"¡*El Pueblo no se rinde, Carajo*!" (The People Will Never Give Up, Dammit!): A Case Study of the Buenaventura Civic Movement's Contributions to Insurgent Planning

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ABSTRACT

For ethnic minorities in Latin America and throughout the Global South, an expansion of citizenship rights, such as constitutional recognition of ethnic groups, has been undermined by State-sanctioned neoliberal policies, political corruption, and violent occupation of territories. State-led planning within these contexts is characterized by the use of centralized planning models that execute megaprojects which continue to represent dominant economic and political interests at the expense of ethnic communities, oftentimes, touting inclusive planning practices. In these instances, insurgent planning practices, collective actions from below, challenge the neoliberal mechanism of dominance through inclusion, with alternative forms of city-making.

In Buenaventura, Colombia, a port city which is part of the constitutionally recognized Afro-Colombian and Indigenous ethnic-territory, 67% of the population cannot meet its basic needs for housing, water, sanitation, food, healthcare and/or education. This high rate of unmet basic needs sits in stark contradiction to the wealth flowing through its port economy, which brought in 1.7 billion USD in national custom revenues in 2016 and manages 30% of the nation's exports. In 2017, *El Movimiento Cívico de Buenaventura para Vivir con Dignidad y Paz en el Territorio* (Buenaventura Civic Movement to Live with Dignity and Peace in the Territory) emerged as a multisectoral coalition to address structural inequality and violence. The movement successfully organized a 22-day civic strike to close the commercial activity of nation's third-largest port. An estimated 25% of *bonaverenses*, people of Buenaventura, participated either by blockading, marching or negotiating with the government. In an agreement to end the strike, the movement created an autonomous fund to finance a 10-year comprehensive development plan and secured 500 million USD of initial financing.

Through interviews with movement leaders, social media, historical context, and analysis of the legal agreements, I describe three mechanisms of civic governance that the movement offers for an insurgent planning practice. The first is multisector solidarity that is built by a process of collective learning. The second mechanism looks at the committee structure of the *Movimiento Cívico*, in which thematic committees are established to manage the priorities of the city. The third, is the legal framework that creates a mixed-management board of directors, with *Movimiento Cívico* representatives and the State, for the autonomous fund and the 10-year comprehensive development plan. These mechanisms, *formas propias de gobernanza* (our own ways of governance), contest the relationship with the State and aim to restore a *cosmovision* (worldview) that reflects the ethnic-territory.

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MOTIVATION

> *"Yo creo que el Paro Cívico marcó la historia de Buenaventura en dos. Muchos tomamos conciencia. Hay personas que no sentíamos ese amor por Buenaventura. Yo vivo en zona rural, no sentía tanto el peso de que es vivir en un barrio donde no hay agua... No lo he vivido, pero es mi dolor porque es mi gente. Hay que dar a conocer que tenemos ese sentimiento por transformación. Unos se llevan todo lo que nosotros producimos. No somos solo un contenedor, un puerto, somos un pueblo de negros. Tenemos que demostrar que existimos. Como Afros pudimos decir que existimos. No somos solo folclor, también somos mente, personas que crean, que pueden dar otro punto de vista y mostrarle al mundo entero que los negros también podemos."*
>
> "I think that the *Paro Civico* marked a split in Buenaventura's history. Many of us became aware. There are those of us who didn't feel the love for Buenaventura. I live in a rural area, and I didn't feel the burden of not living with water in an urban neighborhood… I haven't lived it but it's my pain because it's my people. We acknowledge that we are sensing a transformation. There are people who are taking all that we produce here. We aren't just a container, a port, we are a black community. We have to show that we exist. As Afros, we *were* able to say that we exist. We aren't only folklore, we are also thinkers, people who create, who can contribute another point of view and show the entire world that as black communities we are capable."
>
> Yerardi Balanta
> Territorial Innovation Lab, June 2019

In June 2019 I accompanied the MIT Community Innovator's Lab (CoLab) team in Buenaventura, Colombia for the final workshop of the *Laboratorio de Innovacion Territorial*-LIT (Territorial Innovation Lab) in the Colombian Pacific. CoLab has been partnering with social and civic leaders in the Pacific Region of Colombia since 2014. Over these years, leaders have worked together to elevate transformative practices for the region, guided by the pillars of economic democracy, prototyping for innovation, self-determination, youth leadership, and connecting the Pacific's Afro-descendent region to a larger structure of liberation for Africans and those of the African Diaspora. For LIT, CoLab's local coordinators recruited youth leaders in Quibdó and Buenaventura placing emerging leaders at the center of innovation and the future vision for the Pacific and strengthening their collective leadership capacity through a 12-month program. The curriculum is dynamic and leads to a collaboration to prototype socio-economic initiatives and ideate how to set these initiatives into action. Though CoLab is based in Cambridge,

Massachusetts, the team includes two local coordinators that live in Buenaventura and Quibdó, Milady Garces and Kathe Gil, and two national coordinators, Natalia Mosquero and Juan Constain Ramos, based in Bogotá. They describe CoLab's partnership as, "It's not CoLab *in the* Pacific, Its CoLab *with the* Pacific".

In the intimate workshop in Buenaventura, the local coordinators opened up a discussion on how they wanted to proceed with their prototypes after the program. Through key characteristics of the program design, Theory U (Scharmer, 2018) and Asset Based Community Development, and the facilitation expertise of the coordinators, they allowed for the leaders to put forth their experiences and vision to inform what they wanted the future engagement to look like. During the discussion, one particular comment really sat with me. It started with the leaders discussing a tension about whether or not to continue with their prototypes and how feasible this was in the context of accessing start-up resources and balancing this project with securing a livelihood. Some talked about owning their leadership in the region by committing to seeing the prototype launch, knowing that they are the ones who live there and whose kids will grow up in the community and that ultimately, they will be the ones who change their reality. This then expanded to discussing MIT CoLab's role in solidarity. MIT CoLab *with the* Pacific to them meant linking their ideas to technical assistance or easier access to funding sources. These comments resonated with a quote that professor Lily Song at the Harvard Graduate School of Design mentioned when she came to our Intro to Planning: Gateway class during my first semester of graduate school. Lily spoke about her experience as a former organizer and now, working within an institution to leverage resources and power for communities. I finally felt that my values aligned to my purpose within the planning discipline at MIT and with CoLab I was experiencing this in action.

I came into City Planning after a number of years in labor and community organizing myself. My organizing experiences started in earnest in 2015 when I moved to Sacramento, California to become a union organizer with the Service Employees International Union – United Healthcare Worker's West (SEIU-UHW). At SEIU-UHW I was part of a team of organizers, meeting non-union private hospital workers across California, recruiting influential leaders, and developing their capacity to organize their co-workers and win a union election. There is a wide range of union organizing strategies and union organizing is different across sectors and states in the US, but there is an underlying model

that I was trained under known as the Alinsky model, influenced by the work of Saul David Aliksy, a communist activist and political theorist who wrote *Rules for Radicals*, a guidebook for community organizing. He started organizing with Industrial Areas Foundation and influenced Fred Ross, a community organizer, who recruited Cesar Chavez and ultimately had a profound impact in founding United Farm Workers (UFW) with Dolores Huerta. Another organizer, Marshall Gantz, worked with UFW and went on to devise President Obama's successful grassroots organizing political strategy. This strategy and Alisky's legacy are not without critique, while neither is the union movement throughout the United States. From this one model, other forms and knowledge have deepened the practices of mobilizing and building power.

Organizing put to action the frustrations and hopes that I have felt with the world we live in now. One of my most memorable campaigns was a 2016 organizing drive at Pomona Valley Hospital for 1,200 service and technical workers. This was the largest campaign to take place nationally and we spent over 8 months organizing. My day to day involved meeting with workers and carrying out a one-on-one, a very thoughtful organizing conversation about the worker's most important issue on the job, tying these concerns to how it affected them, their families, or their patients, and getting honest about why things remained the same year after year. For example, many workers make only a few dollars above minimum wage despite their licenses or years of experience; many are kept just below full-time to limit their eligibility for benefits or they pay incredible sums of money for healthcare despite being healthcare workers; many work back-to-back 12 to 16-hour shifts to make ends meet, and; many departments are understaffed and workers are asked to make difficult decisions about patient care in these situations.

This honesty often meant that a one-on-one was an emotional conversation, driving so many of the feelings of anger, frustration, and indignation to the forefront, leading to a call to action: "Are you willing to join your co-workers in building a union?" As the campaign became stronger, I was only a successful organizer if I was able to recruit influential workers, people in the hospital that others looked up to, to the union organizing committee and if I was able to facilitate meetings for this committee to act collectively to mobilize their coworkers. I would support leaders as they started to have honest one-on-ones with their coworkers, organize house meetings, and collect union drive cards from all the workers willing to support. Leaders are the first to go public with their campaign in the

face of their employer, and ultimately, the campaign depends largely on how strong this group is. This is because when the hospital's CEO and HR become aware that a union organizing campaign is taking place at the workplace, a campaign of bribes and threats begins. The strongest strategy to win a union organizing campaign is to recruit influential leaders that are trusted by their coworkers to walk them through the apathy, confusion, fear, and division that begins when their employer finds out workers are organizing. Often times, a campaign never gets to a vote because there aren't enough leaders recruited. A victory is glorious, but it's also only the beginning, to win a great contract, the phase of contract negotiation requires the same if not more leadership capacity and mobilization.

A reality became clear to me, organizing workers in a capitalist economy is a psychological battle between courage and fear, between faith and cynicism, between hope or apathy. This meant that my role was to build strong relationships based on trust and build hope with leaders so that as they too guided their coworkers. I built very close and meaningful relationships with many healthcare workers, certified nursing assistants, environmental service techs, surgical techs, respiratory techs, and many other types of hospital jobs that are so often under looked as the critical backbone of healthcare. Pomona Valley Hospital workers won their union vote on January 21, 2016, but their employer filed with the National Labor Relations Board to include many hospital workers throughout their hospital that our team had not organized because they are not traditionally considered under the classification of technical workers. To date, this tactic by their employer has delayed the certification of the vote, and they are not yet union members. Today, as I write this thesis, many of these healthcare workers are on the frontline of the COVID19 pandemic in California.

After three years organizing with SEIU-UHW, I yearned to apply the skills that I had learned in mobilizing workers and building power within the workplace to community-level concerns. I started to work for an environmental justice organization in Sacramento where I met an incredible community leader, Naia, in South Sacramento who was organizing her family and neighbors to clean up a creek that was gated off from the community. This small project to clean the creak turned into a multi-ethnic coalition of neighbors to remove the gates from a 1-mile section of the creek and create a multi-purpose greenway. When I started at this organization, I became aware that this was a longer-term battle, not like the hyper-speed organizing drive like in the union world. I

started to engage with other organizers around the Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) model to not only use mobilization as in the union world to win campaigns but to leverage assets at a community level, to shift access to opportunities, resources, and ultimately, community development. One of the biggest assets that exist in the community is culture and values of collective action, of coming together during times of difficulty to resist and to share joy. In my own personal experience, this is a value that transcends the labor-based organizing model that I had learned to apply. The ties workers have in the workplace are ties that go beyond the workplace. Often times during labor organizing I noticed this in how interconnected families and friends are in the healthcare industry. Many of the Filipino and Latino healthcare workers, for example, have saving mechanisms with family and friends to help them save so they can invest in their kids' education, purchase a car or a home. A union provides dignity to earn your livelihood, it builds leaders at the workplace who often push for political change, and the future of labor organizing must continue to engage beyond the workplace and into communities.

