EMERGING PATTERNS OF NATIONALISM IN INDUSTRIAL EAST ASIA: TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA IN AN INTERDEPENDENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the emerging patterns of nationalism among the college students in Taiwan and South Korea, two of the four Mini Dragons in industrial East Asia. Based on in-depth interviews conducted in Taiwan and South Korea with college students, this study concludes that there is an identifiable and distinctive pattern of nationalism reflecting an intergenerational break from previous generations of nationalism in each of these two societies. The analysis further demonstrates that the conventional wisdom of assuming commonality between Taiwan and South Korea fails to capture the profound nuances in terms of the political cultures of these two Confucian societies with similar historical and developmental trajectories. The study argues that in the case of Taiwan and South Korea a long tradition of cultural identity does not necessarily reinforce or produce a stable and coherent sense of political identity. The new pattern of nationalism represents a new search for national identity which is intrinsically different from the nineteenth century reform nationalism and twentieth century anticolonialism. The Taiwanese pattern is characterized by a strong sense of ambivalence in terms of its cultural identity and political identity. Whereas the Korean students' nationalist sentiments manifest a pattern of polarity. These new patterns represent a persistent intergenerational change rather than a life-cycle effect. The ambivalent Taiwanese nationalism is reflected in students' uncertainty about Taiwan's political identity vis-a-vis China; in their ambivalence toward traditional cultural heritage and values of modernity; and in their general ambivalence toward the ultimate benefits or social costs of modernization. Such deep-seated ambivalence leads to political pragmatism and dampens potential galvanization of nationalist sentiments among Taiwanese students. The Korean polarity is reflected in their students' sharp criticisms of Confucian heritage while their conducts manifest a pattern of deeply Confucianized behavior; in their unequivocal desire for unification based on traditional ethnic and cultural identities while their political beliefs reflect an equally intense commitment to democracy and market economy; in their intense victim-based antiforeignism while their attitudes reflect a keen appreciation of the significance of global interdependence; in the coupling of strong demands for virtuous and paternalistic ruling authorities and unyielding quests for human rights and democracy; and the coexistence of emphases on egalitarian values and elitism.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This is a thesis on the emerging patterns of nationalism among the youth in Taiwan and South Korea, two of the four Little Dragons in industrial East Asia. These are two dramatically changing societies that are remarkable economic successes and are new in the process of finding themselves politically. With success has come a search for a new sense of nationhood. Both societies share a Confucian tradition and both had strong historic past but both must now find a new place, based on a new sense of nationalism. This thesis will provide a comparative perspective into the emerging patterns of nationalism in these two societies. Modern nationalism, in a broad sense, is a manifestation of the basic group identity. Modern nationalism not only serves as a galvanizing force in the quest for national modernization but also conditions and shapes the political discourse of a wide range of major issues on the national agenda of development. In the arena of domestic politics, in the responses to international crises, in the interaction with foreign national governments, as well as in the negotiation of any international issues, traces of nationalism are visible on every level of political process such as bargaining, policy deliberation, and policy implementation. The spectacular economic success

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of industrial East Asia and the Pacific Basin's increasing strategic importance in the post Cold War global community warrant an in-depth examination of the new pattern of nationalism in this area. It is not difficult for seasoned politicians and journalists who have been observing this area to sense a shifting pattern in East Asia's nationalist sentiments in the last decade or so. Such changes are reflected in people's renewed interests in various versions of their nationalist past, increasingly assertive attitudes toward foreign policy issues, outbreaks of anti-American mass movements, as well as domestic pressures to resolve or reassess issues of national unification or territorial disputes.

The study of the phenomenon of nationalism in Taiwan and South Korea is made all the more important by the unsettled state of post-War division and the accompanying thorny issue of national identity. Closely related to our study in Taiwan and South Korea is the problem of defining the nature of these two polities. [1] They are both divided countries. The Nationalist (Kuomintang) government retreated to Taiwan in 1949 while Mao Tse-tung announced the establishment of People's Republic of China in Beijing. Korea was divided along the 38th degree

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[1] In this thesis, we shall not deliberately distinguish between Taiwan and Republic of China. We would also use South Korea and Republic of Korea interchangeably.

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parallel in 1945 by the two superpowers. Both sides, either People's Republic of China - Republic of China or Democratic People's Republic of Korea - Republic of Korea, have consistently expressed the official desire for eventual unification of the country. The political leadership and the general public, in the final analysis, never admit the possibility for permanent separation. It is generally maintained that the present division represents only an aberration in their national history. Yet the de facto co-existence of separate regimes, administrative structures, distinct territorial boundaries, international recognitions, and national memberships in many international organizations, etc. all seemed to suggest separate and independent political entities. Therefore it is still debatable whether these two systems are independent states or part of a divided country.

There has been a gradual growth of scholarly interests in the two societies. In the initial post World War II years Taiwan and South Korea were not on the forefront of western social science interests. In 1945 Taiwan was turned over to the Nationalist government of China and Korea regained its independence in the wake of Japanese surrender. Wartime devastation severely impeded the postwar reconstruction efforts. In the 1950s and early 60s United States aid and advice provided the

necessary financial and technical assistance in their
national reconstruction programs.[2] In those days,
American social scientists' understanding of Taiwan and
Korea was only at a beginner's phase.[3] Since the 1970s,
both societies began receiving increasing scholarly
attention as part of the academic focus on development
studies. Scholars of various camps of intellectual
persuasion, or paradigms, began examining their post
World War II developmental experiences.[4] Modernization
theorists in the United States used them to verify

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[2] Neil H. Jacoby, <u>U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of
Aid, Self Help, and Development</u> New York: Praeger, 1966.

[3] See, for example, George W. Barclay, <u>Colonial
Development and Population in Taiwan</u> Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1954; Doak A. Barnett
"Formosa: Political Potpourri." American Universities
Field Staff, East Asia Series 3(13), 1954; Cornelius
Osgood, <u>The Koreans and Their Culture</u> New York: Ronald
Press, 1951.

[4] Development studies such as Edward S. Mason and
Mahn Je Kim et. al. <u>The Economic and Social Modernization
of the Republic of Korea</u> Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1979; Anne O. Krueger, <u>The
Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid</u>,
Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1979; Noel E.
McGinn et. al. <u>Education and Development in Korea</u>
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980; Leroy
Jones and Il SaKong, <u>Government, Business, and
Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case</u>
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980; Rober Wade
and Gordon White eds., <u>Developmental States in East Asia:
Capitalist and Socialist</u> Brighton, England: Institute of
Development Studies, IDS Bulletin 15, 1984; Walter
Galenson ed. <u>Economic Growth and Structural Change in
Taiwan</u> Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979; Gustav
Ranis, "Equity with Growth in Taiwan: How 'Special' Is
the 'Special Case'?" **World Development** 6(3), March 1978:
pp. 397-409.

theories formulated in the fifties and sixties.[5]
Beginning in the late seventies, dependencia advocates
and critics used these two cases to support or criticize
the validity of dependency theories.[6] Mainstream
political scientists began to reexamine earlier theories
in light of the new evidences found in many NICs.[7] The
rise of Japan and the Pacific Rim vis-a-vis the decline
of Pax Americana in the eighties brought in another surge
of intellectual interests in Taiwan and South Korea, two

[5] See, for example, Sung M. Pae, Testing Democratic
Theories in Korea Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1986. Also, Ramon H. Myers, "Political Theory
and Recent Political Development in the Republic of
China," in Asian Survey 27, 1987: pp. 1003-1022.

[6] See Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History:
A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory,"
Modern China, 5(3), July 1979: pp. 341-380; Richard E.
Barrett and Martin King Whyte, " Dependency Theory and
Taiwan: Analysis of A Deviant Case," American Journal of
Sociology 87, March 1982: pp. 1064-1089. For an
application of world system, statist, and other paradigms
on Taiwan, see Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh
eds. Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of
Taiwan Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1988.

[7] See, for example, Myron Weiner and Samuel P.
Huntington eds. Understanding Political Development
Boston: Little Brown, 1987. Huntington's article on "The
Goals of Development" in this volume provides an
insightful observation on East Asian developmental
experience and its theoretical relevance to studies of
political development. Also see Lucian W. Pye, " The New
Asian Capitalism: A Political Portrait," in Peter L.
Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao eds. In Search of An
East Asian Developmental Model New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1988: pp. 81-98.

of the Four Mini Dragons in East Asia.[8] Then came the "Third Wave" of democratization, with Philippines taking the lead, Taiwan and South Korea followed in the liberalizing path and occupied again a not-insignificant position on the agendas of numerous political science conferences and publications.[9]

The Commonality Presumption

In all of these new-found academic interests in Taiwan and South Korea, one generally finds all too often the assumption of commonality. For the sake of

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[8] See, for example, Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991; Steve Chan, East Asian Dynamism: Growth, Order, and Security in the Pacific Region Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990; Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao eds. In Search of An East Asian Development Model New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988; Frederic C. Deyo ed. The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Also see Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986 and Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

[9] For example, Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl eds. Political Change in Korea Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988; Hung-Mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989; Larry Diamond, Juan J, Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset eds. Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol.3 Asia Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989; Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard eds. Political Change in Taiwan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992; Peter Moody, Jr. Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability New York: Praeger, 1992.

convenience in testing theories or developing generalizations, scholars have tended to lump Taiwan and Korea in one package. Only casual references have been made to note the differences in their national histories, social composition, political institutions, and economic landscape, etc. But for many serious area experts, there are profound nuances in terms of political culture and styles of politics which bear significantly on the political development of these two societies.[10] In particular, the contrast in styles of politics between these two societies has been most impressive. In this chapter we shall first review these commonalities which constitute the basis for comparison. Then we shall demonstrate in broad outline the startling differences that characterize the contemporary versions of nationalism and patterns of politics.

The selection of Taiwan and South Korea for such a comparative study of nationalism is based on the following criteria. First, they provide a remarkable pair of comparison for students of development studies. To what extent do they share the same factors in explaining their economic success? Or have there been different reasons that have provided parallel development?

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[10] For a sophisticated analysis of related topics, see Lucian W. Pye Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985

Secondly, the increasing economic weight these two countries carry in the Pacific rim warrants more in-depth understanding of the subtleties and nuances of their politics. Have their respective macro-economic successes produced the same political effects? Are they likely models for other Asian-Pacific developing countries? Thirdly, their common colonial experience under Japan offers invaluable insight into the effects of colonial domination on the pattern of nationalism in a developing country. The fourth is related to the fact that both are divided countries after World War Two. In both societies, the tensions between sectors of common citizenry over the timing, pace, manner, and need for reunification with their socialist counterpart pose interesting questions for those concerned with the relationship between group identity and political change. A fifth basis for comparison is the common Confucian cultural heritage that deeply penetrated the social fabrics of both societies. The almost identical cultural milieu gives scholars an excellent setting for developing and testing psychocultural hypotheses on the spirit of politics in each polity

South Korea and Taiwan are both leading examples in the group of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). From the sixties to the eighties, significant changes in the economic and political realms have contributed to this

emerging pattern of nationalism in the industrial East Asia. In the wake of high-powered economic development in East Asia, these societies have transformed themselves from ashes to riches. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed limited resources in the world, notwithstanding all the talk of interdependence, intense economic competition and protectionist pressures from the former big brother countries like United States. States and people in East Asia alike felt the need to reexamine their own international status and regional role. There is a growing awareness among the citizenry of the lack of symmetry between the economic reality of their affluence and strength, on the one hand, and the dependent political role of their respective government in matters of even regional concerns.

In the domestic arena, the state in Taiwan and Korea saw the sea-changes in its capacity for imposing internal order and regulating relations between its own people and those of the communist regimes in the other part of their divided countries. State authority was being undermined by a democratic commitment to self-determination, rising educational levels, and a corresponding increase in citizen demands for more open participation and social services. This liberalization process in a fast-growing civil society, combined with the wide-spread effective penetration of mass media and popular access to foreign

travel, further eroded the on e powerful omnipresent authoritarian state's capacity to manipulate policies, allocate resources, formulate national agenda, and enforce partisan preferences. Decades of economic growth and aggressive industrial targeting and promotion on the part of the state brought in numerous global giants from Coca Cola, MacDonald to Proctor Gamble and IBM. The reality of these transnational investments and globalized production system as well as the intrusion of electronic media culture have again reduced the state's ability to determine the nature of its domestic economy and the isolation of the cultural life of the people. People have almost immediate access to international news. Any significant interaction with a foreign country had domestic repercussions and feedback that changed society.

The most outspoken groups in the two societies were the post World War II generation. These were generations that were much better educated, affluent, and politically aggressive than any previous ones. The result was a definite generational change in terms of values, beliefs, and world view. These younger voters no longer took for granted a paternalistic state dictating the future of their nations. The uncritical acceptance of United States leadership in regional affairs was gone. Assertive statements were commonly made by young people and question of congruence between American national interest

and their national goal was openly raised. In more extreme cases, United States has been labeled as a culprit for many political outcomes beyond citizen's control. Another related feature of these two countries is the existence of a large corp of Western-educated technocratic elites with advanced degrees dominating the managerial stratum in the administrative machinery and private sector. This western-trained elite stratum is fundamentally different from that of the former European colonies. Whereas traditional post-colonial elites were trained by their former rulers, East Asian technocrats of today mostly received their advanced education in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan during the sixties and seventies.

The constant threat of war and isolation, however, remained a major element in shaping the psychological makeup of both the national community and the individual citizens in Taiwan and Korea. Both societies experienced the devastation of war and defeat. Most of the parents of this generation of college students have had the personal experiences of wartime dislocation and trauma. Such legacies constitute a powerful source of primary political socialization in the primary group for today's youth. In Korea's case, the imminence of military conflict was both real and immediate. The DMZ is only an hour drive away from the heart of Seoul where the

majority of college students study. The status of
unresolved civil war impinges directly on each young man
in these two societies. Every young man older than
eighteen must serve two to three years in the conscript
armed forces. The effect of military training and
political education in the barracks contrasts sharply
against the civil college education the young men receive
outside the barracks. An in-depth look into the
subjective realm of the younger generation offers a
valuable understanding of the result of such mixed
transmissions and learning of differing values from the
civilian and military sectors.

Nuances in Styles of Politics

Despite all the above discussed commonalities
between Korea and Taiwan, there are elements of Korean
political culture that distinctly mark itself off from
the styles and patterns of Taiwanese political culture.
In the modern history of development of nationalism in
these two societies, Korea and Taiwan each developed
characteristically different responses to imperialist
domination and colonial rule. Koreans displayed more
violent direct rebellion when Japanese first deprived
them of their nationhood. Taiwanese responses , in
comparison to Korean reaction, appeared less intense and

violent.[11] Postwar Korean politics and Taiwanese politics demonstrated different styles of political discourse in the domestic arena. Korean politics, according to Gregory Henderson's theory of the vortex, emphasize the continuous high degree of political centralization imposed on a geographically small and ethnically - culturally homogeneous polity. This feature results in a powerful "upward sucking force throughout the Korean society. The vortex has an overpowering, atomizing tendency which undermines all forms of integrative groups such as social classes, political parties, and other intermediary groups.[12] Each social force, therefore, tend to exhibit naked, open, and direct confrontation in political contestation, clashing against each other. In Taiwan, the pattern leans toward a muted political maneuvering. There are more behind the scene coalition building and bargaining than direct confrontation that appeals to mass sentiments. In terms of student activism, the contrast is even more amazing. Taiwanese students pales by contrast in its intensity, scale, ideological

[11] For contrasting views on such different patterns of nationalist response, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977 and Edward I-Te Chen, Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of Its Effects Upon The Development of Nationalism University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. Dissertation, 1968.

[12] Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.

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commitment, organization, prevalence, and levels of physical violence. The moral justification that portrays one's own side as the incarnation of moral righteousness and one's opponent as morally corrupt characterizes Korean politics. In the power game of Taiwanese politics, pragmatism plays a much more significant role than the need for moral consistency. Matters of national pride, as reflected in the 1988 Olympic Game in Seoul, easily galvanize Korean mass into slogans of anti-foreignism. Whereas in Taiwan, we find only periodic eruptions of nationalist sentiments directed against an arbitrarily defined "alien enemy". Even in the national strategies for development, Korean government exhibited more "risk taking" in investing resources to certain sectors of heavy industry while Taiwanese economic planners tended to be more conservative and less risk-taking.[13] A broad sketch of the contrast in national styles of politics reminds us of the need to eliminate crude generalizations in analyzing two societies with similar Confucian

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[13] See Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. For an excellent analysis of Korean and Taiwanese approach to national competitiveness, see chapters by Edwin A. Winckler and Vincent S.R. Brandt in George C. Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel eds. Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1987.

traditions.[14]

Nation, Nationalism, and National Identity

A survey of available literature on nationalism would suggest an enormous number of definition for the concept of "nation". In this thesis, "nation" is defined as composed of a body of people of a given historically evolved territory, with a set of common cultural attributes, that perceives itself to be a national community. A nation is also a politically mobilized people who are capable of communicating effectively with each other on a regular basis and are able to imagine themselves as members of a common community.

Nationalism is a mutidimensional concept and there is no readily available definition that is both empirically and logically conclusive. In this thesis it is defined as a state of mind. We choose to emphasize the psychocultural dimension of the concept in this study. It is, therefore, more than a political movement in search of political power. Nationalism serves to establish a direct link between the individual member of a nation and

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[14] For a general discussion of Korean political culture, see Hahm Pyong-Choon, The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Essays in Korean Law and Legal History Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1967. For an anthropological perspective, see Vincent S. R. Brandt, A Korean Village: Between Farm and Sea Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, also his "Stratification, Integration and Challenges to Authority in Contemporary South Korea," August 31, 1983 (mimeo)

the nation-state or nation. Such link fulfills an individual's psychological need for identity and sense of belonging. This link is a "lived relationship" between an individual and his/her nation.

Nationalism is intimately related to the concept of national identity which is analytically composed of cultural identity and political identity. National identity is a form of basic group identity. A nation-state is sustainable only when a coherent sense of national identity is assured. Internally, the congruence between political identity and political identity is a crucial variable for successful nation-building in any nation-state.

Hypothesis

In this thesis, we shall test the hypothesis that there is an identifiable pattern of generational change in the youth's search for a new sense of national identity and that this search for national identity is characterized by ambivalence in Taiwan and polarity in Korea. We shall seek to demonstrate through in-depth interviews with college students and other citizens in representative areas of life, and through the use of existing secondary research findings, available public opinion polls/surveys, and government documents that these two Confucian states are in fact experiencing a generational transformation in their respective political

cultures - in terms of the emotive, the cognitive, and the evaluative dimensions. In both Taiwan and Korea college age youth constitutes a distinctive generational type, different from previous generations of Chinese-Taiwanese and Koreans. They are experiencing changes that have made them develop new feelings of individual identity and hence new sentiments of nationalism. They represented a generational break, and not just a phase in the life cycle. We shall thus be speaking of an experiential model of generation and not a life cycle model.[15]

We further hypothesize that in each of these two Confucian-culture based societies, the implicitly assumed cultural identity does not lead to similarly coherent and stable patterns of political identity among the youth. Rather their political identities are being molded in and realized through political socialization processes which transmit mixed messages from the major agents of socialization. Thus while this generation of Taiwanese and Koreans have been socialized to one set of cultural values, they have been politically socialized in quite different directions. Cultural identities and political identities have not been reinforcing realties but there

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[15] For a discussion of generational models, see Richard J. Samuels ed., Political Generation and Political Development Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977: pp. 1-3.

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are tensions between the two. Such a process in the youth's developmental stage is predominantly governed by conscious learning, perception, as well as cognition.[16]

Ambivalence and Polarity

The sense of ambivalence that characterize Taiwanese students' nationalism refers to a profound sense of uncertainty and ambiguity between Confucian cultural heritage and modern values that are primarily rooted in Western cultures; an uncertain evaluative attitude toward the process of modernization and the accompanying fear of loss of their traditional cultural identity; as well as a deeply ambivalent attitude toward the political reunification with China and the accompanying confusion in terms of one's personal identity as a Chinese or a Taiwanese.

The Korean pattern of polarity refers to the polarized nationalist sentiments among Korean college students. The existence of polarization in an individual is manifested in between a highly critical attitude toward Confucianism as their cultural heritage and a deeply Confucianized behavioral pattern. Polarization is also evidenced by the romantic yet adamant commitment to national unification, on the one hand, and the equally

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[16] For the theoretical basis of this hypothesis, see Lucian W. Pye <u>Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity</u> New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962

strong belief in the preservation of democracy and free market, on the other. Polarized Korean nationalism also simultaneously manifest intense anti-foreignism and strong desire for American military presence and further integration with an interdependent global economy. Polarity also imply a coupling of strong demands for a paternalistic authority and a strong state as well as the unyielding pursuit of democracy and human rights. Furthermore, students' commitment to egalitarian values are pitted against their own sense of elitism and expectation of preferential treatment by the society.

In the following chapters, we will first review major analytical approaches to the study of nationalism and then develop a theoretical framework for analyzing national identity and its dual bases of political identity and cultural identity. Next will be an analysis of the weight of history for each of these two societies. Included in the historical review are the impact of the West, the loss of sovereignty, the differing pattern of Japanese colonial rule, the national division, the civil war legacies, the ideological and partisan struggle for legitimacy, political massacres and inter-ethnic/inter-regional tension, as well as the new-found affluence and prosperity. We will focus on the effects of political leadership, collective memory, political amnesia, and major political events on the generational makeup of

political identity. In Chapter Four, the results of our interview with college students in Taiwan and South Korea will be presented and analyzed against the stages and dimensions of their socialization processes. In Chapter Five we will present a psychocultural explanation for the ambivalence and polarity manifested in Taiwanese and Korean youth generation respectively. The political implications and the related effects each pattern has on the youth's national identities will also be discussed in our conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONALISM & NATIONAL IDENTITY: APPROACHES & THEORIES

Although we shall be engaged in essentially case studies of the generational development of nationalistic sentiments in the two societies of Taiwan and South Korea, we need to first seek intellectual perspectives from the general theoretical literature on nationalism. Few topics in the contemporary study of politics have attracted as much theorizing as the concept of nationalism. In this chapter we shall attempt to review in broad outline several major approaches adopted by social scientists to study nationalism as an ideology, a form of politics, and a state of mind. Then we will go on to examine the use of "national identity" as a key conceptual tool in the study of nationalism.

Up to the First World War, nationalism was thought to be waning. The distinctive tendencies of the modern world, science, technology, industrialization, democracy - were supposedly eroding the bases of nationalist beliefs. It was assumed that the nation-state would eventually wither away, and the world would move toward an internationalist destiny. History unfolded very much to the contrary of such predictions. Not only has nationalism not faded away but it remains by far the most vital political emotion in the world. Lord Acton argued that the partition of Poland in 1772 "awakened the theory

of nationality in Europe." The American and French revolution further gave the nationalist phenomenon new force and edge. In the eighties and nineties, as we witness the unraveling of socialism, democratization in many developing countries and Eastern Europe, and the integration of European Community, nationalism and its accompanying destructive force is still very much alive in all parts of the world. Even with the increasing interdependence of global economies and the spread of multinational capitalism in manufacturing, marketing, media, and telecommunications, nationalism as a potent political force continues to constrain, shape, and in many cases determine national policies and politics. In Baltic States, Tibet, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, armed conflicts and rebellions in the name of nationalist agitations arouse both common people and politicians.

Nationalism prescribed no single political direction, but collaborated with a diversity of ideologies, assisted democracy and despotism alike, supported revolution and reaction in various contexts. The power of nationalism came not from any specific political content but from its capacity to provide psychic and emotional sustenance in an age of dehumanizing industrialism. Nationalism thrives because it taps the potent emotions of history and locality to

give individual lives meaning in a chaotic universe. Though modern nationalism came late to East Asia, one can argue that on the basis of European experience nationalism has not been an unmixed blessing and that it embraces within it genuine dangers.

The historical function of nationalism as a shaping force has thus been ambiguous. In general, nationalism can mean the patriotic determination to assert national identity, dignity and national freedom of action. Or alternatively it can be the xenophobic determination to assert these things at the expense of other nations. At times it can strengthen the state by endowing it with quasi-religious loyalty and then shatter the state by legitimizing the national aspirations of minorities within the state.

On the more positive side, it certainly raises the effective social horizons of the people beyond and above village, family, tribe, caste, or other limited groupings. A sense of national unity is thereby achieved. Nationalism tends to establish a direct relationship between the individual on one side and the nation and the nation-state on the other. Such a link is no longer or at least not to the same extent mediated through a hierarchy of lesser groupings and communities. Rupert Emerson saw nationalism as a creative and positive response to the

shattering impact upon Asia of the modern West.[1] It makes possible a new appreciation of the national worth and dignity among the people. Through nationalism, a kind of dynamism and political activism is injected into the society. National citizenship may then be galvanized into dedication to a common cause.

But nationalism also works as a divisive force under some circumstances. It may serve to accentuate minority issues where there is already marked ethnic, religious, linguistic diversity, as in the case of South Asian politics.[2] When no longer ruled by a alien political force, a newly independent national community may begin to ponder the question as to what the "nation" is now. What is the "self" which demands rights? In other words, nationalism actually works to "impose a separation of the sheep from the goats which may have been up to now kept under the same cover".[3] Nationalism does not necessarily function as an integrative force in history.

This brings us to the problem of the multidimensionality of nationalism as a concept. One may

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[1] Rupert Emerson, "The Progress of Nationalism," in Philip W. Thayer ed. Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins, 1956.

[2] See, for example, Paul R. Brass Language, Religion and Politics in North India New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

[3] Rupert Emerson, "The Progress of Nationalism," in Philip W. Thayer ed. Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956: p. 117.

compare the study of nationalism to a group of blind persons each feeling an elephant and each trying to make sense out of their personal experience. This very multidimensionality underlies the difficulties social scientists have had in defining and explaining nationalism. For all its pervasiveness, theorizing on nationalism usually reflects the ideological and theoretical lenses each observer uses. It is known that theorizing about nationalism has proven to be a difficult task.[4] Any rigorous application of analytical writings on nationalism causes much of the historical literature based on the concept to lose its persuasiveness. Often social scientists would assign to the concept of nationalism explanatory tasks that theorists eventually find are beyond its power to carry out. Enough is unexplained about nationalism itself as to cast some legitimate question marks upon the concept's usefulness in historical explanation. Having noted this troublesome

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[4] On the theorizing of nationalism, many leading scholars have contributed their critical thoughts in recent years. See Ernest B. Hass, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" **International Organization** 40(3), Summer 1986: pp. 707-744; Chong-Do Hah & Jeffrey Martin "Toward A Synthesis of Conflict & Integration: Theories of Nationalism," **World Politics** 27, April 1975; Gail Stokes, "The Underdeveloped Theory of Nationalism," **World Politics,** 31, October 1978: pp 150-160; Arthur N. Waldron "Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanation," **World Politics** 37,1985: pp 416-433.

problem, we can still move on to lay out a range of theoretical approaches to the study of nationalism.

It is possible to identify at least five major approaches to defining, analyzing, and explaining the phenomenon of nationalism. Each has its particular strengths and weaknesses. They include, first, the intellectual historian's approach which focuses on the historical development of the central ideas and symbols that became the expressions of each distinctive nationalism. A second approach is more functional and sociological in that it stresses the role of the communications processes in developing the community basis of nationalism. The third is the structural approach which emphasizes the manner in which nationalism can be built out of smaller units of loyalties. A fourth major approach sees nationalism as the product of an elite seeking rationally its self interest and using the sentiments of nationalism as a way of holding on to power. Finally, there is the psycho-cultural approach which relates nationalism to problems of group and individual identity. We will examine each of these in greater detail so as to get a richer sense of the complexities of the phenomenon of nationalism and a better theoretical basis for our study of the nationalism of the youth in both South Korea and Taiwan.

In terms of the utility of the various theories for

our purpose of understanding development in our two critical cases, it should be noted that the first four approaches are most useful for our macro-historical analysis which will appear in Chapter Three, while the psycho-cultural approach will be basic to our interpretation of the interview data we collected from students in both Taiwan and South Korea.

1. The Intellectual Historian's Approach:

This approach is used by those most concerned with nationalism as primarily a set of ideas stressing the sovereignty, the mission, as well as the welfare of the nation state. Hans Kohn[5] and Carlton J. Hayes[6] were two major scholars of this approach that is basic to the classic study of nationalism. Intellectual historians focus on the transmission of nationalist ideas, delineating and tracing such ideological fermentation and diffusion from one intellectual or group to the rest of the society in question. In the East Asian studies field, Benjamin I. Schwartz and George M. Wilson are leading practitioners of this approach. Such an approach is embedded in modern historiography. It sees nationalism as an ideology or set of ideas that has a life of its own

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[5] See Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Revised Edition, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1985.

[6] See Carlton J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, New York: MacMillan, 1928.

and new ideas emerge out of the intellectual womb of antecedent ideas. Intellectual heritage thus becomes essential in explaining each particular thinker's version of nationalism.

The problem with this approach, as Richard H. Minewar puts it, " is that (the intellectual historian) can only go so far: he can say what the ideology was, but he cannot say why it received general acceptance."[7] Chalmers Johnson once criticized it as ignoring the question of timing in the emergence of a nationalist movement.[8] In short, the intellectual historian's approach to the study of nationalism fails to address head-on the activating social forces of nationalism.

2. Functional/Social Communications Approach

A second approach was largely inspired and pioneered by Karl Deutsch with his seminal study Nationalism and Social Communication, which was first published in 1966. Deutsch criticized earlier studies of nationalism because in them nationalism was "widely accepted as a mere 'state of mind' with few tangible roots."[9] This approach is less

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[7] Richard H. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor, State, and Law in the Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970: p. 23.

[8] Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962

[9] Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1966: p.16

concerned with the ideological content of nationalism than with the dynamics and process of its growth. It attempts to identify the sociological pressures that cause populations to form nation-states and to delineate the social conditions under which groups of people are transformed into national citizens.

The essence of nationalism, in Deutsch's theory, lies in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders. Karl Deutsch defined nationalism as a state of mind which gives national messages, memories, and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making of decisions. A nationalist gives greater attention to those messages which carry specific symbols of nationality or which originates from a special national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or culture.[10] This definition emphasizes intensive social communication as the precondition for feelings of national identity in a group. This intensive and effective communication presupposes a common language, religion and culture - a heritage of common meanings and memories. A communication society is based primarily on a cultural community. If a people thus

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[10] Karl W. Deutsch "Nation and World," in Ithiel de Sola Pool ed. Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory, New York 1967.

defined also possesses its own state apparatus, and wields autonomous political power, then it can be regarded as a nation. A nation is a people in possession of a state.[11]

Deutsch's definition is very restrictive. In reality, a nation-state often is the outcome of a nationalist movement. The test of communication is less useful when strong cultural identities already exist among a group of people. This is the case of an old society with a new national community.[12] There is no doubt that Germans regarded themselves collectively as a nation before a unified German state was established in 1871. In the case of China, Korea, and Japan, a strong sense of common cultural heritage existed from early times and therefore provided a cohesive basis of national identity. Other cases like Tibetans, Kurds, and Scots whose nationhood have never been questioned, have so far failed to acquire their own states. Besides, the number of existing states is not equal to the number of existing nations. But Chalmers Johnson counterargues that this approach is exactly why social scientists need to explain the timing of a nationalist movement. He said that cultural homogeneity, after all, does not explain why a

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[11] ibid.

[12] See Clifford Geertz ed. Old Societies and New States New York: Free Press, 1963.

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particular nationalist movement is more popular in one period of time than another since at both times a people may be of the same language, religion, ethnicity.[13]

In studying the emergence of national communities out of European feudal societies, Deutsch places emphasis upon the following indicators of social mobilization: (1) a common language and the reduction of a vernacular language to written form; (2) the urbanization process; (3) the monetization of the commercial economy and the enlargement of basic communication grids; (4) development of a mass audience; (5) the spread of literacy among the adult population; (6) industrialization and its resultant impacts. The more gradually the process of social mobilization moves, the more time there is for social and national assimilation to work. The more social mobilization is postponed the more quickly its six aspects listed above must eventually be achieved. When all these developments have to be crowded into the life time of one or two generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will be precipitated into politics with their old languages, old outlooks on the world, old tribal/ethnic loyalties still largely unchanged. Then it becomes far more difficult to mold a sense of national identity, to think of oneself as a

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[13] Johnson, op. cit., p.21.

member of one new nation. Since it took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen, Deutsch asked then how is it possible for Asian and African societies to do it in one generation?[14]

Along this line of analysis, there are other scholars who stress other causal variables. Chalmers Johnson in discussing the study of Chinese society as a national community suggested that the nature of the educational system is one logical place to begin exploring the ethical and moral pronouncements of the state and the people's responses to them.[15] The relevance of education to the emergence of a sense of national community formation could be illustrated by the following two examples: 1. the Japanese Imperial Rescript on education in 1890 was one of the key pieces of social engineering that the Meiji oligarchy undertook in moving Japan quickly from Tokugawa feudalism to nationhood. 2. In the case of Burma, Lucian W. Pye in his Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building illustrated the incoherent socialization in the family with grandmothers still teaching the children, and the impact such

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[14] Karl W. Deutsch Nationalism and Its Alternatives New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969

[15] Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship" World Politics 17 (2), January 1965: pp. 256 - 271.

incoherence had on the formation of a national identity.[16] Ronald P. Dore's work on Japan mentions the content of Tokugawa education and its diffusion as having a "nationalizing effect", literacy enhances citizens' capacity for empathy, the samurai class sharing a common intellectual culture, and the growth of Confucian scholarship and teaching profession served as new channels of national communication which cut across fiefdom boundaries.[17]

In addition to universal compulsory education, national conscript armies have also been mentioned as facilitating institution for promoting group consciousness. In many developing countries military serveice and national education have both been used to elevate citizens' parochial loyalties to the national level. In these societies, these two institutions eventually became political vehicles for nationalist indoctrination. The military service in East Asian states has been a powerful institution for bringing young men from rural areas into contact with the national community

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[16] On national community formation also see Hermann Weilenmann "The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure" in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz eds. Nation-Building New York: Atherton Press, 1963: pp. 33 - 55.

[17] Ronald P. Dore Education and Tokugawa Japan Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965 : pp 296- 297

and for initiating political mobilization of this previously peripheral group. As an integrated element of the state apparatus, the armed forces of East Asian states often serve to spread the nationalist sentiments among the young recruits.

In addition to all the endogenous factors, the functional approach also pays attention to the impact of the international environment as an exogenous factor. The unequal treaties imposed upon China in the nineteenth century and the Triparte Intervention imposed on Japan in 1895 all awakened national consciousness. The function of war can exert no less a galvanizing influence upon a nation whether the result is defeat or victory.

