THE IRRESISTABLE FORCE VS. THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT:

CIVILIAN ATTEMPTS TO FORCE INNOVATION ON A RELUCTANT MILITARY

by

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
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ABSTRACT

Civilians periodically call on the military to alter its traditional structure, missions, and operational practices. This often requires the military to either restructure itself, take on new missions, or perform existing duties in a different way. In other words, it must innovate. Should such innovation pose substantial organizational problems for the military, its members might not innovate on their own. Although the military accepts the tenet of civilian control, it resents civilians intervening to force innovation upon it and will frequently oppose such efforts. This sets the stage for a civil-military struggle in which civilians seek to force an unpopular innovation on a reluctant military.

Why does the military resist many civilian-sponsored innovations? Under what circumstances will civilian efforts to force innovation succeed? Why do civilians choose to intervene in military affairs to force innovation in the first place? What tactics do civilians and the military employ in their struggle with each other? This dissertation answers these questions. It presents a framework that, when applied to an instance of forced innovation, can explain both why civilians and members of the military acted as they did and why the eventual outcome occurred. Built around six variables, this framework can address the full range of forced innovation cases. One set of variables examines the proclivity of the military to resist a particular innovation on the basis of inherent challenges to the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. The greater the extent of the threat posed by a forced innovation along these dimensions, the more the military will resist that innovation. Another set of variables examines the levels of military and civilian unity surrounding the innovation in question and highlights who will have the upper hand in a forced innovation struggle. The more united civilians are and disunited the services are, the easier it will be for civilians to force innovation on the military. The framework also explores the many possible motivations that can drive civilians to force innovation. Finally, the framework contains a typology of tactics that civilians and the military use in order to promote and resist innovation, respectively.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Harvey M. Sapolsky

Title: Professor of Political Science
This is dedicated to the memory of my father, Milton G. Savos.

His unquestioning devotion to all I have ever done is a source of strength and confidence for me. His perseverance and sense of humor in the face of unimaginable adversity remains an inspiration to all who knew him.
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Chapter 1

Forced Innovation: An Introduction
INTRODUCTION

Civilians periodically call on the military to alter its traditional structure, missions, and operational practices. This often requires the military to either restructure itself, take on new missions, or perform existing duties in a different way. In other words, it must innovate. Should such innovation pose substantial organizational problems for the military, its members might not innovate on their own. Although the military accepts the tenet of civilian control, it resents civilians intervening to force innovation upon it and will frequently oppose such efforts. This sets the stage for a civil-military struggle in which civilians seek to force an unpopular innovation upon a reluctant military.

Why does the military resist many civilian-sponsored innovations? Under what circumstances will civilian efforts to force innovation succeed? Why do civilians choose to intervene in military affairs to force innovation in the first place? What tactics do civilians and the military employ in their struggle with each other? In my dissertation I seek to answer these questions. I do so by offering a framework that, when applied to an instance of forced innovation, can explain both why civilians and members of the military acted as they did and why the eventual outcome occurred. Built around six variables, my framework can address the full range of forced innovation cases. One set of variables examines the proclivity of the military to resist a particular innovation on the basis of inherent challenges to the military’s professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. Another set of variables examines the levels of military and civilian unity surrounding the innovation in question and highlights who will have the upper hand in a forced innovation struggle. My framework also explores the many possible motivations that can drive civilians to force innovation. Finally, my framework contains a typology of tactics that civilians and the military use in order to promote and resist innovation, respectively.

FORCED INNOVATION: A GROWING TREND

The topic of forced innovation is quite relevant today. With the end of the Cold War, the principal security threat to the United States has faded. As a result, the organization, size and traditional missions of the US military are much less sacrosanct than in the past. Civilians are now more willing to alter the military, primarily by shrinking and
restructuring it. Changes in dimensions other than scale have also been suggested. There have been calls to use the US military for missions not traditionally assigned to armed forces. Senator Sam Nunn's (D-GA) 1990 call for an "Environmental Initiative," which sought to use the military to address environmental damage, is but one of many examples.1 Some civilians now view the US military as a tool available to the government for solving problems in non-military areas. As foreign threats diminish, other factors, such as social, environmental, or economic needs have begun to play a greater role in driving defense policy. Civilians stand ready to impose an unprecedented number of innovations upon a military that would rather be left to its own to pursue its traditional duty of safeguarding the nation’s security.

In reaction to this trend, Lt. Col. Charles Dunlop, Jr., USAF, wrote an article in the Winter, 1992-93 issue of Parameters, the Army War College journal, in which he explains the roots of a fictional American military coup that he sets in the year 2012.2 Dunlop suggests that this coup results in part from efforts to involve the military in new missions in the post-Cold War world. His fictional persona laments that "faced with intractable national problems on one hand, and an energetic and capable military on the other, it can be all too seductive to start viewing the military as a cost-effective solution. This persona goes on to discuss how the trend of involving the military in crime fighting, health care, education, environmental cleanup, and infrastructure repair led to a growing political role for the military in both domestic and foreign policy. This, in turn, sowed the seeds for the military's failure in battle abroad and seizure of power at home. Although Dunlop's article is fictitious, it expresses real concerns about the expanding civilian efforts to use the military for innovative purposes.3

There are plenty of people in the US government and the general public who are enthusiastically pushing for precisely the innovations that Dunlop warns against.4

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recent role played by the military in the Hurricane Andrew relief effort has served to wet the appetites of those who see the military as a bundle of resources that should be applied to the many non-military problems facing the United States.\(^5\) In a telling sign, 92% of Floridians surveyed by the *New York Times* said that the military responded adequately to the hurricane, as opposed to 80% for the Red Cross, 49% for the federal government, and only 39% for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.\(^6\) People around the country also took note of the effective military response to Andrew. Rep. Fortney Stark (D-CA) noted, "If a huge earthquake strikes California, we need someone like Stormin' Norman on the job, not a bureaucratic response. We need a strike force."\(^7\) Dunlop's article seeks to remind such people that the use of the military for such non-military missions could, in the long run, carry a high cost.

One can expect the popularity of civilian-sponsored organizational, doctrinal, and mission innovation to continue. Calls for such changes by the media, members of Congress, and groups and individuals that follow defense matters are being voiced at a growing rate.\(^8\) For example, the 1993 Senate Armed Services Committee report on its defense bill stated that "the post-Cold War environment means that the armed forces will have a much greater opportunity than in the past to assist civilian efforts to address critical domestic problems."\(^9\) In addition, Sen. Nunn claimed in June of 1992 that the US military has "a proper and important role" in addressing a wide variety of domestic ills, including "drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment, and racism."\(^10\) Adding to the impact of such declarations is the growing tendency of some politicians to see military services as yet another pork-barrel benefit that they can distribute to their constituents.\(^11\)

One can expect that the military will continue to resist changes forced upon it that it views as inappropriate or undesirable. For example, the incoming Clinton Administration has many ideas about reshaping the military, from reassigning roles and missions to allowing homosexuals in the ranks. The present military leadership has already spoken out

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8 See, for example, "JCS Roles and Missions Review to Spur Far-Reaching Changes," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* Oct. 19, 1992: 23-24; "Time to Reassess Role and Missions," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* March 30, 1992: 7; and "Revamp It, Don't Just Shrink It," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* July 20, 1992: 9. (This last cite contains excerpts from Sen. Nunn's speech on the Senate floor in which he argued that the US must "reshape, reconfigure and modernize" its armed forces.)


against many of these changes, and the stage is set for a new series of struggles over forced innovation.\textsuperscript{12}

Civilian attempts to force these changes will most likely be accompanied by an ignorance of exactly how proposed innovations will affect the organizational interests of the military. This dissertation is intended, in part, to enlighten policymakers to the problems that they can expect when forcing the military to innovate. Hopefully, such knowledge can facilitate a careful structuring of innovations that can minimize civil-military conflict while still achieving the ends desired by civilians.

\textit{Innovation Defined}

A clear, concise definition of innovation is an elusive goal. Organizational theory literature abounds with various definitions. Lawrence Mohr defines innovation as "the successful introduction into an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation."\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, Everett Rogers notes,

An \textit{innovation} is an idea perceived as new by the individual. It really matters little, as far as human behavior is concerned, whether or not an idea is 'objectively' new as measured by the amount of time elapsed since its first use or discovery. It is the newness of the idea to the individual that determines his reaction to it.\textsuperscript{14}

Both of these definitions stress that an innovation need not be something that is novel to humanity. Instead, it need only be new to the organization adopting the technology, doctrine, task, or bureaucratic structure in question. March and Simon highlight this quality of innovation by noting that "most innovations in an organization are a result of borrowing rather than invention."\textsuperscript{15} Given this, I initially define an innovation as an end or mean that an individual or organization views as novel to its own situation and experience.

Critical to any definition of innovation is the question of scale. The extent of change wrought by a new end or mean is relevant to its being worthy of the innovation label.


\textsuperscript{14} Everett Rogers, \textit{Diffusion of Innovations} (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 13. Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis included in quotes throughout this dissertation were included in the original.

\textsuperscript{15} James March and Herbert Simon, \textit{Organizations} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 188. P.A. Geroski suggests that organizations in fact benefit more from implementing someone else's innovation than they do from the inventive act of coming up with the innovation themselves. (P. A. Geroski, "Innovation and the Sectoral Sources of UK Productivity Growth," \textit{The Economic Journal} Nov., 1991: 1438-51.)
Some authors place a great deal of weight on the issue of scale in defining innovation. James Q. Wilson includes it in his definition of innovation:

An innovation (or, more precisely, a major innovation, since we are not concerned with trivial changes) is a 'fundamental' change in a 'significant' number of tasks. What is 'fundamental' and 'significant' cannot be given a precise, a priori definition, for in our scheme the meaning of these terms can only be determined by the organizations themselves. Each organization... can rank proposed (or actual) changes in terms of how 'radical' they will be (or are).\textsuperscript{16}

Wilson also offers a quick way of measuring how radical an innovation is:

The greater the cost in scarce inducements, the more radical the innovation, regardless of the prospective benefits.... Money costs are often very important, of course, but other costs may be of equal or greater importance: soothing ruffled fur, reducing uncertainty-induced anxiety, bolstering members' self-conceptions, appealing to their sense of duty, eliminating interpersonal tensions and hostilities, changing the norms of informal work groups, familiarizing workers with new technologies, finding ways to compensate demoted members for their loss of prestige and power, reformulating statements of organizational purpose. The more of these expenditures of money and effort that are required by the innovation, the more radical it is.\textsuperscript{17}

Such a measurement is precisely what the first four variables of my framework are intended to provide. They examine the extent to which a given innovation challenges the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. Some authors, such as Wilson in the above passage, contend that only major innovations are of any concern. Stephen Rosen, in his book \textit{Winning the Next War}, which will be discussed at length below, takes this approach. Rosen, addressing the military in particular, is only concerned with "major innovations," which he defines as

a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm... [that] involves a change in the concepts of operation of that combat arm, that is, the ideas governing the ways it uses its forces to win a campaign, as opposed to a tactical innovation, which is a change in the way individual weapons are applied to the target and environment in battle... [It] also involves a change in the relation of that combat arm to other combat arms and a downgrading or abandoning of older concepts of operations and possibly of a formerly dominant weapon.\textsuperscript{18}

I approach the issue of scale much differently than Rosen does. He is concerned with the types of sweeping changes that alter how a military pursues victory on the battlefield. Although such "major innovations" are certainly of importance to me, I am also concerned

\textsuperscript{17} Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," p. 197.
with changes within the military that have little or nothing to do with how it fights during war. My broader focus encompasses how the military is structured, both organizationally and socially. For example, the proposal to alter the military's social structure by allowing homosexuals in the ranks does not directly affect how the military will fight the next war, but clearly is a new idea whose implementation would have numerous substantial organizational implications.

Unlike Rosen, I do not have a threshold below which a new program's effects make it uninteresting. As long as an innovation has organizational effects that the organization adopting the innovation finds to be significant, it is worthy of my framework's attention. Such effects include changes in organizational structure, mission, mindset, and equipment. In terms of the relative level of change incorporated in an innovation, I find Wilson's measurement criteria to be useful. My framework's four variables for explaining the military's resistance to innovation reflect the potential costs of innovation that Wilson speaks of. As a result, these variables can be used to measure just how radical any given innovation is.

Having addressed the issue of scale, I can amend my definition of innovation while also making it specific to the military, which is the organization of concern here: An innovation is an end or mean that the military or a subgroup within the military views as novel to its own situation and experience. It creates significant organizational side effects for the group adopting it. From this definition of innovation, this next definition follows: A forced innovation is an innovation that is forced upon a reluctant military by civilians. Such forced innovations may have some supporters within the military, but this support is not strong enough for the military to adopt the innovation on its own. It must be forced to do so by civilians who have to overcome active resistance by the military.

One important aspect of an innovation, forced or unforced, is the need to determine whether an organization has, in fact, adopted the innovation in question. Until such adoption occurs, one cannot say that innovation has actually happened. Mohr argues that for an innovation to be adopted, the "human element" in the relevant situation must accept it.19 Samuel Huntington adds that an innovation is accepted in part when "autonomous organizational units devoted exclusively or primarily to it" are created.20 These answers provide a useful criteria for measuring whether or not an innovation has been adopted: The relevant people within the organization must accept the innovation and the organization must undergo the necessary structural changes to properly incorporate the innovation. For

19 Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," p. 52.
the purposes of this dissertation, in order to determine if the military has accepted an innovation being forced upon it, these two measurements must be joined by a third: The civilians pushing for an innovation must be satisfied that the military has ended its resistance and implemented that innovation to an extent they find acceptable.

TYPES OF INNOVATION

Just as there are many ways to define innovation, many different types of innovation are posited to exist, particularly with regards to the military. The literature speaks of tactical, wartime, peacetime, technological, and strategic innovations, just to name a few. I consolidate these many variations into six types: organizational, mission, doctrinal, operational, technological, and social innovations. Are these distinctions important? From a descriptive point of view, they are.\textsuperscript{21} From a theoretical point, however, these distinctions are not always useful. There are several reasons for this. First, all that I am concerned with and all that my framework is intended to capture are the organizational implications of an innovation. Thus, in some sense, every innovation is somewhat organizational in nature. If it has no organizational impact, then by my definition it is not an innovation. This explains why I do not treat technological innovations separately, as some authors do.\textsuperscript{22} A new weapon that does nothing more than advance the technical prowess of the military is not an innovation.\textsuperscript{23} A radical technological advance is only of concern to the topic of innovation -- as presented here -- if it requires corresponding changes in doctrine, operations, organizational structures, etc. Just the fact that a particular innovation incorporates a high degree of technological advancement is rarely, if ever,
enough of a reason for the military to resist it. There must be unwanted organizational effects associated with the innovation. These effects, and not technological change in itself, lead to military resistance.\textsuperscript{24}

The above innovation typology also has little theoretical value because every innovation has aspects of more than one type. By my definition, all innovations will have an organizational component and many will exhibit characteristics of several of the above types. From this fact I derive the term \textit{compound innovation}, which is more useful theoretically than the labels contained in the above typology.

The concept of a compound innovation reflects the fact that in order for the military or any other organization to change in one direction, it must change in several. Although the modern organization features a division of labor, few organizations are so compartmentalized that they can incorporate a significant change in what they do or how they do it without having to make adjustments across the organization in order to maintain consistency and best manage the implementation of change. Thus, every type of innovation is a compound innovation. The British experience with the tank nicely illustrates the nature of a compound innovation. Important technological advances occurred as early as 1914 that made the tank a reality. However, successful use of this new weapon could not begin until the British adopted the operational innovation of using tanks on a large scale without the traditional preparatory artillery barrage. This, in turn, could not occur until organizational changes were made, namely the creation of a position devoted to tank warfare on the Imperial General Staff.\textsuperscript{25} In other words, one cannot accurately label the tank as any specific type of innovation, due to its hybrid nature.

Inherent in the concept of compound innovation is the time lag that typically occurs between the different facets of the innovation as a whole. It takes time for new technologies and techniques to be properly digested by large organizations. In the case of the tank, the adoption of an operational innovation did not happen overnight. Similarly, cruise missiles "evolved without a well-defined conception of why they [were] needed, and without an assessment of their full implications."\textsuperscript{26} The main cause of time lag, however, is the fact that in order to adopt new ideas, old ones must be replaced. These old ideas will be tied up in the traditions, practices, and identities of the organizations that hold them, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{24} For example, in the case of the development of the TFX aircraft, the military wanted more technological advances incorporated into the aircraft's design than Secretary of Defense McNamara did, yet it was against the program as a whole because of the doctrinal and organizational innovations it entailed. (The TFX case will be described in greater detail below.)


\end{footnotesize}
abandoning them is never easy. The classic example of the resiliency of existing practices is the horse cavalry charge, which was retained by militaries around the world long after its effectiveness had been negated by changes in military technology.27

Another important aspect of compound innovation is that there is no set order in which the various types of innovation occur within a compound innovation.28 As Richard Betts notes, "There is no automatic relation between technological and doctrinal innovation.... it is often unclear whether technological push or doctrinal pull dominates."29 An excellent example of this is the Navy's fleet ballistic missile program. The Navy's Special Projects Office, an organizational innovation that claimed to use "innovative management techniques," was created to develop the technologically novel fleet ballistic missile.30 This, in turn, was preceded by the doctrinal innovation of possessing a secure second-strike force for the purposes of deterrence, which also spawned the mission innovation of the submarine's strategic nuclear role.

The phenomenon of compound innovation causes me to refrain from including in my framework a typology that divides different sorts of innovations into separate classes. As a result, my framework is free to operate without having to make a judgement call as to whether or not a given innovation is an operational, organizational, or technological type of innovation. This allows analysis generated by the framework to avoid being challenged on the grounds that someone does not agree with how a particular innovation is classified. Due to the effects of compound innovation, it is difficult to definitively label most innovations as being of only one particular type. For example, is the cruise missile a technological innovation, or are its novel operational aspects more important? By not relying on such a distinction and instead looking at factors that can be determined independent of innovation type, the framework does not incorporate a source of subjectivity that is best avoided.31

28 Here I refer to which type of innovation, from the above typology, precedes other types within a single compound innovation. This should not be confused with the stages of innovation. The literature on innovation is full of references to these different stages. Wilson, for example, proposes that the stages run from conception to proposal to adoption/implementation. (Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," p. 198.) Herbert Shepard suggests similar stages: idea generation, adoption, and implementation. (Herbert Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," in Organizational and Managerial Innovation: a Reader, ed. Lloyd Rowe and William Boise. (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing, 1973), p. 143.) For my purposes, the different stages in the life cycle of an innovation are not of concern.
31 A given innovation's type will only be referred to in the concluding chapter, where I will draw a few limited generalizations regarding the interaction between certain types of innovations and the variables that make up my framework.
THE NATURE OF MY APPROACH

My approach to the topic of forced innovation centers on a framework that is intended to help guide an examination of any case of forced innovation.32 This framework accounts for all of the most important characteristics of forced innovation. It also shows how these characteristics operate. The framework therefore strives to provide what Max Weber calls an "explanatory understanding" of forced innovation. Such an understanding arises when a "particular act has been placed in an understandable sequence of motivation, the understanding of which can be treated as an explanation of the actual course of behavior."33 In this case, it is the behavior of the various actors within the military and the civilian community that the framework explains.34

Some might question the validity of an attempt to create a single formula for addressing different cases of forced innovation. James Wilson, for example, argues that the creation of a "pure" theory of innovation is impossible. He contends that each innovation is unique because the changes it entails will differ from those embodied in all other innovations.35 Twenty-three years later, he adds:

Not only do innovations differ so greatly in character that trying to find one theory to explain them all is like trying to find one medical theory to explain all diseases, but innovations are so heavily dependent on executive interests and beliefs as to make the chance appearance of a change-oriented personality

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32 I must stress that I am not seeking to explain the broader topic of innovation in the military. In other words, I am not trying to show why the military innovates at some times and not others. Instead, I am offering a framework that helps to expose and explain all of the pertinent factors surrounding instances when civilians decide to force change upon the military. However, my framework certainly does offer a good deal of information about military innovation in general. For example, my framework could be used to show how the relatively few conflicts that a given innovation might pose to military operational routines, autonomy, etc., will allow the military to adopt it without civilian prodiging.


34 This framework is a model of forced innovation. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a model as "a schematic description of a system, theory, or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be used for further study of its characteristics." (The American Heritage Dictionary, Third Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), p. 1160.) I use the term "framework" rather than "model" because it conveys the sense that the framework is meant to support analysis of forced innovation. It provides a structure upon which such analysis is hung. In building my framework, I am modelling forced innovation. I am doing so by drawing on organizational and civil-military theory and on historical cases exactly what the critical characteristics of forced innovation are. Organizational and civil-military theories laid down by others create the paradigm within which I work. This paradigm supplies tools in the form of the hypotheses that underlie the variables that form the foundation my framework. (See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 76.) John Steinbruner suggests that many different models can arise from the same paradigm. (John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 11.) My framework is one such model.

enormously important in explaining change. It is not easy to build a useful social science theory out of 'chance appearances.'\textsuperscript{36}

Mohr sees a greater value in generalizing with respect to innovation. He contends:

Innovation is difficult because it involves doing something new. The introduction of innovative practices into a social setting implies actions that entail a certain amount of uncertainty, risk, or hazard. This, then, suggests one significant factor that may help to explain innovation, i.e., \textit{there are certain obstacles or deterrents to innovation that may be more or less operative in any given case.}\textsuperscript{37}

Just as these obstacles tend to remain constant across innovations, they are consistently present in any case of forced innovation. My approach to this variety of innovation is based on this assumption.

The framework of forced innovation that I present here is based on six main hypotheses. Each relates to the reoccurring characteristics of forced innovation. These hypotheses are as follows:\textsuperscript{38}

1) The more an innovation conflicts with the military's \textit{professional identity}, the greater the military's resistance to it will be.

2) The more an innovation conflicts with the military's \textit{operational routines}, the greater the military's resistance to it will be.

3) The more an innovation threatens the military's \textit{autonomy}, the greater the military's resistance to it will be.

4) The more an innovation threatens the military's \textit{budget}, the greater the military's resistance to it will be.

5) The more disunited the military is with regards to a particular innovation, either across or within the services, the easier it will be for civilians to force that innovation upon the military.

6) The more unified civilians are in their support for a particular innovation, the easier it will be for them to force that innovation on the military.

These hypotheses are expressed in the framework as variables. The first four hypotheses are reflected in independent variables that explain the level of military resistance to a given innovation. The second two are included in intervening variables that offer insight into who has the upper hand in an instance of forced innovation, civilians or the military. Figure 1 presents an arrow diagram that relates these variables to each other. It


\textsuperscript{37} Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," p. 53. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{38} All terms mentioned here will be described in depth later in this chapter.
shows how the two intervening variables modify the effects of the four independent variables to produce an outcome. It also illustrates that the resolution of a struggle over forced innovation -- the dependent variable -- can take one of several forms. The military can successfully resist adopting the innovation, civilians can succeed in forcing it upon the military, or a compromise can be reached where the military adopts a watered-down version of the innovation that civilians are pushing.

Figure 1

![Diagram showing the relationship between professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, budget, military unity, civilian unity, innovation resisted, and innovation adopted.]

Another important part of my framework is a description of the various reasons why civilians might choose to intervene in military affairs in order to promote innovation. I hypothesize that in any instance of forced innovation, the civilian decision to intervene can be traced to recognizable and reoccurring situations that arise within the areas of domestic politics, international relations, and recent military performance.

The potentially critical effect that crisis experienced by the military can have on the services' willingness and ability to resist innovation is another aspect of the framework. Crisis only occasionally plays a part in forced innovation, but its impact can be quite substantial. Its appearance is both unpredictable and independent of the innovation being forced. However, when a relevant crisis does occur, I hypothesize that its effects tend to follow certain patterns. This chapter describes these effects and their role in forced innovation.

Finally, this framework contains a typology of the various tactics for bureaucratic warfare that civilians and the military use in the struggle over forced innovation. These
tactics do not cause outcomes but instead are the means by which the intervening variables of military and civilian unity influence the resolution of attempts to force innovation.

As mentioned above, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to provide a framework that will guide any examination of forced innovation. Thus, I am creating an analytical tool. I am also testing it by holding it up to several empirical examples of forced innovation and judging its effectiveness in explaining these cases. In addition, I am using this dissertation to explain two cases that have not been adequately dealt with by the literature: drug interdiction and Special Operations Forces. Lastly, in testing my own framework, I am, in effect, testing the very hypotheses that I borrowed from the organizational and civil-military relations literature to build it. If part of the framework proves to be in error, it might be due to flaws in the underlying hypotheses.

This dissertation's structure is fairly straightforward. In the beginning of this chapter, I provide the necessary theoretical background of my topic, focusing on the relevant literature and the tensions within it that I hope to address. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to laying out the forced innovation framework in some detail, exposing for the reader both the theoretical assumptions and real-world examples that I used to construct the elements of this framework. The next two chapters contain my main case studies. The final chapter offers conclusions and generalizations regarding forced innovation.

Throughout this chapter, I frequently refer to a series of ten cases of forced innovation that I have used to both build my framework and to illustrate its many points to the reader, so that he or she is not left with page after page of theory void of examples. In order to place what I refer to as my secondary case studies in context, a very brief description of each is provided here. These cases are not meant to be an exhaustive list of the universe of cases. Instead, they represent an interesting mix of cases having different types of innovations, different dominant actors, and various time frames. Several of these cases are ongoing, with their outcomes open to speculation. These secondary cases are as follows:

1) **The Desegregation of Military Units**  In 1948, President Truman ordered the military to create equal opportunity within the ranks, regardless of race. He intended this order to end the practice of segregating blacks and whites in separate military units, but this did not occur until the Korean War made such practices imprudent.
2) **Counterinsurgency**  In response to growing Soviet Third World adventurism, President Kennedy in the early 1960s ordered the military to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine that would allow it to help US allies resist communist-backed guerrillas. This doctrine required the military to move away from large engagements and focus on small units, civic action, and less of a reliance on firepower. The military avoided making these changes and instead used less innovative methods when fighting the Vietnam War.

3) **The TFX Aircraft Development Program**  The tactical fighter, experimental, known now as the F-111, was the first modern combat aircraft designed for use by two services, the Air Force and Navy. McNamara forced this new dual development program on the military in 1961. He then took civilian oversight of military procurement to new heights by overruling the military's unanimous choice of Boeing as the contractor, deciding instead in favor of the General Dynamics-Grumman team.

4) **The A-7 Attack Aircraft**  This aircraft was designed by the Navy as a dedicated land attack aircraft. McNamara forced the Air Force, who did not field single-purpose, close-air support aircraft, to purchase the A-7 in 1965 for the close air support mission.

5) **The M16 Rifle**  This weapon, known during its development as the AR-15, was the first fully-automatic rifle intended for standard use in the Army. McNamara was able to force the Army to make a limited purchase of the weapons in 1963. In 1967, the Army decided on its own to drop its previously-favored rifle, the M14, and accept the M16 as the new standard rifle.

6) **Permissive Action Links**  PALs, as they are known, are fitted on nuclear weapons in order to make their operation impossible without first entering codes that are given to the military by civilian leadership in times of crisis. PALs place an additional layer of civilian control over nuclear weapons. Civilian intervention forced the military to fit PALs on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the early 1960s.

7) **The Cruise Missile**  This weapon comes in several different varieties, all of which are, in effect, small, pilotless aircraft carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads. Their ability to deliver ordnance precisely over relatively long distances provided the services with an innovative way of attacking a target. Civilian intervention and support during the 1970s was critical to the eventual adoption of the cruise missile in its various forms by the military.
8) Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization. This legislation, passed in 1986, arose from a bipartisan congressional effort to address the need for defense reorganization. It contained many elements that changed the structure of the Department of Defense by increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified command chiefs. It also increased the importance of joint service requirements.

9) Women in Combat. This case covers the recent efforts to allow women to choose combat assignments in any of the services. Most legal restrictions against women in combat were removed in 1992. In April of 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin announced an end to service policies excluding women from flying combat missions and said that he was asking Congress to repeal an existing law that restricts women from being assigned to certain classes of ship.39 Ground combat exclusions remain for now, but these too may be dropped in the future.

10) Homosexuals in the Military. This case covers the present efforts to force the services to drop their ban on allowing homosexuals in the military. This issue has received a great deal of attention recently due to candidate Clinton's campaign pledge to rescind this ban, and his efforts as President to fulfill his promise. The issue is presently under study by Congress.

In researching these secondary cases, I relied entirely on secondary sources. For the historical cases, I relied on books and articles written on each. For the two ongoing cases, women in combat and homosexuals in the military, I used numerous press reports and recent articles in defense periodicals. On the whole, the literature on these secondary cases was more than adequate for my purposes. Comprehensive and informative books and long articles have been written on all of the historical cases. I found these sources particularly valuable because their authors performed the exhaustive types of literature searches, combined with personal interviews, necessary to explore their topics in some depth. Since I frequently used more than one of these longer sources per case, I am confident that any biases a single author might have had were unable to distort my view of a case to the point where I was drawing the wrong conclusions. Although these sources were in no way geared to examine their cases as innovations, let alone as forced innovations, they all provided the information required by my framework to construct a fairly complete picture

39 These events unfolded as I was wrapping up this dissertation. For details on Aspin's announcement, see Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon to Allow Combat Flights by Women; Seeks to Drop Warship Ban," New York Times April 28, 1993: A1.

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of each case. For the two contemporary cases, the flood of recent articles on them provided me with all of the information I needed. I did not have the luxury of having the whole story laid out in one or two places. Instead, I pieced together the details of each case from numerous sources.

The next two chapters apply my framework to recent cases of forced innovation in order to test its explanatory power. Chapter 2 explores the efforts by civilians in the 1980s to involve the US military in the war on drugs. This effort culminated in 1988 with the assignment of monitoring and detection duties to the Department of Defense. Chapter 3 looks at civilian efforts throughout the 1980s to build up the US military's unconventional warfare capabilities. This campaign reached its peak in 1986 with legislation that created the US Special Operations Forces Command.

I chose these two cases for several reasons. They represent major instances of forced innovation during the last ten years. The fact that they occur relatively simultaneously will help to demonstrate how the same events can affect various innovations in entirely different ways. These two instances of forced innovation also involve the entire military, allowing for an examination of interservice relations that are a cornerstone of my framework. Each case also exhibits a complex mix of civilian opinions regarding the innovation in question, allowing for ample demonstration of the effects of civilian unity on the eventual outcome of each case. Both cases offer a rich variety of military tactics used to thwart civilian intervention. The drug interdiction case offers an instance where the military eventually dropped all resistance to the innovation in question. This makes the case an interesting test of my framework, which must be able to explain this change of heart. The Special Operations Forces case, on the other hand, provides an example of the military continuing resistance after civilians believed they had given unambiguous orders. Finally, these two cases, the drug interdiction case in particular, have never before been dealt with in the manner or to the extent that I address them. Thus, in examining these cases I am filling both descriptive and theoretical holes in the literature.

To construct these two case studies, I relied heavily on secondary sources. These sources included press accounts in daily newspapers and in numerous defense periodicals such as Armed Forces Journal International, the US Army's Military Review, and the US Naval Institute's Proceedings. These sources were augmented by recent books and articles in academic journals that dealt with drug interdiction or special operations. I also utilized a smaller range of primary sources such as transcripts of congressional testimony and General Accounting Office reports. In order to check the veracity of the secondary sources and to help resolve ambiguities in the record, I conducted a series of interviews in the summer and fall of 1992. I met with active and retired military officers and former and
present staff members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Department of Defense. These interviews also allowed me an occasional behind-the-scenes view of events that provided information that the secondary sources lacked.

A quick glance at my ten secondary and two primary case studies shows that they are all examples of forced innovation in the United States. This consistency is intentional and arises from the fact that my framework is intended primarily to address innovation when forced on the US military. I have focused my work in this way for several reasons. First, the civil-military and executive-legislative relationships that are so important to my framework take on a particular flavor in the United States. Totalitarian governments or military dictatorships obviously exhibit civil-military relations that differ significantly from those found in modern western democracies. Even within these democracies, differences exist that would impinge on the applicability of my framework. For example, the framework's civilian unity variable would function much differently in a parliamentary system such as Great Britain, where there is no separation of the executive and legislative branches. Second, the professional identities and self-images of the various services in the US military are an integral part of my framework. These identities are, in part, a product of the services' organizational histories. Foreign militaries arise from different cultures, have different histories, different identities, and even different service divisions than does the US military. Lastly, this dissertation's American focus is the product of my own background, as the majority of my experience is with the US national security apparatus.

My focus on the US military does not mean that my framework or this dissertation has nothing to say about forced innovation in other countries. On the contrary, many of the more general ideas I address are applicable abroad. For example, the reasons why militaries do not always innovate on their own and the effects that crisis can have on this reluctance are not unique to the US military. In addition, my comments regarding the nature of innovation are universal. So too is the general message that militaries will resist innovations that challenge their professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. Finally, the types of civilian and military tactics that I cover will exist, albeit in somewhat different forms, in other civil-military systems around the world.

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40 For an example of how these differences can affect a military's proclivity to innovate, see Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance: 1939-1945* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). Van Creveld notes that in the German Army "commanders [were] trained to tell their subordinates what to do, but not how." (p. 36.) He contrasts this with the US Army, which took a "scientific management" approach to war, owing in part to the fact that America "was the home of Taylorism: a system of management that tried to foresee and dictate the operative's every movement with the aim of turning him into a human machine as reliable as the mechanical ones he attended." (pp. 37-38.) Obviously, the German system was one in which innovation was expected, while in the American system, it was often discouraged.
THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON FORCED INNOVATION

The paradigm from which my framework arises does not contain a definitive view of forced innovation. In fact, the topic is a matter of some contention within the literature. For example, in *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Barry Posen argues that civilian intervention is often the engine of military innovation, while in *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Rosen argues that civilians have little to do with military innovation. In this dissertation, I lend credence to Posen’s position by offering numerous instances where civilian intervention was critical to innovation in the military.

Posen contends that civilian intervention aimed at forcing the military to innovate does occur. He views such intervention as a way in which civilians can create a greater harmony between the political and military aspects of a state’s grand strategy. He notes:

> Many of the political aspects of grand strategy are determined by factors in the international environment that the state cannot control. Military aspects are within the purview of the state and are more controllable.... If political-military integration is important to the security of the state, then we should be interested in how to promote it. Innovation and stagnation at the military level are not only important determinants of integration, they are manipulable ones.

Military innovation is manipulable precisely because civilians can take action to prod the military to innovate in ways that it would not choose to if left on its own.

Although Posen allows for the role of civilian intervention in forcing innovation, he is not sanguine about the prospects for such action. He suggests that although civilian intervention into military doctrine would seem to be a key determinant of innovation, it involves special problems. The division of labor between civilians and soldiers is intense. Civilians are not likely to have the capability to dream up whole new doctrines. Thus civil intervention is dependent on finding sources of military knowledge. Civilian intervention should take the form of choosing from the thin innovation menu thrown up by the services.

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43 Civilian attempts to force the military to innovate are similar to what Waltz calls the “internal efforts” that a state can take to increase its own power relative to others. Waltz notes that efforts to increase economic production capability and military strength are options that a state can choose in order to improve its ability to balance against the power of others. Pushing the military to innovate in ways that make it more capable of carrying out the state’s grand strategy is another such step. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 118.
Thus, Posen's bottom line is that civilian intervention to force innovation does occur and is important, but should be limited to choosing among doctrines that either exist elsewhere or have been examined and rejected by the military leadership itself.

In *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Rosen offers a different view of forced innovation. Although Rosen certainly agrees that civilians are ill-suited to intervene usefully in military affairs, he departs from Posen in that he contends that such intervention rarely, if ever, happens. Rosen's book therefore appears to dispute the very existence of the topic of this dissertation. However, much of the difference of opinion between Rosen and myself over the record of civilians forcing the military to innovate is found in the fact that we define military innovation quite differently. As mentioned above, Rosen's definition is structured so that only very large-scale changes that directly relate to a service's theory of victory on the battlefield qualify as innovations. My definition, on the other hand, is much broader, and includes many changes that are of no interest to Rosen. Many cases that I discuss, such as homosexuals in the military, the TFX aircraft, and the drug interdiction mission, to name a few, are not innovations by Rosen's definition. However, holding up this dissertation to the arguments in his book is not the equivalent of comparing apples and oranges, as some of my cases, the Special Operations Forces reorganization effort in particular, appear to satisfy his definition of innovation.

The core of Rosen's argument is that the military innovates on its own much more than people give it credit for. He notes several common misperceptions that lie at the root of the belief that militaries do not innovate. His primary complaint is that academics are too quick to depict the military as a stagnant, monolithic organization whose every action is hindered by concerns over bureaucratic prerogatives.\(^{45}\) In contrast to this image of the military, Rosen offers his own, which highlights the fact that "each service is far from monolithic" and that "there is no permanent norm defining the dominant professional activity" of the services.\(^{46}\) Instead, "Many theories concerning the relative priority of roles and missions compete" in a political struggle.\(^{47}\) As a result, innovation

requires an 'ideological' struggle that redefines the values that legitimate the activities of the citizens. Because the service is a military organization, and because it is victory in war that ultimately legitimates any military organization, this ideological struggle will revolve around a new theory of victory, an

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\(^{47}\) Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, p. 19. Rosen's point about the multifaceted nature of the military is, in fact, critical to my approach to forced innovation. The divisions both across and within services, as expressed in my military unity variable, are an important part of my forced innovation framework and say a great deal about the ability of the military to resist civilian intervention.
explanation of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be won.\textsuperscript{48}

Having attacked the image of a stagnant, monolithic military, Rosen goes on to challenge the belief that civilian intervention is important to military innovation. Part of his doubt of the significance of civilian intervention arises from his contention that such intervention cannot hope to yield useful results. This doubt stems from the difficulty that he says a president would have in forcing innovation upon the military. He cites Richard Neustadt's \textit{Presidential Power} and its message that it is difficult for the president to get bureaucrats to follow his orders as a corroborating argument.\textsuperscript{49}

Rosen's shortcoming here is that he treats the civilian side of the forced innovation equation as the same monolith that he accuses others of depicting the military as. Nowhere in his book does Rosen discuss the potentially powerful role of Congress, yet the 1980s were characterized by a Congress that was interested and involved in the minutiae of defense planning. As the Special Operations Forces and drug interdiction mission cases examined in this dissertation clearly show, Congress has been at the forefront of many efforts to force the military to innovate and has proven to be capable of achieving some success. Rosen's failure to mention Congress therefore weakens his overall argument that civilian efforts to force innovation are inconsequential to military innovation.

Rosen's doubt of the potential of civilian intervention in forcing innovation is also founded on his belief that "the order to innovate is likely to be ambiguous because what is being ordered is not some familiar, well-defined task, but something that has never been done before."\textsuperscript{50} This characterization ignores Posen's depiction of the menu of innovation provided by a military composed of the very sub-groups that Rosen himself says provides the military with varying theories of victory. Rosen also fails to recognize the role that foreign militaries can play in providing ready-made examples of novel tasks or tactics that a military can take on (more will be said about foreign models of innovation below).

Rosen does recognize much of a potential for civilian intervention to force innovation. He contends that since civilians are outsiders, neither they nor their military protégés can ever gain legitimacy within the military. As a result, he argues, "A civilian will have the most impact if he can devise a strategy that reinforces the actions of senior officers who

\textsuperscript{48} Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military}, p. 20. (emphasis added)
\textsuperscript{49} Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{50} Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military}, p. 10.
already have 'legitimate' power in the military." He suggests that the only way civilians can do this is by using the power of promotion to protect those within the military who favor a particular innovation. As an example of such civilian intervention, Rosen offers the development of airmobile divisions in the US Army during the early 1960s. This case, which he says has been mistakenly labelled as an instance of forced innovation, he shows to be nothing of the sort. He demonstrates that the intervention of Secretary of Defense McNamara, who wrote a memo blasting the Army for its resistance to the airmobile concept, merely "helped a group of senior officers win the endgame in their struggle to create combat units utilizing helicopters. What is equally important, it appears as if the McNamara memoranda were written by army aviation 'mafia.'"

Rosen does not address cases where innovations have no champions of any importance in the military, such as the drug interdiction mission (see Chapter 3). Several cases contradict his contention that the only civilian role in military innovation is for civilians to support the efforts of pro-innovation groups within the military, as I will show.

This dissertation goes beyond both Posen and Rosen in two ways. I concentrate on the issue of forced innovation to an extent previously absent in the literature. Forced innovation is not the focus of Posen's The Sources of Military Doctrine and is said not to even exist in Rosen's Winning the Next War. My broader definition of innovation allows me to move past what Posen and Rosen have to say on this topic. Both of these writers focus their attention on innovations that substantially alter the military's concept of operations. I also examine such innovations, but in addition, I look at changes that have less-sweeping effects on the military. Such innovations do not always affect how the military seeks victory on the battlefield and are largely ignored by the existing literature, yet

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51 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, p. 21. Rosen does note that his approach "may not fully explain truly unique innovations, such as the introduction of nuclear weapons, but it helps us to understand this case as anomalous. With nuclear weapons, the radical novelty of the new weapons was and is such that the officer corps does not possess a body of professional expertise that gives it a legitimate right to exclude civilians from decisions about how nuclear war should be fought and which theories should dominate operational behavior, innovation, and promotions." (pp. 21-22) In such "unique" cases, he is willing to admit that civilians can play a larger role. One such case that Rosen cites in an earlier version of his book is that of permissive action links, which, he says, "Did force elements of the American military to change their way of war, and do appear to have been the intellectual and bureaucratic children of civilians in the defense establishment." (p. 166.)

52 Similar to Rosen, David Hendrickson stresses the important role that civilians can play by supporting change through promotions rather than overt pressure. Hendrickson further notes that if civilians cannot find supporters for their proposals within the military, they should drop their ideas for change. (David Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 57.)

53 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, p. 91.

54 He does not acknowledge these cases because, as in the case of the drug interdiction mission or rescinding the ban on homosexuals, they are not innovations by his definition.
they can lead to bitter political fights that create a serious challenge to harmonious civil-military relations.

WHY THE MILITARY DOES NOT ALWAYS INNOVATE ON ITS OWN

The historical record shows many instances in which the military has successfully innovated on its own to address complicated and pressing problems. However, the fact remains that the military, like any other complex organization, has a great deal of difficulty in adopting innovations that challenge its interests. It is at these times that civilian intervention can be critical if innovation is to occur.

A proper examination of the process by which civilians force the military to innovate must first begin by addressing this issue of why the military does not always adopt the innovations desired by civilians on its own. This is one point on which the existing literature has much to say.

If the military was an organization that was highly open and conducive to all types of innovation, the need or opportunity for civilians to intervene in order to force innovation would be minimal. The military is not such an organization, however, and there are numerous reasons why. These factors are critical to the topic of forced innovation because, as David Hendrickson notes, "the same characteristics that hinder innovations in military organizations also make such organizations resistant to change imposed 'from the outside.'"55

Mohr suggests that there are "certain obstacles or deterrents to innovation" that tend to operate in most organizations. He identifies two roadblocks to innovation. The first is the cost of innovation in terms of resources and time. The second is the vested interests of groups and individuals whose position, prestige, and resources can be threatened by an innovation.56 With regards to the military, it is home to many different communities that do not want to expend scarce resources on untried programs and whose power and interests might be jeopardized by change. Thus, roadblocks to innovation are present. This is a major theme that will run throughout this dissertation.

56 Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," p. 53. Similarly, Shepard notes that "to insure reliable repetition of prescribed operations, the organization requires strong defenses against innovation. Efforts to innovate must be relegated to the categories of error, irresponsibility, and insubordination, and appropriate corrective action taken to bring the would-be innovators 'back in line' Any change is likely to run counter to certain vested interests and to violate certain territorial rights." (Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," p. 143.)
Wilson also notes the problems that a complex organization like the military has in innovating. He suggests that the more diverse an organization is, the greater the chances are that innovations will be conceived by members of the organization, but the lower the chances are that any innovation will ever be adopted. As an organization becomes more diverse, an innovation that promises gain to one sector may offer losses to competing sectors. As a result, the need for negotiations, side-payments, and coercion rises, often to the point where an innovation's adoption is no longer possible. All of these factors are reflected in my framework's variables that explain the military's resistance to forced innovation.

The many subgroups within the military, combined with the highly varied interests of these groups, pose exactly the obstacles to innovation that Wilson warns of. What is good for one service is often bad for another. An innovation that might hold promise for one subgroup within a service may only threaten another. The cruise missile case illustrates this point. This new weapon served the needs of the surface Navy quite well by offering it new offensive capabilities, yet at the same time it threatened the aviation community's domination of surface-to-surface and land attack missions.

**UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE**

In addition to the fact that almost any innovation will pose a threat to someone within an organization as diverse as the military, there are other obstacles to innovation based on organizational theory that are at work in the military. The first of these is the desire of organizations to avoid uncertainty about how to successfully perform the tasks it is assigned. As uncertainty is an important factor in the military's decision to resist innovation in many cases, my framework is careful to include the effects of uncertainty in its variables, as described below.

Anthony Downs defines uncertainty as "any lack of sure knowledge about the course of past, present, future, or hypothetical events." Organizations avoid uncertainty because it complicates the task of meeting desired levels of performance in the present and of planning for the future. An innovation, because of its novel nature, will always introduce some degree of uncertainty into the life of the innovating organization. Old ways of doing things and long-established relationships both within the organization and with extra-organizational entities may not be suited to a particular innovation. This, in turn, requires

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57 Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," pp. 200-203.
the organization to change in unfamiliar ways, which creates uncertainty. Thus, organizations like the military often avoid innovation because of the uncertainty it introduces.59

James Thompson breaks down the uncertainty that organizations face into three types. Innovation presents the military with all of these varieties of uncertainty. The first such type is generalized uncertainty, which is produced by the inability of an organization to fully understand the cause and effect relationships that exist in its operating environment. Thompson refers to this as an "organization's first and worst problem."60

Whenever the military contemplates innovation it must first weigh "the remote and uncertain advantages promised from change... against the costs and disruption that any changeover entails."61 Such balancing is complicated by the effects of generalized uncertainty, which hides both the costs and benefits of any given innovation. This type of uncertainty therefore lies at the heart of the struggle between civilians and the military over forced innovation, as each group tends to hold a much different opinion of what the true effects of a particular innovation will be. Civilians see benefits while the military sees nothing but problems. Each side, unsure exactly what results a given innovation will produce, believes that it is correct.

Generalized uncertainty is an underlying characteristic of forced innovation, therefore it is not embodied in any one variable of my framework. Instead, one must keep in mind that generalized uncertainty forces civilians and the military to make predictions based on their own biases, which often leads to quite different utility expectations for the same innovation.

Thompson's second type of uncertainty is contingency uncertainty, which arises because "the outcomes of organizational action are in part determined by the actions of elements of the environment."62 He notes that after generalized uncertainty, "the basic threat to organizational success lies in interdependence with an environment which may be uncooperative. Under these conditions, organizations try to achieve predictability and self-

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59 Downs suggests that the tendency within certain organizations to avoid change may often work towards their advantage. He notes, "Inertia imports a measure of stability to social organizations which helps them perform certain vital functions, such as maintaining a pattern of order in social life, and preserving important ethical and cultural values. Such functions are especially significant in modern societies marked by strong pressures towards rapid change emanating from technological innovations. Thus, the fact that inertia often makes bureau change extremely difficult is sometimes a virtue." (Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 197.)


62 Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory, p. 159.
control through regulation of transactions at their boundaries."\textsuperscript{63} Anything that forces an organization to interact with extra-organizational groups in ways that lack such predictability creates contingency uncertainty.

Graham Allison suggests that one way organizations seek to avoid this problem is to create a "negotiated environment" in which agreements and established practices "regularize" multi-organizational interaction.\textsuperscript{64} Similarly, Salamon and Wamsley note that an organization seeks "to define and carry out its task in a way that will stabilize and institutionalize supportive relationships with" other organizations and strives "to work out a modus vivendi with the narrowly restricted group of 'relevant others' who control its access to the legitimacy and resources required to occupy a permanent niche."\textsuperscript{65} The organization does all that it can to protect its negotiated environment and regulated relationships in order to avoid contingency uncertainty.

An innovation whose adoption would complicate the relationship between military and non-military organizations threatens to increase the level of contingency uncertainty. As interdependence increases, the level of certainty with which the military can operate decreases. New relationships must be formed which might not be to the advantage of the military and which might challenge existing favored patterns of interaction. An excellent example of this occurring is found in the drug interdiction mission (Chapter 2). This innovation forced the military to work with numerous other agencies and created a great deal of uncertainty over how interagency cooperation would work. My framework's \textit{autonomy} variable, which deals with the relative level of freedom that the military enjoys in its actions, encompasses this type of uncertainty.

The \textit{interdependence of components} is Thompson's final type of uncertainty. This variety is created by the problems of integrating the actions of units \textit{within} the organization.\textsuperscript{66} To fight this type of uncertainty, "the organization seeks self-control through coordination of the actions of its components, through subordinating each component to a monolithic authority network with centralized decision making."\textsuperscript{67} For the military, this means a heavy reliance on a definite chain of command and complex organizational charts with carefully drawn and observed paths for interaction and control.

\textsuperscript{63} Thompson, \textit{Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{64} Graham Allison, \textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis} (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 84.


\textsuperscript{66} Thompson, \textit{Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory}, p. 159.

An innovation will create interdependence of components uncertainty if it forces the military to alter its internal organization, upsetting established command paths in the process. The more an innovation forces the military to act in ways to which it is unaccustomed, the higher the probability that new routines and relationships will have to be developed to handle the innovation. With these new patterns of interaction comes uncertainty, as different subgroups within the organization are unsure how to best coordinate their activities. The Special Operations Forces case (Chapter 3) provides a good example of interdependence of components uncertainty. Many conventional commanders were afraid that an increasingly independent special operations community would make the coordination of conventional and special operations within the same geographic area quite difficult. Because this type of uncertainty deals with both issues of control and of task performance, it is reflected in the autonomy and operational routine variables of my framework.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADITION

One of the more striking organizational characteristics of the military is its respect for tradition. Past battles and heroic exploits anchor the collective identities of militaries around the world. From this reverence for tradition comes much of the military's conservativism and insistence on doing things as they have always been done.68

This attachment to tradition is not by chance. Morris Janowitz argues that "traditional attitudes are institutionalized by the requirements of military organization and planning."69 He suggests that "what has happened in the past becomes a powerful precedent for future engagements" and that "dogmatic doctrine is a typical organizational reflex reaction to future uncertainties."70

The value placed on tradition in the military makes innovation difficult. Gen. David Jones, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in Senate testimony that each service relies heavily on "imbuing its members with pride in its missions, its doctrine and its customs and discipline -- all of which are steeped in traditions."71 If the military adopts

68 Commenting on the power of conservatism in the military, General Meyer, a former Army Chief of Staff, is quoted as saying that innovative ideas are "forced through the meat grinder of conservatism which then spits out hash." (David Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 37.)
a new way of doing something, not only is it replacing an existing means, it is also, in
effect, saying that the old way was flawed. To do this is to refute one's own traditions,
which is never easy to do. As a result, the practices of the past exhibit a great deal of
resiliency, even in the face of overriding evidence that their time has past. The fact that the
first steam-powered US naval ships still carried useless sail riggings, or that British
artillery troops continued to account for holding their horses when firing their guns long
after trucks replaced these horses, are examples of this.\textsuperscript{72} One general in Vietnam nicely
demonstrated the power and reverence that tradition holds in the military when he
exclaimed, "I'll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine,
and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."\textsuperscript{73}

Because of the value that the military places on tradition, the services tend to apply
existing practices in order to perform new tasks, rather than innovate and introduce novel
ways for fulfilling new responsibilities. Posen points out that "a new technology will
normally be assimilated to an old doctrine rather than stimulate change to a new one."\textsuperscript{74}
This habit often dooms some innovations from the start. Halperin and Kanter note that
when organizations have to address new problems, they tend to suggest options that
strongly resemble existing operating procedures, while charging that options not reflecting
standard practices are infeasible.\textsuperscript{75}

Simple inertia and faith in established methods in part explains the reliance on
tradition, but other factors are also at work. Part of the value of tradition is explained by
the desire of the military to avoid uncertainty. Traditional methods are tried and true. New
ways of doing things are unknown, and their true utility can be masked by generalized
uncertainty.\textsuperscript{76} Tradition is also reflected in the military's pecking order, which innovation
can challenge. For example, prior to World War II, the battleship was king and the surface
community dominated the Navy. The critical role that the aircraft carrier played in the US
victory in the Pacific led to a reversal of fortunes in the Navy, with the traditionally
dominant group having to take a back seat to the aviators. Tradition is also emotionally

\textsuperscript{72} See Morison, \textit{Men, Machines, and Modern Times}, pp. 17-44.
\textsuperscript{74} Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{75} Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in
\textsuperscript{76} For example, Richard Betts notes that "because experience with existing weapons establishes clearer
perceptions of their utility, military planners sometimes develop attachments to them that inhibit willingness to
expend resources on novel alternatives." Betts, "Innovation, Assessment, and Decision," p. 6.
important within the military. It provides a sense of belonging and ties the soldiers of today with those of the past.\(^{77}\)

These characteristics of tradition are reflected in several of my framework’s variables. The desire to cling to established methods for reasons of inertia and uncertainty avoidance is found in the operational routines variable. The control relationships entrenched by tradition and challenged by innovation are found in the autonomy variable. The emotional power of tradition is reflected in the professional identity variable.

**SOCIALIZATION TO PROFESSIONAL NORMS**

Another factor that inhibits innovation in the military is the way that military members are socialized to identify with professional norms. The result of such socialization, or indoctrination, as Anthony Downs depicts it,\(^ {78}\) is that would-be innovators are discouraged from promoting change in the organization they are a part of. William Ouchi suggests that socialization helps to create "common values and beliefs" that "provide the harmony of interests that erase the possibility of opportunistic behavior." As a result, all members of the organization seek to attain organizationally-defined goals above all else.\(^ {79}\) This unwillingness to engage in opportunistic behavior can translate into a refusal to seek goals that go against the interests and values of one's own group, even though such an action might better serve the organization as a whole. The refusal of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance in the early 1900s to accept the benefits that the innovation of continuously-aimed naval gunfire offered is a prime example of this.\(^ {80}\)

Socialization attunes and focuses the individual to the needs of the profession and organization. When this happens, change is perceived as challenging these interests and will be avoided. Discussing the potentially stagnating effects of socialization, Herbert Kaufman notes, "An individual imbued with the spirit of an organization, indoctrinated with its values, committed to its established goals and customary ways, and dedicated to its


\(^{78}\) Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Chapter XVII.


\(^{80}\) See Morison, *Men, Machines, and Modern Times*, pp. 17-44. Morison's account suggests that the personality of the naval officer who promoted the gunfire innovation, William Sims, was critical to that case because he was not successfully socialized to hold up the well-being of the Navy as primary goal, as were most officers. Morison also observes that in order for both the military and the population as a whole to be more open to innovation, people must reject the socialization that ties their identities to small groups if they are to become more willing to work for the good of a greater group, society.
traditions, is not likely to experiment a great deal, nor even to see the possibilities suggested by unplanned developments.\textsuperscript{81} As a result, "An organization consisting of men who have internalized organizational perspectives, values, and premises may well become infertile on the one hand and un receptive on the other."\textsuperscript{82} Innovations may be "filtered out" before they reach the leadership, and if this leadership is also a product of the organization, it would most likely reject any novel idea that somehow arose from below.\textsuperscript{83}

In some cases, even if key military leaders support a particular innovation, this is not enough to overcome the resistance that exists throughout the lower levels of the organization. For example, Gen. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff, was inclined to adopt the M16 as his service's new rifle. He knew, however, that such a decision would not go over well with the Ordnance Department. Ordnance was against the M16 and had many allies within the Army to back it up. As a result, Wheeler could do almost nothing to push an innovation that he felt deserved a closer look.\textsuperscript{84} If innovation proves difficult even when military leadership supports it, then clearly it should be substantially harder when this leadership is firmly against it. This is precisely the case in nearly all instances of forced innovation.

The stagnating effects of socialization in the military are preserved by the military personnel system, which forbids lateral entry. The existence of service academies as an option to civilian educational institutions offers many future officers an important first step in the process of socialization.\textsuperscript{85} The lessons learned in the academies are reinforced by the fact that, under normal circumstances, the only way to move up in the military is to be promoted from within. As a result, those members of the organization that go out of their way to promote changes that are unpopular with the service leadership stand little chance of


\textsuperscript{82} Kaufman, \textit{The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior}, pp. 234-5.

\textsuperscript{83} Kaufman, \textit{The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior}, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{84} See Thomas McNaugher, \textit{The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition} (New York: Praeger, 1984). Similarly, Herbert Kaufman tells of the problems that the Forest Service leadership had in overcoming subordinate resistance to the innovation of using controlled burning in order to prevent larger fires. Such an idea was completely foreign to the training of Forestry personnel and seemed to invite disaster. As Kaufman notes, Forestry officials "had to engage in a large-scale program of innovation and education for its own men, to sell them on the utility of at least testing [controlled burning], and to overcome the overwhelming fear and hatred of fire instituted in them in their training. The program could not be instituted at once by fiat: the attitudes of many men had to be changed gradually before it made much progress." (Kaufman, \textit{The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior}, p. 84.) This example is strikingly similar to the difficulty that naval officials had in convincing US submarine commanders during World War II to attack Japanese merchant shipping rather than avoid contact, which they had long been trained to do. (See Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military}, p. 83.)

\textsuperscript{85} For a brief discussion of the role played by an academy in producing a professional, see Sanford Dornbusch, "The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution," \textit{Social Forces} May, 1955: 316-21. Dornbusch examines the Coast Guard Academy's "two-fold process of transmitting technical knowledge and of instilling in the candidates an outlook considered appropriate for members of the profession." (p. 316.)
advancement.86 Everett Rogers contends that innovators are viewed by other group members, and even view themselves, as being deviants with respect to organizational norms.87 Such deviance is rarely awarded. Thus, in many cases there is little personal incentive to champion innovation.

As the above section has shown, there are many valid reasons why the military does not always freely innovate on its own. These factors often lead the military to act as what Salamon and Wamsley refer to as, a "pathological agency," which responds neither to those actors who control its resources nor to the public, "but rather operates chiefly in response to complex, rigidified, internal decision rules." Such an agency is the product of its own particular sense of mission, socialization patterns, and operating procedures.88 The military does not always operate in a pathological mode and has shown itself to be quite capable of innovating on its own, but the many obstacles to innovation present in the military often render internally-generated change impossible. This creates the need, on some occasions, for civilian intervention to force innovation.

THE ROLE OF CRISIS

Even with so many reasons for the military to resist innovation, it still manages to innovate at an impressive rate. There are several explanations for this. First, many of the technological innovations that the military adopts are not, by my definition, innovations. They are evolutionary changes that merely allow subgroups within the military to carry out favored missions better. The B-2 bomber is one example of such an "innovation." It embodies numerous technological advances, all of which are intended to allow the Air Force to better perform its traditional and favored penetration bombing mission. Second, the military must be very concerned with its relative capabilities. It must innovate in order to remain competitive on the battlefield. Should a military decide not to improve its tactics and weaponry, it will eventually find itself at the mercy of those that have. The innovative German military's rapid destruction in World War II of a French military designed to fight World War I illustrates this point nicely. The need to match an enemy's perceived advances was at the heart of the tremendous innovative process that fueled much of the

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86 This creates the opportunity for civilians to reach into the ranks and promote the champions of preferred innovations. In this way, civilians can create lateral entry to higher ranks that would otherwise be impossible. Such was the case with Sims, who was promoted by President Teddy Roosevelt to a position that allowed Sims to influence naval gunnery on a wide scale. See the Civilian Tactics section below.

87 See Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, pp. 198-202.

arms race during the Cold War. In cases where the military innovates to maintain a competitive advantage, the innovations are usually structured by the military to create the smallest possible challenge to existing patterns of power and autonomy within the military.

The above reasons for the military's general proclivity to innovate say nothing about instances where it innovates in a way that has very definite and unpopular organizational side effects. Such cases require a different explanation. One way that innovation occurs is through civilian intervention that forces such adoption. This, of course, is the topic of this dissertation and will be greatly expanded upon. Such innovations can also find their way into the military when it is experiencing a crisis that the adoption of the innovation in question might help alleviate.

Wilson defines a crisis as "an extreme change in conditions for which there is no adequate, programmed response." He notes that a crisis can make an organization's members temporarily drop their narrow interests in order to better address an urgent challenge to the organization as a whole. In other words, the negotiated environment is opened to change in order to protect it from greater and more widespread harm. Shepard similarly notes that "the uncertainty and anxiety generated by the crisis make organization members eager to adopt new structures that promise to relieve the anxiety." He goes on to say that "during a crisis there is an external threat to the survival of that system; for a moment it is open and searching for new solutions to the basic problem of survival." In such an environment, according to Rogers, "The relative advantage of a new idea becomes more evident."

The effect of crisis on the military's willingness to innovate is quite specific. The military is more likely to adopt previously shunned innovations only if they offer some

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90 Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," p. 209. As Shepard put it, during a crisis "men are ready to give up their boring and petty struggles for status" and place the good of the organization as a whole ahead of their parochial interests. (Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," p. 146-49.) As a result, the shift in identification that Morison says is necessary for innovation is accomplished.
91 Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," p. 146. Shepard argues that "radical innovations are most readily adopted and implemented in times of organizational crisis." Similarly, Thomas McNaugher notes that "dramatic changes in behavior generally come in response to massive challenges to the organization's survival. This helps explain why military organizations tend to change most fundamentally in combat." McNaugher, The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition, p. 8.
92 Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," p. 146-49.
94 Crises are not, however, innovation-specific, as are the variables of my framework. This means that the nature of a crisis is not derived from a specific innovation. In other words, the crisis could exist without the innovation. The relevance of a crisis to a particular innovation are, however, based on the characteristics of that innovation.
relief from the present crisis. For example, in the 1950s, the growing importance of nuclear weapons in US defense planning, combined with the dominance of the nuclear mission by the Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy, created a crisis for the Army. It was threatened with the loss of its primacy in defense of the European theater and with being left out of the nuclear revolution occurring in the armed forces. Not wanting to be placed on the sidelines, the Army eventually endorsed the innovation of tactical nuclear weapons, even though a heavy reliance on them promised significant side effects on the Army, most of which were not desirable.\footnote{See Evangelista, \textit{Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies}, p. 104.} The crisis facing the Army at that time did not, however, make it any more open to innovations that had nothing to do with competition among the services over the European defense missions.

Crisis that have an impact on the military have several sources. They can arise as the result of catastrophic military failure. Poor performance in ongoing military or peacetime operations can also create crises. Changes in the international or domestic political environment are other sources of crises.

Catastrophic failure almost always creates a crisis for the military. The loss of a major campaign, or worse, a war, places a military in crises.\footnote{The catastrophic failure need not be directly experienced by a military in order to create a crisis. If a foreign power whose military is quite similar suffers a major defeat, one's own military can come under question. For example, the complete destruction of the Iraqi air defense system during Desert Storm has created serious doubts for all those countries fielding similar integrated air-defense systems.} The perceived failure of its doctrines and tactics can create an urgent need to develop new plans in order to avoid defeat in the future. In terms of forced innovation, the most important effect of catastrophic failure is that a military who has just suffered a major defeat will find it much harder to resist civilian intervention, as its political clout will have suffered accordingly and major realignments within the ranks can be expected.

The effects of catastrophic failure on innovation are sometimes mitigated by the tendency of militaries to, as Posen puts it, "adapt new technology to old doctrines rather than to generate an entirely new doctrine to suit new technology."\footnote{Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars}, p. 190.} In other words, the military may maintain the doctrine that led to defeat but add new weapons to it in hopes that it will work the next time around. As Posen argues, the German military's defeat in World War I left it reeling, and the familiar offensive doctrine that it had adhered to the past forty years provided it with a much needed sense of stability and familiarity.\footnote{Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars}, pp. 184-85.}

A somewhat lesser degree of crisis can occur when the military recognizes that it is performing poorly in an ongoing conflict and realizes the need for change before more
serious failure occurs. In this way, the strains created by war make the military more open to innovations that it had previously shunned. As Rosen notes, during war the military is "in business" and has "the strongest possible incentives to learn rationally from its experiences," even if these lessons challenge pre-existing organizational interests. In other words, during war the traditional power relations that tend to stifle innovation are set aside as the need to protect the organization as a whole and its performance in war take precedence. As a result, innovations that help alleviate the problems that the military recognizes it is suffering from suddenly become more attractive than they were during the calm of peacetime, when the military's shortcomings were not as apparent.

The history of the US military's policy regarding blacks in its ranks demonstrates the effects of wartime crises. Blacks were originally barred from serving in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. Gen. Washington requested that this policy be changed -- which it was -- in part because manpower shortages were threatening the Army's strength. The crisis that the Continental Army was experiencing in the field made the acceptance of blacks a more tolerable idea. An even more striking example of the crisis effect is the decision in 1865 by the Confederate Congress to allow blacks into the Confederate Army during the Civil War. Having blacks in uniform went against the "Confederate conviction of Negro inferiority," yet by March of 1865, the South's fortunes in the war were bleak and it's military felt compelled to change it's policies. Crisis produced by the demands of the Korean War was also at the heart of the US Army's decision to at last comply with orders to racially integrate its units. The sudden flood of fresh recruits coming through basic training made segregation difficult and led the Brigadier General in charge of the 8th Infantry Division to instigate integrated training. This created the need to integrate all combat units in order to maintain uniformity throughout the Army. In addition, all-black units in Korea were performing quite poorly due to their inferior training. This degraded overall line strength and made things worse for all Army units in

99 Some authors, such as Rosen, make a distinction between wartime and peacetime when discussing innovation in the military. I make no such distinction with regards to forced innovation because forced innovation does not automatically become harder or easier during wartime. I have been unable to draw any useful generalizations about the effect of war on the ability of civilians to force the military to innovate. Civilian attention is more focussed on the military during war, which would seemingly make intervention more likely. However, as Arnold Kanter argues, military prestige and political influence during war might increase to the point where it is difficult for civilians to challenge the military. (Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 56.) The main way that war can affect forced innovation is through its potential to create a crisis that will lead the military to drop its resistance to innovate.

100 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, p. 22.
Lastly, segregation, combined with the policy of keeping black units in a support role, created overstrength black support units at the same time that white combat units were shrinking due to heavy battle losses. Integration was the obvious way to address this imbalance and improve manpower and combat performance. Without the crisis created by the Korean War, however, the Army would have continued to resist civilian demands for an end to racial segregation.

More recently, the challenges of Vietnam, a war that the European-focused US military was not prepared to fight, created crises for the military in several areas that eventually facilitated the adoption of unpopular innovations. For example, the Vietnam War highlighted both the need for close air support and the Air Force's shortcomings in this area. According to Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, information gleaned from operations in Vietnam as of late 1965 underscored the need for an aircraft with a heavy payload. This requirement made the A-7 suddenly look much more desirable than the F-5, its opposition in the competition for a close air support aircraft. Vietnam also provided the crisis that led the Army to move beyond the initial purchase of M16s forced on it by McNamara to the much more sweeping decision to make the M16 the standard rifle for the Army. US and South Vietnamese soldiers armed with M14s found themselves outgunned by Viet Cong armed with the fully-automatic Soviet AK47. Meanwhile, the few troops equipped with M16s praised the new weapon. In addition, its performance at the siege of Plei Me was seen by Gen. Westmoreland as the key aspect of the eventual US victory there. With the need to increase the rate of fire of US and allied forces both clear and urgent, Gen. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff who had favored the M16 in the past but was prisoner to organizational interests, could finally make the M16 the Army's standard rifle. As one observer put it, Vietnam "spoke to the [Army] in a clear voice that favored the M16. For completing what McNamara had started, Vietnam's jungles could not have been better suited."

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103 Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, pp. 49-55.
105 Just as the military was historically more tolerant of blacks in the ranks when facing manpower shortages, so too did it alter its rules regarding homosexuals. In 1943, the War Department issued a directive that ended the discharging of homosexuals because they were needed in the war effort. (D. C. Spriestersbach, "Letter to the Editor," New York Times Dec. 2, 1992: A22.) For an account of the willingness of the military to look the other way with regards to homosexuals during most wars, see Randy Shilts, "What's Fair in Love and War," Newsweek Feb. 1, 1993: 58-59.
Peacetime military failures can also create a crisis by focussing civilian attention on the military's shortcomings and inviting intervention. For example, the many procurement scandals that buffeted the military during the 1980s helped Congress recognize the need for defense reorganization and, in turn, made the Pentagon more open to reform measures that it did not really approve of. A somewhat different example of peacetime failure creating a crisis for the military is the series of sexual assaults perpetrated by naval personnel during the Navy Tailhook Association's national convention. The Tailhook incident created a crisis for the Navy in terms of its mistreatment of woman and focussed extra attention on the issue of women in combat roles. According to Eric Schmitt of the New York Times, "Many military women are optimistic that the uproar may open opportunities for them and tear down the biases they believe foster harassment." Some men in the military think that just such opportunities have, in fact, been created by the crises arising from the Tailhook scandal. One Navy Captain points out that "every group or organization with a stake in eliminating sexual harassment or achieving equal rights for woman [will now come] forward, anxious and willing to assist in getting the military in line with the rest of society." One Navy Commander suggests:

Although it should not be our primary motivation, putting women in our tactical cockpits and doing it right is an excellent way to show society that naval aviation has overcome the effects of tailhook - indeed, it may be the only way to convince the hardened cynics that we are serious about change.

Just as the Tailhook crisis may have undermined the ability of the Navy to resist the innovation of allowing women in combat roles, reports of harsh treatment of homosexuals in the military, culminating with the fatal beating of a gay sailor in October, 1992, threatens to create a similar crisis.

Changes in the international environment that threaten the military's organizational interests can also create relevant crises. The military is particularly sensitive to such

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108 Michael Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach President's Desk This Year," Armed Forces Journal International April, 1986: 16.
110 Capt. Richard Limekin, "Tailhook 1991 and Other Perplexities," Proceedings Sept., 1992: 37. A former Marine infantry officer also sees the Tailhook crisis in this light. He notes that "the uproar over Tailhook is being extended beyond sexual harassment. It is being used to galvanize public opinion behind feminizing the armed forces." He also fears that "the growing clamor from activists in Congress and the media" over Tailhook "may become "a wedge to force open combat positions for women." (John Luddy, "Two Wrongs Don't Make it Right," Proceedings Nov., 1992: 68.) Luddy believes that any link between sexual harassment in the military and the combat exclusion policy is entirely spurious.
113 Mohr notes that "environmental changes and demands... frequently constitute an important source of motivation" to innovate. (Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," p. 53.)
changes, as it is intended to address external threats. When the nature of these threats changes substantially, the military's existing routines can become outdated and the military's favored way of doing things becomes threatened.\textsuperscript{114}

An excellent and recent example of a crisis arising from the international environment is the end of the Cold War. Although it finds itself on the winning side, the US military is threatened as never before, ironically, because its greatest enemy lies defeated. Absent a monolithic Soviet threat, the military has become a popular target for substantial budget cuts. This has created a crisis for the military that has led it to be much more open to innovations that it avoided in the past. The military now views many long-resisted missions as more attractive, for now these new tasks can be used in an attempt to justify its force structure and value to the country.\textsuperscript{115} As one military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies puts it, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, "Has to show the social utility of the armed forces to Congress and the American people. If that means Hurricane Andrew, the L.A. riots or a peacemaking mission in Somalia, then so be it."\textsuperscript{116} Such mission innovations offer a way to partially alleviate the crisis for the military brought about by the end of the Cold War. The conclusion of the Soviet-US standoff has also made it increasingly difficult for the services to resist organizational innovations that have been suggested for many years. The shrinking force levels of the post-Cold War era have, for example, played an important part in a recent major reorganization in the Navy and in the creation of the Unified Strategic Command.\textsuperscript{117} These

\textsuperscript{114} Rosen supports the view that most military innovation is driven by a perception "of change in the structure of the international security environment." (Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, p. 57.) He further argues that "military planners were driven to consider the need for innovation by broad structural changes in the security environment in which their organizations would have to fight for the foreseeable future, not by specific capabilities or intentions of potential adversaries." (p. 75) In contrast to Rosen, Vince Davis, in his study of innovation in the US Navy, argues that "certain domestic aspects of the Navy Department's external environment -- that is, aspects within the United States and particularly within the governmental community in Washington -- appear to have been considerably more important than the international aspects in improving the climate for innovations within the Navy." (Vince Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (Denver: University of Denver, 1967), p. 41.) Anthony Downs sides with Davis in this dispute. (See Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 197-99.)

\textsuperscript{115} See, for example, David Morrison, "Operation Feel Good," National Journal Oct. 26, 1991: 2593-97. In this article, Morrison examines in part how the end of the Cold War has made the disaster relief mission much more appealing to the military, leading it to compete actively with other agencies for a leadership position in this mission area.

\textsuperscript{116} John Morrocco, "Somalia to Impact Debate on Reshaping US Forces," Aviation Week and Space Technology Dec. 14, 1992: 23. The value of such missions for justifying force structure is limited, but at this point the military will take what it can get. In dropping resistance to these and other novel missions, the military is acting as Downs predicts when he notes that "a bureau threatened by abolition because of a decline in the social significance of its functions must either find new functions or reinstate the importance of its present ones. Thus, it might find new ways whether its existing functions are beneficial, or develop new by-products from them."(Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 200.) (This is not to suggest, however, that the military is in any way facing abolition.)

changes did not have to be forced by civilians because the services realized that the new climate made such reorganizations unavoidable.

Changes in the international environment that arise from treaties between adversaries can also create crises for the military that can facilitate innovation. In the very late 1950s and early 1960s, the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to a nuclear testing moratorium posed problems for the US military. The doctrine of massive retaliation dictated how the military was to prepare for war, yet the testing moratorium made it difficult for the military to continue to develop the types of nuclear weapons that it felt it needed. Thus, the military was strongly against the moratorium. In this atmosphere, the Air Force, who had long been solidly opposed to the development of enhanced radiation weapons because of the threat they posed to the dominance of Strategic Air Command, pushed for these new weapons in hopes that their development would necessitate an abrogation of the moratorium. Without the moratorium, the Air Force would have worked against any service acquiring enhanced radiation warheads. The SALT treaty limitations were a similar source of crisis for the military. The military was not at all happy with the limits on numbers of nuclear delivery systems that SALT dictated. The treaty did not, however, cover cruise missiles, making that weapon suddenly more attractive to the military as a way to circumvent SALT limitations.

None of the above types of crises are innovation-specific. In other words, the events that created the crises facing the military were completely independent of the innovations whose adoption they facilitated. Because of the random nature of such crises, neither the causes nor effects of crises can be predicted. Thus, such crisis cannot be encompassed in any of my forced innovation framework's variables. Instead, someone examining a case of forced innovation must be alert for events that at first glance may have little to do with the case in question but which, in fact, create a crisis that lowers the military's resistance to the innovation in question. Crises that arise from other sources, in contrast, are innovation-specific and can be encompassed within the framework's innovation-specific components, as the following discussion demonstrates.

Changes in the domestic political environment can create crises for the military. A political crisis can result either from the action taken by civilians or by elements of the military itself. In the former, civilians threaten the military with sanctions in order to push

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119 Betts, "Innovation, Assessment, and Decision," p. 5.
adoption of a particular innovation. This creates a crisis for the military, as it must decide between the cost of innovating in a direction it dislikes vs. the cost of continued resistance. As such crises arise from actions that civilians take in order to force a specific innovation, the Civilian Tactics section of my framework encompasses them. In the A-7 case, for example, Secretary of Defense McNamara created a minor crises for the Air Force by threatening to block various aircraft procurements that the service wanted unless it agreed to purchase the A-7 (see Civilian Tactics section).

Domestic crises created by the actions of other services are innovation-specific and are reflected in the military unity variable of my framework. In such crises, a service resisting a particular innovation finds that one or more of its sister services are adopting that innovation. As a result, the resisting service is threatened with being effectively locked out of whatever mission area that innovation provides a large advantage in performing. Thus, it faces the crisis of possibly losing bureaucratic territory. One way of alleviating this crisis is to bear the negative side effects of the innovation in question and adopt it in order to remain competitive with other services. For example, the Air Force's decision to develop long and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which threatened that service's preference for manned bombers, was driven by the threat that the Air Force would be locked out of the growing missile business by the development programs of the Army and Navy. The effect of such interservice competition crises, like all crises, are often a powerful determinant of military decisions to innovate.

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120 Civilians can also unwittingly act in ways that create crises for the military that adoption of a particular innovation might help alleviate. For example, Evangelista describes how the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's (JCAE) denial of the Army's request for modern nuclear artillery led the Army to rethink its stance on enhanced radiation weaponry. JCAE created a "window of opportunity," or crisis, in my language, which led the Army to "somewhat reluctantly [come] to support the development of neutron warheads as the only possibility of getting any nuclear artillery at all." (Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies, p. 248.) Similarly, the fact that the Navy's program to develop a new fleet defense aircraft, dubbed the "Missileer," was canceled, played an important part in its eventual acquiescence to McNamara's demands that it take part in the TFX program. The cancellation of the Missileer left the Navy with no new air superiority plane in the works, leaving TFX as the only available option. (Robert Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), p. 48.) Since civilian actions that created these crises were unintentional and not carried out with forced innovation in mind, they are not innovation-specific. As a result, such crises cannot be encompassed by any of the variables in my framework.


