological terms and equating modernity with the decline of religion, I also rule out the conventional secularization approach to modern culture as devoid of traditional religious elements. Instead, I assume that the pluralistic nature of modernity allows for the perpetuation of elements of religion in its myriad forms in the subjective web of meaning constituting culture. Finally, emphasis on experience and the meaning of experience (as opposed to technologically-determined development) as central to the formation of culture also leads to a conception of culture as a subjective order, a whole framework, "...an idea held in common rather than an individual wish" (bold mine), a framework that can be seen as both the cause and the result of a plurality of interpretive interactions rather than a single interpretive act per se.\textsuperscript{41} Since the individual is not automatically taken as the unit of analysis, culture becomes something broader than a narrow preoccupation with the values and beliefs of individuals;\textsuperscript{42} rather, a conception of culture which is experientially-based leads to the notion of culture
as a meaning system, a set of psychological and cognitive ideas, which are held by collectivities and groups.

The conception of culture adopted in this dissertation leads to a rich interpretation of the issues at stake in the Church-state relationship in 1980s Greece. By concentrating on historical experiences, it is possible to identify the formative events which fashioned the beliefs, values, and cognitions that comprised Greek culture over time. It is also possible to trace the emergence of continuities and contradictions within the cultural matrix as a result of the interpretation of historical experiences; Church and state, through their political activities, became the key institutions which interpreted such experiences and, therefore, which played a central role in processes of cultural reconstruction. The interpretation and reconstruction of culture was most intense with regard to the process of "imagining the community," or the formation of collective identity based on notions of belonging and inclusion.

The dissertation traces the defining features of culture in Greece at the time of PASOK's emergence in politics by exploring the Greek historical trajectory in three main periods: the Byzantine Empire (313 to 1453), the Ottoman colonization (1453 to 1821), and the nation-state era (roughly, 1821 to the present). In each of these periods, Church-state relations were regulated by formal arrangements (what I refer to as the symphonia, millet, and constitutional models, respectively) designed to specify the functional role of each institution in public life and to organize society in a way which maintained order. I explore the ways in which the interactions of Church and state in politics not only shaped ideas about power, authority, and social structure, but also constructed collective identity over time.
For example, the symphonia model constituted a cooperative undertaking in which Church and state defined the collectivity in terms of an imperial theology which superimposed membership in the political, secular Greek-speaking Empire with belonging to the Christian faith. In contrast, the *millet* model counterposed the colonizing Ottoman state against the subjugated Eastern Orthodox Church, and reconstructed the collective identity of the Greek-speaking community in exclusivist terms of the Orthodox Christian faith. With the creation of the Greek nation-state, the constitutional model represented an effort by the new Greek state to rework collective identity according to the principles of secular nationalism while simultaneously incorporating elements of the Orthodox religion into the emerging definition of the national imaginary. By examining the culture and collective identity which was constructed and reconstructed over time through the recombination of religious and political ideas and beliefs, the dissertation sets out the ideational issues at stake in the Church-state interactions under the PASOK governments of the 1980s.

The same analysis also illustrates, however, that politics and culture exercise a determinant impact on each other, wherefore I make the claim about the relative autonomy of culture. To begin with, the institutional models which evolved to regulate Church-state relations in politics were built on a combination of religious worldviews and political ideologies which presumed to offer all-inclusive systems of meaning for interpreting reality. In this respect, the models represented the institutionalization of culture, by formalizing a set of rules, procedures and rituals meant to sustain a set of beliefs, values, and attitudes concerning "...the core existential questions that confront every human group."
Church and state were constrained in their public activities by virtue of a way of life they were supposed to represent. Moreover, through their own participation in the historical construction of a conception of collective identity which included unresolved inconsistencies related to the imperfect coexistence of secular and sacred aspects, any attempt by either institution to alter its role vis-a-vis the other could be interpreted (and, potentially, rejected) by the public as the destabilization of those psychological, emotional, and cognitive bonds constituting the collectivity. The dissertation demonstrates that the most contentious episodes in Church-state relations under PASOK were interpreted precisely in these terms by principle actors in each group, which helps to explain the failure to bring about institutional change and which underscores the determinant capacity of culture on politics.

IV. Examining the Greek Case

The main puzzles explored in this dissertation are (a) the capacity of the Orthodox Church to influence the agenda and outcome of the state's policies on religion under the PASOK government, and the related question of (b) the role of religion in public life in Greece. The resolution of these two puzzles will provide an endorsement of the main theoretical claim of the dissertation, that the way in which societies negotiate modernity allows for a multiplicity of roles and spaces for religion in public life. To explore these ideas using the historical and cultural method of analysis outlined in the previous section, the dissertation is divided into five chapters which move sequentially from a highly historical discussion to an examination focused on the period from the transition to democracy in 1974 up to the close of PASOK's tenure in government in 1989.
Chapters One and Two are companion pieces dedicated to the same basic objectives: to indicate both the scope and vitality of the historical dimensions informing the contemporary Church-state relationship, and also to clarify how the institutional relationship has been continuously defined according to considerations of power understandable in terms of cultural issues. The chapters are organized according to a periodization of history which separates the pre-nation-state era from the nation-state period (frequently referred to in area studies works as "the modern Greek period," with the qualifier implying an equation of modernity with the status of nation-statehood), and which examines each period according to the models of Church-state relations cited above. Chapter One is a chronology of the symphonia and millet models which obtained over nearly fifteen centuries of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, respectively; Chapter Two details the constitutional model which, despite reformulations over time, retained its essential norms and structures from the establishment of the Greek nation-state in the early nineteenth century until the transition to democracy in 1974.

Using the Church-state models as a lens for analyzing each historical period provides three insights which are critical because of their relevance to the Church-state episodes under PASOK in three respects. First, each model represented the effort to institutionalize and to actualize a certain vision for organizing society; this vision originated in the worldviews of religion and politics. The models, therefore, indicate that the historical origins of contemporary culture in Greece are rooted in the normative belief systems of religion and politics, and that the actualization of this belief system was guided primarily by the interactions between Church and state. Second, despite the fact that each model was meant to operationalize a
particular project for organizing and for transforming society, the Church-state arrangements developed into conflicts over the power of each institution in public life. While balance of power conflicts were militated in Byzantine times by the fact that the Christian Church and the Byzantine state purported to share a similar vision of social organization, these power conflicts became particularly acute during the Ottoman period, when the Eastern Orthodox Church was forced into a formal arrangement with the alien, colonizing Ottoman state. Significantly, however, the establishment of the Greek nation-state and the subsequent proclamation of the autocephalous Church of Greece generated new power conflicts between the two institutions.

Third, the models demonstrate that the primary source of conflict between Church and state, while grounded in differences in the religious and political worldviews, crystallized in the issue of collective identity—that is, in terms of the meaning of collective identity over the historical trajectory and in terms of which institution enjoyed the legitimate right to define and protect this collectivity. Taken together, the two chapters use the Church-state relationship to trace the emergence of contradictions in Greek culture over the issue of collective identity, and to chronicle those historical circumstances affecting the changing role of religion in public life. By the same token, Chapters One and Two also demonstrate how culture, as a subjective web of beliefs, values, and norms, came to constrain politics and the options for managing the relationship between Church and state in society.

Chapter Three is primarily concerned with examining the transformations in the Orthodox religion over the Greek historical trajectory. The chronological
focus is on the World War Two period up to the eve of the regime transition in 1974, although relevant historical material from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries is included. The chapter considers religion as compromised of two dimensions: the doctrinal (the message of the faith) and the institutional (the Church, defined in terms of the ordained hierarchy and clergy, and the popular strata, or laity). The chapter discusses the ideal-type set out in Orthodox theological doctrine for the structure and organizational life Church; less attention is given to the theological vision for the Church in terms of its role in society, since this issue is explored extensively in the previous two chapters. The aim of Chapter Three is to trace the actual internal transformation of the Church in twentieth century Greek public life in terms of the relationship between ordained and popular strata, and in terms of the the Church's role in public life.

Chapter Three shows that the organizational life of the Church as well as its role in society was largely defined by the constitutional relationship between Church and state, through the mechanisms of the Greek Constitution as well as the Constitutional Charter of the Church. This constitutional arrangement evolved over the course of the twentieth century according to the ideology and social objectives of the various regimes governing Greece, so that the organizational development of the Church came to be primarily constrained by the domestic and foreign policy exigencies of Greek statecraft.

The nexus with the state and the ideological battles in Greek politics exerted a range of centrifugal pressures within the Church, and the chapter identifies those internal sources of contradiction and cleavage which exerted a dynamic for change and reform in the organizational and structure of the Church. First and foremost,
repeated state interventions and legislation during the twentieth century produced the steady concentration of decisionmaking power in the hands of the hierarchy, primarily in the administrative body known as the Permanent Holy Synod, at the expense of any solidarity with the non-Synodal hierarchy and the clergy. Second, the alienation between hierarchy and clergy was surpassed by an increasingly acute rupture between the entire ordained stratum and the laity of the Church, with the latter claiming that the ideological politicization of the hierarchy and the low level of education of the clergy (mainly a product of constitutional arrangements affecting the resources and structure of ecclesiastical education) have made the message of Orthodoxy increasingly irrelevant for the challenges of modernity. Responses to the pressures of organizational factionalization are examined, and the chapter suggests that by the time of the transition to competitive democratic politics in Greece, the main outlines of an internal debate within the Church over the question of institutional reform had been formed. The central issue of this debate was the need to decentralize the organizational structure of the Church, in a way that would allow for greater lay participation in decisionmaking and administrative matters and with the objective of making the message of Orthodoxy relevant to the country's social and political needs.

Chapter Four examines the transition to and consolidation of democratic politics that began in Greece with the dissolution of the authoritarian regime in July 1974 and ended with the election victory of PASOK in October 1981, which brought a non-Right party to government for the first time in post-WWII Greek history. I argue that the transition to a democratic political regime was a watershed in the historical path of political development in Greece, due to the
confluence of political, socio-economic and cultural factors whose synthesis generated a remarkable departure, a branching off, from the pattern of politics hitherto predominant in Greece throughout the post-WWII era. The nature of the changes which occurred during the 1974 to 1981 period were extraordinarily powerful because they involved both the recasting of the institutional bases of politics in an effort to account for and respond to the extensive social structural transformations played out in Greece during the post-war era but, likewise, because the political reorganization was a manifestation of a refashioning in the cultural matrix affecting Greek politics for most of the twentieth century.

The first objective of the chapter is to explore the regime change as a process of cultural transformation as expressed in the debate over modernization; regime change catalyzed a discussion over the meaning of and methods for building a modern, pluralist democratic society in Greece. The debate over modernization and democratization is considered in terms of conflicting cultural tendencies, which I label modernist versus traditionalist, preoccupied as much with questions over Greece's historical identity as much as with the challenges of political-economic restructuring and state-society relations. It was in the interstices of the discussions over these issues that the Church of Greece and Orthodoxy were introduced as a piece of the political debate over modernization and democracy-building. The second objective of the chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate how the possibilities for resolving conflicts between the modernists and traditionalists created the possibility for a change in the role and meaning of religion in Greek society.

To achieve its objective, Chapter Four places PASOK at the center of the examination of the regime change. PASOK's genesis and rapid march to electoral
power over the short, seven-year period of the transition and consolidation phases is explained in terms of the party's unique potential for effecting a resolution of longstanding cultural contradictions in Greek society. The party's potential for resolving the country's cultural contradictions rested on its self-proclaimed identity as a radical socialist formation and its pledge to address the causes of the key fault lines which had defined Greek society in the WWII and post-war era (in certain cases, these issues were rooted as far back as the early twentieth century). Of particular importance in this respect was the psychological trauma of the country's civil war in the 1940s, the perpetuation of the ideological schism of Greek society by the creation of a Right-wing, exclusivist political system supported by an extensive para-constitutional apparatus, and the social frustrations and dislocations caused by the country's rapid yet highly uneven economic growth for most of the post-war period.

Because PASOK's potential for creating an unprecedented cohesion in Greek society depended on reformulating the beliefs, values, and assumptions about who belonged to the modern political community in Greece, as well as on building consensus about the rules and procedures required to sustain a competitive, pluralist democracy, the question of the place for Orthodoxy and the Church entered the debate over modernization. In this respect, the chapter views Orthodoxy and the Church as located at the interstices of culture and politics. Through examining the discourse and agenda of the democratization process, particularly with regard to issues of nationalism and constitutional reform, the chapter shows how religion was drawn into the public domain, and how the links between religion and politics (and Church and state as their institutional
representations) were central to the process of cultural reconstruction that was part of democracy-building.

By the conclusion of the consolidation phase with PASOK's entry into government in 1981 with a historically unprecedented electoral majority, the place of religion in Greek public life under democracy remained in question. Chapter Five takes up the issue through a detailed examination of Church-state relations during the two PASOK administrations of the 1980s; in light of the legal-constitutional history of religion and politics in Greece, it is not surprising that the Church-state dyad was the fulcrum for PASOK's religious policy as a whole. The chapter addresses PASOK's religious policies as part of the extended consolidation of democracy in Greece, insofar as the 1980s offered the first post-transition opportunity for a left-of-center party to attempt widespread structural reforms. The agenda, processes, and outcome of PASOK's religious policies are therefore understandable as a subset of the modernization debate discussed in Chapter Four.

The chapter characterizes PASOK's religious policy as dualist, based on the party's simultaneous call for the institutional separation of Church and state, on the one hand, and the cultural inseparability of Church and nation, on the other. To explain the roots of this distinction as well as its implications for coherent state policymaking, I examine the ideological and organizational factors in PASOK qua party. Of particular importance in this respect was the growing centralization of authority in the person of the party's founder and leader, Andreas Papandreou, the growing factionalization of the policymaking apparatus over the party's increasing turn towards populism and away from socialist ideological principles, and the extremely heterogeneous quality of the party's electoral base.
Just as PASOK's institutional profile had a direct impact on the evolution of the party's dualist policy towards the Church and religion once in power, the institutional structure of the Church played a critical role in determining its reaction (amongst all strata) towards the state's policies. Indeed, the chapter shows that the most radical aspects of PASOK's religious policies were the product of the aforementioned organizational conflicts between the ordained and lay strata of the Church. Based on their interpretation of the organizational history of the Church in the post-WWII period, lay intellectuals (primarily academic theologians) decided to bypass the hierarchically-controlled ecclesiastical structure by trying to use the mechanisms of politics to bring about an internal restructuring of the Church. Their objective was to create an ecclesiology of participation which would revitalize the role of the Church in Greek society by allowing for the actualization of Orthodoxy's religious message in the context of modernity and democracy. During its second term in office, the PASOK government proposed legislation for the democratization of the ecclesiastical organization, as the necessary first-step towards the institutional separation of Church and state; according to the government, democratization and eventual legal-constitutional separation would reinforce the links between the Orthodox Church and the Greek nation. This chapter presents this legislation as the product of a joint undertaking between reformist theologians and members of the Ministry of Education and Religions, and details the responses of Papandreou and the Church hierarchy as part of the institutional fragmentation of both Church and state.

Finally, the chapter considers how the main actors in each institution interpreted the question of Church-state separation with regard to the religious
versus secular features of collective identity and, more broadly, with regard to the implications for democracy grounded in the Church's historical influence on the state's legitimacy as the purveyor of national identity. The dualism in PASOK's religious policy speaks directly to the historical sources of culture and collective identity in contemporary Greece, namely the Orthodox religion and formative political experiences detailed in earlier chapters. The dualist policy reflected the contradictions in Greek culture generated by the historical recapitulation of unresolved tensions over the sacred and secular meanings attached to collective identity. The outcome of the centerpiece of PASOK's religious policies—the legislation on the organizational restructuring of the Church—was the decision to eliminate the democratization articles in the initial legislation. The chapter explores the result, as well as the process leading up to it, as part of the unwillingness of the leadership of the state or the Church to disrupt an arrangement which leaves both institutions in the public space and with control over those cultural resources most directly related to the way in which the collectivity is imagined.
ENDNOTES

1. The changing meaning and form of religion in the politics of the developing world is extensive, as indicated by the diversity of but a few examples. The interpenetration of religion and political interests in Latin America ranges from the activism of Christian base communities (grassroots communities generally known under the acronym of CEBs, for comunidades eclesiales de base) against the military in El Salvador to the cooperation of ecclesiastical personnel in the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua. In Eastern Europe, the role of the Polish Catholic Church in mobilizing support for the Solidarity movement was critical to the movement's success in opposition as well as in influencing candidates' stands on the issue of abortion in the recent general elections. From the late 1970's onward, the Rumanian Orthodox Church used its extensive network of social welfare activities and well-established theological press, as well as its membership in the World Council of Churches, as mechanisms for agitation against the Ceausescu regime. The conflation of religious and political themes in the Middle East can be seen in the Islamic revolution which toppled the Shah's government in Iran, the increasing ability of the ultra-Orthodox parties to influence the Israeli government's domestic and foreign policies, and in the Muslim-Christian-Druse fault lines of Lebanon's political chaos. The convergence between religious and political issues runs through many societies in Africa as well, as evidenced by the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist parties in Algeria and the Sudan and by confrontations between the Coptic Church and the Egyptian governments under both Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The engagement between politics and religion is also conspicuous in the Asian context. The Catholic Church has figured prominently in South Korea's political-constitutional crises of the 1980's, while communal violence between Sikhs and Hindus has notably undermined Indian democracy since the assassination of Indira Ghandi. The examples cited here, while by no means all-inclusive, are meant to indicate the sweep and complexity of the connections between forms of religious and political expression in the developing world over the past two decades.


3. As is the case with societies in the developing world, there are countless cases of the construction of new relationships between politics in religion in West European societies. In the 1980's, France and Spain experienced Church-state confrontations over claims surrounding the public-secular versus private-religious education of children and, yet, electoral politics in both countries indicating an increasing interpenetration between Catholic Action groups and parties of the Left suggests the difficulties with drawing clear lines of affiliation and confrontation. In Italy, the changing nature of the boundaries between religion and politics are reflected in the efforts by the Italian state and the Vatican to improve relations
by revising the Concordat between Italy and the Vatican, within a context of a subtle decoupling in the association between Catholicism and the political Right. The resurgence of traditionally religious concerns in the language and politics of the United States is striking as well, with the religious Right spearheading political debates over prayer in public schools, abortion, and capital punishment. Finally, Confucian and Taoist principles clearly inform the Japanese political economy system, in terms of both industrial structure and management philosophy.

4. The Ministry which deals with educational policy and religious affairs in Greece is called Το Υπουργείο Εκπαιδεύσεως και Θρησκευμάτων. This title is translated variously, as the Ministry of Education and Cults, the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of Education and Religions. Throughout this dissertation, I will use the term Ministry of Education and Religions, as the translation which, in my view, captures the full meaning of the responsibilities and policies for which the Ministry was established.


6. These three broad definitional criteria of secularization, or the condition of secularity, are set out by Harvey Cox in his seminal work on the origins and impacts of secularization, The Secular City. 25th anniversary edition (New York, N.Y: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1990). For a detailed discussion of these three features of secularity, see especially p. 1-3, and for a more expansive treatment, see the "Preface" and "Introduction" of The Secular City.

7. While social scientists working in the secularization school focus on the absolute centrality of reason in explaining the meaning and process of secularization, Cox offers a fascinating but highly controversial (amongst theologians and sociologists of religion) interpretation of secularization as grounded in the Bible. According to Cox, secularization "...is the legitimate consequence of the impact of biblical faith on history." See p. 15. For a full discussion of this argument, see Chapter I, "The Biblical Sources of Secularization" in The Secular City.

8. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York, N.Y.: Scribner and Sons, 1958), for a discussion of all the features of modern society which are antithetical to religion. Also see H.H. Gerth


11. In one of the best known formulations of the consequences of the marginalization of religion that is secularity, Daniel Bell argued that the disengagement of faith from its social consequences threatened political stability. Indeed, he claimed that secularity, as one of the very conditions of modern capitalism, informs "...the tensions between the norms of [the economic, political and cultural] realms--efficiency and bureaucracy, equality and rights, self-fulfillment and the desire for novelty...[These tensions] form the contradictions of the modern world, a contradiction that is enhanced under capitalism." See Bell, "The Return," p. 424. For a more elaborate treatment of this same concept, see Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1976). Also, for yet another secularization thesis approach to analyzing the unraveling of religion as the linchpin of a traditional social order and the attendant inability of capitalism to generate the values necessary to legitimate the new social order, see Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd edition (New York, N.Y.: Harper, 1949).

12. In yet another set of arguments which grew out of the secularization thesis, that is, one which takes the fundamental assertions of the perspective as valid, the "political religion" or "civil religion" hypothesis offers an alternative interpretation about the consequences for politics which result from the decay of traditional religion. The political religion thesis claims that politics in modern society takes on a religious quality as "[t]here is a transfer of religious commitment into politics, a shift of passions, religious intensity and a sense of transcendent mission and faith from the God...[of traditional religious worldviews]...into the gods of secular [politics]." See Clarke E. Cochran, *Religion in Public and Private Life* (New York, N.Y.: Routledge Press, 1990). The argument about the transposition of religious qualities to the political order assumes that religious needs are inherent and permanent to human nature. Modernization and industrialization do not simplify life through a rational reorganization which sunders religion from public life and neatly relegates religion to the private realm of individual choice. Instead, it is precisely in this respect that modernization presents the individual with an existential dilemma, since it challenges him to choose from an array of worldviews for integrating all dimensions of his life - religious, political, and social - into an all-encompassing system of meaning. The individual is forced to decide on one among many frameworks for answering life's core existential questions. The answers to this existential search lie in politics, which become a secularized
expression of religious attitudes and feelings, and, most specifically, in the state, which replaces the Church as the sole source and sanction of moral authority.

Although some scholars claim that the channelling of religious needs and passions into the realm of politics produces benign, mutually affirming results (the most frequently cited examples of this scenario are mainly those Western European, liberal polities where the Protestant ethic stands as the apogee of the supposed compatibility between and identification of classical liberal values and religion), most of the works in the political religion perspective adopt a far less sanguine vision about the consequences of seeking to fulfill religious needs through politics. The transformation of traditional religion, whether through the contraction in the Church's territory of authority or as the Church experiments with unconventional adaptations to changing times in order to retain a large following, presents a threat to democracy by informing politics with same sorts of absolute beliefs and goals which characterize religion. Significant examples of this sort of religious politics can be found in totalitarian regimes and self-styled, revolutionary ideologies which appropriate religious symbols and ceremony to justify the complete concentration of power in the hands of the state. Some of the most oft-cited cases include the character and influence of German nationalism under Hitler and Italian fascism under Mussolini. The political religion theme runs throughout the developing world as well, with paradigmatic cases including the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Pan-Arabism during Nasser's rule in Egypt and, perhaps most widely known, the plethora of studies on the destabilizing impacts of militant Islam on politics in Muslim societies.


18. Ibid., p. 130.


20. One can surmise that Clogg sees PASOK as having attempted to appropriate religious images and symbols in order to gain political capital with certain voting segments. He comments that "[o]ne of the most extraordinary aspects of [the pro-PASOK press's] rhetoric was the use of religious imagery," and that "[t]he extent to which PASOK constitutes a 'broad Church' is indicated by election material circulated at the time of the June 1985 election." See p. 91 and p. 146 (note 1), respectively, in Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece. The Search for Legitimacy* (London, England: C. Hurst and Company, Ltd.). Although one can infer from Clogg's observations some understanding of religion as an element in shaping culture as well as an affinity with the "political religion" hypothesis, his failure to develop his abbreviated observations is consistent with the pervasive orientation of area studies scholars that religion has been marginal to public life in Greece for most of the WWII period.

21. For discussions of the "underdog" tendency as the countervailing cultural force to the "modernizing" tendency, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece," unpublished manuscript (New York, N.Y.: Social Science Research Council, 1987), and Nikiforos Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988),"


25. I am not suggesting that the multiplicity of nation-states of Western Europe can be lumped together and considered as a single, unified, political, economic, and cultural entity; such a claim would inform my analysis with the same ahistorical bias that makes modernization theory problematic. I refer to the notion of a Western European exemplar only because this is precisely the analytic orientation of modernization approaches. For the purposes of comparison with the Greek historical experience, however, my reference to the Western European path suggests that, notwithstanding the multiplicity of religio-political arrangements derived from the fragmentation of Christianity in the West European world, Western Christianity was crafted in a common historical context that included Papal centralization and the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and the birth of the nation-state according to the philosophical orientations of the Enlightenment.

26. As far back as the early fourth century of the Christian Roman Empire, the establishment of an Eastern imperial capital at Byzantium (inaugurated as Constantinople in 330) gave political significance to the cultural and ecclesiastical contrasts which belied the theoretical unity of the Christian world. The cultural fabric of Eastern Christendom (the Byzantine Empire) was informed by the Hellenistic worldview and the Greek language, while the cultural and linguistic traditions of Western Christendom were grounded in the Latin language and Roman law. The barbarian invasions which ushered in the Dark Ages of Western Europe obliterated the law of the state and, in its place, gave the Church at Rome a political authority supported by a defensive, theological and ecclesiastical centralization; meanwhile in the East, the Empire expanded under the cooperative aegis of a strong state and vigorous Church characterized by rigorous theological debate and relative decentralization. The creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the ninth century contributed to the political, ecclesiastical, and cultural estrangement of Eastern and Western Christendom. The Church in the East rejected the notions of theological and ecclesiastical authority which constituted the basis of the Pope's autocratic leadership of the Church at Rome, and the Byzantine state regarded the formation of the Holy Roman Empire as an open
act of rejection of the principle of imperial unity. Linguistically and culturally, Eastern Christendom came to be restricted to the Greek-speaking world and Western Christendom relied almost exclusively on the Latin language.

The East-West estrangement was formalized in the eleventh century when the "Great Schism" spawned what are known as the Roman (Latin) Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church, respectively. For an excellent historical treatment of the religious, political and cultural evolution of Eastern and Western Christendom, see Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism. A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries* (England: Oxford University Press, 1955). Chapters One and Two are especially useful in summarizing the convergence between political and doctrinal issues. For a comprehensive review of the theological, ecclesiastical, and ecclesiological aspects of the history, see Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 9-81. Also, see Theodore H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and Its People under Turkish Domination* (Brussels, Belgium: 1952) and John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece* (London, England: Ernest Benn Limited, 1968).

27. For the next four centuries, the Greek heartland of the Ottoman Empire was, in Kitromilides' words, "...ideologically and psychologically held together by the bonds and traditions of eastern Orthodoxy [and]...the Orthodox Church, with the Ecumenical Patriarch at its head, was transmogrified into a polity in captivity. Paschalis Kitromilides, "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1989): p. 151-152. The Greek-speaking Orthodox community was divorced from the formative intellectual experiences of Western Europe, namely the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and from the religious events of the Reformation and counter-Reformation.

28. For an excellent and comprehensive assessment of the incongruities between state and society which were generated by the imposition of a non-indigenous, Bavarian ruling elite on the traditional Greek social formation with national independence, see Diamandouros, "Political Modernization." For a fascinating treatment of the same issue within a comparative framework, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1986). Finally, for a work addressing the state-society incongruity in terms of a meticulous historical study of the Greek party system, see George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

29. See Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*.

30. The revisionist approaches are a diverse literature whose most important common feature is a rejection of the grand design ethos and deep developmental logic of modernization theory. At the risk of overschematization, revisionist studies can be identified in terms of their examination of three broad clusters of
ideas vis-a-vis the interactions between religion and politics: the relationship between institutions, usually that between church and state; the role of organizations as fosterers of routine patterns of action and expectation; and the articulation of norms, values, and beliefs which together weave a tapestry of culture. Analysis of religion and politics in terms of these different social spaces in which they converge and interact effectively broadens the meaning of both politics and religion to include not only formal institutional structures but also relations of power and equity, and implicit issues of legitimacy, in virtually any organized forum.

31. Studies dealing with developing countries are prolific. Representative works include John Esposito's *Islam and Politics* (New York, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1984). Esposito lays out his analysis of contemporary events—the Iranian revolution under Khomeini, and the Islamicizing, military regime of Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, for example—against the backdrop of the historical tradition of Islamic revivalist and reform movements that arose in response to the decline of the medieval Muslim empires and the attendant disintegration of the socio-moral cohesion of the Islamic community, as well as to the threats posed by western cultural and political imperialism. He also discusses the theological foundations for the political activism of Islamic movements, pointing out that the Islamic imperative for the constant struggle to realize the ideal-typical Islamic society is a personal as well as a societal one and is premised on a sense of identity explicitly grounded in membership in a community of common faith. Other notable works assessing the links between Islamic revivalism and political transition from the revisionist perspective include Cheryl Benard and Zalmai Khalilzad, *The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1984); Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Yvonne Y. Haddad, *Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History* (New York, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982); and Ali Shariati, *On the Sociology of Islam* (CA: Mizan Press, 1979).

Some of the most pathbreaking revisionists studies are those dealing with political conflict and religious change in Latin America. In *Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), Daniel H. Levine discusses the expanding lines of inquiry regarding the dialectic of change between religion and politics in Latin America and, in particular, the importance of the definition of new roles and the creation of new identities for the poor within the structures of religion and politics. He points out that the emergence of the grassroots Christian communities (known as CEBs or *comunidades eclesiales de base*) has formed a focal point for joining of religious and political debate and, likewise, for organized action directed at liberalization and democratization in the institutional frameworks of both. For other works on Latin America, see, for example, Thomas C. Bruneau, *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Gutierrez, Gustavo, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973); Daniel H. Levine, "Religion and Politics: Drawing Lines, Understanding Change," *Latin American Research Review* 20 (1985): 185-
201; and Brian H. Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges To Modern Catholicism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

32. See Pizzorno, "Politics Unbound."

33. Ibid., p. 33.

34. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities."


36. I will focus on the notion of culture, as opposed to the derivative (albeit highly interesting) concept of political culture developed in the modernization literature of the 1950s. In one of the seminal definitions of the discrete concept of political culture, Sydney Verba defines political culture as "...the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place." See Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, eds., *Political Culture*, p. 515. In the same source, Pye explains that political culture forms "...coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing," and "...represents a system of control vis-a-vis the system of political interactions." See "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development" in ibid., p. 7. For an elaboration of the concept of political culture within a comparative framework and with an emphasis on the ordering capacity of political culture at the level of the individual (as opposed to the collectivity), see Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1965), and Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980).


38. As Sabel and Piore observe in their critique of the deep logic assumptions which undergird modernization theory, "[m]ass production has come to mean modern times because it is the expression of a web of ideas that promise to explain how industrial progress works, where it came from, and why it has to be so." See Piore and Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide*, p. 21.


41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. For a brief discussion of the conceptualization of culture as a meaning system held by collectivities rather than as voluntaristic values and beliefs of individuals, see ibid. Also, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Post-Authoritarian Greece," unpublished manuscript (Athens, Greece: University of Athens, 1991), p. 3-4.

43. This expression is a reference to Benedict Anderson's well-known appellation of "the imagined community" for the nation. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Norfolk, VA: Thetford Press Limited, 1983).

44. The period from the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks until the outbreak of the Greek War for Independence in 1821 is frequently termed by Byzantine and Orthodox Church historians as the time of the Ottoman Turkish captivity (known in Greek as I Turkokratia).

45. For an especially compelling analysis of Church-state relations in these terms, see Kritromilides, "Imagined Communities," with particular attention to p. 159-161 and p. 177-185.


47. There are a number of competing interpretations about the nature, meaning, and impact of the regime change in Greece, which also fall within the debates on the appropriate theoretical and methodological approach to studying the phenomenon of regime transitions. For relevant comments, see Diamandouros, "Regime Change," p. 139.

48. In a recent yet already widely-adopted formulation, Nikiforos Diamandouros originated the terms "modernizer" and "underdog" to distinguish between these conflicting cultural tendencies. See Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture."

49. For a more generalized discussion of the meaning and impact of the enormous changes in the definition, agenda and instruments of politics in the overall context of Western European societies, see Charles Maier, "Introduction" in Maier, ed., Changing Boundaries, p. 1-24.
CHAPTER ONE

*Church-State Relations in Byzantine and Ottoman Times: Religion and Politics under Symphonia and Millet*

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the historical foundations of the relationship between state and Church in Greece under the PASOK government of the 1980s. I organize the chapter into a two-part chronology dealing, first, with the Byzantine Empire (330 to 1453) and, second, with Ottoman imperial control over the Greek Orthodox populations of the former Byzantine world (1453 to 1821). I explore each period in terms of a specific model of Church-state relations which regulated interactions between the two institutions as part of the larger goal of transforming society according to a particular worldview.

The central premise of this chapter is that Church-state relations under PASOK cannot begin to be understood without appreciating the historical rootedness of the relationship. For more than sixteen centuries of Greek history, Church and state have played a central role in public life, and have defined the relationship between politics and religion. By examining the philosophical underpinnings, functional aspects, and balance of power which emerged through these two models, the chapter establishes the patterns of cooperation and points of contention which came to inform Church-state relations over the Greek historical trajectory. In particular, analysis of the *symphonia* and *millet* models points to the recapitulation of specific tensions in the Church-state relationship...
which continued to constitute important points in the agenda of Church-state interactions under PASOK.

One of the main objectives of the chapter is to use the Church-state models as a means of exploring the changing role of religion in the public space. Significantly, both the symphonia and millet models reflected worldviews which envisioned a dynamic role for religion in public life. Both Church-state arrangements were grounded in theological worldviews which did not circumscribe the role of religion in the public realm. The putative goal of the symphonia model was to create an earthly Christian kingdom in which society would be structured according to Christian beliefs, norms, and ideas. Similarly, the objective of the millet model was to build a society organized according to the tenets of Islam. However, because the practical attempts to realize a particular vision for society involved balance of power considerations, the institutional relationship developed into a struggle over the public space and, more specifically, into state attempts to control and to circumscribe the influence of the Church in politics.

The chapter also aims to explore how the Church-state models fostered the emergence of a conception of power understood in terms of the interpenetration of politics and culture. The religious worldviews which informed the Church-state relationships offered an all encompassing system of meaning for interpreting historical events. Where Church and state subscribed to the same worldview—as in the symphonia model—their mutually reinforcing interpretation of historical experiences generated a coherent set of ideas, values, and cognitions shared by all members of society. However, in the case of the millet model, the Ottoman state and the Orthodox Church interpreted historical experience according to
antagonistic worldviews which fostered distinctive groups of ideas and beliefs among different members of society.

For both the Byzantine and Ottoman states, cultural cohesion and a strong sense of identification with the collectivity were critical to maintaining the political stability necessary for the project of building and sustaining empire. As Church and state began to interpret historical experience according to alternative worldviews, they participated in a process of identity (re)construction which had implications for the stability of politics. Power rested, then, on the ability to define the ultimate identity of the community, and the Church-state models developed into a structure for working out which institution would determine the nature and boundaries of the collectivity.

II. The Byzantine *Symphonia*: A Theocratic Model

The genesis of formal institutional relations between the contemporary Orthodox Church of Greece and the Greek state dates back to the fourth century, when Christian theology transformed the pagan Roman Empire into the Christian Byzantine Empire. The Roman Emperor Constantine I celebrated his conversion to Christianity by inaugurating Constantinople in 330 as the new, Christian capital for the Roman Empire. Built on the site of the ancient Greek city of Byzantium and entitled "the New Rome," Constantinople was the capital of what came to be known as the Byzantine Empire (the eastern Roman Empire).\(^1\) The Emperor Theodosius I's establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire in 380 marked the legal establishment of a Christian state.

The establishment of a second imperial capital at Byzantium gave political significance to the cultural contrasts in the eastern and western parts of the
Roman Empire. The culture of the Byzantine Empire was grounded in the Hellenistic world and the Greek language, so that the Byzantine state as well as the language and structure of the Church came to be dominated by Greek-speaking Christians.

Despite protestations by theologians,² most historians accept the assumption that the motivations for Constantine I's conversion and Theodosius' subsequent legalization of a Christian Empire were political and military in nature, and in no small degree were based on Constantine's aim of establishing a competing locus of political power to the western imperial capital at Rome. By adopting the task of protecting the rapidly expanding membership of the Christian Church from pagan persecution and by expropriating the religious symbols of Christianity as signs of the Byzantine Empire, Constantine astutely gained popular support and theological legitimacy for the politico-military expansion of the Empire.

Notwithstanding the controversy over the rationale for the proclamation of the Christian, Byzantine Empire, the fact constituted a radical reorientation in the relationship between the Christian Church and the Roman Empire, from a centuries-old situation of confrontation to a cooperative arrangement in which "...the state and the Church were wedded in Christ,"³ and in their commitment to creating a unitary, Byzantine, Christian society. The Church-state model designed to achieve this vision was the Byzantine symphonia.⁴

The symphonia model regulated Church-state relations for the subsequent eleven centuries. However, the specific norms and structure of the model were not grounded in any extensive legal foundations. The single most detailed explications of the symphonia accord are found in the writings of Bishop Eusebius
of Caesarea, the biographer and court theologian of Emperor Constantine I, and in the sixth-century writings of Emperor Justinian I. Eusebius' writings are most useful in articulating the worldview on which the symphonic accord was premised. Eusebius built on the doctrine of the early Church (the first four centuries of the Christian experience), as well as on older intellectual currents of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and Hellenistic theories of kingship, to articulate a theology of Empire and a theory of the state which supported the vision of a unitary Christian society.

The theology of early Christianity understood the religion as the tangible affirmation of God's divine plan for "...the transfiguration of all realities." Far more than simply an intellectual proposition or a contemplative mysticism, Christianity was a way of life which demanded of its adherents that they bear witness to the world in terms of their actions. The early Christians, therefore, took as their mandate the building of a new society to prepare for the divine Kingdom which would be established with the second coming of Christ. The Church, as "...extensive with the Kingdom of God on earth," was endowed with a social concern, that of working towards the reconstruction of society in the image of the heavenly kingdom.

Eusebius built on the theological emphasis on the socially transformative aspects of the Church to form the Byzantine political cosmology which was the worldview for the symphonia model. Describing the Byzantine Empire as the new world empire which was the complement of the universal Church, Eusebius articulates a conception of society as a permanent organic unity comprised of a single political and ecclesiastical whole. According to this view, just as the
Church was meant to be a terrestrial copy of the heavenly ideal, the Byzantine state was to be modelled on the divine prototype of God's monarchy in heaven.\textsuperscript{12}

Eusebius posits the \textit{symphonia} as a theocratic model binding Church and Empire, both having preceded from the same origin of the divine ideal, in a collaborative effort to realize an earthly Christian commonwealth. The harmony presupposed in the \textit{symphonic} model not only referred to the relationship between the Church and state, but to "...the internal cohesion of one single human society for whose orderly welfare on earth...\textsuperscript{13}" the two institutions cooperated. According to Eusebius, the Byzantine Emperor was absolutely essential to ensuring that the \textit{symphonic} accord would realize the vision of an organic society whose religious and political, spiritual and temporal boundaries were coterminus. The sacrosanct status of the Emperor in the Church-state relationship derived from the fact that Constantine I's conversion had resulted from a divine vision.\textsuperscript{14} The divine intervention which had provoked Constantine's conversion meant that the person of the Emperor was Christ's representative on earth, "'equal to the apostles' (\textit{isapostolos})...and responsible for the 'externals' of the Christian religion.'\textsuperscript{15}

Despite its complexity, the Byzantine political cosmology was marked by serious lacunae with regard to operationalizing the \textit{symphonia} model. Eusebius offered no concrete guidelines for how to structure, much less to institutionalize, the \textit{symphonic} accord. Since the Byzantine Empire had no legal constitution, the only real bond between the two institutions was their commitment to a common worldview whose actualization required the indivisibility of Empire and Church. \textit{Symphonia} was a political-ecclesiastical experiment.
As noted earlier, the sixth-century writings of Emperor Justinian I provide the most extensive discussion of the operationalization of the *symphonia* accord. Justinian's writings are most useful because they provide some understanding of the balance of power within the *symphonic* arrangement, and because they acknowledge that, together with their complementarity, Church and state are distinct entities. Justinian elaborated that the simultaneous qualities of distinctiveness and harmony which characterized Church and state, and which were both essential to realizing an organic Byzantine Christian society, were represented by the complementarity of the persons of the Patriarch (leader of the Church) and the Emperor. The Patriarch and Emperor were spiritual and secular ministers, respectively, who were jointly responsible for ensuring that the *symphonia* model functioned to achieve the universalization of the Church and the Empire.16 As a ninth-century Byzantine text reiterated, "Emperor and patriarch, however distinct and separate, together constitute...the greatest and most necessary parts of a single organism."17

Notwithstanding his view of the mutual responsibility of Emperor and Patriarch for building a Christian empire, the very distinctiveness of state and Church explains Justinian's emphasis that the Byzantine cosmology called for the Emperor to assume responsibility for the externals of the faith. Because the creation of a Christian inhabited world (*oecumene*) via imperial expansion rested on the state's ability to develop the legal and administrative structures necessary to safeguard imperial society from both external threat and internal fragmentation, the Church was necessarily subject to the legal and administrative framework built by the state. The Emperor was entrusted with maintaining the legal and administrative
aspects of the ecclesiastical organization necessary to preserve doctrinal orthodoxy within the Church and within the Empire. Accordingly,

"...nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for their (imperial) welfare that they constantly implore God. For if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general harmony (symphonia tis agathi) will result."\(^{18}\)

Based on the few formal theoretical treatments on the operationalization of symphonia as noted above, the Church-state arrangement evolved out of the daily interactions of the two institutions and involved an informal consensus on the balance of powers. For the most part, the defining practical features of the symphonia model were developed during the first three centuries of the Byzantine epoch, and remained largely intact until the fall of Constantinopie to the Turks. The Emperor's status as isapostolos and his responsibilities for what Eusebius had called the externals of the faith, meant that the Emperor enjoyed ecclesiastical prerogatives. These, however, were limited exclusively to non-doctrinal matters.\(^{19}\)

The most important rights of the Emperor vis-a-vis the institutional life of the Church were his influence over the process of Patriarchal succession by making direct nominations and appointments,\(^{20}\) and his mandate to preserve the unity of the Church by calling Ecumenical Councils.\(^{21}\)

The Emperor's influence in the Patriarchal selection process, despite the Emperor's exclusion from doctrinal matters, affected the balance of power between Church and state under the symphonia arrangement, and the frequency of imperial interventions in the Patriarchal candidacies reflected the Byzantine state's prioritization of temporal exigencies (and authority) over spiritual authority. By
making Patriarchal selections contingent on imperial decision (justified according to the Emperor's responsibility for protecting the externals of the faith), the state improved the likelihood of ecclesiastical support for all range of imperial policies in Byzantine public life, and thereby indirectly affected the nature of the Church's role in the public space. Equally, important, the evolution of the Patriarchal selection process by the sixth century was such that the laity had been almost totally eliminated from the process,\textsuperscript{22} thus creating an internal cleavage between the ordained and non-ordained strata of the organic community of the Church and weakening the Church's claim to constitute all of Byzantine society.

However, while the state's ability to impact the Church's place in public life was improved via influence over the Patriarchal candidacy, the assumptions of the \textit{symphonia} model provided the Patriarch with the capacity for safeguarding the Church's powers vis-a-vis the state and for ensuring a dynamic role for religion in Byzantine public life. The \textit{symphonia} arrangement endowed the Patriarch with responsibility for the spiritual welfare and orthodoxy of Byzantine society, as well as of the Byzantine state and its leadership. Indeed, for the Church, the \textit{symphonia} model never implied the primacy of secular over spiritual matters but, in fact, just the opposite. For "...although the church surrendered the discipline and management of its external affairs and administration to the state, that surrender was always contingent on the [state's] own submission to the divine law."\textsuperscript{23}

The Church interpreted the fact that the Emperor's guardianship over Church and Empire was grounded in his status as a reflection of Christ on Earth as prioritizing spiritual over temporal authority. Countless formal and informal
practices that developed within the framework of the symphonic model produced an interpenetration of politics and religion which seemed to reinforce the Church's view. There was no legally defined mechanism for the imperial succession which, as noted earlier, was understood to be divinely sanctioned, so the Emperor's legitimate right to rule in God's name could only be confirmed through Patriarchal coronation. The Patriarch's confirmation of the Emperor's legitimacy was more than a ceremonial act, since the leader of the Church could censure of the head of state for any conduct considered un-Christian. The Emperor's good standing as a faithful member of the Church affected the ability of the state to rule, as evidenced by examples of both the ordained and popular elements of the Church in successfully opposing state efforts at doctrinal machinations for political purposes. Finally, Byzantine history included several episodes in which the Patriarch substituted for the Emperor as regent over the oecumene.

There is no doubt that relations between Emperor and Patriarch subjected the symphonia model to substantial strains, particularly given the pattern established by Justinian I's view that the symphonic harmony was

"...not a harmony between two powers or between two distinct societies, the Church and the State; rather, it [was] meant to represent the internal cohesion of one single human society, for whose orderly welfare on earth the emperor alone is responsible...[because]...the law governs the entirety of human polity, and the emperor is sovereign in issuing laws." (bold mine)

Nonetheless, both Emperor and Patriarch were realistic in their recognition of the fact that symphonia was a symbiotic relationship benefitting both Church and state, so they confined their jockeying for power to aspects which would not disrupt the viability of the relationship but would reinforce the place of both state and Church in the public realm.
The Byzantine Emperors had recognized the Church as a powerful force for imposing religio-cultural unity on the heterogeneous peoples who came under the control of the expanding state, and the Church's missionary work was utilized as a successful tool in converting many of the barbarian tribes settling to the north of the Empire; in many cases, the state prudently supported ecclesiastical missionary work as an effective precursor to direct political penetration and military conquest. The state's military program as a whole was justified in eschatological terms. The expansion of the imperial borders was carried out in the name of Christ, as the Byzantine military apparatus claimed to wage a holy war aimed at creating a commonwealth of Byzantine faithful.

By the same token, the Church used the aegis of state protection to pursue its mission of spreading Christian values to the whole of society, and capitalized on state economic support to solidify various aspects of the ecclesiastical institutional structure. The Church utilized state subsidies to amass a large landed estate, and relied on state funding to support a host of charitable institutions and philanthropic programs. Over time, the Church leadership's adroit use of state economic assistance effectively allowed the Church to obtain a significant degree of economic self-sufficiency, and to use its own economic resources to secure its influence in Byzantine society. With the steady decline in the political-economic fortunes of the Byzantine state from the ninth century until the fall of the Empire in 1453, the economic strength of the Church became more noticeable in contrast, as did the divergence in the role of Church and state in public life.

Indeed, the divergent fortunes of Church and state during the prolonged senescence of the Byzantine Empire highlighted the latent balance of power
tensions in the symphonia model, and suggested that these tensions were rooted in the interpenetration of politics and culture generated by the worldview that informed the symphonia accord. The state's project of empire-building by means of combining the Byzantine and Christian universalisms, by its very nature, fostered the interpenetration of politics and culture: the Byzantine political community would be created, or "imagined,"\textsuperscript{31} in terms of identification with the ideas, beliefs, and norms of Christianity. The establishment of a Christian Empire formalized the interpenetration of politics and culture, since belonging to the Byzantine political collectivity was synonymous with belonging to the Christian oecumene.

The symphonia model—as the mechanism invented to manage, to perpetuate, and to symbolize the above political-cultural identity—in fact, was an actualization of the inherent tensions in the Byzantine cosmology. The symphonia accord expressed the question of whether collective identity was primarily religious or secular. Because Christianity was conceived of as the means for creating a cultural unity for the Empire, the principal identity criterion for members of the society was religious. Consequently, the Church as the institutional embodiment of Christianity believed itself to be the unparalleled and legitimate representative of the collective good. Insofar as the state defined itself as Christian and supported Christianity as the identity which transcended all others in the multi-ethnic Empire, the symphonia arrangement was marked by an innate question about which institution controlled the balance of power over public life.

The need to answer the aforementioned question was avoided by virtue of two factors: first, by the willingness of both: Church and state to participate in an arrangement in which each actor perceived the benefits of collaboration as
outweighing the costs of clarifying the balance of power in the association; and second, by the relatively uninterrupted expansion of the Empire from the fourth to the ninth centuries. However, as the public realm over which the state ruled contracted with the decline of the Empire, the Church's purview did not diminish accordingly and, instead, was reinforced.

The imperial defeats by the Arabs and Turks to the East were framed not simply in military terms. Instead, because Arab and Turkish military expansion was waged in the name of Islam, Byzantine subjects came to perceive themselves vis-a-vis an external military threat which was defined in religious terms. With the state's failure to protect the political community, the Church stood alone in its moral and spiritual authority over Byzantine society (and over those former members of the Byzantine Empire who had fallen under Arab and Turkish control).

Paradoxically, the demise of the Byzantine Empire clarified the basic contradiction which had been inherent to the symphonia model, namely that the Church's participation had not in any way implied acceptance of state preeminence as the guarantor of collective welfare. The defeat of the Byzantine state amounted to a sort of reversion for the Church to the pre-Constantinian situation whereby the Church had pursued its eschatological vision without the support and cooperation of the state. Equally paradoxical was the fact that the politics of empire-building had cultivated a culture with vital religious dimensions which succeeded the imperial political order on its implosion. Moreover, the nature of the termination of the Byzantine political order—the Ottoman, Islamic victory—reinforced the religious dimensions of the Byzantine culture and solidified a
conception of collective identity amongst the former Byzantine subjects which was fundamentally religious.

III. The Millet System as Church-State Paradigm

The fall of the Byzantine Empire with the Ottoman Turkish conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453 marked the formal dissolution of the symphonia model. The Church, however, succeeded the Byzantine state, and played a central role in the organization of Ottoman imperial society over the next four centuries. The Christian Church had undergone a major internal transformation by the time of the establishment of the Ottoman imperial capital at Constantinople.

The "Great Schism" of 1054 had split the Christian Church into separate institutional and theological entities, whose jurisdictions effectively corresponded to the Latin Western and Greek Eastern regions of the Roman Empire, and which were known as the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, respectively. Although the proximate cause of the split was a theological controversy, the Great Schism was actually the product of a long and complicated process reflecting divergences in the religious, cultural and political-economic development of the Eastern and Western portions of the Byzantine Empire; the origins of religious fragmentation had been integrally linked to the political disintegration of the Empire. The bulk of the Greek-speaking Christian populations under Ottoman control were members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, which was dominated by the Greek language and an ordained stratum whose majority was ethnically Greek.

The period from the Ottoman capture of Constantinople until the outbreak of the Greek war for independence in the early nineteenth century is generally
termed by Byzantine and Orthodox Church historians as the time of the Turkish captivity. The Orthodox Church and the Greek people considered themselves to be held captive by the government of the Ottoman Turks, which had overrun the Byzantine Empire in the name of Islam. The bulk of the scholarship on the history of Orthodoxy in the Attic Peninsula, the Balkans, and Asia Minor presents the period of the Ottoman overlordship as a calamitous time. Yet, the process of empire-building under Ottoman Turkish rule (*Turkokratia*) was grounded in a worldview which led to a remarkable reorientation in the role of the Orthodoxy in public life within the Church-state arrangement known as the *millet* model.

The Ottoman policy toward the Orthodox Church as the institutional representative of the Orthodox Christian populations of the Empire was established almost immediately after the capture of Constantinople. The Ottoman Sultan, Mohammed II, as the leader of the Ottoman state, sanctioned the election of the monk Gennadius Scholarios as the new Patriarch of Constantinople and as the leader of the Orthodox Christian Church. The Sultan also bestowed on the Church an official spiritual and political status, as the legal representative of the Christian, Orthodox *millet* (nation).³⁴

The *millet* was the fundamental unit of social organization in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, Ottoman Empire. The Christian *millet*, with the Orthodox Church as its designated representative, encompassed all Christians within the Ottoman realm, and subsumed racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences under the single identity variable of religion. Greek, Slavic, and Arab Orthodox Christians were considered one and the same as part of the *millet*, based on their common profession of faith in Orthodox Christianity. The leader of the Orthodox Christian
*millet* was the highest ecclesiastical authority, namely the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was known as the *millet bashi*.

The *millet* system, and the model for relations between the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman state under this system, was grounded in the worldview of Islam.\(^{35}\) The Islamic conception of humanity differentiated peoples solely according to religious affiliation, rather than along racial or ethnic lines. Islam defined a person's identity exclusively in religious terms, and treatment of the various peoples who comprised the Ottoman Empire was based on by this categorization. The religious community determined an individual's status and position in Ottoman society.\(^{36}\)

Islam made no distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms, or between the religious and the secular spheres. As a result, the *millet* was conceived of as both a religious community and a political collectivity. The political character ascribed to the *millet* derived from the Islamic conception of racial and ethnic differentiation. Just as Islam did not differentiate between Orthodox Christians, it did not recognize racial and ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims were viewed as belonging to a single religious community, wherein "...all the Islamic peoples are associated in a unique 'nation' which is the totality of the believers."\(^{37}\) The Islamic worldview effectively equated religious communal identity with collective political identity, or nationality. The religious collectivity of the *millet*, therefore, was a nation, and the leader of each *millet* was a national leader.

The *millet* model of relations between the Ottoman state and the Eastern Orthodox Church represented the mechanism by which social reality was organized
according to the Islamic social vision of the temporal and religious world as one. The Ottoman state, therefore, established a legal-formal relationship with the Church as the institutional representative of the Orthodox Christian nation, which was overwhelmingly Greek in its language and culture.

The millet marked a decisive turning point in the history of relations between the Orthodox Church and the state. For the first time in history, the Church's legal institutional status was formally established, and the Church's institutional prerogatives in society were specifically delineated. The basic legal-formal mechanisms which structured the millet model were the Sultan's imperial berat (an official diploma of confirmation similar to the Byzantine imperial bull) conferring formal political and spiritual status on the Church, and the prostagmata, the set of written ordinances undersigned by the Sultan to delineate the Church's privileges as representative of the millet.

As under the Byzantine symphonia, the Patriarch was accorded full responsibility for the spiritual leadership of the millet. In fact, the millet model resulted in the expansion of the ecclesiastical administrative powers of the Patriarch at Constantinople, known as the Ecumenical Patriarch (the leader of the Christian oecumene), at the expense of the other Orthodox Patriarchs (at Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria) within the Ottoman Empire. The Turks treated the Patriarch at Constantinople as the most senior hierarch in the structure of the entire Eastern Orthodox Church, by virtue of his location at the seat of Ottoman power. The effective ecclesiastical supremacy of the Ecumenical Patriarch was reinforced by the Ottomans' practice of requiring the Patriarch at Constantinople to submit to the Sultan the list of nominees for the three Near
Eastern Patriarchal thrones; the Constantinopolitan Patriarch's direct access to the Sultan gave him the power to influence the Sultan's decision.

The centralization of ecclesiastical administrative power at Constantinople was paralleled by and also encouraged the increasing predominance of the Greek element in the Orthodox Church. The proximate cause of the Greek preeminence lay in the fact that the Ottomans' steady conquest of Orthodox areas meant that previously independent Patriarchates now fell under the auspices of the predominantly Greek Patriarchate located in Constantinople. In fact, the origins of Greek predominance in the Orthodox Church and millet can be traced back to the political disintegration of the Christian Roman Empire during the Byzantine era. As noted earlier, the process of fragmentation of the Christian Roman Empire eventually produced two Christian Empires, the Roman Empire in the West and the Byzantine Empire in the East. The Byzantine Empire was, for all intents and purposes, a Greek Empire. Greek became the spoken language of the majority of the Byzantine population, and Byzantine civilization was deeply grounded in the intellectual and cultural heritage of Hellenism. Likewise, the language of the liturgy, the essential means for expressing the collective nature of Byzantine Christianity, was Greek. Finally, because the senior Orthodox hierarchs and theologians were Greeks, the Church during the Ottoman period became the vehicle for the preservation and perpetuation of Hellenism.

During the Turkokratia, education played the pivotal role of keeping alive the Greek language and the Hellenistic heritage. Because of its administration of the educational system of the millet, the Church became the preserver of the Greek national spirit. The Hellenization of the Orthodox Church and the preservation
of the Hellenistic heritage reached its pinnacle during the seventeenth century, a period of strong intellectual revival amongst the Empire's Greek peoples, and was reinforced by the financial and social rise to power of the Greeks throughout the Ottoman Empire. By virtue of the Church's role in the millet, religious, political and, increasingly, ethnic identities were conflated.

The augmentation of the Patriarch's powers was most striking in the area of the political responsibilities based on the expansion of the Church's jurisdiction in these areas; according to the theory underlying the millet arrangement, the Patriarch, as the Ethnarch of the Orthodox Christian political community, was to be consulted on all matters concerning the Orthodox community. The Patriarch of Constantinople was the leader of the largest and most important millet in the Ottoman Empire and, as Ethnarch, he was charged with overseeing a civil jurisdiction corresponding to his ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

The Ottomans state intended that the millet would function effectively as an autonomous civil administrative unit and, to this end, they appropriated the organizational structure of the Church. The Orthodox Church was exceptionally well suited to Ottoman purposes of regulating the millet. In geographical terms, the Church extended its spiritual jurisdiction over a vast territory which had been divided into metropolitansates and dioceses, ecclesiastical districts which offered a useful system comparable to political subdivisions. In structural terms, the Church was built on an organized hierarchical system which allowed for compatibility with the centralized, bureaucratic organization of the Ottoman state. Likewise, the extensive system of parish priests meant that the ecclesiastical organization had a grassroots administrative structure which could support the
objectives of the Ottoman state. The Patriarch, through use of the ecclesiastical organization, was responsible for the systematic collection of the special minorities taxes which all non-Muslims were obliged to pay; members of the clergy were exempted from these taxation requirements. The Patriarchal courts and the supporting ecclesiastically-based administrative structure also dealt with matters including "...divorce, marriage, inheritance, [and] guardianship of minors, [c]ommercial cases, theft, and even murder involving Christians only."46

Despite the increase in the power of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the expansion in the civil responsibilities of the Orthodox Church, the millet model was a mechanism for the social organization of a subject population within the Ottoman Empire. The millet model made the Church into the state's handmaiden in ensuring the compliance of the Greek Orthodox people as colonized subjects47 who, in nearly all aspects of their lives, confronted their second class status in Ottoman society. The members of the millet had no recourse against either the actions of Muslim citizens or the demands and whims of the Ottoman state.48

The millet model in no way provided the Church with a means of ameliorating the impacts of the arbitrariness of Ottoman rule. Rather, the civil responsibilities and political status of the Church under the millet effectively transformed the Patriarch (and, to a lesser extent, the episcopal hierarchy of the Church) into instruments of the Ottoman bureaucracy, so that the Church was placed in the untenable position of protecting a community against an overlord state on whose largesse it was completely dependent for survival. The legal features of the millet arrangement reflected the emphasis on the responsibilities (and the concomitant lack of rights) of the Church. For example, the berat stated that the Patriarch
alone held responsibility for the obedience of all Orthodox Christians subjects of
the Empire. In those cases where the Patriarch failed to fulfill his duties, the
Sultan decided on punishments ranging from financial retribution to personal
banishment. Execution was also a possibility, as would prove to be the case for
Patriarch Gregory V, who would be hanged by the Ottoman state in 1821 for his
failure to prevent the outbreak of the Greeks' war for independence from the
Turks. The Patriarch's fate was especially illustrative of the subordinate status
of the Church within the millet arrangement, given that Gregory V had never
made a statement of public support for an independence movement which he saw
as a threat to the existence of both the Church and the Greek Orthodox people.49

The outright disregard of the supposed toleration to be shown the Christian
millet extended to the state's direct interference in the organizational affairs of the
Church. The Sultan assumed the right to reject any particular candidate for the
Patriarchal throne, based on the candidate's purported fidelity to the state. The
Ottoman leader also exercised a large degree of indirect control over the election
process through an extensive network of simony. Bribery became a permanent
feature of the Church-state relationship during the Turkish period, and Patriarchal
financial obligations to the state under the millet strictures produced a cycle of
financial exaction which was played out at every level of the Church's
organizational structure.50

By institutionalizing a range of financial obligations and practices51 which
contributed to financial corruption within the Church, the Ottoman state
contributed to the emergence of cleavages within the ordained and popular strata
of the Church.
"The Greek in the provinces could not understand the subtle politics of the Patriarchate. He could not appreciate the delicacy that the Patriarch and his advisers had to show in their dealings with the [Ottoman Sultan]."

For the rural Greeks, the Church-state relationship under the millet became a symbol of the former's spiritual decay and the latter's humiliating control over the Greeks by use of their supposed spiritual guardian. The resentment of the local population, however, was largely confined to the hierarchy, perceived to have become a pliant tool in the hands of the Ottoman overlords. Anti-clericalism understood in terms of the experiences of the Catholic Church was not a notable phenomenon in the Orthodox Church, since the rural Greek population looked to the local clergy for protection against the abuses of Ottoman state bureaucrats.

One of the most important features of the financial subordination of the Church through the millet was the hierarchy's increasing dependence on the wealthy Greek nobility known as the Phanariots (for the quarter in Constantinople in which they resided) who, by the close of the eighteenth century, "...dominated the central organization of the Church...The Patriarchate could not do without them; for they were in a position both to pay its debts and to intrigue in its favour at [the Sultan's court]." Most Greeks resented the social arrogance and financial privileges of the Phanariots, and blamed the apparent capture of the Church's hierarchy by the Ottoman state on the Phanariot strata whose socio-economic success was integrally tied to the politics of Ottoman imperial expansion. The Church-state relationship, therefore, fostered cleavages within the Church as well as within the fabric of Greek society.