Still another variant is advanced by Ernest Gellner who sees the emergence of the national state as the replacement of one structure by another.[18] The essence of this structural change is, in the course of it, the role of culture itself in society changes profoundly. When culture is directly worshipped in its own name, according to Gellner, this is nationalism. Gellner asserts that the need for cultural homogeneity follows from the requirement of rapid, easy, and precise communication, of

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[18] Here Gellner defines "structure" in the tradition of Radcliffe-Brown as a system of relatively stable social positions, to be distinguished from more volatile organization which is seen as a system of more transitory activities. See Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987: Chapter 2.

the possibility of slotting people rapidly into new economic roles of a complex, sophisticated and quickly changing division of labor. In such circumstances, cultural discontinuity - tolerable and often positively functional in stable agrarian societies - becomes unacceptable, and when it relates with the persisting inequalities of industrial society , cultural discontinuity becomes explosive. Nationalism is therefore an inescapable consequence of the atomized, mobile and universally literate modern society.[19]

3. The Structural Approach

This approach identifies in traditional social groups certain structural features, with their supporting ethics, that were conducive to the emergence of nationalism. While conventional wisdom holds that the emergence of a national loyalty entails the weakening of traditional loyalties, Albert M. Craig sees in Japan's case an intensification of traditional loyalties. He argues that even though it was directed toward a status instead of a person, it was a potentially free floating loyalty which made possible the symbolic shift from the feudal lords to the emperor. Also made possible was the transmutation in its ideological content "from Han

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[19] See Ernest Gellner, ibid. 1987; also Gellner, **Nations and Nationalism** Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

nationalism to nationalism proper."[20]

The structural approach places the theoretical focus on the similarity of nationalism and other forms of group loyalty and regards national loyalty as an outgrowth of other lesser loyalties. David Potter argues that in some situations both sectionalism and nationalism may not work in an antithetical fashion and that in fact nationalism may be the terminal result of a full development of strong sectional ties.[21] According to this view, nationalism may be seen not as breaking down parochial, tribal, or regional ties but rather incorporating and subsuming them. The nationalist elites may manipulate the traditional symbols and languages of loyalty to make minor loyalties lead up to one paramount loyalty to the nation-state. This position directly challenges another popularly shared proposition that the rise of nationalism and the growth of national identity depends upon the destruction of other lesser ties.[22] Robert Nisbet, for example, stated that "modern nationalism.... cannot be

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[20] Albert M. Craig "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism," in Robert E. Ward ed. Political Development in Modern Japan N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968

[21] David M. Potter "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," American Historical Review 4, 1962

[22] See Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?" World Politics 24 (2), April 1972: pp 319-355.

understood except in terms of the weakening and destruction of earlier bonds, and of the attachment to the political state of new emotional loyalties and identifications. It cannot be understood, that is, apart from those rents and clefts in the traditional structure of human loyalties, caused by economic and social dislocation, which left widening masses of human beings in a kind of psychological vacuum." [23] However, there is no consensus as to how long such traditional loyalty can remain the basis of nationalism. Some may even argue that nationalism as a cohesive political force remains dependent on the traditional structure of group ties in the rural regions. This is because industrialization has not broken up the peasant village and traditional values of social solidarity and obedience still thrives in an agrarian society.

4. The Rational Interest Approach

This approach treats "nationalism" as a political construct, that is, an ideological weapon used by the government and by the dominant social group in the interest of perpetuating their own power. The growth of nationalism is therefore seen primarily as the result of ideological indoctrination and manipulation of traditional symbols to serve the interests of the ruling

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[23] Robert A. Nisbet Community and Power New York: Free Press, 1962: p. 164

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elites. According to this view, it is by no means a form
of primordial sentiment among the members of a national
community. Nationalism involves the government's use of
education, mass media, and the military service in
inculcating the official version of nationalist
orthodoxy. At times, a network of local organizations is
established to facilitate the process. A more refined
argument involves nationalism among certain groups
prompted by the group members' perception of their self-
interest as coincidental with that of the nation.[24] Liah
Greenfeld's research on Russian, French, German, British,
and American national identity formation suggests that
nationalism is a political instrument devised by the
ruling elites of individual society in an attempt to
preserve their class privileges and status.[25] Potter
quoted Morton Grodzins in his 1962 article that
"populations are loyal to the nation as a byproduct of
satisfactions achieved within non-national groups,
because the nation is believed to symbolize and sustain
these groups."[26] From this point of view, one is loyal
not to the nation but to family, business, religion,

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[24] For instance, see Liah Greenfeld's "The Formation
of Russian National Identity," **Comparative Studies In
Society and History,** 32 (3), July 1990: pp. 549-591.

[25] Liah Greenfeld, <u>Nationalism: Five Roads to
Modernity,</u> Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992

[26] David M. Potter, op. cit.

friends. One fights for the joy of his bridge club when he is said to fight for his country.

In East Asia this view may have its merits because nationalism often masked people's concern for self-interest which tends to lack cultural sanctions. And self-gain must be rationalized with reference to the greater collectivity. Lucian W. Pye's unique analysis of Chinese student's motiver in the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989 shed penetrating lights on the masking of private interests behind heroic gestures.[27] The two may not be easily distinguishable. Even in the United States, Charles Wilson's "What is good for GM is good for the country" is not an uncommon argument either.

Rational interest theorists also emphasize the importance of "situational choice" of one form of identity rather than a either/or situation in which the choice is a "permanent moral commitment" to such identity.[28] According to this view, there is the possibility for coexistence of forces and identities. One therefore needs to pay attention to the contrast between dominance and dormancy of contending identities. Treating different bases of social - political cleavages (caste,

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[27] Lucian W. Pye "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture," **Asian Survey** 30 (4), April 1990: pp. 331-347.

[28] S.N. Jha, "Dynamic View of Identity Formation: An Agenda for Research" in Zoya Hasan et al ed. The State, Political Processes and Identity: Reflections on Modern India London: Sage Publications, 1989.

class, religion, language, regionalism) as separate structures would be artificial and static. Only the situational exigencies, defined as a certain configuration of social forces at one point in time, would make a particular dimension salient.[29] Daniel Bell argues that: (Ethnicity)....is best understood not as a primordial phenomenon in which deeply held identities have to reemerge, but as a strategic choice by individuals who, in other circumstances, would choose other group membership as a means of gaining some power or privilege."[30] One nation may have many pasts and depending on the needs of each age, the nation brings a particular past into its consciousness.

5. The Psycho-Cultural Approach

We turn now to the psycho-cultural approach which will provide the principle theoretical guideline for what is most distinctive in this study, the first-hand reports representative of the sentiments and beliefs of individual students in Taiwan and South Korea. This approach draws on social-psychological and cultural anthropological perspectives in analyzing nationalism. There are variants within this approach as well. The

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[29] Also see Paul Brass, op. cit. for an excellent analysis along this line of reasoning.

[30] Daniel Bell "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan eds. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975: p. 171.

first one focuses on irrational impulses and sees nationalism as provoked by malintegration of society and by psychological strains that result from a fast paced modernization process. Rapid social changes and the unevenness of the pace of change between sectors are said to subject both the society and the individuals to severe psychological stress. The introduction of industrial technology and the consequent transition from an agrarian to an industrial society uprooted individuals from their traditional roles and thereby causing strains. As Clifford Geertz said: nationalism provides "a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium."[31]

A second variant sees nationalism emerging out of the psychological need to resolve the uncertain sense of personal and cultural identity. Lucian W. Pye's work on China and Burma are the leading examples in this school.[32] Cultural disorientation is seen as setting the stage and creating the need for the rise of modern nationalism. A nation's cultural patterns and symbols are considered to be the shaping force in the formulation of nationalist ideology. This particular perspective is more

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[31] Clifford Geertz "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter ed. Ideology and Discontent New York: 1964.

[32] See Lucian W. Pye's work on Burma, op. cit. 1964; also Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics New Edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

synthetic and eclectic in nature. It takes an interest in
the way the unstated presuppositions of a society inform
behavior and institutions and determine a society's
style. Scholars of this school attempt to capture the
nuances of a state of mind and seek to convey a sense of
the functional interrelationship of beliefs, values,
aspirations and emotional attachments. One central
concern is placed upon the interplay between social
forces and processes of ideological formation that is
essential for analyzing nationalism.[33] The difference
between this second variant and the first one is that the
culturalists see the focus of impact as primarily
cultural disruption and dislocation, rather than a
sociopsychological strain involving tensions over the
clash between "they" and "we" in the process of seeking
a new identity. Nationalism fills the vacuum created by
the displaced traditional sets of cultural values.
Nationalism rises in responses to a cultural crisis when
the old political order is liquidated and outmoded and
when a highly differentiated polity is developing.
Intensive intrusion and borrowing of Western technology,
institutions and even cultural values creates serious
tensions and contradictions in the minds of the national
citizenry. There is a dilemma of trying to reconcile

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[33] David B. Davis, "Some Recent Directions in
American Cultural History," **American Historical Review** 3,
1968: pp. 696-707.

cultural borrowing and national pride. How such tensions

and confusions are played out in the realm of politics,

and are internalized or resolved in each individual, is

the key to understanding any new nationalistic

formulation. One classic manifestation of this process is

the "Ti vs. Yung" debate in all three East Asian

societies - China, Korea, and Japan.[34]

From Personal Identity to National Identity

Identification theory and its application in

political science has its roots in the works of Sigmund

Freud, Erik Erikson, George Herbert Mead, as well as

Emile Durkeim. In contemporary political science the

first entry of political identity into our research

agenda was introduced by Lucian W. Pye in his 1960

article "Personal Identity and Political Ideology" on

Erik Erikson's identity theory and its potential

application in political research.[35] Later on in 1962 Pye

developed a much richer theoretical framework on national

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[34] One formulation of neo-Confucian ontological dualism is the dichotomy of Tao vs. Ch'i (instrument or vessel), or alternatively, Ti (substance) vs. Yung (function). According to this line of separation, after 1860s, Western learning was assigned a secondary or instrumental value while reserving the category of Tao or Ti for Chinese learning.

[35] in Dwaine Marvick ed. Political Decision-Makers New York: Free Press, 1960.

identity in his work on Burma.[36]

That nationalism constitutes a link between the individual and the state is acknowledged by most scholars of nationalism. But most stop at describing nationalism as merely a psychological state of mind. Few studies venture into the dynamics of national identity and its interaction with the personal identity. The relationship between individual character and group character was first articulated by Erikson in his 1951 Childhood and Society in which he demonstrated that the individual's character is developed mainly in terms of the group character, that is, of the values and patterns of behavior of the group as these are manifested in bringing up children. Furthermore by studying a great man, such as Luther or Gandhi, we may understand the society in which he is educated and to which he contributes his creativity.[37] The ways in which an individual's major problem in each developmental stage are met is reflected in the evolving pattern of the individual's personal identity. As for the great man, his pattern will be reflected in his political ideology. Pioneering works by Lucian W. Pye and Harold Issacs on this aspect has added

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[36] Lucian W. Pye Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity New haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

[37] See Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther New York: W.W. Norton, 1958.

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to our understanding about how national identity was formed and how it shapes the nation-building process for a new state.

National identity theory gives in-depth answers to a series of central questions on human political behavior and beliefs. Questions like why people give their loyalty to the nation-state? Why they are prepared to die for it? Why killings of human life in defense of one's nation is justifiable as heroic and moral? How does nationalism galvanize a group of people? It also informs us of the structure and dynamics of people's psychological attachment and the ways in which this psychological identification affect government policies, domestic politics and international relations. For any nation national identity is one of the crucial factors in defining the spirit of its politics.[38] Successful nation-building is a precondition to political integrity and stability for development. A coherent sense of national identity is crucial in this regard. Internally, the congruence between culture and polity has been sufficiently achieved when internal political conflicts, no matter how severe, do not intrinsically threaten the existence of the state itself. Geertz wrote: "they threaten governments or even forms of government, but they rarely at best ...threaten to undermine the nation

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[38] Lucian W. Pye, op. cit., 1962: p. 52.

itself, because they do not involve alternative definitions of what the nation is, of what its scope of reference is. Economics or class or intellectual disaffection threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new definition of its domain."[39]

The nation state should have the transcending claim on people's political loyalty. There may still be regional, religious or ethnic ties but in a stable nation these loyalties should not be mobilized against the nation state itself although they may compete within the nation state. Externally, such internal coherence reflects a clear political solidarity vis-a-vis the external world. Stephen Decatur in 1816 said, "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong!" With a coherent sense of national identity, dramatic manifestation in mass mobilization can be seen demonstrated in times of international conflict, or in situations where symbols of national identity are perceived to be threatened. In the arena of international power politics, national sentiment is a major resource

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[39] Clifford Geertz, "Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa Glenco: Free Press, 1963: pp. 105-157.

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for any state and a prerequisite for a credible foreign policy. A nation state is sustainable only if the existence of a coherent sense of national identity is assured. In formulating his analytical approach to the problem of nation-building in developing countries, Lucian W. Pye wrote: "the real problem in political development is therefore the extent to which the socialization process of a people provides them with the necessary associational sentiments so that they can have considerable conflict without destroying the stability of the system.....In short, it is associational sentiments which makes it possible for organizations to endure, and even thrive upon, many forms of controversy."[40]

Daniel Katz has identified four kinds of latent forces in each individual person which can be galvanized into assuming his/her role as a national citizen. One is the emotional and behavioral conditioning to national symbols, that is, those aspects of the political and general socialization process in which one internalizes a sentimental attachment to symbols of the nation, such as national flag, national anthem and national leadership. Secondly, the sense of his/her personal identity as a national which is associated with education concerning a common history, fate, and culture in

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[40] Lucian W. Pye, <u>Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building</u> op. cit.: p. 52.

contrast to out-groups that features different histories, culture, etc.. A third force is the compensatory and defensive identification based on a person's own attempt to resolve his/her own internal conflict and insecurities. The fourth is related to instrumental involvement in the national structure.[41]

For the individual to internalize the symbols of the nation, the nation must impinge upon the actual experience of the individual and bring psychological security. For each individual citizen, nationalism provides an appropriate ideology or identity-securing interpretive system.[42] Borrowing Althusser's idea, one may say that nationalism or national identity must be a "lived relation" between an individual and his/her nation. Only for those who live it, national identity is both real and true. It must be acknowledged that in history, though nations are made by human will, consent, coercion, and inertia have coexisted among a wide variety of communities in addition to voluntary reaffirmation of what Ernest Renan called "daily plebiscite".

If nationalism is treated merely as a manipulated

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[41] Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and International Conflict Resolution," in Herbert C. Kelman ed. International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965: pp. 356-392.

[42] See William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

political construct to be explained away, then the concept of nationalism will lose much of its own explanatory power. In recent years, rational choice school has dominated the stage of the American political science, and consequently few students of politics still remember Graham Wallas's warning which called on scholars to overcome the "tendency to exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind" and pay attention to human "impulses and instincts" which in many ways substantially motivate and influence human's political behavior.[43] As Lasswell argued, "politics..... is the sphere of conflict, and [it] brings out all the vanity and venom, the narcissism and aggression, of the contending parties. ..... Politics is the arena of the irrational. But a more accurate description would be that politics is the process by which the irrational bases of society are brought out into the open."[44]

Methodological Issues

Admittedly, applying psychological theories or cultural interpretation to political analysis does involve some methodological difficulties. Critics often charge those who apply political cultural analysis as

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[43] Graham Wallas, <u>Human Nature in Politics</u> Constable, 1908 cited in William Bloom, <u>Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations</u> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[44] Harold D. Lasswell, <u>Psychopathology and Politics</u> Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930: p. 184.

being tautological and reductionistic. Fuzzy
conceptualization, ambiguous causal link, missing link
between microtheoretical and macrotheoretical analysis,
are but a few often cited weaknesses in this approach.
Some of these criticisms are legitimate and justifiable.
For instance, even in the discipline of psychology,
scholars have yet to come to an agreement about how to
characterize personality or how to resolve differences
concerning competing models.[45] And sociologist Neil J.
Smelser admitted that "we do not at present have the
methodological capacity to argue causally from a mixture
of aggregated states of individual members of a system to
a global characteristics of the system"[46] Fred Greenstein
puts the issue in the following equation: personality
structure + political belief + individual political
action + aggregate political structures and processes.[47]

Conducting research on issues of political cultures
in a non-western society poses another methodological
challenge. There is the methodological difficulty in
using ideological scale in political attitude research

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[45] See Seymour M. Lipset ed. Politics and the Social
Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

[46] Neil J. Smelser in "Personality and Explanation of
Political Phenomena at the Social System Level: A
Methodological Statement," **Journal of Social Issues**
24(3), 1968: p. 123.

[47] Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics:
Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization New
York: Norton, 1975: p. 123.

because the meaning of ideological labels may vary culturally. The meaning of a specific issue is defined by a particular set of salient beliefs known as "referents" which facilitate the actors in positioning the issue on the liberal - conservative spectrum. But the problem arises when in non-western countries whose cleavage systems do not reflect the fissures of the industrial revolution. The left-right division lacks clarity and that such dichotomous scheme should be interpreted only within the context of a particular culture. As a result of this confusing ideological scale, area experts and disciplinary generalists often cannot agree on the precise interpretation, for instance, of the nature of a particular political groupings. It may be misleading to consider the radical student group in Korea ideologically the same as a leftist "radical" group in Paris. Similarly, a class-based analysis of East Asian politics often misses the essence of political struggle based on other more traditional and culture-bound cleavages.

The Problem of Political Generation

In our effort to map out the pattern of emerging nationalism among East Asian youth, the inevitable question arises as to the validity of treating any political grouping based on age as an enduring or persisting category with political and social significance in its own right. Is it not possible that

youths will simply adapt themselves to the values, norms, beliefs of the previous generation upon entering adult society? Theorists have offered two opposing hypotheses in this regard.[48]

(1) The "maturational" model was proposed by S. N. Eisenstadt in his **From Generation to Generation**. Eisenstadt sees in the rise of self-conscious youth groups and oppositional movements a response to social change. In modern society they result from industrialization or cultural contact in which discontinuities come to exist between the values and norms of adulthood and those of the family. The chief discontinuity is between universalistic criteria for allocating roles in the adult sphere of modern society and the particularistic norms of the family. The transition to adulthood requires youth to learn the universalistic standards of action characteristic of relationships beyond the family. Yet this very transition may threaten emotional security relationship with age-mates in youth groups. Youth movements provide emotional security and, at the same time, relations of wider scope than the family. The youth group is both a defense against the anticipated new roles of adult society and a preparation for them. The family is associated with the

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[48] For a leading work on this topic see Richard J. Samuels ed. <u>Political Generation and Political Development</u> Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977.

reactionary, conservative, authoritarian, or traditional old order - often at odds against institutions undergoing change. Functionalist like Parsons in analyzing American youth in the 1950s accepted Eisenstadt's model and saw youth peer groups as the vehicle for expressing both conformity to and alienation caused by the strains arising from the transition from the family to the modern adult society.[49]

(2) The "generationalist" model heralded by Karl Mannheim sees generations as a product of specific social changes. Such changes bring about a common generational perspective among those of the same age cohort who have been influenced by the same political, intellectual and social trends. Within the same generation, there may be different generational units: youth who share common experiences but respond to them in different ways. Contrary to the functionalist theory, Mannheim sees these impressions of youth as long lasting and persisting into adulthood. Political values formed by common historical experiences will endure into adulthood. Later development of human consciousness is shaped by the early experiences of youth which constitute the primary stratum of experiences from which all others receive their meaning. Differences in the world view of each generation persist

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[49] See Talcott Parsons' chapter in Erik H. Erikson ed. Youth: Change and Challenge New York: Basic Books, 1963.

as well. The political identifications formed by historical and cultural conditions prior to entrance into adulthood or into new adult roles have a formative influence generally resistant to adaptation to specific adult environments. Ralph Linton had similar views about adult values being shaped by the common experiences in early adulthood.[50] A study done on the Japanese radicals students by Ellis S. Krauss also supports this theory of experiential effect.[51] Generationalists reject the assumption that the adolescent - adult transition will be necessarily and smoothly integrative. Instead, youth may reject and attempt to supplant the existing adult role structure, rather than adopting its values and norms. Such clusters of individuals who share common experience may influence the course of politics.

Another body of literature supporting the generational thesis involves the use and analysis of systematic longtitudial time series data in order to determine the value and belief change in advanced industrial countires. In studying the value changes in advanced industrial society, Ronald Inglehart, Scott C. Flanagon, and others utilized a series of survey data

[50] Ralph Linton, "Age and Sex Categories," **American Sociological Review** 7 (5) October, 1942: pp. 589-603.

[51] Ellis, S. Krauss, <u>Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan</u> Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

including the Euro-Barometers (1970 - present), a 25-country World Values Survey (1981 - 1982), and a three-nation panel study (1974 - 1981) by Inglehart and his colleagues.[52]

In our examination of Taiwanese and Korean youth, we will proceed on the assumption of the experiential model without losing sight of the potential life-cycle effects. As our evidence will suggest, the reactions and rebellion observed are certainly less than ephemeral and cyclical. The phenomenon has a deeper psychological roots than sociologists might admit. Yet it seems to us that certain qualifications may be necessary in getting at a more sophisticated application of the generational model. One also needs to look at the cross-cutting influence of functional clusters and other political cleavage basis such as socio-economic class, religious affiliation, linguistic grouping, or ethnicity.[53]

In this thesis, modern nationalism, as different

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[52] See Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; also his "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review 65 (4), December 1971: pp. 991-1071; Scott C. Flanagan, "Value Chnage and Partisan Change in Japan: The Silent Revolution Revisited," Comparative Politics 11 (3), April 1979: pp. 253-278.

[53] see Lucian W. Pye, "China: The Politics of Gerontocracy," and Harold R. Issacs,"Fathers and Sons and Daughters and National Development," in Richard J. Samuels op. cit. 1977: pp. 107-124 & pp. 39-56

from subnationalism or ethnonationalism, is examined as the political manifestation of national identity. We would like to push the theoretical boundary further by building on previous scholarship on the study of nationalism. We do not exclude approaches other than psycho-cultural perspective. In view of the multidimensionality of the concept of nationalism, a sound and thorough explanation of nationalism must eclectically take note of all available research findings based on a variety of theoretical approaches. Totally excluding other theoretical perspectives may blind us to the true nature of the subject in question. Nevertheless, we shall argue later in this chapter that currently available theories on nationalism have failed to capture the emprical reality of the contemporary phenomenon of nationalism in East Asia. Logical deductions based on earlier theories do not offer a sufficiently convincing account of the nationalist sentiments we observe among today's young Korean and Taiwanese college students.

We also need to see national identity not as a static concept, but a dynamic one which is subject to change according to the character of political leadership, the demands of external reality, the socio-economic formation, and the formative experience of the particular political generation involved. As economic and political reality is constantly changing, it is not

impossible for new identifications and new loyalties to come about. Apparently dead peripheral ethnic identities may turn out to have been only slumbering, and regional demands may suddenly exert heavy pressure on any central government. Even a social revolution may threaten a state which disregards the associational sentiment across a whole class or group. In short, in studying the phenomenon of nationalism, a national identity perspective avoids the pitfalls associated with both the static culture model embodied in classical anthropology and the culture-blind rational interest model embodied in economics.

National Identity and the Self

Boyd C. Shafer wrote that nationalism is a feeling, "a sentiment filled with emotional overtones".[54] It satisfies profound psychological needs and drives in an individual. But what exactly is the nature of this emotional dimension all about? There are three domains of self-feeling that are directly connected to national identity. First, national identity fulfills the need for belonging. The need to feel connected to a larger group is an essential part of any person, one that has its roots in the earlier family relational experiences. Thus

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[54] Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1972: p. 18.

the sense of "we-ness" reflect this being part of a larger group. This aspect of being a member of a larger entity is a continuing presence and a molding element in an individual's life span. Identity, therefore, always possesses a dual aspect of separateness and membership in an encompassing entity.[55] Such affiliative needs, or as Pye puts it - associational sentiment, may be expressed through familial and societal bonds; or the person may crave for an association with the Cosmos or the higher God. The membership in a national group is a crucial element in the psychological makeup of an individual's sense of who he/she is. On the other hand, when a person is rejected, ostracized, or excluded by one's own national group, the experience is often painfully dislocating. In the political realm, a man's passport is his emblem of belonging in the real life. And its absence only signifies non-belonging or non-acceptance.

The second domain of personal emotion directly connected to national identity is the sense of security and the need for survival. Individual citizen expects the state to provide them with public protection and security against chaos, lawlessness, foreign invasion, violation of personal rights. With increasing contact and

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[55] On the distinction between "we" group and "they" group, see John Mack, "Nationalism and the Self," **Psychohistory Review** 11 (2-3) Spring 1983: pp 47-69. Also see Harold Issacs, op. cit., 1974: passim.

interaction between states, individual citizens understand the latent risk or threats to their security emanating from other nations. This anxiety is often played upon by national leaders for political purposes. Because of this craving for security and the imperative for national survival, strong armies and military might are often associated with security for the nation.[56]

Self-esteem and values constitute the third domain. Deeply seated in human psyche is the need to achieve a positive sense of self-regard. Negative self-esteem can be painful and can lead to depression. National pride can be a source of personal self-esteem. This is especially true when people come in contact with persons of other culture or nationality. There are two aspects to national pride - cultural aspect and political aspect. For most of the old civilizations and societies, cultural pride is unambiguously demonstrated and reflected in the people's daily behavior. Thus most Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese would proudly talk about their culture's contribution to world civilization and human progress. Students from these countries are never tired of the idea about the "material West" and the "spiritual East". Deeply seated within such cultural pride in things traditional is an

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[56] This perception , however, may change as we turn our attention to a more potent weapon system such as nuclear warheads. Increasing stock of nuclear weapons may be perceived to be associated with increasing risk of destruction.

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ambivalent feeling toward the "humiliating" modern historical path their countries experienced as the Western impact shattered the historic empire and rocked common people's confidence in their own culture to face up to the challenge of modernity and industrialization.

The political standing of a nation in the contemporary world is directly related to national pride. Whether the nation's self-image is cast in one of colony, semi-colony, a pariah state, a proxy for the superpower, or a peripheral dependent state in the Wallersteinian sense, the very image of one's own nation looms large in the minds of many Korean and Chinese youth. A negative image of one's motherland affects an individual's behavior in a subtle way. John Mack described a Palestine child's inferiority complex and its link with the Palestine people's destiny.[57] Taiwanese youth often refer to their own country as an international orphan ostracized from almost all international organizations. Koreans, on the other hand, indulge themselves as victims of international power maneuvering while conducting negotiations with former colonial overlord (Japan) or military protectors (United States) in a guilt-based diplomacy.

Dual Basis of National Identity: Cultural Identity &

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[57] John Mack "Nationalism and the Self," **Psychohistory Review** 11 (2-3) Spring 1983: PP 47-69.

Political Identity

National identity is a form of basic group identity that is based on biological, linguistic, economic, cultural, territorial, historical, nationality elements.[58] Analytically, this basic identity has a dual basis, that is, the political identity and the cultural identity. Few scholars have drawn on this distinction in their analyses of nationalism. Carlton Hayes was among the first scholars who suggested the distinction between cultural nationalism and political nationalism. And he argued that the former tended to lead to the latter. Most studies, however, still focus on the cultural bases of nationalism. The functional and sociological approach in particular have concentrated their analyses on such cultural variables like language, religion, intellectual development, communication pattern, etc..

Our distinction of political identity and cultural identity derives from Lucian W. Pye's analytical approach in his study on Burma and another illuminating insight advanced by German historian Friedrich Meinecke in his Cosmopolitanism and the National State.[59] Meinecke argues

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[58] For an excellent overview of basic group identity see Harold R. Issacs, Idols of The Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

[59] See Lucian W. Pye, op. cit. 1962: pp. 32-56. Also Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970 (German edition published in 1907).

that the nation is essentially founded upon equality and commonality and thus the distinction between **Staatsnation** (political nation) and **Kulturnation** (cultural nation). The political identity of a particular group centers on the idea of individual and collective self-determination and derives from the individual's free will and subjective commitment to the nation. A similar voluntaristic view is Ernest Renan's dramatic formulation which puts nation as a "daily plebiscite".[60] A nation's existence depends ultimately on the will of the individual. It is the people of a given historically evolved territory that perceives itself to be the nation. Citizenship is equated with nationality. A sense of political nation also entails the conscious acknowledgement of a set of commonly shared normative ideals for the national community. Membership in a political nation necessarily implies the distinction of "we" vis-a-vis "they". For a sense of political identity to take shape, there is generally some catalytic form of exogenous infringement upon the sovereignty and autonomy of the national community. But the exact content and nature of such political identity further depends on the political leadership which is ultimately responsible for articulating the goals, ideals, and institutional

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[60] Ernest Renan's definition was articulated in his famous address "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?", Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1882: p. 27.

framework of a nation-state.

By contrast, the solidarity spirit that is obtained in the cultural identity is founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common heritage and language, a distinctive area of settlement, religion, customs, myths and history.[61] It does not have to be mediated by a nation state or any political organizational form. Consciousness of unity and the sense of belonging together can develop independent of the political state. The cultural identity is similar to what Harold Issacs called "the Houses of Muumbi".[62] The individual has little room to choose to which nation he/she belongs. Membership of a cultural nation was more often a fate decided by nature and history.

The concept of political nation has its concrete historical referents in France, England, United States, in which a process of domestic political transformation generated the nation as a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social and economic status, ethnic origin, religious beliefs. The creation of France is an act of will. The nation as a community of responsible citizens expressing

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[61] Another set of distinctions was introduced by Hans Kohn in <u>Idea of Nationalism</u> on the West European and East-Central European concepts of nation – the subjective and objective concepts of nations.

[62] Harold Issacs, op. cit..

a common political will through the state is in theory constituted by individual commitment to the ideas of 1789 and to the grande patrie. The sovereignty of the people is the foundation of state power.

As to when and how an individual forms his/her cultural and political identities, Pye points out that an individual passes through three stages of socialization which condition his/her approach to political action and choices. For each individual experiencing similar processes of basic socialization, one develops "roughly similar personalities which constitute the essence of their sense of their common cultural identities." It is at this stage that an individual acquires the core cultural values. Later in the political socialization stage, an individual further develops his appreciation, understanding, and evaluative judgement of the political reality. One is then "socialized to his political culture and realizes his political identity."[63] Yet the self-images derived from these processes may not be always self-consistent or coherent. This is because the socialization processes are not necessarily coherent and may be disjointed or sending mixed signals. The assumption of continuity in or static reproduction of values and beliefs does not always stand, particularly in a society experiencing rapid paces of change.

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[63] Lucian W. Pye, op. cit., 1962: p. 45

There are many problems with the other apporaches we reviewed earlier in this chapter. First of all, the intellectual historian's approach places its emphasis on the elite nationalist thinkers' ideological formulation and fails to help social scientists empirically measure or verify nationalist phenomenon in the society. It also relegates causal primacy to historical legacy and antecedent ideas. Secondly, the functional approach emphasizes the dichotomy between modernity and tradition. The fallacy of this scheme is self-evident. We will not belabor this point here. However, it is important to point out that functional approach necessaril/ sees rapid chang?s as precipitating a breakdown of traditional identity and implies the coming of modernity as the Mecca for the new nationalism. It does not capture the internal dynamics of the emergence of individual identification with the national community. Rational interest theory on the other hand exaggerates the significance of ruling elites's indoctrination of the mass. Socio-economic modernization and increasing interdependence expose the mass to many more channels of information. Ruling elites' or dominant social group's monopoly of ideological indoctrination has thus become more and more questionable in East Asian contexts. All of them provide only partial explanations of the dynamics and processes.

We propose to base our research on the

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psychocultural approach and focus on the national identity concept as an analytical tool in studying nationalism. This approach would enable us conduct empirical analysis of individuals' personal beliefs, values, and identities. It also allows us to analyze the significance of the inner tensions, anxieties, dilemmas, and ambivalence exhibited by individuals in our study of the phenomenon of nationalism. By doing so, the holistic facade of nationalism would be lifted to allow more in-depth examination of individual's relationship with the nation state and help us understand, for example, why certain groups become galvanized by nationalism and how the individuals relate to their national community.

With the distinction of dual basis in mind, we will then proceed to examine the historical development of nationalism in Taiwan and South Korea in the next chapter. The emphasis in Chapter Three will be placed upon the weight of history as a source of nationalist inspiration or imagination and a source of psychological ambivalence among the national citizenry. Before we explore how the youth generation read their own national history, it is necessary for us to highlight the major historical themes in the emergence of modern nationalism in Taiwan and Korea.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY: TAIWAN AND KOREA

In this chapter we shall review some of the crucial historical stages in the process of national identity formation in these two societies. The link between each nation's historical legacies and the construction of competing forms of national identities will be examined as well.

In the case of Taiwan, the role of history in the development of national consciousness has proven to be extremely complex and ambiguous. First of all, there are two distinct paths of historical trajectories for Taiwan and China respectively. Conventional wisdom would have us believe that Taiwan and China share the same stream of grand history; that they share the same racial and cultural makeup; that they have been closely related to each other as the core and the periphery of the same national entity. As we shall demonstrate in this chapter, the reality is a complex web of historical trajectories, often subject to conflicting interpretations of Taiwan's historical development. This very complexity and ambiguity conditions the emergence of a distinct pattern of nationalism in Taiwan today.

Modern nationalism, either in Taiwan or in China, is a direct response to the impact of the West since the late nineteenth century. Japanese colonialism in Taiwan

and invasion of China was a second major exogenous force that shaped the path of Chinese nationalist movements. Contrasting patterns of anti-Japanese nationalist resistance in Taiwan and Korea offer an interesting perspective on this issue. We then examine endogenous social movements and political events that sparked a lasting internal debate on the ambivalent issues of wholesale Westernization vs. selective borrowing. Taiwan's liberation and her subsequent return to the arms of Continental China brought the two tracks of historical developments together. However, in some ways, this was a mixed blessing for the KMT regime after its withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949. History became a Janus-faced source of inspiration for competing versions of nationalist interpretations. The grandiose ancient line of Sinic culture is pitted against the distinctive experience of the island China. The 2-28 Incident of 1947 spelled a tragic beginning for Taiwan's return to the Nationalist rule. It also marked the tension-filled process of political integration in postwar Taiwan. Ethnic tension became entangled with nationalism. The birth of a Formosan nationalist movement calling for independence planted the seeds of distrust between a predominantly mainlander regime and a newly liberated society. With the arrival of KMT regime, China and Taiwan began another long period of competing claims to legitimacy. It is in

this historical setting, coupled with rapid economic growth and social mobilization, that the contemporary generation of Taiwanese college students, mostly born after the sixties, learn about their national past from their families and textbooks. We will analyze and highlight the significance of each phase in the development of modern Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism.