122 Civilians can help to create interservice crises by fostering competition within the military. See the Civilian Tactics sections below.
WHY CIVILIANS INTERVENE TO FORCE INNOVATION

Crises do not always occur, and the many roadblocks to military innovation can lead to a failure of the military to innovate. Sometimes when this happens, civilians intervene in an attempt to act as the catalysts of innovation. But why do civilians get involved? Situations arising in the areas of domestic politics, international relations, and recent military performance drive civilians to force innovation.

At the most fundamental level, such intervention is driven by the belief that the military is not responsive enough to its environment and therefore will not always innovate on its own. The Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms provide a good example of civilians intervening with the understanding that the military was unable to reform itself. A 1986 report by Armed Forces Journal International on the need for defense reorganization noted the inability of DoD to change from within. The report complained that "despite substantial evidence of poor performance, DoD expends its energies on defending the status quo. The absence of an effective process of self-correction and self-modification has resulted in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures." It was quite clear to Congress that the military and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) believed that the present system worked fine. As a result, if Congress did not intervene, change would never have taken place and the problems reorganization advocates sought to address would have remained. In discussing this need for congressional intervention, Sen. Nunn noted that "the Pentagon has no mechanism for real change." He told Congress, "If we leave it up to the Pentagon, there will be no change. The Constitution gives Congress

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123 Lang notes that "structural reforms, such as the formation of a central staff before World War I under [Elihu] Root and the limited unification of services following World War II were largely promoted by civilians, who often have shown themselves more sensitive to changing needs than the professional military leadership. (Lang, "Military Organizations," p. 857.) General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), a former JCS Chairman, notes, "The likelihood of a successful initiative emerging from within the system is extremely low." He draws on Mahan, suggesting that "a military service can not be expected to reorganize itself; pressure must be exerted from outside the organization." (David Jones, "Introduction," in Reappraising Defense Organization, ed. Archie Barrett. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. xiv.)

Thus, the military often resembles Elting Morison's description of a bureau: "The bureau as a self-enclosed world has great trouble in changing itself. It tends to settle into a firm structure within which rival passions and energies can contend with each other. It is highly dependent upon outside stimuli to force changes upon itself. Everyone inside is too committed to the special world." (Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times, p. 63.)

the power -- and the duty -- to 'make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.' We must exercise that power and authority."\textsuperscript{125}

To say that civilians intervene to force innovation because they think that the military is too rigid to change itself does not really answer the question of why civilians decide that innovation is necessary in the first place. This question is better answered by looking at what situations focus civilians' attention on the need for innovation in the military.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{STRATEGIC AND STRUCTURAL RATIONALES}

Civilians' decisions to intervene in military affairs can be influenced by factors arising from either the international or domestic environment, or both.\textsuperscript{127} Each type of environment creates differing requirements for innovation. This is best explained by the distinction that Samuel Huntington makes between \textit{strategic} and \textit{structural} military policy. Strategic decisions involve the number, make-up, and use of military forces and "are made in the currency of international politics." Structural decisions "deal with the procurement, allocation, and organization of the men, money, and material which go into the strategic units and uses of force" and "are made in the currency of domestic politics."\textsuperscript{128} In general, strategic decisions are driven primarily by the international environment, structural ones by the domestic environment.\textsuperscript{129}

Strategic intervention is prompted by a civilian reaction to changes in the international environment that require a change in US foreign policy. When such policy reformulation occurs, a similar modification of military policies is often required. Posen notes that civilian intervention is frequently necessary to foster better civil-military integration between these policies. He points out that "as a rule, soldiers are not going to go out of their way to reconcile the means they employ with the ends of state policy."\textsuperscript{130} Instead, the state must occasionally intervene to insure the proper ends-means coordination. For


\textsuperscript{126} These conditions, like crises, are not innovation-specific. In other words, the factors that drive civilians to intervene could exist independent of the innovations that civilians push to address these factors. An analogy to this is the fact that the nature of a problem is not dependent on one of the possible answers to that problem.


\textsuperscript{128} Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{129} Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics}, p. 3. Huntington notes that decisions required by one policy type may conflict directly with the other. For example, the structurally-driven decision to procure weapons that are less expensive but also less capable can clash with the strategic goal of maximizing relative military power. Ideally, the trade-off in such cases is minimized because the lower unit cost can translate in to a greater number of units procured, creating quantitative benefits.

\textsuperscript{130} Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars}, p. 53.
example, Khrushchev's January 6, 1961 speech declaring the Soviet Union's support of "wars of national liberation" prompted Kennedy's action to build up US counterinsurgency capabilities. The growing examples of such Soviet support throughout the world shaped Kennedy's determination to respond.\textsuperscript{131} The dominance of and preference for the European conventional defense mission assured that the military was not going to restructure itself to match the US commitment to counterinsurgency. This required civilian intervention. Posen, drawing on organizational theory, sums up the point here by suggesting that civilians will intervene into military affairs if they are planning military aggression or if they fear other states or the international environment in general.\textsuperscript{132}

Civilian intervention for structural reasons arises from new domestic currents that require a political response that may have little to do with the US military's ability to protect the nation's interests abroad. Changes in the "domestic condition of a country" often translate directly into a requirement for alterations of military policy.\textsuperscript{133} Here, intervention seeks to increase the harmony and coordination between social values and the military.\textsuperscript{134} In discussing how military policy is not just based on strategic factors, Huntington notes that "most of the distinctive characteristics of the American political process in general are also found in the processes by which military policy is made. Military policy cannot be separated from foreign policy, fiscal policy, and domestic policy. It is part of the warp and the woof of American politics."\textsuperscript{135}

Structurally-motivated civilian intervention is often driven by a desire to increase the military's resemblance to the values of society as a whole. As a result, there is an underlying tension between the need to have an aloof military whose sole focus is on managing violence and the desire to have that military reflect contemporary societal norms. Huntington depicts this tension as follows:

The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely

\textsuperscript{131} Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{132} Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars}, pp. 74-75.
\textsuperscript{133} Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{134} When Huntington discusses the need to balance social needs with national security needs, he depicts social needs only in terms of the fiscal requirements of social welfare programs that are harder to meet when more money is being spent on defense. My definition of \textit{social} goes beyond this, and looks not only at economic issue but at issues of fairness and the need to address social ills that money alone cannot cure, the drug problem being one such example.
\textsuperscript{135} Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics}, p. xi.
by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{136}

The problem that Huntington notes boils down to the issue of military effectiveness vs. social justice. The case of allowing women in combat illustrates this point nicely. As one retired Army colonel notes about this case, "Two sets of values are on a collision course. Equality and opportunity are noble ideals, but they have little to do with the battlefield, where the issues are living and dying."\textsuperscript{137} The military takes issue with the superseding of military effectiveness by social values. As Gen. Barrow of the Marine Corps testified before the Senate, the issue of women in combat for the military is not "about women’s rights, equal opportunity, career assignments for enhancement purposes for selection to higher rank. It is about, most assuredly... combat effectiveness, combat readiness; and so we're talking about national security."\textsuperscript{138} A former Marine infantry officer provides a more scathing attack on civilians who he sees as offering to trade military effectiveness for equality. He says that the arguments for allowing women in combat "are simplistic because they reduce a life-or-death issue to a mere matter of the military's benighted institutional discrimination. They are ignorant because they both reveal and exploit the public's general lack of military experience and its profound misconception of combat realities."\textsuperscript{139}

Intervention driven by structural factors often represents what Huntington refers to as "civilianizing" the military and is a symptom of the subjective civilian control that \textit{The Soldier and the State} strongly criticizes.\textsuperscript{140} One prerequisite for any attempt to "civilianize" the military to a substantial degree is that the extent of the military threat that a country faces must be at a level low enough to allow civilians to want their military to reflect values other than operational effectiveness. This also holds true for civilian efforts to use the military for non-military purposes.\textsuperscript{141} If a significant challenge by a foreign power looms on the horizon, civilians will be less willing to divert the attention of their military away from its

\textsuperscript{138} Cited in Hackworth, "War and the Second Sex," p. 25.
\textsuperscript{139} Luddy, "Two Wrongs Don't Make it Right," pp. 68-70. He goes onto note that "the armed forces are not laboratories for social experimentation; their priority is to fight and win." His main point is that "it is not worth a single grunt’s already threatened life to apply pristine notions of equality to the messy conditions of warfare... Combat is not politically correct. The purpose of the armed forces is to fight effectively and win decisively with as few casualties as possible. Allowing women in combat is a social experiment of huge dimensions with the highest possible risk."
\textsuperscript{141} Huntington notes that as a country's strategic threats grow, the influence of domestic priorities on military policy decreases. Similarly, when foreign threats fade, military policy tends to be driven more by structural factors, as the country can now afford the luxury of worrying about domestic needs. (Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics}, p. 20)
most pressing duty: protecting the country. Thus, the recent spate of innovations that seek to alter the missions and profile of the US military could only emerge after the dangers of the Cold War were laid to rest.142

The ultimate source for many instances of civilian intervention for structural reasons is the mood of the country, translated into public pressure on politicians to address certain issues, usually social or economic in nature.143 The military itself is not directly susceptible to public pressure, but elected officials are, and pressure to either change the makeup of the military or use the military for novel purposes is channeled through the halls of Congress and the White House.144 The more the public is concerned about a particular issue, the greater the pressure on politicians to act. For example, Truman’s order to racially integrate military units arose from public pressure. Black Americans were determined in the post-war period to use their political power to attain the equal rights due them.145 The black press amplified their cause. It took up this issue of integration in the military and assured that politicians would take notice. Like desegregation, the call to allow women a role in combat also derives from pressure from the general public. Similarly, one of the rationales for Clinton’s promise to intervene on behalf of homosexuals wanting an end to the military’s ban on gays and lesbians is that his candidacy received support from gay political action committees, who contributed around $3 million to his campaign and who voted for him largely as a block.146

The effectiveness of public pressure in motivating civilian intervention is often augmented by the actions of particular congressional representatives who adopt an issue as their personal cause and devote a great deal of time to it. The role of Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) in the women in combat case is one such example.147 So too is Rep. Gary Studds (D-MA) in the homosexuals in the military case. In cases where the public

142 Similarly, after World War I, when many people mistakenly thought that the War to End All Wars had done just that, a move to civilianize the military arose in the US. As Martin Van Creveld explains, “During the interwar period in particular, the dominant business culture rejected militarism as a vestige leftover from a barbarous past. Reform minded liberals, by contrast, were prepared to retain the army, but only insofar as it shed its military character and became an instrument of social reform.” Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance: 1939-1945, p. 20.
143 Huntington notes that the individual has little interest in strategic decisions regarding the military “so long as his government maintains the minimum prerequisites of security and order.” (Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, p. 443.) As a result, the public will rarely push for strategic changes whose effects on military capabilities are beyond the concern or understanding of the layman at best, and, at worst, promise to draw on scarce resources that could be directed elsewhere.
144 Salamon and Wamsley note that “federal bureaucrats [like the military] respond not to some broad public interest, but to the particularistic demands of key congressmen, to those nongovernmental actors among the agency’s clients, or to the enemies who have the organization, efficacy, and intensity to influence legislative behavior.” (Salamon and Wamsley, “The Federal Bureaucracy: Responsiveness to Whom?,” p. 157.)
145 Dalifume, Desegregation of the US Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953, p. 3.
has little understanding of the issues involved, such personal crusades can take the place of public pressure. The Goldwater-Nichols and Special Operations Forces cases each illustrate the important role that individual members of Congress can play when they take up an issue that the public is relatively unconcerned with.

Often, intervention that is structural in nature is driven not by social issues but by economic ones. Civilians are concerned with minimizing spending on defense so that more money will be available for domestic programs. The military, in contrast, tends to value the performance of its weapons more than their ultimate cost. This tendency is driven in part by the fact that military personnel's lives depend on this performance. In order to bring the military more in line with civilian concerns for economy, intervention is necessary at times. The military rarely appreciates being forced to trade performance for cost. The entire McNamara era consisted of fights over this trade-off. One example in particular was the TFX, one of the earliest instances where McNamara challenged the standard method of weapons procurement by requiring that greater importance be placed on cost estimates and commonality, primarily at the expense of performance.\textsuperscript{148} The A-7 was a replay of TFX experience.

One special type of structurally-driven civilian intervention is forced innovation geared towards using military resources to address non-military problems. Such mission innovations require the military to undertake novel tasks that have little or nothing to do with traditional combat. Examples of this type of innovation include the drug interdiction mission, which was forced on the military by civilians, and Operation Provide Hope, the humanitarian aid mission to Somalia, which civilians volunteered the military for.\textsuperscript{149} In such cases, intervention is not intended to solve a problem that exists either in the realm of international security or in the military itself, therefore any decision to push the military into new areas of operation requires some explanation.

A fundamental aspect of civilian intervention to use the military for non-military missions is the fact that, under normal circumstances, the military would not think of conducting such missions on its own. Such untraditional tasks fall completely outside of

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{149} Some innovations of this nature are virtually impossible for the military to resist and therefore do not become forced innovations as much as they do new programs of action initiated by civilians. The use of the military for a specific non-military mission, such as Operation Provide Hope or disaster relief in Bangladesh, usually arise as a response to a specific instance where action is needed immediately. In such cases, civilians tell the military to act, and it has little choice but to do so. Resistance just is not possible. In other types of cases, such as the drug interdiction mission, where the military is asked to plan for and engage in a long-term mission, the situation is much different. Here, timing is not as urgent, and action is not judged by a simple go, no-go criterion. The military can more easily delay implementation of civilian desires without appearing to be insubordinate.
the military's normal channels of concern. Thus, problems such as drug trafficking or starving children will remain irrelevant to the military unless civilians order it to take note. When organizations like the military do not move into new areas of operation on their own is due not so much to a resistance to change as it is to what Mohr refers to as "the absence of a vigorous search for new alternatives under circumstances where the existing program is regarded as satisfactory." The military is a strong believer in avoiding what Peter Lynch refers to as "diworsification," in which an organization takes on unfamiliar tasks only to find that performance of its core tasks suffers as a result.

This characteristic of the military, or of any organization, for that matter, resembles a cybernetic approach to decision making. As John Steinbruner explains, in such an approach "decision mechanisms screen out information which the established set of responses are not programmed to accept." For example, information that the country is suffering from a serious drug problem does not fall within the military's established feedback loops, so it does not address the issue beyond removing drug users from its own ranks. As a result, civilians must force the military to address such issues by, in effect, mandating the creation of new mechanisms for action and information gathering. As Wilson notes, "Outside forces -- academic scientists, industrial engineers, civilian theorists, members of Congress, and presidential aides -- all induce the military to embrace programs that initially [seem] irrelevant to (or at odds with) their core tasks."

Faced with problems that the military would not usually address on its own, the decision by civilians to employ military assets as a solution is not an automatic one. Certain characteristics about the military frequently make it an attractive tool for civilians to reach for. Most significantly, the military presents civilians with a tantalizing mix of assets and capabilities. In terms of a composite of manpower, budget, and equipment, the military is far and away the largest agency in the federal government. Its troops, ships, and planes represent a substantial investment that all taxpayers have helped pay for. All of these resources are engaged in their primary purpose of fighting a war only on rare

150 As Hult and Walcott note, "Structures already in place [in an organization] shape perceptions of decision contexts. Hierarchical authority can define values and procedures in such a way that problems or decision contexts are forced to fit or treated as 'irrelevant' or 'insoluble.'" Significantly, such structuring is a potent means of containing uncertainty and conflict." (Karen Hult and Charles Walcott, "Organizational Design as Public Policy," Policy Studies Journal Spring, 1989: 484.)
151 March and Simon, Organizations, p. 174.
occasions. The rest of the time, to the untrained observer, they are just sitting around. As a result, the military offers a large pool of manpower, machines, and money that can seemingly be applied to any problem. The military's resources, combined with its historical record of success, make it an attractive option for civilians seeking to get a particular job done. There tends to be a general feeling that the military is capable of anything. As Donald Mabry notes, "Americans have great respect for the integrity and ability of their military, and more than that, have an almost childlike faith in it. Americans want the cavalry to come to the rescue, as it did in so many movies they saw as children."\textsuperscript{155} Finally, the weight that calling out the troops to handle a problem carries with the public and the world allows politicians to make a statement regarding their commitment to a problem without really having to do much.

*THE ROLE OF MILITARY FAILURE*

Although most cases of civilian intervention to force the military to innovate can be explained by strategic or structural rationales, there is a third driver of intervention that deserves special attention. Instances where the military in some way fails often lead to civilian intervention in order to force innovation intended to preclude future failures. Thus, failure can create a crisis for the military by calling its shortcoming to the attention of civilians (see discussion of crisis above).

Posen notes that "disasters fresh in a state's memory are great promoters of civilian intervention, even if no immediate threat appears on the horizon."\textsuperscript{156} If it is probable that the same type of situation in which the military failed could occur again, then the impetus to push a remedy of the civilians' choosing on the military will be more pressing. As Allan Millet points out, military failure can be assessed in two main dimensions: performance during war and performance during peace. The latter of these dimensions refers to the ability of the military to raise, equip, and prepare its forces for conflict.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, there does not have to be a war for civilians to perceive that the military is somehow failing.

An excellent example of the magnetic effect that military failure has on civilian intervention is found in the aftermath of the failed rescue of the American hostages held in the US embassy in Tehran and the clumsy execution of the invasion of Grenada.


\textsuperscript{156} Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars*, p. 76.

two episodes were studied in great detail, the Holloway Commission's study of Desert One being one such effort. In these two operations civilians found unmistakable evidence that the structure of the military contained serious flaws. This lesson led directly to several forced innovations, including the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms\textsuperscript{158} and the revitalization of US Special Operations forces.

A somewhat different type of military failure, one in which the military fails to meet previous civilian demands, can also bring civilians to intervene in order to force innovation. Usually, when civilians desire a change in military practices, they request that the services take steps on their own to address the problem in question. In most cases, the military decides how best to handle the situation and the issue is resolved. Sometimes, however, the rigidity of the military is such that it ignores or tries to dodge civilian requests for change. When the military fails to meet civilian requests in this way, suggestions for change can soon turn to demands as civilians intervene to force innovation on a military that has failed to clean up its act on its own. An excellent example of this is found in the Special Operations Forces case. The military did not adequately deal with repeated civilian requests to improve the status of these forces and soon found itself being forced to create a unique command to protect the interests of the special operations community.

**FACILITATORS OF THE DECISION TO INTERVENE**

Whatever the underlying reason for the civilian choice to force innovation, this decision is often made easier by two factors that facilitate the willingness of civilians to intervene. The first is that, as my definition of innovation reflects, an innovation is not something that appears out of thin air. It can be a tactic, technology, or organizational structure that is well-established elsewhere. Civilians can draw innovative ideas from foreign organizations, domestic rivals, or even from the long-forgotten history of the same organization.\textsuperscript{159}

Posen argues that one of the values of interservice rivalry in post-World War II America was that it produced "a menu of innovations for policymakers."\textsuperscript{160} In other

\textsuperscript{158} Reforms can be innovations, even though the word "reform" seems to connote an evolutionary change. As Blackwell and Blechman note, reform is "not evolutionary because it cannot occur in small steps over a long period of time. The essence of reform is rapid, fundamental change in basic operating procedures." James Blackwell Jr. and Barry Blechman, "The Essence of Reform," in *Making Defense Reform Work*, ed. James Blackwell Jr. and Barry Blechman. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1990), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{159} Of course, as Mohr notes, the existence elsewhere of such proposed innovations do not necessarily make them any more attractive to the military. In fact, the military can often be more hostile to such foreign solutions, labelling them with a not-invented-here stigma.

\textsuperscript{160} Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars*, p. 57.
words, differences between the services provided civilians with different images of how to do things. As a result, one service's practices in a particular area might be particularly attractive to civilians, who then try to apply them to another service. The A-7 is an excellent example of this. Secretary of Defense McNamara saw this aircraft, already fielded by the Navy, as the most economical way of providing the Air Force with a dedicated close air support aircraft. Although the Navy was used to operating single-purpose aircraft, the Air Force was not, and the flying of a sub-sonic aircraft with minimal air-to-air capability was an innovation that the Air Force did not want.

The menu of innovations that civilians can select from includes more than just domestic selections. Foreign options are also available. The existence of a weapons system or program in a foreign military that performs successfully can offer civilians an image of what their own military could be like if it innovated. Both allies and enemies can serve as foreign models. The only difference is that an idea adopted from an enemy has elements of both emulation and the need to match an opponent's military capabilities across the board. An example of the value of foreign innovation menus is found in the Special Operations Forces case. The successful histories of the British SAS and German GSG-9 units, and the extensive Soviet Spetsnaz special warfare forces, stressed to American civilian leaders the potential of these types of forces and helped to shape the effort to push the US military to fully develop them. The case of women in combat is one where foreign models are pointed to by both proponents and opponents of the innovation. Opponents cite the unsuccessful Israeli experiences in 1948. Proponents cite other examples, such as the Viet Cong's use of women as irregulars and Great Britain, which allowed women on combat vessels during Desert Storm. Similarly, proponents of rescinding the ban on homosexuals in the military are quick to point out the many countries whose militaries do not discriminate against gays. Rep. Studds (D-MA), for example, argues that the recent decision by Canada to allow gays in the ranks undermines the US military's arguments

against gays. Other proponents are quick to note that most of NATO's militaries are open
to homosexuals.163

Whether domestic or foreign, innovation menus facilitate civilian intervention by
demonstrating what is possible. This keeps the service or military under fire from claiming
that the changes that civilians want are infeasible. Menus also provide civilians with ready-
made recipes for solutions to a host of problems. This is particularly important, given that
civilians rarely have the expertise required to formulate detailed military proposals entirely
on their own.

The second main facilitator to civilian decisions to intervene to force innovation is the
naiveté that civilians tend to have with regards to pushing change on the military. Civilian
failure to recognize the magnitude of their proposals is symptomatic of what Albert
Hirschman calls the Hiding Hand. As he defines it, the Hiding Hand causes people to
consistently underestimate the "difficulties of the tasks" they face.164 Although Hirschman
was not discussing anything like forced innovation, much of what he says is directly
applicable to this subject.

The effects of the Hiding Hand make civilians more willing to undertake forced
innovation. "The Hiding Hand is essentially a way of inducing action through error, the
error being an underestimate of the project's cost or difficulties."165 Civilians are quicker
to push for innovation "because of the erroneously presumed absence of a challenge --
because the task looks easier and more manageable than it will turn out to be."166 They
tend to see an innovation that they push for "as more routine, simple, [and] undemanding
of genuine creativity than it will turn out to be."167 In other words, civilians often do not
recognize the fact that the changes they are proposing might require a major effort on the
part of the military. Civilians can also be blind to the fact that the changes they want
represent an innovation to the military. Rarely do they note on their own that an innovation
might have serious negative organizational side effects. As a result, civilian are more likely
to try to force innovation on the military. They are also more disposed to choose a practice
or technology from existing menus of innovation in the belief that it will be easily applied to

163 Amy Graves, "A Victory in Canada," Bay Windows Oct. 29-Nov. 5, 1992: 1. See also Eric Schmitt,
"Barring Homosexuals Called Costly to Military," New York Times June 20, 1992: A6; Alan Riding, "In NATO,
the Editor," Wall Street Journal Dec. 18, 1992: A11; and Eric Schmitt, "Gay Soldiers No Problem Elsewhere,
a new situation, even though in reality this is often not the case.\textsuperscript{168} The A-7 example mentioned above and the problems of developing the TFX for both the Navy and the Air Force are evidence of this. In both of these cases, differences between how the Navy and Air Force preferred to operate complicated their both using the same aircraft.

The counterinsurgency case offers a good illustration of the Hiding Hand at work. President Kennedy and his advisors, for example, did not grasp the true challenge of pushing the Army in a new and unpopular direction.\textsuperscript{169} Kennedy had no idea how difficult a simple decision like issuing green berets for Army Special Forces would actually be. Nor did he appreciate the extent of innovation that the counterinsurgency program he wanted entailed. Blaufarb contends that Kennedy and his advisors were ignorant of "the true depth of the revolution they were calling for."\textsuperscript{170}

Wilson notes that the proponent of an innovation will clearly see the potential benefits, while any costs incurred by the adoption of the innovation will appear remote and will be borne by the organization, not the proposer. This situation is reversed for the organization's members.\textsuperscript{171} Thus, when facing forced innovation, the military does not fall victim to the Hiding Hand's optimism. The first thing that it sees are an innovation's potential costs.

The military's approach to civilian oversight often helps create an environment where the problems posed by the Hiding Hand can most easily occur. Efforts by the military to keep the details of its profession to itself in order to maintain a monopoly on expertise, combined with the understandable practice of rarely framing issues bluntly in terms of organizational interests, help to mask the magnitude of the challenge facing civilians forcing innovation. This dissertation is intended to combat this problem by improving the vision of civilians contemplating forced innovation. It does so by fully explaining the phenomenon of forced innovation, thus removing the Hiding Hand from the eyes of policymakers so that they have a better idea of what they are doing when they choose to intervene.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[169] Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era}, p. 82.
\item[170] Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era}, p. 82. He suggests that "if they had delved into these aspects of the problem they might then have arrived at a solution more likely to have satisfied both the army's objections and the demands of their own doctrine."
\end{footnotes}
THE VARIABLES OF MILITARY RESISTANCE

The preceding section provided a critical ingredient in my effort to model forced innovation: it offered a series of reasons for why civilians decide to intervene to force innovation. The next element that the model needs is an explanation of why the military chooses to resist certain innovations that civilians favor. The first four of the six variables in my framework provide just such comprehension.

The four variables that explain the military's resistance to a particular forced innovation highlight how that innovation challenges the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. In accordance with Wilson's point that innovation can not be understood without first examining what is changing, each of the manifestations of these variables is shaped by how a given innovation forces the military to change along these four dimensions. In other words, unlike crises and the reasons why civilians decide to intervene, these variables are innovation-specific. They are directly dependent on the characteristics of the innovation in question.

The more incompatible an innovation is with the military's interests in these four areas, the more the military will resist adopting that innovation. As Everett Rogers notes,

Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is consistent with existing values and past experiences of the adopters. An idea that is not compatible with the cultural norms of a social system will not be adopted so rapidly as an idea that is compatible. Compatibility insures greater security to the potential adopter and makes the new idea more meaningful to him.\textsuperscript{172}

The following four variables all measure the degree of compatibility present (or lacking) in every potential innovation.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY

The more an innovation conflicts with the military's professional identity, the greater the resistance to that innovation will be. Professional identity has two main components. The first has to do with the characteristics of professions in general. The second reflects the culture and sense of mission peculiar to the military as a whole and to subgroups, such as the separate services.

\textsuperscript{172} Rogers, \textit{Diffusion of Innovations}, pp. 126-27.
The very professionalism that makes the modern military a successful manager of violence in service of the state also operates as an impediment to innovation in general and forced innovation in particular. As Kurt Lang notes, "The realism demanded from the military has its counterpart in the romanticism of the profession, so that distrust of change may very well be the price paid for the military man's dedication to the cultivation of martial arts in peacetime."\textsuperscript{173}

Change will be viewed even more harshly by the military if it is imposed from without. An organization like the modern professional military will have a reduced responsiveness to outside interests. With a strong sense of professionalism comes a greater concern for both individual advancement and the health of the parent organization. As a result, the needs of the broader public, or, in the case of the military, the desires of civilian leaders, may be superseded by more self-serving concerns\textsuperscript{174} -- of course, faith in one's profession leads one to believe that what is good for that profession is also good for the country. Similarly, the problems posed by servicism, the tendency to seek the needs of one's own service rather than of all services, grow from a strong professional identity with a particular service at the expense of the military establishment as a whole.

In \textit{The Soldier and the State}, Huntington discusses three main attributes that all professions share. Each of these characteristics is present in the military and, when challenged by a particular innovation, make military resistance more likely. The first of Huntington's distinguishing attributes of a profession is \textit{expertise}. According to him, a profession is based on "specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor... [this knowledge] is the basis of objective standards of professional competence for separating the profession from laymen."\textsuperscript{175} Most instances of forced innovation conflict with the expertise characteristic of military professionalism because civilians are, in effect, questioning the military's competence. As Samuel Finer notes, military expertise can lead to "an insistence [by the military] that the military and only the military are entitled to determine [policy] on such matters as recruitment, training, numbers and equipment."\textsuperscript{176} Civilians are implying that they know how the military profession should operate better

\textsuperscript{173} Lang, "Military Organizations," p. 257.
\textsuperscript{175} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations}, p. 8. Huntington, whose respect for military professionalism can be a bit extreme at times, argues that professional expertise "justifies military disobedience" in cases where the political leadership calls on the military to do something that goes against the logic contained in the military's professional standards. (p. 77.)
than the professionals themselves.\textsuperscript{177} Thus, McNamara's efforts to force the military to procure the TFX, A-7, and M16 were a direct affront to military expertise, as McNamara and his staff were telling the military which weapons it needed.

The second of Huntington's professional attributes is \textit{corporateness}. He notes that "the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen." In addition, "The interest of the profession requires it... to protect itself against outsiders who would claim professional competence because of achievements or attributes in other fields."\textsuperscript{178} Forced innovation is a challenge to the corporateness characteristic in that it represents an attempt by laymen to operate as if they were members of the profession.

Challenges to corporateness often go hand in hand with affronts to expertise. The TFX case provide a good example of this. After the military had unanimously chosen Boeing's paper prototype submission to the TFX contest, it found itself reversed by McNamara, who chose the General Dynamics-Grumman team instead. It appeared to the services that McNamara was telling them that he knew better than they what type of plane was best for them. This was a direct affront to professional expertise. The fact that McNamara was making the final choice independently put him in a position that the military brass had long occupied. He was, in effect, operating as a member of the profession, which he was not. This slighted the corporateness aspect of the military's professionalism.

The corporateness of the military can also be challenged by innovations which threaten to cause divisions within the military profession along lines other than rank or service affiliation. Such innovations threaten the unity aspect of this characteristic of professionalism. The Special Operations Forces innovations of the 1980s are an example of this. The military has long disliked elite units because the "special" label is an artificial designation that seems to set these groups above the rest of the military (see Chapter 3). Similarly, Kennedy's decision to force the JCS to allow the Army Special Forces that were integral to his counterinsurgency program to wear green berets was bitterly opposed by the

\textsuperscript{177} Recognizing this problem in 1964, Col. Robert Ginsburgh noted, "It is not too difficult for a military man to accept an adverse decision based on nonmilitary considerations. It becomes extremely difficult, however, for him to reconcile himself to an adverse decision by his civilian superior based on military considerations. This strikes at the very \textit{raison d'être} of the military man. It challenges his military professionalism." (Col. Robert Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," \textit{Foreign Affairs} Jan., 1964: 255.)

\textsuperscript{178} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations}, p. 3.

James Wilson describes a professional as "someone who receives important occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to people who have undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a group-defined code of proper conduct. The more the individual allows his or her behavior to be influenced by the desire to obtain rewards from this reference group, the more professional is his or her orientation." (Wilson, \textit{Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It}, p. 69.) Thus, the true professional seeks reassurance from his or her peers, not from civilians, who are outsiders. In the case of forced innovation, members are rewarded for towing the line and resisting intervention. This makes the civilians' task that much more difficult.
Army. The idea of allowing women in combat also challenges the corporateness aspect of the male-dominated military. Opponents of allowing women in combat units argue that their presence would decimate unit esprit by inhibiting the male bonding that is an integral part of such units. The acceptance of homosexuals in the military is opposed for similar reasons. Opponents of such a move claim that interaction between the homosexuals and heterosexuals would be quite strained and that it would be impossible for homosexuals to command heterosexuals, who most likely would not respect gays or lesbians.

The final attribute of professionalism that Huntington explores is responsibility. The profession's client is society and the professional performs a service that "is essential to the functioning of society." It is responsible to the needs of the society. In the case of the military, it is beholden to protect national security and interests in service of the state.

The fact that the military is responsible to society would seem to mitigate the willingness of the military to resist civilian desires. This is not the case for two reasons. First, relying on its expertise, the military profession is convinced that it, and not civilians, knows the best way to manage violence. Often, when civilians seek to force change upon the military, the military depicts this attempt as threatening the military's ability to carry out its sworn duty to protect the country (see the Military Tactics section below). They see politicians trying to use the military for political purposes, not civilians honestly concerned with national security. Efforts to push the military into drug interdiction are an excellent example of this. The military repeatedly claimed that to do all that was being asked of it in the drug mission, it would be less able to carry out its duty of protecting America's security, its primary responsibility.

The second reason why the responsibility aspect of professionalism does not do away with military resistance to civilian desires is that, as Huntington notes, the officer is torn between "a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society." It is hard for the military to turn its back on its traditions in order to undertake an innovation that may or may not actually help society.

It is possible in rare cases that an innovation can directly challenge the responsibility aspect of the military's professionalism. The permissive action links case is one such

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180 See Heckshir, "War and the Second Sex," p. 26. As one strong critic of allowing women in combat sees the issue, "If esprit de corps, cohesiveness, discipline, and controlled aggression are essential to an organization's success, it cannot be sexually integrated." (Lt. T. M. Downing, "Just Say No!," Proceedings Feb., 1992: 45.)
example. PALs reflected a certain lack of trust in the military profession, thus questioning the military's dedication to the needs of its client. As Stein and Feaver note, "The slur on military responsibility and loyalty implied by the fear of unauthorized use insulted the military who thought that the real threat of accidental war might stem from hasty or ill-conceived action by the civilians." Admiral Miller further notes with regard to the Navy that such "doubt about the integrity, loyalty, and normalcy [sic] of our [ballistic missile submarine commanders] must be frustrating and irritating to the superb personnel in those positions."

Although all professions share Huntington's three attributes, each has a very unique organizational culture and sense of mission. This particular characteristic of professional identity goes by many different names in the literature. Salamon and Wamsley speak of organizational ethos, which they define as "the more or less explicit set of norms and beliefs that defines the agency's mission, both means and ends. The ethos thus gives agency cadre a sense of identity and guarantees some coherence in task accomplishment." Similarly, Halperin and Kanter refer to organizational essence, which "refers to the notion held by members of an organization as to what the main capabilities and primary mission of the organization should be." Wilson discusses organizational culture, which he says is "a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization." He notes that "when an organization has a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike, we say the organization has a sense of mission."

A strong sense of mission provides an organization with "a basis for recruiting and socializing new members," facilitates the use of incentives by managers, allows for a sense of elán, and discourages shirking of duties. However, a strong sense of mission can cause several problems, Wilson notes. First, "Tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it." In the military, mine warfare is an example of such a task. As a result, civilians might have to step in to ensure that these tasks are not neglected. Second, "Organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture. The

188 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, p. 91.
189 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, p. 95.
190 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, p. 95.
stronger and more uniform the culture — that is, the more the culture approximates a sense of mission — the more obvious these consequences."\textsuperscript{192}

The overarching culture, or professional identity, of the military as a whole is that of the warrior. The self-image is that of the traditional heroic figure: brave, loyal, strong, and male. Any innovation that calls for the military to challenge this most basic building block of its identity is sure to arouse resistance from within the ranks. New missions that are not military in nature, such as the counternarcotics mission, do not mesh with the warrior culture because they require members of the profession to act as if they were members of another occupational group, in this example, law enforcement agents.\textsuperscript{193} Other innovations that seek to alter the makeup of the military can threaten the image of what a military officer is. The debate over the social innovations of women in combat and homosexuals in the military illustrates this fact. Part of the warrior identity in all of the services is that of the strong male. The image of women fighting, killing, and dying alongside men does not fit with this identity. Homosexuals, particularly gay men, are an equally poor match. They are considered unmanly and, therefore, unable to fight "like a man."\textsuperscript{194} One observer notes, "To survive in a killing field, a warrior has to believe he's invincible, that he's wearing golden armor; that he can buck 1,000-to-1 odds and live. To think that way, he has to be macho. Fairly or unfairly, gays threaten that macho."\textsuperscript{195}

Part of the warrior image that pervades the military's professional identity is that of the aggressor. Militaries have always preferred to be on the offensive, seeking and destroying the enemy rather than standing and defending against an attacker. Any innovation that forces the military to operate in a defensive mode therefore conflicts with professional identity.\textsuperscript{196} As Jack Snyder notes, this preference is rooted in the budgetary, prestige, and autonomy advantages that an offensive doctrine provides.\textsuperscript{197} All of the European militaries maintained offensive doctrines on the eve of World War I, even though technological advances and recent conflicts demonstrated the advantages that defense would most likely hold in the next war. The preference of the military profession for offensive actions also

\textsuperscript{193} As Charles Dunlap, Jr. suggests in his fictional account of why their was a military coup in 2012, one of the roots of this coup was the many new, non-military missions given to the military in the 1990s. He says that "the military was told to alter its purpose.... The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves warriors. Instead, they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians -- everything but warfighters." Dunlap Jr., \textit{The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{195} David Hackworth, \textit{The Key Issue is Trust}, \textit{Newsweek} Nov. 23, 1992: 27.
\textsuperscript{196} This would not be the case if the military in question had a defensive doctrine, but such a doctrine is not very common and has been considerably less fashionable after the French experience of World War II.
played a role in the Royal Navy's reluctance to implement the convoy system in World War I. The Royal Navy preferred to go on the offensive against German U-boats rather than riding shotgun for merchant ships in a convoy system.\footnote{See Arthur Marder, \textit{From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, Vol. IV} (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 115-166. The World War I convoy case is very interesting because it has long been a point of contention as to whether or not the initiative of the convoy was, in fact, an innovation forced by British Prime Minister Lloyd George on a reluctant Admiralty. Marder does a good job of showing that, even though George was prepared to force the Royal Navy's hand, the admirals decided on their own to start convoying ships. This decision arose from two factors. First, the level of shipping losses to German submarine warfare had grown to an unacceptable level. This is an example of the military reacting to a crisis of failure during wartime. Second, the entrance of the United States into the war provided the Royal Navy with the escort ships that it thought it previously lacked. Even though the Admiralty in the end decided to act on its own, this case exhibits all of the hallmarks of forced innovation that my framework predicts one would see.}


As a result, the Army not only resisted this aspect of counterinsurgency, it made offensive search-and-destroy methods the foundation of its own counterinsurgency program.

One final aspect of the military-wide professional identity of the warrior is the fact that the US military exists to execute the legitimate use of violence when the civilian government determines that such action is necessary.\footnote{Foreign militaries that actively seek political roles do not share this aspect of professional identity.} The military has no desire to operate as an equal with its civilian masters by becoming involved in purely political decisions and actions. Although it certainly wants a voice in budget and employment questions, the military has no desire to help run the government. Innovations that force the military to operate in a non-military, or political, role, therefore tend to foster resistance from the military. For example, the requirements of the counterinsurgency mission that was forced on the military during the Vietnam War were problematic in this respect. The idea of becoming involved in the governing of Vietnam on a local level went against the military's identity as a servant of politics, not a formulator of it. According to Richard Betts, "The reason that counterinsurgency was never enthusiastically adopted by the military elite was that it was not a thoroughly military mission and was incompatible with
their conception of professionalism." Similarly, the military leadership of the 1940s and 1950s resisted the desegregation of units. They saw racial integration as a political issue, and integrating would violate the need to separate the military and political realms.

Although the entire military shares certain professional characteristics, each service also has its own professional identity, reflected in a strong sense of mission and a unique culture that complicates efforts to present them with innovations that do not fit their self-image. The more an innovation conflicts with a service’s sense of mission, the more strongly the service will resist that innovation. To be able to examine how a given innovation might challenge professional identity, one must first have a basic understanding of the personalities of each of the three main services. In his book, *The Masks of War*, Carl Builder examines these identities. According to Builder, the Army is based on the ideal of service to the country. It is concerned primarily with its size as expressed in terms of people, not equipment. The Army believes wholeheartedly in the value of overwhelming firepower. Its purpose is to take and hold ground. The Navy cherishes tradition and "the concept of independent command at sea." It is concerned primarily with capital ships, and the number of ships that it has is also important. Control of the seas is its main purpose. The Air Force is obsessed with technology and flight. It is concerned with increasing the technology of its aircraft, and would rather have fewer high-tech aircraft than more low-tech ones. Art and Ockenden also note that "since its inception, the United States

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202 Stillman, *Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces*, p. 35.
203 The fact that the various services have different values and experiences accounts for much of the division within the military over certain innovations. Each group has its own interests. In addition, what may be an innovation for one may be a natural progression for another. See the Military Unity section below.
204 The Marines and Coast Guard are left out here because, as Builder puts it, "Neither the Marine Corps nor the Coast Guard enters the defense planning arena as an independent institutional actor with a significant voice in the national approach to strategy or military force planning." (Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 9.) In addition, their small size relative to the other services is such that the topic of forced innovation can be thoroughly examined without having to account for the independent personalities of these organizations.
205 Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, pp. 18-21. Of these service identities, Builder says that "they may be simultaneously one of the most useful and most neglected aspects [of the military] deserving consideration. Their value is that they reveal or explain so much, yet take so little effort to grasp or remember." (p. 9.)
206 Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, p.19-22. Builder also argues that the Army's sense of mission and culture is less defined than the other services, making it somewhat more open to new ideas. He also credits this relatively greater openness to the fact that the Army must be prepared to bear the brunt of fighting in any war and, therefore, has the most to lose should it find itself ill-prepared. In other words, the Army is more susceptible to being placed in crisis-producing situations that are the other services.
207 This reliance on firepower has its roots in the practice of scientifically managing combat. See Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance* 1939-1945, p. 167.
Air Force has identified itself intimately with the manned strategic bombardment mission."208

The more an innovation being forced on the services conflicts with these identities, the more the services will resist it. Examples of such conflict are numerous. All three main variants of the cruise missile posed challenges to service identities. The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was a direct threat to the Air Force's identity. The range of the ALCM was much longer than that of the attack missiles that the Air Force was trying to develop. This range raised "the specter of standoff operations," which were a serious challenge to the penetration mission so favored by the Air Force.209 In terms of the ground-launched cruise missile, the Air Force "had no taste for a mission that involved pushing around in the mud a cumbersome weapon that moreover required no pilot to fly it."210 The Army did not want the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in part because it could only perform a nuclear mission and did nothing to augment the conventional capabilities of the ground forces.211 The sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) contrasted with the identities of the aviation and submarine communities within the Navy. Professional submariners did not want SLCM because they were more concerned with Soviet submarines. They did not see their mission as involving attacks on surface ships or, even more so, on land targets. Also, as every SLCM meant one less torpedo a submarine could carry, the SLCM challenged the ability of the submariner to carry out his preferred mission.212 As Art and Ockenden put it, "the submariners were downright hostile to the operational implications of a strategic SLCM for their boats."213 Also, as Werrell notes, "Polaris submariners feared that the successor to their existing ballistic missile, the Trident, would be endangered by the emergence of the much cheaper and shorter-ranged cruise missile."214 Naval aviators saw the cruise missile as challenging their hold on the land and surface attack mission. One future CNO pointed out, "We already have a cruise missile, it's an A-7."215 The cruise missile also challenged the primacy of the aircraft carrier in naval operations. These missiles spread offensive firepower across the fleet, and their capabilities allowed much

smaller, less-expensive ships to carry out many of the missions that carrier aircraft had a monopoly on.216

The fact that different services and communities within services have different cultures and identities often accounts for their viewing the same innovation quite differently. This, in turn, creates both interservice and intraservice disunity (see the Military Unity section below). The cruise missile case noted above is but one example, as the surface community in the Navy favored the new weapon. Another is the A-7. This single-purpose plane was not an innovation for the Navy, which had a long history of fielding aircraft designed for only one mission.217 The A-7 reflected the naval attack aviation community's belief in "large numbers of load-carrying, low-cost aircraft to increase the cost-effectiveness of the attack carrier force."218 The Air Force, on the other hand, had always preferred multipurpose aircraft to perform the three tactical missions of close air support, interdiction, and air superiority. The A-7's conservative technology also went against the Air Force's preference for continuously advancing the level of technology embodied in its weapons.219

OPERATIONAL ROUTINES

The more an innovation conflicts with the routines that the military relies on to conduct its business, the greater the resistance to that innovation will be. The operational routine variable reflects this contention.220

216 Werrell, "The Weapon the Military Did Not Want: The Modern Strategic Cruise Missile," p. 434. In comparison, the surface Navy wanted a long-range cruise missile. (Art and Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of the Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980," p. 382.) For it, the missile would improve their offensive capabilities greatly. It did not challenge the surface community's missions or operational routines, but instead offered it new capabilities that were quite attractive.


220 Standard operating procedures (SOP) is a term commonly used for what I am calling operational routines. I do not refer to SOPs, defined by Allison as "rules according to which things are done," because of certain connotations that go with the SOP label. (Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 68.) In particular, many SOPs reflect factors closely related to professional identity. As Allison notes, "Most SOPs are grounded in the incentive structure of the organization or even in the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes and operating style of its members." (p. 83.) Thus, many SOPs are the result more of professional norms than they are of simple routine based on tradition. For example, while the Army resisted the M16 rifle because it violated the routine of arming individual soldiers with automatic weapons and threatened to waste ammunition, the foundation of resistance along these lines was the value of marksmanship that was part of the Army identity. The M16 was seen as challenging marksmanship as a professional skill. Thus, the SOP of arming troops with non-automatic weapons is really a reflection of professional identity and not operational routines. As such, this aspect of the M16 innovation and similar characteristics of other innovations, are best addressed by the professional identity variable.
Nearly all organizations develop set ways of carrying out different tasks. They rely on operations routines that dictate how a particular action is done. By following predetermined ways of doing things, organizations can minimize the opportunity to make mistakes. James Thompson notes that internal specialization in the form of routines allows organizations to operate "under conditions of certainty or near certainty."\footnote{Thompson, \textit{Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory}, p. 13.} The military is full of operational routines. Each subgroup has its own particular way of going about its business. Innovations that force a segment of the military to deviate from its established operational routines are more likely to engender resistance from the services.

As was mentioned above, tradition is very important to the military. Much of the power of tradition has to do with professional identity, but it also has to do with operational routine. The belief that the old, tried and true way of doing things is the best way is one aspect of the resiliency of operational routines. The reliance on routines should not be viewed as a symptom of stodginess and simple inertia, but rather of conservatism.\footnote{The military's reliance on operational routines make it somewhat unresponsive to novel civilian concerns, at least in the eyes of civilians. As Salamon and Wamsley note, "Rather than being impressed by the vast amount of routine work handled expeditiously, they [civilians] are more likely to be negatively impressed by some failure to give special handling or expeditious treatment to a matter that concerns them. Thus the very procedures that enable agencies to perform with general effectiveness by universal criteria can make them appear unresponsive." (Salamon and Wamsley, \textit{The Federal Bureaucracy: Responsiveness to Whom?}, pp. 175-76.) This image can lead civilians to feel that they must intervene in order to overcome the military's attachment to routines. When they do, the innovations they push will not mesh with the military's existing operational routines, giving the services another reason to resist that innovation.} New methods and mission bring with them uncertainty. There are numerous examples of the military resisting an innovation because of its conflict with exiting methods of doing things.

Rosen discusses how the decision in World War II to use US submarines in the Pacific against Japanese merchant vessels proved to be quite difficult to implement, largely because it called for the abandonment of existing operational routines.\footnote{See Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military}, pp. 130-147.} Submarine commanders, due to their pre-war training, were overly cautious about being detected by the enemy, and the idea of conducting search and destroy operations to sink merchant
shipping went against their built-in survival instincts. Only the eventual replacement of these men allowed for the successful adoption of this operational innovation.  

One of the most wide-spread and enduring of operational routines in the US military is that of the reliance on overwhelming firepower. It has long been the military's practice to apply the maximum amount of fire on any given target. This practice provides the greatest margin of error for the military and helps to reduce uncertainty. Innovations that force the military to abandon this practice are therefore not very popular, as they do not mesh with standard practice. The requirements of the counterinsurgency program of the 1960s created a challenge to this operational routine. Proper counterinsurgency did not require massive firepower. This went against common sense for most officers in the military. As Blaufarb notes, "It appeared to defy common sense to reduce a sophisticated and immensely potent war-making force to something far less potent and fearsome and then deploy it in combat." The revitalization of Special Operations Forces in the 1980s created a similar challenge to the firepower operational routine, as these forces were specifically designed to travel as light as possible, and they were intended to have little need for firepower beyond their personal weapons.

Often, innovations that conflict with the military's operational routines do so at the level of day-to-day operations, whether in wartime or peacetime. The innovation of allowing women in combat units is one such case. Women pose unique challenges to the way that the military conducts business. Opponents of a female combat role worry about the effects of menstrual cycles on the performance of female troops. More important is the issue of pregnancy and the effect that this has on readiness rates. A pregnant soldier, sailor, or pilot is no longer available to her unit and leaves a space that must be filled. Opponents of women in combat quickly point out, for example, that more than 1,200 women in the US military were sent home from the Gulf War because they were pregnant.

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224 Similarly, the submarine community of the 1970s did not want the SLCM in part because of its conflict with established operational routines. Submarine commanders feared that their boats would have to remain at specific firing points during crises, which went against standard practices. (Lehman, *Making War*, p. 142.) The strategic SLCM would also require submarines to move close in to enemy shorelines, making detection more probable, especially considering that the launch of a SLCM was sure to give the sub's location away. Also, these strategic SLCMs would probably be integrated into the SIOP, requiring close contact with SAC headquarters that could also lead to detection by the enemy. As Art and Ocken summarize, "Simply put, submarines could not be simultaneously attack and strategic." (Art and Ocken, "The Domestic Politics of the Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980," p. 391.) Permissive action links also challenged operational routines. The main problem that the military saw with PALs was that they would lessen the reliability of nuclear weapons should the need arise to use them. Should communication with those civilians holding access codes falter, or should the PAL itself malfunction, the weapon would be rendered useless.

Traditional all-male combat units do not have to deal with such issues. In addition, the way that militaries live in the field is such that integrated units create numerous problems. As one ex-Marine notes, "In infantry units, people bathe, undress, sleep, and relieve themselves quite close to one another. In combat, the situation is worse.... Most civilians are not even prepared to share public restrooms; how can they demand that the military men and women—in combat—suddenly forgo their need for privacy."227

**AUTONOMY**

The more an innovation conflicts with the military's autonomy, the greater the resistance to that innovation will be. For any organization, the ability to act as it wants is highly valued. The *autonomy* variable highlights this fact. Freedom of action, the product of autonomy, affords an organization the opportunity to protect its own interests and carry out its tasks in ways that best match its particular culture. The easiest way for an organization to stabilize both itself and the environment in which it operates is to maintain a high degree of autonomy. When an organization loses autonomy it finds itself at the mercy of other actors who have their own concerns and interests. An organization's autonomy can be challenged in any of three different dimensions: Autonomy is lost whenever an organization is required to interact with other groups, loses control of its own actions to another group, or loses control of a particular mission area to another organization. The military, like any organization, is very concerned with autonomy. For each community within the military, its freedom of action with regards to other military groups and civilians is highly valued. When an innovation challenges this freedom, it will face resistance from the military.

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226 Interestingly, this pregnancy figure is small when compared to the number of male soldiers who were lost from duty due to sports-related injuries, which one colonel claims produced the most casualties during the war. (Hackwith, "War and the Second Sex," p. 29.)

227 Luddy, "Two Wrongs Don’t Make it Right," p. 70. Similar to its argument against women in combat, the military argues that the cramped quarters that typify barracks and ships would create numerous difficulties in terms of forcing heterosexuals to cohabitate with homosexuals. As Gen. Colin Powell testified before the House, "It is difficult in a military setting where there is no privacy, where you don’t get choice of association, where you don’t get choice of where you live, to introduce a group of individuals who are proud, brave, loyal, good Americans but who favor a homosexual life style." (Eric Schmit, "Challenging the Military," *New York Times* Nov. 12, 1992: A1. See also Eric Schmit, "Chaplain Says Homosexuals Threaten the Military," *New York Times* Aug. 26, 1992: A16.) Highlighting this point, one Marine Corps General illustrated the problem that homosexuals pose to the normal way of doing things in the military by describing a situation that often occurs after field exercises when it’s time to clean up. As he put it, "We were standing in this shower tent, naked, waiting in line for 35 minutes for a 5-minute shower. Would I be comfortable knowing gays were standing there in line with us? No. It just introduces a tension you don’t need." (John Cushman Jr., "Top Military Officers Object to Lifting Homosexual Ban," *New York Times* Nov. 14, 1992: A9.)
The issue of autonomy is at the heart of any instance of forced innovation. Attempts by civilians to force innovation upon a reluctant military is first and foremost a challenge to military autonomy. Such efforts signify a loss of the military's control over its own affairs to civilians. This challenge provides a baseline for resistance by the military to civilian interference. Usually, this underlying level of attack on military autonomy goes hand-in-hand with a challenge to the military's professional identity, its expertise and corporateness. As Hendrickson puts it, "The resistance to outside pressure will become particularly acute if the military organization feels its autonomy is being challenged; for to the knowledge that its prerogatives are being usurped has to be added the inescapable indignity that it is considered incompetent." Thus, autonomy is a fundamental issue in all forced innovation cases.

Most innovations that civilians try to force on the military have additional challenges to autonomy, usually along one or more of the three dimensions noted above. First, some innovations require groups within the military to interact with other military and non-military groups to greater extent than in the past. Such increased interaction can be the result of organizational restructuring, the consolidation of existing missions, or the imposition of new missions. In all of these cases, different groups are forced to operate in the same policy space, which Downs defines as a specific social function that may be performed by one or more organizations. The region of a policy space controlled by one organization is its territory. The more crowded a policy space becomes, the more territories will overlap and the greater the potential for conflict among all parties is. In addition, greater interaction creates contingency uncertainty for all involved by changing negotiated environments and requiring the establishment of new patterns of cooperation and coordination.

The main problem with situations where two or more organizations must work together is highlighted by Anthony Downs' Law of Interorganizational Conflict, which states: "Every large organization is in partial conflict with every other social agent it deals

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228 The threat to autonomy inherent in civilian intervention complicates the ability of innovation proponents within the military to enlist civilian support for their ideas. In his study of innovation in the Navy, Vince Davis notes that would-be innovators within the service must seek a vertical political alliance and that when such an alliance cannot be formed with higher rank officers, innovators sometimes turn to civilians. This, in turn, assures even more resistance to their proposed innovation, as the Navy has "a very strong value pattern against the involvement of outsiders in settling disputes or disagreements 'within the family'" and resents any such intrusion into its affairs. As a result, a reliance on civilian allies can be counter-productive to innovation supporters unless they have already secured strong vertical support within the service. (Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, p. 37.)


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with."²³¹ Because of this conflict, "Bureaus consume a great deal of time and energy in territorial struggles that create no socially useful products."²³² As a result, in instances where interaction is required, all parties must tailor their actions to avoid creating conflict with each other. This represents a loss of operational freedom and autonomy.

The TFX development program, as imposed by McNamara, illustrates the problems that such interaction poses to the military. The bi-service nature of the TFX made development of the plane quite difficult, as two sets of priorities and specifications had to be taken into account. Going into the program, "Each service wanted to retain the privilege of autonomously developing its own weapon systems and consequently of tailoring them as much as possible to its respective needs."²³³ Instead, each lost its traditional freedom of action in procuring weapons.²³⁴

The drug interdiction mission offers another excellent example of the loss of autonomy that can occur when the military is forced to increase its interaction with other groups. The nature of this mission is such that the military must work closely with federal, state, and local governments, as well as with the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs, and numerous law enforcement agencies. The communication, coordination, and control problems created by novel interagency arrangements have been a constant headache for the military (see Chapter 2). The challenges of the interdiction mission to the interaction aspect of autonomy are particularly acute because the services are forced to work with non-military actors rather than each other, thus removing even the chance that a common identification with military norms could smooth cooperation problems.²³⁵

The second dimension of autonomy that forced innovation can challenge is the ability of groups within the military to control their own actions and assets. Although the need to coordinate actions with other groups as discussed above can be a headache for communities in the military, the need to take orders from others is infinitely more distasteful. Any innovation that changes command relationships within the military and increases one

²³¹ Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 216. (Emphasis removed.)
²³² Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 216. Downs further notes that "the excessive territorial sensitivity of other social agents makes it difficult for a bureau to avoid stirring up conflicts when it changes its own behavior. Since these conflicts are often extremely costly to the bureau, it normally seeks strategies by which it can minimize the amount of conflict engendered while it is carrying out its necessary changes." (p. 217)
²³⁴ Art says that through commonality, McNamara was forcing the services "to partake in the dismantling of their separate service identities." (Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military, p. 80.) This represented an egregious challenge to service autonomy.
²³⁵ Normally, the military enjoys a relatively autonomous existence. It has a large advantage over other government bureaucracies in that it has a monopoly on functions in its area of responsibility. It does not have to compete with other government agencies or with nongovernmental groups in the management of violence. Only when civilians use the military in non-traditional ways does autonomy with respect to extra-military agency competition become an issue.
group's subservience to others therefore poses a serious challenge to the autonomy of that group. Thus, in the TFX case, the Navy faced an additional threat to autonomy in that the Air Force was in charge of the development effort. The Navy feared that its priorities and operational requirements would suffer. The different requirements that each service had for the TFX assured that either the Navy, Air Force, or both, would not get the plane that it wanted.236

The loss of autonomy by means of increased subservience to others can also occur when an innovation provides civilians with greater control over military activities. The permissive action links (PALs) case offers an example of this. The services felt that PALs created an additional level of civilian oversight of the use of nuclear weapons that was both unneeded and threatened the reliability of the weapons. The Navy in particular viewed PALs as an issue of autonomy, and it still does. Stein and Feaver note that "sailors steeped in the Navy's traditions seem to find PALs equivalent to rudder orders radioed from the beach -- and just as repugnant."237 Counterinsurgency created similar problems of increased civilian oversight for the military. Blaufarb argues that proper counterinsurgency strategy requires close coordination, if not direction, by an overarching civilian authority. Such a system would create a loss of autonomy for the military, as its freedom of action in its counterinsurgency activities would be severely compromised.

The M16 case provides another example of an innovation that poses a loss of autonomy to civilians. From 1812 to 1962, the Army's Ordnance Department had controlled the development and production of nearly all Army weapons. It thus had a dominant position within the service.238 The M16 was a product of private industry and did not arise from Ordnance. This heritage challenged Ordnance's role within the Army and also earned the M16 the not-invented-here stigma. In questioning the Army's decision to procure the M14 instead of the M16, OSD "challenged the Army's right to make decisions about weapons procurement."239 The TFX case and the intimate role of McNamara in its production was a similar challenge to Air Force and Navy autonomy.

The third type of autonomy that a forced innovation can threaten is control over a particular mission area, or turf. The last thing that any group within the military wants is to

236 This is precisely what happened, as the plane eventually produced by the TFX program, the F-111, was deemed unsuitable for carrier operations.
237 Stein and Feaver, "Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links," p. 73. Adm. Miller agrees with this portrayal and shows that it is still a prevalent sentiment within the Navy. (See Miller, "Who Needs PALs?," p. 53.) Fears of such "rudder orders" was at the heart of the Navy's resistance to the innovation of radio in the early 1900s. (See Susan Douglas, "Technological Innovation and Organizational Change: The Navy's Adoption of Radio, 1899-1919," in Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience, ed. Merit Roe Smith. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.).
see one of its missions taken over by another organization, as this would represent both a relative and absolute loss of prestige and budget. The more important this mission is to a group's professional identity, the greater the impact of its loss, although groups will fight to keep even the missions that they do not want. For example, it would be much more damaging for the Air Force to lose control of the tactical air superiority mission to another service than it would be for it to lose the close air support mission, yet the Air Force has consistently fought to hold on to this less-favored mission.

Loss of a mission area is frequently accompanied by a corresponding loss of budget share and prestige. Thus, any innovation that promises to change the allocation of missions will be strongly resisted by the organization threatened with the loss of turf. One example of an innovation posing this type of challenge to autonomy is the cruise missile. The aviation community within the Navy feared that the addition of cruise missiles to surface ships would threaten the aviator's previous domination of the anti-ship and land attack missions. The surface community was well aware of this fact, and, desiring a share of these missions, supported the cruise missile for the same reasons that the aviators resisted it.

Sometimes, an innovation being forced on the military can challenge the military along all three dimensions of autonomy. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, which was actually a cluster of organizational innovations, is one such example. The service chiefs were all "vociferous in their opposition" to Goldwater-Nichols because it threatened to take power away from them in numerous ways.240 One of the main goals of the legislation was to create divisions within JCS in order to stop the logrolling that leads to a common military front against civilians on almost all issues. This was accomplished, in part, by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) more power in order to free him from the control of the service chiefs. This had the effect of placing the services below the CJCS. The legislation also called for the creation of a Vice CJCS, adding another player to the JCS and diluting the service chiefs' power further. Furthermore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was given a fair amount of influence over the procurement process, which came at the expense of the individual services. These are all examples of threats to autonomy along the dimension of subservience to others. Other challenges to service autonomy abounded in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The new requirements for joint service by officers with flag-rank aspirations and a stress on jointness in general posed problems of increased service interaction. Finally, the increased power given to Unified Command Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) over operations and

240 Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach President's Desk This Year," p. 16.
planning took power and autonomy away from the individual services and challenged their hold on most theater operations.

**BUDGET**

The more an innovation threatens the military's budget, the greater the resistance to that innovation will be. The budget variable, which reflects this contention, is the most straightforward of the four variables that explain the military's resistance to any given forced innovation. It incorporates the tendency of any organization to resist allocating scarce resources for projects that it does not desire. Corporations, for example, are loath to spend money for pollution control, and most would not do so if not for government regulation. The military is similar. The services make their decisions on how to spend precious dollars by what Alfred Paddock calls "the basis of essentiality."\(^{241}\) Programs not viewed as critical to the needs of a service will not enjoy a high funding priority.

Almost every innovation that civilians might force on the military will have a budgetary component to it.\(^ {242}\) Thus, this variable comes into play in nearly all cases of forced innovation. In general, the greater the fiscal requirements of an innovation, the more the military will resist it. This does not mean, however, that an innovation that threatens to drain $10 billion from a service's budget will be resisted on budgetary grounds ten times as strenuously than one that will cost only $1 billion. Relative amounts of money do not translate directly into relative levels of resistance. This is due to the fact that any money needed to fund an innovation will have to come from somewhere in the service budget, and those threatened with losing funds feel nearly as strongly about loosing $10 million as they do $100 million.\(^ {243}\)

If an innovation's budgetary threat disappears and its adoption promises additional funding, then resistance for monetary reasons can fade quickly. For example, once it became obvious that the counterinsurgency mission meant money, the services began to

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\(^{242}\) As one Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense noted, "Human nature resists change.... And, of course, when defense policy changes, defense budgets also change, and anytime one reallocates resources vested interests and the status quo are challenged." (Noel Koch, testifying before the House Appropriations Committee. Quoted in James Adams, *Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 266.)

\(^{243}\) As Admiral Stansfield Turner points out, there is someone whose job it is to fight for and protect every dollar in the budget, and no one wants to have the slice of the pie reduced. (Interview with Adm. Stansfield Turner, Sept. 30, 1992.)
compete for it.\textsuperscript{244} This rarely happens, however, and the military is usually quite wary about congressional promises to maintain healthy funding into the future for given programs. The services fear, quite justifiably, that in the end they will be stuck with the bill. The Fleet Ballistic Missile program, which produced the Navy's Polaris missile system, was an unforced innovation that provides an example of this happening. Promises by the Secretary of Defense that the cost of this innovation would be funded on top of regular Navy programs did not alter the reality of the situation. As Harvey Sapolsky notes, "It is clear that the Navy paid heavily for the program." It did so by slashing funds available for maintenance and the development of new equipment.\textsuperscript{245} Thus, even when civilians assure the military that innovations being forced on them will not cost the services anything, this is not always the case. The military realizes this, which adds to the impetus of resisting forced innovations on budgetary grounds.

THE VARIABLES THAT EXPLAIN OUTCOMES

The four variables discussed above, when taken together, explain why the military resists some innovations. Two other variables in my framework, \textit{military unity} and \textit{civilian unity}, explain the forces that determine the outcomes of instances of forced innovation. The level of unity exhibited by the services and by civilians has an important influence on the struggle over forced innovation. The more unified each side is, the better it is able to fight for its cause.

As Huntington notes, "A monopolist possesses advantages in dealing with a large number of firms on the other side of the market place. So also, a group which is structurally united possesses great advantages in dealing with a group which is structurally disunited."\textsuperscript{246} Thus, the relative levels of civilian and military unity go a long way towards determining the outcome of struggles over forced innovation. As with the variables of resistance, both the \textit{military unity} and \textit{civilian unity} variables are innovation-specific. This means that they focus on military and civilian unity only in terms of how it relates to the forced innovation in question. For example, if one is examining the case of women in combat, attention must be paid to how unified the services are in opposition to this

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\item \textsuperscript{244} McLintock, \textit{Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990}, p. 182.
\item \textsuperscript{245} Sapolsky, \textit{The Polaris System Development}, pp. 160-178.
\item \textsuperscript{246} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations}, p. 87.
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innovation. Their unity with regards to the drug interdiction mission, for example, is irrelevant to the issue of women in combat.

Outcomes of forced innovation struggles must not be thought of as a binary choice of an innovation being forced on the military or of the military successfully resisting civilian intervention. Instead, outcomes usually lie on a continuum, with the civilian's most extreme proposals for innovation at one end and the military's desire to totally reject the innovation at the other. Most cases produce end results that fall somewhere between these two extremes. For example, in the Goldwater-Nichols case, some reorganization proponents were pushing for replacing the JCS system with a Military Advisory Council, while the military and OSD wanted to affect only minor changes. The end result fell between these two options, as the resulting legislation maintained the JCS system in an altered form in an attempt to reduce service influence on it. Similarly, in the drug interdiction case some civilians wanted to grant the military full arrest powers, while many in the military wanted no role in the drug war at all. Once again, the result fell between these two extremes, with the military being given a low-level antidrug role: the detection and monitoring of smugglers. The relative levels of civilian and military unity determine how close to either extreme an outcome will fall. For example, the more civilians are unified and the less the military is, the closer an outcome will move towards the extreme desired by civilians.

**MILITARY UNITY**

The more unified the military is in opposition to an innovation, the harder it will be for civilians to force that innovation upon the military. Faced with a unified front, civilians' ability to intervene decreases. When cracks in the military's position exist, however, civilians can adopt a divide-and-conquer strategy. As Huntington notes, "In almost every modern state, the division of the military forces into two or more separate groups has been used to bolster civilian control."248

Military disunity aids civilians forcing innovation in several ways. Occasionally, an individual or a small group will seek out civilians to help reform the organization that they themselves are a part of. Such assistance can take several shapes, including supplying civilians with important technical data, identifying the true locus of resistance to a particular innovation within the military, and helping to lobby for the military to change. More often,

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247 See Figure 1 above for a graphic representation of this continuum in relation to the framework's variables.
however, "Military disunity increases administrative choices."²⁴⁹ Civilians can use one service that has embraced a particular innovation as a menu of innovation that offers evidence that other services could and should innovate likewise. The desegregation case provides such an example. By 1948, both the Navy and the Air Force had made public their intentions to racially integrate units. This left the Army isolated, open to attack, and unable to explain why it could not follow the lead of the other services.²⁵⁰

The M16 case provides another example of the effects of interservice disunity. Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay was in part responsible for keeping the M16 alive.²⁵¹ His attempts to purchase the M16 for the Air Force after the Army rejected it were blocked by Congress and OSD, who wanted to maintain unified procurement. Nonetheless, his efforts assured that the M16 would demand attention even after the Army chose not to buy it.²⁵²

Divisions within a service can facilitate forced innovation in the same way that interservice disunity can. The cruise missile is an excellent example of this. The Air Force was strongly unified in its resistance to the new weapon, as it challenged that service’s close association with manned aircraft and strategic bombing. The Navy, on the other hand, exhibited a high degree of disunity over the cruise missile. Although aviators and submariners had many reasons to oppose the cruise missile, the surface community had much to gain from the weapon and pushed for its development. Efforts by this subgroup of the Navy led to a cruise development program that eventually yielded weapons that both the Navy and Air Force fielded. Had the Navy been as uniformly against the cruise missile as the Air Force was, civilian efforts to field this weapon would have been greatly complicated.²⁵³

Another example of the effects of inraservice disunity on the ability to resist innovation is the M16 case. Division within the Army worked in favor of the M16’s eventual adoption. The new weapon won the support of commanders in Vietnam who recognized its potential. These men in the field, headed by Gen. Westmoreland, became

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²⁴⁹ Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, p. 116.
²⁵³ While the root of these relative levels of intraservice unity was the fact that the cruise missile had little to offer anyone in the Air Force and many things to offer some in the Navy, these differences were intensified by structural differences between these two services. As Art and Ockenden note, "While the Air Force has a relatively tight hierarchical structure, the Navy has long been more decentralized and organized around three autonomous factions or 'unions' -- the surface fleet, the carrier fleet, and the underwater fleet. This decentralized structure shaped much of the cruise missile development within the Navy because it gave cruise missile proponents there more freedom to maneuver than their Air Force counterparts had." (Art and Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of the Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980," p. 379.)
"vigorous" sponsors of the weapon within the Army. Westmoreland was key to the eventual decision to accept the M16 as the Army's standard rifle.²⁵⁴ The Continental Army Command also supported the new rifle.²⁵⁵

One important aspect of intraservice unity is that at different times, different groups within a particular service are dominant. For example, World War II ended the dominance of the Navy by the surface community and put the aviation community in control. Similarly, the strategic and tactical communities within the Air Force have vied with each other for control over the years. The attitude of the dominant group within a service is of paramount importance to the ability of that service to innovate in a particular direction. As Art and Ockenden note, the dominant group will fight innovations that threaten its resource control, challenge its position and prestige, and threaten it with obsolescence. They point out that all bureaucracies have this trait in common. As a result, all such organizations are resistant to threatening changes. Thus, Art and Ockenden suggest that "political intervention from the outside is necessary if radical change is to occur."²⁵⁶

In terms of forced innovation, the existence of dominant communities is important in that intraservice disunity will be most beneficial to innovation proponents if the group favoring innovation is also the primary community within the service. If the dominant group is powerful enough, it can overrule the objections of other groups towards a particular innovation. If, on the other hand, a secondary group favors innovation, it faces a hard fight in getting the entire service to accept innovation. Once again, the cruise missile case shows the effects of such intraservice division and the role that dominant communities can play in blocking innovation. None of the dominant groups in any of the services wanted the cruise missile. It was civilian intervention that helped the surface fleet override the objections of the carrier community and led to the development and fielding of the weapon.

One type of intraservice unity is somewhat of a hybrid, as it revolves around each services' relationship with its civilian secretary. If a service can successfully coopt its secretary, then it removes the civilian that has the most direct control over it from becoming an innovation proponent. In effect, it creates localized civilian disunity by drawing an important civilian actor onto its side. Should a service secretary remain aloof from service

²⁵⁵ Edward Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 176-183. Many other branches of the Army involved with the selection of a new rifle, such as the Infantry Board, also favored the M16, but they were in the minority and were less vocal than Westmoreland and Continental Command. (McNaugher, The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition, p. 68.) These groups tended to fall in line with Ordnance, especially when the M14 decision began to come under attack by McNamara.
pressures and choose to actively manage the service as he sees fit, that service's ability to resist forced innovations can be severely compromised. The desegregation case illustrates this point quite well. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was committed to desegregating the Navy. Against the wishes of the admirals who ran the Navy, Forrestal made great strides in racial integration of Navy personnel.\textsuperscript{257} The Army's civilian secretary, however, bowed to the concerns of the generals, most of whom were strongly against desegregation. He did not push the Army in the way that Forrestal did the Navy. Such restraint helped the Army to be the last holdout with regards to desegregation.\textsuperscript{258}

The TFX case offers another demonstration of how the inability of a service to coopt its civilian secretary makes it harder for that service to resist forced innovation. A significant factor in that case was that McNamara had the active support of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, who helped him face the services with a unified front of the relevant high-ranking DoD civilians.\textsuperscript{259}

One type of division both within and across services that frequently occurs falls along the lines of rank. The more junior an officer is, the more open he or she will be to a new idea. This division arises because, as March and Simon point out, many innovations appeal to one level of an organization but are threatening to others.\textsuperscript{260} In the military, the lower ranks in the field are more prone to see how an innovation might help them carry out their task better. The higher ranks, however, are more concerned with the military organization as a whole and are more likely to find that the gains promised by the innovation are too narrow to be worth the organizational-wide impact of the innovation.\textsuperscript{261} Part of the reason for this is that the higher ranks of the military are much more politicized than the lower ranks, who are concerned more with task performance than organizational health issues.\textsuperscript{262} Another explanation of the more conservative outlook present in the higher ranks is offered by Simon and March: "The longer an individual remains in an organization, the more his interactions occur within the organization, the more his needs are

\textsuperscript{257} Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, pp. 36-47. For more on the Navy and desegregation, especially during World War II, see Dalfiume, Desegregation of the US Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953, pp. 101-103.

\textsuperscript{258} Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, pp. 48-9.

\textsuperscript{259} Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military, p. x.

\textsuperscript{260} March and Simon, Organizations, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{261} This relationship appears to be reversed when the innovation in question has nothing to do with military performance and instead involves personnel issues. Specifically, in both the cases of women in combat and homosexuals in the military, resistance to these two innovations is more intense in the lower ranks. This is explained by the fact that it is the heterosexual men in the field who will have to live on a day-to-day basis with personnel changes along these dimensions. These men care less about the overall image of the military in society than they do about who they will have to fight and sleep beside. The higher ranks, while somewhat attentive to these concerns, must worry about how their stand against these changes will affect the overall health of the services and the maintenance of productive civil-military relations.

\textsuperscript{262} Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
satisfied within the organization, and, therefore, the more he identifies with the organization."263

Although division based on rank differences is fairly common, its impact on innovation in general and on forced innovation in particular is minimal. The military is not a democracy, and a relative few generals and admirals make the important decisions for the military. In addition, the fact that the lower ranks are dependent on their superiors for advancement severely limits their willingness to challenge the system and clamor for innovation. Thus, although the military is divided in opinion by rank from time to time, this does little to aid civilian efforts to force innovation on the military. One example of this is the drug interdiction case, where officers below the rank of colonel were much more open to the idea of helping in the interdiction effort than were more senior officers. Such a split did nothing to help civilians, however, as the officers at the top made the policy decisions (see Chapter 2).264

One of the most important effects of interservice and intraservice disunity arises from the competitive nature of bureaucratic relations within the military. If one group adopts a particular innovation, this places a great pressure on the other groups to adopt the same innovation, no matter how distasteful, in order to compete with the group that has already innovated. Evangelista argues that internal threats posed by rival services "appear to constitute the primary motivation for pursuing programs that meet bureaucratic resistance."265 As Downs points out:

If a bureau is in direct competition with other bureaus, possible technical improvements in its own methods are also open to its rivals. If the rivals make these changes, it amounts to a shift in the bureau's external environment... hence failure by one to exploit possible improvements... may result in a deterioration of its capabilities in relation to the other.266

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263 March and Simon, Organizations, p. 74. This relates back to Morison's comments that in order to be more innovative, people must expand their identification in order to allow themselves to act for the greater good.
264 There was also a definite division along the lines of rank in the Navy with regards to adopting radio technology in the early 1900s. See Douglas, "Technological Innovation and Organizational Change: The Navy's Adoption of Radio, 1899-1919," pp. 117-143.
265 Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies, pp. 61-62. Similarly, Rogers notes the existence of an "interaction effect," in which "individuals in a social system who have adopted an innovation influence those who have not." (Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, p. 215.)
266 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 197. Downs points out that the impetus to innovate in order to compete with another bureau within the same country is much stronger than the need to compete with a foreign challenger. As he argues, an organization such as the US Navy will have to compete with its domestic counterparts, such as the US Air Force, on a regular basis, as the Navy is "directly threatened by the Air Force in every appropriations struggle." The Navy only experiences a direct threat from foreign competitors, such as the Soviet armed forces, during war. As war is infrequent and authorization decisions are not, it is only logical that the Navy be more responsive to changes in other US services, its "functional competitors," than in foreign militaries. (p. 199.)
The threat of such a relative decrease in capabilities can act as a domestic source of organizational crisis, as mentioned in the section above on the role of crisis.

In his examination of innovation in the Navy, Vince Davis argues that the most important facilitator of innovation in the Navy was the growth of the Air Force's image as the service most favored by the public and political leaders. Specifically, Davis notes that the task of creating a carrier-based nuclear capability was made much easier because naval officers who normally would have opposed this innovation "were willing to tolerate these new ideas if they would help the Navy to survive in the face of the Air Force challenge" to monopolize nuclear warfare.

The A-7 case offers a good look at the affects of interservice competition on forced innovation. In the early 1960s, the Army wanted a new fixed-wing, dedicated close-support aircraft and pressured the Air Force to produce such a plane. Realizing the reluctance of the Air Force to buy a plane like the A-7, the Army sought to fill the close air support mission by means of a newly-formed air assault division and the beginning of an attack helicopter program. This created a crisis for the Air Force, which was threatened with the loss of the close air support mission, a mission it did not love but nonetheless wanted to keep. The Air Force responded to this pressure by dropping its resistance to the A-7. The Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. McConnel, in office only six months, said the decision to buy the A-7 was made largely in terms of interservice competition. As he put it, "The thing that was pushing (in 1965) was that we had to get something to give the Army close air support. First, it was our job. Second, if we didn't do it, somebody else was going to do it for us."