Despite the fact that the millet model of Church-state relations engendered tensions within the institutional Church and cleavages in Greek society, the
Church-state relationship under the Ottomans fostered the conditions which brought about the demise of the Orthodox *millet* with outbreak of the Greek War of Independence against the Ottomans in 1821. By the start of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was demonstrating signs of disintegration under the combined strains of territorial over-expansion, domestic and external socio-economic pressures, and the effects of corruption endemic at nearly all levels of the state bureaucratic apparatus. These factors, in tandem with steady intensification of a Greek nationalist ethos whose genesis can be traced back to the latter part of the eighteenth century,\(^5^6\) culminated in the uprising of the Greek Orthodox population against Ottoman rule in the early months of 1821. By the end of April 1821, the Greek Orthodox population covering the entire region of the central and southern Peloponnesus was in revolt, and the independent Kingdom of Greece was established after a prolonged war in 1830.

The social origins of Greek nationalism and the specifics of the role of the Orthodox Church in the Greek War of Independence remain a matter of historiographical controversy.\(^5^7\) A full treatment of these points is beyond the objectives of this dissertation and, more importantly, the controversy cannot overshadow one essential point: by virtue of the legal recognition accorded the Orthodox Church as the political and spiritual representative of the Greek Orthodox population, the *millet* model ensured that the nationalist struggle was, by nature, a religious struggle.

Regardless of the attempts of Greek nationalists to define the independence movement in terms of a community defined by a common language and putative uninterrupted continuity with the classical Greek past, the *millet* structure had
imposed a system of meaning whereby the objective experience of subjugation to the Ottoman Turks had been interpreted and subjectified in terms of belonging to the Orthodox religious collectivity. Moreover, because of its political status vis-à-vis the Ottoman state in the *millet* model, the Church could not sustain its claims to represent the spiritual collectivity without accepting its responsibilities as leader of the political community. The raising of the standard of revolt on 25 March 1821 by Germanos, the Metropolitan of Patras, was interpreted by Greek Orthodox and the Ottoman state alike as the official proclamation of the Greek Revolution. For the bulk of the ordained stratum of the Church, the "...Revolution had become a Holy War." Paradoxically, the vision for social organization which informed the Church-state relationship under the *millet* model facilitated an interpenetration of culture and politics, whereby reconstructions in the meaning of collective identity catalyzed political changes that led to a radical social transformation.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the *symphonia* and *millet* models which defined Church-state relations under the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. One of the most remarkable conclusions to emerge from the analysis is the fact that, despite the marked changes in the political, economic, and cultural conditions of the Greek people under the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, relations between the Christian Church (and its Eastern Orthodox progeny) and the state (Byzantine-Greek and Ottoman Turkish) functioned as the driving force for social organization throughout the Greek historical experience. Both the *symphonia* and *millet* models, in spite of the distinctive worldviews which informed each of them,
assumed a dynamic role for religion in public life. The longevity and continuity of Church-state relations in the Greek historical experience is a point which emerged, explicitly and implicitly, in the debates on religion and politics of the 1980s under PASOK.

The symphonia and millet arrangements were especially critical in terms of the specific patterns they established and recapitulated with regard to Church-state relations. The most definitive pattern to emerge in Church-state interactions was the steady evolution of the relationship from one of cooperation to one of antagonism, over the millenium-and-a-half from the proclamation of the Byzantine Empire to the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. The symphonia model had been built on the premise that Church and state shared a commitment to the construction of a Byzantine Christian oecumene, and that both institutions were equally necessary to the realization of such a political-religious project.

However, because the Church interpreted the raison d'être of the symphonia concord as an affirmation of divine law and, therefore, as the prioritization of sacred over secular authority, the symphonia arrangement was characterized by an innate tension over which institution wielded a predominance of power in public life. The symphonia set implicit restrictions on the scope of the Church's involvement in public life by separating the ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction of the Church from the civil and political jurisdiction of the state. Therefore, the resolution of the above power struggle was played out in cultural terms, through the abilities of each institution to define and to defend the collectivity against internal and external threat.
The survival of the Church with the destruction of the Byzantine state appeared to resolve the balance of power tensions which had been inherent to the *symphonia*. Not only did the Orthodox community supersede the Byzantine political collectivity, but the Church's position as the official representative of the Greek Orthodox was legally recognized by the *millet*. But the *millet* actually rendered overt the implicit tensions of the *symphonia* model, by explicitly defining the Church-state relationship as a political arrangement between unequals. Further, the political inequality was underscored by a cultural inequality, in that the subordinate political status of the Orthodox Church was determined according to the worldview of Islam. The political and cultural inferiority imposed on the Orthodox Church and the Greek Orthodox community under the *millet* cast the Church-state relationship in antagonistic terms, but the formal mechanisms of the *berat* and *prostagnata* were designed to allow the state to manage and to regulate the antagonism for the benefit of the Ottomans' objectives of empire-building.

The second pattern generated by the *symphonia* and *millet* arrangements was the disintegrative impact of politics on the internal cohesion of the Church as a religious institution. On the eve of the formation of the Greek nation-state, both the *symphonia* and *millet* models left the Church with a mixed legacy of legitimacy in Greek society. Given the regular interventions of the Byzantine Emperor in the Patriarchal selection process, as well as the Church's practical approach of lending its public support to the state's policies of empire-building in return for economic benefits, the organizational life of the Church became increasingly politicized and factionalized as ordained and lay strata developed differing perspectives on how the Church should pursue its missionizing strategy within the
context of the *symphonia* accord. Moreover, while the Orthodox Church's role in the independence struggle against the Ottomans must not be under-appreciated, the endemic corruption amongst a hierarchy with demonstrated ambivalence towards the question of nation-statehood had demoralized important segments of the clergy and laity, and had intensified the antipathy of Greek secular nationalists towards the Church.

The *symphonia* and *millet* models, then, altered the perception and the reality of the Church's identity in Greek public life. By virtue of its formal participation in the processes of *poli*tics under the Byzantines and Ottomans, the Church became a political as well as a spiritual institution. The political choices and behaviors of the Church affected the organizational development of the Church, generating internal cleavages and factions, and subjected the Church's claims to stand as the legitimate representative of the Greek Orthodox collectivity to a set of political criteria which set the Church in direct competition to the state. This competition would be rendered overt in the debates over the legal status of the Orthodox Church according to the Constitution of the Greek nation-state.
ENDOTES


2. For a concise summary of the experiences leading up to Constantine's conversion to Christianity, see Harry J. Magoulias, *Byzantine Christianity. Emperor, Church and the West* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1982), p. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 1.


5. For a review of Eusebius' role as the preeminent Christian political theorist under Constantinian rule, see Magoulias, *Byzantine Christianity*, p. 6-8. For a discussion of Eusebius' writings and their impact on subsequent elaborations of Christian political, see Papadakis, "The Historical Tradition," p. 38-40.

6. The lack of a developed political philosophy in the writings of the early Church theologians left Eusebius and his Byzantine cohort a significant degree of latitude in formulating a Byzantine theology which integrated Christian doctrine and the temporal concerns of the state. By the time of the eleventh-century religious schism between the Latin West and Orthodox East, differing political philosophical orientations had developed in the two Churches. For a comment on the reasons for the lack of a rigorous, formal political philosophy in what, after the eleventh century, was known as the Eastern Orthodox Church, see Michael A. Meerson, "The Doctrinal Foundation of Orthodoxy," in Ramet, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, p. 35.


9. The renowned Orthodox theologian, Georges Florovsky, emphasizes the social concern of Christianity. Quoted in Ramet, "Autocephaly and National Identity", p. 1, from Georges Florovsky, *Christianity and Culture*, 2 vols. (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1974). For a comprehensive discussion of the socially transformative capacity and responsibility of the Church, see the Florovsky volumes. On p. 16 in *Ekklesia kai Politia*, Bishop Meletios of Kithire argues that the Church, as "...unity of life with all creation, [and a] communion with all human beings," bears the responsibility of reconstructing society as a whole in the image of the heavenly kingdom.


12. Ibid., p. 38.


17. Ibid. This perspective of the interdependence of the two leaders was articulated in the ecclesiastical codex known as the *Efanogogue*, believed to have been authored by the then-Patriarch, Photius.


19. The Emperor shared certain liturgical privileges restricted to the clergy (such as blessing the congregation with the episcopal candelabra and delivering sermons) but he had no sacramental authority. See Magoulias, *Byzantine Christianity*, p. 9-10, and Papadakis, "The Historical Tradition," p. 41, for a discussion of the ecclesiastical purview of the Emperor. In terms of administrative prerogatives, the Emperor modified the boundaries of ecclesiastical jurisdictions by rearranging dioceses and, in certain cases, decided on the promotion and transfer of bishops.
20. George Dan Kent, "The Political Influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece," unpublished Ph.D. diss. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1971), p. 31. Most scholars do not dispute the ability of the Emperor to influence the selection and tenure of the Patriarch and, through this, to exercise some impact over the course of doctrinal disputes within the Church. On this point, references are frequently made over the fact that almost one third of the Patriarchs at Constantinople resigned their office under pressure from the imperial throne. See, for example, Papadakis, "The Historical Tradition," p. 41. By the same token, however, the instability in the Patriarchal office must be understood within the overall context of the political instability of the office of Emperor, particularly during the last four centuries of Byzantine rule. Moreover, Meyendorff comments that of the "[t]wo thirds of all Byzantine emperors [who] were either killed or dethroned...many had been, at least in part, the victims of their own religious policies." See Meyendorff, The Byzantine Legacy, p. 15.

21. In cases where doctrinal controversies threatened the unity of the Church, the Emperor was mandated by his divinely-endowed status as isapostolos to convoke and preside over the Ecumenical Councils. The Ecumenical Councils decided all questions of Church dogma and doctrine, and were responsible for the publication, confirmation, and enforcement of the Church's disciplinary canons. Despite the Emperor's responsibility for convening the Ecumenical Councils in cases of threats to the religious orthodoxy of the Empire, it was the Patriarch who presided over the Councils by virtue of his charismatic authority for safeguarding the doctrinal purity of the faith. All matters of faith and doctrine fell under the exclusive purview of the bishops, based on their collective decisions in Ecumenical Councils under the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit. The Emperor was not permitted to participate in or to vote with the bishops, whose decisions in turn ultimately depended on the cooperation and consent of the majority of the clergy and the laity.

22. Meyendorff, The Byzantine Legacy, p. 20. Meyendorff also provides a summary of the Patriarchal selection process. The repercussions of the elimination of the lay voice from the decisionmaking processes of the Church is discussed in detail in Chapter Three, with regard to the doctrinal-institutional incongruities in Orthodoxy, intra-institutional pressures for ecclesiastical reform, and the Church-state relationship in postwar Greece.


26. Magoulias, Byzantine Christianity, p. 16. For example, public opinion negated the results of the two noteworthy attempts at healing the formal estrangement of
the Christian East and West during the latter centuries of the Byzantine Empire. While political representatives and religious delegates signed documents of ecclesiastical reunion at the so-called reunion councils at Lyon in 1274 and Florence from 1438 to 1439, the documents were rejected and thereby nullified by the majority of the clergy and laity in the Byzantine East. Ware discusses the attempts at ecclesiastical reunion in terms of their political context and theological stumbling blocks. See Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 71-80.


28. For elaboration on the reasoning behind this conclusion of Justinian I's, see ibid., p. 49.


30. The battle of Mantzikert and the fall of Bari in 1071 marked a decisive turning point in the expansionary history of the Empire. From this point on, the Byzantine Empire was essentially under a state of constant siege in the face of Turkish and Arab invasions on its eastern and Mediterranean frontiers; meanwhile, the schism in the Christian Church in 1054 cemented what would become an open politico-military breach between the Byzantine and Holy Roman Empires, so that the Byzantine Emperors confronted enemies on nearly every front for the next five centuries.


32. The theological and historical literature on the Great Schism is substantial. For an excellent and understandable summary, see Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 51-95. For a more comprehensive account, see Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*.

33. The political unity of the two parts of the Christian Byzantine oecumene, the Greek east and Latin west, was broken with the start of the barbarian invasions in the Latin west in about the sixth century. The break was deepened with the proclamation of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor in 800 AD, with the spread of Islamic control over the eastern provinces and Mediterranean portions of the Empire and, with the eventual Turkish capture of Constantinople. For a summary of the links between the religious and political disintegration of the Roman Empire, see Meyendorff, *The Byzantine Legacy*, p. 22-31.

34. For a discussion of the *millet* as a religious as well as ethnic community, see Theodore H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and Its People under Turkish Domination* (Brussels, Belgium: 1952).


36. Islamic law posited the existence of a historically continuous tie between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Islam regarded the Bible as a holy book and Jesus Christ as a prophet, although Christianity was seen as imperfect and incomplete. Christians, as "Peoples of the Book," were assured religious tolerance in the form of the right to practice their own religion. So long as they remained loyal and obedient members of the Empire, conversion was not compulsory for the non-Muslim subject populations of the Ottoman Empire.


38. Sultan Mohammed II conferred the imperial *berat* on the Orthodox Church almost immediately after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople, and subsequent Sultans conferred the *berat* on the occasion of the election of each new Patriarch. The *berat* represented "...the original (supposed) charter by which [the Sultan] conferred to the Church its status" under Ottoman imperial rule. Ibid., p. 27-28.

39. The privileges of the Patriarch included "(I) Inviolability of his person; he is not accountable to anybody; (II) exemption from taxes of any kind; (III) immutability in his office; (IV) absolute freedom; (V) transmission of his status to his successors; (VI) extension of his privileges to the higher dignitaries under his jurisdiction." The ordinances also recognized specific rights for the Church, including "(I) the inconvertibility of the surviving churches into mosques; (II) the sanction of the customary procedure followed by the Church in respect of marriages, burials, and other usages; (III) the preservation of the feast and holiday of Easter, and the permission of keeping the gate of the Phanar, the Greek quarter, open for three days on the occasion of that holiday." Papadopoulos, *Documents and Studies*, p. 4-6.

40. The Ottomans vested the Patriarch with full responsibility for matters of ecclesiastical discipline, episcopal election, financial management of Church property, and doctrinal disputes. Ibid., p. 26-29.

41. The Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine heartland had reunited the Orthodox Christian populations of the entire Near East, the Balkans, and Asia Minor. According to the organizational structure of the Eastern Orthodox Church, these populations were administered by the three Orthodox Patriarchs at Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria. These hierarchs were theoretically independent to the Ecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, who was considered the "first among equals." The centralization of ecclesiastical power in the hands of the Patriarch
at Constantinople extended, by the late eighteenth century, to the Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Serbia, Cyprus, and Crete.

42. Ware, The Orthodox Church, p. 52-54. For an excellent historical treatment of the links between the Hellenization of the Balkan Christians and the impact on emergent nationalisms, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," in European History Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1989): 149-192.

43. The Church was in charge of organizing and running the educational system of the Orthodox millet, including both secular and catechetical instruction. Runciman provides a brief discussion of the Church's administration of the educational system under the millet model, on p. 30 in The Eastern Schism. For a detailed treatment of the same issue, with particular attention to the Hellenization of the millet under the educational auspices of the Orthodox Church, see Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities."


45. The millet model was part of the Ottoman state's broader policy goals with regard to the Church and the Greek Orthodox population of the Empire. The state's desire to reach an accommodation with the Orthodox Church was based on vital practical concerns. The Ottoman Sultan prudently recognized that the continued economic prosperity of the expanding Ottoman Empire depended on the cooperation of his Orthodox subjects, who comprised a large majority of the conquered peoples, particularly in the region of southeastern Europe. A working relationship with the Church would help to reduce the animosity and opposition of the Greek Orthodox population in the Empire, as well as allow the state to make use of the Church's substantial infrastructure in order to organize the economy. Accommodative relations with the Church were also essential to the Ottoman state from the point of view of political and military strategy. In order to ensure that the Orthodox Church would not seek assistance from the Latin west against the Ottomans, Sultan Mohammed II indirectly supported the East-West ecclesiastical divorce. His confirmation of Gennadius Scholarios as Patriarch had been a shrewd tactic along these lines, in that Scholarios was not only the leading Greek theologian of the time but was also a staunch opponent of reconciliation between the two Christian Churches. Papadopoulos discusses the choice of Scholarios on p. 1-20 in Documents and Studies.

46. Papadakis, "Church-State Relations," p. 47.

47. They were forced to wear distinctive dress, and were restricted in the scope of their interactions with Muslims. For example, Christian men could not marry Muslim women, although Christian women were regularly taken and placed in Turkish harems. A variety of head taxes was imposed on the Orthodox Christians, due to their classification as religious minorities. Christians had to accept the
arbitrary confiscation of their wealth, as well as the Turks' frequent attacks on and destruction of their property. Finally, the Orthodox Christian community endured the periodic loss of a portion of its young male population, who were rounded up to serve as recruits for the Empire's elite military corp, the Janissaries. See Kent, "The Political Influence," p. 38-39, for a discussion of these points.


50. In addition to the peshkesh, the berats set out several classes of financial obligations to which the Patriarch was subjected. All of these payments could be modified according to the pronouncements of individual sultans, and they were uniformly accompanied by large material contributions in kind paid to the Sultan. The Patriarch financed his berat payment by exacting a fee from each bishop for installation as the leader of the diocese; the bishops, in turn, taxed the lower clergy, who then drew financial recompense through the services they provided at the parish level. Papadopoulos gives a full account of the range of financial obligations imposed by the Ottoman government, on p. 30-31 in Studies and Documents.

51. Each candidate for election to the Patriarchal throne was obligated to make a payment (known as the peshkesh) to the Sultan, in order to finalize the election process and to guarantee the issue of the berat of confirmation. Significantly, most sources agree that the practice actually originated in the fifteenth century amongst the Patriarchal candidates themselves, who offered money to the Sultan at the time in order to influence his decision on the Patriarchal appointment. Runciman, The Eastern Schism, p. 32-33.

52. Runciman, The Great Church, p. 391.


54. The resentment of the laity and clergy towards the Ottoman state was particularly acute with regard to the state's overt lack of tolerance for the free practice of Christianity by the members of the millet. The state progressively expropriated the Orthodox churches in the Empire and, usually, converted them into mosques. By the eighteenth century, only three churches dating from before
the fall of Constantinople remained in Christian hands. Likewise, Church efforts to construct new places of worship and new Christian school facilities were, with increasing frequency, rejected by the state and, here again, bribery became the modus operandi for securing any such requests. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, p. 32.


56. The origins of Greek nationalism are discussed in detail by Kitromilides in "'Imagined Communities'". Also, see Runciman, *The Great Church*, p. 392-406 and, for additional background, p. 362-384; and, Clogg, "Anticieryalism."


58. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 21. A detailed account of the role of hierarchs and clergy in the war, based on regional differences, is provided on p. 21-45.
CHAPTER TWO

The Establishment of the Greek Nation-State: the Constitutional Model of Church-State Relations and the Imagined Community

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the reformulation of the Church-state relationship which occurred with the establishment of the Greek nation-state in 1830, on the conclusion of the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire. The chapter concentrates on the period from 1821 to 1850, since these are the formative decades in which the basic assumptions and structures of the constitutional model of Church-state relations were defined. The Greek War of Independence marked the de facto termination of the millet model of relations between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Ottoman state. Those parts of the Church within the territories in rebellion repudiated Ottoman rule, and thereby severed their relations with a Patriarchate which for all practical purposes was controlled by the Sultan at Constantinople. The establishment of the Greek nation-state required a formal resolution of the ruptured relations between the Patriarchate and those portions of the Orthodox Church within the new sovereign territory of the Kingdom of Greece. The resolution of this intra-ecclesiastical problem was also tied to the question of the nature of relations between the Orthodox Church and the state in Greece.

The chapter explores the constitutional model of Church-state relations as a response to the aforementioned circumstances. As a successor to the symphonia and millet arrangements, the constitutional model represented an attempt to
rework the links between politics and religion in Greek public life according to the emergent exigencies of nation-statehood. The chapter focuses on clarifying the worldview and mechanisms which defined the constitutional model of the 1821 to 1850 period, because these features remained largely unaltered up through the time of PASOK's emergence as a new political formation in the wake of the transition to democracy in 1974--despite the radical changes in the country's political-economic and cultural conditions in the intervening century-and-half.

The main aim of the chapter is to show that the constitutional model was the product of two conflicting visions for constructing a modern nation-state and of alternative interpretations of the role of Orthodoxy in the Greek historical experience. I characterize the competing visions for modernizing Greece in terms of two groups of elites, referred to in the social science literature on Greece as modernists and traditionalists.¹ The ascendancy of the modernists, coincident with and reinforced by the decisive impact of the Great Powers of nineteenth-century Europe in imposing on Greece its initial political structures, determined the nature of Church-state relations under the constitutional model. I argue that, despite the modernists' conviction that the constitutional model should subordinate the Church to the aims of nation-building, the model was informed by contradictions based on the ways it attempted to deal with the historical experience of Orthodoxy as a constitutive aspect of collective identity in Greece.

The chapter also considers how different groups within the Orthodox Church participated in and reacted to the experience of nation-statehood. The declaration of autocephalous status by the Orthodox Church of Greece provoked dissent within the Church over the implications of such ecclesiastical autonomy for the
Church's role in society. The autocephaly debate as part of the elaboration of the constitutional model reflected the Church's attempt to negotiate the place for Orthodoxy in the fluid conditions of secular, modernizing Greece. I argue that, despite disagreements within the Church, the declaration of autocephaly and the elaboration of the constitutional relationship in no way implied the acceptance (by either ordained or elite strata) of a marginalized role for the Church in Greek society. The contradictions embedded in the constitutional model were partly the result of the Church's attempt to utilize the framework as a political mechanism for strengthening a conception of the nation which was essentially religious in nature.

II. The Greek War of Independence: Modernists and Traditionalists

As observed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, the Patriarch and the hierarchical leadership of the Eastern Orthodox Church responded with some ambivalence to the outbreak of the war for independence from the Turks by the Greek Orthodox members of the Christian millet. The ambivalence within the Church, although largely confined to the Constantinopolitan hierarchical elites whose failure to maintain the political loyalty of their millet stood to cost them their lives, was symptomatic of broader irresolution in Greek society towards the redistribution of political-economic power which would be the likely outcome of Greek independence from the Ottomans.

The power struggle within Greek society which occurred as part of the War of Independence centered around the two constellations mentioned above, the modernists and the traditionalists. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of each group, a summary characterization of the modernists and traditionalists is possible
in terms of socio-economic composition, political role under the Ottoman imperial system, and attitude towards the creation of a Greek nation-state.\textsuperscript{2}

The modernists were a disparate group of political and intellectual elites, the majority of whom had been living in the Greek diaspora communities of Western Europe and Russia during the \textit{Turkokratia}, although an important segment of the modernists was comprised of the Greek merchant elites residing in the Danubian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The singular element in explaining the modernists' support for the Greek War of Independence and for a particular conception of an independent Greek nation-state was their exposure to Enlightenment ideas about modernity, through education in Western European centers of learning and through contacts with Western European ideas and practices via trade and commerce.\textsuperscript{3} In the tradition of the French Revolution, the Greek modernists aspired to found an independent state of Greece whose territorial boundaries would coincide with the Greek Orthodox peoples formerly under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

While the immediate political objective of the modernists was liberation from the Ottoman Empire and the founding of an independent Greek state, the longer term project of the modernists was to construct a national community which would act as a source of legitimation for the new state. The modernists calculated that the success of their political and cultural projects was as much related to indigenous circumstances as it was to the willingness of the then-powerful nations of Western Europe to endorse the enterprise of a modern, Greek nation-state. So, while the modernists subscribed to the general outlines of the Western prototype of nation as a community defined in terms of language and secular
culture, these Greek elites also recognized that the Great Powers' fascination with classical Greece as the wellspring of Western civilization provided a critical political opportunity for gaining Great Power protection for the nascent Greek nation-state. As a result, the modernists aimed "...to exploit the fusion of the classical and modern..." in order to secure a modern Greek state, and purposefully shaped the identity of the national community "...in a spirit of European Hellenism..." that would appeal to "...the master narrative of the West."

The modernists' conception of the nation took the Western European vision of nationalism as a paradigm for the Greek nation, and endorsed the Western European identity of modern Greece as a representation of the classical past. Accordingly, the modernists rejected (or, at least, devalued) the importance of the country's Byzantine and Ottoman historical experiences. In particular, those political and cultural elements associated with the Ottoman period were seen as traditionalist denigrations of the classical identity of the Greeks, and therefore deserved to be eliminated by the state from the imagined community of the modern nation.

Notwithstanding the broad consensus amongst modernists that the emergent Greek nation should be constructed in terms of Western, secular precepts stressing social and political unity through language and through emphasis on spatial-temporal continuity with Greece's classical heritage, there is ample evidence to suggest an important ambiguity in the modernist view of the national imaginary. This ambiguity centered on the question of the meaning of secularity and, likewise, the meaning of religion for the Greek nation. Many leading figures of what came to be known as the Greek Enlightenment school of the late eighteenth-early
nineteenth century were committed to creating a secular society, understood as one in which the Church's jurisdiction in society would be limited to non-political matters. However, in terms of the meaning of religion for the Greek nation, Greek Enlightenment figures also were committed "...to the abstract idea of the Greek nation...as a community encompassing all Greek-speaking Christians living within..."9 (bold mine) the given territorial boundaries controlled by the state. The ambiguity around the religious dimensions of the new imagined community would exert an important influence in the nature of the Church-state relationship as formulated in the constitutional model.

Significantly, those very elements which were the target of either reconstruction or marginalization according to the modernist vision were the indigenous traditional elites whose response to the War of Independence and conception of collective identity were shaped by the reality of having survived direct Ottoman control as part of the Orthodox millet. The traditionalists were a heterogeneous group of Greek elites, comprised of military, political, and ecclesiastical elements which included the notables and military chieftans of the Peloponnesus, the military chieftans of Rumeli (Central Greece), the Phanariots, and the ordained stratum in the Church. The defining features shared by this conglomeration of elites was that all of them had secured positions of political and economic power within the constraints of the millet, and therefore viewed the prospect of nation-statehood as a threat to their existing place in the social matrix.

However, it is important to recognize that the ambivalence of the traditionalists towards nation-statehood did not preclude support for the War of Independence. In fact, each of the segments of the traditionalist constellation contributed to the
revolution against the Turks in critical ways, but the traditionalists participated in the revolution against the Ottomans "...not [as part of] a common program or ideology but rather [because of] the desire to cast-off the foreign yoke, and be free to pursue their goals of individual or group independence." Overall, in their participation in the War of Independence, the traditionalists were motivated by a reaction against the arbitrary exercises of authority and violence to which they had been subjected under the millet, rather than by a concrete set of goals for establishing an independent Greek state.

Political independence, rather than nation-statehood, was seen as the objective of the revolution for most traditionalists, so that the prospect of losing their existing bases of power to a state imposed in the name of a putative national community with which most traditionalists felt no allegiance determined the traditionalists' response to the modernists' vision for nation-statehood. In short, the traditionalists viewed the state in instrumental terms, as a mechanism of power to be captured for use in the protection of one's own interests. Other than this general objective, the traditionalist program for state-building was inchoate.

For the traditionalists, "the idea of nationalism if at all present in their minds was at most very vague and dim." Indeed, the abstraction of an imagined community grounded in shared political norms and ideals was largely irrelevant to the traditionalists, whose single formative experience of community under the Ottomans had been defined in religious terms with the Church at its head. The Church's place in the modernist versus traditionalist schema remains a matter of controversy in Greek historiography, suggesting the difficulties in placing the Church in either the traditionalist nor to the modernist group. However, if the
essential distinction between the modernist and traditionalist constellations was the
attitude towards forming a Greek national imaginary conceived in terms of
Western European prototypes, then the Orthodox Church belonged to the
traditionalist group.

The near unanimous support of the parish clergy in Greek Orthodox
communities throughout the *millet* and the leading role of the hierarchy in the
Peloponnesus\textsuperscript{13} was grounded in a view of the war as a revolution "...in the name
of religion."\textsuperscript{14} For the major participants in the independence struggle--the largely
uneducated and politically fragmented peasants--the revolution against the Turks
was understood as a Holy War by the Greek Orthodox community against a
Muslim Turkish oppressor. Accustomed to identifying themselves as members of
a religious community administered by the Church, the peasant elements of the
traditionalist group certainly did not take the creation of a Western, secular state
as the objective of their struggle.\textsuperscript{15}

The War of Independence was fought, then, by two heterogeneous groupings
in Greek society whose objectives for statehood and vision for national community
were remarkably different from one another. Moreover, the above summary of
the modernists and traditionalists also illustrates that, within these two
constellations, there existed significant ambiguities concerning the motivations for
revolution as well as the links between religious and secular conceptions of
collective identity. These ambiguities were expressed in the debates over the
Church-state constitutional model that were part of the process of state building
and social modernization after independence.
III. The Establishment of the Greek State

The Greek War of Independence from the Turks was a prolonged struggle which stretched from 1821 until 1830, when the Great Powers of Europe (Britain, France, and Russia) decided the existence of an independent Greek nation-state under their guarantee. The Convention of Constantinople, signed in 1832 by Britain, France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, set the borders of the Greek state around three main territorial blocks: the Peloponnesus, the large southern peninsula; Rumeli, the central portions of the mainland; and the Aegean Islands. In May 1832, the three Guarantor Powers decided the political system of the new Greek state, by establishing Greece as a monarchy and offering the first Crown to Prince Otho of Bavaria. A three-man Regency was to be appointed by the King of Bavaria, to exercise royal authority until Otho attained ruling age in June 1835.

Otho and his regents arrived in Greece in February 1833, marking the official termination of the revolution and what had been a continuous situation of internal political strife. The duration of the war for independence had been as much a result of internecine struggles and lack of organization among the revolutionaries as of the strength of Ottoman resistance, since the Ottoman state apparatus had lost control of most of the territories in revolt within the first several months of the start of the revolution. From 1821 to 1828, the various Greek elites engaged in an intense political and military struggle reflecting the fundamental disagreement between modernists (the majority of whom had returned from diaspora to join the struggle against the Ottomans) and traditionalists over the nature of the central authority, if any, which should be established to govern
Greece. The brief interregnum of Ioannis Kapodistrias, who had arrived in Greece in January 1828 following his election as President by the National Assembly of the revolutionary government at Troezen,\textsuperscript{21} was ended with his assassination in 1831, and the arrival of the Bavarian leadership marked the end of the renewed civil war amongst the Greek revolutionaries.

The formulation of Church-state relations in the independent Kingdom of Greece was part of the larger project of state-building undertaken by the Bavarian Regency which established Greece's political foundations during the years from 1833 to 1835. The internecine conflict amongst the Greeks for the first seven years of the war for independence was driven by the modernists' and traditionalists' struggle over control of the emergent political system. The modernists had four basic objectives with regard to structuring the Greek political system:

"a constitutional state...in which provision would be made for individual liberty, in addition to a popularly elected assembly which would register the will of the nation; a separation of Church and State which would, in effect, reduce the Church to one of several social institutions within the state, and confine its role to ministering to the spiritual needs of its flock; a legal-bureaucratic state following western prototypes of legal and administrative practices; and a regular army, organized and trained according to western practice."\textsuperscript{22}

In contrast, the traditionalists were had little concerned for

"...a central authority for a central authority, for a popular constitution and for legislative assemblies;...while admitting the need for a common tie and for a sort of general leadership...each would no less desire to remain absolute master within his district. Their aim, in one word, is neither a republic, nor a monarchy, but an oligarchical confederation..."\textsuperscript{23}

The imposition of the Bavarian Regency guaranteed the ascendancy of the modernists' objectives. The traditionalists, who had little in common with Great Power approaches to nation-statehood and who—as it turned out, quite accurately—
viewed Great Power interference as a potential threat to the long-term autonomy of Greece's indigenous elites, reacted to the changing internal balance of power by attempting to secure their own interests. The traditionalists' instrumentalist response took the form of a pragmatic acquiescence to the imposition of Western political institutions simultaneous with an attempt to secure internal control over these political structures.

The Bavarian Regency produced a constitutional model of Church-state relations that was the product of the modernists' larger effort to graft Western European institutions onto Greek society without attending to the contingencies of local structure. This "peculiar hybrid system" directed the creation of the imagined community of the nation, or that collectivity which is imagined as limited by virtue of being finite, if elastic, boundaries; sovereign by virtue of being a free state; and a community whose deep, horizontal comradeship underlies a willingness to die for such national imaginary.

IV. The Constitutional Model of Church-State Relations

The constitutional model of Church-state relations was largely the product of Professor Ludwig von Maurer, who was Regent appointed to head the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The intense political and military instability of the revolutionary period and of the Kapodistrian interregnum had produced physical destruction and administrative chaos for the Church, particularly as Ottoman reprisals against the ecclesiastical leadership had provoked a widespread relocation to Greece of bishops and clergy seeking refuge from the Ottoman-controlled territories. Maurer therefore set out to resolve three immediate problems regarding the Orthodox Church in Greece: first, relations between the Orthodox
Church in Greece and the Patriarchate at Constantinople; second, the legal-formal relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Greek state; and third, reconstruction and reform of the organizational structure of the Church in Greece.

In fact, all three of the above issues had been a consistent item on the political agenda of the revolutionary governments and, then, of the Kapodistrian regime. Every National Assembly held from 1821 through 1832 dealt with at least some aspect of the above three elements. The failure to resolve the question of the Church's place in the Greek nation-state was the result of the Greek state's lack of capacity for implementing the policies outlined in the Constitutions of the various National Assemblies, as well as of the contradictory aspects of policies which reflected the divergent views of the modernist and traditionalist elites over the structures and norms of Greek society.

Maurer's objectives with regard to each of the three aspects of the religious question were clear-cut, however, and reflected a substantial convergence with the modernists' approach to the role of the Church in the larger project of statecraft in Greece. The religious question was subordinated to the enterprise of building a political system designed according to the aims of "...national independence, royal absolutism, state centralization, and curbing the aims of the native [that is, traditionalist elites] ruling class." The Ecclesiastical Constitution of 23 July 1833, as well as the constitutional legislation (from May 1833 through May 1834) pertaining to the Orthodox Church, reflected the above objectives. Moreover, the constitutional model of Church-state relations was shaped by significant input from the modernist contingent, who formed a majority on the Ecclesiastical Commission
which Maurer had established to make recommendations on the structure for Church-state relations in Greece.³³

In every respect, the constitutional model of Church-state relations was designed to achieve the legal-formal subordination of the Orthodox Church to the state, and therefore to eliminate the Church's abilities to challenge the legitimacy of the state on the basis of the responsibilities and rights which had been accorded the Eastern Orthodox Church under the millet model. The autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church of Greece was proclaimed, establishing the administrative autonomy of the Church vis-a-vis the Patriarchate at Constantinople while stipulating the continued doctrinal communion of the two institutions. The autocephaly issue was integrally related to Maurer's concerns over the sovereignty of the Greek state, since he viewed the autonomy of the Church of Greece, from a Patriarch who would continue to be constrained by the Ottoman Sultan, as a sine qua non for the complete political independence and sovereignty of the new state.³⁴

Maurer's aims in the resolution of the autocephaly question were reinforced by the specific features of Church-state relations structured by the constitutional model. The Church of Greece was effectively transformed into a department of the state, and was subordinated to the state through a range of political and administrative mechanisms. The Constitution set Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church as the established (epikratousa) religion and Church of Greece, but the Church was bound to respect the authority of the King of Greece "in secular affairs."³⁵ Additionally, the monarch was appointed the highest authority for the
external affairs of the Church, including administrative and jurisdictional aspects of the ecclesiastical organization.

A Permanent Holy Synod was created, as the supreme administrative organ dealing with doctrinal and ecclesiological matters in the Church, but Synodal membership was subject to state approval and Synodal procedures were invalid without the presence of the Government Procurator, a lay person to be appointed by the state. One of the Synod's constitutionally-specified responsibilities was to ensure that "...priests do not engage in political affairs or in any way take part in them." The Church was stripped of all of its political prerogatives formerly enjoyed under the millet model, including responsibility for judiciary matters.

The economic and financial structure developed by the constitutional model, which was aimed at the post-independence reconstruction and reform of the organizational structure of the Church of Greece, expanded the legal-formal subordination of the Church to the state. A series of legislative decrees mandated the expropriation of extensive amounts of Church properties (including land, buildings, and religious artifacts) and closed nearly seventy-five percent of the monasteries. Further, the state decreed the formation of an Ecclesiastical Treasury, whose proceeds from expropriations were meant to support the salaries of all ordained members of the Church (who were legally civil servants), to finance the education and training of candidates for ordination, and to contribute to the national education system.

The constitutional model had achieved Maurer's objectives of circumscribing the role of the Church in the emerging political system of Greece, and satisfied the modernists' aims of building the country's political institutions according to
Western European prototypes. However, the constitutional model had important repercussions on the organizational structure of the Church, which insinuated the ambiguities in the modernists' conception of the meaning of Orthodoxy in the national identity.

V. Tensions in the Constitutional Model

The proclamation of autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Greece had precipitated an open rupture with the Patriarchate at Constantinople, which refused to grant official recognition to the Church's status. The Patriarch at that time, Constantine, maintained that the decision was uncanonical and that it undermined the unity of the Eastern Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{41}

The break between the Church of Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople was not resolved until 1850, with the promulgation of the Patriarchal \textit{Tomos} (Tome) re-establishing communion between the Eastern Orthodox Church at Constantinople and the Church of Greece and granting official ecclesiastical recognition of the autocephalous status of the latter. The stipulations of the \textit{Tomos}, however, demanded as an indispensable condition for recognition that the synod of bishops vested with responsibility for administering the Church would be "...called to serve successively according to the date of their consecration, having as president the metropolitan of Athens\textsuperscript{42} and that the synod would "...direct the affairs of the Church according to the sacred canons in all liberty and without any hindrance or temporal intervention.\textsuperscript{43}

Following two years of drafting, the Greek state legislated yet another Ecclesiastical Charter which marked the most significant change in what had been only incidental revisions to that date in the constitutional model of 1833.\textsuperscript{44} In
addition to implementing a rotational structure for the Permanent Holy Synod, the number of episcopal sees for the Kingdom of Greece was expanded, and all of the bishops holding these episcopates were appointed to a newly created Hierarchal Synod mandated to decide on doctrinal matters in the Church.

But while the Ecclesiastical Charter of 1852 effected the reconciliation between the Churches at Athens and Constantinople, the government augmented the stipulations of the Patriarchal Tomos with provisions which preserved the interventionary capacity of the state as embodied in the original constitutional model. Most importantly, the powers of the Government Procurator and the Minister of Religions were retained.\textsuperscript{45} In short, the Patriarchal Tomos and the 1952 Ecclesiastical Charter did not augur any essential changes in the nature of the constitutional model.

Because the reconciliation between the Church of Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople did not fundamentally alter the Church-state relationship in Greece, the strains created by the constitutional model were perpetuated over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These strains were grounded in dissension within the Church over the implications of the constitutional model, and were intensified by state's attempts to utilize Orthodoxy as an element in constructing the collective identity of the nation.

Intra-ecclesiastical disagreement over the Church-state constitutional model was rooted in the procedures surrounding the Episcopal Assembly which Maurer had convened to vote on the recommendations made by the Ecclesiastical Commission regarding the reformulation of Church-state relations. Because Maurer viewed the Assembly as a tactical effort to give legitimacy to the
Commission's actions, he summarily called the meeting to ensure that its composition would be heavily weighted in favor of a positive vote on the proposals for the constitutional model.\textsuperscript{46} The legacy of intra-ecclesiastical acrimony over the procedures, as well as the outcome, of the 1833 constitutional model crystallized around Constantine Oekonomos and Theoklitos Pharmacides.\textsuperscript{47}

Both Oekonomos and Pharmacides were well-educated, ordained members of the Church, who represented, respectively, the traditionalist and modernist approach to structuring Church-state relations in the Greek nation-state. The fundamental difference between the perspectives of Oekonomos and Pharmacides, and the ecclesiastical groups they came to represent, was the way in which each interpreted the implications of the constitutional model for the Church in the Greek public life. Pharmacides maintained that the constitutional model and the autocephalous status which was its concomitant were essential to the sovereignty of the Greek state and, therefore, to the long-term possibilities for the Church to play a dynamic role in Greek society. Oekonomos, in contrast, argued that the constitutional model was a blatant attempt by the state to marginalize the role of the Church in public life in Greece and to manipulate the Orthodox dimensions of the national imaginary.

The state's project of nation-building over the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries lent credence to Oekonomos' perspective. The almost chronic instability which marked Greek politics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries\textsuperscript{48} was grounded in the lack of congruence which grew out of the imposition of Western institutional structures on the country's traditional social formation. The Great Power decision to establish Otho as the country's first
monarch without any consultation with domestic political forces in Greece stood as the most stark example of the source of the state-society incongruence, and undermined the legitimacy of the state supposedly founded on Enlightenment principles of popular sovereignty.

Maurer's use of the constitutional model to subordinate the Church to the state had been an astute effort to secure the sovereignty and legitimacy of the nascent state in the face of an institution whose historical role presented the possibility for a challenge to the unrivalled political authority of the state. However, the state-society incongruence generated by the circumstances of state formation (as well as the state's subsequent performance in political and economic management) encouraged the modernists to attempt to use Orthodoxy as a means of making the state and the national imaginary coterminus. Therein lay the contradictions of the constitutional model of Church-state relations.

Whereas the modernists first envisioned the Church-state constitutional model as an institutional mechanism for reducing any extant sense of collective belonging defined in terms of Orthodoxy, the modernists turned to enlist the Church in two of the most important aspects of the enterprise of national identity construction: first, the use of language to promote a sense of shared ideas, values, and interpretations about historical experience; and second, the pursuit of the irredentist dream of the Meghali Idea (the Great Idea) to cultivate a sense of shared political commitment to a Greater Greece.

A brief examination of both of these attempts to integrate nation and state shows how a space was opened for Orthodoxy in the collective identity, and exposes the ambiguities in the Church-state relationship under the constitutional
model. The question of a national language as part of the political project of constructing collective identity grew out of the modernists' decision to imitate Western European models for nation-statehood, as well as to subscribe to the Western European interpretation of the meaning of Greekness. The modernists, predominant in the state bureaucracy as a result of their cooperation with the Regency and the Great Powers, installed as the official language of the state and education the linguistic register known as *katharevousa*.

An artificial language which combined elements of the classical Greek with the demotic (*demotike*), or spoken vernacular register, *katharevousa* was imposed as the national idiom in an effort to create a modern cultural community imagined in terms of continuity with Greece's classical past.

"By returning to an uncorrupted from of the ancient language,...[the modernists] believed the Greek people would once again assume their rightful place in Europe, a position worthy of their resurrected ancestors,...based on...'the linguistic proof of the continuity of Hellenism and of the Greekness of the Greeks.'"51

Paradoxically, the modernists' attempt to use language to create an imagined community defined in terms of classical Greece involved Church and state in a cooperative enterprise, and introduced Orthodoxy into the collective identity. The Church also subscribed to the use of *katharevousa*, based on the fact that this had been the language of the Church fathers (those theologians writing during the first four centuries of Byzantine Christianity), as well as on the fact that *katharevousa* had been the idiom used in the liturgical experience under Ottoman rule. The modernists' language program linked state and Church in the functional aspects of building the nation, as the state looked to the Church for support against those segments of Greek society who supported *demotike* as the preferred register for
education and the creation of a national literature. Furthermore, the state weakened its ability to use *kaiharevousa* as a means of defining national identity in solely in classical terms, since the association of *katharevousa* with the Byzantine and Ottoman experiences informed the national consciousness with religious dimensions.

The irredentist project of the *Meghali Idea* was the major foreign policy platform of the Greek state from the time of its inception and, in a basic sense, was the *raison d'etre* of the state with regard to its legitimacy as purveyor of the nation as imagined community and as living reality. Since its formal articulation as the primary objective of Greek foreign policy in the early 1940s, the *Meghali Idea* had been the motive force in statecraft vis-a-vis the Near East and Asia Minor. Significantly, the Great Idea was elaborated at a time when the state's problems in overcoming local cleavages suggested a reorientation towards the external possibilities for state success in building the nation.

But if the *Meghali Idea* was designed by modernists as "...a guarantee of social cohesion,...as a panacea for problems of the Greek state and as a medium of communication between people and government," this particular aspect of the construction of national identity reinforced the ambiguous nature of the Church's subordination in the constitutional model. The aim of the *Meghali Idea* was to recover the members of a community defined in terms which preceded the nation-state, that is, those Greeks residing in the territories of the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires. So as a conception of community, the *Meghali Idea* de facto relied on Orthodoxy and on an historically continuous Orthodoxy whose longevity surpassed any secular conceptions of nationhood proposed by the Greek state.
Furthermore, because the Church had been the legitimate representative of that community which the *Meghali Idea* sought to recreate, the state's political project of unifying the nation acknowledged an institutional competitor for the right to define the collective imaginary.

As with the attempt to use the *katharevousa* to construct a linguistically-based conception of national identity, the state's elaboration of the *Meghali Idea* as a utopian vision for imagining the nation drew the Church and Orthodoxy into the enterprise of collective identity construction. Rather than reinforcing the subordination of religion to politics, which was the central feature of the constitutional model of Church-state relations, the state's domestic and external projects of collective identity formation offered the Church an opportunity to use its status as the *epikratousa thriseia* (established religion) under the constitutional model as a state-sanctioned mechanism for participation in public life in Greece.

**VI. Conclusion**

This chapter examined the restructuring of Church-state relations which occurred with the formation of the Greek nation-state. The strict chronological focus of the chapter was the period from 1833 to 1850, since this was the timespan in which the defining features of the constitutional model of Church-state relations were worked out. Moreover, the basic structure of the 1833 constitutional model became the framework which, with few changes, regulated interactions between the Orthodox Church and the state in Greece until the transition to democracy almost a century-and-a-half later in 1974. The agenda and mechanisms which formed part of the PASOK approach to religious questions in
the latter part of the twentieth century were elaborated as an alternative to the extant constitutional model.

The chapter showed that the constitutional model of Church-state relations was part of the overall project of political modernization directed by the Bavarian Regency and that group of Greek elites whose interpretation of nation-statehood was defined according to Western European prototypes. Because the model was the product of one particular vision for nation-statehood, the Church-state relationship necessarily represented the exclusion of those political and cultural approaches advocated by the traditionalist elites. Further, the modernists' understanding of nation-statehood meant that the constitutional model was premised on a deliberate break with the symphonia and millet arrangements; the balance of power between Church and state in terms of control over public space, as well as the religious dimensions of collective identity, were elements of the symphonia and millet which were incompatible with the modernists' aims for statecraft and construction of the national community.

Despite the compatibility between the secular nationalist philosophies of the Greek modernists and the Bavarian Regents, the latter were primarily concerned with imposing order on Greek society after almost a decade of revolution and internecine warfare, and with creating political structures designed to centralize authority in the monarchy and the state. The Church-state model reflected this primary concern and, to a lesser extent, suggested some attempt to harmonize to harmonize the antinomies between the Greek historical experience and the Western European blueprint for modernization by manipulating the place for religion in public life in Greece.
The Church-state relationship engendered by the constitutional model was informed by inconsistencies which belied the fact that the legal-formal strictures of the constitutional model seemed to empower the state with the authority to circumscribe the Church's place in public life in Greece. The constitutional model promoted the formation of an authentically secular society in Greece, since one of the essential conditions of secularity is the relativization of worldviews concomitant with the desacralization of society. Moreover, by stripping the Church of the political prerogatives it had been explicitly accorded in the millet (and implicitly afforded in the symphonia) arrangements, the constitutional model strengthened the secularizing objectives of the Greek state: namely, to construct the nation on the basis of non-sacred constructs such as language and the putative origins of the modern Greek collectivity in the country's classical past. The constitutional model suggested that religion and secular modernity were incompatible, both in terms of the functional aspects of Church-state relations in the public sphere and in terms of cultural role for each institution in shaping the national imaginary.

However, by making Orthodoxy the established religion of Greece and by providing the Church with an official constitutional status different from all other institutions in society, the constitutional model compromised the creation of the kind of religious pluralism which marks secularity. The constitutional model, by acknowledging the distinctiveness of Orthodoxy in society, perpetuated the historical claims of the Church as the purveyor of collective identity, and weakened the state's abilities for monopolizing the definition of the national imaginary according to Western European criteria of secular modernity.
The inconsistencies in the constitutional model were underscored by the modernist statemakers' responses to the challenges of constructing the national community. The use of *katharevousa* and the elaboration of the *Meghali Idea* introduced religion as a key component of the collective identity of the nation, and recalled historical renditions of community which were defined in terms of religion. Moreover, insofar as the Church participated in public life, through the use of *katharevousa* as the language of the liturgy and educational instruction, and through its official stance of support for irredentist politics aimed at incorporating the Greek Orthodox populations into the new nation, the Church remained a competitor to the state as the sole purveyor of collective identity in modern society in Greece.

2. A detailed analysis of the modernists and traditionalists is provided in Chapter Four, as part of an analysis of the cultural contradictions (and their religious dimensions) in Greek society. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, I deliberately confine the discussion of modernists and traditionalists to a summary characterization of each group. The aim is to offer a working understanding of the vision of nation-statehood to which each group subscribed, in order to demonstrate the worldview in which debates of the Church-state relationship were framed. For a general discussion of the relationship between religion and modernity in nineteenth century Greece, see Nikos Kokosalakis, "Religion and Modernization in 19th Century Greece," in *Social Compass*, Vol. 34, 2-3 (1987).


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. See Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities;" and Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity*.


9. Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," p. 5. For example, Dimitrios Katartzis, one of the leading theoreticians of the Greek Enlightenment, remarked, "When I refer to a Greek Christian I mean a citizen of a nation...a member of a civil society...[whose]...laws and explicit ecclesiastical rules ...make him different from other [citizens] and members of other societies and religions." Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity*, p. 26.


11. An interesting discussion of the Phanariots' conception of nationalism and statehood is provided by Runciman, *The Great Church*, p. 360-384.


15. See ibid., p. 9-49, for a discussion of the Greek peasants' identification of the political struggle with a religious war against the Muslim Turks. For more on this point, see Runciman, *The Great Church*, p. 385-406.


17. The three European powers signed the protocol establishing the independent Greek state at the London Conference of 3 February 1830; the decision was made without any consultation of the Greeks. A comprehensive account of Great Power interests in the outcome of the Greek War of Independence is provided in Theodore Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos, and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign*


20. Diamandouros' "Political Modernization" offers a detailed treatment of this specific period in the history of Greek nation-state formation. See Dakin, "The Formation," for a condensed analysis of this period.

21. From the outbreak of the revolution in 1821, until Kapodistrias' election as President of revolutionary Greece in April 1827, the Greek revolutionaries were engaged in a continuous process of attempting to set up a central governing authority. A range of local and regional councils and assemblies were created, but historians generally divide the 1821-1827 revolutionary period into six National Assemblies and three parliamentary phases, culminating in the Kapodistrian interregnum from 1 January 1828 through his assassination in October 1831. The fragility of the National Assemblies as central governing authorities is indicated by the outbreak of two civil wars during the revolutionary period, with yet a third civil war ensuing in the wake of Kapodistrias' assassination. For a thorough treatment of the revolutionary period, see Diamandouros, "Political Modernization." A comprehensive history of the revolutionary period and the Kapodistrian interregnum is provided by Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft; a synopsis of the same periods is provided by Dakin, in "The Formation."

22. Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," p. 11. Petropulos reiterates these same four characteristics as the four objectives of the modernists' political program. See p. 41 in Politics and Statecraft.


25. One of the main factors which helps to explain the ascendancy of the modernists over the traditionalists during the course of the 1821-1828 period of internal struggle which, at times, was almost as intense as the Greeks' struggle against the Ottomans, was the steadily increasing fragmentation of the traditionalist camp as a whole. For an expansive treatment of the internal fragmentation of the traditionalists, see Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," and Clogg, ed., The Struggle.

26. Diamandouros' phrase is particularly compelling in that it implies the fact that the attempts to transplant Western European political structures into a non-Western society produced a deviant version (with, ultimately, dysfunctional results) of the prototypes. See "Political Modernization," p. 3.

27. The notion of the nation as an "imagined community" was developed by Benedict Anderson. See Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Norfolk, VA: Thetford Press Limited). The three defining features of the imagined community, as limited, sovereign, and a community, are discussed on p. 6-7.

28. Maurer's other portfolios included the Ministries of Justice and Public Instructions. The other two regents were Major-General Karl Wilhelm von Jeideck, who headed the Ministry of War, and Count Joseph von Armansperg, who ran the Ministries of Finance, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. For a summary of the backgrounds and portfolios of the Regents, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church, p. 92-93. A fuller account of the political histories of the Regents in Bavaria, as well as their responsibilities on arrival in Greece, is provided by Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 154-217.

29. See Frazee, The Orthodox Church, p. 101. The Ottoman Sultan had taken almost immediate retribution against the Patriarch on the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, charging him with treason on account of his failure to ensure the political loyalty of the Greek Orthodox populations of the Christian millet. In addition to Patriarch Gregory V, two metropolitanans and ten bishops were hanged in Constantinople. The Ottoman attacks on the Church (its leadership and its properties) continued throughout the war. For accounts of these events, see Steven Runciman, The Great Church, p. 405-406; and, Charles Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," in Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974, John T. Koumouliades, ed., (London, England: Zeno Press, 1977), p. 129-130.

30. Maurer was actually recalled to Bavaria in mid-July 1834 and was replaced in the Regency by Agid von Kobell. However, by the time of his recall, Maurer had firmly established the constitutional framework of Church-state relations for the Greek nation-state, and Kobell made no efforts to change this basic structure. Maurer's intellectual worldview and personal experiences strongly shaped the constitutional framework for determining the place of religion in Greek society. A German Protestant and one of the outstanding legal minds of his time in
Bavaria, von Maurer had studied in Heidelberg and in Napoleonic France. See ibid., p. 157.

31. For a detailed account of the National Assembly debates on how to structure the role of the Church in the Greek nation-state, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church, p. 49-89. A list of the six National Assemblies held between 1821 and 1832 is provided by Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, on p. 48.

32. Ibid., p. 183. On the same page, Petropulos elaborates that "...the ecclesiastical settlement stood on a par with the new military system and the revised administrative setup, each devised to break the power of one of the existing ruling classes" which, in each case, was that of the traditional, indigenous elites who had administered the Greek millet prior to the War of Independence. For additional discussions of the military and state bureaucracies as foundational parts of the political institutional structure designed by the Bavarian Regency to reflect the modernists' view of the nation-state, see Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities," p. 159-177, and Jusdanis, Belated Modernity.

33. Maurer formed the Ecclesiastical Commission on 15 March 1833, with a mandate to address each of the three aspects of Church-state relations discussed above. The membership of the Commission was weighted in favor of the lay stratum of the Church, and most of these individuals were deliberately chosen by Maurer because of their Westernist, secularist views on nation-statehood. For a detailed account of the composition, deliberations, and recommendations of the Ecclesiastical Commission, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church, p. 101-123.

34. Frazee quotes Maurer as observing that "it was certainly fitting that freedom should come to the Greek church as part of the struggle made for independence. Just as it sought to be free of the political relationship which bound it to Ottoman authority, in the same way Greece endeavored also to have religious autonomy, i.e. freedom from a patriarch appointed and supported by the sultan." The Orthodox Church, p. 105. Maurer's linkage of the autocephaly of the Church to the larger question of the sovereignty of the Greek state was also grounded in his perception of Great Power competition at the time; in particular, the role of Russia was paramount in Maurer's thinking. See ibid., p. 105-106; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 180-192; and Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomiades, Foreign Interference.

35. See Article One of the Ecclesiastical Constitution of 23 July 1833.

36. The internal affairs which fell under the specific purview of the Permanent Holy Synod were doctrine, liturgy, catechetical education, clerical behavior and discipline, and management of ecclesiastical property (buildings). See Article Ten of the Ecclesiastical Constitution of 23 July 1833.

37. Frazee, The Orthodox Church, p. 114.
38. As far back as the first National Assembly of the revolutionary period, in December 1821 at Epidaurus, the revolutionary government had divested the episcopacy of all judicial authorities mandated by the millet model.

39. Although state expropriations of Church properties had begun under both the revolutionary governments of the 1820s and the Kapodistrian interregnum, the constitutional model formalized a legal structure for widespread state takeovers of a range of religious properties. The three main decrees relevant to the financial and economic subordination of the Church to the state were those of 7 October 1833, 9 March 1834, and 8 May 1834. See Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," p. 133-136; Frazee, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 125-128; and Petropulos, *Politics and Statecraft*, p. 181-183.

40. Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," p. 133-134.

41. Patriarch Constantine threatened the Church of Greece with excommunication, and returned the official Synodal letter proclaiming autocephaly without opening it.

42. Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," p. 136.

43. Ibid.

44. Laws 200 and 201 were the foundations of the changes in the Constitutional Charter of 1852, in response to the Patriarchal Tomos of 1850. For a summary of this legislation, see Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," p. 136-137. The first main revision in the constitutional model occurred in 1844 in the wake of a constitutional coup against King Otto, but the only substantive change made by the Ecclesiastical Charter of 1844 was the addition of the provision that, in the future, the monarch of Greece must be a member of the Orthodox Church. King Otho had never converted to Orthodoxy from Protestantism.

45. The state thereby maintained control over the composition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy through the selection process, and the continuing state financial control over the Church contributed to the ongoing deterioration of the educational standards of the ordained stratum. See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of these issues.

46. The Assembly included a majority of refugee bishops, whose difficult practical constraints made them more amenable to supporting the Commission's recommendations. For a full account of the composition of the prelates as well as the circumstances under which they were summoned to the Assembly, see Frazee, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 108-113, and Frazee, "Church and State," p. 132.

47. For biographical sketches of both men, see ibid., p. 103-105 and p. 133-135.

48. See Chapter Four for an elaboration of the instability of Greek political history during the twentieth century.
49. I restrict this discussion to a summary of the language question and the *Meghali Idea* as constitutive elements of nation-building because both points are treated in more detail in Chapter Four, where I consider their relevance to the emergence of cultural contradictions in Greece.

50. For a discussion of the origins of the invention of the *katharevousa* register, see Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity*, p. 44.

51. Ibid., p. 43.

52. According to Jusdanis (*Belated Modernity*, p. 115), Ioannis Kolletis first espoused the Great Idea as the ultimate objective of Greek statecraft in 1944. However, Petropulos observes that, in fact, the Great Idea was the motive force behind the Greek War of Independence. For a full discussion of the Great Idea in Greek foreign policy during the first two decades of national independence, see Petropulos, *Politics and Statecraft*, p. 345-350. Also, see Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities," p. 168-177.

53. See Kitromilides, p. 165-167.

54. Ibid., p. 78.
CHAPTER THREE

The Church and Orthodoxy:
Doctrine, Institution, and Politics,
WWII to the Transition to Democracy

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the evolution of the Orthodox religion in Greece during the period from the outset of WWII up to the eve of the transition to democracy in 1974. Insofar as this chapter is meant to contribute to the larger dissertation question concerning the role of Orthodoxy in contemporary Greek public life, religion as the object of analysis is a careful choice. I work from the premise that religion must be understood as an aggregate of the multiple components which, theoretically, form the coherent whole which is any faith.¹ This chapter, therefore, explores Orthodoxy in terms of two components, the doctrinal and the institutional. The doctrinal dimension is understood as the message of the religion. The institutional dimension is the Church, comprised of ordained (hierarchy and clergy) and popular (laity) strata.

The chief aim of this chapter is to illustrate that the fragmentation of the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of Orthodoxy, and particularly conflicts within the institutional strata of the Church, was part of the broader interpenetration of politics and religion in Greece during the period from WWII up to the dissolution of the colonels' authoritarian regime. To explore this point, the chapter examines a period of striking and coincident political, economic, and societal upheaval and change in Greek history, over the course of which Orthodoxy and the Church played a variety of roles.
The fragmentation of Orthodoxy is characterized as a lack of cohesiveness between the ideals articulated in the religious doctrine and the institutional structures meant to typify and to realize the doctrinal ideals. I explain the reasons for the doctrinal-institutional incongruity in terms of two main factors: first, an internal conflict between the ordained and popular strata of the Church over how to realize the message of Orthodoxy within the context of the needs and constraints of Greek society in a time of enormous transformation; and second, the constitutional relationship between Church and state, which provided the latter with legal-formal mechanisms for repeated interference in the organizational life of the former. I interpret the struggles within and across ordained and lay strata as grounded in differing interpretations of how the Church should negotiate the modernization processes characterizing Greek society, and I analyze the state's interventions in ecclesiastical affairs as an effort to ensure the cooperation of the official Church (represented by established organs of the hierarchy) in the state's domestic and foreign policies of nation-building.

The chapter devotes significant attention to analyzing the conflicts within the institutional Church over the course of the three-and-a-half decades in question. I trace the factionalization within and across the ordained and popular strata, in order to develop an understanding of the agenda for and responses to internal pressures for transformations in the structure of the institutional Church. I also associate the motivations for and objectives of internal reform movements with the legal-formal arrangement of Church-state relations, in order to determine the constraints imposed by politics on religion.