At DUSP, I have been able to continue to deepen my understanding and tools for how to catalyze social transformation through my relationship with CoLab and the Colombian Pacific. In addition to being linked to a team of organizers, CoLab's work links me to my homeland of Colombia which I left in my childhood when my family immigrated to the US. In that same trip during the summer of June 2019, after six years of building community trust, CoLab began a crystalizing a partnership with the *Movimiento Cívico*, a civic movement of a multitude of sectors and interest groups because leaders of LIT who are part of the movement initiated a first meeting. Since then, the *Movimiento Cívico* has invited CoLab staff to provide support in ongoing negotiations with the national government in territorial planning processes. The importance of this movement to the Colombian Pacific is the basis of this thesis and their promise for the future of Buenaventura can be summed up in their ability to organize and execute a civic strike that in 2017 shut down the port in Buenaventura for 22 days and resulted in an agreement with the national government of a development plan to address what the *Movimiento Cívico* states as "*problemas de fondo y no de forma*", problems that are systemic, not superficial. Milady Garces, CoLab local coordinator in Buenaventura and one of the organizers of *Destila Patrimonio*, a collective of *viche* makers, named the *Movimiento Cívico*'s work in a team meeting that summer as "*formas propias de gobernanza*" (our own forms of

governance). This brought me to the central question I aim to explore in this thesis: what can social movements, organizers, and planners learn from the forms of governance that the Pacific's *Movimiento Cívico* is building? As I try to answer this question, I am reminded of the pictures that CoLab's Pacific team brought to an All Staff team meeting when we were prompted to bring a picture of a social movement. Natalia Mosquero brought a picture from the Quibdó based photographer, El Murcy, of people from Quíbdo lifting a tree together (Image 1). Milady Garces brought a few of her work, highlighting the *Viche* production, an ancestral drink, from the cultivation of sugar cane to the fermentation and bottling of the alcohol (Image 2) and a picture of their political work with the regional government, Department of Valle del Cauca, which led to the creation of an ordinance recognizing *viche* as cultural heritage for the region (Image 3). Kathe Gil brought a picture of her work with *Jóvenes Creadores del Chocó*, which utilizes art and culture with youth to heal from violence and to strengthen community assets (Image 4). These pictures highlight the team's daily practice of connection between the land's resources and the cultural traditions, relational ways of being, that describe the ethnic-territorial identity and sustain the struggle to defend it.

Image 1 Fotograph by El Murcy, Quíbdo, Colombia



Source: El Murcy

Image 2 Recreation of the cultural practice of *molienda*, a stage in the process of distillation and production of *viche* done with a traditional *trapiche* "*Mata 4*" with the Community of Triana, rural zone of the Alto y Medio Dagua, Buenaventura, and members of the collective of *viche* makers named *Destila Patrimonio*

Source: Milady Garces Arboleda, 2019

Image 3 First International congress of artisanal and ancestral beverages of the Colombian Pacific, 2019. From left to right, Milady Garces Arboleda, Director of *Destila Patrimonio*; Veneranda Ruiz, pioneer in the transformation of artisanal beverages; Dilian Francisca Toro, Governor of the Department of Valle del Cauca; Rosmilad Quiñones, Director of the Association of Traditional Midwives of the Pacific; Edid Consuelo Bravo, Secretary of Culture for the Department of Valle del Cauca

Source: Secretaria Cultural del Valle del Cauca, 2019

Image 4 Youth from *Jóvenes Creadores del Chocó*, a community-based organization led by Kathe Gil, perform the play "*Desde la Orilla*"

Source: Kathe Gil 2019

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

"Jóvenes y adultos el mismo compás
ancianos y niños gritando ¡no más!
la gente en la calle saliendo a marchar
no nos detendrán
ni a bate ni a gas
el pueblo se cansó,
ya está demostrado,
a la indiferencia le hemos ganado
El Pacifico arroje, ya no he esta callado,
no estamos exigiendo más que lo ganado.
Y esta es otra historia para contar, como
la de David y Goliat
el gigante no se mató,
se le hizo arrodillar
Ya no más, ya no más."
David Paredes

"Por el Pacífico junto vamos a luchar
el pueblo no sé rinde
porque somos más
los buenos somos más"
Mia Josef (del barrio inc)

"Youth and adults following
the same compass,
Elders and kids yelling 'enough'!
People on the street going out to march.
They won't stop us,
not with batons or gas.
The people are tired,
you already know
we have won against indifference.
A forgotten Pacific will not stay quiet,
we are not asking for more than what
we've already won.
This is a different story being told,
like the one of David and Goliath,
the giant, not killed,
brought to his knees.
Enough is enough."
David Paredes

United we fight for the Pacific,
the people will never give up.
Because we are more,
on the side of good, we are more.
Mia Josef (del barrio inc)

Excerpts from the song ''*Buenaventura no se rinde*", Buenaventura won't give up,
written by various artists, May 29, 2017

Throughout history, manifestations by civil society and social movements emerge and influence change in how nation-states approach the project of economic and social development. In Latin America, the 1970s saw a rise in Marxist influenced socialist and communist left-wing grassroots organizations, often drawing from strong labor union leaders, and ultimately led to powerful political parties, some which became heads of states and others which remained peripheral movements. By the 1990s, in response to system exclusion from both social movements and State influenced economic and social development, Latin America experienced a surge in ethnic-based movements, their tactic focused on influencing constitutional reform to recognize ethnic rights. Countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Colombia formally shifted away

from recognizing blanket citizenship rights and towards acknowledging specific rights of ethnic minorities (Negretto, 2009).

In Colombia, Law 70 of 1993, for Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities granted collective titling rights, the results of which opened an avenue to formally recognize ethnic-based territorial communities and their aspirations for autonomy over their territory. This important milestone towards territorial autonomy was undermined by a State-led shift towards neoliberal economic policies in the 1990s that involved privatization of public infrastructure and the execution of megaprojects. Coupled with political corruption and the arrival of illegal armed actors, this enabled violent actors in the 2000s to control the Pacific territory for economic interests through terror (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015). As a result, starting in the 2000s, thousands of rural Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities were massacred and displaced through terror, leading to increased urbanization in the major cities of the Colombian Pacific, including Quibdó, Tumaco, and Buenaventura, a major port which connects the nation's economy to the foreign trade market. In Buenaventura, neoliberal policies privatized the port and water operators and State-centered planning has focused on financing port and commerce-related megaprojects. A long history of structural violence and racial discrimination results in staggering 66.53% percent of the population living with unmet basic needs (Vida Piedrahita, 2020).

On May 16, 2017, at 5:00 am, la *hora cero* (zero hour) of the *Paro Cívico para Vivir con Dignidad y Paz en el Territorio* (Civic Strike to Live with Dignity and Peace in the Territory) in Buenaventura, Colombia struck. Eleven points throughout the city became sites of civil disobedience seeking to disrupt the flow of wealth from the nation's most important Pacific port, Buenaventura, to the nation's interior, the Andean region of political and economic hegemony. *El Comité del Paro Cívico*, the Civic Strike Committee, sent a manifesto of grievances to incumbent president Juan Manuel Santos signed by 80 organizations and announced an indefinite civic strike until the national government declared an economic, social, and ecological state of emergency for Buenaventura. The 22-day civic strike and negotiations with the national government resulted in a multi-faceted agreement outlining the creation of an autonomous fund to finance a 10-year comprehensive development plan as well as 500 million USD for priority public works. As an organizational body, the *Movimiento Cívico* represents a coalition of multisector organizations that gained

legitimacy to represent the interests of the community-at-large from the demonstrated support throughout 22-days of enacting a strike in Buenaventura. The events of the *Paro Cívico* perdured, now three years later, the *Movimiento Cívico*, continues strengthening civil society's role in the city. In a conversation between CoLab and *Movimiento Civico* leaders, the vision for the movement was stated as creating a civic society to "govern governance and the market" (C. Cunningham, personal communication, June 2019).

This thesis looks at how the movement strategized its mobilization, negotiation demands, and political agreements and asks, what are the forms of civic governance that are built by the *Movimiento Cívico of Buenaventura* in the struggle for ethnic territorial autonomy? How do these forms contest the relationship between the national government and the *pueblo*, the people, over governance of the ethnic-territory? How do these forms of civic governance show relational ways of being and worldviews of the Colombian Pacific's ethnic-territory?

RESEARCH METHODS

The theoretical frameworks I employ in this analysis are twofold: on the one hand, the theory of radical and insurgent planning which positions collective action from below within the context of the Global South. I discuss the utility of this theory and complement it with emergent social theory, epistemologies of the South, to link insurgent planning practice of the *Movimiento Cívico* as forms of civic governance that contest the Colombian national government's occupation of the territory, socially, economically, and ontologically.

The case study methodology is supported by a historical analysis of the economic development models employed in Latin America through a political economy lens, outlining the ways in which the Colombian Pacific is marginalized on a racial and ethnic basis from the economic and political power concentrated within the capital of Colombia, Bogotá. In addition, the case study methodology required documentation of the movement informed by interviews with leaders, participants, and allies of the *Movimiento Cívico* conducted during January 2019 (Appendix A). These interviews are rich in content and reflect the collective memories of those leaders of the *Movimiento Cívico* that I was able to interview, but are limited in that, as this thesis will show, this movement is deeper than its leaders and thereby captures only a small amount of those embodied by the *Movimiento Cívico*. All participants gave written consent to the interview and all interviews were transcribed and

translated by the author. Limitations by MIT's institutional policies due to the travel safety restrictions for the region of the Colombian Pacific left a small window of two weeks to interview leaders. During this time period, two of the most active female leaders of the executive committee were unable to meet. There are also no interviews with Indigenous Nation leaders, a perspective that merits an even more in-depth understanding of the indigenous rights movements of the region outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, to include these voices and others not officially interviewed, interview accounts are complemented by news articles and posts from the *Movimiento Cívico* social media account, local news media, and transcripts from a CoLab *LIT* session in which youth leaders of Buenaventura discussed their reflections of the *Paro Cívico*. Finally, official records of decrees and laws as a result of the agreement with the government were analyzed.

This introductory chapter continues with a historical overview of the Colombian Pacific and the port of Buenaventura through a political economy lens and is followed by an account of the foundational ethnic-territorial social movement, *Proceso de Comunidades Negras* (PCN; Process of Black Communities) of the Colombian Pacific. Chapter two provides the theoretical approach of insurgent planning and its turn towards the Global South and political ontology. Chapter three provides the case study, emphasizing the mechanisms of civic governance, *formas propias de gobernanza* (our own ways of governance) produced by the *Movimiento Cívico* and chapter four summarizes the *Movimiento Cívico*'s contribution to insurgent planning.

CASE BACKGROUND

A Brief History of The Colombian Pacific

The Colombian Pacific is an ethnic-territory of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities whose *cosmovisión*, worldview, is sourced from a web of relationships to each other and to the more-than-human natural world, a deeply relational ontology. Nationally, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities makeup 11% and 4% of the nation's population, respectively (*Censo General* 2005, n.d.). In 1991, the Republic of Colombia formally recognized itself as a multi-ethnic society as a result of a constitutional reform that brought expanded citizenship rights to ethnic communities. Between the 1990s-2000s, a majority of the Afro-Colombian communities residing in the Colombian Pacific

were rural communities, yet, violent displacement starting in the 2000s accelerated migration to urban centers such as Quibdó, Tumaco, and Buenaventura. Both in this rural and urban context, the region marks some of the highest national rates of unmet basic needs and poverty. This is not an accident. This section outlines the major waves that characterize the formation of structural systems of racial and ethnic inequality and oppression that are at play in Buenaventura and its relationship to the ethnic-territory of the Colombian Pacific.

It's important to situate the history of ethnic-communities in Colombia in a conflict which began at the establishment of the Atlantic slave trade and the genocide of indigenous communities in the Americas during colonization. Since then, a system of extraction of natural resources and labor from these ethnic communities at the coast and peripheries of the nation supports a dominant white-*mestizo*[1] elite at the interior of the country. Indigenous communities inhabited the Pacific region of Colombia for at least a millennium prior to the brutal and violent settlement of the Spanish which took place between the 15th and 19th centuries. Colonial economies in this region manifested as the extraction of gold through mining, later, agricultural production of commodities such as rubber, bananas, and sugar cane, both of which extracted labor from enslaved Indigenous and African populations (Escobar, 2008). Settlements of indigenous communities in *encomiendas*[2] and enslaved Africans in mining enclaves engaged in acts of liberation, leading to networks of rural ethnic communities who established ways of life in the humid rainforest region of the Colombian Pacific. This led to the emergence of kinship between river-based inter-ethnic communities whose *cosmovisión*, worldview, is characterized by a relationship with the natural world, examples of which can be seen in the ancestral agricultural, hunting, fishing, and mining cultural practices of the territory of the Colombian Pacific (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015; Escobar, 2008). Meanwhile, settlement patterns in the nation followed a racialized logic, in which Spaniards and *criollos*[3] settled the Andean highlands of the country with mild temperatures, building cities and capitals of the white elites, controlling at a distance the

[1] Descendants of white Europeans and American Indians
[2] Institutions implemented by Spanish conquistadors to control indigenous labor
[3] A person of Spanish descent born in the Americas during colonization

production of natural resources and exploiting labor at key strategic points of control in the lowlands of the Pacific, such as the fluvial port of Buenaventura.