Another example of the role of interservice competition on the willingness of the military to innovate is found in the cruise missile case. As Werrell notes, "The Air Force attitude toward ALCM changed... as the naval cruise missile program began to pick up technical momentum and, even more important, political momentum." The danger existed that if the Air Force did not become involved in cruise development, it would have a Navy version forced upon it by DoD and Congress. Once it did become involved, the Air

268 Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, p. 15. Similarly, Janowitz noted in 1960: "The ground forces have been confronted with an organizational crisis [due to the development of nuclear weapons], and have become outsiders, in a sense, in the military establishment. Again, it is understandable that they have been the most flexible, the most concerned with new approaches to the nuclear arms race and national security. The weakening of their traditional function has forced a widening of horizons and a greater concern with the consequences of war." (Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 31.)
Force was unable to limit the range of its ALCM as it wanted, because civilians could always point to the greater range of the naval version and demand more from the Air Force.

**CIVILIAN UNITY**

Just as a more unified military is better able to resist civilian intervention, civilians are more capable of forcing the military to innovate if they themselves are unified. This is reflected in the civilian unity variable of my framework. Civilian unity relevant to the process of forced innovation occurs in two dimensions: within Congress and between Congress and the executive branch.272

Although it is tempting to assume that divisions within and across these two bodies of the federal government will always fall along party lines, this is by no means always the case. For example, in the two cases explored in depth in this dissertation, drug interdiction and Special Operations Forces, innovation proponents in Congress had a definite bipartisan makeup. Similarly, the defense reorganization effort manifested in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was a true bipartisan effort. Congressmen on both sides of the aisle recognized the need to address the state of the US defense establishment.273 In some cases, however, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, party affiliation went a long way towards determining the level of unity within the federal government. The point here is that the

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272 In very rare cases, the judiciary branch can become an important player. For example, in the homosexuals in the military case, the courts have already played a role by declaring that the expulsion of a gay sailor by the Navy violated his constitutional rights. See, for example, Seth Mydans, "Navy is Ordered to Return a Gay Sailor," New York Times Nov. 11, 1992: A14. However, even in this case it is highly unlikely that the courts would act to remove the military ban on homosexuals, as the courts tend to shy away from giving homosexuals special protection. (Junda Woo, "Will Courts Uphold Military Ban on Gays," Wall Street Journal Jan. 26, 1993: B9.) See also Thomas Friedman, "Judge Rules Military's Ban on Homosexuals is Void," New York Times Jan. 29, 1993: A12 and Sanford Levinson, "Presidential Power and Gays in the Military," Wall Street Journal Feb. 3, 1993: A15.

273 See, for example, "Congressional Oversight of National Defense," Defense Organization: The Need for Change (Armed Forces Journal International Extra Edition) Oct., 1986: 4-9. Sufficient unity within Congress was also in part the result of public concern over defense issues. Sen. Goldwater (R-AZ) believed that legislators felt they could not come out against defense reforms at a time when stories about "$7,000 coffee makers and $400 hammers" were fueling public anger with the Pentagon. In addition, lawmakers who were in favor of the Reagan military buildup recognized that such abuses threatened public support for the President's defense programs. Thus, both they and Reagan felt the pressure to support measures that they did not necessarily approve of. (Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach President's Desk This Year," p. 16.)

This same rationale helps to explain why Reagan and Weinberger signed on to the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), which released its findings in early 1986. The changes it called for were quite similar to those sought by Goldwater-Nichols. (Benjamin Schemmer, "What Was Behind Reagan's 'Rush to Judgement' on DoD Reorganization?" Armed Forces Journal International May, 1986: 15-17.) Schemmer notes that another explanation is that by accepting the Packard Commission's recommendations, the Administration could head off congressional reformers and, in the process, have a better chance of controlling the pace, direction, and extent of the reorganization.
manifestation of the civilian unity variable is not always determined simply by the party affiliation of innovation proponents.

As unity among members of the House of Representatives and the Senate grows, so does the ability of proponents of an innovation to legislatively mandate that the military adopt that innovation. If support for an innovation in Congress cannot achieve a majority, then the military does not have to worry about being forced by law to innovate. With a majority, innovation proponents can pass laws that order the military to innovate. The greater the support beyond a simple majority, the more unambiguous and sweeping congressional mandates to the military can be.

The drug interdiction case provides the best example of the effects of varying levels of civilian unity within Congress. Support for a military role in drug interdiction was widespread by the mid to late-1980s. Congress was not united, however, on the extent to which the military should become involved with this new mission. Specifically, there was a great deal of disagreement over the desirability of giving the military direct law enforcement duties. As a result, those congressmen seeking the more extreme levels of military involvement could not garner enough support to legislate such responsibilities. Instead, unity was only high enough to support a limited course of action, in which the military was assigned the title of lead agency for detection and monitoring of potential drug smugglers (see Chapter 2).

Even if a particular innovation enjoys the backing of a unified Congress, disunity between the legislative and executive branches can still inhibit any attempt at forced innovation.\textsuperscript{274} The executive branch, personified by the president and the secretary of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{274} Although the president can be a very important player in forcing the military to innovate, the Congress enjoys certain statutory powers that make it more capable of either carrying out or blocking forced innovation than the executive branch. A quick comparison of each side’s powers highlights this fact. The president’s most powerful tool is the executive order, but such orders can be overturned by an act of Congress. The president can then veto this act, but Congress can override this veto. The president cannot create new departments or agencies. Congress can. More importantly, Congress can organize and reorganize the Executive Office of the President, as it did in the SOF case. Congressional power also allows a detailed degree of control over the military, as Congress can “specify the powers and duties of specific officials in the departments and bureaus.” (Richard Pious, \textit{The American Presidency} (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 214-16.) Although both the Congress and the president can promote officers of their choice, presidential promotions require approval by the Senate. Congress also has ultimate control over all of the president’s political appointees. Perhaps most significantly, the control of appropriations gives Congress numerous powers that it can use both against the military and the executive branch. (See Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott, \textit{Congress and the Administrative State} (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), pp. 157-62.) The appropriations power, combined with other congressional prerogatives, provides Congress with more potent methods for punishing or rewarding federal agencies like the military than the president has at his disposal. (Herbert Kaufman, \textit{The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs} (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1981), pp. 164-66.) Finally, congressional committee powers are such that they, in effect, have a line-item veto power over administration actions. (Pious, \textit{The American Presidency}, pp. 223-24.) This power can be used, for example, to veto presidential attempts to reorganize federal agencies. (Dodd and Schott, \textit{Congress and the Administrative State}, p. 314.) The president has no such power, and any use of a veto will usually require the blocking of a large piece of legislation. The one main limiting factor on congressional power is that a certain level of unity must be reached among legislators before anything can be done, while the president, being but one person, can wield his powers individually.
\end{footnotesize}
defense, has direct managerial responsibility for the armed forces, which fall within the
domain of the Department of Defense. If unity between Congress and the White House is
high, then the president can put his considerable weight behind congressional forced
innovation efforts, making military resistance quite difficult. If, however, the president
does not support congressionally-sponsored innovations, then forcing change upon the
military is greatly complicated. In such cases, an administration can choose either to
simply not assist congressional efforts, or it can take an active role in working against
Congress. When the latter occurs, the White House and the civilian leadership of the
Department of Defense in effect become the allies of the military and help it resist
congressionally-based civilian intervention. Such an alliance helped the military to prolong
adoption of innovations deigned to improve US Special Operations Forces (see Chapter 3).
In extreme cases, a president could veto legislation that seeks to force innovation on the
military.\footnote{275}

Civilian disunity can also work in the other direction: The administration can try to
force an innovation upon the military that Congress does not approve of. By means of
executive orders the president can go a long way towards forcing innovation on the military
without any congressional assistance. As a result, unless Congress decides to actively
oppose the president (and is unified enough to do so), the executive branch can both
dictate, monitor, and enforce change on the military.\footnote{276} Most of the McNamara-era forced
innovations touched on in this chapter, for example, were the products of administration
activism and did not require much in the way of congressional agreement.\footnote{277} Even when
Congress did not agree with McNamara, as in the TFX case, it was unable to muster
enough support to reverse his decision.\footnote{278} Usually, if executive-legislative unity is such
that members of Congress do decide to fight presidential efforts at forced innovation, their
best way of thwarting the administration is by exercising power over the Defense
Department's purse strings. The annual fights in Congress over funding for SDI are an
eexample of this. Congress can also pass laws reversing the effects of an executive order.

\footnote{275} I could find no such cases of this occurring. One reason why an example of such a presidential veto is
missing is that most legislation that Congress uses to force the military to innovate is attached to the much
bigger Department of Defense budget authorization. As a result, the president tends to be unwilling to veto the
entire package that might be favorable to him except for the sections dealing with forcing innovation (see
Civilian Tactics section below). Also, any presidential veto would be a very public stand against change
promoted by Congress that also might be popular with the general public.

\footnote{276} He can do everything but pay for it, and the power of the purse is the last recourse for Congress in such
cases.

\footnote{277} Of course, during the 1960s, Congress was still clearly secondary to the executive branch in terms of
dictating defense policy. Only after the Vietnam War did the influence of these two branches balance out. This
will be examined in Chapter 4.

\footnote{278} Congressional backers of Boeing, the contractor spurned by McNamara, fought to overturn the TFX
decision.
Advocates of removing the ban on homosexuals in the military, for example, fear that Congress will not support this move and will use legislation to maintain the ban. 279

The level of civilian unity is very influential on the outcome of any forced innovation struggle, but discussion of this key characteristic raises the question of why some innovations enjoy higher degrees of civilian support than others. There are numerous answers to this question. First, party affiliation of innovation proponents can be a factor. If a particular innovation does not enjoy bipartisan sponsorship, then any effort to force it upon the military can be bogged down in the gridlock of party politics. Second, the level of interest and concern the general public has is often important. If an innovation is intended to address a problem that the public is quite concerned about, then Congress, the House in particular, will be motivated to support that innovation. The drug interdiction mission is a prime example of the role that public pressure can play in building unity. When public support for an innovation is not solid, congressional backing will reflect this. For example, the American public is divided on the issue of allowing homosexuals in the military. As a result, as former Secretary of the Army John Marsh, Jr. notes, "A bill introduced by Representative Pat Schroeder, Democrat of Colorado, to rescind the prohibition on gays got 77 co-sponsors but did not get any further -- did not even get a hearing, after referral to committee." 280 A 1993 Boston Globe poll showed that only 43% of the American public approved of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military, while an equal number felt that the ban should be maintained. 281 Similarly, the shaky public support for allowing women in ground combat units has limited the prospects of that innovation ever being forced on the military. 282 Such limited support does not necessarily spell doom for innovations that the president himself supports, however. He is less beholden to the public and freer to act as he chooses, without having to win over a majority of other people whose power is equal to his, as in the case in Congress. Thus, even with the split public support for rescinding the ban against homosexuals, President Clinton still plans to lift the ban. 283

282 In July of 1991, 52% of Americans said that women should be assigned to ground units, while 44% said no. Any boost that this narrow margin could give to the innovation effort was limited by the fact that most conservatives, a powerful political force, are against allowing women to fight. (Gordon, "Panel is Against Letting Women Fly in Combat," p. A24.) Furthermore, many elements in the feminist community do not favor women in combat because it does little to "advance the feminist agenda." (Rothstein, "War of Words Over Women Warriors," p. 7.) For a detailed account of both public and service opinion on the women in combat question, see Capt. Georgia Sadler, "The Polling Data," Proceedings Feb., 1993: 51-54.
In cases where the public does not understand or care about the issues involved, a decision by individual members of Congress to take up a particular innovation as a personal cause can substitute for strong public support. Such congressmen can build unity by attracting people who have little to lose by supporting someone else's pet project. The congressional effort to reform SOF is an excellent example of this (see Chapter 3).

Finally, in terms of executive-legislative unity, innovations proposed by Congress that either seriously challenge the president's role as commander-in-chief or that require the executive branch itself to innovate will make disunity between Congress and the White House probable. The Goldwater-Nichols case illustrates this point. One of the reasons why executive-legislative unity with regards to this legislation was low was that the reforms called for changes in OSD. Then-Secretary of Defense Weinberger saw these reforms as intrusion on his turf. Weinberger claimed that the defense system was not broken and only needed "evolutionary changes" rather than the "more radical and untested measures" that reorganization supporters were pushing. As a result, supporters of Goldwater-Nichols feared that Weinberger would convince President Reagan to veto the final legislature. 284 As one observer noted, "The critical problem for defense reorganization during the past several years has been the opposition of former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.... Reorganization proposals inevitably reflected criticisms of his management practices," even though reorganization proponents tried not to blame him for the problems they were addressing. 285

Whatever the factors that determine the level of civilian unity backing an attempt at forced innovation, the greater this unity is, the less likely it is that the military will be able to resist civilian intervention intended to force innovation. In addition, the higher civilian unity is, the closer an outcome of an instance of forced innovation will fall to the end of the continuum of possible outcomes that represents extreme civilian versions of the innovation in question.

TACTICS

A high degree of civilian unity does not magically translate into an end of military resistance to forced innovation. Instead, it allows civilians to employ certain strategies that

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284 Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach President's Desk This Year," p. 16.
make the military's resistance increasingly difficult. However, the military has tools of its own that it can use to frustrate civilian efforts. The tactics that each side uses in the civil-military struggle over forced innovation influence the course of these conflicts. In addition, these tactics illustrate the lengths that the military will go to to resist civilian intervention and its impressive ability to bend the rules of civilian control without breaking them outright.

Civil-military relations literature often touches on the tactics available to civilians and the military, but usually in only a case-by-case basis. This hole in the literature, combined with the importance of these strategies to my topic, makes a tactic typology a logical and useful inclusion in my framework of forced innovation.

CIVILIAN TACTICS

The series of civilian tactics described below are available for civilian innovation advocates to use in order to force the military to adopt the innovation they favor. Use of these tactics can also be aimed at assuring that the military actually implements the changes it eventually agrees to make. It should be noted that nearly all of the tactics are not unique to the issue of defense. They could also be employed by civilians against non-military government bureaucracies that were resisting change.286

At the root of the effectiveness of many civilian tactics is their ability to create a crisis situation for the military. As Shepard notes, supporters of innovation may "help to generate a crisis in order to create conditions favorable to the adoption and implementation of their innovation."287 In such a crisis, the military must decide which is more unpleasant: the innovation being forced upon them or the pressure, threats, and organizational harm that the military's resistance produces.

Exercise Constitutional Authority

The most effective and unambiguous tactic available to civilians is the direct exercise of constitutional authority over the military. In the United States, the military is legally bound to follow the orders and desires of its civilian masters. The exercise of this authority can take several forms.

286 As this dissertation is not a treatise on American government, I will not go into great detail on the many ways that Congress and the President can control federal bureaucracies like the military.
The military, part of the Department of Defense, falls under the direct control of the executive branch. This structure provides the president, designated by the US Constitution as the Commander-in-Chief, with a great deal of power over the military. The president is not just another face in the crowd that the military can pretend to listen to: he commands respect and has the power to force the military to do a variety of things. The key to the effectiveness of the exercise of presidential power is the level of interest that the President takes in the matter at hand. As Halperin and Kanter note,

The most effective Presidential weapon is personal involvement which demonstrates a willingness to be forceful and, if necessary, nasty. This personal involvement shows that the President cares, making it much harder for officials to resist doing what he had ordered. He can make an authoritative decision and, with the assistance of the White House staff, can monitor actions for compliance. When decisions are made in the name of senior participants other than the President, the frequency and degree of non-compliance will increase.288

Usually, the president acts through the secretary of defense. Depending on the personality of those who hold these two offices, the secretary can act in tandem with an involved president, or he can act with the support, but not the intense and active interest of the president. An example of the former situation is the hands-on approach that Kennedy took with regards to counterinsurgency, highlighted by his concern over details such as ordering Army Special Forces to wear the green beret. Most of the McNamara-era cases discussed in this chapter are examples of the latter. McNamara had the full blessing of the presidents he worked for, but often had to fight his battles by himself, which, as Halperin and Kanter correctly point out, made it somewhat easier for the military to employ all of the tactics at their disposal to frustrate reform efforts.

Even when a president takes direct interest in forcing innovation and utilizes his most powerful tool for affecting change in the military, the executive order, the matter is not always settled. Part of the reason for this is that the military still has tactics that it can use in an attempt to water down the effects of the order. More often, however, the ineffectiveness of an executive order arises from its ambiguities. President Truman's 1948 Executive Order 9981, which called for desegregation of the military, is an excellent example of this. Because of the vagueness of this order's wording, the Army could legally interpret it as not mandating integration. Presidential intervention at steps below that of issuing an executive order also often suffer from the effects of vagueness.289 For example, although Kennedy was very interested in the details of counterinsurgency, he was

not an expert at it and could not tell the military exactly how to come up with proper doctrine for this new mission. As a result, the military was able to approach the problem as it saw fit.

The president, of course, is only half of the civilian side of forced innovation. Congress plays a key role in most cases. When a president chooses for whatever reason not to take up the cause of a particular innovation, the burden of forcing change on the military then falls to the members of the House and Senate. Like the president, Congress also has many advantages in dealing with the military that arise from its powers as mandated by the US Constitution.

The most powerful tactic that Congress has at its disposal is the ability to legislate. By passing laws, Congress can force the military to do a variety of things. It can impose new commands on the military, such as it did with the Special Operations Command and the Rapid Deployment Force. It can order that money be spent on projects that the military does not want. It can also mandate changes in personnel policy.

Similar to the problems facing presidential intervention, congressional attempts to legislate change can also suffer from vagueness that allows the military to exploit loopholes in an effort to avoid adoption of an innovation. The series of laws required to finally get the military to create an effective Special Operations Forces Command are an example of this (see Chapter 3).

The specific nature of congressional powers can be important when the executive branch sides with the military in opposing a given innovation. The fact that Congress controls the defense budget gives it a good amount of flexibility when dealing with a president who can veto any attempt by Congress to legislate change for the military. One of the primary tactics that the legislative branch uses when faced with not only a resistant military but a confrontational executive branch is to attach legislation regarding an innovation to a defense authorization bill. This forces the president to veto the entire bill if he wants to block the innovation-relevant sections of the legislation.290

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290 As Michael Ganley of Armed Forces Journal International pointed out in 1986, this tactic was naturally attractive to supporters of defense reorganization. "Parliamentary tactics by reorganization advocates in Congress [can] force a Presidential signature. For instance, if the House and Senate agree on a reorganization bill and send it to the President only to see him veto it, the same bill might then be attached to the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization later in the year. The President, so the thinking goes, might find it difficult to veto the FY87 DoD authorization just to beat back a reorganization effort." (Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach President's Desk This Year," p. 16.) This happened many times in the drug interdiction case, though not always intentionally.

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Congress has other means of dealing with an obstructionist executive branch. The Department of Defense, although technically run by the president, is answerable to Congress, as is the president. Halperin and Kanter note that Congress, through legislation, can "shape the rules of the game by requiring a specific subordinate official to make one or another kind of determination, by attempting to stipulate whom the President shall consult, or by specifying that the President personally must make a particular decision."291 Thus, the ability to change the rules by passing laws gives Congress a very powerful tactic when dealing with either a military resisting innovation or an executive branch allied with that military.

Just as a president can use his powers to help the military resist an innovation, so too can the Congress. In particular, if the House or Senate Armed Services Committee opposes an innovation that arises from elsewhere in Congress or from the executive branch, the ability of the military to resist that innovation increases dramatically. As one congressional staffer notes, "If an armed services committee is for it, it's got a chance. If a panel is opposed, the fight's over. They can make policy go or stop."292 This fact once again illustrates the importance of civilian unity to the outcome of any case of forced innovation.

Alter Incentive System

In many cases of forced innovation, civilians do not rely on just mandating, either by executive order or congressional legislation, that the military adopt an innovation. Such direct action might not always be preferable. If civilians can somehow convince the military that it is in its best interests to adopt the innovation in question, the odds of the military then making a legitimate effort to properly incorporate that innovation will improve, as the military leadership will be committed to the task.

Civilians can use several tactics to attempt such a convincing. The strategies revolve around different ways of altering the military's incentive structure so as to make an

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innovation's adoption a more desirable move. Specifically, civilians can either make adoption of the innovation more attractive or make resistance to it less attractive.

In attempting to make an innovation more appealing to the military, civilians have several options. First, as Halperin and Kanter put it, civilians can decide "to compromise: to alter the proposal in a way which reduces its cost to the interests of a particular participant." In other words, civilians can alter the nature of the innovation so that it conflicts less with the four variables of resistance present in my framework. For example, McNamara eventually modified the TFX innovation somewhat. A year after he forced the Navy and Air Force into the joint program, he allowed each of the services to have a somewhat different version of the plane. As Art notes, McNamara "encountered immediate and continuous service opposition to every decision he made; and, as a result, he was forced periodically to reduce the scope of the program."

Altering the innovation in question is not always an option. Instead, civilians can make an innovation more attractive by offering side payments in order to bribe the military into adopting that innovation. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger used this tactic in order to convince the Air Force to procure the F-16 and A-10. According to Fred Kaplan of the Boston Globe,

To win over the Air Force chief of staff, Gen. George Brown, Schlesinger made him an offer he couldn't refuse: If Brown signed on to the F-16 and the A-10, he could have six extra air wings -- 432 extra airplanes, billions of extra dollars in the budget battles with other services. He wouldn't even need to give up his favorite, the F-15. He could have both, in what Schlesinger called a 'high-low mix' of aircraft. Brown accepted the deal.

The tactic of using side payments to buy the military's acquiescence is not always available to civilians. A lack of scarce resources, always a problem, can block this tactic. More importantly, the use of bribes sets a bad precedence, as it makes the situation appear to be one in which the military does not have to follow civilian guidance unless it wants to. Also, such payments create the incentive for the military to resist civilians more frequently and for longer in order to reap greater benefits.

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293 Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," p. 23. As a member of the team developing the Short Range Attack Missile noted, "The trick in any innovation is to balance the demands of the innovators with the political reality. We always took care to list modifications as 'refurbishes' rather than as 'upgrades.' We kept everything as incremental as possible. It's a lot less threatening that way." (Art and Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of the Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980," p. 366.)

294 Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military, pp. 79-80.

295 While these cases are not innovations, Schlesinger's actions illustrate the operation of side payments quite well.

When civilians do choose to change the military's incentive structure in order to end resistance to an innovation, they are more likely to increase the costs of continued resistance than they are to reward acquiescence. Civilians can make the military pay for its resistance to innovation in many different ways.

The most common method of increasing the costs of the military resistance to innovation is to hold its resources hostage. Civilian control over all Department of Defense funding and mission allocation gives civilians a powerful tool with which to threaten the military. McNamara repeatedly used the tactic of denying service requests for weapons systems they wanted until they also accepted the systems that he was pushing on them. Rather than outright force the Air Force to buy the A-7, McNamara worked instead "to create an incentive structure that led indirectly to the desired result." He did this by threatening to give the close air support mission to the Army and by manipulating favored aircraft programs of the Air Force by terminating some (F-105) and delaying the continuance of others (F-4). These moves left the Air Force with little choice: if it wanted to maintain the close air support mission and purchase the aircraft it wanted, it had to accept the A-7.297 Similarly, fed up with the Army's attempts to undermine the M16s final development, McNamara ordered a halt to all production of M14, the Army's preferred rifle.298

The control that civilians enjoy over military resources allows civilians to do more than just withhold weapons systems that the services want. Civilians can take away resources that the military already has. In response to the Navy's sloppy handling of the Tailhook scandal, the House Appropriations Committee moved in 1992 to cut the Navy's administrative and headquarters staff by more than 10,000 people.299 Such a tactic can also be used to address reluctance by the civilian leadership of the Pentagon to adhere to congressional wishes. For example, continued reluctance of OSD to spend funds earmarked for the V-22 aircraft led the House Armed Services Committee to threaten to cut the Pentagon's comptroller's budget by 5% each month that resistance continued.300

One effect of the tactic of raising the costs of continued military resistance is that it can create an innovation-specific crisis for the military. The services suddenly find that their missions and resources are in danger. They are then faced with a choice: adopt the

innovation in question or continue to suffer at the hands of civilians who have made their intentions quite clear.

Civilians can also alter the military's incentive structure by creating crises rooted in service competition. As was described above in the Military Unity section, one service will often adopt an innovation it does not want in order to limit a potential relative gain by another service. Thus, by creating interservice competition, civilians can make an innovation suddenly more attractive. McNamara's actions in the A-7 case, mentioned above, in which he let Army develop the Cheyenne helicopter and appeared to be willing to overlook the Key West agreements, which gave the close air support mission to the Air Force, created just such a crisis for the Air Force.

**Exercise Control Over Promotions**

Rosen argues that in hierarchical bureaucracies like the military, "Power is won through influence over who is promoted to positions of senior command. Control over the promotion of officers is the source of power in the military." He argues that the only type of civilian intervention that can have any influence on the military's ability to adopt an innovation is for civilians to exercise this power. This suggests that manipulating promotions is a potentially useful civilian tactic.

Civilians can utilize control over promotions in either a positive or negative fashion. They can use promotions to advance the careers of officers who are proponents of innovations that civilians favor. This is often depicted as "reaching down into the ranks." One example of this is found in the case of implementing continuous-aim naval gunfire in the Navy at the turn of the century. William Sims, a junior naval officer, was blocked by the Navy's leadership in his efforts to innovate the way naval guns were aimed. In protest, he wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt, who took a liking to Sim's ideas and made him Inspector of Target Practice, a position from which Sims could institute the changes he wanted, backed by the prestige of presidential support. Similarly, promotion paths can be designed so as to facilitate the adoption of new innovation.

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301 Speaking in more general terms, Kanter pays a great deal of attention to the powerful tool that the promotion of interservice rivalry provides civilians with. As he puts it, "If civilian influence is (in part) a function of the intensity of interservice conflict, then the administration must create incentives which are sufficient to overcome the system's bias toward formal unanimity among the services." (Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective*, p. 44.) Kanter's preferred method for creating such conflict is civilian manipulation of the defense budget. While much of Kanter's book is relevant to this dissertation, someone reading *Defense Politics* must keep in mind that Kanter is looking at ways that civilians can make the military more responsive to all civilian desires over an extended period of time. I am only interested in steps that civilians can take to create interservice competition at a specific point in time regarding only one issue: the innovation being forced on the military at the time.


Examples of such actions are rare. In fact, Rosen blames the shortcomings of the counterinsurgency program of the 1960s, which he refers to as an example "of failed peacetime innovation," on the fact that civilians did not work to change promotion paths. As a result, officers leaving Vietnam with relevant experience were often rotated into positions that had little bearing on how the war was conducted.\textsuperscript{304} The joint duty requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, on the other hand, successfully tied the implementation of the reorganization innovations to the career paths of officers aspiring to the higher ranks of the military.

The negative variation of the promotion tactic involves civilians blocking the promotions of officers who are either specifically against a given innovation, or who just happen to belong to a service that is resisting the wishes of civilians. An example of how such a use of this tactic would work was provided by the Tailhook scandal. In the aftermath of Tailhook, the Senate held up thousands of promotions within the Navy and Marine Corps until it was proven that those officers up for promotion were not involved in the sexual harassment incident in question.\textsuperscript{305}

**Acquire Military Expertise**

Although civilians have the constitutional authority to control the military, their clout in defense matters is often diminished by the fact that, as civilians, they are not members of the profession that they are trying to change. This can create problems for the civilian advocate of innovation. Max Weber notes that

under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overowering. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 'expert,' facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration.\textsuperscript{306}

He goes so far as to say that "the absolute monarch is powerless or, at best, the superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert."\textsuperscript{307}

\textsuperscript{304} Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, pp. 100-101. Promotion in the Army was always based on performance in combat, yet the requirements of counterinsurgency would take officers out of combat situations, which they did not want, as this would hurt their career. Attempts by General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, to rectify this situation by advising promotion boards that service as an advisor should be treated equal to combat duty failed because no one believed that such a change in priorities would actually happen, given the long-standing tradition of the stress on combat duty. (p. 104) Johnson was "unable to bring about a necessary innovation because he was unable to restructure the reality or perception of promotability within the service in the time he had available." (p. 105) Intervention by the president or the secretary of defense on this matter might have made a difference.


Civilians can improve their relative position by acquiring military expertise of their own. The primary means of doing this is by enlisting the support of members of the military profession, both active and retired, who can assist civilians in understanding the nuances of military issues. In using this tactic, civilians seek "to exploit any islands of support within the services in order to reduce the probability of noncompliance" with their wishes.308 Allies within the military can help civilians structure the innovations being forced on the military by providing information that civilians would otherwise be denied by the military itself. The behind-the-scenes efforts of members of the Special Operation Forces community in drafting the creation of the legislation that created the Special Operations Command is one example of this (see Chapter 3). More importantly, members of the military who openly support civilian efforts to force innovation provide civilians with a sense of respectability that they might otherwise lack. As Shepard notes, "Respectability is an innovator's best friend, and since innovation is not a respectable undertaking in innovation-resisting organizations, he should choose respectable friends to support him."309 The vocal support that former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. David Jones gave to defense reorganization is an example of civilians gaining the respectability that goes with an insider's opinion. Because this tactic relies on finding someone with a military background who is willing to challenge the system, successful use of this tactic requires a certain degree of military disunity.310

Civilians can acquire and exercise military expertise in one other way. They can develop their own experts to analyze military issues, drawing on scientists, national defense academics, and other civilian specialists. The best example of this was McNamara's Systems Analysis office, staffed by his "whiz kids." Their complex analysis of all aspects of the military gave McNamara "hard" numbers that he could use to support his choices when they conflicted with those of the services. Kanter depicts this tactic as a way for civilians to sidestep the military's monopoly on professional expertise and prestige. He notes that civilians "can attempt to introduce criteria for choosing among defense alternatives which are beyond the boundaries of claimed expertise, that is, to insist that military expertise is a necessary -- but not sole -- element in the formulation of national security policy."311 This tactic, as employed by McNamara, had the added benefit of relying on an analytical skill that was not part of the military's professional expertise,

310 It is also akin to the military tactic of exploiting civilian disunity by forming alliances with one branch of government (see below).
making it difficult for the military to refute Systems Analysis. This advantageous situation was short-lived, however, as the military soon trained its own experts in economic analysis in order to fight fire with fire.

Create Oversight Boards

The final tactic that civilians frequently use is the creation of a body whose existence is intended either to provide justification for forcing the military to change or to monitor the actual adoption of innovation once the military claims to have dropped its resistance. Such bodies can take many forms, from congressional panels, such as the House Special Operations Panel, to committees manned by former high-ranking military officers, such as the Special Operations Advisory Group. (The latter example demonstrates how this tactic can be combined with that of acquiring military expertise. See Chapter 3.)

One classic example of such an oversight board is the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, the Fahy Committee. This group played a key role in the eventual desegregation of the military. As Stillman notes,

The importance of the Fahy Committee cannot be overstated. It succeeded in bringing civilian views into the nation’s defense organization, long handicapped by the dominance of the military and its rigidity of thought on racial affairs. The presence of the committee, until May, 1950, institutionalized Presidential interest in improving the status of Negro personnel within the Pentagon. Its presence engendered a dialogue on a subject long considered incapable of discussion by officers, and publicized alternatives to the segregation policy. Also, it served as a base for collecting quantitative data on Negro service participation and a place for forming alliances with friendly defense administrators and finding and checking resistance to the Presidential Order.

Not all civilian commissions automatically serve the interests of innovation proponents. For example, the fifteen-member presidential commission tasked with recommending whether or not to allow women in combat had both proponents and opponents of this innovation as members. Some critics claimed that the panel included "too many members who oppose allowing women into combat roles and that the Pentagon officials [had] cited the panel's deliberations as an excuse to delay opening more military positions for women." These points, plus the fact that the panel eventually ruled against recommending dropping female combat restrictions, illustrates the point that commissions

312 Kantor, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective, p. 86.
313 Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, p 44.
are not always beneficial for the proponents of innovation: it all depends on the makeup of the panel. The issue of homosexuals in the military might eventually be put before a committee, and the leanings of those assigned to it will similarly determine whether or not it will facilitate innovation.

The mixed benefits that committees can have on forced innovation can be avoided if desired. The body that forms such a committee, either Congress or the administration, can choose the members. If the creator of the group is predisposed to a particular outcome, it can stack the membership so that the outcome of its deliberations is predetermined. The level of civilian unity over a given innovation will determine whether such stacking is possible.

*MILITARY TACTICS*

The decision by civilians to force the military to innovate by no means ends the matter. The fact that the military's cooperation is necessary to implement any plans created by civilians provides it with various opportunities to keep any actual innovation from ever taking place. Halperin and Kanter note, "If deliberate non-compliance is possible, the key variable determining the degree of congruence between decision and action is whether or not the executor favors implementation."315 In instances of forced innovation, the executor, which is the military, by definition does not favor implementation, thus there is a low degree of congruence between civilian decision and the military action from the start. Hendrickson further notes that "outsiders may force a service to accept a certain decision, but the service must be relied upon to implement it" and that such forced change is "never settled with the single stroke of the pen."316

Mattingly and Walker recognize that "senior professionals have developed multiple strategies for playing the game of bureaucratic politics in national security policymaking."317 However, these professionals recognize certain constraints that bind these strategies. All civil-military struggles take place in an environment shaped by the US Constitution, and officers recognize and respect both this document and the process of policy formation that arises from it. Halperin and Kanter also acknowledge the "rules of the game" that constrain the actions of participants in bureaucratic struggles. They note that

the military's tactics are limited by the "shared images of international and domestic reality." In other words, the military cannot argue that a widely-recognized problem does not exist simply because it chooses not to address that problem. To do so would cause the military to lose a great deal of credibility.

Constitutional constraints do not force military organizations to sit back and take their lumps. Halperin and Kanter go on to point out that "astute participants will design maneuvers which either seek to exploit an existing set of constraints for their advantage or try to modify constraints in order to increase the probability of success." The US military, being quite astute, has developed numerous such maneuvers.

Finer argues that the military is intervening in politics whenever it fails to carry out the wishes of the government. Thus, the use of tactics to resist civilian calls for innovation is an inherently political act. Finer goes on to suggest that in a country with a mature political culture, such as the United States, the only methods of intervention in politics available to the military are "normal constitutional channels" and "collusion or competition with the civilian authorities." More extreme measures, such as blackmail, threats, and outright violence, though options available in countries with less-developed political cultures, are not tactics that the US military can even consider, due to the level of professionalism that it exhibits and its respect for the principle of civilian supremacy. Nonetheless, as the following discussion shows, the military has a number of tactics that it can and does employ to thwart attempts at forced innovation.

Many of the tactics described below are also available to a branch of the federal government that sides with the military in resistance to innovation. If, for example, the administration allies with the military in resisting a congressionally-sponsored innovation, the president, secretary of defense, and other civilian DoD officials can employ several of the tactics below against Congress either in concert with or independent from military resistance efforts.

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320 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, p. 20
322 The argument can be made that this same professionalism that limits the extent to which the military can go to resist civilian intervention also entitles, if not requires, that the services speak out against forced innovations that they view as ill-conceived. The higher echelons of the services, the JCS in particular, has the responsibility for providing the president with its candid advice. Thus, the tactics described below that the military uses to argue against forced innovation can be justified on many occasions. This same logic cannot justify tactics that seek to undermine order once the military's advice has been rejected, however. For arguments to this effect, see "Clinton and the Chiefs," Wall Street Journal Feb. 16, 1993: A14 and Eric Schmitt, "The Top Soldier Is Torn Between 2 Loyalties," New York Times Feb. 6, 1993: A1.
Attack the Proposed Innovation

In every case of forced innovation, the military attacks the innovation being forced upon it on one or more of the following grounds: the innovation is not necessary, it will not work, it will undermine military effectiveness, or it will overwhelm the limited resources of the defense budget. The goal of such attacks is to convince uncommitted civilians that the innovation in question is bad for the military and, more importantly, for the security of the country. If enough people accept the military's opinion, then civilian unity can be degraded to a point where forcing the innovation on the military is no longer possible.

The most straightforward form of this tactic is to argue that an innovation is not needed. With this tactic, the military seeks to convince civilians that any changes they desire can be accommodated by the existing shape of the military. For example, the services argued that existing nonmechanical measures were enough to provide security from unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, therefore permissive action links were not necessary.323

The counterinsurgency case provides one of the more large-scale applications of this tactic. Military leaders sought "to dismiss the contrast between conventional and counterinsurgency combat as an exaggerated premise.... All infantry units, marines and army both, were to be made proficient in counterinsurgency combat as an added duty."324 Although Kennedy maintained that counterinsurgency was a "special art," Army Chief of Staff Decker told Kennedy that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas."325 General Maxwell Taylor said that insurgency and other types of low-intensity conflict were "just a form of small war, a general operation in which we have a long record against the Indians. Any well trained organization can shift the tempo to that which might be required in this kind of situation. All this cloud of dust that's coming out of the White House really isn't necessary."326 McLintock notes that "training for future 'guerrilla' warfare was seen as something that could be arranged through existing schools, without the creation of either a

323 Stein and Feaver, "Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links," p. 28. As Adm. Miller put it in 1988, "In the Navy’s opinion, there are already plenty of safeguards in place to protect against inadvertent or unauthorized use." (Miller, "Who Needs PALS?", p. 52.)
324 Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 80
326 Cited in Noel Koch, "Objecting to Reality: The Struggle to Restore U.S. Special Operations Forces," in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern in the Modern World, ed. Loren Thompson, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1989), pp. 53-53. Taylor's attitude is typical of the military's towards low intensity conflict: If we are designed to handle the European contingency, the most challenging scenario we can think of, than we can certainly handle any scenario that requires less manpower, firepower, etc., so leave us alone and let us prepare for the big wars.
'guerrilla' curriculum, or a 'guerrilla' elite."327 Thus, as Blaufarb points out, "The 'solution' adopted in the 1960s was simply to deny the problem, to insist that standard military doctrines could readily be adapted to counterinsurgency warfare with only minor changes."328

Just as the military attacks innovations for being unnecessary, it also slights some innovations by claiming that they will not work. For example, throughout the 1980s, the military argued strongly that the use of military assets to fight drug smuggling was doomed to failure (see Chapter 2).

The military frequently attacks innovations on the grounds that they threaten to undermine military effectiveness. Allowing women in combat is one innovation that has often been subjected to this attack. As one opponent of women in combat notes, "Because the stakes are the protection of the nation and life itself, anything that compromises the military's effectiveness cannot be tolerated."329 The desegregation of military units and allowing homosexuals in the military are innovations that were also criticized because of the supposed effects that such personnel changes would have on military performance. Similarly, the drug interdiction mission was long assailed because it would degrade military readiness.

Innovations can also come under attack because of their potential effects on the military budget. As Vince Davis points out, the opposition to innovation does not want "to appear to be against 'progress,' so it typically argues merely that it would cost too much."330 The services are usually quick to note that the missions or technologies being forced on them by civilians will both cost taxpayers dearly and divert military funding away from more important programs.

Attacks that highlight the cost of an innovation in terms of military effectiveness and money are often accompanied by a healthy dose of hyperbole. Innovations whose monetary costs are minimal when compared to the defense budget as a whole, such as permissive action links, are depicted as creating far more fiscal trade-offs than they actually do. The claims associated with the effectiveness and monetary costs of the drug interdiction mission represent this tactic taken to extremes (see Chapter 2).

The military can attempt to back up its attacks on an innovation by providing slanted studies that highlight the problems that they claim an innovations poses. One example of

329 Luddy, "Two Wrongs Don't Make it Right," p. 70.
this is the White Paper used to create an alarming vision of the amount of resources needed for the military to address the drug interdiction mission. Similarly, the Bohn Study, conducted under the auspices of the Air Staff Directorate, concluded that supersonic speed was very important and that the Air Force needed more F-5s, not A-7s. Such studies can also benefit the use of the delaying tactic (see below) if civilians have agreed to await a military study before taking any steps towards reform. The Special Operations Forces case provides an example of such a study (see Chapter 3).

At the root of any attack on an innovation is the military's claim of professional expertise on defense issues. When assailing an innovation, the military attempts to paint the civilians sponsoring it as misguided and unaware of the realities of military operations. Simon describes the military quite well when he notes that "in a tradition-bound agency almost any suggestion for change may constitute a danger. Organization members often become very adept at proving that all suggestions for new methods, especially those from outside the organization, are founded in ignorance." From this fact arises the potential value of the civilian tactic of acquiring military expertise.

Although many attacks on innovations reflect actual fears held by the military, some operate in place of other fears that the military cannot credibly voice. It is much more acceptable for the military to fight against an innovation by saying that the change in question is unneeded than it is to say that the innovation will adversely effect one service's autonomy. Civilians do not have much sympathy for such problems. Thus, rather than publicly basing its resistance efforts on the factors encompassed in my framework's four variables that explain the military's resistance to a given innovation, the military must couch its resistance in terms of goals that civilians are concerned with. The TFX case provides one example of this. As Art notes, when it came to resisting the TFX program, "the responsible military officers chose to argue on the grounds of technical nonfeasibility instead of expressing their mutual desires of maintaining their respective service identities." Similarly, the rationales -- based on a supposed threat to combat capability

331 The M16 case provides a somewhat more complicated example. The Army's tests of the M16 in 1962 were structured such that the M16 could not possibly outperform the Army's choice for a new rifle, the M14. Among other things, the criteria were such that it was impossible for an automatic weapon to outperform single-shot aimed fire. McNaugher notes that Army tradition weighed heavily on those people carrying out the tests and that "infantry personnel applied standards that by their very nature biased the test results." An internal study launched by the Secretary of the Army made note of the tests' biases. As a result, the Army's position with OSD was undermined and Gen. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, found that he had to compromise on the M16 issue. He decided to order between 50,000 and 100,000 of the weapons. See McNaugher, *The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition*, pp. 90-97. (The Army saw this purchase as a one-time buy, eventually of 85,000 M16s.)


-- that are used for attacking the proposal to rescind the ban on homosexuals, function for some members of the military as a more acceptable expression of the homophobia that actually drives their opinion on the matter.

**Argue for Alternative Strategy**

Occasionally, the military augments its attack on an innovation by suggesting alternative strategies that it claims will address the problems that civilians are concerned with. Sometimes, these strategies reflect programs that already exist within the military. For example, the Army maintained that equality could be created within the military without integrating units because existing Army programs would eventually lead to racial parity.\textsuperscript{335} Similarly, in arguing against the A-7, the Air Force contended that the existing multipurpose, supersonic F-4 was much better suited to handle the rigors of close air support than was the subsonic A-7.\textsuperscript{336} Other times, alternate strategies championed by the military stress the need for an entirely different approach to the problem, one which does not involve the military. For example, the military strongly argued against the supply-side approach to the drug problem that the interdiction mission represented and instead called for a demand-side approach. It also suggested that any supply-side approach be dominated by the Coast Guard, and not by one of the other, more combat-oriented services (see Chapter 2).

**Take Argument Public**

In most cases, efforts by the military to attack the innovation being forced upon it are contained within bureaucratic channels of the Pentagon or in hours of congressional testimony. At other times, however, the military chooses to use the tactic of taking its case to a wider audience in an attempt to build wide-spread sympathy and support for its position. As Richard Pious notes, when a federal agency goes public with its debate with either the president or Congress, it is "calculating that it can make a national agenda item of the issue and force the president [or Congress] to retreat."\textsuperscript{337} This tactic seeks to undermine civilian unity on an issue by mobilizing members of the general public to back the military. The vocal opposition that has arisen as a result of the military's vocal outcry against President Clinton's call to drop the ban against homosexuals is an example of the use of this tactic.

\textsuperscript{335} Dalifume, Desegregation of the US Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953, pp. 175-200.


\textsuperscript{337} Pious, The American Presidency, pp. 233-34.
Create Alliances With Civilians

One of the most powerful tactics available to the military is to create alliances with civilians who are against a particular innovation in order to counteract civilian innovation advocates. Such alliances undermine civilian unity and greatly augment the ability of the military to resist innovation. Hendrickson describes how the military becomes involved in politics because of the division of authority among civilians, which allows the military to seek what it wants "from one set of civilians what another would deny them."338 In the case of forced innovation, the tactic is the same, but the goal is different. The military may turn to the branch of government least committed to the forced innovation in order to seek help in not getting what it does not want. Kanter points out that the fact that civilian control of the military is divided between the executive and legislative branches presents the military with the opportunity of denying the wishes of one while obeying the other, thus remaining within the rules governing civil-military relations. As he puts it,

These multiple authority relationships permit a service, in good conscience, to give less than full and faithful compliance with an administration decision, to impose the most congenial interpretation on an ambiguous order, to exercise professional military judgement, and to appeal to other superiors for a reversal of an offending directive.339

When one branch of government is actively opposed to an innovation, such alliances are easily made. This is often the case with the executive branch, which tends to view the military as its turf and whose OSD is often affected by many congressionally-sponsored forced innovations. When an administration-military alliance occurs, the military can sit back and let the secretary of defense and his staff do the work of resisting innovation. This is precisely what occurred in the Goldwater-Nichols case for several years. According to Armed Forced Journal International, Weinberger's deputy, William Taft IV, "headed a small Pentagon brain trust developing strategies to thwart reorganization initiatives brewing in the Senate and the House of Representatives and even within the Packard Commission."340

The military can also seek alliances with congressmen who either traditionally serve as protectors of military interests, as some claim the armed services committees have done over the past twenty years (see Chapter 2), or whose interests coincide with those of the

339 Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective, p. 38. Most of the examples in Kanter's book deals with the military turning to the Congress to help resist the administration. In many of the cases that I examined, however, the situation was reversed, with the administration allied with the military against an intervening Congress. This difference is explained by the growth of the congressional voice in defense policy since 1975, when Kanter wrote his book. See Chapter 4 for more on this point.
340 Schemmer, "What Was Behind Reagan's 'Rush to Judgement' on DoD Reorganization?", p. 15.

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military. For example, in the M16 case, Congress supported the rapid purchase of the M14 and the rejection of the new rifle. In particular, Massachusetts legislators whose districts contained the Springfield Armory, which built the M14, worked to keep that weapon alive.

The frequency and extent of congressional-military alliances is limited by the fact that Congress is being asked to help the military avoid making a change whose adoption might mean new contracts and jobs for constituents back home. This also limits the ability of the military to form alliances with contractors. The cases that are exceptions to this, such as the M16 and TFX cases, are those in which the innovation revolves around the choice of one weapons system vs. another, rather than vs. none at all.

**Window-Dressing**

Another military tactic for fighting forced innovation is to convince civilians that all of their desired changes have been implemented, when, in fact, nothing has really changed. Such window-dressing is an attempt to pull a fast one on would-be reformers by passing off existing programs or meaningless alterations as evidence of requested changes. Window-dressing is not an option in cases where acceptance of a particular innovation is unambiguous, such as allowing homosexuals in the military. Most cases of forced innovation, however, allow for much vaguer interpretations of when change has really occurred. Mission and organizational innovations lend themselves particularly well to window-dressing, as the military can pretend that it has prepared itself to undertake a new task or that new lines on an organizational chart actually mean something.

The early years of the counterinsurgency case provide a good example of this tactic at work. As Rosen notes,

> Where the army had responded [to Kennedy's call for development of a counterinsurgency program], it had done so by relabeling as counterinsurgency programs existing doctrine for antipartisan warfare and rear-area security missions that had been developed to support army activities in a large-scale conventional war.

The Special Operations Forces case, described in Chapter 3, also provides numerous excellent examples of the military's use of the window-dressing tactic.

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Budget Reprogramming

One of the military's more insidious tactics for resisting forced innovation is budget reprogramming. When using this tactic, the military allocates money in the Five Year Defense Plan for a specific item requested by civilian leadership. When the time comes to actually spend the money, the military then shifts the funds to another, more desired budget item, thus buying what it wants and blocking funding of projects forced upon them. It uses this strategy in hopes that interfering civilians will either leave office or will change priorities, forgetting about projects that they once championed.\(^{344}\) The best example of budget reprogramming is found in the Special Operations Forces case, where the Air Force repeatedly shuffled around funds set aside for SOF airlift needs. Only diligent civilian oversight and continued commitment to the issue kept the Air Force from succeeding in reprogramming SOF money for more favored programs.

Classification

Another tactic available to the military is the use of the classification process to undermine civilian efforts to learn what is actually going on within the military. Noting that such classification is common to all bureaucracies, Max Weber suggests that "every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret sessions': in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action form criticism."\(^{345}\) He further notes that "in facing a parliament, the bureaucracy, out of a sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or from interest groups."\(^{346}\)

In both keeping its actions and motives secret from civilians, the military hopes to maintain a monopoly on information regarding its profession. The nature of the military's business, national security, lends itself to classification more than that of any other profession and makes the employment of this tactic that much easier. Often, the military uses classification as a justification for either delaying or withholding completely the supply of information to civilians trying to force innovation.

One example of this tactic at work is the effort by the military to blunt the drive for the US to field tactical nuclear weapons. In 1951, Senator McMahon, head of the Joint


\(^{345}\) Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p. 233

Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), asked the Secretary of Defense for information on the battlefield applications of tactical nuclear weapons. Admiral Arthur Davis, director of JCS, felt that "too much [information was] being given or may be given to Senator McMahon's group... McMahon should be politely told that [his] questions cannot be answered." The JCS told the secretary that "there was no practical way in which Senator McMahon's questions could be answered without serious risk to our national security" and that only the president and his closest advisors could be privy to such information.\textsuperscript{347} In response, McMahon commissioned his JCAE staff to prepare the study for him.\textsuperscript{348} This study ended up highlighting the tactical value of nuclear weapons and raised important questions about the present efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons. The JCS, in another attempt to use classification to thwart McMahon, sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense, saying,

> The answers to many of the questions enumerated [by McMahon], as well as to many of the other questions raised in this staff study, are not considered to be appropriate for the presentation to any Committee of Congress. They concern problems which must be solved within the military structure and touch upon very sensitive information which must be carefully safeguarded from a military security point of view.\textsuperscript{349}

**Delay**

One of the more common tactics employed by the military is to delay civilian efforts to force innovation whenever possible. As Huntington notes, "Evasion and delay are key methods of preventing innovation, and referral of the proposed program to committees and study groups becomes a means by which its opponents attempt to defeat it."\textsuperscript{350} The delaying tactic is founded on the fact that "military organizations may have significantly greater staying power than their civilian superiors, whose terms of office expire and whose perspectives change."\textsuperscript{351} In the TFX case, for example, the Air Force figured that it could wait out McNamara, as most previous secretaries of defense had had short tenures.\textsuperscript{352}

The military has several ways of delaying civilian forced innovation efforts. As Huntington notes above, one way is to offer to study the issue at hand, at which point the

\textsuperscript{348} This is an example of the civilian tactic of creating an oversight board.
military undertakes the most extensive, exhaustive study possible in order to drag out the process. Another, simpler method of delay is to refrain from making any changes recommended by civilians in a timely fashion. Instead, the military holds off from doing anything as long as it can, usually until civilians get upset at the delay and mandate that changes must occur within a certain time frame. The classification tactic, discussed above, is also often used to delay the forced innovation process by slowing down all civilian requests for information.

**Threaten Resignation**

Resignation is often cited as a possible response by the military to civilian initiatives of which it does not approve. However, the utility of the tactic of threatening to resign tends to be overstated. Richard Betts argues that "no service chief or field commander in the postwar era ever" resigned in protest. Richard Pious suggests that resignation is not a very effective tactic for senior officials of government agencies, including the military, because "very few career officials enjoy the public prestige to make such threats credible." Furthermore, resignation is unlikely to serve the military’s interests because it merely removes from the services the very people who oppose the innovation favored by civilians. Such civilians will not necessarily be sorry to see these officers go. Thus, the threat to resign may be somewhat empty.

Even with the shortcomings inherent in the tactic of resignation, incidents of forced innovation often give rise to claims from officers in the military that they will resign rather than accept the changes being forced upon them. For example, when presidential candidate Clinton announced that he would remove the ban on homosexuals in the military, there was a lot of talk from all ranks about resigning in protest over the issue. It is unlikely that any such resignation will occur, and cooler heads will probably prevail should President Clinton in fact remove the ban.

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353 Public resignation does not really work as a civilian tactic for fighting one branch of the government that may be standing in the way of innovation. All such a resignation might accomplish is the removal of one of the military’s opponents, who then might be replaced by someone more in line with the military’s thinking. In other words, it may only facilitate the military’s strategy of delay. The value of civilian resignation is lessened by the fact that all such positions are temporary in nature and their forfeit does not represent a major sacrifice. The resignation of Noel Koch, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who quit in part out of disgust for the administration’s and military’s handling of Special Operations Forces, for example, had little impact beyond freeing him to more vocally attack the administration’s stand on these forces.

354 Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, p. xii. Betts notes that one reason for this might be that an officer who resigns forfeits all pension rights. (p. 7.)


Undermine Implementation

The tactic that the military often turns to when all else fails is to undermine the implementation of an innovation that has already been forced upon it by legislation or presidential mandate. There are many different ways that the military can do this. It can choose several of the tactics already discussed, such as window-dressing, budget reprogramming, and delay, in an attempt to block any actual innovation from occurring. The military can also implement the adoption of an innovation in a manner somewhat different from that expected by civilians. The military has numerous opportunities to do this, as only it can actually put into practice the changes that civilians order, and only so much civilian oversight of implementation is possible.

One example of the military undermining the implementation of an innovation that had already been forced upon it is found in the case of the M16 rifle. McNamara created the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) in order to dilute Army authority in the development of the final M16 version. Nonetheless, the TCC called for more than 130 technical changes in the weapon, many of which made the weapon more like the M14 and, unfortunately, less effective.\textsuperscript{357} The Army succeeded in delaying the purchase of M16s while also shaping the weapon more to its liking. This success ultimately led to serious problems in the weapon's performance, which the Vietnam War made painfully obvious.\textsuperscript{358}

The fact that civilian orders for innovation are often vague facilitates the military's opportunity to use this particular tactic. When civilians are not specific enough in their demands it becomes easy for the military to follow its orders to the letter while at the same time ignoring their intent. A good example of this is Truman's Executive Order 9981, which was meant to end segregation in the military. However, because the order did not state this explicitly, the military, the Army in particular, had plenty of room in which to maneuver. The Army was able to meet Truman's mandates while ignoring his intent by claiming that the existing segregated structure offered everyone equal opportunity.\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{357} McNaugher, \textit{The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition}, pp. 97-103.
\textsuperscript{358} In fairness to the Army, not all of the design changes that hindered the effectiveness of the production version of the M16 was the Army's fault, but the fact remains that its participation in the TCC was a leading factor in moving the M16 away from the weapon that McNamara thought he had saddled the Army with.
\textsuperscript{359} See Dalfiume, \textit{Desegregation of the US Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953}, pp. 175, 200.
PREDICTIONS OFFERED BY FORCED INNOVATION FRAMEWORK

This chapter has carefully constructed a framework for explaining forced innovation. Each element of the framework, from why civilians intervene to force innovation, to why the military resists those innovations, has been outlined in some detail. The next two chapters will test the utility of my framework by applying it to two different instances of forced innovation: the drug interdiction mission and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) revitalization.

Before I use my framework to examine these cases, I must first be as explicit as possible as to what it predicts that I should find. Although these predictions cannot be terribly specific, they can be focussed enough to assist in the testing of my framework.

The first set of predictions the framework suggests deals with why civilians might choose to intervene to force innovation. In the drug interdiction case, the fact that civilians want to employ the military to address a social problem -- illegal narcotics -- implies that they are acting for structural reasons. In particular, they are seeking the social goal of reducing drug abuse. Given the attention devoted to this issue when this case took place, it is likely that public pressure helped to push civilians to seek this goal. The SOF case suggests a much different motivation. SOF reorganization promises little in the way of economic or social benefits, so such structural goals are unlikely to be the drivers of intervention. Instead, a concern for military performance, a strategic goal, will most likely influence civilian intervention. It is also likely that military failure in the area of special operations will highlight specific problems that civilians will seek to address through forced innovation. Without such failure, civilians would probably have no reason to think that the existing system needs fixing.

The forced innovation framework predicts that the military will resist the two innovations present in the test cases because of the way these innovations threaten the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. It is quite difficult to say, a priori, which of these factors will be of greatest importance in each case. One would suspect, however, that since the drug interdiction mission does not sound like a military mission, resistance based on this innovation's conflict with professional identity will be an important factor in that case. In the SOF case, the fact that the innovation in question involves the formation of a new command suggests that hierarchical relationships within the military will be altered. As a result, some groups can be expected to lose control
over their own actions, the actions of others, or both. Thus, military resistance is likely to center on concerns over autonomy.

In terms of predicting the outcomes of these two cases, the framework focuses analysis on the relative levels of civilian and military unity surrounding the forced innovation in question. It is difficult to predict the level of civilian support that either of the two innovations will enjoy. The goal of the interdiction mission -- to slow the flow of drugs entering the country -- appears to be the type of issue that anyone in Congress could get behind. The level of actual support for using the military in the drug war will probably depend on how extreme the proposals are. As the level of the military's involvement in law enforcement grows, fewer congressmen are likely to feel comfortable backing such measures. As for the Reagan Administration, the fact that Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger showed a great deal of deference to the military profession suggests that the Administration would oppose this forced innovation. Thus, civilian unity will most likely be divided along executive/legislative lines. Using this same logic, the Administration is unlikely to favor efforts to force SOF reorganization on the services. As for Congress, this case revolves around issues that the public will not really care about. As a result, most congressmen are unlikely to feel strongly one way or the other on the matter. This could allow a few members to take up the issue and run with it relatively unopposed by other congressmen.

Military unity appears to be somewhat easier to predict. In the drug interdiction case, the forced innovation will most likely challenge the entire military equally. Unless some group within the services believes that it stands to gain from embracing this new task, the military should be unified against this forced innovation. In the SOF case, the existence of SOF in each service that stand to benefit from reorganization will probably split from the services and support the creation of a unified command of their own. Given the low status and power of these forces, however, it is hard to predict exactly how helpful their defection will be to civilians.

In the overall balance, each case faces a good chance of creating a split in civilian support between Congress and the Reagan Administration. Thus, the critical factor will be just how unified support in the Congress is for each forced innovation. If unity is high enough to overcome both the Administration's resistance and that of a relatively unified military in each case, then innovation proponents should succeed in forcing the military to adopt these two innovations.

For the following two case studies to be successful tests of my framework, the framework must be able to clearly answer five main questions for each of these cases: why did civilians decide to intervene, why did the military resist the innovation in question,
what tactics did each side use to gain the outcome it desired, what was the eventual resolution of the case, and what factors determined the nature of this outcome. If the elements of my framework are unable to account for the answers to any of these questions, then the framework will have to be modified. More significantly, if a case exhibits characteristics contrary to those predicted by the framework -- for example, if it turns out that the military could not care less about its autonomy -- then the framework will obviously require some changes. Should my framework perform well in the two case studies, then it will have passed an important, though by no means absolute, test in establishing its accuracy and usefulness as an analytical tool.

The concluding chapter of this dissertation will assesses both the accuracy of these predictions and the overall utility of my forced innovation framework, based on the level of success achieved by the upcoming case studies. In addition, the final chapter will offer some useful observations on forced innovation gleaned from the two main and ten secondary case studies.
Chapter 2

Drafting the Military to Fight the Drug War
THE DRUG INTERDICTON CASE

America's drug problem captured the attention of both the public and politicians during the 1980s. Each group saw the US military as a potentially valuable tool in an intensified fight against drugs. If we want to fight a "war" against drugs, the idea went, then why not call out the troops? The reality was that the military was not going to volunteer to fight in this war. Its participation would only occur if civilians drafted the Department of Defense into the antidrug effort. The efforts of the Pentagon to dodge this draft spanned the decade. From 1981 on, calls from Congress to use the military to interdict the flow of drugs entering the US grew both more frequent and more intense. Some congressmen wanted no more than for the military to offer equipment and advice to civilian law enforcement agencies. Others sought more extreme approaches, ranging from allowing the military to arrest smugglers to giving it the power to shoot down aircraft suspected of carrying drugs.

The Pentagon resisted all requests to enter the drug war but found itself legislated deeper and deeper into an antidrug mission. Throughout the struggle between Congress and the military, the Reagan Administration and its Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, sided with the military. This alliance, combined with a lack of support in Congress for the more drastic plans to employ the military to fight drugs, helped the military to avoid excessive involvement in drug interdiction. In the end, the military did have a moderate antidrug mission forced upon it.

Today, the military is an important player in the multi-agency effort to halt the flood of illegal narcotics coming across US borders. Specifically, the Department of Defense was designated by Congress in 1988 as the lead agency for the detection and tracking of drug smugglers. Because of this tasking, the military now coordinates the early stages of the interdiction process, where it first detects and then tracks potential smugglers. To do this, Navy E-2C Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) and ground-based radars search the skies above the Caribbean. Naval ships on patrol look for suspicious vessels and, under the control of Coast Guard personnel, stop, board, and search such ships. The National Guard assists Customs agents in searching cargo containers at the nation's ports and at border checkpoints. In the jungles of Central and South America, US military personnel train, equip, and assist foreign militaries in efforts to eradicate the crops.

\[360\] For a concise view of how such missions are performed, see Rear Adm. George Gee, "Vigilance in Paradise," Proceedings Oct., 1992: 87-90.
and labs that are the first steps in getting cocaine to users in the United States. Through these and other operations, the military carries out the drug interdiction mission innovation that civilians forced upon it in the 1980s.

It is quite clear that without civilian intervention the military would never have become as involved in drug interdiction as it is today. This fact, combined with the military's attempts to resist civilian intervention in this case, makes the "forced" element of this instance of forced innovation obvious. Was the drug interdiction mission actually an innovation? It certainly does not meet the requirements of Rosen's definition of a major innovation. 361 It did not create any new combat arms. It did not involve a new theory of victory on the battlefield. However, by my definition of innovation, which characterizes an innovation as an ends or means that is new to a specific situation, the drug interdiction mission is clearly an innovation.

This mission is certainly a new "end" for the military. This innovation gives the military an entirely new enemy to fight against: drug smugglers. More importantly, this enemy is not military in nature. As one Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staff member argues, the real innovation in this case is that in the antidrug mission there is no application of force vs. force. As such, this mission is quite different than any that the military has traditionally undertaken. A 1991 GAO report summarized, "The lead agency mission was a radical departure from DOD's traditional military role and was accompanied by social and legal questions regarding the proper role of the armed forces in a democratic society." 362

The interdiction mission's novel "end" has had an impact on several of the military's traditional "means." For example, John Heaphy, the Director of Inter-Agency Affairs in DoD's Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, points out that this new mission has altered the military's thought process. Now, it must factor its drug mission responsibilities into many of its decisions, including those regarding operations funding, training, and the deployment of forces. 363 Furthermore, Jack Dranttel, former counsel for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), notes that the drug mission forces the military to work very closely with non-DoD agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. 364 In the past, DoD was free to act without concern for these other agencies.

364 Interview with Jack Dranttel, former Counsel for House Armed Services Committee, Sept. 30, 1992

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In an effort to minimize the requirements for change inherent in the antidrug innovation, the military has tried to use existing operating routines whenever possible to carry out its new mission. As a result, the drug interdiction operations that the military performs today are conducted largely without the use of new "means." Relatively few changes in the military's operational practices have been necessary. Thus, the drug interdiction mission is best described as a mission innovation, rather than an organizational or tactical innovation. This new mission has clearly forced the military to operate under unfamiliar constraints while seeking a new end: the interdiction of illegal narcotics. By my definition, this makes drug interdiction a definite innovation for the military.

This chapter uses the forced innovation framework in order to examine the struggle between civilians and the military over increasing the military's involvement in drug interdiction. The framework will show why civilians intervened in this matter, why the military resisted, and why this instance of forced innovation unfolded as it did.

The following section highlights the escalation of the military's role in the drug war from 1981-90. This brief history focuses primarily on the various legislative acts which mandated new roles for the military and is not meant to be an exhaustive account of antidrug efforts during the 1980s. Throughout this legislative effort, the military worked vigorously both behind the scenes and in congressional testimony to resist being dragged into a mission it did not want. The military enjoyed the support of the Reagan Administration in its efforts to remain free of antidrug duties. In the end, the military found itself saddled with more of an interdiction mission than it wanted, but less than it feared.

THE FIRST STEPS IN DRAFTING THE MILITARY

Serious civilian-led efforts to use the military for drug interdiction began in 1981. However, supporters of a military role in the drug war have cited several precedents for such a mission that pre-date the 1980s. These precedents served as facilitators to the civilian decision to intervene. For example, a 1988 Washington Post op. ed. argued in favor of a military drug role, citing the British use of the Royal Navy to stop the international slave trade as a relevant historical precedent.\textsuperscript{365} The Chinese Opium Wars against the British were also offered as instances where a country used military force to halt an unwanted drug trade.\textsuperscript{366} Supporters of a military drug mission used these two


examples as a foreign, historical innovation menu in order to suggest that the US military could move in this direction. Similar examples drawn from America's past served the same purpose. Military assistance provided during Prohibition is one such example. During the 1920s, the Navy loaned the Coast Guard more than twenty destroyers in order to help interdict "rum-runners." 367 Finally, in the most relevant historical precedence, during the 1970s the Navy loaned several antisubmarine warfare aircraft to the new Customs air service. 368

The decade-long effort to employ military personnel and equipment in an antidrug mission began in earnest in 1981. During HASC hearings in June, Rep. Charles Bennett (D-FL) attempted to add a provision to the Fiscal Year 1982 (FY82) DoD authorization bill that gave the military the power to search for and arrest drug smugglers within US territory. Such power would have challenged long-standing prohibitions contained in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which specifically forbids the use of Army or Air Force


Another historical precedent for a military drug mission existed that differed somewhat from those described above, yet was still relevant. The military had direct experience in combatting and achieving a near-total victory against drugs. The post-Vietnam military suffered seriously from drug abuse within the ranks. A strict demand-side policy instituted by the military eventually rid it of this problem. Interestingly, this internal battle on drugs was itself an innovation forced upon the military. As one 1974 article noted, "The resistance which many career military personnel display to the vast expenditure of money, time and talent necessary to effectively combat drug abuse is based in the rationale that rehabilitation is not a proper mission of the armed forces.... At this point, career military personnel are resentful or at least ambivalent about this strange additional new mission which has been imposed upon them." (M. Scott Peck, "The Role of the Military in American Society Vis-a-Vis Drug Abuse: Scapegoat, National Laboratory and Potential Change Agent," in New Civil-Military Relations, ed. John Lovell and Philip Kronenberg. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), pp. 186-87.) Not only was the military developing an innovation for itself by attacking drug abuse, it was serving as a laboratory for the entire nation. This 1974 article went on to that "the truth of the matter is that the military is embarking upon a vast program of treatment at a time when an effective model of treatment is not known. Indeed, it is becoming a mission of the military not simply to treat drug abusers, but to develop a successful and model treatment program on behalf of the nation." (p. 183.)

Another historical case that is of peripheral relevance is that of the State Department, which was forced by Congress in 1978 to create an antinarcotics bureau. One State Department member describes this bureau as "the bureau that nobody wanted" and notes that State has never been comfortable with its drug duties. (James Gormley, "Reflections of a State Department Drug Warrior," Foreign Service Journal June, 1992: 31.)

There was also the historical precedence of the FBI's forced antidrug mission. J. Edgar Hoover resisted a drug role for the FBI for decades. He sought to protect his organization's autonomy by shielding it from change pushed from without. He had many organizationally-based reasons for opposing a drug mission. Hoover feared the corruption of his agents and the need to resort to enforcement policies that might be "unsavory" to the public. He also did not want the jurisdictional headaches that would come with operating in such a crowded policy area. He also thought that the FBI would take the blame if narcotics trafficking was not halted. For similar reasons, Hoover's FBI resisted becoming involved in the new mission areas of civil rights and organized crime. Only once pressure from Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the public to take part in these missions made the costs of resistance greater than the risks of compliance did the FBI adopt these mission innovations. (See James Wilson, The Investigators (New York: Basic Books, 1978), and James Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 182.) As my framework, applied in the second half of this chapter, shows, there are many similarities between the FBI's and the military's resistance to an antidrug mission.
personnel in a domestic law enforcement role. Bennett's call for this substantial military role in the drug mission was widely opposed, both inside and outside of the House. His provision was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which rejected it and replaced it with a much less stringent compromise amendment introduced by Rep. William Hughes (D-NJ). Hughes' provision allowed the military to pass on to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) any drug-related information gathered during regular military operations. It also permitted the military to loan spare equipment to LEAs and to help them operate this equipment. Hughes addressed Bennett's failed initiative by reiterating in the wording of his provision the prohibition against military search and arrest powers.

The Judiciary Committee eventually passed Hughes' amendment, as did the House as a whole. The final version passed by Congress had four main provisions that affected the military's role in drug interdiction:

1) The military may provide relevant information gathered during normal operations to LEAs.

2) The military may provide equipment to LEAs and train them in its use.

3) Military personnel may assist LEAs in the operation and maintenance of donated equipment.

Congress bounded these new capabilities with very specific wording stating that assistance to LEAs could only be provided if it did not negatively affect military readiness rates. To add to this limitation, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who was strongly against an antidrug mission for the military from the outset, declared that the collection of information useful to LEAs could only take place if it were an "incidental aspect of training performed for a military purpose." In other words, only surplus military equipment, personnel, and time could be made available to LEAs. This substantially limited the impact of the law. More importantly for the military, the legislation prohibited equipment operated by military personnel from being used to interdict suspected smugglers. Thus, the military was only given a passive supporting role in the overall national effort to stem the flow of drugs reaching the US.

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369 This prohibition has been extended in practice to cover the Navy and Marines as well. *Posse Comitatus* is very important to this case and will be discussed at some length in the *Professional Identity* section below.

370 Pat Towell, "House Passes Defense Bill; Armed Services Committee Brushes Aside All Critics," *Congressional Quarterly* June 20, 1981: 1310. The House also called on the Pentagon to prepare a report examining the possible effects of military participation in drug arrests.

371 It is interesting to note that the law specifically stated that powers granted to the executive before its enactment would not be limited by its contents. Because the Navy and Marine Corps have never been legally included in the *Posse Comitatus* act, this wording left the door open for these services to operate in a direct civilian law enforcement role without requiring a formal alteration of *Posse Comitatus*. (Paul Rice, "New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act," *Military Law Review* Spring, 1984: 127.)


Although civil libertarians viewed the 1981 law as a significant challenge to *Posse Comitatus*, the limitations built into the act made its effect on the traditional separation of the military and civilian law enforcement realms quite small. In most respects, all this new law did was codify the permission for the military to do what it was already doing in many instances. In the early 1980s, military commanders at bases across America often cooperated with local law enforcement officials, providing equipment, training space, and other means of indirect support. Such informal actions were part of the constant effort by commanders to maintain good relations with the communities that housed their bases.\(^374\)

Thus, early civilian efforts to bring the military into the fight against drugs merely codified existing practices by providing consistency and more formally drawing the line between direct and indirect support, the former of which was forbidden. In fact, commanders in the field wanted to provide more low-level support to local law enforcement officials. When they requested permission from Washington, they were turned down by a leadership in the Pentagon that was concerned with *Posse Comitatus* conflicts. As a result, commanders continued their practices without asking for further permission.\(^375\) The military and the civilian leadership of DoD fought even these limited efforts because they feared these moves were only the first steps in what might become a major antidrug responsibility.\(^376\)

Those fears proved to be well-founded.

Small escalatory steps continued during the early 1980s. In March of 1982, Vice President Bush announced that DoD would provide "AWACS-type aircraft" to help fight drugs. This decree was news to the Navy, which did not want to provide such assistance, fearing a decline in military readiness. The Navy cited Operation Thunderbolt, a recent trial mission using Naval E-2s with the Customs Agency, as being successful but also damaging to readiness due to decreased training time and the "inconvenient" relocation of the E-2s.\(^377\)

By the end of the year, several Navy ships were serving as taxis for Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs, composed of 4-6 personnel). In accordance with limitations placed in the 1981 law, any assistance provided to TACLETs could not interfere with normal Navy operations.\(^378\) Nor could TACLETs tell their ship's captains

\(^{374}\) Interview with John Heaphy.
\(^{375}\) Interview with Jack Drantel.
\(^{376}\) Interview with John Heaphy.
\(^{377}\) "DOD Pressed for AWACS to Help in Drug Fight," *Air Force Times* Mar. 22, 1982: 10. Although the Navy may have complained about the effects of Operation Thunderbolt, it nonetheless was able to benefit quite nicely from its involvement in that exercise. According to a congressional staffer, the Navy charged Customs nearly $800,000 for the E-2s and their crews. In addition, the Navy rotated different planes into Florida during the course of the operation so that regularly scheduled maintenance would be billed to Customs.
where to go. Only if a ship with Coast Guard personnel embarked on it happened across a vessel that fit the profile of a drug smuggler, and only if the ship could spare the time from its scheduled operations, did the TACLETs then get to conduct boardings. The military's drug mission, although slowly growing, was still a low-level, indirect operation.

During the summer of 1985, Rep. Bennett attached an amendment nearly identical to his 1981 provision to the FY86 DoD Authorization bill. He argued that "George Washington put down the whiskey rebellion,...[and] Eisenhower integrated the schools of Little Rock. I don't see why federal troops can't be used to enforce federal law."379 This time around, more congressmen in the House agreed with such sentiments, and Bennett's amendment passed in the House by the wide margin of 364-51.380 Whatever the factors that drove the House to pass Bennett's amendment, they apparently were not operating in the Senate. Once the DoD authorization bill reached conference, it encountered strong resistance from senators who did not like the idea of giving the military such an in-depth drug mission. As a result, the Bennett provision was deleted from the final bill. In a compromise, House and Senate conferees replaced the amendment with one that provided $15 million to pay for 500 new Coast Guard TACLET personnel to be assigned to Navy ships that frequented smuggling routes.381

CONGRESS DRAGS THE MILITARY IN DEEPER

In March of 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime released its final report, entitled America's Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime. In its report, the Commission declared:

Beyond threats to friendly democracies, international drug traffickers should be considered a threat to our national security because they comprise a direct attack on the physical and social well-being of our country... The Joint Chiefs should be instructed [to this effect] by the highest level of government, through a National Security Decision Directive, or by other appropriate means.382

President Reagan signed just such a National Security Decision Directive in April, declaring drugs to be a threat to national security. Concurrently, Reagan started his

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380 Bill Keller, "A Son's Death, a Father's Crusade," New York Times June 28, 1985: A12. In other relevant House action, Rep. Robinson (D-AR) offered an amendment that would have mandated a minimum of 200 hours of lessons in criminal procedure to US Naval academy cadets, followed by continuous "on-the-job training to keep them up to date on all the Supreme Court rulings." (22, p. 2109.) The House defeated this amendment.
382 Cited in Ault, "Capitol Hill and Pentagon Face Off on Drug War," p. 60.
campaign against drugs in earnest. In order to demonstrate commitment to the cause at the top of government, Reagan and other White House officials took drug tests.

Recognizing that drugs had become a major political issue, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-MA) sought to get out ahead of the White House on the drug issue. He set to work in July in an attempt to have a drug bill ready to present to Congress before the Administration could present its own.³⁸³ The result of O'Neill's efforts were realized on September 11, when the House passed the Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986 by a vote of 392-16. As one observer noted, "Republicans and Democrats scratched and clawed one another to offer yet more draconian amendments" to the omnibus legislation.³⁸⁴ This bill represented a quantum leap in the level of the military's involvement in fighting drugs. Among the bill's most relevant sections:

1) The Hunter Amendment, named for Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA). It gave the president thirty days to deploy active military and National Guard personnel and equipment "sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of United States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics." Within forty-five days such penetration was to be "substantially" halted. Any state whose National Guard commander failed to cooperate would have all of its federal funding withheld. The Amendment also gave the military the power to make arrests, but only in cases of hot pursuit. Such arrests could occur within US territory.³⁸⁵

2) The Bennett Amendment (weaker than his previous tries) allowed "the use of [DoD] personnel to assist drug enforcement officials in searches, seizures, and arrests outside the US" while under the control of LEA personnel.

3) The bill directed the Secretary of Defense to spend $213 million from existing appropriations on eight Blackhawk helicopters and four planes with "look down" radar that would then be made available to LEAs.

4) All incurred costs were to be borne by the Department of Defense.

When debate on the Senate's version of the House Omnibus Drug Enforcement Act got underway, the Hunter Amendment was quickly defeated, thanks largely to the efforts

³⁸⁵ Quoted in Julie Rovner, "Reagan, Senate Republicans Join Drug War," Congressional Quarterly Sept. 20, 1986: 2193-94. It is important to note that the Hunter Amendment, which was a major sea change in military involvement, had no hearings, either public or closed-door. As a result, the military never had a chance to testify. This did not sit well with several representatives, who complained that members seeking to draft the military into the drug war were doing so by circumventing regular channels. ("Controversy Over Omnibus Drug Legislation: Pros and Cons," Congressional Digest Nov., 1985: 271.)
of Sen. Nunn (D-GA). In an effort to gain some of the intended benefits of the Hunter Amendment, but using a more realistic approach, Sen. Dixon (D-IL) offered a similar, though less demanding, amendment. Dixon was careful to use phrases like "where it is reasonably available," and "to the extent possible," and did not mandate results within a given time frame. He did, however, grant the military the power to arrest in cases of hot pursuit when LEA personnel were not available. The Senate, in no mood as of 1986 to involve the military to such an extent in a drug mission, also soundly rejected Dixon's amendment, 72-14.