In South Korea, history presented another set of ambivalent issues and lessons for today's students. Yi dynasty's exclusionist and "Sadae" policies toward the outside world were shattered by the Japanese. Similar set of controversy over "Ti" and "Yung" baffled many Korean intellectuals at the turn of the century. The loss of national sovereignty stimulated the emergence of a nascent Korean national identity. The effects of harsh Japanese colonial rule only furthered strengthened the nationalist cravings among the masses. The traditional cultural elite and the newborn Korean national bourgeoisie were equally ambivalent in defining the essence of a modern Korean identity. Korean bourgeoisie's ambiguous role under Japanese colonial rule made the issue of national identity even more sensitive. What differentiates Taiwan and Korea in this case lies in the emergence of their political identities. Taiwan faced a troubling convergence of historical trajectories while Korea had a homogeneous and continuous national past to

fall back on. National division and Korean War, however, set the stage for two opposing Korean regimes in contest for political legitimacy. Ideological orthodoxies took over the center stage. Our discussion will reflect on how this pattern of development affects the contemporary debates among the Korean students. We will also outline the recurring themes in the consideration of Korean nationalism.

History and National Identity

In this chapter we will examine the standard accounts and interpretations of the national histories of China and Korea which constitute the background knowledge that informed the respective concepts of nationalism of students in the two societies of Taiwan and South Korea. Although as a new generation they had their own distinctive sentiments of nationalism, such sentiments had to be built upon the received history of their countries which they had been taught at school and home. Their experience did, of course, constitute a break to some degree from the histories. Still in finding their new sense of nationalism they had to work within what they had inherited as their national and collective histories. We therefore need to examine the problem of historical interpretations of the two societies as a basis for understanding the nationalism of current student generation.

Depending upon how it is interpreted, history can be a powerful shaping force in galvanizing a national community or inspiring a socio-economic class into political actions and movements. A glorious historical past can be used to legitimatize the state and leadership. Some ruling class trace their genealogies and rights to rule back to a royal or divine authority. History as a political tool or ideology may therefore be used either to consolidate ruling elites' hold onto power or to challenge those incumbent rulers whose partisan visions of a purposeful historical past has deceived their national citizens. Historical lessons are often cited by both the state and the primary socialization agents to inculcate a certain sense of national consciousness in the minds of their younger generation. Political leaders resort to historical examples for analogies and road maps in formulating policy options. In general, fixing links to the past and future from some version of a shared collective experience fulfills a deep and immediate psychological need for an individual's identity. It links the individual to his/her own personal history and origins, assuring the individual that he/she comes from somewhere and is going somewhere.[1] This shared

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[1] For a theoretical discussion on the impact of history and origin, see Harold Issacs, <u>Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change</u> Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989: pp 115-143.

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past is deeply imbedded in each national citizen's personal identity. This is part of the national identity with which our personal identities are molded.

For Taiwan and Korea, history has been a vital part in the construction and maintenance of their national identities. But history has been more than a source of national pride for a people of an ancient civilization, the dark sides of their histories also pose deep troubling questions, dilemmas, and contradictions that needs to be resolved. In this chapter we shall delineate the major historical legacies that impinge directly on the identities of these two societies. As we shall demonstrate, the assumption of a clear and unambiguous cultural identity is considered a cultural and historical "given" among the Koreans and the Taiwanese. Yet the painful historical trajectories of modernization in their modern histories brought out deep cultural identity crises for the citizens of these old civilizations. Nationalism in East Asia as a response to the impact of the West was therefore endowed with the mission to restore pride and resolve ambivalence among both the elites and the masses. In doing so, nationalist intellectuals often take up historical materials for the purposes of eradicating a shameful past, rediscovering a glorious phase, or resolving the ambivalent past.[2]

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[2] Ibid.: pp. 115-143.

There are three dominant themes that have reemerged,

in various disguises, time and again in Taiwan's and

Korea's contemporary search for their respective national

identity.[3] First, there was the theme of reform through

adopting Western technology; second, there was strong

currents of total hostility toward all forms of western

culture; and third, there were appeals to wholesale

Westernization. At different times different themes

dominated. The key point, however, is that for both

Taiwanese and Koreans the Western impact had ambiguous

and ambivalent effects on their sense of national

identity.[4]

Beginning in the late 19th century, the intrusion of

gunboat diplomacy and western cultures ignited among the

literati class the call for reforms and national self-

strengthening.[5] The goal was no other than wealth and

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[3] To a significant extent, modern Japanese
nationalism has manifested a similar set of historical
themes. See James W. White, Michio Umegaki, & Thomas R.H.
Havens eds. The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan
Between East and West New York: University Press of
America, 1990.

[4] See Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction Fourth
Edition, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1992; also Changsoo
Lee ed. Modernization of Korea and the Impact of the West
Los Angeles: East Asian Studies Center, University of
Southern California, 1981.

[5] See Chong-Shik Chung & Jae-Bong Ro Nationalism in
Korea Seoul, Korea: Research Center for Peace and
Unification, 1979; Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of
Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West Cambridge, MA;
(continued...)

power through the doctrine of "Eastern learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use". As John K. Fairbank put it, this "fallacy of halfway Westernization" which brought in sputtering pace of modernization still haunts many East Asian intellectuals today.[6]

After the reform nationalism of the 19th century, anti-colonial nationalism set in as a reaction against the encroaching colonial powers upon their national sovereignties. Nineteen-nineteen was a crucial year for the inception of modern nationalist movements in Korea and China. In China, the iconoclastic May Fourth Movement shocked the entire nation into a debate on the idea of wholesale westernization not only in tools but also in values. In the Hermit Kingdom, Koreans saw the convergence of the mass and the elite nationalist movements against Japanese domination.[7] Each of these two events opened what was to become a dynamic chapter in

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[5](...continued)
Harvard University Press, 1964.

[6] John King Fairbank, China: A New History Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992: pp. 217-234.

[7] See Vipan Chandra, Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth Century Korea Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.

Chinese and Korean anti-colonial nationalism.[8]

After World War II, civil wars broke out in both countries. 1945 and 1949 saw the division of Korea and China. The domestic partisan struggle between the left and the right complicated the quest for an integrated national identity.[9] Imbedded in the cold war bipolar environment, contemporary nationalism in China and Korea became entangled with the contest for political legitimacy between opposing regimes.[10]

In the case of Taiwan another factor entered the contemporary picture. In Taiwan, the initial KMT governor Chen Yi and his abusive and incompetent rule aggravated the newcomers and local Taiwanese residents. The fateful

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[8] Though China was not a fullfledged colony, its foreign concessions in major treaty ports and the unequal treaties were widely seen as a sign of what Sun Yat-sen called "semi-colony". The nature and manners in which anti-colonial nationalism manifested in China and Korea differed too.

[9] For immediate post-liberation politics, an excellent analysis is in Bruce Cumings's two-volume work The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947, Volume I, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981; and The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, Volume II, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

[10] See Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea:The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976; Tien Hung-Mao, The Great Transition: Political & Social Change in the Republic of China Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.

February 28 Incident and its ensuing purge wiped out the Taiwanese elites and general masses' trust in the nationalist government.[11] A tragic beginning led to decades of ethnic tension between the mainlanders who came after 1949 and the Taiwanese who lived through Japanese colonial rule. Such dichotomized social scene under an authoritarian leadership with a siege mentality did not help much in achieving a coherent sense of national identity. In its stead was an official ideological package of a less than pronounced version of ambiguous nationalism imposed from above. The awkward mythical claim of territorial jurisdiction over the entire mainland and the dogmatic emphasis on political legitimacy by the nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo produced many problems of cognitive dissonance for the younger generation.

Then in what ways are these historical themes and patterns related to the contemporary youth in Taiwan and Korea? Historical past of a nation has been an important part of the primary and secondary education curricula in Taiwan and South Korea. The textbooks and courses on

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[11] The most recent and balanced account of February 28 Incident is Ramon Myers and Tse Han Lai's A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. Earlier English publications covering this period include George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965 and Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970.

history, civics, national ethics, national culture, and
social studies pay special attention to the history of
national reform movement in the late 19th century, the
anti-Japanese war, and anti-communism ideological
struggle. Both governments stress the singular importance
of national unification. Children of today learn early on
that they are members of a legitimate system representing
the real "Chinese" (or "Korean") as opposed to the other
system based on an "alien" Marxist-Leninist ideology
imported from the West. As we learned from our interviews
with the students, historical experience and legacies
often stood out as points of reference in their political
socialization process. In their families, children learn
about their nation and people from stories told by
grandparents and elders who have lived through some of
the tumultuous stages in nationalist struggles against
the colonial rulers or the oppression by corrupt military
regimes.

There are often contrasting versions of official
history vs. the unofficial oral history. Official
ideologies and orthodox interpretation of national
history sometimes present conflicting cognitive map for
the youths when they are held against the socio-political
realities. Adolescents begin to reflect on and question
the gap between what they personally experience and what
they are told in the textbooks. Such incongruence in

transmitted messages bring about tensions, anxieties, and puzzles in the political socialization process and the basic identity formation process. As this generation of students witness an ever closer incorporation of their societies with the Western capitalist system, legacies of the past including certain historical ambivalence remain unresolved.

A voluntaristic definition of a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation. But to advance beyond this subjective notion of national identity, we need to take the notion apart and to isolate the historical forces and cultural elements that have been most decisive in bringing about this sense of national identity. The root of this common identity is the sense of "the existence of a singularly important national 'we' which is distinguished from all others who make up an alien 'they'."[12] Korea, along with Japan and Vietnam, probably approximates most the ideal mode of the nation based on European experience. This ideal-typical nation, though no such nation in actuality exists, is a single people, traditionally fixed on a well-defined territory, speaking a unique language of its own, and sharing a common historical past. In the case of Taiwan, history has provided a much more complex web of

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[12] Rupert Emerson, <u>From Empire to Nation</u> Boston, Beacon Press, 1960: p. 102.

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crisscrossing picture. Taiwan's national identity therefore was anything but the ideal mode delineated above. Ambivalence becomes its idiosyncratic mark.

I. TAIWAN

Taiwan and China: A Loose Tie

Historically Taiwan was never closely integrated into the Middle Kingdom before the late Ch'ing period. The dynastic cycles in the mainland seldom affect directly the daily lives of the Chinese settler community on Taiwan, then known as Formosa. The island of Taiwan is separated from the Chinese mainland by a strait of 90 to 120 miles in breadth. For the Chinese on the mainland, the island represented a strategic shield to defend the southeastern China from attacks from the Pacific. But the island should also serve as an ideal base of operations for an invader launching attacks on the coastal provinces of China. Few Chinese chronicles offer data on the island of Taiwan before 1430, when a Ming dynasty official reported his "discovery" of the island to the Emperor. Back then, Taiwan was inhabited by aborigines of Proto-Malayan stock and the few Chinese settlers were mostly political or economic refugees or merchants. There was no record that the Ming Court incorporated Taiwan into the imperial territory. During the latter half of the 15th century and the 16th century Taiwan emerged as a retreat for Japanese pirates and Chinese outlaws. In the absence

of any form of governmental authority on Taiwan, the island was in fact a neutral port open to the vessels and peoples of all countries. Japanese tried unsuccessfully between 1593 and 1616 to bring the island within the influence of the Japanese government. For the Chinese who were disaffected with the Ming government and those who were seeking economic relief from the adverse economic conditions of southeastern coastal provinces, Taiwan was a place for migration.[13] Steady streams of migrants came mostly from Canton and Fukien provinces. They concentrated on the western plains and lowlands. By the turn of the 16th century the Chinese settlers were believed to have numbered about 25,000.

The Dutch came to Taiwan in 1624 as a result of the negotiation between the Ch'ing court and the Dutch whereby the Dutch were accorded some commercial privileges by China on the condition that the Dutch withdrew from the Pescadores they occupied in 1622 and seek a base on Taiwan. Japanese residents later came into a dispute with the Dutch over possession of Taiwan and eventually withdrew in 1628 on their own accord. After the Japanese withdrawal, the Spanish came to northern Taiwan only to be ousted by the Dutch in 1642. In 1644 with the fall of the Ming dynasty, remaining loyalists

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[13] For a general overview, see John F. Cooper, Taiwan: Province or Island State? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

led by Koxinga began looking for a refuge in the former bastion of Chinese trader-pirates: the Pescadores and Taiwan. In April 1661, Koxinga's troops numbering about 25,000 landed on Anping and in 9 months defeated the Dutch, thus ending the thirty-eight years of Dutch rule in Taiwan.[14]

Koxinga brought into Taiwan the practices of laws, customs, and governmental institutions of the Ming dynasty.[15] He improved and stabilized the economy as well as the political conditions of the western half of the island. After Koxinga and his son's deaths, Ch'ing naval force led by Shih Liang captured Taiwan in July of 1683. Though the court was originally intent on repatriating all settlers back to mainland and abandon the island, at the urging of Shi Liang, the Ch'ing court eventually incorporated Taiwan into the province of Fukien. Under the Manchu regime, Taiwan and Pescadores were made a prefecture (fu) under the Fukien province. But the government, for fear of reemergence of pirate and criminal activities, restricted the migration and trade.

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[14] On this period, see Hsu Wen-hsiung, "From Aboriginal Island to Chinese Frontier: The Development of Taiwan Before 1683," in Ronald G. Knapp ed. China's Island Frontier, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1980: pp. 3-29.

[15] For an account of Koxinga and his influence, see Ralph C. Crozier, Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977.

However, during the first one and half century of the Ch'ing dynasty, the population increased by seven fold.

The population of Taiwan saw a significant increase in size in spite of the strictest prohibition of emigration ever to be practiced by a Chinese government. The population consisted of three distinct groups in the 1830's: the aborigines, the Chinese settlers, and the mandarins who ruled over the other groups. The Chinese settlers were divided into two major groups according to the areas on the mainland from whence they came, and therefore according to the dialect spoken by each group. There were the "Hakkas," and the "Puntis". Hakka signifies a stranger to a place. They were considered outcasts by the "Puntis" (the original dwellers). The Puntis were divided into two major groups according to their native origin on mainland. These two groups, natives of "Ch'uan-chou-fu" and of "Chang-chou-fu", exhibited a particularly militant parochialism and often involved the whole island in their armed conflicts. For administrative purposes in the 1830's the island was divided into four hsien (districts) under civil magistrates; three ting (seaboard divisions) under marine magistrates; and an eastern mountainous territory of the aborigines. The chief military authority of the island was the chen-t'ai, the Brigade General. Due to the frequent disturbances caused by the population, which had

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by then grown to some two and a half million in the years immediately after the reign of Emperor Chia-ch'ing in the 1820's, the size of the garrison troops on Taiwan was increased to some 14,000 members.

As far as the status of Taiwan within the Ch'ing Empire was concerned, we must first turn to examine the conceptual basis of Chinese world order before the onset of Western imperialist infringement upon China's hitherto unchallenged sovereignty. The traditional concept of a universal Chinese state - based upon the ethnocentric theory with China at the center of the universe - excluded considerations of sovereignty or equality which are basic to western theories of international relations. The Chinese emperor claimed to be the Son of Heaven and ruled supreme over all mankind with the Mandate of Heaven. His imperial domain was the entire known world. In this imperial expanse China occupied the center, surrounded by satellites or lesser tribes. These satellites included all non-Han tribes which had not yet accepted Chinese civilization. Chinese policy toward these uncivilized barbarians was one of expecting them to gradually and voluntarily seek assimilation.

Back then, the eastern part of Taiwan where the aborigines lived, however, was not immediately incorporated into the administrative units of the island prefecture. The underlying theory of the universal

Chinese state and the traditional assimilation policy which the government took toward the aborigines of Taiwan differed significantly from the traditional Western concept of property rights of a state. Such Western concept, as expressed in international law, required as prerequisite for claiming a territory a certain visible sign of the state's effective control of the territory. In the Western scheme, active measures were the means to subjugate the indigenous inhabitants of the territory. What was considered effective control was reflected in the instituting of administrative authority on the land.[16] This new concept was not readily accepted by imperial China, nor was China challenged by Western powers on this point until the mid-19th century when the Western powers were aggressively seeking to expand their spheres of influence and privileges in East Asia. But in 1874 China's claim was challenged by Japan.

Before Japan's acquisition of Taiwan, the intangible sense of competition, among other indirect factors, prevented any one western nation from seizing Taiwan to its exclusive use. Tangible arrangements, however, were concluded to ensure that benefits to be derived from Taiwan's unique commercial and strategic values vis-a-vis

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[16] On the comparison of these two schemes, see Sophia Su-fei Yen, Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations, 1836-1874 Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, 1966: passim.

China proper would be shared among the major powers. [17]

The turning point came with the signing of the Treaty of

Tientsin in 1858 which provided that the ports of Taiwan

were to be opened to foreign trade. These treaty ports of

Taiwan were all located in the western part of the island

where Chinese had more or less control: Hu-wei (Tamsui),

Keelung, An-p'ing, and Ch'i-hou (Kaohsiung). In the

process of forcing open these ports, the Western powers

were also acknowledging, in effect, the Chinese

sovereignty over the western part of Taiwan. The opening

of Taiwan ports immediately drew many foreigners to the

island. The British were actively involved in setting up

close links between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Tamsui and

Kaohsiung were the two most active ports. Other European

and American consular offices, trading houses, and

missionaries also came in to set up operations in Taiwan.

But very soon these treaty ports proved to be too small

as an arena of foreign commercial and trading activity as

the trade volume gradually increased. Confrontations with

the foreigners also increased. Foreign merchants then

started to reach into the eastern part of the Taiwan

seeking to trade directly with the aborigines instead of

trading through official monopoly systems controlled by

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[17] Leonard H. D. Gordon, "Taiwan and the Powers, 1840-1895," in Leonard H.D. Gordon ed. Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History New York: Columbia University Press, 1970: pp. 93-116.

corrupt Chinese mandarins.

With these commercial activities and exposure to the West, Taiwan's treaty ports did not develop, like the treaty ports of mainland China, a significant class of merchants, clerks, and laborers. Nor was there any foreign enclaves or concessions. Local residents remained by and large unaffected. For the island's business elites, the trading and commercial activities did bring them more wealth. A group of landowners and businessmen began to pick up more of the traditional Chinese gentry-literati culture. This group, through intermarriages, by and large maintained themselves as a privileged social class in Taiwan.[18]

In 1874, Japanese challenged China's effective sovereignty over the aboriginal Taiwanese by arguing that China lacked effective control - the type of control prescribed in international law.[19] The Chinese officials insisted that its territorial sovereignty was based on the traditional Chinese concept of a universal state system. After the Japanese withdrew their dispute over the sovereignty issue, China moved to incorporate the

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[18] Johanna Meskill, A Chinese Pioneer Family Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

[19] For an unorthodox analysis of the shifting interstate relations in East Asia in the late 1800s, see Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979.

whole island within the prefectural administrative system. However, twenty years later, as a result of the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan.

Before the Japanese colonial period, Taiwan had a loose relationship with China mainland. It was never effectively incorporated into Chinese political system. It could be argued that the Chinese settlers, not to mention the aborigines, did not develop a clear sense of national consciousness. Japanese settlers lived among the Chinese for a significant period of time. Many of the Chinese migrants themselves never developed strong political identifications with the Middle Kingdom, though there was no questioning as to their cultural identity as a Chinese community.

The "peripheralness" of Taiwan in the Chinese Empire of the nineteenth century had two implications. First, the geographical remoteness of the island far removed from the central government in Peking and considerably removed from the provincial authority in Fukien effectively precluded close political incorporation. The central authority was never able to penetrate downward because of the lack of an efficient network of communications. Second, Taiwan was "politically peripheral" in terms of the traditional concept of a universal Chinese state. In the centrifugal feature of a

universal Chinese state system, Taiwan was peripheral because the island had been inhabited by aborigines who were not yet Sinified and who did not receive the direct attention of the central government. On philosophical and traditional grounds the <u>Book of Rites</u> expressly stated that a group of people would be brought under the Chinese influence only when such people voluntarily accepted Chinese rule. Such an induction process called for a gradual cultural assimilation of the tribes as the precondition for political incorporation. The absence of direct Chinese rule over the aboriginal territory in Taiwan until 1874 was, therefore, based on a deeply imbedded cultural and philosophical principle. The chronic uprisings of the settlers in western Taiwan indicated that the central government had not been able to exercise effective jurisdiction over its subjects who where composed of heterogeneous dialect-speaking groups with strong parochialism. And the strong undercurrent of anti-Ch'ing dynasty sentiments left behind by Koxinga and other Ming loyalists further undercut any tendency toward closer identification with China. In reality, in the mid-nineteenth century the Chinese government was unable to show undisputed evidence of its effective control over the whole island of Taiwan.[20]

Cultural Construction of National Identity

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[20] Sophia Su-fei Yen, op. cit..

The problem for the basis of nationalism in Taiwan was further complicated because of certain fundamental problems of Chinese nationalism in general. Indeed, the problem of Chinese national identity before the Republican revolution was even more complex. There is no denial that late imperial China exhibited a high degree of cultural integration. Even though serious divisions based on kinship, ethnicity, and regional loyalties did exist in China, but historical development in China saw gradually increasing incorporation and cooptation. Before the onset of modern nationalism in early twentieth century, Chinese could not "imagine" the state as an integral part of their personal identity.[21] The concept of a national citizenship simply did not exist. Neither was there a well-defined "national we" versus an "alien they". In the traditional Chinese mindset, "they" were defined as "I" or "Fan", meaning barbarians who are necessarily assigned an inferior position. The political boundary was porous. Barbarians would be allowed into the Chinese national community as long as they are assimilated into the Chinese culture. The idea of being a Chinese was primarily defined by identifying with the abstraction of Chinese culture. Such cultural construction of identity allows what one scholar called

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[21] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism London: Verso, 1983.

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the "synthesizing mind in Chinese ethno-cultural adjustment".[22]

James L. Watson argues that a unified culture predated, and made possible, the fabrication of a modern Chinese state. People of all stations in life already related to China's grand cultural tradition with its ancient history. When referring to the "civilized" vs. "uncivilized" or "savage" way of life, Chinese are using notions of civility, conformity, and order to measure those who have or have not followed the accepted cultural norms in their society.[23] This notion of a shared culture as the core of cultural identity began to unravel during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, culminating in the May Fourth Movement which we shall discuss later in this chapter.

As to the elements in this vision of a shared culture, scholars differ in their interpretations. It must be acknowledged that identifying the positive contents of nationalism or the essence of national identity is a very difficult task. However, it may be

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[22] Hsien Rin, "The Synthesizing Mind in Chinese Ethno-Cultural Adjustment," in George De Vos & Lola Romanucci-Ross eds. Ethnic Identity:Cultural Continuities and Change Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1975: pp. 137-155.

[23] James L. Watson, "The Renegotiation of Chinese Cultural Identity in the Post Mao Era," in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom & Elizabeth J. Perry eds. Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992: pp. 67-84.

less difficult in identifying the factors conducive to the emergence of such cultural identity. In the case of China, the facilitating factors included the historically centralized bureaucratic state, the universally shared ideographic script cutting across speech communities, the diffusion of print medium, a common literary and philosophical tradition, a common oral tradition of folktale, myths, and legends, as well as China's elaborate hierarchy of commercial centers and marketing communities.[24]

The set of cultural attributes that made a person Chinese appears to have little to do with a shared creed or set of prescribed religious beliefs.[25] Furthermore, in China there has never emerged a unified clergy. Confucianism, at most, could only be seen as a form of ethics with an important spiritual dimension.[26] Rather, the processes of cultural construction of a national identity hinges on the distinction between Han and non-

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[24] See Benedict Anderson, op. cit., passim; and James L. Watson, op. cit..

[25] Samuel P. Huntington suggested the importance of the "American Creed" for American national identity in American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981: pp. 13-30.

[26] See Tu Wei-ming, "Confucian Ethics and the Entrepreneurial Spirit in East Asia," in Tu's Confucian Ethics Today: The Singapore Challenge Singapore: Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, Federal Publications, 1984: pp. 65-99. For a different view, see Max Weber's The Religion of China Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.

Han. The key litmus test here is whether a particular group of people are judged to have "wen-hua" (civilization), learning, or elegance. To be Chinese in this context means that individuals must conduct their daily lives according to the rules of the dominant Confucian culture. It is practice rather than belief that makes a person Chinese. The essence of such cultural identification process lies less in some elegantly codified moral ethics extracted from classic texts than in the core values reflected in Chinese people's daily rituals and behaviors. The individual Chinese finds his/her identity of being "Chinese" through the complex web of cultural symbols and daily interactions.

Nationalism in the pre-1945 China clearly lacked a strong base in its political dimension. That there was a lack of commonly accepted and shared political identity among Chinese, elite or mass, is reflected in the less than integrated society in modern China from late Ch'ing to the Republican era. The nationalist state, in particular, relied heavily upon military coercion, ideological commitment, and limited resources to govern a militarily and politically segmented civil society in a diverse geographic expanse. Consequently, individuals in the modern Chinese society were left to organize themselves into more or less cellular and particularistic

units based on personal and other particularistic ties.[27] While Sun Yat-sen characterized Chinese society as "a sheet of loose sand", the Chinese society is sufficiently structured, though still rather diffuse, via personal networks.

Even when we examine Chinese political leadership as a national symbol, modern Chinese history offered few, if any, exemplary national heroes who would stand for a nationally accepted set of values. Political leadership has traditionally been conceptualized as the incarnation of a paternalistic authority which fulfills the deep psychological dependency on authority.[28] When the country was engulfed, for most of the Republican era, in a domestic strife among fragmented warring factions and regional warlords, one would not be surprised if a modern Chinese found it difficult to identify himself/herself with a distinct "political China".

From Xenophobia to Self-Strengthening: The Search for Wealth and Power

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[27] Kenneth G. Lieberthal dealt with this problem in modern Chinese history in his <u>Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-52</u> Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980.

[28] See Lucian W. Pye, <u>Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority</u>, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1985. Pye, <u>The Spirit of Chinese Politics</u>, New Edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Also Richard H. Solomon, <u>Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture</u> Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971.

In China in the 1890s an intellectual ferment for reform began to take shape. It eventually generated a movement for political reform and ushered in a new phase of socio-cultural change. Imperialism was the political catalyst in this process. And contact with Western culture was another transformative catalyst.

By 1890 imperialist aggression entered a new climatic stage. China suffered defeat in Sino-Japanese War. French and Western powers scrambled for a share of "spheres of influence" in South and Southwest China. Foreign concessions in treaty ports brought forth an atmosphere of crisis of imminent dismemberment. However, those treaty ports, which were fundamentally different from colonies, saw the emergence of a new version of modern Chinese cities blending the West and the East. An elaborate system of administrative arrangements and a group of modern bourgeoisie, professionals, and intellectuals quietly emerged.[29] Coincided with the socio-economic transformation that took place in the treaty ports, Western expansion generated a sustained cumulative economic growth in coastal cities. This nascent modernization linked the treaty ports with the world market. It also saw the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs, professionals, and urban working class.

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[29] John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

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New values were accepted as part of the social mobilization process. But outside these spots, the socio-economic structure of the hinterland remained unchanged.[30]

But the 1890s were a crucial turning point for western values spillover to areas outside of treaty ports on a large scale, one which contributed to the ferment among gentry-literati by the mid-decade. From 1840 to 1890 the influx of western learning was slow and limited. Christian missionaries who went into inland China had little impact and in fact created more tension and psychological chasm. Intellectual rigidity and insulation was the result of the continuing existence of civil-service exam and Confucian education system. But the gradual infiltration of western thoughts and their subsequent fusion with indigenous intellectual trends eventually gave rise to the intellectual ferment of mid-1890s. Christian missionaries acted as cultural brokers in reaching the intellectuals through the use of publications and private associations as vehicles of social criticism and public discussions. Political writings in this period moved to accept the idea of political participation. The polity of constitutional

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[30] For a thoughtful analysis of the treaty ports and Chinese nationalism, see Lucian W. Pye, <u>Chinese Nationalism and Modernization</u> Wei Lun Lecture Series, Chinese University Bulletin Supplement 22, Hong Kong: Chinese University, 1992.

monarchy surfaced in discussions.

The central concern was a continuation from the 1860s' search for national wealth and power. But they moved beyond technology and commercial-industrial resourcefulness in their search for western secret to national strength. The key was identified as democracy. Thus the trend among modern Chinese intellectuals to assimilate democracy into nationalism and to view the former as no more than an ingredient in the latter. This change signaled the possibility for a totally different political order/framework other than monarchy. But these reforms stopped short of criticizing the ideological foundation - Confucianism.[31] Furthermore, the trend never went beyond the cultural elite circles.

May Fourth Movement and Student Nationalism

The Republican revolution in 1911 ended millennium of dynastic rules and pushed China into a new stage in history. But the perennial question of Chinese national identity did not get resolved overnight. Though the revolutionaries utilized nationalistic anti-Manchu racial sentiments in their mass agitation, Chinese, mass or elites, still had little consensus on what the new China

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[31] Hao Chang gave an cogent overview of this period in his "Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 1890-8," in Kwan-Ching Liu and John King Fairbank eds. Cambridge History of China, Vol 11: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980

would be like. Amid this frenzy, it was the persisting foreign domination and infringement on China's sovereignty that eventually touched off what became one of the most influential event in modern Chinese history.

In 1919 the Shandong settlement reached at the Versailles Conference ignited students' protests from thirteen universities and colleges. Approximately three thousand students gathered in Tiananmen Square in demonstration. The student unions quickly spread across the country to major cities like Tientsin, Wuhan, and Shanghai. Coupled with this event, more significantly, were the wide ranging cultural, social, and political movements aiming at a total transformation of China from a backward peripheral nation to a modern nation. The core question was modernization.

Before the Republican era, Chinese intellectuals lived deeply within the traditional culture as far as their personal identities were concerned. That was the generation of Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a generation that did not perceive the traditional Chinese social order and cultural legacies as "a totality to be either accepted or rejected as a whole".[32] The question for those cultural elites was not one of incompatible and

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[32] Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Introduction" in Schwartz ed., Reflections on the May Fourth Movement Harvard East Asian Monograph, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973: pp. 1-13.

mutually exclusive dichotomy between Chinese tradition and Western modernity. For the older generation, China's problems originated in its cultural ailments and the political prescription must be preceded by cultural transformation. Political leaders like Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Bing-lin subscribed to this view as well.[33] Sun Yat sen called for a blending of the traditional and Western values. But the nation's political plight had already exhausted the younger generation's patience. Students turned to a form of totalistic cultural iconoclasm which was a foremost feature of the May Fourth period.[34] On the ideological scene, this period also saw the rise of Marxism to a dominant position in China.

Paradoxically, the May Fourth era featured both nationalistic rejection of imperialist infringement and internationalistic embracing of various western political ideologies and philosophies. Such combination of nationalist and internationalist approach created an

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[33] Young-tsu Wong, Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869-1936 Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989.

[34] For a general analysis of the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. On the cultural iconoclasm, see Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Era Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

unsolvable tension for the younger generation.[35] The "New Culture" movement, with its total rejection of traditional culture, emerged in an urban environment with the support and participation by intellectuals, students, journalists. But the exact content of this "new culture" was a controversial subject of contention itself. One popular slogan was "Down with Confucius and Sons!". They advocated the adoption of "Bai-hua wen" (the vernacular) as the national language and espoused a new Bai-hua literature as the major medium.

In this period, there was distinctly a trend toward the emancipation of the individual from the shackles of the traditional social system. It was widely believed that the family and clan system of an agricultural economy were incompatible with the requirement of a modern nation. Attacked along with the antiquity was the entrenched position of Confucianism in Chinese society. Yet all these destructive attack on the tradition was rooted in the deep psychological need for an ever stronger nation and powerful state as China faced the aggressive foreign imperialists. Chinese version of individual emancipation was not the same as the liberal version of western individualism because the individual was only replacing his/her craving for a strong state for

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[35] Maurice Meisner, "Cultural Iconoclasm, Nationalism, and Internationalism in the May Fourth Movement," in Benjamin I. Schwartz, op. cit.: pp. 14-22.

an antiquated cultural tradition.[36]

The spirit of criticism and destruction did not receive much welcome among the conservative KMT leadership. Sun yat-sen himself only lent his support to the students and the new culture movement on political grounds. Political leaders like Chiang Kai-shek were eager to seize the opportunity for spreading anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism. Both Sun and Chiang's nationalist background made them critical and suspicious of the movement's iconoclastic attitudes toward the national heritage and historic past. Chiang kai-shek was even more critical of both liberals and communists for their failure to give proper respect to traditional culture. He attacked the students' indiscriminate embracing of imported western political ideas which he deemed incompatible with China's needs and realities. In a July 1941 speech, Chiang said:

> "Let us see what the so-called new culture movement of that time (the May Fourth period) means. In view of the practical situation of the time, we really do not see that it has concrete content. Does the new culture movement mean the advocacy for the vernacular literature? Does the new culture movement mean the piecemeal introduction of Western

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[36] Chow Tse-tsung, op. cit.: pp. 359-361.

literature? Does the new culture movement mean
the overthrow of the old ethics and the
rejection of national history? Does the new
culture movement mean the demand for
individual emancipation and an ignorance of
nation and society? Does the new culture
movement mean the destruction of all
discipline and the expansion of individual
freedom? Or, does the new culture movement
mean the blind worship of foreign countries
and indiscriminate introduction and acceptance
of foreign civilization? If it does, the new
culture we seek is too simple, too cheap and
too dangerous!"[37]

This criticism carried a long-lasting impact on
KMT's cultural and educational policies from the thirties
to the seventies. During this period, students in China
and later in Taiwan all received this official
interpretation of the May Fourth Movement. In this
ideological format, Chiang Kai-shek interpreted the
popular May Fourth era ideas of "Mr, Te" (democracy) and
"Mr. Sai" (science) as discipline and organization. For
Kuomintang conservatives, May Fourth nationalist
sentiments were powerful tools against the warlords and
foreign powers but the anti-traditionalist elements of

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[37] Quoted in Chow Tse-tsung op. cit.: p. 344.

th same movement were evils to be decimated. After KMT's 1,49 withdrawal to Taiwan, the government began to reemphasize the importance of spiritual armament. The loss of mainland and KMT's postwar popular support were attributed to the contamination of revolutionary ideological orthodoxy by alien ideologies, i.e., Marxism-Leninism. The problem was therefore conveniently framed in the Chinese tradition of "learning proper ideas" - a matter of reforming the mind of the younger generation.