The goal of the institutional analysis is to suggest how the tactics and alliances
for Church-state reform and ecclesiastical change which evolved after the transition to democracy were, in one important respect, rooted in the outcome of attempts to reform the Church and, by extension, to redefine the place of Orthodoxy in public life during the postwar period up to the transition. That is, the state's ability to utilize the constitutional channel for making changes in the internal affairs of the Church, coupled with the increasing capacity of the hierarchy to block internal pressures for reform, demanded a new strategy on the part of those forces interested in religious transformation. Under the PASOK government, religious reformers turned to the mechanisms of politics emerged as a plausible option for bypassing the hierarchy and using the state to change religion from within.

II. Doctrine and Institution: The Theological Ideal of the Church

The doctrinal foundations of Eastern Orthodox Christianity are what is known as the Holy Tradition of Orthodox theology; Holy Tradition includes the whole system of knowledge that is the product of Biblical Scripture, the writings of the Church Fathers (theologians from the first three centuries of Christianity), the Ecumenical Councils of the Christian Church held prior to the Great Schism of 1054,² liturgical (ecclesial) practice, and iconology.³ According to the doctrines of Holy Tradition, the original Christian Church and, subsequently, its various offspring, were part of an overarching eschatological and cosmological vision. The Christian Church represented the Kingdom of God on earth and, therefore, stood as the affirmation of a divine plan in the process of construction. The task of the Church was to prepare the world for Christ's second coming by rebuilding society on entirely new foundations.⁴
Holy Tradition, as the ideal blueprint against which the Church is meant to be constructed, must be recognized for its simultaneous dynamism and continuity. These qualities directly affect not only the internal construction of the Church, but the place for the Church in a societal context of transition and change. For although one of the most distinctive features of the Orthodox Church as a Tradition-based Church is its claim of changelessness, Orthodox doctrine envisions an institutional structure that preserves the past through an experience of the present. As Ware points out, the Orthodox conception of Tradition

"...is not static but dynamic, not a dead acceptance of the past but a living experience of the Holy Spirit in the present. Tradition, while inwardly changeless (for God does not change), is constantly assuming new forms, which supplement the old without superseding them." (bold mine)

The Orthodox Church of Greece, in its structure and function, is part of an extensive and complex ecclesiastical superstructure grounded in the above doctrinal ideals. The Eastern Orthodox Church claims to be the "true faith" claiming direct continuity with the Christian Church prior to its fragmentation beginning in the eleventh century. The Eastern Orthodox Church claims to have established an ecclesiastical superstructure consistent with the doctrinal ideals elaborated above. Accordingly, the Church of Greece is one of many autocephalous (internally self-governing) Churches which comprise the Eastern Orthodox Church as a whole. However,

"[w]hether situated in the Eastern Mediterranean or Eastern Europe, or in more recent settlements in Western Europe, North and South America, and Australasia, the [various autocephalous] Orthodox Churches regard one another as equal heirs of the scriptural, patristic, canonical, hagiographical, liturgical, iconographic, and spiritual patrimony derived directly from the ancient, undivided Christian Church of the first millennium after the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ."
The ecclesiastical superstructure is not a centralized organization operating under the aegis of a single prelate wielding absolute power over the whole body. Although individual Churches must maintain full agreement on doctrinal matters and full sacramental communion with one another, each Church's autocephalous status allows for flexible administration of their internal organizational affairs and those of the network of local churches in their jurisdictions. Indeed, within each autocephalous Church and its local satellites, the organizational structure is designed to be relatively decentralized; while built on a hierarchical pyramid, clergy and laity are meant to play an active role in the administrative and decisionmaking functions of each church. For the Church of Greece as for all autocephalous member-Churches under the Eastern Orthodox umbrella, this doctrinal blueprint is intended to allow for flexible and effective adaptations to local contexts and to changing socio-economic, political and cultural conditions.

Two doctrinal concepts undergird the entire structure of the Orthodox Church of Greece as an ideal-type for the transformation of society into a temporal Christian kingdom. These concepts are organicity and community. The Church is understood as an organic unity comprised of ordained clergy and laity, neither of whom can be thought of apart from the other. Ware observes that the organic quality of the Church means that "...there is no conflict between freedom and authority; in the Church there is unity, but no totalitarianism." The organicity of the Church is an expression of unity in plurality, which is enforced by the communal character of the Church. The renowned Orthodox theologian, Fr. Georges Florovsky, explains the communal nature of the Church as the logical result of the fact that "Christianity is a liturgical religion [and the] Church is first
of all a worshipping community.\textsuperscript{12} Nobody is a Christian by himself, but only as a member of the body [that is] ...the redeemed community, of the Church.\textsuperscript{13}

The continual reiteration of the notion of the Church as an organic community in Orthodox doctrine deserves further examination, since these principles indicate not only a particular conception of how to actualize the ideals of the theology but, as the subsequent analysis will illustrate, also points to a main source of incongruity between the theological ideal-type and the institutional reality. Canon law and the writings of the Church Fathers posit that the Church should be organized according to a hierarchical structure, whereby the Doctrine of Apostolic Succession\textsuperscript{14} justifies and requires that leadership of the Church rest in the persons of the ordained hierarchy, or episcopacy.\textsuperscript{15}

The same theology which places the bishops in a pre-eminent position also emphasizes that the episcopacy is part of the "royal priesthood of all the faithful"\textsuperscript{16} which includes all of the ordained clergy and the laity as well. The royal priesthood of the faithful reflects the theological premise that all the believers of the Church, regardless of their ecclesial status, are in communion with one another through receiving the same gifts of the Holy Spirit in the sacrament of the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, the organicity of the Church is underscored by the absence of formal distinctions between the ordained and lay strata of the Church in the doctrinal texts until at least the first century.\textsuperscript{18} From that point (especially from the third century), the distinctions between ordained and lay strata were explained in terms of the divine charisma which marked the hierarchy as leaders of the rapidly growing ecclesiastical communities, and functional differences related to the celebration of the liturgy.
That Orthodox theology does not imply a prioritization of ordained over non-ordained members of the Church in the distinction of these two orders is clearly conveyed in the conviction that the laity (*laos*) are guardians of the faith and that, because the Church is Pentecostal, "the Holy Spirit is poured out upon all of God's people...[T]he whole people of God are prophets and priests."\(^{19}\) And this organic unity of ordained and lay strata is meant to be reinforced even in the hierarchical structuring of each autocephalous Church, with its hierarchically organized parish network, under the leadership and guidance of the bishops. Canon law is replete with mechanisms designed to ensure that the bishop governs in agreement with the whole Church, including the laity, by augmenting the hierarchical structure of the institutional Church with vital conciliar or collegial mechanisms.

Doctrinally-related decisions require the collective agreement of councils of bishops and clergy, depending on the type of decision in question. Although restricted from taking part in the final decisionmaking process,\(^{20}\) the non-ordained, popular stratum of the Church was permitted to attend and to participate in the proceedings and deliberations of the seven Ecumenical Councils, the primary conciliar forum for the doctrines which, to this day, regulate the network of Churches belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church.\(^{21}\) Within the hieratical structure of each autocephalous Church, down to the local parish level, Orthodox doctrine dictates that the *laos* play an active role in actualizing the Church as an organic, Christian, temporal community. At the most general level, the full unity of the Church is expressed by each parish community in regular, collective participation in the sacramental experience of the liturgy.\(^{22}\) According to St.
Ignatius, the local community is the Church, because it is at this level that the Church as a Eucharistic society is most widely expressed.

The most significant mechanism for the laity to participate integrally in the administrative and spiritual leadership aspects of Church life emerges in the practice of elevation of bishops and clergy. Notwithstanding the doctrinal emphasis on the importance of holy charisma as a determinant factor in the leadership and guidance abilities of the hierarchy, as well as on the educational and spiritual distinctions of the clergy, Orthodox theology is based on the notion that members of the episcopacy and the clergy are, after all, drawn from the laity. In order to preserve the organic, communal quality of the Church, the laity is meant to be involved in the election and elevation of both episcopal and clerical elements of the ordained strata of the Church. As further analysis will show, a combination of practical factors related to the expansions of the Churches in membership and geographic range, as well as political factors related to the legal-formal relationships between various Orthodox Churches and the states in which they were located, led to a notable decline over time in the institutional practice of lay participation in election of bishops and clergy. The case of the Greek Church is emblematic in this respect.

Taken in its entirety, the doctrinal dimensions of the Eastern Orthodox religion provide an cosmological-eschatological vision and a set of practical prescriptions for the construction of an institutional ideal meant to represent the Kingdom of God in temporal circumstances and meant to transform society according to the doctrinal worldview. The ideal-type of the institutional Church is that of an organic community of ordained and popular strata, whose structure and
participation in ecclesiastical life is aimed at making the Church a living experience of Tradition whose existence transfigures all aspects of public life.26 The doctrinal dimensions of the religion emphasize, however, that the actualization of the divine ideal of the Church and of its prophetic mission of social change require the construction of the Church consistent with its essential nature as organic community.

III. The Institutional Reality

In the little more than a century which had elapsed between the establishment of the Greek nation-state and the country's entry into WWII, the structure and practices of the Orthodox Church of Greece had become formalized. A review of the basic features of this structure and practice illustrates the emergence of significant gaps between the doctrinal ideal sketched above, and also demonstrates the emergence of internal pressures for reforms at rectifying the lack of congruence between doctrinal ideal and institutional reality.

The autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed with the Constitutional Charter of the Church of 1833 as part of the political institutional structures established with the formation of the Kingdom of Greece.27 The legal-formal relationship (the constitutional model)28 between the newly proclaimed autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece and the state was the work of the Bavarian regent Georg von Maurer,29 the country's first Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction.30 The Patriarchate explicated its formal understanding of the limits and extent of the Church of Greece's autocephaly in the 1828 Decree of the Synod of the Patriarchate, although the Patriarchate's canonical recognition of the autocephalous status of the Church of Greece was not
extended until the issuance of the Patriarchal *Tomos* of 1850.\textsuperscript{31}

The 1833 Ecclesiastical Charter, the Patriarchal decrees of 1850 and 1928 and, later, the Ecclesiastical Charters of 1923 and 1936, set out the general organizational guidelines for the Church. The origins of the incongruities between the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of Orthodoxy in Greece up until the WWII period lie in these documents, whose guiding principles are actually largely intact today.\textsuperscript{32}

The Church of Greece by the outset of the 1940s represented a combination of state-imposed alterations in and ecclesiastical interpretations of the ideal institutional Church articulated in Holy Tradition. The Church was organized in a loose, three-tiered, pyramidal structure. At the top of the pyramid were the ordained hierarchy; in the middle tier were the ordained clergy, or the parish priests; and, in the bottom tier was the popular stratum, or the *laos*. The administrative jurisdiction of the autocephalous Church of Greece had expanded almost coincidently with the expansion of the Greek national territory since 1821. The ecclesiastical territories were divided into administrative units known as metropolitanates and dioceses, whose lines roughly coincided with the political-electoral lines of demarcation of the state\textsuperscript{33} and encompassed the full network of local, parish churches within each jurisdiction.

The Archbishop of Athens and of All Greece,\textsuperscript{34} bishop of the country's most important diocese (the basic administrative units into which the Church of Greece was divided), stood at the top of the institutional pyramid. The Archbishop was the administrator of the autocephalous Church of Greece by virtue of his status as Chair, ex-officio president, and the only permanent member of the Permanent
Holy Synod (most commonly referred to as the Holy Synod, or Synod), the Church's supreme executive organ. The Synod was an elected body of twelve diocesan bishops drawn equally from the New Lands and the original territory of the Greek nation-state. These bishops rotated their position every three years, based on elections at the tri-annual meeting of the Synod of the Hierarchy (commonly referred to as the Hierarchical Synod), the body of all active bishops that is the supreme legislative body of the Church.

The Synod is in continuous session, with meetings held in Athens for a few days per week during the ecclesiastical year, in order to carry out is main responsibility of the daily administration of ecclesiastical affairs. One of the most critical functions of the Permanent Holy Synod, in addition to its administrative role, is its responsibility for all dealings with the Greek state. The Synod is the conduit through which the Ministry of Education and Religions maintains the state's formal association with the Church. The state's close communication with and scrutiny of the Synod was facilitated through the office of the Government Procurator, a state-appointed official who enjoyed full (non-voting) rights of participation at all Synodal meetings.

In contrast to the administrative emphasis of the Permanent Holy Synod, the Hierarchical Synod was the legislative body designed to represent the interests of all ranks in the ordained clergy, and acted as the contact point between the Permanent Holy Synod and the remaining, majority of the ordained ministry. The Ecclesiastical Constitution required the Hierarchical Synod to meet every three years, and endowed it with legislative powers regarding any matter pertaining to the institutional life of the Church. By far the most important of its legislative
rights were decisionmaking power over any proposed alterations in the Constitutional Charter of the Church and the election of new members to the Permanent Holy Synod.

The scope of administrative and legislative powers resting in the two Synodal bodies reflected the pronounced episcopocentrism of the Church of Greece, but the concentration of organizational prerogatives in the top tier of the ecclesial pyramid was not necessarily contradictory to the doctrinal ideal discussed above. Indeed, while individual hierarchs enjoyed the same rights and responsibilities for his diocese as did the Permanent Holy Synod for all of Greece, the doctrinal emphasis on conciliarity and community was also reflected in the organizational mechanisms of the Church of Greece. The dual synods (Holy Synod and Hierarchical Synod) were conceived as an institutional balancing mechanism for guarding against intra-episcopal power struggles, and the constitutional charter of the Church vested the Synod of the Hierarchy with the right to revise or cancel decisions made by the Permanent Holy Synod. Likewise, rotational membership on the Permanent Holy Synod was aimed at preventing the creation of a self-perpetuating hierarchical elite within the Church and of rendering a pluralistic quality to hierarchical decisions. In sum, the Synodal system was intended to reflect the doctrinal emphasis on the Church as an organic community, wherein there "...is neither dictatorship nor individualism, but harmony and unanimity...In [the Synodal structure]...no single member [could] arbitrarily impose his will upon the rest, but each [had to consult] with the others, and in this way all freely [achieved] a 'common mind.'"

The role of the ordained clergy and the popular strata of the Church of
Greece was far more fluid and self-constructing, reflecting the doctrinal tendencies on this same issue. As with each bishop and his diocese, the local priest was intended to function as the spiritual leader and teacher of his parish community. Clerical duties were most clearly spelled out in terms of regular liturgical functions and related sacramental functions as the foundation of the priest's responsibilities, and the Church was notably vague in legislating the more clearly spiritual-pastoral undertakings associated with the role of parish priest. As a result, individual clergymen were entrusted with meeting the needs of their parishes in discharging spiritual-pastoral activities (for example, counseling, missionary work, education, and catechetical instruction). The organizational structure of the Church provided little direct support or direction for the parish priest in his ministry, since the typical parish priest operated relatively autonomously vis-a-vis the diocesan bishop who was his superior and whose time was devoted primarily to administrative functions and secondarily to visitations with the numerous parishes in the diocese.

The lack of a definitive organizational blueprint for the role of the parish priest was much the same in terms of the position of the laity within the institutional Church of Greece. The form and substance of lay involvement in the Church was based largely on informal expressions and practices which adapted doctrine to local culture and traditions. Moreover, by the revisions of the 1936 Constitutional Charter eliminated the formal participation of the laity in the election and elevation of the ordained strata, with the hierarchy arguing the soundness of this change on the basis of an interpretation of Orthodox theology as maintaining that "...the final rightness or wrongness of any doctrinal decision taken by an assembly of bishops is judged by whether in the long run the people
accept the decision or not," in the form of "...an assent which is not, as a rule, expressed formally and explicitly, but lived."46

The only clear exceptions to the informal mechanisms for lay participation in the organizational life of the Church were through the Parish Council (Eπιτροπή) and the Metropolitan Council. The former was an administrative committee responsible for overseeing the daily operations of the local church, and its members were usually appointed by the diocesan bishop.47 In parishes in larger towns, Parish Council members were oftentimes elected by the entire community,48 but even in this case, the Council president was almost always appointed by the priest. The Metropolitan Council, the diocesan equivalent of the Parish Council, operated under the aegis of the bishop; one individual from the entire pool of local Councils was appointed to serve as lay representative to the Metropolitan Council. In important respects, then, the councilial structure involving the lay stratum of the Church actually circumscribed the popular role in ecclesiastical decisionmaking by virtue of the appointive powers of hierarchy and clergy.

The above institutional framework drove the operation of the Church of Greece for the first century of its operation. Within the context of the country's changing historical circumstances and, particularly, under the constraint of the legal-formal arrangement of Church-state relations, the institutional Church had come to be characterized by significant incongruities with its doctrinal archetype as expressed in Orthodox Holy Tradition.

The evolution of institutional Orthodoxy by the eve of WWII is best understood in terms of the social and economic context in which the Church operated, as well as the political limitations imposed on the Church's development
by the legal-formal relationship with the state. The Church in Greece was built on an extensive, albeit loosely coordinated, network of parish churches, appropriate to the country's primarily rural population. The parish church was, likewise, the focus of ecclesiastical life in the larger towns of Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras as well. As Rinvolutci observed about the structure of the Church in mid-twentieth century Greece, "[w]hen a new commun; v comes into being the first thing it does is to build a church...[The church] becomes a symbol of community pride."

That the local churches formed the backbone of religious life in Greece shaped the interactions between all three tiers of the ecclesiastical structure. First, the non-hierarchical clergy (parish priests) and the laity were the foundations for religious institutional life, such that the participation of the popular stratum in the Church was shaped by contact with the local clergy. Relations between parish clergy and laity differed depending on, amongst other things, rural versus urban location; diocese size and, therefore, extent of clergy autonomy vis-a-vis episcopal interventions; and professional and educational composition of the parish membership. But in spite of such distinctions, clergy-laity relations on the whole were characterized by a high degree of direct and personal contact; conversely, interactions between laity and hierarchy were highly circumscribed and distantiated, based on the latter's preoccupation with administrative, bureaucratic matters in the Synodal structures. The parish priest, therefore, became for the popular stratum a representative of the institutional and doctrinal aspects of the Orthodox faith in Greece.

The centrality of the local clergy in sustaining the institutional cohesiveness
of the Church helps to explain the internal fractiousness which emerged in the Church, with the gradual development of a dualist economy and the concomitant sociopolitical pressures associated with the kind of state-driven, uneven development which characterized Greece from the turn of the nineteenth century up to the outbreak of WWII.50 In short, in the face of the existential and practical challenges associated with the pressures of modernization, the popular stratum looked to the local clergy to provide an interpretation of Orthodoxy which would allow religion to serve as a coherent framework in which to make meaning out of political economic and societal conditions of transition.

However, the capacity of the local clergy to respond effectively to the needs of a population in transition was severely limited, most directly by the multiple effects of the Church-state constitutional model—the Church's autocephalous status and constitutional standing as the established religion of Greece were formulated in a legal-formal arrangement which made the Church a department of the Greek state and, by extension, imposed the status of civil servants on the ordained stratum of the Church. State control of the ecclesiastical salary structure and educational system circumscribed the ordained stratum's abilities to use the message of Orthodoxy to meet the demands and needs of the laity.

State control over the ecclesiastical education system had produced an antiquated and qualitatively-poor religious education training system.51 The Greek state's fiscal niggardliness towards ecclesiastical education was partly the result of the almost chronic public sector budget problems characterizing the country's hydrocephalic state bureaucracy,52 but also indicated the state's recognition that the Church's potential for social activism depended on the quality of its human
resource based. Candidates to the priesthood, in a highly condensed program of study, processed vast quantities of material by rote memorization, learned the basic liturgical and sacramental functions, and spent extraordinarily little time on issues of spiritual-pastoral development and parish ministry; most clergy completed the minimum education necessary for ordination.53 The result of this system by the 1940s was a cadre of parish priests who, by and large, were deficient as teachers, preachers, and confessors and who, instead, had a vocational attitude towards the priesthood that was manifested in a de-emphasis on spiritual activism and an overt concern for bureaucratic and advancement and financial improvement.54 This characterization was especially the case amongst priests in large town and urban parish communities, whose low earnings and heavy responsibilities encouraged an instrumental approach to clerical life.

The parish priests’ technical status as civil servants reinforced the decline in the number of activist, spiritually-committed clergy over time. The Greek state set up a salary scale based on educational gradations that accounted for number of years of study completed and type of seminary attended.55 Given the problems with the religious education training system, in addition to the still predominantly rural demographic composition of Greece at the start of the wartime hostilities, most parish clergy fell into the third and fourth class grade; these priests had, at best, two years of minor seminary education, some secondary education and, in many cases, had been ordained under the traditional social practice where the village elder or priest personally selected a new candidate for ordination. These priests earned a subsistence salary, and were forced to supplement their earnings by maintaining an additional source of income (usually, working as farmers) or by
relying on discretionary fees from parishioners in return for performing sacramental and pastoral services.

The informal institutionalization of discretionary fees\textsuperscript{56} fuelled animosity between the lay and clergy strata of the Church, since the former resented the clergy's apparent prioritization of financial gain over spiritual ministry. What appeared to be the commodification of the religious message only reinforced the growing lack of lay-clergy solidarity generated by the educational weaknesses that made the latter unable to respond to the changing needs of the former. Moreover, the laity's lack of compassion for the financial neglect at the hands of the state\textsuperscript{57} was a disincentive for pastoral ministry and an incentive for selfinterested jockeying for appointment to wealthy communities and to administrative appointments in the Church bureaucracy. Finally, the likelihood of a life of financial struggle as a result of educationally-linked civil service gradations produced a chronic shortage of individuals interested in the priesthood, and perpetuated arbitrary selection criteria for seminary candidates whose education was almost guaranteed to be mediocre at best.

The Church-state relationship, therefore, was a primary determinant in undermining the Church's dynamism in public life as the religious demands of the lay population changed in response to the political and economic conditions of Greece's modernization. The result in institutional terms was a growing alienation between the clergy and popular strata, the deepening of antagonisms between the laity and the hierarchy, as well as the fragmentation of the ordained strata as a whole.

The disintegration of the ordained strata grew out of the clergy's criticism of
the hierarchy's preoccupation with financial self-reward, as evidenced in the unofficial yet regular exaction of a percentage of the priestly discretionary fees, elaborate schemes for the transfer of ecclesiastical real estate to private episcopal ownership and, in certain cases, charges of simony and acceptance of government kickbacks\textsuperscript{58} in return for the Holy Synod's public pronouncements in favor of policies of the political regime in power.\textsuperscript{59} In addition, lower clergy resented having to take the brunt of popular criticisms for the well-publicized cases of moral laxity on the part of bishops on the Holy Synod. Finally, clergy resented the broad appointive powers which allowed bishops to decide on the ordination, promotion and transfer of priests, particularly given the attendant financial implications for individual clergymen.

The alienation of the popular stratum with the episcopacy grew out of many of the same criticisms expressed by the clergy against the hierarchy, but centered especially on the hierarchy's overt preoccupation with bureaucratic life at the expense of its mandate for active ministry and communal leadership. The laity also ridiculed the hierarchy for moral hypocrisies, financial excesses, and what came to be viewed as a despotic\textsuperscript{60} exercise of episcopal prerogatives.

Although many of the complaints of both the clergy and the popular stratum against the hierarchy were well-founded, the hierarchical capacity for responding to intra-ecclesiastical problems was severely compromised by the repeated, direct interventions of the Greek state in the affairs of both the Holy Synod and the Hierarchical Synod. State interference in ecclesiastical affairs dated back to the establishment of autocephalous status in 1833 and assumed a variety of forms.\textsuperscript{61} Most consistently, the state concentrated on ensuring "...that bishops should be
chosen who represented views sympathetic to its own [the government's views], [demonstrating that the government regarded]...church leaders more as servants of the State than as ministers of the Gospel.\textsuperscript{62}

The frequency of state interventions in Synodal life intensified with the introduction of nearly three decades of disintegrative politics in Greece, from the onset of the Liberal (Venizelist) versus Royalist (anti-Venizelist) National Schism,\textsuperscript{63} or Ethnikos Dichasmos, of the WWI period up to the outbreak of WWII.\textsuperscript{64} The fractiousness of national politics was translated to the ecclesiastical arena, as alternating regimes unabashedly ousted Archbishops and Synods to reflect domestic and foreign policy objectives.

Significantly, the importance of Orthodoxy to the cultural dimensions of nation-building was underscored by the state's activities, as evidenced by the monarchy's encouragement of the Church's excommunication of former (and future) Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos in 1916 as a pariah who "...puts priests into prison and rises up against his King and his nation."\textsuperscript{65} But paradoxically, under the fluid historical conditions of intra-bourgeois conflict, working class radicalization, and political debates over democratic accountability, the state's control over the Synodal hierarchy weakened the Church's ability to provide the kind of leadership necessary for a religiously-defined response to circumstances of societal transition and state-society incongruence. These legal-formal constraints on hierarchical action were aggravated by episcopal apathy encouraged by the bureaucratization of the hierarchy, as well as by the fact that centralization of the ecclesiastical bureaucracy in Athens reinforced the distantiation of the hierarchy from the daily life of the parish and diocese.
IV. Internal Adaptation to the Institutional-Doctrinal Gap

The fragmentation of institutional Orthodoxy, while undeniably aggravated by the legal-formal relationship between Church and state, was interpreted by some elements in both the lay and ordained strata as indicative of the hierarchy's unwillingness to try to sustain the message of Orthodoxy in spite of politically-determined constraints. This perspective generated formal and informal efforts from within the Church at reform designed to adapt Orthodoxy to the conditions of political and social modernization, in adherence to the notion of the dynamism of Orthodoxy's religious message.

One of the most informal, but nonetheless important, adaptive responses to the aforementioned problems associated with a life in the ordained ministry was the growing number of laymen interested in a life of active service in the Orthodox tradition who chose to forego the route of ordination and, instead, to become theologians (commonly referred to as lay theologians, or lay intellectuals) by profession. Rinvulc pci observes that, "[i]n Greek Orthodoxy it is the lay theologians who have taken over the thinking and teaching function that in the West has become to be the prerogative of the clergy," suggesting that these laymen deliberately selected the teaching and study of theology as a more efficacious mechanism (as opposed to ordination and the attendant dangers of bureaucratic and societal marginalization) for creating an activist, missionizing Church based on a dynamic interpretation of Orthodox Tradition.

The lay intellectual community came to be centered in the Faculties of Theology at the University of Athens and the University of Thessaloniki, but extended to those university graduates who filled nearly all the religious education
posts in the country's secondary schools. The Department of Theology at the University of Athens was founded in the mid-nineteenth century, while that at Thessaloniki was created in 1942 and, in both cases, the faculty members generated the majority of the articles in the Greek religious press. The lay intellectuals not only represented an alternative to the narrow path of participation in the institutional Church, but also reinforced the doctrinal emphasis on the Church as the laos.

By far the most organized response to the organizational problems of the ecclesiastical structure came from the religious brotherhood known as Zoe (Life). Zoe (as well as the various other religious brotherhoods that were formed in Greece during the post-war era) has been classified in sociological literature as a religious brotherhood but is referred to under a variety of terms, including lay movement, lay association, and ecclesiastical movement. This dissertation uses the terms lay movement and religious brotherhood interchangeably, based on the view that both terms capture those features which make the organizations distinctive vis-a-vis the Church of Greece. The religious brotherhood is

"...a community of laymen and clerics who live together and are bound by a moral commitment and obligations more severe than those of the church. Legally this community is administered and governed by its own laws and is subject to a particular centralized authority and internal hierarchy."

Zoe was founded in 1907 by Fr. Eusebius Matthopoulos. As with the leaders of those religious groups at the turn of the nineteenth century which were Zoe's organizational forebears, Matthopoulos viewed the Brotherhood as the best vehicle for bringing about the re-evangelization of Greek society. Zoe was led by both ordained clergy and laymen, but Matthopoulos' longterm objective was to
build an organized network of activist theologians whose nucleus and, eventually, majority membership would be predominantly laymen.

Since Matthopoulos and many of Zoe's initial leaders were ordained clergymen in the Church, Zoe was not formed as an independent, institutional alternative to the Church. Rather, the Brotherhood was constituted to generate reform from within the Church, albeit on the basis of very specific programs for reorienting the organizational features of the Church as described above. The chief aim was to create an ecclesiology of broader participation which would unite both ordained and popular strata of the Church in actualizing the message of Orthodoxy under the modernizing conditions of Greek society. An explicit component of this agenda was a rectification of the bureaucratic episcopocentrism of the Church and authoritarian decisionmaking by the Holy Synod, in favor of a renewed emphasis on spiritual-pastoral tasks by the ordained stratum and on lay participation in the spirit of the collegial features of Orthodox doctrine.

Despite their origins within the Church, Zoe leaders directly attacked the ecclesiastical hierarchy (especially members of the Holy Synod), charging them with cooptation by the state in matters of nationalist policy and domestic politics and with the prioritization of material reward and personal advancement over ministration to the laos. The Brotherhood called for a purge of the hierarchy, and a reorientation of the home missionary activism which became Zoe's hallmark. The Brotherhood concentrated its efforts on nationwide preaching, the formation of an extensive catechetical and educational network, and on expanded social work, as part of the overall drive to expand lay participation in all aspects of the Church and thereby to develop the role of the whole Church in public life.
in Greece.

In light of the nature and scope of its criticisms of the Church as well as of the appeal of the Zoe message to large segments of the Greek population, it is not surprising that the movement was sharply criticized by the "official" institutional Church and, especially, by the hierarchy. Because the movement was founded as a reform current critiquing the extant ecclesiastical structure, the majority of the hierarchy responded with hostility to what was perceived as Zoe's formation of "...in some ways...a Church within the Church, its lay supporters feeling themselves to be first [members of the movement] and secondly members of their diocese." The anti-Zoe bishops argued that the movement's emphasis on democratic process and egalitarianism in organizational terms represented a misinterpretation of the nature of the organic and communal features of Orthodoxy, a misunderstanding which might provoke a dangerous tendency towards an excessive emphasis on individualism and selective obedience to the teachings of the faith. The Church undertook a formal response to Zoe, the establishment in 1930 of a Synodally-approved home missionary association called the Apostoliki Diakonia (Apostolic Service).

However, the Apostoliki Diakonia as a serious home missionary alternative to Zoe had only limited success, primarily because of the aforementioned fragmentation between clergy and hierarchy, on the one hand, and ordained and popular strata, on the other. Despite the fact that the institutional separation of Zoe and the Church had become formalized by WWII, mainly through the Synod's constant criticisms of Zoe as "overly ecclesiastical" and fundamentalist, the clergy and lay strata in the Church responded positively to the dynamism and
organizational strengths of the Zoe system. Parish priests and lay intellectuals, in particular, worked cooperatively with Zoe members in ministering to the local community. Conversely, the Brotherhood saw unofficial cooperation with the Church, through collaborative efforts with clergy and lay elements (and with those hierarchs sympathetic to the reformist objectives of Zoe) as a useful opportunity to reach the broadest possible constituency in Greek society.  

By the eve of WWII, the Brotherhood's lay associations were firmly entrenched in the urban areas of Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki; the movement's emphasis on education and participation appealed to the country's expanding bourgeois strata, many of whom were recent migrants from rural Greece. The movement had also made significant inroads in involving the rural populations in the catechetical networks—notwithstanding the logistical constraints on missionizing the more remote regions of Greece—as the traditional Greek peasant sympathized with Zoe's emphasis on a holistic vision of Orthodoxy and was attracted to the possibilities for upward mobility deriving from the educational aspects of the Brotherhood.

The establishment of Zoe as a reform movement born from within the Church, as well as the hierarchally-driven response in the form of the Apostoliki Diakonia, was a milestone in the evolution of Orthodoxy in Greece. The formation of the Brotherhood openly engaged the Church in a process of self-examination and self-criticism, around the question of how to make the message of Orthodoxy relevant for Greece's modernizing society. The Brotherhood made a direct link between the coherence of the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of Orthodoxy, and maintained that the organizational structure of the Church was vital to its ability
to play a dynamic role in transforming public life in Greece.

One of the most significant aspects of the reform impetus generated by Zoe's operational success lay in the interpretive nature of the debate over the relationship of Orthodox Tradition and modernity. Despite its emphasis on the participatory dimensions of Orthodox theology, the Zoe leadership's stress on the need for impeccable morality, piety, and obedience to the collective body informed the movement with a fundamentalist tenor which, paradoxically, was manifested in the withdrawal from society in order to work towards individual salvation. The response of the hierarchy of the Church, in contrast, was to adopt a conservative interpretation of Tradition for the country's modernizing conditions; this conservatism was manifested in the insistence on institutional changes carefully guided by leaders whose knowledge would, literally, conserve and protect the essential meaning of Orthodoxy in the fluid context of Greek politics and society. Co, although Zoe catalyzed internal forces for reform in the Church, the result by WWII was the gradual crystallization of alternative approaches to institutional Orthodoxy ranging along a continuum from conservative to fundamentalist.

This debate over ecclesiastical reform and Orthodoxy's role in society, as well as the broadening of the nature of the reform tendencies, was put on hold due to the extraordinary conditions of external war and domestic fratricide which beset Greece for almost the entire decade of the 1940s. Led by the dominant personality of the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos Papandreou, the various groups of organizational actors within the Church and the Zoe Brotherhood closed ranks in a joint effort to respond to the societal suffering and political needs of a nation under siege. Yet while postponing the immediate debate over
ecclesiastical change, the wartime experience actually sharpened the issues which would define the debate in the postwar period.

V. The Church during WWII and the Greek Civil War: Mobilization against External Threat and Internal Disintegration

The decade of the 1940s saw Greece devastated economically and polarized politically, as a result of Axis occupation during WWII and the country's steady disintegration into civil war. The Church of Greece, supported by the Zoe Brotherhood (which was, by then, operating independently of the Church), mobilized effectively in the face of external invasion and internal disintegration. As noted earlier, the administrative jurisdiction of the Church coincided with the geographic frontiers of the state, and the parish church network covered most of the country. In those areas where the Church was weak infrastructurally, the Zoe movement more often than not had established local Brotherhood chapters with well organized catechetical schools and lay associations. The Zoe infrastructure was also very well established in the large towns and in the urban concentrations of Athens and Thessaloniki. In short, the Church and Zoe offered a nation-wide, functional network with bureaucratic structure and grassroots support. It was the bureaucratic structure, as well as the decisive role of its leadership under the aegis of the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, that allowed the Church of Greece to take the lead in responding to a decade of national siege.

The Church responded to two, inter-related threats to the survival of the Greek nation-state, the one stemming from external attack and foreign occupation and the other derived from the progressive breakdown of the domestic sociopolitical fabric into Civil War. A brief historical narrative is necessary to
establish the outlines of political history in Greece during the 1940s, in order to establish the context for the role assumed by the Church during a decade of devastation.

Italy's declaration of war against Greece in 1940 eventuated a joint German-Italian occupation of the country. The emergence in mid-1942 of a concerted popular resistance movement against the Axis occupation contributed directly to and lasted until the German withdrawal from Athens in October 1944. The low-level civil war within the Greek Resistance during the period from the Italian surrender of 1943 until Greece's liberation in October 1944, was briefly suspended by ceasefire agreement in 1945, and rapidly degenerated into full-scale Civil War from September 1946 through the end of 1949.

The origins of the Greek Civil War can be traced over the fractious politics dating back to WWI and unfolding over the interwar period. The politics of WWI and the interwar period were characterized by the steady polarization of Greek society into two coalitions, Venizelist (Republican-Liberal) and anti-Venizelist (Royalist-Populist). The culmination of the National Schism between these two political camps (parataxes) was the imposition of a widely unpopular, Right-wing dictatorship headed by General Ioannis Metaxas endorsed by the Greek monarch, George II. At its foundations, the Metaxas dictatorship represented an attempt to prevent what had been a largely intra-bourgeoisie competition to control the state and, by extension, the Greek political economy, from being decided by the impacts of an increasingly radicalized working class represented by the KKE (Communist Party of Greece).

The imposition of a "...fascist police state...[with]...no popular roots..." drove
the KKE underground\textsuperscript{90} and decisively polarized the country along Left versus Right lines. The faultlines of the interwar cleavages and Metaxas dictatorship were hardened with the Resistance Movement\textsuperscript{91} which, while spearheading "...a remarkable and seldom-paralleled surge of self-abnegating patriotism [running through] the whole Greek nation,"\textsuperscript{92} was driven by two key guerrilla bands, EDES (Greek National Democratic League)\textsuperscript{93} and EAM-ELAS (National Liberation Front\textsuperscript{94}-National People's Liberation Army\textsuperscript{95})\textsuperscript{96} representing the ideological poles of Greek society.

The disintegration of Greece into Civil War with the withdrawal of the Axis was, in many respects, the logical, albeit belated, result of nearly three decades of steady political polarization around the issues of regime legitimacy and societal cohesion. These cleavages had been perpetuated by the April 1941 flight of King George II and the bulk of the Greek military and government to Egypt, where a British-dependent Government-in Exile and military were established with the long-term aim of reimposing on postwar Greece the balance of forces which had obtained on the eve of WWII. The internecine struggles within the Government-in-Exile and the Greek military, the lack of legitimacy of the quisling government imposed by the occupation forces in Athens, and the Civil War precipitated by the monarch's return to Greece in 1946,\textsuperscript{97} represented the continuation of interwar politics under conditions of external invasion and, then, internal disorder.

The resolution of the Greek Civil War with the defeat of the Communist forces by the fall of 1949 was decided by massive amounts of Truman Doctrine\textsuperscript{98} military and logistical assistance, directed to the Greek Armed Forces which, by then, constituted a Right-wing, Royalist agency purged of all Left and most
republican elements.\textsuperscript{99} The political system and societal structures which emerged following the termination of the Civil War would be grounded in the unresolved cleavages of the interwar period, informed by the legacies of ideologically-driven fratricide and foreign intervention.

The Church's response, under the leadership of the charismatic figure of Archbishop Damaskinos and supported by Zoe, to the decade of societal centrifuge resulting from the above events was multi-faceted. The most practical and immediately effective response occurred with the provision of relief assistance to the population during the famine conditions which developed under the Italian-German occupation.\textsuperscript{100} Famine relief to Greece was coordinated by the International Red Cross. The Holy Synod in Athens was instrumental in interfacing with the Red Cross by providing an administrative center for the provision of food and medical assistance to the Greek population; the diocesan infrastructure of local churches, buttressed by Zoe enclaves, was critical in coordinating the distribution and shipment of relief resources, especially in rural areas. Local churches and Zoe catechetical facilities were converted into temporary shelters, offering makeshift lodging to peasants and farmers displaced by the destruction of property by occupation troops and by guerrilla strikes on occupation outposts.

Damas\textsuperscript{i}nos adroitly managed the Church's coordination with all segments of the political spectrum--including the Resistance, the Allied relief effort, the Government-in-Exile, and the occupation government--to bring humanitarian and relief assistance\textsuperscript{101} to Greek society while avoiding identification with any particular ideological tendency.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, the Church also assumed a support role for the
political and military resistance activities of the general population and of the guerrilla movements in particular. The Church attempted to maintain an even posture towards the two major resistance groups, EAM-ELAS and EDES, in order not to be drawn into their dissolving relationship. Resistance fighters found protection and safe haven in local churches and with priests, who became valued conduits for channelling information between Allied intelligence services and the guerrilla leaderships. Furthermore, the Synod organized an underground system providing philanthropic assistance to Jewish citizens of Greece, and served as a transit point for European Jewish families fleeing Nazi persecution.

Indeed, with the progressive breakdown of state services in most of rural Greece, the Church was left as the only institution with a functioning infrastructure capable of providing relief assistance. The Church's role in supporting the Resistance Movement and the Allied relief effort was most striking because it stood in stark contrast to the failure of the Greek state, as the putative defender of the nation against external force, to fulfill its responsibilities. Further, in its ability to supersede the internal fragmentation which had come to mark the ecclesiastical structure by the outset of the 1940s, the Church—in contrast to the state—demonstrated an ability to put the national collectivity, the organic community, above factional institutional conflicts. The Church emerged as real and symbolic protector of the nation.

The liberation of Greece ushered in the most decisive period of Church action on behalf of the nation, and was directly related to the state's inability to fulfill its political responsibilities. The Church's formal involvement in Greek politics stretched from January 1945 to September 1946, during which time the Archbishop
of Athens and All Greece, Damaskinos, held the position of Regent of Greece. Damaskinos was appointed Regent by the Greek Government-in-Exile under intense pressure from the British, who interpreted the failure of the coalition Government of National Unity to restore any semblance of domestic political cohesion after the Axis withdrawal as a sign of the complexity of the regime question in Greece. The British viewed Damaskinos as "...almost the only man in [a] prominent position who could command the respect and confidence of both Left and Right," and surmised that "...no other individual combined the qualities and prestige of Damaskinos to see the Greek state and society through the circumstances of [the time]." (bold mine)

The Damaskinos Regency was effectively a tactical decision by the Allies to facilitate domestic peace and, ultimately, the restoration of the prewar political order. Moreover, the Damaskinos Regency ultimately became simply an intermediate phase in the severe disruption and disorder of Greek politics throughout the 1940s. However, Damaskinos' selection was a critical indicator of the role which he and the Church had assumed in public life during wartime Greece, and his tenure as regent would exercise a formative impact on the evolution of the institutional Church in the postwar period.

Damaskinos had ascended to the Archiepiscopal throne in 1941, nearly three years after his election had been annulled through state intervention on account of his republican orientation. As in the period prior to his Regency, Damaskinos sustained the Church's commitment to social activism throughout his political tenure, working with the United Nations to coordinate distribution of relief supplies, in the face of the state's incapacity to administer the task. After
the termination of his Regency, Damaskinos organized the Church to provide safe
haven for the growing number of civil war refugees moving from rural areas to
Athens and Thessaloniki. In short, the Archbishop established the Church in the
popular mind as a capable alternative to the state in meeting the practical and
psychological needs of the nation.109

The Archbishop's leadership of the Church during the 1940s was equally
notable in terms of his efforts to distinguish the ideological warfare of society
from the processes of ecclesiastical politics. His own ecclesiastical experiences
having been directly affected by the politicization of the Holy Synod, Damaskinos
was committed to reducing the capacities of the state for intervention in the
institutional life of the Church. Accordingly, he astutely used the state's reliance
on the Church's socio-political legitimacy to gain state support for a new
 Ecclesiastical Constitution in 1943, effectively rescinding the expansion of state
control over hierarchical elections and decisionmaking which had been passed
under the Metaxas dictatorship.110 A significant feature of Damaskinos' personal
charisma and success in reducing the immediate interventionist powers of the state
in the Church was concomitant centralization of decisionmaking powers in the
hands of the Archbishop;111 the wartime conditions contributed to the Archbishop's
accretion of power, militating against regular meeting of the Holy Synod and the
even more infrequent meetings of the Synod of the Hierarchy.112

Despite the Archbishop's efforts to improve its legal-formal autonomy from
the state and, in his assumption of the mantle of national protector, to establish
the Church as prior to the state, Damaskinos and the Church gradually were
identified by the Left as puppets of the Right (based on Damaskinos' formal
appointment as Regent by the Government-in-Exile) and lackeys of Western imperialists (based on the Archbishop's refusal to condemn British and U.S. interference in the Civil War and his failure to reject the Anglo-American timetable for the referendum on the monarchy). Moreover, the intensification of EAM's stridently Communist agenda and the escalation of ELAS' retributionary strikes against all but the most avowed anti-Right segments of the population, the hierarchy and parish clergy alike began to adopt an anti-Left posture.

The Left's perception that the Church had been coopted by the Right eventuated a situation wherein parish priests became deliberate targets of ELAS by the Third Round of the Civil War. In addition to the enormous destruction of physical plant sustained during the Albanian campaign of the Resistance, the Church and the Zoe network had suffered enormous human loss and institutional destruction at the hands of ELAS forces and in the overall cross-fire. The situation was especially acute in the country's rural areas, which witnessed what most accounts describe as the wholesale extermination of parish churches, priests, and their lay communities. Entire villages were wiped out in rounds of fratricidal attack and retribution. Observers note that "[n]o single category of the population [unless it be the gendarmerie)...sustained heavier casualties in the slaughter of these years than the village papades, the Greek country parson," and reports estimate that approximately 400 priests were killed by the Communist forces.

By the close of the decade and the end of the Civil War in August 1949, the institutional infrastructure of both the official Church and the Zoe movement had been devastated by the country's protracted political disorder and military conflicts. The entire parochial structure had collapsed in many of the mountainous areas of
dioceses, and the already low numbers of parish priests were vastly depleted by their extermination in the Civil War.

The wartime legacy for Orthodoxy in Greece was a mixed one. The Church had demonstrated its ability to actualize the socially transformative message of Orthodox doctrine, both in working as an organic whole and in responding to the needs of the Greek nation. Further, the Church had established its position as an alternative to the state as the defender of the nation, thereby conditionalizing the legitimacy of the country's political leadership and suggesting a place for religion in the collective identity. However, the Civil War experience led to an ideological politicization of the ordained and popular strata which mirrored broader societal trends. This internal polarization, superimposed on the prewar fragmentation of popular and hierarchical elements, characterized the Church at the close of the 1940s and would shape the Church's interpretation of the meaning of modern politics for religion in Greece. The formulation of the role for Orthodoxy in the postwar period, moreover, would occur under the aegis of a new Archbishop, Spyridon Vlachos, who was elected on the death of Damaskinos in May 1949.

VI. 1950-1967: Guided Democracy and Economic Modernization

The defeat of the Left in the Greek Civil War "...meant in essence the defeat of all democratic forces"\textsuperscript{116} in society, and the construction of a postwar political system defined in absolutist ideological terms reinforced by Greece's frontline status as a NATO ally in the Cold War. The rapid reconstruction of a country which faced the 1950s in a state of gross economic construction and societal exhaustion was largely due to massive amounts of reconstruction assistance under
the Marshall Plan, and was managed by an anti-Communist state apparatus whose triarchic coalition included the victorious forces in the Civil War, namely the armed forces, the monarchy, and the Parliamentary Right.

The political project of the state under this triarchy was to use the ideology of anti-Communism as "...the governing principle of an aggressive strategy of social demobilization and of social control designed to safeguard the closed nature of the Greek political system, to reinforce it and, above all, to ensure its perpetuation." The KKE was outlawed, and an elaborate para-constitutional apparatus, based on the expansion of emergency measures implemented during the Civil War, controlled Greek society by dividing it into the "nationally minded" and the "opponents of the established order." The state arbitrarily excluded a large segment of the population from access to equal rights of participation and representation in the political system, by isolating the parties of the Center and the Left. Based on the above objectives and policies, the postwar political system from the end of the Civil War up to the imposition of the authoritarian regime in 1967 was what Mouzelis has termed a "guided democracy" or "repressive/restrictive parliamentarism" grounded on an unchallengeable anti-Communist state.

The success of the triarchic alliance was reflected in eleven consecutive years of rule by the political Right under successive party labels from 1952 to 1963, following three years of unstable, Center-dominated coalition governments. From 1955, the Right was led by Constantine Karamanlis, who founded ERE (the National Radical Union Party). Karamanlis enjoyed eight years as Prime Minister at the helm of ERE. He oversaw the institutionalization of the anti-
Communist state and its para-constitutional machinery, and accepted the military's role as arbiter of the postwar triarchy.

Furthermore, Karamanlis managed what by most accounts is regarded as the remarkable reconstruction and rapid take-off of the Greek post-war economy. By the middle of the 1950s, prewar levels of output had been reached and the average annual GDP growth rate was 6 percent throughout the 1950s. By the early 1960s, industrial production had reached twice the levels at the start of WWII, and industrial output accounted for one quarter of total GDP.\textsuperscript{125}

However, the regime's very successes were also the source of the system's contradictions and eventual breakdown. The ascendance of the anti-Communist state represented the political Right's unwillingness to dialogue over the ideologically-grounded questions that polarized Greek society in the wake of the Civil War; the limitations on political participation undermined the possibility for an electoral resolution of societal divisions. Meanwhile, the country's rapid growth and integration into global markets produced significant social dislocation and pronounced inter- and intra-sectoral inequalities in the lower middle class strata that formed the bulk of the industrial labor force. So, throughout the 1960s, the Greek economy increasingly reflected the structural imbalances of "...the classical characteristics of underdevelopment seen in most formations of peripheral capitalism: a low productivity agriculture, a highly inflated and parasitic service sector, and an industrial sector unable to absorb the redundant agricultural labor for and to expand into capital goods production."\textsuperscript{126}

The pressures on the system exerted by the above contradictions and cleavages were manifested in the 1963 and 1964 election victories of the Center Union Party
led by George Papandreou. Papandreou's campaign of an "Unyielding Struggle" against the Right and what he termed "the party-state" appealed to the expanding petty bourgeois strata frustrated with the unequal distribution of the country's economic wealth, as well as to those sectors of society whose political rights had been denied on the basis of purported domestic security reasons. The Center Union victories reflected growing popular discontent with the institutional balance of political power and strong dissatisfaction with structural imbalances in the economy.

The political cohesion of the anti-Communist triarchy unravelled over how to address the demands expressed in rising popular mobilization: either to expand on (liberalize) the competitive, parliamentary (albeit circumscribed in nature) dimensions of the political system or to reinforce its authoritarian, paraconstitutional elements. The choice was made in favor of the latter with the military coup of 21 April 1967 by a group of junior officers in the Greek Army.


The start of the 1950s marked a crossroads in the development of the Church. The ecclesiastical leadership confronted the practical task of reconstruction, which included rebuilding the numerous churches as well as the pool of ordained clergy which had been wiped out in the previous decade. The ecclesiastical leadership faced two options in managing the latest phase in the Church's development: either, to use the general reconstruction effort as an opportunity to redress the fragmentation and problems which had emerged in the Church in the prewar period; or, to approach reconstruction as an undertaking whose scope required
intra-ecclesiastical consolidation and attention to immediate pragmatic challenges.

Those favoring the first option interpreted reconstruction as an opportunity for the Church to build on the sense of Church (and the Zoe) as organic community which had emerged under the emergency conditions of the 1940s. In this view, the postwar Church would become a missionizing community dedicated to rebuilding Greek society consistent with the notion of Tradition as a dynamic, yet inwardly constant, way of life. Those in favor of the second option understood the postwar period as a time of recovery in a fluid sociopolitical context. According to this assessment, the assaults against the Church during the Civil War, as well as the loss of Damaskinos' charismatic and political clout, demanded clearcut hierarchical control and disciplined clergy and lay consent in the interests of preserving the Church.

As with the political leadership, the ecclesiastical leaders favoring conservatism and consolidation eventually gained ascendance within the Church. This outcome was in no small part due to the influence of the anti-Communist state on the Church, as on all other institutions in Greek society, and to the ideological interpretation assigned to the Civil War experiences by those hierarchs associating reconstruction with consolidation. Further, intra-hierarchical struggles came to dominate the organizational life of the Church during the 1960s, so that the focus of the hierarchy was less on building an integrated institutional structure and fulfilling the social message of Orthodoxy than on ensuring organizational security.

As noted earlier, the Church's social activism and political involvement during the 1940s, as well as its cooperation with the Zoe movement, had been closely connected to the purposeful leadership of Archbishop Damaskinos and the
attendant centralization of ecclesiastical power in the position of the Archbishop at the expense of the remainder of the ordained stratum and popular elements. Upon his ascension to the Archiepiscopal throne in May 1949, Archbishop Spyridon took initial steps in the direction of ecclesiastical integration by opening discussions with the Old Calendarite sect which had split from the Church in the mid-1920s\textsuperscript{130}, and brought the Church of Greece into the World Council of Churches (a positive response to the ecumenical movement in favor of reuniting all denominations of the Christian Church).

The Archbishop's tentative moves in the direction of ecclesiastical integration at both the national and international levels were quickly marginalized, however, by the practical challenges of reconstruction. The need for massive amounts of financial assistance, to educate new candidates for the decimated ranks of the clergy and to rebuild destroyed churches, forced the Church to look to the state for support; one of the traditional sources of financial support for the Church, the rural agricultural population, was not an option given their economic ruin as a result of the wartime experiences and, indeed, large tracts of ecclesiastical property were expropriated by the state in 1952 for distribution to peasants whose land had been destroyed.\textsuperscript{131}

The fact that the state controlled the financial resources necessary for ecclesiastical reconstruction (and survival) provides a logical explanation for the hierarchy's willingness to endorse the anti-Communist ideological project of the state. Moreover, practical considerations were reinforced by the ideological reorientation of much of the senior hierarchy and the clergy themselves who, as the earlier discussion indicated, had been targets of the Left forces during the
Civil War. The EAM-ELAS attacks on the Church from 1946 to 1949 had alienated all but the most radicalized members of the parish priesthood and hierarchy and significant portions of the lay strata, and had fostered a tendency amongst the hierarchy towards the conservative elements of the political spectrum in postwar Greece. The dogmatic KKE pronounced atheism as an essential component of Communism, so the Church found an apparently unassailable theological justification for the Church's support for even the most flagrant political and social abuses by the state in the name of anti-Communism.

The steady ascendance of the pragmatic, consolidationist approach to ecclesiastical reconstruction--reflected in the failure of the Church to develop a coherent vision for responding to the political exclusivism of guided democracy and the societal fragmentation generated by accelerated, uneven economic development--was fostered by the almost total lack of leadership continuity during the period from 1950 to 1967. Due to the combined effects of death, internal scandal,\textsuperscript{132} and state interventions in the election of new Archiepiscopal candidates, the Church was guided by no less than five Archbishops over this period.\textsuperscript{133} The leadership crisis was exacerbated by the legacies of centralized decisionmaking at the level of the hierarchy marked by a lack of organizational and ideological consensus, as well as by growing factionalization over state-imposed reforms regarding inter-diocesan transfers and appointment of bishops, and sources of episcopal revenues.\textsuperscript{134}

Under successive Archbishops, the reconstruction of the Church was constrained by the financial control of a state whose ideological objectives demanded at least tacit support on the part of the Church, and whose successive
interventions in the organizational and administrative structure of the Church had aggravated hierarchical factionalization. All of these factors contributed to the growing institutional disintegration of the ordained and popular strata. Insofar as the hierarchy failed to take a public stand against the definition of the Greek nation in exclusivist terms, the conception of the Church qua community assumed an exclusivist nature which aggravated the prewar gap between the lay and ordained strata. Those segments of society excluded from egalitarian membership as citizens of the Greek nation were implicitly excluded from belonging to the religious community represented by the ascendant, conservative faction of the hierarchy.

The alienation of those lay strata who viewed the blatant politicization of the Church as a perversion of an Orthodox vision for social participation, activism, and reform was aggravated by the general process of cultural transformation associated with modernization in postwar Greece. At a time when accelerated economic development and political reordering were calling into question the beliefs, values, and ideas with which people organized their lives, the Church's posture suggested a defensive stance towards modernity and identified religion with a culture formulated on exclusivist, rigid ways of interpreting the self and the other. Those elements of the popular stratum who looked to the Brotherhoods for alternative conceptions of belonging and self-definition were faced with yet a more fundamentalist, reactionary view of modernity, based on the predominance of highly moralistic, autarkic notion of spiritual community in the range of Brotherhoods which sprang up in the urban concentrations of Greece. In sum, the social fragmentation and ideological extremism which culminated in the coup
of 1967 was mirrored within the Church by organizational factionalization and a lack of consensus over the mission of the Church under the modernizing conditions of postwar Greek society.

VIII. Authoritarian Politics and Internal Division in the Church

The military coup of 21 April 1967 imposed an authoritarian regime which remained in power for the next seven years in Greece. A summary of the roots of the dictatorship and its objectives sets out the sociopolitical context in which the Church existed during the authoritarian period. The imposition of the military regime in 1967 resulted from the convergence of two factors reflecting a widespread demand for a reorganization of postwar society structured by the triarchical balance of power amongst the military, the Parliamentary Right, and the monarchy.

The first of the aforementioned two factors was the crisis in the country's existing Parliamentary institutions. Designed to circumscribe participation by non-Right political forces deemed enemies of the established political order, the Parliamentary system proved unable to accommodate the introduction of previously excluded political formations into the system, as the election victories of the Center Union Party in 1963 and 1964 required. The Center Union victories caused a fracture in the relatively fragile unity of the ruling triarchy over how to re-establish the exclusive control of the anti-Communist Right in national political life. Second, the advances of the Center Union Party indicated heightened mobilization by those sectors of Greek society long marginalized or, at least, unrepresented politically. Particularly important in this respect was the expanding petty bourgeoisie, which looked to the non-traditional political formations to
address the structural imbalances generated with Greece's postwar economic development.

The unravelling of the Right triarchy and the rise in societal pressures for the political economic redistribution of power convinced the Greek military of the need to assert its full autonomy vis-a-vis the other members of the anti-Communist coalition which, in the military view, were showing signs of becoming "...corrupt and incapable of defending the integrity of the formula upon which the postwar political system had been based. in order to ensure the perpetuation of the anti-Communist state in Greece."\(^{137}\) The convergence of the above three tendencies motivated the military coup against the civilian government in April 1967. The authoritarian regime represented the military's attempt not only to safeguard the existent anti-Communist state and Right-dominated political system but, in the view of the military, "to heal the unhealthy Greek political system and thereby to restore health to those institutions necessary to maintain democratic and competitive politics."\(^{138}\) The Colonels who carried out the coup\(^{139}\) explicitly stated that the purpose of their regime was to safeguard the country's political and social order\(^{140}\) until such time as a democratic regime could be restored in Greece.\(^{141}\) Of course, the Colonels understood democracy in terms of an improved version of the post-WWII system, whereby a renewed contract amongst the anti-Communist triarchy would sustain the kinds of reinvigorated institutional structures necessary for social normalization (meaning circumscribed mobilization) and the reintroduction of guided democracy.

As part of its program for rehabilitating the institutional foundations of the anti-Communist society, the military government intervened quickly and extensively
in the internal affairs of the Church. But the nature of the state interventions in religious institutional life over the subsequent seven years suggests a longer term set of objectives vis-a-vis the role for religion in the new, improved version of guided democracy which the military was seeking to build: a conscious attempt to use religion in a cultural project of reshaping notions of national identity, as well as a deliberate effort to rework the organizational structure of the Church in order to ensure a cooperative relationship between Church and state in the public realm.

The junta's immediate interventions in the Church occurred by virtue of state decree, thereby setting a pattern for state decisionmaking by fiat regarding the internal structure of the Church. In addition to the mandatory retirement of then-Archbishop Chrysostom Hadjistavrou, the state replaced the existing Holy Synod with a Specially Chosen Synod selected wholly by the state and mandated to elect a new Holy Synod and an Archbishop whose final approval was subject to the state. Following the election of the new Synod, the state announced the appointment of Ieronymos Kotsonis as the new Archbishop of Athens and All Greece.

Ieronymos' approval by the state reflected the junta's belief that the Archbishop's earlier activist history on behalf of the nation during WWII and Civil War, as well as his roots in the fundamentalist Zoe Brotherhood and his position as the long-time chaplain of Greece's royal family, made him an ideal candidate to manage the state's project for "...[the] moral regeneration [of society] based on devotion to...nationalism, anti-Communism, and the Orthodox church."

Paradoxically, amongst hierarchical, clerical and lay reformists (Ieronymos had
been Professor of Canon Law on the Faculty of Theology at the University of Thessaloniki), there existed a general consensus that Ieronymos was an excellent selection to head the Church. His intellectual rigor and record of social activism in the wartime and postwar periods\textsuperscript{147} suggested that he would provide the Church with the dynamic leadership\textsuperscript{148} necessary to create an institutional Orthodoxy dedicated to transforming society in terms of inclusive notions of community.

Ieronymos' enthronement as Archbishop of Athens ushered in an era of intense institutional transformation, both actualized and aborted, for the Church. The clarification of intra-institutional cleavages were shaped by the differing assumptions on the part of the state and various actors within the Church regarding the reasons for and objectives of Ieronymos' enthronement. Moreover, that Ieronymos became the flashpoint for Church-state conflicts and intra-ecclesiastical factionalization was not surprising, given the significant accretion of powers in the office of the Archbishop since Damaskinos' tenure.

Because of the association of Ieronymos' leadership with the politics of the dictatorship, assessments of the Church's evolution under his leadership and the impact of his tenure on the Church's public role have been marked by intense polemics.\textsuperscript{149} However, what is clear from the consistency of Ieronymos' actions was his support for ecclesiastical reform managed by the Archbishop and the Synod. The episcopocratic religious aggiornamento in Greece was aimed at the establishment of an integrated Church, whose capacity for social activism and direct engagement with the conditions of modernity would rest on (a) the improvement of the educational standard of the clergy as a whole (especially for the parish clergy) and, therefore, of their spiritual-pastoral capabilities; (b) the
development of an ecclesiology of broader participation, through strengthening the catechetical school program and the religious education system for adults; and, (c) achievement of the Church's economic independence from the state.  

What was less clear, but suggested by his emphasis on the financial autonomy of the Church vis-à-vis the state, was Ieronymos conviction that he would be able to oversee the modernization of the Church "...while dissociating himself from the repressive measures of the [Colonels'] regime."  

Indeed, Ieronymos' autonomy from and leverage vis-à-vis the regime was substantially weakened by the departure of his protector, King Constantine II, to self-imposed exile in the wake of his unsuccessful counter-coup against the Colonels.

The announcement of a new Ecclesiastical Charter whose specific organizational changes were predicated on the aforementioned objectives marked the overt split of the Hierarchical Synod into Ieronymite and anti-Ieronymite factions. The Ecclesiastical Charter of 1969 was passed after prolonged debate by the Hierarchical Synod, a not surprising result given that over one third of the total metropolitans on the Synod had been appointed under the triadic system imposed by the Colonels' regime. However, after four years of internecine fighting within the ordained stratum and the eventual involvement of the Council of State (Symvouleion tis Epikrateias) and the Patriarchate at Constantinople, the anti-Ieronymite faction in the Church succeeded in having a set of episcopal appointments by Ieronymos overturned.