The Senate came up with its own set of proposals. Its version of the Omnibus Drug Enforcement Act contained the following orders to DoD:

1) It authorized DoD "to loan personnel to civilian law enforcement agencies to operate and maintain equipment used by those agencies to assist foreign governments in drug interdiction activities."386

2) It allowed the military to intercept ships and planes in order to identify and track them (not seize them), but only until LEAs could take over.

3) It gave the Secretary of Defense ninety days to compile a list of the material and manpower assets that it could make available for LEAs. The Secretary of Defense was also to create a plan for providing those assets.387

The final version of the bill that came out of conference reflected the Senate's changes regarding the military's role in the drug war. The House passed this bill on Oct. 17, the Senate passed it the next day, thus pushing the military one step further into the drug interdiction business.388

387 This requirement was an attempt to improve on the existing system of military aid whereby LEAs made requests for assistance and were then helped. The problem with this system was that the services never provided the LEAs with any information as to what military equipment or personnel skills might be relevant to interdiction missions. (Peter Reuter, et al., "Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction," R-3594-USDP, Rand, January, 1988: viii.) Such a practice is an example of the military following the letter of the law without volunteering to take the extra step required to meet the goals of the legislation. This amendment was a civilian attempt to force just such a step.
388 While the omnibus legislation moved through Congress, the White House acted to assure that its public voice against drugs would not be drowned out by Congress. On September 14, President and Mrs. Reagan addressed the nation in a unique speech televised from their White House living room. Their entire talk dealt with the drug problem, which they depicted as "menacing our society" and "killing our children." This address further publicly committed Reagan to fighting drugs. It also heightened awareness of the issue and raised the profile of the drug problem in Washington. Nowhere in the speech, however, did the Reagans mention the use of the military against drugs. In addition, Reagan maintained his position that America must fight drugs without the effort costing anything.
Efforts to more deeply involve the military in drug interdiction arose again in 1988.\(^{389}\) On May 5, the House approved the infamous Hunter Amendment again, this time as part of the House version of the FY89 DoD Authorization, by a vote of 385-23. Although a major escalation of the military's anti-drug powers, the Hunter Amendment was not the most extreme measure offered in the House that year. Rep. Ravenel (R-SC) wanted to give the military the power to shoot down any aircraft suspected of smuggling.\(^{390}\) Another representative wanted to expand the focus of using the military in an antidrug law enforcement role by using military personnel in "gang-busting."\(^{391}\) Fortunately for the military, there was little support for such proposals.

The Senate version of the FY89 Defense Authorization Act reopened debate on using the military against drugs. Sen. Nunn sought to defeat an amendment similar to the Hunter Amendment offered in the Senate by Sen. D'Amato (R-NY) and Sen. Wilson (R-CA) that would have given the military the power of search and seizure. An eventual compromise between the two amendments was slow by fighting between Republicans and Democrats.

\(^{389}\) 1988, like 1986, offered many instances of competition between the parties to see who could be tougher in the drug policy area. In April, for example, the Democratic-controlled House Rules Committee decided that in order to streamline the cumbersome annual defense debate in the House, amendments to the authorization bill that had not already been examined by the Armed Services Committee would be removed. Such amendments had been the favored way of involving the military in drug interdiction in previous years, and some proponents of a greater role were enraged by this ruling. Rep. Gingrinch (R-GA) led the Republican attack on this measure. He charged that "the left is terrified that we might actually force votes in this house on drugs, on using the military to stop drugs." He was backed up by Rep. Gunderson (R-WI), who claimed that the House lacked "the courage to make the war on drugs a real war." (Pat Towell, "House Again Rebuffs Reagan Arms Policies," \textit{Congressional Quarterly} April 30, 1988: 1141.) The House voted largely along party lines to approve the controversial rule.

Given the Rules Committee decision, the 1988 amendment that eventually passed should have been barred from the FY89 DoD authorization bill. However, once the House floor debate began, events took a strange turn. Continuing the game of one-upmanship over drug policy, Rep. Aucoin (D-OR) challenged the Republicans, saying that if they were serious about combating drugs, they would cut back on SDI. "The choice is yours," he said, "star wars or drug wars." His remarks infuriated Republicans. A procedural battle ensued, and the Hunter Amendment was eventually tacked on to the authorization bill. (Pat Towell, "House Deals Reagan Defeat on SDI, MX Missile," \textit{Congressional Quarterly} May 7, 1988: pp. 1207-08.) Aucoin's attack may have been a factor in $600 million in SDI funds being reallocated to the Coast Guard.

This episode shows how the Republicans were trying to turn the military's involvement in the drug war into a manhood issue to beat the Democrats over the head with. The Democrats support of the amendment-limiting rule said nothing about their overall support for the military's drug mission, however. They took their position at the request of the Democratic House leadership, which was trying to come up with a comprehensive drug package of its own. (Towell, "House Deals Reagan Defeat on SDI, MX Missile," p. 1207.) The Republican reaction reflected how important a political issue and potential weapon drug policy had become by early 1988.

\(^{390}\) Donald Macbr, "The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America," \textit{Journal of Inter-America Studies} Summer-Fall, 1988: 53. In particular, Ravenel suggested, "I feel that if this country ever is going to get serious about stopping drugs, and if indeed we are in a war against drugs, then we are going to have to involve the military, from what I have heard today drag you guys into it kicking and screaming, interdict these people, and upon positive identification shoot these drug-bearing aircraft down and machine gun the survivors. Think of all the long trials it would save us. All that expense, and maintaining those devils in prison, ad infinitum, or until we turn them loose to go back at it. The same thing would go for you guys, Admiral, in the Navy, upon positive identification draw off, shell those ships, sink them. They would very soon get the message." (Cited in "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," Joint Hearings Before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Investigation Subcommittee and the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, May 10, 23, and 31, June 9 and 15, 1988: 349.)

over who should be able to take the credit for increasing drug interdiction efforts. The final version, which passed by 83-6, contained the following provisions:

1) The bill ordered the president to deploy enough airborne radar surveillance along the US southern border to yield "an appropriate increase" in the number of surveillance flights.

2) It gave military personnel the right to track suspected smuggling boats and notify LEAs of their location.

3) It stated that "Navy personnel may arrest suspected drug-smugglers outside US territorial waters, if they have been trained by Coast Guard officials in law-enforcement procedures and are working in cooperation with Coast Guard officials stationed on the same ship." The Secretary of Defense to urge governors to develop plans for using the National Guard in their states to fight drugs.

5) It ordered the president to present Congress with a plan to create a communications and intelligence network to assist LEAs.

Before the House and Senate versions of the FY89 Defense Authorization Act reached conference committee, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees held an unusual set of joint hearings about the military's part in the drug war. These hearings were characterized by congressmen blasting the military for not doing enough to fight drugs and by uniformed and civilian DoD officials arguing that they should not be involved any deeper in the drug war. The hearings showed the military in no uncertain terms that Congress was serious about giving it a drug mission. This determination was not boundless, however. By the time the FY89 Defense Authorization Act had cleared conference, the Senate version largely prevailed, and all sections giving the military arrest powers were removed. Instead, DoD was made the "lead agency" in narcotics surveillance, placing it in charge of detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime smuggling. The assignment of lead agency status was the single most important designation of interdiction responsibility to DoD that occurred in the 1980s.

Congress was fully aware that DoD was not happy with the changes that had been forced upon it as of 1988. As Sen. D'Amato said, "Let's face it, they're not doing

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394 The final version also requires the military to take LEAs into account when planning military exercises.
cartwheels over there [at the Pentagon]. They are not happy."395 However, congressional proponents of the military's new mission were determined to see the military's resistance to its new mission end with the passing of the FY89 Defense Authorization Act.

THE STRUGGLE COMES TO AN END

The ability of the 1988 legislation to successfully mandate a drug mission for the military was facilitated by the advent of the Bush Administration in 1989. This administration brought with it a new attitude towards the use of military personnel and resources in the drug war. On September 5, President Bush gave a televised speech in which he laid out his antidrug plan. In it, he broke new ground with regards to involving the US military in the drug war on foreign soil when he said "We will help any government that wants our help. When requested, we will for the first time make available the appropriate resources of America's armed forces." His only other reference to the military was a call for "greater interagency cooperation, combined with sophisticated intelligence gathering and Defense Department technology, [which] can help stop drugs at our borders."396

Bush and his new Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, were content with the Pentagon's antidrug role. Some members of the Congress were still unhappy as of mid-1989, however. Sen. Wilson charged that the military was "AWOL when it comes to aggressively mobilizing its resources against drug traffickers." In response to this, he and several other senators introduced legislation to create a new unified antidrug command led by a three-star general or admiral. This reorganization effort for the sake of the drug war was unable to win much support, however, and it went nowhere.397 This was fine with the military, as such an organizational innovation, similar to the creation of the Special Operations Command discussed in the next chapter, had no supporters in the Pentagon.

By mid-1989, the eight year battle between Congress and the military over the drug war was largely over.398 Congress chose to give up major escalatory steps such as the Hunter and Bennett Amendments and instead focussed on improving the military's main role as the lead agency for detection and monitoring. The political support required to turn

396 "Bush Reveals Anti-Drug Plan, Calls for Extra $2.2 Billion (text of speech)," Congressional Quarterly Sept. 9, 1989: 2332.
the military into a true law enforcement agency with arrest powers did not exist. For its
part, DoD finally decided that such a low-level mission might, after all, be tolerable. More
importantly, the military realized that the best way to keep from being dragged further into
the drug war was to supply the modest level of effort that Congress had finally agreed
upon.399

Congress duly noted the military's new attitude. Rep. Mavroules (D-MA), after
returning from observing the military's antidrug efforts in Florida, said that "initial foot-
dragging" appeared to be over and that he was now quite happy with DoD's efforts and
attitude. His concern now only lay with the Bush Administration's willingness to fund
military interdiction programs.400 He later added, "We have a commitment by the secretary
[of defense], by the administration, and I think we are all now going to work together as
one team here."401 Rep. Hopkins (R-KY) echoed these sentiments. He said, "We have
always been faced with a reluctant, hesitant and at times downright rebellious Pentagon...
So it is with a great deal of satisfaction that I can say today that I think things are rapidly
changing."402

Secretary of Defense Cheney signaled a greater change in DoD when in September he
declared that the drug mission was a "high priority national security mission" for the
military. He gave military leaders three weeks to come up with plans to help in the drug
war, even at the cost of diverting resources from other activities. He said that it was time
for the Pentagon to "go beyond" its efforts of the past.403 In accordance with Cheney's
demand for the military to put forth some sort of plan, the various relevant commander-in-
chiefs (CINCs) responded in different ways. The CINC of the Atlantic Command
(CINCLANT ) and the Pacific Command CINC (CINCPAC) each decided to create joint
task forces (JTF 4 and JTF 5, respectively) to manage their antidrug duties and allow for
better coordination with LEAs. They put Coast Guard officers in charge of these task
forces. The other two relevant CINCS, of North American Aerospace Defense Command

399 The military's decision to end resistance to the antidrug duties it had been assigned by 1989 must not be
misconstrued as a decision to accept whatever new tasks that Congress might want to add on in the future. The
military was not going to passively let itself be dragged in any further than it was. For example, Jack Dranttel
helped to write a bill for the HASC that would merely have given the military permission to use active-duty
personnel to help Customs officials inspect cargo containers. The military fought this minor move tooth and nail
and was able to defeat it. (Interview with Jack Dranttel.)
401 "Military Role in Drug Interdiction (Part 3)," HASC No. 101-35, Hearing Before the Investigations
402 "Military Role in Drug Interdiction (Part 3)," HASC No. 101-35, p. 3.
(CINCNORAD) and Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), each chose instead to rely on an expansion of their existing organizations.  

The same week as Cheney's speech, Gen. Colin Powell told the SASC during his confirmation hearing to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) that he pledged his full support to the drug mission. He stated:

I have no reservations and I know that none of my colleagues have any reservations. The American people have spoken clearly on this one. We ought to be concerned about this cancer that is in our midst, and I think we do have capabilities to bring to this war. I am actively working on that problem now in my current job, and I can assure you if I become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it will enjoy the highest priority in my daily activities, and I will work... to make sure that the armed forces are making as much of a contribution to it as we can.  

He also reiterated that the military must not be given the power of arrest, but said that short of that, he was ready to increase the military's interdiction efforts.  

The arrival of the 1990s brought with it a new era in how the Pentagon approached the drug interdiction mission. The military leadership had accepted its marching orders. No longer did Congress have to drag every small commitment out of the military. Everyone now said how ready and committed they were to fighting drugs. A survey of the various regional CINCs showed that the drug war bandwagon was getting crowded. CINCPAC Admiral Hardisty stated that counternarcotics had become his command's "No. 1 peacetime priority," although he noted that "the success rate [was] not high." Similarly, CINCLANT Admiral Kelso said that the US must be prepared to meet the increasing naval demands of the drug war in the Caribbean.  

Colin Powell, now CJCS, stood behind the drug mission, saying "There's nothing America has to do of a higher priority to its security -- national security and all kinds of security -- than to get a handle on this drug problem. I have had no reservation on [the military's antidrug mission]."  

In summary, serious efforts to involve the military in drug interdiction surfaced in 1981 and ran their course by 1989. The resulting level of involvement is one that

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404 See "Military Role in Drug Interdiction," HASC No. 101-2, Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Feb. 22, 1989: 13-14. JTF 6 was later established to coordinate antidrug efforts along the southern land border with Mexico.  
Congress, the administration, and the military have learned to live with. The preceding pages told the basic story of how this mission arose and evolved. The following analytical section offers an explanation for why this conflict over forced innovation developed as it did.

WHY CIVILIANS INTERVENED

The level of public concern over the drug problem was instrumental to the congressional drive to force the military into the drug war. This concern translated directly into political pressure in Washington. As this pressure grew, so did the impetus in the House, Senate, and the Administration to get involved with this issue. Thus, intervention in this case was driven by structural factors, namely the need to address both the social problem of drugs and the political problem of voters' demands to do something about this problem.

The straightforward idea that public pressure was translated into political action is easy to observe over time and simple to understand. It nonetheless is the key factor in the explanation of civilian efforts to force innovation in this case.\textsuperscript{409} Other factors were of lesser importance in the civilian decision to intervene. The personal experiences that congressmen had with the drug problem created greater empathy with the public and facilitated intervention. Finally, the fact that the military did not innovate on its own in the area of drug interdiction made intervention necessary if the country was going to bring its military resources to bear on the drug problem.

Drugs have always been a background political issue in Washington. From time to time, interest in the topic swells and politicians rush to ride the wave of attention building around the issue. Public figures need not worry about taking a tough stand against drugs, since such a move is usually a no-lose proposition politically. The illegal drug trade has few supporters. In addition, the public expects action more than it does results in any fight against drugs.

\textsuperscript{409} The relationship between the public's attitude and government action was by no means a one-way street with regards to the drug issue. The public's concern about drugs was often manipulated by politicians seeking support. For example, before Bush's September, 1989 speech, the White House notified the media of the upcoming speech and its contents. This led to an increase in news coverage on drugs in the week before the speech. After Bush's talk, coverage increased even further, saturating the public with information on the drug problem. The result was that the percentage of the public that said drugs were the most important problem facing the country rose from 22% on July 22 to 64% after the speech. Later, as the White House focused on other issues and the Gulf crisis began to dominate headlines, the drug problem slipped to below 10% by August of 1990. The entire episode illustrates how an adroit president can set the short-term national agenda rather effectively. (Michael Ovanes, "Drug War Underlines Fickleness of Public," \textit{New York Times} Sept. 6, 1990: A14.)
In 1971, President Nixon declared the first of many wars on drugs. The issue then faded into the background in the mid-to-late seventies. With the election of President Reagan, billed as a law-and-order president, and the beginning of his and Nancy's "Just Say No" campaign in 1980, the drug issue arose again. In resurrecting the drug issue, Reagan tapped into an existing base of support in this country that was ready to back anyone taking a more vocal stand on drugs. (Similar bases exist for other timeless political issues such as taxation, crime, corruption, and excessive government spending.) In opening a new round in the fight against drugs, Reagan was able to gain easy support for his position before he had to throw any punches. Not until the mid-eighties, when drug use and drug-related violence would grow substantially, would public pressure reach a point where politicians had to offer action and not just words. In the early 1980s, however, the public was not yet clamoring for steps as extreme as pulling the military into the antinarcotics effort. As a result, a high-profile, bipartisan call for an increased antidrug effort had yet to emerge. In this environment, those in favor of involving the military in the new antidrug mission had little hope of mustering enough political support to overcome the military's resistance to this mission. As evidence of this, Rep. Bennett's 1981 version of his amendment went nowhere in the House.

As the public's perception of the drug problem in America grew, so did the political pressure in the country to get tough on drugs. Congressmen began to really feel the heat by the mid-1980s. This explains why the Bennett Amendment was able to pass in the House in 1985 where it had failed before. Singular events such as the cocaine-induced death of Boston Celtics first round draft pick Len Bias in 1986 served to jolt much of America into recognizing how widespread the drug problem was. By the election year of 1988, the status of the drug problem as a political issue attained new heights. In March, a New York Times/CBS News poll indicated that 48% of the US population thought that drug trafficking was the most pressing foreign relations problem facing the country. The rapid and highly publicized growth in the use of crack cocaine, increasing drug-related violence, and the lack of other important campaign issues helped to push drugs to the forefront of the public's attention.

By mid-year, this pressure was weighing heavily on the White House. Secretary of Health and Human Services Bowen warned Reagan that Jesse Jackson's presidential

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410 See Joseph Treaster, "20 Years of War on Drugs, and No Victory Yet," New York Times June 14, 1992: E7 for a discussion of the twenty-year effort to fight drugs.
411 The death of Mr. Bias is constantly cited in the literature and was mentioned in several interviews as an important event in terms of focusing public and congressional attention on the drug problem.
campaign was getting a very positive response to his passionate call against drugs and was "poised to steal from our party what has been a traditional republican issue -- law enforcement."\textsuperscript{413} Democratic pollster Peter Hart summed up the atmosphere at the time:

The drug issue has always been there, it's the frustration level that has been building. It's not that drugs have taken a quantum leap in the polls as the No. 1 issue of concern to the public [at this point, concern over the economy was number one], its that more and more people have personal experience with somebody close to them who has been touched by drugs. The politicians get the message, they see it and hear it and feel it...\textsuperscript{414}

Echoing this view, Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) said in 1988, "The train is moving and it cannot be stopped. The pressure on us to do something about drugs is coming from outside the Beltway so we have to do something about it."\textsuperscript{415} Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin added in 1989 that "the risk of ignoring this issue is one hundred times worse than the risk of trying to do something in a credible way."\textsuperscript{416}

As a result of this pressure, the HASC, which had served as the protector of the military against efforts to draft the military into drug interdiction, had no choice but to alter its stance. It could no longer defend the military's resistance to congressmen who were more in favor of a military drug mission. Rep. Nichols (D-AL), a member of the HASC, noted at the time that the country was worried about three things: communism, the deficit, and drugs. Of the three, Nichols believed, drugs were more important than the other two put together.\textsuperscript{417}

A good example of the effects of the growing pressure on Congress to support a military drug mission is the actions of Sen. Nunn with respect to the various manifestations of the Hunter Amendment. In 1986, Nunn attacked the Amendment without mercy and was instrumental in its defeat. By 1988, public pressure was such that Nunn, who still opposed the measure, could only afford to work for its defeat by offering an alternate

\textsuperscript{413} Christine Lawrence, "Election-Year Drug Bill Shaping up in House," \textit{Congressional Quarterly} May 14, 1988: 1281.
\textsuperscript{416} "Now for the Real Drug War," \textit{U.S. News and World Report} Sept. 11, 1989: 18. This risk was greater for some politicians than for others. Congressmen who represented districts where the drug problem hit hardest had the greatest incentive to act on the issue. More specifically, congressmen whose districts straddled the major smuggling routes logically sought to increase interdiction efforts. This helps to explain why Rep. Hunter introduced his amendment on several occasions. His district in California runs the length of the border with Mexico and is a hotbed of smuggling activity. Hunter's position on the HASC made his attempt to enlist the military in interdiction a natural one, as the military was a resource over which he exercised a certain degree of control. As evidence of Hunter's continued influence, the military is now building a metal fence along stretches of the border in Hunter's district.
\textsuperscript{417} Interview with Jack Dranttel.
amendment that nonetheless deepened the military's involvement in the drug war. Nunn, with his allies on the HASC and SASC, had no choice but to call for an escalation of the military's antidrug duties. The result of this was the landmark 1988 law that established DoD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of potential smugglers.

The pressure on politicians to do something about drugs was felt in several ways. Sometimes it was direct, in the form of letters from constituents asking for help. More commonly, it was indirect. Every politician knew that appearing to be weak or indifferent about the drug problem would create an easy and effective attack strategy for their opponents in the next campaign. The fact that opposing drugs is a bipartisan issue made such indirect pressure even more persuasive, as one could be attacked by any opponent, regardless of their party affiliation or ideological identification. The need to come across not only as being against drugs but to actually be doing something about it increased both the ability and the likelihood that members of Congress and the president would step forward with new plans, many of which involved the military. This led to situations where Democrats in Congress and the Reagan Administration were in competition to come up with the most sweeping antidrug legislation.418

The negative effects of drug abuse that drove public concern in the first place were also known firsthand to several congressmen, and this fact made Congress more sensitive to the drug issue. For example, Rep. Bennett, who was well ahead of the curve in calling for much greater military involvement in drug interdiction, had a personal connection to the drug issue. Four years earlier, his oldest son died from a drug overdose. Since then, Bennett was at the forefront of antidrug efforts in Congress.419 Given his prominent position on the HASC, it was only logical for Bennett to seek to engage the resources that he had the most control over. Though his hope of enlisting the military in his cause failed in 1981, Bennett continued his efforts throughout the 1980s.

Bennett's experiences brought home to many in Congress the true extent of the drug problem. As this problem grew by the mid-1980s, more congressmen had personal tales of hardship that influenced both their votes and the votes of their peers. In addition to the deep sympathy felt for Bennett, the House was further moved by members such as Stewart McKinney (R-CT), a Bennett Amendment supporter whose daughter had just finished a

418 Just as public pressure had the greatest influence in the civilian decision to intervene, it also explains why efforts to escalate the military's role basically ended with the 1980s. By mid-1990, the percentage of adults who cited drugs as the most important problem facing the country dropped from its high of 64% a year earlier to only 10%. By July of 1992, the middle of an election year, this figure was down to a paltry 2%. ("Views of the Drug Problem." New York Times July 28, 1992: A12.) Thus, the impetus provided by public pressure to employ the military in the drug war dissolved and drugs as a political issue again moved into the background.

419 Oddly, his son overdosed on Valium, a prescription drug, and not an illegal narcotic.
treatment program for cocaine addiction. The passing vote on Bennett's proposal in 1985 was pictured by some in the House as a "victory" that "reflected less the logic of the matter than the fact that the drug issue now cuts closer than ever to home in the House."\(^{420}\) In other words, congressmen were feeling the effects of the drug problem not only politically but personally. Although not as important a factor as public pressure, the personal experience of congressmen influenced the decision to intervene. In particular, it led Rep. Bennett to push the military towards the drug mission before the public felt such a step was necessary.

Bennett and several other leaders of the effort to employ the military in drug interdiction were acting in hopes that the military really could help attack the nation's drug problem. They realized that the task was daunting, but they felt that it was worth a try to utilize military assets in the drug war.\(^{421}\) For many of the other congressmen who jumped on the drug war bandwagon, however, their motivations are best described as being driven by political concerns created by public pressure.

The final factor that influenced the decision by civilians, Congress in particular, to intervene to force a drug mission on the military was the military's decision not to address the issue on its own. The military leadership's continued resistance to any drug mission made it quite clear to Congress that the only way the military was going to help out was if it was forced to. The fact that the civilian leadership of DoD, personified in Weinberger, was equally, if not more, hostile to the drug mission assured the fact that any such intervention would have to take the form of congressional legislation.

By 1985, many members of Congress had grown tired of the military's attitude and lack of action on the drug issue. Rep. English (D-OK) complained that forcing the drug mission on the military "has been a constant battle since 1981." All of this resistance will in the end be for nought, he warned, because the military will have to go along with legislation mandating its new task. He noted, "That's been a point that some people in [DoD] have been a little slow to recognize." Sen. Stevens (R-AK) further complained that the military was delaying implementation of its new mission and continued to use \textit{Posse Comitatus} restrictions to defend itself from playing a greater role.\(^{422}\)

DoD's airing of its misgivings about the drug war were met with little sympathy from congressmen fed up with the military's resistance to the antidrug mission. A main source of congressional ire was that DoD had so far failed to offer any ideas of its own on how it could help fight drugs. This led many congressmen to threaten to push the military even

\(^{421}\) Interview with Jack Dranttel.
deeper into the drug war. For example, Rep. Sisisky (D-VA) admonished the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, saying, "For God's sakes, do not come in with just a list of five things [the military can do to help LEAs]. Come in with something practical, or somebody is going to get you to do something that is not viable, or right, or cost effective." 423

Rep. Davis' (R-MI) comments at the end of the joint HASC/SASC hearings summed up Congress' attitude towards the military's handling of the drug war issue to date:

I am shocked and dismayed here this morning to hear the testimony that all three of you gentlemen [Secretary of Defense Carlucci, CINCLANT Admiral Kelso, and Air Force Gen. Herres, the Vice CICS] have given. It is hard for me to believe, after both Houses of the US Congress, have passed an expanding military role amendment to their respective authorization bills and are going to conference, that you would come into this room this morning without some notion of a positive plan, some notion of supplemental appropriations request, or some notion of a cost somewhat geared to what we have been talking about this morning.

Just some plan, instead of a bunch of negatives. We cannot do this, this myth is here, this myth is there. The people of the United States through their elected representatives in the Senate and the Congress, want an expanding military role.

How can we drive that home any more graphically to you than has been driven home this morning? Are you so bureaucratized and stilted that you cannot accept the mission.... If I were the Soviet high command, I would have an order in with Cessna aircraft right now for 1,000 new aircraft....

And if I sound a little bit tough, gentlemen, and a little mad, it is because I am. I cannot believe you would come into this room and give us this kind of stuff. 424

Had the Pentagon tackled the drug interdiction mission earlier on in the 1980s and carved out a low-level role for itself, it might have been able to preempt congressional efforts to force a greater role upon it. Instead, the military and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) combined to argue against even relatively small increases in the military's drug mission. As a result, Congress, feeling the tremendous weight of public pressure to do something about the drug problem, and sharing the view that drugs were, in fact, a serious problem facing America, intervened to draft the military into the drug war.

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423 "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 22.  
WHY THE MILITARY?

The preceding section on its own does not offer enough of an explanation as to why civilians intervened in this case of forced innovation. It explains why Congress and the Administration both chose to become more aggressive in drug policy, but does not account for why Congress turned to the military to address the drug problem. The use of the military in a drug interdiction role was only one of several possible responses by politicians in Washington to the need to act on the drug issue. Other responses included the passage of stricter laws regarding drug dealers, the "Just Say No" campaign, and the hiring of more police officers. Why did civilians look to the military to answer the public's call for an increased effort in the fight against illegal narcotics? The answer is contained in the forced innovation framework. The civilian decision to turn to the military in this case was the result of the military's reputation, its symbolic value, and its vast resources.

The military is one of the most respected institutions in the United States. It has a long and storied history of success. There was a general feeling both in Congress and the country that if the military could win two world wars, it could certainly make a dent in drug smuggling. This faith helped civilians turn to the military to solve the social problem of drugs.\textsuperscript{425} The fact that the problem was framed as a "war" with an enemy personified in the drug cartels made resorting to the military that much more logical.\textsuperscript{426}

The military not only offered civilians a record of success, it presented them with substantial existing resources. DoD assets were seen as ripe for the picking in order to provide a quick influx of personnel, material, and expertise for the interdiction mission. In 1983, for example, one reason that Rep. Bennett cited for using the military in the drug war was that "in peacetime, boredom and lack of mission have been historical problems for the military, and involvement in the drug war would be extremely beneficial."\textsuperscript{427} During debate over the 1986 omnibus drug proposal, Rep. Shaw (R-Fla) said, "We have a great power out there and we spend a great deal of money on it, and I think it's incumbent that

\textsuperscript{425} From a more academic point of view, Bruce Bagley suggests that the decision to use the military to combat the social problem of drugs is indicative of the US government's insistence of operating within the realist paradigm. He says that "the assumption that the US Armed Forces could -- if so ordered -- interdict drug smuggling efficiently, also reflects the realists' consistent overestimation of the effectiveness of force as an instrument of policy." (Bruce Bagley, "US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure," \textit{Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs} Summer/Fall, 1988: 203.)

\textsuperscript{426} As opposed to the "war on poverty," which lacked a physical enemy that could be targeted.

\textsuperscript{427} Cited in Rice, "New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act," p. 110.
we use it to the maximum extent practicable."428 While arguing for his 1986 amendment, Sen. Dixon said, "I do not think this is going to cost our country any additional money. These pieces of equipment, this military hardware, is already there and in place."429 Thus, the fact that this huge military organization was paid for and not fighting in any war played an important part in the decision to turn to the military to fight drugs.

The decline in East-West tensions in the late 1980s heightened this attractiveness of military resources. The winding down of the Cold War allowed civilians to view military assets as more available for diversion from traditional roles than in the past. Suddenly, the huge military apparatus created by the Reagan buildup appeared to have more time on its hands. As a result, civilians favoring a military antidrug mission were able to find more backers for their position. (The Administration, however, did not share this view. See the Civilian Unity section below.)

Finally, the symbolic importance of turning to the military to help deal with a problem drew civilians to push the military into drug interdiction. When politicians call out the troops to deal with a foreign enemy, they are in effect saying that a given issue has reached a point of such importance that they are ready to have US military personnel kill and be killed. The application of military force therefore carries with it a weighty political commitment and shows that the country means business. As the mayor of New York City, Ed Koch, argued in a Washington Post op. ed. in 1985, if America was really serious about fighting drugs, it would employ the military. As he put it, "You can't win a war without weapons. Until the weapons are committed, the drug invaders will have a virtual free pass across our borders. That's why its time to commit our armed forces to help in the battle against drugs."430

Koch was speaking about sending a message to the drug smuggler, but an equally important message being sent was by Congress to the American public. In employing the military in drug interdiction, Congress hoped to show Americans that it was taking their concerns quite seriously. This raises the question of whether Congress was seeking actual results in the drug war, or merely a show to try and satisfy public pressure. (This question is answered in full in the Change of Heart section below.) Col. Harry Summers, Jr., (Ret.) argues, for example, that bringing in the troops was nothing more than a smoke screen by politicians designed "to hide the fact that they haven't got the will or the backbone to really fight a 'war' on drugs. All they want the military for is to serve once

428 Rovner, "House Panels Vote Ammo for War on Drugs," p. 1929.

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again as a whipping boy when their posturing and bluffs fall through." Similarly, as Sen. Goldwater (R-AZ) sarcastically noted in arguing against the 1986 Dixon Amendment, "I have to say that this amendment has a lot of political sex appeal. You can go home and say, 'Well, we have sure taken a crack at the narcotics business. We've put all our forces against them.'"  

The use of the military as a gimmick to impress the public was a reflection of the greater tendency of politicians to seek supply reduction rather than attacking the demand for drugs. As one observer notes:  

"Engaging the supply side of the problem gets far more public-relations mileage. Daring seizures of Columbian and Peruvian cocaine stashed in Los Angeles warehouses or aboard speedboats on the high seas play much better on the nightly news than do the quiet successes in inner-city drug education and rehabilitation programs."  

In addition, these more rational and potentially effective demand-side policies might have taken years to show results and did not carry the full psychological effect that calling in the military did. Demand reduction meant paying for the treatment of drug addicts, whom the public would rather see punished. A supply-side approach, bolstered by military participation, offered the public the more popular image of sticking it to the smugglers and was therefore preferred by politicians.  

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431 "The Pentagon's War on Drugs: The Ultimate Bad Trip," Defense Monitor Sept. 6, 1992: 2. This quote also expresses the fear, discussed below, that the military would be blamed for the country's failure to win the war on drugs.  
433 This preference remains strong today. For example, Bush's 1992 antidrug budget of $12 million allocated 43% for domestic law enforcement, 24% for law enforcement abroad, and only 32% for treatment and education programs. (Joseph Treaster, "Candidates Seek Little Change in Antidrug Efforts," New York Times Oct. 22, 1992: A22.) In addition, President Clinton's first budget allocates twice as much money on law-enforcement operations than it does on drug treatment programs. (Stephen Labaton, "Reno Questions Drug Policy's Stress on Smuggling," New York Times May 8, 1993: 9.)  
435 For an excellent discussion of America's preference for a supply-side approach that rejects the reality of the drug problem, see Treaster, "Candidates Seek Little Change in Antidrug Efforts," p. A22. Treaster notes that "American voters see drugs more as a police problem than a health or education issue, and they're not about to be caught playing Dr. Kildare when the script clearly calls for Eliot Ness." Nor is Congress about to make the same mistake. As Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) noted in 1992, "Drug education and treatment have gained a name as a wimp activity. If you favor these things, you're a softy. When these proposals come up in Congress most members want to know, before they vote, which one is the toughest. It's sort of, 'I don't know if this is going to work, but nobody is going to blame me for not being tough.'" (Joseph Treaster, "Some Think the 'War on Drugs' Is Being Waged on the Wrong Front," New York Times July 28, 1992: A1. Also see Neil Peirce, "Sweeping Drugs Under the Rug," National Journal Aug. 15, 1992: 1911.)  

Congressmen who see the folly of a supply-based approach to the drug problem have always found few people who will listen to them, no matter how persuasive their arguments are. One State Department drug official notes, "As one congressman pointed out in urging greater effort on education and less reliance on enforcement, the decline in the use of alcohol and tobacco in the United States is due to long-term health education campaigns, not to bombing distilleries in Scotland or scorching tobacco fields in North Carolina." (Gormley, "Reflections of a State Department Drug Warrior," p. 34.)
In summary, for civilians seeking results in the form of fewer drugs entering the country, the military's resources and capabilities were an attractive potential addition to the war on drugs. For civilians looking for a "smoke screen" instead of a useful program for curtailing the drug problem, the reputation and symbolic power of the military provided them with a fine one.

WHY THE MILITARY RESISTED

My framework uses four variables to shed light on why the military resisted civilian intervention intended to create a military antidrug mission: the professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget variables. The particular manifestations of these variables in this case also show that the military was not about to volunteer to take on this new mission. It is therefore clear that without civilian intervention there would not be a military drug interdiction mission today.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY

The various forms of an antidrug mission proposed by Congress created several serious conflicts with the military's professional identity. These conflicts were the primary factors driving the military's resistance to the interdiction mission and the more extreme counternarcotics roles proposed by civilians. Other characteristics of the drug mission innovation certainly played a part in the military's motivation to resist civilian intervention in this case, but the professional identity variable captures the most critical factors.

The drug interdiction mission's main conflict with the military's professional identity was that it was a law enforcement mission, not a military one. This, in turn, created a related challenge for the military: The duties required in this new mission threatened to blur the distinction between the military and civilian realms. Of lesser importance than these two conflicts with professional identity was the potential for both corruption and failure that the antidrug mission created.

At the most basic level, the military resisted any sort of antidrug mission because such a task was not a military mission. The US military exists for the purpose of protecting the United States and its interests from military threats. The narcotics trade has not traditionally been viewed as a threat to national security and has therefore remained outside of the professional concern of the military. Even after Reagan declared in 1986 that drugs
were a threat to national security, many segments of the military still maintained that this threat was social, not military, and should therefore not involve them. The military member’s professional identity is that of a warrior, not a police officer. Military personnel enter into service with the vision of preparing to take part in the application of military force against a foreign military force. If they wanted to fight drugs and crime, they would have chosen to join a different organization, one that has different goals, practices, and a distinctly different professional identity.

The primary manifestation of this mismatch between the military’s professional identity and the requirements of the antidrug mission was its challenge to the traditional separation between the civil and military realms in the United States. Unlike in many other countries around the world, a clear line separates military authority and civilian law enforcement in the US. Prior to the 1980s, the military was expressly prohibited from crossing this line. The legal precedent for this separation was the *Posse Comitatus Act*.

The *Posse Comitatus Act* (posse comitatus means "power of the country" in Latin) grew out of the problems caused by the Northern Army’s military rule in the South in the years immediately after the Civil War. White Southerners saw the occupying Army’s control of the South as abusive and overbearing. This experience led to the passing of the *Posse Comitatus Act* in 1878, which specifically forbade the use of Army personnel in a law enforcement role. In 1956, the Act was amended to also cover the Air Force.436 Thus, any use of military personnel in a domestic law enforcement role would violate the Act and be illegal.

In addition to the legal aspects of *Posse Comitatus*, the Act has a central place in the tradition of the US military profession. The separation of the civil and military realms has long been a cornerstone of military professionalism in America. The military has always seen itself as the servant of the country and, beyond seeking to protect its bureaucratic interests by enlisting political allies, has rarely sought an active role in the political life of the country.437 It also has never desired a mission that would require it to act against other Americans. Any interdiction duty that allowed the military to search, seize, and arrest drug smugglers would have represented a major departure from *Posse Comitatus* and would have been just such a mission.

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436 See Adams, "Navy Narcs," p. 35. The Act never specified coverage of the Navy, but its restrictions on this service have always been implied and observed.

437 As Donald Mabry noted in 1989: "The military understands that the Constitution dictates the supremacy of civil authority [and] does not want to abandon its political stance of obeying the Constitution its members are sworn to defend. Rather, in testimony before Congress and elsewhere, military officers have almost pleaded with civilian authorities not to abandon the historic tradition that reigns in military power within the United States." (Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 78.)
The military's appeal to the Constitution created a somewhat ironic situation. Civilians were using their constitutional authority to direct the military to operate in ways that the services felt violated the Constitution. As a result, the ideal of civilian control of the military was placed head-to-head with that of the separation of the civilian and military realms.

The military feared that any diminishment of this separation in order to facilitate the use of the military in the drug war might start it down a slippery slope. As DoD warned in a statement submitted to Congress:

The next step is to involve the Armed Forces further in our nation's ever changing agenda of social and political forces. The notion of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines enforcing our laws is simply contrary to the weight and wisdom of American political and social history.438

A GAO report seemed to confirm some of these fears. The report voiced the GAO's concern that the military could not really have arrest powers only in the case of drugs, because non-drug legal violations are often involved in drug cases. As a result, a wider breadth of powers would be required by military personnel.439 The military also feared that such an escalation would fundamentally alter its relationship with the public to the point where the armed forces were viewed as an enemy.440 Law enforcement duties would create numerous opportunities for costly operational mistakes or abuses of power. Unlike in war, its hard when fighting crime to separate the good guys from the bad. All it would take is one accidental shooting or Rodney King-like incident to seriously harm the military's public image. The last thing that the military wanted was to suffer the public's animosity in the way that urban police forces tend to face the strongest resentment from the very people they are intended to protect. The military's professional identity is based on

438 "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 58. Interestingly, the military faced a similar danger of escalation when it took on its own internal drug problem. As one observer noted in 1974, "Should the military succeed with its drug abuse mission, it is not unlikely that it will be assigned other missions of human resources development and domestic civic action." (Peck, "The Role of the Military in American Society Vis-a-Vis Drug Abuse: Scapegoat, National Laboratory and Potential Change Agent," p. 187.)
loyal service to the nation, not on being in conflict with American citizens. It had a taste of such a relationship during the Vietnam War and did not want to experience it again.441

Congressmen who wanted the military deeply involved in the drug war often had little patience with the military's use of Posse Comitatus restrictions as a rationale for not getting involved. Responding to a DoD official's statement that the military should not act in a police role, Rep. Bennett said,

Oh, well you are not the legislative body of the Congress, of the country. In other words, if the policy of the country is, in fact, to do something that you do not particularly like to do, you follow the law. You took an oath when you came in. Your attitude is one of looking at every impediment and saying that is the law and we are not going to do anything about it. We are trying to fight drugs. Instead of coming up with an urgent effort to fight them, you are making all kinds of excuses for not doing it.442

Bennett later expressed his feeling about the Posse Comitatus law in no uncertain terms, saying that it "is not a noble law. It is a very simple, evil law. It ought to be repealed in its totality."443 Bennett saw no reason why Congress could not modify the law as part of an effort to deal with a problem as significant as drugs. There was historical precedent of such modification for much less important reasons. For example, Congress has allowed for the military protection of guano deposits.444

441 Besides these philosophical conflicts, the law enforcement aspects of the drug mission presented more practical challenges to professional identity that were of secondary importance in creating military resistance. Much of the US military's identity is based on that of the warrior, carrying out the legitimate use of force as authorized by the state. Except for the extreme case of war crimes, the individual does not expect to be held personally responsible while acting as a tool of the state. If a member of the military were acting in a law enforcement role, however, the rules might be different. The military feared that if its personnel took part in drug arrests they would not only have to appear in court to testify, but could also be sued by the people they arrested. Thus, not only would the military job description now have to include that of part-time witness, it would also need to mention that military personnel may be sued during the conduct of their duties. (Susan Rasky, "Senate Votes 83-6 to Give Military Anti-Drug Powers," New York Times May 14, 1988: 54.)

442 In an effort to allay these fears, the Senate in 1988 created an amendment that "would permit the Attorney General to treat any legal action against a member of the armed forces arising from such an arrest as an action against the United States, and the United States would thus be substituted as a defendant." (Rasky, p. 54.) This, of course, created the unlikely but unattractive possibility of the US being legally responsible for abusive actions that military personnel might purposefully take.

443 Air Force Gen. Robert Herres noted other potential problems of using the military in a law enforcement role. He pointed out that the collection of intelligence on US citizens during antidrug operations could become quite sticky, and any evidence so gathered could be thrown out of court. Were this evidence admissible, the need to reveal sources could compromise national security. (Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 80. With regards to these fears, the FY89 Defense Authorization Act bans the military from conducting intelligence on domestic targets.) In addition, such intelligence mission would again force the military to operate against US citizens.

444 Much of the military's present-day mission involves providing intelligence to LEAs. Great care has been taken to assure that intelligence oversight laws dealing with targeting US citizens are not broken. For example, military translators providing language skill assistance to LEAs are only allowed to listen to tapes of wiretaps so that they cannot eavesdrop directly on conversations that could involve US citizens. (Dale Brown, "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military," Parameters Winter, 1991-92: 55.)


Fortunately for the military, not enough congressmen shared Bennett’s disdain for the separation of the military from the realm of civilian law enforcement. All attempts to turn the military into an antidrug law enforcement agency with arrest powers failed. Thus, this serious threat to the military’s professional identity never came to pass.

The drug mission posed other threats to the military’s professional identity. One such challenge was the possibility that duty in the drug war could lead to corruption in the ranks. Although not as important as the non-military nature of the drug mission and its threat to *Posse Comitatus*, the drug war’s corrupting influence posed an additional threat to the military’s professional identity and provided yet another reason to resist this new mission.

In a standard military operation, a person’s failure to carry out his or her respective mission could lead to not only their own death but that of their comrades in arms. Thus, on the battlefield there is little that the enemy can offer to get its opponent to either look the other way or to actively cooperate with its operations. It is much more difficult for someone to turn corrupt if they know that their actions could cause serious harm to their friends. There are, of course, instances of treason driven by blackmail or greed, but they are rare and tend to occur in peacetime. Wartime instances where, for example, a sentry is bribed to allow an enemy’s attacking force to pass through his position are unheard of. As a result, the military experiences much less corruption than do LEAs. This fosters a much greater sense of corporateness and mutual trust within the ranks.

The drug war presents the military with an enemy whose success during any given operation would not directly harm military personnel. In an active interdiction environment, military personnel can look the other way, knowing they will never feel the effects of their corruption. As a result, making the choice to sell out is that much easier. More importantly, the enemy has virtually unlimited monetary resources with which to tempt relatively low-paid military personnel. To even further complicate matters, the enemy is armed with substances that were widely abused in the military in the 1960s and early 1970s. The drug mission therefore creates a threat of corruption for the military. Such corruption, should it become widespread, would seriously undermine the military’s faith in itself and would diminish the corporateness aspect of its professional identity.

As Lt. Col. Velasquez of the Columbian Army notes, the "unethical environment" of the drug war poses a "threat of corruption [that] could affect the heart of the US Armed Forces -- its ethical values." Should these ethics come under attack, the core of the military's professional identity would suffer. Furthermore, corruption could also change

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the way that the public views the military profession, and the traditional trust for the military institution could wane.

There are plenty of examples of how the corrupting power of drugs and drug money can damage organizations. The Mexican military, once a relatively honest institution, has become quite corrupt since entering the fight against the drug trade.\(^{446}\) The militaries of Peru, Columbia, and Bolivia provide even more striking examples where an antidrug mission acted as a catalyst for corruption.\(^{447}\) The US military itself has not been immune. In early 1990, two Army Sergeants were arrested for using the military mail system to ship cocaine from Panama to the US. One of them was paid $100,000 for arranging one such incident for Colombian drug dealers.\(^{448}\) The Coast Guard experienced more severe problems with corruption in 1990 that symbolized the worst fears of the military. Some of its members were found to have been intimately involved with smugglers, notifying them of interdiction patrol times and locations. These corrupt personnel not only sold radio codes and frequencies to smugglers, they even sold a percentage of the cocaine that their units successfully interdicted.\(^{449}\) Shockingly, for every three smugglers apprehended by the Coast Guard in early 1990, more than one Guardsman was charged with drug violations.\(^{450}\)

Of equal importance to the issue of corruption was the potential for the military to be labelled a failure in its interdiction efforts. An important part of the military's self-identity is seeing itself as a successful organization. The services might have had their temporary setbacks from time to time, but whenever the country has supported a military mission that needed to be accomplished, they have come through. The drug interdiction mission was a fight that the military knew from the outset it could not win. The question was whether or not it would be blamed for the failure. Were it so labelled, the military profession's image would suffer in the eyes of the public.

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\(^{446}\) Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 80.


\(^{450}\) "Coast Guard's Drug Policing Hits Home Often," \textit{Baltimore Sun} Apr. 23, 1990: 3. Ironically, when then Vice President Bush toured a Coast Guard base in the Florida Keys, he had his picture taken with several Guardsmen, two of whom were later brought up on charges. This picture is now official evidence in the investigation of these men. ("Operation Tempest/Coast Guardsmen's Cocaine Smuggling," \textit{Exposé}, 8:00 p.m., May 20, transcript in \textit{Current News Special Edition}, "Military Role in the Drug War," July, 1990, p. 41.)
Gen. Woerner, a former CINC of SOUTHCOM, says that during the height of congressional efforts to draft the military into the drug war, there was a "predominant fear of failure" within the military. According to Woerner, the fear was that if the military was viewed as losing the drug war, there could be a reemergence of the "Vietnam syndrome," with its accompanying loss of public faith in the military.\textsuperscript{451} The military was finally completing its slow emergence from the shadow of Vietnam, and the last thing it wanted was to be pushed into yet another war that, by its very nature, could not be won.

There was little faith within the military that it could slow the flow of drugs coming into the country. There were too many routes for the military to shut them all down. One senior Pentagon official said that the military was "frustrated" by the fact that its new mission could not achieve its objectives. "'Ultimately,' he said, 'we're going to end up holding the can for the failure to stop the flow of drugs.'\textsuperscript{452} The greater DoD's level of involvement in the drug war, the more likely that the military could be singled out as the agency that had failed to solve the drug problem. The fear of such a label played a part in the military's effort to limit its antidrug role as mandated by Congress.

In summary, the challenges that the antidrug mission posed to the military as manifested in the \textit{professional identity} variable were of paramount importance in the military's decision to strongly resist civilian efforts to force this new mission upon it. The fact that this mission was not military in nature made it both uninteresting and unattractive to the military. The problems that the mission posed by its challenge to \textit{Posse Comitatus} restrictions and its threats of corruption and failure made the antidrug task threatening to the military.

\textbf{OPERATIONAL ROUTINES}

Just as the military has a certain view of itself, it also has a particular way of doing things. Its operational routines help it manage uncertainty and provide a foundation from which to tackle novel problems. The nature of the drug interdiction mission is such that it does not mesh well with military operational routines. The more extreme versions of the mission pushed by Congress, those which granted search and seizure powers, were in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{451} Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr., June 22, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{452} Cited in Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Says Drug War Will Cost $2 Billion," \textit{New York Times} May 17, 1988: A17. Even if the military did somehow succeed, this could lead to an unwanted snowball effect where more social problems are thrust upon the military for it to solve, leading to a challenge to the level of civilian rule practiced in the country. (Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 82.)
\end{itemize}
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direct conflict with these routines. This mismatch between the innovation and operational routines was another influence on the military's level of resistance. Although not as critical as the challenges embodied in the professional identity variable, the problem contained in the operational routines variable still played an important role in the military's decision to fight against imposed innovation in this instance. There is also a strong connection between these two variables in this case because the fact that the drug interdiction mission was not a military mission, as discussed above, is at the root of its conflict with the military's standard methods of operation.

The military's operational routines that control how it trains and equips its people do not prepare it to operate as a law enforcement agency. Pentagon officials were always the first to point this fact out to congressmen pushing for a greater DoD drug role. These officials argued that they were prepared to meet national security threats, not social problems. After 1986, when the military publicly agreed that drugs were a threat to national security, some officers then noted that a bad economy was also a national security threat, but neither problem could be addressed through the application of military power, so the military should be left out of those areas.\(^{453}\) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel testified to this effect before the HASC and SASC in 1988, saying:

We must always remember that our military forces are trained to achieve their objectives through the employment of force, and are not trained or experienced to operate in the legitimate constitutional environment in which we require our law enforcement agencies to work.\(^{454}\)

The inappropriateness of military operational routines for a search and seizure role was one of the cornerstones of the military's argument against such a mission. In a 1988 editorial, *Air Force Times* argued that it made no sense to use a military force for border interdiction. The editorial asked sarcastically if Congress would rather use military forces in a manner they were constructed for and "begin air strikes against coca trees and poppy fields."\(^ {455}\) Getting to the heart of the matter, a Pentagon spokesman said that "the only way that an F-16 is really prepared to deal with a Cessna flying across our border is to shoot it down."\(^ {456}\) Trained and equipped for an environment where the enemy is relatively easy to distinguish from non-combatants and where the application of force to confirmed targets need not be restrained, the military was not designed to force down

\(^{453}\) Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 77.

\(^{454}\) "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," pp. 11-12.


suspected airborne smugglers. The last things the military wanted, however, were rules of engagement that would allow them to shoot down such planes. The joke within SOUTHCOM that reflected misgivings about such an ill-conceived order was that the first plane shot down was bound to contain a Baptist minister and his family flying home from their vacation.\footnote{Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr.}

The military had no existing methods to handle many of the more demanding versions of the drug mission that Congress was pushing. The operational routines available for transfer would have led to a great deal of overkill. The only types of drug missions that the military could easily absorb were those to which it could most directly apply its existing programs of action. Such routines involved the use of systems designed to track and monitor military targets, to facilitate communications, and to gather intelligence.\footnote{It appears at first glance that the military's experience with conducting blockades and quarantines would allow the services to easily integrate many of the requirements of the interdiction mission with existing routines. Upon closer examination, however, several important differences between these two duties become evident. First, the military is accustomed to blockading foreign countries and intercepting foreign nationals. The antidrug mission would require the military to act against US nationals entering their own country. This would force the military to act against American citizens, which, as mentioned in the \textit{Professional Identity} section, it does not like to do. A second important difference revolves around the issue of scale. The drug mission requires the military to intercept a wide range of potential smuggling vessels, from cargo container ships to very small pleasure crafts, private planes, and even cars. In a blockade, the military tends to ignore these smaller targets, as the amount of contraband they might contain is insignificant. The nature of drugs like cocaine is such that even a small carriers can transport significant enough quantities of contraband to undermine the entire blockade effort.}

Missions calling for much more than this would force the military to operate in novel ways that required a blatant disregard for existing bureaucratic routines. As a result, it was only natural that these more involved missions were resisted more strongly by the military.

The civilian response to the military's claims that it was not prepared to operate against drugs was often less than sympathetic. The testimony of the Attorney General of Alabama before the HASC hearings in 1988 was typical:

\begin{quote}
Defense Secretary Carlucci testified previously that the military was trained to 'shoot to kill', and that this was not appropriate for most law enforcement purposes. The fact is, we all know that the military can be trained to do whatever job the Congress determines needs to be done.\footnote{"The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 241.}
\end{quote}

Civilians, most notably congressmen, who wanted the military to take on drug smugglers, found it hard to believe that the mighty military machine they had agreed to pay for during the Reagan buildup was not adaptable enough to handle a low-level threat like drug smugglers.\footnote{Interestingly, the next chapter will show that the military argued that its firepower-based forces could handle special operations, while Congress maintained that new forces were needed to handle low-intensity threats.} Their unwillingness to accept the military's claims that it was not well-suited to the job represented a challenge to the expertise characteristic of the military's
professionalism and highlights the close connection between the *professional identity* and *operational routines* variables of my framework.

In another reference to conflict with its operational routines, the military argued that since the drug mission was so different from its traditional mission, any effort given to the new task of fighting drugs would result in a direct decline in the ability to conduct existing core tasks. This fear of a drop in military readiness stemmed from the decline of personnel skills and of available equipment that DoD saw as the likely result of this new mission.

A majority of people in the Pentagon believed that military personnel operating in a drug interdiction role would not be exercising skills useful for traditional combat missions. 461 Personnel only had a finite time in which to train, the argument went, and any of it spent chasing smugglers was time away from practicing more militarily important missions. In 1985, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, representing both the Administration's and the military's point of view, wrote to the HASC to oppose the Bennett Amendment. He said, "Our forces must be prepared to counter the destructive power of modern weaponry. Interdiction of the small boats and aircraft typically used by drug smugglers would not provide the realistic training needed to prepare most units to counter hostile military forces." 462

The other side of the readiness argument was the availability of equipment. The services, the Navy in particular, has set patterns of deployment for its forces, which rotate in and out of certain areas. Requiring these forces to spend a portion of their time in an interdiction role necessitated changes in these standard practices and in the number of platforms available for traditional military missions. DoD was always quick to point out this problem. For example, the JCS report issued to fight the Hunter Amendment in 1986 stressed the drawdown in forces worldwide that Hunter's call to seal the borders would require. Also, the same day in 1988 that a spokesman for Secretary of Defense Carlucci announced that there was a greater level of agreement between Congress and DoD over the need for DoD to do more about drugs, George Wilson of the *Washington Post* noted that "military leaders warned privately that... they would be pulled away from their regular duties in Latin America, where their forces are already overtaxed, to join a war that cannot be won by aircraft, ships and troops." 463

461 There were exceptions to this, most notably personnel involved in the Latin American eradication side of the drug mission. See below.
Although some of the military's claims about the readiness effects of the antidrug mission were a bit overstated, the fear that this new task would undermine the ability to successfully conduct many military operations was real. This fear, combined with the inadequacy of military training and equipment, added to the military's negative view of this innovation and further fueled resistance to civilian intervention.

AUTONOMY

Although not as important as the factors contained in the professional identity and operational routines variables, the characteristics of the drug interdiction mission innovation that fall under the autonomy variable of my framework provided still more reasons for the military to resist this innovation.

By the mid-1980s, there were already many organizations involved in antidrug operations. This crowded issue area posed a challenge to the military's autonomy. The interdiction mission promised a high degree of contingency uncertainty, because each relevant agency's actions were influenced and constrained by the presence of its partners in the war on drugs. As a result, any role the military had in this mission would involve it with numerous other agencies, each concerned with its own organizational well-being. Although the services were used to operating in this environment with respect to each other, the military as a whole was not accustomed to having to compete against or coordinate with non-military agencies. As a result, it would be forced to take the needs and desires of alien agencies into account when planning its own antidrug operations.

Although the issue of autonomy promised to be an annoyance, it was not a major factor in the military's decision to resist the drug mission. The primary reason for this was that the military could not really lose in a turf war over drug interdiction. It did not want the mission in the first place and was quite happy to see other agencies take on larger roles.\footnote{464} Drug interdiction was far from being a core task it relished. It also had no pre-existing "turf" in this area, so there was none to lose.\footnote{465} Finally, the sheer size of the military and its political clout when compared to DEA and other antidrug agencies assured DoD that, if it wanted, it would not have to play second fiddle to another agency. As a

\footnote{464 In reality, the fact that so many organizations were already fighting drugs was raised by the military on several occasions as evidence that there was no need to assign yet another agency to the task. See the section below on military tactics.}

\footnote{465 The only thing that the military did fear losing was control of big-ticket assets like AWACs. Operating them in support of LEAs was much more attractive than handing them over to other agencies. (Interview with John Heaphy.)}
result, DoD's general view of autonomy problems was that it expected the friction produced when any group of agencies function together, but it did not foresee any major jurisdictional struggles and felt that any problems could be worked out eventually. This is not to say that DoD was eager to step into such a crowded policy area. It did not need the headache. The Pentagon recognized the potential for conflict as early as 1981. William Taft IV, DoD's general counsel (and future Assistance Secretary of Defense), argued against the Bennett Amendment by noting that involving the military in the drug war "would produce troublesome interagency difficulty and generate acrimony over requests for assistance with little actual results."\(^{466}\)

The drug interdiction mission was full of interagency conflict and promised to create just the frustrations that the military wanted to avoid. Throughout the 1980s, the tangle of antidrug agencies adversely affected the overall war on drugs. In a May, 1987 attempt to correct this, the Administration announced the designation of several lead agencies to clear up jurisdictional matters. Unfortunately, this only ended up making things worse. It put Customs in charge of land interdiction, made the Coast Guard the head of maritime efforts, and split air interdiction among the two agencies. This shared jurisdiction created bitter turf struggles. Attempts by the two agencies to resolve their differences through memorandums of understanding (MOUs) did not work, as their MOUs contained cooperative language but offered no mechanisms that allowed for operational coordination.\(^{467}\) Nothing better illustrates the conflict that existed between the Coast Guard and Customs than the fight in 1986 over which agency would get four additional E-2Cs. The two agencies fought a bitter public battle that only ended when Congress stepped in and decided that each would get two planes.\(^{468}\) Clearly, DoD was not looking forward to getting involved in such interagency animosity.

The level of resentment and competition with which LEAs greeted DoD's entrance into the drug war would have a direct effect on how much of a problem working with these agencies would be. Thus, it is important to understand the opinions of the most relevant LEAs regarding the military's antidrug mission in order to fully understand the military's resistance to this mission. Although the autonomy problems facing DoD were limited to the hassle of coordinating with other agencies, the LEA community already engaged in the drug war had a much greater stake in the military's entry into this war. They all had


jurisdictional control to lose. More importantly, for many of these agencies, their interdiction duty was either a core task (Customs) or their most prestigious one (Coast Guard). In addition, none of them could match the resources or reputation of the US military.\textsuperscript{469} The leadership of the LEAs were therefore afraid of losing jurisdiction, resources, and prestige to the military.

Fortunately for the military, factors other than concern over organizational health were at work in the drug war and led to a split in LEA opinion over working with DoD. In general, LEA officers in the field tended to view DoD more positively than those in Washington, who saw the big picture and were quicker to recognize the threats to their organization.\textsuperscript{470} LEA field officers had little to fear when the military's role was one of providing support to LEA operations.\textsuperscript{471} LEA leaders in Washington, on the other hand, had to be just as concerned with budget shares and agency prestige as they were with performance in the field. As a result, it was only natural that these people saw a threat in DoD's entrance in the drug war.\textsuperscript{472}

The support role that DoD was intended to play made many LEA members eager for the military's help. For them, the prime concern was winning a battle on the ground that they fought daily. They saw DoD as a source of much-needed resources more than as a new threat to bureaucratic turf. Civilian law enforcement officers at the front line expressed a desire for military help on many occasions.\textsuperscript{473} They often found that military assistance at this level allowed them to perform their assigned duties much more successfully than if they were on their own. For example, Customs agents assigned to search cargo entering ports noted in December of 1989 that the National Guard had already been a tremendous help, allowing them to inspect five to seven times more cargo than when operating alone.\textsuperscript{474} Gene McNary, Commissioner of US Immigration and Naturalization Service, said in 1990, "So far as bringing substantial resources to help get control of the Southern border and the drug traffic, the military is just incredibly invaluable."\textsuperscript{475} For McNary's

\textsuperscript{469} As General Olmstead noted in 1989, "There's been some apprehension by the traditional law enforcement agencies that a large organization is now going to take over." ("Military Role in Drug Interdiction," HASC No. 101-2, p. 17.)

\textsuperscript{470} Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr.

\textsuperscript{471} As Rep. Robinson (R-AR) said of DoD, "You are the only agency in my opinion that local law enforcement officers feel good about because they do not feel threatened by the military." [emphasis added] ("The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 351.)

\textsuperscript{472} This division is similar to the disunity with regards to innovation that often occurs in the military along the lines of rank.

\textsuperscript{473} John Burlage, "Officials on Border Support Military Role in Drugs," \textit{Air Force Times} June 13, 1988: 3.

\textsuperscript{474} William Matthews, "Florida Guard on Point," \textit{Army Times} Dec. 18, 1989: 16. Of course, when performing in such a role, the military could not pose much of a turf threat to Customs because Customs controls every move that military personnel make during such operations.

agency, military participation was usually limited to such support missions as supplying National Guardsmen to inspect vehicles at border crossings. These operations created no turf threats for the LEAs involved, as long as control remained in the hands of the LEAs.\textsuperscript{476} Given \textit{posse comitatus} restrictions, such control was assured.

For somewhat similar reasons, the Department of Justice (DoJ) did not object to having DoD as the lead agency for detection, tracking, and interception of smugglers. It was not directly involved in that aspect of the operation itself. DoJ did say that it would prefer using an LEA to apprehend suspects, but could accept DoD should this be "the Congress' will."\textsuperscript{477} In such a role, the military would merely provide DoJ with support, so DoJ's turf was not jeopardized by DoD.

One organization that had something to fear from DoD's entry into the drug war was the Coast Guard. The organization had a history of "performing duties that [were] neither attractive nor institutionally threatening to the Navy." Interdicting smugglers had always been just such a mission. In resisting a drug mission for itself, the military had often pointed to the Coast Guard as the agency that should be carrying out the mission. Should the drug mission become attractive to the Navy, however, the leading position of the Coast Guard in that area would be threatened.\textsuperscript{478} Fortunately for the Coast Guard, its value in the interdiction mission was protected at least partially by the decision not to allow military personnel to make arrests. This, combined with the many other missions the organization is responsible for, and the continued belief within the Navy that the Coast Guard is the better suited of the two for interdiction, ensures the Coast Guard's survival as a major antidrug player.\textsuperscript{479}

As it has turned out, the autonomy issue has become a major headache for the military. For the most part, DoD has merely become another player in a policy area that has always provoked turf fights, but its position relative to the LEAs, as described above, have lessened the stakes for DoD. The main problem has been coordinating the military's

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\textsuperscript{476} Interview with John Heaphy.
\textsuperscript{477} "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 79.
\textsuperscript{478} Lt. Christopher Abel, "Hunker Down Now!," \textit{Proceedings} Dec., 1990: 58. Lt. Abel of the Coast Guard warns that in the new atmosphere, Coast Guard units may become nothing more than "the Navy's errand boys." In order to avoid the organizational stress prompted by the military threat, Abel suggests a mission innovation for the Coast Guard, arguing that it is well-positioned to claim maritime environmental protection as its private domain.

Some members of the Coast Guard even feared that the military's new drug role, combined with increased pressure to cut the budget, could lead to an attempt to do away with the Coast Guard entirely (the ultimate threat to autonomy). (Com. Louis Orsini, "In Need of a Plan," \textit{Proceedings} December, 1991: 60.)
\textsuperscript{479} John Heaphy of DoD's Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, argues that the Coast Guard never had a problem with the military's entrance into the interdiction business, as it considers itself to be an integral part of the military. Also, when interdicting smugglers, the Navy may turn over control of an entire destroyer to the temporary command of a Coast Guard Lieutenant, which is a lot of power for a young Guardsman to have. (Interview with John Heaphy.)
\end{flushleft}
activities with those of other agencies. During the early years of military involvement, coordination was quite difficult because there were no mechanisms for overall operational command. The Reagan Administration's opposition to designating a drug czar merely exacerbated this problem. This created a situation that required command by committee, which was "antithetical" to the military practice of hierarchical command structure.\textsuperscript{480} Throughout the 1980s, autonomy problems arose from the different ways in which the LEAs and DoD approached the drug mission. Stephen Duncan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, described these problems as follows: "It is not that people have different agendas... but the way they go about meeting their own agendas is so different it simply takes time for people to learn each other's operating process and procedures and learn how to cooperate."\textsuperscript{481}

The assignment in 1988 of lead agency status to DoD for detection and monitoring was an important step towards clearing up some of the interagency difficulties posed by the military's involvement in the drug war. This was an idea whose time had come. Up to that point, there was little coordination and much direct competition between the many LEAs involved in interdiction. Customs, for example, continued to go its separate way in developing its own C\textsuperscript{3}I network that duplicated existing DoD systems and offered little in the way of assistance to the Coast Guard. As interdiction expert Capt. Frank Ault noted in 1987, "The terms 'interface' and 'interoperability' are, at this reading, still largely missing in the Customs C\textsuperscript{3}I lexicon."\textsuperscript{482} Ault said later in the year that "it should be clear that a preeminent imperative is the integration of the national defense and drug interdiction C\textsuperscript{3}I systems."\textsuperscript{483} The designation of DoD as lead agency, combined with the congressional command in 1988 for the military to create such a system, were two important steps in

\textsuperscript{480} Interview with Gen. Fred W"omer, Jr. Such "committees" can become quite crowded. The commander of Joint Task Force 4 notes that the typical detection and monitoring operation "may involve as few as five or up to a dozen different agencies." (Gee, "Vigilance in Paradise," p. 90.)

\textsuperscript{481} "Military Role in Drug Interdiction (Part 4)," HASC No. 101-67, Hearing Before the Investigation Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 19, 1990: 63.

\textsuperscript{482} Capt. Frank Ault, "Drug Interdiction--Performance or Policy," \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} Jan., 1987: 43.

\textsuperscript{483} Capt. Frank Ault, "Who is Responsible for Security of the Nation's Borders- DoD, the Coast Guard, or Customs?" \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} Nov., 1987: 70. Ault was not satisfied with the naming of DoD as the detection and tracking lead agency because nothing was said about the control and command aspects of C\textsuperscript{3}I. (Capt. Frank Ault, "We Must Be On Drugs!," \textit{Proceedings} Dec., 1990: 49.) This oversight led to a longer break-in time for DoD, as numerous MOUs had to be negotiated with the LEAs.
resolving some of the cooperation problems in the drug war.\textsuperscript{484} As of 1992, these problems remain a thorn in the side of both the military and the LEAs; however, as the problems of creating an intelligence and communications system has proven to be a "communications nightmare." The need for different levels of various agencies to communicate, not to mention coordinate their activities, creates major challenges that have yet to be mastered.\textsuperscript{485} A prime example of this problem is found in the area of intelligence, where, as of 1992, the ten agencies involved frequently repeat each other's efforts and fail to share information, wasting both time and money.\textsuperscript{486}

Some members of the LEA community have voiced concerns about the side-effects of DoD's drug role. There have been complaints that the addition of the military has led drug policy leaders, such as William Bennett, the first "drug czar," to think too much about planes and ships and not enough about the traditional practices of drug enforcement, such as investigations.\textsuperscript{487} As a result, this militarization has led, in the eyes of some LEAs, to a downgrading of the importance of many of the traditional organizations in the field of narcotics.

A May, 1991 overall assessment of DoD's role in supporting LEAs, written by the LEAs themselves, was generally positive, but there were complaints. These complaints dealt with the Pentagon's tendency to task other agencies rather than support them, and with the problems posed by certain military operational routines, such as a classification system that makes the sharing of intelligence quite difficult.\textsuperscript{488}

Can true interagency cooperation in interdiction, managed in part by DoD, become a reality? Maj. Carlson, US Army, suggests that one of the problems standing in the way of this happening lies in how agency performance in the drug war is assessed. At issue are the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used. His argument illustrates nicely the element of competition that exists in this mission area that complicates the ability of agencies to

\textsuperscript{484} In this respect, the addition of DoD to the antidrug game could be viewed as having partially alleviated some the autonomy difficulties experienced by the LEAS. Instead of constant confusion over who was in charge and common duplication of efforts in order to stay ahead of other agencies, there was now one agency that was with authority over at least part of the antidrug effort. Of course, this decrease in coordination problems created a new loss of autonomy as authority over certain duties was handed over to DoD. Ault notes other types of problems caused by DoD's ability to aid the effectiveness of LEAs. He noted that after years of Customs blaming its disappointing performance in interdiction on a shortcoming of detection and tracking resources, the sudden addition of DoD resources might take away this excuse, leaving Customs open to criticism it could formally dodge. (Capt. Frank Ault, "DoD Wades into Drug War," \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} July, 1989: 52.)

\textsuperscript{485} Interview with Jack Drantel.


\textsuperscript{488} As Stephen Duncan summed up the situation as of early 1992, "At first we had what I call a clash of operating cultures.... Over a couple of years, the professionals in the law enforcement community and the military community have grown a great deal of respect for each other and are working together very effectively. Have all problems disappeared? No. But every year, they become fewer in number." (David Morrison, "Police Action," \textit{National Journal} Feb. 1, 1992: 269.)
cooperate. He argues that "arrest and seizure 'body-count' statistics" are what determines how LEAs will fare in gaining their budget requests from Congress. This has several effects on interagency cooperation. Because it matters whether agency X or Y gets credit for making a bust, information flows less freely through the entire system. Furthermore, the presence of increased military activity in a region forces smugglers to find new routes, with the result being that fewer seizures are recorded, harming LEA MOEs. Carlson argues that the military has avoided such problems by adopting a different MOE, one that provides "quantitative data pertaining to equipment loans, aircraft hours, man-days and other like data." Although the tactic of non-qualitative MOEs may help DoD to better manage its place in the interdiction community, it does little to help coordinate the overall effort.489

Although Carlson is critical of DoD's MOE, Maj. Dale Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations for Joint Task Force Six, argues that the military rightly uses different MOEs than do LEAs. He contends:

The value of military support is measured by its worth as perceived by law enforcement agencies and its training value for participating military units. The deterrent value of military involvement in terms of disruption of the smuggler's patterns or forcing him to take riskier, less-profitable routes cannot be quantified.490

Congress seems to agree with Brown on this issue. A report from the HASC in the summer of 1991 concluded:

It is difficult to quantify the contribution and effect the department [DoD] has had on the drug market in this country... [but military] interdiction efforts clearly are making it logistically more difficult for the smuggler to get his product into this country. Perhaps that in itself is a worthwhile goal.491

With different MOEs, operating cultures, and incentives, the LEAs and DoD will continue to have difficulty coordinating their efforts in the drug war. DoD's lead agency status has led to a resolution of some of these disagreements, but others will continue as they always have in this issue area.

Although autonomy problems arising from interagency coordination requirements have been a headache for the Pentagon from the beginning, the problems incurred during the

491 Cited in Morrison, "Police Action," p. 268. The Coast Guard has developed its own new subjective MOE that combines both quantitative and qualitative factors, but Congress has been less willing to accept a non-objective, quantitative MOE from that organization than it has from DoD. See Lt. Daniel Laliberte, "Measuring Drug-Interdiction Effectiveness," Proceedings June, 1992: 92-94.
1980s were never overwhelming. This reality, combined with the fact that the stakes in the drug war were not as high for DoD has they were for the LEAs, limited the effects that the concern for autonomy had on the military's resistance to the innovation in question.

**BUDGET**

The effects of the *budget* variable on the military's choice to resist the antidrug mission are quite straightforward. The military feared that it would be given this new mission but not the additional funds to pay for it. The total amount of money that the antidrug mission required was relatively small (see Figure 1). As a result, the influence of this variable on the military's resistance to this mission was somewhat limited.

**Figure 1**

![Diagram: DoD Antidrug Mission Funding](image)

Although the amounts of money involved were relatively small, the money taken out of the DoD budget would have to come from somebody's slice of the pie, and no one was ready to give up something for nothing. Also, there was a fear that the drug mission would only grow with time, demanding more and more of increasingly scarce DoD funding. Finally, no one in the military appreciated the fact that politicians were trying to fight the drug war on the cheap by making DoD pay for it. For example, the Senate's version of the 1986 omnibus drug bill (not the final version) called for $1.4 billion in spending, $887 million of which would be supplied from the defense budget. Air Force Col. Pothier, acting director of the Pentagon's Task Force on Drug Enforcement, summed up this
approach as follows, "We call it a feeding frenzy, with the Defense Department's budget as the bait." Fear of this practice was dominant throughout the military. It was also a concern within OSD. As an aide to Secretary of Defense Weinberger said, "People want to use the military not so much to solve a problem as to solve it without spending money.

The negative fiscal impact of the drug mission loomed even larger because the majority of funding spent on the mission did not purchase items that the military could also use for its more favored missions. Much of the money was used to purchase equipment that was then transferred directly to LEAs, leaving the military with nothing to show for its expenditure.

DoD was always quick to stress the negative effect that forcing it to pay for the drug mission would have on the military. After the Senate's 1988 amendment passed, for example, the military announced that the level of effort requested would cost $2 billion and that if Congress failed to provide new funds to pay for the drug mission, US military operations worldwide would be reduced, with a commensurate degradation of readiness levels.

Congress was aware of DoD's constant claims of poverty. Many congressmen had little sympathy, however, as they contended they were more than willing to pay the drug war bill. Rep. Hunter, for example, said to DoD officials that "We on the committee [HASC] understand the need for more funding. You want funding? Come ask me and I will vote for it." Although Hunter may have been sincere, his pledge did not mean all that much to DoD as long as the Administration and Republicans in Congress refused to budget additional money for the drug war. Ironically, the Administration, which sided with the services in opposing a military antidrug role, made the mission even more distasteful to the military by raising the financial cost to DoD of this new task.

Even after 1989, when the military accepted its drug mission, members of Congress continued to try to chip away at DoD's budget in order to pay for various aspects of the drug war. In mid-1990, for example, Sen. DeConcini (D-AR) tried to move $100 million from the military budget to pay for the care of children whose mothers were undergoing drug treatment programs. This proposal was defeated, with Sen. Wallop (R-WY) noting,

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493 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr. The practice continued in the future. In FY89, for example, DoD had to take $71.8 million from the services' operations, maintenance, and training accounts to support antidrug activities. In FY90, this figure grew to $119.5 million. (GAO, "Drug Control: Defense Spending for Counternarcotics Activities for Fiscal Years 1989-91," GAO/NSIAD-92-82, April, 1992: 11.)
496 "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," 37.
"The defense authorization bill is becoming a cash cow to be milked for every social ill in the country."497

Concern over the budgetary impact of the drug interdiction mission was not a major factor in the military's resistance of this forced innovation. Nonetheless, it did loom constantly in the background and provided yet another reason for the military to find disfavor with the mission. The relative importance of this variable to explaining the case is best demonstrated by a counterfactual question: If Congress and the Administration had been willing to fully fund the military's drug duties with new money, would resistance to this new mission have lessened significantly. The answer is no, because the problems contained in the professional identity and operational routine variables and, to a lesser extent, the autonomy variable, were too serious to allow civilians to buy the military's cooperation in this case.

In summary, the military resisted the drug interdiction mission innovation because of this innovation's challenge to the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. The professional identity variable of my forced innovation framework provides the most important rationale for military resistance. The fact that the military did not view the mission as a military mission was the prime driver of military resistance to this innovation. The law enforcement aspects of the mission were a poor match with the military view of itself as a protector of the people, not a policer of them. This innovation's challenges to the military's operational routines, autonomy, and budget made resistance to civilian intervention more likely, but were clearly of secondary importance.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY UNITY

The services presented Congress with a unified front against the drug mission. There were no significant divisions within the military that civilians could take advantage of, thus, in this case, the military unity variable worked in favor of the military. Without exception, the more extreme measures considered by Congress, such as the Bennett and Hunter Amendments, found no favor within the military leadership. As a result, all of the services were able to join together in testifying against what they could readily agree were ill-

conceived measures. The military was also solidly against congressional efforts to escalate aerial and maritime interdiction programs. Had a major disagreement existed either between or within the services over these issues, it would have been harder for the military as an institution to fight Congress. More importantly, a significant division within the military would have created the option for the Secretary of Defense and the Administration to support a military antidrug mission without having to force one on the military. For example, had the Navy come out in favor of the drug interdiction mission in 1985, the Administration could have sided with it, and the military as a whole would have become involved in this task much faster and to a greater degree than it eventually did.

Although there were no significant splits in military unity over the desirability of the drug mission, lower-ranking officers and enlisted personnel did have a more favorable view of this innovation. They tended to see the milder levels of military involvement in the drug war as a positive contribution that the services could make to the country. They also felt that it was a worthwhile use of their time. Officers at the higher ranks, from colonel on up, saw the drug mission much differently. They were more concerned about the bureaucratic and political implications of the antidrug mission. As the leaders of the institution, it was both understandable and responsible for these higher-ranking officers to view the issue as such. Because this division within the military was along the lines of rank, with only those at the bottom favoring drug duties, it was of little help to civilians trying to force innovation upon the military as a whole. These lower-ranking personnel were not in a position to influence military policy, nor did they have enough incentive to take on the system by vocally supporting the antidrug mission.