At the turn of the 20th century, Buenaventura was a modest fluvial port, connected to the mining economy via its rivers and to Cali by railroad, yet the entirety of the nation's global imports and exports were managed by the Caribbean ports. By 1920s, given Buenaventura's geographic importance, Buenaventura's businessmen and politicians pushed forth a series of construction projects to open the nation's trade to the Pacific Ocean. By the 1940s then, a commercial class of foreigners from England, Germany, the United States, Syria, Lebanon, and China began to settle at the port-city, building lavish accommodations, while a rural migration of Afro-Colombians and Indigenous populations seeking job opportunities moved and built modest housing; a settlement pattern of socio-economic stratification and an extractive economy characterizes this port-city. Even still, the majority of Afro-Colombian communities remained in the rural regions of the Pacific. Escobar (2008) notes the permeation of colonial logic in early nation-building in the Americas, tying it to the continuation of the project of 'modernity', where the conquest of capital and labor in the Pacific of Colombia is justified as the way to achieve national progress.

For the Colombian Pacific, the mid-20th century brought more frequent and powerful waves of extractive commodity-based economies to the rural regions including multinational and national corporations and State government policies to extract and export rubber, tagua, cacao, and mining, as well as investments in railroad and roads. During this time, a national decision is made to invest in the modernization of the maritime port in Buenaventura to support the commodity economy of the region. To manage this effort, a State-run port enterprise, *Puertos de Colombia* is erected. The effect of this between the 1960s-1990s was a modest middle class in Buenaventura that was able to enter into the political arena of local administration as well as management jobs in the public enterprise and access higher educational opportunities, yet, the majority of the territory experienced the absence of public services from the State (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015).

The post-WWII trajectory increasingly accelerates the occupation of the territory when a push towards globalization leads the Colombian State to turn its eye towards the Pacific region, looking to generate and accelerate development as a matter of national

importance. Escobar describes this as a process to "replace the previous dynamic of Afro-indigenous colonization and limited, externally driven exploitation of resources with the modern imaginary of accelerated economic growth, intensification of natural resource extraction, development enclaves, urbanization, and so forth" (Escobar, 2008, p. 163). By 1983, this materialized as the first State-led plan for development, Plan for the Integral Development of the Pacific Coast, which opened the Colombian Pacific to 250 million USD for infrastructure in roads and modern technologies, with funding from international banks and technical assistance of international development organizations. The vision was for the Pacific to be the ocean of the 21st century, turning over the page of the Atlantic routes to a new frontier of development.

As the Colombian Pacific became the object of national development, the economic logic of neoliberalism, which supports privatization and deregulation of private and public services, generated a series of megaprojects with the goal of driving competition and foreign investment. In Buenaventura, first the port was privatized with the creation of *Sociedad Portuaria* in 1993. Likewise, water and sewage services were granted to *Hidropacifico*, through a program of loans which placed the local government in long-term debt. An immense number of projects have been formulated, including the expansion of a fifth port operator *Terminal de Contenedores de Buenaventura* (TCBUEN), a highway expansion known as *Vía Interna-Alterna*, a boardwalk redevelopment project known as *Malecón Bahía de la Cruz*, a national development plan to improve port logistics under *Programa Nuevas Cuidades* (New Cities Program), an internationally funded plan titled Emblematic Cities, and numerous other investments. Echeverría (2015), Zeiderman (2016), and (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015; Jenss, 2020; Zeiderman, 2016) have linked the expansion of megaprojects in rural and urban areas to the structural racism experienced as displacement and violence in the territory through political, economic, and extra-legal means.

Defending the Territory

In the Colombian Pacific, territory and ethnic identity are intertwined. A cultural practice of burying a newborn's umbilical cord under the roots of a tree to provide them strength in life also means that people are physically connected to the land. The saying, "*acá nacimos, acá crecimos, acá hemos conocido que es el mundo*" (here we are born, here we

grow up, and here we have known what the world is) reflects the *cosmovisión* of the ethnic territorial identity (Escobar, 2016). The appropriation of an ethnic territorial identity for Afro-Colombian communities emerged around the 1990s, after three decades of grassroots organizing of rural Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities, in partnership with ecclesiastic communities influenced by liberation theology. By the 1990s, through three decades of organizing, 135 organizations representing the above interests coalesced as the *Coordinadora Nacional de Comunidades Negras* (CNCN; National Coordination of Black Communities) and representative social leaders arrived at the Constitution's National Assembly (ANC) in Bogota to demand that recognition of ethnic territorial rights be included in the reformed constitution of Colombia in 1991 (Castelblanco, 2000). The ANC was assembled after a popular vote in 1990 to reform the constitution and maintained representation of political party representatives, including the M-19 and communist groups as well as indigenous communities. Meanwhile, Afro-Colombian communities were not offered representation in the assembly despite their request. The CNCN employed a strategy of alliance with indigenous leaders and mobilizations that included sit ins in public buildings, civic protests, lobbying, and international calls for attention, and a telegram campaign that resulted in tens of thousands of messages from all over the nation sent to the ANC. CNCN ultimately received support from the left-wing political parties such as M-19[4] and *Union Patriótica* (UP)[5] that were advocating for regional autonomy within the reform. On the last day of the assembly, the civil protests, mobilizations, and alliance resulted in the inclusion of *Articulo Transitorio* 55 (Transitory Article 55) in the reformed constitution. This charged congress with a special commission to recognize black communities in "*tierras baldías*", at the time considered unoccupied public lands legally owned by the State, of the rural riverine watershed in the Colombian Pacific. This also included the acknowledgement of their historical importance, traditional practices, and the right to collective property. As a result, a commission is established and over two years, 12 representatives from *comunidades negras* negotiate the law with the national government. Castelblanco (2000) note that the process was challenging; including at first for the national government representatives the realization of how large the actual population of

[4] M-19 a left-wing nationalist guerilla organization movement established in 1970
[5] the Union Patriotica (UP) was founded in 1985 as a political party representing the interests of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revoluationary Armed Forces of Colombia; FARC) members which fall in ideological line of democratic socialism and boliviarism.

rural black communities living in *tierra baldias*, and second, a realization that the request to recognize territorial rights went beyond some of the urban black movements for civil rights which were focused primarily on anti-racism and discrimination and not on the concept of autonomy of ethnic-territories. The CNCN gives way to the *Proceso de Comunidades Negras* (PCN) and passage of Ley 70, 1993, which formalizes the intentions of Transitory Article 55 into law and sets a milestone for ethnic territorial recognition of Afro-Colombian communities in Colombia and Latin America.

The impact of this law is multifold: first, the politicization of the black identity led to the recognition of an ontology linking black communities and territory which upholds values and forms of life born out of the experience of the African diaspora yet uniquely defined by the conditions of the Pacific's ecosystem of rivers and humid tropical forest. The second, forms of inclusion in the national political arena, including establishing for the first time two seats for representatives of black communities in the national congress, as well as special commissions for black communities with the Ministry of the Interior as well as in the environmental, education, financial, and national planning ministries of the State. At the local level, forms of autonomy that existed in the rural communities were given a pathway to become formalized in the relationship with the State through the collective land titling process that would be governed by local councils, *consejos comunitarios*, Thirdly, the grassroots organizing that was employed for this milestone had strengthen the political capacity of black communities through a regional identity and collective organizing process and opened the possibilities for influencing how development in the territory should take place from the vision of ethnic territories.

***La Toma de la Guerra al Puerto* (The Occupation of the Port by War)**

"*Procesos sociales de base*" or grassroots organizing, is a form of life for the people of the Pacific, yet, beginning in 1999, a peak of violence victimized civilians and systematically disrupted the fabric of this network. A report published by the National Center for Historical Memory (CNHM), "Buenaventura, a Port without Community", documents the emergence of illegally armed forces and their acts of violence against civilians. The peak of violence emerged with the occupation of the right-wing paramilitary group, *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC; United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), which rivaled the existing presence of the left-wing *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC;

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), during the years of 2000-2004. This engendered a conflict that bled into violence against civilians in a territory where the State had little physical military presence and where impunity was the *defacto* rule of law as the State failed to acknowledge or address victim's complaints. Meanwhile, the focal point of the conflict revolved around control of the international and intranational trading infrastructure and economy. Illegal armed actors financed their activities through the illegal drug and arm trade economies and made deals with the country's corporations and political elites to guarantee their ability to export commerce, relying on the nation's privatized ports to export commodity agricultural products, coffee and sugar, as well as supply the growing global demand for natural gas, hydrocarbon, minerals such as gold and iron, and oil. As such, CNHM argue, illegally armed groups become *defacto* private operators of public services, both terrestrial and water transportation routes, but also funneling water and waste management services to those able to pay the extortion fees (Valbuena, 2012). The result, a geography of violence in which the community ties were critically severed while political clientelism, corruption, and bribery thrived (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015).

In 2004, under an accord between President Álvaro Uribe and the AUC signed two years earlier, the AUC underwent demobilization of its Pacific occupation. Demobilization, is a complex process to demilitarize guerilla groups, and success requires intentional programs and policies for the integration of para-military soldiers into civil society. Rather than alleviate the violence, demobilization in this context left a vacuum of formerly controlled zones that was filled by a new configuration of illegally armed forces, some of which included former militants of the AUC who refused to demilitarize, and led to the formation of local gangs, such as *Los Rastrojos*, and opened up the FARC's access to territorial control. By 2005, the urban core of Buenaventura was under "*la toma de la guerra al puerto*" (the occupation of the port by war), experienced by civilians as invisible frontiers within neighborhoods, massacres, shoot outs in the streets, and bombings (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015). The response of the national government by President Alvaro Uribe in 2008 was militarization of the city, a strategy which utilized National Police to occupy the city and incentivized their efforts to recruit civilians as informants, escalating retaliation and further recruitment of youth into armed conflict. From 2005 to 2013, authors note a "geography of terror" was the primary logic within the

territory. Illegally armed groups began to split and claim space within the urban and peri-urban cores. No longer just *Los Rastrojos*, other local bands of narcoparamilitaries such as *La Empresa* and *Los Urabeños* emerged.

The National Center for Historical Memory and Marin et al. (2019) note how the systematization of violence in Buenaventura disrupted a strong network of grassroots movements and the political and leadership capacity amassed by them within the last decades of organizing. One salient example of the disruption was the immediate effect of the violence on collective titling processes. The victory for afro-descendent and indigenous communities in 1991 for collective titling of the territory meant that previously considered *tierras baldías* could now be governed by *consejos comunitarios*, a process that formalized in the eyes of the State the previously unrecognized kinship-based form of governance that existed in the rural regions of the Colombian Pacific. In 2000, in the city of Buenaventura, 21 *consejos comunitarios* were awaiting titling rights when a series of 18 massacres were carried out by paramilitaries, causing communities to flee their lands in terror by the time titling rights were ready to be finalized (*Buenaventura: Un puerto sin comunidad*, 2015).