In the wake of the public rupture within the Church, a coup within the military government occurred in late November 1973, and a hardline faction emerged with the balance of power in the Colonels' regime. The coup reflected cleavages
within the military over the regime's ongoing failure to achieve legitimacy and, in this light, helps to explain the new leaders' decision to snub Ieronymos by inviting Metropolitan Seraphim Tikas to administer the oath of office to the new government. Given the regime's flagging legitimacy, the Colonels' decision was a rational calculation designed to gain the support of the anti-Ieronymite faction on the ascendant within the Church, and was explained as Seraphim having "...‘performed his national duty in an hour when the country needed to acquire lawful leaders and authorities.'"\(^{156}\)

The above events point to the Ieronymos period as one of factionalization, fragmentation, and cleavage within the Church. Those reformists who had endorsed Ieronymos' program for ecclesiastical reform were in favor of his ideas for improved clergy education and lay training and participation, an interpretation of Orthodoxy which engaged modernity by involving all strata of the Church. However, Ieronymos's supporters were gradually alienated by his imperious leadership, as well as by what they perceived as the intense alienation of the laity over the Erastian nature of Ieronymos' appointment and the junta's manipulation of Orthodoxy as part of its anti-Communist agenda.

The junta's slogan of "A Greece of Christian Greeks" (\textit{Ellas Ellinon Christianon}) and the extremist approach to spiritual renewal, through mandatory Church attendance for children with responsibility imposed on teachers,\(^{157}\) identified Orthodoxy with social coercion and political authoritarianism in the popular mind. The identification of Orthodoxy and political extremism in the popular view was reinforced by the regime's legislation which purged the clergy of those elements "...who had lost their 'outward good reputation and necessary prestige' should be
judged and punished;\textsuperscript{138} contacts between clergy and laity were thereby politicized, and contributed to a rift between these two strata.

Those hierarchs who remained staunch supporters of Ieronymos did so out of opposition to the conservative ecclesiastical vision and reactionary politics of the anti-Ieronymites. The opponents of Ieronymos were opposed to the liberalization and modernization measures which they perceived as undermining the episcopocentrism of the Church. Critics framed Ieronymos as part of a spiritual and intellectual elite whose questionable "...ecclesial sense of Orthodox Tradition, which constitutes at once the touchstone and the great need of the contemporary Greek Orthodox Church...[would be likely to implement a "reform program]...which 'occidentalized the Greek Orthodox Church and impaired its patristic spirit.'\textsuperscript{159}

Moreover, many of the anti-Ieronymites claimed that liberalization through expanded clergy-lay decisionmaking prerogatives would open the Church to the threats of atheistic Communism.

Paradoxically, however, the ideological compatibility between many of the anti-Ieronymites and the anti-Communist junta did not outweigh the anti-state criticism of this faction: the opponents of Ieronymos were most stridently opposed to his reform program and his episcopal appointments because they perceived the process (and outcome) of these measures as representative of an increase in state control over the internal affairs of the Church. The Specially Chosen Synod, the Constitutional Charter of 1969, and the episcopal appointments under the Ieronymos Synod were, in the final analysis, subject to the approval of the Colonels' regime, and anti-Ieronymites claimed that he was a lackey for an increasingly invasive state determined to gain full control over internal
ecclesiastical life and over the Church's role in society.

The illegitimacy of the junta was confirmed with the foreign policy debacle in Cyprus in July 1974,\textsuperscript{160} and precipitated the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the transition of power to a civilian government headed by Constantine Karamanlis. By the time of the transition to democracy, Ieronymos had resigned his position and Seraphim had been elected Archbishop by an anti-Ieronymite Hierarchical Synod excluding those prelates who had been elevated during the Ieronymos tenure.\textsuperscript{161} The 1969 Constitutional Charter remained in effect at the time of the political and hierarchical transition, but the implementation of the reforms proposed in the document was effectively precluded by the anti-Ieronymite balance of power at the hierarchical level.

\textbf{IX. Conclusion}

This chapter examined the evolution of the Orthodox religion in Greece from WWII up to the 1974 transition to democracy. Although the chapter focused on explaining the development of Orthodoxy as a dynamic interaction of the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of the religion, the analysis also explored how this interaction produced an evolving role for Orthodoxy in Greek public life. Further, the chapter considered the ways in which the constitutional relationship between Church and state influenced debates within the Church over how to actualize the message of Orthodoxy.

Two key points emerge from the analysis in this chapter, both of which point to the critical importance of the wartime and postwar period in shaping the issues and processes of Church-state relations which would emerge under the PASOK governments of the 1980s. The first point concerns the sources of cleavage within
the Church and the attempts by various strata within the Church to redress these splits. By the time of the transition to democracy in Greece, the Orthodox Church was characterized by a discernible fragmentation. Organizational and administrative control was concentrated at the level of the hierarchy, with the clergy and lay elements marginalized in terms of participation in the decisionmaking structure of the Church.

One of the most interesting features of the above fragmentation is the fact that those religious leaders (Damaskinos and Ieronymos) who demonstrated a coherent vision for redressing the sources of fragmentation assumed the Archiepiscopal throne under conditions of political crisis. Both leaders conceived of a dynamic engagement between the message of Orthodoxy and the existential circumstances of modernity, and both attempted to reform the Church to allow it to negotiate a meaningful religious response to the needs of a modernizing Greek society.

Paradoxically, because both Damaskinos and Ieronymos believed that the possibilities for ecclesiastical reform within the context of national political crisis depended on firm leadership by the hierarchy, both of these modernizers reinforced the episcopocentrism which was one of the sources of cleavage within the Church. In short, neither Damaskinos nor Ieronymos were able to realize the opportunities for religious reform enabled by conditions of social flux. Their failures—in Damaskinos' case, his death cut short the possibilities for him to pursue his modernization of the Church under conditions of postwar peace—strengthened the conservative tendency within the Church.

In contrast to the modernizing, liberalizing tendency within the Church, the
conservatives understood the political-ideological and cultural aspects of modernity as a threat to Church. Indeed, conservatives focused on the state as one of the most serious threats to the role for Orthodoxy in modern public life. Those hierarchs who had endorsed a cooperative relationship with the state during the reconstruction years, despite the state's ideological exclusion of large segments of society from political life, surmised that the Church's survival depended on its ability to avoid antagonizing the state. After all, the state controlled the financial resources absolutely essential to the Church's reconstruction task. Similarly, the most severe (and consistent) attacks by anti-Ieronymites against the Archbishop were framed in terms of his willingness to allow the state to augment its control over every aspect of ecclesiastical life.

The reactionary tendency within the Church, represented by the Zoe movement and the various religious brotherhoods which it spawned, also understood modernity as a threat to religion. The response of the reactionary tendency, however, was to support reform in the Church but to characterize reform in puritanical, moralistic terms which undermined the capacity of Orthodoxy to serve as an integrative force in society. Rather, the fundamentalist cast of the reactionary reformists resulted in a choice for those who endorsed this view: either remain part of a modernizing society marred by spiritual poverty, or separate from society and become part of the closed community of the brotherhoods.

The second point concerns the ways in which the historical experiences of the 1940-1974 period had contributed to the conflation of sacred and secular notions of collective identity in Greece, primarily by generating a profound ambivalence towards both Orthodoxy and nationalism as they had come to be defined by the
Church and the state. The heroics of the Church as protector against external threat and internal dissolution under the Damaskinos stewardship had created, for the most part, a positive conception of Orthodoxy as the essential component of collective identity. However, the ascendance of the pragmatic approach to ecclesiastical reconstruction and, more importantly, the Church's tacit endorsement of the ideological project of the postwar, anti-Communist Greek state suggested that the religious conception of the collectivity was as exclusivist as the secular definition of nation. As a result, neither sacred nor secular definitions of community were acceptable to large segments of the Greek population. Religion became a source of contradictions and confusion in Greek culture, rather than a source of integration for the ideas, beliefs, and values by which people made meaning out of their history.

The growing legitimacy crisis of the state, culminating in the military dictatorship and, then, in the junta's inability to legitimate itself, was matched by a legitimacy crisis for the Church. By the time of the transition, the Church's legitimacy as the representative of the doctrinal truths of Orthodoxy had been compromised by the episcopocentrism, lay marginalization, and clergy apathy which characterized the institutional structure. Moreover, this doctrinally-based legitimacy crisis was severely aggravated and reinforced by the Ieronymos period. The junta's standard of *Ellas Ellinon Christiaron* and its filling of the episcopal ranks with candidates evaluated in terms of ideological criteria, had also undermined the Church's legitimacy in public life by suggesting that the Church was willing to compromise its doctrinal responsibilities for protecting the whole of society for the sake of power politics with the state.
Faced with a legitimacy crisis within the Church as well as in terms of the Church's role in public life, Archbishop Seraphim emphasized in his enthronement address the urgent need to restore unity to the Church and to Greek society. However, the program for ecclesiastical unity, as well as the agenda for how the Church might contribute to national reintegration under democracy, would become a point of contention amongst religious groups with differing approaches to reform. As in the past, the ecclesiastical tendency favoring a dynamic engagement of modernity by the Church faced a window of opportunity for implementing their vision for the role of religion in public life. Moreover, the lessons of previous tactics, successful and failed, for reform served as a learning curve in the pursuit of ecclesiastical reform in the democratization context.
ENDNOTES


2. See Chapter One for a discussion of the Great Schism.

3. The concept of Holy Tradition and its relevance for the daily, institutional life of the Church is very complex and remains a matter of lively debate amongst theologians and laymen alike. Most Orthodox theologians, however, agree that the main elements of Holy Tradition are those articulated in this text. Theologians also emphasize that Holy Tradition must be differentiated from tradition or traditions, these being cultural manifestations and behavioral elements which have become intertwined with Church life but which are not rooted in the theology of the faith. Holy Tradition, then, is understood to maintain the living continuity of the original Church and, in this, supports the claim of the Orthodox Church to be the true Church of Christ. The centrality of Tradition to the Church is undeniable yet is frequently misunderstood.


4. See Chapter One for a more detailed discussion of the doctrinal formulation of the Church qua institution as part of Christian eschatology and cosmology.

5. Ware, The Orthodox Church, p. 206.

7. For a useful, non-specialist's summary of the organizational supra-structure which constitutes the Eastern Orthodox Church, of which the Church of Greece is a part, see Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 12-13.


10. The ordained clergy encompasses bishops, priests and deacons.

11. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 244. Ware goes on to discuss the balance between freedom and authority inherent to the organicity of the Church in terms of the concept of the Holy Trinity. The Trinity posits that there is one, Triune God--comprised of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit--who possesses one essence in three persons. The Trinity is a holy mystery of unity in diversity, wherein each of the constitutive persons is distinct yet one. Ware speaks of the Church as a reflection of "...God the Trinity, reproducing on earth the mystery of unity in diversity. In the Trinity the three are one God, yet each is fully personal; in the Church a multitude of human persons are united in one, yet each preserves his personal diversity unimpaired. The mutual indwelling of the persons of the Trinity is paralleled by the inherence of the members of the Church."

12. Quoted in ibid., p. 271.

13. Quoted in ibid., p. 310. The community of Orthodox believers is expressed in the Church as "the body of Christ," that is, the Christocentric community whose members constantly reaffirm their existence in and commitment to the image of Christ by virtue of liturgical participation in the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist. The Eucharistic basis for the notion of the Church as the body of Christ are explained on p. 23-24 of Michæl A. Meerson, "The Doctrinal Foundation of Orthodoxy," in Ramet, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, p. 20-36.

14. For a concise summary of the special role of the bishop by virtue of the doctrine of Apostolic succession, see p. 29-31 in ibid. The functional symbiosis
meant to characterize the roles of bishop and laity in the Church, according to the Doctrine of Apostolic Succession, is discussed on p. 30.

15. Ware discusses the ordained hierarchy as those "...appointed by God to guide and to rule the flock [that is the Church]." See *The Orthodox Church*, p. 253. This special position of leadership in the Church accorded the bishops, by virtue of their ordination as successors to St. Peter and the other eleven disciples of Christ, requires that the bishops of the Church stand as the living image of God upon earth, just as the original apostles lived as examples of Christ's message.


17. Through the participatory experience of the liturgical celebration of the Eucharist, each communicant expresses his belonging to the royal priesthood of the faithful and thereby reaffirms the Church as a perfect unity expressed in plurality. For more on the Eucharist as a gift open to all Christians, and therefore, attesting to their equality in the community of the faithful, see Alexandre Faivre, *The Emergence of the Laity in the Early Church* (New York, N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1990), p. 28-35.


19. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 250.

20. Only the bishops, by virtue of their *charisma*, were permitted to make final decisions and formal proclamations regarding the Christian faith.

21. The Ecumenical Councils were held between between 325 and 787. These councils were held when there was still only one, united Church in the Christian *Oikoumene* (inhabited world).


23. St. Ignatius, who lived in the first century A.D., was Bishop of Antioch and is considered one of the great "Fathers of the Church." For a brief discussion of his understanding of the role of the laity in the church, see p. 21-22 in Ware, *The Orthodox Church*.

24. Varying interpretations by the Church Fathers on these points are discussed in Faivre, *The Emergence of the Laity*, p. 46-69.

25. The gradual decline of lay participation in the election and elevation of hierarchy and clergy differed over time in the various member Churches of the Eastern Orthodox Church according to the conditions of local political and cultural context. For a useful discussion of the general decline of the practice as part of
the growing differentiation of the ordained and popular strata of the Church, see ibid., p. 43-71.

26. The socially transformative capacities of the Orthodox Church, by its very nature as an organic community, are discussed by Webster, *The Price of Prophecy*, p. 12-14, and in detail by Yannaras, *The Freedom of Morality*, p. 195-229.

27. See Chapter Two for a full treatment of the establishment of the autocephalous Church of Greece as part of the politics of nation-state formation.

28. Chapter Two offers a full treatment of the constitutional model of Church-state relations and its continuities and breaks with the previous *symphonia* and *millet* models under, respectively, the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires.

29. The decision to establish the autocephalous status of the Church of Greece grew out of the recommendations of a mixed clergy-laity committee appointed by the Bavarian Regency to study the autocephaly issue, as well as the broader problematic of relations between the Church and the newly formed Greek state. The commission, in concluding its investigation of these issues, recommended to the state that an ecclesiastical structure independent of Patriarchal control be appointed by the King. As a legitimating measure for the government's decision to follow the commission's recommendations, the Regency convoked a synodal meeting of bishops to vote on the proposal. It was this "Extraordinary Synod"--the war for independence had left many episcopal sees vacant and had created many refugee bishops from the Anatolian areas with no official diocesan assignments in the new Greek Kingdom--which confirmed the proclamation of the autocephaly of the Church of Greece. For a detailed discussion of the above proceedings, refer to Charles Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece: 1821-1852* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 110-112. Frazee offers a synoptic account of the autocephaly proceedings on p. 131-132 in "Church and State in Greece," in John T. Koumouvides, ed., *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974* (London, England: Zeno Press, 1977).

30. The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction was the precursor of the current Ministry of Education and Religions.


32. For good coverage of these cycles of reform in the institutional life of the Church and their interface with the history of Church-state relations during the 1833-1950 period, see Theofanis G. Stavrou, *The Orthodox Church of Greece*, in

33. Having grown steadily with the expansion of the Greek national territory since 1821, the geographic radius of the Church included, with varying degrees of administrative control, the original territory of the independent Kingdom of Greece; the Ionian Islands, incorporated in 1864; Thessaly and Epirus, annexed in 1881; and the so-called New Lands (*Neaì Khoraì*) annexed between 1912 and 1945 and encompassing Macedonia, Crete, and the Dodecanese Islands. The Church of Greece maintained administrative control over the original territory of the modern Greek state as well as over the New Lands, although the latter areas technically still belonged in principle to the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople. The diocese on Crete and the Dodecanese Islands remained fully under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. For a discussion of the jurisdictional and administrative distinctions within the Church of Greece, see Kallistos Ware, "The Church: A Time of Transition," in Richard Clogg, ed., *Greece in the 1980's* (London, England: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1983), p. 209. For a more detailed discussion of the jurisdictional issues relating territories in Greece to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, see the comments on the Patriarchal Decree of 1928, on p. 150-151 in Charles Frazee, "The Orthodox Church of Greece: The Last Fifteen Years," in John T. Koumoulides, ed., *Hellenic Perspectives: Essays in the History of Greece* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980).

In addition to the above territories, the monastic community of Mt. Athos, located on Greece's Chalcidice Peninsula and considered to be the center of Eastern Orthodox monasticism, retains ecclesiastical autonomy from the Church of Greece and, more broadly, holds the civil status of an autonomous territory within the Greek state. According to *Eastern Churches Review*, Vol. II, No. 4 (Autumn 1969): 433, Mt. Athos is officially regarded as a "...self-governing monastic republic, not subject to bureaucratic control from Athens." The same source provides a useful discussion of the legal status and administrative realities governing relations between the Athoneite community and the Greek state. Also on this issue, see Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church", p. 190-191. Each of the monasteries on the Holy Mountain selects its own representative to sit as a member on Mt. Athos' governing body, known as the *Iera Koinotis* "Holy Community." Ware discusses the administrative and functional status of Mt. Athos, including trends in the level of membership in the monastic community there, on p. 140-142, in *The Orthodox Church*.

Regarding the division of the ecclesiastical territories into dioceses, the number of dioceses comprising the Church had fluctuated primarily according to jurisdictional rearrangements decided by the Permanent Holy Synod, the Church's supreme executive body. For example, the original diocese structure of the autocephalous Church of Greece was formalized in a state decree of 1833, where the number of dioceses was set at ten in order to correspond to the ten new political departments into which the country was organized. See Frazee, "Church and State," p. 124. Revisions in the diocese structure often corresponded to revisions in Greece's borders, as after the Balkan Wars. For a more recent
example of changes in the diocesan lines of demarcation via a decision by Archbishop Seraphim of Athens on behalf of the Holy Synod, see ibid, p. 159. With regard to these changes, see data cited from the official Yearbook of the Church of Greece, 1985 [Imerologion tis Ekklesias tis Ellados] in Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church," p. 191.

34. In lieu of the complete, official title, the Archbishop is usually referred to, simply, as the Archbishop of Athens.

35. See Note 7.

36. The Holy Synod administers the Church through an elaborate system of agencies dealing with the various functional requirements of the Church. The ecclesiastical calendar works on a yearly cycle beginning on the first of October one year and ending on the thirtieth of September in the following year. Some of the most important activities falling under this broad mandate include supervision of the ecclesiastical education of the clergy and the laity, administration of official ecclesiastical publications, and publication of materials used for religious education in the public school system. The Archbishop of Athens acts, in either titular or active capacity, as head of all the agencies administered by the Permanent Holy Synod. For an interesting review of what had become two of the most powerful agencies by the late 1960's and, not coincidentally, those over which the state exercised a strong degree of control (the ODEP, Organismos Dioikisis Ekklesiastikis Periousias; and the TAKE, Tameion Asfaliseos Klerou Ellados), see George Dan Kent, "The Political Influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece," unpublished Ph.D. diss. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1971), p. 200-203.

37. This title has been changed several times over the history of the autocephalous Church of Greece, and is currently referred to as the General Council of the State to the Church.

38. The importance of bishops was rooted in Orthodox canon law, which states that the bishop holds the highest distinction in the hierarchical orders (bishop, priests, and deacons) of the Church.

39. For an extensive discussion of the responsibilities and privileges of the bishop within the organizational structure of the Church, see p. 211-227 in Kent, "The Political Influence." For a more rigorous, theologically-grounded approach to the same topic, see p. 252-258 in Ware, The Orthodox Church. In general, on the basis of the same charisma that endowed the hierarchy in Greece with powers of ruling as an ecclesiastical leader, hierarchs were mandated to fulfill their responsibilities of teaching and of the liturgical life centered around celebration of the sacraments with all members of the diocese.

40. The bishop's latitude in administering his diocese is circumscribed only in
cases of flagrant violation of ecclesiastical rules, whereupon the Peramen. Holy Synod and the Hierarchical Synod are authorized to intervene.

41. The importance of councils can be traced throughout the institutional history of the Church. For a review of the conciliar foundations of Orthodoxy's institutional history, see Chapter 2, "Byzantium, I: The Church of the Seven Councils" in Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 26-50. In the same source, see p. 210-212.

42. Ware, "The Church: A Time of Transition," p. 211.

43. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 23.

44. These would include such activities, for example, as administering the Eucharistic sacrament to the elderly and infirm, as well as the wider range of sacramental activities including marriage, baptisms, and confession.


46. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 257.

47. Bishops most commonly made appointments to the Parish Council on the basis of an individual's hereditary distinction, financial status, or political affiliation. In the post-WWII period, the last criterion became decisively important, as the hierarchy's acceptance of the state's militant anti-Communism was reflected in an effort to exclude any perceived Left infiltrations into community life. The overlay of ideology on the episcopate's selection of Parish Council members began to be apparent with the intensification of Venizelist versus anti-Venizelist politics from the early 1920s.

48. Only the male members of the parish were permitted to vote in Parish Council elections.


51. By the end of the 1940s, candidates for the priesthood could be trained at one of ten main seminaries, as well as in degree programs in theology at the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki.

53. Rinvolucri discusses the problems in the system for ecclesiastical education and training on p. 22-26 in *Anatomy*.

54. Rinvolucri observes that "...an examination of Greek village parishes [leaves one] with an impression of fine leaven but poor bakers, of a religious people but of educationally and, above all, spiritually inadequate pastors." Ibid., p. 30.

55. For a discussion of the educational ranking system and salary scales for parish clergy which obtained through the Second World War, see ibid., p. 22-26.

56. These discretionary fees were known as tychera or, literally, "luck money."

57. The state's failure to provide for the financial survival of the parish clergy was a longstanding problem dating back to the Ecclesiastical Constitution of 1833, and had become a continuous, subsequent source of Church-state antagonism despite legislative revisions designed to improve the salary and benefits scale of the lower clergy. See Frazee, "Church and State," p. 133-139; Rinvolucri, *Anatomy*, Ch.1; and, Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church," p. 198-200.


59. One of the most controversial decisions on the part of the Holy Synod, in conformity with government pressures, was the decision in 1923 for the Church to adopt the Gregorian Calendar adopted by the regime of Colonel Nikolaos Plasteras soon after assuming power in 1922. In addition to the doctrinal controversy over the Calendar question, the Synodal vote was seen as suspect in light of the fact that the newly appointed Archbishop of Athens was elected by a Holy Synod whose membership had been determined by the pro-Venizelist government. The vote on the Calendar provoked a split within the Church of Greece. Those supporting the continued use of the "old," Julian Calendar formed a separate religious community identified as the Community of True Orthodox Christians (commonly referred to as "the Old Calendarites"). See p. 141 in Frazee, "Church and State," on the Synodal vote on the Gregorian calendar. For a discussion of the Plasteras regime, see Mavrogordato, *Stillborn Republic*, p. 29-30.

60. The word despotis (literally, despot) is the one used by most people, clergy and laity alike, to refer to the bishop. The word can be traced back to the Byzantine period, when it was a title accorded only temporal rulers. The Ottomans, however, applied the title to the Orthodox bishops in the Empire, since the Ottomans held the leaders of the Church responsible for the civil as well as religious administration of the Christian millet. The continued use of the word until the present suggests a cultural predisposition concerning the role of the bishop, and by extension, the Church. The term conveys a set of attitudes and beliefs, that the bishop is, in fact, the ecclesiastical ruler of his diocese; further,
70. In Greece, these groups are most commonly referred to, simply, as koinimata (movements), or as ekklesiastika koinimata (ecclesiastical movements).


72. Rinvulcri, Anatomy, p. 82. Matthopoulos was a follower of Apostolis Makrakis, one of the leading figures in the nineteenth-century, missionary, lay apostolate currents which presaged the twentieth century brotherhoods. The precursors of the twentieth century brotherhoods lie in the nineteenth century with the missionizing activism of certain well-known clergy and laymen whose primary aims were the instigation of an intellectual-spiritual awakening amongst the Orthodox masses and an ecclesiastical response to the Church's subjection to relatively constant interference from the Greek state. Although these earliest activists are generally regarded as the forbearers of the contemporary brotherhoods, for the most part they did not oversee the establishment of organized lay associations but rather served as rallying points for spontaneous albeit largescale popular demands for religious reform. For a summary review of some of the most well-known figures in this early genealogy of the brotherhoods, as well as of the motivations for these movements, see p. 69-70 in Jioultsis, "Religious Brotherhodds."

73. The movement, despite its cenotic features, was distinguished by its sustained commitment to home missionary activism. As with the other, less well-known brotherhoods that sprang up in the post-WWII period, Zoe has been characterized typologically as constituting a new form of cenotic monasticism blended with a catechetical and preaching current. On entry into the Brotherhood, members made a formal promise to live a life of poverty, chastity, and obedience to the collective body of the brotherhood and, implicitly, to the Orthodox community of the faithful, that is the Church qua laos. The brothers lived and preached throughout the country and, while the organization was centralized in Athens, the Brotherhood grew to function in a loosely decentralized, parliamentarian style, with member houses scattered throughout Greece.

The organization is administered by a superior and a council. The council is comprised of three clerics and two laymen, all of whom are elected, and is the supreme administrative body of the Brotherhood as an organization. An advisory commission, composed of the council and additional, regular members, functions as a general deliberative body dealing with day-to-day problems related to the movement and as a sort of forum for deciding issues to be heard by the council and superior. Finally, independent commissions with a mixed composition of council members and regular members oversee the various divisions of the Zoe's activities that come under the direction of an extensive network of lay associations. Each of the lay associations was designed to evangelize a specific section of the population, and is administered under the auspices of a director, elected by the Zoe governing council.
the continued use of the word suggests that, at the subjective level, the popular understanding of the line separating the bishop as a purely spiritual leader from the secular, civil authorities is a porous one.

61. For an excellent summary of the origins, mechanisms, and results of state interference in ecclesiastical affairs through the Synodal bodies from 1821 through the start of WWII, see Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, p. 136-144.


63. For a discussion of the charismatic features which informed the split of the Greek political world into Venizelist and anti-Venizelist poles centered in the individuals of Cretan politician Eieftherios Venizelos and then-monarch Constantine I, see Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, p. 55-64.

64. The origins and results of the highly fragmented nature of politics in Greece, from the Revolution of 1909 up to the dissolution of the military regime in 1974, are discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this dissertation. For a thorough, comprehensive treatment of politics in the interwar period, see ibid.

65. These words were part of the Archbishop of Athens' public excommunication of Venizelos in 1916. Quoted in Frazee, "Church and State," p. 139.

66. Rinvolutri, *Anatomy*, p. 120.

67. The lay theologians who comprise the intellectual community of which I am speaking should not be confused with the relatively large numbers of individuals (male and female) who obtain either undergraduate or advanced degrees in theology merely as a means to an end, namely, a degree from one of the two state universities. The comparatively large number of theology graduates is directly related to the structure of the national education system and, specifically, to the selection of a theology specialization by those who failed to qualify for the discipline of their choice. There is no data tracking the career paths of theology degreeholders in Greece. However, comprehensive anecdotal evidence as well as a comparison of the number of graduates with the number of teaching posts (the educational system is nationalized) shows that theology degreeholders rarely pursue a professional path related to their discipline of study.

68. The full name of Zoe is the Brotherhood of Theologians.

69. Other well-known movements include those founded by Frs. Kandiotis and Nisiotis and, in both cases, are strongly identified with the founders. For a brief review of these two movements, which depend far more exclusively on the leadership of their founders than on a formalized administrative and organizational structure, see p. 94-95 in Rinvolutri, *Anatomy*. According to Basil Jioultsis, the most important brotherhoods are Zoe, Sotir, Stavros, and Paraklitos. See p. 73, "Religious Brotherhods: A Sociological View," in Social Compass, Vol. 22, 1 (1975).
74. *Zoe* focused its efforts in four major areas, those of preaching, education, liturgical participation, and social service activities. *Zoe* brothers travelled regularly throughout the country on preaching tours, which became the catalyst for attracting followers to a renewed, personalized form of Orthodoxy. Preaching formed the foundation for the movement's extensive catechetical school structure at the primary, secondary, and high school levels. Teaching was conducted by members from the movement's various associations, with the largest concentration of instructors drawn from the Association of Teachers, the Students Association, and the Professional People's Association. The catechetical system interfaced with other *Zoe* educational programs and with a wide net of social and philanthropic activities at the parish and diocese levels. These included Bible study groups and spiritual retreats. As a corollary to Bible study, the movement's leaders worked with lay intellectuals to begin the translation of the Gospels and the Epistles from ancient Greek into the modern idiom (*demotiki*) and, thereby, to make the central sources of Orthodox theology accessible and understandable to the widest possible segment of the Greek population.

Although cooperative clergy-laity educational initiatives were most commonly used by the Brotherhood, the movement had begun to utilize a host of publications that catered to the varied educational levels of the still primarily rural population. These publications became increasingly effective with the overall modernization of Greek society that occurred from the 1950s onward. *Zoe* publications included journals, newsletters, and bulletins, and appealed particularly to the growing, educated urban population. The written materials covered subjects ranging from specifically religious questions, to debates on contemporary scholarly issues, to the application of religious teachings to everyday societal dilemmas. For more information on the scope of *Zoe* publications, see Rinvuluci, *Anatomy*, p. 85-86.

At the level of social action, the movement arranged pilgrimages to holy sites within Greece and throughout the Christian world (for example, the movement organized pilgrimages to the Holy Land in Jerusalem). The Brotherhood also coordinated missionary teams sent to Orthodox Christian communities in developing countries. In the postwar period, for example, Brotherhood teams have travelled to Africa—to Kenya and Uganda in particular—to spearhead missionary activities (building of churches, schools, and hospitals) for the growing Orthodox communities in these countries. Schools, hospitals, and churches are common projects on which the Brotherhood teams work. Finally, the Brotherhood set up philanthropic "houses" in large towns and in rural areas whose poor infrastructure made state-assistance logistically difficult.

75. p. 88 Rinvuluci, *Anatomy*. For elaboration on the negative response of bishops to the *Zoe* movement, see ibid., p. 87-88.

76. In their emphasis on vows of morality and acceptance of an established code of ethics, the brotherhoods draw on some of the better known elements of the ancient monastic traditions in Orthodoxy. However, the brotherhoods incorporate new attitudes and practices which are relatively unknown to the historical tradition of Orthodoxy and which have generated intense debate within the established
institutional structure of the Church. The linchpin of the brotherhoods' revisionism, however, grows out of their openly critical attitude and resultant demands for reform of the ecclesiastical institutional structure, and the need for a lay-clerical synthesis in which both lay and ordained members of the movement enjoy the same institutional decisionmaking privileges. Both Ware, *The Greek Orthodox Church*, and Rinvoucri, *Anatomy*, refer to the theological conservatism and the revisionism which informs the *Zoe* philosophy. The fullest treatment of those elements of the brotherhoods that are not rooted specifically in the historical traditions of Orthodoxy is found in Jioultsis, "Religious Brotherhoods," p. 74.

77. *Apostoliki Diakonia*’s mandate was "(i) to organize sermons all over Greece and to study the techniques of preaching; (ii) to provide training for confessors, and (iii) to organize and supervise a network of catechism classes all over the country." In fact, the association was loosely modeled on the Brotherhood. By most accounts, *Apostoliki Diakonia* had achieved the greatest degree of success in its third objective, building a catechetical school system functioning at the grade school through the university levels. Rinvoucri, *Anatomy*, p. 92.


79. By the outset of the wartime period, there had developed significant informal cooperation between the *Apostoliki Diakonia* and the *Zoe* movement in the realm of catechetical education. *Zoe* preachers relied on local parish priests to help set up catechetical schools in rural areas where the Brotherhood was most weakly established. Meanwhile, priests--and some bishops--overwhelmed with responsibilities in larger parishes, directly and indirectly encouraged their parishioners to take advantage of the religious activities coordinated by the *Zoe* lay associations.

80. The emergence of an authoritarian pattern of decisionmaking within *Zoe*, as a result of the gradual predominance of the notions of obedience to the community of the Brotherhood and penitence for supposed lapses of morality, provoked a split within the movement in 1960 and the formation of another Brotherhood, *Soir*. See Jioultsis, "Religious Brotherhoods," p. 72-73 and p. 77-79.

81. The wartime experience and the Greek Civil War were intimately related. The complexity and long-term importance of the WWII and Civil War linkages have been explored in the substantial literature on these experiences. The purposes of this dissertation do not warrant an extensive coverage of the two events, except with respect to how they affected the ideological and sociological context within which the institutional Church operated in post-war Greece. For a comprehensive collection of the political economic, military, ideological, and sociological aspects of the Civil War in Greece, see John O. Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1981).
82. The Greek military campaign in response to the Italian declaration of war was well-established by the time of the emergence of the Resistance Movement in mid-1942. The initial campaign, initially fought on the borders with Albania, represented a remarkable demonstration of national unity and popular mobilization, given that the country was infrastructurally and militarily ill-equipped to face the Axis war machine. What became known as "the Epic of Albania" was both an anti-fascist and patriotic war that saw "...[t]he nation united as never before." William Hardy McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma. War and Aftermath* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947), p. 40. The guerrilla activities of the Resistance Movement reinforced the campaign against Italy, and eventuated German intervention on behalf of the Italian troops.

83. The Varkiza Agreement was signed on 12 February 1945, and was an official ceasefire pact between the representatives of the Greek Government-in-Exile, the EDES, and the leaders of the EAM-ELAS movement. For a detailed discussion of the origins and breakdown of the Varkiza Agreement, see Heinz Richter, "The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War," in Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940s*.

84. See Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, for a comprehensive account of the interwar politics which formed the seedbed for the fratricidal politics of the 1940s. As Svoronos observes, "For Greece, and perhaps for the whole of Europe, the 1940s constituted the conclusion of a larger historical period that began with the end of World War I. In the case of Greece, the conventional *terminus a quo* is 1922." Nicolas Svoronos, "Greek History, 1940-1950: The Main Problems," in Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940s*.

85. Throughout the interwar period, Metaxas was one of the main leaders of the most extreme segments of the anti-Venizelist coalition, and had headed the Free Opinion Party (*Komna ton Eleftheron*).

86. For an excellent summary of the political events which formed the immediate backdrop to the establishment of the "Fourth of August" dictatorship (imposed on 4 August 1936), see Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, p. 43-54.

87. Svoronos discusses the Metaxas dictatorship in the following terms: "What can be assumed with some certainty is this: during the years immediately preceding World War II and during the occupation, the social programs of the political representatives of the ruling class [the heterogeneous Greek bourgeoisie] no longer differed. These representatives merely disagreed on how public affairs should be conducted. Faced with the threat, although distant, of the new social tendencies [the urban working class] that were beginning to achieve political autonomy, they finally agreed on dictatorship...The leading groups of the Greek bourgeoisie considered the dictatorship to be the proper safeguard of their class interests." Svoronos, "Greek History," p. 8.
88. The *Kommunistiko Komma tis Ellados* had been established in 1923 and, compared to other working class movements and Communist parties in the neighboring Balkan countries, was relatively weak in electoral power. The electoral weakness of the KKE could be traced to several factors, not the least of which was the strength of the country's incorporative, clientelistic associations that undermined the possibilities for forming autonomous working class interest groups capable of organizing as cohesive political groups. The enormous influx of over a million Greek-speaking refugees from Turkey, in the wake of Greece's 1922 military defeat at Smyrna in Asia Minor (the so-called Asia Minor "Disaster"-'*H Katastrope'"), provided the initial impetus for the growing electoral strength of the KKE in the mid-1920s. Many of these refugees, who had constituted an economically flourishing enclave in Asia Minor, settled in the Greece's urban areas, were forced to serve as a source of cheap labor for the country's nascent industrial base. Given the negative impacts on the urban working class as a result of the international Depression and Greece's position as a semi-peripheral economy, as well as domestic societal pressures generated by resentment from the native population over the costs associated with absorption of the refugees, the KKE's working class appeal grew strongly by the end of the 1920s and into the early 1930s.


90. The Metaxas regime outlawed the KKE. Paradoxically, by forcing the Communists to establish a working underground network with an organized political apparatus, the dictatorship had created the very agent capable of assuming the leadership of the Greek Resistance against the Axis occupation.


93. *Ellinikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*.

94. *Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon*.

95. *Ethniko Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos*

96. EAM was the political arm of the military organization, ELAS. Besides EAM-ELAS and EDES, there were several other resistance groups which played a notable role in the guerrilla activities against the Italian Occupation, although none ever achieved the organization, results, and stature of the EAM-ELAS and EDES. Notable resistance groups included EKKA (National and Social Liberation, *Ethniki kai Koïnoniki Apeleftherosis*) and X (Chi).
97. King George II had announced the formal termination of the dictatorship in February 1942 while in exile in Cairo, recognizing this as an essential prerequisite for his long-term objective of returning to Greece as constitutional monarch. His return to Greece came in the aftermath of the elections of March 1946 (in which the monarchist Right gained a majority) and the plebiscite of 1 September 1946 (which resulted in a victory for those favoring a monarchical regime as opposed to a republic). For a discussion of the questionable procedure and outcome of both the elections and the plebiscite, as well as an analysis of these events as turning points in catalyzing the civil war, see George Th. Mavrogordatos, "The 1946 Election and Plebiscite," in Iatrídes, ed., Greece in the 1940s.

98. The Greek Civil War came to be interpreted by the Great Powers as a microcosm of the East versus West battle that was shaping the emergent post-WWII geopolitical framework, so that it was the U.S.'s massive intervention in the form of Truman Doctrine assistance that produced the victory of the Greek Right over the Communist-dominated EAM-ELAS forces. The Truman Doctrine was promulgated on March 12, 1947 as part of the U.S.'s overall commitment to containment of the perceived threat of Soviet communist expansionism which, in the Greek case, was seen as the inevitable outcome of a victory by the Communist forces. The Truman Doctrine also represented part of the larger shift in the post-WWII global balance of power, as the decline of British international predominance was matched by the emergence of the United States as the principle counter to Soviet power. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine also followed close on the heels of the British government's formal expression of intent-- given its own, domestic economic exigencies--to terminate the estimated $250 million in economic and military support then extended to maintain the non-Communist status quo in Greece and Turkey. For a readable summary of developments in Greece and Turkey as the catalyst for the Truman Doctrine, see Theodore A. Coulommbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 7-22. A detailed discussion of the role of the U.S. and other foreign powers in the process and outcome of the Greek Civil War is provided by John O. Iatrídes, "Civil War, 1945-1949: National and International Aspects," in Iatrídes, ed., Greece in the Civil War.

99. For a summary discussion of the Right-Left and royalist-republican conflicts within the Greek Army, most of which occurred amongst the bulk of the senior officers who had disembarked with the King to Egypt and formed part of the British Middle East Command, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece" in New Left Review, No. 96 (March-April 1976), p. 58-59.

100. Greece had been a net importer of grain before WWII, but physical ravages of war and occupation all but eliminated domestic agricultural sources of food, and intensified the shortage by crippling the country's already very basic transport system and exacerbating distribution of extant supplies.

102. Ibid., p. 109.

103. The Government of National Unity was meant to be a government of national reconciliation which would govern Greece following liberation until the resolution of the regime question through elections and plebiscite. For the British and the Government-in-Exile, the Government of National Unity was viewed as a short-term solution for restoring order, in the service of the long-term objectives of a defeat of the Left, the return of the monarch, and the establishment of a firmly pro-Western government buttressed by the anti-Communist Greek military. The Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, which landed in Greece with a British backup force as the Germans withdrew in October 1944, was George Papandreou, a well-respected liberal politician of the interwar period. A straightforward narrative discussion of the negotiations and formation of the Government of National Unity under George Papandreou is provided in McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma*, p. 131-160.

104. Ibid., p. 124.

105. Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church," p. 194.

106. For a biographical sketch of Damaskinos' early life and initial path within the Church, see Koukounas, *O Archiepiskopos*, p. 17-37.

107. See ibid., p. 41-61, for a detailed treatment of the links between national politics and hierarchical partisanship in the elections, annulment, and re-elevation of Damaskinos to the Archiepiscopal throne. This discussion is particularly useful in pointing to the politicization of the hierarchy of the Church through successive state interventions in ecclesiastical affairs. A highly summarized account of these events is provided by Frazee in "Church and State," p. 144-146.

108. Koukounas addresses Damaskinos' ability to establish the Church as the psychological protector of the nation, in *O Archiepiskopos*, p. 151.

109. That the occupation government recognized its own lack of domestic legitimacy and, conversely, the ability of the Church to appeal to the need for a unified collective identity in the face of the war had been admitted in a letter by General George Tsolakoglou to Damaskinos, soon after the latter's ascension to the Archiepiscopal throne. See ibid., p. 103-106.

110. Almost immediately after the imposition of the dictatorship in 1936, Metaxas had begun a steady process of expanding state controls over the Synodal bodies of the Church, thereby politicizing the hierarchy and reducing the Church's scope for autonomous action in Greek society. Frazee provides an understandable synopsis of this complicated series of actions in "Church and State," p. 144-146.
111. See Kent, "The Political Influence," p. 208, for comment on the accretion of decisionmaking powers in the hands of the Archbishop.

112. The Hierarchical Synod met only once during the 1940s, on 22 July 1946; this was the first such meeting since 1938. Frazee, "Church and State," p. 145.

113. Mavrogordatos discusses the factors in the timetable for the election and plebescite in "The 1946 Election."


121. These included the Greek Rally (*Ellinikos Synagermos*) and the National Radical Union (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*).

122. The adoption of a new electoral law based on the principle of majority representation helped to effect the victory of the Greek Rally Party (ES, or *Ellinikos Synagermos*) in November 1952. The ES was founded by Field Marshall Alexandros Papagos, the party's first Prime Minister. Papagos was somewhat of a war hero, based on his leadership in the Albanian campaign of 1940, and he had been commander-in-chief of the Greek Armed Forces in the Civil War. Papagos was impatient with the ineffectiveness of the Center coalition governments to restore the political order necessary to begin the task of reconstruction, and was opposed to those governments' conciliatory gestures towards the Left in the aftermath of the Civil War. He founded the Greek Rally in 1951, consciously modelling it on de Gaulle's *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* founded four years
earlier, and emphasized the need for new, decisive leadership to rebuild Greece and to eliminate any possibility of a ressuscitation of the Left. According to Mouzelis, the changes in Greek electoral law that facilitated the victory of Papagos' Greek Rally were pressured on the existing Greek government by the United States. See Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, p. 135-136. Also, see Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece. The Search for Legitimacy* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987), p. 26-30.

123. For a complete discussion of the shifting electoral coalitions and general weakness of the Center during this period, see Clogg, *Parties and Elections*, p. 17-30.


128. Nicos Mouzelis coined the now widely used term "restricted parliamentarism" to refer to the Greek political system from 1950 until the imposition of the Colonels' dictatorship.

129. There is an exceptional dearth of systematic studies dealing with the institutional evolution of the Church during this period. For limited references, see Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," p. 146-148 and Kent, "The Political Influence," p. 343-383.

130. See Note 59 for a discussion of the origins of the political pressures and ecclesiastical decisions which led to the formation of the Old Calendarite sect.

131. According to Frazee, the state expropriated 188,000 acres of agricultural properties from the Church in 1952, and compensated the Church at approximately one-third of the total property value. See "Church and State," p. 146.

132. The most well-known controversy over elevation of an Archbishop during the 1950-1967 period involved Iakovos Vavanatsos, who occupied the Archiepiscopical throne for a little under two weeks in early January 1962. The Archbishop's short tenure was grounded in the scandal surrounding alleged sexual improprieties, and was marked by intra-Synodal infighting and state involvement in determining his eventual resignation. For an interesting review of the "Iakovos scandal," see Kent, "The Political Influence," p. 343-351.

133. A list of the Archbishops and their tenures in office is provided by Stavrou in "The Orthodox Church," on p. 206.

135. See Jioultsis, "Religious Brotherhods," for a review of the formation of new Brotherhoods and their fundamentalist orientation in the postwar period.

136. A detailed examination of the military regime is not necessary to the main purpose of this chapter, namely analysis of the evolution of religion (its doctrinal and institutional dynamic) during the postwar period. However, a basic presentation of the backdrop to the imposition of the junta is necessary for understanding the overall sociopolitical context for Orthodoxy during the period.


138. Diamandouros refers to the concern, articulated by the leadership of the authoritarian regime, that their intervention in politics was a temporary, albeit, absolutely essential method for restoring democracy. See ibid., p. 148. For an in-depth examination of the transition and consolidation strategies of the authoritarian regime with respect to creating a democratic political system, see the recently completed work of Constantine Arvanitopoulos, "The Political Economy of Regime Change: The Case of Greece," unpublished Ph.D. diss. (University Microfilms: Georgetown University School of International Service, 1989).

139. The Colonels' coup had the short-lived support of King Constantine II, whose subsequent, abortive counter-coup on 13 December 1968 led to the Greek monarch's exile to London. This exile became permanent following the 1974 plebescite that produced a majority vote against the re-instatement of the monarchical regime.


141. The Colonels referred to their act as the "Revolution of 1967." As Diamandouros observes, "[e]ven the utterances of the most militant among the colonels spoke not of a total abandonment of democratic practices, and an alternative model of political organization for Greek society, but of a restoration of democracy, and of the creation of a 'healthy' and 'regenerated' political system." Diamandouros, "Prospects for Democracy," p. 148.

142. In accordance with the Compulsory Law of 10 May 1967, a new Holy Synod whose members were chosen by the state was consecrated by the Church the following day. In a final playing-out of the 1966 Church-state controversy related to the issues of election and consecration of new bishops and to transfer of bishops, seven of the eight members on the Holy Synod belonged to the minority group within the hierarchy that had sided with the state. See p. 422, *Eastern Churches Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1967-68).
143. According to the state decree of 10 May 1967, known as the Compulsory Law (Anankastikos Nomos) for Ecclesiastical Reform, a host of changes was mandated in the organizational and administrative structure of the Church. As is evidenced by the portions of the law reproduced below, the primary aim of the Anankastikos Nomos was to centralize decisionmaking power in the Holy Synod and, in turn, to increase direct state control over this body. The Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 1, No.4 (Winter 1967-68): p. 421, reproduced the following portions of the decree: "(i) the Holy Synod is to consist of 9 bishops instead of 12; (ii) the existing synod is dismissed from office (under normal circumstances it would have continued until October). It is replaced by a 'specially chosen synod' (aristidin synodos), whose members will be selected by the government. This new synod will retain office until 30 September 1967, but if necessary its term may be extended by the government; (iii) the provisions of law 4589, of 10 November 1966, requiring the retirement of bishops at the age of 80, are extended to include the archbishop of Athens. Since the existing holder, Archbishop Chrysostom, is 87, the see of Athens automatically becomes vacant; (iv) a new method is laid down for the election of the archbishop: the synod is to put forward three names, and one of these will be selected by the government, acting through the intermediary of the king. The same method is also to be followed when appointing bishops for other sees; (v) the post of Government Commissioner to the Holy Synod is abolished. His duties will be performed by the Director General of Cults in the Ministry of Education and [Religions]. The Director General must hold the degree of Doctor of Theology, and should preferably be a person who has studied for at least two years in the west." For a summary of these changes, see Frazee, "The Orthodox Church," p. 148-149.

144. See Koukounas, O Archiepiskopos, p. 134-147.


146. Frazee, "The Orthodox Church," p. 148.

147. While not formally affiliated with the Brotherhood at the time of his enthronement, Ieronymos' sympathies for the social missionizing aspirations of the Zoe movement are discussed on p. 426 in Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1967-68).

148. The Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1967) and Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1967-68), commented on Ieronymos' qualifications to lead the Church, noting that he "...is a strong character, and one of the people from whom much could be hoped for the future of the Church" and that "few could doubt that Archbishop Ieronymos is by far the best person that could have been chosen to head the Greek Church."

149. The literature on Ieronymos' tenure is quite limited, and attempts to conduct interviews with those hierarchs and lay theologians directly involved in the
organizational and administrative apparatus of the Church during the Ieronymos period were a source of constant frustration--most interview subjects for this dissertation refused to discuss the Ieronymos years as Archbishop. For limited references on Ieronymos' objectives for ecclesiastical reform and religious renewal in Greece, see Frazee, "The Orthodox Church," Frazee, "Church and State;" and Christos Yannaras, Kefalaia Politikis Theologias [Chapters on Political Theology] (Athens, Greece: Grigoris Publishing, 1983).


151. Frazee, "The Orthodox Church," p. 148-149. In an interview with the author, Professor Savvas Agourides underscored Ieronymos' belief in his ability to direct a religious aggiornamento while remaining untainted by his appointment by the junta. Agourides saw Ieronymos' miscalculation of this point as the essential reason for the intense factionalization of the Church under his tenure and, more generally, for the emergence of a popular view of the Church as collaborators with the 'dictatorship. Interview in Brookline, MA: 16 October 1990.

152. Ieronymos had outlined his preliminary ideas for the Ecclesiastical Charter in his "Plan for the Reorganization of the Church of Greece, a memorandum submitted to the Holy Synod prior to the presentation of the Ecclesiastical Charter in 1969. Among the more striking organizational reforms suggested were the abolishment of the triadic system which endowed the Holy Synod and, ultimately, the state with control over the appointment of new bishops. Instead, Ieronymos called for the creation of mixed clergy-laity committees at the diocese level which, in conjunction with bishops from neighboring sees, would be participate in episcopal elections. The problem of the generally low educational standards of parish clergy was addressed through several proposed measures, including the temporary transfer of clergy from better supplied dioceses to areas with insufficient clergy to service the most basic religious needs of the local population. In addition, Ieronymos' plan aimed at achieving a longer term solution that would attract motivated and qualified candidates to the priesthood; for example, special theological programs were proposed that would allow continuing education, through correspondence courses and examinations, for those clergymen below a certain degree of education. The above elements of Ieronymos' memorandum were completely eliminated from the Ecclesiastical Charter eventually submitted to the Hierarchical Synod, no doubt because of the state's final approval rights over the Charter.

153. The Council of State is the supreme tribunal for administrative law in Greece.

155. Diamandouros observes that the coup reflected not only the failure of the authoritarian regime to attain legitimacy by that time, but also pointed to "...the intractable problem of legitimacy within the Greek Right [as a whole]." "Prospects for Democracy," p. 147. See Arvanitopoulos, "The Political Economy," for a discussion of the internal coup in terms of the authoritarian government's failure to legitimate the regime.

156. Frazee, "Church and State," p. 150.


160. These events are discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

161. Ieronymos' resignation came after Seraphim had sworn in the new military regime. In fact, the Archbishop had submitted his resignation as far back as March 1973, in the wake of the ecclesiastical conflicts over his selections for the episcopate and, more broadly, over the 1969 Constitutional Charter of the Church. A summary of these points is provided by Frazee, "The Orthodox Church," p. 150-152, and Frazee, "Church and State," p. 150.
CHAPTER FOUR

Democratization, Religion, and Cultural Contradictions:
PASOK and the Opportunity for Cultural Reconciliation

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the transition to and consolidation of democratic politics that began in Greece with the dissolution of the authoritarian regime in July 1974 and ended with the election victory of PASOK in October 1981, which brought a non-Right party to government for the first time in post-WWII Greek history. The chapter specifically explores the regime change as a process of cultural transformation which suggested a change in the role and meaning of religion in Greek society.

The emphasis on the cultural aspects of regime changes does not imply a lack of recognition of the importance of the structural aspects of the democratization experience. Indeed, the chapter acknowledges that successful democratization depended on recasting the political system in ways that accurately represented the structural changes that had taken place in Greek society over the previous three decades but which, until 1974, had been ignored or repressed by the country's dominant political leaders and interest groups. A critical aspect of such political reordering involved the inclusion of large segments of the population whose ideology had been used as a basis for their systematic exclusion from the post-WWII political system. The regime change, therefore, involved an expansion of the existing political space through the institutionalization of mechanisms designed to safeguard rights of political expression and representation.
Recognizing the structural aspects of the regime change, I argue that the effort to build the institutional prerequisites for a sustainable democracy was predicated on a cultural project with two important parts, each of which involved the Church and Orthodoxy. First, democracy-building required a reformulation of the beliefs, values, and assumptions about who belonged to the modern political community in Greece, as well as about where the democratic Greek nation-state belonged in the larger international environment. Redefining notions of belonging in domestic and international terms drew in Orthodoxy and the Church, given that the self-definition of the nation had included Orthodoxy and the foreign policy identity of the nation had been informed by the Orthodox religion as well. Second, democratization required modernization, by creating the institutional structures of a pluralist democracy and by organizing state-society relations to reinforce those structures. The modernization project also affected the Church, based on its role in civil society and its legal-formal relationship with the state.

My aim is to show that democratization, as the re-examination and reinterpretation of the meaning of Greece's historical experience within the context of the current domestic and international conjuncture, was a process of cultural transformation. I also aim to underscore how democracy-building affected the specifically religious dimensions of Greek culture. The final aim of the chapter is to illustrate how the democratization process simultaneously revealed the contradictions in Greek culture and offered an opportunity for their resolution. The discourse of the regime change revealed the origins and issues that caused contradictions in Greek culture, but also demonstrated how those same contradictions constrained the politics of the democratization process. The chapter
considers the debate between conflicting cultural tendencies characterized by some as "modernizing versus underdog," and analyzes religion as an aspect of these cultural tendencies. I argue that PASOK was a unique vehicle with the potential to effect a resolution of these longstanding cultural contradictions, but that ideological and organizational factors undermined the party's potential. The party's inability to foster a resolution of the country's cultural contradictions is explored in PASOK's position on the provisions on religion in the debates over the 1975 Constitution. By the formal conclusion of the consolidation phase in 1981, the place of religion in Greek public life under democracy remained in question. The next chapter explores Church-state relations under the PASOK governments of the 1980s as a direct attempt to redefine the links between religion and politics as part of the project of modernizing Greece.

II. Outline of the Regime Change

This section of the chapter reviews the major actors and events of the regime change. It is a descriptive map of the conjunctural and macro-historical factors that are relevant to the arguments of the chapter. The transition to a democratic regime in Greece occurred with the dissolution of the seven-year-old authoritarian, military regime of the Greek colonels. The transfer of power to a civilian leadership took place over three days, from 20 to 24 July 1974, when a chain of events beginning on 15 July catalyzed the internal disintegration of the regime and provoked the colonels' decision to seek a political solution to the rapid escalation of foreign-policy and domestic tensions. The proximate cause of the decision was the foreign policy crisis precipitated by the regime's coup d'état against the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, on 15 July, which provoked a
Turkish invasion of the island and raised the imminent possibility of a Greek-
Turkish war over Cyprus.\(^5\)

The open defiance of reservists in response to the colonels' call for a general
mobilization aggravated strains amongst hardliners and moderates within the
armed forces, revealed the military's incapacity to defend the country's territorial
integrity against its historic enemy, and showed the more widespread antipathy in
civil society towards the regime.\(^6\) The military leadership decided to seek a
political solution to the domestic and foreign policy crisis,\(^7\) and on July 23 the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called a meeting of thirteen individuals
(eight politicians of primarily conservative orientation, and five military officials)
to decide on the format for the transfer of power.

The outcome of the group's deliberations was a decision to transfer power to
Constantine Karamanlis, leader of the anti-Communist Right during the decade
from the mid-1950s until his self-imposed exile to Paris in 1963 following his
party's defeat in national elections and a falling-out with the reigning monarch.
The choice of Karamanlis was most directly the result of his political past, which
made him acceptable to a broad cross-section of actors whose cooperation was key
to the successful transfer of power to civilian leadership.\(^8\) Karamanlis returned to
Greece and on July 24 was sworn in as Prime Minister by the Archbishop of
Athens, Seraphim. A civilian cabinet was sworn in two days later.

Karamanlis received a national mandate for his continued management of the
consolidation of democracy with the elections of 17 November 1974, whose major
contestants were three new political formations. The New Democracy Party (ND)
won 54.4 percent of the vote and 220 of the 300 seats in Parliament.\(^9\) Founded
by Karamanlis on 26 September as a new political party or camp (*parataxis*), New Democracy was a "...liberal, right-of-center formation, very much in the image of modern conservative parties in western Europe."11 The Center Union-New Forces Party (EK-ND),12 formed in October 1974 under the leadership of long-time centrist politician George Mavros, was a reconstituted version of the pre-authoritarian Center Union Party (EK), and managed to secure 20.4 percent of the vote and 60 seats in Parliament but, for a variety of reasons, would see its political strength wane substantially over the course of the consolidation phase. The other new political formation was PASOK, which gained 13.6 percent of the vote and 12 seats in Parliament. PASOK had been founded with Andreas Papandreou's Declaration of 3 September 1974,13 on his return to Greece one month after the termination of the dictatorship. Papandreou identified PASOK as a radical Left, non-Communist political formation.

The question of the restoration of the monarchy was resolved via plebiscite on 8 December 1974, with a 30.8% vote in favor of a restoration of the monarchy and a 69.2% vote in favor of a republican form of government. The plebiscite, openly and fairly contested, was a singularly important event, in that it effectively removed one of the most crucial sources of polarization in Greek politics and society since the first decade of the twentieth century, and set a popularly endorsed point of departure from which the new government could reconstruct the institutional framework of politics. Further, the elimination of the monarchy removed one leg of the post-WWII political troika and, therefore, was a crucial precondition for redistributing power in favor of the civilian forces of politics. Despite intense debate14 that culminated in a boycott of the final draft by PASOK
and other opposition parties, the new, democratic constitution was promulgated on 8 June 1975, and was to remain unchanged until its amendment in 1986.

By the time of national elections in 1977, the main political formations contesting the elections were ND, PASOK, the Union of the Democratic Center (EDIK, a reconstructed EK-ND),¹⁵ and the KKE.¹⁶ The election outcome saw EDIK garner only 11.9 percent of the vote. ND's majority slipped to 42.8 percent of the vote, while PASOK's share of the vote rose to 25.3 percent. The 1977 elections signalled PASOK's emergence as a serious contender for the party of government, a signal that was realized in the party's election victory in October 1981. The successful consolidation of the democratic political order was reflected in the smooth turnover of governmental control from one party to another with the October 1981 elections, when PASOK displaced the conservatives from political power for the first time since 1935 and thereby marked the ascendancy of open, competitive politics in post-authoritarian Greece.

III. Culture and Politics: the Historical Roots of Cultural Contradictions in Greek Society

Immediately on his return to Greece after accepting the offer of managing the transfer of power to civilian leadership, Karamanlis observed that "[t]here are in the life of nations crises that can be transformed into turning-points of national rebirth."¹⁷ This statement captures the idea that the regime change was a branching path in the country's trajectory of development. Karamanlis' remark also suggests two notions, both essentially cultural in nature, which suggest that the political transformation provided a window of opportunity for a cultural metamorphosis that would affect the politics of building a democratic society in
Greece. The two notions were those of national reconciliation and modernization. The nation and modernization were the thematic subtext of the politics of the regime change, and they spoke to the cultural contradictions which had informed Greek politics and society in the post-WWII period. Furthermore, national reconciliation and modernization were undertakings with important religious dimensions which had contributed to the emergence of inconsistencies in the country's culture.

The concept of culture has undergone a variety of reconceptualizations and reformulations since its initial widespread use in the post-WWII social science literature in comparative politics and political development. As noted in the Introduction, this dissertation uses culture to mean "...the 'order' corresponding to meaningful action," and sees historical experience as the source of the set of meaningful actions which becomes an orderly, subjective web for organizing reality. That same historical set of experiences which provides subjective order to reality also is "...the shared assumptions and meaning systems held by collectivities..." and, more specifically, is the "...pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation or internal integration." The meaning system by which society as a whole or different groups within society organizes all level of interaction has direct implications for the processes and institutions of politics. Jusdanis describes culture as "a sphere of shared sentiments and experiences [regarding major] social, political, and economic transformations...", and argues that the cultural creation of a collective identity "...becomes a means for orchestrating an ideological
consensus." By virtue of its coherence, the culture of a society exerts an organizing influence and, in some respects, control on politics.

The links between culture and politics are important for understanding the regime change in Greece in two respects. First, the relative determinant capacity of culture vis-a-vis politics grows out of the fact that culture is an enduring pattern of beliefs, traditions, and emotional attachments about life; as a cognitive and psychologicl system, culture then becomes a controlling web which shapes interpretations about the meaning and objectives of politics, as well as choices and behaviors in the political arena. However, as the ideas, values, and beliefs which constitute culture become part of the structures of politics--as culture is institutionalized in the power structures of society--politics becomes a means for reconstructing culture. The integrative capacity of culture is extremely important with regard to the mutually determinant relationship between culture and politics: (dis)integrative features in culture, which are the product of historical experience, can generate (dis)integrative features in politics, and vice versa. The regime transition was an opportunity for the subjective reinterpretation of historical meaning. The democratization process offered the possibility for resolving historically-recapitulated cultural contradictions in Greek society, as well as for constructing an integrated political system based on pluralism and participation. The notions of national integration and modernization mentioned above were, at one and the same time, political and cultural enterprises.