Another subgroup within the military, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), also had a different view of this innovation than service leadership did. The nature of SOUTHCOM's possible drug duties were such that this subgroup was more receptive to its part of the drug war than other commands were to theirs. SOUTHCOM's mission involved eradication efforts in Latin America that, for reasons explained below, were organizationally appealing to SOUTHCOM.

This division did nothing to facilitate civilian efforts to involve the military as a whole in a drug interdiction mission. SOUTHCOM was just as strongly against the other types of drugs missions as was the rest of the military. Its lack of distaste for its own slice of the drug war did not translate into enthusiasm for the duties being suggested for other

498 Interview with Jack Dranttel. Dranttel arrived at this conclusion after travelling extensively to military bases around the country in order to discuss the antidrug mission.

499 Note the similarity between these rank-based differences of opinion and those that existed in LEAs with regards to the military's entrance into the drug interdiction business.
subgroups within the military or for the more extreme roles that were contemplated by the House. The difference of opinion arising from the nature of the Latin American mission may actually have facilitated DoD's resistance to congressional efforts, because Pentagon officials could point to military efforts in Latin America when congressmen complained that DoD was not doing its part in the drug war.

THE LATIN AMERICAN MISSION

My framework must be able to account for an instance where one sector of the military is unique in finding a forced innovation attractive. Within that sector, the variables that determine resistance should, according to the framework, be manifest differently than for the rest of the military. As application of the framework will show, this was clearly the case with the Latin American side of the drug interdiction mission.

The Latin American mission focuses on eradication rather than interdiction.\textsuperscript{500} This entails going to the source of drugs -- processing labs and coca fields -- which are often located deep within inhospitable jungle terrain. The primary mission required by the US military in fighting the drug war in Central and South America is two-fold. First and foremost is the task of training both US LEA agents (usually from DEA), foreign military personnel, and to a lesser extent, foreign LEA members. Skills taught include small group infantry tactics, small arms use, communications systems operation, and the operation and maintenance of US-supplied military equipment. Second, the US military operates in a support role for Latin American antidrug forces and accompanying US DEA agents. This support ranges from providing intelligence and communications to transporting these forces to and from raid sites. US forces may also provide an extensive level of operation planning and control. To date, however, US forces have not taken part directly in raiding cocaine labs, beyond flying the helicopters used for transportation.\textsuperscript{501}

Operation Blast Furnace is both an example of this type of mission and evidence that the military and the Reagan Administration viewed the Latin American mission differently than the other types of drug duties proposed by Congress. Operation Blast Furnace was a short-term eradication mission conducted in Bolivia in 1986. It primarily involved 6 Blackhawk helicopters and a communications system supported by 160 US military

\textsuperscript{500} Eradication can be viewed as the first line of defense in an interdiction campaign.
\textsuperscript{501} There have been reports of US troops taking a much more active role in raids, but nothing in the open literature can substantiate these charges.
personnel. The helicopters were used to transport Bolivian troops and US DEA officials into the Bolivian jungle to raid cocaine labs.\textsuperscript{502}

Congress had nothing to do with Blast Furnace and therefore did not have to force it on the military or the Administration.\textsuperscript{503} At the same time the Administration was fighting congressional efforts to involve the military in the drug war, it was expanding the military's use in South and Central America. In doing so, members of the Administration were careful to point out that such missions had very definite limits, usually falling short of the measures desired by the House. For example, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, when discussing Blast Furnace, noted that "once the military is committed in the drug fight abroad, it must operate within certain limits. It may not interdict or interrupt the passage of civilian vessels or aircraft."\textsuperscript{504}

Latin American eradication missions offered fewer organizational problems than the interdiction missions being pushed by Congress. As a result, this side of the military's drug war progressed without having to wait for Congress to legislate such duties. An examination of how the variables of resistance in my framework are manifest in this particular aspect of the antidrug mission shows that it was quite logical for some segments of the military to support operations like Blast Furnace in particular and the Latin American mission in general.\textsuperscript{505}

\textsuperscript{502} Other foreign operations did predate Blast Furnace, but on a much smaller scale. Operation BAT, for example, had been underway since 1983, but it consisted of only 2 Air Force Special Forces UH-1N helicopters that were on call to help Bahamian officials in their interdiction efforts.

\textsuperscript{503} While Congress originally paid little attention to the Latin American mission, by 1989 the HASC was growing more interested in how the military's eradication mission could be expanded. (Interview with Jack Drantel.)


\textsuperscript{505} The primary negative aspect of the Latin American side of the drug war, one that was consistently raised in the press during the 1980s, was the many similarities between this mission and the Vietnam War (i.e., US forces were only supposed to be advisors and trainers, they operated in a hostile jungle environment, etc.). (See, for example, Trainor, "Military Assumes Wider Role in Anti-Drug Effort," p. A24; Bernard Trainor, "For Some Top Officers, Bush's Call For Military Aid in the Drug War Evokes Visions of Vietnam," \textit{New York Times} Sept. 8, 1989: A12; Bernard Weinraub, "Bush to Let U.S. Anti-Drug Troops Move Outside Latin Base Camps," \textit{New York Times} Sept. 11, 1989: A1; "What Kind of Drug War," \textit{Army Times} Sept. 18, 1989: 23; Rick Maze, "Military Role in Drug War May Grow," \textit{Air Force Times} Sept. 18, 1989: 18; and Martin Walker, "Green Berets Train Peru Anti-Drug Units," \textit{Manchester Guardian} Apr. 23, 1990: 6.) From these similarities and the rising concern of the US government with the region sprang the fear that the military's drug mission in that area could become another Vietnam. The slowly expanding nature of US military involvement in the region did not make anyone feel better.

Bush's 1989 speech declaring that the US would offer military help to Latin American nations that requested such assistance further fueled fears of another Vietnam. This new policy was facilitated by a Justice Department ruling that Posse Comitatus restrictions might only apply to the military when operating within US borders. This opened up the possibility that military personnel, acting alone, could apprehend drug smugglers both on the high seas and in foreign countries. (William Matthews, "Drug Ruling May Have Profound Effect on Military," \textit{Army Times} Jan. 15, 1990: 18.) The US Supreme Court recently gave further credence to this 1989 ruling by declaring legal the abduction of suspected criminals from foreign soil if the country in question has an extradition treaty with the US. (See Linda Greenhouse, "High Court Backs Seizing Foreigner For Trial in U.S.,” \textit{New York Times} June 16, 1992: A1.)
The Latin American antidrug mission offered a much better match with SOUTHCOM's professional identity than the general interdiction mission did for the rest of the military. This was the primary reason why SOUTHCOM viewed its drug mission more favorably than other parts of the military viewed theirs. The Pentagon knew full well the dangers that awaited any antidrug mission in the jungles of South America, but these perils were little different than those posed by the counterinsurgency mission in that part of the world. The Latin American theater provided the military, SOUTHCOM in particular, with several benefits, all related to SOUTHCOM's existing missions. It offered the opportunity for a continuation of the development of bilateral relations originally fostered during the Cold War between the US and foreign militaries. It also meshed nicely with existing concepts of low-intensity conflict that were organizational mainstays of the military in this region of the world throughout the Cold War (if not before). Not surprisingly, this overlap made subgroups within the military involved in these issues more enthusiastic than other sectors of the services about the drug war.

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The Bush Administration never announced that its policy would reflect this ruling. However, it appears that Bush was prepared to use military forces in other countries to seize noted drug smugglers before this ruling was handed down. In the summer of 1989, for example, the US was planning to use the military to snatch drug kingpin Pablo Escobar from Panama. Uncertain intelligence as to his true location grounded the operation. ("Use of Military in War on Drugs," CBS Evening News, 7 p.m., Dec. 14, transcript in Current News Special Edition, "Military Role in the Drug War," March, 1990, p. 1.) According to some reports, the US military played a major role in a Colombian raid that killed drug lord Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha in December of 1989. See (Knut Royce and Peter Eisner, "US Got Gacha," Long Island Newsday May 4, 1990: 1.) In addition, the military in 1990 conducted exercises that practiced the capture of drug lord. (John Gaines, "War Games Succeed in Capture of Mock Drug Lord," San Diego Union Apr. 20, 1990: B1.)

Concerns about another Vietnam tended to be voiced not by the military but by the press and commentators on US foreign policy towards Latin America. Military personnel did not have such fears because they recognized the reality of the US involvement in the region. They knew that it was highly unlikely that any of the countries there would ever agree to allow US military combat personnel to operate in their territories. Any action beyond low-level training and support of indigenous forces would smack of imperialism and be a blow to local nationalism. (Mark Uhlig, "Drug Wars: U.S. Weighs a Military Escalation," New York Times July 9, 1989: E3.) As one Peruvian congressman said, "What we need in this country are greenbacks, not Green Berets." (Mark Day, "Peru-Balks at US Military-Aid Offer," Christian Science Monitor May 3, 1990: 3.) Such attitudes prevail today. News that US military planes were helping Columbian officials search for the escaped Pablo Escobar was not well-received in the area. The headline in one large Colombian newspaper warned: "The Gringos are Coming, National Sovereignty is on the Floor." (James Brooke, "US Military Planes Join Search for Escaped Columbian Drug Lord," New York Times July 31, 1992: A8.) Thus, although President Bush did announce in his September, 1989 speech that the US would send troops to other countries if requested by their governments, no one in either hemisphere really believed that such a request would ever occur. In addition, the Bush Administration appeared from the beginning to be strongly committed to keeping the US in a support role that involved relatively few troops. (Washington Office on Latin America, Clear and Present Dangers: the U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1991), p. 24.) Thus, the fear of another Vietnam developing out of the drug war was not held to any meaningful extent by the military.

506 See David Fulghum and Rick Maze, "Colombia to Get Aircraft for Drug War," Air Force Times Sept. 11, 1989: 3. During his Senate confirmation hearings, future CICS Colin Powell said that sending military advisors to foreign countries, although quite risky, was "a risk worth taking." (Halloran, "Powell Sees Risks in War on Drugs," p. A28.)

The main reason why the Latin American mission did not pose a significant challenge to the military's professional identity was that, unlike most antidrug duties, the eradication mission was basically a military mission, not a law enforcement mission. The military perceived the Latin American mission in much the same way that Weinberger, a virulent opponent of using the military to fight the drug war, did. Weinberger endorsed the idea of using the military in South America, saying that "direct military support for other nations involved in counterinsurgency operations, even when those insurgents are drug organizations, lies within the proper scope of our military action." He argued that missions such as Operation Blast Furnace were appropriate because they offered "a clear military objective" and, most importantly, did not involve the military in civilian law enforcement.\footnote{508}{ Caspar Weinberger, "Our Troops Shouldn't Be Drug Cops: Don't Draft the Military to Solve a Law-Enforcement Problem," \textit{Washington Post} May 22, 1988: C2.}

In other words, when conducting the Latin American mission, members of SOUTHCOM perceived themselves as acting as military professionals, not as members of some other profession.

One way that the Latin American mission resembled a traditional military mission was that it provided a familiar enemy that the military could go on the offensive against. During the Cold War, the entire US overt and covert military effort in Central and South America was centered on the dual task of helping non-communist regimes combat leftist rebels while also aiding non-communist rebels who sought to overthrow communist regimes. Because of the perceived connection between such leftist rebels and the drug cartels,\footnote{509}{For an example of the arguments commonly made supporting and disputing this supposed connection, see Capt. Dan Meyer, "The Myth of Narcoterrorism in Latin America," \textit{Military Review} March, 1990: 64-70 and Maj. Randy Kolton, "Combating the Columbian Drug Cartels," \textit{Military Review} March, 1990: 49-63.}

the designation of these cartels as similar enemies fit rather easily with the military's professional identity.\footnote{510}{This identification of the drug cartels as a threat to national security became an even more direct and urgent issue once Reagan formally declared drugs to be such a threat. SOUTHCOM took this declaration seriously and realized that they were best-suited to deal with the problem by assisting the governments of the countries that the cartels were based in. (Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr.)}

Evidence of this is found, in part, in a 1985 JCS recommendation that the US military should aid those Central American countries that request help in fighting drugs. The JCS noted the connection between drug money and the purchase of weapons by insurgents seeking to bring down anti-Marxist governments. Because of this link, they saw drugs as "a national security problem." They suggested training local militaries in eradication methods and lending them equipment.\footnote{511}{George Wilson, "Military Urges Wider Drug War," \textit{New York Times} June 20, 1985: A22. As for the US military's direct role, it would "surround" the country in question to halt the flow of ships and planes carrying drugs. This description sounds more like the military was proposing a temporary, total quarantine around the participating country than a general interdiction campaign, which it had little interest in.}

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quickest way to get involved without risking acquiring civilian law enforcement powers.\textsuperscript{512} In general, fighting drugs in Latin American countries offered another way that the military could conduct counterinsurgency in support of non-Marxist US allies,\textsuperscript{513} but under a rationale more acceptable to the US public. In this respect, it did not create a conflict with professional identity.\textsuperscript{514}

Another reason why the Latin American mission was more appealing to the military's sense of professional identity was that it seemed like a less futile job than the interdiction mission. Thus, it did not create an intense fear of failure. In Latin America, the military was operating as a military organization, and not as an LEA. As a result, it was more likely to be assessed in terms of military MOEs rather than LEA MOEs. Operation Blast Furnace showed that military force could make a difference on a short-term basis. Although the operation had no effect on the overall drug trade, the military was able to take Bolivian producers off-line for a short time. Thus, in its limited objectives, it could succeed. This compared quite favorably to the interdiction mission, which had the much more grandiose objective of stemming the flow of drugs entering the US.\textsuperscript{515} If the Pentagon could show examples of limited, temporary successes in the Latin American mission, then it would be harder for political leaders and the public to label the military a total failure in the drug war. More importantly, such operations might satisfy congressional calls for a military role in the drug war, allowing the military to avoid more distasteful law enforcement missions.\textsuperscript{516}

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\item[512] Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," p. 75.
\item[513] Jonathan Marshall, "Drugs and United States Foreign Policy," in \textit{Dealing With Drugs: Consequences of Government Control}, ed. Ronald Hamowy. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 149. Interestingly, Marshall, along with Peter Dale Scott, offer a great deal of evidence in arguing that the US was often operating at cross purposes with regards to fighting both Marxists and drugs. Because Marxism was long viewed as the greater of these two evils, the CIA and the military often worked with non-Marxist groups either seeking to overthrow Marxist regimes (the Contras) or who sought to limit the influence of communism in Latin America (Noriega). The cost of US cooperation with these groups was often US complicity with regards to drug trafficking. See Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, \textit{Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
\item[514] In fact, the military adhered to its professional identity and operational routines so closely that its efforts to aid South American countries in fighting our drug war often suffered from the same organizational tendencies that have hindered US counterinsurgency efforts over the years. For example, donated equipment was often too heavy and complicated and was always given to militaries, when in fact police forces were primarily responsible for fighting drug traders in countries like Columbia. Bruce Bagley, "Dastline Drug Wars: Colombia: the Wrong Strategy," \textit{Foreign Policy} Winter, 1989-90: 164.
\item[515] Fishel notes that although "the law enforcement aspect of Blast Furnace was an abject failure," the more localized, military aspect of the operation was not. "The attack on the drug labs successfully reduced the supply of coca products from Bolivia by about 90 percent." (Fishel, "Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace," pp. 64-5.) Abbott adds that "Blast Furnace seems to have been little more than a costly short-term political statement that quickly lapsed into oblivion because its effect on the international drug trade was virtually nonexistent." (Abbott, "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security," p. 104.) The military was well aware, however, that such an effect was neither intended nor expected.
\item[516] Of course, there was always the chance that military success in Latin America could lead Congress to desire and expect more from the military in other theaters of the drug war.
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The Latin American mission meshed nicely with the military's operational routines. This provided a secondary reason for SOUTCOM to be less resistance to its antidrug mission than the rest of the military was. Evidence of this is found in the training value seen in this mission. Unlike the general interdiction mission, the military believed that conducting this side of the drug war offered valuable training experience for personnel. Thus, Latin American drug war duties interacted favorably with operational routines rather than conflicting with them.

The lessons drawn from Operation Blast Furnace illustrate the training value of the Latin American mission. Col. Pothier, speaking in 1986 about Blast Furnace, said that such missions have definite training value to the military because they force the military to stretch its supply routes and operate over unfamiliar terrain. As he saw it, "What greater training for low-intensity conflict?" 517 In a 1988 assessment of Blast Furnace, published in Parameters, Col. Michael Abbott noted that "the personnel involved received invaluable, realistic training in air assault operations, logistics, intelligence analysis, and planning." 518 Speaking in more general terms, Gen. Meyer, the former Army Chief of Staff, said in 1989 that "drug-eradication missions are exactly what combat units are trained for." 519 The training value of mission like Blast Furnace lie in the fact that their execution requires the use of military skills. In his 1991 assessment of Blast Furnace, Lt. Col. Fishel pointed out that the mission showed that "to attack the center of gravity effectively does not require a law enforcement approach," but rather a military one. 520

519 Paraphrased in Maze, "Military Role in Drug War May Grow," p. 4.
520 Lt. Col. John Fishel, "Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace," Military Review June, 1991: 64-5. Clausewitzian references to this "center of gravity" in the drug war clutter the literature on the military's role in this war. As the following cites illustrate, there is a great deal of disagreement as to where this "center" is: The drug trade's "true centers of gravity are the growing fields, the refineries and the deep transshipment points in Central and South America" (Patrick Pacalo, "Drug War is Being Fought on the Wrong Battlefield," Army Times July 10, 1989: 2); Marine Corps Gen. Gray told Congress in 1990 that US demand for drugs is the true center of gravity (Lt. Col. Gary Wilson and Capt. Sandy Wilson, "The Drug War Revisited," Marine Corps Gazette March, 1990: 19); "The center of gravity for the United States is the population's resistance to drugs" (Herlitz, "Narcoterrorism: the New Unconventional War," p. 21); "Drugs are in their most concentrated form during shipment" (Charley Diaz, "DOD Plays in the Drug Wars," Proceedings May, 1990: 77); Operation Blast Furnace showed that "the point of concentration of resources and product is a center of gravity" (Fishel, "Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace," p. 64); DoD believes "that as good sound military strategy, to maximize your effectiveness, you go to the source. You don't try to interdict along the US border, [where] the druggers have all of the advantages. You go to the source, where he or she has all of the disadvantages" (Morrison, "The Pentagon's Drug Wars," p. 2109.); A 1989 editorial in Army Times said that "trying to stem the flow of drugs at the US border is not striking at the center of gravity. Striking at the center of gravity requires eliminating the apparatus that grows, harvests, processes and distributes cocaine and its byproducts." ("What Kind of Drug War," p. 23.) For a particularly extreme and misguided argument that "massive close air support, artillery, and armor" can help destroy the "illegal drug structure," see Lt. Col. James Schmidt, "Hit Drug Lords' Center of Gravity," Army July, 1992: 18-22.
Not only does the Latin American mission overlap with the training requirements of more traditional military activities, often this training is much better qualitatively than can normally be attained during peacetime. Gen. Woerner, CINCSOUTH during the 1980s, pointed out that he used to spend a great deal of time developing fictional scenarios to train his intelligence personnel. The drug mission offered a chance to train in what in many ways equaled a wartime environment. Thus, his personnel were able to hone their skills to a level normally not possible, while at the same time conducting antidrug support operations. Similarly, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) believe that restrictions covering the extent to which they may aid foreign militaries in antidrug missions should be relaxed because the tasks required by locating and destroying cocaine labs are quite similar to SOF skills required during wartime. Used in a more active drug role, SOF could achieve a training level otherwise impossible during peacetime.

The training value of the Latin American mission, combined with the fact that SOUTHCOM assets remained deployed in areas they tended to be involved in anyway, meant that this side of the drug war did not threaten readiness. Although the military often complained that the interdiction mission would degrade readiness, it had no such problems with the eradication side of the war. As a result, it was more inclined to undertake the Latin American mission.

The Latin American mission promised far fewer problems related to autonomy than did the interdiction mission, making it less threatening than other military antidrug duties. This was primarily because the training and equipping of foreign militaries was not a crowded policy area. Except for the need to work with DEA agents stationed in countries throughout the region, the military did not face substantial overlap with LEAs. The potential for conflict between DoD and the State Department existed, but did not pose any greater threat to autonomy than already existed due to interaction between the two departments in Central and South America. More importantly in terms of autonomy, the military nature of the foreign assistance mission guaranteed that the military would be running the show and that any LEAs involved would have to adapt to the military's way of doing things. As was discussed above, the "clash of cultures" between the DEA and the military did cause some problems, but compared to the crowded policy area of drug interdiction, the Latin American mission created relatively few autonomy problems.

In terms of a budgetary threat, the Latin American antidrug mission was not very imposing. All military training given to foreign militaries and police forces is supposed to

521 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr.
be paid for by the host country. Such training is one of the largest elements of the Latin American mission, yet it costs the military little. Thus, the additional funding required by eradication in Latin American is minimal.

In addition to lacking many of the budgetary threats of the interdiction mission, the Latin American mission may also offer several budgetary benefits to those involved with it. Funding for the drug war that comes from DoD's own budget must be taken from one group and given to another. In the case of the Latin American mission, the receiver is often SOUTHCOM. Gen. Thurman, CINCSOUTH in 1990, noted this fact, saying it was fortunate that his command benefited most from the new mission, while commanders in charge of the European theater, long the focus of US military policy, were now left to "dance with themselves." Although the monetary benefits are quite small, at least they represent a net gain at a time when all commands are watching their budgets shrink across the board. These benefits also extend to the area of prestige, as SOUTHCOM, long in the shadow of the unified commands associated with conflict with the Soviet Union, is now at the forefront of a new type of conflict.

In summary, the forced innovation framework is able to explain why SOUTHCOM favored its involvement in the drug war even as the rest of the military did not. The relatively low level of the Latin American mission's challenge to professional identity made this mission more appealing to SOUTHCOM than other antidrug duties were to the rest of the military. Fewer challenges to operational routines, autonomy, and budget inherent in the Latin American mission provided other, less significant reasons for SOUTHCOM's positive outlook on its being the first line of defense in the drug war. SOUTHCOM's opinion did not lead it to seek wider involvement of the military as a whole in the drug war, however, as it agreed with the other commands on the unattractive characteristics of the interdiction mission. As a result, military unity against the drug interdiction mission was quite high and congressional supporters of using the military to fight drugs were unable to take advantage of any splits in the military's front.

524 Douglas Jehl, "GIs Escalate Attack on Drugs in S. America," Los Angeles Times July 2, 1990: A1. SOUTHCOM, traditionally considered of much less importance than the European Command, stood to gain in reputation and importance as the war on drugs grew. Thus, the Latin American mission offered increased status as well as more funding.
THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN UNITY

More important to the military's campaign of resistance than its own unity was the relative level of disunity it faced among civilians, Washington politicians in particular. There were deep divisions both within Congress and between Congress and the Reagan Administration over the military's proper antidrug role. Had there been unity among politicians, the military might have found itself much more deeply involved in the drug war than it is today. If, for example, the Senate and the Administration had not fought against the Hunter Amendment, the worst fears of the military might have been realized. The importance of this division, although obvious in its implications, cannot be overstated. Therefore, the manifestation of the civilian unity variable is critical to the understanding of this case.

Although the decision to fight drugs in general and to use the military in specific enjoyed bipartisan support, there were definite divisions within Congress over drafting the military into this fight. The most obvious and important of these splits was between the House and the Senate. The nature of each institution was such that they approached this issue differently. A former counsel to the HASC notes that the Senate, because it is more conservative and less in need of "responding to the topic of the moment," was not eager to involve the military in drug interdiction. The House, on the other hand, was full of representatives who were quick to respond to new trends in public opinion.  

Evidence of this split between the House and Senate and the effect that it had on the effort to drag the military into the drug war is found in the several times that the House passed more extreme measures such as the Hunter and Bennett Amendments only to have them defeated by the Senate. For example, in 1986 the House passed the Hunter Amendment. When the Amendment reached the Senate, it was subjected to a withering attack from Sen. Nunn, the Chairman of the SASC. Nunn charged that the Amendment was "the equivalent of passing a law saying the president shall, by Thanksgiving, devise a

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525 Interview with Jack Dramtettel. Dramtettel notes that divisions also ran along geographic lines with respect to the issue of using the military in an antidrug role. He recalls hearing a southern Senator tell a northern peer that it was easy for Northerners to call for a relaxation of Posse Comitatus because they were never occupied by the US Army. Thus, Southerners tended not only to respect military traditions more, they were also more sensitive to the source of the Posse Comitatus restrictions.

Dramtettel also notes that it was the character differences between the House and Senate the led the House to pass so many measures increasing the military's drug role only to see the Senate cancel them. He says that the House did not pass these bills in an attempt to gain public favor, knowing all the while that the Senate would then do the right thing and shelve the House's plans. Although an examination of the history makes it appear that this is what was happening, Dramtettel says that it was not.
cure for the common cold." In his oration, Nunn quoted extensively from a report provided by the JCS that presented a laundry list of the military forces JCS claimed it needed to have even a slight chance of complying with the amendment. This list included, among other things, the entire US Navy and fifty-eight new AWACs. Most Senators recognized that the military had made several exaggerations in their report, but its overall message was received loud and clear: Do not ask us to undertake a task we cannot possibly accomplish. Thus, the House's efforts to employ the military were severely watered down and the military directly benefited from division between the House and Senate.

As the 1980s wore on, the extent of this division diminished somewhat. As public pressure over the drug issue increased, the ability of the Senate to refuse to increase the military's role in drug interdiction declined. Senators had to acknowledge the requirement for some new role for the military. Fortunately for the military, the gap between the House and Senate on this issue remained large enough that it was able to avoid being saddled with the more demanding tasks that the House favored but the Senate continued to oppose.

Sen. Nunn's treatment of the Hunter Amendment in 1988 is evidence of this process of public pressure reducing the House-Senate division. Nunn, who was instrumental in blasting the Hunter Amendment in 1986, was quick to recognize that the political climate of 1988 was different. He knew that to attack this provision again with such zeal would create a serious political liability for himself. As a result, he instead offered his own watered-down version of the Hunter Amendment in the Senate, cosponsoring it with Sen. Warner (R-VA), the ranking Republican on the SASC. In getting with the spirit of things, Nunn referred to the illegal narcotics trade as "a form of chemical warfare against this country."  

Public pressure had forced the Senate to come more into line with the House, but Nunn and his fellow Senators would never be ready to accept the more extreme measures passing in the House by 1988, and this restraint was critical to the military's ability to resist
the types of antidrug missions that it feared the most. Although there may have been divisions within Congress over exactly how to pursue the war on drugs, there was virtually no debate over the merits of such a fight. Drugs had become a major campaign issue by 1988 and everyone knew it. No one could afford to come across as being soft on drugs. As a result, greater civilian unity was possible in the formation of drug policy than existed in other policy areas. Fortunately for the military, this unity had its limits.

Civilian unity over the issue of using the military for drug interdiction was further reduced by the Reagan Administration's opinion on the matter. In the beginning of the 1980s, when the military was being pushed into a drug mission in small fits and starts, the Administration did not offer opposition, as long as the military's involvement was strictly limited. According to John Heaphy, the Director of Inter-Agency Affairs for DoD's Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support notes, Vice President Bush was the Administration's point man in the drug war. He was instrumental in the formation of the South Florida Drug Task Force in 1981, for example. With the help of his chief of staff Dan Murphy, a former CINCANT, he made it quite clear to the military that more was expected in terms of assistance to LEAs. The Administration's enthusiasm for directly employing the military in its newly-declared war on drugs was quite reserved, however, and it opposed any proposal that suggested using the military beyond the very low level of support already occurring by the end of 1981. Thus, civilians who desired to dramatically increase the antidrug role of the military faced not only determined military resistance but an Administration who agreed with the military and sought to fight Congress on the issue.

The Reagan Administration's alliance with the military over the issue of a DoD drug mission was the result of several factors. First and foremost, this alliance was a product of the Administration's role as the military's protector. This partnership was indicative

528 Some members of the Senate believed that by 1988 it had already become too like the House in that it was too quick to pull the military into the drug war. For example, Sen. Glenn (D-OH) complained that the Senate's amendment to the FY89 defense authorization bill that emerged from Nunn's efforts was an example of the "drug hysteria" and "posturing" that had gripped the Senate, creating a "steamroller going down the road" of military involvement in the drug war. (Rasky, "Senate Votes 83-6 to Give Military Anti-Drug Powers," p. 54.) He complained that the amendment had been rushed through without appropriate hearings. The formation of much of the drug legislation dealing with the military was created in this backward way. Committee hearings did not occur before the floor debate as they normally would. Instead, these hearings were conducted after amendments had been proposed and accepted on the floor. They gave House and Senate Armed Services Committee leaders a chance, as Susan Rasky of the New York Times put it, "To remodel and scale down the legislative handiwork of colleagues caught up in an election-year frenzy to attack the drug problem." (Susan Rasky, "Military Role in Drug War," New York Times June 24, 1988: B6.) Jack Dranttel, former HASC counsel argues, however, that the use of such amendments was not always an intentional tactic by proponents of a military drug mission. He points out that the "watershed" legislation of 1988 was written in the House-Senate Conference on the two versions because the DoD authorization bill was already out of committee by the time the drug related parts could be written. (Interview with Jack Dranttel.)

529 Interview with John Heaphy.

530 Interview with Jack Dranttel.
of the relationship between the Administration and the military during the Reagan years. The Administration's respect for military expertise and its hands-off approach to managing military matters led to a cooperative and protective relationship between the Reagan White House and the military. Both Reagan and civilian DoD officials, from the Secretary of Defense on down, were happy to defer to the military on most matters, and the drug war was no exception.

The Administration's stance on the use of the military in drug interdiction was also the product of the fact that it saw congressional attempts to force this mission as an affront to the Administration's autonomy. If someone in government had to tell the military what to do from time to time, the Administration felt, it should be the executive branch, and not the legislative branch. In trying to define a military antidrug mission, Congress was not only infringing upon the military's autonomy, it was entering an area that the Administration felt was its own to control. The Administration operated as an exceedingly tolerant parent of the military, and interference from Congress that both threatened the child and challenged the parental rights of the Administration naturally led the Administration to ally with the military.

Finally, the military-Administration alliance on this issue was a reflection of the fact that each shared the same views as to the purpose of the military and the appropriateness of using the armed forces for drug interdiction. Each held the traditional view, described in the Professional Identity section above, that the purpose of the military was to protect US interests from military threats. The drug problem did not qualify as such. The Administration was understandably more concerned with the role that the military had to play in checking communism around the globe. Thus, any proposal that called for decreasing the readiness of the military to carry out this mission in order to chase drug smugglers around the Caribbean met with resistance from the Administration. Furthermore, any antidrug policy that undermined the government's ability as a whole to fight communism was unacceptable to the Administration. In the name of promoting democracy, the Administration (and quite often Congress) frequently looked the other way when aiding friendly foreign regimes who happened to cooperate with or actively engage in the drug trade.531 For example, provisions that placed sanctions on countries whose antidrug efforts did not meet certain standards were resisted by the Administration on the

531 One observer notes that "narcotics enforcement has always taken second place to communist containment as an objective of US foreign policy." He cites a DEA official who defended US' willingness to look the other way with regards to the Jamaican government's tolerance of marijuana. This official said that "the issue is, should we press them to do things which could result in the election and installation of a leftist government, as they've had in the previous administration. Drugs are a serious problem. But Communism is a greater problem." (Marshall, "Drugs and United States Foreign Policy," p. 146. See also Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America.)
grounds that they would threaten to undermine the weak democracies of Central and South America.\textsuperscript{532} Drugs were treated similar to the issue of human rights: they were important, but were by no means worth easing up on the global struggle with communism. The only time that a country's role in the drug trade was important in terms of how the Reagan Administration would deal with it was when that country happened to have an insurgency with supposed drug ties that was threatening a friendly government. In such cases, the drug issue was frequently used as a justification to support democratic or right wing governments against communist insurgents that the US claimed were involved with the drug trade. As one critic put it in 1987, "Under the guise of drug enforcement, the United States continues to advance the original missions of police assistance: counterinsurgency, countersubversion, and indirect political control."\textsuperscript{533} Such charges help to explain why the Reagan Administration tended to favor the use of the US military in Latin America over drug interdiction roles closer to home.\textsuperscript{534}

The effect of the split between Congress and the Administration in this case was twofold. First, congressmen desiring a major antidrug role for the military were denied the help of the Administration in enlisting the military. Had Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger decided that they were in favor of such a role, their unparalleled influence with the military would have made resistance much more difficult than it was in the face of a divided civilian front. Second, the military had in the Administration an ally that could and

\textsuperscript{532} Lawson, "Congress Strengthens Stance Against Drug Sources Abroad," \textit{Congressional Quarterly} Sept. 7, 1985: 1764.

\textsuperscript{533} Marshall, "Drugs and United States Foreign Policy," p. 149. Jorge Castenda, a Mexican political analyst, notes that "in a sense, now that the Cold War was nearly over, or coming to an end, the traditional justification for US intervention in Latin America, at least the last 50 years, has disappeared, but there's another one in its place, which is the drug war." ("Reaction to US War on Drugs," \textit{ABC World News Tonight}, 6:30 p.m., Apr. 24, transcript in \textit{Current News Special Edition}, "Military Role in the Drug War," July, 1990, p. 1.)

\textsuperscript{534} Joseph Douglas, Jr. and Jan Senja offer a different view of the traditional connection between drugs and communism. They argue that the connection is best described as an alliance that poses a double-edged threat to US national security. They offer \textit{Druzba Narobov} as a prime example of the ways in which drug traders and communists can work together to take advantage of the US. \textit{Druzba Narobov} was a 1960s Soviet operation that tried to use drugs as a strategic weapon against US and western European capitalist production, education, society, and military effectiveness by means of encouraging and facilitating drug use. China had a similar plan and was a catalyst to the drug trade within Vietnam during the 1960s in an attempt to decrease US battlefield effectiveness. (Joseph Douglass Jr. and Jan Senja, "Drugs, Narcotics, and National Security," \textit{Global Affairs} Fall, 1987: 67-85. Adding credence to these charges is the fact that Senja was a member of the Czech National Assembly, where he took part in meetings chaired by Soviet Premier Krushchev on \textit{Druzba Narobov}. Senja defected to the West in 1968.)

Jonathan Marshall's book, \textit{Drugs and United States Foreign Policy}, is typical of those written by critics of US policy who ridicule the idea of a communist-drug trade connection. His overall argument is somewhat weakened because he depicts the entire history of the connection between communism and narcotic as a fraud. He never mentions the \textit{Druzba Narobov} operation, nor does he address the fact that drug money does help certain communist insurgents buy weapons. Even authors who argue against the existence of any true alliance between drug smugglers and rebels in South America recognize that marriages of convenience do occur from time to time. Regardless of whether Marshall or Douglass and Senja are correct about the true danger posed by a supposed narco-communist connection during the 1980s, fighting drugs in South America certainly did give the Reagan Administration an inroad to opposing Marxist movements, as Marshall duly notes.
would work actively to thwart congressional efforts to force greater interdiction duties on the military. The Administration, usually in the persona of the Secretary of Defense, tirelessly testified before Congress in support of the military's position on this issue. For example, in the 1988 joint HASC/SASC hearings, Secretary of Defense Carlucci stressed that the military must "remain in a support mode and not as a lead agency." He summed up his, the White House's, and the military's positions as follows:

Aside from the many practical problems involved in these proposals, there are more fundamental constitutional principles involved. (*I remain absolutely opposed to the assignment of a law enforcement mission to the Department of Defense.* [emphasis added])

And I am even more firmly opposed to any relaxation of the posse comitatus restrictions on the use of the military to search, seize, and arrest. I have discussed this matter with the President and other senior members of his Cabinet and I can report that these views are shared throughout this administration. 535

The Administration worked hard in both houses of Congress to forestall efforts to draft the military into the drug war. (By the late 1980s, however, it realized that the House was a lost cause and instead focused its efforts on the Senate. 536)

By 1988, public pressure over the drug issue had reached the level where the Administration had to ease its opposition to the use of the military in drug interdiction. Although it was still entirely opposed to granting any law enforcement powers to the military, the Administration did make concessions elsewhere. An announcement by a DoD spokesman on May 12 reflected the White House change of heart about the military's drug mission, while being careful to note remaining concerns:

The Secretary's [Secretary of Defense's] position is that we're doing a lot and we're prepared to do a lot more. We're prepared to cooperate further, but everyone should understand that when we expand our intelligence role, our surveillance role and our interdiction role, that, at the same time, requires resources. And these resources have to come from somewhere, and they can affect the readiness of this country to defend itself. 537

The spokesman then said he doubted that Congress would provide any extra money to the military, forcing cutbacks elsewhere. He also stressed that arrest powers must not be given to the military in the future. 538 Finally, the spokesman conveyed the Secretary of Defense's belief that demand reduction was the only true solution to the drug problem. The fact that a spokesman for the Secretary and not the Secretary himself made the

535 "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction." pp. 281-82.
536 Interview with Jack Dratnell.
538 Lawrence, "Election-Year Drug Bill Shaping up in House," p. 1281.
announcement reflect the relative level of importance that DoD placed on the mission (compare this with Secretary of Defense Cheney's 1989 announcement, discussed below). Also, the fact that the announcement specifically mentioned readiness problems posed by the drug mission indicates that the Administration was still echoing the military's concerns about that mission.

The arrival of the Bush Administration and the changes that this led to illustrate exactly how important the lack of civilian unity was during the pre-Bush 1980s. The new Administration was not deferential to military expertise to the extent that its predecessor was, and it expected its orders to be followed, no matter how unpopular they might be. The new Bush line on the use of the military in the drug war, signalled by a 1989 speech by Secretary of Defense Cheney, made it quite clear to the military that it could no longer expect to hide behind the Administration when Congress came calling for a bigger antidrug effort.

Dick Cheney was a dramatic change from Caspar Weinberger. 539 Where Weinberger was perhaps the most adamant opponent either within the Administration or the military to any antidrug role for the military, Cheney had been a supporter of military involvement in the drug war while he was House minority whip. Once at DoD, he voiced empathy with the military's position. He noted that "society should not expect the Department of Defense to resolve every problem that comes down the pike just because we're big and have a lot of resources." Cheney expressed his belief that the military's role should be limited to detection and monitoring of smugglers, which by 1989 was its assigned mission. 540 Even this was quite a departure from Weinberger's constant resistance to such a role, however. This was essentially the new Administration's position as well. Cheney said in October that "there's a much higher level of concern than was true even a few years ago over the nature of the problem. You've got a President now who is committed to trying to do something about it, who's made it a major national priority." 541

The most concrete example of the change between the Weinberger/Carlucci and Cheney eras was Cheney's September, 1989 speech in which he gave CINCs three weeks to propose plans for helping in drug interdiction and gave the military unambiguous marching order with regards to its role in interdiction. Unlike Secretary of Defense Carlucci's less-encompassing statement, made through a spokesman a year earlier, this

539 Frank Carlucci occupied the Secretary of Defense position briefly between the Weinberger and Cheney tenures, but he did not deviate from Weinberger's position on the issue of the military's role in the drug war.
541 "Cheney at the Pentagon," Government Executive Oct., 1989: 57. Although Cheney was determined to see the military carry out the duties it had been assigned by 1989, he did not favor involving the military any further in the drug war.
announcement came directly from the source and did not contain the many qualifications and reservations of the earlier speech. After years of Weinberger and Carlucci standing in the way of military involvement, Cheney's mandate was a critical turning point in the military's ability and willingness to resist Congress.

The advent of the Bush/Cheney team signalled a new level of civilian unity on the matter of the military's role in drug interdiction. Fortunately for the military, this increase in political unity came after efforts to escalate its role in the drug war had ended. As a result, the power that solid civilian unity offers in the struggle over forced innovation was attained at a point when there were no new battles to fight. All that remained as of the end of 1989 was for the military to accept the tasks it had already been assigned.542

In summary, the civilian unity variable is critical to the explanation of why this instance of forced innovation progressed the way it did. Division both within the Congress and between Congress and the Reagan Administration was deep enough that the more extreme measures proposed for using the military in the drug war could not garner the

542 With the role of the military in the drug war now agreed upon by most congressmen and the new Bush Administration, the two sides settled in to fighting mostly about funding levels. (See, for example Rick Maze, "Congress Wants Larger Military Role in Drug War." Army Times Sept. 25, 1989: 14.) As Sen. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) argued in 1989, "Are we kidding ourselves? The words are good. The intent is good. But when it comes to finding the meat, there isn't enough there." (Joan Biskupic, "Bush's Anti-Drug Campaign Emphasizes Enforcement," Congressional Quarterly Sept. 9, 1989: 2312.) Once again, the Republican strategy of paying for the drug war was to cut existing programs elsewhere in the budget.

The issue of paying for the drug war had long been a divisive issue between the Republicans and Democrats. Reagan summarized his fiscal approach to the matter in 1986 by saying that "winning the crusade against drugs will not be achieved by just throwing money at the problem." ("President and Mrs. Reagan On Drug Abuse and Prevention (text of speech)," Congressional Quarterly Sept. 20, 1986: 2227-29.) Most congressional Republicans shared Reagan's reluctance to pay for the drug war. This turned the matter of funding into a divisive bipartisan issue. During the early formation process of the 1986 omnibus drug proposal, Majority Leader Wright said that he was "very pleased with the degree of bipartisanship" in the House. This consensus began to break down, however, when the question of paying for the proposal came up. The Democrats, on average, sought to commit more money than Republicans, who accused the Democrats of trying to spend the problem away. When pressed as to where he would get the money to pay for the new antidrug programs, Wright answered, "From the same place that $300 billion for weapons comes from." (Rovner, "House Panels Vote Ammo for War on Drugs," pp. 1928-29.)

Money was a major dividing line between the 1986 House omnibus proposal, which called for $2 billion in new funds, and Administration and Republican-controlled Senate proposals, which were "revenue neutral." Senate Majority Leader Dole argued that "we don't have to get hooked on a spending habit to beat America's drug habit." Although the Reagan Administration was worried about the price tag of the proposed antidrug measures, the ranking civilian members of DoD feared that not enough new money would be provided, leaving the military holding the bag.

Sounding exactly like Reagan did in his televised drug speech, Bush said at the beginning of his term, "We've all seen in the past that money alone won't solve our toughest problems." ("Bush Reveals Anti-Drug Plan, Calls for Extra $2.2 Billion (text of speech)," p. 2333) One observer, Frank Ault, characterized these funding fights as a win-win situation in which both the Congress and the Administration were able to take the political stands they wanted. He noted, "A Republican administration would send to Congress an underfunded anti-drug program, knowing full well that certain Democrats would complain mightily, then beef it up. The administration would then deplore the profligate spending habits on Capital Hill but do what Congress mandated." (Ault, "We Must Be On Drugs!," p. 48.) As for the military, although it appreciated the Administration's efforts to restrict the services' drug mission, it would have been happier if the White House was willing to put up some more money for the mission so that funding would not have to come out of DoD's pockets.

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political support necessary to be thrust upon the military. Thus, all efforts to grant the military the power of arrest, arguably its greatest fear, failed. Public pressure did push civilian unity to the point in 1988 where the military was forced to accept the responsibility of lead agency for detection and monitoring of potential smugglers, but even then, more radical plans for employing the military could not muster enough support to be implemented. Had civilian unity with regards to the military’s drug mission been total, the course of this case and the present level of military involvement in the fight against drugs would be drastically different.

WHY THE MILITARY HAD A CHANGE OF HEART

Just as my framework must account for any difference of opinion within the military regarding the drug mission, so too must it offer an explanation as to why the military eventually dropped its resistance to this innovation. Use of my framework to answer this question focuses inquiry on the nature of the variables that determine military resistance to innovation. Did the manifestation of these variables change in 1989? If so, which variables were the most influential? The answers to these questions also shed light on which variable or variables were most critical to the case as a whole. The over-determined nature of the military’s change of heart is such that it is impossible to single out one variable as the sole determinant, but relative weights of importance can be assigned to the variables involved.

Although one might argue that the military’s decision to drop its outward resistance to the drug mission was just a public relations ploy, the fact is that its active resistance to this mission innovation did end in 1989. It is true that, privately, most high ranking officers within the services still are not very happy with the drug mission. However, their personal attitudes are not as important to the outcome of a struggle over forced innovation

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543 With this new acceptance of the drug mission came an increased level of military involvement in the drug war domestically. One large-scale example of this was a marijuana eradication operation on government-owned land in northern California. The mission involved members of LEAs as well as Guardsmen and active-duty troops, C-130s, and Army helicopters. The stormtrooper efforts of the military yielded few pot plants and one lawsuit brought forth by local residents who resented having the area turned into a war zone for several days. (See Katherine Bishop, “Military Takes Part in Drug Sweep and Reaps Criticism and a Lawsuit,” New York Times Aug. 10, 1990: A12; Mark Stein, “Army Troops Join Federal Marijuana Raids,” Los Angeles Times July 31, 1990: A3; and Michael Isikoff, “War on Drugs Mobilizes National Guard,” Washington Post Aug. 14, 1990: A1.) Guardsmen were even being used in 1990 to monitor and report drug sales during a Grateful Dead concert in Foxboro, Massachusetts. (Michael Isikoff, “Interest in Grateful Dead Was Not Musical,” Washington Post Aug. 14, 1990: A4.)

as is the willingness and commitment of the military leadership to carry out civilian mandates. That, and not the true underlying attitude, is what counts, as long as this attitude does not impede implementation of the new mission. Civilian proponents of forced innovations do not expect that military personnel will be happy about changes thrust upon them, only that they will carry out their new orders to the best of their abilities.

The literature on the military's role in the drug war is full of explanations for the end of the military's resistance. One answer is that DoD finally saw the light with regards to the need for military action on the drug issue. As Bernard Trainor noted in August of 1989, there was a new "conviction among senior military officers and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney that drugs [were] tearing at the fabric of American society and pose[d] such a threat to national security that greater military involvement [was] warranted." This explanation, although it may be accurate, is not satisfying on its own. Why did this conviction surface in 1989 and not earlier? Another parsimonious explanation is that the ending of military resistance of 1989 was a recognition that the 1988 legislation establishing lead agency status for DoD was impossible to resist. However, as this dissertation shows, the existence of a law alone is rarely reason enough for the military to adopt civilians' policies. Obviously, something more was going on. By examining the manifestation of several of my framework's variables circa 1989, one can see that the military's change of heart made sense from the standpoint of bureaucratic self-interest.

THE ROLE OF CRISIS

The prevailing explanation in the literature for the military's change of heart is based on a relevant change in the environment that created a crisis for the military. This answer supposes that the end of the Cold War put the military in the difficult position of no longer having an enemy to fight. The demise of East-West tension brought into question the rationale for a large military. Who was it protecting us from? What were we, the taxpayers, getting for our money? Denied its traditional mission, the military suddenly viewed the antidrug task in a new light. The drug war offered the US military an enemy and a justification for both resources and public respect. This argument, which I will refer to as the Cold War argument, has dominated the literature. However, the account offered by this argument is not satisfactory as a stand-alone explanation for the military's decision to drop its resistance to the antidrug mission.

546 Interview with Jack Dranttel.
Standard quotes about how the drug mission filled a void left by the end of the Cold War litter articles on the military's new attitude toward this mission. One author cites a congressional staffer who says that the drug war is the military's "new meal ticket now that the commies are not their big threat."\textsuperscript{547} Another cites a Navy drug official who assessed the drug war by saying "It's the only war we have."\textsuperscript{548} Former CJCS Admiral Crowe supported this line of reasoning when he appeared on \textit{Nightline} in 1990, saying:

Certainly I think we'll put more emphasis on the drug war. And if there are resources tied to it, why, you'll see the services compete for those, and probably vigorously.

\begin{quote}
We take some pride in being accomplished bureaucrats, as well as military men. And I think it's legitimate for military men to try and perpetuate their institution and to look for ways for it to be more appropriate.\textsuperscript{549}
\end{quote}

Competition among the services over roles in the drug war did in fact begin to crop up in 1989. For example, the Marine Corps Commandant testified before Congress that his service's flexibility and capabilities made the Marines the best-suited service to fight drugs. As one Marine Capt. paraphrased the Commandant's message, "The Marines are, on the whole, much more spiritually attuned to this sort of combat than the other Services."\textsuperscript{550}

In support of the Cold War explanation, from 1990 on the military did cite the drug war repeatedly as a rationale for maintaining a large military. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Trost, for example, said that the US must maintain a large, modern Navy to counter not only the remaining Soviet threat but also to deal with drug smugglers.\textsuperscript{551} Others painted the drug mission as providing the military with a tool to do everything from silence critics of the maritime strategy to strengthen strategic sea lift.\textsuperscript{552} There have even been several instances where the military tried to improperly use the drug mission to justify non-drug mission expenses. For example, of the $195 million requested by PACCOM for fighting drugs in FY89, the Pentagon inspector general ruled $152 million invalid. He complained that some offices were using the drug war "as an opportunity to subsidize

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\textsuperscript{551} John Broder, "Role Unchanged, Navy Chief Insists," \textit{Los Angeles Times} March 6, 1990: A4.
\textsuperscript{552} For the most extreme view of how the military can benefit from its new mission, see Diaz, "DOD Plays in the Drug War."
\end{flushleft}
some non-counternarcotics efforts struggling for funding approval."553 The attempt by the Air Force to fully fund its $2.3 billion Backskatter radar system, designed for general air defense and of questionable counternarcotics utility, is the most extreme example of this tactic.554

Although the literature offers many quotes that support the Cold War explanation that the drug war was a way for the military to justify its share of resources, upon closer examination this interpretation is not completely satisfying. The amount of money involved in the military's side of the drug war is tiny when compared to the overall defense budget. The entire DoD drug budget request for FY92, the highest level of funding to date, was only $1.16 billion.555 This is spare change to an organization whose budget was $271 billion for that fiscal year. The promise of four-tenths of one percent of its budget was hardly enough to switch the military's position regarding the drug war, especially when one considers that future drug spending would, in part, come not from new funds but from money reprogrammed from other DoD accounts. The military was well aware that the drug mission offered no resource windfall. At the most, the military could only hope that this new mission could limit to some small degree the future defense cuts that everyone knew were coming.556

General Woerner offers another argument against the Cold War explanation. He contends that as of 1989 the military was not feeling institutionally threatened by the end of the Cold War, for at that point the Soviet Union and its military might were still quite intact. He finds no convincing evidence that the military ever played a "narcotics card" in an attempt to win over more funding. Instances where military leaders noted the drug war as a rationale for having certain forces, such as CNO Trost did in the above example, reflect the concern that if Congress is not frequently reminded of the services' requirement to carry out the antidrug mission adequately, it will not authorize the necessary funding.557 Thus, the military has not been milking its drug mission for additional funds, it has been fighting to see that it does not have to pay for the task out of its own pocket, which it has always feared.

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553 For FY92, the SASC cut $45 million from the Pentagon's drug mission request, saying that it "will not allow this program to grow uninhibited and act as a funding source for... programs which could not be financed within the non-drug-related defense budget." (Morrison, "Police Action," p. 268.)
556 Interview with Jack Dranttel. Dranttel notes, however, that even thought the amount of money involved was not much, the services were determined to fight for every scrap they could get.
557 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr..
The Cold War explanation also states that the drug mission offered the military not only a justification for resources but a rationale for maintaining a large professional military in a country that no longer faced a Soviet threat. In other words, the drug mission provided the military with a new "social-utility" justification for existing.\footnote{558} Furthermore, the drug war was not just the only war, it was a good war with an enemy that was unambiguously evil and uniformly hated by the American public.

The strong desire of the public to fight the drug problem supports the assertion that the drug mission offered the Pentagon a war in which the public would rally behind a military addressing an important social problem. Evidence of any belief within the military that the drug war gave it a new justification for its existence is hard to find. There are, however, many statements by military personnel reflecting the theme that the military can provide a real service to society by fighting the drug threat.\footnote{559} For example, in 1989 HASC testimony, Gen. Andrus of NORAD said that the people in the field that he had seen were enthusiastic and positive about their role in this new mission because, as parents, they have a strong personal interest in fighting drugs.\footnote{560}

The social justification aspect of the Cold War explanation is quite weak because the military itself certainly never felt that the end of East-West tensions meant that the military as an institution was less valuable to society. In its efforts to show the public that it was anything but obsolete, the military focussed on Third World threats, proliferation, and problems posed by the disintegration of the Soviet empire as reasons why the need for military power was still urgent. The Pentagon never said that the world, except for drug dealers, was now a friendly place. Thus, the antidrug mission, although important to the country, was of peripheral concern to a military that was not ready to move away from its


\footnote{559} A GAO report examining the role of the military in drug interdiction said that DoD did recognize the positive effect on moral than the new mission seemed to have. However, GAO noted that "while lower graded personnel may obtain a morale lift from these activities, the higher in the chain of responsibility you go, the greater the awareness of the potential readiness degradation." (GAO, "Drug Control: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction," GAO/NSIAD-88-156, April 29, 1988: 27.)

\footnote{560} He also notes that they have been staring at their radar screens for years and rarely get to track a Soviet plane. Some never do. With the drug mission, he said, "They have something that is real, that they can get their teeth into, that they can work on and they're going to find on a daily basis. They're very enthused about it, absolutely." ("Military Role in Drug Interdiction (Part 2)," HASC No. 101-5, Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 18, 1989: 17.)

Given NORAD's operational routines and professional identity, their rosy view of the drug mission makes perfect sense. As Gen. Piotrowski of NORAD noted, NORAD's move into the drug war was quite smooth because no new equipment or training was required to carry out this new mission. (Sue McMillin, "NORAD Adding its Muscle to the Fight Against Drugs," Air Force Times Dec. 25, 1989: 16.) Gen. Andrus added that "anything we do to improve our capabilities against the drug smuggling only helps us in our primary first assigned mission of working against a hostile military threat. We see nothing but gains from the anti-drug program." ("Military Role in Drug Interdiction (Part 2)," p. 17.) The application of my framework to explain NORAD's opinion of its drug mission would be quite similar to that of explaining SOUTHCOM's relatively favorable view of its antidrug responsibilities.
core missions. Cold War or not, the military hardly needed to justify its existence to the public by offering itself as a law enforcement agency. This would have been totally out of character for the military and would have represented an abandonment of its professional identity. Instead, the drug mission merely provided the military with one of several new secondary missions that would always remain a side show to the military’s more traditional and favored missions.

Although the Cold War explanation is, on the surface, satisfying and fits nicely into my framework’s concept of relevant environmental change creating crisis, closer scrutiny shows the reality of the situation the military faced in 1989 to be such that other factors must have been at work.\textsuperscript{561} Other elements of my framework account for these alternative explanations.

\textit{CIVILIAN UNITY}

A more credible reason for the military’s change of heart is found in the \textit{civilian unity} variable.\textsuperscript{562} The arrival of the Bush Administration in the beginning of 1989 was a change that had direct bearing on the division between the executive and legislative branches over the proper role of the military in the war on drugs. The Bush Administration had a much different view of the appropriate role for the military in the drug war than did its predecessor. Although it did not seek a more extensive mission than had already been assigned by 1989, the Bush Administration made it quite clear that it expected the military to perform all drug duties mandated in the 1988 legislation without resistance.

Equally as important as the change from Reagan to Bush was the transfer of civilian power in the Pentagon from Carlucci to Cheney. During Carlucci’s brief tenure, he had done little to reverse Weinberger’s policies regarding a military drug role. Weinberger was totally against such a mission and was a major roadblock in the way of efforts to involve the military on any scale. Cheney, on the other hand, had long been a proponent of such plans. His drug war marching order to the military, issued in the fall of 1989, provided strong and unambiguous leadership to the services, which, like good soldiers, fell in line and followed orders.\textsuperscript{563}

\textsuperscript{561} The Cold War interpretation does appear to have slightly more utility in explaining the level of enthusiasm elements of the military have shown for the drug mission since 1991, given the increased level of efforts to cut back on the military’s size following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{562} Formulation of this section was greatly facilitated by a discussion with Gen. Woerner.

\textsuperscript{563} Interview with John Hoaphy. Hoaphy further notes that the effects of the change to Cheney was augmented by the installation of Colin Powell as CJCS. While CINC of US Forces Command, Powell had favored a drug role for the military.
The advent of the new Administration therefore signalled a critical increase in the level of civilian unity that the military faced in its struggle to avoid a drug mission. Not only did it still face a majority of Congress, it could no longer count on help from the White House or the civilian leadership of DoD in its struggle. Instead, further resistance would require that it face this powerful triumvirate in what was certain to be a fight that offered little chance of victory. Continued resistance would have created intense and unneeded organizational stress in pursuit of a lost cause.

The civilian unity variable offers a much clearer explanation than does the crisis-based Cold War argument. It also explains the military's change of heart with far fewer contradictions and qualifications than the Cold War explanation does. The civilian unity variable therefore provides the best answer to the question at hand.

**AUTONOMY**

The military's change of heart is a very over-determined event, and other factors combined with the civilian unity and crisis explanations to influence the ending of the military's resistance to the drug mission. One such factor is found in the autonomy variable of my forced innovation framework. Each time Congress mandated an escalation in the military's antidrug mission, military autonomy came under attack, as the military lost the ability to decide on its own how and to what extent it would handle interdiction. By 1989, it was evident to the military that maintaining its resistance to the drug mission was only going to invite further civilian intervention and greater challenges to its autonomy. Rep. Boxer, during the 1988 joint HASC and SASC hearings, made Congress' willingness to further intervene quite clear to the Pentagon:

I want to compliment the gentleman [Asst. Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel] for his presentation. I think it was brilliant, actually; and I would like to make the point to the panel that I think your response [to requests for ideas on how the military could help fight drugs] has been as underwhelming as I have ever heard.

I understand that when we try to change the way things are done we often get this type of response. But we as a nation have to rise to this challenge. So often we are accused of micromanagement, many of us as individuals in this committee. Believe me, there is no one who would rather not get involved in indicating exactly how to fight this problem than I. I think it is your responsibility.564

564 "The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction," p. 27.
She later warned Pentagon representatives quite bluntly, saying "If you want us to get more and more involved in this, then just keep saying no."\textsuperscript{565} The military wisely said yes, and in doing so, protected its autonomy from further civilian assaults.

The effects of civilian unity, mentioned above, were such that future civilian intervention would not only be influenced by frustration over military resistance to the 1988 legislation, it would enjoy an unprecedented level of support. This would reduce the military's ability to fight off such intervention. It therefore made sense for the military to cut its losses and sign on to the drug war before its resistance resulted in another escalation of its interdiction role. Thus, the military's change of heart can also be depicted as a move to avoid future losses of autonomy in the form of continued civilian intervention.

\textit{PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AND OPERATIONAL ROUTINES}

The \textit{civilian unity} and \textit{autonomy} variables cast the military's change of heart in terms of a strategy that the military was being pushed into, while the Cold War explanation depicts the military's move as one in which it was drawn to by changes in the environment. The \textit{professional identity} and \textit{operational routines} variables, on the other hand, show that the nature of the innovation itself had changed to the point where it was easier for the military to give in to the pushing and pulling factors present in 1989. In other words, the innovation being forced on the military turned out to be much less of an innovation than originally feared.

During the 1980s, much of the military's resistance to the drug mission was based on worst-case scenarios for its role in the drug war as proposed by Bennett, Hunter, and others. By 1989, the general guidelines for the military's drug mission were fairly well established. Fortunately for the military, the mission's biggest potential threats to professional identity went unrealized. The lack of high civilian unity had forestalled the passage of more extreme and threatening antidrug tasks. Likewise, the mission's conflicts with operational routines were less than originally anticipated. This was due, in part, to the way in which the military chose to carry out its antidrug duties.

The single most important challenge to professional identity that had not come to pass by 1989 was the acquisition by the military of full law enforcement powers. Its search, seizure, and arrest capabilities were still severely limited, much to its liking. The support role that the military occupied in the drug war posed far fewer threats to the military's self-
image and made the mission much less repugnant. The fact that all attempts in Congress to
grant more sweeping powers failed provided the military with a reason to believe that future
efforts would fail similarly. Furthermore, as the discussion on autonomy pointed out,
continued resistance was probably the most likely way to renew congressional intervention
aimed at turning DoD into another LEA.

The fear of being labelled a failure was another of the threats to professional identity
that the drug mission posed to the military throughout the 1980s. By 1989, however, this
fear had been diminished by the fact that neither the country as a whole nor the military in
particular was winning the drug war, yet no one was blaming the military for failing at its
new mission. Congress often accused the Pentagon of not trying hard enough to fight
drugs, but they never pinned blame for the inability to stop drugs from entering the country
on the military. The reason for this was that from the outset most civilians understood the
true magnitude of the problem they were asking the military to address. Although
congressmen expected military involvement in the drug war might make a dent in the drug
flow, few, if any, expected the military to single-handedly win the war.

Evidence that civilian expectations were not unrealistic is plentiful. For example, Rep.
Mario Biaggi (D-NY) said in arguing for the 1986 version of the Bennett Amendment that
"chances are, we may never be able to do enough to stop this drug flow entirely, but we
shouldn't be reluctant to try."

During 1988 conference meetings between the HASC and SASC on the defense
authorization, one observer made note of Congress' view of both
the utility of the military's drug mission and of the necessity to force such a mission:

Two things were already clear to the leaders on the armed service panels: first,
that the military, even with more money from Congress, could not solve the
country's drug problem, and second, that it was politically impossible to avoid
some expansion of the armed forces' role in drug interdiction.

Sources abounded that stressed the true magnitude of the interdiction mission and
made it unlikely that more than a handful of congressmen could honestly expect the military
to win the drug war. A much-cited RAND report released in 1988 demonstrated that
"increased drug interdiction efforts are not likely to greatly affect the availability of cocaine
in the United States."

In addition, the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy noted that
during 1988, "355 million people entered or reentered the country, along with more than
100 million vehicles, 220 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and eight million

568 Reuter, et al., "Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction."
containers," all of which could be used to smuggle drugs. Not only was the number of potential targets for an interdiction campaign daunting, so too was the small number of smugglers that had to get through in order to meet the demand for drugs in the US. In other words, no matter how good a job the military did in its new task, it would not make a difference in the overall war on drugs. Even Rep. Hunter, whose amendments called for a sealing of the southern border, realized this fact. He was not dedicated to actually sealing the borders as much as he was to shaking Congress up in order to get it to increase the military's antidrug role. He had no objection to his original amendments being altered in committee, as long as some progress was made in raising the military's contribution to the drug war in hopes that this might make some difference.

Experience gained by the military before 1989 bore out the general belief that its mission could only be a success on a political level. For example, the Air Force AWACs used for a year and a half starting in 1987 to detect low-flying planes crossing the southern US border lead to the apprehension of only two drug smugglers. Sen. Levin (D-MI), using somewhat different numbers, calculated that during 1987 each drug bust made possible by Air Force AWACs cost $350,000 to $450,000, while Navy efforts cost "$2 million per drug seizure and $360,000 per arrest." Even given these dismal numbers, however, no one sought to label the military as a failure, only as not trying hard enough.

The effects of low expectations of DoD success were reinforced by the way in which the military measured its effectiveness. As the MOE discussion above showed, DoD adopted MOEs that it could easily control. When concrete results were required, the Pentagon could choose from a wide variety of MOEs, always careful to stay away from "body-count" statistics. For example, when testifying in support of DoD budget requests for the drug mission for FY92, Stephen Duncan cited as measurements of success various statistics showing a reduction in drug use among certain sectors of US society. He also presented selected statements by LEAs that praised DoD for its assistance in the drug war. Given the flexibility of choosing such MOEs by 1989, the military was further
able to avoid any blame for failure in the drug war. As a 1990 General Accounting Office report, entitled "Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase but Program Effectiveness in Unknown," points out, "Because good measures of program performance have yet to be developed, it is not possible to determine accurately whether resources are being appropriately allocated to fight the drug war."575

Just as the nature of the drug mission by 1989 posed fewer threats to professional identity for the military than it had in earlier years, the level of conflict with military operational routines proved to be lower than anticipated. The support role occupied by the military, combined with a conscious effort to operate within existing practices whenever possible, helped the military to manage its drug mission in a way that made it less of a true innovation than some congressmen had originally intended.

In 1989, Frank Ault recognized this strategy, noting:

It is clearly the intention of DoD to absorb the drug interdiction mission with the minimum disruption or change to existing organizations, doctrine, and procedures. DoD is seeking mission accomplishment in a manner which, if possible, will enhance traditional mission capabilities. Every effort is being made to avoid innovations or modifications which will be unique to drug interdiction." [emphasis added]576

Similarly, Stephen Duncan in 1990 characterized the increased drug efforts of DoD over the past year as being "substantially more of the same" programs used in the past.577

One example of an attempt by the military to rely on existing operational routines to carry out its antidrug mission was the ill-fated effort to place a carrier battle group off the coast of Columbia. This plan was described by a Pentagon official as the linchpin of the military's blueprint to stop drug smuggling.578 What easier way for the military to undertake a supposedly novel mission than by applying a tried and true set of equipment and personnel? Another common antidrug strategy that requires no innovation on the part of the military is the practice of terrain denial, where battalion-sized groups of ground forces conduct large training missions along the southern US border. The point of these operations is not to intercept smugglers but rather to deter them just by being present in a particular area. This strategy was developed by the commander of FORSCOM at the time, Gen. Colin Powell.579

579 Brown, "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military," p. 56.
The entire Latin American strategy is, in many ways, also a recycling of old operational routines to conduct a new mission. Counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict has been paired with drug eradication in a neat package, allowing the personnel and subgroups previously involved in these missions to more easily absorb antidrug duties. The fact that the military's Center for Low-Intensity Conflict now also doubles as a clearinghouse for antidrug strategy development and information is an excellent example of this.580

In summary, the arrival of the Bush Administration and a new Secretary of Defense in 1989 was the most important factor that pushed the military to drop its resistance to the drug mission. The further loss of autonomy that continued resistance might have caused was a supporting push factor. The end of the Cold War provided the antidrug mission with a certain appeal and pulled the military to it. The limited nature of the actual innovation in 1989, with its tolerable conflicts with professional identity and operational routines, made adoption of the innovation easier to swallow. Had the critical civilian unity variable changed at a time when the Cold War was still going strong and the proposed drug mission was closer to that called for by the Hunter or Bennett Amendments, the military would have been caught between a rock and a hard place. The military was quite fortunate that these push and pull factors occurred at the same time.

TACTICS USED BY CIVILIANS

Before the military had its change of heart in 1989 regarding the antidrug mission, civilians, Congress in particular, had to rely on several tactics to force the military to get involved in the drug war. The principle tactic employed by Congress in its struggle with DoD was quite straightforward. Congress used their most potent weapon to drag the military into the drug war: direct legislation. By writing into law exactly what they wanted the military to do, congressmen took a route that was both straightforward and hard for the military to fight. To assist their efforts, congressmen favoring a military drug mission wrote this legislation as riders on major defense bills. As the case history showed, much of the legislation used involved amendments to DoD authorization bills. This tactic gave its users two benefits. First, most of these amendments were never subject to public hearings,

580 See Washington Office on Latin America, Clear and Present Dangers: the U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes for a detailed study of this overlap phenomenon and its attractiveness to the military.
making it difficult for the military or its allies to present their side of the story. This also allowed supporters of the antidrug mission to partially thwart congressmen on the armed services committees who were opposed to involving the military. Such amendments often were added on the floor rather than during committee, giving proponents a better chance of sneaking something by their chamber. This could partially explain why more extreme measures that passed in the House then ran into trouble in the Senate, where their appearance was not a surprise. Second, adding amendments to the DoD authorization partially neutralized the value of the military's ally in the White House. It was unlikely that President Reagan would veto an otherwise-favorable defense budget just because it contained some measures relevant to the drug war that the military did not like.

When drug-related measures did come up for debate in committee hearings, congressmen favoring these amendments relied, from time to time, on another common civilian tool. They found retired military personnel to lend their expertise and testify in support of these measures. For example, in 1985, the recently retired Gen. Paul Gorman testified in favor of the Bennett Amendment. He told the Senate that the drug mission would improve, not degrade, military training and readiness.581 Vice President Bush's use of his chief of staff, a former CINC, to shake up the military in the early 1980s is another example of this tactic.582

Congress did not make much use of threats to harm the military should congressional mandates be ignored. The only threat they repeatedly made was to continue to intervene in greater depth in the future should resistance continue.

One final tool the civilians who supported the military drug mission employed occasionally was to bring the issue before the public, primarily through op. eds., such as Mayor Koch did in 1985. This strategy served to heighten public pressure on politicians, which, in turn, led to a greater degree of civilian unity in Congress.

The tools used by civilians were somewhat limited not only in their number but in their extent as well. Although the use of direct legislation was a powerful strategy for forcing the military to comply with its wishes, Congress never mandated very specific details concerning the military's antidrug mission. (This will be more evident after reading the next chapter, on US Special Operations Forces.) The reason for this lies in the true purpose behind the legislation. Concerned more with involving the military in the drug war rather than achieving immediate results, Congress was less inclined to legislate details than it was to assign general responsibilities to the military. Had resistance continued beyond

582 Interview with John Heaphy.
1989, Congress might have attempted such micromanagement (see Rep. Boxer’s quote, above), but events made this step unnecessary.

**TACTICS USED BY THE MILITARY**

Civilian reliance on direct legislation of the drug mission complicated the military’s job of resisting forced innovation in this case. It could not show blatant contempt for the letter of the law without demeaning the tenet of civilian control of the military. This did not mean that the military was without tactics of its own, as obeying the letter of the law and its spirit are two different things, especially when that law does not lay out its mandate in any great detail. The military, aided by the civilian side of DoD, fought a two-front war against the antidrug mission. On one front they sought to limit the impact of laws already passed by Congress. More importantly, they waged a campaign to blunt any future congressional attempts to broaden the military’s antidrug powers.

**ARGUE FOR ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY**

The military often argued that strategies other than the one being pushed by Congress offered a better approach to the problem at hand. The idea was to demonstrate that Congress was looking at the drug problem all wrong and needed to adopt a different strategy, one which coincidentally did not involve using the military in an interdiction role.

The most frequent use of this tactic revolved around a fundamental debate within the drug control community: Should the drug problem be attacked on the demand side or the supply side. Most experts agreed that the only way to eliminate the drug problem was to reduce the demand for drugs in the US. They said that trying to intercept drugs was a waste of time, because as long as a market existed, a supply would somehow be provided. The military became an avid supporter of this argument.\(^{583}\)

DoD often argued against a military role in the drug war by attacking the underlying supply-side approach of this war. For example, Pentagon officials claimed that any progress they might make in denting the supply of drugs reaching the country would only serve to raise its street price (which is exactly what many experts believe needs to be done).

\(^{583}\) Interestingly, everyone seems to have agreed with this point, including those congressmen who pushed for the interdiction mission. They believed, however, that the US could not just give smugglers a free ride into the country.
This higher price could, they pointed out, increase the number of violent crimes as drug users sought money to pay the higher prices.\textsuperscript{584} Testifying before the HASC in 1987, General Olmstead summed up the military's view on how to go about fighting drugs:

Drug interdiction alone... will not win the war on drugs. Victory requires the eradication of the source; punitive action against traffickers and habitual users; appropriate treatment centers for the addicted; and a 'tough love' education program at home, in our schools and in the workplace. The drug lords will be put out of business only if we and our children decide we will not be their customers and that we will not pay for our own destruction.\textsuperscript{585}

CNO Admiral Trost added in mid-1988 that even if the Navy did nothing else, it could not stop cocaine smuggling. As he put it, "The only way we are going to stop this immense flow of illegal narcotics into this country is to shut off the demand for it."\textsuperscript{586} The military had one big advantage going for it in making such claims: It had solved its own drug problems by taking a demand-based approach. As Olmstead, DoD's point man on drug use in the ranks, noted during testimony in 1987 before the HASC, the military found in 1980 that 27\% of its personnel used some type of illegal drug. By 1987, its antidrug programs had lowered this figure to 3\%.\textsuperscript{587} Thus, the military could show Congress that the drug problem did have a solution, but it had nothing to do with beefing up interdiction efforts. Through extensive testing, treatment, and sanctions, the military had eventually done away with its drug problem. Of course, the relevance of the military's argument was limited because the military's "high degree of social control" over its members makes it much better suited than the country as a whole to deal with a drug problem within its ranks.\textsuperscript{588} The military has the option of expelling users from its ranks. Society does not.

In a further effort to show its commitment to the demand strategy, Secretary of Defense Carlucci announced in 1988 drug testing requirements for contractors that deal with the Pentagon. This move was viewed in the press as an "effort to show that the military is dedicated to fighting drugs even as it demurs over using combat forces to do so."\textsuperscript{589} Even though the military was allied with the majority of people in the antidrug

\textsuperscript{585} "Department of Defense Drug Testing and Drug Interdiction Programs," HASC No.100-19, Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, July 23, 1987: 10. Gen. Olmstead was in charge of lending military equipment to LEAs. His primary job, however, was ridding the ranks of the military of drugs. According to one congressional staffer interviewed, he was so adamantly against the use of the military in drug interdiction that he earned the title of "General No" within Congress.
\textsuperscript{587} "Department of Defense Drug Testing and Drug Interdiction Programs," p. 3.
\textsuperscript{588} Peck, "The Role of the Military in American Society Vis-a-Vis Drug Abuse: Scapegoat, National Laboratory and Potential Change Agent," p. 183.
community in arguing for such a demand strategy, the political pressure on Congress was such that the less-flashy programs required by such a strategy were not enough to satisfy the public's hunger for action in the drug war.

The military brought up another debate within the drug control community in an effort to cast doubt on the utility of the interdiction mission. Given that a supply-side approach to the drug problem was inevitable, where should the supply be checked, at the source or in transit? The military's answer was at the source. The reason for this is found in the discussion of why SOUTHCOM viewed its potential role in the drug war more favorably than did other communities within the military. The Latin American eradication mission, which went after the source of the drugs, fit much better with the military's professional identity and operational routines than did the interdiction mission. Given its choice, the military would have chosen to sit out the drug war, but faced with the inevitability of being forced to take part, it would have preferred the eradication mission.

From this preference sprang numerous op. eds. that advocated going to the Clausewitzian center of the drug war. When the military employed the tactic of taking its argument to the public, it was for the most part limited to this argument, as openly arguing that the military had no role in fighting the drug flow might have turned public opinion against the military. The Latin American eradication mission offered an out. Unfortunately for the military, Congress insisted on a multi-front attack on smugglers, and some type of interdiction mission was therefore inevitable.

Another aspect of the tactic of arguing for alternate strategies was to shift attention onto other organizations that could take on the interdiction mission in place of the military. Not only did the military argue that it was ill-suited to operate in the interdiction environment, it offered examples of other organizations that were ready to conduct an intensified interdiction campaign.

The logical choice of an organization for the military to champion as the true antidrug interdiction agency was the Coast Guard. This organization was already heavily involved in the mission and had the equipment, training, and legal powers that the military neither had nor wanted. The Coast Guard, for its part, would have been happy to accept a greater role in drug interdiction. Since the mid-1980s, the Coast Guard had been pushing for a larger drug mission and was even willing to redirect budget dollars away from its traditional mainstay, search and rescue, to beef up interdiction. The interdiction mission's characteristics made it attractive to the Coast Guard for many of the same organizational reasons that it was unattractive to the military. The mission was based on the "founding concepts of the service." In addition, it was a high-visibility task with both Washington
and the general public, so it offered an increase in prestige and attention.\footnote{See Allen, "The Evolution of Federal Drug Enforcement and the United States Coast Guard’s Interdiction Mission: A Case Study."}  Thus, the Coast Guard was more than happy to hear the military tell congressmen that, rather than turn to the Pentagon to fight drugs, the country should beef up the Coast Guard to do it. As the case history shows, failed attempts to add to the military’s drug mission often wound up benefitting the Coast Guard in the form of money for more equipment and personnel. The Coast Guard offered the military a willing outlet for congressional determination to get tough with the drug problem.

Another organization that the military tried to shift the burden of the drug war onto was itself a military organization. The services, run by active duty personnel, sought to have the National Guard take the place of active forces whenever possible. Although the military did not vocally publicize the Guard’s drug war potential in the same way that it did the Coast Guard -- for fear that active forces would be dragged in too -- its criticism of congressional efforts to involve the Guard were paltry compared to those generated by calls for using active forces.