Whereas the second half of the 20th century saw grassroots movements demanding ethnic recognition and territorial rights, the start of the 21st century necessitated a reconstruction of capacities and shifted priorities to a defense of human rights, which also sought solidarity amongst national and international organizations, academics, and other activist groups to visibilize an otherwise unrecognized humanitarian crisis[6]. Specifically, during 2005-2019 initiatives emerged to meet the needs of victims of violence and displacement in an urban context, demand the recognition of human rights for youth and women, and the use of art and cultural practices for collective healing spaces (Jaramillo Marín et al., 2019). Marin et al. (2019) speak to a paradox of two processes occurring during this time period, geographies of violence and processes of re-existence. Geographies of violence as the use of violence by economic, illegal armed forces, and state actors to define a social order, political logic, and daily life that results in de-territorializing the ethnic communities of the Pacific both physically from their territory through displacement and

[6] Coalitions with international actors emerged including, Human Rights and Washington Office on Latin America, African Americans civil rights organizations in the US, labor unions in the US, the African American caucus in the US Congress, for example within the United States, particularly during the negotiations of the US and Colombian Free Trade Agreement.

mentally from their cultural practices, sense of belonging and community. Practices of re-existence refers to the range of actions undertaken by people within the territory, collectively, to contest and restructure this reality in ways that affirm the right to life and in particular, reconstruct the ties between people, culture, and territory. The *Movimiento Cívico*, arises amidst this context as an multisector coalition of grassroots organizations, including those that aren't registered as formal entities but are continuously being formed and re-formed depending on the context, and formal organizations, such as the labor unions, ethnic organizations recognized by the State, and religious entities, that constitute a legacy of organizing processes and a fight to re-exist in defense of the territory in the Pacific.

A Key Contradiction

The gains of PCN in 1993 through Law 70, colloquially refered to as the black communities law, expanded citizenship rights and began a process of local governance of the territory based on ethnic territorial values. This advancement was arrested by the expansion of the civil war intertwined with neoliberal projects designed to protect national economic interests and simultaneous State-absenteeism in the wellbeing of ethnic communities and their autonomy. As a result, Buenaventura is a city of wealth extraction, for example, in 2016 the port commerce generated 1.7 billion USD in tariffs, contributing to 30% of national exports and 40% of national imports while 67% of residents are unable to meet their basic needs (Vida Piedrahita, 2020). The *Movimiento Cívico*, deeply rooted in the social and political grassroots organizing in defense of the territory, its autonomy, identity, and way of life transpires in this context to continue the struggle.

CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

WHAT DOES CIVIL SOCIETY DO IN THE FACE OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE?

As the history of the Colombian Pacific demonstrates, grassroots organizing movements such as the *Movimiento Cívico*, simultaneously struggle against oppressive institutions while drawing from their own ways of life, *formas propias*, of living in the territory to generate the future. *Formas propias*, is a concept utilized often in conversations with people from the Colombian Pacific, including in documents from the PCN, but notably, Milady Garces and Kathe Gil, Co-Lab's local coordinators in the region were the first to draw my attention to this concept. *Formas propias* refers to the many relational ways of being in the world and is applied to many themes, education, innovation, and in this thesis, governance. True to its relational form, *formas propias* is not an insular or essentialist notion, rather, it is an affirmation that within the Colombian Pacific there exists ways of life that contradict the logic imposed by a dominant world. I further draw from insurgent planning as a theorical framework from which to position social movements and their actors as integral experts in planning for social transformation, particularly for communities who face structural inequality and violence. In this conceptual framework, I review the foundational theory proposed by John Friedman on radical planning's proposal to situate civil society within the planning discipline. I link this shift to the insurgent practice, which situates radical planning in practices of the Global South making a distinction between inclusive and substantive citizenship and outline the set of principles proposed by the scholarship. The utility of this theory rests on the critical urgency that our world is facing today, a historicized embeddedness in structures of inequality and violence, and the consciousness that civil society living and organizing within these struggles is distinctly positioned to advance innovative solutions to these complex problems. It follows then, that looking to social movements is a shift in what we consider valid knowledge and whom we consider experts in the field of planning; it also proposes emerging out of structures of inequality and violence by looking precisely to those living within these contexts. As such, it draws from the theory of epistemologies of the South to consider how knowledge from relational worldviews in worlds like that of the Colombian Pacific can support the possibility of a different world. Arturo Escobar frames this as an

epistemological shift, one in which we move "…out of the epistemic space of Western social theory and into the epistemic configurations associated with the multiple relational ontologies of worlds in struggle. It is in these spaces that we might find more compelling answers to the strong questions posed by the current conjuncture of modern problems with insufficient modern solutions…" (Escobar, 2018, p. 68). To look toward compelling answers, chapter 3 presents the forms of governance emergent from the *Movimiento Cívico*'s work and chapter 4 consider its contributions to the growing body of insurgent planning practices.

THE TURN TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY

Planning, John Friedman argues, is "the art of linking knowledge to action in a recursive process of social learning" (1987, p. 4). This definition, first proposed in his book *Planning in the Public Domain* in 1987, applies broadly to the two major traditions of planning which he categorized as social guidance and social transformation. Generally, social guidance can be thought of as a State-led endeavor in which rational decision making relies on neutral scientific and technical knowledge, ultimately upholding existing systems, while social transformation focuses on "political practices of system transformation" (Friedmann, 1987, p. 38). Friedman argues that in recent history, planning as social guidance has emerged from the Keynesian economic school of thought that appealed to scientific knowledge for practices of social reform and policy analysis where State-led intervention addresses the externalities of a capitalist economic system. Planning for social transformation, Friedman suggests, consists of two branches, one of which is social learning. This branch proposes the planning profession can engage in social transformation by utilizing multiple forms of knowledge, from various stakeholders, to develop an action, evaluate, learn from the outcomes, and adjust the course of an intervention. It draws on the scholarship of John Dewey, who rejects a positivist view of one-truth and suggests instead that valid knowledge is generated from practical experience, a learn by doing approach that allows one to experiment and test a hypothesis. In this approach, reason is not rejected, rather, reason emerges from deliberation between stakeholders. Dewey's work is concerned with this framework for the political sphere, specifically the quality of democracy, arguing that democracy depends on civic society in dialogue with public concerns (Friedmann, 1987). Social learning also draws from the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, who considers

reason as the result of communication between people, or communicative rationality. Instead of one objective reality produced by laws of the universe, a reality is constructed by deliberation between subjects and context, and its validity is established through discourse and experimentation, similar to pragmatism (Healey, 1992, p. 151). However, Habermas specifically considers multiple forms of reasoning, including, scientific rationality, morality, and culture, to be equally valid if decided upon by deliberation and this allows societies to be able to generate collective agreements for how to live together amongst differences (Healey, 1992). Ultimately, this validated knowledge results in an action that aims for social transformation. Within this scholarship, the planner's role is to act as a neutral mediator for various stakeholders to reach consensus through communicative acts of reasoning. This branch of planning has led to various process-based forms of planning such as advocacy planning, participatory planning, and communicative planning. A salient critique of these approaches is that, while arguing that equitable outcomes can result from consensus between stakeholders, it assumes a context where conflict is only about difference, instead of about the *power* that marginalized groups are allowed to exert in a consensus deliberation *because of* their difference. As a result, particularly in contexts of structural violence and inequality, methods like advocacy, participatory, and communicative planning have been criticized for driving the rise of new non-governmental actors such as NGOS to partner with the State or international organizations, as mediators between these institutional forms and civil society. Rather than lead to social transformation, Shrestha and Aranya (2015) suggest, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other mediators are co-opted by the neoliberal state. Thus, while social learning pushes the planning profession away from rational comprehensive models, offering a process of deliberation as valid knowledge to inform action for social transformation, planning must still contend with how, in a context of structural inequality and violence, equitable outcomes can be achieved. A closer look at the role of civil society provides promising pathways.

Radical planning, the second branch of planning for social transformation, "departs from all the others by asserting the primacy of *direct collective action from below*"(Friedmann, 1987, p. 83). This branch draws from the intellectual traditions of utopianism, social anarchism, and historical materialism, taking as their parting point a critique of the existing systems of oppression which leads to struggle, as evidenced by

citizen-led mobilizations, violent and non-violent, towards the goal of transforming these systems by collective action from below. Friedman acknowledges that the revolutionary social movements that emerged from utopianism, social anarchism, and Marxism, have experienced limited success in establishing long-lasting or democratic alternatives, nonetheless arguing that it is only radical planning that "can stand up to the dominant order" (1987, p. 308).

What then is the theory and practice of future radical planning? Friedman outlines that radical planning must take the route towards "the re-centering of political power in civil society, mobilizing from below the countervailing actions of citizens, and recovering the energies for a political community that will transform both the state and corporate economy from within" (Friedmann, 1987, p. 314). In this framework, the household is the mode of production of life and the nucleus of civil society. From this unit, the collective production of material goods and non-material needs occurs. This contrasts sharply with existing neoliberal economic models that focus on the individualistic unit of consumption as well as with State-led models as the unit of concerted action. For households to be in control of their means of production, they require access to "the bases of social power- the information, knowledge, skills, organization, tools of production, and time and space" (Friedmann, 1987, p. 326). To succeed in control of the means of production is both a shift towards self-reliance, in which societies undertake the provision of goods and services and a shift towards political communities, in which households undertake the role of governance. Friedman, however, does not argue for the state to become obsolete nor for a complete dissolution of capitalism, instead suggests that the radical planning practice leads to their power being "redistributed among smaller political units…rendered more accountable to the people" (Friedmann, 1987, p. 327). A shift towards political communities necessitates that the people engage in processes of deliberation where, drawing from the Habermassean foundation of social learning, knowledge of radical practice evolves and shifts in its effectiveness against struggle (Friedmann, 1987, 2011).

Rather optimistically, Friedman suggests that in so-called Third-world cities, the urgency to meet people's basic needs requires that a radical planning practice be State-led to quickly mobilize households to this end. To be sure, the struggles of social movements emerging from ethnic, peasant and working-class, feminist and LGBTQI, religious groups, and other minority majorities throughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America

and the violent repression often faced by their governments, contradict this possibility. How then does civic society in the Global South plan engage in radical planning? What are the key principles that can inform the theory of change?

SEEING FROM THE SOUTH

Clearly the radical planning practice that Friedman describes is informed by Western intellectual traditions, even so, making a claim to its pertinence for the struggles across geographical and intellectual boundaries and challenging rational models of knowledge as bound to a project of dominance. Since first proposing radical planning as mediation of knowledge to action for social transformation, scholars across the Global South have been expanding on the theory of radical planning with case studies of collective action from below and rooted in the experience of the Global South (Beard, 2003; Miraftab, 2009; Shrestha & Aranya, 2015; Watson, 2009, 2016). The move to 'Seeing from the South', is not just a geographical shift, it implies challenging radical planning on two fronts. The first, an extension of the critique of the positivist model of knowledge to the epistemological and ontological hegemonic use of Western world models, noting the importance of the local context while at the same time a relational, global view. The second, problematizing the assumption of universal citizenship in order to reach concensus in Habermasean approaches; in cases of the Global South, as will be explained, universal citizenship rights don't result in substantive citizenship. Substantive citizenship is built through insurgent practices and the following section will explore the turn to the Global South through the concept of insurgent planning.

The distinction that comes from positioning theory from the Global South, Miraftab (2009) propounds, is that States in these contexts are post- (and presently) colonial governments that have been embroiled in a globalizing economic project of neoliberalism. Miraftab (2009) states "insurgent movement and oppositional practices described in this article, as historicized reveal their political and cultural roots to be in political formations that resisted the inequalities produced by colonialism, apartheid- and now, neoliberalism" (p 44). Within this reality, the strategy of the post-colonial state's and international organizations to maintain State control is to co-opt inclusive practices, such as community participation or the move towards decentralization. For example, decentralization and participatory community practices can extend the reach of State control when public

entities such as local government or international funded partnerships between organized civil society (e.g. non-profits and community-based partners) and the State are generated without the goal of substantial material redistribution or substantial citizenship. They argue that this relationship ultimately sustains the status quo by stabilizing state-society relations. Critically, they also note that this is not a transformational practice because "symbolic inclusion does not necessarily entail material re-distribution" (Miraftab 2009, p. 34). Nonetheless, Miraftab's case study takes the conviction that social movements can take advantage of the *invented* opened spaces of State-sanctioned participation as well as create their own, *invited* spaces. A key example Miraftab mentions is a housing anti-eviction struggle in which legal and extra-legal tactics were utilized, she describes this as: "they took their housing struggle to the court, they also brought the courts and its inherent limitations out to the street" (2009, p. 38). Miraftab implores the reader to not consider these binaries as reality, but instead to look towards ways in which the State bifurcates inclusion, and many other concepts such as economies and housing (e.g. formal and informal economies) to legitimize a state-sanctioned form of civic participation and denounce the other as an extra-legal and illegitimate form.