IV. Historical Origins of Cultural Contradictions in Democratizing Greece

The historical roots of Greek culture at the time of the transition to democracy can be traced as far back as the Byzantine Empire and, as Chapters One and Two
have illustrated, the religious dimensions of contemporary culture in Greece certainly originate as far back as the Byzantine epoch. However, because this chapter focuses on the regime change as an opportunity for cultural resolution, the historical basis for this argument logically begins at the conjunction when the contradictions in the contemporary cultural matrix most clearly originated. The starting point, then, is the experience of Ottoman rule.

The experience of Ottoman rule lasted nearly four centuries for the Greek Orthodox population (many, but by no means all, of which were Greek-speaking) which had been part of the Byzantine Empire until its collapse. The culture of this population was shaped by two major factors during the Ottoman experience: the millet as the organizing system for the administration of the Ottoman territories, and the pattern of social relations within the Greek Orthodox millet. These two formative elements of life under Ottoman rule created a culture characterized by a sense of collective belonging defined in religious terms, a profound lack of congruity between state and society, and intense feelings of mistrust and suspicion which fostered a preference for opportunistic (flexible and pragmatic) behavior.

The importance of the millet system must be appreciated, in terms of the lack of integration and the contradictions it generated in the origins of contemporary Greek culture. The millet system was the encompassing framework for the socio-political organization of the Greek-speaking populations under Ottoman control, based on the Islamic worldview defining individual identity primarily in terms of affiliation to a religious community. The economic and socio-political organization of the Empire along confessional lines meant the designation of the Orthodox
Church as the institutional representative of the Greek (and all other non-Greek speaking Orthodox) subjects, thereby endowing the Church with an explicitly political status in addition to its religious one. Functionally, the Patriarch and the ecclesiastical hierarchy interacted with the Ottoman state officials on behalf of the Greek Orthodox population, whereas the local priest acted as an intermediary between the village population and the ecclesiastical and Ottoman authorities.

Within the larger administrative framework of the millet, the pattern of social relations characterizing the Greek population developed out of the traditional pastoral and agricultural economy in the areas of the Ottoman Empire roughly coincident with the borders of modern-day Greece, on the one hand, and the pre-bourgeois merchant economy of the Balkan and Constantinopolitan regions of the Empire, on the other hand. The pastoral and agricultural populations of the Empire engaged in frequent conflicts over access to vital resources such as land and water. But the constant migrations by these populations in search of security from the arbitrary encroachments of Ottoman officials as well as stable access to resources, produced a significant degree of agricultural-pastoral interpenetration. The intense concern with security also fostered interpenetration amongst agricultural-pastoral populations and local military chieftans (armatoloi) and mountain brigands (klephtes).

Social relations between the agricultural-pastoral and kleph-t-armatoloi populations were organized in a general pattern. An essential radical familism and individualism was tempered by a wide network of contacts and contractual relations whose overarching aim was to maximize security against the uncertainties of the natural environment and the threats of an aggressive, arbitrary state.
In contrast to the above pre-capitalist, agrarian-pastoral economy, there developed in the Greek-speaking populations of the Balkan and Constantinopolitan regions of the Orthodox millet a pre-bourgeois strata of Greek merchants.\textsuperscript{28} The Greek merchant class had accrued significant wealth and state concessions by virtue of their economic success in the Ottoman financial and commercial networks. Together with the Greek administrative stratum known as Phanariotes (based on their origins in the Phanar quarter of Constantinople), who had acquired substantial authority as prominent advisers and officials in the upper echelons of the Ottoman state bureaucracy in the Imperial capital, the Greek merchant strata constituted the elite amongst the subject populations of the Orthodox millet. The economic and social privileges which derived from the Greek merchant strata's gradual evolution into "...a sort of inter-Balkan class, exercising power and influence in the entire [Levantine and Central European] area,"\textsuperscript{29} did not change the fact that this group was a member of a conquered population which therefore patterned its social relations accordingly. Social relationship were primarily structured in terms of bureaucratic and functional networks and clientelistic arrangements. Although tied in varying degree to the centralized state, the clientelistic networks of the merchant strata were organized with the main objective of maximizing economic security and opportunities in the face of market fluidity and against the aggressions of an interventionist, regulative, imperial state.

It is essential to recognize that, despite obvious differences in economic structure and certain specific differences in the organization of social relations, the general pattern of social relations for both main population groupings within the
Orthodox *millet* reflected a similar perception of the world under Ottoman rule. The culture, or shared meaning ascribed to life experience under the Ottoman Empire, was one of mistrust, suspicion, readiness for conflict, and fear for one's livelihood and/or survival.

The defensiveness and suspicion which defined the culture of the Greek populations under the Ottoman Empire can be understood as a generalized reaction to the arbitrary exercises of power and violence from almost all sources of imperial authority. The arbitrary exercise of Ottoman state power, usually in the form of economic exactions or violence, increased over the course of the experience of colonization. However, the "...generalised insecurity and arbitrariness--an arbitrariness emanating from the top when the State was strong, and from below, i.e. from the local potentates, when the State was weak"\(^{30}\) became especially acute from the early eighteenth onward, as the Empire began a process of steady internal decay.

It is not surprising that a culture whose primary features were those described above was characterized by a largely undeveloped notion of community, since the sense of danger and unpredictability associated with daily life as part of the Orthodox *millet* retarded the development of affiliative ties outside of the extended family and certain circumscribed kinship groups. Furthermore, the rapacity of the state and its agents (both Ottoman and Greek) created an "...absence of organic articulation between the State and...[society],"\(^{31}\) which might have fostered a sense of collective belonging through shared experiences of participation and norms of behavior. So, one of the main manifestations of the Greek culture which originated in the Ottoman experience was a hostility and defensiveness toward...
institutional concentrations of power, with implications for future possibilities for an integrated state-society relationship.

The culture which generated the lack of articulation between the Ottoman state and its Greek Orthodox subject populations was reinforced by the structure of the *millet* system itself. The Ottoman-imposed *millet* structure fostered the conditions for the development of a nascent sense of collective identity defined exclusively in religious terms. In opposition to the threatening invasive "other" which was the Ottoman state apparatus, the Greek Orthodox populations came to define their benefits and, mostly, their punishments in terms of their belonging to a collectivity whose meaning was religious, Orthodox. The shared experiences under Ottoman rule came to be understood cognitively and psychologically in terms of membership in the Orthodox *millet*. Collective identity, however tenuous and fragile given the overall cultural matrix in which this identity was formed, was religious in nature.

The definition of the collectivity in religious terms was reinforced by the rights and responsibilities with which the Church was endowed by the Ottoman Porte\textsuperscript{32} in order to administer the *millet*. Outside of the basic family unit, the Church, by means of the liturgical trope as well as through control over the education of the Orthodox *millet*, became the primary institutional repository and transmitter of those shared values, ideas, and beliefs by which Greeks organized their lives. That collective identity came to be defined in religious terms was in itself significant, especially within an overall culture whose features were certainly not conducive to the formation of larger collective affiliations and identifications. However, that the Church became the institutional representative of the religious
collective was equally significant, since it meant that the lack of articulation between the Ottoman state and that society which was the Greek Orthodox millet was replaced by an alternative articulation, between the Orthodox Church and Greek society.

It is important to point out that, despite the sense of belonging to the Orthodox religious community and the affiliation with the Church which was part of this feeling of religious identification, the Church was hardly immune to the institutional degeneration that informed the Ottoman political bureaucracy. Ecclesiastical corruption generated a negative popular perception and a factional faultline dividing lower clergy and laity on the one hand from the bulk of the hierarchy on the other. But despite popular anger that "...widespread corruption in the [C]hurch was fleecing them" and the antipathy of many Greek intellectuals towards the Church as a whole, anti-clericalism "...had no effect on [most Greeks'] Orthodox identity," and the most notable cultural outcome of the popular perceptions of the phenomenon of corruption within the Church was that it reinforced the widespread distrust of institutional concentrations of power but minimally damaged Orthodoxy as the sole system of imagined community.

Moreover, because the millet had a political meaning within the organizational structure of the Ottoman Empire and because the Church had a political legitimacy (defined, of course, by the Ottoman overlord state), the rudimentary collective identity which developed as a religious sense of belonging also assumed a political dimension. The Church developed, in this respect, into a surrogate state, or at least into that political institution which fulfilled for the Greek Orthodox collectivity the function which the colonizing Ottoman state did not: the
Church assumed the absolute claim to define the ends of the collectivity over which it exerted control. Interestingly enough, in its very separateness from the Ottoman state not only as a non-Greek institution but also *qua* state, the Church would become the target of controversies about the nature of secular authority once there emerged a Greek state which was meant to be the representative of that collectivity known as the nation.\(^{35}\)

By the end of the period of Ottoman rule, the origins of contemporary Greek culture were cast in very distinctive terms. Greek culture (that of the Greek populations which comprised the Orthodox *millet*) was highly suspicious, distrustful, and defensive, based on a perception of social reality as threatening, arbitrary, and corrupt. These beliefs, ideas, and values led to a profound mistrust of, and even hostility towards, institutional concentrations of power in general and the state in particular. The culture therefore fostered flexible, opportunistic behaviors, based on broad clientelistic networks designed to minimize risk, and led to an instrumentalist perspective vis-a-vis the state; the state became, at best, an object for capture and manipulation in order to secure one's interests and, at worst, an entity to be circumvented and outwitted in order to safeguard one's gains. The state's lack of legitimacy in the popular perspective, generated a disarticulation between state and society. Finally, within the context of the non-integrative culture described above and the lack of congruence between state and society which was its manifestation, there emerged a remarkable inconsistency: the *millet* system contributed to the emergence of a nascent sense of solidarity, community, and collective identification defined exclusively in terms of the Orthodox religion and with the Church as the institutional representative of this collectivity. So, the
fragmentation of the Greek cultural matrix was contradicted by a sense of belonging to a religious whole, and the state-society incongruity stood in contrast to the loose congruity between the members of the Orthodox collectivity and its Church.

V. Culture and the Greek Nation-State in the Nineteenth Century

Just as the culture of the Greek Orthodox populations at the founding of the nation-state had originated in "...the social reality of the [Ottoman] period itself," the cultural evolution of Greek society, during the nineteenth century was the product of the historical circumstances surrounding the formation and solidification of the Greek nation-state. The politics of nation-state consolidation both reshaped and were constrained by the cultural matrix formed under the Ottoman colonization. Moreover, the tensions which had been generated by the religious dimensions of the extant culture were recapitulated by the political experiences that marked nineteenth century Greece, and were subsumed under a broader set of cultural antagonisms regarding the modernization of Greek society.

The formation of an independent Greek kingdom was the product of a Great Power solution. This externally-brokered outcome superimposed bourgeois capitalist, Western European political institutions on a pre-capitalist, agrarian economic structure and traditional social formation, in order to create a centralized state capable of directing the country's modernization from above. The political argument for a strong state was buttressed by the economic rationale that state-driven economic development was an appropriate method for overcoming the country's position as a late developer on the periphery of the industrializing, capitalist center.
Over the course of the nineteenth century there emerged amongst competing segments of the Greek political and economic elites—working within the context of the externally imposed superstructure—divergent views about the meaning of and strategy for building a modern society in Greece. These divergent groups and their strategies can be loosely labelled modernizers (or, alternatively, modernists, westernizers, and westernists) and traditionalists. Indeed, the traditionalists did not have an actual program for modernization, since their main objective was to structure and to engage in politics under the new historical circumstance of nation-statehood in a way which preserved as much of the pre-independence status quo as was necessary to ensure their political-economic interests.

Despite the conflicts between the modernists' strategy for political development and the almost wholly reactive stance of the traditionalists, both groups had to deal with the cultural legacies of state-society disarticulation and a fragile, religious sense of collective identity within the context of nation-statehood. The modernists and traditionalists not only had very distinctive visions for the meaning of the new nation-state, but drew very different interpretations of the impact of the historical past on the exigencies of building a modern Greek nation-state. These differences produced a process of cultural construction and reconstruction which directly addressed the religious dimensions of Greek culture.

The Greek modernists were a relatively disparate group comprised of several distinctive components whose respective economic interests, ideological orientations, and intellectual histories converged such that they equated modernization with Westernization. This conception of modernity was largely the articulation of Greek intellectuals who had been educated in the Western
European (and, to a lesser extent, Russian) diaspora, and who viewed independence from the Ottomans as a triumph for Enlightenment ideas. They argued that a modern society depended on a strong state that could ensure the development of a functionally-differentiated society operating according to rational principles and secular values. The ideas of the intelligentsia were particularly appealing to the merchant and trade strata, many of whom had amassed and invested their wealth in the diaspora, but who now endorsed a strong state as the best means for integrating the Greek economy into the western capitalist system.

As with the institutional project of fashioning a modern Greek polity, the modernists' ideological project of constructing a modern Greek nation took the Enlightenment philosophy of Western Europe as the point of reference. The Greek modernists understood the nation as "...an imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." The critical distinctiveness of the national imaginary lay in its quality of community which, as Anderson points out, assumed a peculiarly unique, deep, horizontal comradeship that made it possible for people to willingly die for the whole under the aegis of the state. Furthermore, the basis for the subjective identification with the national community was not religious, but was grounded in a putative shared language and set of interests derived from a common historical experience.

Encouragement of the subjective identification with the national community was seen as the most compelling political resource available to the state in legitimating its power as domestic arbiter and as protector of the collectivity against external threat. With the emergence of a new system of political relations ordered by nation-states, the forging of a national community was seen as
fundamental to the social cohesion necessary for legitimizing and consolidating state power.

Well aware of the contradictions between historical experience and current reality with regard to forging a conception of the nation consistent with Western European notions, the Greek modernists set out to use the state to forge a new nation out of the disparate social groups which had combined in the fight for independence from the Ottomans. The modernists envisioned that the nation would be bound primarily by language. The choice of language as the primary criterion for defining the new imaginary was a practical choice for many reasons,⁴⁶ although the very process of establishing a national language itself evolved into a struggle over differing registers of vernacular, archaistic, and classical Greek as a mode of education, administration, and discourse,⁴⁷ and faced with the obstacle of encompassing and levelling multiple local and regional dialects.

Despite the aforementioned problems, in language the state had a mechanism for inventing and communicating the collective narratives that provided individuals with a common past and a system of meaning. Language became the single most important tool in a process of cultural engineering, whereby the state undertook to establish an educational system and to create a national literature⁴⁸ that would enable people to think and to experience the new, national imaginary.

Language as the common expression of the nation's identity was consistent with the other source of imagined linkage, "...the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time"⁴⁹ evidenced in the supposedly unbroken historical-cultural trajectory that linked the modern Greek nation-state with classical Hellas. Inventing the set of shared stories that would explain membership in the new
national community, the Greek westernizers invented their present and future imaginary in terms of a past that was, in fact, a western European interpretation. As Jusdanis summarizes, the modernists "...sought to draft the story of modern Greece in a spirit of European Hellenism and to incorporate it into the master narrative of the West."\(^{50}\)

Accordingly, Greek westernizers explained their country's belated transition to modernity as the result of the abrupt developmental interruption that occurred with the Ottoman captivity.\(^{51}\) This interpretation led to certain conclusions about the place of Orthodoxy in the new imagined community and, concomitantly, about the role of the Church in the new political order. The Church's ambivalence about the Greek struggle for independence against the Ottomans, rooted in personal power concerns as well as an intense anti-Westernism directed at the Latin Catholic Church,\(^{52}\) had engendered a militant anti-clericalism amongst Greek modernizing intellectuals who blamed the Church for having supported the Ottoman colonizers and for having perpetuated a non-rational worldview that had retarded the development of Greek civilization.\(^{53}\) As noted earlier, however, anticlericalism did not necessarily imply non-belief,\(^{54}\) and this distinction was an operative one amongst peasants and certain elite strata (Phanariots and merchants). These groups resented the financial corruption and political conservatism of the hierarchy but distinguished these complaints from their Orthodox identity; indeed, the common popular perception of independence was that the Greeks had emerged victorious in a religious war against their Muslim overlords.\(^{55}\)
Therefore, consistent with rational secularist precepts but cognizant of the undeniable religious dimensions of the Greek historical imaginary, the modernists undertook to overcome the antinomies between Orthodoxy and secular nationalism, by attempting to "...draw the nation and the Church together as integral parts of the same symbolic universe."56 The modernists aimed to cultivate a Greek national community that would be defined primarily by language and historical continuities with classical Hellas, and secondarily by the Orthodox faith. The order of prioritization was essential to the desired complexion of the nation. The goal rested on a radically changed form of consciousness that required people to think of themselves in terms of a larger community and, more specifically, that demanded a cognitive and emotional choice whereby the collectivity voluntarily endorsed the valorization of putative linguistic and historical ties over religious attachments. The westernists' vision of the nation, then, obliged a conscious reconstruction of collective historical memory. Furthermore, the nation-building enterprise necessitated the cooperation of the institutional Church in forming a collectivity based on premises that disavowed the universality and primacy of the religious worldview as the essence of collective identity.

The westernizers' modernization project provoked a reaction from those groups in Greek society who stood to lose the most with the dissolution of the traditional socio-economic and political order which had been obtained under the Ottomans—hence the designation of this group as "traditionalists."57 It is difficult to characterize the traditionalists perspective on how to modernize Greece, since their view was largely a reaction, against the centralizing authority of the state (perceived as an externally imposed structure with little consideration for the
contingencies of local context) and the definitive articulation of the nation in secular terms. The traditionalists' reactions were grounded in their cultural reality, a belief in the arbitrariness of institutional power and a lack of affiliation with a collectivity other than that which was the legacy of the religiously-defined millet.

However, in the convergence of the various economic, political, and intellectual interests which comprised the traditionalists, some semblance of an alternative approach to modernization evolved. The traditionalists were a loose configuration made up of the Church (primarily represented by the ecclesiastical hierarchy), the Phanariots, Greek merchant elites, large landowners who had acquired their properties as the Ottoman Empire was dissolving, and local military chieftains centered in the Peloponnesus. Insofar as these groups had carved out their own bases of power within the context of the Ottoman Empire, they understood the accretion in their own political and economic power as inversely related to the strength of centralized institutional authority. Given their zero-sum logic, the political, military, and economic traditionalists moved to re-establish their power and to redefine the opportunities for social mobility under the new historical conditions by competing for control over the state apparatus. According to Mouzelis,

"[t]he stronger and more centralized the state became, the more...[the traditional]...oligarchies endeavoured to offset their loss of local autonomy by acquiring control of the state from within." Given that the landowning avenue was relatively blocked [by the state's agrarian restructuring measures], they turned to the professions...and, above all, to the state itself as politicians, state officials, academics, lawyers, and tax farmers...Ultimately, the state budget itself became their principal economic base. State-driven modernization fostered a competitive reaction amongst those elites whose traditional bases of power were undermined by the creation of an economic
and political system which redefined opportunities for social mobility. These traditionalists, recognizing the reality of the end of the old order, sought to secure their economic standing by colonizing the state from within and to consolidate their political authority by developing clientelistic networks that tied state patrons to local political oligarchs with extensive links to the countryside.

As with the other traditionalist groupings, the Church's response to the new political circumstances associated with independence was also defensive. The roots of the Church's ambivalence towards nation-statehood have been discussed earlier in this dissertation, but it bears repeating that the ecclesiastical hierarchy's antagonistic stance towards the state was driven by the former's recognition that independence posed a direct threat to the Church's status as the political as well as religious leader of the Greek Orthodox collectivity. These balance of power calculations seemed well-founded with the successful formation of an autocephalous, national Church and its legal-constitutional subordination to the state, as well as the concomitant nationalization of the education system. However, as Kitromilides points out, the power conflict between Church and state reflected an historically-embedded cultural conflict, over two fundamentally different conceptions of collective identity: on the one hand, the Church's ecumenical, theological conception of community, and the modernists' parochial, linguistic, secular view of the collectivity, on the other.

The Church's response to what it viewed as the modernizing threat was, as with the political-economic traditionalists, a tactical attempt to safeguard its position under new historical circumstances, by establishing a controlling interest in the modernists' project. The Church adopted a pragmatic stance: it participated
in an ethnographical and historiographical enterprise which made Orthodoxy a constitutive element of the new, national imaginary and, by so doing, made the Church an indispensable handmaiden to the state in any of the latter's nationally-grounded political endeavors.

Yet, the Church's participation in constructing the state-defined, westernizing view of the new imaginary should not be mistaken for acceptance of a secular national community in place of the religiously-defined collective. Rather, the Church perceived the modernists' institutional and ideological projects as a direct threat, and responded adaptively. The creation of a modern Greek society imagined in secular, linguistic terms threatened to relativize the Orthodox worldview by calling into question the closed system of religious meanings and suggesting or, more accurately, imposing an alternative meaning system as prior to the religious one. By cooperating with the state in constructing the new national imaginary, the Church weakened the challenge of relativization and, instead, consciously attempted to make a synonym of religious and national identity, such that anyone who understood himself as a member of the Greek national community axiomatically understood himself as a member of the Orthodox community of the faithful.

The success of the Church's tactic in making Orthodoxy and nation an identity was reflected in the state's nationalist doctrine of the Great Idea (Megali Idea). The Great Idea was a platform for political irredentism, calling for the expansion of the rump Kingdom of Greece and the reunification of the whole nation. The definition of the nation posited in the Great Idea was all those Greek-speaking peoples previously under Ottoman domination, that is, the members of the
Orthodox millet; in its most grandiose historical formation, the idea of the nation contained in the Great Idea was all of those territories coinciding with the Byzantine, Orthodox Empire. The state enlisted the support of the Church in all endeavors associated with the Great Idea, on the opportunistic premise that national mobilization against external states would be more manageable if characterized as a religious war, especially when such an enterprise was aimed at the historic Ottoman enemy (redefined as Turkey in the twentieth century). The Church's cooperation only reinforced its tactical effort to identify the national and religious imaginaries, since the Great Idea of reuniting the entire Greek nation was undergirded by a religious definition of the object.

Overall, the nineteenth century was a critical period in sharpening the characteristic features of the contradictory cultural tendencies that had been fostered by the Ottoman experience. Most significantly, the conflicts and competition amongst the modernist and traditionalist segments of Greek society reinforced and complicated the primary cultural traits which were the legacy of social relations from the previous four centuries--generalized feelings of suspicion and defensiveness. These cultural characteristics directly affected the politics of nation-state formation, by contributing to a remarkable alienation between state and society and to a formalized confusion over the nature of collective identity.

The political institutions which developed over the course of the nineteenth century, in turn, reinforced the cultural traits of mistrust of mediated forms of authority and a fragile sense of affiliation with a non-religious collectivity. The state-society incongruities caused by the forced imposition of Western European monarchical and parliamentary structures on the traditional, indigenous social
formation were aggravated by inter-elite struggles as modernists and traditionalists competed for control over the state bureaucracy. Once the state was particularized and controlled by competing elites, the disarticulation between state and society was intensified by oligarchic clientelistic networks that developed as mechanisms for organizing and incorporating new segments of society into politics.

The lack of congruence between state and society was complicated by the continuous interference of European powers in Greek domestic affairs, reinforcing the cultural ambivalence about the legitimacy of the Greek state and the differences in perspective over the meaning of the nation. The creation of a national Church did not bridge the gap between Orthodoxy and secular nationalism as alternative principles for organizing community. Instead, the legal-constitutional arrangement of Church-state relations clouded the boundaries between public and private, secular and religious, and allowed the Church to pronounce on the legitimacy of the state's claims as the final arbiter of the national collectivity. The confusion over the secular versus sacred sources of collective identity was exacerbated by the fact that the Orthodox imaginary was grounded in an historical reality whose longevity far outstripped the supposed national unity being constructed through literary and educational endeavors, as well as by several important foreign policy failures which seemed to underscore the state's inability to actualize the conception of national identity it propounded.

VI. Culture and Politics in Twentieth Century Greece

The contours of the modernist versus traditionalist cultural dichotomy were sharpened and reworked by the defining political events of twentieth century Greece. Twentieth century Greek political history can be periodized in a variety
of formulations.\textsuperscript{69} In terms of illustrating the interplay between politics and cultural contradictions and addressing the evolution in the religious dimensions of Greek culture, the most useful periodization focuses on three historical episodes: the so-called Revolution of 1909 that precipitated Eleftherios Venizelos' entry into Greek politics, and the "National Schism" (Ethnikos Dichasmos) which made Venizelism and anti-Venizelism virtually synonymous with liberal republicanism and monarchism; the ideological realignments of the interwar period, culminating in the protracted Civil War during the 1940s; and the authoritarian interlude under the colonels' dictatorship.

The pattern of each of the above historical episodes was division over the definition of and membership in the nation, as well as the growing split of "...state and nation into two 'political worlds'."\textsuperscript{70} The interpenetration of culture and politics cast the modernist and traditionalist dichotomy in ever sharper relief by the time of the transition to democracy in 1974, with the role of religion and the Church figuring consistently in the cultural contradictions and political instability that marked the first three quarters of twentieth-century history in Greece.

The proximate cause of the National Schism, which developed into the division of Greek politics into two basic camps of Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, was the disagreement between the then-Prime Minister Venizelos and then-King Constantine I over Greece's entry into WWI; the essence of this disagreement was over how to realize the Great Idea. However, the antecedents of the Venizelist-Constantist feud lay in the Revolution of 1909,\textsuperscript{71} an intra-bourgeois split driven by economic conflicts which became intertwined with questions of democratic
accountability and conservative-monarchist versus liberal-republican approaches to modernizing Greece's political institutional structure.\textsuperscript{72}

The above synopsis points to the fact that the politics of the early twentieth century in Greece were informed by a culture based on hostility, mistrust, and divided loyalties. The lack of cohesion and integration at the societal level, as evidenced in growing class antagonisms, was reinforced in the widening rift between state and society. Venizelos' insistence on bringing Greece into WWI in order to sustain the country's irredentist mission (revanchists understood Greece's gains in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 as steps in the actualization of the Great Idea) perpetuated the conception of a larger Greek nation including Orthodox elements. The monarchy's refusal to accept Venizelos' stand, and the eventual collapse of the Greek Army against the Ottomans in Asia Minor in 1922 under an anti-Venizelist regime, were interpreted by irredentists as the state's rejection of an historically-grounded conception of nation and, equally important, as the state's inability to protect the collectivity. The Constituent Assembly vote which abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a republican form of government was the result of popular doubts about the legitimacy of the state under a monarchical regime.\textsuperscript{73} The resolution of the constitutional question created a momentary opportunity for national reconciliation, via political reordering and the economic modernization necessary to integrate over one million Greek refugees from Asia Minor into the developing post-WWI economy. However, the ideational vacuum created by the apparent death of the Great Idea\textsuperscript{74} and the political conflicts over the path to a modern economy produced a new set of cleavages which weakened the cohesion of the nation. Interwar elections\textsuperscript{75} pitted Venizelists against anti-
Venizelists in a conflict over economic modernization under increasingly difficult international and domestic constraints; the two political blocs, vying for control over the state apparatus as the means for imposing their respective modernization strategies, also deliberately used the psychological trauma of national disintegration embedded in the Asia Minor debacle for domestic political purposes. The most critical outcome of the interwar realignment of political and economic forces, however, was the imposition of a new ideological map on societal cleavages grounded in foreign policy and domestic factors related to national identity.

The mobilization of working class interests under the aegis of the militant Communist Party of Greece (KKE) had been accelerated by the economic hardships faced by millions of refugees from Asia Minor, and by the overt dissension around the refugees' membership in the national collectivity. As Mavrogordatos points out, "[o]n the level of perceptions (bold mine), the 'Greekness' itself of the refugees was questioned, or even denied, despite their own claims to be the purest Greeks." The intermingling of conflicts over the country's modernization strategy with discord over criteria of membership in the nation provoked a defensive, ideological alliance among elements representing the country's principal bourgeois strata, the military, and monarchists. By the time of the electoral defeat of Venizelos' Liberal Party in 1933, the aforementioned conservative coalition had succeeded in linking liberal republicanism with Communism and, thereby, in reconfiguring the political system in ideological terms which defined the nation as a defensive, reactionary collectivity excluding large segments of the population. The political polarization that grew out of the
progressive realignment of Greek society along rigid ideological lines culminated in the Civil War of the 1940s.

The division of Greek society into two hostile ideological camps was institutionalized in the anti-Communist state in the postwar period. The state, under the control of a conservative triarchy of interests, deprived a large proportion of the population of its civil rights. Likewise, a developmental strategy of state capitalism, resulting in a structurally weak industrial base, inefficient agricultural sector, and low-productivity tertiary sector, reinforced the fragmentation of Greek society by creating clear winners and losers in economic terms: amongst the former were finance capital and the commercial bourgeois strata, while the latter included the rapidly expanding petite bourgeoisie, agricultural labor, and urban working class.

The military intervention and imposition of the authoritarian regime in 1967 reflects the political crystallization of the contradictions in Greek culture which had become increasingly irreconcilable over the course of the twentieth century. The military's direct intervention in politics ruptured any weak sense of integration between state and society, and the eventual failure of the authoritarian regime to legitimize and institutionalize itself must be interpreted as societal rejection of a state perceived as hostile and invasive. The colonels tried to refine an economic development strategy which was rigidly modelled on standards of Western capitalist industrialization. Despite the high rates of economic growth and per capita income improvements, indigenous constraints related to Greece's late industrialization generated a dualist economy with aggravated inequalities and inefficiencies, and deepened the cleavage between the state and those segments
of society negatively affected by the structural dislocations of the westernizing economic pattern. Moreover, regardless of partisan affiliation or class location, entrenched clientelism and public sector patronage had convinced all sectors of society that the state lacked autonomy because it was penetrable for economic gain.

The cleavage between state and society was aggravated most intensely, however, by the state's inability to realize the project of nation-building. The state's imperfect invention of the national community resulted from a variety of factors, the most important being the language question, and domestic and foreign policy mistakes. In every case, Orthodoxy and the Church contributed to the perpetuation of cultural non-integration.

The junta militantly enforced the use of *katharevousa* as the preferred national idiom, and the Church supported this policy, albeit for different reasons. As noted earlier, the modernists had chosen language as the primary mechanism for articulating the new national community. Through the formation of a national literature and via the educational system, language was used as the vehicle for expressing the chronological continuity of contemporary Greece with its forebears. Language was also intended as the bond for justifying the state's irredentist plan to reunite the Greek-speaking autochthons inside Greek territorial borders with their heterochthon brethren still outside those lines. Yet the Greek state itself had become an obstacle to the emergence of a standardized linguistic medium, contributing to the emergence of diglossia (the contemporaneous presence of two registers of the same language)\textsuperscript{78} and preventing the emergence of a standardized national idiom as a shared mode of oral and literary communication.
The state's establishment of *katharevousa* (a puristic idiom combining archaistic and classical form), as opposed to the vernacular or *demotike*, as the official discourse of state administration and education was based on the modernist argument that the medium was superior because it took classical Greece as its referent. Significantly, the Church, which had been stripped by the state of its purview over education, endorsed *katharevousa* on the basis of very different reasoning: the writings of Orthodoxy had been done in a classicizing idiom (the Hellenistic *koine*), and *katharevousa* stood as an obstacle to the spread of anti-ecclesiastical Enlightenment ideas. The militant reaction of demoticists against the use of *katharevousa* had resulted in the ascendancy of *demotike* as the medium of popular discourse over the course of the twentieth century; demoticists and those who supported their perspective viewed Church and state as equally guilty in undermining the sense of shared values, ideas, and beliefs that would emerge from the use of a language with which all members of the putative national community were facile.

The junta's systematic suspension of all forms of competitive political activity and exclusion from the national community on the basis of ideological criteria even more clearly delineated the lines of hostility between state and large portions of society. The Church's apparent cooptation by the state in the anti-Communist definition of the nation deepened the ambivalence amongst traditionalists and modernists alike about the Orthodox dimensions of collective identity. Perhaps the most striking representation of this confusion was the junta's slogan of "A Greece of Christian Greeks" superimposed on a representation of the mythical
phoenix, an unwieldy attempt to marry the country's Eastern, Orthodox heritage and Western, classical ancestry.

What appeared to be the rapprochment between, on the one hand, a state rigidly wedded to the Western alliance (on the basis of anti-Communist ideology) and Western European conceptions of the definition of the meaning of Greekness and, on the other hand, the Church of Greece, which had been subject to violations of internal ecclesiastical affairs by regimes of various ideological persuasions over the twentieth century, was indicative of historical experience and internal struggles within the Church itself. Partly based on the direct persecution suffered at the hands of the Left forces in the Civil War and partly based on the state's control of the finances needed for ecclesiastical reconstruction after the WWII and Civil War hostilities,\textsuperscript{80} internal battles amongst the Church hierarchy had resulted in a victory for those who signed on to the post-WWII state's elevation of anti-Communism as the national credo. This segment of the Church leadership justified its support for the anti-Communist state in terms of the religious threat posed by atheistic communism.

However, the popular conception of the Church was that of an institution that had been coopted by a hostile state which excluded large segments of the population from political participation and that endorsed para-constitutional excesses which were anti-Christian. So, the process by which the Church and the Greek state came to endorse a similar nationalist project aggravated the deep popular ambivalence about both the secular and religious dimensions of collective identity, and compromised the legitimacy of either Church or state to stand as the purveyor of national identity.
VII. Democratization: an Opportunity for Cultural Reconciliation

By the time of the transition to democracy in 1974, Greek society was characterized by a distinctive cultural dualism, of which Orthodoxy and the Church were integral contributors and components. Further, the historical account has shown that the political efforts to resolve antagonisms in Greek culture, as represented by the modernist and traditionalist alternatives for development (modernization) and nationalism, had fueled a dynamic reconstruction of cultural contradictions which, in turn, perpetuated structurally-rooted dysfunctionalities in the political system.81

The transition to democracy was a watershed82 in the development of the ongoing cultural conflicts, because the major political actors agreed that national reconciliation and modernization were absolutely essential to the prospects for a successful shift to democracy and for eliminating the threat of an authoritarian involution. Foreign policy factors, as well as the structural imperatives of both the transition and consolidation phases83 of the regime change, created the conditions for the emergence of an integrated culture whose hallmark would be the enduring dominance of a coherent vision of modernity in Greece. The development of such a culture depended on a positive articulation, or a greater congruity, between state and society, and on a redefinition of collective identity according to criteria of inclusiveness in the political process. In both respects, the resolution of cultural contradictions involved a re-examination of the role of the Church and Orthodoxy.

The democratization process, although with steadily decreasing intensity over time, revealed that the contrast between ND and PASOK was not simply a contest between alternative ideologies and political strategies, but was a contest between
two political formations that highlighted competing cultural tendencies in Greek society. It bears repeating that it would be inaccurate to portray individual political parties as singularly representative of discrete cultural tendencies, given that the cultural cleavages in Greek society cut across class and ideological lines. But it is possible to identify the constellation of features that marked the two cultural tendencies at the outset of the democratization period and, then, to draw some loose yet discernible associations between these tendencies and the two parties of ND and PASOK. PASOK, in its earliest stages of party development, presented a vision for modern democracy which, by incorporating significant features of both cultural currents, moved beyond previous distinctions and, in this, offered a mode for the permanent ascendancy of an integrative culture which would support social cohesion and political stability.

VIII. The Founding of PASOK and New Democracy, and the 1974 Elections

In keeping with his view of the transition as a time of national rebirth, on his return to Greece Karamanlis founded the New Democracy Party to represent those "healthy and progressive" interests essential to stabilizing the country's nascent democratic political order. Karamanlis stressed that the transition to democracy was a "unique opportunity," and called for elections for November in order to legitimate a new, popularly-elected government that would oversee the institutionalization of democratic politics.

The elections of 1974 were remarkable in that they were, according to the majority of observers, the most fair, competitive, and free in the country's modern history. The interim government under Karamanlis' leadership demonstrated that democracy meant the expansion of the political space to allow for the
participation of all political forces, by legalizing the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)\textsuperscript{90}—the KKE participated freely in electoral politics for the first time since the government had outlawed it in 1947.\textsuperscript{91}

Insofar as it is possible to identify cultural tendencies with individual political parties, ND was the heir to the modernist/westernist cultural current. Karamanlis had spent his formative political years supporting westernist policies and orientations, and he had a conception of democracy and a reformist strategy for modernizing Greece which drew heavily on his ideas about Greece's delayed democratization. The distinguishing feature of Karamanlis' reformist approach to democracy-building in Greece was the ideal-typification of the Western European developmental model, with certain accommodations for the constraints of the Greek context, as reflected in Karamanlis' often-cited statement that "Greece belongs to the West."\textsuperscript{92} Karamanlis overtly linked the country's prospects for institutionalizing genuine democracy (as opposed to the guided democracy which had obtained it for much of the post-WWII period) with the need to modernize the political and social system along western European lines.

The policy centerpieces of Karamanlis' westernizing strategy were, in the political sphere, the institutionalizaton of a pluralist, parliamentary democracy whose rules and norms would be set out in a new constitution safeguarding order, broadening the political space, and strengthening the powers of the executive branch. ND was also committed to the "...harmonisation of the governmental system with the conditions of Greek reality...",\textsuperscript{93} namely, the restructuring of the state, and the concomitant strengthening of civil society. In the economic sphere, the party called for the creation of a neo-liberal system defined rather vaguely as
a mixed economy based on private enterprise but not excluding "...the widening of the economic sector controlled by the [s]tate." As with its political orientation, the "...economic philosophy of ND...[was]...oriented towards economic systems which prevail in the democratic countries of Europe with which...[the Greek] economy is closely linked." The principal foreign policy objective, and in some ways the testament of the reformist strategy, was the party's call for Greek entry into the European Community.

It is critical to recognize that Karamanlis' strategy for democratization and modernization was premised on a continuity with those structures of politics and society which mimicked western prototypes, albeit with an emphasis on the reform of these structures. In this respect, ND stood as the latest reconfiguration of the westernist cultural perspective. Karamanlis stressed that the reformism advocated by ND was the best means for making the changes in both state and civil society required to foster a new sense of national unity. But the overt westernism, secularism, rejection of class-based analytic solutions to the country's economic imbalances, and incremental approach to forming incorporative mechanisms of politics meant that the ND culture was essentially one which proposed to modernize Greek society by eliminating, or by not acknowledging, structural and cultural realities which themselves functioned as operative constraints on the party's potential capabilities to transform the political and social system.

In contrast, Papandreou founded PASOK as a means for realizing a new social order understood from a cultural perspective that was neither westernist nor traditionalist. Examination of the party's organizational structure and ideology will clarify the ways in which Papandreou's vision for democracy and modernity
integrated elements of both the traditionalist and westernist cultural currents, and advocated radical change (as opposed to gradual reforms) as the only means of a cultural reconciliation. The founding of PASOK was perhaps the most remarkable sign of the opening of the political space resulting from the dissolution of authoritarian rule. Unlike any of the other contestants in the elections, PASOK occupied an entirely new place in the political terrain in that the party represented the first non-Communist, Left party option in the country's political history.

The party's organizational structure was built around three main groups, all of which had been main actors in the resistance to the authoritarian regime and all of which were expressions of the social radicalization resulting from the junta experience and the events preceding it. The three groups that made up PASOK were the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), the Democratic Defense (D.D.), and the Panhellenic Liberation Front (P.A.M.); this broad grouping encompassed many of Andreas Papandreou's supporters from the left wing of Center Union Party (mainly palaiokommatikoi, or politicians experienced in the old-style, clientelistic system), radical intellectuals and students, and members of the Communist Party of the Interior. Taken as a whole, the new party represented a cross-section of interests united mainly by their rejection of the postwar system of guided democracy and the uneven economic development that had been its concomitant; PASOK's social base encompassed segments of the urban working class, the peasantry, and the radicalized petty bourgeoisie.

One of the most significant reasons for PASOK's capacity to act as a potential mode for cultural reconciliation was precisely the combination of the above three
groups under one organizational umbrella. The party stood as the representative of those social groups which felt most dissatisfied with the pre-1974 economic and political balance of power, and which were most invested in changing the socio-political balance of power in a way that implied a more inclusive national collectivity. Leaders of the three co-founding groups in PASOK emphasized that a dynamic for social change would be generated by following competitive, democratic procedures within the organization, such that resultant policy decisions would be the outcome of pluralist bargaining and cooperation.

Papandreou claimed that the multiple tendencies in the party represented its very strength, by creating within PASOK a unity in diversity. The pluralism of the movement's tendencies was seen as the source of its dynamism, as a microcosm in which democratic procedures would bring about integrated solutions that the party could then apply to restructuring society. The organizational structure was seen as an arena in which societal cleavages would be consensually resolved and superseded.

The most important element distinguishing PASOK's radical strategy and cultural potential was that the party's plans for restructuring relations between state and society as well as for refashioning the criteria of national unity were incompatible with the social order that existed. The Declaration of 3 September, the foundational statement of the party's ideological vision, was a reinterpretation of the country's political and economic problems in terms that bypassed the existing modernist versus traditionalist critiques, by incorporating elements of both to arrive at a new conception of modernity for Greek society.
Through the Declaration, Papandreou established PASOK's ideology as socialist in that he interpreted Greek society according to Marxist analytic methods. In essence, Papandreou applied Marxist dependency theory to explain the country's domestic structural imbalances as the replication of the international political-economic order whereby the capitalist center exploited the dependent periphery. Papandreou argued that Greek political leaders who had based the country's development patterns on the logic of the capitalist center had consigned Greece to a permanent state of economic underdevelopment, political authoritarianism, and cultural inferiority.

The prospects for building a "socialist democratic Greece" depended on achieving the strategic goals of national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation, and democratic procedure. While anti-Western nationalism was the basis for Papandreou's argument about national independence as a prerequisite for popular sovereignty, an analysis of Greek society along class lines informed his views of the necessity for social liberation as a sine qua non of democratic procedure. Papandreou summed up the PASOK platform under the slogan of radical socialist transformation (allaghi). The Declaration was accompanied by a limited number of programmatic recommendations which are indicative of the schematic for a modern, socialist democratic Greece. Foundational elements of these policy pronouncements included socialization of targeted sectors of the economy, the creation of cooperatives in the primary sector, the socialization of the education system, the complete separation of Church from state, and a host of legislative changes designed to ensure equality between the sexes. As these
policies suggest, Papandreou articulated a vision of modernity that was based on a mixed economy, participatory democracy, and secularity.

The party's 13.6% of the popular vote in the 1974 elections belied the scope of PASOK's potential ideological appeal and organizational capacities, and was largely the result of the conjunctural constraint in the form of Karamanlis' call for elections in November. The party's popular identity had to be shaped under the pressurized conditions of a near immediate mobilization for the impending elections. The timing was all the more confining in that the elections came only three months after the party's genesis and therefore generated, not surprisingly, a degree of vague eclecticism as a result of the limited opportunities for reconciling the inconsistencies derived from combining three founding tendencies within one organizational structure. Nonetheless, the party's ability, as a completely new political formation operating under significant conjunctural constraints, to garner the third highest percentage of the popular vote, must be recognized as a sign of the country's changing culture: PASOK's platform called for and required a metamorphosis in the values, ideas, and behaviors, according to which polity, economy, and society were organized.

IX. PASOK's Internal Recalibration and Cultural Antagonisms

The period from 1975 through the elections of 1977 exerted a formative influence on PASOK's identity as a political formation. The conflicting ideological orientations of the party's three tendencies were resolved through intense organizational struggles which, in the final analysis, determined an ideological reorientation that permanently compromised the party's radicalism and its potential for actualizing an integrated culture.
The leadership of the nascent party, which was drawn from the senior ranks of the three founding groups, made organizational questions the main focus of the post-election activities. The major issues of attention were the party's constitution, the internal operational principles of the Central Committee, and the strategy for the party's trade union movement. Basically, two perspectives existed within PASOK as to how to structure the party. The first, primarily represented by former D.D. and P.A.M. members, emphasized that the party must be based on the principles of democratic, mass participation. This perspective required extensive participation by rank-and-file membership through local and prefectural clubs and, likewise, a decentralized decisionmaking structure in which the main function of the top-level collective bodies would be coordination rather than control. Such organizational objectives implied a long-term strategy of building up a grassroots membership, commitment to democratic procedures for resolution of all political, ideological and organizational problems, and a decentralized decisionmaking apparatus. The second organizational perspective, endorsed by the palaiokommatikoi and the so-called Leninists in the former PAK, also called for the development of a mass-based structure but with a top-down decisionmaking apparatus dominated by middle-level politicians with relative autonomy (and, therefore able to maintain their clientelistic networks) and a charismatic leader. To realize this organizational plan required attention to efficiency in recruiting and thereby widening the incorporative scope of vertically-ordered decisionmaking.

The story of PASOK's development from 1975 up until the 1977 national elections is one in which factional struggles resulted in the predominance of the latter of the aforementioned organizational philosophy, based on a strategic
decision to pursue an electoral, parliamentary objective (a "short march to power") and, by extension, an ideological reorientation towards populism. The decisive factor in the organizational contests was the person of Papandreou, who utilized the factional disputes to undermine unity among the organizational's top functionaries and thereby to solidify his domination over the party; the result was that Papandreou's charismatic authority, initially based on his role as the founder and central public figure in PASOK, was intensified as he became a pole of both power and unity within the party.

Although one could speculate about the psychological factors in Papandreou's behaviors in splitting the party leadership, what is clear within the context of an institutional analysis is that Papandreou's tactics were based on his goals of reinforcing his charismatic leadership rather than institutionalizing his charisma to create a decentralized organizational structure. Papandreou skillfully presented the dangers of factionalism to the party's overall aim of bringing about a democratic socialist Greece, to justify his manipulation of the Declaration of 3 September to elevate himself as the only legitimate interpreter of PASOK ideology and, thus, as the exclusive arbiter of organizational conflicts impacting the party's capacity for political action. In another tactical maneuver that would become characteristic of both Papandreou's *modus operandi* and the party's fragmented policymaking, Papandreou described the party's institutional structure in terms aimed to satisfy both organizational perspectives. He identified the party as a vanguardship, but qualified the PASOK vanguardship (as opposed to that posited by the "rigid, dogmatic Communist parties") as "defined in the last analysis, by the base."
The outcome of the organizational struggles, however, was not based solely on Papandreou's initiatives, but on factors related to structure and timing as well. The most intense factional conflicts that occurred in the early stages of the party's development meant that established channels for communication and conflict resolution were basically non-existent or, at best, fragile and idiosyncratic; likewise, networks of communication between the party and external actors in politics and society (for example, other parties and the press) were at that time in the process of formation and, for the most part, were restricted to personalized contacts. Those actors within PASOK who were most experienced with the nuances of factional party politics and who had the best developed extra-party networks were Papandreou and the palaiokommatikoi, precisely the interests who endorsed an organizational framework based on charismatic leadership and top-down decisionmaking. The upshot of the mix between Papandreou's self-elevation and internecine party conflicts was a substantial round of resignations and, eventually, unceremonious expulsions, by those members (radical intellectuals, students, and former centrist politicians committed to pluralist procedures) who considered Papandreou's decisionmaking by fiat as the harbinger of PASOK's betrayal of its promise for building a democratic mass movement and of the party's incapacity for reforming the structural imbalances of Greek society.

The shift in the party's internal balance of power meant an organizational emphasis on building PASOK around the charisma of Papandreou and the use of traditional organizational patterns and methods. Nonetheless, significant portions of the membership (representing the radicalized working class and a large contingent of foreign-educated technocrats) remained committed to notions of
democratic procedure and pluralist decisionmaking. The emergent organizational structure came to be characterized by inherent contradictions that, as we will see in the upcoming chapter, would be significant weaknesses in policymaking.

An important outcome of the organizational reorientation was the dilution of the party's initial ideological message of radicalism, by means of Papandreou's gradual but deliberate articulation of a populist discourse, consistent with the electoral-parliamentary strategy which was operative throughout 1977 leading up to the elections of that year. The discourse within the organizational structure continued to be defined by radical, Marxian analyses of the nature of the country's political-economic imbalances, but Papandreou began to construct a public discourse designed to avoid alienating the less radical bases of PASOK support and to develop the party's image as a viable electoral choice for governing the country. Despite his continued emphasis on the need for economic changes that reflected the class alignments of Greek society, and despite the continued assessment of Greece's domestic political economy in terms of the country's dependent status in the world capitalist system, Papandreou increasingly concentrated on the overtly nationalist responses to changing the country's domestic and international political-economic condition, and stressed the importance of organizational efficiency and electoral strength for achieving genuine democracy in Greece.

In place of more exact discussions about class location, Papandreou turned to broad abstractions about the capitalist metropolis, with its allies of the elites in the Greek power bloc, to explain the oppression of the underprivileged strata (the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie) within Greece. The goals of national
independence and popular liberation were discussed in terms of sweeping calls for Hellenization of the state apparatus, foreign policy autonomy vis-a-vis the West, and the democratization of institutional concentrations of power. Similarly, the objectives of social liberation and democratic procedure were premised on the new-found equivalence between organizational efficiency and electoral strength, so that Papandreou created the justification for sacrificing democratic participation to the expedients of mass recruitment and mobilization, and shrewdly subordinated collective processes to the discretions of his leadership.

PASOK won 25.3% of the popular vote, against ND's 41.9% majority and EDIK's 11.9%, in the national elections of 1977. Undeniably, the disintegration of the traditional Center as an electoral option, based on EDIK's lackluster leadership and nondescript platform, played a role in PASOK's improved showing. Still, the most compelling reason for PASOK's notably improved electoral performance was the party's ability to mobilize the rural population and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, based on the appeal of an organizational apparatus geared towards electoral-parliamentary turnover and of the ideological de-radicalization required by such a political strategy. Paradoxically, the same organizational and ideological modifications that allowed PASOK to mount an electoral challenge on the basis of inter-class support led to the internalization within the party of the cultural contradictions derived from a heterogeneous voting bloc. PASOK's election performance was built on an ideological dilution that foreclosed a break with the existing social structure and its cultural cleavages; further, the development of a dual discourse compromised the party's dynamic for cultural integration by undermining the organizational capacity for coherent
policymaking and participatory procedures. These trends were crystallized with the party’s organizational and ideological maturation from 1977 to 1981.


The 1977 elections must be understood as a turning point in terms of PASOK’s possibilities for functioning as a mechanism for cultural reconciliation. The electoral outcome established PASOK as the country’s main opposition party, and convinced the party leadership that the goal of capturing government by the next national elections was a realistic one. However, the PASOK leadership clearly understood the likelihood of reaching the electoral goal as dependent upon the movement’s ability to capture as much of the electoral terrain previously belonging to the all-but-extinct Center parties. This assessment was significant for two reasons: first, it required an ideological shift tantamount to the abandonment of radical socialism as the core logic of the party’s view for modernizing Greek society; and, second, it necessitated the consolidation of organizational procedures and tactics consonant with a catch-all party, such that vote-getting was prioritized over democratic procedures within the party.

Papandreou calculatedly appealed to the Center of the political spectrum through a shrewd rearticulation of PASOK’s ideology: moving away from the principles and constructs of socialism, he constructed a populist discourse that subsumed all other democratizing analyses under its hegemonic logic of equivalence. The refashioning of the party’s radicalism was completed with the formulation of a populist critique of the Greek social reality, which Papandreou represented as a division into two antagonistic groups, the people and the power bloc. This conception superseded Papandreou’s earlier analysis of Greek society
and its problems in terms of the establishment (oil pronomiouchi) and the non-
privileged (oil mi-pronomiouchi), and definitively replaced the party's earliest
socialist, class-based interpretations with a deliberately vague manicheanism far
removed from any substantive notion of class. The most specific, class-related
distinctions used by Papandreou in articulating the party's populist view was the
construct of the "small and middle strata" (mikromesaia stromata), but even this
group was defined in relatively vague language to include all those individuals who
felt themselves to have been exploited by those forces who controlled the existing
socioeconomic and political structure. The dichotomous logic of the populist
discourse was consistent with the party's electoral strategy, for populism allowed
Papandreou and PASOK to mobilize, as Lyrantzis observes, "...not a specific class,
but the 'people' or the 'masses' in general, against whatever [was] identified as
'the enemy'."¹¹²

The strength of the populist ideology was its lack of specificity. Expurgated
of its potentially alienating socialist terminology and replaced with the leveling,
vague language of populism, PASOK's ideology became all things to all people
and, therefore, was well-suited to capturing the amalgam of primarily petty
bourgeois voters who comprised the Center of the political terrain and the self-
denoted (mainly petty bourgeois) members of the inchoate class designation
termed lower-middle strata. The populist reorientation of the party ideology was
summed up in its sloganeering, as the initial calls for 'radical socialist
transformation' were accompanied by the general demand for "change", and
increasingly were replaced by the promise of "PASOK in government, the people
in power."
The ideological distancing from the party's original socialist discourse was reinforced by an increasingly overt technocratic approach to solving the country's economic dysfunctions and political inefficiencies. In place of the emphasis on social liberation as the basis for radical social change, Papandreou and the growing corps of party technocrats criticized the government for its failure to implement "...a consistent and integrated developmental policy."113 The creeping technocratism was a valuable justification for the ideological shift away from socialist analyses and solutions to the country's problems; as economic imbalances were presented in terms of government policy failures as opposed to deep-seated structural incongruities, solutions came to be framed in terms of management and administration rather than in terms of a restructuring of the means and relations of production.

The organizational emphasis on technocratic management reflected the decision of the party leadership to concentrate on the electoral priority and, in essence, constituted a refinement of the tendencies towards vertical, centralized decisionmaking discussed above. The party leadership implemented a strategy of "National Popular Unity"114 in the immediate aftermath of the 1977 elections. Specifically designed to expand PASOK's membership for the purposes of electoral mobilization, the strategy was explained as the people's responsibility to democracy and the nation.115 The party became institutionally thick, as numerous layers of committees (at local, regional, and national levels) were created with the purpose of growing recruits and preparing the apparatus for the election. But this focus on numbers and mobilization left little opportunity for democratic procedure and genuine participation by the membership, such that "...the membership's activity
remained superficial and shallow,...[and organizational strength was rarely considered]... in terms of the political education and awareness of its membership." By the time of the elections, the party had established an expansive, nationwide, grassroots membership; the regional and local apparatus, however, was highly underdeveloped vis-a-vis the national organization, which exercised almost complete decisionmaking control over the rest of the party structure. The locus of legitimation and power was centralized at the top of the decisionmaking tree and, most specifically, was concentrated in the person of Papandreou, whose charisma\textsuperscript{117} was enhanced by virtue of his decisive role as arbiter of the party's organizational disputes since the events of the 1975-1977 period, as well as the intellectual credentials which made him the de facto leader of the technocratic current in the party. Pronouncements by the party's Central Committee cited Papandreou as "...the single and stable point of reference in the unsettled consciousness of, and in the desires of the radicals, either among the ranks of people or in PASOK,"\textsuperscript{118} and one senior party leader explained that "...[f]or us Papandreou and the organization of PASOK are identitical and constitute an undivided whole. This unity secures the necessary preconditions and appropriate terms for the realization of socialist change."\textsuperscript{119}

The overwhelming victory of PASOK in the October 1981 elections was a testimony to Papandreou's leadership in successfully recasting PASOK as a populist party with a catch-all strategy. But paradoxically, the party's ideological and organizational metamorphosis over the 1974-1981 period had led to the internalization of the cultural contradictions in Greek society within the party structure itself. Rather than helping to articulate a new basis for national
cohesion and thereby to foster a modern, democratic collective identity, Papandreou's populism deliberately highlighted the westernist/traditionalist fault lines in the national community, and aggravated them with the superimposition of a malleable (and, ultimately, meaningless) class-based typology. Similarly, as the organizational structure of the party took on the typical features of bureaucratic clientelism, the traditional reliance on vertical networks was reinforced at the expense of trying to foster horizontal participatory mechanisms, suggesting limited possibilities for restructuring the state much less for a more accurate articulation of relations between state and civil society.

XI. Religion, Politics, and Culture: the 1975 Constitution

The official promulgation of the 1975 Constitution on 9 June established the rules of the game for regulating competitive politics and expanding the political space in Greece; in this respect, the document was an essential factor in shaping the cultural as well as institutional features of the emergent democratic regime.

Constitutional reform was a central feature of Karamanlis' transition and consolidation strategies. Following the timely resolution of the monarchy-versus-republic debate over the desired form of government, Karamanlis turned to the project of forming a new constitution. Karamanlis' perspective was that the constitution would form the institutional bedrock of the new regime by preventing the abuses of parliamentary politics that had contributed to the imposition of the junta.\textsuperscript{120} The newly-elected Parliament, empowered to amend the 1952 Constitution in effect since the dissolution of the junta\textsuperscript{121}, drafted the new document. The Constitution was modelled on the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic,\textsuperscript{122} and was designed around a strong executive, with a rigorous definition of the powers
of the president as head of state. These clauses reflected Karamanlis' view of the importance of political elites in preparing the conditions for broad-based popular participation over a long period of time. It was mainly on the issue of the role of the president that Papandreou opposed the draft constitution and, even with subsequent amendments to this and various other articles (including those relating to the Church) in the drafts, PASOK and the other opposition parties abstained from voting on the final draft.

Insofar as Papandreou's objections to the new constitution focused on points of form for the democratic government to be established in Greece, the constitutional debates were a forum for delineating the radical versus gradualist cultural perspectives towards modernizing society. And while the provisions on religion were not a part of Papandreou's arguments against the new constitution, these articles provide important insights into the way in which the regime change involved a window of opportunity for reposing the role of the Church in the new political order. The changes in the Church's role in public life contained in the constitution are especially interesting as illustrations of the awareness by both party leaderships of the need to rethink the links between religion and politics, as related to the meaning of modernity and democracy in Greece.

The transfer of power from military to civilian leadership had not been accompanied by any shifts in the leadership of the Church, and Archbishop Seraphim, at the time the head of the Church, retained his position as Archbishop of Athens and All Greece. However, the elevation of the Archbishop by the authoritarian regime had come at the cost of significant internal dissatisfaction in the ecclesiastical structure, thereby aggravating the intense factionalization at the
hierarchical level which was the result of the Ieronymos period.\textsuperscript{125} The democratization process, then, seemed to mark the end of what had effectively become the regimentalization of the leadership of the Church. Nonetheless, Karamanlis had been sworn in by Archbishop Seraphim as leader of the interim civilian government in July 1974, and the Archbishop represented the Church at the inauguration of the first popularly-elected government of the transition. In keeping with historical practice in Greece, the leadership took its oath of office on the Bible. The formal institutional links between Church and state appeared to remain intact with the transition to democracy.

The provisions regarding religion in the draft of the 1975 constitution underscored the regime change as a window of opportunity for "...pioneering modifications in Church-state relations,"\textsuperscript{126} and, by altering the official status of the Church in society, for significant repercussions in the organizational life of the Church. In fact, the draft constitution contained three articles (Articles 4, 16, and 33) dealing with the Church and religion. Given that the document bore the unmistakable imprint of Karamanlis' conception of the necessary form of constitutional democracy in Greece,\textsuperscript{127} we can assume that the provisions on Church-state relations reflected his (and, by extension, the ND party's) vision about the space for religion in public life in a modern democracy.

As noted above, the underlying theme of the proposed changes in the provisions on religions was that of separation of Church and state. The National Minister of Education and Religions at that time, a member of the ND party, confirmed that "...[the ND leadership considered]...the correct system to be the separation of Church and State; however, in the present situation and in the light
of tradition, it is difficult to abandon the existing system at the present time."\textsuperscript{128} The ND government therefore proposed constitutional changes which amounted to a gradual move towards the legal separation of the two institutions, and framed this broader problematic in terms of issues of individual rights and guarantees of religious freedom in a pluralist society. For example, the draft recognized Orthodoxy as the established religion in Greece and the Orthodox Church of Greece as the established Church (\textit{epikratousa})\textsuperscript{129}, meaning that Orthodoxy is the religion by which a majority of the country's citizens identify themselves. However, the articles in question also affirmed the inviolability of freedom of religious conscience by stating that "[e]njoyment of individual and civil rights shall not depend on the religious convictions of the individual,"\textsuperscript{130} and imposed prohibitions on proselytism relating to all religions (including Orthodoxy). The draft also shifted sole responsibility for matters of education to the state, removing references to the Church's prerogatives and terminating the hitherto existing state responsibility for ensuring that the educational system upheld the so-called "Greek-Christain culture." The draft provisions also loosened the ties between Church and state by eliminating the invocation to the Holy Trinity traditionally placed at the introduction to the Constitution, and by removing stipulations regarding the president's membership in the Greek Orthodox Church and regarding his official oath of allegiance to the Church.\textsuperscript{131}

The official Church (that is, the position of the Church as represented by the Holy Synod) reacted negatively to what it perceived as a piece of legislation which, while theoretically logical, was practically impossible because it did not account for either the historical background or contemporary circumstances
relevant to Church-state relations.\textsuperscript{132} The Memorandum of the Permanent Holy Synod, prepared in response to the draft constitution, addresses both of the aforementioned factors and suggests revisions to the provisions in the form of the introduction of the system of \textit{synallilia} (coordination, or cooperation). The Synod argued that the system of \textit{synallilia} "...embodies the traditional relationship between the Church and the State in Greece while also corresponding to the spirit of the times and modern ecclesiology."\textsuperscript{133} What is most clear from the Church's position is that the hierarchy took issue not only with the objective, however gradually it might be achieved, of a complete legal separation of Church and state, but also with the break in the connection between Orthodoxy and national identity. The official Church's perspective was based on an understanding of the legal-institutional arrangement as an essential mechanism for perpetuating the subjective identification between the religious and secular components of the national imaginary and therefore for sustaining the religious features of Greek culture. The Synod's argument in favor of \textit{synallilia} was built on the premise that the legal separation of Church and state also implied the separation of "...the question of religious freedom prematurely from its central place in the national consciousness of the Greek people[, a break which] may be highly dangerous not only to the Church but to the State itself."\textsuperscript{134}

The positions advocated by PASOK with regard to Church-state relations present a contrast to the gradualism which characterized the ND approach, a quality which was strongly reinforced with the final version of the constitutional provisions on religion. The PASOK perspective was initially explicated in clauses in the Declaration of 3 September and in the party's response to the "Karamanlis
Constitution" (the proposed 1975 document) in the form of the "Constitution for a Democratic Greece" as well as in later party documents such as the "Directive for Policies of a PASOK Government Policy" in 1977 and the "Contract with the People" in 1980. The party's recommendations were founded on the premise of the need for the definitive separation of the Church from the state, and for a host of revisions which would guarantee that "...the election of the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church, the nomination of every Archbishop and, more generally, the administration of the Church according to its own internal canons and its traditions, would remain complete free and beyond any sort of official state imprint."