Once the Guard had been brought into the drug war, the military was careful to highlight the Guard’s efforts when arguing with Congress about the level of effort the military was putting in. The military recognized that in doing this it could take the pressure off of the active forces. As one senior Pentagon officer said in reference to the JCS, "The Chiefs are more than happy to see the Guard take on more of the anti-drug role to get that monkey off their back."\footnote{Bernard Trainor, "Role in Drug War for National Guard," New York Times Jan. 8, 1989: A1. The fact that the military’s concern with the Guard getting involved with the drug war was not as great as it was for active forces is shown in the domestic missions the Guard was being used for by 1989 and the lack of intense DoD criticism for these missions. For example, National Guard personnel and equipment frequently acted as "force multipliers" for local police forces, such as in Washington D.C., where Army National Guard Black Hawks provided D.C. police with surveillance of drug dealers. (James Hyde, "National Guard, Law Enforcement Agencies Team up in War on Drugs," Armed Forces Journal International  Sept., 1989: 16.)}

For the Guard’s part, it tended to show a greater enthusiasm for the drug mission than did the active forces. Guardsmen often volunteered for antidrug duty. For example, a program that uses Guardsmen in Florida to search ships entering ports had a waiting list of applicants 400 people long in 1989.\footnote{Rick Maze, "Reservists Eager to Fight Drug War," Army Times Sept. 4, 1989: 8. The Pentagon has never been crazy about such duties as they offer no cross-over in terms of training Guardsmen in militarily-relevant skills, but it would rather have the Guard involved than active-duty troops.} One simple explanation for the difference in attitudes between active personnel and Guardsmen can be explained by money. When on drug duty, Guardsmen draw full military pay and allowances that they might not otherwise receive.\footnote{Maze, "Reservists Eager to Fight Drug War," p. 8.} Another explanation lies in the fact that Guardsmen are not full-time
professionals. They have civilian lives and jobs that come first. As a result, their professional identity is quite different from that of the active forces and is not as threatened by an antidrug role. The fact that the Guard, while under state control, has a long history of law enforcement and other non-military duties further lessens any conflict with professional identity. In addition, many Guardsmen are police officers in civilian life, making law enforcement duties familiar to them. Lastly, since the Guard always acts in support of civilian LEAs, the issue of autonomy is simplified. There is no potential of a struggle for control. The Guard's tradition of being placed under direct civilian operational authority during missions further facilitates its ability to work with LEAs.\textsuperscript{594}

The military's hope that the Guard could carry much of the weight of the antidrug mission in the continental US had several factors going for it. First, when not under federal control, the Guard is not bound by the restrictions of \textit{Posse Comitatus}, so there is a good chance that if any part of the military was ever given the dreaded power of arrest, it would be the Guard. Second, the strong allies that the Guard has within Congress would, and did, work to see that the Guard would benefit as much as possible from the availability of this new mission.\textsuperscript{595} Thus, the military's tactic of unloading certain drug war responsibilities on the Guard could count on a favorable audience in Congress. These two factors, combined with the relative willingness of the Guard to take on part of the new mission, allowed the active military to shift attention off of itself and onto another organization.

\textit{WINDOW-DRESSING}

Another tactic used by the military was window-dressing. At times, DoD followed the letter of the law but not the spirit as it conducted what it claimed to be antidrug missions. For example, Secretary of Defense Carlucci noted before the HASC that in FY87 the Navy and Air Force provided a total of 16,000 flight hours for drug interdiction. What he failed to mention was that almost none of these flights were flown in coordination with LEAs that could act on information produced by these missions.\textsuperscript{596} Rep. Hunter eventually became aware of this situation and attacked DoD for putting up a front. During the 1988 joint hearings, he charged that

\textsuperscript{594} The National Guard is also more popular with LEAS than active forces because of the citizen-soldier nature of the Guard. (Kitfield, "Drugs: The Military's New Unwinnable War," p. 14.)

\textsuperscript{595} It should come as no surprise that Rep. Sonny Montgomery (D-MS), the Guard's champion in Congress, led the effort to assure the Guard a piece of the antidrug action.

\textsuperscript{596} Ault, "Capitol Hill and Pentagon Face Off on Drug War," p. 60.
E-2C pilots... go up regularly; they site drug planes on their radar coming into the country; they have no chase planes up with them, so there are no hand-off planes. They simply make out their report card, say, yeah, we saw a couple come in today, and they go back and check in their timecard, and they send that up to you to present to Congress as part of their accomplishment of the military with regard to interdicting drugs.\textsuperscript{597}

In some ways, the military's entire antidrug mission was an example of some members of Congress using DoD in a window-dressing effort with the American public as the intended audience. Thus, the fact that the military had to show Congress an honest effort rather than concrete results, combined with the military's flexible MOEs, should have made this tactic a useful one once the military demonstrated a level of effort high enough to satisfy Congress. However, as the 1988 joint HASC and SASC hearings clearly show, Congress did not think that the military had yet reached this level. As a result, this tactic failed to keep the military from being assigned greater antidrug powers. It does appear that successful window-dressing might have allowed the military to lessen the impact that the drug mission had on its day to day operations, as the above E-2C example illustrates.

\textit{ATTACK THE PROPOSED INNOVATION}

One final tactic that the military used extensively was to exaggerate the problems that the antidrug mission would create. It constantly complained that it could not afford to carry out the mission it was being asked to do. Although it is understandable why the military did not want to pick up the tab for its drug mission, the amount of money involved was hardly going to break the DoD bank.

A better, closely related strategy used by the military was to highlight the problems that the mission would cause not just for the military but for the country as a whole. The military did this by exaggerating the effects that the drug mission would have on military readiness and on the Pentagon's ability to protect US interests both at home and abroad while fighting the drug war.

The white paper circulated in Congress during the 1986 debates over the Hunter Amendment is the best example of the military blowing the effects of an admittedly extreme measure out of proportion. Sen. Nunn quoted from this paper at length, listing the large numbers of men and material that JCS said would be needed to close off all US borders (as

\textsuperscript{597} \textit{"The Role of the Military in Drug Interdiction,"} p. 26.
opposed to just the southern border, as Hunter intended).\textsuperscript{598} This oration played a key role in the defeat of the Amendment and illustrates the value that an exaggerated attack tactic had for the military. What this strategy did not do is help the military avoid being assigned less-demanding roles in the drug war. In the cases of the missions it was assigned, the military was unable to convince Congress that the effects of supporting LEAs would devastate military readiness or cause other severe damages to US military capabilities.

THE DRUG INTERDICTIO CASE: A FINAL ASSESSMENT

In the final assessment, who won this struggle over forced innovation? Congress did succeed in forcing a role in the drug war on the military, so it achieved part of its goal. All but those congressmen who truly desired more extreme measures largely got their way. More importantly, the military has now accepted its mission to the point where it is performing its new duties without repeated threats from civilians. As evidence of this, the Pentagon did not use the build-up in the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield and Desert Storm as an excuse to cut back on interdiction efforts. In fact, the military was able to complete a planned increase in some efforts.\textsuperscript{599} If active units involved in the drug mission were called to the Gulf, they were "backfilled" by Guard and Reserve units.\textsuperscript{600} The few draw-downs that did occur in the drug mission were due to equipment such as AWACs being redeployed to the Gulf.\textsuperscript{601} Although personnel could be replaced by Guardsmen, expensive systems that are in relatively short supply could not. As of 1993, the level of military personnel and equipment committed to the drug war has not changed substantially since the Gulf War period. Congress is satisfied with the level of DoD efforts and is no longer trying to thrust seizure and arrest duties on the military.

As for the military, it also scored a partial victory in this case. It would have rather stayed out of the drug war entirely, but when faced with little choice in the matter, it

\textsuperscript{598} One congressional staffer interviewed contends that this paper was, in fact, requested from the Pentagon by Sen. Nunn's staff to help him defeat the amendment. A similar paper surfaced in 1988 when Sen. Nunn again blocked the Hunter Amendment. This time, Rep. Hunter complained publicly that this paper was filled with "errors and misstatements" about his amendment. For example, the paper claimed that the military would have to station troops in Alaska and operate AWACs along the Canadian border. Hunter cited this as a cheap shot, as it was clear that his intention was to seal the southern US border, not the northern one. For its part, the Pentagon claimed it was unaware of any such paper. (Rick Maze, "Lawmakers Contest DoD Opposition To Larger Role in Drug Interdiction," \textit{Air Force Times} June 13, 1988: 3.)


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preferred to limit its involvement to a support role. This is precisely what has happened. More importantly from the military's standpoint, the extreme congressional measures that it feared the most are relics of the past, and Posse Comitatus today remains relatively intact.

The forced innovation struggle in this case appears to have ended in a draw. The military is knee-deep in the drug war, rather than up to its neck, as many in Congress would have preferred. Each side got part, but not all, of what it wanted. The underlying issue that lead to civilian intervention in the first place, America's drug problem, has not been solved by this outcome, but even if the Congress had gotten its way entirely, this would still be the case. Since the use of the military was never intended to be a silver bullet that would cure this country's narcotics ills, Congress' accomplishments are not diminished by the final outcome of forcing the drug mission innovation upon the military. In summary, the end of the struggle over this instance of forced innovation signifies a meeting of the minds between Congress, the Administration, and DoD over the issue of military involvement in antidrug efforts, but it certainly does not represent the end of America's struggle with its drug problem.

With the benefit of hindsight, was the decision by civilians to force the drug interdiction mission on the military a good one? One way to answer this question is to look at the negative effects of this forced innovation, measured in terms of a loss of military effectiveness and harm to military professionalism.\textsuperscript{602} Fortunately, any such effects have been minimal. The scale of the military's antidrug mission has been kept at a low enough level that readiness and training rates have not been harmed, thereby maintaining the military's combat effectiveness.\textsuperscript{603} As for damage to military professionalism, this was avoided because civilians in the end assigned the military duties that did not force the military to act like an LEA. In addition, civilians told the military what to do in broad terms and left the details of how to accomplish its mission up to the services.\textsuperscript{604} By handling the matter in such a fashion, civilians allowed for the military profession to apply its own expertise and operational routines to the task it was given.

\textsuperscript{602} In Chapter 4 I explain why these are two important measures of a forced innovation's effects on the military. Basically, I equate these two characteristics with the ability of a modern military to operate successfully in combat, its main reason for being.

\textsuperscript{603} The services' performance in Desert Storm offers evidence of this.

\textsuperscript{604} This supports Rosen's contention that whenever civilians do intervene, their instructions are so vague as to be useless. Although certainly not useless, the nature of civilian guidance in the drug matter was sufficiently vague enough to complicate implementation of the 1988 legislation. A 1991 GAO report notes: "The fiscal year 1989 authorization act did not define DOD's 'lead agency' role for detection and monitoring and conveyed no clear authority to allow DOD to control the resources or direct the operations of civilian agencies." GAO blamed this shortcoming for causing problems in terms of inter-agency cooperation, "causing DOD and the civilian agencies to sometimes plan around each others operations." (GAO, "Drug Control: Impact of DOD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow," p. 6.)
Had the more extreme measures suggested in Congress been adopted, the effects of civilian intervention in this case would have been much different. The abandonment of Posse Comitatus prohibitions would have fundamentally altered the military profession and its relationship with the American public. Civilians would not have merely been using the military as a tool, they would have been sacrificing critical elements of military professionalism in order to seek political and social goals. Not only would the military have been acting in a non-military realm, it would have been acting as something other than a military.

This instance of forced innovation is best judged by noting the effect that the enlistment of the military in drug interdiction has had on the drug problem in general in the United States. Military interdiction efforts may have forced smugglers to change tactics and use alternate routes. For example, the overland corridor coming up from Mexico and commercial cargo containers are now being used more often due to military operations in the air and sea routes coming up the Caribbean. However, the amount of drugs entering the US has not been diminished by any noticeable amount. More importantly, overall drug abuse in the US, no matter how one chooses to measure it, has not decreased to any significant extent. The employment of military force has made no real difference in the drug problem facing America. The forced innovation in this case was therefore a poor policy choice. This was to be expected, however, as even the very congressmen who drafted the military into the drug war did not really expect that this move would make a significant difference. It was doomed to fail from the start and was attempted largely to placate the public and to produce the questionable result of not giving smugglers "a free ride." The economics of the drug trade are such that no possible amount of interdiction by the military and LEAs can make even a small dent in the profit margins enjoyed by the cocaine cartels. Thus, as expected, the ride remains free and the policy represented by the forced innovation in this case has been a failure.

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605 A recent telecast highlighted the futility of the military's interdiction effort. See "What Happened to the Drug War?" PBS Frontline, Feb. 2, 8:00 p.m., 1993.
607 In a clever article, one observer notes that the employment of the military to fight drugs was doomed to fail from the start. The drug war does not meet the criteria created by Caspar Weinberger for determining whether or not the commitment of military forces is justified. Had these criteria been followed in the 1980s, the military would not have found itself drafted into the fight against drugs. See Hance Hamilton, "The Drug War Flunks the Test," Proceedings Feb., 1993: 42-46.
608 See, for example Reuter, et al., "Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction."
Chapter 3

Putting the "Special" Into Special Operations Forces
THE CASE OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Civilians intervened in the 1980s in order to improve the ability of the United States to conduct special operations. Such operations, according to the Department of Defense, seek "to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas." The forces designed to conduct such operations are collectively referred to as Special Operations Forces (SOF).

US SOF have never been high on the list of the services' priorities. The military has always been more concerned with its large conventional forces and the prospect of conflict in Europe than it has with small SOF units and the low-intensity conflict (LIC) environment in which they often operate. The neglect that SOF have suffered historically contributed to several highly-publicized failures of these forces in the early 1980s. These failures highlighted the sorry state of SOF and led first the Reagan Administration and later Congress to step in and force the military to improve the training, equipment, organization, and employment of US SOF assets. This civilian effort culminated in 1986 with legislation that created the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

SOCOM represents a significant organizational innovation for the military. It cuts across all of the services and concentrates a specific function in one place organizationally in a way that no other unified command save the Space Command does. It increases the level of jointness in SOF in part by wresting peacetime control of these forces away from the services. This new command also helps to institutionalize SOF within the military, improving both their status and independence. Most significantly, SOCOM has control over its own budget, making it unique among unified commands.

In many ways, SOCOM functions like an independent SOF service. It is responsible for developing strategy, doctrine, tactics, equipment, and training programs for all SOF. It monitors the assignment and promotion of SOF officers. SOCOM exercises its control of SOF assets by means of its authority over the separate service SOF organizations. It maintains this control until these forces are deployed abroad, at which point the relevant theater Commander in Chief (CINC) is given operational control.610

609 DoD definition, cited in GAO, "Special Operations Command: Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates," GAO/NSIAD-90-166, September, 1990: 8. I will say more about these operations and the forces that carry them out below.
610 If the president so dictates, operational command of selected SOF missions can be given to the CINC of SOCOM.
Throughout the extended effort by civilians to revitalize and later reorganize SOF within SOCOM, the military fought all civilian attempts to improve the status, resources, and quality of these forces, which the services have tended to view as superfluous at best and contrary to the nature of a modern professional military at worst. This created a civil-military struggle over forced innovation. As with the drug interdiction case, the executive branch eventually sided with the military against a congressional attempt to force innovation. This chapter examines this struggle.

SOF: THE MISSIONS

In order to place the following discussion in context, one must first have a feel for the various missions involved in special operations. Only if it is clear what these operations are can one understand why civilians became concerned about SOF. Unfortunately, defining exactly what special operations are proves to be a difficult task. The literature on the topic is filled with various descriptions, many of which take such a broad approach that nearly any military operation could be labeled as special. The problem of defining special operations arises because they can take so many forms. Thus, trying to define them is a frustrating exercise.

In an attempt to deal with this problem, it is useful to identify the unique characteristics that many of these operations share with each other. The most important such aspect of all special operations is that they are unconventional -- i.e., they differ from the types of operations that the military spends most of its time preparing for. Several shared characteristics of different types of special operations contribute to this unconventionality: special operations are small in scale, relatively short in duration, often contain a high level of risk, are frequently covert, might force units to operate independent of friendly support, and do not always require the use of force, but when they do, this force is always employed very selectively.

A less ambiguous and more helpful way to think of special operations for my purposes is to look at them in terms of specific missions. After all, the SOF case of forced

612 The terms "special" and "unconventional" are often used interchangeably in the literature to describe special operations.
613 Some conventional missions could contain one or two of these characteristics, but not a majority of them, as do most special operations.
innovation was driven by civilians’ desire to get the US military to perform these particular missions better than it had in the past. The first step in looking at these missions is to divide them into two main categories: direct action, which requires SOF to directly apply military force against an objective; and indirect action, where SOF uses non-violent means to either lower the fighting ability of an enemy, increase the fighting ability of an ally, or win over enemies and neutrals so that they become allies.614

Direct actions include two main missions. The first of these is raiding, which has the goal of destroying or temporarily occupying a high priority target located behind enemy lines. An example of such a raid is the air drop of Delta Force and Rangers at the beginning of the US invasion of Grenada to seize the airstrip at Point Salinas. Rescue missions are the second type of direct action. Such missions can seek to extract friendly forces trapped or imprisoned in hostile areas, or they can seek to free civilian hostages held by terrorists. Either of these missions can be conducted in wartime, in support of conventional forces, or in peacetime, as stand-alone operations. An example of the former is the raid on Son Tay, a North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp, during the Vietnam war.615 An example of the latter is the failed attempt to rescue US hostages held in the American embassy in Tehran.

Indirect actions consist of two primary missions that are closely related: insurgency and counterinsurgency. In the former, the goal is to help indigenous insurgents overthrow an unfriendly government, while in the latter the intent is to help a friendly foreign power quell insurgents that are threatening it. US efforts to help the Contras in Nicaragua during the 1980s is an example of an insurgency operation.616 US assistance provided to El Salvador during the same period is an example of the counterinsurgency. Indirect actions are conducted through the use of three main tactics: training, in which US forces teach foreign regular or irregular forces how to conduct insurgency or counterinsurgency operations; civic action, where, by means of various development projects, US forces help to win the hearts and minds of the local populace; and psychological operations, where


615 The one special operation that does not fit neatly into either of these categories is reconnaissance. SOF conducting reconnaissance do not seek to use force. Instead, they are gathering intelligence that might be used for a future application of force.

As I will address later in this chapter, the Reagan Administration sought SOF revitalization to improve the conduct of both direct and indirect actions. Congress, on the other hand, was concerned primarily with direct actions.

616 US forces reached Son Tay, only to find that no Americans were being held there.

617 If US forces carry out acts of insurgency themselves, as they would have done in stay-behind operations had the Soviets overrun parts of Western Europe, then insurgency would become a direct action. Since the vast majority of US involvement in insurgency is indirect, however, I classify it as such.
propaganda, threats, and the manipulation of information are used to sway the opinions of enemies and neutrals. As with direct action missions, indirect actions and the tactics to carry them out can be conducted either in wartime or peacetime environments. For example, the US military trains numerous militaries around the world in counterinsurgency skills during peacetime. Conversely, it can also carry out campaigns during war, as the counterinsurgency efforts during the Vietnam War illustrate.

The concept of low-intensity conflict, or LIC, is just as elusive as that of special operations. However, the two are intertwined, and any discussion of SOF -- this one included -- cannot help but make numerous references to the role of special operations and SOF in LIC. Thus, it is important to establish at the beginning of this chapter what LIC is and how it relates to special operations. One way to define LIC is to offer some of the characteristics that differentiate it from high-intensity conflict. Low-intensity conflicts are not decided by firepower alone, nor do they usually involve formal engagements between uniformed forces. LIC often involves the need to win the support of local populations. The use of force in LIC is much more restricted than it is in conventional conflicts because of a heightened sensitivity to political considerations. Thus, LIC is an environment not of division-size engagements of armor or mechanized infantry against an enemy's like forces. Instead, it is one of small units, enemies that are difficult to distinguish, and occasional, brief outbursts of violence.

Special operations are often confused with LIC, but the two are not synonymous. Any of the special operations missions mentioned above can be undertaken in a LIC environment. However, they can also be carried out in high-intensity, large-scale warfare in support of conventional forces. The best way to view the connection between LIC and special operations is therefore to view LIC as an environment in which a large percentage of the military missions that will have to be conducted will be special operations. A quick glance above at the shared characteristics of most special operations shows that are somewhat similar to the characteristics that define LIC. Thus, SOF, trained to conduct special operations, are particularly well suited to operate in a LIC environment. This fact was an important influence on the civilian decision to force SOF reorganization on the military.

617 These characteristics of LIC were adopted from a discussion in Thompson, "Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview." Although I have relied on Thompson here, there are numerous other sources that offer similar, equally unsatisfying characterizations of LIC. For my purposes, this definition of LIC should suffice. A more useful, clearer definition is difficult to come by in the literature. Construction of such a definition is beyond the scope or needs of this chapter.
SOF: THE FORCES

Since this chapter examines the civilian desire to improve SOF, it is important to understand exactly what the forces were that this instance of forced innovation revolved around. In light of this, the following section gives a brief accounting of the main elements of each service's active SOF assets, circa 1987, when SOCOM was activated. Constructing such a list of forces and missions is complicated by the secret nature of SOF. Due to classification, one can only make educated guesses based on open sources as to what these forces are actually intended to do.618

Army SOF consist of six main components. The cornerstone of the Army's SOF capability are its four Special Forces Groups, commonly known as the Green Berets because of their distinctive headgear.619 Special Forces Group members are trained to conduct a full range of special operations, from direct actions to training foreign militaries. Each group contains roughly 1,400 men and has as its basic building block the "A Team," made up of around twelve men.620 The second component of Army SOF are the Rangers, made up of three battalions of roughly 575 men each. The Rangers are primarily intended for raids in hostile territory. They can also be used as spearheads for larger conventional attacks, as they were in the invasion of Grenada.621 The still-secret Delta Force is the third arm of Army SOF. Delta specializes in hostage rescue. It contains an estimated 100 members, with four-man squads as the smallest operational unit.622 Army SOF also have an aviation asset, Task Force 160, a highly-secretive group intended to provide transportation and air support via helicopter for SOF ground units. The fifth branch of

619 In 1987 there were four Special Operations Groups in the Reserves.
620 Each Group is dedicated to a different geographic region. This allows them to attain a strong knowledge of the languages and cultures in the areas where they will be operating.
621 Although at first glance, the Rangers appear to be quite similar to the 82nd Airborne Division, they are in fact quite different. Rangers are intended for operations of limited duration. They lack the heavy weaponry needed to hold a position against a determined and well-armed opposition. This difference is reflected in the fact that the Ranger elements that raided the Point Salinas airstrip in Grenada were to be reinforced by the 82 Airborne Division later in the day. (James Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 234.
622 The military still will not officially recognize the existence of Delta, even though it has received a great deal of attention. Members of the military that I spoke with would not even mention the groups name in conversation. The fact that Delta, trained primarily for hostage rescue, preceded the Rangers in the Point Salinas raid is symptomatic of the poor handling of SOF by the military that led civilians to intervene to force improvements.
Army SOF is the Psychological Operations Group, whose 1,100 members specialize in psychological warfare. The final branch is Civilian Affairs, a battalion of 600 people that use non-military programs to help win over local populations in foreign countries.  

Air Force SOF assets are intended to provide the ground SOF elements of other services with transportation and close air support. The Air Force operates planes specially designed for stealthy infiltration and extraction of SOF personnel. Air Force SOF are divided into five squadrons. Three fly the MC-130E Combat Talon, a specialized SOF transport. One operates the AC-130H Spectre gunship, designed for close air support. The final squadron flies the MH-53/H/J, a helicopter heavily modified for SOF insertion and extraction. There is also one additional detachment with UH-1Ns. In 1987, the Air Forces fielded a total of only 55 SOF aircraft.

Naval SOF assets perform a wide variety of missions, ranging from reconnaissance and the destruction of coastal targets to friendly port security. They are divided into two Special Warfare Groups. The foundation of these Groups are the Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Teams. There are publicly acknowledged to be five such Groups, with 175 members each. Like their Army counterparts, SEALs operate in groups much smaller than full team size. Each Special Warfare Group also contains a SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team and a Special Boat Squadron that assist in SEAL infiltration and extraction. There are also three Navy Special Warfare Units of around 17 men each that perform various clandestine missions behind enemy lines.

**SOF: AN ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN PRIORITY**

The history of SOF in the United States is one of oscillation from heroic achievement and recognition to failure and obscurity. In his study of US Army Special Forces during
Vietnam, Col. Francis Kelly nicely summarizes the ebb and flow of US SOF's fortunes since the birth of the country:

An elite group has always appeared within the Army during every war in which the United States has been engaged... the Rough Riders in Cuba, the Lafayette Escadrille in World War I, the Rangers in World War II... always some group has captured the imagination of the American public and has embodied the national ideals of the American fighting man. 627

The literature on Special Operations Forces is full of references to the heroic history of such forces. The Indian Wars of the 1800s are the most commonly-cited early examples of relatively modern military forces employed in an unconventional fashion. Operations conducted in the Pacific theater and behind enemy lines in occupied Europe during World War II by groups like the Rangers and Merrill's Marauders are more recent examples of unconventional operations by elite forces. 628

The history of these operations and the forces that conducted them highlights the important role that civilian intervention has played in protecting SOF from conventional militaries that were hostile to such unconventional units. Eliot Cohen, for example, in his book Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, notes that Churchill was instrumental in the formation of the British Commandos during World War II and had to intervene in order to protect them from the regular army on numerous occasions. 629 Alfred Paddock, in his history of the origins of the Army's Special Forces, offers further evidence that civilians have always been critical to the formation of elite units. As he puts it,

It was a civilian -- Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy -- who pushed the Army into developing a branch at the War Department for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities... McCloy's interest illustrates a theme seen throughout our investigation of the origins of special warfare: the initiative demonstrated by influential civilian officials to prod somewhat conservative Army leaders into venturing forth in new and uncertain fields. 630

The cyclical nature of SOF popularity has historically necessitated repeated civilian intervention. This cycle is tied closely to the need for SOF in wartime. Military organizations are often faced with the requirement to conduct unconventional missions during war. SOF are one way to carry out such tasks. In other words, combat creates a crisis that the capabilities of SOF can help to alleviate. The military also often finds its hand forced in these instances by civilian proponents of SOF who take a greater interest in unconventional forces during war. With the end of hostilities, civilian attention tends to turn elsewhere, and the conventional military is free to purge its ranks of all unconventional units. James Adams, in his book *Secret Armies: The Full Story of Delta, SAS, and Spetsnaz*, refers to this practice as the "repeating cliché" facing SOF. Adams description of the post-WWII period highlights the operation of this cliché:

Many of those who were to take up the cause of unconventional warfare in peacetime were veterans of World War II, men attempting to turn their experiences of the period to advantage during peacetime. Sadly, however, it is only war that cuts through the conventional thinking and brings to the fore exceptional men who are then allowed to think imaginatively.... Peace brought the beginning of a new era, when special operations forces would fight for their existence against political and military prejudice.\(^{631}\)

This on-again, off-again characteristic of the US commitment to SOF continued after World War II for the next thirty-five years. Obviously, the periodic manufacturing and dismemberment of unconventional units assured that the quality of and respect for such forces could never develop any momentum. This fact often manifested itself in the form of poor SOF performance when these forces were suddenly needed. Such failures fueled the eventual civilian drive to intervene in order to make SOF a less transient part of the US military arsenal.

**THE VIETNAM LEGACY AND THE EARLY 1970s**

The roots of the 1980s SOF revitalization and reorganization efforts can be traced to President Kennedy's intervention in the early 1960s to improve Army Special Forces. Under Kennedy, the US SOF role in Vietnam increased as manpower grew from 2,000 to 9,000 personnel.\(^{632}\) These gains were temporary, however. SOF personnel strength returned to its pre-Kennedy low of 2,000 by the early 1970s. The SOF budget shared the fate of SOF billets. SOF funding peaked at around $1 billion in the late 1960s, but fell

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\(^{632}\) Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies*, p. 57.
rapidly to under $100 million by Fiscal Year 1975. Although the entire military experienced budget cuts following Vietnam, funding reductions came out of SOF's hide at a disproportionate rate. As had occurred at the end of WWII, the cyclical pattern of intentional neglect of SOF capabilities with the arrival of peace repeated itself at the conclusion of the Vietnam War.

With the War over, the military's attention refocused on NATO and the defense of Europe. The military realized that the public had lost its stomach for intervention in the Third World, so it looked to "the politically safer mission of deterring conventional conflict in Europe." The primacy of the European mission, combined with the public's and Congress' loss of appetite for foreign intervention, did not bode well for the organizational health of SOF. The general assessment for war in Europe was that it would be intense and short, thus there would be little time for special operations centered on raising and training indigenous armies to fight the Soviets. In addition, the more offensively-oriented missions often assigned to special forces in the past were closely guarded by the conventional community that controlled the military. As a result, SOF enjoyed little support or interest from within the military.

On the civilian side, there was a strong association of special forces with interventionism. As a further strike against SOF, the public's image of special forces had been severely harmed by the Vietnam experience. Forces that began the conflict associated with John Wayne and his Hollywood Green Berets came out of the war linked to such controversial programs as the Phoenix Operation, for which SOF bore a good deal of the public's distaste for this operation's perceived excesses.

Because neither the American public nor Congress viewed the degradation of the capability to operate in LIC environments as a problem, civilians made little attempt to counter the organizational biases of the military against special forces in the 1970s. As Douglas Blaufarb, author of The Counterinsurgency Era, described the period,

An impatient public and a disillusioned press were unwilling to hear of innovations to make future interventions more effective. They wanted no more such interventions. By the early 1970s, the army, after a brief, unconsummated flirtation with the notion of fighting in new or, perhaps more accurately, in more primitive ways, slipped back with some relief to a more familiar posture. Its principle concern again became the preparation for conventional, high-

636 The fact that Vietnam fell without creating dire security consequences for the US might have helped to reduce the impetus to mobilize to fight insurgency everywhere.
technology war against a conventional enemy on the familiar battlefields of Europe.\textsuperscript{637}

Thus, in the early 1970s, the US SOF community had no political allies. As a result, SOF units experienced severe cutbacks. For example, four of the Army's five Special Forces Groups were disbanded. Overall quality and morale in the units also suffered, and by the mid-1970s the "hollow army" was home to particularly vacuous special forces. The situation was similar in the other services.\textsuperscript{638}

\textit{THE FIRST STEPS OF CIVILIAN INTERVENTION: REVITALIZATION}

President Carter took the first small steps in the SOF revitalization process. When he took office, US SOF were still suffering from post-Vietnam cutbacks. Carter's decision to pay attention to SOF was influenced by the two international trends of increased Soviet adventurism and an increase in terrorist activity. These global trends were joined by a third, based on US counterterrorist capabilities: the repeated failure of the US to respond to attacks on US nationals abroad.\textsuperscript{639}

Towards the end of Carter's term, an event occurred that clearly highlighted the need for changes in US special warfare capabilities. The failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, culminating in the disaster of Desert One, laid open all of the US SOF shortcomings to the Administration, Congress, and the public.\textsuperscript{640} It was now obvious that the US military's ability to conduct such unconventional operations was severely lacking. This image of weakness played into the hands of Carter's opponent in the presidential election, Ronald Reagan.

The Reagan Administration started its SOF revitalization program soon after taking power.\textsuperscript{641} The 1981 Defense Guidance to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for the upcoming five years placed a high priority on SOF. It stated, "We must revitalize and enhance special

\textsuperscript{639} Thompson, "Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview," p. 8.
\textsuperscript{641} The term "revitalization" is a misnomer because SOF never really were all that "vital." Although they had been larger in the 1960s than when Reagan took office, they never did have the autonomy or resources that the revitalization movement sought to attain for them. I will retain this term, however, in order to remain consistent with the literature on this topic and to contrast Reagan's revitalization efforts with later congressional reorganization efforts.
operations forces to project United States power where the use of conventional forces would be premature, inappropriate, or infeasible.\textsuperscript{642}

Given this direct presidential mandate, the military took several steps in 1982 to improve US SOF capabilities. The Air Force created the 1st Special Operations Group. The Army formed the 1st Special Operations Command in order to provide coordination of doctrine and training for all Army Special Forces units. Its head, Gen. Lutz, claimed that his new command sent "a signal to the other services that we're serious about this business" of special operations.\textsuperscript{643} The JCS established the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to coordinate special operations programs across the services and to address issues not delegated to any particular service. Although these new organizations offered an outward appearance of change for the SOF community, they were, in fact, attempts by the military to show a commitment to SOF without really changing anything.\textsuperscript{644}

Pressure to improve SOF capabilities continued. In response, the military opened the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) for business on January 1, 1984, in response to calls for greater coordination among the services' SOF. The main function of JSOA was to advise the services on the development and use of SOF and to develop a more joint approach for the training, outfitting, doctrine, and budgeting of SOF. Once again, this move represented little in the way of actual change and was intended only to mollify civilians calling for SOF reform.

International events in 1983-84 built on the failure of US SOF at Desert One and further illustrated both the need for effective SOF, particularly in the area of antiterrorism, and the continued shortcomings of the US military's SOF capabilities. The October of 1983, terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, the US invasion of Grenada that same month, and the hijacking of TWA 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro all focused attention on the state of US SOF.


\textsuperscript{644} These moves by the military will be discussed as the window-dressing that they were in the Military Tactics section below.
CONGRESS TAKES AN INTEREST IN SOF: THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT

One of the first congressmen to take an interest in the SOF issue was Rep. Dan Daniel (D-VA). His role as Chairman of the House Readiness Subcommittee focused his attention on the shortcomings of US SOF. In August of 1985, he published an influential article in Armed Forces Journal International that raised the level of debate on SOF. This article served as a wake-up call for the services and put them on notice that if they did not address SOF problems, they might face the prospect of a new service created specifically for SOF. Not everyone agreed with Daniel's call for a new service for SOF, but he found many congressmen willing to listen to his concern over the state of US SOF assets.

The drive to improve US SOF capabilities culminated in mid-1986 with the introduction of separate House and Senate legislation, as well as a JCS plan intended to head off congressional intervention. (See Figure 1.)

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645 I will go into greater detail as to why Daniel and other congressmen became involved in the SOF issue in the following section on why civilians intervened.


647 In 1985, even members of the defense community that strongly favored SOF revitalization did not agree with Daniel's call for a sixth service. Noel Koch, the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and DoD's point man on SOF, believed that things were getting better for SOF and that the step of creating a new service was not needed. (Koch's optimism later turned to pessimism as he resigned from his position in disgust.) (See Noel Koch, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service for Special Ops," Armed Forces Journal International October, 1985.)

648 J. Michael Kelly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, shared this aversion to Daniel's plan. He argued that a separate service would create a strong division between SOF and regular units, yet many critical SOF missions called for special forces to closely support conventional operations. This could lead the SOF service to lose interest in such missions in much the same way that critics complain the Air Force had abandoned the close air support mission. Kelly also noted that since an SOF service would necessarily be quite small, promotion opportunities for SOF personnel would become even worse. (J. Michael Kelly, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service for Special Ops," Armed Forces Journal International Oct., 1985.)

Figure 1

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<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>JCS Proposal</th>
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<th>House (HR. 5109)</th>
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Sens. Cohen (R-ME) and Nunn (D-GA) introduced the Senate proposal, S. 2453, on May 15. By early August, the bill had 13 Republican and 15 Democratic cosponsors. S. 2453 never actually passed. Instead, the Senate approved an amendment to the defense authorization bill on August 6 that was almost the same word-for-word as S. 2453. The only difference was that the amendment also required Special Operations Command heads in the European and Pacific Commands to hold flag rank. One reason the defense authorization amendment route was taken was that it would give the Senate greater leverage with the House in conference over Daniel's bill, which the House had adopted as a defense authorization amendment.649

The Daniel bill, HR. 5109, was introduced in late June by Rep. Daniel and was intended to protect and improve SOF in order to avoid "very dangerous and potentially disastrous problems worldwide in our employment of our Special Operations Forces."650 His bill passed in the House.

The House approach to SOF reorganization was more extreme than the Senate's. While the Senate proposed a new unified command within the existing military command structure, the House proposed to "take special operations and its forces as far out of conventional military command and control as possible." In other words, rather than reforming the existing system as the Senate sought, the House wanted to remove SOF entirely from the system.\textsuperscript{651}

Congress was not the only one jumping into the SOF reorganization game. Aware of the move to force change upon it, DoD offered its own reorganization plan. The DoD plan mirrored the Senate's in many ways, but it failed to spell out any changes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) treatment of SOF, nor did it call for any alterations to the National Security Council (NSC). In addition, the DoD plan called for a head of the new SOF command who was one star short of what the Senate wanted. The DoD proposal was, of course, constructed so as to provide the military with a good deal of latitude when it came to its implementation. For example, the military said that forces would only be placed under this new command once each service determined its individual and team training levels to be sufficient. This would have allowed the services to substantially delay handing over forces to the command.\textsuperscript{652}

Given the poor track record of SOF self-reform, Congress was not about to adopt the DoD proposal. Clearly, reorganization would come from Congress. Of the contending House and Senate proposals, the feeling was that DoD and Congress could eventually reach agreement on the Senate suggestion, while the more radical House proposal to move SOF out of the JCS structure entirely offered no chance of compromise.\textsuperscript{653} Another negative of the House version was that it went against the aims of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which in part sought to strengthen unified command CINCs.\textsuperscript{654} Finally, the SOF community itself was not all that happy with the House proposal. There were few details as to how operations would work with SOF removed from the military command and control structure to the extent that the House measure suggested. The SOF community was too dependent on conventional forces for logistical support and creating their own

\textsuperscript{651} Henry Koren Jr., "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," \textit{Parameters} December, 1988: 69. The House proposal, unlike the Senate's, did not include LIC policy reform with SOF changes because in the House different groups were looking at the issues of SOF reform and defense reorganization, while in the Senate the same panel was dealing with both issues, making the connection between the two more logical.


\textsuperscript{654} Koren, "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," pp. 69-70.
logistical tail was not a viable option.\textsuperscript{655} The House proposal appeared to necessitate such moves and was therefore not attractive to the very community it was intended to help.

The ultimate proposal -- adopted as an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act -- mirrored the Senate proposal, with the only addition being the House provision granting budget authority to SOCOM. This entire package was part of the FY87 National Defense Authorization Bill, which passed the House and Senate on October 15.

The most important effects of the legislation was the creation of:

1) The Unified Command for Special Operations (SOCOM), headed by a four-star general or Admiral. SOCOM was given command of all SOF forces, including control of training, development of doctrine, tactics, procurement, interoperability, intelligence requirement formulation, promotions, and personnel assignments.

2) The post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), which gave SOCOM direct access to the Secretary of Defense, allowing it to circumvent the JCS.

3) The Board for Low Intensity Conflict, located within the NSC and headed by a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs for Low Intensity Conflict appointed by the President.

\textit{CONTINUED RESISTANCE FROM THE MILITARY}

The report accompanying the 1986 reorganization measure noted that forced reorganization was needed because of "unending resistance in the Department of Defense to necessary organizational and other reforms of Special Operations Forces."\textsuperscript{656} The 1986 legislation was by no means the end of this resistance, however. Reorganization supporters still faced opposition from the military and from an OSD that seemed more determined than ever to resist congressionally-mandated changes. Sen. Cohen said in July, "We're going to be very skeptical [of DoD's cooperation] until such time as we see there is a genuine commitment to make this work."\textsuperscript{657} His skepticism was well-founded.

\textsuperscript{655} Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard, Sept. 2, 1992. The fact that the House did not realize the detailed problems inherent in its approach is evidence of the Hiding Hand at work. The Hiding Hand made a solution that caused as many problems as it created seem, on the surface, to be a rational program for reform.


The Reagan Administration was not happy with the 1986 legislation because the changes in the executive branch that the bill mandated were unwanted and represented an infringement by Congress in an area traditionally dominated by the White House. Thus, the Administration allied with the military in order to resist implementing SOF reforms.658

One of the most striking examples of DoD's and the Administration's continued resistance to SOF reform is found in their refusal to fill the ASD SO/LIC position. As one congressional staffer put it, "The Pentagon is not complying with the intent of the SOF legislation, and is in fact, holding the ASD SO/LIC hostage until it gets its way."659 It took 16 months for the position to be filled.

SOF reorganization supporters were also angered by the choice of MacDill Air Force Base, which previously housed the US Readiness Command, as the SOCOM headquarters.660 In a letter to Weinberger complaining about DoD's decision to locate SOCOM at MacDill in Florida, HASC members Earl Hutto (D-FL), Dan Daniel, and John Kasich (R-OH) said that SOCOM had been placed "as far away from the rest of the U.S. government as is possible without setting sail out to sea."661 DoD contended that this choice, by utilizing Readiness Command's leftovers, would allow the new command to "hit the ground running."662 The military also claimed that it could not find a qualified four-star officer to head SOCOM. This further delayed the new command's start-up and caused the new command to "hit the ground" with a thud rather than with its wheels already turning.663

The delay in implementing the 1986 legislation led Congress to take further steps to force SOF reorganization on the military.664 Congress passed two more laws that mandated further action by both the military and the Administration. Public Law 100-180, passed in 1987:

1) Directed the Secretary of the Army to act as temporary ASD SO/LIC.

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658 See the Civilian Unity section below.
660 Nor were SOF supporters happy that the ASD SO/LIC's staff was assigned to Rosslyn, outside of Washington and the corridors of power, in a building whose lease ran out in 18 months.
663 In April, Reagan finally named Gen. James Lindsay as Commander in Chief of SOCOM (CINCSOCOM). Lindsay had experience with the Rangers and with special forces during his career and "was seen as a sensible appointment by the special forces community and by Congress." (Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz, p. 286.)
2) Directed the Secretary of Defense to provide SOCOM with the resources required for it to carry out its mission.

3) Mandated that SOCOM headquarters staff could be no smaller than 450 people by September 30, 1988.

4) Increased the budgetary powers of SOCOM by granting "limited head of agency authority" and directing the Secretary of Defense, within 30 days, "to establish the new major force program category [Major Force Program 11] for special operations."^665

Public Law 100-456, passed in 1988, added responsibilities and authority to the head of SOCOM, including:

1) "Preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to the Command"

2) "Exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assigned to the Command and, to a limited extent, for special operations forces assigned to the other unified combatant commands."

This law was also issued with the understanding that SOCOM "was to have sole responsibility for preparing and submitting the program objectives memorandum for all special operations forces."^666 These budgetary powers were quite unique and represent an organizational innovation themselves.

The 1988 law was the last major instance of civilian intervention in order to force the military to improve its SOF assets. What started as an effort by the Reagan Administration to prod the military into revitalizing its SOF capability ended with a congressional mandate for major reorganization in order to promote SOF fortunes. Civilian efforts since 1988 have mainly focused on monitoring the progress of the military in meeting these existing mandates.

**WHY CIVILIANS INTERVENED**

The intervention of civilians in order to build a credible US SOF capability took place in three stages. During each stage, the primary civilian interveners were different, as were

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their motivations for intervention. In the first stage, the Carter Administration took several small steps towards a very limited build-up of US SOF capabilities. In the second, the Reagan Administration was the active force, prodding the military to place a greater emphasis on SOF in order to improve their capacity to perform both direct and indirect-action special operations. In the third stage, Congress, concerned primarily with direct actions, became the main engine of innovation as the Administration refused to force the military to undergo any significant changes. In this final stage, the revitalization movement took the shape of a drive for SOF reorganization.

During the Carter Administration's tenure, several trends in global affairs focused attention on the sorry state of US SOF and made obvious the need to add some substance to these empty forces. These trends created strategic rationales for civilian intervention. The first of these trends was the increased level of Soviet adventurism in the Third World. From Angola and Ethiopia to Mozambique, the Soviets appeared to be returning to Kruschev's policy of aiding in "wars of national liberation." This adventurism reached its apex in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The second trend was the increased terrorist activity and the complications it caused for US policy-makers, the most extreme example being the Iranian hostage crisis. The Carter Administration's decision to meet this rise in terrorism focused attention on the neglected SOF, and "antiterrorism provided a new rationale" for SOF, "much as counterinsurgency had under Kennedy."

On October 17, 1977, a hijacked plane temporarily on the ground in Mogadishu, Somalia, was stormed by members of Germany's antiterrorist unit, Grenzschutzgruppe 9, or GSG 9. Only one hostage and one GSG9 member were slightly wounded. The lightning-fast raid of the parked plane impressed the world and served as an illustration of the potential of a specially-trained and dedicated antiterrorist force. The Mogadishu rescue offered Carter the clearest lesson of what a specially-trained paramilitary force could accomplish, and it played an important part in his decision to call for a similar US capability. The German action at Mogadishu, combined with the British SAS tradition and

669 GSG 9 also had its roots in earlier failure. In September of 1972, a botched attempt by the Germans to rescue Israeli hostages seized at the Olympic Village in Munich resulted in the deaths of nine Israelis. This failure by ill-prepared military and police personnel led the German government to form a force devoted to the counterterrorist mission, the Grenzschutzgruppe 9, a division of the Federal Border Guard. The formation of GSG 9 is a classic example of military failure leading to both civilian intervention and innovation (although the GSG 9 is a civilian force devoted solely to counterterrorism). The French mimicked the Germans by forming the Groupe D'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale, illustrating once more how one country can offer innovation menus to others.
a dramatic July, 1976, raid by Israeli commandos at Entebbe, offered a menu of innovation to Carter in the shape of ready-made ways of addressing the negative trends he was facing. The Israelis, Germans, and British served as a reference group that US forces could be compared to. Such comparison allowed for a relative assessment of US capabilities and facilitated the recognition of a need for innovation. Without these foreign sources of success, the military could have more easily claimed either that it was doing the best job that anyone could expect to in the area of counterterrorism or that it was not an issue that the military could concern itself with.\footnote{The use of foreign SOF as a reference point to compare US forces was to be constant throughout the revitalization process. See, for example, Kelly, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service for Special Ops," p. 105; Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era; "(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," Congressional Record, August 6, 1986; and Trainor, "Special Military Forces: Congress Sees Room for Improvement," p. A9. Not surprisingly, neither the US conventional or SOF communities are always happy with the tendency to praise foreign solutions to special operations problems for the simple reason that they are foreign. The Navy, for example, ignored congressional attempts to get it to evaluate German and Italian minisubs for SOF use because this equipment was "not invented here."(Stan Zimmerman, "SEALs Stranded by Delays In Swimmer Delivery Systems," Armed Forces Journal International, July, 1992: 16.)}

After Mogadishu, President Carter told Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor, and Secretary of Defense Brown to look into German and Israeli counterterrorist capabilities. He then issued orders to get the US up to speed in this area. This directive gave the go-ahead for the formal creation of the Army's antiterrorist unit, Delta Force, on November 19, 1977.

The formation of Delta Force, although a difficult process, was not a forced innovation.\footnote{For a slanted but colorful look at the formation of Delta Force, see Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force. Beckwith, Delta's creator, was by no means well-liked or well-respected by many observers of the special operations community. His gruffness, bravado, and general intolerance of people who do not see things his way have earned him many enemies, and his performance at Desert One did nothing to enhance his reputation. For example, Edward Luttwak, in commenting on Beckwith's book, Delta Force, calls it "an inadvertently revealing apologia whose main value is in exposing the shortcomings of the higher-ranking officers who chose a man of his own low caliber to raise, train, and command the nation's elite commando force." (Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 308.) For a less-biased account of the formation of Delta than Beckwith offers, see Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz and David Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).} People within the military, notably Gen. Meyer, favored the idea of a dedicated antiterrorist force and championed this cause. Delta faced resentment and resistance from the regular forces from its inception, but was able to overcome it by relying on internal allies rather than on civilian patronage. President Carter's sudden personal interest in counterterrorist capabilities merely helped Delta proponents achieve the final victory in a long battle against their opponents within the Army.\footnote{Such patronage is precisely what Rosen refers to as the only type of civilian-forced innovation that he believes ever occurs.}

Carter did not do much more for SOF than to assure that Delta would become a reality, so his contribution to the first stage of SOF revitalization was limited. His goal was
specifically to create a deployable antiterrorist force to respond in emergencies, and not to build up US SOF capabilities across the board.\textsuperscript{673} The fact that he did not act to improve SOF to any real extent helped to lay the groundwork for the most influential failure of US SOF, one which both assured the presence of a revitalization effort in the future and ultimately may have cost Carter his job.

The taking of the US embassy in Tehran two weeks before Delta was officially activated set in motion events that made US SOF shortcomings obvious to all. The US was both unprepared and incapable of launching a swift rescue mission soon after the hostages were taken. Properly-trained and sufficiently-outfitted forces did not exist. This was symptomatic of the third trend that emerged during the Carter presidency: the inability of the US to respond to attacks on its nationals abroad. When a rescue mission was finally launched, its disastrous outcome, culminating with a hasty retreat from the rendezvous point designated Desert One, made it quite clear that the US was incapable of conducting such operations with the present force structure. Thus, military failure joined strategic rationales in driving civilian intervention.

Desert One was a US failure in a mission area where other countries had fared much better. Personnel from foreign special forces analyzed the Desert One rescue plan and noted that it may have been doomed from the beginning because it violated so many of the basic laws of covert or special operations.\textsuperscript{674} A congressional investigation of Desert One arrived at a similar conclusion.

In testimony on Desert One, Charlie Beckwith, the head of Delta Force and one of the key participant in the failed rescue operation, highlighted SOF shortcomings and offered a remedy whose tone would be echoed years later when Congress legislated SOF reorganization:

In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex mission. The parts all performed, but they didn't necessarily perform as a team. Nor did they have the same motivation.

My recommendation is to put together an organization which contains everything it will ever need, an organization which would include Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALS, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support people, its own aircraft and helicopters. Make this organization a permanent military unit. Give it a place to call home. Allocate sufficient funds to run it. And give


it sufficient time to recruit, assess, and train its people. Otherwise, we are not serious about combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{675}

The investigation of Desert One concluded with the issuing of the Holloway Report, which examined the failed mission and called for changes in order to avoid a similar failure in the future. Specifically, the report called for the creation of a Counterterrorist Joint Task Force and a Special Operations Advisory Panel (later SOPAG), staffed by active and/or retired officers with a background in special operations.

The military was not very happy with these recommendations. The Counterterrorist Joint Task Force utilized normal military channels because it worked through JCS, but it represented more attention than the military wanted to give to special operations. The Advisory Panel not only raised the status of special operations, it also created additional unwanted oversight by individuals (retired officers) whom the military could not control. It also had the effect of telling JCS that it was not competent enough to make decisions regarding SOF on its own.\textsuperscript{676} As such, SOPAG threatened the military with a loss of autonomy on SOF matters and made controlling the growth of SOF more difficult.

Had the military somehow been able to avoid the Desert One fiasco, civilian interest in SOF might have remained at a relatively low level, equal perhaps to Carter's request for the capabilities that Delta supposedly offered. The very public failure of the rescue attempt, however, assured that more people would be paying attention to SOF in the future. Because Desert One highlighted, more than anything, the lack of a joint approach to SOF, it was only natural that the reforms spurred by the incident would take the shape of organizational changes intended to increase such jointness.\textsuperscript{677}

The strategic trends operating during the Carter years -- growing terrorism and Soviet Third World adventurism -- were similar to changes "in the structure of the international security environment" that Rosen argues lead military leaders to recognize the need for innovation.\textsuperscript{678} In this case, these changes did not push this leadership to innovate in ways that would allow it to meet the growing unconventional challenge. Why did it fail to innovate on its own? One explanation was that the military failed to see what everyone else did and simply did not recognize how unprepared it was for unconventional operations. A more credible explanation is that it recognized the changes, but chose to rely on existing

\textsuperscript{675} Beckwith and Knox, \textit{Delta Force}, p. 295.
\textsuperscript{676} Interview with Adm. Stansfield Turner, Sept. 30, 1992. Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA during the hostage crisis and the Desert One failure, also argues that SOPAG is, in a way counter-productive, because JCS must learn on its own how to effectively prepare and use SOF. The existence of a panel with a mandate to provide this knowledge makes such learning less likely.
\textsuperscript{677} Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.
operational routines to meet this new threat, rather than adopt novel approaches that promised negative organizational side-effects. Whatever the explanation, the failure of the military to restructure itself to deal with these environmental changes led civilians, fed up with failure and aware of foreign models of success, to intervene.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Reagan Administration, like Carter's, was concerned with the problem of terrorism. In January of 1981, for example, Secretary of State Haig announced that "international terrorism [would] take the place of human rights" in the new Administration's list of priorities.679 The Administration eventually formalized its concern for terrorism in National Security Decision Directive 138, drafted by the ubiquitous Oliver North and signed by Reagan on April 3, 1984. The Directive stated that "the US government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause a threat to our national security."

Unlike Carter, Reagan was more willing to use conventional military forces in response to terrorism, as the battleship shelling of Lebanon after the 1983 attack on the Marine barracks and the 1986 bombing of Libya illustrate.680 SOF, although a part of the planned response to terrorists, was only one element of it. The Reagan Administration's interest in SOF was fueled by additional factors absent from the Carter Administration. The Reagan White House was very interested in the role that SOF could play in anti-Soviet insurgency and counterinsurgency and in support of conventional forces in a large war.681 Thus, Reagan's efforts to improve US SOF capabilities stemmed from much different aims than did Carter's brief incursion into SOF issues. The Reagan Administration found both the direct and indirect actions that SOF were capable of conducting to be appealing.

Much like the impetus for the buildup of SOF during the Kennedy era, the revitalization of the early 1980s was fueled by the Administration's belief that Soviet

679 Don Oberdorfer, "Haig Calls Terrorism Top Priority." Washington Post Jan. 29, 1981: A1. In justifying why terrorism was now more important than human rights, Haig argued that terrorism "is the ultimate in abuse of human rights."

680 Usually, however, the Reagan Administration's bark was much worse than its bite when it came to backing up threats of retaliation for terrorist activity. See Turner, Terrorism and Democracy.

681 The Reagan Administration's first five-year guidance said that in the event of war with the Soviet Union, the US SOF mission was quite clear: "To exploit political, economic and military weaknesses with the Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy rear area operations, special operations forces will conduct operations in Eastern Europe and in the northern and southern NATO regions." In other words, as Halloran notes, "The primary mission of the Special Forces [was] insurgency." (Richard Halloran, "Military is Quietly Rebuilding Its Special Operations Forces," New York Times July 19, 1982: A1.) This represented a shift from the post-Vietnam belief that war in Europe would be too short for SOF to conduct their traditional behind-enemy-lines missions.
adventurism, manifested either directly or through surrogates, was a challenge to US national security that had to be met.\textsuperscript{682} One of the best means of confronting the Soviet's low-intensity conflict challenge, the Administration believed, was through a robust SOF capability.

It was in a LIC environment that the majority of military operations since World War II had occurred. Both the Reagan Administration and Congress understood that future conflict would also most likely be of this type. This realization, combined with the recognition of the role that SOF had to play in LIC and the understanding that the military, left on its own, would prepare for large-scale, high-intensity conflict, led both the Administration and Congress to concern themselves with the state of US SOF.\textsuperscript{683} As Secretary of Defense Weinberger noted in 1984, "The high priority we have assigned to SOF revitalization reflects our recognition that low-level conflict -- for which SOF are uniquely suited -- will pose the threat we are most likely to encounter throughout the end of this century."\textsuperscript{684}

A recognition of the extent of Soviet buildup of their own special forces, the Spetsnaz, accented to the Administration the need for the US to address the role of SOF in both LIC and large-scale conventional war environments. Similar to the influence that US allies' successes in counterterrorist operations had on Carter's decision to activate Delta, the importance that the Soviets placed on their SOF offered a foreign menu of innovation to American civilians. As Noel Koch noted in 1985, "Ways of war which violate [the] status quo may be adopted in one place simply because they are being adopted in another. As the threat of Soviet Spetsnaz becomes increasingly plain to defense planners, the value of such forces may also become increasingly evident to us."\textsuperscript{685}

The Administration's interest in SOF was further augmented by its overall view of the utility of military force in achieving US security objectives. As the Center for Defense Information saw things in 1985, "The renewed emphasis on Special Operations Forces is one more clear application of the Reagan Administration's policy of seeking military

\textsuperscript{682} McLintock, Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990, p. 324.


\textsuperscript{685} Koch, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service for Special Ops," p. 103.
solutions to Third World problems." In further stressing the military nature of the SOF option, the Administration tied SOF closely to LIC combat operations and rejected the "patchwork strategy of the 1960s," which called for using SOF to lead large scale nation-building efforts. The nation-building aspects of SOF were downplayed in favor of the need to help friendly governments conduct counterinsurgency campaigns and to assist guerrillas in their insurgent movements against Marxist governments.

Reagan matched his improvement of US SOF and LIC capability with a willingness to use these forces. US military support to the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Philippines, and guerrilla forces in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan all increased, leading to "the biggest surge in low-intensity conflict and special operations activity since the early 1960s." With Reagan's election came a sense, propagated by the Administration, that what was happening in the Third World was again of direct significance to US security. The anti-interventionist policy of the post-Vietnam 1970s gave way to an atmosphere more tolerant of involvement in foreign internal wars by means of special operations characterized by indirect action. In such an environment, the need for an improved US unconventional warfare capability was quickly grasped by the new administration. SOF was thus a priority with the Reagan Administration from the beginning and was an integral part of its commitment to build up the US military.

Another reason suggested in the literature as to why the Reagan Administration chose to revitalize SOF was that SOF offered a way to conduct clandestine operations while avoiding congressional oversight and interference. SOF do not fall under the same rules of oversight that intelligence agencies such as the CIA do, thus allowing an administration a greater degree of freedom in covert operations. Congress realized the potential for abuse that SOF created. Intelligence officials tried to remove these fears by claiming that any SOF covert activity would be directed by the CIA and would therefore be reported to Congress, but many congressmen were still uneasy with the situation.

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689 This fact led the Center for Defense Information to suggest in 1985 that invigorated SOF "could lead to a significant increase in U.S. covert activity around the globe which would largely be unsupervised by Congress." ("America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces," p. 3.)
690 Jeff Gerth and Phillip Taubman, "US Military Creates Secret Units For Use in Sensitive Tasks Abroad," New York Times June 8, 1984: A1. The Administration feared that concerns like this would hinder SOF revitalization. In an effort to protect the SOF build-up from potential congressional resistance (that never materialized), funding for the revitalization was hidden within the FY83 budget so as not to attract undue attention. (Halloran, "Military is Quietly Rebuilding Its Special Operations Forces," p. A1.)
In summary, the Reagan Administration's view of the utility of SOF in both direct and indirect-action special operations led it to push for an improved US SOF capability. The failure of the military to provide this improvement on its own drove the Administration to prod the military to bolster its SOF organizations. The military responded by creating several organizations in 1982 and 1984 that had little, if any, effect on SOF capabilities. Thus, after the Administration's initial attention to the issue, the old SOF problems remained. The Administration was unwilling to push the military any harder on the issue of SOF, and the second stage of civilian intervention, a revitalization effort, accomplished little in the way of actual results.

CONGRESS

The Reagan Administration's reluctance to force the military to improve SOF could have ended any serious efforts to revitalize SOF. Congress, however, was much less apprehensive about challenging the military. As a result, members of the House and Senate took up the SOF cause.

Why did Congress choose to intervene to force SOF reorganization on the military? Congressional intervention was driven by several main perceptions held by the representatives and senators who lead the forced innovation effort. These perceptions, when taken together, paint a clear picture of why Congress felt that the United States needed to have a robust SOF capability and why it believed that the military had to be forced to produce it.

The first perception that influenced Congress was one it shared with the Reagan Administration: unconventional conflict in a LIC environment was the most likely military threat that the country would face in the years to come. As the beginning of the amendment that created SOCOM clearly states, "The threat to the United States and its allies from unconventional warfare, including terrorism and insurgency, continues to increase at an alarming rate." Congress concluded from this and expressed in the amendment that "the most likely use of armed force by the United States in the foreseeable future will be counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and other unconventional operations." In testimony surrounding this amendment, its supporters, Senators Cohen and Nunn in particular,

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691 These organizations are described in greater detail in the military tactics section below.
692 The Civilian Unity section below examines the Administration's reluctance to force the military to change.
693 The interconnection of these perceptions is such that it is impossible to single out any one as being most important.
continuously stressed that the end goal of the SOCOM legislation was to improve the country's ability to conduct such operations.694

Congress' perception of the likely threat posed by unconventional warfare was different from the Reagan Administration's in one important way. While the Administration was concerned with both direct and indirect-action special operations capabilities, Congress was focused primarily on the direct action capabilities such as hostage rescues and raids.695 This was due in part to the fact that the missions of indirect action tend to be more closely associated with foreign intervention, which Congress was less willing to undertake than the Reagan Administration was.696

Several events in the years proceeding 1986, when the SOCOM legislation was written, reinforced Congress' perception of the primacy of the unconventional threat to the US. Specifically, the 1983 attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, the US invasion of Grenada that same year, and the 1984 hijackings of TWA flight 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro, all demonstrated the types of threats that the US could expect to face in the future. All suggested the need for an improved ability to conduct direct-action special operations.

The second perception that drove congressional intervention was that the regular forces of the US military were ill suited to conduct the types of unconventional operations that would be necessary in the future. The SOCOM amendment specifically noted that "the capabilities needed to respond to threats from unconventional warfare are not those fostered by the armed forces of the United States." It complained that DoD "has failed to recognize that conventional force capabilities can seldom be effectively employed in unconventional warfare missions." This belief arose from the poor record that the military had in unconventional combat, stretching from the botched rescue attempt during the Mayaguez incident to the more recent problems experienced in the invasion of Grenada.

The third perception influencing congressional intervention was a direct outgrowth of the second: Special Operations Forces are best suited for conducting unconventional warfare missions. Congress believed, as Sen. Cohen expressed, that unconventional operations needed to be carried out by forces that are "specially trained and equipped to engage in this new type of conflict."697 This perception had three sources. The record of

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695 Congress showed little to no interest in SOF operations in conjunction with conventional forces in a major war.
696 Although the SOCOM legislation does mention counterinsurgency here, it is quite clear from reading congressional transcripts that congressmen were not nearly as concerned with indirect actions as they were with direct actions.
failure that US conventional forces had in what Congress saw to be special operations made SOF a logical choice for these missions. This logic was reinforced by the existence of foreign models. Specifically, congressmen repeatedly referred to the successes posted by specially trained units fielded by the Israelis at Entebbe and the British in Malaya, Oman, and the storming of the Iranian Embassy in London. They saw these foreign examples of proof that special operations called for special forces. Finally, this perception was no doubt furthered by the US SOF community itself, which stressed its value by pointing out that it was trained to do the missions that the rest of the military could not.698

The fourth perception that led Congress to intervene was that the conventional military was unable to create a capable SOF force and that only if SOF gained a degree of independence could such a force develop.699 Rep. Dan Daniel, for example, argued that the services were fundamentally unable to properly manage SOF. As he pointed out, "Whether the strategy is continental, maritime, amphibious, or aerospace, the essence of each Service's approach boils down to mass, firepower, and maneuver," and SOF relies on none of these things for success.700 The SOCOM legislation specifically faulted the military for its inability to formulate SOF policies in the areas of training, tactics, doctrine, and intelligence. In addition, it highlighted the military's unwillingness to provide SOF with adequate resources. Lastly, it attacked the dismal level of coordination across the services with regard to SOF.

This fourth perception was based on two sources. The first source was the long string of SOF operational failures, the blame for which Congress placed squarely on the regular forces' neglect of and dislike for SOF. The series of events that underscored the importance of the unconventional threat facing the US also provided Congress with a litany of SOF failure. The first example of SOF that was always cited by innovation proponents was the Desert One debacle. By the mid-1980s, the problems inherent in the flawed rescue plan were well known to Congress. The October 23, 1983, attack in which 241 US Marines in Beirut were killed by a suicide bomber also highlighted problems facing SOF. For example, Noel Koch claimed later in a letter to several congressmen that SOF warnings that the barricades were in danger from just such an attack were ignored by the JCS. He

698 Many missions usually designated as special, such as long-range reconnaissance and raids, do not necessarily require forces trained or equipped much differently than those found in the regular military. Others, like hostage rescue and counterinsurgency, require skills not usually found in the regular forces. Regardless of the reality of the need for SOF to carry out all unconventional missions, Congress firmly believed in this need, and this played a part in its decision to force innovation in this case.

699 Sen. Cohen stated, "I believe we must take immediate steps to repair a flawed organizational structure that leaves special operations forces at the mercy of interservice rivalries and a military bureaucracy in which support for special operations runs counter to mainstream thought and careers." ("(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," p. S 10541.)

700 Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," p. 70.
attributed such disregard to a "distrust of SOF and a convoluted command structure." 701 Also in October of 1983, the US launched Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of the small Caribbean island of Grenada. First depicted in the press as a rousing success for the US military, in time the operation became the symbol of all that was wrong with the US military. Grenada raised questions about the use and performance of SOF assets during the operation, as several SOF members died in accidents. 702 The June, 1984, hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the October, 1984, hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro continued the streak of SOF problems. In each case, SOF transportation limitations were so severe that SOF could not even attempt a rescue operation.

The second source of Congress' perception that only a more independent SOF could hope to achieve operational success was the SOF community itself. In August of 1986, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees held closed-door hearings that dealt, in part, with US SOF. During these hearings, active and retired military officers involved with SOF testified about the serious deficiencies that SOF had, many of which were the product of the conventional military's handling of these forces. Particularly influential was the testimony of Maj. Gen. Richard Scholtes, who commanded the Joint Special Operations Command during the invasion of Grenada. 703 Most of the testimony received by the Committees was classified, so its exact contents are uncertain, but it appears likely that members of Congress were presented with evidence of other SOF failures or near-failures that were never made public. What is clear is the effect that these hearings had on Congress. They convinced influential members of the Armed Services Committees that the present SOF arrangement was seriously flawed. For example, Sen. Nunn said of the hearings, "I talked with some of the witnesses about some of the command structural problems we have had in the last several episodes where those forces either had to be used or were planned to be used, and it was really profoundly disturbing to say the least." 704

The fifth and final perception that led Congress to force SOF reorganization on the military was that the military was incapable of making the necessary changes to improve SOF itself. Congress had plenty of reasons to doubt that there was any chance for SOF

702 Problems experienced by the military in Grenada also helped fuel the reform efforts behind the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization effort.
self-reform by the military.\textsuperscript{705} The military's limited and disappointing response to the Holloway Report was one source of doubt.\textsuperscript{706} The warnings of the SOF community during the 1986 closed-door hearings also convinced Congress of the need for change to be forced on the military.\textsuperscript{707} The final source of this perception was the warnings of Noel Koch, the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the DoD civilian official most closely involved with SOF at the time. In May of 1986, Koch resigned, fed up with military's insistence on blocking SOF reform and with the Administration's unwillingness to takes steps necessary to overcome this resistance. He despaired, "We've got bands that are in a higher state of readiness than some of our special operations assets... and that's no joke."\textsuperscript{708} Koch had originally believed that the military could reform itself, but with his optimism extinguished, Koch sent a letter to Sen. Cohen in September that argued that the "management of Special Operations Forces must be corrected... by legislation because it will not be corrected otherwise."\textsuperscript{709}

By 1986, there was a clear consensus in Congress that it would have to force the military to innovate if it wanted to improve SOF capabilities.\textsuperscript{710} Daniel, Cohen, Nunn and their associates recognized that the SOF revitalization begun by Reagan had not achieved its objectives, and they placed the blame for this shortfall squarely on continued military

\textsuperscript{705} No one was more convinced of the inability of the military to fix SOF on its own than Rep. Daniel. In his influential \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} article of 1985, he argued that the biases of the regular forces were so powerful that merely creating an SOF command would not solve the problems he saw gripping US SOF. As he put it, "Regardless of the breadth of authority vested in an SOF agency or command, the health of SOF would ultimately be determined by the Services that furnish the forces." To Daniel, the creation of a unified SOF command was only a "half-way" solution. (Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," p. 74.) A year after writing his article, Daniel still argued, "We have seen no evidence that there's been any change in attitude [among military leaders]... they don't want elite forces. And they don't want to give up any turf." (Keller, "Conflict in Pentagon Is Seen Hurting Elite Units' Buildup," p. A1.)

\textsuperscript{706} Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard, Sept 2, 1992.

\textsuperscript{707} As Sen. Cohen said after these hearings, "I was prepared to proceed on the basis of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution [rather than pass a binding SOF-specific law]. I was not happy with it but was prepared to proceed along those lines. Until yesterday, listening to the testimony, particularly that revealed in closed session, which persuaded me that unless we move and mandate in this direction, it is not going to be done." (\textit{Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986}), p. S 10544.)


\textsuperscript{709} Cited in Ganley, "Congress Creates New Unified Command for SOF and New Civilian SOF Chief," p. 20. Koch was replaced by Air Force Col. Larry Ropka, a man with no SOF experience other than having been in on the Son Tay raid planning in Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{710} Ganley, "Congress Creates New Unified Command for SOF and New Civilian SOF Chief," p. 20. As the Conference Report accompanying the 1986 legislation noted, "Legislation is necessary to overcome the unending resistance in the Department of Defense to necessary organizational and other reforms of special operations forces." (Cited in GAO, "Special Operations Command: Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates," p. 12.)
resistance.\textsuperscript{711} As a result, the Administration's request for the military to revitalize SOF was replaced by a congressional demand that the military do so. Congress also went a step further than the Administration by telling the military exactly how to make the changes it wanted. This created a split between Congress and the Administration over how to deal with the military's resistance to SOF. The Administration did not approve of congressional plans that both dictated organizational detail to the military and mandated changes within OSD that the Administration did not favor. As a result, the Administration stood in opposition to congressional SOF reorganization legislation.\textsuperscript{712}

Congress intervened further in 1987 because it recognized that its 1986 mandate was not being met by either the military or the Administration. Koch notes that the 1986 legislation presented the military with a chance to "cut its losses by cooperating with the Congress." He argues that the military failed to do so because "the whole business had become a manhood issue at the Pentagon, where officials were going to prove they could not be told what to do."\textsuperscript{713}

Congress had hoped that its 1986 legislation would end the need to intervene to promote SOF. Continued military resistance made such disengagement impossible. The conference report accompanying Public Law 100-180, passed in 1987, said that DoD was continuing to hinder the implementation of SOF reforms, and true change would require additional legislation to overcome persisting "bureaucratic obstacles to progress."\textsuperscript{714} As a result of this attitude, Congress continued to intervene, prolonging this third stage of civilian intervention for another year. By the end of 1988, all that remained was for the Pentagon to finally live up to the mandates provided by Congress.

Congressional action in the SOF case was not driven by the domestic political imperatives in the way that it was in the drug interdiction case. Unlike the drug case, where many politicians felt the need to put on a show, congressional efforts to improve US SOF capabilities sought actual results. The public was certainly concerned about terrorism, but the way to show the masses that you, as a politician, were tough on terrorism was to

\textsuperscript{711} As reported in the New York Times in January of 1986, "The Reagan Administration's five-year effort to build up special commando units for unconventional warfare and counterterrorist operations has been hampered by the indifference, and sometimes active opposition, of regular Army and Air Force officers, according to a senior Pentagon official and members of Congress... A recent House Appropriations Committee report, based on Air Force data, asserted, 'Half the forces are not combat-ready half the time.'" (Bill Keller, "Conflict in Pentagon Is Seen Hurting Elite Units' Buildup," New York Times Jan. 6, 1986: A1.)

\textsuperscript{712} See Civilian Unity section below.


support retaliation strikes. The general public never clamored for politicians to do something about the sorry state of US SOF capabilities. This was neither the obvious nor the emotional solution to the terrorist problem. Thus, in this case, public pressure played a negligible role in the process of forced innovation. The goal of SOF revitalization was never to show the public that Congress was now getting tough on terrorism. Instead, it was aimed at removing the causes of problems that had plagued the use of SOF assets in the past in order to avoid future operational failures.

There was no political payoff waiting for congressmen who took on the military to bolster SOF. The public, for example, did not understand or really care about SOF lift requirements. Given this, Lt. Koren, in his article "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," asks, "Why then did Congress feel compelled to enact the special operations legislation, and why did a bipartisan group take up an issue that had no real constituency?" His explanation:

The legislation was not triggered by one specific reason or event, but by an accumulation of events over time that indicated such legislation was critically needed. Parts of the answer may be found in two areas - perceptions of the most likely threat to US interests and security for the foreseeable future, and the track record of the United States in special operations and low-intensity conflict in recent decades.715

Congress is not a monolithic organization with a single corporate will and direction. It goes without saying that not all members who voted for this legislation had strong opinions on SOF or LIC, or even had a passing knowledge of them. What was key here was the small group of senators and representatives who took up this issue and why. As with most legislation, who introduces it and who the cosponsors are become the keys to the progress of the legislation.716

These congressmen were Sens. Nunn (D-GA) and Cohen (R-ME) and Reps. Daniel, Bennet (D-FL), Hutto (D-FL), and Kasich (R-OH), all key members of the congressional structure that oversees the military.717

The Goldwater-Nichols reorganization efforts that were going on at this time dealt with many of the types of coordination and policy problems haunting SOF and "served to

715 Koren, "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," p. 65. As the civilian unity discussion below will show, another reason why the Congress intervened was because by 1986 it had become quite obvious that the Administration was not willing to play hard ball with the military over the issue of SOF.
717 Noel Koch further notes, "Every significant reform within the Department [of Defense] in the pre-Carlucci era occurred as a direct result of Congressional action. In the case of SOF restoration, this action took the form of a series of legislative steps... It is important to note that these steps represent a Congress acting in a bipartisan fashion out of conviction rather than political interest, since it is widely recognized that SOF is a low-budget capability... No one on the Hill had to have their pockets lined to get them to act on SOF." (Noel Koch, "Special Operations Forces: Tidying Up the Lines," Armed Forces Journal International Oct., 1988: 106.)
prompt or reinforce the will" of congressmen to act on SOF.\textsuperscript{718} One of the structural problems that Goldwater-Nichols was intended to address was the lack of jointness among the services. The creation of SOCOM was aimed, in part, at improving SOF jointness, which had proven to be dangerously lacking during Desert One and the invasion of Grenada. The SOF reorganization movement thus benefitted from the overall defense reform efforts of 1986 and the corresponding concern for increasing jointness.

In summary, the third stage of civilian intervention shifted from Administration-sponsored revitalization of US SOF to congressionally-mandated reorganization. Congress was driven to intervene by several interrelated factors. The unconventional warfare threat that it perceived and the belief that this threat was best met by SOF provided a strategic rationale. The perceived inability of the military to field SOF forces on its own, resulting in numerous operational failures, provided another rationale. Finally, the repeated failure of the military to successfully revitalize and reorganize SOF on its own, and the unwillingness of the Reagan Administration to force it to do so, made it clear to Congress that in order to achieve the goals it wanted, it would have to force the military to innovate.

**WHY THE MILITARY RESISTED**

The question of why the military resisted civilian efforts to change the structure of SOF is actually a two-part question. First, why did the regular military traditionally dislike and discriminate against SOF? (The answer to this helps to underscore where the need for civilian intervention arose from in the first place.) Second, what was it in particular about the nature of the civilian-sponsored changes that disagreed with the military. An application of the forced innovation framework to this case shows that different variables best answer each of these questions and, together, provide a comprehensive picture of why the military fought civilian-led efforts to reorganization US SOF.

**PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY**

The *professional identity* variable of my forced innovation framework provides the best explanation for the conventional military's dislike of SOF throughout history. This

\textsuperscript{718} Koren, "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," p. 68.
historical distaste for SOF is not to be confused with the military's resistance to the creation of SOCOM in particular, which is best explained by the autonomy variable (see below).

At the root of the military's attitude toward SOF is the elite status of these units. There is a strong belief in the US military that no one group should be formally designated as an elite. The "special" label given to SOF does just this. When one group is separated out and placed above other groups in the military, this seriously challenges the corporateness of the military's professional identity. The elite status of SOF does this and therefore calls into question the sense of unity and collective identity that bind the military together as a unique profession. This equation of "special" with "elite" is the central issue in the regular forces' dislike of SOF. Thus, the main source of conflict between the military and its SOF components arises from emotion more than from any calculation of organizational interests.719

The military has always resisted arbitrarily designating one group by name as somehow being above others. As Maj. Gen. Rice told Congress in 1984,

There has traditionally been in the services a feeling that special operations, special people, special equipment, special funds, takes something away from, if you will, the regular or conventional forces... To segregate a group over here and give them something special didn't sit well with some people.720

The "special" label has weighed heavily on SOF. The Army, for example, still has not forgotten the distasteful intervention of President Kennedy in order to promote specialness. The emotional battles that raged over Kennedy's decision to have the Army Special Forces wear their distinctive green berets still ring loudly in the background of any discussion of SOF.721

The regular military's resentment of the special label is heightened by the fact that the prestige implied by the label is seen as being totally artificial. As Kurt Lang, in his essay "Military Organizations," notes, "The prestige ranking of units and functions depends upon collective definition of their contribution to the primary military mission."722 In the case of SOF, this contribution is viewed to be minimal. Lt. Gen. Wilson (Ret.) notes that "special

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719 The emotional nature of this conflict has made any attempt to make SOF more acceptable to the rest of the military highly problematic. Such emotional issue cannot be resolved by any sort of structural changes. (Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr., Sept. 1, 1992.)
721 Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard. General Woerner argues that elite unit symbols such as the green beret really do matter in the military. Any time an attempt was made to add or change elite symbols in the Army, the result was an internal battle of surprising magnitude, he notes. (Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr., Sept. 1, 1992.)
operations are often supplemental to the main action, a kind of military sideshow. They rarely win the battle, and they never win the war.” 723 Because of this, the conventional forces see little utility in SOF, which appear to add little to combined arms doctrine, making them superfluous. 724 Left on their own, the conventional forces have traditionally believed that they can handle things just fine. Given the conventional military’s failure to see much utility in special operations, the prestige of SOF within the military has always suffered accordingly. Thus, the military views the civilian-provided designation of SOF prestige as underserved and as an affront to those groups not similarly designated as elites.

The creation and designation of an elite group such as SOF also has the effect of telling other forces within the military that they are not capable of performing the missions that SOF can. This equates in some sense to labelling these other forces as inadequate. 725 Thus, the creation of elite units sends the message that the conventional groups are not making the grade and need help, or worse, need to be replaced.