By now it should be clear that the link between planning and politics and economics is very much integrated. This is why planning as a formal practice cannot separate itself form the notion and implications of operating from the nation-State and under a globalized neoliberal economy. It is also why radical planning must consider what is the form of citizenship and politics that pertains to its practice. Miraftab (2009) notes social transformation should work towards substantive material redistribution and substantive citizenship (akin to the earlier principles of self-reliance and self-governance). Here, Miraftab (2009) draws from Friedman's later writings (2002), Sandercock (1998) and Holston (1997)'s scholarship to make a distinction between legalized rights gained by State citizenship and a form of citizenship that is constructed from below, through a practice of insurgency. Substantive citizenship then is not a gained by legitimacy but from becoming, "It rather grows under the skin of the city, that is as an invisible city, through the insurgent practices of marginalized communities- be it disenfranchised immigrants, racialized, and gendered minorities of the industrialized world; or the squatter citizens of the global South" (Miraftab 2009, p. 40). In this framework, insurgent citizenship is non-essentialist, temporary instead in its formation, tactics, and discourse, and by opening up spaces of

democracy, it also moves towards self-reliance; insurgent planning practice, it follows, strives for this form of substantive citizenship. To sum up, insurgent planning practice, is then a "form of active participation in social movements or, as we may call them, communities of political discourse and practice, that aim at either, or both, the defense of existing democratic principles and rights and the claiming of new rights that, if enacted, would lead to an expansion of the spaces of democracy, regardless of where these struggles take place" (2002, p. 77). The case study for this thesis, the *Movimiento Cívico* of Buenaventura, situates itself as an insurgent planning practice, and the goal of this thesis is to show how the movement is creating forms of civic governance from below that are expanding substantive citizenship and material redistribution.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INSURGENT PLANNING

Presented as a set of principles, and not as a set of rules, insurgent planning scholarship outlines the following as part of its practice:

1. Enacted by specific groups whose life chances are collectively at risk in particular circumstances,
2. Offers a critical analysis and understanding of the structural forces that deny the fundamental right to human flourishing and full political participation
3. Strategizes simultaneously at multiple scales (micro-local to global),
4. Diverse practices of insurgent citizens are articulated through loosely networked, temporary sodalities (solidarity groups)
5. Aims simultaneously at a number of different problems
6. Engages State and State-like formations

(Friedmann, 2002, pp. 83–84; Shrestha & Aranya, 2015)

Once situated in the Global South, Miraftab contributes a set of additional principles:

7. Counter- hegemonic: destabilizes normalized relations of dominance; exposes the rift between inclusion and redistribution

8. Imaginative: recognizes that other forms of cities and planning is not only possible but necessary
9. Transgressive in time, place and action: it transgresses binaries that are set up with Western logic such as invited/invented spaces of citizenship practice, informal/formal, developed/undeveloped
(Miraftab, 2009, p. 46)

KNOWLEDGE WITHIN INSURGENT PRACTICE

Having laid out the groundwork for insurgent planning practice and its intersection with an emerging theory of the Global South, I now consider the role of knowledge within the practice. Watson (2016), in their theorizing for a Global South suggests a practice of "situated knowledge", meaning that a critical understanding of historical processes that shape the socio-political contexts of the Global South such as colonialism, imperialism, post-colonialism, and neoliberalism. As such, Watson says that a southern turn in planning requires a "local, in-depth understanding", which conflicts with Habermasean models of planning due to their qualifying assumption that power imbalance such as those between the State and social movements can be neutralized with discourse during negotiation (Watson, 2016, p. 37). Nonetheless, some radical planning scholarship by Beard (2003), attempts to look at processes of building knowledge within radical practice. Beard asks: how do communities learn to practice radical planning? Beard presents a case study of an informal settlement in an authoritative state context, Indonesia, to elucidate how radical planning can begin from non-radical acts that build a community's social learning over time. In this case study, state-directed planning first allows the community to engage with state programs, build a skill set that allowed them to move towards community-based planning, and later strategize covert actions towards more controversial ends of radical planning. Beard argues that this is the process of social learning is one in which the community is experiencing both the power and limitations of collective agency. Over time, when the State's power is weakened by an economic and political crisis, it is this social learning which allows them to undertake radical planning actions through a protest to demand political reform. Thus, social learning, as Beard describes it, is a process of cumulative acts over years of building political capacity that strengthens collective agency and opens avenues for broader politicization.

Sandercock (1998), in *Towards Cosmopolis*, also draws lessons from insurgent planning examples of ethnic, labor, and civil rights, and social movements in the U.S. Looking at how knowledge is produced, Sandercock notes "the importance of popular education and social learning", typically taking place when social movements build political capacity by teaching the historical socio-political contexts that generate structural inequality and a second learning node in a learn-by-doing democratic, inclusive process. Notably, Sandercock draws from communicative action as one of methods that can support coalition building for social movements to "find common ground" (Sandercock, 1998, p. 158). As such, communicative acts of knowledge, she argues, can inform how social movements themselves operate, suggesting that perhaps this type of process can be appropriate within the spaces of collective action from below. Nonetheless, Shrestha and Aranya (2015) remind us that "there are vested interest even among members within these grass-roots organizations co-opting the whole social mobilization process to suit their own means. The term 'collective action by the poor' in many ways indicates that these groups are a homogenous composition, whereas in many cases the intra-group power structures are one of the main reasons for exclusion of the vulnerable within the group" (2015, p. 438). Considering that there remain gaps in how insurgent practices overcome differences in power, both within and in their struggle for inclusion with institutional actors, looking to the production of knowledge within insurgent practices remains an opportunity to inform the transition to a new world. While many of these experiences are understood within the local context, as a collective they make up the majority of human experience in both the Global North and Global South. Therefore, accepting Friedman's definition of radical planning as mediating knowledge to action for social transformation, I consider how insurgent planning practice can draw from epistemologies of the South, a relational ontology framework that draws from vast experiences of territorial struggles in the Global South.

EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH

We concluded the last section considering how social learning, a process of generating knowledge for action, is conceived within insurgent planning practice. The *Movimiento Cívico*, which emerges from the long-term struggle for ethnic-territorial rights in the Colombian Pacific is a form of insurgent planning practice that contributes to

expanding and deepening the notion of each of the principles of insurgent practice laid out by Friedman and Miraftab. Under the principle of transgressive actions, we consider that insurgent practices transgress the Western logic of binaries, such as in the example presented by the anti-displacement movement that utilized invited and invented spaces to gain substantive citizenship. Epistemologies of the South, a relational ontology framework builds on the concept of transgression, suggesting that the struggle of movements in defense of territory are not only struggles simply about control over capital or resources. Instead, epistemologies of the South suggest that at their core, these struggles are about multiple ontologies, or *cosmovisiones, or* worldviews struggling to exist outside the Western one. Epistemologies of the South suggests that "the world is made up of multiple worlds, multiple ontologies or reals that are far from being exhausted by the Eurocentric experience or being reducible to it" (Escobar, 2018, p. 67).

Epistemologies of the South has its intellectual roots the disciplines of anthropology and sociology, namely, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos in Brazil and Arturo Escobar's work in the Colombian Pacific with PCN. To understand this framework, Escobar considers that ontology has three modes of operation, the first is our assumptions of how we perceive ourselves as beings and our relationships; the second speaks to how those assumptions influence the way we act in the world and the third, how we connect these actions to the stories we manifest about our world, for example, narratives and mythologies that arise from these. In a Western ontology, a strong set of dualisms coat our assumptions of being and relationships. For example, the self is seen as an individualist experience, and what is considered valid is limited to positivist rationality. Escobar 2018 notes, "the problem is not that dualisms exist", rather, "the problem is with the ways in which such divides are treated culturally, particularly the hierarchies established between two parts of each binary, and the social, ecological, and political consequences of such hierarchies", such as those seen in contexts of colonialism (Escobar, 2018, p. 94). Escobar notes that this struggle can be seen as a political ontological concept where implicit in the project of hegemony is ontological worlds to be conquered, those worlds and knowledge that don't conform to the Western assumptions of beings and relationships.

This is a particularly important shift when considering how struggle is articulated from previous frameworks, for example, political economy in which a Marxist lens poses that a proletariat and bourgeoisie class struggle over the means of production. Political

ontology suggests that struggle framed in this context limits our understanding to a world that is organized primarily by capital, and expands this window with a framework for struggle that is at its core, about ontologies of people and their relationship to others, to non-human nature, to emotion, or to spirituality, to offer a few examples. Relational ontologies characterize the worldviews from communities at the crux of territorial struggles, and in the Colombian Pacific, this worldview shapes the concept of ethnic-territory. PCN, in collaboration with academics such as Escobar, has been working towards strengthening the practice of social transformation that is ultimately a fight for a worldview that is shaped with and from the territory of the Colombian Pacific. A poignant example, mentioned in chapter 1 captures this complexity: "*acá nacimos, acá crecimos, acá hemos conocido que es el mundo*" (here we are born, here we grow, here we have known what is the world", an inter-relationality that considers that we exist in relation to eachother, both the human and the more-than human world (Escobar, 2016). Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities of the Colombian Pacific embody worldviews captured by the above quote, but that are under incomplete occupation, or struggle. In the Colombian Pacific, a region rich with grassroots organizing, a fight for territory is a fight to restore the values that ethnic territories espouse from their worldview as these practices and relationships are eroded by the extractive economies, discrimination, and violence. PCN and other territorial struggles have captured these worldviews as part of their struggle, generating theory from their daily practices. Here, the concept of *Ubuntu*, I am because we are, and el *Buen Vivir*, an Andean indigenous philosophy that embodies an alternative to development have become part of discourse of the alternative worlds that not only necessary, but possible. Epistemologies of the South within this thesis's conceptual framework looks to position the *formas propias de gobernanza* generated from the *Movimiento Cívico* within an insurgent planning practice in which civic governance contests a relationship with the State that leaves little room for the relational worldview of the Colombian Pacific ethnic-territory.

Summary

The shift in the planning tradition to radical planning marked the discipline's self-reflection on its implication in pushing a hegemonic world order that has particularly delineated inequalities, situating civil society engaged in social movements as acts of

alternative visions to development. Insurgent planning practices posited a shift towards the Global South, considering complex socio-economic and political histories and the struggle for substantive citizenship. However, insurgent planning practices from the Global South also retake the task of positioning multiple forms of knowledge, in the form of life experiences, cultures, and ultimately, worldviews, into conversation with a political reality that is based in a practice of governance, for which the role of civic society becomes ever more principal. The task is not a utopian ideal, rather it proposes that civil society be equipped with the power, tools and methodology to not only work through difference, but to recover relational ways of being in the world. As the field of planning broadens to consider civil society's struggle with State-sanctioned models of development as forms of planning for social transformation, these actions can show the way towards creating alternatives to the present world.

CHAPTER 3 *FORMAS PROPIAS DE GOBERNANZA* FROM THE *MOVIMIENTO CÍVICO*

> "*Seguimos con la visión de que si no nos mantenemos unidos nos pueden romper fácilmente. Y lo que nos tiene que mover es el amor al servicio al territorio y estas generaciones y no al dinero. No la riqueza mala vida, ni la riqueza rápida.*"
>
> "We continue with the vision that if we don't remain united, they will be able to break us easily. And that what has to motivate us is our love in the service of the territory and generations to come and not money. Not the evil of greed or rapid creation of wealth."
>
> Henry Hercillo Tobar Otero, Leader of the Executive Committee of the *Movimiento Cívico*

As chapter one sought to elucidate, Buenaventura's community assets include a rich network of social and civic leadership and a cultural ethnic identity that is tied to a relational worldview. To defend the latter, activism has been cultivated over decades of struggle – *nos ha tocado luchar por todo* (we have always had to fight for everything). The rise of the *Movimiento Cívico* then is perhaps not singular under this historical lens, but it does mark a turning point in the city's history where these assets were leveraged to construct a broad-based civic coalition seeking to attack the symptoms of violence and poverty in Buenaventura at the root of their causes: the structure of governance in the territory. Henry Tobar, leader of the *Movimiento Civico* referred to their vision for the structure of governance in the territory as building a "civic society that governs governance and the market" (C. Cunningham, personal communication, June 2019). This chapter outlines three mechanisms of civic governance that are designed by the *Movimiento Cívico* and illustrates how these forms of governance are part of an insurgent planning practice that strengthen critical consciousness, awareness of the struggle and value of ethnic-territorial identity, and allow the *Movimiento Cívico* to legally access a means for material re-distribution.