The question of autonomy of ecclesiastical administration also highlighted the gradualist versus radical approaches of ND and PASOK, respectively, to changing Church-state relations. The government stipulated that the Church "...is administered by the Synod of the Hierarchy, as the law defines [it]..."(bold mine), and further, that the Constitutional Charter of the Church be voted on by the total membership of the Parliament. The critical dimension of this stipulation was the interpretive latitude of the wording. According to the strict interpretation of this clause, the Constitutional Charter of the Church (the legal framework governing internal organizational matters in the Church) was automatically and necessarily a law of the state, given that precedence was accorded the parliamentary decisionmaking process over that of autonomous, ecclesiastical decisions. Such a reading, which was advocated by the ND government, creates significant space for state interference in the internal affairs of the Church. Conversely, according to a flexible interpretation of the clause, the state's
ratification of any Constitutional Charter would be understood as the endorsement of a set of changes determined autonomously by the Church according to internal procedures grounded in canon law; this reading rejects state prerogatives for interference in the internal affairs of the Church, and is consistent with the PASOK emphasis on full administrative separation of Church and state.

There is no doubt that the radical break with the past system of Church-state relations proposed by PASOK stood in marked contrast to the gradualist approach to Church-state separation adopted by the ND government, and moved beyond the synallilia arrangement which had been proposed by the Synod. However, the PASOK perspective on Church-state relations was ambiguous in one key respect: Papandreou emphatically stated that the separation of Church and state referred to the administrative relationship between the two institutions and did not refer to the Church's bonds with the nation and the people.\textsuperscript{139} Such a distinction posed clear operational questions and problems, but these were not addressed by Papandreou (nor by any other PASOK leader, for that matter). Papandreou's statement, however, does make clear that the PASOK position on Church-state relations acknowledges a historically-informed position for the Church in Greek society, and further, that the party recognizes the constitutive role of Orthodoxy in the national culture and the subjective imaginary.

A comparison of the draft with the final version of the constitution\textsuperscript{140} reveals a complete absence of the PASOK perspective on Church-state relations under democracy in Greece, and underscores the gradualism of the ND approach to modernization and democratization. Furthermore, while the influence of the official Church on the outcome of the constitutional provision appears at first
glance to be quite limited, the contradictions of the ND gradualism suggest the ongoing ability of the Church to affect political outcomes. The invocation to the Holy Trinity was reintroduced at the outset of the constitution and at the beginning of the oath sworn by the president and members of parliament; the reference to the Trinity constitutes an implicit elevation of Orthodoxy (and, especially, Christianity) over other religions, given that the parliament has often included members, albeit few, of the Islamic faith. The Church also gained a small victory regarding the clauses on education which, although mandated as the responsibility of the state, was intended to uphold the "development of national and religious conscience;" the draft proposal had made no mention whatsoever of religious conscience.

Most important, however, is the fact that the Constitution does recognize the Orthodox Church as the established (epikratousa) Church of Greece. This recognition, taken together with the above, more minor points, preserves the differential position of Orthodoxy in Greece, constitutes a de facto acknowledgement of the priority of Orthodoxy over other faiths, and avoids any de jure separation of Church and state. The ND National Minister of Education and Religions explained the government's decision to forego the option of definitive constitutional separation in terms of "...the critical nature of the circumstances which obtained in the country following the seven-year dictatorship, the need for ensuring [both] the singular religious unity of the people and [the future] possibility of correcting the relevant provisions through constitutional review, as well as on account of the reactions of the Church." The Minister's remarks echo the Church's arguments about the state's needs to account for the
impact of historical memory on the national conscience, and acknowledge the Church's capacity for affecting political decisions.

The Church's reaction against constitutional changes in the direction of religious pluralism was strongly affected by the internal organizational conditions which obtained at the time of transition and which, to a great extent, had been exacerbated by the Church-state relationship during the period of the dictatorship. The elevation of Archbishop Seraphim by the colonels' regime further weakened the credibility of the Church at the popular level, and factional infighting between the "Ieronymite" and "Seraphimite" hierarchs over issues of lay participation and administrative reform were largely unknown to the vast majority of the laity. Given the organizational cleavages and contradictions characterizing the Church at the time of the transition, the hierarchy viewed the possible restructuring of Church-state relations as the imposition of a responsibility for a kind of societal competition for which the Church was grossly unprepared. So while the Church's ability to influence the ND government's already gradualist approach to religious policy met the immediate concerns of the institutional Church, the result was a constitutional arrangement which effectively increased the state's capacity to circumscribe Church autonomy, both inside the organization and in society in general.

The paradoxical nature of the constitutional arrangement grew out of the fact that these compromises by the state, taken together with the clause on the internal administration of the Church, meant that neither synallitia nor complete legal separation was achieved. Rather, a precedent was set, under the system of democratic politics, for state interference in the internal ecclesiastical affairs of the
Church when the revised Constitutional Charter of the Church of Greece¹⁴³ was passed in 1977; the changes in the Constitutional Charter were ratified by the total membership of the Parliament, thereby rendering the document a product of state legislation rather than ecclesiastical determination. The significance of the premises on which the Ecclesiastical Charter were ratified must not be underestimated. The law reflected not only the failure to meet the Church's proposal for synallilia, but equally notable, raised questions about whether or not the 1975 Constitution in fact abolished the system of nomo kratousa politeia or merely covered it with the facade of legal recognition of the epikratousa system. For even as the 1975 Constitution had created the possibility for "...new terrain in the relations between 'the two leading institutions of the Nation,' [a terrain on which] they might be free from friction and shocks,"¹⁴⁴ the ambiguities in the constitution and their incorporation in the Ecclesiastical Charter of 1977 had "...tipped the balance towards a system of Caesaropapism and [therefore] proved to be a starting point towards the wrong direction."¹⁴⁵

XII. Conclusion

This chapter explored the claim that the transition and consolidation of democracy in Greece begun in 1974 was an opportunity not only for reordering the country's political system, but for the resolution of historically-grounded cultural tensions in which the meaning and role of Orthodoxy in public life was a central issue. The chapter explored the origins and recapitulation through changing historical conditions of two main antagonisms characterizing Greek culture at the time of the regime change: first, a marked disarticulation, or lack of congruity, between the Greek state and society; and second, a confusion, or
lack of coherence, in the conception of Greek collective identity. The chapter traced the influence of the Church and Orthodoxy over the Greek historical experience as constitutive aspects of both cultural tensions. Finally, the chapter considered PASOK as a unique vehicle with the potential to resolve the tensions in Greek culture, and examined the debates over the articles on religion in Greece's first post-authoritarian Constitution to illustrate the reasons for the party's failure to realize such potential by the time of its entry into government in 1981.

Karamanlis' metaphor of the regime change as a moment of national rebirth underscored the idea of democratization as a watershed for cultural transformation. However, it was PASOK which held the unique potential to act as the vehicle for effecting such cultural transformation, based on the party's promise for reconciling the two main sources of contradiction and tension in Greek culture within the larger program of constructing a modern, democratic society in Greece. Rejecting the equation of modernization with Westernization, Papandreou used an idiosyncratic blend of dependency theory, tiers mondisme, and populist culture to offer an alternative view of modernization which, he claimed, accounted for the domestic structural and political factors and international constraints specific to Greece's path towards democracy. Papandreou's plan for allaghi, therefore, held out the promise of resolving the disarticulation between state and society and of creating an inclusive, integrated collectivity, both of which were essential to resolving the tensions in Greek culture.

The party's failure to realize its potential by the formal conclusion of the consolidation phase with the elections of 1981 can be attributed to several factors,
each of which points to the interactions between the religious dimensions of Greek culture and the political process of regime change. First, conjunctural factors functioned as confining conditions on the prospects for resolving the cultural confusion over the place of Orthodoxy in the national identity. Specifically, the coincidence of the dissolution of the authoritarian regime with an external crisis circumscribed the radicalism of the PASOK vision for modernizing Greek society. Karamanlis and the ND leadership successfully employed a discourse identifying democracy with national unity, in order to interpret the Cyprus crisis as a grave threat to Greek sovereignty and therefore to call for an electoral closing of ranks behind Karamanlis in 1974.

Given Papandreou's need to establish PASOK's credibility as a supporter of the nation in times of crisis, he avoided an overtly Marxist interpretation of the crisis as the outcome of the failure of the liberal model of the neutral state. Instead, Papandreou used dependency theory to construct a radical explanation of the Cyprus crisis which was consistent with the ND discourse. In the process, however, Papandreou created space in the PASOK worldview for the perpetuation of the Church's role in public life under democracy. Papandreou's rejection of Karamanlis' claim that "Greece belongs to the West" was consistent with PASOK's view of the Cyprus crisis as the result of U.S. aims for incorporating Cyprus into the Western security net, as well as with the party's larger discussion about those aspects of the Greek historical experience which were not compatible with Western prototypes of democratic development. Insofar as PASOK's nationalist interpretation of the Cyprus crisis touched on the country's non-Western identity in general, and framed the crisis as a Greek-Turkish conflict in
particular, the party's discourse drew Orthodoxy into the perception of the foreign policy crisis and recapitulated the confusion over the sacred versus secular sources of collective identity in post-authoritarian Greece.

Second, organizational and ideological factors contributed to PASOK's initial failures to act as a vehicle for cultural resolution, including with regard to those internal features of culture which derived from the role of Orthodoxy and religion in public life. The ideological turn to populism challenged the legitimacy of the Greek state under ND to protect the interests of Greece against Western exploitation in the foreign policy realm, and accused the state under ND of being a tool manipulated by the privileged (*pronomiochôoi*) at the expense of the non-privileged (*mi-pronomiochoi*). These attacks only reinforced the lack of articulation between state and society, delegitimizing the institutional capacities of the former to delineate the values and norms underpinning societal consensus, while offering little in the way of specific alternatives to foster the integration of state and civil society. Papandreou's criticisms of the state's lack of popular legitimacy, on account of its capture by the power bloc implied, underscored the Church's historical capital as an alternative institutional authority to the state.

The logic of populism which came to characterize the party's ideology over its short march to power further undermined PASOK's abilities for redefining the national collectivity in positive, inclusive terms. Lyrantzis observes that populism exemplifies the logic of equivalence, whereby

"all the differential features of an object have become equivalent and it is impossible to express anything positive concerning that object; this can only imply that through the equivalence something is expressed which the object is not...It is because a negative identity cannot be represented in a direct manner-
-i.e. positively--that it can only be represented indirectly, through an equivalence between its differential moments.\textsuperscript{147}

The advantage in this kind of logic for PASOK's electoral objectives was that it used a discourse which operated above class contradictions: through the logic of equivalence, a range of groups could identify themselves with the entity termed "the people" on the basis of a negative identity simply posited by virtue of its opposition to the antagonist, the power bloc. Further, Papandreou used populism to claim that Greek political identity was not Western, but was unable to use the same logic to provide a positive articulation of the country's political identity. Given the country's cultural make-up, it is not surprising that the PASOK emphasis on non-Westernness evoked subjective notions of the Eastern, Orthodox dimensions of Greek collective identity.

The debates on the provisions on religion in the country's first post-authoritarian Constitution can be understood as PASOK's first test in resolving the religious dimensions of the cultural contradictions in Greece. The process and outcome suggested not only PASOK's failure to meet this first cultural challenge. But as the party's earliest articulation of the place for religion in public life under the country's emergent pluralist democracy, PASOK's stand on the Constitutional provisions seemed likely to perpetuate the longstanding cultural inconsistencies. The party's emphasis on the need for the immediate, full separation of Church and state in legal-formal terms, \textit{simultaneous with} an emphasis on the indivisible bonds between Church and nation, was an attempt to create a democratic society built on principles of pluralism (including religious pluralism) and a reconciliation of the nation while also maintaining the sacred (and exclusivist) dimensions of
national identity. The perpetuation of cultural inconsistencies implied in the dualism of PASOK's religious policy, coupled with the internalization in the party's organizational structure and populist ideology of the modernist versus traditionalist cultural tensions, laid the foundations for direct Church-state confrontations over the role for religion in public life once the party entered into government.

Finally, one of the most interesting points suggested by the notion of the regime change as a process of cultural transformation as well as political reordering is that the mutually determinant relationship between culture and politics makes the project of nation-building an open-ended one. The unresolved question of the role of Orthodoxy and religion in Greek public life can be understood as the dynamic for the ongoing enterprise of nation-building, and speaks to the legitimacy of the state as the absolute purveyor of the nation-building initiative.

Because of historical experiences which had made Orthodoxy an integral part of Greek collective identity in the pre-nation-state period, the state's project of constructing the imagined community of the nation in terms of modern, secular notions necessarily required an effort to integrate the extant identity into the newer conception. However, the imposition of Western political institutions on traditional social structures with the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece aggravated the extant disarticulation between state and society which was the manifestation of a culture of suspicion, defensiveness, and mistrust, and undermined the legitimacy of the state to redefine national identity and to demand those responsibilities which derive from a positive articulation between state and society.
Paradoxically, the institutional relationship between Church and state contributed to the failure to close the nation-building process. Greek modernists viewed the establishment of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece as a means of institutionalizing the legitimacy of the state as the protector of the nation, and of mimicking Western prototypes for constructing a modern secular nation-state. But the constitutional model provided the Church with a legal-formal framework for conditionalizing the legitimate authority of the state as purveyor of the collectivity, and perpetuated the cultural confusion over the secular and sacred sources of national identity.
ENDNOTES

1. I am not arguing that the cultural aspects of the democratization process were exclusively religious. I am claiming that, insofar as that national reconciliation and modernization were two key aspects of the cultural transformation that was part of the regime change, there were religious dimensions to both aspects.


3. At the time of transition, Greece was, technically, a "presidential parliamentary republic." The President of the Republic was Lieutenant-General Phaedon Ghizikis, but the real power base within the regime centered on Colonel Dimitrios Ioannides, commander of the Greek military police and a political hardliner who in 1973 had ousted the regime's previous leader, Georgios Papadopoulos. For a useful summary of the main individuals who had carried out the coup, as well as the internal factionalization that resulted in several changes in leadership within the authoritarian regime, see Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece. The Search for Legitimacy (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987), p. 55-59.

4. The Greek colonel's coup constituted an ill-considered bid to regain what recent events (the most important of which was the student occupation of the National Polytechnic Institute--see upcoming Notes) had shown to be a clear lack of popular support for the authoritarian regime. The object of the coup was to oust Makarios III and thereby to set in motion a chain of events that would culminate in the unification of the independent Republic of Cyprus with Greece, an act by which the colonels' hoped to secure the regime's legitimacy by virtue of a revanchist accomplishment in the name of the Great Idea. The colonels' aims were also consistent with NATO aims of bringing Cyprus into the Western alliance and therefore of neutralizing the influence of the island's communist party. For an excellent summary of the junta's role in the Cyprus Crisis, as well as of the importance of international and historical factors in contributing to the unfolding of the 1974 events, see C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece. A Short History (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), p. 303-306.
5. The occupation of approximately thirty-eight percent of the island by Turkish forces. The presence of Turkish occupation forces on the island has been uninterrupted since the 1974 invasion and continues at the time of this writing. In 1983, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, with the support of the Turkish government in Ankara, proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Cyprus in the occupied territory. The secessionist state remains unrecognized by the international community which, with the exception of the Ankara government, continues to recognize as legitimate the Republic of Cyprus, whose government is currently headed by Greek-Cypriot leader Spyros Vassiliou. There are a good deal of studies dealing with the 1974 invasion and the political history of the island since that time. For especially useful accounts of the Cyprus Crisis with respect to the roles of the Greek, Turkish, and U.S. governments, see the recently published book by Monteagle Stearns, *Greece, Turkey, Cyprus. Entangled Allies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).

6. Not long before the outbreak of the Cyprus problem, domestic events in Greece had pointed to the increasingly open popular rejection of the regime. A striking reflection of the junta's lack of legitimacy came in the form of the anti-regime protests by students at the National Polytechnic in November 1973, which the state suppressed by resort to force. The student demonstrations at the Polytechnic (Greek National Technical College) marked a turning point in the history of the junta and stand as a signal moment in the events leading up to the establishment of democratic politics in Greece. In October 1973 the regime had installed Spyros Markezinis, a longtime conservative politician and a prominent member of the country's political elite, as Prime Minister in a government mandated to prepare the country for Parliamentary elections and a transition to a civilian government that would manage a circumscribed democracy presided over by the military. The Markezinis interlude represented one, albeit the most publicly touted, in a long list of liberalization experiments which had failed to accomplish the regime's objective of consolidating its power by gaining popular legitimacy. One month later, however, students occupied the National Polytechnic in Athens and university buildings in Thessaloniki and Patras, and called for an end to the junta and the establishment of democratic, competitive politics in Greece; sporadic public outbursts suggested that popular sympathies lay with the students' demands. That the student occupations occurred only one month after the start of the liberalization experiment was a striking sign of the regime's lack of legitimacy, and its brutal suppression (an estimated thirty-four students were killed and several hundred were wounded when tanks and riot police were sent into the Polytechnic to wrest control from the students) reflected the bankruptcy of the junta's policies. For a useful summary of the events of the Polytechnic and their impact on the resultant internal coup by Ioannides against Papadopoulos, see Woodhouse, *Modern Greece*, p. 303-304.


7. Notwithstanding the dearth of documentary evidence on the events surrounding the unfolding of the transition, a number of studies suggest that the junta's initial aim in deciding to dissolve itself was actually a tactical decision by moderates within the regime who hoped to engineer a transfer of power to a civilian leadership who, with an ideological and political orientation sympathetic to the authoritarian regime's conception of democratic politics, would oversee the construction of a guided democracy built on a restored, albeit liberalized, version of the country's postwar political system. From this perspective, the transfer of power was a tactical measure designed to stave off domestic crisis and to place responsibility for resolution of the foreign policy crisis under the aegis of the new regime. For one of the most recent and quite comprehensive works on the transition, in which the author makes use of extensive personal interviews and archival evidence from the archives of Constantine Karamanlis, see Arvanitopoulos, "The Political Economy." Also see Constantine Arvanitopoulos, "Constantine Karamanlis: A Leadership Profile," M.A. Thesis (Washington, D.C.: University Microfilms, 1985).

8. For a detailed discussion of the evolution in Karamanlis' political philosophy while in exile, see Arvanitopoulos, ibid.


and ideology --within the context of its first three years in office--see Oi Ideologikes Arhes.

12. The Center Union-New Forces (Enosis Kentrou-Nees Dynameis) was officially founded with the Joint Declaration of the Center Union and the New Forces in October of 1974, and constituted a coalition of groupings ranging from the conservative Center to the moderate left. The Center Union Party had been led by George Papandreou until his death in 1969. The New Forces was itself a loose coalition of political groups, largely without parliamentary experience and primarily distinguished by a record of resistance against the authoritarian regime. For a list of the coalition members, see Thanos Veremis, "The Union of the Democratic Center," in Penniman, ed. Greece at the Polls, p. 90.

13. The English translation of the Declaration of 3 September 1974, also known as the Proclamation of Fundamental Principles and Objectives of PASOK, is available on p. 217-222 in Clogg, Parties and Elections.

14. Papandreou's PASOK, supported by other parties on the Left and by the EK-ND under George Mavros, respectively denounced the draft as "totalitarian" and "reactionary," with the focus of their attacks being the creation of a centralized presidency (a Gaullist-type elective head of state) with significant reserve powers of government that, in effect, enhanced the powers of the executive vis-a-vis the legislature. Their critique claimed, first, that the expansiveness of the presidential prerogatives undermined Parliamentary freedom of action and, second, that Karamanlis was merely creating the institutional mechanism in preparation for his eventual ascension to the presidency and, thereby, for his personal political longevity. Papandreou's remark that the constitution was "the spiritual child of Karamanlis" compellingly conveyed the fact that the document bore the unmistakable imprint of Karamanlis' views regarding the proper form for a constitutional democracy in Greece.

From Karamanlis' perspective, the new constitution would be an institutional foundation for a viable, competitive democracy in Greece, by preventing the abuses of parliamentary politics that had contributed to the imposition of the junta. Karamanlis supported a very elite-centered vision of political democracy, based on his conception of human beings and, ergo, politics, as inherently conflictual. Strong leadership was the essential linchpin for political order, particularly in view of the idiosyncracies of Greece's political history, and Karamanlis was committed to a constitution which supported a centralized presidential leadership capable of safeguarding the nation against the disintegrative, conflictual tendencies of its own citizenry. See Arvanitopoulos, "Constantine Karamanlis," for a fuller discussion of Karamanlis' views on the 1975 Constitution.

15. EDIK (Enosis Dimokratikou Kentrou) was founded in 1976, and represented the formal fusion of the two parties that had comprised EK-ND (Enosis Kentrou and Nees Dynameis).
16. There were other parties which contested the elections, including the KKEes; the Alliance of the Progressive and Left-Wing Forces; the Progressive Party (KP, or Komma Proodeftikon); and the National Democratic Union (EDA, or Ethniki Dimokratiki Enosis). However, the individual percentages of electoral votes received by each of these parties was relatively insignificant in comparison to that garnered by the three main political formations. For a review of the elections and the showings of each of these parties, see Clogg, *Parties and Elections*, p. 70-81.

17. Quoted in ibid., p. 73.

18. As discussed in the Introduction, this dissertation focuses on the concept of culture and its relationship to politics. However, there is an extensive literature on political culture, and the concept shares many of the same characteristics as that of culture. Amongst the many definitions of political culture, one of the most well-known is that of Verba, who defines it as "...the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place." See Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 515. Like the construct of culture as a whole, that of political culture assumes "...that the attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior in...society are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing." Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in ibid., p. 7.


23. Ibid.


27. Although *armatoloi* were actually members of the indigenous population authorized by the Ottomans to maintain peace within a given area of the Empire and *klephtes*, in contrast, were Greek outlaws usually living in the mountainous areas of the Empire, many of the most well-known leaders from both groups had their origins in the same nomadic tribes and shephard families. For a discussion of this point, with extensive references and citations, see Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," p. 21-22.


29. Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," p. 72. For a full discussion of the evolution in the focus of activities of the Greek merchant strata from the late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries, see Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan."


31. Ibid.

32. See Chapter One for a fuller discussion of these rights and responsibilities. For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Papadopoulos, *Documents and Studies.*

34. Ibid.

35. This point represents the essence of the decision to create an autocephalous Church of Greece with the formation of the Greek nation-state. See Chapter Two of this dissertation.


38. See Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (London: Praeger, 1962). According to Gerschenkron, the more economically backward a country when it begins industrialization, the greater the role of the state in driving and financing the process of industrial development.

39. For the definition and comprehensive exploration of the modernizers and westernizers, see Diamandouros, who originated the term with regard to Greek social science studies, in "Political Modernization." Other interesting discussions of the origins and program of the modernizers include those by Paschalis M. Kitromilides, in "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," in *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1989): 149-192; Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*; and Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity* (Minneapolis, MINN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Although these authors use the terms interchangeably and somewhat differently, depending on the context of the arguments being made, all retain the original orientation and meaning discussed by Diamandouros in "Political Modernization." For more recent reformulations of the modernizers as a political-economic elite with a particular cultural program, see Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture."

40. Although this appellation grows out of Diamandouros' discussion of the traditional elites opposed to the modernizers' strategy for political modernization in nineteenth century Greece, Diamandouros refers to these anti-modernizers as traditional elites. In a recent reformulation, Diamandouros refers to the contemporary representation of the traditional elites—in terms of worldview—as the underdog tendency in contemporary Greek culture. See ibid., and Nikiforos Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece.

41. For a summary of the reactive, status quo stance of the traditionalists vis-a-vis the stance of the modernizers, see Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," p. 2-3.

42. Ibid., p. 3.

43. For an account of the major ideas and representatives of the Greek Enlightenment, see Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities," p. 151-159.


46. Jusdanis also points out that language was a critical mechanism for "...the homogenization of ethnic differences, and the induction of citizens into the ideology of the imagined community." See *Belated Modernity*, p. 28. For a discussion of the centrality of sacred language as a bond in the imaginary of pre-national, religious communities, see Anderson, *Imagined Community*, p. 9-19. Anderson also considers the forces that dissolved sacred languages and began a process of linguistic territorialization that coincided with and supported the formulation of new, national imaginaries. Kitromilides also discusses language and nationalism with regard to the emergent nation-states of the Balkans during the nineteenth centuries, in "'Imagined Communities'."

47. The conflict over language, or "the language question," has remained a matter of philological, ecclesiastical, and political argument up to the present time in Greece. For a comprehensible summary of a frequently unintelligible set of distinctions and derivative ideological and political arguments, see Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity*, p. 41-46.

48. Jusdanis compellingly argues that literature is the most critical carrier of nationalism, serving both "...as a mirror of the collective identity and also recit[ing] its story." See ibid., p. 40. For a full discussion of the importance of literature in inventing the nation, see p. 49-87 in the same source.


51. The westernizers' historical account was, not incidentally, an appeal astutely calculated to oblige Western European powers to lend practical support to the country to whose heritage they owed so much. For a discussion of the historical origins of Greece's belated development, see Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*. An excellent comparative treatment of this same subject is offered in Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

52. For a fuller discussion of the ambivalence of the Church regarding the Greeks' war for independence, see Chapter 2. Also, see Clogg, "Anti-Clericalism".

53. According to Clogg, the anti-clericalism of the Greek westernizing intelligentsia was directed at the perceived cultural obscurantism and political conservatism of the Church (primarily its hierarchy). For a very useful discussion of anti-clericalism at both the intellectual and popular levels, see Clogg, "Anti-Clericalism."

54. Clogg points out that despite distinction between the anti-clerical attitudes of the Greek modernizers, there is little evidence of religious disbelief as a manifestation of such hostility. Rather, even the most hostile critics of the Church's ambiguous stance towards the Ottoman captivity "...was concerned to make it clear that [they were] critical of the hierarchy for departing from the pristine purity of the apostolic church." See p. 272-273 in ibid.


56. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities", p. 166.

57. As explained in Chapter 2, the contrasting designations "westernizers" and "traditionalists" have been most fully developed by Diamandouros. See "Political Modernization." But the terms have been adopted and widely utilized by other social scientists working on modern Greece. See, for example, Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*.

58. The creation of a new economic and social order under the aegis of state guidance directly reduced the traditional economic base of those Greeks who had amassed landed properties which were abandoned by Ottoman owners with the dissolution of Ottoman imperial control over the course of the last century of the Empire and under the chaotic conditions of the Greek war for independence from the Turks, and which had been sold by Turks to wealthy diaspora Greeks in those provinces incorporated at later dates into the Greek nation-state. These Greek landowners, with the formation of the nation-state, now confronted the Greek state in its efforts to parcelize or expropriate the larger properties. For a discussion of state ownership of the former *chiftlik* properties (landed estates which had been owned by Turks under the Ottoman Empire) and the subsequent impact of these national lands on the country's agrarian structure, see Mouzelis, *Politics in the*
Semi-Periphery, p. 33, 39-40, and p. 206-209. For a specific discussion of the initial legislation of the Greek state regarding property rights and distribution, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 205. It is important to recognize that, with the exception of those provinces incorporated subsequent to the formation of the nation-state, land ownership patterns and agrarian structures in Greece were dominated by small landholdings. A summary discussion of this point is provided by Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 3-73, and in Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 14-22 and p. 74-89.

59. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 33.

60. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 207. For more on the attempts to acquire control of the state from within, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft.

61. See Chapters One and Two.

62. The autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed in 1833, after prolonged debates that included varying the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the new Kingdom of Greece, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Greek state, by a unilateral decision of Greek bishops. See Chapter 2 for a discussion. Also, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church.

63. See Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities," p. 156-159. The author observes on p. 159 that "The Church objected precisely to the ethnic parochialism of secular nationalism, which threatened, and eventually did destroy, the ecumenicity of transcendent values which held Balkan society together within the fold of Orthodoxy during the centuries of captivity. In place of this ecumenicity nationalism put the celebration of the individuality and uniqueness of linguistic communities."

64. For a reference to the Great Idea as rooted in a conception of the nation stretching back to the Byzantine period, see Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 60.

65. The Meghali Idea was initially elaborated as a means of resolving domestic political controversies over autochthon versus heterochthon citizens. The use of the Great Idea to bridge the autochthon-heterochthon divide constituted an attempt to subsume internal national differences under the larger collective of a Greater Greek unity historically defined in religious terms. For a summary of the domestic and external motivations for the Great Idea, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict," in Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1979).

66. The civil war-like conditions that obtained during the consolidation of independence, from 1821-1828, attested to the strength of affective ties grounded in kinship and local affiliations, and highlighted the fragility of any subjective
commitment to the creation of a collective whole capable of protecting its individual members.

67. The success of Greek political leaders and, especially, intellectuals in gaining the support of European powers in the war for independence did not come without longlasting political costs. In addition to the cultural confusion generated by drafting the identity of the modern Greek nation in terms of western European suppositions about a continuity with the country's classical past, the Greek leadership (particularly the modernists but also the traditionalists) effectively opened up space for the institutionalization of such cultural contradictions by tying the country's early political survival to foreign protection. The result was a prolonged foreign presence in Greek domestic politics, as is evidenced by the emergence of political formations in the nineteenth century that came to be known euphemistically as the English, French, and Russian parties. See Diamandouros, "Political Culture," in Clogg, ed. Greece, p. 48-49. For a more expansive treatment of the history of European and, later, American intervention in domestic Greek politics, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos, and Harry J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics. An Historical Perspective (New York, N.Y.: 1976).

68. The most striking of these was the Greek defeat in the war of 1897 with the Ottoman Empire. An excellent, comprehensive treatment of the foreign policy difficulties of the Greek state in the early and mid-nineteenth century is provided by Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft.


70. Although Mavrogordatos uses this compelling phrase to characterize the National Schism (see Stillborn Republic, p. 28), the split of state and nation expresses the steady intensification throughout the twentieth century of the lack of congruence between state and society discussed throughout this chapter of the dissertation.

71. The striking demoralization of support for Venizelos' Liberal Party in the 1910 elections had signaled not only that the economic balance of power was a legitimate question for national discussion but that the political dominance of traditional notables (palaiokommatikoi) was no longer acceptable to other strata of society. The Greek peasantry and working class were drawn into the intra-bourgeois struggle, although the principal lines of debate hardly mattered to them. The incorporative features of the oligarchic clientelistic system of the nineteenth century had diluted the potentially radicalizing influences of socio-economic marginalization. Likewise, the expansion of the state patronage system in the early twentieth century undercut autonomous forms of peasant and working class representation.
72. While Mavrogordatos provides an excellent and comprehensive historical analysis of the many dimensions of the split between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists (see p. 25-48 in Stillborn Republic), a useful summary of the interests comprising the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist camps is provided by Mouzelis in Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 46-47. For an analysis of the political institutional questions which provoked the Revolution of 1909 and the subsequent liberal-republican (Venizelist) versus conservative-monarchist (anti-Venizelist) split, see Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 111-116. The broader historical context for these issues is provided by Petropulos in Politics and Statecraft.

73. The process of proclaiming a republic and resolving the constitutional questions associated therewith stretched from 1924 through 1927. See Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 30-36.

74. Although Greek historiography treats the "Asia Minor Disaster" in which the Greek Army was defeated by the Ottoman Turks as the death of the Great Idea, most scholarly accounts and popular interpretations agree that the final blow to any lingering notions associated with Greek irredentism came with the events surrounding the Cyprus crisis in 1974. 

75. The elections of 5 March 1933 are particularly representative in this respect. See ibid., p. 40-48 for an account of these factors. Also, see Gregorios Dafnes, I Ellas Metaxi Dio Polemon, 1923-1940 [Greece Between Two Wars, 1923-1940], 2 vols. (Athens, Greece: Ikaros, 1955).

76. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 194.

77. See Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 114-122.

78. Jusdanis, Belated Modernity, p. 41.

79. Ellas Ellinon Christianon.

80. See Chapter Three.

81. In his discussion of culture in post-authoritarian Greece, Diamandouros refers to the historical pattern whereby "[t]he inability of either side to gain permanent ascendancy over the other and the resulting emergence and coexistence, over a long time, of two separate cultures, each with its own universe of meanings, shared assumptions, and symbolic content produced a profound and enduring division in the [Greek] society and politics....In different periods of varying lengths during the last two centuries, one or the other [cultural] tradition, having gained ascendancy through the temporary rise to power of the social and political forces espousing it, acted as the dominant logic of exclusion." See Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture," p. 9-10.

83. A brief word about the analytic distinction between the transition and consolidation phases of regime change is in order. There is a very substantial literature on regime change from a variety of national comparative perspectives and theoretical orientations, but one of the most salient conceptual points discussed in nearly all the literature concerns the differences between the transition and consolidation stages. I will use these analytic terms in keeping with the general consensus in the scholarly literature, in order to differentiate between the conjunctural, short-term aspects (the transition) and the macro-historical, structural aspects (the consolidation) of regime change. I also find that a differentiation between the two phases is useful in thinking about modifications in the nature and pace of the cultural transformation that occurred from one phase to the next. For example, if the primary goal of the transition is to legitimate the new regime by securing the cooperation of those social and political actors vital to constructing the new, democratic regime, then the "critical decisions and delicate political choices...that ensure cooperation must be based on an awareness of the various subjective orientations which each critical actor brings to the transition process." The transition phase represents an initial recognition of the fact that there are cultural dimensions to the political reordering. Likewise, if the central project of the consolidation phase is the institutionalization of the democratic regime by attending to structural factors relevant to the long-term viability of the system politics, then working out "...that set of formal and quasi-formal arrangements and practices which are likely to maximize the [regime's] smooth operation...requires the resolution of those cultural inconsistencies which had precluded a functioning, competitive political order." The consolidation phase, constitutes an attempt to reach an new consensus over the beliefs, values, and conceptions that will inform the institutional bases of the democratic order. For both quotes, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Transition to, and Consolidation of," p. 51.

84. Katsoudas touches on this idea in his discussion of the origins of ND's ideological and policy contradictions. See Demetrios Katsoudas, "?" Democracy: In or Out of Social Democracy?," in Vryonis, ed., *Greece on the Road*.


86. See Karamanlis' proclamation of the founding of the New Democracy Party, p. 223 in Clogg, *Parties and Elections*. The full reproduction of Karamanlis' speech is available on p. 223-225.

87. In this initial stage after the transfer of power, Karamanlis' main goal was to create the preconditions necessary for the institutionalization of democracy over the long term and, as such, he recognized the need to legitimate the new regime as the critical first step in moving towards his longer term objective. Karamanlis'
acumen in interpreting the differences between his conception for the future of Greek politics and that of the transfer-of-power team that had called him back is demonstrated not only in the intelligent coalition-building (as evidenced by the political composition of the transition team--while the new cabinet was comprised of established politicians associated with the Right and the conservative forces of the Center, all of these individuals possessed unimpeachable anti-junta credentials) he utilized to secure a broad cross-section of support for the new regime, but also in that the swift, effective timing of his measures functioned to build a consensus in favor of democracy while simultaneously reducing the possibilities for a backlash from more reactionary sources. The timing of the first, post-authoritarian elections was part of his overall strategy for legitimation. In Karamanlis' view, the timely resolution--via open elections--of the new government which would manage the country's democratic political enterprise. The resultant popularly elected government could then turn its attention to a resolution of the longstanding and divisive constitutional dilemma over the form or government (monarchy versus republic) and head of state (monarch versus prime minister) which would obtain in a democratic Greece. Accordingly, the transition cabinet announced that national elections for a new government would be held on 17 November, a mere four months after the transfer of power to civilian leadership, and that the new government would then oversee a plebescite on the monarchy issue within thirty days.

88. Critics charged that the early election date denied them the time necessary to organize an effective campaign. Papandreou was especially vocal in criticizing Karamanlis on these grounds, although other politicians (including those who belonged to the traditional Center) voiced similar criticism of Karamanlis' election decision. In fact, Karamanlis' subsequent comments to biographers and other interviewers show that his timing of the election date, while intended to open the political space to those previously excluded from participation in politics, also was calculated to maximize the opportunities for a victory by his newly-formed New Democracy Party (Nea Dimokratia). A concise review of the criticisms regarding the November election date is offered by Clogg, Parties and Elections, p. 62. Once the announcement was made, a vigorous campaign was launched, with the participation of a wide range of existing, reconstituted, and new parties. For a comprehensive treatment of the 1974 elections and their party composition, see p. 49-159 in Penniman, Greece at the Polls.

89. Political space is that arena, comprised of the political actors who through participation in it, make decisions regarding those issues which, in particular, are viewed by the actors as impacting social order. The political space is variable, in terms of both those political actors (groups or individuals) with access to it and the scope of issues up for debate. The transition strategy of Karamanlis involved an expansion of the Greek political space with respect to both variables, and rested on the elimination of the exclusivist structures (formal and informal) that had drawn very narrow boundaries for the pre-1974 political space.
90. The Communist Party of Greece refers to the orthodox marxist KKE (Kommunistiko Komma tis Ellados - Exoterikou, or "of the Exterior), as opposed to its Eurocommunist rival, KKE-es (Kommunistiko Komma tis Ellados - Esoterikou, or "of the Interior), which was formed in 1968 after splitting from the core party.

91. Mavrogordatos called this event "[t]he most significant change in the left with respect to the past." See George Th. Mavrogordatos, "The Emerging Party System" in Clogg, Parties and Elections, p. 72. The legalization of the KKE occurred with the decree of 23 September 1974, which legalized all political parties and represented the culmination of the Civil War legislation that had lain at the heart of the para-constitutional apparatus of the post-WWII period. The annulment of the para-constitutional framework began with the transition cabinet's constitutional decree of 1 August 1974, which replaced the authoritarian Constitutions of 1968 and 1973 with the Constitution of 1952 (importantly, all provisions relating to the monarchy suspended until a popular referendum was held on the constitutional issue). The transition cabinet also had decreed an end to all emergency legislation of the Civil War period, which had been indefinitely extended up through the junta period and had divided Greek society into the two categories of enemies of the social order and the nationally-minded. For a discussion of the KKE's operations in Greece from the time of its formation up to the transition to democracy in 1974, including a useful summary of the party's split in 1968, see Michalis Papayannakis, "The Crisis in the Greek Left" in Penniman, ed., Greece at the Polls, p. 140-149.

92. Karamanlis' identification of Greece with the West was a consistent theme in his discourse throughout the democratization process. For a reiteration of the idea, see his speech at the First Congress of New Democracy (Khalki, Greece, 1979), where he states that "...ND believes that Greece's place is with the western world with which it has long been connected politically, economically and defensively. It defends the same ideals. And it has the same political philosophy as that of all the democratic countries that make up the western world." The speech is reproduced in Clogg, Parties and Elections, p. 225-228.

93. See the "Proclamation of the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis on the foundation of the political camp Nea Dimokratia", reproduced on p. 223-225 in Clogg, Parties and Elections. For the quotation, see p. 225.

94. Ibid, p. 224.


96. For a comprehensive account of PASOK's founding tendencies, see Spourdalakis, The Rise, p. 50-91. For a useful journalistic exposition on the same subject, see Roula Eletheriou's series, entitled "Ennea Khronia PASOK", in the 2. 16, and 30 September 1983 issues of the Greek daily newspaper, Anti.
97. The *Panellenio Apeleftherotiko Kinima* was founded by Andreas Papandreou in early 1968, following his arrival in the United States upon release by the colonels' regime in Greece. The movement, whose *raison d'être* was resistance to and overthrow of the military regime, was comprised of a diverse membership which drew from the left wing of the Center Union Party, students, and radical intellectuals, and was linked by member groups operating throughout North America and Europe. For a discussion of PAK as the dominant force amongst the three groupings and, in effect, as the forerunner of PASOK, see p. 126-149 in Christos Lyrintzis, *Between Socialism and Populism: the Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK),* unpublished Ph.D. diss. (London, England: University of London, 1983). Also see Spourdalakis, *The Rise,* p. 51-56, for a summary of PAK's membership and ideology.

98. *Demokratiki Ameina* was founded on the morning of the colonels' coup. The DD Constitution declared that the movement was dedicated to the overthrow of the authoritarian regime by any means possible. The movement itself encompassed several ideological tendencies, but all of these agreed on the primacy of democratic process within the organization and in any post-junta political system to be established in Greece, and all rejected the clientelistic practices which had shaped Greek politics in the pre-authoritarian era. For a useful summary account of the DD, see Spourdalakis, *The Rise,* p. 56-58.

99. The *Panellenio Apeleftherotiko Metopo* was established by members of the KKEs and the EDA (United Democratic Left, or *Eniaia Demokratike Aristera*) nearly immediately after the imposition of the authoritarian regime. P.A.M. was intended to function as a unifying association of all resistance organizations, and aimed at establishing a democratic political system with all constitutional rights and allowed free participation of all parties. See Spourdalakis, *The Rise,* p. 58-59.

100. In a speech to the PASOK Central Committee not two months after the 1974 elections, Papandreou reiterated the connection between PASOK's socialist moniker and Marxist analytic origins. See p. 85-87 in Andreas Papandreou, *Apo PAK sto PASOK* (Athens, Greece: Ladias Publications, 1976).

101. For the references to these principles in the Declaration of 3 September, see p. 217-220 in Appendix I of Clogg, *Parties and Elections.*

102. The two groups endorsed a similar organizational plan for differing reasons. The Leninist faction from PAK wanted to create in PASOK a vanguard party whose legitimacy derived from the charismatic leadership of Papandreou. The organizational objectives of the *pelaiokommatikoi* were defined by their desire to preserve the clientelistic patterns and electoral orientation that were the basis of the old-style politicians' power.

103. For a brief discussion of the possible types of internal distribution of power generated by a party with charismatic leadership, see p. 88-91 in Lyrintzis, "Between Socialism and Populism."

105. This is Spourdalakis' term, in The Rise.


107. The major factional splits in the organization actually occurred in two discernible phases. The first was in March-April 1975, during the period of the first party Pre-Congress and Central Committee meetings. The second was in the fall of 1976, surrounding the meetings of the Central Council of PASOK's student organization, PASP (Panellenic Militant Students Front, or Panellenea Agonistiki Paratasi). For extensive discussions of both of these phases in the factionalization of PASOK, see Spourdalakis, The Rise, and Lyrintzis, "Between Socialism and Populism."

108. Spourdalakis observes that "...PASOK's success was...the Center's "'kiss of death" as the former's electoral gains came primarily from the withering away of the Center." See p. 167, The Rise. For a fuller account of the results of the 1977 elections, see p. 166-172 in the same source.

109. In an evocative formulation of the notion of the constraints imposed by PASOK's internalization of the cultural contradictions that characterized its social base, Diamandouros suggests that PASOK was "...as much the political expression of the forces to which it gave autonomous representation within the new system as it is also their hostage." Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations," p. 19.

110. In an interesting periodization of the post-WWII period of Greek history, Diamandouros interprets the 1977 elections were a key moment of transition in the politics of postwar Greece. According to his interpretation, the 1977 elections marked the coincidence of political reconciliation through the re-integration of large elements of the communist and non-communist left together with an acknowledgement of the structural changes which had marked the postwar period. For a detailed discussion, see Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations," p. 18-23.

111. For an overview discussion of the various theoretical definitions and analytic views associated with populism, see Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 88-94. Mouzelis suggests that the central, unifying elements in most definitions of populism are the ideology's appeal to the people and its anti-elitism.


114. Ibid., p. 194.

115. Ibid., p. 194.


117. According to Mouzelis, it is the organizational structure as much as the ideology that defines a populist movement. Specifically, populist movements are distinguished by vertical, rigid, authority relationships between leaders, cadres, and followers, such that intermediary structures are relatively unimportant in terms of affecting organizational tactics and decisions. For a fuller discussion of Mouzelis' conceptualization of the structural aspects of populism, which he understands as a particular type of political incorporation, see p. 89-94 in Politics in the Semi-Periphery.


120. The numerous provisions regarding votes of confidence, the importance of basic human rights and civil liberties, and the centrality of popular sovereignty, underscored that the raison d'être of the constitution was to act as a legal framework for preventing the kinds of abuses of Parliamentary process and the denial of popular representation that had culminated in the dictatorship. See, for example, Articles 4 through 14.

121. The executive decree of 1 August 1974 replaced the authoritarian Constitutions of 1968 and 1973 with the Constitution of 1952, but with all provisions relating to the monarchy suspended until a popular referendum was held on the constitutional issue. The transition cabinet also decreed an end to the emergency legislation of the Civil War period, which had been indefinitely extended up through the junta period and had formed the centerpiece of the elaborate para-constitutional apparatus which had developed to support the political and social objectives of the post-WWII anti-communist state. The culmination of the dismantling of the aforementioned para-constitutional mechanisms was the 23 September 1974 decree, legalizing all political parties and permitting the KKE to operate openly and to participate in electoral politics for the first time in nearly three decades.

122. The origins of Karamanlis' commitment to constitutional reform date as far back as his decision in 1963 to leave Greece, after then-King Paul had rejected Prime Minister Karamanlis' proposals for 13 amendments to the constitution.
While Karamanlis had argued his position on the principle that the 1952 Constitution constituted an obstacle to the country's balanced economic development, he also recognized that the constitution was a vital fulcrum for balancing power between the prime minister and the Parliament, on the one hand, and the palace, on the other. For an elaboration of Karamanlis' confrontation with the palace in 1963 over reforms to the Constitution of 1952, see Clogg, *Parties and Elections*, p. 42. From his subsequent vantage point in exile, as an observer of the French political system, Karamanlis more fully worked out his views regarding the 1952 Constitution as an institutional impediment to the development of competitive, parliamentary democracy in Greece. Many scholars concur that Karamanlis' time in Paris constituted a key period in the intellectual and philosophical development of his political worldview, particularly in terms of the formative influence exerted on him as an observer of the French political process. These scholars support their claims by pointing to the overt similarities between the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic and the 1975 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, particularly with regard to the creation of a strong, centralized presidency with significant governmental prerogatives. Those supporting this perspective include Clogg, *Parties and Elections*; Woodhouse, *Modern Greece*; Arvanitopoulos, "Karamanlis."

123. The first president of the Fifth Hellenic Republic, elected to a five-year term, was Constantinos Tsatsos. Tsatsos, who was a ND deputy and longtime Karamanlis supporter, was a prominent academic and one of the main architects of the 1975 Constitution.

124. The Constitution was explicit, however, in stipulating that the powers of the executive were "...to come into play in times of political or national crisis, and the president was precluded from intervening in the day-to-day running of the government." See Clogg, *Parties and Elections*, p. 68. For details on the powers of the executive, see Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 210.

125. For a discussion of the events surrounding Archbishop Seraphim's elevation, see Chapter 3.


127. Papandreou accurately commented that the 1975 Constitution was "the spiritual child of Karamanlis," and biographical studies of Karamanlis corroborate this observation. Karamanlis supported a very elite-centered vision of political democracy, based on his conception of human beings and, ergo, politics, as
inherently conflictual. Strong leadership was the essential linchpin for political order, particularly in view of the idiosyncrasies of Greece's political history, and Karamanlis was committed to a constitution which supported a centralized presidential leadership capable of safeguarding the nation against the disintegrative, conflictual tendencies of its own citizenry. See Arvanitopoulos, "Karamanlis."


129. See p. 30 in Konidaris, O Nomos, for a brief discussion of this term. The difference between this term and that of nomo kratousa politeia (state dominated Church) forms the essence of the legal distinction necessary to determine the grounds for and extent of state intervention in the internal administrative affairs of the Church. This distinction is explored in Chapter Five.

130. See Article 4, Paragraph 4 of the draft constitution. Quoted in Basdekis, "Between Partnership," p. 56.

131. For a more detailed review of the changes in the individual draft provisions on religion, see ibid. See also Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 24-28.

132. Author's interview with Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides (Athens, Greece: 11 February 1990).

133. Basdekis, "Between Partnership," p. 55. Basdekis defines synallilia as "a relationship between Church and State in which the two are equal partners, and neither side may dictate to the other." See footnote 9 on the same page.

134. Ibid., p. 56. According to Basdekis, this quotation comes from an unpublished paper by certain faculty members of the Department of Theology at the University of Athens, who prepared a review of the 1975 draft provisions on behalf of the Synod.


136. See, respectively, PA.S.O.K: Katevthintirics Grammes Kyvernikis Politikis tou Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinimatos (November 1977), and Symvolaio Timis me to Luo (1980).
137. See Syntagman yia mia Ellada Demokratiki, quoted in Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 26. For a fuller review of PASOK's perspectives and policy on the Church, especially in contradistinction to the provisions of the 1975 Constitution, see the same source, p. 25-27 and p. 33-34.

138. Quoted in ibid, O Nomos, p. 25.

139. For the most explicit statement in this respect, see Prime Minister Papandreou's speech of 22 November 1981 to the Greek Parliament, in which he outlines the agenda of the newly-elected PASOK government. See Praktika tis Voulis (Minutes of the Parliament). For earlier references, see the same source for Papandreou's statements in Parliamentary debates on the 1975 Constitution.


141. Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 28.

142. For a brief discussion of the Church's perspective with regard to these points, see Konidars, O Nomos, p. 23.

143. The new Constitutional Charter was passed in May 1977, as law 590/1977, "Peri tou Katastatikou Har tou tis Ekklesias tis Eliados."

144. Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 19. Quoted from the introductory remarks of then-National Minister of Education and Religions Antonis Tritsis, in the Introductory Essay to the Bill for "Regulation of Matters of Ecclesiastical Property" [Eisighetiki Ekthesis sto skhedio nomou 'Rythimisi Theataton Ekklesiastikis Periousias].


CHAPTER FIVE

Church and State under the Socialist Government:
PASOK's Dualist Religious Policy

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes PASOK's religious policy during the 1981-1989 period when the party governed Greece. The analysis concentrates on Church-state interactions under the PASOK governments; not surprisingly in light of the legal-constitutional history of religion and politics in Greece, the Church-state dyad was the fulcrum for PASOK's religious policy as a whole. The chapter provides an account of the party's legislative measures on religious issues, drawing out the oftentimes ad hoc nature of PASOK's religious policy and, especially, the evolution of the state's posture in response to the actions taken by the Church.

The chapter works from the premise that PASOK's religious policies must be understood within the context of the extended consolidation of democracy in Greece. As discussed in the previous chapter, PASOK's rise to power marked an historical watershed in Greek political history. PASOK was the first non-Right party to govern Greece, and the party's platform of allaghi constituted an important test of the country's nascent democratic institutions to respond to the challenges of implementing structural reform according to a socialist-populist program. The agenda, processes, and outcomes of PASOK's religious policies can be understood as a subset of the modernization debate discussed in the previous chapter. The cultural dimensions of the debate on modernization centered on the role for religion and the Church in public life in a modern democratic society.
Paradoxically, PASOK's religious policy drew the subjects and the representatives of religion directly into the public domain.

In analyzing PASOK's religious policies as part of the debate over democratic politics and modernity in Greece, I concentrate on developing two main aspects of Church-state relations during the 1980s. First, I characterize the party's vision for religion in public life by identifying the main features of PASOK's religious policy. What emerges at first glance is a picture of a policy of non-policy; the party's programmatic pronouncements on religion were limited in number and scope. Closer inspection of Papandreou's speeches and the discussions of policymakers in the Ministry of Education and Religions shows PASOK's religious policy to be characterized by a dualism, based on the distinction between the institutional separation of Church and state, on the one hand, and the cultural inseparability of Church and nation, on the other. Second, I explore the organizational dynamics of the Church-state relationship and, in particular, the organizational obstacles to restructuring the Church's role in society. The personalization of power in the hands of Papandreou undermined the consistency and outcome of PASOK's policies towards the Church. At the same time, the cleavage between the ordained clergy (especially the hierarchy) and the lay components of the Church emerged as a critical factor in impeding internal changes in the Church which the latter group perceived as consonant with the message of Orthodoxy.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of how the main actors in each institution interpreted the question of Church-state separation with regard to the religious versus secular features of collective identity and, more
broadly, to consider the potential impacts for democracy of the Church's capacity to influence the state's legitimacy as the purveyor of national identity. The question of institutional control over defining and defending collective identity also helps to elucidate the other goal of this chapter. I am trying to use the experience of Church-state relations under PASOK to illustrate the porousness and flexibility of the public/private divide separating religion from politics. For just as Papandreou's articulation of a two-track policy for Church-state relations drew religion directly into public life, the conflicts between the hierarchy and laity over how to reinterpret and actualize the message of Orthodoxy were waged ultimately, not within the structure of the Church, but in the forum of politics. In the final analysis, the interdependence of religion and politics in Greece explains the outcome of PASOK's policies.

II. Outlines of PASOK's Religious Policy

The logical starting point for constructing PASOK's religious policy is the party's programmatic statements, during the democratization period and at the start of each administration. Although the party's specific pronouncements and plans regarding religion were remarkably limited, it is possible to identify the main themes in PASOK's agenda for religion in Greek society, and to draw some conclusions about the policymaking framework for implementing this agenda at the time of the party's move into government.

There were four sources with references to the Church and religion in PASOK's program for social change: the founding Declaration of 3 September; the "Constitution for a Democratic Greece",² the PASOK alternative to the ND Constitution of 1975; the party's 1977 election platform, the "PASOK Directives
for Government Policy,\(^3\) and the party's platform for the 1981 elections, represented in the "Contract of Honor with the People"\(^4\) and the "Declaration of Government Policy."\(^5\) The two issues mentioned consistently in these documents were the separation of Church and state, and the socialization of monastic properties, both of which were consistent with PASOK's interpretation of the structural changes required for building a genuine, viable democracy in Greece. Papandreou had repeatedly emphasized the need to reduce institutional concentrations of power in Greek society. He came to define this objective in terms of strengthening civil society via the internal democratization of its main institutions,\(^6\) through the creation of decisionmaking structures that allowed for popular participation and control. As we saw in the previous chapter, this philosophy had been most clearly represented by the radical wing of the party and had driven the internal party conflicts about how to structure PASOK along participatory, consensual lines. Given the Church's historical longevity and importance in civil society, Papandreou's call for Church-state separation of Church was predicated on the notion that this was the means for freeing up the Church to function in civil society. Likewise, the socialization of monastic properties was consistent with the party's general socialist conception of property rights and, particularly, the emphasis on equalizing rural-urban inequities. As we will see in the chapter, the monastic property question came to be subsumed under the larger issue of Church-state separation, with regard to the question of the capacity of the Church for self-administration.

In all of the documents cited above, as well as in his statements regarding the provisions on religion in the 1975 Constitutional debates, Papandreou
emphatically called for the permanent, definitive separation of Church and state\textsuperscript{7} as essential to the party's vision for a socialist, democratic Greek society. Upon PASOK's election to government, Papandreou elucidated his conception of Church-state separation as one based on a clear distinction between the institutional and cultural nature of separation. According to Papandreou, the formal institutional separation of Church and state was aimed at ensuring the complete organizational autonomy of the Church in matters of administration.\textsuperscript{8} However, institutional separation, according to Papandreou, in no way included the rupture of the ties between "...Church and Nation and people."\textsuperscript{9} Rather, because the raison d'être of separation was to guarantee that the administration of the Church functioned according to "...its internal regulations [that is, the Holy Canons] and its traditions,"\textsuperscript{10} the result would be a strengthening of the Church's capacity to function as an autonomous actor in civil society, in the hands of the people and in support of the nation. In his first address to Parliament, Papandreou stated that

"The Church will be allowed to follow freely its own road, without the involvement of the State. The separation of the Church from the State will be concerned with the Administration and not with its [the Church's] ties with the Nation or the People."\textsuperscript{11}

He called for the Ministry of Education and Religions to continue to operate according to its "...typical role until the separation of the Church from the state, which presupposes modification of Article 3 of the Constitution."\textsuperscript{12} (bold mine)

The modification of Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution meant that the PASOK government understood that the administrative separation of Church and state could encompass issues relating to the Constitutional Charter of the Church. As
events would show, the state's purview over the internal functioning of the Church: according to the Constitutional Charter developed into one of the most controversial aspects of the Church-state dialogue under PASOK.

Regarding the socialization of monastic properties, Papandreou's Parliamentary address offered a slightly expanded commentary on previous references to the issue, with the statement that [t]he public properties, the monastic properties, the tsiflikia, which are suitable for agricultural use will be socialized and will be given to landless [workers] within the framework of the Cooperative Organization."13 As noted above, the property question came to be integrally tied to the larger question of how to secure the institutional separation and administrative autonomy of the Church from the state, while simultaneously reinforcing the ties between Church and nation.

What emerges from the above programmatic statements, however abbreviated, is a dualism in the party's approach to the role of the Church and religion in Greece, based on what remained at that time an undeveloped distinction between institutional and cultural forms of Church-state separation. As noted by one of Greece's established journalists writing on issues of religion and politics, "[t]he word and the term 'separation' says a lot. Its interpretation depends on the disposition and intentions of those who want to implement it."14 This distinction, as with much of PASOK's populism, left significant room for interpretation on the part of Greek society and by the Ministers who would be charged with developing and implementing the party's religious policy.
III. Church-State Coexistence under the First PASOK Administration

It fell to the Ministry of Education and Religions to clarify through its policies the dualism of Papandreou's view on Church-state separation. In his address to the Fifth Panhellenic Theological Conference in late 1982, the Minister of Education and Religions, Apostolos Kaklamanis, discussed PASOK's election to power as a popular decision in favor of allaghi, a change which was nothing less than a new model for modernity in Greece. Kaklamanis rejected a notion of modernity based on a single, preordained developmental path, and stressed PASOK's credo that dynamic, popular participation was essential to modernizing society and politics. It is in the emphasis on popular participation that Kaklamanis introduced the importance of religion to PASOK's vision for modernity. Linking structural (external) change to the need for internal transformation, Kaklamanis pointed to Orthodoxy as "...the definitive expression..." of the importance of the internal-external connection, and as "...an inalienable constitutive element in the identity of Hellenism."

The second theme expressed by Kaklamanis followed from his association of Orthodoxy with Greek identity, namely, that PASOK's aim of separation of Church and state in no way implied the separation of Church and nation, a point echoing Papandreou's remarks. Indeed, Kaklamanis explained that PASOK envisioned a strengthening of the ties between Church and nation:

"Moreover, it is well known that our Orthodox Church, according to its unadulterated tradition and its essence, is the Church of the people, exists for the people, is that people. And that people expects from contemporary Greek Theology an sacrificial ministry at this critical time of social upheaval and worldwide ideological confusion. Such a ministry will receive unanimous support from our Government. Because contrary to what is skillfully propagated, we will not facilitate any sort of relaxation of the bonds of
Orthodoxy and the Nation, bonds which were forged at critical national moments, during the period of our Nation's march of struggle."\(^{18}\)

To strengthen the ties between Church and nation, PASOK's priority at the start of its administration was the restructuring of religious education in particular as well as key aspects of the educational system as a whole, in order to enable the Church to respond creatively to the changing norms and orientations of the contemporary Greek social environment, and to help the Church to expand its support in society. Kaklamanis emphasized the government's hope for a cooperative undertaking between the state, the leadership of the Church, and the theological schools (the university faculties of theology, in particular), directed to the transformation of Greek society along "...progressive, socialist and democratic..."\(^{19}\) lines.

The government had already taken steps towards institutional separation of Church and state, in the form of major revisions in the Greek Family Law.\(^{20}\) The original Family Law of 1946 was based on Byzantine theology,\(^{21}\) and the Church regarded changes, particularly in those provisions regarding the rights and responsibilities of husband and wife within the conjugal unit, as an assault on the moral foundations of Greek society. Indeed, PASOK's program for modernizing the Family Law built on changes begun by the ND government of 1975, which had "...introduced equality of the sexes for the first time in the legal history of Greece"\(^{22}\) under the 1975 Constitution. But whereas ND claimed that the changes in the Civil Code which the PASOK government enacted were actually the outcome of ND policies, PASOK maintained that the ND government had backed down on meaningful revisions in the Family Law out of an unwillingness to take
a decisive stand against the Church. In contrast, the PASOK Ministry of Justice's preliminary report on revisions in the Family Law made the case for the necessity of changes that would "...take into consideration not only contemporary social developments, needs, and ideas in Greece, but also...[preserved]...tradition within the present social reality and...[reinforced]...continuity in the future."  

Two of the first issues on the PASOK agenda were the legalization of civil marriage and the decriminalization of adultery, both of which provoked extremely strong reactions by the hierarchy of the Church. Until then, the only marriages which were legally recognized in Greece were those performed by the Church of Greece. PASOK proposed a radical change, whereby all Greek citizens would be required to have a civil ceremony in order for a marriage to be legally recognized by the state. Under this proposition, those individuals who wanted to reinforce the civil marriage with an ecclesiastical ceremony could exercise that prerogative, but the civil ceremony would be the prior and legally-binding act. The reaction of the Church, represented by the Holy Synod, was immediate and vociferous. The hierarchy claimed that the proposed legislation was both anti-Orthodox and a rejection of the spiritual dimensions of the sacrament of marriage. Moreover, they argued that the legislation deprived Orthodox Christians of the right to exercise their religiously-grounded conception of marriage, by virtue of making the civil ceremony the sine qua non for legal recognition.