Chinese students' impatience with compromise and craving for immediate holistic solution in the face of imperialist encroachment resurfaced again between 1927 and 1937, the year China formally declared war against Japanese invasion. Many of them had first-hand experience with the imperialist violation of their national integrity. Beginning in the twenties, student movement in China increasing came under the shadow of CCP-KMT partisan politics. Each side was eager to take in the students as its political tool for domestic struggle. In 1931 and 1935 anti-Japanese demonstrations were all infiltrated by CCP in their later stages. After the war ended in 1945 until the communist takeover in 1949, student demonstrations and strikes were mostly manipulated either by KMT or by CCP. Student nationalism in China eventually became a code word for totally

politicized partisan struggle.[38]

Formosan Nationalism and Colonial Rule

While China was deeply involved in reform movement , nationalist revolution, anti-imperialist movement, iconoclastic antitraditionalism, and civil war, Taiwanese were living under the Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945. The Japanese colonial administration had exerted tremendous influence on the economic, social, and political development of Taiwan.[39] This period also shaped the later development of a Taiwanese identity in many subtle ways.

The importance of colonial rule for nationalism is best illustrated by Rupert Emerson. He argued that "the nature of the colonial setting and the contrasting colonial policies of the powers have played a significant role not only in the shaping of nations but also in the development of nationalism, influencing the speed with which nationalist movements have swung into action, their membership and structure, the demands they pose, and their tactics and strategy. In Asia and Africa nationalism is essentially the response of peoples to the

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[38] For student nationalism in the 1920s and 30s, see John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966.

[39] There has been a voluminous literature on Japanese colonialism in English. A general overview is in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie eds. The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

impact of the West. Since in dependent territories the timing and intensity of that impact are controlled in large measure by the colonial regime, the importance of the latter as an agent in the creation of nationalism tends to be correspondingly great. Such matter as the type of economy the imperial power encourages, the goals it sets, the colonial institutions it establishes, the civil and political rights it extends to the people, the utilization of direct or indirect rule, and the strength or absence of alien settler communities are all of major consequence in determining the character of the political movements which arise to challenge the colonial overlords."[40]

Japanese colonial rule was different from that of the European colonial powers in several aspects. First, Japan was a late comer to the colonial power game. As a latecomer, she was in a position to draw on the colonial experiences of other major powers in the previous centuries. Secondly, both Taiwan and Korea were located in relatively close proximity to the metropole which encouraged Japan to take an aggressive approach in pursuing a policy of direct rule and strengthening economic ties to Japan. Such factor further gave Japan relative ease in deploying military force, when necessary, to the theater of combat. Japan also

[40] Rupert Emerson, op. cit.: p. 61.

encouraged its own people's emigration to settlements in these two colonies. Thirdly, Taiwan and Korea as colonies of Imperial Japan were not remote abstractions for the Japanese ruling elites but a nearby territorial entity with vital strategic and economic importance to Japan. A fourth feature was the cultural affinity between these two colonies and Japan. Such sharing of a Confucian heritage prompted the Japanese colonial policy makers to seek a policy of assimilation toward their colonial subjects. The fifth distinction was the fact that after the liberation, unlike the British and the French, Japan has never publicly taken pride in their colonial past. Japanese in general do not claim credits for laying the infrastructure for industrialization or for initiating the modernization process in Korea and Taiwan.

Taiwan and Japan never had the same kind of cultural, military encounters between Korea and Japan. Except for some pirates and individuals, significant exchanges started only by 1874 when Japan sent an expedition force to Taiwan. Geographic separation was the main reason for this lack of early contact. The first recorded contact was in 1593 when Hideyoshi dispatched his personal emissary Harada Magoshichiro to Taiwan as part of his plan to invade Ming China. In 1604 Yamada Nagamasa briefly visited the island and later introduced the island to the Japanese as Takasago, meaning the

Island of Treasure. The unsuccessful attempt by Hamada
Yahei to drive the Dutch out of Taiwan was the last
recorded contact between Taiwan and Japan prior to 1874.
In May 1874, Japan dispatched an expedition team to
Taiwan without China's protest under the command of Saigo
Tsugumichi. They occupied a large area of the southern
part of Taiwan. Peiking officials by then finally came to
realize that their earlier failure to proclaim
sovereignty over Taiwan was a serious mistake. The court
rushed to issue a statement that the entire island
belonged to the Chinese Emperor. Through the
intermediation of British Envoy in Peiking, China and
Japan signed a treaty in October which included Chinese
compensation and recognition that Japan's expedition was
a just and rightful proceeding. Local Chinese settlers in
this event did not express intense anti-Japanese
sentiment. They were mostly indifferent. In sharp
contrast was Korean hostility generated as a result of
the Japanese expedition in 1875. The reason may be due to
the fact that the Japanese were after the aboriginal
tribes of the mountains against whom the settlers had for
centuries fought. Such invasion was seen more as a
chastisement of their foes rather than a foreign
encroachment.[41]

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[41] Edward I-Te Chen, Japanese Colonialism in Korea
and Formosa: A Comparison of Its Effects Upon the

In contrast to Koreans' often unreserved bitter
memory of Japanese colonial rule, many Taiwanese who had
lived through the colonial period had mixed emotions and
some nostalgia toward their Japanese overlords. On the
contemporary scene, the KMT government on Taiwan have had
several periods of strained relations with Japan over the
trade imbalance issue, Japan's recognition of PRC in the
seventies, conflicting territorial claims over the
Senkagu islands. Yet the general Taiwanese public,
individuals or corporations, have by and large remained
close contacts with the Japanese. Many older Taiwanese
speak fluent Japanese. Japanese language is one of the
two most popular foreign languages among Taiwanese
people, second only to English. Japanese restaurants are
commonly seen in cities and countryside. With the
increasing Taiwanization in political leadership, many
leading Taiwanese politicians openly speak Japanese in
public gatherings where Japanese visitors are present.
Contrasting the past and the present attitudes toward
Japan, one would be surprised by the differences between
Taiwanese and Koreans.[42]

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[41](...continued)
Development of Nationalism, Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

[42] There are two views on the differing nationalistic
reactions, Edward I-Te Chen in his Japanese Colonialism
in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of Its Effects Upon
the Development of Nationalism op.cit. offered a
(continued...)

As we have argued earlier in this chapter, Taiwanese did not develop a distinctive Chinese identity prior to the twentieth century. To be sure, there was a clear sense of common cultural affiliation with the Sinic culture by the time Japan was about to occupy Taiwan in 1895. After the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty on April 17, 1895, China ceded Taiwan to Japan. Local Taiwanese immediately made a last-minute appeal to Peking pleading for a postponement in ratifying the treaty so that they could prepare an island-wide armed resistance. The plead fell on deaf ears. After their appeals to the court had failed to reverse the situation, a group of Taiwanese decided to declare the island the Republic of Formosa. Some twenty thousand men were armed to resist Japanese takeover. On May 2 the same year, they issued a declaration of independence in the name of the Republic of Formosa.[43] The newborn Republic appealed in vain to the British and French government for intervention. The

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[42](...continued)
sympathetic perspective. A more critical view is presented in E. Patricia Tsurumi's Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

[43] On the Republic of Formosa and armed resistance in 1895, see Harry J. Lamley, "The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern Chinese History," Journal of Asian Studies, 27(4), August 1968: pp. 739-762. Also by he same author, "The 1895 Taiwan War of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power," in Leonard H.D. Gordon ed. Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History New York: Columbia University Press, 1970: pp. 23-76.

resistance movement was quickly suppressed by the Japanese.[44] To be sure, the first phase of Japanese rule was not smooth. Armed resistance persisted in sporadic manners from 1895 to 1915 when the last large scale Hsi-Lai An Uprising in southern Taiwan was put down by the Japanese forces.

After the relentless crackdown of armed resistance, a group of Taiwanese intellectuals under the leadership of Lin Hsien-t'ang, a wealthy landlord from central Taiwan, began organizing "The Assimilation Society" in 1914 with the goal of seeking equal treatment based on racial equality with the Japanese. Lin got the support of an influential Japanese Itagaki Taisuki, the founder of the Liberal Party. According to Edward I-Te Chen, in the first month of its existence the Assimilation Society attracted a total of 3198 due-paying membership. There were only 44 Japanese members in the Society.[45] The Assimilation Society (1914-1915) heralded a long period of legitimate political movements under Japanese colonial rule. There were five other major organizations: New People's Society (Shinminkai, 1918-1923); League for the

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[44] Harry J. Lamley, "A Short-Lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan's Resistance Against Japan," in Paul K.T. Sih ed. Taiwan in Modern Times New York: St. Johns University Press, 1973: pp. 241-316.

[45] Edward I-Te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," Journal of Asian Studies 31(3), May 1972: pp. 477-497.

Establishment of a Formosan Parliament (Taiwan Gikai Kisei Domei, 1920-1934); Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan Bunka Kyokai, 1921-1930); Popular Party (Minshuto, 1927-1931); and League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy in Formosa (Taiwan Chihojichi Kisei Domei, 1930-1937). These movements variously aimed at the goals of equality with Japanese, home rule through the creation of a representative parliament or by expanding on existing system of local autonomy.

Leadership in these organizations often overlapped. Lin Hsien-t'ang, Ts'ai Pei-huo, and Chiang Wei-shui were three leading figures who were all educated in Japan. Their political philosophy was primarily influenced by liberal ideas. Participants and supporters came from a wide range of middle class social groups, including medical doctors, students, lawyers, businessmen, and teachers.[46] There was no doubt a distinct resentment against Japanese domination but, as Edward I-te Chen stated, "while Formosans were acutely aware of their cultural difference from the Japanese, such an awareness did not develop into a political movement in support of the island's restoration to China."[47] These political movements did not achieve what they had planned for but they certainly had contributed to preserving, promoting

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[46] Ibid..

[47] Ibid.: p. 496.

and spreading a distinctive Chinese cultural identity.

One of the major factors that explain the contrasting patterns of nationalist responses to Japanese colonial rule between Taiwan and Korea lies in the styles of Japanese colonial governance. The Japanese colonial authority in Korea was much harsher than its counterpart in Taiwan. This highhanded policy was related to the military background of every Japanese Governor-General in Korea and the broader authority he possessed in comparison to the colonial authority in Taiwan. Of all the 10 Governor-Generals in Korea from 1910 to 1945, everyone of them was either army general or navy admiral. Most of them had a distinguished military career and enjoyed political prominence in Japan. Four out of the six post-1919 Governor Generals served earlier or later as Japanese Prime Minister. The Governor Generals for Taiwan included seven military generals from 1895 to 1919. In the post 1919 period, nine were civilians, two were retired admirals, and only the last Governor General was an army general, Ando, who was also Commander-in-Chief for Taiwan Garrison. The obvious contrast in styles of governance was clearly related to these colonial rulers' professional background.

In addition to the civilian background, Japanese colonial governors in Taiwan had only an average tenure of two years and one month, whereas in Korea they stayed

in office for an average of three years and three months. The civilian governors were of course more susceptible to the political vicissitudes of Japanese domestic politics, often subject to personnel reshuffle with the changes in cabinets. Also the Governor Generals in Taiwan tended to have more colonial administrative experience than those military generals assigned to Korea.[48]

The political authority for the two colonies' top administrators differed in degree of freedom as well. Governor General in Korea could by-pass the Prime Minister and report directly to the Emperor while his counterpart in Taiwan was supervised by the Prime Minister. The discrepancy in political clout remained well beyond the 1919 reform which placed the two Governor Generals equally under supervision. The discretionary power of the Taiwan office was further limited by the legal requirement to accept directives from Ministry of Finance and Correspondence and later on Ministry of Colonial Affairs. The Government General Office in Korea, however, had no similar legal obligations written into its organic regulations. The military authority of each Governor General's office was different as well. Mostly due to the prominent military career of Japanese colonial chiefs in Korea, they tended to have more control over the military authorities in the colony. In Taiwan the

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[48] Ibid.: pp. 92-98.

separation between civilian and military authorities was well maintained.[49] In terms of legislative power, the Colonial authority in Korea enjoyed much wider discretion than its counterpart in Taiwan whose legislative power was subject to extension by the Diet every five years.[50]

On the local administrative level, the Japanese instituted the traditional Chinese P'ao-Ch'ia system which enabled the colonial authority to penetrate deeper into the village level and maintain more effective control over the mass. In Korea, on the other hand, no such system was ever introduced by the Governor-General.

In Taiwan, Japanese authority initially pursued an assimilationist policy. Colonial education was therefore specifically tailored to facilitate the attainment of the assimilation goal. Many Taiwanese intellectuals who were educated in the Japanese system of education later became organizers of anti-colonial movements. Those who were lucky enough to go to Japan for higher education encountered many nationalist Chinese and Korean students. In Japan they learned about the May Fourth Movement in China and the March First Movement in Korea. Wilsonian idealism in the 1920s also introduced the idea of

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[49] Ibid.: pp. 102-105.

[50] The legislative power of the Governor-General in Taiwan was authorized by Law No.63 promulgated in March 1896. It required an extension every three years. In 1906, Diet replaced Law No. 63 with Law No. 31 which provided a five-year duration.

national self-determination to these Taiwanese youth. It was in the metropole that these young Taiwanese elites first began to realize the political plight their homeland was suffering. The bloody suppression of pre-1919 armed-resistance period made them realize the futility of senseless rebellion. After the 1920s, advocacy of home rule became the dominant demand. Patricia Tsurumi argued that the shift to home rule brought the Taiwanese society one step further toward a position of self-determination.[51] 1921 saw the formation of Taiwan Cultural Association in Taihoku. After the split with radical elements in Taiwan Cultural Association, the more conservative leaders established the Taiwan Popular Party in 1927. This was the only legal Taiwanese political party authorized to exist in colonial Taiwan. This seemingly collaborative approach was persuasively argued by scholars that such political acquiesce was merely instrumental and tactical under widespread police control. However, the exact content of Taiwanese cultural consciousness was still ambiguous. Years of colonial rule and education, however, had injected enough modern messages into the local mindset that had molded a nascent sense of Taiwanese culture, as distinct from the continental Chinese culture.

A comparison between Korea and Taiwan before

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[51] E. Patricia Tsurumi, op. cit..

Japanese occupation would suggest the importance of a national symbol and political leadership. The Koreans had a national symbol, the King, with which they could identify themselves with and a distinctive cultural tradition with which they could mark themselves off from Chinese and Japanese. Taiwan had no long-standing political institutions and its settlers' culture, though Sinic in essence, were less rigid. Korea's millenniums of independence and autonomy under a homogeneous leadership contrasted with Taiwan's settlers' frontier status. Notwithstanding Chinese suzerainty over Korea, the Koreans were always allowed to keep their own king and national government. The King and the national government served as the national symbol for resistance in times of foreign invasion. This effort to preserve national institutions marked the Korean national consciousness against the Japanese domination.

By contrast, Taiwan was never an independent state except for a brief period between 1661 and 1683. Under Ch'ing rule, local people never had and never sought autonomous status, though periodic grassroot rebellions broke out against local authorities dispatched by Beijing. The lack of a clear national identity was the primary reason for the relative absence of nationalism in Taiwan before 1945. And the above discussion on Japanese colonial polices and styles of governance illustrated

Japan's effective penetration and control of Taiwan's society that further dampened any potential outburst of mass nationalist movement on the island. Economic exploitation was less severe in Taiwan than in Korea. For the general mass, improved living standards and administrative efficiency certainly reduced alienation and rebellion. The only sensible alternative left to those Taiwanese elites was passive resistance through cultural nationalism. The Japanese authority, by their own failing to fully integrate Taiwanese and their refusal to extend full legal rights to colonial subjects, incidentally triggered anti-colonial sentiments among those who had proved themselves worthy in Japanese education system. Indeed, the relationship between Japanese colonial education, economic modernization, Chinese cultural heritage, internationalist influence, and the identity of middle and upper class Taiwanese, to say the least, is both complex and ambiguous. And the ambivalent feeling is still very much alive among the elder generation.

Nationalism and Ideological Struggle: Post-1945 era

After the Nationalist government took over Taiwan in 1945, the first governor Chen Yi failed to maintain an efficient and incorrupt administration on Taiwan. The abusive attitudes on the part of the Nationalist military and mutual distrust finally touched off a tragic uprising

on February 28, 1947. Chen Yi first negotiated with the Taiwanese Settlement Committee but soon called in mainland troops and massacred numerous Taiwanese. During the riot many mainlander were killed by mobs as well.[52] The February 28 Incident has since become a political totem for opposition politicians and Taiwan Independence movement activists alike. Its lasting effects on Taiwanese politics and the development of Taiwanese nationalism are deep and significant. Politically, it served to dichotomize the island population, in the minds of many a ideologue, into the oppressor mainlander-dominated KMT regime and the oppressed Taiwanese local residents. Ethnic tension has therefore haunted Taiwan for decades. Furthermore, Chen Yi and his associates' brutal crackdown essentially wiped out the majority of Taiwanese cultural elites, a group that could have been a potential source of sponsors and spokesmen for the later Taiwanese independence movement. After 1949, Chiang Kai-shek imposed rigid military-style authoritarian control on the island, a few Taiwanese dissidents found it easier to continue their operations overseas,

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[52] There have been several English publications on this tragic event. See, for example, George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965; Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970. The most recent account is in Lai Tse-Han and Ramon H. Myers A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.

primarily in Japan and United States.

But the nationalist government was more concerned with its own survival. In the fifties and sixties, imminent military threat from across the Taiwan Strait led the government to adopt a high-handed policy toward any divisive issue inside the island. Ethnicity was a highly sensitive area most intellectuals avoided to address head-on. Mainlanders dominated the political scene, few Taiwanese could gain access to the inner power circle. Only the local level elections and administrative positions were open to Taiwanese contenders. Since Taiwan never developed any class-based political movements, electoral politics revolved primarily around factional coalitions and charismatic leadership based on personal and family ties.

In the economic sphere, though the state played an active role in promoting strategic industries, KMT essentially let the local entrepreneurs compete on their own comparative advantages. In Taiwan, unlike Philippines or Korea, political favoritism did not distort the overall economy. Land reform further cleared away any potential reactive elements in the island's drive toward industrialization.[53]   Liberal   policies   toward

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[53] See Samuel P.S. Ho _Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970_ New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978; and Lin Ching-yuan, _Industrialization in Taiwan_ New York: Praeger, 1973.

multinational corporations facilitated the transfer of manufacturing technology, access to foreign markets, and learning of modern managerial know-how.[54] Taiwanese gradually came to dominate the private sector economy while the mainlanders controlled the state enterprises, the military, and the bureaucracy. Such implicit division of labor constituted a rare paradox in ethnic politics. For the first time in Chinese history, political power was divorced from access to material wealth.[55] This arrangement, strangely enough, worked as a safety valve by containing Taiwanese dissatisfaction and releasing potential frustration Taiwanese majority might have harbored against KMT in the early stages of development.

By the mid seventies, high growth brought along increased social mobilization and pressures for popular participation from the expanding sector of affluent middle class Taiwanese.[56] All along, KMT never gave up its claim on its political legitimacy and its rightful

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[54] On the role of multinational corporations in Taiwan's development, see Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986. On technology transfer, see Denis Fred Simon, Taiwan, Technology Transfer, and Transnationalism: The Political Management of Dependency Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

[55] See Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: Cultural Dimensions of Authority Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

[56] Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973 Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976.

jurisdiction over the entire mainland. The regime was caught between the need to Taiwanize its political leadership and the nationalist imperative for maintaining a fictitious organizational and political structure to hold on to its legitimacy claim. While eager embracing of vernacular Taiwanese culture is frowned upon, any overt advocacy of Great China nationalism would be suspected of a communist conspiracy as well. Students grew up in a paradoxical political atmosphere. China's major achievements in art, sports, or science, were mostly censored from media coverage, yet the World Championship from Little League baseball in Florida was regarded as the pride of all Chinese. Taiwanese people, having experienced a series of diplomatic setbacks in the seventies, eagerly embraced any achievement for national affirmation. It was a paradox of national identity for the KMT leadership which was confronted by a deep psychological need among the mass for national pride and dignity. KMT's political leadership and its own ambiguous China policies therefore paved the way for the later development of a ambivalent national identity among the national citizenry.

Another source of ambivalent identification came from the national educational system which perpetuated the cognitive dissonance as a result of the incongruence between the government's legitimacy myth and political

realities. Formal secondary socialization in Taiwan is primarily controlled by the conservative state bureaucracy. The political contents of curricula were in general geared toward anti-communism ideologies and allegiance toward the leadership and the state. A semi-ossified civic education program did little to enhance the political awareness of the students. If anything, the system actually worked to deter or discourage students from taking any active interest in politics. National politics, therefore, became such a paradoxical topic for the younger generation. Students were taught the absolute importance of nationalist ideology, patriotism, and anti-communism while at the same time being subtly discouraged from debating their nation's political future or learning about their national past. In schools, contemporary Chinese history were either edited according to the official version or largely omitted. Before the late eighties, open discussions of historical details of February 28 Incident or CCP-KMT struggle were seen as political taboos. Such an atmosphere created the paradoxical attitudes of an anti-politics generation.

II. KOREA

Traditional Korea: A Model Confucian State

The political crisis of the late 19th century that ultimately toppled Yi dynasty signified a significant change in the fortune of Confucianism in Korea. The

intrusion of Western commercial and military power impacted upon Korea after the signing of the Kanghwa treaty with Japan in 1876. The failing Yi dynasty was buffeted by the increasingly acrimonious competition of imperialist powers in East Asia. Among foreign powers, Japan was the most important source of stimulus that shaped the emergence of modern Korean nationalism.

Japan and Korea came in contact with each other in the Three Kingdom period, AC 313-670. Japan even had a small settlement near the region of what is now Pusan. In 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an expedition force of one hundred and fifty thousand men to invade Korea as a prelude to his planned invasion into Ming China. Korea, then under the Yi Dynasty, was a vassal state of the Ming China. Japanese advance was soon checked by Chinese intervention and Korean naval victory under the command of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. It was only the death of Hideyoshi in 1598 that halted the Japanese who immediately withdrew from Korea. The seven year war ravaged many villages and devastated Korea. After 1609 friendly relations were resumed and cultural exchanges started to take place. Over the centuries, Korea served as the transmitter of Chinese culture into Japan. The cultural contacts slackened considerably by the end of the eighteenth century. Over this long period of time, Korea-Japanese relationship was by and large cordial despite occasional

military skirmishes.[57] The Hideyoshi expeditions of 1592 and 1597 were often cited by Korean nationalists as the origin of Korean hacred against the Japanese. This argument, however, does not seem to stand up to the test of historical evidence we can gather. In fact, congratulatory missions were exchanged on almost every important official occasions as late as the end of the eighteenth century. While Korea practiced the seclusion policy, the Korean court still allowed Japan, along with China, the privilege of entering the "Hermit Kingdom" while all other foreigners were forbidden from any form of contact with Korea. The historical root of Korean antagonism toward the West, including Japan, should be sought in Korea's modern history.

It was in 1876 when Taewongun, the Regent of Korea, refused to accept the Japanese mission sent by the newly established Meiji government on the ground that Japan inappropriately usurped the Imperial title. The Regency of Taewongun later repeatedly rejected Japanese offer to restore diplomatic relation. This refusal clearly infuriated and antagonized many Japanese ruling elites.

Korean nationalism was built up progressively as the direct response to Japanese involvement in Korean affairs from the Kanghwa Treaty to the Shimonoseki Treaty to the

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[57] Lee Ki-Baik A New History of Korea Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

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Protectorate Treaty. Harsh repression by the Japanese only invited more intense reaction.[58] Korean nationalist sentiments reached a climax at the time of Ito's assassination. This smoldering nationalism exploded again nine years later with even greater impact. Even after the liberation, Koreans relationship with Japan is still characterized by bitterness and hostility. There were a series of disputes between the two including the disposition of Japanese properties in Korea, the reparation issue, rehabilitation of Koreans in Japan, and fishery rights issue. Many of these issues still haunts Japan-Korea relationship even into the 1980s and 90s. A strained relationship prevented the two countries for nearly two decades the normalization of diplomatic relations after the war. The eventual conclusion of a treaty in 1965 still provoked a series of anti-Japanese demonstration by Koreans and opposition politicians.[59]

In sum, the traditionalist response to the mid-

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[58] See Chong-Sik Lee The Politics of Korean Nationalism Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965.

[59] See Chong Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965; also his Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. On anti-Japanese politics in post war period, see Cheong Sung-Hwa The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952 Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.

nineteenth century crises was to shore up the ailing dynastic system. Reformists argued that social and political malaise were products of nonadherence to the Way. The solution they proposed was reaffirming state orthodoxy and in their view isolating Korea from corrosive heterodox foreign values was seen as a positive step toward preserving society. However, after the opening of Korea, this goal is increasingly difficult to accomplish. The court had neither the will nor the power to maintain Korea's political autonomy.[60]

Confucianization and De-Confucianization of Korea

Around 1880s, Japanese influence began to infiltrate as the progressives stared to think about wholesale reform of Korean political institutions and social practices. After 1900, coinciding with the emergence of modern Korean nationalism, progressives began to reject the universalism of Confucian political theory. The development of state power was the focus. Confucianism was portrayed as an alien ideology, a foreign import, despite the fact that Confucianism had been very much Koreanized.[61] The nationalists blame Korea's national plight on its excessive veneration of a foreign cultural

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[60] James B. Palais, <u>Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea</u> Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.

[61] Hahm Pyong-Choon, <u>The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Essays in Korean Law and Legal History</u> Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1967.

system. The principle of sadae (serving the great) was an idea used to describe Korean relationship with China. It was in particular regarded as an affront to Korean national independence and sovereignty. It was said that Confucian political tradition corroded Korean national identity. Obeisance to China only worsened the already weak Korean identification with the nation. The nationalists further reasoned that a sadae mentality weakened the king's legitimacy and thus circumscribed central authority. A more balanced retrospection shows that such weakness of central authority was more a result of indigenous political patterns.[62] However, this criticism of Confucianism as a barrier to Korea's modernization has persisted to this day in history.[63] "Sadae" as a historical policy had affected Korean intellectuals' conceptions on national consciousness. Most Koreans today criticize this policy. In some subtle ways, it makes intellectuals rebel against any dominant power vis-a-vis Korea. Sadae's legacy contributed to a strong national pride whereas China's "great Han" chauvinism posed a psychological ambivalence for Chinese

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[62] See James B. Palais, op. cit..

[63] Michael Robinson, "Perceptions of Confucianism in Twentieth Century Korea" in Gilbert Rozman ed. The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

intellectuals who cannot resolve the weak Chinese international status with the historic greatness of Sinic civilization.

A famous Korean scholar, Yi Kwang Su, in his seminal "Minjok Kaejoron" asserted that Korea would never become modern without total rejection of Confucianism. In 1895, the state examination system was officially abolished. School curriculum no longer concentrated on the Chinese classics. New learning courses on math, science, western languages, and philosophy took its place. Yet the elite intellectuals' style and self-image continued to be heavily influenced by Confucianism. Dexterity in western learning - western literature, language, history, and political theory became the criterion for a well-educated person. It was, however, merely a change of contents of the definition of a cultivated intellectual.

It should be noted that these westernized elites attacked not only the political tradition but also Confucian conception of social system and human relations, ranging from male-dominated hierarchical relationships, unequal treatment of women to ancestor worship, charging these practices and beliefs as wasteful, backward, authoritarian and superstitious. In 1949, Hyon Sang-yun published <u>History of Korean Confucianism</u> (Choson Yuhaksa) in which he attempted to advance an overall critique of Confucian influence on

Korea. Confucianism was blamed for Korea's commercial weakness, lack of martial tradition, factional politics, bureaucratic dominance, and class conflict. Nationalist attacked the Chinese origin of Confucianism. The plight of Yi system was attributed to the court's excessive veneration of a foreign cultural system.[64] This was one force at work shaping modern Korean identity as the drive for modernization coincided with a nationalist tendency for de-Confucianization. These ideas largely reflected a general consensus among intellectuals at the end of the Japanese colonial rule. Similar arguments are still being forwarded today among the younger generation.

Even though Korean people have always been aware of their distinctive ethnic and linguistic identities, their primordial loyalties were still focused upon their regions, lineage, clan, village, or family. There was hardly any attachment toward Korea as a nation-state, much less any political imagination of a national community. In other words, Koreans did not have a clear sense of political identity before the twentieth century. For the yangban elites, modern nationalism was an alien idea totally contrary to their lifetime learning since " the ruling classes in Korea had thought of themselves in cultural terms less as Koreans than as members of a larger cosmopolitan civilization centered on China. The

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[64] Michael Robinson, ibid..

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Korean king was formally invested by the Chinese emperor,

Chinese was the written language of the court and

aristocracy, and the Chinese classics of philosophy and

literature provided the basis for all education. To exist

outside the realm of Chinese culture was, for the Korean

elite, to live as a barbarian."[65]

Shifting Poles of Ideological Orthodoxy

As we have argued above, Korea was and still is the

most deeply Confucianized society in East Asia. Its

interpersonal relationship is mostly dictated by the

Confucian ideals of hierarchical social arrangement. But

the decline of Confucianism both as ideological orthodoxy

and underlying political philosophy of the state had

already began in the late 19th century. After Korea's

loss of her national sovereignty in 1910, more skepticism

toward Neo-Confucianism's value and fundamental utility

to Korea began to emerge.[66] Beginning in the early

nineteenth century, competing philosophical, religious,

or political traditions began gradually expanding their

influences in the Korean society. These alternatives

include Catholic and Protestant Christianity, the

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[65] Carter J. Eckert, Offsprings of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1867-1945 Seattle: Washington University Press, 1991: pp. 226-227.

[66] See William Shaw ed. Human Rights in Korea: Historical and Policy Perspectives Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Ch'ondogyo (Heavenly Way Movement), liberalism, and Marxism.

While for much of the twentieth century nationalism has been a dominant theme in modern and contemporary Korean history, the exact content of Korean nationalism has always been a highly contested matter. The search for a modern Korea involves both the promotion of an independent, strong Korean state as well as a genuinely participatory political institutions based on popular sovereignty. The latter goal underlies Koreans' search for a democratic constitutional identity and human rights. William Shaw pointed out the paradoxical development of modern Korean nationalism in that nationalism not only seeks to strengthen the Korean state, on one hand, but also attempts to extensively promote human rights, on the other hand.[67]

Japanese Colonial Rule and Korean Nationalism

Japanese colonization of Korea was both brutal and harsh. Koreans experienced a pattern that was quite different from the earlier development of Taiwan which experienced significant economic growth under the enlightened administration of Goto Shimpei.[68] Ramon Myers attributed this different treatment partially to

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[67] William Shaw ed., ibid.: passim.

[68] See Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.

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historical setting. Because in 1895 when Taiwan was ceded to Japan, Japan was yet to be recognized as a full-fledged national power in the world. Therefore, Japanese were determined to show off Taiwan as a model colony that was to be modernized by its colonizer. By 1910 when Korea was formally annexed by Japan, the aim of the Japanese was centered around the building of an empire. Thus the absorption of entire Korea and the destruction of Korean nationality became the paramount objective.[69] However, Japanese was confronted by intense resistance on the part of the whole Korean society as the nascent "sense of Korean nationality began to develop just at the time Japan chose to rule."[70]

Korean sense of nationality had its historical basis. Korea had been a unified nation since 668 A.D.. There is over a millennium of shared, uninterrupted history among a homogeneous people with a distinct national language, social mores and customs, folk religions and world view. The basis of such Korean identity in the earlier days was predicated upon a strong sense of national consanguinity, reinforced by neo-

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[69] See Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984; also Frederick A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea Seoul: Yonsei University Reprint, 1975.

[70] Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie eds., op. cit.: p. 24.

Confucianist philosophy, which tended to foster a notion that Korea was a large extended family.

Governor-General Terauchi Masatake took a high-handed policy in suppressing any anti-Japanese movement in Korea. Most of the Japanese Governor-Generals in Korea came from a successful military background. Their political clout at home gave them more latitudes of freedom in pursuing iron-fisted rule. Japanese disdain for Korean culture and their racial superiority further strengthened this militaristic tendency. All antagonisms peaked by the March First Movement of 1919. This was a turning point for Korean nationalists because the uprising signaled the merging of mass nationalism and elite nationalism. The Japanese, on the other hand, brutally crushed down the march and demonstration, and later intensified its effort to totally Japanize the Korean population.[71]

Japanese approach to assimilate its colonial subjects was at best self-contradictory. As the Japanese colonial education objectives would indicate, Japanese authority intended only to provided limited basic education for Koreans and Taiwanese alike. A dual track educational system was put in place. Japanese nationals in the colony were to receive high quality teaching,

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[71] For an account and analysis of the March First Movement, see Chong-Sik Lee, op. cit..

facilities, and curriculum, while the native subjects receive only basic and technical education.[72] Another component in the Japanese colonial educational policy was the "enlightenment of the masses" which sought to incorporate the mass Koreans as obedient and subordinate elements in the Japanese empire. The Educational Ordinance for Chosen expressly stated the goals: "common education shall pay special attention to engendering of national [Japanese] characteristics and the spread of the national language; the essential principles of education in Chosen shall be the making of loyal and good subjects." [73] But the local gentry class, yangbans, was given access to higher quality education. Its aim was to win the literati's understanding and cooperation for the colonial authority's reform programs. In Taiwan, the strategy worked and convinced many literati to support the program which was designed to subtly dissolve Taiwanese consciousness.[74] In Korea, the effort was by and large rejected by the Koreans. In retrospect, Japanese colonial policy was an unfortunate compromise of two views: the separatist policy and the full integration policy. Japan attempted to fully assimilate their

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[72] See E. Patricia Tsurumi, op. cit..

[73] Carter J. Eckert et. al. Korea, Old and New: A History Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990: p. 262.

[74] E. Patricia Tsurumi, op. cit.: p. 38.

colonial subjects into a system without allowing them to become a fully equal member of the Japanese race, acquiring Japanese traits only to the extent that would facilitate colonial exploitation.

As far as the new born Korean bourgeoisie were concerned, the Saito administration in the 1920s adopted a policy of economic cooptation which diluted nationalist sentiments among the Korean bourgeoisie. Wartime preparation required the Japanese authority to mobilize more and more Korean human resource. The policy of Naisen Ittai (Japanese-Korean Unity) that emerged from this background aimed at transforming the Korean people into imperial subjects, i.e., the elimination of any existing Korean national identity. The Japanese failed to accomplish what this intensive assimilation policy had targeted for but it did manage to coopt some Korean businessmen to forge close ties with the metropole. One of the profound effects colonial transformation had left behind was "the emergence between 1919 and 1945 of a new urban intelligentsia, a small core of white-collar managers and technicians, and a modern labor force." [75]

Years later, when the American occupation took over Seoul, American military authority actively recruited conservatives into the bureaucracy because of their anti-communist views, even though these conservatives were

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[75] Carter J. Eckert, op. cit., 1991: p. 253.

resented and suspected by most Koreans for their
collaborationist past. This was a question mark the post
liberation Korean regimes were never quite able to get
rid of. When Park Chung Hee launched economic
modernization programs in the sixties, he had to turn to
the same group of Korean bourgeoisie who had been tainted
in the 1930s and 1940s. This historical legacy explains
why even today Korean bourgeoisie seldom receive full
trust by the more nationalistic elements in their
society.