Figure 1 Organizations who signed on to the *Paro Civico* 2017 demands
Legend demonstrates the multisector coalition that makes up the *Movimiento Cívico*

CIVIC GOVERNANCE AS MULTISECTOR SOLIDARITY

Social learning allows individual interests to be put in service of the collective

The *Movimiento Cívico para Vivir con Dignidad y Paz en el Territorio*, Civic Movement to Live with Dignity and Peace in the territory, arose as a confluence of various groups, formal and informal, and social processes that constitute civil society in Buenaventura. Organizationally, it is composed of a general assembly, which is made up of individuals representing their grassroots and community-based organizations and independent individuals. The general assembly meets monthly at the local church or the local public universities and anyone from the community is allowed to attend these meetings, whether or not they are an official member of the *Movimiento Cívico*. Official membership refers to a process of building trust and a commitment to the work. One can register their grassroots organization as part of the coalition through a pact referred to as "*Solidaridad Social*" (Social solidarity; Resolución N001, 2018). The organizations that make up this coalition represent the following sectors of civic society: " associations, foundations, guilds, indigenous cabildos[7], *consejos comunitarios*, *juntas administradoras locales*[8], alliances, committees, movements, corporations, societies, centers, networks, labor unions, secretariats, and others which are similar" (Resolución N001, 2018). The general assembly of the *Movimiento Cívico* is estimated to include around 300 people and over 100 organizations of the sort mentioned above. The movement has structured itself into eight thematic committees as working groups for the eight demands that were made to the government on the day of the *Paro Cívico* and a ninth, a *Comité Ejecutivo del Movimiento Cívico*, executive committee, which represents the movement at meetings and leads the execution of the agreements with the government. The members of the movement and leaders of the *Comité Ejecutivo* have all been involved in social and civic struggles for the Colombian Pacific throughout their life, many leaders are part of two or three grassroots organizations at a time, and these

[7] *Cabildos* are a public special entity, whose members are elected and recognized as representatives of an indigenous community, with a traditional sociopolitical governance structure, whose function serves to legally represent the community and exercise authority over activities that apply to laws, production activities and customs, and local laws.

[8] *Juntas administratoras locales* are voluntary civic organizations that oversee matters at the comunas and corregimientos (urban and rural city districts, respectively) of a city designed as "Special District"; they elect representatives and procure resources for community development projects through donations.

experiences provide valuable lessons from their life's work. Forming this multisector coalition required creating a civic space where civic society could leverage these experiences to plan for collective action from below.

Around 2014, members of the then titled, *Comité del Paro Cívico de Buenaventura para Vivir con Dignidad y Paz en el Territorio* (Committee for the Civic Strike of Buenaventura to Live with Dignity and Peace in the Territory), known as the *Comité del Paro Cívico*, began their organizing process. Henry Tobar, leader of the *Comité Ejecutivo*, brought to the movement his experience in organizing transportation workers as a union organizer. He began to reach out to the union and labor sector to recruit social leaders into the *Comité del Paro Cívico*. Within a context of violence where trust is eroded by terror, building a civic movement requires rebuilding trust in the community. Tobar mentioned that they recruited leaders from across communities and sectors that could be trusted because of their life's work and conviction. Weekly meetings were held regularly, though there wasn't a requirement to attend and Gersain Diaz Osorio, leader of the *Comité Ejecutivo*, expressed that its likely 200 or so people have participated in these meetings at one point or another. Benjamin Mosquera Rodriguez, leader of the *Comité Ejecutivo*, notes that to understand the *Movimiento Cívico* one has to understand the history of grassroots movements in the Colombian Pacific:

> *"La lucha que se concreta el 6 de junio 2017, es una lucha ha venido hace más de 20 años desde los territorios, desde los procesos…. Pero entonces vale la pena resaltar que gran parte del éxito [del Paro Cívico] es que logra conectar a todas las dinámicas organizativas que de una manera están gestando movilizaciones sociales en el territorio. Algunas con experiencias de trabajo comunitario, otras con experiencias de trabajo sindical, otras con experiencia de obreros…artesanales, trabajo gremios. La gran virtud de esta movilización es que logro juntar todas las expresiones organizativas sin importar su vocación. Y no necesariamente están todas en la misma línea en términos de política, muchas están, como le comento, por ejemplo, el gremio de transportadores, que solo luchan por los derechos de los transportadores, pero también tenemos otras organizaciones que fueron como las que fueron el pilar para que el Movimiento estuviera. Por ejemplo, el PCN, que es el Proceso de Comunidades Negras, tiene más de 30 años en lucha y toda su experiencia, toda su acumulación, y todo su capital político y social lo puso al frente del Movimiento. Igual paso con la pastoral social, igual paso con las comunidades indígenas a través del guardo del cabildo, la* ACIVA[9]*, que es parte del*

[9] ACIVA RP (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Valle del Cauca Región Pacífico): Association of Indigenous Cabildos of the Valle del Cauca, Pacific Region

Movimiento. Entonces, hay unas estructuras muy sólidas de organizaciones que ya venía trabajando en las comunidades hace más de 20 o 30 años. Y que, por su experiencia por su capacidad instalada, su visión del futuro, las pusieron en función del Movimiento. Entonces logró que conectara otras organizaciones con ella por una solidez en materia de planteamiento y la visión política del Movimiento."

"The fight that took place on June 6th, 2017, is a struggle of more than 20 years ago from the territory, from its grassroots processes... But it's worth noting that a large part of the success is that we managed to connect all the organizational dynamics that are generating social mobilizations in the territory. Some with experiences in community work, others with experience in unions, others with experience with workers, artisans, or collectives. The great virtue of this mobilization is that we were able to unite these organizational expressions regardless of their individual vocation. And they are not necessarily all on the same page in terms of politics, many are... for example, the union of transport workers only fights for transportation workers; but, we have other organizations that were a pillar for the existence of the movement, for example, the PCN, which as more than 30 years in the struggle and all its experience, what its accumulated, all its political and social capital was put at the behest of the movement. The same happened with the *pastoral social*, the same with indigenous communities through ACIVA, they're part of the movement. So, we have very solid structures, that have been working in communities and that have been building for 20-30 years. And all their experience, their installed capacity, their vision of the future, they put them in the function of the movement. So, we managed to connect organizations in solidarity for the strategy and political vision of the movement."

(B. Mosquera Rodriguez, personal communication, January 27, 2020)

Multiple interviews echo Mosquera Rodriguez's sentiment, noting unity as one of the factors that led to a successful mobilization on May 16, 2017, and in untangling the substance of unity, they describe a process of collective learning. As the *Comité del Paro Cívico* met, members started to piece together key lessons, leveraging experiential knowledge from all the grassroots processes for a strategy that could make a 2017 strike different from the previous major ones in 1964, 1998, and 2014 which led to agreements with the national government but a reality of broken promises. This was a strategy to be built, looking precisely towards the past struggles of all the sectors to inform the future of a united front. "El *gobierno fue nuestro maestro*" (The government was our teacher) is how the Padre Jhon Reina, leader of the *Comité Ejecutivo*, describes the learning process (P. J. Reina, personal communication, January 23, 2020). Leaders who were recruited brought to the movement

lived experience of participating in past demonstrations and negotiations, and this experiential knowledge was shared before the general assembly, developing their local leadership to be ready to engage with the national government.

One of the recent sources of learning came from the fight of *El Comité por la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida* (The Committee in Defense of Water and Life) for the provision of water and sewage services against the private company, Hidropacifico, and the local government of Buenaventura (Comité por la defensa del agua y la vida, n.d.). Gersain Diaz Osorio, a leader in the *Comité Ejecutivo* who contributes to the communications strategy, notes that this committee, organized in 2009, is "*la madre, el punto organizativo de origen de lo que conocemos como el Movimiento del Paro Cívico*" ("the mother, the organizing origin of what we now know as the civic strike movement") (G. Osorio Diaz, personal communication, January 28, 2020). Narcilo Rosero and Humberto Hurtado, lifelong organizers and present-day leaders of the *Comité Ejecutivo*, belong to this lineage of struggle for the right to water and sanitation (Gallego, 2018). Humberto Hurtado's activist lineage also goes back to the PCN, which at the time was actively fighting for recognition and reparations of violence done by illegally armed groups in the territory. Rosero, who participated in the 1998 civic strike of Buenaventura, where the right to water had also been a salient demand during negotiations with the national government, contributed his experience to this learning process. Diaz Osorio recalls Rosero telling his story of the 1998 civic strike, executed by a public workers union but which grew in force with 45 organizations joining the strike over six days. To end the strike, an agreement was reached with various representatives of the national government making promises to pay back-wages for the public workers who had started the strike and set up a committee that would explore an Emergency Plan for Buenaventura with a commitment of 223,288 million pesos. The movement's leaders reflected on this experience:

> "*El año 1998, en otro paro que fue menos estructurado, duró cuatro días y en el que cometieron el error y lo identificaron ellos para este paro del 2017. De que habían hecho una lista con más de 60 puntos porque fruto del cansancio y de protestas y de insatisfacción porque no les pagaban a los trabajadores del municipio bloquearon el puente del piñal que era la única vía de salida en su época. Entonces, claro, la gente se entusiasmó porque pues vieron que estaban representando la dignidad del pueblo y la gente fue llegando, pero como era espontáneo cada persona iba llegando llevando su problemita. Entonces 'vea en mi calle no hay pavimentación, en mi barrio no hay un puesto de salud' y*

> *fueron poniendo allí unas peticiones para presentarlas al gobierno con quien interactuaron en el momento, que era más que el gobierno nacional la gobernación. Trajeron al gobernador de la época y tuvieron una experiencia de negociación que no fue exitosa. Ellos recuerdan mucho… que el gobernador decía 'intentaré solucionar, procuraré tal cosa'. Entonces habían tenido un antecedente en esa negociación en la que se hicieron acuerdos, pero luego no se cumplieron.*"
>
> "In the year, 1998, in another civic strike that was less structured… they made a mistake, and they identified it for this civic strike in 2017. They had made a list with over 60 petitions as a result of protests and dissatisfaction that municipal workers were not getting paid and they blocked the bridge El Piñal, which was the only exit then, and of course, other people got motivated because national government's representatives came. And the community and people started to spontaneously come, seeing that the dignity of the city was on the line and each person bringing forth their concern, 'Look there's no pavement in my neighborhood, there's no clinic for health care', and they were putting their petitions in front of the government to be addressed. And it wasn't the national government, it was negotiations with the regional governor. And they had a negotiation experience that was not successful, where the Governor at the time, they remember, would say 'I'll try to fix that, I'll work on obtaining that request'; so in the end, in that previous negotiation they had made agreements that were not carried out".
>
> (G. Osorio Diaz, personal communication, January 28, 2020)

This was a negotiation experience with the regional government for which there were no mechanisms agreed upon to ensure their demands would be met, but importantly, it also shows how the leaders from the movement reflected on their political acumen, on *how* to engage with the government. A list of petitions motivated by the enthusiasm of collective action of the strike sparked civil society to engage with the protest, but the movement recognized that mobilization and demonstration only get the national government to the negotiation table in the interest of resuming state-control. To realize material redistribution, the movement would need a mechanism for civic society to hold the national government in compliance and accountability of agreements.