The PASOK proposal for civil marriage was consistent with the dualism reflected in Papandreou's vision of Church-state separation in tandem with Church-nation connection. First, by establishing the necessity for a civil ceremony, the legislation created a separation between Church and state by virtue of
dichotomizing religious and secular matters and, respectively, private and public life. Prioritization of the civil ceremony was consistent with notions of modern religious pluralism, since the civil ceremony made all citizens equal before the law and made the religious sacrament a matter of private, individual choice. Indeed, in interviews with this author, many PASOK supporters described the legislation as a step towards strengthening the ecclesial community: the Church would no longer be perceived as anti-democratic and as an obstacle to the exercise of individual civil rights in the case of marriage, while those individuals who elected to have a religious ceremony would have done so out of a deliberate exercise of religious faith. According to this interpretation, the loosening of the institutional links between Church and state was, at worst, a non-factor in the link between Church and nation, and at best, a positive element in the Church-nation connection. In fact, the Synod's reaction led to the modification of the final form of the legislation, so that the civil and religious ceremonies were of the same legal force.\(^{27}\) The decision, therefore, was a modified step in the direction of institutional separation, which antagonists of the original proposal justified as a balanced decision respecting the rights of both believers and non-believers.\(^{28}\) In the case of the decriminalization of adultery, the protests of the official Church were overridden and PASOK decriminalized adultery with the removal of Article 357 from the Civil Code.\(^{29}\)

An additional yet important result of these two incidents was the climate of potential mistrust engendered between PASOK and the Church. Given that the ND government's constitutional provisions, changes in the Constitutional Charter of the Church, and proposed property legislation had created an antagonism
between the Church and the state (the former perceived the ND government's pro-Western conception of modernization as having the inherent capacity and objective of marginalizing the Church on account of its Eastern orientation), the PASOK government had deliberately tried to cultivate an atmosphere of trust between Church and state. Papandreou tried to address the Church's suspicion of the state on the basis of the revised Family Law, maintaining that the legislation was not intended as an attack on the Church, and that positive relations between Church and state were essential "...for the good of the Nation." But Church hierarchy perceived the changes in the Family Law as part of "...methods of improvement and modernization of life which would have brought impermissible confusion to...the hierarchy." An element of mutual suspicion had been introduced into the Church-state relationship under the PASOK government, just as had existed under the ND governments from 1974 up to 1981, and the basic clash was over differing notions of tradition and the modernization of Greek society.

The element of Church-state mistrust generated by the revisions in Family Law was deepened by the events of 1983, namely, the state's decision to revise what had become one of the most controversial articles in the 1977 Constitutional Charter of the Church. The proximate cause of the state's decision to undertake the revision of the Ecclesiastical Charter was a dispute within the Church over the Permanent Holy Synod's authority in deciding episcopal appointments, with the particular bishop in question having turned to the Symvoulion tis Epikrateias (Council of State) for a ruling on the conflict.
The very fact that a member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy turned to the *Symvoulion tis Epikrateias* reflected the unresolved debate which had been joined with the ND Constitution of 1975. In opposition, PASOK had contested the ND reading of the state's prerogatives for intervention in the Permanent Holy Synod's administrative purview in the Church.\(^{35}\) Once in government, however, PASOK amended the Constitutional Charter\(^ {36}\) with respect to the article (Article 34) dealing with precisely the aforementioned issue.\(^ {37}\) The upshot of the amendment was to widen the latitude and to increase the centralization of administrative powers regarding hierarchical appointments in the body of the Permanent Holy Synod. More specifically, the powers of the Archbishop were significantly heightened, insofar as he was empowered to take the initial steps (requiring a subsequent Synodal vote) of enthroning or removing metropolitans under the legislated circumstances.\(^ {38}\) The arbiter of these critical changes in the internal organizational structure of the Church was the state.

Both the process and the substance of what became the government's decision to revise the Ecclesiastical Charter revealed confusion over the issue of separation of Church and state, and foreshadowed the troubles emerging from PASOK's policymaking inconsistencies vis-a-vis the Church. The government's stance suggested that PASOK endorsed the state's right to make decisions affecting matters regarding the administrative processes of the Church, including those cases where the procedural questions touched on the theological authority of the bishop as the leader of the eucharistic community. Some observers have maintained that PASOK's revision of the Constitutional Charter was grounded in the desire to strengthen the capacities of the Church for internal self-governance.\(^ {39}\) According
to this line of argument, delineating the privileges of the Synod in the kind of
detail outlined in the amendment would not only preclude further hierarchical
controversies, but would thereby eliminate the need for any recourse to extra-
ecclesiastical entities such as the Symvoulion tis Epikrateias, and ultimately
contribute to the administrative separation of Church and state. Advocates of this
position cite the lack of a negative reaction by the official Church—notwithstanding
the debates among lay scholars specializing in constitutional law and theology— as
evidence of the hierarchy's satisfaction with an externally-imposed solution
which resolved the controversy in a way that improved the Synodal machinery for
confronting any similar cases which might arise in the future.

A more cynical interpretation suggests that PASOK successfully weighted the
balance of Church-state relations in favor of the latter through a shrewd mix of
power politics and tactical alliance-making: the state exercised its primacy in
legislating the changes regarding internal organizational matters in the Church.
Further, by reinforcing the Archiepiscopal decisionmaking prerogatives, the state
curried favor with Archbishop Seraphim and, by extension, all those hierarchs
enthroned during his tenure.

In fact, while elements of both of the above assessments were true, two other
points bear mentioning. First, against the backdrop of the party's rhetoric and
actions, initially in opposition and then in government, PASOK's decision on the
Ecclesiastical Charter reinforced the confusion around the question of the meaning
and extent of legal-institutional separation of Church and state, particularly in
terms of the state's interpretation of the administrative autonomy of the Church.
Second, the decision highlighted balance of power realities within the Church as
well as the tactical constraints on internally-generated efforts at reforming the Church. The amendment to the Ecclesiastical Charter underscored the centralization of administrative powers in the person of the Archbishop and, more broadly, in the synodal bodies of the hierarchy who, under the new ruling, were deprived of any motivation for a democratization of the ecclesiastical structure. For example, the upgrade in the Archbishop's powers vis-a-vis the hierarchy as a whole seriously undermined the dynamic for intra-hierarchical debate even at the level of the Permanent Holy Synod; the amendment effectively provided the Archbishop with the twin threats of punitive and promotional action against bishops deemed either recalcitrant or worthy of elevation. Furthermore, because the rotational system ensured that all members of the Hierarchical Synod would enjoy at least one rotation on the Permanent Synod, the hierarchy as a whole was bound by the new amendment to assume at least the appearance of unity. As several renowned scholars in the field of Church-state relations observed at the time, the outcome of the amendment was that "[i]n the body of the Hierarchy now opposition does not exist, they all move within the framework of the status quo that has been created, except for certain individual cases." (bold mine)

The amendment also had an important effect on the non-hierarchical members of the Church. As one commentator observed, the "[d]irect consequence of this situation is the disappointment of progressive theologians...who are deceived by the same strong ecclesiastical and political force." In this respect, the ruling on the Ecclesiastical Constitution was less important in terms of its immediate impact on the Church-state separation question than for its effect on the development of intra-ecclesial views about restructuring the Church in line with the democratizing,
participatory dimensions of allaghi. Only in "individual cases" in the hierarchy and amongst "progressive theologians" did there emerge a discussion about using the state as the best mechanism for altering the ecclesiastical structure, as the starting point for effecting a transformation in the role of religion in Greek society under the system of democratic socialist politics.

Meanwhile, tensions plagued Church-state relations on two other matters related to the question of separation. Consistent with the focus of his speech of 1982, Kaklamanis had concentrated on drafting legislation dealing with the restructuring of the Religious Education system, as well as a bill dealing with the "Regulation of Questions of Monastic Property."44 The Church, represented by the hierarchy but with significant support from the ordained clergy, had been at loggerheads with the state over didactic and curriculum changes proposed by Kaklamanis' draft legislation early in 1984.45 The Church labelled the government's religious education reform as anti-Christian, and focused specifically on the use of texts discussing the Darwinian theory of evolution and Marxist theories of social change.46 Kaklamanis continually emphasized that the implementation of such changes would occur only after full discussions between the Ministry's Working Group on Religious Education and the Church's official representative on matters of religious educational reform.47 He also stressed that the government's ultimate objective in proposing religious education reform was to enable the Church to assume control of the organization and administration of religious education. The Minister repeatedly closed his arguments by pointing to the fact that the PASOK government had introduced as part of its bill on primary and secondary education that the educational system institutionalize "...the orthodox
perception in the instruction of our youth. The controversy over educational questions continued throughout 1984 and into the first part of 1985, although electoral concerns and pressures forced PASOK to relegate the issue to subordinate status. Likewise, the initial stages of a discussion on the socialization of ecclesiastical property—in September 1984, Archbishop Seraphim announced that the Church was voluntarily donating 360 stremata of ecclesiastical land to the state to use for housing homeless families—were interrupted by pre-electoral pressures.

With elections set for June 1985, the pre-electoral atmosphere became politicized with Papandreou unexpectedly announcing in March that PASOK was reversing its earlier stance of support for Constantine Karamanlis as President of the Republic, and, instead would nominate the jurist, Christos Sartzetakis, as the party's candidate for President. Although the decision to oppose Karamanlis' candidacy for a second term as President of the Republic was certainly not directly related to the issue of PASOK's religious policy, the move helps to characterize the political context and orientation with which the party entered its second term in office. In the first place, Papandreou's reversal on the Karamanlis issue was part of the party's attempt to redefine and re-emphasize its image as a vehicle for radical social change.

Papandreou argued that Karamanlis, as the historical leader of the conservative establishment, would have been an obstacle to the restructuring of Greek politics along participatory democratic lines and to the continuation of radical social and economic reform policies under a second PASOK administration. According to this line of argument, the rejection of Karamanlis was represented as a sign of
PASOK's ongoing commitment to a radical allaghi in Greece, and was intended as a dramatic response to those critics within and outside the party who charged that PASOK had become nothing more than a populist, clientelistic organization. Second, the Karamanlis episode illustrated what would become the tactical modus operandi of the party, the case of Church-state relations being no exception. Papandreou's announcement was a complete about-face, and according to members of the PASOK Central Committee at that time, was made without their knowledge. The final decision seems to have been Papandreou's alone, based on his reading of the pre-electoral landscape and, as he subsequently revealed, on his longer term objectives of revising the presidential provisions of the 1975 Constitution. The Karamanlis episode, then, suggested the party's willingness to sacrifice policy continuity for the sake of radical imagery and political expediency, on the one hand, and the increasing centralization of decisionmaking power in the person of Papandreou, on the other. Both of these factors would exercise an impact on the course of Church-state relations under the second PASOK administration, which began when PASOK won a majority in the elections of 2 June 1985.

IV. The Second PASOK Administration: Church-State Conflict

The party's second term in office began with a continuation of policies outstanding from the first administration. Soon into its second term, the government resumed its restructuring program for national education and religious education, passing a law on primary and secondary education. According to Article 1 of the law, one of the purposes of the educational reforms was to restore to primary and secondary education "...the original elements of orthodox
christian tradition. Kaklamanis claimed that PASOK was therefore responsible for a reorientation of the educational system towards Orthodoxy, after the removal of this objective under the ND Constitution of 1975, thereby strengthening the tie between Church and nation.

At the same time, the party remained focused on creating a modern secular society with minimal legal-formal ties between religion and politics. As a final step in its revision of the Family Law, PASOK legalized abortion in Greece. The abortion question had provoked an intense public reaction by the official Church, expressed through official channels of Church-state communication as well as through the Church's direct activities in civil society. The Holy Synod issued an official letter to the entire body of the Church, read by parish priests in church and appealing to the faithful to make known their opposition to the legalization of abortion. Despite the Church's attempts to use its institutional status to mobilize civil society around the abortion issue, and despite a split in PASOK's Parliamentary representation, the government passed the revision to the Family Law. The conflict over abortion was most important to the Church-state relationship for the single reason that it placed the two institutions at direct odds with one another: the government's unwillingness to modify its position in the face of inter-institutional communications and the Church's public opposition signalled to the hierarchy that PASOK appeared intent on modernizing Greek society along secular lines; by the same token the official Church's decision to attempt to mobilize its membership around a sociopolitical issue put the government on notice that the hierarchy was prepared to pursue its own political objectives through societal activism.
Such was the context for what emerged as the most controversial issue of Church-state relations under the PASOK government. At the outset of his second term as Minister of Education and Religions, Kaklamanis introduced a bill (NS1700) to the Parliament, entitled "The Regulation of Questions of Monastic Property." The so-called Kaklamanis Bill was based on a similar ND bill drafted in 1979-1980 under the ND administrations of Prime Minister Karamanlis and, then, Prime Minister George Rallis. The ND bill actually had been presented in Parliament in March 1980, and the Holy Synod had agreed in principle to the draft plan calling for the Church to transfer an estimated eighty percent of its monastic properties (both cultivated and uncultivated agricultural lands, these are distinct from the Church's significant commercial real estate holdings located in the country's major urban areas) to the state after determination of ownership titles on untitled Church real properties. In fact, the unresolved discussion over the ecclesiastical properties issue dated back to the immediate post-WWII period. The bill ultimately had been abandoned by the Rallis administration as potentially problematic in the pre-electoral period.

NS1700, in terms of issues, process, and outcome, can be understood as a microcosm for the larger question of the role of the Church in public life in Greece, and as an attempt to reconcile the notions of the institutional separation of Church and state and the connection between Church and nation. The Kaklamanis Bill was presented to Parliament by the Ministry of Education and Religions, but was officially endorsed as well by the Ministries of Forestry and the Environment, and Public Order and Works. The centerpiece of the bill was the proposal to transfer the bulk of the Church's agricultural properties to the
state, under the administrative and redistributive purview of the agricultural cooperatives established under the first PASOK administration. The transfer process was actually a largescale undertaking, which included resolution of outstanding property ownership questions, issuance of new title deeds, compensation to the Church for the property transfers, and finally, restructuring of those ecclesiastical organizations with responsibility for managing Church properties and associated financial matters.

According to the arguments in the Introductory Essay for the NS1700, the rationale for the state's action on the property question was the traditional principle of *nomo kratousis politeias* (bold mine), by which the state enjoyed not only the right, but the burden of responsibility, to address this ostensibly economic question and to use it, eventually, as the basis for restructuring the broader relationship between Church and state. The state justified its invocation of the principle of *nomo kratousis politeias* as consistent with the relevant N.2185/1952 of 1952, whose decision on the transfer of ecclesiastical property had yet to be complied with by the Church. Kaklamanis claimed that the state's rights and responsibilities on the property question were logically grounded in the fact that the state shouldered the financial burden of the bulk of the salaries and operating expenses of the Church; therefore, in order to fulfil its obligations of fiscal responsibility to the Greek voting public, the state was legitimately responsible for resolving the property question, restructuring the financial apparatus of the Church, and placing the ecclesiastical organization on solid economic footing.

It was primarily on the basis of the *nomo kratousa politeias* rationale that the official Church expressed its reaction against NS1700, in a memorandum from the
Permanent Holy Synod to the Ministry of Education and Religions. The Synod emphasized the Church's desire to facilitate the state's efforts to carry out its social and political responsibilities, but also reminded the state of its obligation to support the Church in rendering its holy objectives in Greek society. The Synod stated warned that "...the one-sided practice [represented by the Kaklamanis Bill contained] the danger of frictions between Church and State, something which [the Church] not only does not want but rejects." The Synod called for a cooperative undertaking by Church and state towards the resolution of the property question. The hierarchy's letter suggested preliminary alternatives to the Kaklamanis proposals, particularly regarding the method for classifying those properties acceptable for transfer of ownership and over the proposed compensation to the Church in such cases. Archbishop Seraphim reiterated the essence of the Synodal memorandum with a separate letter, in his official capacity as leader of the Church of Greece, to Prime Minister Papandreou.

Indeed, the legal rationale as well as the substance of the Kaklamanis Bill revealed the confusion and contradictions in PASOK's dualist conception of legal-institutional separation of Church and state, on the one hand, and cultural connection between Church and nation, on the other. The Ministry argued that NS1700 was an absolutely necessary, and clear, first step towards the full legal-institutional separation of Church and state. In the most immediate sense, resolution of title deeds meant the legal separation and resolution of a long outstanding issue in a way that defined the legal and administrative purview of the two institutions. In the longer term, the restructuring of the ecclesial organs charged with administering property-related financial questions was intended to
deepen the Church's income stream and, over time, to allow for full financial and economic self-sufficiency and autonomy from the state payroll. At the same time, the restructuring of the ecclesial organs was designed to expand the decisionmaking and administrative role of the popular membership of the Church, based on a concomitant reduction in hierarchical and state appointments; the state claimed, therefore, that the Kaklamanis Bill not only was consonant with PASOK's commitment to democratization of the institutional foundations of Greek society, but reinforced the ties between Church and Nation by putting the administrative apparatus of the Church in the hands of the people. The main problematic with the above arguments was, of course, the fact that the rationale and implementation of NS1700 was predicated on the acceptance of the tradition of *nomo kratousis politeias*, which implied that the PASOK government viewed the Church as a *nomo kratousa ekklesia*, or state Church. This formulation of the Church-state relationship was an interpretive tightening of the legal-institutional bond between Church and state and, not incidentally, was an overt reversal of the stance expressed by PASOK in the debates over the 1975 Constitution. In short, the Kaklamanis NS not only failed to clarify the nature of and means for achieving the legal-institutional separation between Church and state, but also was extraordinarily vague with reference to the cultural ties between Church and Nation and to the meaning of the "broader issue of Church-state relations" left to future resolution.

The rising tension between Synod and state was interrupted with Papandreou's reshuffling of his cabinet in April 1986. Papandreou replaced Kaklamanis with Antonis Tritsis, who would serve as the Minister of Education and Religions until
his resignation in April 1988. Tritsis immediately took up the question of Church-state relations and the role of religion in modernizing Greek society. He elaborated a fuller, if at times still inconsistent, vision of the institutional and cultural dimensions of the Church-state relationship, with an address in September to the Sixth Panhellenic Theological Congress in Athens.

Several key points bear mentioning from Tritsis' speech on the topic of "The Role of Orthodoxy Today." First, Tritsis drew a clear connection between what he called Orthodoxy's message of social transformation, on the one hand, and the Church's responsibility to translate that message into action, on the other. According to Tritsis, Orthodoxy was the "...rich moment of meeting between Christianity and Hellenism..." whose essential message was one of "justice, brotherhood, and peace."69 Likewise, the message of Orthodoxy was "...perpetually revolutionary," borne out by the Church's historical involvement in the major transformations of Greek national life.70 Tritsis characterized contemporary Greek society as standing at an "...historic moment of critical change" based on the challenges associated with creating a modern democracy. Here is the second important point made by Tritsis, in that he constructed a conception of modernity in which religion and democratic politics were positively related and inherently compatible. He discussed the Orthodox Christian struggle in terms of a social vision of freedom in every dimension, national, moral-religious, political, economic, social, and cultural; he emphasized that the current historical project of building "...a cohesive social system, from the level of the family unit to that of the Nation,...based in freedom of expression and choice...could not be any nearer to the ideal of Orthodoxy."71 Therefore, PASOK's project of allaghi, according to
Tritsis' interpretation, was in no way antithetical to Orthodoxy. Indeed, Tritsis was claiming that the PASOK project of building a modern, democratic socialist Greece, assumed a public role for religion and the Church.\textsuperscript{72}

Tritsis discussed two other ideas with important implications for the Church-state and Church-Nation distinctions first expressed by Papandreou. Tritsis called on the Church to accept its responsibility in building a new kind of democracy in Greece, to move beyond the kind of reform whose "...anachronistic conservativism has nothing in common with the Greek tradition..." as well as beyond the kinds of "...conventional progressivism" limited by static confrontation with conservative, outmoded forces.\textsuperscript{73} He challenged the Church to grasp the dynamic essence of Orthodox tradition, "...by democratizing itself," (bold mine), by following the PASOK state in its democratization of other sectors of society through the creation of "...organs of popular participation."\textsuperscript{74} Tritsis invited the Church to undertake its self-democratization within the context of the ongoing dialogue between Church and state--his reference, of course, was to the debates over NS1700. Finally, Tritsis explicitly discussed the connection between Church and Nation in terms of collective identity, in his description of the Greek-Christian spirit as offering the answer to the problematic of how to define contemporary national identity. Tritsis argued that in clarifying to the people the relevance of the Orthodox message to the modern Greek circumstance, the Church would answer the questions of "who are we?", "what is modern [contemporary] Hellenism?"\textsuperscript{75} In short, Tritsis claimed that the democratization of the Church would re-establish the link between Orthodoxy and people and, in this process, would help to shape the country's distinctive contemporary national identity.
In addition to the significance of its content, Tritsis' speech constituted a key tactical step in policymaking terms, insofar as he issued a public invitation to the whole Church--hierarchs, clergy, and laity alike--to participate in the debates on Church-state relations within the context of NS1700. The invitation was critical in its recognition of the popular as well as ordained elements of the Church; likewise, the invitation to all elements of the Church for a cooperative Church-state project of social modernization came only days after Tritsis' formal response to the Synod's communiqué of counter-proposals, issued almost nine months earlier to Tritsis' predecessor.

Both the substance and timing of these events exercised a major impact on the subsequent development of the dialogue over Church-state relations. In terms of the substance, Tritsis' letter to the Synod had proposed two alternatives to the Synod's counter-proposals. The differences in proposed procedures and structures aside, the critical element in the two options was that, for the first time, the Ministry introduced a discussion about ecclesiastical properties as whole; that is, Tritsis' discussions expanded the scope of the Kaklamanis Bill, which had restricted the property question to rural-agricultural the Church's holdings, thereby suggesting the possibility that the Church's vast urban and commercial holdings might come under the purview of the so-called "monastic properties" bill. The timing of Tritsis' letter was equally provocative, insofar as he requested a response from the Church within a six-week period, by the opening of Parliament in October.

As had been the pattern until that juncture, and despite Tritsis' invitation at the Theological Conference, the Holy Synod had represented the Church stance on all communications around the property question. The response to Tritsis'
letter was no different. A special session of the full Synod of the Hierarchy was convened, suggesting the urgency involved in a possible widening of the scope of the discussion to include the entire base of ecclesiastical properties. The outcome of the meeting was the election of a committee comprised of four metropolitans, mandated to interface with the Ministry and, especially, the Prime Minister if possible, around the property question. Following a meeting of Papandreou, Tritsis, and the Metropolitan Committee, in which Papandreou reiterated support for Tritsis' proposals, yet another special session of the full Synod of the Hierarchy voted on its own plan for the transfer of Church properties to the state. The Hierarchy authorized the Metropolitan Committee to hammer out the details of this plan with Tritsis, based on a lengthy working document which clearly excluded the Church's urban properties from consideration.

The outcome of the above round of counter-proposals was the beginning of a confrontational posture on the part of both the state, as represented by the Ministry of Education and Religions, and the Church, as represented by the hierarchy. Tritsis announced that the hierarchy's counter-proposals were untenable, reflected an unwillingness on the part of the hierarchy to negotiate a timely solution to the property issue in good faith for the whole membership of the Church and, most importantly, that the state was unilaterally assuming "...full responsibility for the legislative regulation of the question, 'on the basis of the bill which had already been presented [Kaklamanis' Bill] with the necessary adjustments." Yet another significant outcome of what appeared to be a breakdown in Church-state communications was a simultaneous crack in the united front between Tritsis and Papandreou around the property question.
Papandreou, despite assurances to Tritsis that all meetings around NS1700 would include the Minister, met separately with Archbishop Seraphim, and issued a communique stating that the Church would be provided with any reformulations for study prior to legislative action. The Papandreou-Seraphim meeting, although seemingly innocuous in terms of its outcome, established separate channels of communication between Church and state, and was a portent of the process of Church-state decisionmaking until the end of the second PASOK administration.

The Ministry, consonant with the Papandreou-Seraphim communique, provided the Synod with a copy of the working draft of the revisions to the Kaklamanis Bill. Three significant additions to the extant NS1700 were included in this latest document: first, the urban and commercial properties of the Church (for example, mines, quarries, and fish-processing plants) were definitively included as part of the scope of deliberations on the property question, with the introduction of some form of state management of these properties together with the Church; second, the Ministry planned to take a direct role in implementing programs, financed by special state budgetary appropriations, part of the Church's "national project," which effectively referenced the social responsibilities discussed by Tritsis in his address to the Sixth Theological Congress; and, third, the full range of property and financial changes proposed by the additions to NS1700 were premised on the need for a full overhaul in the organizational and administrative apparatus of the ecclesiastical institutional structure, with special emphasis on O.D.E.P. (the Organization for the Administration of Ecclesiastical Properties).

The reaction of the Church to the latest reformulations in the Kaklamanis Bill was immediate and defensive. A meeting between Tritsis and the Metropolitan
Committee followed, in which the bishops stressed that the proposed revisions in NS1700 threatened to subvert the autonomy of the Church vis-a-vis the state.⁸⁴ According to Metropolitans Anthimos and Christodoulos, the Committee as a whole requested that Tritsis agree to begin anew reconsideration of the property and administrative questions related to Church and state, but with a fully-coordinated effort which included representatives from both institutions that were agreeable to both parties.⁸⁵ The Hierarchical Committee reiterated its points in a formal letter to Tritsis on 25 February 1987, and Archbishop Seraphim issued a personal appeal on 1 March to Papandreou, to intervene "...to ward off the direct, real danger of a conflict of the Church with the State...I do not aim at [causing] a deviation from the question of the monastic property, and I offer...my advice...so that the crisis, in which many [people] will be taken advantage of, will be avoided."⁸⁶

The culmination of the above cycle of proposal and counter-proposals came on 12 March when Tritsis introduced to the Parliament for discussion the revised version of NS1700.⁸⁷ The new title of what came to be called the "Tritsis Bill", "The Regulation of Questions of Ecclesiastical Property" (in contrast to the Kaklamanis Bill, whose title had referenced "monastic properties"), in itself suggested a significant revision in the scope of the bill. The reinterpretation and expansion of the property question was consistent with the fundamental change in the nature of the bill as a whole. The most critical revision in NS1700 as presented by Tritsis centered on a reformulation and democratization of the administrative structure of the Church at every level of the organization, and
represented a radical interpretation of PASOK's policy of Church-state separation cum Church-Nation connection.

The centerpiece of the democratization envisioned in the Tritsis Bill was Article 8 (particularly, Paragraph 8).88 Article 8 began by revising the membership criteria of ODEP and ODMP (Organization for the Administration of Monastic Properties)89 such that the decisive role of the Archbishop was eliminated.90 The core of Article 8, however, was the proposed revision in the Constitutional Charter of the Church91. The changes were grounded in a re-institution of the conciliar structure of the Church, with mixed membership comprised of elected lay representatives working cooperatively with certain appointees of the state and the Church (the state appointees were meant to fulfil judiciary and treasury responsibilities). The conciliar structure was to be implemented at the parish, diocese, and metropolitan levels, and was mandated to administer the full range of daily financial affairs and properties of the Church. According to the new stipulations, the Ministry of Education and Religions was entrusted with sole responsibility for all procedural aspects of registration on the election lists from which the lay representatives would be elected.

The reaction of the official Church is best summed up in the following comments issued by the Permanent Holy Synod:

"The Tritsis Bill removes the Archbishop from the presidency of ODEP...In addition, the majority vote in the Administrative Council of ODEP is reduced to the State and ODEP becomes a State Organ with unlimited powers for the disposal of ecclesiastical property."92 "[The proposed changes in the Constitutional Charter of the Church]...are amazingly provocative. The provocation relates to the fact that [the proposed conciliar structure] is anti-canonical and anti-ecclesiastical, which leads to heresy, since on the one hand the Orthodox Church, according to the Holy Canons, is episcopocentric, and because on the other hand the Bishop, as a model...of Christ, has the power
to recognize potential and active members of the Church. The perspective of the [Tritsis] Bill is an expression of a Protestant worldview, since it imposes a populist power on the Church and abolished the standing of the Bishop. The Minister [Tritsis]...is giving his opinion on who comprises the body of the Church and is determining its membership with bureaucratic processes. [His behavior] recalls that of Leo III, the iconoclast, who in his attempt to control the Church, to close the monasteries, said to then-Pope Gregory II, 'I am king and priest...!', or even the depressing period of the Bavarian Regency, which the present bill seeks to bring back.\textsuperscript{93}

According to the Introductory Essay, Article 8 in the revised NS1700 was aimed at "...the modernization of the organs of administration of ecclesiastical properties, and at ensuring the essential cooperation of Church and state in the management of ecclesiastical properties in general."\textsuperscript{94} The official Church, both of whose Synodal bodies presented a united front against the Tritsis Bill, maintained that neither was it opposed to the modernization \textit{per se} of the Church, nor was it opposed to examining the question of democratic revisions in the existing administrative structure of the Church. Rather, the Church stated its outright opposition to the Tritsis Bill on the basis of principle: as Metropolitan Christodoulos, the spokesperson for the Metropolitan Committee, explained, the Church's opposition was to the state's interference in internal ecclesiastical affairs, a realm over which it had no legal and, especially, theological purview.\textsuperscript{95}

According to Christodoulos, the PASOK government was using the pretext of democratization to bring about changes in the ecclesiastical structure which, in the long run, would destroy any semblance of democracy within the Church by coopting the ecclesiastical structure from within. Implementation of the committee structure proposed by the government, therefore, would recreate the system of \textit{nomo kratousa ekklesia}, and would allow the socialist government to preside over the ideological capture of the Church by controlling the election process for the
Christodoulos maintained that, indeed, the Church had a moral responsibility to the Greek nation, to the Greek people, to oppose what was actually a state-engineered effort to politicize the Church in a way that guaranteed the inability of Orthodoxy to function as a force for dynamism and democracy in Greece.

The Tritsis Bill as a debate about the modernization of Greek society and, more specifically, about a two-track view of the role of religion in a modern democracy (separation of Church and state, versus identity of Church and nation) was expressed by the group which was most vocal in its support for the Bill—namely, the lay theologians of the Theologikos Syndesmos (Theological League). The Theologikos Syndesmos had been founded in 1984 by lay intellectuals primarily centered in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Thessaloniki but also included professors of theology at the University of Athens and teachers of religion in the Greek school system. The group was deliberately founded as an autonomous entity, separate from all extant organized religious institutions in Greece, in order to allow for the independent exploration and criticism of Orthodoxy, in its theological, institutional, and popular dimensions. The driving objective of the group was the rediscovery of the creative dynamism inherent to the Orthodox tradition, and the application of this creativity to the challenges of modernity in Greece. Furthermore, the founders of the Theologikos Syndesmos stressed that one of the group's main objectives was to engage a broader membership, namely the laity of the Church (membership by non-theologians was stressed), or any individual or group interested in a dynamic response to the
ecclesiastical, theological, social, and cultural issues confronting Orthodoxy in modern Greek society.\textsuperscript{101}

Between its founding and the introduction of the Tritsis Bill for Parliamentary debate, the \textit{Theologikos Syndesmos} had undertaken a major study of the problematic of Church-state relations in Greece. As part of its analysis of "Church-State Relations with a Perspective for the Future," the \textit{Syndesmos} explored the "...requirements for a service-based and democratic Church (a sociological and theological approach)."\textsuperscript{102} The group's initial suggestions were presented at an open conference in Thessaloniki, whose participants included ordained clergy, politicians, lay theologians, academics from disciplines other than theology, and laymen.\textsuperscript{103} The overarching objective of the group's review of Church-state relations was the revitalization of the Church and its role in Greek society under the new circumstances of modern democracy. The conference maintained that two guiding principles were absolutely essential to achieve this objective: first, the revitalization of the lay and clerical role at every level of ecclesiastical administration, including the reintroduction of the early Church practice of lay participation in the election of all ranks of ordained candidates (priest, bishop, and metropolitan);\textsuperscript{104} and, second, the legal-formal separation of Church and state which, however, should in no way weaken the link between Church and Nation.\textsuperscript{105} Papers presented by different \textit{Syndesmos} members outlined a range of mechanisms for implementing the above principles and objectives, including a recommendation to reintroduce the traditional conciliar structure for mixed lay-clergy administration of ecclesiastical affairs, as well as to maintain the constitutional assignment of the Orthodox Church as the established (\textit{epikratou{}sa}) religion of Greece.
The underlying principles, much less the specific elements, of PASOK's dualist approach to Church-state relations and of the revisions in NS1700 introduced by Tritsis are undeniably reflected in the positions of the *Theologikos Syndesmos*. In fact, the *Syndesmos* conference on Church-state relations had been held five months prior to Tritsis' own address to the Sixth Theological Congress in September 1986, whose audience also included many of the founding members of the *Syndesmos*. According to interviews by this author, Tritsis and members of the *Syndesmos* had been in regular contact during that period; Tritsis had been studying the position papers of *Syndesmos* members on the Church-state relationship and, likewise, had been reviewing background materials suggested by lay theologians in the group on the mission of Orthodoxy in transforming society.\textsuperscript{106} Tritsis, and what emerged as a core group (of lay theologians and intellectuals in related humanities disciplines) in the *Theologikos Syndesmos*, established an informal dialogue in the course of the first six months of his tenure as Minister of Education and Religions, and was formalized with a full meeting between Tritsis and the faculties of the theology from the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki in February 1987.\textsuperscript{107} The discussion centered on the means for empowering the popular voice in the Church, the centrality of Orthodoxy to collective identity under modern democratic circumstances in Greece, and the need to restructure the Church-state relationship in a way that would strengthen the autonomous role of the former in society.\textsuperscript{108} Each faculty submitted formal proposals as a follow-up to the meeting and, in the meantime, the Tritsis Bill was presented to Parliament.
The intensity of the official Church's reaction can not be understood, nor can the full spectrum of the dynamic for change, without understanding what developed into a working alliance between lay intellectuals rooted in the *Theologikos Syndesmos* and Tritsis. Most significantly, the fullest articulation of the PASOK position on the Church-state and Church-Nation duality grew out of the lay academic perspective which, for all intents and purposes, claimed to represent popular religion in democratic Greece. The limited published materials on the subject of religion under the PASOK government, buttressed by interviews with the individuals involved in the events of that period, allow us to develop a picture of the motivations for the group's decision to cooperate with the PASOK government in restructuring the Church-state relationship.

According to the participants of the *Syndesmos* conference, the decision to form a tactical alliance with the PASOK government and, more specifically, with Minister Tritsis, on questions of Church-state reform was based on the fact that, by 1986, the "...government in its programmatic statements and in other partial activities demonstrated its interest in [seeing] the most decisive possible impact of the Church in the realm of Greek society." The lay intellectuals perceived the PASOK administration as committed to an activist redefinition of the role of the Church and religion in Greek society. They understood the political context of *allaghi*, directed by a socialist party committed to strengthening the democratic structures of civil society, as a watershed opportunity to democratize the Church and thereby to revitalize its role in modern society. Most specifically, these activists equated democratization of the ecclesiastical structure and the Church's contribution to the modernization of Greek society with two prime elements
articulated by Papandreou and in the PASOK programmatic statements on religion: first, elimination of the episcopocratic structure imposed on the Church by successive Greek states and coopted hierarchs, and a second and clearly related point, the legal formal separation of Church and state.\textsuperscript{111} Equally important was the lay intellectuals’ perception of Tritsis, whom they perceived as a creative thinker, appreciative of the historically-proven dynamism of Orthodoxy as a force for progressive social change and of the links between Orthodoxy and collective identity.\textsuperscript{112} The decision of the lay intellectuals to cooperate with Tritsis stemmed from their reading of PASOK’s statements and first-term policies on religion, as well as from their interpretation of PASOK’s modernization project as genuinely democratic and historically sensitive.

However, the critical factor in explaining the cooperation of lay intellectuals, self-proclaimed religious believers,\textsuperscript{113} was their conclusion that the impetus for ecclesiastical reform and, more broadly, for a meaningful application of the religious message of Orthodoxy to the needs of modern democracy could not come from within the Church: the Church had been captured by a conservative (religiously and politically) hierarchy dedicated to preserving its own power through exclusionary policies within the Church and through controlled channels of cooperation with the leadership of the Greek state. On the basis of this conclusion, the cooperation with Tritsis in reworking NS1700 was seen as an optimal tactical solution to a strategic problem: the lay elements sought to use the mechanisms of politics to bring about a democratic modernization of the Church, a legal-formal separation of Church and state, and an enrichment of the bonds between Orthodoxy and the collective imaginary of the Nation.\textsuperscript{114}
Following the introduction of the bill for debate in Parliament, the reaction of the official Church rose steadily in terms of intensity and vitriol, and the Church called on the Greek public to take a stand against protecting the Church from state intervention through NS1700. Tritsis' appeared on television to present the outlines of the bill to the Greek public and, in response, the Synod requested a televised discussion between representatives of the PASOK government and the Metropolitan Committee. On 20 March televised debate on the Church-state question was held, between Tritsis and representatives of the leading opposition parties. All of the opposition parties, including the KKE, opposed the bill; their denunciations of NS1700 ranged from questions of the constitutionality of such state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs, to worries about the democratic process implied in voting for a bill which, while ostensibly dealing with property questions, actually dealt with the administrative structure of an organization in civil society.\textsuperscript{115}

On 25 March, a t.v. debate on NS1700 was held by Tritsis and Professor Giorgos Kasimatis, the Director of the Legal Office of the Prime Minister, on the one hand, and Bishops Christodoulos and Anthimos, both members of the Metropolitan Committee, on the other. On the same day, for the first time in the country's history, a full hierarchical liturgy was held in Athens\textsuperscript{116}, with sermons calling on "the faithful" to express their opposition to the state's attempts to threaten the independence of the Church. The Church organized a massive demonstration in front of the Greek Parliament during parliamentary discussions on revised NS1700, and a reported half a million people participated in the veneration of religious relics brought from Mt. Athos for the occasion;\textsuperscript{117} a similar demonstration was held by the Church four days later in Thessaloniki. The official Church stated
categorically, as well, that it would not cooperate in the implementation of NS1700 if it was passed as a law, a response provoked by additional provisions regarding ecclesiastical justice. NS1700 was voted into law on 8 April 1987; ND did not participate in the voting, citing the bill as "fraudulently titled, anti-ecclesiastical, anti-constitutional, and nationally dangerous" (bold mine). The stance of the official Church was one of complete opposition and non-cooperation.

The passage of the Tritsis Bill as law neither guaranteed the start of immediate implementation of the proposed changes in property ownership or organizational structure, nor did it put an end to the official Church's opposition to the law. Indeed, in the wake of the Parliamentary vote in favor of NS1700, the Ministry of Education and Religions announced the establishment of the Epitropi Meletis Ekklesiastikon Thematon (Committee for the Study of Religious Issues, EMETH). EMETH was comprised primarily of lay intellectuals, mainly theologians who were members of the Theologikos Syndesmos, but the committee also included two clergymen. Significantly, one of the EMETH members was one of the country's most senior lay theologians, although a controversial figure insofar as he was associated by the hierarchy with historical pressures for democratic reform and Church-state separation; likewise, the senior clergyman on the committee enjoyed popular support for his lifetime of creative, missionizing activity on behalf of Orthodoxy, including in cases where his actions were criticized by the ecclesiastical hierarchy and/or local political authorities. EMETH's mandate was to formulate a new Constitutional Charter of the Church, which would be submitted to the Epitropi Meletis ton Scheseon Politeias kai Ekklesias (Committee for the Study of Church-State Relations, EMSPE). Formed by the Ministry of
Education and Religions, the original membership of EMSPE (the personalities changed somewhat over time) included the members of the four-man Metropolitan Committee, as well as three state attorneys and four academics (two of whom were also members of EMETH). According to Tritsis, the composition of the group was meant to provide a balanced perspective from both the hierarchy of the Church, from the lay representation of the Church, and from the state. EMSPE was mandated to undertake a systematic study of all facets of the Church-state relationship, and to work with sub-committees of specialists to propose revisions in Church-state issues in the specific areas of the Constitutional Charter of the Church, ecclesiastical justice, ecclesiastical education, and the general character of economic relations between Church and state. EMETH was, in effect, the sub-committee responsible for drawing up a plan for the revision of the Ecclesiastical Constitution.

The guiding principle for the framework developed by the individuals who comprised EMETH was to revitalize the Orthodox Church as a dynamic agent for the modernization of Greek society, where modernity meant a pluralist democracy, equitable economic development, and a respect for the historical particularities of Greek culture. The group understood the strengthening of modern democracy and the revitalization of Orthodoxy as mutually reinforcing notions. Based on these assumptions, the long-term objective of EMETH was the administrative separation of Church and state. The Committee was clear, however, in its view that complete legal separation required an "...extended process of freedom and democracy in the Church," so that the democratization of the Church was the first, necessary step on the path to Church-state separation. The "...expression of
the authentic democratic tradition of the administration of the Church, by renewing the popular, lay voice in the Church, would strengthen the ties between Church and nation and thereby establish the conditions for the full separation of Church and state.\footnote{131}

EMETH presented Tritsis and the members of EMSPE with a set of "General and Specific Principles" for a new Constitutional Charter of the Church, which was seen as the logical concomitant of the impending implementation of Law 1700. This plan extended and deepened the scope for the committee structure outlined in Article 8, such that the decision-making purview of the Ministry of Education and Religion was reduced in favor of a greater lay and clergy presence (at the expense of hierarchical control). Most significantly, the EMETH proposals introduced to the Ecclesiastical Charter the system used in the first four centuries of the Church, whereby both elected laymen participated in choosing and voting on candidates for ordination to the priesthood and episcopacy.\footnote{132}

The proposals for the revision of the Ecclesiastical Charter of the Church were submitted to EMSPE for consideration. While a possible parliamentary vote on the changes to the constitution was avoided with the refusal by the hierarchical representatives on EMSPE to even consider the changes, the participants in the Church-state discussion moved to the most senior level. Archbishop Seraphim completely bypassed the Ministry of Education and Religions and through Lilaios, the Joint Counsel to Papandreou and the Archbishop, arranged a private meeting with Papandreou which deliberately excluded Tritsis.\footnote{133} The meeting between Papandreou and the Archbishop marked a turning point in what had become a public confrontation between Church and state, with the former targeting its
criticisms at Tritsis; the absence of Tritsis from the discussion—he was not informed that the two leaders were meeting\textsuperscript{134}—marked the start of Papandreou's effective distancing from his Minister and the controversy associated with him, as well as the beginning of a rapprochement with the Church around the "committee question." The subsequent series of meetings between Papandreou and the Archbishop were accompanied by a growing series of press reports and leaks which suggested a break between Papandreou and Tritsis over the proposed revisions in the Constitutional Charter of the Church. In the face of Papandreou's increasingly apparent conciliatory stance towards the Church's demands for the abrogation of Article 8 in Law 1700, Tritsis submitted his resignation to Papandreou; Papandreou reassured Tritsis that the meetings with the Archbishop had been by way of trying to gain the Church's cooperation on continuing with the EMETH proposals, and the Minister agreed to withdraw his resignation. Following yet another round of meetings between Papandreou and the Archbishop, the government issued an official statements that a preliminary agreement satisfactory to both Church and state had been reached. The result of this preliminary rapprochement was Tritsis' formal resignation from the party on 9 May 1988, the appointment of George Papandreou (the Prime Minister's son) as the new Minister of Education and Religions, and the passage of a "Special Accord for the Concession of Agricultural and Forest Property of the Holy Monasteries to the Public"\textsuperscript{135} in August 1988. The Special Accord, effectively, emasculated Law 1700, since the new agreement was an official cancellation of the property concessions stipulated in the Tritsis Law and, most importantly, was a symbol of Papandreou's agreement to suspend all activities regarding the democratization
provisions centered in Article 8. At the time of PASOK's failure to secure a Parliamentary majority in the national elections of June 1989, the status of the Church-state relationship was, *de facto*, unchanged from the time of Tritsis' appointment at the outset of the party's second term.

V. The Institutional Constraints on Church-State Change

The previous chapter explored the ways in which PASOK, in both its initial ideological and organizational orientation, represented a unique vehicle for the resolution of historical cultural contradictions over the meaning of modernity in Greek society; but although the democratization process created a window of opportunity for PASOK to effect the kinds of social changes necessary for cultural reconciliation, the internalization of societal contradictions in the ideological and organizational structure of the party came to constitute a barrier to radical social change by the time of the party's election to government in 1981. The dualist approach to and the outcome of Church-state relations under the PASOK governments of the 1980s can not be fully understood without returning to the organizational and ideological features of the party. During the second PASOK administration in particular, the confining impact of PASOK's institutional structure on Church-state relations was striking.

As we have discussed, by the time it moved into government PASOK had evolved from its origins as a radical socialist party with a maximalist strategy for the structural modernization of society to a party with a populist ideology and an increasingly hierarchical, clientelistic approach to decisionmaking. The populist and clientelist features became more intense over the course of PASOK's two terms in government. Although the party's catch-all strategy and ideological
populism had been electorally successful, the extremely heterogeneous base of popular support meant that the government faced a difficult policymaking challenge.\textsuperscript{136} The party had to be all things to all people, while simultaneously undertaking the restructuring of the Greek economy. The PASOK government undertook a neo-Keynesian economic program,\textsuperscript{137} which Papandreou explained as the best means of "putting the people in power."\textsuperscript{138} In addition to its basic demand management strategy, the government moved to nationalize (while using the term "socialization" as a sign of the party's continued commitment to radical economic change) targeted sectors of the economy.\textsuperscript{139} That the neo-Keynesian program was not achieving the desired results was obvious to the party leadership within its first year in office,\textsuperscript{140} and the government abruptly reoriented its economic policy along monetarist lines. Besides the fact that the monetarist policies were predicated on politically-sensitive wage controls, the failure of monetarism was evidenced by the dramatic worsening of the country's fiscal situation and what, by the approaching elections of 1985, was emerging as a full-scale balance of payments crisis.\textsuperscript{141}

Following its victory in the national elections of June 1985, the PASOK government inaugurated its second term in office with the introduction of a two-year "stabilization program," a euphemism for what was seen as a potentially politically-damaging but economically-unavoidable austerity program.\textsuperscript{142} The political costs to the PASOK government lay in the fact that the goals of improving the country's balance of payments situation and reducing domestic inflation levels were predicated on a significant reversal in the existing incomes policy and exchange rate management which directly affected the agricultural
sector. In order to ameliorate public reaction against the obvious move away from its original radical-socialist restructuring policies and, most importantly, from its 1985 election slogan of "even better days for the Greek people," the government turned to emphasizing the need to democratize and streamline the inefficient state bureaucracy, stressing PASOK's first-term accomplishments in the areas of social policy (especially the revisions in the Greek Family Law), and to resort to increasingly frequent nationalist rhetoric about the imminent "Turkish threat."

In performance terms, by the end of the party's second term in office nearly every economic indicator reflected a striking deterioration; particularly striking was the ballooning public sector deficit and public external debt, in tandem with low growth and productivity rates vis-a-vis the country's European Community peer group.\(^{143}\) Paradoxically, despite the party's claims about the need to streamline the state apparatus, most analysts concur that, in terms of organizational structure, PASOK developed into a bureaucratic clientelistic structure distinguished by "...the systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocation of favours through it, [where]...the central party leadership and particularly the leader himself played a central role at the expense of the influence of local factions."\(^{144}\) The party successfully utilized the carrot of public sector employment as an electoral tactic in the 1985 national elections; and although the same tactic, while swelling the public sector rolls, failed to win PASOK an election victory in the June 1989 national elections, the expansion of public sector posts proved to be a critical mechanism for the party's ability to maintain its significant electoral base for most of the decade.
The above overview of PASOK's economic policymaking record illustrates the government's failure to implement a coherent program for modernizing the Greek economy in terms designed to break the dependent development model that PASOK had campaigned against. At the institutional level, the government's policymaking record reflects the translation of intra-party contradictions into the state apparatus, as well as the steady redistribution of power which took place amongst the party's three founding tendencies once in government. The populist logic which had come to dominate the party's organizational structure was reinforced with the overlay of bureaucratic clientelistic practices, so that party practices became state practices and state policy was held hostage to intra-party problems. Once in government, the party leadership undertook a deliberate effort to populate the policymaking apparatus with party members, a not necessarily illogical step given that decades of right-wing and conservative government had stacked the state machinery with conservative functionaries. However, because the state at the most senior levels of decisionmaking came to mirror the PASOK party, this meant a reinforcement of Papandreou's leadership primacy as well as the replication of intra-party antagonisms centered around radical versus electorally palatable methods of socio-economic modernization. The centrality of Papandreou in state policymaking was, of course, intensified by virtue of the fact that, as he had emerged as the single arbiter of the intra-party conflicts of the mid-1970s, he became the final judge for all controversial policymaking decisions in the state and for the Ministerial life of appointees who opposed his decisions.

The clearest evidence of Papandreou's command over the party and state organizational structure was the multiple cabinet shuffles which occurred during
both PASOK administrations and which, in most instances, were provoked by policymaking disagreements amongst representatives of the three tendencies and as a tactical measure designed to garner popular support (or stave off reaction against) controversial social and economic programs.\textsuperscript{148} The cabinet changes were ostensibly decided by the party's Executive Bureau, but its membership was appointed by Papandreou and, in this respect, kept each individual beholden to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{149} Yet Papandreou's primacy was not simply the continuation, within the party and then in the state apparatus, of organizational patterns developed in the key years of PASOK's institutional development. His critical role in the party was grounded in his charismatic stature, which in turn was institutionally strengthened by the nature of the bureaucratic clientelistic system. The charisma of Papandreou generated the ". . . special bond [that] developed between the president and the party structures."\textsuperscript{150} Papandreou's charisma was also, in a sense, necessary to the party's continued success once the ideological choice of populism had been made. The party's ability to be all things to all people, and especially to continue to appeal successfully to a petty bourgeoisie base characterized by ". . . its transition nature, . . . ideological disorientation, sense of loss of values, insecurity about what has been left behind . . . and . . . a vague, inchoate, almost manichean sense of class antagonism vis-a-vis the 'privileged' strata,"\textsuperscript{151} depended on a compelling leader whose charisma outweighed the contradictions innate in the hegemonic logic of populism. Papandreou's charisma became even more critical to the party's electoral fortunes once the austerity program, as well as a host of domestic and foreign policy inconsistencies (justified in terms of the pressures imposed by a hostile "other", whether an external threat or the internal
establishment), made it clear that the movement's original *tiers mondiste* radicalism had been abandoned in favor of pragmatic concerns.

That "...the government [had] become the arena of the Movement's internal politics"\(^{152}\) exerted a strong influence on PASOK's policies regarding religion. Three factors in this respect were especially important in shaping the agenda and outcome of the Church-state relationship. First, the very dualism which characterized Papandreou's distinction between the institutional separation of Church and state, on the one hand, and the strengthening of the cultural ties between Church and nation, on the other, reflected the internalization within the party structure of conflictual interpretations of the meaning and objective of building a modern democracy in Greece. The party's support, in the Declaration of Founding Principles and during the debates over the 1975 Constitution, for the complete institutional separation of Church and state was consistent with PASOK's rejection of what it saw as New Democracy's half-hearted measures purportedly aimed at structural change but actually designed to maintain the balance of power which had obtained in post-WWII Greek society prior to the 1974 transition. The legal-formal separation of Church and state was one of the cornerstones of a modern, pluralist democracy, insofar as it would liberate one of the most historically formidable institutions of Greek civil society from state control;\(^{153}\) conversely, the state's legitimacy as the defender of the nation would be strengthened by virtue of its disengagement from the only other institutional pole capable of making a challenge on such grounds. One of the main aims of the founding radical tendency in the party was the elimination of those formal and informal linkages between the state and key institutional concentrations of power
in Greek society which had contributed to an hydrocephalic state and to a weak civil society; the decoupling of the Church-state relationship was essential in this respect. Furthermore, the radical wing of the party identified the Church with a long tradition of anti-democratic politics in Greece, so that a modern, pluralist democracy required an end to the legal-formal inclusion of the Church in politics. For the liberal technocrats, the institutional autonomy of Church and state was a logical response to managing public sector budgetary pressures and, more broadly, a sign of the kind of functional rationality which characterized modern societies.

By the same token, what appeared to be Papandreou's appropriate rejection of the equation of secularization with the marginalization of religion, based on the historical realities of Greek political development, was also a reflection of the influence of traditionalism within the party. The palaiokommatikoi tendency, or the old guard politicians whose careers had been built on clientelistic practices, was one of the contributors to a continuing traditionalist interpretation of the relationship between religion and politics in Greece. The palaiokommatikoi had built their careers on the rural and petty-bourgeoisie strata of the party, those segments of the population amongst whom the identification of Church and nation remained most intense. Interestingly enough, the cultural linkage of Church and nation was not inconsistent with the radical tendency within PASOK; Papandreou's strident anti-Western, anti-Turkish, nationalist rhetoric necessarily relied on the centrality of Eastern Orthodoxy to the putative uniqueness of Greece's collective political identity. For the radical tendency within the party, the successful democracy-building in Greece demanded the recognition of the country's particular
national identity. In the most general sense, then, Papandreou's distinction between the legal-institutional and cultural dimensions of the Church-state and Church-nation relationship was a reflection of the different interpretations of modernity endorsed by the party's three founding tendencies.

Continuing the trend begun since the party's formation, over the course of the 1980s PASOK's leadership was increasingly dominated by the technocratic and *palaiokommatikoi* tendencies in the party. The founding radical base, represented primarily by PAK members and students, was steadily marginalized in terms of policymaking voice. In the most general sense, it was the *palaiokommatikoi* politicians who were responsible for the government's initial neo-Keynesian economic policies and the technocrats who developed the austerity program. The final two years of the second PASOK administration was marked by a power struggle between the *palaiokommatikoi*, who were most sensitive to and socialized in the use of state clientelism for the approaching election, and the technocrats, who continued to maintain that stabilization of the economy was the optimal pragmatic and electoral solution; what remained of the party's radical tendency, a large portion of whose membership had withdrawn from PASOK in reaction to what was considered the anti-labor, anti-socialist nature of the austerity measures, opposed both the technocratic emphasis on austerity and the traditional electoral preoccupations of the *palaiokommatikoi*.155

The above schematic of the policymaking balance of power amongst the party's three tendencies affected PASOK's measures towards religion and the Church in several distinctive ways. First, in the interests of a modicum of intra-party unity and, more importantly, in terms of maintaining the support of those portions of
the electorate which had seen PASOK as a radical option for socio-economic restructuring, the party leadership relied on symbolic successes and appointments designed to reinforce the party's socialist image. The revisions in the Greek Family Law, particularly those regarding civil marriage and the decriminalization of adultery, were characteristic examples of the party's ability to gain symbolic capital, by presenting the social legislation as a modernizing victory over the forces of conservative entrenched, in this case, around the Church. Despite the fact that the government actually scaled back its initial, full-scale secularizing stance on the civil marriage issue, PASOK could claim, not incorrectly, that it had stood up to the opposition of the Church in the interests of modernizing Greek society. Similarly, the government's revisions in the system of religious education and, more broadly, the rewriting of grade-school textbooks were areas in which the party could claim that, despite the antagonism of the Church, it was fulfilling its pledge to modernize Greek society.

The issue of cabinet appointments was of greater importance in understanding the way in which the Church-state debate over NS1700 unfolded. The decision to replace Kaklamanis with Tritis in April 1986 was part of the party's general policy of appointing individuals with "anti-establishment," and therefore "radical" credentials to positions where the benefits (usually symbolic) would outweigh the costs (in terms of generating potential opposition in the government and from the public). The timing of Tritis' appointment, as well as the expansion in the scope and objectives of NS1700 as he had inherited from Kaklamanis, can not be divorced from the context of the economic policy struggle developing around the implementation of the stabilization package. In an attempt to mollify both public
opposition and internal party dissent over the stabilization measures, Papandreou reshuffled his Cabinet and appointed Tritsis, well-known for his policymaking dynamism and willingness to challenge longstanding methods of procedure, and equally important, a relatively young politician whose idiosyncratic yet charismatic radicalism was especially appealing to the younger segment of the electorate.\textsuperscript{158} As far as the question of the Church-state relationship was concerned, Papandreou viewed Tritsis as the appropriate choice for an important, yet non-economic and therefore supposedly non-controversial, ministerial position from which symbolic and real political advances could be achieved within the context of growing policy pressures.

Tritsis was given an impressive degree of policymaking autonomy and latitude vis-a-vis the outstanding question of the Kaklamanis Bill, and undertook an expansion in the domain of ecclesiastical properties to be included in the revised bill as well as in incorporating the provisions on democratization of the ecclesiastical structure.\textsuperscript{159} According to Tritsis and those involved in drafting the revised NS1700, Papandreou and Tritsis agreed on the general, dualist nature of PASOK's policies on religion and politics, and Papandreou also agreed on the general aim of expanding the Kaklamanis Bill to encompass the full range of ecclesiastical properties and to address questions of democratization of the Church.\textsuperscript{160} However, the specifics of designing and implementing the new provisions were left to Tritsis, which is a key factor in explaining the outcome of the Church-state struggle during the second PASOK administration.

In spite of Tritsis' autonomy in reformulating the Kaklamanis Bill and in educational policy initiatives as well, the centrality of Papandreou in the state and
party structure meant that the Prime Minister reserved the right to intervene at any time and in any fashion in the policymaking process. Papandreou's prerogatives for intervening were partly the result of his charismatic presence in the party and government, but were also the result of the institutionalization of his prerogatives through the party's First (and only) Congress held in mid-1984. The First Congress had been a sort of watershed in the party's institutional development, in that the event had "...crystallized all the hierarchical, undemocratic and centralized tendencies which PASOK's internal opposition had attempted to fight as the Movement was struggling to develop its organizational and political identity...[The Constitution approved by the Congress] preserved an explicitly exceptional role for the President when he was given unlimited powers (e.g. full representation of the Movement and capacity to decide on any issue if the circumstances do not allow a session of the Executive Bureau, which in any case is called in session only by him--article 62). In addition, he also remained outside the collectivity of elected bodies of the organization and was therefore accountable to no one." 

Papandreou, for the most part, had not been involved in either the lengthy process of revising the Kaklamanis Bill which Ttritsis undertook once appointed to the Ministry, nor was the Prime Minister directly touched by the intra-ecclesiastical tensions generated by the involvement of lay intellectuals in working with Ttritsis and EMETH on the question of ecclesial democratization. Papandreou viewed the Ttritsis Bill from two perspectives: first and foremost, as a piece of legislation on the state expropriation of properties from an established institutional concentration of power, which would therefore appeal to the radical wing of the
party and to the significant agricultural electorate; and second, as a legislative example of the party's initially radical promises to modernize and democratize Greek society, again an electoral calculation designed to appeal to what remained of the party's radical constituency.163

Until the Tritsis Bill began to generate public confrontations between the Church and the state, Papandreou had restricted his involvement to messages to the Synod via the Joint Counsel, Lilaios, and to occasional public statements and meetings with the Archbishop in which the Prime Minister assured the Church of PASOK's commitment to maintaining the ties between Church and nation. Papandreou's lack of direct, sustained involvement was a logical organizational decision based on priorities: he had delegated authority to Tritsis, while focusing his own attentions on the government's problematic management of the economy, an issue of far more policymaking urgency and electoral importance. Once, however, Law 1700 threatened to cause a public rupture between Church and state during the increasingly difficult pre-electoral period, Papandreou resorted to the kinds of organizational tactics described earlier. Once Papandreou decided that communications with Archbishop Seraphim was the modus operandi for ameliorating the Church-state conflict in view of the broader goal, he bypassed Tritsis and, in the process, undermined the credibility of his own Cabinet-member and the latter's policy achievements. In short, the accord with Archbishop Seraphim and the revisions in Law 1700 were a paradigmatic reflection of the institutional evolution of the party and the erosion of its potential for the radical, democratic modernization of Greek society: ideological consistency and organizational cohesion were sacrificed on the alter of electoral considerations.
VI. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the policies of the PASOK governments of the 1980s towards religion and the Orthodox Church, and aimed to show that, despite the secularization of Greek society and PASOK’s plan to modernize society according to a rather idiosyncratic conception of socialist democracy, religion and the Church continue to play a significant role in public life. The Church remains central to the debate over the meaning of modernity in democratic Greece. In concentrating on the Church-state dyad to explore such issues, the chapter suggested the ways that the institutional relationship between politics and religion was as a metaphor for the ongoing cultural discussion over the definition of collective identity in Greece.

Several conclusions emerge. First, interactions between the state and the Church under PASOK show that institutions and individuals in civil society understood the state as an institution for capture and control, in order to protect interests against threats of power from either the state itself or from other members of civil society. In this chapter, the Church-state debates suggest not only the antagonistic nature of the relationship between state and civil society, but the dynamics that might be understood as part of a legitimacy crisis of the Greek state.