Post Liberation Era: National Division and Legitimacy
Contest

Post war arrangement between United States and
Soviet Union eventually led to the tragic civil war
between the South and the North. Korean War, as much as
it was a war between international communism and the
American-backed democratic capitalism, was a civil war
rooted in wartime dislocation and social upheaval.[76] The
1951-1953 Korean War served not only to divide the nation
but also polarized the Korean society on the ideological
spectrum. The end of World War II did not live up to
Korean people's expectation. The country was instead

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[76] Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War:
Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-
1947 Volume I, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1981; and The Origins of The Korean War: The Roaring of
the Cataract Volume II, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1990.

locked in a "Soviet-American duopoly".[77]

It is well known that South Korean political leadership has been besieged with the problem of legitimacy. The immediate post-liberation leadership was largely composed of anti-Japanese resistance heroes whose nationalist aura was their prime basis of legitimacy. Syngman Rhee had relatively little problem with this issue except for the fact his regime was hastily put together with American Occupation's backing. His personal history in resistance movement was better than many of his peers' track record. But Park Chung Hee's rise to power in the 1961 coup was first of all without popular support. He was also lacking in personal attractiveness. Furthermore, Park had no traceable claim to leadership legitimacy in the eyes of Korean people. His pre-liberation background involved training by the Japanese army in a military academy in Manchuria from 1940 to 1942, and participation in the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria from 1943 to 1945.[78]

In building the post-liberation Korea, Korean national leaders were beset by the familiar issues the yangbans encountered in the nineteenth century reform. This new generation of political leaders in the sixties

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[77] Bruce Cumings, ibid.: p. 428.

[78] Joungwon A. Kim, <u>Divided Korea: the Politics of Development, 1945-1972</u>, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976: p. 230.

had a vision of a modern Korea that would be economically and technologically modernized, yet without the "degenerate" aspects of Western capitalist society. They wanted "a Korea proudly independent and respecting its own basic traditional values, yet rejecting the behavior patterns that had led Korea into decline and collapse under the Yi dynasty".[79] In the first three years after the Park military junta seized power, the government published three books under Park Chung Hee's name. These books included The Ways of a Leader, Our Nation's Path, and The Country, the Revolution, and I in which a revival of the best essence in the Korean character are called for. The writers also urged the eradication of some dysfunctional Korean characteristics such as factionalism, bureaucratism, and flunkeyism.

The first groups of political leadership sought to tie their legitimacy to the Korea's national political mythology. Syngman Rhee placed emphasis upon his strong links with both traditional sources of legitimacy and the reform and independence movements of the pre-independence Korea. He attempted to portray his regime as the apparent succession from Yi Dynasty's last monarch to the Korean Provisional Government which Rhee headed. Since the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was established at the time of King Kojong's death, this background provided

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[79] Ibid: p. 243.

strong ties of legitimacy and continuity for the First Republic (1948-1960). In the north's DPRK, Kim Il Sung's based his claim to legitimacy primarily through his participation in the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in Manchuria. The overthrow of Rhee, took the form of a repudiation of the link with legitimacy which led backward through Rhee to the independence movement, the monarchy, and the reformist movements of the nineteenth century. This plus Park's personal association with the Japanese army casts a spell on the Second Republic. Political leadership in the southern Republic of Korea (ROK) had its pre-independence ties with the Japanese military in Manchuria and could claim no links with the traditional system or the independence movement. Parks assassination and Chun Doo Hwan's rise to power only worsened the legitimacy crisis. Up until the 1987 presidential election, legitimacy issue had always been the prime excuse for opposition and dissident radicals. Roh Tae Woo had less problem with this haunting legitimacy crisis, though he too cannot avoid opponents' attacks for his earlier association with Chun Doo Hwan.

The effects of national division, civil war, and the ensuing military tension along the DMZ aggravated the mutual suspicion between the two Koreas. As a result of this direct stand-off, both sides have committed to building large and often militaristic state apparatus.

Such tendency combined with the historic need for a strong and effective state dedicated to development and modernization gave birth to an political authoritarianism that bases its legitimacy claim on nationalistic grounds.[80] Particularly after 1961, the Park regime and Chun Doo Hwan regime accelerated a pattern of state-led industrialization and development program. The conservative leadership of South Korea from the sixties to the eighties focused their developmental goal on economic growth as the basis of regime legitimacy. This is only typical of the nationalist fascination with national wealth and power. Whereas the North Korean socialist regime, under the leadership of Kim Il Song proclaimed a national policy of autarky. This official juche (self-reliance) ideology plus the Kim Il Sung personality cult have been the prime spiritual glues that hold North Korea together. Though, ironically, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has had just as much foreign support from Soviet Union and China. This approach seeks to galvanize Korean mass sentiments against dependence on foreign powers. The American presence in South Korea is therefore portrayed as a contemporary manifestation of "sadae" policy practiced in

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[80] An excellent overview of both regimes' contest for political legitimacy is in Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

Yi dynasty.[81]

The main feature of ideological reality in Korea today is the contest between North Korea's extreme Stalinesque communism and the South Korean anti-communism. Since each ideological position is closely related to the matter of political legitimacy, sudden relaxation in any side's position does not seem likely. Under Park's and Chun's leadership the military was able to penetrate the civil society and institutionalize the anti-communism ideology by establishing elaborate networks of KCIA for domestic surveillance and by initiating intense indoctrination program for young Korean males who must serve a thirty-month conscription requirement. In the schools, all high school and first year college freshmen must take the course on "National Ethics" to provide them with ideological armament. National security became the priority concern and political criticism or dissent would not be tolerated.[82] This authoritarian control was tolerated by most older Koreans who had personal experience of wartime ravage and communist attacks. But for the younger generation born after the sixties, authoritarianism constitutes one of

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[81] On this rivalry between the two Koreas, see Ralph N. Clough, Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

[82] Ralph N.Clough, ibid..

most intolerable form of government. Democracy, whatever its precise definition may mean for the students, became a popular concept.

Next in Chapter Four, we shall proceed to examine in more detail how the current generation of Taiwanese and Korean students think of their personal lives, their societies, their national politics, and their national future. Their life stories will reveal to us what it means to be a Chinese or Taiwanese or Korean today, how they reflect on their nation's identity in the contemporary world, and the generational changes all this may signify for these two societies.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERSONAL SENTIMENTS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS

Proceeding from the general analysis of nationalism in the two countries, we turn now to the interview data we collected in South Korea and Taiwan in 1989 and Spring of 1990. The data will be analyzed and checked in the context of other available research findings from secondary sources as well as polling and survey data. We begin with a methodolcgical note that focuses on our field research experience and some methodological issues in collecting data. The second part of the chapter analyzes the educational setting in both Taiwan and South Korea. The last section in this chapter deals with the interview data.

Methodological Aspects of Field Work

A. Taiwan

We arrived in Taiwan in January of 1989 to begin the field work for the first part of this research. Being a native speaker of Mandarin Chinese, it was not difficult to reach and develop contacts on university campuses. We decided to concentrate interviews in the metropolitan Taipei and Taichung areas. The choice was primarily based on practical considerations. I lived in downtown Taipei where the leading institutions were located. Taipei is also the cultural, political, and economic center of Taiwan. Located in the central part of Taiwan, Taichung

was my hometown where I could have easy access to living accommodations.

Taiwanese college students have been historically known to be politically apathetic, the reasons for which will be discussed below. This anti-political attitude was reflected in students' initial cautious responses when we approached them and requested interviews. Most students were, however, much more open when compared to the students of the late seventies when I was a student in National Taiwan University. Some of them were less direct in responding to questions on political issues. In a few cases, I had to show my M.I.T. student ID card in order to convince them of my academic background. In both Taiwan and South Korea, name cards bearing my academic affiliation were in general sufficient to establish a friendly contact. In order to diversify the range of backgrounds of our respondents, we relied mostly on direct contacts with students on campus and did not use personal introductions through other respondents. By doing so, we avoided getting too many respondents in the same social circle who might share similar political views. Through several key informants, we received departmental correspondence records and then we randomly selected students from divisions of science and engineering, social sciences and law, humanities, and medical science.

Up to 1989, there had been very few activist student organizations or clubs in Taiwan. Open association of this nature before the lifting of martial law in 1987 would invite immediate official intervention or monitoring. Consequently, there was no visibly radical student groups that we could identify and approach directly. Several key informants in Taiwan including journalists, professors, and lawyers helped us in establishing contacts with some leading student members in the major opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and several activists involved in the emerging labor and environmental movements. We also talked to students closely associated with the ruling party, some of whom actually held party cadre positions in the university level KMT caucus. On the whole we were satisfied with the range of ideological spread among the respondents.

There was no conscious efforts to single out students of either mainlander or Taiwanese origins. Ethnic origins were self-defined by the respondents. The random selection process did however produce an approximate 30-70 distribution between the mainlanders and the native Taiwanese which matched the demographic split in Taiwan. The controversial and ambivalent issue of ethnic identity, of course, ties in directly with the core of our research objective.

In both countries, our interviews were primarily conducted in small coffee shops around the campuses or in a quiet corner in the school library. Few students were willing to conduct interview sessions in their homes. This was in sharp contrast to most American scholars' field experiences where Americans researchers were often welcomed in their respondents' houses. We speculate that this was related to my being a Chinese rather than a foreigner who would be seen as a guest to the local community. Another reason was that most respondents did not usually discuss politics in their homes.

Taiwanese students in general seemed less assertive in their responses. They appeared to have more difficulties in formulating coherent answers to questions that involved any self-reflection or critical judgements. The traditional emphasis on rote memory and examinations in Chinese education obviously had a dampening effect upon their creative and original thinking. But given sufficient time, the students were able to give us tidbits of valuable information. Once a friendly personal relationship was established, the students became more forwarding and relaxed. In their answers to questions regarding life histories, students' own personal lives were mostly touched on in a marginal manner. Chinese conservative attitudes in this area was the main factor for their less than candid discussions with us. With

female respondents, my wife Mimi proved to be a tremendously valuable assistant in the interview process. Her sensitivity and personable approaches facilitated many of our in-depth interviews with female students.

In most interview sessions, respondents felt less comfortable when the session was tape-recorded. This was understandable given both societies' recent authoritarian rule and the ideological control on all campuses. We relied primarily on note-taking in the interview sessions. Multiple sessions were exceptions in both Taiwan and Korea. Students were generally rather generous in terms of their time. Each session lasted about two to two and a half hours.

B. SOUTH KOREA

In Korea our research had another set of practical constraints. As my Korean language skill was only at the beginner's level, approaching and establishing contacts with Korean college students proved to be much more difficult than in Taiwan. The language barrier and research budget constraints led to my decision to concentrate my field work around the metropolitan Seoul area where many renowned universities were located. I lived in a faculty dormitory on the campus of Korea University near Annan Dong. Several voluntary interpreters were present in some of our interviews. In Korea, despite all the anti-American rhetoric, English

has always been the most popular second language among the college students. In Korea and Taiwan, English is a required six-year course throughout the junior high and high school curricula. Basically we communicated with Korean students in English. But when it came to in-depth answers, if an interpreter was present or when the taperecorder was used, we often asked the respondents to answer our questions in Korean which we would later ask the interpreters to help us transcribe into English. This language barrier indeed was the prime drawback in our field work in Korea.

The selection of Korean respondents followed the same process as in Taiwan. One major difference was the extreme difficulty in interviewing any of the core members of the radical student organizations. Korean radical student groups are closely integrated and professionally organized. Outsiders in general have very little access to their leadership. Most activities and correspondences are very secretive. After several failed attempt to set up contacts, we decided to take the initiative ourselves. My wife and I attended several small scale student demonstrations in downtown Seoul and on campuses of Korea University and Yonsei University. After the demonstrations we approached bystanders and active participants directly and introduced ourselves. The results were quite positive. About one out of five

attempts resulted in a successful interview appointment. According to the radical students we interviewed, the fact that I was a Chinese rather than an American or a Korean actually made them feel more comfortable and secure in talking to us.

The overall ideological distribution of Korean student respondents was essentially balanced. The radicals constituted approximately 8 per cent of our respondent pool. This proportion is close to what most informed observers' estimate as the percentage of the radical elements among Korean students.

Compared to Taiwanese students, Korean students were much more assertive and confident in their responses to our questions. They demonstrated clear interests in national politics. Political views were more coherent and strongly advanced. Whereas Taiwanese students often wavered between conservative and progressive views, Koreans tended to exhibit more intense ideological dogmatism. Political apathy was rare among the Korean college students. But on questions relating to personal lives, Korean students behaved more like their Taiwanese counterparts - conservative and avoiding direct self-reflection. Based on our field work, it appeared that Korean female students were politically more active and articulate than Taiwanese females. This would seem to contradict the fact that Korean females have been

traditionally very subservient to males.

On the whole, we have attempted to put together an approximate cross-section sample population in both Taiwan and Korea in terms of gender, ideological persuasion, ethnic origin, socio-economic status, and regional background. It must be pointed out that class-based social cleavage system is not clearly applicable in either Taiwan or South Korea because of the lack of class consciousness. In both societies, the majority of citizens subjectively identify themselves as belonging to the middle class. Very few would positively identify themselves as lower/working class or upper/bourgeoisie class.

Iuterview Respondents

In all, we conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 106 college students in Taiwan and 110 students in South Korea. There were also some open-ended interviews with government officials, university professors, high school teachers, university administrators, major political party officials, student parents, and business community leaders which were carried out to get a picture of these people's views about student attitudes. Public opinion surveys by local news media such as Korea Herald and Korea Times of South Korea, and China Times and United Daily News of Taiwan

are used as auxiliary source of data.[1] Up-to-date

research findings published in English have been reviewed

as well.

The majority of students and other respondents we

interviewed expressed their desires to remain anonymous.

Therefore, we have chosen to use pseudonyms for our

respondents in presenting our data in this chapter.

In the Taiwanese sample group, there were 49 females

and 57 males. The age range was between 17 and 25. Of the

total 106, there were 11 graduate students, 4 females and

7 males. For our research purpose, the ethnic origins of

the Taiwanese respondents were categorized into

Mainlander (if their parents came from mainland China

after 1945), Taiwanese (if their parents were in Taiwan

before 1945), and Hakka.[2] A small portion of the

Taiwanese respondents either expressed their

unwillingness to specify their provincial origins or

stated that such distinction should not be considered at

all. A few others said that they came from a family in

which the father and the mother were not of the same

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[1] Polls and telephone surveys are known to be at
times unreliable data for valid interpretation. In Korea
and Taiwan, the survey and polling techniques still have
much room for improvement. Another consideration is that
some polling agencies have ties to ruling elites which
raises the inevitable question on their objectivity and
the possibility of manipulated data.

[2] For a discussion of the major ethnic groupings in
Taiwan, see our discussion in Chapter Three.

ethnic origins. Six female and two male Taiwanese students held either American or Canadian passports in addition to their ROC citizenship.

Among the 110 Korean students we interviewed, there were 65 males and 45 females, age between 18 and 26. Graduate students numbered 18 in all, with 10 males and 8 females. Students came from all regions of South Korea. The geographic distribution was fairly even in terms of their regional backgrounds. As we discussed above, there were 8 self-proclaimed radical students, 4 males and 4 females, who belonged to the more activist-oriented student groups. Two female students held dual citizenship in both Korea and United States. Three male students were born in America, making them natural citizens of the United States, but later went back to Korea for high school education.

Interview Questions

In our interviews, the questions were, expect for routine personal biographical data, primarily designed to be open-ended. Interview questions were largely designed to reflect the political and social realities in each society. They were categorized into the following areas:

(1) Questions on personal and family background;

(2) Questions on education and school life;

(3) Questions on personal sentiments about government authority, political parties,

political legitimacy and political leadership;

(4) Questions on social changes, political development, and economic achievement;

(5) Questions on student activism and personal participation;

(6) Questions on ethnic tension and regionalism;

(7) Questions on cultural tradition and its role in their nation's future;

(8) Question on personal views about national unification or independence;

(9) Questions on the national priorities, major issues, and nation's future;

(10) Questions on key political ideals, beliefs and values;

(11) Questions on definition of being a Chinese or Korean and national pride;

(12) Questions on views toward foreign cultures and foreign powers.

Questions were presented to our respondents not necessarily in any specific sequence. Usually we would lead off with some questions on personal and school life, then we would let the session flow on its own. In most cases, this semi-structured free discussion in a relaxed atmosphere would give us more interesting responses than would happen in a formally administered test-like atmosphere. We speculate that this contrast is related to

the changing educational environment, from an authoritarian one in the earlier years to a relatively more liberal approach in recent times. Students experience tension and restriction in a classroom-like environment and therefore will perform according to a set of culturally presumed behavioral norms and logical patterns typically expected of them in an examination.

It must be pointed out that students' and other respondents' did not necessarily answer all the questions. To a particular question, we might receive simply a shrug or a blank look. Some respondents would answer that they had no personal view or knowledge on a certain topics. Misunderstanding of questions posed was not uncommon. Interview time was not unlimited either. Under the time constraint, in a few cases, we had to selectively omit some questions and concentrate on some others in-depth. The discussion that follows in this chapter, therefore, is not arranged necessarily according to the above categories.

In evaluating the students' responses, we take the view advanced by Ezra F. Vogel that researchers should be more concerned with the question about "What truth did the informants tell?" than the question on "Did they tell the truth?".[3] The responses, non-responses, or even

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[3] Ezra F. Vogel <u>Japan's New Middle Class: The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb</u> Second Edition, (continued...)

negative responses to a question would all reveal interesting details of the true story behind each person. We found that by posing the same key question in several ways to the same person would give us more reliable information. Some students did tend to preempt the interviewer or formulate showcase answers to questions especially with respect to any negative aspects of national heritage or basis of national pride. Question about traditional values and beliefs would often incur ambiguous responses. All these clues pointed to various interesting interpretations of the answers given by our respondents.

Radical Students and the Study of Nationalism

While the radical student movement in South Korea has been an important element in the understanding of contemporary Korean college student generation, it is not the subject of this study. The primary objective of this research is the emerging patterns of nationalism among Taiwanese and Korean youth, college students in particular. Thus, the nature of the radical student movement and its accompanying social implication remain secondary on our research agenda. It is generally agreed by informed area experts that in South Korea, radical elements account for no more than ten per cent of the

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[3](...continued)
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971: pp. 285-298.

total student population. Their nigh visibility and

intense confrontational tactics contributed to a general

image of Korean students as being intensely involved in

national politics and in influencing the setting of

Korea's public agenda. But such high profile activism

should not be misinterpreted as being the dominant

political orientations of most Korean college students.

In fact, the majority of Korean students remain moderate

or conservative. In Taiwan, the college students are even

more docile. The more radical or activist elements only

began to emerge in the late eighties.[4] Because of the

disproportionate attention given to the radical students,

we need to stress the fact that the central focus in our

study is the respective national identities and the

idiosyncracies that characterize the two contemporary

generations' sense of nationalism. Essentially we are

examining the new bases of these two society's cultural

identities and political identities in order to determine

the continuities or discontinuities in their respective

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[4] See Sheldon Appleton, "The Political Socialization
of Taiwan's College Students," **Asian Survey** 10, October
1970: pp. 910-923; Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard eds.
Political Change in Taiwan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1992: passim. Also see Hisin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "The
Changing State-Society Relation in the ROC: Economic
Change,the Transformation of the Class Structure, and the
Rise of the Social Movements," in Ramon H. Myers ed. Two
Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the
People's Republic of China After Forty Years Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991: pp. 127-140.

national identities in the context of the rapid socio-
economic changes, dynamic growth, and late
industrialization, and their responses to the realigned
international political environment.

Generational Change vs. Life Cycle Effect

In other words, the new dimensions of nationalism
that we observe in the youth generations of Taiwan and
Korea carries more theoretical significance than just the
understanding of student movements. The new dimensions of
national identity certainly reflect a unique blend of
continuities and discontinuities in both the cultural and
political identities of Taiwan and Korea. And such
changes reflect more than just a stage in any given
generation's life cycle. To establish the focus of the
interview data, let us repeat the central concern of this
study. We want to find out how the youth generation of
Taiwanese and Koreans, who have experienced an
astonishingly fast-paced and compressed modernization,
have recast their respective traditional psychocultural
makeup of national identities. Such recasting has to
involve both the reinterpretation of historical legacies
and cultural heritages which they inherited and the
introduction of a new world view intrinsically different
from that of their parents. The sixties and seventies
generations not only did not have the traumatic wartime
experiences and material poverty of their parents but

they also enjoyed the benefits of the most spectacular economic growth and affluence in the world. This generation therefore received conflicting signals and messages from the various agents of socialization. In their primary socialization environment, they learn about the traditional values and world views from their parents and grandparents. In their schools and peer groups they began to take on modern values, which were reinforced by their increasing exposure to the mass media. A new set of bases for national pride thus begin to emerge, shifting from cultural pride in an old civilization to a new found sense of confidence based on their first-hand experiences with the achievements of their societies in industrialization. When compared to the rest of the global community, this generation of Taiwanese and Koreans inevitably faced questions about the contradictions between their society's international economic role and its political dependency. Thus objective conditions have formed the psychological need for a reorientation of their national identities. This new search for national identity is directly tied in to the need for a reaffirmation/renegotiation of personal identities of a generation caught between the modern and the traditional sources of values and beliefs. In this chapter we will be able to dissect the personal and collective experiences which have led to such a

distinctive generational break with their parents and grandparents.

Education and National Development

We start by noting that in both Taiwan and South Korea education, as a national effort, has reaped remarkable improvement in quality of human resourcess.[5] This concerted national investment in education comes on top of a historical tradition of cultural emphasis on education. Compared with most other developing countries, Taiwan and Korea have both had high literacy rates. In Korea, by 1970 the illiteracy rate had dropped to 11.6%. Contrast this figure to 1945 when nearly 75% of the adult population was illiterate. In Taiwan, the explosive expansion of education is reflected in the following statistics: the total number of elementary and middle schools increased from 1,504 in 1950 to 4,950 in 1979; student population from 1.05 million in 1950, 4.57 million in 1979, to 5.27 million in 1990. A solid 25.903% of the population are enrolled in schools in 1990. The percentage of school age children attending schools soared from 79.98% in 1950 to 99.90% in 1990. In higher education, total number of colleges and universities

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[5] For Korea and Taiwan's national education, see Doulgas C. Smith ed. The Confucian Continuum: Educational Modernization in Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1991; and Noel F. McGinn, Donald R. Snodgrass, Young Bong Kim, Shin-Bok Kim, and Quee-Young Kim Education and Development in Korea Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 1980.

expanded from 7 colleges with 6,665 students in 1950 to a total of 121 colleges with 576,623 students in 1990.[6] From 1950 to 1985 the total number of educational institutions at secondary and primary levels has also more than tripled.[7] Korea experienced even more astonishing expansion in higher education enrollment. By 1987, university students in South Korea numbers 1.2 million.

The Confucian-based cultural values heavily influence the general preference for more education. Citizens in the two societies look upon college education as one of the ultimate goals in life. Consequently college students and professors command high regard in general so that people with advanced education degrees are often held in comparable respect to that of a traditional Confucian scholar in ancient times.[8] Though today's college students probably cannot enjoy as many privileges as a Korean yangban or Chinese chin-shih, college degrees are still widely regarded as the most

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[6] Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China Taipei: Director General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1991.

[7] Tien Hung-Mao, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the republic of China, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.

[8] See Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization New York: Oxford University Press, 1989: pp. 215-239.

accessible means for social mobility. Therefore,not surprisingly our respondents generally saw themselves as a definite elite who should define the character of their societies. Public policies and social priorities in both Taiwan and Korea reinforce the attitudes among the students that they are important people, that their views are significant, and that the rest of society should look up to them as proper leaders. On the other hand, there has been an explosion of the college student population in both societies as the result of the governments' encouragement in the growth in the number of colleges and universities. Consequently the student quality in many fields is not very impressive. The combination produces, as our data shows, many students who have exaggerated opinions of themselves so that they act as though they were an elite when in fact they are not necessarily outstanding.

It is understandable that the students tend to think well of themselves because in both countries so much is made over the college entrance exams. The exams are held annually with great preparations and much fanfare. Both countries, along with Japan, have possibly the most competitive college entrance systems in the world. For example, in South Korea, the record showed a ratio of 4.5 applicants to every available slot in the colleges. Colleges and universities thus represent a symbol of

meritocracy and equality in the system.[9] In general, students trained in such a competitive system have demonstrated superior levels of academic performance. The excellent reputation of Taiwanese and Korean science and engineering graduate students in American universities is proof of this. Taiwanese students represent the largest overseas student group in the world and have been among the largest from 1960s through 1980s. Over 90% of them came to American higher institutions. Of all the Taiwanese students studying in the United States about 78% are at the graduate level.[10]

In the realm of social sciences, however, these two societies have not yet achieved international recognition. Gilbert Rozman has commented: "So far, humanistic and social science education in these [East Asia] countries does not seem sufficiently developed to prepare adequate numbers of people with these qualities. In none of these countries does scholarship on the contemporary world meet the highest international

[9] See Christopher Lucas, op. cit.; also Theodore Hsi-en Chen "The Educational System," in James C. Hsiung et. al. eds. Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950-1980 New York: Praeger, 1981: pp. 65-77.

[10] See Erwin H. Epstein and Wei-fan Kuo "Higher Education," in Doulgas C. Smith ed. The Confucian Continuum: Educational Modernization in Taiwan New York: Praeger 1991: pp. 207-208.

standards of objectivity and depth."[11] Rozman's observation confirms our overall assessment of the depth of understanding and levels of sophistication among Taiwanese and Korean students' humanistic and philosophical training and knowledge. Their abilities to apply their knowledge from textbooks to critical social analyses are obviously still less than desirable.

In the demographic center of the dramatic postwar development is a new generation of political citizenry born after the traumatic war, the tragic division of their nations, and the dramatic economic take-off. This is "the affluent generation" of East Asia whose formative experiences of their pre-adulthood periods are intrinsically different from the prewar generation. This is a youthful generation that will lead the two societies into the twentieth first century. The different political socialization contexts in which they were educated during their childhood and adolescence inevitably will have a significant impact upon their own sense of nationalism.

Tradition & Change: Primary & Secondary Socialization

As children brought up in Confucian culture the Taiwanese and the Korean students have been taught that if they get into college they will be part of the next

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[11] See Gilbert Rozman, "Introduction: The east Asian Region in Comparative Perspective," in Rozman ed. <u>The East Asian Region: The Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation</u> Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991: pp. 3-42.

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political elite. Thus it is their culture's traditional value which makes them have a sense of special status. Yet, they are also exposed to modern values which make them, and particularly the Koreans, question their Confucian heritage. Thus in a peculiar way both Taiwanese and Korean students have reasons to cling to Confucian values but also to scorn them. Hence the fundamental conflict of half wanting the past, half rejecting it, of wanting to be modern but still needing their traditional values which make them a special elite.

Chung-Lim. a senior at National Seoul University in Korea, is representative of such critics. He came from a salaried middle class, white collar family. Both parents voted for Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan in the past. He claimed that he was a combination of moral conservative and political progressive, which meant that "in terms of personal life (I am) as traditional and conservative as (my) parents are, but in politics (I am) a liberal freedom fighter who would do everything to throw out the military rascal in the Blue House." In his view, Korea before independence was a weak state without leadership and ideology and the source of such weakness was none other than the imported Confucianism. He said to us:

"It was the over indulgence of our society in Confucian teachings that made Korea weak and eventually an easy prey to the Japanese

imperialists. I am not saying that Confucius'
teachings are all bad but a lot of those ideas
were so anti-modern, anti-democratic. Korea needs
a modern philosophy to guide us into the future.
Besides, we Koreans have a proud history of five
thousand years. You probably don't know that
Koreans invented many things thousands of years
ago, way before America was discovered by
Columbus."

When pressed on what Confucian philosophy meant, Chung-
Lim became rather vague about what he had in mind. It was
clear that many of these young Koreans share his
ambiguities. Another point of contention that emerged in
our data was the perverted role of filial piety and
loyalty to ruling authority during the military
authoritarian rule. The Park and Chun regime, in their
nationally organized moral education and ideological
indoctrination campaigns, both took advantage of such
Confucian teachings on loyalty, obedience, and piety to
the paternalistic state and supreme leaders. This modern
adaptation of an ancient philosophy by a military regime
naturally made the younger generation leery of the
utilitarian value of Confucianism to the nation's drive
for democratization and modernization. Many of our
respondents also emphasized the "feudal" and "regressive"
aspects of their Confucian heritage, claiming that ever

since the Yi dynasty, interestingly enough, Confucian tradition was in their views the very stifling barrier to modern economic development in Korea. Quite a few of them, however, also cited values such as loyalty, emphasis on education, sacrifice for the group, etc. as part of the contributing factors to Korea's recent economic success.

Despite all their criticisms, the students' behavior manifest a highly polarized tendency toward a set of deeply Confucianized values. Their responses to our questions on personal lives reflected their inclination toward hierarchical authority, filial piety, group conformity, ancestor worship, family and consanguinal ties, and subordination of female in society. Very few Korean students seemed to have been aware of such incongruence. If anything, they were rather more strongly and openly critical of the very philosophical tradition in which their own daily behaviors were embedded than outside observers would expect. As we will discuss below, Korean textbooks provided numerous examples of national heroes who were cited for their Confucian virtues of loyalty to the state and benevolent leaders, their filial piety and patriotism, and their virtuous qualities associated with a Confucian gentleman. But the more powerful agent in terms of preserving the contemporary Confucian values among the Korean youth, although in

somewhat altered form, is still the basic socialization process in the nuclear family settings of an increasingly urbanized society.

In Taiwan, in direct contrast to the Korean respondents, the majority response was rather more positive as far as national tradition is concerned. "Cultural renaissance" was often mentioned in the students' comments. A slim engineering major, David Huang[12], in National Taiwan University said:

"Tradition is essential for our existence. China has over five thousand years of great history and Taiwan is the place where that line has continued unbroken. Don't you think that our economic success has a lot to do with our cultural tradition? You ask me what the contents of that national tradition is, well, it is hard to pinpoint precisely what that means. You see, Chinese civilization is extremely diverse, we absorb various minority cultures into the original Han culture. But here in Taiwan, some parts of our cultural heritage are already lost. We are already lost in this overly commercial island culture. There is too much capitalist influence here. People of my generation know more about MTV than

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[12] David Huang explained that his Chinese first name was pronounced similarly as Da-wei. Therefore he preferred to use David in his social circle.

Peking Opera. This is not a good sign. We need to

preserve our cultural treasures. I don't mean the

American culture or Hollywood culture is bad

either. Like what they say in the textbook,

preserve the essence in traditional culture,

discard the outdated bad elements, and blend in

the best elements western culture can offer. I

think that's what Dr. Sun Yat-sen said."

These two quotes, one from a Korean and the other from a

Taiwanese, present the mixed feelings of both students

about their traditional cultures. But it is the Koreans

who have a sharper sense of conflict, a greater degree of

polarization and less respect for Confucianism. The

Taiwanese students were more ambivalent, less sure what

they should be critical of Confucianism, more inclined to

see the faults in modern culture, but unwil ng to be

really critical of contemporary culture. Her. we have the

first indication of their sense of nationalism. Both are

ready to claim elite status, but both are unsure of what

should be their base values.

On the whole there is a paradoxical attitude toward

the Confucian heritage in Taiwan and Korea. Most of our

respondents indicated their pride in their country's

economic achievement and explained in part the crucial

importance of their Confucian ethics which contributed to

the emergence of successful economies. But they could not

reconcile the contradictory remarks they themselves offered about the "repressive and feudal nature" of this same set of "modernizing and productive" cultural values.

Personal Life and Education: From Family to School

To understand their attitudes as college students we need first to go back and learn more about their earlier socialization experiences and especially how they developed their view about the importance of education. Taiwanese and Korean life patterns still revolve to a very significant extent around family. The only difference time has made is reflected in the shift from a pattern of extended family to one of nuclear family. Rapid urbanization and industrialization has dramatically reshaped the social landscape. High social mobility and urban-rural migration as a result of dynamic economic growth strike a direct blow at the stable agriculture-based family life patterns in the forties and fifties. In Taiwan, for instance, city population accounted for 27.5% of the island's population in 1957; in 1978 it rose to 45.4%. Among the newcomers in the cities, 38.3% were migrants from the rural areas. In South Korea today, about a quarter of the total population live in the metropolitan Seoul area. Living quarters are typically crowded and quality of life are less than satisfactory in terms of GNP level. Housing expenses have skyrocketed in recent decades. Most adolescent and college students live

with parents until they get married. Family life remains a significant part of a young adult's socialization process. But such family life is not without its own tensions in terms of personal values and beliefs. We asked the students to describe their family life and school life in general. The responses reflected a mixed bag of comments.

Hyo-ran, a Korean college sophomore at Yonsei University, was from a lower middle class background. Her parents were farmers in Cholla province in the seventies but later switched to work for a plastic toy factory near Seoul. The family had two daughters and a son. All three received college educations in Seoul. Their story was representative of tens of thousands of Korean families that supported their children through college education. She said:

"Family is important to me. This is where one receives moral education and all the support one needs in order to fully develop oneself. In the house, Mom is the real decision-maker. My dad works hard and he expects everyone to study hard and excel in school. We don't really talk about politics in the house that much. Their political thinking is quite different from our generation. I guess you could say that they are too conservative and old-fashioned. Their past experiences are so

different from ours. For example, my parents always warn us about the evils of communism and danger of invasion. They insist on a frugal life style. But we don't really agree with them. There is usually very little argument or debate in the house. After all, they are our parents and we should respect the elder generation. We just pretend that we agree and everyone will be happy with the situation. Education is very important to me as well. I don't have rich parents so I must be very competitive in this society. The best credential one can have is a good degree. Only a good education can help me climb up the ladder. Besides I am a woman. Women's status in Korea today is still low. Korean men aon't treat women on an equal footing. For example, my sister is a Ph.D. student in Korea University. But she always says that it is next to impossible for her to get a teaching job in universities. That's a men's world, no place for women. I heard people say that in the United States women's rights are much respected. Many of my friends are thinking about going to America for graduate studies."

The primary socialization in these two societies is not significantly different. We asked every Korean and Taiwanese student how he or she would like to educate

his/her children, what moral values were to be instilled in the children's minds. An overwhelming majority replied that they would teach the children values such as obedience and filial piety, respect for the elders, honesty and truth, interpersonal harmony, cooperation, etc.. We did detect a preference for more democratic manners toward education and child rearing. However, this democratic tendency was not accompanied by respect for individuality and privacy. Corporal punishment and shaming technique were in general regarded by our Korean and Taiwanese respondents as necessary evils in educating adolescent and children. Most of them shared stories about corporal punishment up to high school with us. It was surprising to see the ambivalent responses from these students, many of whom personally experienced physical abuses by teachers, that they considered some form of "moderate and limited" corporal punishment would be good for discipline, though they themselves condemn such practices as outdated and inhuman. One sociological factor for the persistence of authoritarian educational approach may be linked to the extreme pressure of the examination system in both countries. In the rural areas, Korea in particular, anthropological studies have shown that family life patterns and social structures remain much dominated by Confucian values and mores in spite of

the urbanization and industrialization processes.[13] A significant portion of the population continue to be educated and raised up with deeply ingrained values of the traditional heritage.