The effects of such a message is exacerbated by the inordinate attention that the media, Hollywood, and the public give to SOF, often at the expense of the regular forces. The combination of being subordinated to SOF in terms of both status and attention received can lead non-elite personnel to become demoralized. 726 Hollywood’s long-standing love affair with elite units, from the classic movie, "The Green Berets," to the more recent "Delta Force" and "Navy SEALs" movies, are examples of such attention. A 1985 Newsweek report on US SOF offers another example. In it, the authors complained that Green Berets "must spend much of their valuable time on administrative and even clean-up duties that could be performed by other units." 727 This suggests that non-SOF personnel are less valuable and should be willing to clean up after their elite brethren. Obviously, such beliefs do little to improve the conventional military's opinion of SOF and creates problems for the military profession's feelings of corporateness.

The elite nature of SOF is responsible for the majority of the conventional military's resentment of and discrimination against SOF. Other characteristics of SOF that conflict with the military's professional identity offer the regular forces additional, though less important, reasons to dislike, distrust, and, most importantly, neglect of SOF. One such characteristic is the stereotypical image that the regular military has of SOF personnel. It

724 Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard. Howard notes that SOF community did not help its own cause very much because not until the mid-1980s did it play up its potential contribution to conventional operations.
725 Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism, p. 37.
726 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, p. 54.
often views such SOF personnel as unpolished figures lacking the level of discipline that is the hallmark of the conventional forces.728

Another such characteristic is that SOF are a poor match with the dominant identities of each of the services. The peculiarities of SOF are such that these forces do not mirror any of the individual services' identities. Because of this, the regular forces have traditionally had little interest in supporting SOF. This helped to create the conditions of neglect, poor coordination, and resource scarcity that civilians intervened to address. The worst SOF-service identity match is with the Air Force. The SOF aviation mission is not one of speed, control of the skies, or strategic bombing. Instead, it is one of airlifting supplies and the SOF personnel of other services and of providing close air support with slow propeller-driven planes. As a result of this mismatch between the Air Force's favored identity and the requirements of SOF, the Air Force has never relished its SOF duties.729 In addition

728 As one SOF officer said, "We're seen as either snake-eaters or mafia in uniform." He noted that the SOF image has traditionally suffered from "too much macho." (Halloran, "Army's Special Forces Try to Rebuild Image by Linking Brains and Brawn," p. 8.) Evidence of the mismatch between the SOF personality, as perceived by the conventional military, and the general military's professional identity lies in the contempt with which many conventional officers view their SOF counterparts. Charles Beckwith, the father of Delta Force, and Richard Marcinko, father of SEAL Team Six, are two such SOF officers whose non-traditional, overbearing personalities grate against the respect for authority that characterizes the conventional military's identity. (See, for example, Dale Andradé, "Review of Rogue Warrior," Proceedings Aug., 1992: 98-99.)

The negative SOF image has been furthered by Hollywood portrayals of Rambo and other fictional SOF members who often fail to fit in with the rest of society in general and the military in particular and whose behavior would clearly be unbecoming of a truly "professional" military member. This view of the SOF soldier, when taken to its extreme, leads to the image of that soldier as someone who does not always tow the line with respect to the wishes of conventional commanders. (Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard. Howard notes that the loose canon problem is exacerbated by memories of SOF performance in Vietnam, where such behavior was at times relied on to build moral among the SOF.) As a result, there has always been a strong suspicion of the elite soldier as an undisciplined "loose cannon on the deck." (Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.) For example, even though CINCSOUTH Woerner had a deep appreciation of the capabilities of his SOF assets and they were performing 99% of his politically sensitive missions outside of Panama, he had the "emotional need" to keep an especially close eye on SOF because they made him uneasy at times.

The SOF community is well-aware of its image problem and has tried to remove its "rogue warrior" reputation. As the Principle Deputy ASD SO/LIC, Dr. Alberto Coll, noted in 1992, "We are out to stamp out the Cowboy image" of SOF. (Talk by Alberto Coll, Principle Deputy ASD SO/LIC, J. F. Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, Nov. 19.) Similarly, a US Navy Commander recently suggested with regards to Navy SOF, "To be a SEAL, you don't have to prove your manhood in a bar fight against a drunken Marine or by sucking pears through your nose. Being a SEAL means being tough and doing all the demanding things we are paid to do... If the members of the Navy's special-warfare community want to be respected and taken seriously as Navy professionals, then we should cultivate the reputation of being 'quiet professionals.'" (Com. W.L. Hamilton, "Letter to the Editor," Proceedings Nov., 1992: 20-23.)

729 Evidence of this is found in Initiative 17, one of the most drawn-out instances of resistance to improving SOF capabilities during the 1980s. In 1984, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of staff came up with a plan whereby the Air Force would transfer all rotary lift SOF missions to the Army, but without having to transfer any actual assets. In discussing Initiative 17, one Air Force Colonel confessed that there was "'some truth' to the idea that the Air Force wanted to hand over the [SOF airlift] job because helicopters did not fit the 'thoroughbred' image of the pilot service." (Keller, "Conflict in Pentagon Is Seen Hurting Elite Units' Buildup," p. A10.)
to this image conflict, the fact that the Air Force's SOF missions are all designed to support the SOF assets of other services also makes SOF unattractive to that service. The Air Force sees itself as being capable of deciding conflicts without help from other services, as the doctrine of strategic bombing illustrates. The SOF mission forces the Air Force to play only a supporting role for other services, just like the airlift and close air support missions, and thus does not mesh with its self-image as the wielder of the decisive form of military power.

The Army's professional self-image is closely tied to the power that it exhibited at the end of World War II. As such, the Army sees itself as an organization that relies on massive firepower and overwhelming force in order to conduct combat operations. Russell Weigley refers to such reliance as a "strategy of annihilation." Army SOF assets operate on a much lower scale. Army Special Forces groups, for example, are organization around twelve-man teams designed to function independently. In addition, there is no place for armor or artillery, two important constituencies within the Army, in the majority of SOF missions. SOF rely primarily on small arms that they carry themselves. All of this adds up to a general lack of interest within the Army for SOF.

The Navy's view of SOF is somewhat different than that held by its sister services. The Navy has traditionally respected and appreciated the role that SEALs play in the support of its conventional missions. Because of this, the Navy has always provided for the SEALs' needs to train for such missions as harbor protection, scouting for large

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731 In recent years, the emergence of maneuver warfare doctrine has added another dimension to the Army's view of how it should fight. Maneuver warfare does not call for an end to overwhelming force and massive firepower, however. It calls for a more flexible approach to applying this power to the enemy's assets.


733 The fact that the Army's Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) are not ignored or disdained by the Army in part highlights the importance of SOF's elite status in their position within the Army. However, this difference of status can also be partially attributed to differences of scale between SOF and LIDs. LIDs, while centered on the foot-mobile infantry man, do have light armored vehicles and about 100 helicopters each, including AH-1s. They are also designed to operate in divisions of more than 10,000 men. One of the goals in creating LIDs -- to have a division that could be moved to trouble spots in less than 500 C-141 sorties -- points out that even though these divisions are listed as light, they still are big enough to warrant much more of the Army's attention than SOF, whose total active force in the Army by the mid-1980s was only around 10,000.
amphibious operations, and the destruction of enemy shore facilities.\textsuperscript{734} Generally, however, SEALs have, at best, been peripheral to the professional image of the Navy. For example, no one hoping to make Admiral would ever choose the SEALs as a career path.\textsuperscript{735} Special operations are not what the Navy is about. These missions have little to do with capital ships or control of the seas. Instead, Navy SOF means rubber rafts and minisubmarines. It means inserting small bands of SEALs to conduct limited operations on shore. Although this could be construed as a form of power projection, which has become an increasingly important aspect of the Navy's professional identity, the use of a few SEALs is a far cry from attacking land targets with, for example, waves of A-6s. Thus, there is not a great deal of affinity between the Navy's professional self-image and the requirements of naval SOF.

Not only do SOF conflict with the conventional services' self-images, their missions often go against the military's idea of what a professional military is for. One factor that is fundamental to the identities of all of the services' missions is the idea that warfare is conducted in the open. Although operational details are certainly secret, the fact that the US is using force against an enemy is not. The military is in the business of the \textit{overt} application of force. SOF operations do not always work this way. Often, the secondary objective of an SOF mission is to meet its primary goal without anyone knowing of its actions, including the US public.\textsuperscript{736} Publicity tends to be a hallmark of failure. The presence of SOF within the armed forces threatens to involve the military in clandestine operations. Such "dirty tricks," employed during peacetime, are not the type of operations that the military likes to be involved with. There is a "quandary implicit in the nature of elite paramilitary forces... they often operate on the blurred boundaries between law enforcement, the military, and clandestine operations."\textsuperscript{737} As one writer notes, "This in itself provides a rationale for the continued isolation of elite and covert forces and, given the covert (and often criminal) nature of certain unconventional tactics, for the limitation of


\textsuperscript{735} As early as 1969, the SEALs were designated a separate career branch. (The Army did not make Special Forces a separate branch until 1987.) In addition, even as of 1992, "Only the Navy has an officer career field that allows the development, promotion, and effective utilization of general or flag officers with substantial special operations experience." (John Brennan, "Special Ops Generals (letter to the editor)," \textit{Armed Forces Journal International}, July, 1992: 6.)

\textsuperscript{736} As evidence of this, as of 1987 there was not a single Admiral with any SOF experience. (Howard, "Anything, Anytime, Anyplace -- Thanks to Congress," p. 49.)

the resources put into such operations."\textsuperscript{738} The military would prefer to stick to the business of preparing for engaging in honest fights that the public will support rather than get involved with shadowy missions that the public might not back if it knew about them.\textsuperscript{739}

\section*{AUTONOMY}

The critical factor that fueled the military's resistance to SOF reorganization efforts lies in the \textit{autonomy} variable.\textsuperscript{740} Specifically, the creation of SOCOM posed several threats to the regular military's autonomy. The military feared that a strong SOCOM would infringe on the services' share of LIC missions. The services also feared that the creation of an independent SOF organization would result both in the loss of control over their SOF assets and in a loss of operational control both to SOCOM and to civilians in general.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the largest degree of autonomy loss that an organization can suffer, next to being dissolved as an independent entity, is to be replaced in a particular mission area by a rival organization. SOF created just such a threat for the conventional military. SOF were able to draw on the romanticized image of elite units as a clean, quiet way to do dirty jobs. Civilians were understandably drawn to SOF, and this attention threatened to come at the expense of the conventional military. The more SOF's role in

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The strong connection between Army Special Forces and the CIA in Vietnam created just such an awkward situation for the military. This problem also existed for Army Special Forces in the early 1950s because they were closely associated, and in fact arose from, the remains of OSS. (See Paddock, \textit{U.S. Army Special Warfare- Its Origins}.)

One example of the conflict between covert activities required by SOF and the conventional military's professional identity than the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA). ISA provides groups like the SEALs and Delta Force with its intelligence needs. The Pentagon has always been uncomfortable with the CIA-type operations of ISA. (Steve Emerson, "Stymied Warriors," \textit{New York Times}, Nov. 13, 1988: 83.) The fact that ISA has been involved in several scandals, the worst of which uncovered ISA members double-charging the government for thousands of dollars of questionable expenses, has not made the Pentagon any more comfortable with ISA.

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\textsuperscript{739} The fact that SOF are designed to operate in the gray zone of operations short of war also raises the fear that politicians would more readily employ SOF than they would conventional forces, making the involvement of the US in unwise military adventures that much more likely. As Lt. Gen. Clay, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in 1985 warned, possessing capable SOF is "like carrying a loaded gun... Some people seem to think that the use of Special Forces would be less provocative than the use of overt conventional forces like Marines." (America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces," p. 3.) Such employment would be even easier if SOF were contained in an organization separate from the services and their relatively conservative view of employing military assets. Because of this, some members of the conventional forces opposed the creation of an SOF agency as favored by the House because "the cautious nature of the military" that had served as a "brake" on employing SOF in the past would be lost. (Keller, "Conflict in Pentagon Is Seen Hurting Elite Units' Buildup," p. A10.) Without this brake, the military feared that the romantic appeal and can-do reputation of SOF would make policymakers more likely to involve the US military in covert activities overseas and would diminish the ability of the military's conservatism to keep the country out of trouble.
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\textsuperscript{740} This is not to be confused with the military's historical dislike of SOF in general, which is best explained by the \textit{professional identity} variable, as discussed above.
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LIC grew, the more the conventional military's province in these mission areas would shrink. In the extreme, a powerful and autonomous SOCOM or similar agency threatened to take LIC missions away entirely, resulting in a major loss of autonomy for the conventional military.\textsuperscript{741} Although the regular military never favored these unconventional missions, the increasing importance of LIC as East-West tensions declined meant that the services would jockey for a larger LIC role, not sit by and let a new organization carve out an ever-increasing niche.

One service that felt particularly threatened by the move to revitalize SOF forces was the Marines. Many of the LIC missions that SOF appeared well suited for were traditionally allotted to Marines.\textsuperscript{742} The Marines have long championed themselves as the true special operations force. The Corps has designated several of its units SOF-capable.\textsuperscript{743} The GAO, arguing that the Marines SOF "capable" units are just that, thinks that they should be assigned to SOCOM. Neither the Marines nor DoD agrees with GAO's interpretation of the 1986 legislation, however, and will not take such a move.\textsuperscript{744} Instead,

\textsuperscript{741} This threat is illustrated in a 1988 interview with longtime SOF supporter Gen. Meyer (Ret.). Meyer said, "The Air Force mistakenly thinks that if you want to improve the ability to fight terrorists, just buy more F-111's and bomb Libya again." (Emerson, "Stymied Warriors," p. 83.) Meyer instead argued that a better solution would be to insert commandos into Libya. In other words, the conventional response was inadequate and should be replaced in the future by a cheaper, less-violent SOF option. Whether misguided or not, this type of substitution is a clear threat to service autonomy.

\textsuperscript{742} An article by Maj. Linn that appeared in \textit{Proceedings} in 1988 was typical of the Marine's attitude and reflected an unspoken concern for mission autonomy. The basic message of his article was that SOF could never take the place of the Marines. As Linn put it, "This is not to argue that special operations forces do not have a role in those operations associated with low-intensity conflict. Their mission is very specialized and specific, and they could be used in conjunction with Marine Corps forces. But they are not a substitute for Marine Corps forces. They lack the flexibility to adapt to a situation that may rapidly change from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing, or even conventional war... Successful foreign policy requires a versatile military force. Versatility provides foreign policy options -- and is the hallmark of the U.S. Marine Corps." (Maj. Thomas Linn, "The Marine Corps Is Special Ops," \textit{Proceedings} Feb., 1988: 51)

One mission that Linn argues the Marines are better suited to handle than SOF is counterinsurgency. He notes that "a sea-based counterinsurgency force has tactical and strategic mobility, and is capable of outmaneuvering its opponents." Successful counterinsurgency has little to do with "strategic mobility," however, and Linn's opinion reflects the fact that even in the late-1980s, many people within the military had yet to grasp the lessons of Vietnam regarding how and how not to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. Linn's argument backs up Rep. Daniel's claim that an SOF service might be needed because firepower, maneuver, and mass are all that the services understand.

\textsuperscript{743} In what appears to be an effort to not get locked out of the antiterrorist mission by Delta Force, the Marines have also created two Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security (FAST) companies to handle such mission. (See "FAST Origins," \textit{International Defense Review} 1990: 751.) These FAST units might only be unnecessary duplications of existing capability, as their true acronym, FATS, would seem to indicate. On the other hand, the fact that such units are more likely to be forward-deployed on ships could increase the ability of the US to respond quickly to a hostage situation.

the Corps has continued to try and have it both ways. It maintains its independence from SOCOM while declaring its SOF potential.\textsuperscript{745}

The SOF reorganization challenged the conventional military's autonomy in other ways. The creation of SOCOM gave birth to an organization that was designed to take control of SOF units away from the services, forces that had previously been theirs to command. Though they never showed any great love towards their SOF stepchildren, the services did not relish losing custody of their SOF assets to another organization. The services were well-aware that once SOCOM was up and running, they would lose control over training, personnel selection, doctrine, and nearly every other aspect of SOF. The services did not want to see control of what had previously been their SOF assets slip away.\textsuperscript{746}

Given the greater relative value that the Navy placed on its SOF assets when compared to the other services, the threat of losing control over these assets was at the root of the Navy's resistance to the 1986 legislation and the creation of SOCOM. The Navy's SOF, the SEALs, had an important fleet mission in the form of harbor protection, scouting, and small unit insertion and had always enjoyed a level of appreciation far above that given to the SOF of other services. Although the Navy by no means viewed the SEALs as a critical component of its force structure, on par with surface or air forces, for example, it did

\textsuperscript{745} For one small example, a letter in \textit{Proceedings} pointing out the need for the SEALs to have their own airlift capabilities provided by the Navy was answered by a Marine Corps officer who argued that "instead of forming a new Navy special-operations squadron, efforts should be concentrated on enhancing the capabilities of Marine Corps aviation," which has the experience and training required for the job. See Capt. Roger Crossland, "Has Naval Air Missed an Opportunity?," \textit{Proceedings} June, 1992: 90-92 and Capt. Harley Skidmore III, "Letter Regarding 'Has Naval Air Missed an Opportunity?,'" \textit{Proceedings} Aug., 1992: 26.

\textsuperscript{746} Although the details of Initiative 17 indicate that the Air Force would have been perfectly happy to hand over the majority of its SOF mission to the Army, this would have been quite different than surrendering assets in the form of equipment and personnel, which were not a part of the initiative. As evidence of this, the Air Force has blocked recent calls for transferring all Air Force helicopters, including those for SOF missions, to the Army. The Air Force is working hard to avoid all such shifts of assets that have been suggested for the sake of decreasing duplication by the various services. (See John Morrocco, "JCS to Backtrack Decisions in Roles, Missions Study," \textit{Aviation Week and Space Technology} Jan. 18, 1993: 58 and Michael Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Curtail Plans For Reducing Duplication," \textit{New York Times} Jan. 29, 1993: A1)

The shift of assets from the services to SOCOM that has occurred has created problems for both parties. A 1990 GAO report that examines the implementation of the 1986 legislation notes that "Many of the functions the Congress assigned to the Command traditionally had been the sole responsibility of each service. For example, each service trained its special operations forces and developed strategy, doctrine, and tactics for using the forces." (GAO, "Special Operations Command: Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates," p. 20.) Therefore, in order "to fully and successfully implement the changes required by the legislative mandates, the Command needs to have formal, signed agreements that will delineate each party's role and responsibilities as well as the relationships with each other." (p. 19.) These memorandums of understanding proved to be a headache for both the regular military and SOCOM and increased the \textit{interdependence of components} uncertain for each community.
recognize the value of its SOF assets. As a result, the Navy was loath to turn over control of its SOF assets to a new unified command.\footnote{747}

Another threat to autonomy that SOF reorganization and the creation of SOCOM posed to the military was the loss of control over portions of the battlefield. For commanders in the field, the biggest challenge to autonomy raised by the reorganization effort was the loss of control of forces in their area of operation that would result if SOCOM were given an operational command role.\footnote{748} SOF had traditionally created such fears for CINCs, and the existence of a SOCOM with command authority would only make matters worse.\footnote{749} Normally, the regional CINC or local commander retains control of the actions of all units in his area of responsibility. SOF, due to the unconventional and often covert nature of their missions, do not always fit into this neat arrangement. The presence of semi-autonomous SOF can complicate matters for a CINC. As former CINCSOUTH Gen. Woerner puts it, "No commander likes forces wandering around. It's untidy."\footnote{750} The last thing a commander wants is to be blindsided by an SOF operation in his area that he has no control over but would held accountable for should it fail. The specter of a SOCOM with operational command made the likelihood of this occurring much higher, as the chain of command would more often exclude the CINC. The threat of losing operational command in a particular region to independent SOF challenged the Unity of Command, one of the guiding principles of the Army, and was a serious threat to conventional military

\footnote{747} Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard. The Navy did all it could to resist assigning SEALs to the new SOCOM command. SEALs were originally not placed under SOCOM because they are not technically based in the continental US. Instead, more than half of all SEAL units tend to be deployed with the fleet at any time. The Navy promised in 1987 that SEALs would "work closely with [SOCOM], but operationally [would] remain under their respective fleet, and type commanders... This deviation for the Navy recognizes the reality of the SEALs being at sea, operating with the fleet." (Norman Polmar, "SOF -- The Navy's Perspective," Proceedings Aug., 1987: 136.) Gen. Lindsay, the first CINC of SOCOM, was not happy with the SEAL arrangement. He turned to civilians within the Pentagon for help and on March 1, 1989, SEALs were placed under SOCOM's control. (Dudney, "Toward a Fifth Armed Service?," p. 24.)

\footnote{748} Maj. Gen. Healy (Ret.) points out that this happened when SOF were given a significant degree of freedom in Vietnam. "This caused serious resentment in field headquarters of conventional forces, and a critical lack of coordination, cooperation, and trust resulted." (See discussion following Roger Pezzelle, "Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s," in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. Frank Barnett et al. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 158.)

The first head of SOCOM, General Lindsay, was aware of such concerns. He denied that he was creating a separate service. He said that "people think of this as being a war-fighting headquarters... I'll tell you up front, I'm not. I'm a provider. I package, prepare, and provide forces" that are then used by other commands. (Robert Dudney, "Toward a Fifth Armed Service?," Air Force Magazine May, 1988: 24.)

Lindsay's quote highlights the point that no matter how strong SOCOM becomes, the fact that SOF are placed under other commands once deployed means that non-SOF personnel will be the ones calling the shots in the majority of situations where SOF are employed. Koch does not seem troubled by this, as he wants SOF units earmarked for specific theater commands during peacetime. He hopes this, among other things, will lead to an increased knowledge of SOF capabilities. (See Koch, "Special Operations Forces: Tidying Up the Lines," p. 104-112.) Other SOF supporters, such as Daniel, see such a move as taking the control of SOF away from the SOF community at the precise time when its expertise is most needed. (See Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," pp. 70-75.)

\footnote{749} Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.

\footnote{750} Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.

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autonomy. This type of autonomy loss in turn threatened to create interdependence of components uncertainty, which challenges the military's ability to properly coordinate its various components, namely SOF and regular forces, effectively.

Fortunately for the military, the 1986 legislation was specifically structured to alleviate this fear. The mandate for SOCOM stressed the supportive role that SOCOM was to play with respect to theater CINCs. The Command was not intended to take on operational responsibilities. However, the legislation does say that, if so directed by the president or the Secretary of Defense, the CINCSOCOM can exercise command of an SOF mission. Thus, it is possible for an SOF operation to occur within a regional CINC's area of responsibility without his either knowing about it or, more importantly, having control over it.

A more widespread autonomy problem posed by an independent SOF organization was the potential for greater civilian control over operational decisions. The covert nature of many SOF missions requires that the fewest number of people know what these forces are doing. In the past, this list of people kept in the dark about SOF operations has included the top of the conventional command structure. Furthermore, civilians often take a much more direct role in controlling SOF than they do general forces. Thus, avenues for micromanagement are created, and civilians can direct the activities of SOF units without even consulting regular commanders. The end result is that the level of autonomy that the conventional military as a whole, not just the CINC, enjoys over the battlefield could be compromised by the presence of SOF units that were receiving guidance directly from civilians. The more independent these units are from the regular forces, the greater the possibility that conventional commanders will experience such a loss of autonomy.

In the extreme, the presence of SOF can completely remove the control of regional conventional commanders over the battlefield. As Col. Francis Kelly noted in his study of

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751 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner. Woerner told of an instance where an SOF officer attached to SOUTHCOM thought that the SOF forces were his, not Woerner's, to command. This officer was eventually relieved of his position for not accepting the priority of the CINCs control operationally.
752 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, p. 70.
753 SOF supporter Noel Koch argues that this direct control is preferable. As he saw it, one problem that the 1986 legislation did not fix was the excessive bureaucracy overhanging SOF. He believes that the line of command from the president to SOF "has to be made as short and elegant as possible." This would require the president to become much more familiar with SOF and take a greater role in its employment. (Koch, "Special Operations Forces: Tidying Up the Lines," p. 110.) Such presidential attention is just the type of micromanagement that the military fears, as this oversight represents a major challenge to autonomy.
754 This situation can occur in peacetime as well. It is possible that civilians might decide to employ SOF in a covert mission without even consulting with or notifying the relevant regional CINC.
755 This situation did not happen in Desert Storm, however, possibly because of the willingness of the Administration not to meddle in the operational details of the war.
Army Special Forces in Vietnam, these forces "required complete freedom of action within a specified area of operations in order to achieve success. For this reason, once an area was designated for the conduct of an operation, the mobile guerrilla force 'owned' that area...."\(^{756}\) Obviously, such a situation represents a serious loss of autonomy by the regular military.

In summary, the autonomy variable says the most about why the military resisted civilian efforts to revitalize and reorganize SOF. The services stood to lose a great deal of control to an independent and powerful SOCOM and logically decided to work against the creation of such an organization. The reorganization movement threatened to reduce the services' control over unconventional missions, their own SOF assets, and the battlefield. These challenges to the military's autonomy were inherent in the civilian's proposed organizational innovation. The whole point of their efforts was to provide the SOF community with a greater control of its own fate at the expense of the conventional military, which civilians had decided had failed in its stewardship of SOF assets.

If the military was so concerned about the threat that the creation of an independent SOF organization posed to its autonomy, then why didn't it try to head off having something like SOCOM forced upon it? To do so would have required the military to give in and live with higher-profile SOF. While distasteful, a greater institutionalization of these forces would not have intensified the professional identity-based problems that the regular forces had with SOF. After all, these forces already existed within the military. It appears that if the military had been willing to stomach its more emotionally-based reasons for disliking SOF, it could have managed SOF reform effectively itself and avoided the loss of autonomy that the advent of SOCOM brought about. The military did not do this, however, and was unable to avoid being stuck with a civilian-created solution to the SOF problem that resulted in a loss of autonomy to both civilians and to SOF.

The military's failure to successfully head off congressional intervention was a product of the nature of its strategy of resisting forced innovation. As will be discussed below, it relied heavily on window-dressing in order to make civilians think that it was addressing SOF shortcomings. In doing this, the military tried to attain two goals at once. It attempted to limit the independence and resources of a group that conflicted with its professional identity while protecting its own autonomy by staving off civilian intervention. This strategy was undermined by a serious miscalculation on the part of the military. It failed to recognize both the level of support that existed in Congress for SOF reorganization

and the level of congressional frustration over repeated half-hearted, military-generated reform efforts.757

By 1986, the military could see that they had misread the level of congressional determination to do something about SOF. As a result, in cooperation with DoD civilians, it offered its own plan as an alternative to the separate House and Senate SOF reorganization proposals. The DoD plan gave SOF a level of independence and institutionalization that the military was not happy with, but the proposal was carefully structured to protect service autonomy. In particular, this plan limited the head of the proposed SOF command to only a three-star officer, and it left all budget control of SOF with the services. This last-ditch effort to head off the more extreme civilian plans proved to be too little, too late. As mentioned in the section above on why Congress intervened, by late 1986, Congress had become convinced that the military was not capable of serious self-reform.758 Because of this, civilians rejected the military's last-ditch attempt to protect its autonomy.

In conclusion, in trying to maximize both professional identity and autonomy during the course of the revitalization movement, largely by means of window-dressing, the military removed meeting civilians half way on SOF reorganization as an option by 1986. As a result, the services were saddled with SOCOM and lost a degree of autonomy in the process.

OPERATIONAL ROUTINES

The way in which SOF units are selected, trained, and operate run counter to many of the operational routines of the regular military. This mismatch makes it harder for SOF to be accepted by the rest of the military and is part of the explanation for the the regular forces' traditional neglect of SOF. However, there is little about this case that can be said using the operational routines variable. This reflects the fact that most of the ways in which SOF conflict with the military's operational routines are significant because of how they challenge aspects of the military's professional identity and autonomy associated with these routines. Therefore, I covered most of the details of SOF's conflicts with operational routines in the professional identity and autonomy sections above. For example, SOF

758 Any belief that the military could be trusted to deal with the issue seriously was removed by the testimony of SOF members during closed-door hearings that year. This testimony convinced many senators that specific and binding legislation, and not a sense of the Senate resolution, was required to affect meaningful SOF reorganization.
operations have the potential to circumvent the normal chains of command, which are an important operational routine. Although this circumvention of command procedures is a definite challenge to operational routines, it is better depicted as a matter of control. Thus, this issue is more accurately depicted as a threat to autonomy than a conflict with operational routines. Because of this, I explore it in detail in the Autonomy section above.

Similarly, SOF pose numerous challenges to how the regular military operates that are more accurately problems related to professional identity. For example, Rep. Daniel, in his call for a sixth service, nicely summed up many of the reasons why SOF do not fit well with the military’s way of conducting war. He noted,

With the exception of the Rangers, SOF ground elements operate in units of 16 or fewer men. With the exception of the AC-130 Spectre gunship,... the primary weapons are individual and they are normally meant to be used only in emergency situations. SOF maneuvers rely on stealth, and the goal is to avoid rather than join with opposing forces.... Many of their skills are the skills of peace, not war.759

The significance of these differences, Daniel points out, lies in the mismatch between the SOF and the regular forces' identities: SOF small unit size and the Army's image of overwhelming force, slow close air support planes and the Air Force's love of speed and technology, SOF covert and non-violent missions and the conventional military's self-image as manager of state-sanctioned violence. Therefore, these conflicts with operational routines are better depicted as challenges to professional identity. Because of this, I examine these conflicts in the professional identity section above.

One SOF challenge to military operational routines worth noting is not reflected in another variables: personnel recruitment. Rather than take on fresh recruits, SOF tend to draw candidates who already have a fair amount of experience in the various services. Because of this, the military has always feared that elite units will attract the very best men from the rest of the organization, thus removing the prime crop of future leadership from the general forces.760 Eliot Cohen argues that this can become a problem even if only one percent of a service's total manpower is located in elite units. The effects of such recruitment policies are exacerbated by the fact that many SOF units contain only sergeants and officers.761

759 Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," p. 70.)
760 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.
761 Pezzelle, "Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s," pp. 54, 56. He further argues that should elite units reach five percent of total manpower, the general forces may then begin to lose mission to their elite brethren. (Thompson notes that as of 1989, even if one includes support units, SOF personnel in all services totalled only 2-3% of total military manpower. Thompson, "Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview," p. 18.)
The budgetary impact of SOF on the services has always been minimal and as a result did not play a very important role in the military's traditional attitude towards SOF or in the military’s resistance to SOF revitalization and reorganization. (See Figure 2 for SOF funding levels.) The total SOF budget has historically been quite small and was never more than one percent of the DoD total budget until the late 1980s. Even though SOF costs were minimal, the services tended to be hesitant to spend any money on these forces. In fact, control of the SOF purse strings gave the services one of their most potent means of working against revitalization efforts. The results of civilian efforts to loosen the services' grip on the SOF budget can be seen in the fact that the budget grew from $441 million in FY81 to around $3.1 billion by FY89. (Since FY89, the SOF budget has stabilized, and the requested amount for FY93 is $2.95 billion.)

Figure 2

SOF Funding Levels

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One example of the fear that SOF is taking the cream of the crop from the regular forces is found in a note that Army Col. Wallace wrote in approving the transfer of one of his officers to a special forces assignment. Col. Wallace said "I approve this request only because I want to support my officer's career objectives no matter how ill-advised they may be. However, I believe that the Army leadership must stop this erosion of its junior talent into Special Forces Branch which is at best a current fad, and in the long term, a pitiful sideshow from the mainstream Army." (Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Accused of Delaying on Budget Role for Commando Chief," Defense Week Oct. 31, 1988;, p. 105.)

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The only significant cost that SOF posed to the services lay in SOF aircraft programs. Robert Dudney, editor of Air Force Magazine, noted in 1988 that "for the Air Force more than the other services, the emphasis on revitalization of special operations forces carries important hardware implications." He cites the V-22, MC-130H, AC-130U, and MH-53J as the four main programs. He does suggest, however, that:

The Air Force SOF program should be kept in perspective. Throughout the entire 1990-94 period, the Air Force and other services combined will spend a total of only $5 billion for new SOF airplanes and upgrades -- less than the outlay that will be made this year alone for F-15s and F-16s and the Advanced Tactical Fighter.762

In other words, although the Air Force has borne the brunt of funding for SOF, the amount has never been of much concern in the grand scheme of things.

Ironically, the fact that SOF budget needs were relatively small made SOF that much more unattractive to the services. As one SOF officer noted, because there is not much money to be made in special operations, a bigger slice of the SOF pie does not translate into a noticeably bigger budget share for the relevant service.763 In other words, there was little financial incentive for any of the services to stand up for their SOF units.

With the creation of SOCOM, any incentive to pay for SOF decreased further, as the control that each service could hope to exercise over its SOF assets diminished. Once SOCOM attained full budget authority, the small budget drag of SOF on the services ended. For FY93, SOCOM took over funding of all aspects of SOF. Today, SOCOM, and not the services, pays for Air Force SOF exercises, Navy SOF operating expenses, SOF engineering programs, and the like.764

Control over the SOF's monetary lifeline may have been worth more to the services than the few hundred million it cost each of them to pay SOF's bills. As is discussed in the military tactics section below, the ability to raid the SOF budget was one of the more powerful tactics that the services had for limiting the growth of these forces. When SOCOM gained full budget control, the services lost the use of this tactic. If given the option of regaining the budget responsibilities for SOF and, in turn, regaining the weapon of fiscal control, it is safe to assume that the services would jump at such an opportunity. Resistance to SOF reorganization had little to do with money and everything to do with autonomy.

762 Dudney, "Toward a Fifth Armed Service?" p. 27
THE ROLE OF MILITARY UNITY

The level of military unity over SOF revitalization and reorganization played an important role in this case. The services were fairly unified in their opinion towards SOF revitalization, namely, they did not like it. For the reasons mentioned above, none of the services had any reason in terms of bureaucratic self-interest to favor an increase in SOF stature and autonomy. Thus, no splits on SOF occurred along service lines that civilians could take advantage of. Civilians were, however, able to take advantage of one key source of military disunity, the SOF community itself.

The SOF within each service were natural supporters of an innovation that sought to increase the resources, capabilities, prestige, and independence of SOF. The SOF community was an important source of disunity within the military that provided civilian innovation proponents with two invaluable resources: information and credibility.

The key contribution of this military disunity came in 1986, when the creation of and support for the SOCOM legislation benefitted from the efforts of individual members of the SOF community who helped Congress craft the legislation. For example, Lt. Gen. Wilson, a long-time veteran of SOF, assisted Congress and worked to remove aspects of the legislation that would have made it even more upsetting to the military than it already was.  

Most importantly, the role of SOF personnel, both active and retired, in the 1986 closed-door HASC and SASC hearings were critical in building support for the 1986 reorganization legislation. The actions of these individuals provided civilians with professional expertise that otherwise would have been monopolized by the military. These people offered Congress both greater insight into the problems facing SOF and the inability and unwillingness of the military to fix them on its own. They also gave innovation proponents greater credibility with which to deal with the military and the Reagan Administration. These factors significantly facilitated Congress in its struggle with both of these opponents over the reorganization program.

Although the SOF community as a group did not overtly assist civilian intervention efforts, there were examples of SOF members speaking out about the problems facing the

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765 Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.
US in this area of military competence.\footnote{Retired members of the SOF community and former conventional officers who supported SOF, free of the restraints imposed by being an active member of the military, were more overt in their acknowledgement the problems facing SOF and the military's unwillingness to deal with them. In the late 1970s, for example, SOF veterans teamed with former CIA personnel to push for SOF revitalization towards the end of the Carter Administration. (Sarkesian, "Organizational Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflicts," p. 338.) In the 1980s, the Special Operations Advisory Group (SOPAG) benefitted from the presence of numerous former SOF and conventional military men who lent credence and expertise to that civilian oversight board.} A 1988 article in *Armed Forces Journal International* is one such example.\footnote{Foster, "Pentagon Slow-Rollers Stymie SOF Improvements," pp. 98-102.} Using a nom de plume, one SOF officer wrote an article complaining that "Pentagon slow-rollers" were continuing to stand in the way of SOF reorganization efforts. He thought that the situation was bleak enough that he proposed going beyond Rep. Daniel's call for a sixth service and instead favored moving SOCOM out of DoD entirely, making it a totally independent entity. The fact that this officer felt he had to write under a pen name (aptly choosing one with the initials SOF) reflects the inability of the SOF community to publicly fight for itself.

Although the role played behind the scenes in Congress by the SOF community was a significant facilitator of civilian forced innovation efforts, numerous factors made it impossible for this community to overtly push for change within the military. SOF lacked an effective way to voice their concerns within the military in a coherent fashion. In part, this was due to the fact that the various service SOF units were not united in any real sense. More important, however, was the fact that none of the SOF groups enjoyed representation at a high level in the conventional command structure.

The inability of SOF to fight for their interests was a symptom of the problems plaguing SOF and was one that civilians wanted specifically to address. As Sen Cohen pointed out while speaking in favor of an amendment to S. 2453 in 1986, "We are trying to establish a role for an advocate on behalf of special operations forces."\footnote{"(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," p. S 10541.} Rep. Daniel noted in 1985,

> The key problem is the lack of advocacy. SOF are inherently small (about three-tenths of one percent of the DoD budget) and, therefore, cannot justify the senior flag or general officer billets so common to conventional and nuclear forces. The most senior members of the community are two-stars, and they number only three.\footnote{Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," p. 72.}

To illustrate the problem that this lack of advocacy creates, Sen. Nunn told the story, while arguing for S. 2453 in 1986, of how he and Sen. Goldwater had fought to pass a bill that required the services to include SOF airlift needs in their next five-year plan. Threatened
by Congress, the military complied and its funds were released. "What happened then?" asked Nunn,

They came back and now they have taken those special operations forces' aircraft out of the plan. They are no longer in the defense plan. The reason is that there is nobody over their to fight for them... This is a sad commentary, but the way you get resources in the Pentagon is to have somebody high up on the totem pole who goes to bat for you in resource allocation. If you do not, they just cut you out.\footnote{771}

The SOF community had only a few people at the base of the totem pole to rely on for protection. It did not have any clout in the upper echelons of the military, so its ability to push for change from within was minimal to non-existent.\footnote{772} Nor did it have an institutional godfather like it did with Kennedy in the 1960s.\footnote{773} Congress was aware of this problem and, in effect, took on the role of SOF guardian in order to implement reforms that would make such patronage unnecessary in the future.

Not only was the SOF community's ability to push for change from within severely limited, so too was its ability to build support outside of the military. As Rep. Daniel noted, "Because SOF needs are so small, the Services are not bombarded by commercial vendors anxious to sell the latest and greatest (and most expensive) gadgets.... There were no champions in the 1970s, and SOF nearly became a memory."\footnote{774} The SOF community could not count on the support of contractors who would lobby for SOF programs in Congress, nor would congressmen worry about the jobs associated with SOF programs, because there weren't any.\footnote{775} It was quite fortunate for SOF that members of Congress

\footnote{771}{"(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," p. S 10544.}
\footnote{772}{Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner, Jr., Sept. 1, 1992. As a result of this situation, complaints issuing from within the military tended to fall on deaf ears. For example, as one observer noted after a conference on air power and LIC, "There were very few senior officers present of the Air Staff in Washington to hear how many of their own officers (and others) questioned the Air Force's ability and commitment to cope with low-intensity conflict.... In the 17 1/2 years this [Armed Forces Journal International] editor has been attending war college symposia, we have never heard service people question their own Service's priorities so vociferously." (Editor's note to Koch, "Is There a Role for Air Power in Low-intensity Conflict?". p. 33.) Thus, there were those within the Air Force who understood the importance of airlift and the SOF mission, but they tended to occupy the lower ranks, and their concerns were usually not shared by service leadership.}
\footnote{773}{Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.}
\footnote{774}{Daniel, "The Case for a Sixth Service," p. 72.}
\footnote{775}{"America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces," p. 14.}
were concerned enough with the state of US SOF capabilities to take up the SOF cause even though such a move did not promise much of a political payoff. 776

Another source of military disunity besides SOF themselves on the SOF issue was the theater CINCs. They were also proponents of revitalization and, to a certain extent, reorganization. Unlike SOF, the CINCs were well-placed to have their concerns over SOF heard. However, their value to civilians was minimal when compared to that of SOF.

Noel Koch noted in 1985 that "over the past two years our regional Commanders-in-chief unanimously have registered their awareness of threats best addressed by SOF, and their determination to have such forces at their disposal in adequate numbers and properly supported." He claimed that "the active duty four-star generals and admirals preeminently responsible for the Nation's defense are advocates for Special Operations Forces." 777 Koch thought that such advocacy would be enough for SOF to eventually attain its rightful prominence in the military. Of course, he later dismissed this optimism when he resigned in disgust over continued resistance to the SOF revival.

In 1986, the JSOA and Army and Air Force staffs met with CINCs to discuss SOF budgeting needs. The CINCs provided "SOF requirements that would necessitate doubling the Air Force five-year SOF budget and substantially increasing the Army's programmed SOF funding." According to Armed Forces Journal International, "The CINCs requests... caused an uproar in DoD and the Services...." 778 The regional CINCs wielded a certain amount of power and were on the front lines where the need for robust SOF capabilities were most obvious, but their opinion was not enough to push the services to reform themselves, nor were the CINCs going to take on their fellow officers in what would have appeared to be a fight on behalf of Congress.

One factor that limited how much the CINC's could support SOF reforms was that the commanders were not in total agreement with all aspects of the reforms. The proposal to increase the operational independence of SOF in the field created threats to regional CINCs'...
autonomy. They did not like the idea of having an SOF organization that could bypass their authority in operational matters. Thus, although they supported the idea of an SOF organization to improve the training, equipping, etc., of their SOF assets, they could not agree to any proposal that would give such an organization too much operational independence.

In conclusion, while the services all opposed the creation of SOCOM, the disunity created by SOF's favorable view of this innovation was a valuable asset for innovation proponents in Congress. The SOF community could not lead an overt fight against the services, nor could it rely on sympathetic CINCs, but it could take a quieter approach by providing civilians with invaluable information and expertise. This disunity greatly facilitated civilian forced innovation efforts. Without the information supplied by SOF members, Congress would have been less aware of the problems inherent in the military's handling of SOF and of the inability of the military to address these problems itself. As a result, several of the perceptions that drove congressional intervention would have been more open to question and support for the SOCOM legislation would have suffered accordingly. Thus, in this case, military disunity helped to build civilian unity.

THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN UNITY

The story of efforts in the 1980s to revitalize US SOF capabilities is one in which the Reagan Administration started the process, but did not have the stomach to see it through over the resistance of the military. As a result, Congress stepped in and became the engine of change, while the Administration sided with the military. Through inaction combined with purposeful attempts to undermine congressional reforms, the Administration became a major roadblock to SOF reorganization.

This division between the Reagan Administration and Congress over the level of commitment to SOF revitalization was a critical factor in the military's ability to thwart civilian efforts for as long as it did. This dissonance centered on two issues: the Administration's unwillingness to force change on the military, and its unfavorable view of SOF reforms that called for changes in the OSD as well as the military.\footnote{779 The fact that Congress and the White House were controlled by different parties is not critical to the shape or influence of the civilian unity variable in this case. Congressional efforts to force change were not rooted in the fact that President Reagan was a Republican any more than the Administration's alliance with the military was determined by the fact that Democrats controlled Congress. The division between these branches was based more on executive-legislative differences than it was on a Republican-Democratic split. In addition, as was noted in several places above, the SOF reorganization effort was bipartisan to begin with.} The
Administration was too closely allied with the military to carry out the former and too protective of its own autonomy to allow the latter.

The unwillingness of OSD and the Administration to force the military to make unpopular changes is illustrated by Secretary of Defense Weinberger's reaction to the JCS decision to put a two-star general in charge of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). Weinberger was advised by SOPAG that JSOA would be ineffective with only a two-star at the helm. He could have ordered a three-star put in charge, but instead sent a memo to JCS expressing his concern and directing that, if a two-star were appointed, he should be capable of being promoted immediately. Of course, with the power of promotion in the hands of the JCS, this was unlikely to happen. Thus, instead of confronting the military on this point, Weinberger, by default, accepted the two-star General Rice as head of JSOA.

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Noel Koch was frustrated by both the military and OSD in his efforts to strengthen SOF. When Paul Thayer was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Koch found a sympathetic ear in OSD. When William Taft IV took over for Thayer in mid-1985, with Richard Armitage as his Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA), Koch lost an important ally. Taft and Armitage "were disinclined to press the services with the same confrontational enthusiasm that Koch was, and Thayer had been."\(^780\) As for Weinberger, Koch said of him that he "sought not to lead the Pentagon, but to ingratiate himself with it."\(^781\) In other words, the Reagan Administration, with OSD at the forefront, was not willing to play the bully and force the military to improve its SOF assets.

By the mid-1980s, members of Congress were increasingly questioning the Administration's commitment to SOF reform. Sen. Nunn complained,

> We have written the Secretary of Defense. We have talked to him. He has made speeches endorsing this subject, but a strange thing happens after the Secretary of Defense makes a speech. Nothing happens, unless it is on money. If it is on money, something happens, but if it is in resources within the budget, nothing happens.\(^782\)

\(^780\) Ross Kelly, *Special Operations and National Purpose* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1989), p. 4. By 1986, Koch's views isolated him somewhat in OSD. In addition to his differences with Armitage and Weinberger, Koch, who was in charge of SOF policy, disagreed with Donald Latham, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, who oversaw SOF resources. Latham was viewed as touting the Administration's line, while Koch was seen more as a "rogue elephant" who was in favor of reorganization proposals that the Administration did not back. Koch, like Congress, wanted SOF resources and policy to be under the same office. (Meyer and Schemmer, "Congressional Pressure May Force Far More DoD Dollars for Special Ops," p. 22.)


\(^782\) "(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," p. S 10544. This quote nicely sums up the Reagan Administration's approach to the Pentagon in general: It fought tooth and nail to provide the military with the maximum amount of resources, but was loath to interfere and tell the military how to allocate these resources.
The split between Congress and the Administration over how to deal with the military's resistance to SOF had grown quite wide by 1986. The Administration, personified by OSD in general and Secretary of Defense Weinberger in particular, did not approve of plans that called for defense reorganization aimed at creating unique SOF agencies.\textsuperscript{783} The ASD ISA at the time, Richard Armitage, argued in favor of DoD's counter-proposal to the two congressional plans by stressing that "command and control is a military function" and claiming that the House proposal "would bifurcate the lines of command and control."\textsuperscript{784} In other words, command and control should remain a military, not civilian, matter. Armitage also argued that the DoD proposal would accomplish everything that the Senate bill would, but was not "an imposed solution'' and would not "serve to reinforce the subliminal wall between SOF and the rest of the military'' like the Senate proposal might.\textsuperscript{785}

More important to DoD than the effects of the legislation on the military was its challenge to the sovereignty of DoD and the executive branch over the details of defense policy.\textsuperscript{786} The 1986 legislation was unusual in that it addressed details that regularly would be decided by DoD alone. It also interfered with the composition of the President's staff by mandating the formation of a board on the National Security Council to address SOF issues.\textsuperscript{787} OSD understood that the congressional proposals would lead to a loss of its control over SOF matters.\textsuperscript{788} Such elements of the legislation directly challenged the Administration's autonomy.

The Administration was quick to express its displeasure with the points of the legislation that challenged the executive branch's authority and autonomy. The cosponsors of the 1986 bill received a letter from Reagan's National Security Advisor, Adm. Pointdexter, in which he said "I urge you to reconsider the need for this restrictive detailed

\textsuperscript{783} Weinberger said of the issue in January, "I don't think it's a panacea to put [SOF] all in together and just have one leader of the whole thing." He instead proposed "more intensive training, better equipment," and "more forward deployment."(George Wilson, "Weinberger Hits Special Forces Plan," \textit{Washington Post}, Jan. 14, 1986: A5.)
\textsuperscript{784} Odorizzi, "SOF Reorganization: Everyone Has a Plan- Senate, House, and DoD," p. 18.
\textsuperscript{785} Odorizzi, "SOF Reorganization: Everyone Has a Plan- Senate, House, and DoD," p. 18.
\textsuperscript{786} DoD's counter-proposal to the House and Senate plans was careful to leave out any changes that would affect either OSD or the executive branch as a whole. It kept the ASD ISA as the key civilian oversight position and did not involve the National Security Council.
\textsuperscript{787} Koren, "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," p. 62.
legislation on this sensitive issue. [It would present potential constitutional problems because it would impermissibly limit the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.]{789}

Several legislators were also uncomfortable with the level of interference in military affairs and DoD that S. 2453 represented. Sen. Chaffee (R-RI), for example, noted that he was quite reluctant to mandate new commands for the military. He said, "It is far preferable to me it seems to work out these matters with the Pentagon and let them take the initiative." Chaffee here reflected the Administration's thinking on the issue and questioned the need for the legislation in the first place. Sen. Cohen answered him, arguing,

It was this legislation and indeed the threat of legislation that has moved the Pentagon to do anything. I would quite agree with the Senator that this sort of organizational effort ought to take place within the Department of Defense. The fact is that it has not.... We are no better off today than we were 6 years ago.... So I say yes, this legislation is necessary because [DoD] has not moved quickly enough. In fact, the proposal does not go nearly far enough to satisfy this particular Senator.}{790}

Sen. Cohen and his allies were eventually victorious, and they passed the 1986 legislation against the wishes of the Administration. The Administration registered its displeasure with the reorganization measures by working against their successful implementation. As Koch testified before the SASC in April of 1987, DoD continued to do all that it could to "subvert" the goals of the 1986 legislation.}{791}

The Administration's attempt to undermine the 1986 legislation centered on its resistance to the new office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LIC (ASD SO/LIC). OSD did not favor the creation of the office, which it saw as excessive congressional meddling into OSD affairs. According to one official from within DoD, anyone who supported the creation of this new position was labelled as at traitor to the Department. Because of disdain for this new position, OSD civilians, backed by the Administration, did all they could to delay the nomination of a viable candidate for ASD SO/LIC.}{792}

On June 9, seven months after Congress passed the SOF reform legislation, the Administration nominated Kenneth Bergquist to be ASD SO/LIC. This nomination by no

{790} "(Text of SOF hearing of Aug. 6, 1986)," p. S 10542. Sen. Nunn sought to further sway Sen. Chaffee by pointing out that Congress had, in fact, created new commands in the past. Nunn said, "You may recall that [it] was only through the initiation of the Senate and the House that we established a separate command for the rapid deployment force." (p. S 10543.)
{792} Shultz Jr., "Low-Intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and Lessons from the Reagan Years," pp. 60-61. Koch blames OSD for the failure to offer a good candidate for ASD SO/LIC. He quotes Nunn, who said, "Why is Congress micromanaging the operations of the Department of Defense [on this matter]?... The reason is because the executive branch is not managing it, and that is a regrettable statement of fact." (Koch, "Objecting to Reality: The Struggle to Restore U.S. Special Operations Forces," p. 72.)
means ended congressional complaints, however. Members of the HASC and SASC were convinced that the only reason Bergquist was nominated was because he opposed the reorganization legislation, and they told the Reagan Administration that his nomination should be withdrawn. The Senate was also aware that Bergquist was fifth on ASD ISA Armitage's list of possible candidates. Adding to congressional ire was testimony by a former DoD official who said that "Pentagon officials had instructed the staff to 'slow roll' the draft of a charter for the new office so that Mr. Bergquist wouldn't have to face questions about it during his confirmation." Bergquist's nomination was not successful, and the Administration was forced to offer another candidate. In the interim, the Congress circumvented the Administration by appointing the Secretary of the Army as acting ASD SO/LIC in spring of 1988. Finally, 16 months after the secretary position was created, it was filled by Charles Whitehouse. In describing the reaction to the creation of his job, Whitehouse equated it with the "discomfort in any large organization when significant changes are made and authorities are affected by the creation of something new." He said that adding to this discomfort was "the resentment of people who felt it was not appropriate for the Congress to legislate the creation of a command or a job like this and spell out in great [detail] what the responsibilities of these offices were." The people who Whitehouse spoke of here were civilians within OSD as well as military officers throughout the Pentagon.

The Administration's behavior concerning the nomination of a candidate for ASD SO/LIC was not unique. Instead, it was indicative of its overall approach to the 1986 legislation. For example, by the end of 1987, all of the staff positions below the ASD SO/LIC created by the legislation remained unfilled. As for the man assigned as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs for LIC by the White House, he was an admiral with no SOF experience. His deputy was an Air Force colonel with a similar dearth of SOF involvement in his background. As of 1990, the NSC's Board for LIC had never been convened and some agencies, such as the CIA, appeared unwilling to send representatives to its meetings should it ever hold any.

In summary, implementation of the SOF reorganization legislation became a struggle for Congress against not only the military but the Administration as well. SOCOM and the

ASD SO/LIC had to be "crammed down the throat" of the Administration by Congress.\textsuperscript{798} The \textit{New York Times} depicted this dispute as "one of several involving what some Reagan Administration officials deride as 'micro-management' by Congressional committees."\textsuperscript{799} The military therefore had a firm ally in the Administration against congressional meddling on the SOF issue. The poor level of civilian unity that this represented greatly facilitated the military's efforts to resist civilian-sponsored innovation. Without the Reagan Administration running interference, the military would have had a much more difficult time of stalling the implementation of the 1986 legislation. Had Reagan and Weinberger been committed to SOF reorganization, the further legislation passed by Congress in 1987 and 1988 may never have even been necessary. Fortunately for SOF proponents, unity within Congress was high enough for Congress to oppose both the military and the Administration in its effort to revitalize US SOF.

\section*{TACTICS USED BY CIVILIANS}

Civilians, Congress in particular, relied on an assortment of tactics in order to overcome resistance posed by the military to SOF revitalization and reorganization. Civilian tactics were also used by Congress against an obstructive Administration almost as often as they were against the military.

\subsection*{DIRECT LEGISLATION}

The most significant tactic employed by Congress was direct legislation. Through a series of laws during the 1980s, Congress provided the military and the Administration with a legal mandate for bolstering US SOF. The main example of this the was 1986 legislation, which, among other things, created SOCOM. Congress went to great lengths in this legislation to avoid any ambiguities that the military could use to fake an ignorance of the purpose of the law. Congress was therefore "unusually specific" in the wording of the 1986 legislation. As the Joint Explanatory Statement issued by the conference committee explained,

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\textsuperscript{798} Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.  \\
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The conferees carefully considered the degree of specificity to include in this provision. Although several elements of this provision are more specific than may normally be expected in legislation, the conferees determined that the seriousness of the problems and the ability or the unwillingness of the Department of Defense to solve them left no alternative.  

The ability to legislate change was obviously the most important and influential tactic used by civilians in this instance of forced innovation, but other tactics were required to overcome military and Administration efforts to get around the legal mandate that Congress had supplied.

**ALTER INCENTIVE SYSTEM**

The Congress relied to a limited extent on coercion. One form of this tactic was the decision by Congress to hold resources hostage until its directives were met. For example, Congress once held up military funds until SOF programs deleted by the military were restored. Similarly, in the dispute with DoD over its failure to fill the position of ASD SO/LIC, Sens. Cohen and Kennedy announced that until a candidate was nominated, they would hold up all other military appointments. This tactic was important in that it forced the military and the Administration to pay a price for their resistance. As the military's willingness to sacrifice its resources in order to fight SOF reforms was limited, it usually bent to congressional demands in the end. The Administration, faced with a less-severe threat, tended to take longer to come around, as the ASD SO/LIC incident illustrates.

**CREATE OVERSIGHT BOARDS/ACQUIRE MILITARY EXPERTISE**

Another tactic that civilians employed against the military in the struggle over SOF reform was the use of oversight boards to monitor the health of SOF. The most important of these boards was, and is, the Special Operations Advisory Group (SOPAG). Formed in response to the Holloway Report, SOPAG is chaired by Lt. Gen. Wilson, one of Merrill's Marauders in WWII, and includes Gen. Landsdale, a legend in the field of counterinsurgency, and other veterans of unconventional operations and covert campaigns. It is also filled with retired flag-rank officers, including some former service chiefs. During the reorganization movement, SOPAG denied JCS a monopoly on military

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expertise and made ridicule of the civilian proposals regarding SOF difficult. The members of SOPAG saw the need for the revitalization of SOF and "made this clear time after time by confuting the objections of their former colleagues still on active duty."802

SOPAG has been able to raise both the status and awareness of SOF within DoD. The group meets regularly with the Secretary of Defense to consult him on SOF matters. SOPAG has been quite careful, however, to maintain a relatively low status for itself. Its chair, Lt. Gen. Wilson, stresses that from the outset SOPAG has sought the lowest possible profile in order to maintain its credibility and avoid appearing as a bureaucratic threat to the military and JCS. SOPAG operates by means of quiet briefings and avoids grandstanding at all costs. This approach, combined with an effort from the beginning to open lines of communication with the military in an attempt to find some common ground, has somewhat ameliorated the military's initial hostility to SOPAG.803

Congress also formed its own internal SOF oversight board. In May of 1984, Congress created a Special Operations Panel under the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. (This was the logical location for such a board, as Rep. Daniel was the Chairman of the Subcommittee.) The purpose of the panel was to make sure that SOF money allocated by Congress was spent on the projects it was earmarked for in the required time period.804

The 1986 closed-door testimony before the HASC and SASC that featured active and retired officials involved with LIC and SOF served, in effect, as a one-time advisory board for civilians. As with SOPAG, these hearings benefitted from the expertise of retired military personnel. Among those testifying were several generals, including Meyer, a longtime SOF supporter. According to one observer, "These men provided broad and credible support to the congressional attempt to highlight deficiencies in SOF and LIC and to the correction of these deficiencies through legislation."805 Among the most important testimony of the hearings was that of Maj. Gen. Scholtes, who had commanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) during the Grenada operation. Scholtes highlighted the problems that SOF faced during that mission. Noel Koch also submitted a letter to the hearings, recounting his problems with trying to improve SOF capabilities. It concluded, "I am watching the same predominantly selfish interests at work, and I have no doubt that

803 Interview with Lt. Gen. Samuel Wilson. As evidence of SOPAG's efforts to maintain a low profile, Gen. Wilson noted that I was the first person outside of DoD that he had ever spoken to about SOPAG.
their success can only lead somewhere, sometime to a replay of Beirut, October 23. As the why civilians intervened section discussed, these hearings helped to solidify Senate support for reorganization legislation and represent a successful use of the civilian tactic of utilizing oversight boards and retired military personnel.

In summary, civilians relied primarily on the powerful tactic of direct legislation in order to give the military its marching orders with regards to SOF. When the military dragged its feet or went off in the wrong direction, civilians then employed other tactics to assure that their original mandates were being met. This combination of tactics allowed Congress to eventually overcome the efforts of the military and the Administration to resist SOF reorganization.

TACTICS USED BY THE MILITARY

The military employed a number of tactics both to convince civilians that their intervention was not necessary and to blunt the effects of such intervention when it did occur. The three most prevalent tactics were window-dressing, delay, and budget manipulation.

WINDOW-DRESSING

Throughout the 1980s, the military used the tactic of window-dressing in an attempt to show civilians that it was taking the required steps to improve SOF capabilities, when, in fact, the changes offered by the military were largely cosmetic. There are many examples of this tactic. In February of 1982, responding to pressure from the Administration, the Air Force created the 1st Special Operations Group. As one SOF observer noted, "The organization was created in name only and although it did have a small staff it was never an effective organization."

806  Koren, "Congress Wades Into Special Operations," pp. 68-69. This was the date that the US Marine barracks in Beirut was destroyed.
807  The SOF case does not have as strong a trend of the military stressing the use of other organizations to perform the SOF missions that civilians were concerned about because, unlike in the drug war case, the military did not want to lose these missions, it just did not want to perform them in the way that civilians wanted.
808  Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz (Here Adams cites "information supplied under the FOIA by the Department of the Air Force, 12 October 1983.")
An example of window-dressing on a larger scale was the creation in 1984 of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). Ostensibly, JSOA was intended to coordinate all SOF programs. In reality, it served as a half-hearted attempt to satisfy civilians without having to really make any changes. With a staff of sixty-one, JSOA was a coordinator with no role in operational command and no budgetary control. It did not offer a means to avoid the SOF coordination problems experienced in past missions. As one congressional staffer put it, any special operation would still require many different units to be thrown together in a disorganized group where "the first thing they would do is hold a get-acquainted social." The state of doctrinal and operational tactic development was still poor to nonexistent in many areas. Movies, television, and open press sabotage manuals were often used to provide much-needed guidance. In other words, the existence of JSOA did not represent an improvement in US SOF capabilities.

Even with its impotence, the services were against the creation of JSOA. As one senior Pentagon official noted,

If you have JSOA then you have accepted that special operations forces are needed, which of course they [the services] did not want. Once they accepted that Special Operations Forces was the way of the future, the whole rationale behind the huge tri-service investment in conventional systems was brought into question. In order to assure the weakness of JSOA, the military named Marine Corps General Wesley Rice, a two-star, as its head. Given that all generals on the JCS staff were three-stars, JSOA was guaranteed low status and no power when dealing with the services. Rice could not hope to command the respect or cooperation of the three-stars and above. In 1986, Gen. Rice spoke about his role as head of JSOA. He said "I had many responsibilities but I had little authority.... I ran a management staff but exercised no real control over special operations... As a two-star general, I had little clout in a town of three- and four-star generals." He also had little ability to affect change in SOF, which was fine with the military leadership.

As writer James Adams describes the creation of the 1st Special Operations Group and of JSOA, they were "classic bureaucratic" maneuvers by the services. He adds that the services

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810 Cited in Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz, p. 263. This attitude offers another reason why the military did not give ground to civilians on the SOF issue in order to protect its autonomy.
811 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.
simply created a number of high-profile, high-sounding new commands to make it appear a great deal was being done.... Additional layers of bureaucracy and an increase in numbers disguised a lack of willingness in the JCS and senior service commanders to divert the money from other projects necessary to fund the training and equipment that would give real muscle to the new commands. Thus, with consummate political judgement, the JCS used every opportunity to publicly proclaim their support for special operations.813

The military also used the window-dressing tactic when it came to the SOF budget. It would promise Congress that it was budgeting adequate funds for SOF programs, when in fact it was cutting SOF money. OSD's unwillingness to force the military to spend specific funds for SOF facilitated the use of this tactic. As Armed Forces Journal International described one instance in 1986,

One source told AFJ that despite the Pentagon's April testimony on what it planned to spend on SOF airlift, OSD still has not clearly directed the Services to put new money in for SOF airlift. The source likened the Pentagon's April testimony to an 'April Fool's package,' because the Pentagon 'is telling Congress one thing and then going off in a different direction.'814

Even the way in which the military created SOCOM contained shades of window-dressing. Rather than constructing the new command out of people experienced in SOF, the military formed SOCOM by dissolving the Readiness Command (REDCOM), which was never a favorite of the military, and used it as the base upon which to build SOCOM. Many members of REDCOM, who had no SOF training, were simply moved into SOCOM. As Koch describes it, the formation of SOCOM was nothing more than "a paper shuffle," with the military "changing the name of a command and sprinkling a handful of special operations personnel among the staff."815

Although the window-dressing tactic allowed the military to occasionally buy some time in its struggle with Congress, in the end this usually only incited further congressional intervention. Once civilians realized that the military was not living up to its claims in the area of SOF, it became more obvious that the military could not deal with this issue on its own. This left civilian intervention as the only viable option for affecting change for the better for SOF. The military disunity created by the SOF community assured the fact that civilians would have access to information about what the military was really doing and therefore helped to undermine all window-dressing efforts.816

816 The string of SOF failures during the early and mid-eighties also made window-dressing difficult because these operational insufficiencies highlighted persisting problems.
DELAY

Another tactic of resistance popular with the military was delay. The military consistently stretched out the implementation of congressional mandates as long as possible, seemingly in hopes that civilian interest in SOF revitalization would fade away.817

The way in which the military dealt with an unclassified memo, circulated by Weinberger in 1983, that called on JCS to improve SOF capabilities, is one example of the delay tactic. As Koch describes it, "Senior officers responsible for approving the unclassified memorandum eventually refused to take telephone calls from officials of OSD whose responsibility was to issue that memorandum." When confronted from time to time, these officers lied and said that the memo was still making its way across the required desks in the Pentagon, when in fact in was probably sitting in a drawer somewhere.818

A classic example of the delay tactic is found in the JCS effort to seek options to deal with SOF problems that it recognized during a closed door meeting 1982. The content of this meeting was leaked to SOF supporters in OSD, so JCS could not simply ignore their own findings. Instead, they set out to examine the problem by a circuitous route. As Koch relates events, the JCS staff was assigned the task of looking into the matter with the understanding that there was no rush. The staff talked to everyone in the military who could possibly have an interest in SOF and did all that it could to drag out the process of coming up with options for SOF reform. OSD, thanks to its sources within JCS, was able to keep close tabs on the repeated efforts to end the revitalization process that arose during the course of the study. OSD prodded JCS from time to time to hurry up and eventually set a deadline of June, 1983, for completion of the study. The Joint Staff drew up a list of options that, for the most part, were either openly destructive to the SOF revitalization effort, or were so far-fetched as to have no chance of being approved by OSD. OSD got a hold of this list from its inside sources. It headed off the staff's strategy by sending a memo to the JCS reminding them of the seriousness of the SOF issue and providing minimum criteria for any solution. The memo, sent October 3, was purposefully

817 Occasionally, it was more the case that the military hoped it could wait out the relevant civilians' terms of office. As one SOF officer observed, "The Navy leadership ignored repeated Secretary of Defense direction to carry out the order to reassign SEALs [to SOCOM], stonewalling until Frank Carlucci replaced Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of Defense, only to be disappointed by his reaffirming the order." (Foster, "Pentagon Slow-Rollers Stymie SOF Improvements," p. 98.)
constructed so as to invalidate all of the staff's unconstructive options. On October 14, mindful of the OSD memo, JCS approved a new staff proposal to create the JSOA and informed OSD of their decision. As Koch summarizes this episode, "But for the need to humor the military bureaucracy, the whole business could have been concluded a week after the chiefs' original concession of inadequacy on November 19, 1982." 819

The delay tactic was also used by OSD and the military to slow the implementation of the 1986 legislation. A prime example of this is the delay in nominating a viable candidate for the ASD SO/LIC position. This led Sen. Cohen to complain that the Pentagon was clearly guilty of "foot dragging -- doing everything conceivably possible to delay" meeting the legislation's mandates. 820 It also led to additional legislation by Congress in 1987 and 1988. As with the tactic of window-dressing, delay often served only to frustrate Congress into further intervening in order to overcome the military's resistance. The fact that congressmen leading the SOF reform movement were driven not by political expediency but by a real concern over the issue made it unlikely that the military could wait out civilian intervention until the whole issue of SOF blew over. Cohen, Nunn, Daniel, and others were not going to forget about SOF problems.

BUDGET REPROGRAMMING

The military made frequent use of the tactic of budget manipulation during the 1980s in order to circumvent civilian efforts to provide SOF with more funding. For example, the military repeatedly took money that had been allocated for specific SOF programs and reprogrammed these funds, using them instead on projects more to the liking of the services. 821

An excellent example of the use of budget manipulation to stunt SOF revitalization is the manner in which Military Airlift Command (MAC) treated SOF aviation programs. MAC's behavior highlighted both the disdain that the regular military had for SOF budget needs and its continued determination to resist these claims. MAC ranks all of its budget items in terms of relative priority, and the priority placed on SOF air programs dropped even as the revitalization progressed. The MC-130, for example, ranked 50th on MAC's FY86-90 list, then 61st for FY87-91, and finally dropped to 65 for FY88-92. The day-to-day operations of MAC SOF air assets also dropped from 47th to 64th during the same

period, while the HH-53 Pave Low helicopter dropped from 51st to 129th.\textsuperscript{822} MAC CINC Gen. Cassidy explained his organization’s priorities by saying that "the only way MAC can recommend funding a new program is by scrubbing the Air Staff program for excess dollars, or by cutting deeply into our basic combat capability."\textsuperscript{823} To this explanation \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} sarcastically asked what could be more relevant to MAC’s "combat capability" than its SOF assets. The message from MAC here was loud and clear: SOF airlift assets cost money, and the military would rather spend these funds on projects it found more favorable.

One of the main goals of the 1986 legislation, which formed SOCOM, and the 1987 law, which created Major Force Program 11, was to protect SOF funding from such debilitating practices. Even after these steps were taken, however, the services were still trying to play games with SOF funding. In December of 1988, when the services made budget cuts they slashed SOF funds by a full third. Obviously unhappy with this, Gen. Lindsay, CINCSOCOM, and Army Secretary Marsh, an SOF supporter, led the successful fight to get all SOCOM funding restored.\textsuperscript{824} Alluding to these moves, Rep. Kasich said, "The Pentagon has tried to figure out some more ways to get around congressional intent. It shows arrogance." Kasich suggested that "in the next Congress we will once again have to mandate Program 11."\textsuperscript{825}

Although the 1986 legislation did create a specific budget category for SOF, as of 1988, Gen. Lindsay did not have full budget authority. He was "an active partner" in creating the FY90-91 budgets and was "musterling the manpower and expertise to pull together his own budget" the following year.\textsuperscript{826} Until then, however, the services still had extensive influence over a SOCOM budget that was only protected by periodic civilian intervention.

Part of the problem that SOCOM had in formulating its early budgets lay in the staff that the military assigned to the new command. Many personnel were hold-overs from the

\textsuperscript{822} To put these priority figures into perspective, in the FY85 budget, MAC priorities 53 and 54 dealt with providing transportation for Air Force officials and 60, just one behind SOF lift that year, was a program that modernized aircraft used to spray Agent Orange during the Vietnam war. (Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of SAS, Delta Force, and Spetsnaz, p. 268, citing Military Logistics Forum, April 1986, p. 41.) Koch, in his many articles on SOF, blames such tactics for the poor state of SOF aviation programs, as do other observers. Benjamin Schenmer offers a different view. He shows that even after SOCOM gained a greater control over its budget, the delays and cost overruns continued, not because of any purposeful moves by the military, but for the same reasons that nearly all procurement programs experience delays and overruns. (Benjamin Schenmer, "Four New SOF Aircraft are Late and Way Over cost, But...," \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} July, 1991: 42-44.)

\textsuperscript{823} Meyer and Schenmer, "Congressional Pressure May Force Far More DoD Dollars for Special Ops," p. 20.

\textsuperscript{824} Dudney, "Toward a Fifth Armed Service?," p. 24 and Capaccio, "Pentagon Accused of Delaying on Budget Role for Commando Chief," p. 2.

\textsuperscript{825} Capaccio, "Pentagon Accused of Delaying on Budget Role for Commando Chief," p. 2.

\textsuperscript{826} Capaccio, "Pentagon Accused of Delaying on Budget Role for Commando Chief," p. 2.
defunct REDCOM. Not only did the SOCOM staff have little in the way of SOF background, they had "absolutely no program planning or budget background." As a result, once Congress finally forced the services to give SOCOM command over its own budget, SOCOM found that it did not "have a budget department manned, trained, or equipped to participate in the complex DoD budget process."827 Because of this, SOCOM's ability to escape the influence of the services and their attempts to whittle away the SOF budget was somewhat compromised.

As late as 1989, SOCOM's budget was still under attack. At one observer noted at the time,

SOF budget dollars are neither as extensive nor protected as administration assurances suggest; the Program 11... funds are still administered by the services; and competition within the services for overall priorities is, if anything, more intense than ever. There is very much a sense that the SOF community is racing against time, that the funds will soon dry up, and that if it engages in protracted R&D, it will likely realize no ultimate benefit.828

A 1990 GAO report supports this view of the SOCOM budget predicament. It found that the funding requested for FY90 and FY91 represented "the viewpoints of each of the services... not the joint perspective of the Command." Part of the reason for this was that SOCOM did not develop and validate worldwide SOF requirements until June of 1991. For FY90, SOF funding was spread throughout the 10 major force programs that existed before Congress created Program 11. For FY91, except for personnel appropriations accounts, all SOF funds were contained in MFP 11, allowing SOCOM, not the services, to control the funding of SOF.829 GAO concluded that once SOCOM's validation was complete, SOCOM should be able "to choose its future weapons and equipment on a better and more impartial basis rather than to accept candidates that reflect service advocacy and parochialism."830 Such validation is now complete, and, according to Gen. Stiner, the present CINCSOCOM, "The budget authority has dramatically enhanced oversight of all special operations forces requirements and programs."831 Gen. Woerner cites SOCOM's successful control of its own budget as the major result of SOF reform, for this ultimately denied the services their most powerful tool for controlling SOF.832

828 Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, p. 29.
830 GAO, "Special Operations Command: Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates," p. 27.
832 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.
In summary, the tactics used by the military to resist civilian effort to force innovation all failed in the end. Although these tactics did delay the implementation of civilian mandates, they also angered Congress and brought about further intervention that could have been avoided had the military chosen to accept its fate.

THE SOF CASE: A FINAL ASSESSMENT

Who really won this case of forced innovation, civilians trying to improve the standing of SOF, or the military, who sought to maintain SOF's peripheral status? It seems clear that through the tactic of direct legislation, civilians have been able to create the organs that they felt were needed to give the US potent SOF capabilities. Just the fact that SOCOM exists today stands as evidence that the military was not successful in its efforts to resist civilian intervention. The question that remains is whether or not civilians, in forcing innovation upon the military, have achieved their ultimate goal of creating a robust SOF capability.

There can be no denying that US SOF capability is generally in much better shape as of 1992 than it was at the beginning of the revitalization process. Personnel and funding levels have both improved dramatically. More importantly, civilians succeeded in creating a unified command specifically for SOF. SOCOM and its budget authority have facilitated and improved SOF training, doctrinal development, equipment R&D, weapons procurement, and personnel retention and promotion. SOCOM has given SOF a sense of permanence and has gone a long way towards freeing SOF from the cycle of neglect and rebirth that has long plagued the special warfare community. A more rigorous assessment of the achievement of the whole revitalization and reorganization effort requires the examination of some specific symptoms of the organizational health of SOF: budget control, status in the defense bureaucracy, career image and promotions, and performance of SOF in the field.

One area that has long been symptomatic of the problems plaguing SOF is the SOF budget, which the services constantly raided in order to fund more popular programs. For civilian revitalization and reorganization efforts to be deemed successful, the budget picture needs to have improved. As the above section noted, since SOCOM has gained full control of all aspects of SOF budgeting, an independent SOF budget, relatively secure from the grasp of the services, has, in fact, been established. A recent Aviation Week and Space Technology article noted that "the SOF budget is being protected from funding cutbacks
and will remain constant at about $3 billion a year, with just enough [increases] to cover inflation." This stability represents an important milestone in civilian effort to improve US SOF assets and is even more impressive when viewed in the light of rapidly declining budgets elsewhere in the military.

The results of reorganization efforts to improve the status of SOF within OSD, the government, and the military are mixed. Some people feel that the CINCSOCOM needs to be more of a player when working with the other CINCs in order to assure that SOCOM's voice is heard. The ASD SO/LIC has not exhibited much power to date and his influence on policy decisions has been questionable to non-existent. However, other observers now feel that after a slow start he is slowly gaining the respect of the military and the rest of OSD. SOCOM's weight in Congress and with the administration has yet to convince everyone of the success of the 1986 legislation in this respect. On the positive side, the Secretary of Defense and the president are now more aware of the existence, capabilities, and limitations of SOF and now tend to look to SOF first, rather than as a last resort, in crises. It should be noted that SOCOM's and the ASD SO/LIC's voice has been growing louder as of late and improvement to desired levels may just be a matter of time.

Another indicator of the overall health of SOF is the how SOF is viewed as a career path. The image of SOF as a career and SOF promotion possibilities were both unencouraging during much of the 1980s. Service in the SOF was often viewed as the kiss of death for one's career, and the ability of the SOF community to populate the higher levels of the military leadership with its own people was low. In 1983, Lt. Col. Gole stated,

Career concerns cause US Army officers to pause at the prospect of getting out of the 'mainstream.' To invest time and energy in special operations was -- and continues to be -- a career gamble. Ambitious officers with stars in their eyes should stick to conventional command assignments and prestigious staff jobs with 'high visibility.' Psychological operations are for the poet or career

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834 Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.
835 Interestingly, the present ASD SO/LIC is one of the very few top-level DoD civilians that the new Clinton Administration decided to keep on from the Bush DoD lineup. This consistency should serve to bolster the ASD SO/LIC position.
deviant; Special Forces are for hopeless romantics; long-range reconnaissance is a sideshow.\textsuperscript{836}

In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in 1984, Koch complained that SOF personnel rarely attained the rank of brigadier and never went higher. Given the promotions rates, SOF was viewed as a poor career move and was not surprisingly avoided by many ambitious young officers.\textsuperscript{837} This situation contrasted glaringly with the Israeli and British militaries, where service in special forces is often "a fast track for promotion."\textsuperscript{838} Removing the stigma of SOF service that existed in the US military and replacing it with an attitude similar to that exhibited in Israel and Great Britain was clearly a task that the revitalization movement needed to undertake.