The PASOK period shows that the source of conflict between Church and state was grounded in differing conceptions of the role of religion as part of the political project of building a modern, pluralist democracy in Greece. The PASOK leadership's endorsement of the legal-formal separation of Church and state can be viewed as the acceptance of the central premise of modernization
theory, namely that religion and secularity are positively related. Moreover, as we noted in the chapter, much of the party leadership identified the Church, religion, and the cultural orientations shaped by Orthodoxy with the authoritarian political experience of the junta. According to this view, democracy-building and societal pluralism required a reformulation of the legal arrangement between Church and state, in order to reflect the relativization of religious worldviews and to reinforce principles of rationality and pragmatism in organizing individual and institutional behaviors.

The party's understanding of Church-state separation however, also seemed to be built on a flexible and realistic interpretation of the role of religion in a modern, pluralist democracy: the emphasis on the links between Church and nation rejected a rigid equation of secularization with the marginalization of religion, and instead reflected an awareness of the historical importance of Orthodoxy in the Greek political developmental trajectory and to the collective imaginary. In contrast to the PASOK position, the hierarchical Church's stance on legal-formal separation and, therefore, the implicit view on the secularity-modernity problematic was straightforward and unimaginative, although certainly astute in terms of balance of power considerations. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the hierarchical reaction against Law 1700 on the basis of state intervention in the internal affairs of the Church did not in any way imply hierarchical acceptance of the idea of the legal-constitutional separation of Church and state. The hierarchy's position continued to be that of synallilia, as endorsed during the debates on the 1977 Constitution. The support for synallilia rested on a continued constitutional prioritization of the Orthodox Church of Greece, which
implies a concomitant view that pluralist, secular, modernity is a threat to the vitality of religion in society.

Yet the apparent divergence in the Church and state views of religion and modernity was superseded by an ambiguity, and perhaps even an ambivalence, on the part of the PASOK government over the place of religion and the Church in a pluralist democracy in Greece. Specifically, the dualism in PASOK's policies on religion, namely Papandreou's claims about the indissoluble bond between Church and nation, perpetuated a major weakness in the legitimacy of the Greek state in terms of its ability to stand as the singular institution responsible for defining and protecting the nation. Rather than emphasizing the links between Orthodoxy and the Church and Greek culture in general—as a set of ideas, beliefs, and orientations towards individual and institutional behavior—Papandreou stressed the unalterable ties between Church and nation. The distinction between nation and culture, however complicated, is an important one vis-a-vis the power and legitimacy of the state, since one of the central prerogatives and measures of the modern state's legitimacy lies in its ability to define and to defend the national imaginary or collective identity. Insofar as Papandreou proclaimed the PASOK government's acceptance of the Church-nation connection, he undermined the state's singular authority over the nation. Furthermore, given that PASOK's populist rhetoric came to rely increasingly on a reactionary anti-westernism and defense against the threat of the "Turkish Other," the Eastern Orthodox dimensions of chauvanistic Greek nationalism reinforced the state's reliance on the Church as a cohort in defining and defending the nation.
The legitimacy issues for the Greek state raised by Papandreou's dualist approach to religion and modernization were by no means unique to the PASOK period although, as noted above, the party's populist ideology and idiosyncratic tiers mondisme made the already existing problem more vibrant. The state's weakness in standing as the purveyor of national identity was rooted in the peculiar legal-constitutional relationship established, paradoxically, to preclude such a problem and, then more fully, in the unsuccessful attempts by successive regimes to coopt the message, symbols, and heritage of Orthodoxy for the exclusive use of the state in constructing the national imaginary. However, precisely because the longstanding legal-constitutional arrangement between Church and state had contributed to the state's legitimacy problem with regard to national identity, the PASOK commitment to the complete institutional separation of Church and state was a sine qua non for any successful prospects for building a stable, pluralist democracy in which state and civil society existed as autonomous yet complementary spheres of activity. Interestingly enough, as the PASOK government demonstrated its inability to modernize and to restructure the economy, much less to democratize and to reduce the public sector apparatus, the legitimacy problems of the state were reinforced. The unrestrained and partisan expansion of the public sector bureaucracy under PASOK, as well as the country's deteriorating economic performance, pointed to the state's failure to function either as an impartial and balanced reflection of the intersection of society's interests, or as an efficient motor of economic growth, the Greek state. The illegitimacy of the state on both counts meant that the PASOK government, by the end of its second term, could hardly afford to challenge the Church in a
struggle which could easily broaden to include questions over the institutional representative of "the people" or the "nation."

The legitimacy question is related to the second point of this chapter: similarities between how PASOK (both as a party and in the state structure) and the Church as institutions have reproduced the legitimacy problems of the political domain in the religious domain. The Church-state interactions during the 1980s show that, as institutions, both PASOK and the Church were marked by internal fragmentation in organizational and ideational, or ideological, terms. As the tone of the Church-state interactions became increasingly hostile and public over the course of the decade, we saw parallel developments which suggest the fragmentation within each institutional frameworks: first, the leadership of the institutions--Papandreou and, to a lesser extent, the Ministers in his Cabinet, on the one hand; Archbishop Serapahim and, to a lesser extent, the hierarchy in the Permanent Holy Synod and the four bishops on the Metropolitan Committee and EMSPE, on the other hand--moved to consolidate decisionmaking prerogatives and, ultimately, to make policy decisions by personal fiat; and second, the gap between the ideational message of each institution versus pragmatic power concerns grew increasingly significant and, with this tendency, intra-institutional struggles over the ideology of the party and ecclesial message were intensified.

The concentration and personalization of power at the highest leadership levels of both PASOK and the Church is a theme developed throughout the dissertation. However, the Church-state story under PASOK illustrates how directly institutional factors define the overall nature of the relationship between religion and politics in public life in Greece. The entire decade of Church-state
interactions demonstrates a dialogue restricted to the senior levels of both institutions; neither PASOK functionaries outside of the Cabinet nor non-hierarchical clergy were permitted to develop, much less to participate in, the dialogue about connections between religious and political questions. What is striking about the PASOK period, however, is the fact that both institutional leaderships claimed to be making decisions on behalf of the same "constituency", namely the nation (ethnos) and the people (laos), which was almost completely excluded from the range of issues on the agenda of Church-state relations. On the property question, for example, the state argued its expropriation policy on the basis of PASOK's commitment to the elimination of the gap between privileged and underprivileged, therefore explaining the need to redistribute unused ecclesiastical properties to landless peasants and poor agricultural laborers. The Church claimed to stand as an impartial representative of the same constituency, arguing that its opposition to the state's expropriation policies grew out of concerns that the needs of individual farmers and peasants would be unmet if redistributive responsibilities for the properties were entrusted to state-owned cooperatives. The political and religious leadership staked their positions on the democratization question in similar terms, with each posing as the protector of popular rights. Where the Church charged the state with trying to impose ideological criteria on the ecclesiastical participatory rights of the laity, the state countered that the hierarchy stood as an obstacle to the full participation of the people in the life of the Church.

The people, the laity, were virtually absent from this debate, with the exception of the televised debates and the Church's mobilizations through preaching and
demonstrations. The exclusion of the popular elements of each institution from the Church-state dialogue represents the reduction of religio-political questions to a straightforward intra-institutional struggle for power. The leadership of both institutions justified the institutional power struggle in ideological terms grounded in respective visions of how to organize society, yet society itself remained something separate and outside of the inter-institutional struggles. In this respect, the disarticulation between state and society discussed in the previous chapter is a key feature of the relationship between Church and society as well.

In the disagreements over civil marriage, divorce, adultery, property, and democratization, Church and state were engaged in a debate over how to conceive of and manage those mechanisms meant to bring about a desired form of society. The institution which could claim a monopoly over the control over those mechanisms for building a certain form of society necessarily included as its central prerogative the right to define the nature of the ties that identify the collectivity. Because the leadership of both Church and state had effectively ignored the voices of the collectivity they were both supposedly pledged to protect, the ability of either leadership to claim the legitimate right to regulate and to define membership in the collectivity had been seriously compromised. The final compromise between Papandreou and Archbishop Seraphim reflects a recognition of this reality, and suggests a sensible tactical maneuver between two illegitimate institutions to retain a joint, however imperfect, mandate over the definition and protection of the identity of the collectivity.

The exclusion of the popular element from the Church-state discussions leads to the final conclusion which grows out of this chapter, which is that the PASOK
period provided the context for an attempt to resolve the conflict between the ordained and popular elements of the Church over the meaning and actualization of the religious message of Orthodoxy. This point is interesting in two respects. First, the language and actions of the members of the Theologikos Syndesmos as a whole and those of the EMETH members in particular reflect a clear recognition of the multi-dimensionality of religion. The members of EMETH emphasized that the need for ecclesiastical reform was precisely because of the disintegration of the popular, institutional (hierarchical), and doctrinal dimensions of Orthodoxy. The lay reformist tendency represented by the Syndesmos-EMETH faction argued that the contextualizable message of Orthodoxy was being rendered irrelevant to public and private life in modern society by virtue of the fact that the hierarchical Church had managed to obtain a monopoly over the interpretation of this message. They also argued that the hierarchy had utilized its monopoly over the message to control and, ultimately, to marginalize the popular voice in the Church. The objective of reform, within the context of Law 1700 and the revisions in the Ecclesiastical Charter which followed from EMETH, was to re-equilibrate the balance amongst the hierarchical/ordained and popular dimensions of the Church, in order to rediscover what the reformists viewed as the Orthodox message—a conception of Tradition as "...not static but dynamic, not a dead acceptance of the past but a living experience...in the present,...inwardly changeless,...constantly assuming new forms, which supplement the old without superseding them."

The other notable point about the conflict between lay reformist and hierarchical conservative factions within the Church was the decision of the former
to introduce what was ostensibly about religion into what was ostensibly the domain of politics. This decision reflects most basically the worldview of the reformists, who conceived of Orthodoxy and modernity as complementary and, more specifically, who understood the religious message as meaningful for transforming the contemporary social reality of Greece. From this perspective, the reformist decision to cooperate with the Greek state, which they understood as the institutional vehicle for realizing the opportunity presented by PASOK for socialist, democratic modernization (however adulterated this ideological vision had become) and which they identified with the Ministry of Education and Religions under Tritsis, assumed a reflexive relationship between religion and politics. The understanding of politics and religion as reflexive and interactive was reinforced by the lay reformists' analysis of the disintegration of the hierarchical, popular, and doctrinal dimensions of the religion. The ability of the hierarchical element of the Church to utilize its political links to the state had further contributed to the dilution of the message of Orthodoxy, by rendering it contingent upon the broader objectives of the Church-state institutional front. The decision to use the mechanisms of politics represented a means to the rediscovery of the religious message by revitalizing the popular voice in the Church and, in the long-term, to changing the nature of politics by transforming society through actualization of the religious message.

One of the key puzzles is the failure of either institution to create a public dialogue around the essential point of disagreement: namely, the democratization of the ecclesiastical space or, more specifically, an intensification and an expansion of the popular voice in religion in Greece. The state's failure to present the
debates, and here I am referring mainly to the controversy over NS1700 and the proposed changes in the Ecclesiastical Constitution, within the framework of PASOK's ideological emphasis on participation as essential to democratic modernization can be understood in terms of pragmatic calculations: the party leadership felt that there was more to gain in electoral terms by focusing on the economic distributive issues raised by the property question, than by tackling the democratization problematic which, at some point, could have created the space for criticism of PASOK's practices within the state apparatus (and in other institutions in civil society, for that matter). As for the ecclesiastical leadership, the cost-benefit calculations were clear: it was far easier to discuss the state's policies as a socialist attack on the Church's rights to property ownership and financial autonomy, than to introduce a discussion about popular participation and, by extension, potential criticism of the episcopal role in the institutional life of the Church. Framing the Church-state controversy over NS1700 as an argument over economic issues was, in short, a practical decision which circumscribed the issues at hand and, likewise, allowed for decisions which excluded the popular voice (ironically, both within the party and state, and within the Church) and thereby prevented a disruption in the existing balance of power between the two institutions in politics and civil society.

The above distinctions help to explain what was, given organizational and societal power considerations, a logical strategy on the part of the leadership of both institutions to restrict the public debate to the property question. Even so, both the PASOK government and the hierarchy stood to accrue potential gains with their constituencies--ironically, the state and the Church compete for the same
constituency, that is the members of civil society--by articulating the debate more specifically in terms of democracy-building and popular participation.

Nonetheless, the failure of both Tritsis, as a representative of the radical remnant of PASOK, and the reformist intellectuals, representing the popular strata of Orthodoxy, to shape the public discussion in such terms is baffling. The observations of the participants themselves are no more illuminating, especially since those agitating for reform recognized their mistake in not having expressed the issue in language of democratization. The question is an especially relevant one for these lay intellectuals, who were not restrained by the same sorts of organizational constraints imposed on Tritsis by virtue of his party membership and state office. By the same token, one can speculate that it was precisely the lack of institutional support and organizational infrastructure (from both state and Church) which constituted an obstacle to the capacities of the reformist intellectuals to develop a discourse of democratization with regard to the Church-state conflict over Law 1700.

The answers to the lay reformists' failure to bring the debate to the popular level, however, may reflect an innate albeit subtle ambivalence in their posture as well. On the one hand, the reformists had acknowledged that their willingness to cooperate with the state was as a tactical decision based on real political constraints and on the latitude for autonomous action within the Church. However, the reformists primarily explained their decision in terms of their view of PASOK as committed to progressive social reforms, such as the revisions in the Family Law. As the Secretary of EMETH put it,
"PASOK's purpose was not to separate the Church from the state in order to distance [the Church] from the people, but on the contrary, to help [the Church] as one of the finest institutions of the Nation, to come closer to the people and to positively influence [them]."¹⁶⁷

As Papandreou's involvement in the events surrounding NS1700 and its subsequent revisions revealed that, within the party as a whole, the issue of the Church was largely seen in electoral terms, the initial commitment to continue cooperation with the state may have waned.¹⁶⁸ Also important is the fact that the reformists' commitment to complete institutional separation of Church and state had been premised on the notion of the "readiness of the nation" for such separation; readiness implied that the democratization of the Church's administrative structure had been implemented and had allowed a lay participatory ethos to become institutionalized. Only after "...a long process of freedom and democracy in the Church could there occur a [serious] discussion about separation of Church and state."¹⁶⁹ Again, once the Papandreou-Seraphim discussions made it clear that the democratization proposals of EMETH (much less, Article 8 in Law 1700) would not be implemented, the willingness of the reformists to endorse PASOK statements about Church-state separation ended. The above factors, however, relate to the timing of events and therefore do not fully explain the reformists' consistent failure to publicly explain Law 1700 as an issue of democratic renewal rather than as a battle over property.

The unanswered puzzle, taken together with the legitimacy issues surrounding the state and nation-building, make the reflections of a long-time observer of the Church-state relationship a provocative point at which to close this chapter:

"...at bottom, there exists a mutual suspicion in the relationship between State and Church. The state fears the liberation of the Church and the strength to
be obtained in the framework of an administrative separation and, therefore, the loss of control, which [the state] indirectly presently exercises in its administration. The Church, on its part, fears likewise the loss of certain advantages which the status of state Church grants. Such mutual suspicion perpetuates the...STATUS QUO.
ENDNOTES

1. In an interview with this author, Stelio Papanemelis, PASOK MP for Thessaloniki and an active participant in the legislative debates around the government's religious policies, opined that the party had no real program for dealing with the Church and religion in Greece (Thessaloniki, Greece: 5 August 1989). Papanemelis claimed that, particularly with regard to the central issue of separation of Church and state, there was no consensus within the party as a whole or at the highest levels of policymaking, regarding the meaning of and the objectives for achieving such separation. In Papanemelis' view, this lack of coherence in vision and policymaking regarding religion was the basic reason for the development of Church-state relations along increasingly confrontational lines over the course of the two PASOK administrations.


8. Ibid. For a reproduction of the full quote, see Chapter Four (Section VII) of this dissertation.


11. Quoted in Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 34. Papandreou delivered this address in Parliament on 22 November 1981.

12. See Symvolaio Timis me to Lao, p. 46. For the quote, see Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 33.

13. Quoted in Konadaris, O Nomos, p. 34. Papandreou delivered this address in Parliament on 22 November 1981.

14. See the comments by Alexiou in Ekklesia kai Koinonia, p. 177.


16. Quoted from the reproduction of the speech in Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 44.

17. Ibid., p. 44.

18. Ibid., p. 44.

19. Ibid., p. 44.

20. The Family Law was part of the country's Civil Code, which had been promulgated in February 1946, and was made up of five books: General Principles, Law of Obligations, Law of Property, Family Law, and Inheritance Law. See Theresa Papademetriou, "Marriage and Marital Property Under the New Greek Family Law" (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1985).

21. See Eleni Stamiris, "The Greek Women's Movement," in New Left Review, No. 158 (1986), p. 106. Papademetriou, in "Marriage," also confirms that the substance of the Family Law had been strongly influenced by the Orthodox Church. The Church's influence was particularly clear in the interpretation of
family structure in patriarchal terms. For more on this, see Papademetriou, p. 13-43.


25. Consistent with the recognition of marriages according to religious criteria, non-Christian citizens (that is, Jews and Muslims) were obliged to marry in the ceremony of their respective religious institutional tradition. Likewise, other Christians (for example, Catholics) were obliged to marry within their own churches. The point is that the criteria for legal recognition of a marriage were based on a purely religious conception of marriage. Papademetriou explains that "[a]ny marriage not solemnized according to its [the Church's] rights was considered ipso jure not to have existed." See Note 3 in Papademetriou, "Marriage," p. 3.

26. According to Papademetriou, the Church's reactions against changes in the Family Law had been nearly continuous, beginning with ND's amendments in the 1975 Constitution establishing equality of the sexes in Greece. See p. 10 in Ibid.


30. Quoted in Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 35. According to Konidaris, Papandreu's remarks were made in a meeting of the Council of Ministers (a state body equivalent to the U.S. Cabinet) on 16 September 1982.

31. Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 61. For an elaboration of this theme, see p. 61-63. These quotes are drawn from a memorandum of 14 August 1987, submitted to the Ministry of Education and Religions, composed by the members of the Epitropi Meletis Ekklesiastikon Thematon (Committee for the Study of Religious Affairs, EMETH). EMETH had been commissioned by the then-Minister of Education and Religions, Antonis Tritsis, in the Ministerial Decision of 4 June 1987. Nikas was the Coordinator of EMETH until his resignation. The original members of EMETH were Savvas Agourides, Petros Vasiliades, Nikolaos Zacharopoulos (President), Charalamboos Papastathis, Fr. Giorgos Pirounakis, Dimitrios Papaiouannou, and Giorgos Tsananas. In interviews with Zacharopoulos and Tsananas in Thessaloniki (15 February 1990) and with Vasiliades in Brookline,
MA (20 March 1990), these subjects supported the notion that the hierarchy viewed PASOK's policies of secularization and modernization as a threat to the role of religion in modern Greek society. For other references to the formation and membership of EMETH, see Theodore N. Zisis, *Oi Laikoi stin Orthodoxi Ekklesia* [The Laity in the Orthodox Church] (Thessaloniki, Greece: Vryennios Publishing, 1989), p. 55 and p. 60.

32. Stelios Papathelemis, who had participated in the legislative processes around the civil marriage issue, considered the government's initial proposal to have been a tactical error with deep implications for rupturing an atmosphere of mutual trust. Interview by the author (Thessaloniki, Greece: 5 August 1989).

33. The *Symvouliou tis Epikrateias* is the supreme tribunal for administrative legal matters in Greece.

34. The Bishop from the Diocese of Kephalonia was contesting the validity of the Synod's decision to replace him on the episcopal throne. For a review of the controversy, see Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 37-38. For a more detailed discussion, see Nikas, *Ekklesia kai Paideia*, p. 11-12.

35. See Chapter Four (Section VII).

36. The amendments to the Constitutional Charter of the Church were passed in N.1351/1983 (Law 1351, April 1983).

37. For a reproduction of Paragraph 8, the amendment to Article 38, see Nikas, *Ekklesia kai Paideia*, p. 11.

38. For a review of these circumstances, see Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 37-38.

39. See Nikas's discussion of this point on p. 10-11 in *Ekklesia kai Paideia*.


41. See Chapter Three for a discussion of the relationship between the Synod of the Hierarchy (Hierarchical Synod) and the Permanent Holy Synod (Holy Synod, or Permanent Synod).


44. Kaklamanis introduced this bill to the Parliament on 14 October 1985. For a reproduction of the Greek text of the bill, as well as the attending commentary on the origins and objectives of the bill, see Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 244-255.


46. For a full discussion of the Church's critiques on these grounds, see Kaklamanis' letter to Archbishop Seraphim in early December 1984, reproduced in Nikas, *Ekklesia kai Paideia*, p. 16-23.


50. In fact, Papandreou's claims about Karamanlis in this regard, although completely inconsistent with the record of cooperative behavior between the two politicians under the first PASOK administration, were consistent with his longstanding claims that "...leaders of political parties which advocate radical changes in the social order cannot be expected to be members of the Establishment." See Andreas Papandreou, *Paternalistic Capitalism* (Minneapolis, MINN: University of Minnesota Press, 1972).


54. The relevant piece of legislation was N1609/1986 (Law 1609, July 1986), and revised Article 305 of the Civil Code.

55. NS1700/1985 (Bill 1700, October 1985). The abbreviation NS is for *nomoschedio*, or bill. For a full reproduction of the bill, see Annex IV in Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 249-254.

56. The bill was referred to as "*to Nomoschedio Kaklamanis.*"
57. Interview by this author with Panayiotis Koumoufas (Athens, Greece: 30 July 1989). The ND government began a review of the question of state expropriation of ecclesiastical property soon after the first elections of the transition period, with the commission of a task force under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Religions. The task force was led by Vlasis Fidas and Spyros Triaannou, both professors on the Faculty of Theology and Faculty of Law, respectively, at the University of Athens.

58. Under the government of Prime Minister Plastiras, N.2185/1952 (Law 2185 of 1952) called for the transfer of eighty percent of the Church’s monastic properties to state ownership. The provisions of the law were never adopted by either the Church or the state, and the issue remained outstanding up until the transition to democracy. For a brief discussion of the history of the law, see Konidaris, Ο Νομος, p. 46-48.

59. Interview by this author with Savvas Agourides (Brookline, MA: October 16, 1990). Agourides had been a member, along with several other lay theologians, of the government committee mandated to draw up new legislation dealing with the management of ecclesiastical properties. Konidaris concurs with Agourides’ perception that the Rallis government decided to abandon the law, given other priorities in the pre-electoral period. For a useful summary of Rallis’ challenges in cementing his leadership within ND, as well as in guiding the party to a post-Karamanlis electoral victory, see Christos Lyrintzis, "Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’?", in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal (London, England: Frank Cass, 1984), p. 108-109. Given the timing of Rallis’ succession to the leadership of the party and the upcoming national elections, the tabling of the law on monastic properties was a logical piece of political cost-benefit analysis; neither Rallis nor the party could afford to risk alienating the Church leadership in the face of what was looming as a close electoral contest with PASOK.

60. Ypourgio Georgias kai Perivallontos.

61. Ypourgio Chorotaxias kai Dimision Ergon.

62. See the first page in the "Introductory Essay to the Bill: ‘Regulation of Issues of Monastic Property." For a reproduction, see Konidaris, Ο Νομος, p. 249.

63. "The Government...undertakes, with the present bill, a first step towards the regulation...of broader relations between State and Church." Reproduced in Konidaris, Ο Νομος, p. 250.

64. The Greek state paid the salary and medical care of the parish clergy, the salary and pension benefits of the entire hierarchy, and the salary of both the ordained- and lay-assistants of the Archbishop and the Metropolitans. The state also covered expenses related to deficits in the Insurance Fund of the Clergy of
Greece, religious education, the functioning of clergy hospitals (which had been recently incorporated into the National Health Care System), and the pension benefits for employees of OGA. For a more detailed listing of these expenses, see Paragraph A on the first page of the "Introductory Essay" to the Kaklamanis Bill, reproduced in Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 249.

65. The memorandum was dated 20 December 1986, and was based on the decisions of an 18-20 November emergency meeting of the Synod in response to the presentation of the Kaklamanis Bill.


67. Ibid., p. 7.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Tritsis reiterated all of these notions in an interview with this author on 20 February 1990, in Athens, Greece.

73. Tritsis, "O Rolos tis Orthodoxias Symera."

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. On 29 August, Tritsis had issued an official response to the memoranda of the Synod and Seraphim.

77. For a summary of the two options suggested by Tritsis, see Konidaris, O Nomos, p. 53-54.

78. In an interview with this author, Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides, one of the members of the Metropolitan Committee created in response to Tritsis' proposals, stressed that the expansion of the state's purview to include the urban properties of the Church marked a significant change in the nature and scope of the Church-state dialogue. In Christodoulos' view, the reorientation suggested that
the ultimate intentions of the state with regard to ecclesiastical properties was to deprive the Church of a major source of its income and, thereby, to curtail the autonomy of the Church which derived from that economic foundation. (Athens, Greece: 11 February 1990).

79. The members of this four-man Hierarchical Committee were: Metropolitan Anthimos Roussa; Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides; Metropolitan Alexios Michalopoulos, and Metropolitan Ieronymos Liapis.

80. In an interview with this author, Tritis confirmed that Papandreou, in the meeting with the Hierarchical Committee, not only had expressed his full support for Tritis' proposals, but that he had emphasized that the range of religious policies of the Ministry towards the Church enjoyed the Prime Minister's endorsement. (Athens, Greece: 20 February 1990).


82. Holy Synod, Aposeiria Aichmalosias, p. 15.

83. Organismos Dioikisis Monasteriakis Periousias.

84. In an interview with this author, Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides stressed that the changes proposed, particularly those regarding the selection of members to O.D.E.P., suggested that PASOK's ultimate intention was to circumscribe the financial and administrative autonomy of the Church. According to Christodoulos, he and the other members of the Metropolitan Committee stressed to Tritis that the working draft marked a dramatic shift in the nature of Church-state relations, a shift which placed the Church in a defensive posture vis-a-vis a potentially hostile state. Athens, Greece: 11 February 1990).

85. This information was discussed in interviews by this author with Metropolitan Christodoulos (Athens, Greece: 11 February 199) and Metropolitan Anthimos Roussas (Athens, Greece: 8 February 1990). According to the official Synodal perspective on the metropolitans' discussion with Tritis, the meeting revealed that "...our Minister was, unfortunately, an untrustworthy person, who was using the [entire] dialogue [between Church and state over the property question]...to impose the burden of its supposed failure on the Church." See Holy Synod, Aposeiria Aichmalosias, p. 16.

86. Ibid., p. 16.

87. For a complete reproduction of the NS1700, "RhythmisiThematonEkklesiastikisPeriousias," ["The Regulation of Questions of Ecclesiastical Property"] and the new Introductory Essay and article-by-article exposition which accompanied it, see Konidarlis, O Nomos, p. 221-243.
88. For the official response of the Church, on an article-by-article basis comparing the Tritsis version of ΝΣ1700 to the original Kaklamanis Bill, see Holy Synod, *Apopeira Aichmalosias*, p. 18-62.

89. *Organismon Dioikisis tis Monastiriakis Periousias*.

90. See Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 8, reproduced in Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 227.

91. Article 8 stipulated the replacement of Article 35 in the 1977 Constitutional Charter of the Church. For a reproduction of the text, see Konidaris, *O Nomos*, p. 228-231.


93. Ibid., p. 47.


95. Interview by this author (Athens, Greece: 11 February 1990). In an interview by this author with Metropolitan Anthimos Roussas (Athens, Greece: 8 February 1990), the same information which was later conveyed in the interview with Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides was discussed.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. For a complete list of the "charter members" of the *Theologikos Syndesmos*, see the group's founding declaration (*Diakrìxis*) of 29 May 1984 published in Thessaloniki, Greece.

99. For a statement about the rationale for the autonomy of the *Theologikos Syndesmos*, see Paragraph 3 in the founding declaration.

100. See Paragraphs 1 and 2 in the founding declaration.

101. See Paragraph 3 in the founding declaration.


103. The conference was held on 20 April 1986.


105. Ibid., p. 12.
106. According to Petros Vasiliades, Tritsis had contacted founding members of the *Syndesmos* in Thessaloniki as well as Athanasios Nikas (give his affiliation), and had been discussing the Church-state issue from before the time of his appointment as Minister of Education and Religions. Interview with this author (Brookline, MA: 23 March 1990).

107. The meeting took place on 13 February 1987, based on a formal invitation to the faculties following his informal invitation at the speech to the Sixth Theological Congress. See Nikas, *Ekklesia kai Paideia*, p. 51-52.

108. Interviews by this author with Panayiotis Koutoufas (Athens, Greece: 17, 18, 20, 30 July 1989), and with Athanasios Nikas (Athens, Greece: 16 February 1990). On p. 52 in *Ekklesia kai Politeia*, Nikas also cited educational issues as one of the main areas of discussion between Tritsis and the theologians.


110. Interviews by the author with Nicos Zacharopoulos and Yiorgos Tsannanas on 15 February 1990 in Thessaloniki, Greece. Similar points were made by Petros Vasiliades, in an interview with the author in Brookline, MA on 20 and 23 March 1990.

111. Zacharopoulos traces the peripheralization of the popular elements in the Church to the emergence within the Church of the same kind of "Western formalism and bureaucracy" which characterize the Greek state. See Nicos Zacharopoulos, "Oi Skheseis Ekklesias-Politeias stin Ekklesia Symera ["Church-State Relations in the Church Today"], in *Skheseis Ekklesias-Politeias*, p. 20.


113. In interviews by this author, the religious convictions and commitment to an active lay participatory role in the Church were expressed by Nicos Zacharopoulos and Yiorgos Tsannanas (Thessaloniki, Greece: 15 February 1990); Athanasios Nikas (Athens, Greece: 13 February 1990); Dimitrios Papaioannou (Athens, Greece: 17 July 1989); and, Petros Vasiliades (Brookline, MA: 23 and 24 March 1990). In a discussion in Brookline, MA on 16 October 1990, these views were reiterated by Savvas Agourides, who placed them in the historical context of efforts by lay elements within the Church to bring about ecclesiastical reforms.


115. The participants in this debate were A. Kanellopoulos (New Democracy), D. Thesillas (KKE), Gr. Yannaros (KKE-esoteriko).
116. The hierarchical liturgy took place at the Church of St. Panteleimon of Acharnon.

117. The demonstration was held on 1 April 1987 in Constitution Square. The main speaker at the demonstration was Metropolitan Christodoulos Paraskevaides (a member of the Metropolitan Committee), who explained the presentation of holy relics in terms of the threat to the Church posed by the property and administrative changes in NS1700; veneration of the relics was appropriate, therefore, as a way of seeking spiritual guidance at a time of such "national crisis."


119. The President of the Republic signed the law on 5 March. One day later, the law was published in the Government Gazette (*Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*) and was deemed in effect immediately.


121. EMETH was established by Ministerial decision on 4 June 1987. As pointed out in Note 30, the original members of EMETH were Savvas Agourides, Petros Vasiliades, Nikolaos Zacharopoulos (President), Charalambos Papastathis, Fr. Giorgos Pirounakis, Dimitrios Papaioannou, Giorgos Tsananas, and Athanasios Nikos (Coordinator).

122. Professor Savvas Agourides, Professor Emeritus of Dogmatic Theology at the University of Athens, had been a long-time vocal supporter of democratization within the Church. In an interview with this author, Agourides explained that, in the twentieth century, the roots of the Church-state conflict over ecclesiastical democratization (that is, a diminution of hierarchical control and a strengthening of the lay voice in the decisionmaking apparatus of the Church) lie in the early 1920s. Agourides had been a critic of the authoritarian government and, more directly in terms of Church-state affairs, of the ideological cooptation of the episcopacy by the political right. Interview on 16 October 1990 in Brookline, MA.


124. This committee was formed by a ministerial decree on 11 June 1987.

125. Interview by the author with Antonis Tritsis on 20 February 1990 in Athens, Greece. Panayiotis Koutoufas reiterated that, based on his own discussions with Tritsis, the objective of EMSPE was to establish a working relationship between representatives of the state and both hierarchical and popular elements in the Church. The objective of securing a perspective which
represented both ordained and lay strata within the Church was a cons ant priority for Trtis, according to those who worked closely with him on the ecclesiastical question (interviews by this author with Panayiotis Koutoufas in Athens, Greece: 22, 26 July 1989; 17, 18, 20, 30 July 1989; 15, 19 January; 18, 21 February 1990).

126. In addition to the four hierarchs from the Metropolitan Committee, the original membership included Athanasios Adrianos, Vice President of the Elenktiko Synedrio (Court of Accounts, which rules on state budgetary matters); Dimitrios Paizis, Honorary Counsel on the Symvouleion tis Epikrateias (Council of State, the supreme tribunal for administrative legal matters); Konstantinos Stamatis, Honorary Prosecutor for the Areios Pagos (the Supreme Court for civil and penal law cases); Michalis Statopoulos, Professor of Law, University of Athens; Ioannis Manoledakis, Dean of the School of Legal and Economic Sciences at the University of Thessaloniki. The two EMETH members on the committee were Savvas Agourides, Professor Emeritus, University of Athens; and Nicos Zacharopoulos, Dean of the School of Theology at the University of Thessaloniki. See Ministerial Decision AI.660, 11 June 1990.

127. For a review of the committee's responsibilities, see Ministerial Decision AI.660, 11 June 1990.


129. Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 98. This view was reiterated to the author in interviews with Nicos Zacharopoulos and Yiorgos Tsannanas (Thessaloniki, Greece: 15 February 1990).

130. Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 98.

131. See ibid., p. 99, for a reiteration of these ideas.

132. For a complete version of the EMETH "General and Specific Principles" for a new Constitutional Charter of the Church, see Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 95-97. These were reproduced in the 7 February 1988 issue of the Greek daily newspaper, To Vima. In interviews with the author (18 and 20 July 1990), Panayiotis Koutoufas opined that the Vima article was a leak, although he stated that he did not know who provided the information to the press.

133. This meeting, as well as most other subsequent communications between Papandreou and Seraphim were arranged through back-door communications which deliberately excluded Trtis--an objective which Seraphim had been seeking since the introduction of the Trtis Bill to Parliament in early 1987. Although there is no published documentation on these meetings, much less on their arrangement, it is nearly impossible to know how the meetings came about. However, in interviews by this author, Trtis and his advisor Panayiotis Koutoufas,
members of EMETH, as well as members of the Metropolitan Council, concurred in the view that Lilaios arranged the meetings.

134. Author's interview with Antonis Tritsis in Athens, Greece on 20 February 1990.

135. N. 1811 was signed by the new Minister of Education and Religions, George Papandreou, on 18 August 1988.

136. Lyrintzis goes as far as stating that "PASOK's electoral was a mirror image of Greek society...[based on its electoral support from]...farms, workers, employees, craftsmen and artisans, the youth and all the people who are subject to odious exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign." See "Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece," p. 111-113.


138. One of the party's main campaign slogans in the 1981 elections was "PASOK in government, the people in power".

139. Notable examples of nationalized industries included pharmaceuticals, airlines, and cement.

140. The main result of the government's neo-Keynesian program was a marked rise in wage and income levels, accompanied by increased import demand and flat domestic productivity levels. For a summary discussion of the PASOK government's initial economic policies and their results, see p. 225-227 in Spourdalakis, The Rise.


142. The government announced the stabilization program on 11 October 1985. For a list of sources discussing the background and objectives of the stabilization program, see Tsoukalas, "The Austerity Program," Note 4, p. 211-212.

143. According to Loukas Tsoukalas, the country's economic performance for the 1980s was disastrous when compared to the growth and structural indices for the 1960s and, even, to the more problematic 1970s. Tsoukalas characterizes the
state as an albatross around the neck of the Greek economy, pointing to the fact that the public sector deficit reached 20% of gross domestic product by the end of the 1980s. Lecture on "Greece and the Challenges of Adjustment: Economic Modernization" at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA: 28 January 1993). For criticism of the PASOK governments' role in Greece's public sector debt accumulation, see Petras, "PASOK in Power," p. 14.


145. For an evaluation of the PASOK austerity measures, both in terms of economic realism and political constraints, see p. 205-210 in Tsoukalis, "The Austerity Program."

146. See Chapter Four.

147. The list of parliamentary deputies who were expelled for criticizing Papandreou's policymaking style and/or decisions, as well as former cabinet members who resigned or were sacked for tactical reasons, is long. Some of the more noteworthy cases include Tritsis, former Minister of the Economy Gerasimos Arsenis and, more recently, former Minister of Foreign Policy, Antonis Samaras.

148. For example, one of the most significant cabinet changes occurred in February 1987, when the entire cabinet was overhauled in response to PASOK's losses in the municipal elections of October 1986 and to the wave of strikes by all major unions during the first two months of the year. The elections were interpreted as a sign of the electorate's rejection of the austerity measures, and Papandreou turned to a cabinet overhaul; the shuffle marked a key turning point for yet another policymaking battle within the party and state structures, over how to salvage the party's declining electoral margin in the two-year run-up to the national elections slated for 1989. In a discussion of PASOK's austerity program, Tsoukalis points to the lack of policy continuity which resulted from the frequency of cabinet reshuffling under the PASOK governments; he cites intra-party fragmentation and the primacy of Papandreou as important factors in explaining the cabinet changes. See p. 202-204 and, especially, p. 204 in "The Austerity Program."

149. The concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister had been given added institutional support by the revisions in the 1985 Constitution.


153. In this author's discussion with Antonis Tritsis, the former PASOK Minister emphasized that one of the fundamental aims of complementing the economic-financial clauses with the article on ecclesiastical democratization in N1700 had been to ensure every possible measure for a revitalization of the Church's role in Greek civil society. Tritsis argued that the unique historical role of the Church had made it the strongest institutional power in civil society, but by the same token, the legal-constitutional relationship between Church and state had severely limited the former's capacity to function as a force for strengthening civil society and democracy in Greece. Interview on 20 February 1990 in Athens, Greece.

154. In discussions with this author in Cambridge, MA over the course of the 1992-1993 academic year, George Papandreou, the Minister of Education and Religions who succeeded Tritsis on the latter's resignation, emphasized the importance of the ideological and psychological perspective of the radical founders of PASOK vis-a-vis the Church. Papandreou pointed out that, particularly for the members of PAK and for the student supporters of PASOK, the Church was identified with the politics of the dictatorship and, therefore, was seen as an historically-grounded obstacle to democracy.

155. According to Michalis Spourdalakis, despite Papandreou's own leanings towards the economic programs and management style advocated by the technocratic tendency, the palaiokommatikoi voice within the party was by far the most constant and, increasingly, the strongest over the course of the two PASOK administrations. The capacity of the palaiokommatikoi politicians to shape and constrain policymaking was primarily the result of their extensive clientelistic networks and their ability to utilize the state apparatus to expand PASOK's constituency. Interview by the author (Athens, Greece: 28 August, 1989).

156. For a discussion of the Church-state dialogue around the question of revisions in grade-school textbooks and, particularly, the Church's opposition to the inclusion of the Darwinian theory of evolution, see Nikas, Ekklesia kai Paideia, p. 13-42. For a more detailed account, see Athanasios Nikas, Arthra kai Meletes Ekpaideftikou kai Koinonikou Provlmatismou [Articles and Studies on the Educational and Social Problem] (Athens, Greece: 1989).

157. According to Spourdalakis, the most radical members of the party were often consigned to low profile ministerial positions which allowed them little latitude for policymaking with the potential for broad-based impact. See The Rise, p. 240-241.
158. In discussions with this author (Cambridge, MA: fall 1992-spring 1993), George Papandreou explained that Tritis's appointment to the Ministry of Education and Religions was based not only on careful consideration of his policymaking record and credentials, but on the tactical assessment of his appeal to both the radical and technocratic elements within the government and the electorate. In contrast to Tritis' record as the former Minister of Public Order and the Environment (Υπουργός Χωροτάξεως και Περιβάλλοντος), Kaklamanis had come to be seen as an old-style, palaiokommatikoi politician. In discussions by this author with Nicos Zacharopoulos (Thessaloniki, Greece: 15 February 1990), Petros Vassiliades (Brookline, MA: 23 March 1990), Athanassios Nikas (Athens, Greece: 13 February 1990), and Panayiotis Koutoufas (Athens, Greece: 8 August 1992), these individuals concurred that the selection of Tritis was as much a policymaking decision as a tactical political choice, based on what had come to be his reputation for creative problem-solving and a quality of "radical Don Quijotism" vis-a-vis politics.

159. Both Panayiotis Koutoufas (Athens, Greece: 17, 18 20 July 1989; 8 August 1992) and Antonis Tritsis (Athens, Greece: 20 February 1990) confirmed this point in interviews with this author. Further, in discussions with this author in Cambridge, MA in the spring of 1993, George Papandreou observed that Prime Minister Papandreou had been in basic agreement over the general direction of the revisions in the Kaklamanis Bill which Tritis proposed to undertake; however, Papandreou's attention to the Church-state question was not focused and consistent, since economic problems and, increasingly, internal party disputes and political scandals, came to occupy the Prime Minister's attention. In an interview with the author, Stelios Paphathemelis, PASOK Minister of Parliament, maintained that Papandreou had no coherent policy towards the Church and religion. Paphathemelis claimed that, aside from the bare-bones outline reflected in the Church-state versus Church-nation distinction, Papandreou was not preoccupied with Church-state issues, which therefore explains his willingness to let Tritsis develop the existing Kaklamanis Bill as he saw fit. (Thessaloniki, Greece: 5 August 1989).

160. Interview with Antonis Tritsis in Athens, Greece on 20 February 1990.

161. The long-awaited First Party Congress (Papandreou had been promising since the founding of the movement that the Congress would be held) was held after numerous postponements on 10-13 May 1984.


163. Author's interview with Antonis Tritsis (Athens, Greece: 20 February 1990).

164. See Chapter Three for a discussion of the political and institutional reasons explaining the historical evolution of a hierarchico-centric ecclesiastical
structure. Regarding the increasing top-heaviness of PASOK's decisionmaking structure, see Chapter Four.


166. Nikas directly addresses this failure to educate the public about the full scope of the debate on NS1700, although he tends to place the onus of responsibility for such discussion on the state. See his comments on p. 58-59 and p. 66 in Ekklesia kai Paideia. Nikas does allude to the possibility of intra-PASOK constraints on Tritis' ability to publicly frame the Church-state in terms of the democratization issues involved (see p. 66 in the same source). However, there is no written discussion by any of the EMETH members involved in drafting the proposed revisions in the Ecclesiastical Charter, nor by members of the Theologikos Syndesmos who favored the democratization measures, of the lay intellectuals' failure to present the NS1700 controversy in terms of democratic renewal and reform. Likewise, in interviews with EMETH members and with Panayiotis Koutoufas and George Papandreou, the only explanation offered touched on the growing intra-party concerns with the upcoming national elections; Tritis autonomy of action, then, was defined by the constraints of Papandreou and palaiokommatikoi electoral priorities. In interviews with this author (Athens, Greece: 18, 21 February 1990; 8 August 1992), Koutoufas discussed Tritis' awareness of the failure to frame the public debate in the language of democratic reform; Koutoufas would only go as far as suggesting that the lack of follow-through was merely the result of organizational inefficiency within the Ministry of Education and Religions and Tritis' preoccupation with Papandreou's mounting lack of support for the implementation of Law 1700 and the EMETH proposals on the Ecclesiastical Charter.


168. In interviews with the author, several former EMETH members explained that the politicization of the questions of revision of the Ecclesiastical Charter and separation of Church and state occurred with the growing involvement of Papandreou and Archbishop Seraphim prior to and immediately following the passage of Law 1700. Further, as Papandreou's support for Tritis to continue the process of Church-state restructuring became increasingly unreliable, and as the Prime Minister's decisions on the subject seemed to be dictated by electoral concerns related to the emergence of several political scandals, the lay reformists grew disaffected with the party. Interview with Nicos Zacharopoulos and Yiorgos Tsannanas (Thessaloniki, Greece: 15 February 1990).


CONCLUSION

"[The Orthodox] Church and [the Byzantine] Empire form a great unity and community; it is not possible for them to be separated from one another."\(^1\)

Ecumenical Patriarch Antony IV, 1397

"Orthodoxy, as the Greek people see it today, is a national religion...irreplaceable in the popular conscience...For this reason it is impossible to conceive of separation of church and state in Greece."\(^2\)

Well-known writer and social critic in Greece, George Theotokas, 1960

"A Greece of Christian Greeks!"

Slogan of the military dictatorship ruling Greece from 1967 to 1974

"The nation and Orthodoxy...have become in the Greek conscience virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno-Christian civilization."\(^3\)

President of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, 1981

"By virtue of the daring confrontation of the Greek Orthodox spirit with the contemporary world, our own distinctive national identity will be shaped today."\(^4\)

Minister of Education and Religions under the PASOK government, Antonis Tritsis, 1986

The above quotations point to the salience of the Orthodox religion in public life over a Greek historical trajectory spanning more than a millenia-and-a-half, and to the Church-state dyad as the fulcrum for interactions between politics and religion. This dissertation explored the salience of the links between political and religious change in contemporary Greece, by puzzling over the ability of the Church of Greece to influence the agenda and outcome of state religious policies under the PASOK governments of the 1980s.
The influence of the Church on PASOK's religious policies was perplexing for several reasons. First, PASOK's election with a huge electoral majority, on a platform for democratic transformation through the institutional restructuring of society, reflected a broad mandate for reformulating the roles of Church and state in Greek society. Yet, the dualism in and mixed results of PASOK's religious policy suggested that the party leadership was ambivalent about how to use its electoral mandate, with regard to redefining Church-state relations within the context of modern, competitive democracy in Greece. Second, the Church's influence on state religious policies took both an oppositional and a cooperative form. The Church's conflicting stands suggested fragmentation within the ecclesiastical organization. Different actors pursued different strategies and goals for the Church during the PASOK tenure in office but, remarkably, these same competing actors shared a willingness to politics to achieve religious and ecclesiastical goals. Finally, given that both state and Church discussed their agendas in terms which linked their institutional roles in the public sphere to conceptions of collective identity, the Church-state relationship in 1980s Greece challenged the secularization thesis that modernity axiomatically causes the marginalization of religion in public life, and pointed to the ways in which the interface between culture and politics creates space for religion in modern societies.

What conclusions emerge from the dissertation's exploration of the above issues? In particular, what was the outcome of the Church-state interactions under PASOK, and what were the reasons for this outcome? What does the Church's ability to influence the agenda and results of PASOK's religious policies suggest
about the legitimacy of the Greek state? Finally, does the relationship between politics and religion in public life in contemporary Greece bear on the country's emerging role in the transitional context of the transitions to democracy underway in the Balkans?

It is impossible to characterize the outcome of Church-state interactions under PASOK in terms of complete successes or failures, since both institutions can claim to have achieved at least some part of their respective goals. However, one way of characterizing the outcome is as a stalemate, with each institution achieving its minimalist strategy. The assessment of the outcome as a stalemate makes sense in terms of a view of Church-state interactions as a straightforward, balance of power contest between institutional actors which framed their relationship in zero-sum terms, regarding the influence of each institution in Greek society. The state's gain was the Church's loss, and vice versa. The state could claim significant success in its initial moves in the direction of the institutional separation of Church and state, by implementing those policies most consistent with pluralist notions of individual choice. For example, the liberalization of the Greek Family Law and associated social policies such as abortion, adultery, and civil marriage, removed the Church and Orthodoxy as a decisive factor and made these issues a matter of individual choice for all citizens. Conversely, the Church could claim remarkable success in its objective of preserving the constitutional relationship with the state which obtained on PASOK's entry into office, an‘ in blocking state efforts to legislate on the internal organizational structure of the Church.
In those areas where the Church felt its interests in society most directly threatened, it was able to effectively mobilize support to protect those interests. Aside from the clear case of NS1700, the controversy over civil marriages illustrates this point. PASOK's initial legislative proposals amounted to Church-state separation on the marriage question. The deluge of protest statements and demands to involve Papandreou in the legislation convinced Minister Kaklamanis's to compromise, by offering civil marriage as an option rather than a requirement, so that the state backed down from any direct challenge to the Church's authority in society. Where PASOK felt that it could move towards its stated goals of Church-state separation while avoiding any public backlash from a perceived state attack on the Church-nation connection, the government refused to compromise on its aims. The extensive revisions in Greek Family Law illustrates this calculation.

Yet an assessment of the results of Church-state interactions as a stalemate, while not inaccurate, is one-dimensional. The stalemate interpretation fails to appreciate the dynamism of the relationship, by ignoring the strong differences among actors within each institution regarding tactics and objectives, and by failing to account for the historical and cultural dimensions of the relationship.

The dynamism in the Church-state relationship cannot be separated from the historical conjuncture of the regime change in Greece. Indeed, one of the important observations to emerge from the dissertation concerns the ways in which the project of democratization affected, and even encouraged, links between religious and political transformation. In general, actors in both Church and state perceived the political opening and social reconfiguration of the regime change as
an opportunity for a redefinition of the role of each institution in Greek society. The discussions on the religious provisions in the Constitution of 1975, as well as the ND-PASOK disagreements over the importance of history and culture in defining Greece's place with "the West" versus "the East," indicated that the construction of pluralist democracy included possible changes for the role of the Church and Orthodoxy in society.

Equally important, different groups within each institution constructed their own analyses, which were not fully compatible, of how PASOK's particular program for socialist democratization might affect Church-state relations. For example, Papandreou's earliest pronouncements on religion and the Church emphasized Church-state separation as essential to democracy, but paid scant attention to the specifics of reinforcing the Church-nation linkage. In contrast, Tritsis provided a full articulation of the connections between the institutional and cultural aspects of PASOK's dualist policy on religion, maintaining that the former was a prerequisite for sustaining the latter under Greece's ongoing modernization process, and arguing that a strong democratic society in Greece required a vital, democratic Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, the lay theologians centered at the University of Thessaloniki interpreted the regime change, PASOK's call for allaghi, and Tritsis' invitation for Church-state cooperation as a watershed moment for making internal reforms they viewed as essential to a new role for the Church in a modern, competitive democracy. The hierarchy, however, viewed the general fluidity of the regime transition and the uncertainties of the country's first socialist government as a risky environment for the Church and its interests (economic, political, and cultural) in Greek society.
Focus on the intra- and inter-institutional factors noted above leads to a more discerning conclusion about the outcome of Church-state interactions under PASOK than is suggested in the notion of a stalemate. The lack of internal cohesion characterizing each institution contributed to the interpenetration of politics and religion; as both Church and state exerted an influence on the strategies of the other, the political and organizational identities of each institution evolved through a process of mutual adaptation and interaction. Moreover, the interpenetration of the two institutions helps to explain a paradox reflected in the overall pattern of Church-state relations under PASOK: on the one hand, the relationship between the official Church, represented by the Holy Synod, and the PASOK state, represented by the Ministry of Education and Religions, become increasingly antagonistic as the 1980s progress; on the other hand, relations between the lay strata of the Church, represented by the reformist theologians from Theologikos Syndesmos, and the state Ministry became increasingly cooperative.

Both the paradoxical nature and the results of the Church-state interactions are rooted in the institutional dynamics of the relationship. The responses of the official Church to PASOK's policies on religion depended as much on the internal dissension between hierarchy and laity as on the Synod's interpretation of the impact of state policies on the Church's role in society. As the dissertation interviews revealed, the Synod's intense reaction against PASOK's proposals to reorganize the economic and administrative structure was fueled by the perception that lay strata, particularly those on the Left of the ideological spectrum, were attempting to shift the balance of power from the top of the ecclesiastical pyramid to the laity. The dissertation interviews also showed that the decision by lay
reformers to cooperate with the state reflected their assessment that politics was the best mechanism for resolving intra-institutional blocks to ecclesiastical change. The fact that the formal cooperation between the Ministry and the lay theologians from Thessaloniki did not begin until the start of the second administration helps to explain the deterioration in Synodal relations with the state from that point on.

Intra-institutional factors to PASOK also played a role in the pattern of Church-state relations during the 1980s. The minimal overt confrontation between Church and state during the first PASOK administration was partly the result of the party's ideological and organizational make-up. On its entry into office in 1981, PASOK's programmatic pronouncements on religion and the Church were extremely general and consistent with the party's ideological confusion over its socialist-populist identity. During PASOK's first term, the initial euphoria over electoral success allowed for enough ideological and organizational consensus to bring about social policy changes which indirectly affected the Church. However, by the start of PASOK's second term in office, organizational and ideological battles played an important role in the party's reorientation of its religious policies. Papandreou's choice of Tritsis to direct the Ministry for the second administration was deliberately calculated to regain the support of what remained of the radical tendency within the party organization. The Prime Minister's willingness to give Tritsis significant autonomy in articulating the party's dualist line on religion, as well as to use the language of democratic participation to mobilize popular support for reform, was also an attempt to placate those radicals who claimed that the palaiokommatikoi tendency had seized control of the party.
Taking account of the institutional dynamics which fostered the interpenetration of Church and state, one of the most interesting points to emerge in assessing the outcome of the relationship under PASOK is the degree of similarity in the organizational structures and tactics of the two institutions. Both organizations were characterized by centralized, hierarchical and rigid decisionmaking structures. Just as ultimate decisionmaking control within the party had become concentrated in the person of Papandreou (and, to a lesser extent, a small coterie of Cabinet Ministers he perceived as loyal to him), decisionmaking in the ecclesiastical structure was centralized in the Holy Synod and, especially, in the person of Archbishop Seraphim. For the reformist theologians, this structure meant taking their program for renewal of lay participation to the political arena and out of the direct control of the hierarchy. For radical elements in PASOK, the policymaking structure meant a need to work autonomously and to secure the support of Papandreou at critical junctures.

However, those organizational factors which forced political radicals and religious reformists to circumvent status quo interests in both institutions and to forge new inter-institutional alliances, also functioned as limits which defined the outcome of Church-state relations by the end of the 1980s. For just as religious reformists built alliances with a Ministry of Education and Religions calling for democratization in the Church, anti-reformists in the Synod cemented the leadership-to-leadership links which had worked in the past to create the existing internal and intra-institutional balance of power. In fact, the direct, two-way access between Papandreou and Archbishop Seraphim decided the outcome of the NS1700 controversy.
The compromise version of Law 1700 offers the most striking response to the question about the outcome of PASOK's policies. Law 1700 passed under George Papandreou's tenure at the Ministry of Education and Religions (following Tritsis' resignation) marks the failure of PASOK's religious policy. The party failed to bring about the legal-constitutional separation of Church and state, a factor reinforced by the first-term compromise on the civil marriage law. The failure to realize Church-state separation also represented a missed opportunity for PASOK to fulfill its electoral pledge to democratize the institutional bases of Greek society. In one respect, the compromise version of Law 1700 represented a tactical victory for the party. Interview subjects for the dissertation suggested that the Church's lack of public comment on the administrative and personal scandals that rocked PASOK in the period leading up to the 1989 elections was the direct result of the Papandreou-Seraphim meetings preceding the revised Law 1700.5

In terms of the Church, the outcome of PASOK's policies can be seen as a victory for the status quo interests represented by the Holy Synod, and a defeat for those forces favoring reform within the Church as the best means for making the message of Orthodoxy relevant to public life in Greece's new democracy; certainly, the compromise version of Law 1700 represents this line of thinking. The social policies passed by PASOK during its first term in office represented a shift towards the separation of Church and state, although the failure to reinforce this initial reorientation with changes in the legal-constitutional status of the Church and Orthodoxy as the established religion of Greece protects the legal-formal distinctions enjoyed by the Church and ensures that the hierarchical strata of the Church enjoy a kind of priority access to the state not available to popular
strata in the Church. For the institutional Church as a whole, then, the results of PASOK's religious policies can be interpreted as a setback for those voices agitating for institutional restructuring.

One of the most thought-provoking aspects of the process and outcome of Church-state relations under PASOK is the cultural dimensions of the relationship, particularly those which relate to the sacred and secular dimensions of collective identity. Indeed, despite the fragmentation and internal conflicts which characterized each institution, it is striking that *none* of the actors involved in the Church-state interactions of the PASOK period questioned PASOK's emphasis on the indissoluble link between state and nation. This dissertation insisted on the importance of historical analysis to understanding culture as a subjective order of meanings, cognitions, and values which has a determinant impact on politics; by the same token, the dissertation acknowledged that politics also shapes the reconstruction of culture. As the historical analysis demonstrated, the Orthodox religion was a vital part of the process of forming Greek culture. The Orthodox worldview shaped the Byzantine imperial strategy, the interpretation and survival of four centuries of the *millet* system and the Great Idea of Greek foreign policy. The subjective order which grew out of the religious aspects of these historical experiences was also informed by secular notions of imperial conquest, colonial subjugation, and nationalism. In combination, these religious and secular notions formed the collective stock of subjective historical experiences constituting Greek culture at the time of PASOK's entry into government.

The admixture of political and religious imageries, ideas, beliefs, and visions which formed Greek culture had been reinforced by and perpetuated by the
interpenetration of Church and state. However, as the dissertation revealed in examining the three Church-state models, historical experiences led to inconsistencies and contradictions in the sacred and secular dimensions of Greek culture, and fostered power struggles between Church and state for control over the construction and reconstruction of culture. The constitutional model reflected an attempt to sustain, however imperfectly, a conception of collective identity which encompassed both Orthodox religious and secular nationalist elements of Greek collective identity; but the constitutional model also perpetuated the contradictions and confusion which permeated the collective imagination of self.

PASOK's dualist religious policy can be understood as an attempt to supersede the tensions in the collective identity, but at the same time, to establish the unrivalled legitimacy of the state in defining and protecting the nation as reflection of this identity. In addition to the party's stated policy of respecting the bond between Church and nation, the PASOK leadership demonstrated directly and indirectly that it acknowledged and endorsed the religious features of the Greek collective identity. For example, Papandreou's astute coupling of anti-Western and anti-Turkish foreign policy planks appealed to the religious elements of Greece's Byzantine grandeur as well as the historical struggle against the Ottomans. The language of both Kaklamanis and Tritsis was sprinkled with overt references to the centrality of Orthodoxy to historical and contemporary collective identity in Greece.

But the fact that the nation-Church bond reflected an acceptance of Orthodoxy as a constitutive feature of the national identity does not reduce the critical importance of the party's insistence on the institutional separation of Church and
state as a prerequisite for modern, pluralist democracy. By dissolving the constitutional bond between Church and state, the PASOK policy implied that the Church became like any other institution and interest group in Greek society. This decoupling of Church and state, thereby, would have established the latter as the undisputed arbiter of the nation, the imagined community.

The Church's ability to use politics to successfully block the party's dualist objectives not only reinforces what PASOK's policy implied—that the Orthodox religion is an indissoluble piece of collective imaginary—but preserves the Church's claim, via constitutional prioritization, to participate with the state in the definition and protection of that identity. Insofar as Papandreou reached an accommodation with the Church which reflected the demands of the hierarchy regarding Church-state relations, the outcome amounts to an acknowledgement by the political leadership of the determinant influence of religion on certain political processes in Greece, and provokes questions about the legitimacy of the state in Greece to stand as the single institutional power responsible for the ultimate ends of the collectivity. Any explanation of the Church's ability to affect state religious policies under PASOK, then, must account for the mutually determinant relationship between politics and culture.

As noted earlier in this Conclusion, the dissertation has shown how the project of democratization in Greece led to a reconsideration of both the institutional and cultural aspects of the links between religion and politics. The place for religion in public life was a part of the discussion about how to construct a pluralist democracy and to modernize Greece, and about the meaning of collective identity. The Church-state relationship in Greece under PASOK raises some interesting
ideas for comparative work with the Balkans, and also may serve as a learning experience from which Greece might approach regional questions.

Greece's ability to serve as a referent, as well as her ability to offer constructive advice on the religio-political challenges related to democratization, derives from the fact that Albania, Bulgaria, and the Serbian Republic share similar Orthodox religious traditions and political histories (at least until the WWI period) with Greece. Given key similarities in the role of Orthodoxy in the evolution of politics and culture in the region, the Greek experience is important for two fundamental reasons. First, the Greek case suggests that the resolution of incongruities between state and society along lines consistent with pluralist democracy must necessarily consider institutional relations between Church and state. The legitimacy of the new states, as arbiter of collective identity and as guarantor of the interests of all groups in civil society, may be affected by the constitutional relationships established with the Orthodox churches (or any other religious institutions, for that matter). Likewise, the reconstruction of civil society by fostering the participation of institutions operating according to democratic norms and values may engender processes of internal transformation in the Orthodox churches of the region; as in the Greek case, the elaboration and outcome of potential democratic transformations within the churches may be conditioned by the legal-formal links between state and church. It will be interesting to watch the process continue to unfold, as actors within the Greek state and the Orthodox Church of Greece apply their domestic experiences to Greece's role in the Balkans.

2. Quoted in Theofanis Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church of Greece," in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century. Christianity Under Duress* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), p. 186. Theotokas' words are especially interesting when considered in light of the fact that he is generally considered to have belonged to the modernist cultural current which equated Greece's modernization with westernization.


4. Speech by Antonis Tritsis, Minister of Education and Religions, on "*O Rolos tis Orthodoxias Simera*" ["The Role of Orthodoxy Today"] (Athens, Greece, 5 September 1986).

5. This view was voiced by a large number of interview subjects, including Yiorgios Tsannanas, Nicos Zahiropoulos (Thessaloniki, Greece: 15 February 1990); Athanassios Nikas (Athens, Greece: 9 February 1990); and George Papandreou (Cambridge, MA: fall 1992). For more on the emergence of PASOK's pre-electoral scandals, see Chapter Five.
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