Korean society, like Taiwan, values education very much, but largely as the primary channel for social mobility. National control over most educational policies, standards, examinations, tuition, and textbooks provides a system that is relatively equitable and accessible to most of the population. The competition for college is extremely tough in both countries. In our interviews, an interesting contrast emerged between Taiwanese and Korean youth. Koreans tend to stress the importance of a degree and the belief that the secret of professional success lies in one's own intellectual achievement. Taiwanese, on the other hand, often reveal a cynical attitude toward the meritocratic path to a successful career. Many of them emphasized the importance of "quanxi" (proper connections) in one's career advancement and their suspicion about the utility of an advanced degree. A commonly used description of the

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[13] Vincent S. R. Brandt, A Korean Village: Between Farm and Sea Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971; Clark Sorensen Over the Mountains are Mountains: Korean Peasant Households and Their Adaptations to Rapid Industrialization Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988

current Taiwanese society is that the island is a place for "the speculators and the opportunists".

The following is a response from Shu-ying, a female junior student in a Catholic university near Taipei. Shu-ying, a self-proclaimed "westernized Taiwanese", came from a small town in Southern Taiwan where her parents practiced medicine. Her answer is representative of many Taiwanese students:

"I must say that in general, our universities are not very strict. Once you pass the entrance exam, you can pretty much do whatever you want. There is no pressure anymore unless, of course, you want to go abroad and apply for scholarships. Everyone studies either Japanese or English in my department. It is no longer enough to have just a B.A. degree nowadays. My parents insist on sending me to America after I graduate. College degree is still something to be proud of. We will be the next generation of leaders for China after all. But in these days you need more advanced education to have access to more prestigious jobs. My friend who works in Broadcasting Corporation of China told me about their last recruitment for an English announcer - some two hundred applicants showed up. Almost half of them held at least a M.A. degree. Another family friend who is the head

of a consulting firm told me that even his
operator/receptionist position attracted dozens of
MBAs to apply. I think one can no longer assume a
rosy future upon graduation from college now."

The above statement is a comment we have heard again and
again in both Taiwan and Korea. In the words of one
American trained journalist in Taiwan, this is a society
that is "over-educated". Human resource no doubt has been
one of the most decisive contributing factor in Taiwan
and Korea's economic successes.[14] Brain drain was once an
issue debated by policy makers in both countries but the
booming Asian market since the mid seventies has turned
the tide. More and more overseas Taiwanese and Koreans
are now returning home to compete for more lucrative
positions. Although Taiwan saw its students studying
abroad increased from almost 2200 in 1966 to over 7000 in
1986, returnees jumped from 6% to 22% during the same
period.[15] Increased competition has put more strains on
college students and created much frustration among them
upon entering the job market. Still, the result is even
more emphasis on advanced education to get ahead.

In the universities, faculties are facing a

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[14] See, Alice H. Amsden, op. cit. on Korea; and C.H.
Fei, Ranis Gustav, and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with
Equality: The Taiwan Case New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979.

[15] Erwin H. Epstein and Wei-fan Kuo, ibid.: p. 209.

generational shift as well. The majority of pre-war generation are ready to retire their teaching posts. Younger professors, many of them trained in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, are gradually rising to fill the senior positions on the campuses. The accompanying intellectual and philosophical changes in terms of the material taught in classrooms have been equally phenomenal. We noticed the popularity of academic jargon that was mixed in the students' responses. For the radical neo-Marxists it was "dependencia" and "world system lines of analysis" that were among the more popular ones. For the others, the popular terms included "civil society", "state apparatus", "alienation", "exploitation", "bureaucratic authoritarianism", "bureaucratic capitalism", etc.. But when asked for a more precise elaboration of those terms or arguments, the students were often unable to offer a clear conceptual definition. We speculate, based on our conversations with other age groups' respondents, that the younger generation in the faculties have contributed significantly to this spread of analytical jargon. A twenty year old Korean student majoring in Sociology had this to say:

" In school we pay respect to our teachers. If you make mistake, you get punished. There is still corporal punishment. I really hated it, especially

in middle schools and primary schools. It was awful. But I think it is necessary to teach us discipline because we were too young and ignorant of what was proper behavior. Of course, you do not ask too many questions. Teachers know best. We have much to memorize everyday. Even today in university where you are supposed to have "free and creative" thinking, many old professors still want us to memorize their materials by heart. Younger professors are much better. But I don't think they like too many questions either. As long as you do your work and behave nicely in class, you can bet on a good recommendation letter later."

The educational approach and teaching methods in middle school and universities are similarly authoritarian. Intensive shaming techniques are still commonly used by parents and primary school teachers.[16] Contents of primary school textbooks still reveal a significant degree of Confucian influence. Our finding is corroborated by a study on the distribution of lessons themes in 1957, 1965, and 1974 social studies, Korean,

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[16] On the various aspects of Chinese primary socialization process, the best works are Richard W. Wilson, Learning to Be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan Cambridge, MA The M.I.T. Press, 1970; and Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971.

and moral education textbooks for Korea's primary schools.[17] The most frequent themes covered in Korean textbooks included: individual cultivation of virtues, economic productivity; personal responsibility and independence; personal development; social cooperation; obedience to social rules and regulations; development of positive social relationships; nationalism and patriotism; and anti-communism. Under such an educational system, students received their primary socialization in a rather Confucianized context in which teachers emphasize obedience, group conformity, and hierarchical authority. Therefore, we were not surprised to see today's Korean youth deeply acculturated into "traditional" values and behavioral norms.[18] Japanese colonial legacies are still being felt in primary and secondary levels. Students receive quasi-military education in a highly disciplined and authoritarian environment.

History played a significant role in steering the course of educational design in South Korea. After the

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[17] Ross Harold Cole, The Koreanization of Elementary Citizenship Education in South Korea, 1948-1974 Ph.D. Dissertation, Arizona State University, 1975.

[18] The persistence of Confucian values is not limited to the educated only. Sung-mo Huang's study showed that industrial workers also hold on to traditional Confucian attitudes. See Huang's "The Role of Industrial Laborers in the Modernization of Korea," in International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia: Report Seoul, 1965: p.775.

Korean War (1950-1953) the fledgling South Korean state leaders decided to give top priority to military security, law and order, nationalism and anticommunism. All education materials on civics, social studies, and related courses were correspondingly designed to reflect this agenda. Democracy and human rights were temporarily placed on the second pedestal. However, traditional Korean values remain strong and alive even as the country underwent a dramatic industrialization. In Korea, college students must take a course on "National Ethics" for two years. The course consists of two parts: the first part deals with the Neo-Confucian teachings and texts and the second part is on the ideological basis of anticommunism. Since 1977 more classroom time is allocated by an ordinance of the Korean Ministry of Education to military drill and "anti-communist moral education" classes in high schools in order to raise moral standards, strengthening the anticommunist belief and enhancing the sense of national sovereignty. In Taiwan, the defeat on mainland China made KMT keenly aware of the significance of political ideology. Consequently, Taiwanese education place much emphases on the inculcation of orthodox political ideology - The Three Principles of the People (San-Min-Chu-I) by Sun Yat-sen and anti-communism. Marxism-Leninism was portrayed as an alien ideology that was detrimental to the Chinese cultural heritage. San-

Min-Chu-I is a 7-year required course from junior high to Freshman year in college. It is also a required subject for College Joint Entrance Examination.

The exact influence of political education material on students' political beliefs is open to question. Our interview data reflect a rather cynical attitude toward such ideological indoctrination at best. Korean students even told us about how their primary school teachers would fabricate horror stories about life in North Korea in order to instill fear of communism among the children. In Taiwan similar stories were told by mostly people born in the fifties and early sixties. The gradual opening of these two societies and the increasing availability and accessibility of foreign mass media and news coverage have sharply reduced the government's attempt to manipulate ideological education in this regard. In Taiwan, proposal on eliminating or reducing San-Min-Chu-I in the curricula design have been eagerly discussed since late eighties.

Students, Politics, and Street Experience

A. Korean Student Activism: Structural Dissent

In the history of last five republics, Korean students have proven themselves to be a recognized powerful political force with unpredictable potential.[19]

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[19] See, for example, Wonmo Dong, "Student Activism and the Presidential Politics of 1987 in South Korea," in

Korean student activism dates back to the colonial period when thousands of students took the lead in the 1919 Independence Movement against Japan.[20] Student activism was undoubtedly one major element in the Korean nationalist movement under Japanese rule. The first major outbreak after independence was the "April 19th Student Revolution" in 1960 when some 30000 students' bloody confrontation with police claimed nearly 200 deaths and finally brought down the Syngman Rhee regime. Students demonstrated against US-Korea security pact and economic agreement in 1961. Again in March 1964 close to 60000 students rose to protest against proposed Korean-Japan normalization treaty; 1967 they demonstrated against unfair election; 1969 it was against constitutional revision for a three-term presidency. Next came the well-organized, ideologically radical protest of 1971 against

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[19](...continued)
Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl eds. Political Change in South Korea Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1988: pp. 169-188; also Dong, "University Students in South Korean Politics· Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs, 40(2), 1987: pp. 233-255; Han Sung-joo, "Student Activism: A Comparison Between the 1960 Uprising and the 1971 Protest Movement," in Chong Lim Kim ed. Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Press, 1980; Gregory Henderson, Student Activism in Korea, A Background Report for The Asia Society, August 1988.

[20] Korean students in Tokyo heralded the March First Movement after King Kojong's death. Students also played a pivotal role in June 10, 1926 Independence Demonstration after King Sunjong's death in 1926.

compulsive military training. Park's 1972 Yusin Constitution ignited widespread protest in 1973-74. In 1979 it was over opposition leader Kim Young Sam's forced departure from the National Assembly. Kwangju massacre in May 1980 marked another milestone for the students. For most part of the 1980s Chun Doo Hwan's lack of legitimacy basis brought along wave after wave of student protests until the last moment of his term. 1987 presidential election again witnessed students' political impacts.[21]

But what does this long historical track record of violent student activism mean for Korean politics? No scholars of Korean politics have yet offered a coherent and convincing theory to explain this phenomenon. It has been generally agreed that Korean student movement is both a mode of political participation and a structural dissent against a centralized state.[22] In our study of Korean nationalism, we would like to turn the focus onto the tensions and anxieties that underlies Korean students' anger and self-righteousness.

We asked our respondents who were sympathetic with or active in student politics to list their central

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[21] Cho Myung Hyun "The New Student Movement in Korea: Emerging Patterns of Ideological Patterns in the 1980's," **Korea Observer** 21(1), Spring 1989. Also see Wonmo Dong, op. cit., 1988.

[22] Gregory Henderson, <u>Student Activism in Korea</u>, A Background Report for the Asia Society, August, 1988. Also see Hung Sung-joo, op. cit., 1980.

concerns for their causes. Four unifying themes of Korean students' concerns are (1) legitimacy and moral virtues of the ruling elites, (2) autonomy for the nation and the academia, (3) equality and social justice, and (4) national unification issue. It is the quest for national autonomy and unification that helps fuel the nationalist sentiment in the movement. Korean students in general are polarized by their support or criticism of the central government which had its historical root in Confucian tension over political support or remonstrance. The theme of nationalism revolved around two poles: the guarding of Korean separate and autonomous identity against any form of foreign domination, and national unification. The idea of equity is internally oriented, one that is receiving ever more attention as the Korean society moves forward in the modernization process. Social and legal justice, distribution of wealth, foreign relations all relate to this conceptual theme.[23]

We asked a male student in front of Korea University about his views on student activism. He introduced himself as Kim, a peripheral member of a underground radical student group. Kim comes from a lower-middle

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[23] Another study done by Richard W. Wilson in his paper "Wellsprings of Discontent: Sources of Dissent in South Korean Student Values," **Asian Survey**, October 1988: pp 1066-1081 also discovered the tension between equality and the commitment to autonomy of choice among 296 Yonsei University students.

class family. He said that his father was a plumber, mother a part-time cleaning lady. Life in Kim's family was rather traditional. Father's words commanded absolute respect. A family of five with sufficient income for a decent living standard. One elder brother who was working as a clerk in Chosen Bank contributed about half of his salary to family living expenses. Kim appeared to be a calm and stable young man with pleasant personalities and humble manners. When he realized that I was a doctoral candidate from M.I.T., Kim expressed his respect and admiration for a scholar from a prestigious institution. He called me "Poksa" (Doctor) and explained that he too would like to go on to a Ph.D. program after college. Aside from his earlier anti-American and anti-Roh Tae Woo slogans, we found Kim to exhibit few traits of anti-establishment in terms of personal character. Nor did he gave us any impression that his humble attitude and courteous manners were insincere. This impression was not unique to Kim. Every "radical" student we talked to in Seoul presented themselves as traditional as most other Asian students. Kim reflected on his political views:

"Sure we talk about politics a lot among schoolmates and friends. Korea has been a victims of international politics for too long. The military regimes are constantly abusing their power with American backing. You know, in my

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country, college students represent the social conscience. If we don't speak out, who else dares? We are in higher education, we should have conscience to speak out for all Korean people. College students have the moral responsibility for people in all walks of life and people who are less-educated such as older people and young children. Social conscience is part of college student's responsibility. All Korean college students are aware of this responsibility. Even our government cannot refuse to recognize us for speaking out for the society. What are we fighting for? We are fighting for justice and democracy. This society is controlled by big chaebols, the politicians, and the military generals. Park, Chun, and Roh they are all one of a kind - corrupt and self-serving. No one cares about the minjung (mass) anymore. We seldom talk about politics in the house. My father and mother voted for Roh Tae Woo in the 1987 presidential election. I would have voted for Kim Dae Jung. Roh is just another one of the military regime. But I don't challenge my father in the house. If you are a good son you should not fight with your parents. They have no idea that I took part in so many demonstrations against the riot police. No. No. No! I cannot go

home and tell him what I did outside. That would

hurt his feelings. He has high hope for me. The

Kims are proud to have a boy in a prestigious

university. In the future I would work very hard

to bring honor to the Kim family."

Though the truly radical element of the Korean student

activists accounts for no more than 2% of the total

student population, the core cf this leadership remains

highly secretive and cohesive. In the Korean case,

student activist organizations gradually took on a kind

of self-perpetuating momentum which tended in the long

run to escalate demands and confrontation.[24] But none of

the active participants we interviewed could give us a

clear sense of direction and vision of the substantial

objective of their political movement.

The students did, however, demonstrate that they

have deep feelings of anger and anxieties toward the

current ruling elite. Their anger was directed less at

specific policies and more at the moral deficiencies of

the supreme leader and his followers. They criticized the

social inequities in the society, moral depravities of

the regime, continuing subservience to foreign power

domination in foreign policy, and advocated the immediate

unification of Korea. Few concrete measures or remedies

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[24] See Han Sung-joo op.cit., 1980 and Gregory
Henderson, op. cit., 1988.

were suggested by our respondents. There was, however, no evidence of an anti-establishment, anti-power type of alienation. Instead, Korean student activists and general students showed a respect and desire for political power. Not unlike other sectors of the Korean society, we observed the actual organizational leadership in action on three occasions before the demonstrations were about to begin. These activists had clear respect and deference for authority and the demonstration leaders behaved just as authoritatively in their leadership positions.

In recent years except for the major outbreaks, protests and demonstrations have gradually taken on a ritualistic aura. On campuses in Seoul, there are perhaps dozens of demonstrations and protests each semester. Flyers are distributed in advance, riot police are in position hours before, blocking major traffic points. Participating students are emotionally excited but restrained. Many spectators looked on quietly. Everything else on campus is business as usual. Outside the campus, urban Koreans go on with their busy lives. The whole act usually proceeds in a smooth and orderly fashion. Riot police's symbolic presence does not create much tension in the air. Each side plays its assigned roles with a tacit mutual understanding of a set of game rules.

Student activism has gradually become an institutionalized mode of political participation in

Korea. Parents and business people may worry about the potential instability caused by demonstrations. Yet few would question students rights and intent in raising their voices. Students demands often prioritize particular national issues and force the ruling authority to respond.

A female participant in a demonstration, Eun-mi, talked to us about her convictions and beliefs for a just and democratic society. Eun-mi's father was a corporate lawyer who had enjoyed close ties with many leading politicians and entrepreneurs. She had no complaint about her "bourgeoisie family life style" and all the proper connections that came with her family background. She took part in some of the student demonstration without her father's knowledge. She explained to us that it was rather common for students to have radical views or behavior while the parents knew nothing about their children's political beliefs. Eun-mi's comment reflected many a Korean students paradoxical belief in their elitist status and preferential treatment bestowed on them by the society, on the one hand, and the deeply-seated conviction for a egalitarian community where every citizen's needs and rights would be guaranteed by a strong government and a morally superior leadership.

"I have no fear in coming to protest against this authoritarian regime. My friends and I are all

ready to sacrifice ourselves for our beliefs. This society needs a totalistic reform to have genuine equity. The special interest groups and the military must be stopped. If you go to visit the working class people and the farmers, you will know how little benefit they have actually gained in this drive for economic growth. I know the economic statistics would show Korea doing alright in terms of income distribution nut the reality tells a different story. The politicians are always busy with power struggle. There is no idealistic principle that guides the nation. Sure we claim to be a democracy fighting against Kim Il Sung's totalitarianism. But we are far from it. They cannot even tolerate a few student demonstrations. Korea needs a pluralist model of democracy. The current leaders are too weak and too selfish to sacrifice themselves for the collective good. I will sacrifice myself for this goal. But I must first prepare myself for the task of reform too. I plan to get into a medical school in the United States. My father wants me to be a lawyer or marry a rich guy with a good American degree. Many friends of his have tried to match me with their sons. I don't like this matching business for a marriage. I will find my own man.

Of course I will have my own career. I am from SNU
(Seoul National University) and that affiliation
means a lot in this city. Most of my relatives are
alumni of SNU and they are all leading figures in
their fields. In Korea, attending a topranking
university can bring you many good things in
life."

B. Taiwan's Student Activism: Sporadic Eruptions

Compared to Korean students, Taiwanese youth have
historically been more docile and silent. Sheldon
Appleton's study in 1970 pointed out Taiwanese college
students' relative apathy in politics and their less than
enthusiastic support of liberal democratic values.[25]
Voting turnout and the tendency to discuss politics fell
as the level of education increased. In 1991 another
study by Chen i-yen and his colleagues showed a marked
improvement in college students' interest in politics and
support for democratic values.[26] Our data suggest that
there is still a detectable pattern of political apathy
though students' interest and concern in national

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[25] Sheldon Appleton, "The Political Socialization of
Taiwan's College Students," **Asian Survey** 10, October
1970: pp 910-923.

[26] Yi-Yen Chen, "A Study of the Political
Socialization of College Students: Changes in Political
Values and Attitudes in the Past Fifteen Years" NSC
Report 80-0301-H004-18, Taipei, Taiwan, December 31,
1991.

politics are by no means insignificant. Their professed political values indeed lean toward a preference for liberal democratic institutions. Although, these positive developments are coupled with a continuous demand for a no less paternalistic state capable of providing a fair and orderly economic environment for economic or political competition.

Part of the reason for this disparity in student activism between the two societies is attributable to the institutional monitoring mechanism planted on the campuses by the state. In Taiwan, it is well known fact that KMT has laid an elaborate network of party cells among the students. In addition to that, a state-sponsored China Youth Corps encompasses every aspect of intercollegiate and extracurricular activities. Military drill masters on campus, staffed by mid-level career officers, conducts required military training for college and high school students. It was often justified that such network was designed to prevent communist infiltration and contamination which might result in the contagious campus unrest that swept through mainland China in the forties. Such unrest, as one official told us, would lead to inevitable political chaos and opportunities for enemy subversion. One cannot ignore, however, the fact that Korean state also has similar arrangement on university campuses. Syngman Rhee's regime

established the Korean Student Corps for National Defense (Hakto Hoguktae) for student mobilization and control. Under Park and Chun, the practice of monitoring campus activism was never discontinued. Many activist students received black-list treatment after they graduated from schools. Yet the Korean students have historically exhibited more boldness and militancy in their activism. Institutional control obviously could only be a secondary explanation for the different patterns we observe. Since 1987 considerable liberalization has taken place on campuses in both Korea and Taiwan. Government officials have openly discussed such practices in the past and promised reform. But the chilling effects on many students were not insignificant.

Yung-tai was a junior student of agricultural economics at National Taiwan University, the leading institution in Taiwan. He lived alone in a school dormitory because his family lived in Kaoshiung. His father was a career civil servant for the Kaoshiung county government. Mother was a elementary school teacher. Yung-tai was discouraged from any involvement in politics by his parents whose relatives were once persecuted in the aftermath of February 28 Incident in 1947. But he said that his role as an intellectual compelled him to devote himself to active participation in politics. He worked as a campaign volunteer for a DPP

candidate in 1989 election and actively involved himself
in several campus campaigns for campus democracy movement
demanding the security personnel's withdrawal from
colleges. He offered his view:

"When I was in high school people could not even
imagine a demonstration. I guess things have
changed a lot. Ever since I got into Taida
(National Taiwan University) in 1987, student
demonstrations are no longer forbidden ideas. I
took part in some of the demonstrations against
the military drill-masters on university campus
and environmental pollution issues. But in
general, most of my classmates are indifferent. I
would say the percentage of student activists is
still small, maybe 5 per cent. But this is a good
start. After all, Taida is a continuation of the
Beida (Beijing University) Spirit and the May
Fourth Spirit - the genuine Chinese liberalism.
Liberalism? I am not very sure but on the whole it
means advocating freedom of speech, political
liberty, true democracy, and liberation from
outdated feudal traditions in traditional Chinese
culture, and other things like that. I would say
that in my generation, the central concern is for
this island. This is where we are born. What
happens here is a lot more important than some

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remote events in China. I am not about to argue with anyone over whether we are Chinese or Taiwanese. The fact is that we need to devote our energy and attention to this island of ours. There is only one Taiwan. Even if you want unification, you would not want to live under socialism. The prosperity of this place is crucial. I support DPP, I also support self-determination. But I am absolutely against immediate unification or independence. There are too many issues we have to resolve in our own backyard first."

Of the few Taiwanese student movement since the 50s, none could be placed on a par with their Korean counterpart either in terms of scale or of intensity. Beginning in 1989, periodic eruptions of campus sit-ins and demonstrations started to emerge. In 1990, the first large-scale student-led demonstration took place as a direct response to the aging National Assembly representatives' plan to expand their constitutional power. The demonstration was clearly a shock to the KMT leadership which promptly reacted to pacify the students and promised swift constitutional reform. Despite this major outbreak, few other events galvanized the university students in the ensuing months. The development of a concerted nation-wide student activist organization seemed to have been dampened by lack of

commitment and ideological fervor. While the Korean students demonstrate increasingly sophisticated organizational skills and effective leadership networking, Taiwanese students have not yet been able to create any effective organization capable of consistently mobilizing a diverse range of student groups. The first nation-wide organization set up in March 1990 sit-in at Taipei's Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park, National Federation of Student Movement, was able to mobilize no more than a few hundred students in a protest against the nomination of General Hau Pei-tsun as Premier in May 1990, even though the participants in this demonstration was estimated at around 10,000.

In Taiwan, student movement is regarded as a political anomaly. It is true that Chinese students have occasionally burst out nationalist flames since the May Fourth Movement of 1919. But students' head-on challenge to the establishment and the ruling authority since 1987 is still a novelty for Taiwanese. The exact degree of its effectiveness is still to be evaluated. We must point out , however, that in both societies there is not much of any revolutionary element in students' dissent.

C. The Radical Minority vs. the Conservative Majority

The majority of Taiwanese students remain indifferent or apathetic to partisan politics and unification-independence debate. Chiang-ting Sung was a

typical Taiwanese student who preferred to discuss his future career than his country's political agenda. He studied chemistry in a private college in Taipei. Family background was middle class. Parents' marriage was an example of the increasingly common trend of intermarriages between Taiwanese and mainlander. His response to students' role in politics is as follows:

"I am sure this is a most important issue. But students are supposed to get the most out of their university education. These political debates are beyond our control. Who would listen to us? I agree with those who say college students should be concerned with the national issues. But there are other areas we can work on, like volunteer work for the disadvantaged people. Frankly speaking, the so called activists are among the minority in my department and my social circle. Nowadays many of us are interested in investing in the stock market or in starting a small business selling merchandise in a night market. You could really strike a fortune that way. Politics is interesting but it is really not our game. Everyone knows that politics is dangerous. If you are not careful, you could end up in some serious trouble. I remember in my high school days, a guy openly criticized late President Chiang's family

and got into some really serious trouble. We all
pretended that nothing happened. Of course, he was
not really punished. But if it happened ten years
ago, the result could have been much worse. In
Taiwan, as long as you work hard, you will have a
good career. I think democracy is essential and a
loyal opposition party is good for us, even though
I never voted for DPP before. You know why I think
student movement and things like that do not have
much significance here? The student organizations
of this nature here always fail to last more than
a few months. Every time there is a "national
crisis" you see many people, including some
student leaders, come out into the open and
organize some action committee, then they would
collect donations, later they go on TV or radio
for some fancy talks. Few weeks later, they
disappear. No more actions, no more hot-blooded
declarations, no more participants. These
political matters do not mean that much for us -
small potatoes. We seldom get excited or emotional
over these matters."

The majority of Taiwanese students we interviewed
expressed their concern and diffused sense of patriotism
on issues of inter-national disputes. They cited examples
of Taiwan-Japan dispute over the Senkaku Islands, the

protest against Japanese textbook issue of 1982, and the Olympic Games issue. The students expressed their anxiety over Taiwan's lack of international recognition and subsequent weakness in negotiating with foreign powers. Many confessed that they had mixed feelings toward China in these matters. At times they expected to have the Beijing authorities intervene to protest against the Japanese government's policies. On the other hand, they also confessed whenever Taiwan cannot negotiate as an effective sovereign state in the global community, the reality inevitably inflict upon them a sense of inferiority. But a powerful China also imply a potential threat to Taiwan's own democratic and autonomous future. Such ambivalent feelings toward China has in effect diffused or demobilized many potential outbursts of nationalist sentiments against foreign powers. China's military build up and Taiwan's perennial dependence upon American military supply and assistance further exacerbated this anxiety. When the question touched on security issues, Taiwanese students always turned to the arms sales issue and expressed their worry over Taiwan's own defense capability against any military offense from across the Taiwan Strait. This pattern of psychological ambivalence once again manifested itself in the October 1990 dispute over the Senkaku islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) when Japanese coast guard vessels and

helicopters turned back several small Taiwanese fishing boats carrying athletes with Olympic flag attempting to land on the island and claim Taiwan's symbolic sovereignty. The event touched off furious reaction in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, raising suspicions toward Tokyo's intentions in the region. Taiwan's KMT government reacted with awkward gestures and ambiguous protests. Public reactions soon turned to disappointment as the top leaders expressed their futility over this controversy. The same group of student activists who successfully launched an islandwide protest in 1971 over United States' decision to return Senkaku Islands along with Okinawa to Japanese control attempted to organize another islandwide movement. But the students' less than enthusiastic participation soon dissipated the momentum.

For the Taiwanese students, this confused sense of national identity effectively thwarted any galvanization of a cohesive nationalist response in times of crisis. The political upshot of this ambivalence is a pattern of sporadic eruptions of nationalist or anti-foreign outbursts of mass response. But the momentum seldom reaches the critical mass to crystalize into effective political actions.

Political Idealism & Pragmatism: Paradoxes & Tensions

When we probed the students as to their political ideals. Sharp contrast immediately surfaced - the Koreans

were much more idealistic and ideologically informed in the subjective interpretation of politics. Taiwanese students overwhelmingly skewed toward the pragmatic side, much less ideologically committed. This is ironic given KMT's decades of ideological indoctrination through the school and the military training. Some interesting observations from the students would tell the story for us. A third year graduate student in computer science in Taiwan eagerly argued that:

"I am a Chinese but I also think of myself as a Taiwanese. You see, openly claiming oneself to be a mainlander does no good for oneself, particularly in the business world. There you speak Taiwanese, not Mandarin Chinese. People like you better. It is as if there were some kind of chemistry that just make everyone closer. I learned to speak Taiwanese in school from my classmates. Nowadays I tell people here that I am a Taiwanese. Not that I am for Taiwan independence, it is just a matter of practical convenience. Independence does no good. It might provoke the Chinese communists, it jeopardizes Taiwan's chance of doing more business with China. It is such a huge market. Consumers there have very poor taste, you make quick bucks. Before the government here relaxed its regulation a couple of

years ago, my brother and his partners had already

set up paper companies in Hong Kong and then

turned around to invest in Canton's footwear

manufacturing. You can also do it through Chinese

businessmen in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia.

I have many friends who are small business owners.

They donate secretly to DPP (Democratic

Progressive Party) and Taiwan Independence

activists but they are also eager in investing in

China. So why cut off the relationship with China.

Ah, let politics be politics. Economics is in

command here!"

Another student's comment on ideological courses

reflected the majority's view about San-Min-Chu-I. In

Taiwan, KMT's determination to inculcate "correct"

ideology in the minds of students led to a curriculum

design of Sun Yat-sen's thoughts with three years

required course on "Civics and Morals" for junior high,

three years of "San-Min-Chu-I" for high school, one year

of "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Thoughts" in freshman year of

college. This student was a shy female who insisted that

she had no partisan preference. She said:

"Nobody really likes to study San-Min-Chu-I (Three

Principles of the People). I know it is important

for us. But this is too much. We study it in

junior high and high school for six years already

and then in college another two years. The teachers are mostly old people who really don't care if we learn anything. It is a required core course for every college student. It is just a formality, everyone knows that. You just show up in every class, the teachers often give out study questions before exam which is pretty much the same as exam questions, you don't make trouble or ask embarrassing questions in class, then you will pass. Of course, Sun Yat-sen is a great man. He is our national father. I learned some of his great ideas in class. But is it really the foundation of our economic success in Taiwan? My cousin is an economist and he says that much of the literature in our textbooks had exaggerated the relevance. That I don't understand. But I know none of my friends would care much about San-Min-Chu-I. Then our government started to claim that Taiwan will reunify China with The Three Principles of the People. They said this is a powerful political attack that communism will not be able to defend. We think it is just another political show for the politicians. I don't understand how they could make themselves believe that. China is not a paper tiger."

The 1989 Tiananman Square massacre shocked the

entire international community. Taiwan was no exception.
Mass meetings were organized, condemnations were issued,
money was donated. But upon closer observation we found
that there was another dimension underneath this wave of
reactions. Students seemed less than enthusiastic in
condemning the Chinese communist regime. The initial
shock and indignation wore out in a relatively short
period of time. Students' response in general reflected
only restrained concern.[27]

"I think Tiananman massacre was a terrible thing
to have happened. I felt really bad for those
students. It tells you one thing, never trust the
Communists. I am not sure exactly why and how
things got to where they were in China. It has to
do with human rights and democracy, is that right?
Yes, many of my schoolmates and friends sign up
condemnation posters on the streets and went to a
couple of mass gatherings. But that's about all we
can do. Besides, we are all busy with our own
studies and other daily chores. I just feel sad
for Chinese people. I also worry very much for the
future of Taiwan. It is just like what my parents
always said, Communists are always communists,
human lives meant nothing to them when their power

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[27] See Brian Murray, "Tiananmen: The View from
Taipei," **Asian Survey**, 30 (4), April 1990: pp. 348-359
for an interesting analysis on this topic.

is at stake. I don't like the government-sponsored mass meetings here either. I mean, why can't they let people spontaneously organize themselves? They still mobilize high school students to take part in something like this. I know in many schools attendance was compulsory. That is ridiculous."

When asked why in recent years Taiwanese businessmen flocked to mainland China for investment opportunities when most other nations in the world were still enforcing economic and trade sanctions against China's atrocities in the Tiananmen massacre, one graduate student in literature responded:

"Is there anything wrong with investing in China while Westerners are boycotting China after Tiananmen? I don't see anything wrong with that. We are exporting the Taiwan Experience to China to help them modernize. Taiwan needs a mass market to develop further and this was a perfect opportunity when other competitors were out of the scene. Building China into a strong nation is not a bad thing. If they can enjoy the kind of affluence we have in Taiwan, then democracy might really flourish there. I agree with our President's strategy. Three No's policy isn't going to work."

In stark contrast to the prewar generation of political elites, the Taiwanese society has dramatically engineered

a silent political transition f~~m decades of indoctrination under KMT's dogmatic adherence to a mythic legitimacy claim over mainland China to a period of new politics of pragmatism primarily originated from below. The engine for this transition is powered by a new group of "middle class", including students, intellectuals, and professionals. The commercial bourgeoisie maintain an ostensibly neutral position in this process. They are mainly concerned with stability and continued growth but they also sympathizes with the reformers who want to have a more pluralistic and democratic society. Political elites also began to recognize the political quagmire the earlier unrealistic claim of legitimacy had place them in. A more pragmatic "flexible democracy" campaign and official recognition of China's de facto jurisdiction over mainland China were only part of the series of realistic political moves since 1988.

The Taiwanese pragmatic outlook appears even more interesting when compared to Korean counterparts' intense commitment to a moral highground in politics. Even though the Korean students showed idealistic tendency in their approach to politics, they also exhibited a keen sense of pragmatism when it came to personal lives. The boundary of the political was clearly defined for the Korean students. Such moralized political commitments make the Korean students susceptible to a form of "false idealism"

and to "being led unwittingly in an undemocratic direction that insists upon a monopoly of truth and defies democratic procedures".[28]

We talked to a first-year graduate student in an International Relations program, Park Hon-yong, about his belief in politics. Park came from a rural area outside Pusan. Parents were small farmers. He had a part-time job in a trading company working as a translator for business correspondence.