It would not be until 2014, until La *Gran Marcha*, The Great March, when another opportunity was drawn to negotiate with the national government. In 2014, a coalition of organizations including *El Comité del Agua*, PCN, ACODIARPE[10], labor unions, and the Diocese of Buenaventura united under the goal of executing a peaceful march that would

[10] *Associacion Colombiana de Industriales y Armadores Pequeros de Buenaventura*, Association of Industrial Fishermen and Shipowners of Buenaventura

bring attention to the violence and unmet basic needs in the territory. The full name of the event was *La Marcha para Enterrar la Violencia y Vivir con Paz en el Territorio* (The March to Bury Violence and Live in Peace in the Territory). To be sure, this was not the first march against violence. Gersain Diaz Osorio reminds us that marches and demonstrations of various demands which brought around 500 to 2,000 people were a common phenomenon. Padre Jhon Reina, an organizer of the march on behalf of the Diocese of Buenaventura, recalls that the organizing committee had hoped for 5,000 people to turn out. On February 19, 2014, *La Gran Marcha* took place, starting at 8 am and to the surprise the *Comité de la Marcha*, of the organizing committee, and the rest of the nation, 25,000-60,000[11] civilians marched, moving along a trajectory of stops where violence had left indelible marks. The march stopped at each place to grieve the deeds, using white as a symbol of peace and centering youth through art including rap, hip-hop, salsa choke[12], and poetry. Ringing through the streets was the call "*solo el pueblo salva al pueblo*" (only the community saves the community)(*Buenaventura Marcha Para Enterrar y Ponerle Fin a La Ola de Violencia*, n.d.). Alongside the much-needed collective act of healing and denouncing the structural violence, the organizers of the march produced a list of demands directed at the national, regional and local governments calling for an immediate state emergency and release of funds to secure public services for the hospital, water and sanitation infrastructure, and procedural justice for crimes against humanity in the territory. On March 8, 2014, in response to unprecedented and unexpected numbers of *bonaverenses*, people of Buenaventura, marching, the national government sent a delegation of public officials to meet with the leaders of the march.

> "*El 8 de marzo aquí está el presidente con todos sus ministros y cada cosa. Entonces nos pusieron en mesas y mesas y nosotros perdidos ahí en eso. Y nosotros no sabíamos al final como responder porque no estábamos preparados.*"
>
> "On March 8th the President and his ministries were here and they put us all in working groups and we were lost. In the end we didn't know how to respond because we were not prepared. "
>
> (P. J. Reina, personal communication, January 23, 2020)

[11] There are no official counts of the total number of people, some interviewees mentioned 20,000 while others mentioned 60,000.
[12] Salsa choke is a style of salsa that originates in the 2000s from the Pacific of Colombia.

Negotiations with the national government were fraught with confusion over the process, given that the working group structure setup seemed instead to separate and diffuse the united voice of the *Comíte de la Marcha*. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached for an independent fund, "*Fondo para el Desarrollo del Plan Todos Somos PAZcifico*" (Fund for the development of the Plan: We are all Peace in the Pacific). The fund and plan would be managed by the national government's National Entity for Risk and Disaster Management and Ministries of Housing and Public Credit. For the fund and plan, the Santos administration committed to an investment of 400 million USD to be allocated for infrastructure projects in water and sanitation, energy, and transportation via fluvial water-ways (*Plan todos somos PAZcífico*, 2015). The management structure, set up by the national government, to execute *Plan Todos Somos PAZcifico* was exclusively made up of national-level public servants, only one of which was from the Colombian Pacific region, Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as its executive director and who would later be a part of the negotiation on the side of the national government during the *Paro Cívico* of 2017. Reflecting on the 2014 negotiation, Padre Jhon Reina states:

> "*Nosotros decíamos, por más que el gobierno nacional lo aplique [Plan PAZcifico], eso no va a funcionar. Dentro de eso que estábamos haciendo del manifiesto nosotros le estamos diciendo al gobierno que nosotros queríamos que nos declararan una emergencia social y ecológica y económica para Buenaventura por todos los problemas que teníamos y que los problemas eran de fondo y no de forma.*"
>
> "We said, even if the national government follows through [with Plan Pazcifico], this will not change anything. Within everything that our manifesto evoked, we were telling the national government that we wanted a social, ecological, and economic state of emergency to be declared for Buenaventura. Because our problems are more than the symptoms, they are structural issues."
>
> (P. J. Reina, personal communication, January 23, 2020)

The strategy behind calling for a declaration of national emergency addresses the severity of the violence and conditions of life facing the Pacific. Declaring a national emergency legally allows the national government to disburse funds immediately, rather than utilize a lengthy bureaucratic process by which projects and spending have to be cleared by the national government. Today, leaders recall that only 80 million USD of the pledged 400

million USD was allocated for projects in Buenaventura; other funds were pledged to public projects in the Colombian Pacific, to Quibdó and Tumaco, yet, the disbursement of this funding for any city lagged over the following months and then, years. The agreement was one that lacked meaningful inclusion in decision-making processes and methods by which civil society could hold the national government accountable. This experience created a valuable lesson: the *Movimiento Cívico* would need to consider how to structure itself in the negotiations with the government in 2017 in a manner that would shift governance of the territory.

Knowledge production as a form of civic governance is the foundation of the *Movimiento Cívico*. It results from an intentional process of tapping into the social and political capital of mobilizations. Individually, they all generate important social and political capital, and their impact is amplified when individual assets are leveraged for collective interest. Civic governance, in the case of the movement, requires a disciplined and rigorous process of organizing in which unity goes beyond gathering critical mass; instead, the strength of unity comes from a practice of pooling individual strengths in the service of the collective. The next two examples of civic governance further demonstrate how the movement builds upon this foundation to restructure state-controlled governance, effectively tackling *problemas de fondo* (structural change).

CIVIC GOVERNANCE AS MESAS TEMATICAS

Autonomous thematic committees generate the basis for a comprehensive view of development priorities

The *Movimiento Cívico*'s eight *mesas temáticas*, thematic committees, address the key priority needs of Buenaventura and are a form of civic governance designed specifically for civic society to formulate a concerted development plan. In this section, we will dive into how these thematic committees operated during the 22 days of negotiation during the *Paro Cívico* as well as their function post-negotiation, situating this structure as invented spaces that aim for substantive citizenship.

In a commemorative march for *La Gran Marcha* in February 2016, leaflets were handed out saying "*Buenaventura no aguanta mas, preparate para el paro*!" (Buenaventura won't take it anymore. Prepare yourself for the strike!). By 2017, right after the May 1st, international worker's day, the *Comité del Paro Cívico* definitively announced May 16th as *la*

hora zero, t-0. They issued statements to the community, such as, "Súmate al Paro!" (Join the Strike!) and "*Mucha atención! El Paro Cívico comienza, pero es indefinido, por lo tanto, es bueno que usted se aprovisione de productos no perecederos*" (Attention! The Civic Strike begins but will be indefinite, we recommend that you stock up on non-perishables) as part of an information and mobilization strategy. Gersain Diaz Osorio mentions that the supermarkets were selling more rice, potatoes, and other nonperishables, indicative of the movement's measured planning but also the community's preparedness in support of a *Paro Cívico*.

An official letter was sent to Juan Manuel Santos, incumbent President of the Republic, formally signed by nearly 80 organizations, a great part of them are labor unions related to the port's commercial activity, but also the neighborhood and community action committees, ethnic groups, and youth and women's rights groups (Appendix A). The letter decried "decades of denouncing, mobilizing, and negotiating with the national government" with the same outcomes of "constant incompliance"(Comite del Paro Civico, 2017). It also notes the importance of the port to the nation's economy, citing "5.47 billion of pesos in tariff income raised [in Buenaventura], making up 27% of the national total" and demanding that under article 215 of the National Constitution, the State declare an economic, social, and ecological emergency (Comite del Paro Civico, 2017). They further present eight "*lineas gruesas*", central priorities, and called for negotiations for each of the following:

1. Health: health services of low, medium and high standards and in traditional medicine, including coverage, prevention and attention
2. Environment: recovery and conservation of rivers and other strategic ecosystems in status of degradation
3. Education: coverage, quality, and adequacy of the basic, secondary level, technical and higher education
4. Human Rights: strengthen and promote cultural, recreational, and physical activities
5. Water and Sewage: water management and infrastructure including public and community-based management
6. Justice and Reparation: access to justice and reparation for victims on an individual and collective level

7. Territory and Housing: the ordering of the territory and the urban habitat for better livelihoods conditions and the collective well-being including reparation and new housing for families
8. Employment and Productivity: foster the local and regional production and other economic measures that provide employment with dignity and income for the families in need

(*Emisión en directo de TeleMar Buenaventura*, n.d.; Patiño & Moreno, n.d.)

On May 16, 2017, the civic strike began at 5 am with 11 strategic points blocked off. Indigenous leaders and *consejos comunitarios* in the rural areas blocked alternate highways, labor did not show up to man the ports nor to drive the 18-wheelers with freight from Buga, Cali, and Bogotá to and from the port, and local businesses closed. Blockades were made of people locking arms and chants, song, dance, and prayer were part of the march along the streets. Each day a new cry of resistance was announced. The flag of Buenaventura, the colors gold for its mineral-rich gold and green for its nature, were flown all throughout the streets (Redacción de El País, 2017)

Image 5: *Paro Cívico* 2017

Source: Comite del Paro Civico Facebook

On the 3rd day, the national government arrived to initiate a dialogue but immediately rejected the possibility for declaring a state of economic, ecological, and social emergency, stating that this would not be approved by congress because the situation in Buenaventura was not an emergency like that of a natural disaster (e.g. a flood) and thus not defensible by law. On the 4th day, Buenaventura's Mayor, Eliecer Arboleda Torres, aired a message to the city asking the leaders of the *Paro Cívico* to lift the blockades in exchange for continued negotiation with the national government. His request was not met, and later, he resorted to a plea that blamed the strike for limiting people's economic opportunity, specifically referring to informal workers, *rebuscadores*, those that collect trash and recycling. Mayor Torres, in public statement says, "*la gente quiere es trabajar y estoy seguro que este paro no va a durar*" (people want to work and I'm sure that this strike won't last) (*Habla el Alcalde Distrital ante negativa de Levantar Bloqueos*, n.d.; Patiño &

Moreno, n.d.). Mayor Torres gravely underestimated what people wanted. Henry Tobar reflects on this as a critical moment that led to more people joining the strike:

> "*... el alcalde de turno estaba en contra de este proceso porque estaba a favor de las clases políticas corruptas. Lo que hizo fue enervar los ánimos de la comunidad con cosas que hizo... se indignaron y se vincularon.*"
>
> "The incumbent Mayor was against this process because he was in favor of the corrupt political class. What he did was incite the community's motivation with the things he did... they became indignant and they joined." (H. H. Tobar Otero, personal communication, January 21, 2020)

On this same 4th day, the State responded by sending the national police riot control unit, *Escuadron Movil Antidisturbios* (ESMAD), citing the danger that paramilitary groups would get involved and attempting to remove people from the critical blockade at the Puente Piñal, initiating a standoff between civilians and a military unit. Soon after, disturbances broke out in the commercial center and at major grocery chains, intensifying the military repression. ESMAD responded with tear gas, bullets, and arrests. Leaders of the *Movimiento Cívico* felt that they could no longer guarantee a pacific, non-violent civic strike, and fearing bloodshed, decided to call off day 5 of the *Paro Cívico*. Yet, on day 5, youth and youth-led organizations did not heed the *Paro Cívico*'s leaders and instead flooded the streets again with non-violent protest and chanting what would become the motto of the strike, "¡*El Pueblo no se rinde, Carajo*!" (The people don't give up, dammit!)(E. S. Solarte, personal communication, January 24, 2020). As *Manos Visibles*, a non-profit social organization, notes in their documentation of the *Paro Cívico*, this was a moment where "*El pueblo se habia tomado el paro*" (The people had taken over the strike)(Patiño & Moreno, n.d.). The leaders acknowledge day 5 as a day that was outside of anything they had planned, "*Ya se volvió tema de ciudad no solo los organizadores*" (it was now a thing of the city not just the organizers) (H. H. Tobar Otero, personal communication, January 21, 2020).