As of 1992, the career prospects for SOF personnel have certainly improved. SOF officers now hold flag rank, and SOF service is no longer seen as poor career choice. One SOF officer interviewed expressed a very positive view of the personnel improvement brought about by the 1986 legislation. He noted that promotion opportunities and chances for fellowships and temporary academic assignment have all improved noticeably.\textsuperscript{839} Are there are still problems? One SOF observer and critic, John Brennan, argues that "except in the Navy, career special operations officers appear to be shortchanged for promotion to general/flag officer, and key special operations officer billets do not seem to require officers with SOF experience." Brennan cites CINCSOCOM Gen. Stiner as one such officer whose SOF experience is inadequate. He asks, "Is this the result of a short-sighted policy that fails to recognize the need for SOF expertise, or is it an attempt to ensure control of SOF by conventional leaders?"\textsuperscript{840} Gen. Woerner answers this question by pointing out that the situation is much more complex than Brennan depicts it to be and one cannot criticize the choice for CINCSOCOM purely on the grounds of the candidate's SOF experience. Woerner argues, for example, that Gen. Lindsay was the ideal choice for the first CINCSOCOM, even though he was from light infantry and was not a career SOF man. Lindsay bridged the gap between light infantry and SOF well, and his strong infantry background won him the trust of many in the conventional forces, while his willingness to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{836}{Lt. Col. Henry Gole, "Review of US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins," \textit{Parameters} Sept., 1983: 93. In hopes of solving this problem, Army Chief of Staff and SOF supporter Gen. Meyer in 1982 "designated Special Operations a 'career field,' allowing SOF officers to compete for promotion with other SOF personnel, rather than with all other specializations." ("America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces," p. 8.) This move was quite similar to that by General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff in early 1960, to enhance the promotion chances of advisors relative to combat personnel. As with this earlier effort to protect the promotion rates of SOF members, Meyer's move made little noticeable difference.}
\footnote{838}{See discussion following Pezelz, "Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s," p. 157.}
\footnote{839}{Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.}
\footnote{840}{Brennan, "Special Ops Generals (letter to the editor)," pp. 6-7.}
\end{footnotes}
listen made him valuable to SOF. Had the CINCSOCOM been promoted from within SOF instead, it might have been even harder for the conventional forces to accept SOCOM’s existence.  

The full effects of civilian intervention on the attractiveness of SOF as a career path cannot be judged yet. It will take time for SOF members to reach the upper echelons of the military and for the problems raised by Drennan to be worked out. Although a final judgement cannot yet be made, it is certain that civilian efforts to renovate US SOF assets has made a definite improvement in the attractiveness of SOF as a career choice, thus facilitating the attraction and retention of quality personnel. It is also clear that promotion rates for SOF have improved to be at least equal to those existing elsewhere in the military.

The final, and most important, indicator of the level of success attained by civilian intervention is the ability of US SOF to conduct missions. The failure of these forces in the past was the most important impetus for civilian action in the first place, and all of the changes that have occurred with regards to SOF would be for nought if SOF performance had not improved.

One of the most common reasons for SOF failures in the past has been the misuse of SOF assets by military leadership during combat. For civilian efforts to have truly succeeded, such instances would need to have come to an end or at least decreased significantly. The misuse of elite units has a long and ignoble history. Examples of specially-trained units employed as regular infantry are far too common. The well-known use of Ranger units in World War II in a static defense role lead to a military disaster. Similarly, in Vietnam, mobile special operations strike forces were occasionally used as conventional infantry for long periods. Roger Pezzelle contended in 1984 that "since they were conceived in 1952, the military capabilities to conduct unconventional warfare have not been used for that purpose." Such use of these valuable assets signals a continued misunderstanding by military leadership as to how to use SOF units.

The performance of US SOF in the 1983 invasion of Grenada showed that the revitalization movement still had a long way to go. SOF assets were used for several missions, many of which forced SOF personnel to act as nothing more than underarmed infantry and several of which ended in tragedy. The entire operation illustrated the failure

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841 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.
842 As there have been no public disclosures of SOF use for hostage rescues or covert LIC mission, I will have to base my assessment of SOF performance on comparative SOF employment in operations that primarily assisted conventional forces: the invasions of Grenada and Panama and Operation Desert Storm.
843 See Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, for numerous other examples of misused elite forces.
of JCS to understand the proper role of SOF and the inability of a weak JSOC, then in charge of SOF, to see to it that SOF assets were used properly. In the 1989 invasion of Panama, SOF forces were employed more intelligently, but there were still instances of SOF used inappropriately as light infantry.

The most recent case in which SOF were used against hostile forces on a large scale was in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The war with Iraq represented the largest deployment of SOF assets in history. During and preceding the war, SOF conducted a full range of missions, from deep reconnaissance and raids, to psychological operations and the training of coalition partners. There is no public evidence of SOF being employed in an improper fashion similar to the Grenada and Panama actions.

In terms of the level of acceptance enjoyed by SOF during operations, SOF suffered from the traditional biases at the beginning of Desert Shield, but by the time fighting

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847 For an account of SOF in Grenada that draws the opposite conclusion of the majority of the literature, see Daniel Bolger, "Special Operations and the Grenada Campaign," Parameters, December, 1988: 49-61. It is somewhat disturbing that this article, with so many factual mistakes and misleading portrayals of SOF operations in Grenada, could appear in a journal like Parameters. Hopefully, the fact that the article was written in 1988, before many of the details of the operation were made public, accounts for the author's disturbing inaccuracies.

In an interesting twist, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman places part of the confused use of military assets in Grenada on "Senator Nunn and the Armed Services Committee," who "ordered that additional elements from the army and air force be added to the navy and marines" in the name of jointness. (John Lehman, Malting War, (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1992), p. 111.)

848 For a critical account of the way that SOF, SEALs in particular, were used during the Panama invasion, see Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High-tech Invasion of Panama (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). The perfect example of the misuse of SOF forces was the SEAL raid on Pakilla Airport. A SEAL team was used as light infantry with inadequate firepower and backup and, as a result, suffered heavy casualties. McConnell blames this misuse on the Navy, who saw the SEALs as the only way to get in on the action, given that there was no time to deploy a Marine amphibious unit. (See Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High-tech Invasion of Panama (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 54-64.) For a favorable account of the use of Air Force SOF in Panama, see Maj. Gen. Thomas Eggars, "Today's Air Commandos: Air Force Special Operations Command," Military Review, June, 1991 14-21.


The one exception to this, if one wanted to be picky, was the assignment of combat search and rescue duties (CSAR) to SOF. They were given this task because their aircraft had the best ability to penetrate and navigate enemy air space of any of the coalition aircraft in the area. SOF personnel had not prepared specifically for this mission, but the requirements of CSAR fit both the equipment and training of SOF air crews close enough that the assignment of this novel mission to SOF cannot be viewed as a misuse of SOF assets. The main problem created by this tasking was that SOF aircraft were always in high demand and short supply. (See Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress," p. 5-5.)
started, CINCCENT Gen. Schwarzkopf allowed SOF an important role in the action. As
*Newsweek* depicted it,

Initially, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf had little enthusiasm for 'special ops.' A
firm believer in conventional warfare, Schwarzkopf angered commando officers
when he bumped them off military flights last August to rush tank forces to
Saudi Arabia. He vetoed proposals to infiltrate agents into Iraq to organize
dissidents. As the war progressed, however, Schwarzkopf gave the special
forces more latitude, increased their number to 8,000 -- and singled them out
for praise during his postwar news conference.  

The presence of competent and respected SOF commanders in the theater of operations
made it possible to convince Schwarzkopf of the true capabilities and merits of SOF.  
Without the infrastructure and organizational support afforded by SOCOM, it might have
been much more difficult to make Schwarzkopf a believer in SOF capabilities.

In summarizing the SOF experience in the Persian Gulf, CINCSOCOM Gen. Stiner
said,

The operational-level leadership from all of the services had an appreciation for
what SOF could contributed to the capabilities and the limitations of SOF for
preparing the battlefield and gathering intelligence before hostilities and during
each phase of the battle. As a result, SOF was successfully integrated into the
planning, preparation and combat phase of each operation.

Although the true picture of SOF use in Desert Storm is probably not quite as rosy as
Stiner depicts it, there can be no arguing the point that, when compared to the Grenada
operation, the use of SOF in the war with Iraq showed that many of the operational
problems that had long plagued SOF had improved, thanks to changes made possible by
civilian intervention. As time passes and SOCOM gains more experience, SOF personnel
attain higher rank, and several long-running procurement programs reach the production
stage, SOF should move closer to attaining the level of competence and capability that
civilians hoped to create.

Although the preceding section shows that civilians achieved many important victories
in this instance of forced innovation, the military did not come away from the struggle
completely empty-handed. The House proposal to put SOF into a separate service never
passed, much to the relief of the military. The creation of such a new service was "the
mother of all fears" for the military in 1986. Equally important, the fact that SOCOM does

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850 Hammer and Waller, "Special Ops: The Top-Secret War," p. 32.
851 Interview with Lt. Col. Russ Howard.
853 For a very optimistic view of the status of SOF today, see Dennis Steele, "The Special Forces Today: Few
Knuckledraggers, One Rambo," *Army* April, 1992: 35-38. In this article, SOF personnel note how much better
SOF are treated by the rest of the military than in the past.
not have operational control of SOF assets is seen as an important victory for the military in general and CINCs in particular. Had Congress granted such control to SOCOM, the military's worst fears with regards to battlefield autonomy would have been realized. Although the military did escape with operational control of SOF intact, this cannot be seen as a defeat for civilians, because such a realignment of operational command was not a critical aspect of the reorganization movement.

Thanks to civilian intervention, SOF have finally broken out of the cyclical pattern of attention and neglect that caused them to almost disappear in the early 1970s. Any future civilian-sponsored change regarding SOF need only fine-tune existing structures. Now, SOF can look forward to an era of relative stability, especially when compared to the cuts the conventional military is suffering through. Another factor that bodes well for the future of SOF is its involvement in relatively new mission areas that are growing in importance as the Cold War fades. As the last chapter discussed, SOF are at the forefront of drug interdiction and eradication efforts in Central and South America. SOF's "unique capabilities to work with foreign cultures" has also made them the frequent spearhead of international disaster relief operations, another area where the military is becoming more involved. Finally, SOF's language and cultural awareness make it a logical player in any future UN peacekeeping missions, which promise to grow in frequency and importance in the next few years.

In conclusion, civilians appear to have won this instance of forced innovation. Over the resistance of the military, they were able to create a new unified command and raise the resources and status accorded SOF. Even the most vocal critic of the military's resistance to revitalization and reorganization, Noel Koch, believed that by 1989 SOF had finally turned the corner towards respectability and self-sustainability. As he put it,

The Bush Administration inherited a special operations force capability much improved from that which had faced the Reagan administration. A structure for the oversight and management of these forces had been mandated by statute. As a career field, special operations had been legitimized, with the army making it a distinct branch. Special operations forces officers had been promoted to flag rank, a major breakthrough that would have salutary long-term consequences for perceptions of this aspect of military endeavor and of the men and women who engage in it.

Any shortcomings that remain in the capabilities and readiness of US SOF assets can be addressed by the existing SOCOM structure that Congress pushed into place in 1986.

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854 Interview with Gen. Fred Woerner.
Free from the need to fight for its own survival, the SOF community under the leadership of SOCOM can now focus on the development of the doctrine, tactics, and technology required to field an effective special operations capability in the US military. Should another SOF failure on the scale of Desert One occur in the future, the SOF community itself, and not the conventional military, would be held accountable. Hopefully, the civilian intervention that led to the SOF revitalization and reorganization of the 1980s will make such failures unlikely.

With the benefit of hindsight, was the decision by civilians to force innovation on the military for the sake of improving US SOF capabilities a good one? Civilian intervention in this case was driven by a genuine concern about the state of US SOF capabilities. Steps taken first by the Reagan Administration and later by Congress sought not to win political points but to address a serious shortcoming in the US military's force posture. Civilians intervened in order to force an innovation intended solely to improve military effectiveness. There was never an attempt to sacrifice military performance for political or social goals. In addition, there is a clear consensus that without such intervention the organizational biases of the military would have continued to make self-reform impossible. As a result, US SOF would have remained ineffective and under siege by the regular military.

The importance of having capable SOF lies in the high probability that the US will employ these forces in the future. International terrorism, for example, remains an unconventional threat that the US will have to address from time to time. The recent bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City underscores this fact. Because of the perceptions civilians hold about SOF, it is likely that they will call on these forces to perform many future special operations. Given this, it is critical that SOF be as well trained, equipped, led, and understood as possible in order to avoid a new series of operational failures that will cost American lives and prestige. Thus, the goal that civilians had in the 1980s of creating more credible and effective Special Operations Forces was an important one. If US SOF assets perform adequately when they are again called on, as they appear to have done in Desert Storm, then the struggle over forced innovation initiated by civilians will have definitely been worth the effort and civilians will have successfully borne the burden of proof that comes with the decision to force the military to innovate.
Chapter 4

Conclusions
ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCED INNOVATION FRAMEWORK

In this dissertation I have defined and explained the phenomenon of forced innovation. In doing so, I have developed a framework to examine instances of forced innovation, tested this framework by applying it to two cases, and offered a unique explanation for these cases.

My first case study, the military's drug interdiction mission, exhibited the characteristics of forced innovation that my framework predicts. Intense public concern with the drug problem, combined to a lesser extent with the personal interest that some members of Congress took in the issue, drove Congress to act. It turned to the military to address the drug problem because congressmen saw the armed forces as a valuable pool of resources whose employment would cost little yet still make an important political statement. Civilian unity on the matter was high enough to assure that the military would be saddled with some level of involvement in the drug war. Unity among civilians was not high enough, however, to allow proponents of more extreme proposals to force them on the military. For the military's part, its resistance to this innovation fell clearly along the dimensions of this innovation's conflict with the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. The high degree of unity that existed both across and within the services on this issue facilitated their ability to resist civilian intervention. My framework explained the disunity that did exist, namely SOUTHCOM's relatively favorable view of its antidrug duties, using the same variables that accounted for the rest of the military's distaste for its antidrug responsibilities. Changes in these factors combined with the civilian unity variable to explain the military's eventual decision to drop its resistance to the interdiction mission. The eventual outcome of this instance of forced innovation could have fallen anywhere between the possible extreme outcomes of no military involvement in drug interdiction and deep involvement, including the granting of arrest powers. In the end, the military found itself involved in the war on drugs, but only to a relatively minor, manageable extent.

The Special Operations Forces case is quite different from the drug interdiction case. However, it also exhibited characteristics that my framework predicts all instances of forced innovation should contain. Civilians intervened primarily because of the record of failure that US SOF had compiled in the early 1980s. A recognition of the increasing importance of low-intensity conflict -- a change in the strategic environment -- also
influenced civilians. Thus, intervention was driven by strategic factors and military failure. The lack of civilian unity between Congress and the Reagan Administration made forcing innovation much more difficult, as Congress had to contend with obstructionists in both the military and the White House. However, unity within the Congress was strong enough to pass the 1986 legislation that created SOCOM. The framework's professional identity, operational routine, autonomy, and budget variables provided a comprehensive picture of both why the military has never liked SOF and why it resisted this civilian-sponsored innovation. Military unity on the matter was not total, as the SOF community favored the attention it was getting, yet it could not work openly to push the services to change, and this, combined with the lack of SOF supporters at the JCS level, limited the effects of military disunity. Finally, the eventual outcome of this case, the creation of SOCOM, fell between the two extremes of no change and the creation of a separate SOF service. Compared to the interdiction case, the outcome here was much closer to the extreme favored by civilians.

My framework was able to account for all of the key factors that shaped the struggles over forced innovation in each of these case studies. It clearly answered the three most important questions about any instance of forced innovation: why did civilians intervene to force innovation, why did the military resist this innovation, and what influenced the eventual outcome of the civil-military tug of war over adoption of the innovation. In addition, the framework's tactic typology encompassed and underlined the various bureaucratic strategies that civilians and the military used in an attempt to shape this outcome to their liking. The framework therefore did an adequate job of explaining the origins, courses, and outcomes of the drug interdiction and Special Operations Forces cases. In doing so, it also passed the limited test of its accuracy that these two cases presented. The fact that these two cases are quite different from each other yet did not create a problem for my framework increases their value as tests of my approach to forced innovation.

My framework offers several valuable additions to the existing literature on military innovation. Its primary contribution is that it represents the first comprehensive attempt to define, explore, and explain civilian efforts to force the military to innovate in ways that it does not want to. I have therefore filled an existing hole in the literature. My framework also offers others a tool with which they can add to the literature on innovation by using the framework to examine past, present, and future cases of forced innovation in the manner
that I explored the drug interdiction and SOF cases here.\footnote{The fact that I did not address foreign examples of forced innovation suggests an interesting avenue of inquiry for people with a better working knowledge of non-US civil-military systems than I possess.} This dissertation is more than just another building block in the body of literature that supports inquiry in the field of political science, however. It also addresses existing tensions in this literature, most notably the difference of opinion between Posen and Rosen over whether or not civilians ever do, in fact, force the military to innovate.

The relevance of this dissertation’s insight into the Posen-Rosen debate is limited. As I made clear in Chapter 1, Rosen says that he is only concerned with "major innovations" that represent a "new theory of victory" as to how the next war will be won. My definition of innovation, on the other hand, is much broader and includes changes that have little to do -- at least directly -- with how the military fights. Thus, I look at numerous cases of forced innovation that Rosen would not call innovations at all. However, my SOF case appears to be an innovation by Rosen’s definition, as the formation of SOCOM arguably created a new combat arm and upgraded the concept of SOF operations at the expense of conventional operations. According to Rosen, these are hallmarks of a major innovation. Chapter 3 clearly demonstrated that without civilian intervention, SOF would have remained a backwater with a limited role in conventional and unconventional combat. The fact that civilians were critical in pushing SOF changes on the military undermines Rosen’s contention that civilians cannot force the military to innovate and supports Posen’s position.\footnote{Rosen might argue that the SOF case is an example of civilians merely providing the final small push necessary for innovation proponents within the military to achieve their goals, as was the case with the development of air-mobile warfare in the 1960s. However, as Chapter 3 showed, civilians did a lot more than merely sign off on plans developed by the SOF community.}

Although my work shows that Rosen is too absolute in his denial of a possible civilian role in military innovation, it does not totally contradict Rosen’s general message. As I discuss below, the doctrinal and operational innovations that Rosen is most concerned with are the hardest types of innovations for civilians to force, and, in fact, they rarely try to push such innovations on the military. Civilians lack both the expertise to formulate such innovations and the top-to-bottom control within the military required to ensure the implementation of such changes. All that civilians can usually do in this area is make sweeping, vague suggestions. The counterinsurgency case, as Rosen notes, is an excellent example of a failed effort to push a new doctrine and accompanying tactics on the military. Although Rosen is correct that, in most cases, civilians cannot succeed in forcing doctrinal innovations on the military, the extent to which Rosen ignores the critical role played time and again by the executive branch and the legislative branch -- whose existence he fails to
acknowledge -- in forcing organizational, social, mission, and technological innovations on the military belittles the true importance of civilians in many instances of military innovation. Although these changes might not always directly affect the military's "theory of victory," they certainly do not occur in isolation, and each in some way forces the military to alter the way that it fights.

What limited relevance the lessons offered by this dissertation have on the Posen-Rosen debate are of secondary importance when compared to the value added to the existing base of literature by the fact that my work addresses a topic that has to date been largely ignored by this literature. By examining an issue that straddles organizational/innovation theory and civil-military relations theory, I have offered a unique synthesis of the two. In addition, I have for the first time identified the key determinants of forced innovation. In doing so, I have uncovered several generalizations regarding forced innovation that are not contained in my framework but that help to further shed light on this topic. These generalizations, the result of cross-case comparisons using the twelve instances of forced innovation that I examined here, are another contribution that this dissertation offers to the existing literature.

This dissertation performed one more task with regards to the existing literature. It tested the very hypotheses from the organizational theory and civil-military relations literature that I used to construct the elements of my framework. I chose the hypotheses that I did according to a fairly simple criterion: if I thought that they addressed factors that I suspected would be important in forced innovation, then I made an effort to incorporate them into my framework. I by no means set out to do a careful survey and rigorous testing of all general hypotheses related to innovation and civil-military relations. For example, my work does not address some of the standard questions in the innovation literature, such as whether slack or tight resources facilitate innovation. Nonetheless, if my framework encountered trouble in explaining forced innovation, this could have indicated that its underlying hypotheses were the source of its shortcomings. Since my case studies demonstrated that the framework does not have any serious deficiencies, its underlying hypotheses appear to be well-founded.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS

I examined twelve case studies in order to construct and test my framework of forced innovation. These cases were all quite different from each other, yet when viewed together
they proved to have several common characteristics. These commonalties originally helped me to formulate the hypotheses that make up the framework. They also allow me to now draw several generalizations regarding both the elements of my framework and forced innovation in general.

The first lesson offered by the twelve cases is a clear one: civilian unity, not military unity, is the main influence on the outcome of any case of forced innovation. There are several reasons for this. First, given the constitutionally-dictated civilian control that characterizes civil-military relations in the US, a unified civilian government will always be able to overcome a unified military. If enough civilians want something from the military, they can get it. Second, there is a point at which civilians become too disunited to force innovation, regardless of the level of unity within the military. The drug interdiction case nicely illustrates this point. Civilian unity was high enough to force lead agency status on the military. When it came to discarding Posse Comitatus restrictions, however, the unity for taking this extreme step did not exist. Meanwhile, the military was solidly unified against both of these steps, so its level of unity clearly did not determine the outcome here.

Although the relative importance of civilian and military unity can be determined a priori for all instances of forced innovation, this does not mean that the level of civilian unity can be likewise determined. Because this level is innovation-specific, one cannot judge how unified civilians will be regarding a given innovation until the specifics of the case are known. For example, an examiner could confidently predict that civilian unity would be the critical factor in determining the outcome of the SOF case, but he or she could only identify the level of this unity by delving into the details of the case.

Even though the civilian unity variable is the main determinant of forced innovation outcomes, this does not mean that the military unity variable is superfluous to my framework. The level of military unity strongly influences how difficult it will be for civilians to force innovation. Divisions within the military regarding an innovation provide civilians with an important source of leverage over the services. In addition, divisions

860 The military is well aware of this fact. Gen. Powell's eventual easing of his stance on gays in the military reflects this recognition. He assured civilians that "we will take our instructions from the President and the Congress and once we receive those instructions we will execute them." (Eric Schmitt, "Top Generals Ease Stance on Gay Ban," New York Times Dec. 2, 1992: A20.) A spokesman for the General noted that Powell was not conceding the issue of homosexuals to civilians, but that he was offering a "lesson in Civics 101," with the lesson being that in the United States civilians have the constitutional right to make any changes in the military that they see fit.

861 Of course, what they want must be possible. See the section below on forced innovation and policy success.

862 Part of the reason one cannot predict civilian unity is that there is no way to predetermine exactly how deal-making in the hallways of Congress will affect that unity.
within and across the services can serve as mechanisms that lead the military to eventually drop its resistance to an innovation. Concerns over interservice competition may convince a service to adopt a particular innovation, or a service subgroup may exploit civilian allies to get its way over the objections of the dominant group within that service, as was the case in the cruise missile example. Without the military unity variable, the role that these divisions play in shaping the course of forced innovations would be lost and my framework would be incomplete.

The second generalization suggested by the cases I examined concerns the relative utility of civilian and military tactics. There is no doubt that the tactics available to civilians are far more powerful than those the military can use. This relates directly to the above rationale for the primacy of the civilian unity variable in determining outcomes. Most civilian tactics are grounded in legal authority and the ability of civilians to use sanctions to back up this authority. Military tactics, on the other hand, are not supported by such authority. Instead, they require the military to exploit loopholes. They operate on the fringe of legality by taking advantage of even the slightest vagueness in civilian orders.

My case studies also demonstrate that military tactics tend to be counterproductive. Rather than allowing the military to thwart civilian intervention, these strategies usually end up inviting further interference. The pair of laws passed to address the military's resistance to the 1986 legislation that created SOCOM demonstrate how civilians will tolerate the military's tactics for only so long before taking action to remove whatever loopholes the military is using to dodge civilian mandates. Thus, although military tactics might allow the services to cheat when resisting forced innovation, civilian tactics allow innovation proponents to change the rules of the game in their favor.

Given the constitutional realities of civil-military relations in the US, there is only one way that the military can hope to prevail in its use of the tactics that I have outlined: The military must employ its tactics so as to either decrease or circumvent civilian unity. It can do this in one of several ways. It can attempt to decrease unity by utilizing the tactic of creating an alliance with civilians sympathetic to the military's position.\textsuperscript{863} If the military

\textsuperscript{863} Although Congress is a more powerful potential ally than the president (see Chapter 1), there are several reasons why there are more opportunities for the military to ally with the president than with Congress. First, many forced innovations, such as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and SOF reorganization, require changes in the executive branch that the president does not support. As a result, the administration and the military have a common interest in seeing congressional intervention into both of their businesses fail. Second, blocking a proposed innovation rarely offers much in the way of monetary spoils that congressmen can distribute to their constituents. As a result, there usually is little incentive for many congressmen to side with the military. Third, in order to get the benefits of dividing government, the military need only sway the opinion of one person to win over the administration: the president. In order to have a congressional alliance be of any help, the military must sway a substantial number of people. Winning over only a few congressmen will not do much. Thus, efforts to use congressional supporters of the Boeing TFX candidate and the manufacturer of the AR-15 did little to damage overall civilian unity in the TFX and M16 cases.
succeeds, the innovation may develop into a political issue where divisions among civilians widen along party or branch-of-government lines to the point where civilian unity is no longer great enough to force innovation. The military has formed such an alliance with congressmen on both sides of the aisle who do not agree with President Clinton's call for dropping the ban on homosexuals in the military. The military can also employ a delaying tactic in hopes that an existing high level of civilian unity will fade in the future to the point where follow-up efforts to force the military to change will no longer be possible. As was mentioned in the SOF case study, the military appears to have hoped that its foot-dragging on SOF reform would have just such an effect. Unfortunately for the military, the tenures of the congressmen who had taken up the SOF cause were longer than the effective life span of the military's delaying tactics.

The above generalizations deal directly with elements of my framework, namely the civilian and military unity variables and its tactic typology. The following generalizations explore the question of whether we can say something interesting about an innovation simply by knowing what type it is (i.e. technological, doctrinal, operational, organizational, mission, or social). As I discussed in Chapter 1, the effects of the phenomenon of compound innovation are such that I do not include any distinctions based on innovation type in the my framework. Instead, the framework is free to operate without having to make a judgement call as to what type each innovation is best classified as. The twelve cases that I examined here do, however, suggest a few generalizations regarding how certain innovation types interact with the effects of the framework's variables. Thus, if a given innovation being forced on the military contains aspects of a particular idealized type, then there a few things that one can say about how this type will influence the eventual outcome in that case.864 Below, I offer three sets of generalizations based on innovation type: some types of innovations, due to their ambiguous and complex adoption requirements, are harder for civilians to force than others; some types will challenge one of the variables of resistance in the framework more than others; and some types will engender greater military unity than others, making the task of innovation proponents harder.

The more ambiguous the requirements of an innovation's adoption are, the more difficult it becomes for civilians to achieve their desired outcome. As the vagueness

864 Throughout the following discussion, whenever I refer to an innovation as being of a specific type, I am more accurately referring to a compound innovation that has the characteristics of that particular type but that may reflect several other types as well. For example, when I use the cruise missile to illustrate the generalization that a technological innovation will tend to challenge the military's operational routines, I am acknowledging that it has a strong technological component. However, I could also refer to its strong operational component in another generalization.
surrounding an innovation increases, so too does the likelihood that the military will be able to avoid adopting that innovation in the form that civilians originally wanted. Certain types of innovations tend to have more vague implementation requirements than others, as I will explain below.

When the details of an innovation being forced on the military are obvious, the opportunity for the services to dodge the order to innovate is limited. The development of continuous-aim naval gunfire at the turn of the century provides a good example of this. As Morison notes in his examination of this case,

The development of continuous-aim firing rests upon mechanical devices. It therefore presents for study a concrete, durable situation. It is not like many other innovating reagents -- a Manichean heresy, or Marxism, or the views of Sigmund Freud -- that can be shoved and hauled out of shape by contending forces or conflicting prejudices. At all times we know exactly what continuous-aim firing really is.865

In other words, in such cases, all parties involved, civilians in particular, understand precisely what the innovation in question is and how the military must manifest change in order to fully adopt that innovation. As a result, tactics such as window-dressing, budget reprogramming, and classification are not available to the military, for civilians expect very specific actions to occur and will not be fooled by clever shell games.

The vagueness of an innovation's implementation requirements is best measured by how far it deviates from a simple yes/no decision by the military. If adoption of an innovation merely necessitates that the military change an existing policy or buy an existing weapons system, then implementing such an innovation is relatively unambiguous. The integration of military units and the A-7 case are two example of this. Civilians could easily see in each of these instances whether or not the military was obeying orders for change. On the other hand, if an innovation requires the military to develop new tactics, doctrine, operational routines, etc., then its implementation will be a longer, more iterative process. In such cases, civilians will not always know what to look for and will be more susceptible to tactics that the military can employ at every step of this process. The drug interdiction mission is an example of this type of innovation.

In the least ambiguous of civilian calls for the military to implement a new program, the military is left with absolutely no latitude and must act on civilian wishes. Such innovations usually arise from crisis situations where action must be immediate. For example, the use of US military assets in Somalia to quell clan warfare, distribute food, and restore some semblance of order was a mission innovation that the military never

would have become involved in had it not been told to do so by civilians. The nature of the civilian order for this innovation -- the military will act and will do it now -- was totally unambiguous and left the military with little opportunity for resistance.\textsuperscript{866} As a result, the Somali relief example is not an instance of forced innovation, as there was no active military resistance, nor could there have been any.\textsuperscript{867} If, however, civilians had called on the military five years ago to innovate by developing the doctrine, tactics, and organizational structure necessary to prepare the military for Somali-like missions, the case could have been much different. The military, given vague orders, would have had numerous opportunities to window-dress and could have met civilians demands without really changing anything. This is precisely what happened with Kennedy's call for the development of a counterinsurgency capability in the 1960s.

Similar, but not identical, to the issue of vagueness is the question of complexity. The more complicated a particular innovation's implementation requirements are, the harder it will be for civilians to succeed in forcing innovation. As is the case with innovations that have ambiguous requirements, innovations whose adoption requires the completion of complex tasks offer the military the chance to use more of its resistance tactics. For example, it can attack the innovation on the grounds of feasibility. Furthermore, the time required to implement a complex innovation offers numerous opportunities for delay and window-dressing. As complexity grows, more expertise is required to implement the innovation properly. In some cases, for example where new tactics are required, it is unlikely that civilians will have the knowledge required to formulate or judge novel proposals. Such expertise will tend to reside in the military, giving it a certain amount of control over the innovation process. The counterinsurgency case illustrates how the military can take advantage of such control: The services recycled existing practices by labeling them as counterinsurgency programs. The issue of complexity raises the additional problem that what civilians are asking for might actually be unobtainable. The TFX case offers an excellent example of this. McNamara wanted this aircraft to be everything to everyone, but the complexities of the situation were such that he had to finally agree that the naval version of the F-111 was not suitable for carrier operations. In another example, had civilians insisted that the military halt all drug traffic entering the US, this also would have proven to been a goal too complex, if not totally impossible, to obtain.

The characteristics of ambiguity and complexity correspond roughly with the innovation typology that I introduced in Chapter 1 for its descriptive value. Mission and

\textsuperscript{866} Although the order for the military to go to Somalia and address the situation was unmistakably clear, details as to what it was supposed to do once there were much more vague.

\textsuperscript{867} The Somali mission might be better depicted as a civilian-supplied or civilian-initiated innovation.
doctrinal innovations have implementation requirements that exhibit a high degree of both ambiguity and complexity. These innovations do not quickly come to pass once civilians mandate their adoption. Instead, the military must take a number of actions to achieve the end results that civilians want, and it is impossible for civilians to dictate the details of each of these steps. Operational innovations, which require changes on a smaller scale than doctrinal or mission innovations, are somewhat less ambiguous and complex. Some such innovations can be as straightforward as requiring a service to adopt an existing technology to perform a traditional mission, as the A-7 case illustrates. Organizational and social innovations both tend to exhibit a relatively low degree of ambiguity and complexity. Civilians have the expertise required to direct the military to take the relatively fewer steps required to implement these types of innovations. More importantly, they do not have to wait until a war erupts to observe the military in action in order to find out if it has actually made these changes. Finally, technological innovations exhibit low ambiguity and can have either low or high complexity. Civilians can be quite clear as to what they expect from a given technological development program and can closely monitor its progress. Thus, ambiguity is rarely a problem. The issue of complexity is not as straightforward. Some technological innovations, such as the TFX aircraft, rely on technology that represents the cutting edge of present knowledge and poses significant challenges to development of the eventual end product. Others, such as the fitting of permissive action links on nuclear weapons, require that certain technical details be attended to, but they do not face major development hurdles.

In summary, due to the characteristics of complexity and ambiguities, it will be harder for civilians, no matter how unified, to successfully force innovations that require the military to create new doctrines and operational tactics or to undertake new missions than it will to push for innovations that necessitate organizational, social, or technological changes. The ambiguities and, more important, the complexities associated with the three former types appear to hinder civilians from even attempting to force such innovations on the military. The historic record supports this generalization, as I only found two examples during the post-World War II period of civilian efforts to force an innovation best described as a mission or doctrinal innovation: counterinsurgency and drug interdiction.\textsuperscript{868} The facts that counterinsurgency is an example of a failed forced innovation effort and that the eventual shape of the military's antidrug mission was quite limited further supports this generalization.

\textsuperscript{868} I do not include SOF reorganization here because, although it had some doctrinal elements associated with it, it is best described as an organizational innovation, as it centered on the creation of SOCOM.
The twelve cases examined here suggest that certain innovation types tend to challenge the military along one of the specific dimensions of military resistance contained in my framework: professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. For example, social innovations primarily pose a challenge to the military's professional identity. Forced innovations like desegregation, women in combat, and removal of the ban on homosexuals require the services to alter the complexion of the ranks, which requires a change in the military's idea of exactly who, or what, a member of the profession is.

Innovations with a major organizational component will frequently threaten the autonomy of either the military as a whole or of groups within the military. Whenever lines on an organizational chart are redrawn, some groups are bound either to lose control of certain tasks or to find themselves under the control of other groups. The creation of SOCOM, for example, created both such problems for the regular forces.

Doctrinal and operational innovations will tend to challenge the military's operational routines. Such innovations often call for the military to conduct operations whose requirements conflict with those it normally carries out. For example, the counterinsurgency program called for the Army to move away from large conventional operations, which it was used to conducting. These operational routines are often tied in with professional identity, so operational and doctrinal innovations can frequently challenge this as well. For example, the operational innovation aspects of the A-7 challenged the professional identity of Air Force officers committed to the value of multipurpose, supersonic aircraft.

Technological innovations will often challenge operational routines. The introduction of new weapons systems often imposes new routines on the people who must field them. For example, the addition of the nuclear land-attack cruise missile to attack submarines required them to stay closer to shore for launches than they normally would. Cases with a heavy element of technological innovation will also tend to challenge the military's budget. The cost of research, development, procurement, and operation for technologically-advanced systems can run in the billions of dollars. These costs are frequently paid at the expense of programs more favored by the military.869

The one type of innovation for which no similar generalizations can be made is the mission innovation. This arises from the fact that such innovations tend to be the most compound, frequently containing at least two other types of innovations. In order to undertake a new mission, a service must frequently employ new or substantially modified operations, thus introducing an element of operational innovation. In order to successfully

869 All other types of innovation appear to pose an inconsistent threat to the military's budget.
manage the preparation for carrying out a new mission, new organizations are often created, adding an element of organizational innovation. Doctrinal and technological innovations also often accompany most mission innovations. Thus, with all of these different elements, a mission innovation cannot be said to usually challenge the military along the lines of one particular variable of resistance.

The connection between certain innovation types and specific variables of resistance does not say anything about the military’s tendency to resist some types of innovations more than others. The lack of such a correlation arises from the fact that of the four variables, no one can be designated a priori as being the most significant determinant of resistance. Thus, just because organizational innovations tend to challenge autonomy, this does not mean that the military will resist these types of innovations more than operational innovations, which tend to challenge operational routines. The autonomy variable is not always more influential than the operational routine variable, and the framework does not rank them as such. As a result, a generalization as to which types of innovations will engender the most military resistance cannot be based on the four variables of resistance. Instead, it must be based on how these types influence the level of military unity.

Some types of innovation challenge the military in ways that produce a high degree of military unity. As a result, civilians are faced with a solid front of resistance and will have a harder time of forcing innovation. Social innovations tend to generate solid military unity against civilian intervention. The desegregation, homosexuals, and women in combat cases clearly bear this out. Forced social innovations create greater military unity because they usually challenge all groups within the military equally. The policy alterations they call for require equally-unappealing personnel changes for all of the services. Furthermore, there is little incentive for one service to break ranks with the other and champion the changes proposed by civilians. For example, if one service decided on its own to start accepting homosexuals, it would not be rewarded with a larger budget share or the assignment of high-prestige missions. The effects that interservice competition can have on creating interservice disunity do not operate in cases of social innovation.

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870 The Navy’s break from the rest of the services in racial integration was due to the activism of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. The military officers that ran the Navy saw eye-to-eye with the other services and did not favor desegregation. Today, the Navy’s greater willingness to integrate women into positions previously denied them may be best depicted as a reaction to the crisis induced in the Navy by the Tailhook scandal. (John Cushman Jr., "Top Admiral Backs Full Combat Roles For Women in Navy," New York Times April 5, 1993: A1.)

871 Social innovations do offer benefits to some in the military, namely those people who are intended to benefit from the innovation, such as blacks in the desegregation case. However, these people will have little clout within the services and their support of civilian initiatives will not be a tremendous help to civilians, just as the support of lower-ranking officers for the drug mission was not a factor in overall military unity.
Other types of innovation do not, as a rule, engender solid military unity against forced innovation efforts. These other types have a good chance of creating some disunity because, while they challenge the interests of some parts of the military, they will create opportunities for others. Innovations that upgrade a particular weapons system, doctrine, or tactic will threaten groups whose vested interests are tied to the programs being supplanted. However, the groups whose interests are attached to the ascending programs have an incentive to see them fully implemented. The differing attitudes of surface officers as opposed to aviators and submariners regarding cruise missiles illustrates this point nicely. Similarly, organizational innovations often offer benefits to groups who stand to gain autonomy or increased control over others. This provides them with an incentive to support these changes, thus undermining military unity and facilitating civilian intervention efforts.  

My twelve case studies do not suggest a correlation between innovation type and civilian unity. The one generalization that can be made is that the general public will only become involved with social innovations. Social innovations capture the public's attention because the average can understand the issues involved. The man on the street will have an opinion on allowing women in combat or gays in the military, but will have nothing to say about the value of the Air Force having A-7s. Only members of the public directly affected by the A-7's production will care. This interest in social innovations does not translate into greater civilian unity, however, because the public is just as likely to oppose the innovation as support it. On the issues of social justice that social innovations revolve around, there will always be those prejudiced against the people within the military intended to benefit from the proposed innovation. Thus, a significant section of the public will oppose dropping the ban on homosexuals not because they fear the effect that this will have on military effectiveness but because they simply do not like homosexuals. They will be joined by non-prejudiced people who believe that the benefits of the social innovation are not worth the threat to military effectiveness that it creates. To counter these groups, there will always be others with a more activist social agenda who will champion these changes while assigning military effectiveness a secondary priority.

The fact that I have been able to draw relatively few generalizations regarding innovation types and that the use of the word "type" is done with several caveats reflects

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872 The benefits that civilians can reap from such disunity is tempered by the relative bureaucratic power of the groups who stand to gain from the innovation in question. In the best case, an entire service chooses to support the innovation, creating a deep rift in the military's front of resistance. Below this in utility is the support of a dominant service group, like naval aviators, followed by a secondary group, like the surface navy, and finally a marginal group, like SOF.
the importance of the concept of compound innovation. Putting a label that allows for only one type of innovation on a case of forced innovation is misleading. The same innovation can have elements of several types of innovation, and each can threaten the military differently. Furthermore, it is these organizational implications present in the innovation that determine the military's resistance. In addition, the ultimate level of civilian unity determines the outcome of a case of forced innovation, not the innovation's type. As James Wilson points out (see the beginning of Chapter 1), in order to say something useful about innovation, we must look at precisely what is changing: merely knowing that it is an innovation does not tell us much. Similarly, knowing that a forced innovation is primarily of a certain type also tells us little. We must know precisely how it challenges the military and why civilians want to see it implemented. Use of the forced innovation framework will help to uncover this information.


The twelve case studies suggest a somewhat different type of generalization regarding the nature of civilian intervention in these cases. When examining forced innovation over the past thirty years, one quickly recognizes a change in the locus of civilian intervention between the 1960s and 1980s. The record up to the end of the 1960s is characterized by instances of forced innovation driven by members of the executive branch. All of the pre-1980 cases that I examined, from Truman's efforts to desegregate the military through McNamara's many forced reforms, shared this common heritage. In contrast, the cases from the 1980s that I looked at, Goldwater-Nichols, SOF, and drug interdiction, all arose from congressional attempts to compel the military to change. This shift in the pattern of civilian intervention is an important feature of forced innovation and therefore warrants an explanation. There are several possible accounts to choose from.

The simplest and least-satisfying explanation for the difference between the 1960s and 1980s would be that the personality of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara accounts for the high level of administrative activism in the 1960s. McNamara's determination to run the Pentagon like a business, combined with a willingness to challenge military expertise across the board, did lead to many instances of forced innovation that I looked at, including the TFX, A-7, and M16 cases.\textsuperscript{873} McNamara's approach to his job is

\textsuperscript{873} Another McNamara forced innovation that I did not examine but which would no doubt provide an interesting case study is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System that he introduced.
particularly striking when compared to that of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during his tenure under President Reagan. This personality-based argument is not satisfying for several reasons. First, blaming the executive branch’s past dominance in forcing innovation on McNamara does not explain why older cases, like Truman’s desegregation efforts, arose from the executive branch. More importantly, the lack of a McNamara in the 1980s does not explain the dominance of Congress in that decade.

Another explanation for the difference between the 1960s and 1980s could be that Democratic administrations are more likely to challenge the military than are Republican ones. This explains nicely why the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations all supported instances of forced innovation while the Reagan Administration did not.\(^\text{874}\) However, although it is true that Truman led the integration effort, in the election year of 1948 both the Republican and Democratic platforms pledged to end racial inequities in the military. The Reagan Administration's attitude toward the military is best seen as the product of its particular approach to civil-military relations rather than as an ingrained Republican trait.\(^\text{875}\) The peculiarities of the Reagan White House account for the reluctance of the executive branch to engage in forced innovation in the 1980s, but it says nothing about the increased activism of Congress during this time. Although one could argue that the fact that Congress was controlled by the Democrats during the 1980s accounts for its willingness to challenge the military as a way of attacking Reagan, this argument also fails. The main instances of forced innovation during the 1980s were bipartisan in nature and cannot be explained by simple partisan politics.

The best explanation for the role that Congress played in forcing innovation in the 1980s when compared to the 1960s is found in the evolution of the congressional role in defense policymaking. As David Kozak nicely summarizes,

> The political experience since the 1960s... points to an erosion of presidential dominance.... Congress has become a competitor with the president for authority to set foreign and defense priorities. As a legacy of the Vietnam War

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\(^{874}\) As Vince Davis notes, "Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger had stressed form the beginning that they wanted the senior professional military officers to have clear independent voices on policy recommendations, in contrast to those officers' own perceptions of having been politically 'muzzled' over most of the years starting with the McNamara era in the Pentagon in the 1960s." (Vincent Davis, "Presidential Politics and the Policy Process: The President's Key Players," in Presidential Leadership and National Security, ed. Sam Sarkesian. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 123.)

\(^{875}\) Note, for example, that the Bush Administration held a different view of the military's drug interdiction mission than did the Reagan Administration. (See Chapter 2)
and Watergate, Congress has reared up in assertion, forcefully communicating that it expects to be neither a silent partner nor a rubber stamp.\textsuperscript{876}

By the 1980s, Congress had become an equal to the executive branch in defense issues and was not afraid to exercise its newfound power by forcing the military to innovate, even against the president's wishes.

As Congress' role in the defense arena increased, so did its ability to address defense issues. Taking a page from McNamara's playbook, Congress created its own pool of military expertise in order to better compete with both the military and the White House. Possibly the most important development along these lines was the growth of congressional staffs, the House and Senate Armed Service Committee staffs in particular. As one observer notes,

Not only do staff members inject new ideas into the system, they also can spend their time with oversight activities, conducting negotiations, and providing the information critical to decisionmaking within the legislative process. The influence the staff possesses and its ability to expand the agenda of the committees have made staffers a formidable legislative force. Furthermore, a competent, expert staff has allowed the committees to be more aggressive than reactive in the kind of policy debates that the executive branch may one have dominated.\textsuperscript{877}

In addition to the growth of congressional staffs, the formation of the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, and the General Accounting Office have all improved congressional oversight capabilities and power relative to the military and the executive branch.\textsuperscript{878}

In summary, the primacy of Congress in forcing innovation in the 1980s was a symptom of a newly-invigorated Congress and a president who chose not to challenge military expertise. Has Congress now become the locus of all forced innovation? Definitely not. A president with a different approach towards civil-military relations could take up the task of pushing change on the military. In fact, this is happening at the present time. President Clinton, and not Congress, is leading the fight to allow homosexuals in the military. In fact, many members of Congress are siding with the military in an attempt to


\textsuperscript{877} Frederick Black, "The Military and Today's Congress," Parameters Dec., 1987: 44.

block Clinton's efforts. Thus, Congress has not supplanted the executive branch since the 1960s as the main instigator of forced innovation. Instead, it has developed as an institution to the point where, should it choose, it is equally justified in and capable of forcing innovation on the military. For its part, the executive branch remains well-suited to force innovation. Its willingness to do so is dependent on the personalities of the president and Secretary of Defense and the nature of the innovation in question.

Congress' ascension to equal status with the executive branch in the area of defense policy has an important implication for the ability of civilians to force innovation on the military. The existence of two powerful civilian actors creates a built-in division in military unity. As Clinton's effort to drop the ban on homosexuals demonstrates, presidential sponsorship of a forced innovation is not enough to assure civilian backing: Congress still gets to have its say. The fact that congressional members of Clinton's own party, Senator Sam Nunn in particular, took umbrage at not being consulted on this issue highlights the divisive effects that executive-legislative branch rivalry has on civilian unity.

Other changes have placed additional roadblocks in the way of any forced innovation achieving solid civilian unity. The decline of the power of seniority within Congress makes building a strong consensus more difficult. No longer can the House Armed Services Committee chairman, for example, dictate positions taken by junior members of the Committee. To further complicate matters, the ability of the Armed Services Committees to control defense issues in Congress has also declined. Congressmen not on the Committees no longer defer to the Committees' expertise on defense issues. Finally, the power of political parties in the United States has declined to the point where Democrats and Republicans often defy the wishes of their party leadership. All of these factors together complicate any attempt to build civilian unity in favor of a given forced innovation.

Creating solid civilian unity is further complicated by differences that exist within Congress, between the House and the Senate. The House tends to be much more inclined than the Senate to force innovation on the military. The drug interdiction and SOF cases clearly show how, time and again, the House offered extreme proposals for innovation, only to have its efforts tempered by the Senate, which called for less drastic changes within the military. This difference between the two chambers of Congress is explained by the nature of their members. Representatives are elected every two years, and are constantly campaigning for reelection. Senators, on the other hand, have six year terms and can

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879 See the civilian unity section in Chapter 1 for the argument that the Congress is more powerful than the executive branch in its ability to both promote and block forced innovation attempts.
880 This fact is especially evident when one looks at the forced innovations of the 1960s, which were both sponsored by the executive branch and faced little active opposition from Congress.
afford to take a more cautious approach to issues. The effect of this difference is that the House tends to react quickly to the topic of the moment. Its occasionally knee-jerk reactions can lead to the adoption of rather extreme measures without much thought or debate. The Senate, by comparison, is more conservative and is slower to react than the House. As a result, the Senate tends to tread more carefully when intervening to force innovation on the military. This difference between the House and the Senate can therefore translate into a division in civilian unity when the House seeks extreme versions of a forced innovation.

Ironically, the growth of an institutionalized tendency for civilian disunity has happened concurrent to civilian efforts to increase and institutionalize military unity. The civilian-driven move towards jointness has resulted in less interservice rivalry and more collusion among the services. As a result, the services are now more likely to be able to work together to formulate a unified stance against unpopular innovations.

Regardless of the increased difficulty in establishing and maintaining civilian unity, some aspects of civilian intervention have remained constant. For example, civilians have tended to force new weapons systems on the military primarily in hopes of achieving economic benefits without harming military effectiveness in the process. Improving military effectiveness by means of forcing a technological innovation rarely occurs because the military itself is always seeking the most capable system possible. The services rarely need civilians to tell them to build weapons with more capabilities than the services design into them.\footnote{The one exception that I found to this was the M16. McNamara wanted the rifle for the improved effectiveness it offered.} For example, both the Air Force and the Navy felt that the TFX that McNamara was pushing on them for economic reasons was far less capable than the separate planes that each wanted. When civilians intervene to improve military effectiveness, they do so by pushing organizational or doctrinal innovations. Such intervention is usually a reaction to military failure. For example, the military's poor performance during Desert One and the invasion of Grenada led directly to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the creation of SOCOM. Finally, over the past thirty years, no one factor tended to drive civilian intervention the most. Forced innovation efforts were just as likely to be initiated for structural reasons as for strategic ones. The only generalization that can be made about drivers of intervention is the fact mentioned above that the public only becomes an important player when structural intervention seeking social goals occurs.
THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORCED INNOVATION

At its core, forced innovation is a challenge to amiable civil-military relations. In many countries, civil-military relations are often fouled by the military's willingness to intervene in politics. In countries like the United States, however, cooperative relations are more frequently complicated by civilian interference in the military's affairs. Officers of all services usually view civilian intervention as an unwanted venture by politicians into an area best left to military professionals. From the military's standpoint, it has little to gain and much to lose whenever civilians try to force innovation. Civilians see the equation somewhat differently. They view the possible profits of action as outweighing any problems posed by confronting the military.

There are several potential benefits of forced innovation. First, it lets civilians alter defense organizations and policies in order to fix problems that otherwise would remain unaddressed. For example, if civilians had not intervened in the SOF case, the military would not have confronted the serious shortcomings facing US special operations capabilities. The power structure and vested interests in the services were such that self-generated reform was next-to-impossible. As Chapter 1 pointed out, the military, if left alone, will tend to rely on existing routines to deal with persistent or novel problems. The counterinsurgency case demonstrates this point quite strongly. Civilian intervention offers a way out of this trap and can improve combat capability in areas that would continue to languish if the military was left undisturbed.

Another potential benefit of forced innovation is that it allows civilians to shape military policy in order to seek goals that, although important to society, are not of concern to the military. Without civilian intervention, the military would not seek to adopt developing societal norms. For example, the military's accordance with the social goal of racial equality would have been greatly delayed had it not been for civilian intervention.

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883 While not an example of forced innovation, the attention that civilians pay to missions that the services do not like, such as mine warfare and close air support, similarly functions to maintain effective capabilities in these areas. (See, for example, Fred Kaplan, "Beast of Battle," Boston Globe Magazine July 21, 1991: 12 for a brief account of civilian efforts to force the Air Force to fulfill its close air support responsibilities.)
884 Of course, forced innovation can also push the military ahead of society. For example, racial desegregation and the creation of equal opportunity in the military occurred long before such changes took hold in American civilian life. Such situations arise from the fact that lawmakers have more control over the military than they do over society as a whole.
Similarly, statutory discrimination against homosexuals would have no chance of ending without the present civilian efforts. Whether the military need be in harmony with contemporary norms is open to argument, but for people who believe that this is important, forced innovation is the quickest way to achieve such harmony.

Forced innovation also lets civilians compel the military to pursue certain economic goals that the services would normally not address. The economic realities of resource scarcity force the military to concern itself with the costs of certain weapons systems, but the need to minimize expenses has rarely translated into an effort to curtail the functional duplication of systems and missions across the services. The elimination of service-specific weapons systems, such as the different types of aircraft that the Navy and Air Force field to carry out the same types of operations, and the mission redundancies found, for example, in the ground-attack air forces fielded by all of the services, requires the abrogation of service autonomy. The services are almost never willing to set their own interests aside for the sake of overall efficiency. The failure of the military to offer any significant changes aimed at reducing redundancies in the recent JCS roles and missions review is evidence of this. Only civilian intervention that forces the services to reallocate missions or consolidate procurement efforts can cut down on duplication in order to achieve economic benefits. Such cost-cutting was precisely the goal of McNamara's efforts in the TFX and A-7 cases. Although all civilian steps to end service overlap will not necessarily require innovation, the fact that many such policies will necessitate some

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885 There are a few cases where the services have opted on their own for joint programs in the name of economic efficiency. In the most recent example, the multi-role fighter, the F-16 replacement, might be co-developed by both the Air Force and the Navy. (David Fulghum, "New Battles Loom for Prototypes," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* Feb. 15, 1993: 24.) Similarly, the Air Force is becoming involved in formulating the requirements for the Navy's A/FX aircraft. (Talk by VAdm. Leighton Smith, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 2, 1993.) The decision to pursue such joint development programs, long shunned by the services, could be depicted as a reaction to the crisis posed by the shrinking defense budget.

886 *Aviation Week and Space Technology* coverage of this issue, starting in late 1992 and running into 1993, is particularly good. The magazine has been vocal in the need for an end to some of the existing service duplication and has urged lawmakers to take an active role. For its criticism of the military's decision to shy away from this issue, see the editorial "Aspin Must Face Roles and Missions Head-On," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* Feb. 15, 1993: 74. For similar criticism from the *New York Times* editorial board, see "The Price of Protecting Pentagon Turf," *New York Times* Feb. 22, 1993: A16.

887 This consolidation creates an interesting paradox for civilians. As they act to reduce duplication across the services, they might also create a military that will be more stagnant and less susceptible to civilian influence. With less duplication comes less service competition, which, in turn, can lead to less of an impetus to innovate. As noted in the Military Unity section of Chapter 1, the services often innovate in ways they would normally not in order to match any relative gains made by other services. Once roles and missions are unambiguously assigned, the possibility for such gains and the accompanying attraction of innovation could fade. In addition, civilians, if no longer faced with several different service options, would not be able to pick and choose which programs to support. Instead, the military will have only one program to offer civilians. As a result, civilians would lose the power of picking from a wide menu of innovation in order to shape the armed forces.
services to adopt strange systems or new missions assures that some of these efforts will, by my definition, be innovations.

The possible benefits of forced innovation must always be weighed against its potential costs, of which there are several. The first is that the military could be drawn into the domestic political life of the country. Such politicization could occur in one of two ways. If repeated attempts to force innovation poison civil-military relations, the military could decide that it must become more involved in politics in order to protect its interests.\textsuperscript{888} The military could choose to vocally intervene in the political realm in an attempt to lobby and persuade the public that it, not politicians, should be given control of the profession's destiny. This type of politicization would be problematic because it would challenge the tenet of civilian control of the military. As President Clinton's attempt to remove the ban on homosexuals demonstrates, some forced innovations can prompt the military to take its arguments directly to the people in hopes of rallying public support against the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief. Were the frequency and intensity of such efforts to increase, the ability of either the president or Congress to dictate military policy would be severely compromised. Although the military has always been politically active at a low level, for example by publicly arguing in favor of certain budgetary programs or warning against getting involved in unwise operations such as intervention in the remains of Yugoslavia, it has never gone so far as to take more extreme steps like publicly endorse political candidates whose views are most in line with its own. Were it to do so, it would attain a political status similar to large unions like the AFL-CIO and would be courted with promises by politicians. Such a situation would clearly inhibit the constitutionally-mandated ability of the president and Congress to shape military budgets and policy. It would also create the opportunity for politicians to bribe military personnel to take certain stands on issues.\textsuperscript{889}

\textsuperscript{888} This is precisely what happened to the Soviet military in the late 1980s. As Stephen Meyer notes, "Senior officers were propelled into political activism in public fora and in civilian political institutions in order to defend the institutional foundation of the military establishment." (Stephen Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military," \textit{International Security} Winter, 1991/92: 17.) Meyer notes that politicization of the Soviet military has led to serious divisions within the ranks. "In the process," he points out, "troop discipline, officer morale, unit cohesion, training, and readiness suffered severely." (p. 6) Extensive politicization of the US military could create similar problems.

\textsuperscript{889} Such fears were precisely the rationale for the passage of the Hatch Act in 1939, which places strict limitations on the political activities that federal workers are allowed to engage in. This Act has come under repeated attack, but all attempts to repeal it have been blocked. Both Presidents Ford and Bush vetoed congressional efforts to drop the Act. ("Hatch Not Hacks," \textit{Wall Street Journal} Feb. 19, 1993: A14.) Democrats in Congress are now trying again to overturn the Hatch Act and this time, they enjoy the backing of the President. (Illyse Veron, "Panel OKs Rewrite of Hatch Act," \textit{Congressional Quarterly} Jan 30, 1993: 217.) Although the military is not covered by the Hatch Act, the political activity of military personnel is strictly limited by similar military-specific statutes, in particular, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, "Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces," June 15, 1990. Such directives would complicate any attempt by officers or services as a whole to play an overt domestic political role.
Politician of the military could occur by a different route. Forced innovations that involve the military in domestic issue areas such as law enforcement, education, and environmental cleanup require the military to take a greater role in politics. If such non-military missions are handed over to the military, it could not help but get caught up in the political struggles inherent in all such duties. Lt. Col. Dunlop, in his fictional piece on the military coup of 2012, depicts this type of politicization as the handing over of governing responsibilities by the civilian leadership to the military.\(^{890}\) Obviously, such a transfer of authority does little to further either civilian control of the military or military professionalism. Instead, it represents a growth of military power over civilians and a movement away from the characteristics that make military professionals who they are. An example of an innovation that could have this effect is the use of the military for domestic law enforcement. Such an innovation would intimately involve the military in numerous domestic issues that it would be inclined to try and influence in order to facilitate its law enforcement duties. These issues could include everything from criminal codes to gun control legislation.

The second potential cost of forced innovation is a loss of military effectiveness. Forced innovations could conceivably harm military effectiveness and create military forces that would be ill-suited for future conflicts.\(^{891}\) Innovations that go too far in trading military effectiveness for the attainment of economic goals could harm combat readiness. Innovations that attempt to "civilianize" the military by making it more like society in general could also go too far by neutralizing the warrior mentality that is often required in combat. Such civilianization could introduce into the ranks all of the problems that often plague civilian organizations, such as corruption, which would further undermine military effectiveness. Finally and most significantly, innovations that divert the military's attention to non-military tasks stand a good chance of harming combat capability. As the military warned in the drug interdiction case and Lt. Col. Dunlap stressed in his influential Parameters article, the time, energy, and resources spent on non-military missions will be subtracted from resources normally dedicated to preparation for war. Most of the non-traditional missions civilians are suggesting that the military undertake will do nothing to augment combat capabilities. Instead, they will focus the military's efforts and attention on peripheral matters. The potential for such a distraction is increased today by the fact that civilians are now shrinking the resource pool available to the military. Should the scale of


\(^{891}\) As Chapter 1 noted, the military frequently uses the tactic of attacking an innovation on the grounds that it will hurt combat capabilities. Although this tactic is usually accompanied by a hyperbole, this does not mean that all such warnings can be dismissed.
such non-military operations grow too great, the unpredictable onset of combat in the future could find the US military ill-prepared for battle.

Forced innovation can also harm military effectiveness in a much more general way. The military's struggle against civilian intervention can be a serious distraction for the military's leadership. Time spent by service heads contemplating how to resist allowing homosexuals in the military, for example, is time that could be better spent on more militarily pressing problems, such as force structure and readiness. Forced innovation struggles can also threaten military effectiveness by lowering morale throughout the ranks and across the services. Military professionals often view civilian efforts to force change on the services as a lack of respect for the profession and its expertise. This, in turn, lowers morale, a building block in any successful military. If repeated civilian intervention to force innovation produces a siege mentality within the military, the recruitment and retention of quality people would become more difficult. In addition, the military could become less open with civilians in offering advice and counsel. Both of these occurrences could have an adverse effect on military effectiveness, thus increasing the costs of forced innovation.

POLICY PROSCRIPTIONS

What can civilians do to avoid the potential costs of forced innovation when seeking its benefits? The simple answer is to shun forced innovations that have a good chance of either politicizing the military or of decreasing combat effectiveness. To do this, however, civilians must be aware of what kinds of innovations tend to carry these risks.

Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to determine a priori just how an innovation will affect military effectiveness. In part, this is due to the generalized uncertainty inherent in innovation. It is impossible, for example, to predict exactly what the effects of dropping the ban on homosexuals will have on military performance. The difficulty of such prediction is further hampered by the military's common use of the tactic of claiming that nearly all forced innovations will have dire effects on military effectiveness. The services argued in no uncertain terms that racial integration of combat units would destroy unit cohesion and effectiveness. This did not happen, and these fears turned out to be groundless. As a result, proponents of dropping the ban on homosexuals see the military as crying wolf with regards to combat effectiveness. It is impossible at this point to
determine who is correct. Thus, civilians must do their best to sort through the facts when assessing how an innovation might lessen the military's performance.\textsuperscript{892}

Civilians' best chance to avoid forcing innovations that politicize the military is to be wary of innovations that threaten to blur the boundary between the civil and military realms.\textsuperscript{893} Civilians forcing innovation could violate this boundary in two directions. They could intrude into the military arena and deny the existence of a unique military profession by pushing an innovation that either represents civilians acting as professionals themselves or that fundamentally alters the nature of the profession. Alternately, civilians could force an innovation that requires the military to play a greater role in the civilian realm by involving the services in non-military decisions.

Civilians act as military professionals when they become involved in the details of military activities to the point where they are making decisions on matters that have little or no political ramifications.\textsuperscript{894} For example, it is perfectly acceptable to military professionals for civilians to designate certain targets in a war as being off-limits, but they resent civilians telling them which planes and what types of bombs to use on targets designated for destruction.\textsuperscript{895} An innovation that represents similar undue civilian influence on the military realm would challenge the division of the civilian and military realms and would have the potential of politicizing the military profession by placing it under attack.

If civilians push an innovation that forces military personnel to act as if they were not members of the military profession, then civilians fundamentally alter that profession, again

\textsuperscript{892} The hearings held on both the women in combat and gays in the military issues demonstrate that civilians do, in fact, make the effort to expose the true impact of an innovation on military effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{893} In 1964, Col. Robert Ginsburgh nicely summed up the balance that is needed to maintain a healthy relationship between civilians and the military profession, and his words are quite relevant to the topic at hand. Ginsburgh notes, "The statesman needs sound military advice; the military professional needs firm policy guidance. Each must, of course, understand the problems of the other. The military man should be aware of the political, economic, social and other factors which affect national security, but it is not his business to evaluate them. He should limit himself to a consideration of the military aspects which are within his area of competence. The civilian authorities, both executive and legislative, should assist him in exercising self-restraint by not requiring his comments on non-military matters. Similarly, the statesman who is concerned with a political problem must recognize that it may have important military implications but he should refrain from making military analyses. He should use the results of the analysis of the military expert as one of the factors bearing on his total problem." (Col. Robert Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," \textit{Foreign Affairs} Jan., 1964: 266.)

\textsuperscript{894} Using this criterion, instances where civilians intervene to force the military to purchase a particular weapons system do not represent civilians acting as military professionals because such decisions are structural in nature and therefore inherently have a strong domestic political component to them. See Chapter 1 and Samuel Huntington, \textit{The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

\textsuperscript{895} It may be impossible to come up with an example of a military activity that will absolutely never have political ramifications. For instance, in the example I give here, using B-52s to carpet bomb a target rather than using a cruise missile could have political implications. Such inherent ambiguity assures that the exercise of civilian authority will always leave open for argument the question of whether civilians are involving themselves in operational details more than they need be.
raising the danger of politicization. The many proposals to use the military for non-military missions do just this, as they require the military to undertake tasks that have nothing to do with safeguarding the military security of the country. Although one can argue that in the post-Cold War world the definition of national security has changed to the point where illegal narcotics, environmental problems, and economic issues are now relevant, these are not military issues. Other agencies within the federal government exist that are already expected to address them. Pushing the military into these issue areas forces its members to act like members of other occupational groups. It also entangles the military in the country's domestic life. This diminishes military professionalism and and threatens to politicize the military.

Even if civilians tread carefully and avoid forcing an innovation on the military that carries with it the costs of politicization or a loss of military effectiveness, this will not ensure that they will reap the potential benefits of the innovation they desire. To do this, the innovation must succeed from a policy standpoint. An instance of forced innovation can be deemed a successful policy if it attains the goals that civilians publicly claimed they were seeking when they intervened in the military's affairs.896 For example, in the desegregation case, the goal sought by civilians was the racial integration of military units. This goal was achieved and as a policy this instance of forced innovation was a success. Civilians attained the social benefits they sought. Conversely, in the TFX case, the goal sought by McNamara was an aircraft that would be co-developed and co-procured by the Air Force and Navy in order to achieve efficiency benefits. This outcome was not attained, making the TFX case an example of a policy failure.

A forced innovation's policy success must not be confused with its political success. Civilians are not always forthcoming in their true motives for compelling the military to innovate, and while they claim to be seeking a particular policy end, they may only be trying to make political gains. As Chapter 2 argued, the drug interdiction case provides a good example of civilians forcing innovation to score political points. Although many congressmen did hope and believe that using the military in the fight against drugs could somehow help to solve the nation's narcotics problem, most understood that employing the military was primarily a way to answer domestic pressure to do something about drugs that would have little effect on the overall problem. From a political standpoint, the drug interdiction case is a successful forced innovation: Congress demonstrated that it was

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896 A forced innovation that is a policy success must not be confused with an innovation that is successfully forced on the military. In the latter, civilians are satisfied that the military has adopted the innovation that civilians were forced upon it. This says nothing about its performance in terms of meeting policy goals. Thus, Goldwater-Nichols is a clear example of successful forced innovation in that the military has made the changes that the legislation calls for. However, the policy success of this innovation cannot yet be determined.
getting tough on the drug issue to a public hungry for action. From a policy standpoint, however, the military’s role in drug interdiction did nothing to slow the flow of drugs entering the country. Thus, this forced innovation did not meet its stated goals, produced few, if any, benefits, and was a clear failure from a policy standpoint.  

A forced innovation can fail to attain its policy goals -- and therefore not yield any benefits -- for one or a combination of two reasons: these goals were unattainable from the outset, or the military implemented the innovation in a way that assured its failure. One example of the former is the military’s drug interdiction mission. As Chapter 2 stressed, there was never really a chance that military involvement in the US antinarcotics effort would help to solve the nation’s drug problem. By comparison, the counterinsurgency case is an example of a military-induced policy failure. The manner in which the military implemented counterinsurgency -- by basically relying on existing, ill-suited operational routines -- denied the new approach any chance of success in the field. This forced innovation was a failure, but the original policy decision to attempt counterinsurgency was not necessarily doomed from the outset. If executed properly, it is conceivable that this policy could have attained its goals. The TFX case offers an example of an instance where a forced innovation failed from a policy standpoint both because of the goals being sought and the nature of the military’s efforts to reach these goals. The vastly different operational requirements that the Air Force and Navy had for the TFX made putting all of these capabilities into a single plane for the purpose of economic efficiency highly problematic. The difficulties of attaining this goal was furthered by the fact that the two services did their best to manipulate the development program to suit their own priorities, which were distinctly different from McNamara’s.

The twelve cases I examined offer some lessons as to what is required for a forced innovation to succeed from a policy standpoint. First, as the discussion above on which types of innovations are easier to force pointed out, the less ambiguous and complex the

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897 There are several reasons why I am concerned with a forced innovations policy success and not its political achievements. Not all forced innovations have hidden political agendas, but they all have policy goals. Even when such agendas do exist, it is difficult to determine both their true aims and whether or not these objectives are met. Finally, I am concerned with the effects of forced innovation on the military and on civil-military relations, not on domestic politics. It is important to be aware of ulterior civilian motives, but the attainment of political goals is not of concern here.

898 Part of the blame for this must also go to President Kennedy, who was not willing to take all of the steps required to forced the military to truly change its ways. (See below.) The counterinsurgency idea might have been a prudent policy choice, but the hesitant and vague manner in which Kennedy forced it on the military made the argument over whether or not this policy could achieve its goals a moot point.


goals sought by forced innovation are, the better the chances are that civilians will realize their goals. Ambiguous implementation requirements give the military greater freedom to shape an innovation's adoption, possibly in order to assure its demise. Thus, in the counterinsurgency case, the failure to clearly state what was expected of the military helped to doom the policy.\footnote{Kennedy "left most of the men at the operating end of the apparatus confused about what was expected of them and unable to apply the simplistic slogans of their indoctrination to the real situations they confronted." Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 87, citing Lt. Col. Jonathan Ladd, "Some Reflections on Counterinsurgency," Military Review, Oct. 1964, pp. 72-78.} In order for forced innovation to succeed as policy, its implementation requirements and end goals must be clearly articulated by civilians. In addition, the less complex these requirements and goals are, the better the chances are that the innovation will attain them. If complexity is too great, civilians will be wasting their time. The TFX case illustrates this, as the requirements of designing an end product that could perform two very different missions proved to be too complex to allow for success.

The twelve cases also suggest three lessons as to how civilians can increase their ability to force the military to innovate.\footnote{Richard Neustadt, in his classic work, Presidential Power, offers criteria that must be met if a president's orders are to succeed. These criteria also describe the situation that must exist for civilians to force innovation: "At least five common factors were at work [when presidential orders were readily executed]. On each occasion the President's involvement was unambiguous. So were his words. His order was widely publicized. The men who received it had control of everything needed to carry it out. And they had no apparent doubt of his authority to issue it to them... These are the factors that produce self-executing orders. Lacking any one of them the chances are that mere command will not produce compliance." (Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 19.)} The first lesson is both obvious and of limited utility: Civilians will improve their chances if they push innovations that pose minimal challenges to the military's professional identity, operational routines, autonomy, and budget. Such innovations probably would not have to be forced in the first place, however, so this lesson is of little practical value. Nearly any innovation being forced will threaten the military along one or more of these dimensions. Such conflict is therefore difficult to avoid. The second lesson is that civilians must be willing to expend the political capital necessary to compel a large organization like the military to do something against its wishes. Innovation proponents must be prepared to fight both to build civilian unity and to make it clear to the military that resistance will not be tolerated. In instances like the SOF case, innovation proponents were willing to take on anyone that stood in their way, be it a unified military or a hostile administration. The counterinsurgency case was characterized
instead by the unwillingness of President Kennedy to force the military to innovate. 903 Similarly, the Reagan Administration's reluctance to confront the military head on early attempts at SOF revitalization dead on arrival. The third lesson is that innovation proponents can improve their chances of compelling the military to act if they leave room for compromise over the details of the innovation's final shape and implementation details. If civilians can find some sort of middle ground with the military, they can improve the chances that the military will accept its fate and not work to subvert implementation of the innovation at every step. Such compromise is usually reached in one of two ways: either the final form of the innovation is modified to be less distasteful to the military or the military is involved in the implementation process from the outset by giving it a voice in the shaping of the innovation. An example of the former is McNamara's decision to allow the Air Force and Navy to develop somewhat different versions of the TFX. An example of the latter is found in the women in combat case, where the military was given the chance to fully participate in the activities of the presidential commission examining the issue. Similarly, President Clinton has promised that during the six month review of the homosexual ban the military will be extensively consulted.

Given the above policy proscriptions, what does the civilian track record for forced innovation look like for my twelve cases? Figure 1 assesses these cases according to three criteria: Did the forced innovation harm military effectiveness, did it create a politicization problem, and was it a policy success. 904

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903 Kennedy was unwilling to rock the boat too much by resorting to useful civilian strategies. He ignored his advisors' suggestions that he reject Gen. Harkins, the JCS nomination for head of advisors in Vietnam in 1962, who advocated a conventional response in Vietnam. Kennedy also refused to pull a counterinsurgency officer up from the lower ranks "because of the shock this would have administered to the army's career expectations and the unfavorable public comment that would have ensued. If he had intervened to impose specific tactical doctrines resisted by the army, the outcry would certainly have been far greater, and so, if he had considered it, he might have been excused for deciding to abstain." (Blufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 82.) See also Andrew Krepinevich Jr., "Past as Prologue: Counterinsurgency and the US Army's Vietnam Experience in Force Structuring and Doctrine," in Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking, ed. George Osborn et al. (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1987), pp. 269-283.

Kennedy's reluctance to take such measures stands in direct contrast to Magsaysay's practices in putting down insurgents in the Philippines. He was determined to create an effective counterinsurgent military and did not hesitate to reach into the ranks and promote like-minded officers or to relieve those who would not adapt to his new program. (See Blufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 28-38.

904 Obviously, any such assessment must be somewhat subjective and others could understandably code these cases different from me. For example, some people might argue that it is too soon to claim that SOF reorganization was a policy success. (See, for example Charles Krohn, "Special Operations: A Falling Star?," National Defense April, 1993: 42.) However, I think that the particular measurements I used in Chapter 3 to determine the success of reorganization indicates a significant enough improvement in SOF to warrant labelling that instance of forced innovation a policy success.
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<th>Harmed Military Effectiveness</th>
<th>Created Politicization</th>
<th>Was a Policy Success</th>
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<tr>
<td>Desegregation</td>
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Figure 1 is fairly self-explanatory. The women in combat and homosexuals in the military cases have question marks in the military effectiveness and policy success columns because neither of these cases have been resolved to the point where assessments along these lines can be made.\textsuperscript{905} Similarly, although the Goldwater-Nichols legislation has not damaged military effectiveness, it is still too soon to accurately judge whether or not the legislation has successfully met the goals that civilians had for it. The drug interdiction

\textsuperscript{905} I do not label either of these cases as having created politicization, even though the military has been particularly outspoken in its opposition to admitting homosexuals in the ranks or allowing women in combat. The military leadership has refrained from taking such steps as publicly attacking President Clinton, which would be a sign of increasing politicization. In addition, throughout the debates on these two issues, the services have made it quite clear that if they lose to innovation proponents in these cases, they will nonetheless dutifully obey civilian orders. The military's acceptance of Secretary of Defense Aspin's recent order to open certain combat billets to women it evidence of this. Thus, while these cases each generated a loud outcry from the military, they have not pushed the military to become unduly politicized.
case has a "yes" in the politicization column because that particular forced innovation involved the military in a domestic issue area.\footnote{906}

The results depicted in Figure 1 demonstrate that, for the most part, civilians have been sensitive to the need to maintain military effectiveness while avoiding politicization of the military. Although many of the cases examined contained bitter struggles between the military and civilians, none have apparently created serious, lasting negative effects for military effectiveness or civil-military relations. If this trend continues into the future, then the potential costs of forcing innovation on the military can be kept at a minimum.

In terms of the policy success of the cases examined, civilian efforts have not fared any worse than they tend to in non-defense areas. By my coding, to date there have been six successes, three failures, and three cases that cannot yet be judged one way or the other. Of the three failures, each can trace its failure to somewhat different causes.\footnote{907} In the counterinsurgency case, the vagueness of the order to innovate, combined with President Kennedy's unwillingness to push the military hard to change, allowed the military to never truly adopt this innovation. It was therefore impossible to achieve a policy success because the policy itself was poorly formulated and never fully implemented.\footnote{908} The TFX development program ended in failure because its adoption requirements, as mentioned above, proved to be too complex. Finally, the drug interdiction mission failed as policy because the task it entailed was not only complex, it was impossible.\footnote{909} Of the six policy successes, all had two factors in common: achievable goals and civilians willing to take the steps necessary to force the military to address these goals.

The decision to force the military to innovate is one that should never be made lightly. Any attempt to gain the potential benefits of forced innovation must be weighed against the possible costs. If a given forced innovation does not diminish military effectiveness or politicize the armed forces then civilians can more safely contemplate compelling the

\footnote{906}{As I stressed in Chapter 2, drug interdiction is a law enforcement mission, not a military one. Although the final details of the interdiction mission were such that they did not force the military to become involved in law enforcement to the extreme extent desired by some civilians, the fact remains that the present mission is a departure from the normal concerns of the military profession. The amount of politicization that has actually occurred has been minimal, but the fact that the military must now work intimately with numerous law enforcement agencies in an attempt to manage the attack on a social problem signifies to me that some politicization has occurred.}

\footnote{907}{The fact that each of these policy failures was quite different in terms of innovation type demonstrates that no useful generalizations can be made regarding innovation type and likelihood of policy success beyond those made in the ambiguity/complexity section above.}

\footnote{908}{There is also the question of whether the type of counterinsurgency program envisioned by civilians could have worked even if it was properly implemented.}

\footnote{909}{Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, many of the civilians pushing this innovation where well aware of the futility of the undertaking they were suggesting.}
military to innovate. This does not mean, however, that civilians should rush to intervene when these criteria are met. As David Hendrickson argues, the burden of proof remains on civilians. Civilians thinking about forcing innovation must ask themselves if the failure of the military to carry out its professional responsibilities is serious enough to warrant a direct civilian challenge to this profession.910 Even when a forced innovation appears to have few costs, it will almost always upsets civil-military relations and divert the military’s attention away from its primary need to maintain military effectiveness and towards the effort to block the challenge to its professionalism. The military’s professional prerogative to autonomy is not incontestable and there are times when the military does need a kick start to address lingering problems, but civilians must always be on guard. When civilians try to ford the gulf between the civilian and military realms, a misplaced step can put them in over their heads, where they can damage military professionalism, combat effectiveness, and civilian control of the military as they flail about. Only if civilians try to understand the implications of their actions can they hope to force the military to innovate in order to attain previously-unmet goals without creating a host of new problems. With this dissertation, I have sought to provide just such an understanding.

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