> "I am a believer in Karl Marx. South Korea today is a society filled with social injustices and inequities. The capitalist regime is corrupt to the core. Roh, Chun and their running dogs collaborated with the chaebols and the rich bourgeoisie to exploit the poor working class and peasants in Korea. The rich and the powerful conspire behind the scene. Where do students fit in this picture? We are the vanguard of the illiterate and unfortunate masses. We represent the righteous force in fighting corruption and social evils. Can't you see all the inequalities in Seoul? The rich shop at foreign import boutiques, squandering away the surpluses produced by the factory workers earning minimum wages. The

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[28] Robert A. Scalapino, _The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth Century Asia_ Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989: p. 100.

system is perpetuated by the imperialist American hegemon which plotted the division of our motherland. In Korea many of us read books written by Japanese Marxists. Also there are secret study societies throughout the country. Some enlightened young professors who studied abroad came home to inform us of the most recent political theories. We must realize that, intellectually, we have been dominated by the American right-wing conservative social science. Fortunately, the oppressed people in Latin America formulated the dependency theories and many innovative neo-Marxist studies that helped us analyze the intrinsic contradictions in our political system. Korean people must fight together to break out of this peripheral dependency on the capitalist core states. A unified Korea will be strong enough to defy any domination. Ju-che (self-reliance) may be introduced by the North, but that does not make it a bad concept either."

Park Hon-yong's arguments may sound like those of an ideologue but his messages of intense anger and tension over any suggestion of foreign domination or distributive inequities represent the views of many young Koreans we interviewed in Seoul. In the Korean political tradition, compromising one's political stance is regarded as a sign

of weakness.

We then requested an interview with a 33 year old sales associate who claimed to be a former activist. He was accompanied by three of his colleagues in Samsung when we conducted the interview. He was the only one who could communicate in English. Through his interpretation, we understood that his two friends shared his sympathetic view toward the radical students. But they were increasingly troubled by the insistent demand for immediate reunification based on a pan-Korean nationalism and the students' self-immolation. In many aspects, they felt the regime did not live up to their expectation.

"Yes I was a student activist leader in the past. That was ten years ago while I was studying law in Korea University. Korea University was the most radical institutions back then. Alas! Now it is Yonsei University that leads the nation's youth. We threw Molotov cocktail bombs at the police. We burned police patrol cars. A friend of mine died in one confrontation. He was a true national hero, a martyr for Korean democracy. Now I don't take part in demonstrations anymore. A man has his duties toward his own family, his wife, and his children. I work for Samsung as a sales associate. The pay is O.K.. But Seoul is too expensive and my wife has to stay home to take care of my two boys.

All my friends are no longer politically active.
Everyone is busy. But we still support the
students. They deserve our respect. You think
without the university students, who else can
constrain the dictators? Of course, we are
idealists when it comes to national politics. The
government is supposed to be under constant
scrutiny by the conscientious intellectuals of the
society. Those who are in power are to be
monitored and expected to perform according to the
highest moral standards of Korean culture. Just
like ancient times, a ruler who acts against the
heaven's will shall be removed by the people. What
is the heaven's will? It is the ultimate "way"
that conforms to the universal expression of truth
and morality. I may be vague but you can get what
I mean. Can't you? Therefore, students must adopt
a high moral standard in matters of governance and
society when they stand guard for the masses.
However, when you talk about personal life, then
one must be realistic. A man must earn a living in
this competitive world. You cannot get along with
people or with your boss if you are not practical.
Daydreaming is not helpful."

Koreans have a paradoxical attitude toward political
leadership. They moralize and idealize the virtues

necessary for political leadership, yet they also expect the ruling elites to be shrewd Machiavellian politicians maneuvering artfully on the diplomatic stage.

Military Service:Reinforcing or Distorting Nationalism?

Military has been a major socialization agent in Korea and Taiwan. It has been argued that military in the developing countries often function as an integrative mechanism or nationalizing institution, inculcating among the nation's youth a sense of national identity. In this section, we shall explore the military's nationalizing effect by asking our respondents how they perceived their experience in the barracks.

Both Taiwan and Korea have a system of conscription which drafts all physically qualified male 18 years or older for two to three years' compulsory military service. College students in Taiwan must pass an exam to be qualified as second lieutenants. Most college students serve their terms after they graduate from colleges. Before we analyze the male students' perception of their military experience, let us briefly examine the political significance of the military in Taiwan and Korea.

The armed forces have been known to represent a conservative political bastion in Taiwan and South Korea in particular. Korean army have dominated South Korea's political scene since the 1961 coup that brought Park

Chung Hee to power.[29] Its political role has since then been gradually modified from direct intervention to one of watchful surveillance under the leadership of an educated and cohesive career officer corps of about forty thousand.[30] The core is a group of graduates of Korea Military Academy. Furthermore, thousands of ex-officers scatter throughout the civilian bureaucracy where they continue to exercise political influence through their military class networks. In Taiwan, the military's political role is more limited and restrained, particularly after Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo. Before Lee, the Chiangs were able to rein in the military with their personal clout and networks. The military, however, was never ignored in government's allocation of resources. The political potential of the military, its control over the security and intelligence establishment, and its mobilizational influence in an election campaign are nevertheless held in awe by many Taiwanese politicians. In addition, the KMT party

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[29] On the 1961 coup, see C.I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean Military Coup of May 1961: Its Causes and the Social Characteristics of its Leaders," in Jacques VanDoorn ed. Armed Forces and Society, The Hague: Mouton, 1968.

[30] See John P. Lovell, "The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea," in Edward R. Wright ed. Korean Politics in Transition Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1975: pp. 153-199. Also see C.I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role," in Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl Political Change in South Korea Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988: pp. 91-112.

apparatus has developed a semi-parallel organization of political warfare (commissar) department staffed by professionally trained career officers from College of Political Warfare. Their role is primarily to facilitate internal ideological control, anti-corruption surveillance, and counter-intelligence programs.

In such a conservative and ideologically controlled environment, most male students must spend two to three years before they go out into the society to begin their career. The exact effects of this process have not yet been empirically studied by social scientists. But the anti-communist instinct and nationalist emphasis of the armed forces undoubtedly have considerable impact on the contemporary generation's nationalist sentiments.

We asked a twenty-six-year old Taiwanese accountant for his evaluation and reflection on his army experience.

"Two years' service in the army was a tough but rewarding experience. That was the first time in my life when I was required to lead a disciplined life style. At times, life in the barracks can be boring as well. Oh, another thing was that the army was a microcosm of the society. You get to meet people from all walks of life and all regions of the country and you learn to work with people who are very different from yourself. It is a great place for equal treatment. At least, for

most soldiers within the same rank, everyone is equal no matter where you come from, how much wealth you possess, or how smart you are. The thing I did not like was the political education curriculum every Wednesday morning. For four hours you have to sit there watch some pretty boring professors lecture on closed-circuit television or so-called celebrities talk about the evil communism. The lectures were always in the same format and of the same nature. Basically we were told about the evils and corrupt nature of Chinese communists, our assured victory in the holy battle against Marxism-Leninism, the internal enemy, namely the Taiwan Independence activists. Actually more and more emphasis was placed on the domestic side. I knew Political Warfare department was in fact aiming at the Democratic Progressive Party. In the army, no one dared to declare his support for opposition party. But I have heard that after President Lee took office, things have changed a lot. I mean, they have relaxed their attack on the "domestic enemy". Do I believe what they taught me ? Not really. It was just like a game. You played by the political rule they set, you would come out the army without any trouble. There was a time, when my other two elder brothers served in the

armed forces in the early eighties and late
seventies, the military political warfare officers
were very powerful in the military. In those days,
so I heard, in addition to watching televised
political lectures, everybody must attend small
group meetings to report their understanding of
the material and discuss the ways to strengthen
spiritual and ideological armament. I am not sure
if it worked. Maybe, maybe not."

Another young junior high school teacher who just
completed his service a few months before our interview
highlighted a widespread sentiment of anxiety over the
precise definition of the military's mission. The
relaxation of the cold war era and the ensuing detente
between the two Chinese regimes created more cognitive
dissonance than before. Soldiers and students alike have
access to various electronic and print media to keep
themselves informed about the world outside the barracks.
Therefore when the military leadership attempted to
instill a sense of nationalism based on anti-communism
and partisan ideologies into their soldiers' minds, the
educated young recruit reacted quietly with doubts and
confusion. The young teacher said:

"I served in the army for two years and I am proud
of it. There are still many aspects to be
modernized. But I think the real problem is the

definition of our mission today. In the army I talked to many aging sergeants and lieutenants and honestly they are just as confused as many of us are as to who our enemy is anyway. They say that five years ago, the Chinese Communists were still our No. One archenemy. Nowadays, the CCP is not considered bandit anymore. In the past, the military was trained to recover our motherland. Now the Defense Minister tells us that the mission is to defend the prosperity of this island. I was stationed in Quemoy island for a few months. There, contrary to many people's imagination, one finds very little sense of any immediate war or confrontation. The majority of troops on these offshore islands, including the career officers, are just doing the bureaucratic routines day in and day out. Everything has became so formalistic. We just follow the orders from the central command. But everyone knows there will not be a war now. Did you read the newspaper coverage in recent years about the proposal to turn Quemoy into a tourist resort or a casino island? My cousin works in the government and he says that ClubMed has once proposed to open a resort club on those offshore islands too. To be sure, many people are still worried about attacks. My parents

do. Me? It is hard to say. But you look at the world and China's own economic reform, I don't really think there could be a war. We are all Chinese. The blood is thicker than water."

The Korean army was, on the contrary, much more effective in cultivating a keen sense of nationalism among the young students. According to our respondents, the imminent atmosphere of military confrontation and the geographic proximity of North Korea army were perhaps more powerful than any political lecture. Korean military service tends to reinforce a sense of cohesive nationalist perspective while at the same time intensify a siege mentality among the more moderate members. Though the younger generation never experienced personally the devastation wrought by North Korea's army, the military became the best place for them to learn about the primacy of national security and the threat of a hostile military confrontation. The continuing military standoff between North and South Korea resulted in totally different perceptions of threat to national security between the South Korean youth and their Taiwanese counterpart.

Chong-Kyu, a 24-year old graduate from a private college outside Seoul, was a moderate Korean student who claims to be a critic of the military regime and selfish politicians as well. His view was not much different from the majority of Korean students we interviewed: he was

rather sympathetic with the radical students' view of Korean politics, that the regime must be reformed in order to eliminate completely the social injustices, economic opportunism, and bureaucratic corruption, that Korea should be eventually unified to regain her independence from the foreign powers, that democracy must not be compromised. But a moderate like Chong-kyu disagreed with the radicals' demand for an immediate unification based on a simplistic yet aggressive form of nationalism: radical, extreme, militant, and clearly xenophobic in terms of their world view and political strategy. For him, democracy and free market are two of the most precious assets based on which South Korea has built the miracle on the Han River. North Korea's stubborn adherence to Stalinist socialism, unrelenting military buildup, and Kim Il Sung's dynastic cult of personality worried the moderate students more than the American military presence in the South. Military service has a reinforcing function in terms of their appreciation of the volatile situation on the Korean peninsula and the need to preserve a democratic society. Chong-Kyu said:

"I always felt that war was not real until I joined the army and witnessed the tense atmosphere along the DMZ. That was quite an impact on me. It dawned on me that democracy could be very fragile. As far as national unification is concerned, I

believe any form of unification must not be under a North Korean style of totalitarian socialism. I am a nationalist for sure but I will not sacrifice freedom for unification. You know how we dislike the American occupation of our land. But the fact is militarily we still cannot survive without the American military force at this stage. Some of my friends in college consider them as imperialist enemy but I think of them as a protection buffer. After all, we pay for a lot of the expenses. It is not free of charge. Korea needs to really beef up her defense capability and be able to stand up for herself in times of crisis. Military is a place where you cultivate yourself into a real man. Before I went into the army, I had not paid much attention to what many elders said about security threat and the terror of war devastation. But now I am more realistic about it."

Ethnic Identity in Taiwan: Social or Political Cleavage?

In Taiwan, the ethnic tension between mainlanders and Taiwanese has long been a controversial issue. Taiwan experts argue that the Taiwanese pattern of social cleavage does not follow the class model emerged in most industrial societies, rather the predominant social

cleavage is based on ethnic or provincial origin.[31] Though before Chiang Ching-Kuo's death, the issue was never officially recognized to have ever existed. Historically since the fifties, there has been an implicit social division of labor - the mainlanders controlled political power, dominated the military and the bureaucracy; while Taiwanese were generally left free to develop their careers in professional fields like medicine, law, and private businesses. Table 1 and 2 would reflect the lopsided distribution of military and political power and the corresponding shift of balance resulting from generational successions. Another indicator of the disproportionate distribution of economic resources is the fact that 70% of the major business leaders listed in 1979-80 edition of Who's Who in Taiwan Business were Taiwanese and the other 30% were mainlanders.[32] A survey conducted in 1978 of 100 business groups, 78% of the Chairman of the Board were of Taiwanese origin.[33]

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[31] See Lu Ya-li, "Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China on Taiwan," **Asian Survey** 25 (11), November 1985: pp. 1075-1095.

[32] Alan P.L. Liu, The Political Basis of the Economic and Social Development in the Republic of China, 1940-1980 Occassional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies No.1, Baltimore, Maryland: University of Maryland, School of Law, 1985.

[33] Cited in Susan Greenhalgh "Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan," **China Quarterly** September 1984: pp. 531-540.

**Table 1: 1950-1987 Taiwanese-Mainlander Composition in
the Republic of China Armed Forces (Percentage
Distribution)**

Rank Categories	Generals M.	T.	Colonels M.	T.	Lieutenants M.	T.	Soldiers M.	T.
1950-1965	97.7	1.3	90.4	9.6	86.2	13.8	47.2	52.8
1965-1978	92.6	7.4	81.2	18.8	65.3	34.7	31.6	68.4
1978-1987	84.2	15.8	67.4	32.6	51.7	48.3	21.3	78.7

Notes: M: Mainlanders   T: Taiwanese
Source: **The Journalist** 39, December 7, 1987: p. 9. Cited
in Hung-Mao Tien, "Liberalization and Democratization:
Taiwan's Developmental Experience," Paper presented in
Conference on Democratization in the Republic of China,
Taipei, Taiwan, January 9-11, 1989

**Table 2: Taiwanese Membership in KMT Central Standing
Committee**

	Total Members	Taiwanese	Taiwanese Percentage
1973	21	3	14 %
1976	22	4	18 %
1979	27	9	33 %
1981	27	9	33 %
1984	27	12	39 %
1986	31	14	45 %
1988	31	16	52 %

Source: Cited in Hung-Mao Tien, "Liberalization and
Democratization: Taiwan's Developmental Experience,"
Paper presented in Conference on Democratization in the
Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan, January 9-11, 1989

In they realm of representative politics, the national

Legislative Yuan was largely controlled by the

mainlanders before 1980s while seats on local level

assemblies were mostly occupied by Taiwanese supported by

local factions.[34]

When it came to this question, Taiwanese students were very enthusiastic in their responses. From their comments below, one could sense the centrality of the problem of national identity in Taiwan. The following excerpts were comments by two different students from a university in Taichung. Kwang-ming, age nineteen, was a student of animal science and Da-chou was a twenty-two year old math major. Their reflections on the ethnic tension issue present an image of ambivalence in the mind sets of this generation of students who have not been able to quite appreciate the political tension between mainlander and Taiwanese politicians and the conflicting images they received from their parents' admonitions and their personal experience of social harmony among the two major ethnic groups:

> "It is hard to say if I am a Taiwanese or Mainlander. I know there is some ethnic tension in Taiwan. My mother is from Tainan but my father was born in Nanking in 1940. He does not speak Taiwanese but he understands it. Many of my friends are like me. I don't see the point in differentiating between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Can you tell if I am a Taiwanese or a

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[34] See Arthur J. Lerman, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan," **American Political Science Review**, 71 (4), December, 1977: pp. 1406-1422.

Mainlander? My father used to say that he wanted to take the family, my mother and us children, back to Nanking "the old home". He was very homesick since he had been waiting here for too long. The KMT government will never take us back to China, he always says. My father understands that there has been a lot of changes in China. Most of his relatives in mainland are dead by now. My father is now just a mainlander in Taiwan, he is no longer a Chinese in China. Of course, he has gradually come to terms with this fact. Even late President Chiang Ching-Kuo said shortly before his death: " I am a Chinese but I am also a Taiwanese now." I don't think we should differentiate between the two groups. At least no one that I know can argue that there were any social barrier or distance between one and the other. This is not South Africa. Nor is this place India. We have no social caste, no apartheid. Unfortunately, there are still some people, like the politician and some stubborn old people, who are exploiting the differences. These people are only after political power. I believe educated people will not be influenced by them. But the less educated group of people will be influenced. My parents hope I can go abroad for my graduate study. They both want me

to stay in other country and don't come back because they are worried that my being a second generation mainlander may hinder my career. But seriously, whether I am a Taiwanese or a mainlander makes no difference to me. It is nice to go abroad and learn from the advanced countries. If you can permanently reside in other country, you stay. If you can not stay, you come back with a graduate degree, you have nothing to lose. It is very hard to get a Green card in the United States nowadays. There are more and more people coming home with advanced degrees in the job market. In order to be more competitive in the job market, one must have an advanced degree anyway."

The second student, Da-chou, was from a private university in Taichung, Taiwan. His experience captures the inevitable dilemma many Taiwanese students face in between the historical memory of unfortunate oppression in the forties and his personal perception of reality:

" Socially I guess it is not an issue. But when it comes to politics, my parents are particularly excited. I mean they are very emotional about it. They experienced the February 28 Incident in 1947. My mother still shakes whenever she remembers it. My grandparents were educated in Japanese high

schools. According to them, the KMT soldiers were corrupt and life after liberation was getting tougher and tougher. They had some friends killed by the soldiers, so they told me. I feel sorry for them and for everyone. But I don't hate the mainlanders. My girlfriend is a mainlander. My grandmother is not very happy about this. What can you say to that generation? The best way out is to avoid talking about politics. I agree that it is safer to stay away from politics. It is a zero-sum game."

Scholars on Taiwan studies have very different interpretations of the same picture. Hung-Mao Tien, for example, argued that ethnic tension remain a salient social and political cleavage in Taiwan. He cited disproportional representation in public offices, de facto residential segregation, linguistic differences, behavior pattern differences, disparity in identity as indicators of the persisting ethnic tension between mainlanders and Taiwanese.[35] While Tien cited several studies to support his arguments, our data point to a different direction. None of our respondents expressed overt hatred, dislike, or antagonism toward their fellow

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[35] See Hung-Mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political & Social Change in the Republic of China Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989: pp. 35-42.

Mainlander or Taiwanese friends. Most of them, however, were rather open in admitting the existence of such antagonistic sentiments among their elder family members. Generally, they acknowledged the tension between two ethnic groups' political elites. But these young students were also quick to point out that they did not approve of ethnic segregation or discrimination. In fact, barring their own confused sense of identity, our respondents did exhibit a sense of common bonding among their peer groups. The majority speak both Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese and none indicated that they would differentiate in/out group on the basis of linguistic identity. Several Taiwanese respondents did equate democratization with Taiwanization of the ruling strata. But they also admitted that ethnic tension was not strong enough for them to support any radical political measures directed at mainlanders on Taiwan. Most of the students we interviewed also revealed their genuine concerns for native Taiwanese culture as their own culture. We did not find any mainlander students who expressed personal despise for Taiwanese culture as "something beyond the pale of Chinese civilization".[36] Respondents' answers on voting behavior and party identification did, however,

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[36] Thomas B. Gold "Popular Culture and Society in Taiwan," Paper presented at the China Council Conference on Taiwan Entering the 21st Century, The Asia Society, New York, April 23-25, 1987, cited in Hung-Mao Tien, op. cit.: p. 40.

reflect a link between ethnic origin and political preference. Mainlanders tended to support KMT more than Taiwanese while DPP's advocates mostly came from Taiwanese families. Tien's own analysis and other studies he cited indeed revealed a significant political cleavage among the older generation of voters on Taiwan.[37] If anything, the current ethnic paradox in Taiwan only partially confirmed the functional theory's prediction that increased social communication tends to eliminate differences and facilitate the emergence of a common bond. The persisting political cleavage among the elites of different ethnic origin seems to defy its prediction.

But when it came to matters of national identity, our respondents of either ethnic origins were equally ambivalent in their self-definitions. This pattern is supported by a recent survey of 1436 college students in Taiwan in 1991. When asked for a self-definition of nationality, the answers presented an ambivalent and ambiguous picture. 36.6% said they were Chinese while only 4.9% defined themselves as Taiwanese. 28.9% chose to describe themselves as "a Chinese but also a Taiwanese". Another 24.2% said they were "a Taiwanese but also a

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[37] Other scholars, such as John F. Copper, support a less pessimistic reading of the ethnic relations on Taiwan. See his Taiwan: Province or Island State? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990: pp. 36-41.

Chinese". 5.4% said they did not know.[38] Table 3 shows a further breakdown by respondents' ethnic origin.

TABLE 3.

	Taiwanese Respondent	Mainlander Respondent
"I am a Chinese"	32.3%	61.0%
"I am a Taiwanese"	5.8%	3.2%
"I am a Chinese, also a Taiwanese"	31.5%	27.5%
"I am a Taiwanese, also a Chinese	30.4%	8.2%
TOTAL	100%	100%

Source: Yi-Yen Chen, "A Study of the Political Socialization of College Students: Changes in Political Values and Attitudes in the Past Fifteen Years" NSC Report 80-0301-H004-18, Taipei, Taiwan, December 31, 1991: p. 26.

To get a sense of how a young professional who has been exposed to overseas environment would feel about ethnic tension and the complex relationship between ethnic consciousness and the Great China identity, we visited a thirty-seven year old investment banker in a downtown Taipei office:

"I grew up in a small community, one of those government housing provided for civil servants and military personnel. I always knew there was

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[38] Yi-Yen Chen, "A Study of the Political Socialization of College Students: Changes in Political Values and Attitudes in the Past Fifteen Years" NSC Report 80-0301-H004-18, Taipei, Taiwan, December 31, 1991.

discrimination against us mainlanders ever since I was a kid. In school other kids called us "Wai-shen Ju" (mainlander pigs). Yet, to be fair, in our little mainlander community there were also some pretty ugly things said about Taiwanese too. But that was just plain talk. You never heard about any real conflicts or physical fights. After I went to New York University for my MBA degree, I finally came to realize that there was, and probably still is, just as much tension among overseas Chinese themselves. You know how Americans always think of Chinatown as a single unified body of people. Oh, no! There were various factions among ourselves depending on where you came from - China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Southeast Asia. Then there were the ideological lines. Such as the KMT loyalists, the radical independent movement advocates, the drifters who could not care less, the Maoists, the Great China nationalists. From left to right, you could have it all. Back in New York in the seventies, students from Taiwan were divided as to whether we should pledge our national loyalties to PRC or to ROC or to an independent Taiwan. That was a really emotional issue. To watch Jimmy Carter sold out Taiwan was a major blow for many of us. Also there

was the fight over the sovereignty of Senkaku islands. Everyone really hated the little Japanese. But Taiwan was so weak. KMT could do so little in those days. A lot of us shed many tears. Then people started to look to China - at least a great power to be recognized in the world. At least Japan respect China. That was a time of great debates among ourselves. Chiang Ching Kuo was just beginning to reform and change KMT government into a more pragmatic one. I just could not agree with those who claimed they were the real nationalists and disregard CCP's communist nature. After all, we are doing much better than China economically. KMT may not be perfect but it at least gives us a good material life."

Another American trained MBA expressed his feelings on his own dual citizenship. Dual citizenship is not generally considered as improper among Taiwanese elites. In fact, KMT government even allows national legislators and assemblymen to hold dual citizenship. In recent years, as part of the campaign to attract scientific and engineering talents residing in the West, even the military-backed research institutions began to employ returning Chinese holding foreign passports. We discovered an interesting contrast with the Korean attitudes. In Korea, holding dual citizenship is

considered to be unpatriotic and politically unacceptable. The few Korean Americans we interviewed in Seoul all asked us not to reveal their dual citizenship identity to their schoolmates. In the mid-eighties a national assemblyman, Moon Dong-Whan, caused a national outrage when he revealed his American citizenship and was asked to resign from his seat on the National Assembly. Our respondent from Taiwan gave us a very pragmatic view on this issue:

"I worked in Wall Street for several years, got my Green card (U.S. permanent resident status) in 1977. I had planned to come home. My parents are here and they are getting old. I felt it was time for me to take care of them. My wife insisted that we get our American citizenship first. She was worried about Taiwan's future. What if China would attack Taiwan militarily? Taiwan stood no chance of survival. So I waited and finally got back in 1983. You ask me do I feel bad about pledging loyalty to a foreign country? Hey, there are lots of people like me here in Taiwan. I mean quite a few among the educated elites who had graduate degrees from abroad. Also the rich ones and the privileged few. This is an open secret. Just read the classified ad section in the newspaper and you will know how big the market is for people who

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want to buy a foreign passport. It used to be for
security concern. Now it is for a better living
environment. But we all love this land, this is
where we were born, educated, and raised up. I'd
still prefer living in my own motherland. Wouldn't
you?"

National Unification: Opposing Regimes in Contest

The students' attitudes toward the national
unification issue constitute the most emotionally-charged
dimension of national identity. Aside from the assumption
of common cultural identity between the two sides, the
political identity dimension poses a direct dilemma for
the students. Often the choice is one between competing
sets of partisan ideologies, normative ideals, social and
political institutions, economic systems, bases of
political legitimacy, and national symbols. In the case
of Taiwan, even the assumption of commonality in cultural
identity has increasingly come under questions. The
growing use of Taiwanese as a social medium for
communication further facilitated the growth of a
distinct cultural pattern in Taiwan. The question of
cultural convergence or divergence has received
increasing attention in the past decade. Scholarly
debates and political ideologizing have not reached any
consensus on this point yet. But the effects of
increasing cultural contact between Taiwan and China

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since 1987 remain ambiguous so far.

A. North Korea and South Korea: Nationalism vs. Democracy

In Korea, the unification issue reflect a polarized dimension of political identity. The general public and the conservative forces strongly asserts the primacy of unification on the basis of democracy and free market. The vociferous militant students demanded immediate merger with North Korea's Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the grounds of traditional Korean identity, homogeneous racial makeup, common language, and historical political unity. The radical students, small in number but aggressive in approach, also demand immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces on the peninsula in order to speed up the unification process. They are less concerned about the constitutional format than with the return to a unified Korea. No room for compromise or consensus-building has been allowed by either side of the issue.

Generally, the political debate on a highly politicized issue like national unification becomes so polarized that it often erupts into naked confrontation between the opposing political forces. This is because Korean politics is characterized by the continuous high degree of political centralization, imposed on a geographically small and ethnically/culturally homogeneous polity. This centralization tendency tends to

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undermine the effectiveness of many forms of integrative intermediary groups such as social classes, political parties, and other intermediary groups. With competing political entities relating to each other primarily through their linkages to the centralized state power, the Korean society becomes a volatile ground for elites and masses to confront each other directly. A political controversy tends to end up in open confrontation before any intermediation is given sufficient time to function.

In terms of political timing and sequence, there are two views on a unified Korea: (1) the optimists who consider unification a feasible objective within ten years, and (2) a cautious moderate public who envision a democratically unified Korea beyond the immediate future. The drastic change in international affairs seems to be helpful to the former view which the militant radicals hold. However, the current security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula has changed. South Korea's successful industrialization has beefed up its own military preparedness which might be almost balanced to that of the North. The ending of cold war has also influenced the security environment of the Korean peninsula. The moderates' voice for peaceful reunification among the public in the South has become louder in recent years. Thus there has been an increased interest in arms control as a policy alternative to

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reducing military tensions between the two Koreas. The preservation of South Korea's hard-earned success naturally becomes the immediate concern of the conservative and moderate forces.

A student publication editor at Yonsei University gave us a rather balanced assessment of the unification issue and competing views among the students.

"In theory, a unified Korea is an elusive term which can be based upon confederation, commonwealth, and unitary models for a future Korean government. The assumption is that a unified Korea can be achieved through the long process of negotiation between South and North by acknowledging peaceful coexistence based on two loose alliances. While Pyongyang leaders insist on a confederation model, our leaders in Seoul argue for the commonwealth and unitary models. The merit of the confederation model is that it draws some support from some of the students and radical politicians in South Korea by allowing the two Koreas an equal footing in our bilateral relations and in exercising "regional autonomy" in external affairs - at least on paper. But conflict arises when we, I mean the silent majority, still have doubts about Pyongyang's sincerity and intentions. When you see the whole Marxist camp collapsing and

the DPRK still insisting on socialism, you have to wonder if it is a good idea to rush into any marriage of convenience. After all, we still know so little about them. Timing should not be rushed. Most of us feel that social-cultural contacts and economic exchanges should precede any form of military, political integration. It is enough that our parents' generation suffer the trauma of civil war once. The Korean people should not suffer again. Frankly, the radicals are as patriotic as anyone else. But their political naivete can be dangerous."

The romantic nationalism of the more aggressive students is coupled with a strong sense of anti-foreignism. Some of them even equated the withdrawal of all foreign influences on the peninsula with the attainment of true democracy. In this line of nationalistic arguments, traces of anti-colonialist nationalism is clearly detectable. The guilt factor underlies their thinking. Korea is in general portrayed as the victim of major powers' struggle for spheres of influence. The nation's partition is seen as the sole result of external factors. All internal (North-South) diametrically opposed social and political differences were therefore regarded as artificial and irrelevant. A senior student whom we met at a downtown Cathedral gave us a standard account of

this view:

"It is clear that the division of Korea was a unilateral decision by the superpowers at the Yalta Conference. The Korean people did not participate in the decision-making process. Regarding the economic aspects, the division of Korea by such an artificial boundary line has retarded our economic development. Both Koreas have done well economically, but a unified Korea could do even better. Despite the social-cultural lines that divide us, there are yet some common elements: we use the same language and have the same traditional family values. The people of the North are our bloodkins. Now, in my view, this common ground is enough to lead to hope for achieving future peaceful unification. Roh Tae Woo argue for a 'step-by-step" approach by moving from simple issues to more complex ones. But I think a "big step first" approach proposed by the leaders in Pyongyang is what we need. True nationalism means that despite all the differences in political rhetoric between the two Koreas, we are one nation, share the same blood and the same Korean identity."

Nationalist sentiments toward reunification in Korea thus remain polarized between a romantic nationalism based on

ethnic and cultural homogeneity, on the one hand, and a conservative nationalism rooted in deep distrust of the Pyongyang regime and firm belief in democratic capitalism, on the other hand. Unlike Taiwan, the peoples of both Korea, until now, have virtually no access to visit the other side of the divided motherland. Misunderstanding and distrust obstructed even low levels of exchanges and meetings. Tension builds up as each side dwells in its own shelter of political identity, fearing loss and wanting contact at the same time.

B. Taiwan and China: Economics First

To put the Taiwanese students' responses in perspective, let us first examine the relationship between China and Taiwan since the division. KMT government withdrew to Taiwan in 1949. In the fifties, the national slogan was basically on recovering the mainland China. By the seventies, the slogans had changed to ideological confrontation between democracy and communism. In the eighties, government propaganda again finetuned to unification under the Three Principles of the People. Military strategy reflected a similar change in orientation. Before Chiang Ching-Kuo succeeded his father, Chiang kai-shek, Taiwan's military source of inspiration was the vision of a united China under KMT's rule. Beginning in the late seventies, a clear defense strategy began to take shape. The concept of military

spending also started to turnaround to emphasize the defense of a secured Taiwan. On November 2, 1987, the KMT government formally lifted the ban on its residents from visiting the Chinese mainland, though Chiang Ching-kuo still insisted on three no's policy of "no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise".[39] In 1988 alone, about 237,000 Taiwanese residents visited China. By the end of 1991, Taiwanese had made more than 2.4 million trips to the mainland. More than 40 million letters and over 12 million telephone calls had been exchanged.[40] By 1990, under the leadership of the first Taiwan-born President, Lee Teng Hui, the nationalist government officially establi ̦hed the National Unification Council (established Oct. 7, 1990) and Mainland Affairs Commission(established October 18, 1990). Taiwan has begun to take an active initiative in approaching China. Inter-China trade, primarily indirect trade through Hong Kong and other

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[39] For a well documented historical analysis of the unification issue, see Lai-To Lee The Reunification of China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. A thorough analysis of this complex issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, as Lee's title suggests, the unification policies and initiatives by both sides have been under constant changes in recent years.

[40] See Hu Chang, "Impressions of Mainland China Carried Back by Taiwan Visitors," in Ramon H. Myers ed. Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's republic of China After Forty Years Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991: pp. 141-155. Also see Ying-jeou Ma, Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Past and Present Taipei, Taiwan: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, 1992.

countries, increased at an amazing pace. Political realities forced many Taiwanese to reexamine their links with China which was still officially an enemy. Meanwhile, more and more Taiwanese are visiting China each year.

Increased contact among people has definitely influenced how Taiwanese define their national identity. In general, the impressions of those who have visited China reflect an ambivalent feeling toward China. Having witnessed the relative backwardness and poverty in China, the majority of returnees surveyed indicated that the encounter have reinforced their attachment to Taiwan. Few expressed willingness to take up permanent residence in China. We interviewed about a dozen of Taiwanese entrepreneurs investing in mainland's light industries and their responses also reflected the unwillingness of many of their salaried managerial staff to stay in China over an extended period. Though returnees are not necessarily more optimistic about the reunification future, the increased exchanges have certainly reduced the tensions and enmity between Taiwan and China.[41]

On the other hand, there has been a continuous presence of Taiwan Independence movement both inside and outside the island since the fifties. The tragic encounter of mainlander dominated regime and the newly

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[41] Hu Chang, ibid.

liberated Taiwanese society undoubtedly facilitate whatever nascent separatist sentiments there were before the February 28, 1947 incident. In the current political scene, a majority of activists and leaders within the Democratic Progressive Party appear to be in support of the independence concept, though differences regarding strategies remain irreconcilable among factions. Domestic debates centered around the issue of unification-independence. This highly politicized and emotionally-charged issue dominated the constitutional reform debate in 1991, the election of 1989, and the first televised political debate in 1990. Though the electoral results of 1989 national election indicated that the radical "New Nation Front" candidates suffered defeat, independence movement is still believed to command an islandwide constituency of approximately 10% of the adult voters.

The theoretical bases of the independence movement rest on the following arguments. Independent activists argue, first of all, Taiwan has never been effectively incorporated into China's territory. Instead, the island's modern history was marked by periodic colonial rule by the Dutch and the Japanese. Even China was considered by them as a colonizer. They argue that a distinct Taiwanese cultural identity already existed as a result of the separate historical development, even though the majority of early Taiwanese settlers were

migrants from China. The KMT regime is therefore seen as an alien regime imposed upon the native Taiwanese. Secondly, Taiwan's legal status was never clearly resolved in the post war negotiations. Since Japan and China did not sign any treaty regarding the return of Taiwan to China's jurisdiction, according to this argument, Taiwan's international status was never fully resolved. In other words, the sovereignty is uncertain, at least not possessed by the nationalist China government. A third rationale is based on the political reality that KMT's fictitious claim of total jurisdiction over the entire mainland China has forced Taiwan into an isolated position in the international community. The reality of KMT's effective control over Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores islands constitute the de facto basis for an independent state. The fourth argument appeals to the self-determination principle which is presented as the optimal choice for Taiwanese people. An independent Taiwan Republic, the independence advocates argue, would in effect help stabilize the East Asia situation and promote Taiwan-China interactions on a peaceful and equal basis.[42] Our interview with the Taiwanese students who advocated independence also

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[42] See Ya-Li Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: A Case Study of the Democratic Progressive Party," Paper presented in the Conference on Democratization   in the Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan, January 9-11, 1989.

reflected this set of overall theoretical arguments.

A female senior student, Ying-Chi, talked about her personal experience visiting China. Her parents both came to Taiwan in 1949 in their late teens. She professed that she was neutral toward any partisan struggle between KMT and CCP. But she added that she was in favor of any political arrangement that could increase China's wealth and power without jeopardizing Taiwan's democracy and economy. Her parents were both strongly anti-communist. Her father was a lifelong civil servant who opposed any form of unification under CCP's dictation. Ying-Chi majored in economics and planned on entering a multinational company to start her career as a business professional. She reflected on her experience:

"My parents took me along to visit their relatives in China this Spring. I liked it but I definitely don't think I will want to live there. It is too backward. Their relatives live in countryside in Hunan. I feel like totally out of place. We are so different. China has a lot of catch-up to do. It is a strange feeling, you know, I feel excited to finally see China and yet I really want to be a part of it, not for now at least. I know we all Chinese and I get along with my cousins and aunts very well. But we think very differently. Unification? That may not be a bad idea. But the

gap is too wide now. We cannot afford to unify with such a poor country now. My parents have to remit a lot of money every few months to subsidize their relatives in Hunan. I cannot understand why they have to do it. Those people have jobs. My dad said he owed them for what they went through in the past forty years. But I don't see my uncles expressing any gratitude for our generosity. This is terrible. Of course, there are many economic benefits if the two sides can work together. I like the idea of a Greater China Economic Sphere in which China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and maybe Singapore can be integrated into a powerful combination of economic blocs. Can you imagine the economic potential unleashed by the hardworking Chinese workers in all these areas? I think the best part of it is that we could combine China's resource and technology, Taiwan's management knowhow and high level manpower, Hong Kong's financial position and entrepreneurship. In a world of protectionism, we need to build ourselves something like this. But of course there is the danger of our losing the fragile democracy we have finally developed in Taiwan. My dad told us everything about the Communists. How can we trust them one hundred percent. History is the best

lesson for any country, you know."

Ying-Chi's comment reflected a majority of Taiwanese respondents' ambivalent views toward reunification. To a significant extent, both the state and the business community share this ambivalence and caution. The zigzagging in KMT's cross-strait policies is a perfect example. But the prospect for economic opportunities encourages further contacts. Not only the students but also the general public share the profound ambivalence toward increasing contact with China. Policy issues that present dilemmas and ambiguities in terms of defining the relationship between Taiwan and China all create more confusion and ambivalence. These issues include the immigration procedures, credit allocation for business investing in China, divorce laws, inheritance issues, labor disputes, intellectual property rights, etc..

New Bases of National Pride: Being Chinese or Korean

In the following section we asked the question on students' definition of being Chinese or Korean. Korean students demonstrated a clear sense of national consciousness while Taiwanese students showed an ambiguous flexibility in positive identification. While traditional emphasis on cultural and historical tradition is still embedded in the notions of national pride, a clear shift is observed from the cultural pride rooted in the past glories to a new sense of confidence in their

successful economic modernization. One twenty-year-old
Taiwanese student reflected on being a Chinese:

"How do I define "Chinese"? In my opinion, Chinese
share the same culture for over five thousand
years. We have always been a single nation. The
Chinese nation include the Hans, the Manchus, the
Mongols, the Muslims, the Tibetans, and many other
smaller groups. In sum, Chinese share the same set
of philosophical tradition that is centered around
human being (jen). What you see today [the
division of two states] is really an unfortunate
break in Chinese history. Chinese have a saying:
that under the heaven unification would eventually
come after a long period of division; and division
would always be the end result of any longstanding
unity. I believe Taiwan and China are inseparable
parts. Of course, Chinese people have many bad
habits and unworthy customs. Have you heard about
the book on The Ugly Chinese before? Recently, a
young female writer who studied in West Germany
published a book titled Wild Fire in which she
sharply criticized many social injustices, moral
deficiencies, self-centered nature of Chinese in
Taiwan. It immediately became a best seller among
young people. I read it and introduced the book to
my close friends. It was really sad to realize how

little we have changed since the feudal dynastic period. The older generation and the politicians hated it. They said she trashed our traditional culture, that she was poisoned by foreign ideas. Actually, according to a local magazine publisher friend of mine, she was in a position to criticize the whole social establishment because she married a German, meaning she's got a foreign passport as protection. I don't know if it's true but it goes to show you how many of us have been longing for genuine self-criticism and self-reflection. Maybe some of us lack the moral courage and the political exemption she had. Americans marvel at our economic success but they do not realize that under the elegant facade lie many unseemly social and moral depravities. It takes time to change, I hope."

But the Korean student's response was even more assertive and confident. His comments, however, reflected a continuing historical theme in Korean people's concern for autonomy and independence since the turn of the century.

"Being a Korean is something ' _ be proud of. We not only have five thousand years of civilization but also a robust economic achievement that could be the model for any third world country. Koreans

work hard and persevere in our fight for true independence in the world. It is true that we still don't have genuine democracy and that is a shame. But the people deserve respect from other country. Just look at our national achievement today and you will realize how far we have come from the devastation of Korean War. Korea will be Asia's next Japan. If the two Koreas are unified, then in a few decades, we will surpass Japan. Have you heard that the Japanese press say that Japan worries most about the potential competition from a unified Korea? Well, they should. What happened to the Yi Dynasty several hundred years ago was a national disgrace. Korea is strong now and she will no longer be pushed around. The Korean people are well educated enough to take on any enemy. American government does not seem to understand this. We are neither their protege nor their little brother anymore. Yes they have helped us very much in the past, but Korea's future is not something the Americans can have any control over. We are not a pawn in their grand strategic game plan. Indeed they have helped us defend against the Communists for many years. But take a look at those GIs and all the spiritual pollution they brought in to our society. And how about the

command structure in the UN force? Why can't our Korean generals be the Chief? This is unequal treatment. My parents are very fond of Americans. They always love to remember the Korean War days and how the Americans came in to save the country from falling into Communist hands. They are still worried about any attacks from the North. The way I see it, the tension and misunderstanding we have with the North are mostly a result of American occupation here. Do I hate Americans? Not at all. My sister lives in Queens, New York. She has a green grocery store on Northern Boulevard. I have been there before. Americans are very friendly people. I like American music and movie stars like Clint Eastwood and Madonna. The point is that American politicians are behind all this conspiracy to further their own interests."

World View and National Future: Nationalism vs. Internationalism

In this category, Korean students overwhelmingly pointed to democracy, social equality, and national autonomy as Korea's most pressing concerns. Taiwanese students in general were more worried about the domestic order and stability. For the Korean students, internationalization has become another sound bite for them as their country faces increasing challenge from

China and the newcomers from Southeast Asia as well as the emerging trading blocs in Europe and North America. Their national past reminded them of a struggling Korea fending off the imperial powers but the economic reality of today compels them to recognize the need for further penetration and integration into the global market structure. The educated young Koreans therefore face a paradoxical need to emphasize both an internationalist outlook and a nationalist commitment. Antiforeignism slogans of the radical students are seen on campus mixed among students who study second and third languages preparing to work for some of the nation's largest industrial chaebols. The following comments by three different students demonstrate this tension:

"The most serious social issues confronting Korea today is social inequalities and lack of true democracy. In my opinion, Chun Doo Whan and Roh Tae Woo are responsible for this mess. They illegally seized power and repressed the minjung. Political power is used to enrich their personal bank accounts in foreign countries. Chaebols went along and bribed their way to more profits. The only way to cure this illness is to remove Roh Tae Woo and his faction from power and elect a leader with real virtues. Not just some dirty corrupt politicians."

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"National unification is our top priority. The plight of the Korean people must be rectified by the mass. Roh Tae Woo and his followers are nothing but running dogs for the American imperialist interests and the industrial conglomerates. A truly independent and strong Korean nation must be a unified and integrated Korea. The blood and the tears shed by millions of people north and south of the DMZ should not be ignored."

"I think we need to look ahead and diversify our markets in order to reduce our dependence on America and Japan. Korea must become a truly internationalized economic power to have complete autonomy and independence. Before the twentieth century, the Yi dynasty was subservient to China, which led to overdependence. In this century, we have been too dependent upon the Americans. I personally do not think Japan is a friendly partner or a trustworthy ally. Modern Korean must develop a global view and learn to compete with other nations in the international market. We should internationalize quick so that Korea could become a genuine economic power in the 21st century."

In contrast to Korean students concern over their

economic competitiveness and national autonomy, Taiwanese
students seemed to be more concerned with their domestic
agenda - order and stability. Transition from an
authoritarian rule to a democratic pluralist society has
entailed growing pains. The psychological craving for a
paternalistic state with benevolent ruler persists among
many students. Internationally, unlike the Koreans,
Taiwanese are primarily worried over their diplomatic
isolation. While they have little to say in the
unification/independence process, the students deeply
felt the need to reorient Taiwan's international role as
a major trading partner with the rest of the world. Their
anxieties are documented as follows:

> "Taiwan's most pressing concern today is a return
> to order. Everything is out of control. Chaos and
> confusion abounds. If you are a tough and
> unscrupulous opportunist, you can hit it big. Look
> at those investment companies. They first
> attracted innocent depositors with 15% or even
> higher interest rate, then they transferred the
> money overseas and flee to America or Hong Kong.
> Who suffers? The innocent law-abiding citizens
> suffered. People don't work hard anymore. My
> father works in a ceramic factory and they cannot
> even get local workers willing to earn a decent
> pay. Young people, housewives, teachers, everyone

wants to get in on the stock market gambling. Everyone knows it is a manipulated market by opportunists. My classmates in the Economics department skip classes to go to the brokerage firm every morning. We need to put the society back on the right track, We need to restore social order. This chaos will ruin this island and our values and morals. When Chiang Ching-Kuo was alive , everything was under control. Nothing went wrong. My personal view is that Lee Teng-hui is an honest, caring, and competent President. It is just those incompetent petty bureaucrats under him who have failed to perform their duties faithfully."

"The social cost of the political struggle between the KMT and the DPP has been too high. We need to have some kind of orderly and rational political competition. Every controversy over some vague ideological difference could paralyze the Legislative Yuan for weeks. The result is that we the common citizens lose out. Not the politicians. It is important to have a major opposition party to balance the KMT. But appealing to the mass does not necessarily have to entail street demonstration, blocking the already congested traffic, physical fights in the parliament, or

hunger strike. I realize that all the confrontation is part of growing pain Taiwan must undergo before we can enjoy a true democracy. But there must be some kind of mechanism to sort things out between two major political parties without head-on crashes and standoffs. Taiwan's future may be in a unified China. But democracy is important too. It is hard to say what would come out of this debate on unification vs. independence. My friends and I tend to think that whatever form of unification the politicians agree on, the well-being of Taiwanese people must be placed first. We cannot afford to make a mistake here."

"We need to find a new identity for ourselves first. No nation can survive and prosper without a clearly defined identity. Taiwan has its own future which is not necessarily part of China. We need to rejoin the United Nations as a full sovereign member. The KMT government says that an move toward independence will provoke the Chinese Communists into use of force against Taiwan. We don't share that view at all. The international community will not stand by to watch China slaughter an independent nation. Chinese have enough domestic trouble already. Once we obtain an

independent international status as a sovereign Taiwan Republic, then we will be able to break out of this international diplomatic isolation. This move could further help our democratic movement."

The Taiwan Independence activist was not alone in their concerns. Many a Taiwanese students and young businessmen openly complained about the inferior or pariah national status they personally experienced. Such experiences, according to them, made them realize the need for a stronger state. As we argued in Chapter Three, it was their personal experience that directly impinged upon the conception of a national identity. For these cosmopolitan Taiwanese, the international isolation of their country could be as traumatic as the Palestinian child who felt the need for a stronger state. Being a Chinese from Taiwan may not always mean cultural pride for a Taiwanese, the political reality could be deeply troubling for them. As the young sales representative, Michael Lin, from one of Taiwan's leading personal computer manufacturer complained to us about his humiliating experience:

"Every time I travel abroad, it is so inconvenient to use a ROC passport. Taiwan is discriminated by many countries. You have a hard time getting around in Europe. Even Hong Kong visa can be a hassle. You cannot imagine how frustrating it

could become. If only we are a strong power in the world, then every country would treat us with more respect. Taiwan has been isolated in the international community for too long. As one of the most dynamic economy in the Pacific Rim and important trading partners with all the major industrial countries, we deserve more respect and voice in this world. You can tell the difference in the manners in which Japanese and American governments treated us between now and fifteen ago. Back then the Americans refused to sell us advanced weapons, the little Japanese dared to betray us and recognized the Communist regime. Nowadays, even the French government is sending ministers and politicians to sell us advanced weapons like submarines and fighter planes. Look at all those American congressmen trying to befriend Taiwan today. They are coming to Taiwan mainly to promote business. What else could they be here for? What a snobbish attitude! You know what is the basis for this newly earned respect and friendship? It is Taiwan's wealth and the economic power that comes with it. Our economic achievement is not to be ignored by others anymore. The only thing that worries me is that China is blocking our diplomatic efforts whenever

possible. We cannot get into the GATT, the IMF because of China's objection. Considering our economic significance in the global economy, isn't that ridiculous?"

Emerging Patterns of Nationalism

We have here a complex series of snapshots from two of the most dynamic economies in the world. Culturally, these two societies both have millenniums of proud and rich cultural heritages behind them. Racially, they are both homogeneous societies. Each has its own distinctive language. Economically they had impeccable records from import substitution to export-led growth. Their postwar political trajectory showed remarkable similarities as well: from Japanese colonial rule, civil war, American military involvement, foreign aid, authoritarian rule, to recent democratization. For most of the last half century, both societies have a strong bureaucracy and charismatic leaders. What then is the nature and content of their respective nationalism?

As we have argued in Chapter Three, conventional theories of nationalism would suggest a stable, unambiguous and coherent sense of nationalism prevailing in the citizenry of Taiwan and Korea today. Conventional theories would also predict more continuities than discontinuities in the contents and patterns of Asian nationalism. Scholars of modern Asian nationalism have

generally associated the core of Asian nationalism with
a xenophobia directed against foreigners, particularly
white men. They argue that Asian nationalism manifests
itself in three forms. Politically, the Asian distrust
and fear of the West comes from a kind of residual
resentment against Western domination in their modern
era. Asian cultures' reaction against Western values and
cultures constitute the basis of cultural nationalism.
Even in religion, Asian religions tend to exhibit
religious exclusiveness by blocking out non-believers.
According to this conventional line of analysis, at the
root of this Asian xenophobia was always a deep seated
psychological need for equality which was played out in
a form of protests against Western powers. Asian
nationalism, therefore, is negative in nature and
reactionary in orientation. It was through systematic
propaganda in schools and families, in the military
service, and in the mass media, that modern Asian
nationalism became popular by the end of World War I.
Anti-colonialism was the essence that temporarily
transcended various competing caste, religious, and
linguistic identities of the old societies. Political
leaders, however, were never able to progress beyond the
rallying cry of this anti-colonialism. As a political
tool, Asian nationalism is seen as a loosely concerted

movement dedicated to asserting national identities.[43]

The problem with this line of analysis is that it fails to grasp the dynamic changes of nationalism in Asia since the 1960s. In East Asia particularly these changes included the social mobilization, economic development, and political institutionalization which have been further facilitated by highly developed communication network and mass media throughout these societies. Nationalism in Asia is no longer embedded in the old anti-colonialist sentiments. Neither is it simply a recast of the late nineteenth century reform nationalism seeking rich nation and strong army alone. Furthermore, conventional theories on Asian nationalism has failed to capture the nuances of each national society in Asia. As we have demonstrated in this thesis, the theme of anticolonialism alone carried very different implications for the Chinese, Taiwanese, and the Koreans. Our research findings directly challenges the validity of treating Asian nationalism as an across-the-board political phenomenon with uniform characteristics.

In terms of theorizing the study of nationalism,

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[43] See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation Boston,MA: Beacon Press, 1960; Clifford Geertz ed. Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa New York: Free Press, 1963; Ellie Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa New York: The World Publishing Company, 1972; Louis L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study New York: Holt Rinehart, & Winston, 1976; Louis L. Snyder Encyclopedia of Nationalism, New York: Paragon House, 1990.

earlier theorists have developed a body of elaborate theories of nationalism based on the historical experiences of the West and the developing countries before the 1960s. According to these theories, the intellectual historians would alert us to the reemergence of core nationalist ideas antecedent to the current phase. A replay of historical themes and nationalist legacies from the previous century is the key. Functionalist theorists would predict that with increasing socio-economic modernization, Asian nations would eventually witness the emergence of a coherent sense of integrative national identity transcending other lesser loyalties. Rational interest theory , on the other hand, would tell us that only the ruling elites in these societies are capable of manipulating and injecting a partisan and ideological version of orthodox nationalism to replace old identities. None of these theories have proven itself capable of capturing the complex changes in the contents and spirits of each society's nationalism. Nor are they able to offer a coherent explanation of the continuities and discontinuities that coexist in the contemporary nationalism of many Asian countries.

We proposed instead to base our research on the psychocultural approach to analyze the tensions, anxieties, and ambivalence exhibited by individual members of each national community. It helps us

understand the inner dynamics of the personal and societal search for a sense of national identity. By doing so, we are able to break down the holistic facade of nationalism and direct our questions at the individuals in families, schools, peer groups, and societies. This approach offers more in-depth understanding of the ways in which nationalism as an ideology, as a political instrument, or as a political religion affects and conditions personal identities. An understanding of this process would help us explain why certain group of citizens become galvanized into political action by a given set of nationalist sentiments.

Analyzing our data through the psychological lens would reveal the tensions and paradoxes within families, schools, military, and society. A distinct pattern of nationalism in each society emerges from our analysis:

The nationalism of Taiwanese college students is characterized by a strong sense of ambivalence. This ambivalence is manifested in both the cultural and political identities of the individual students we interviewed. First, they are uncertain about the role of the traditional values of China vis-a-vis the modern values they learn in schools and in society. But they are equally unwilling to jettison the Confucian heritage in their quest for modernity. Second, there is a profound

ambivalence toward the ultimate benefits or social costs of modernization. Students are uncertain if everything that accompanied rapid economic development is desirable for their society. There is a fear of the possible loss of their traditional cultural identity. Third, in terms of their political identity, Taiwanese students are unsure about committing themselves to either reunification with China or Taiwan independence. The preferred solution becomes the maintenance of the status quo. In short, what we observe is a confused sense of national identity among the Taiwanese students.

For the Korean students, their nationalism is characterized by a pattern of polarity. The Korean students, in the first place, are adamantly critical of their Confucian heritage yet their personal values and behavior are perhaps more deeply Confucianized than their counterparts in Taiwan or Japan. Next, among the Korean students there is an unequivocal desire for unification of Korea based on traditional Korean ethnic and cultural identities while their political belief reflect an equally strong commitment to democracy and market economy. Thirdly, there is a intense level of anti-foreignism among the students blaming the foreign intervention for national division and other social ills. The "enemy" target has shifted from Japan to United States in recent decades. At the same time, these

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majority of Korean students are keenly aware of their need for American presence in South Korea. A fourth polarity is the coupling of strong demand for a virtuous and paternalistic ruling authority of a strong state and the unyielding quest for human rights. Finally, Korean students commitment to egalitarian values coexist with their strong sense of elitism and expectation of preferential treatment by the society.

Intrinsically the ambivalence of Taiwanese students and polarity of Korean students represent a distinct intergenerational break with the prewar generation's nationalism which was anchored in strong anti-colonial sentiments. However, within their respective nationalism we have also discovered elements of continuity. In their cultural identities, the basic socialization process of each individual served to perpetuate most of the traditional values within each person. But the ensuing exposure to outside world and secondary socialization agents (such as electronic and print media, modern education, foreign travel) injects other modern values into the individual's mindset. The legacies of xenophobia, for example, are being transformed into a more cosmopolitan attitude toward Western cultures. The major driving force behind this transformation lies in the increasing socio-economic modernization and the accompanying affluence in the society. Group conformity

and individual freedom are equally valued by these students.

But how can we be sure that such variations we observed in our data do not represent a result of either the aging effect (life cycle effect) or period effect (short term socio-economic fluctuation) or a combination of generational effect (cohort effect) with any of the former effects? Without systematic cross-section and longitudinal data, we are certainly not in a position to conduct statistical verification of our conclusions. However, if the pattern we discovered is a result of the life cycle effect, we should expect the students' views and values gradually become more and more like the values and world views of their parents' generation. For instance, one will change from a liberal to a conservative, or a cosmopolitan personality to a xenophobic personality. Our interviews with respondents born in the sixties and late fifties did not reflect any significant break with the college students. As to period effects, we must point out on specific policy issues the recent socio-economic fluctuation in each society did have a certain degree of influence. However, on core political beliefs, we have the benefit of crosschecking our findings with other researchers' findings in recent years. The overall match confirmed our belief that periodic effects would not have significantly altered our

analysis of the students' sentiments of nationalism. Of course, any long term change in the formative experiences and the socialization contexts of a particular generation during its adolescent and childhood periods will indeed be reflected in their core values.[44]

In terms of political identity, the preference for paternalistic authority coexist with increasing support for liberal democratic values. Mercantilistic search for national wealth and power is still emphasized. But the recognition of increasing interdependence and the need for more internationalization of the national economy is gaining popularity as well. The changing political identities are made possible through the political socialization process after their childhood years.

The behavioral effects of the new nationalism in Korea and Taiwan are reflected in the contemporary political development of these two societies. In Korea, intense polarization in nationalist sentiments resulted in few working compromises and consensus between the students and the ruling authority. Continuous outbreak of naked and open confrontations between political forces

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[44] On the methodological aspect of statistical research of attitudinal and value changes, see Ronald Inglehart, <u>Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society</u> New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990. For a critique of his methodology, see Scott C. Flanagan "Value Change and the Partisan Change in Japan: the Silent Revolution Revisited," **Comparative Politics** 11(3), April 1979: pp. 253-270.

become a trademark of Korean politics. In Taiwan, widespread ambivalence among the students has effectively dampened political activism and diffused frustrations and anger. Except for period eruptions of short-lived nationalist sentiments, we have witnessed mainly political pragmatism and enduring apathy among the majority.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In studying the emerging patterns of nationalism in South Korea and Taiwan, conventional wisdom would have us believe that, in each case, given a long tradition of cultural heritage, continuous history, homogeneous racial makeup, common language, a literate culture, and a clearly demarcated territorial boundary, we should expect to find a clear, stable, coherent, and unambiguous nationalism. The empirical data we gathered in our field research, however, defy such a simplistic expectation. Our study shows that in fact, among the college students respondents, the nationalism in Taiwan reflects a profound sense of ambivalence while the Korean nationalism is characterized by polarity. This sharp contrast in their respective pattern of emerging nationalism refutes the assumed commonality in treating Taiwan and Korea as two similar Confucian states. Furthermore, we have found a distinct intergenerational break in terms of students' national identity. The generational transformation in their respective political cultures as demonstrated in our data represent more than a life cycle effect but a distinct generational effect in support of our experiential model of political generation.

Conventional Theories on Nationalism

According to major theories of nationalism we reviewed earlier in this study, we should expect to identify a pattern of national identity primarily characterized by continuities in historical themes. Take for example a conventional account of Asian nationalism based on pre World War II history, contemporary nationalism in these two societies should be a composite of nineteenth century reform nationalism, twentieth century anti-colonialism, and perhaps a reaction against the psychological dislocation resulting from rapid industrialization. The major models would also give us the following predictions:

1. The intellectual historian's approach would argue for a continuous transmission of nationalist ideas, a replay of historical themes in nationalist movements of previous generations. The legacies of major nationalist thinkers' ideas would be the bedrock of the contemporary generation's nationalism.

2. The functional/social communication approach would argue that the dynamics of increasing social communication as a result of high levels of socio-economic modernization shall lead to the emergence of a coherent and integrated sense of national identity.

3. In view of the persistence of regional, consanguinal, and provincial ties, the structural approach supports the conclusion of a cohesive and reinforced national

identity. Nationalism may effectively incorporate and subsume these old parochial identities.

4. The rational interest theory would predict the successful injection of ruling elite's ideological version of orthodox nationalist ideas through the military service, the national education, and propaganda campaign. And that such a national identity would be the result of a rational, consensual choice based on situational context.

5. The psychological strain theory of the psycho-cultural school would predict a pattern of nationalism stirred up by irrational impulses or psychological strains associated with fast-paced modernization process and provoked by malintegration of society. We should find nationalism in these societies as an outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium.

None of the above approaches can provide a complete and satisfactory account of the contemporary pattern of nationalism in Korea and Taiwan as reflected in our data. Each one provides only a partial account of certain aspects of the nationalist sentiments we identified among the students. Historical themes still recur in students' formulation of their world view. But the weight of history has gradually taken the backseat role. Intense social communication did not lead to a coherent and integrated collective identity as expected. Nationalist

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indoctrination in education curricula did not produce a significant population of "ideologically correct" citizens for the ruling elites in Taiwan and South Korea either.

Instead we found tensions and anxieties among the students in terms of their personal and collective identities. Relying primarily on the national identity approach we delineated earlier, we have found the psychocultural approach more useful in understanding and explaining the inner dynamics and processes in the emergence of this new pattern of nationalism. By identifying sources and nature of tensions within families, educational systems, military service, peer groups, as well as society in general, we are able to make sense of what these contradictory responses, paradoxical attitudes, ambivalent feelings, etc. we identified on the personal identity level mean in terms of national identity.

Ambivalence and Polarity

Moreover, our interview data have presented us a complex snapshot of the contemporary version of national identity, marked by elements of continuities and discontinuities. From their personal responses, we have derived a picture of ambivalence in Taiwan and a picture of polarity in Korea. Taiwanese are uncertain about the role of the traditional Chinese values vis-a-vis the

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modern values they learn in schools and in society. Neither are they willing to discard the Confucian heritage in their quest for modernity. Secondly, there is a profound ambivalence toward the ultimate benefits or social costs of modernization. Students are uncertain if everything that accompanied rapid economic development is desirable for their society and its traditional cultural identity. As far as political identity is concerned, Taiwanese students are unsure about committing themselves to either reunification with China or Taiwan independence. The preferred solution becomes the maintenance of the status quo. Ambivalence made political pragmatism an attractive and viable ideological alternative. What Taiwanese nationalism reflects is thus a confused and ambivalent "state of mind".

For the Korean students, their nationalism is characterized by a pattern of polarity. While their behavioral pattern demonstrates a profound influence of Confucian values, the Korean students are adamantly critical of their Confucian heritage. Next, among the Korean students there is an unequivocal desire for unification of Korea based on traditional Korean ethnic and cultural identities while their political belief reflect an equally intense commitment to democracy and market economy. Thirdly, the recent anti-American sentiments are only manifestations of an intense level of

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anti-foreignism among the students blaming the foreign intervention for national division and other social ills. Korea is portrayed as the victims of international conspiracy. At the same time, these majority of Korean students are keenly aware of their need for American presence in South Korea and the ever-increasing importance of Korea's interdependent linkage with the global market system. A fourth polarity is the coupling of unusually strong demand for a virtuous and paternalistic ruling authority of a strong state and the unyielding quest for human rights and democracy. Finally, Korean students commitment to egalitarian values coexists with their strong sense of elitism and expectations of preferential treatment by the society.

Cultural Identity and Political Identity: Explaining Styles of Politics

The assumed cultural identity in each of these two societies does not necessarily reinforce the political identity among the younger generation. A common historical past does not generate among the national citizens the same kind of politically imagined community. In fact, our interview data show that national history serves as a source of often conflicting interpretations and justifications for contending ideological viewpoints. In Taiwan, for example, the independence activists resort to the distinctive historical development cf Taiwan as

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supporting evidence of an independent political entity since the Ch'ing dynasty. Whereas the unification advocates cited the same period of history as proof of inseparable ties between mainland and Taiwan. The precise content of Taiwanese political identity is therefore ambiguous and uncertain. Pledging national allegiance, a simple matter to a French or an American student, may be an embarrassing emotional dilemma for a Taiwanese student.

How does this ambivalent national identity shape the styles of politics in Taiwan? In reality, most of us deny stoutly our ambivalence, even as we go about revealing it in our behavior. In daily political discourse, Taiwanese students would formulate crude and false opposites, choosing one and banishing the other. Ambivalence refers to a coupling of opposite tendencies such that the opposite which is in the minority is passive, is refused a direct voice. Yet this opposite tendency speaks powerfully, if indirectly, in the subjective realm of politics to sensitized observers. Ambivalent identity does not refer to the mere succession in time of opposite attitudes and identifications. The political actor in this situation is caught between opposing modes of cognitive map and emotional attachments, which paralyzes the evaluative function of the political actor.

Nationalism ties in directly with the legitimacy of

the regime. Viable political legitimacy and authority depend on the citizens' identification with the nation. In the original schemes of Hobbes and Rousseau, it is this common identification with the nation that creates the Sovereign. Nationalism as a source of political inspiration and national cohesion is fundamentally tied to the stability and maintenance of a national community as a viable polity. It is the sentiment of the group attachment that invests the powerless with political power. Comprehension of a collective national identity therefore permits citizens of a country to act in concert, either in defiance or in support of the government. Their recognition of their common bond with the nation gives them a common will. Once citizens become conscious of their collective identity, they will find themselves directed by their common principles to a common end. In Korea, polarized sentiments of nationalism tend to lead to intense nationalistic commitments. Even though Korean political identity is characterized by polarity, the dichotomy is set between a small section of intensely dogmatic radical unificationists and a majority of moderate nationalists who agree on the inevitability of a unified Korea. In Taiwan, no sizable portion of the public, students in particular, are committed to either immediate unification or independence. Culturally imbedded notion of a unified great China as an historic

ideal has significantly conditioned the growth of a nascent sense of separate and independent Taiwanese identity. Since 1987, increased cultural contact and economic exchanges between Taiwan and China further slowed down this process. Ambivalence dampened any possible intense convergence of nationalistic elements in the society. Angers, tensions, and political frustrations get easily diffused in a society with an ambivalent sense of collective identity. We therefore observe in Taiwan only periodic outbursts of nationalist-like movements which tend to die out within a short time span. No galvanizing focal point is at work to excite the youth into any lasting nationalist commitment. Psychologically, the younger generation either remain politically apathetic or resort to political pragmatism in order to resolve the inner tensions. A Sinic cultural identity, however, provides the primary source of national cohesion. A change in Taiwanese students' perception of their ethnic identities is beginning to take shape - the subjective perception of mainlander-Taiwanese division is gradually evaporating among the younger age cohorts. A single homogeneous post-war Taiwanese national community is gradually coming into shape, raising the social - political horizons of the contemporary generation beyond those of their parents and grandparents who lived through loss of mainland and the tragic February 28 incident.

This new found sense of national community may be based more on a new dimension of political identification with a popularly mandated representative regime than a historically inherited Chinese cultural identity.

Cultural identity in Korea and Taiwan, though assumed to be accepted by the majority of citizens in these societies, are not without its tensions either. Formulation of the "Ti vs. Yung" dilemma still emerges in various disguises in national policy debates. Contemporary generation of students have become distinctly more cosmopolitan than their parents. What is gradually emerging, in our judgement, is a new mixture of the Western and the traditional values which defies any easy dichotomous scheme of modernity versus tradition. This new mixture among the younger generation is still very much a Confucianized cultural complex. This emerging pattern of cultural identity is partly a result of rapid industrialization, increasing contacts with foreign cultures through travel, popular access to electronic media, and the presence of multinational corporations. Industrialization and social mobilization are beginning to undermine the traditional primacy of family in the socialization process. Families remain a major source of basic socialization, as our respondents testify, for the basic cultural identities which youth acquire during the formative periods of their lives. But the increasing

importance of peer groups, street experience, electronic media, and schools have sharply reduced the once predominant influence of family. Child rearing practices, though undergoing minor changes among the younger generation, have essentially maintained its traditional outlook. In both countries, our respondents in general have few criticism of the very basic value structures underlying the manners in which they were brought up. Even fewer would question the very integrity of their cultural heritage. Filial piety, according to our respondents, is still considered the central concept of human relations. Human relationships continue to be conceived more often in terms of hierarchical superior and subordinates, and less in terms of contractual relationship between individuals of equal rights and duties. Moral obligations take precedence over contractual relations. Minor changes and peripheral adaptations in educational and socialization approaches are commonly suggested by the respondents.[1] Youth in these two societies, however, experience more direct exposures to and contacts with Western philosophies,

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[1] The subjects of Richard Wilson's 1970 study of Taiwanese primary school students political socialization process is approximately the same age cohort in our respondents. Wilson's findings serve as an interesting comparison with our interview results. See Richard W. Wilson <u>Learning to Be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan</u> Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970.

literature, popular arts, and foreigners. In schools, American and European trained young faculties introduce ideas and concepts that often raise challenging questions about their own societies.

Emerging Pattern of Nationalism and Its Impact

In addition to the behavioral effects of Taiwan's and Korea's emerging patterns of nationalism, the impact of these nationalist sentiments e.tends beyond the realm of personal political behavior and domestic politics.

National unification issue of these two societies carries far-reaching implications for Asian-Pacific regional security and balance of power. Korean students' romantic view about national unification and their aggressive approach may become significant factors in the future negotiation between the two Koreas. We may expect to see a more extreme sense of nationalism at work among the next generation of Korean political elites whose world view and nationalist belief may significantly alter the foreign policy conducts of Korea. Korean politics of the next generation, furthermore, may witness a more aggressive and competitive nationalist approach. There will be stronger reactions to fluctuations in the political process. There will be no passivity in response to any suggestion of foreign domination. An even stronger sense of national pride is to be expected. Consensus building and political compromise will continue to be

crowded out by open confrontations of opposing political forces.

In Taiwan, the coming generation of political elites will be much less ideological, less radical, and display more pragmatism than the current Nationalist administration. There may still be difficulty in identifying among the next Taiwanese generation a clear basis for their foreign policy as long as the ambivalence issue remains unresolved. The concept of a "cultural China" may continue to receive popular support. The disjunction of economics and politics will become more pronounced in Taiwan's pragmatist approach to foreign policy. Short of unification with China, the concept of a "Greater China Co-prosperity Sphere" including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and South East China may become more attractive to next generation's elites.

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