Image 6: Re-enaction of the ESMAD confrontation during *Paro Cívico* 2017

Source: (Buenaventura No Se Rinde, 2017)

It wasn't until the 8th day that the government sent a negotiation delegation of the Minister of Housing, Vice Ministers of Water and the Interior, and the Director of the Plan Pazcifico and FINDETER. Both the State and the *Comité del Paro Cívico* agreed to live coverage of the negotiations by the local new station, TeleMar. Half a million *bonaverenses* living in the territory and countless others living in other Colombian cities such as Quibdó, Tumaco, Popayán, Cali, Medellín, Bogotá, or internationally, joined in solidarity with Buenaventura and the Colombian Pacific through social media using the hashtag #ElPuebloNoSeRindeCarajo. They rallied via social media to show support and drew a spotlight on the Colombian government at a time when the nation had recently signed the Peace Deal, bringing an expectation of peace in the territory.

This was the moment of negotiation that the movement had been working towards. Rather than allow the national government to set the order of negotiation and the priorities, the movement came prepared. Over the past two years of organizing and preparation, the general assembly had worked together to list out all the individual grievances and to pull together "*lineas gruesas*", central priorities. The eight demands presented to the national government are common threads that affect everyone in Buenaventura, and within the *Movimiento Cívico*, they align with eight thematic committees.

By day 11th, negotiations had stalled around the point of funding, the government refusing to declare the emergency which would allow it to distribute immediate funds and the *Movimiento Cívico* firm in its conviction that the levels of corruption, violence, poverty and unmet basic needs required an emergency response from the national government. Minister of the Environment, Luis Gilberto Murillo, also the former Director of *Plan PAZcifico*, suggested on behalf of the State to utilize the private autonomous fund from the *Plan PAZcifico* to generate a special account to fund the implementation of any agreements negotiated and to allow for a council of directors made up of the gubernatorial actors and by the community (Patiño & Moreno, n.d.). The *Comité del Paro Cívico* decided to discuss this as an option and return with an answer. The next day, both parties agreed to begin negotiations around an autonomous fund to be directed by both government and the community.

Rather than allow the government to determine the priorities, the *Comité del Paro Cívico* employed its structure, 8 *mesas temáticas*, thematic committees and brought 300 persons into the negotiation process to reach an accord. Alongside the eight central themes, an additional committee dedicated to researching the possibilities with regards to the autonomous fund and a tenth table for human rights given the continued military repression of ESMAD were created. Each committee worked to develop solutions, not just demands, and presented these as proposals during negotiation with their national government Ministry counterpart. These thematic agreements were then negotiated as a whole at the level of the *Comité Ejecutivo* and national government. As an example, Harrington Valencia Riveros describes how the education committee functioned:

> "*Estructuramos un pliego de soluciones en educación con 34 propuestas, articuladas en torno a ocho ejes temáticos que alcanzaban en ese entonces un monto cercano a los 200 millones de pesos en educación. Entonces ahí proponíamos mecanismos de política pública a nivel de educación, en temas de infraestructura educativa, temas de calidad de pertenencia, temas de cobertura… de educación superior… Y al final consolidamos un alta de 8 puntos, acordamos que el pliego que presentamos hace parte integral del acuerdo.*"
>
> "We structured a list of solutions with 34 proposals, articulated against eight central points that, in that instance, reached 200 million Colombian pesos [~70,000 USD] for education. There we proposed mechanisms for public policy at the level of education, topics such as education infrastructure, both

> in terms of quality and pertinence, topics of coverage…of higher education… and at the end, we consolidated these into eight central points and we agreed with the national government that the list of solutions would be an integral part of the final agreement."
>
> (H. Valencia Riveros, personal communication, January 23, 2020)

Some thematic committees had moved faster in reaching agreements than others, for example, the Committee for Employment and Productivity, which pooled together so many different labor groups and interests were one of the groups with prolonged deliberations. By day 20th, State-sanctioned violence against demonstrators continued, diminished food and other resources were becoming harder to manage, within Buenaventura but also regionally, as smaller communities in the Pacific depend on the port for provisions and therefore also saw their resources diminished. The pressure to reach an agreement was mounting.

On day 22, June 6th, at 9 am the representatives of the national government and the *Comité del Paro Cívico* signed an agreement that contained two central parts. First, an Autonomous Fund that would last 10 years to finance a *Plan Estrategico de Desarrollo Integral del Distrito de Buenaventura* (PEIDB; Special Strategic and Comprehensive Development Plan for Buenaventura). The PIEDB will need to align with other national, regional, and district-level planning, but will also pool its proposals for development from the matrix of solutions and ongoing work of the eight thematic committees. A second part of the agreement was a set of solutions from these matrix proposals that with allocated funds, reaching an initial investment of 1.5 billion Colombian pesos, the equivalent of nearly half a billion USD, from the national government (*Gobierno Nacional y Comité Ejecutivo del Paro Cívico firmaron acuerdo para levantar el paro*, 2017).

Over the 22 days of civic strike, an estimated that 25% to 50% of Buenaventura participated in the strike, the exact figure is unknown, taking back their territory from the hands of illegally armed actors, corrupt politicians, and extractive economic interests. The strike cost the port and export-based multinationals $230,000 million Colombian Pesos - an estimated 77 million USD (Vargas, 2017). In a session with LIT participants, the youth leaders reflected and discussed what the impact of the strike was:

> *"Se restableció la confianza. Hoy en términos de referentes inmediatos, ya no es Santos, Uribe... Ahora hablan de Humberto, Victor Vidal. La sociedad civil es el*

> *pilar fundamental del estado de derecho*[13]*. El Paro evidencia la confianza en la sociedad civil. A partir de ahí, el impacto es que restablece el constituyente primario.*"
>
> "We restored confidence. Today, in terms of our immediate references we aren't looking to Santos or Uribe… Today we are talking about Humberto and Victor Vidal. Civil society is the pillar of a social state under the rule of law. *El Paro* is evidence of the confidence in civil society. From now on, the impact is that we restored the primary constituent."

The 22-days of the civic strike brought together civil society, both the organized groups that worked on the planning, executions, and negotiation as one united *Movimiento Cívico*, and those who mobilized daily on the streets in defense of the territory on the day of *la hora zero* and for subsequent days, effectively de-authorizing the State's governance and placing in its stead governance from civic society. The structural problems of the territory were understood under these terms: restoring civic society's governance of the territory. The eight thematic committees function as a form of insurgent practice, a practice of concerted, comprehensive planning from below in which proposals for public services from health, to water, to education emerge to contest their counterparts at the level of formal State-led planning. Importantly, this structure continues three years after the *Paro Cívico*, Harrington Valencia Riveros notes, "*Las mesas han venido funcionando como una institucionalidad social*" (The tables have been functioning like social institutions) (personal communication, January 23, 2020). In setting up social institutions that will manage the public works and priorities of the territory, the thematic committees can make proposals towards the comprehensive development plan (PEIDB) which has a 10-year reach and goes beyond any political office term or any previous plans proposed by the government. The PEIDB framework proposed by the movement is considered distinct in that it is a plan to close the gap between the national average for basic needs and the reality in Buenaventura, and it is realistic in that improvements for Buenaventura will require a long-term civic-infrastructure to manage projects and a long-term source of financing that doesn't ebb and flow with the will of incumbent politicians. In a context of structural inequality and violence, the *Movimiento Cívico* has generated social institutions, pooling together social

[13] In Colombia's Constitution of 1991, article 1 states that "Colombia is a social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary republic, decentralized, with autonomy of its territorial units, democratic, participatory, and pluralistic, based on the respect of human dignity, the work and solidarity of the individuals who belong to it, and the prevalence of the general interest"

and political capacity from civic society, and has pooled these resources to generate a concerted process of comprehensive development from below.

Harrington Valencia Riveros, who participates as part of the education committee, describes the thematic committees as social institutions, each with 3-levels of operation. The first level as, "*espacios autónomos*", autonomous spaces, at the community level, then a smaller technical team that is in communication with the Ministry of Education at the national government level, and a mixed team, that pools together the members of the *Movimiento Cívico*, national government, and local government (H. Valencia Riveros, personal communication, January 23, 2020). The thematic committees, in essence, generate a space for the community to make decisions around priorities that address the public infrastructure needs in the city; technical teams utilize resources from academics, volunteers, allies of the movement with technical capacity, and movement leaders themselves to take proposals from ideation and prioritization phases to implementation phase; and the discussion with the national government is a space that functions to operationalize financially and legally what has already been discussed and agreed upon at the community level.

> "*Se alcanzó un nivel de maduración ideológica política del pueblo que se expresó en la movilización tan enorme, en el respaldo social popular tan enorme, y sobre todo en el nivel político y técnico de la dirigencia del Paro Cívico y sus mesas de trabajo en la interlocución política y técnica con el gobierno nacional.*"
>
> "We reached a level of political and ideological maturity as a community, which expressed itself in the mobilization so large and backed the movement, and above all, at the political and technical level of the leadership of the *Paro Cívico* and its thematic committees in a political and technical dialogue with the national government."
>
> (H. Valencia Riveros, personal communication, January 23, 2020)

Comparing this with how the negotiation process went in 2014, an organizational structure around the eight development priorities grew out of political and ideological maturity. The *Movimiento Cívico*'s goal isn't to just reach a deal, they have a long-term vision for civil society to govern governance and the market.

> "*Yo creo que él paro de Buenaventura, en eso fue supremamente exitoso. Que logró reunir a gran parte de sus mejores intelectuales académicos pero*

> *intelectuales de base también, que se dispusieron para aportar en ese proceso, un proceso que ya va para tres años y todavía tiene un voluntariado fuerte en las mesas…mucha gente con mucha capacidad y con mucha formación. Eso también es un aprendizaje muy importante, supremamente importante, porque fuimos capaces de mostrarle al gobierno nacional que un lugar como Buenaventura tenía condiciones para interactuar de tú a tú con los funcionarios del gobierno cómo pares académicos y eso fue un elemento muy significativo, de mucho valor. De los grandes aprendizajes, ¿cómo lograr que los principales activos intelectuales de un pueblo puedan articularse en una cosa como esta? Porque necesitábamos gente con capacidad, conceptual y técnica para poder defender los derechos de la comunidad en los diferentes temas que son amplios.*"
>
> "I think that the strike of Buenaventura… managed to bring together a large part of its best intellectuals, academic and grassroots intellectuals, who set out to contribute in this process, a process that is already three years old and still has a lot of volunteer service. A lot of people with lots of capacity and with a lot of preparation, that is also a very important lesson, supremely important, because we were able to show the national government that a place like Buenaventura has the conditions to interact one-to-one with government officials as academic peers and in that moment it was very significant, it has a lot of value. One of our greatest lessons, how to succeed in bringing together the greatest intellectual assets of our community to articulate something like this [Paro *Cívico*]. Because we needed people with aptitudes, conceptual and technical, to be able to defend the rights of the community in all its different topics, which are vast."
>
> (H. Valencia Riveros, personal communication, January 23, 2020)

Valencia Riveros notes that the movement was successful in tapping into the consciousness and capacity of the community and in sharpening their strategy for social transformation. The thematic committees are set up as foils to their State counterparts, to employ both the conceptual framework, referring to the knowledge of the culture and philosophical grounding behind the proposals, and the technical framework to accomplish them. For example, the Committee for Education's 34 projects each require project management, but these projects are conceptually grounded in a model of education that the movement refers to as, *etno-education*, elaborated as education "*que permita adecuar el sistema educativo a las condiciones particulares del territorio, especialmente a las expresiones culturales de las comunidades locales*" (ethnic education that allows for the educational system to be adequate for the particular conditions of the territory, specifically, the cultural expressions of the local community) (H. Valencia Riveros, personal communication, January 23, 2020). Governance of the territory, after all, requires that

future generations of the ethnic-territory of the Colombian Pacific have the knowledge which prepares them conceptually, technically, and politically for participation in civic society.

To summarize this example of civic governance, the work that comes from the thematic committees has multiple trajectories, one of which is the inclusion of proposals from each committee into the PIEBD, however, this work is also set up to be plugged into other formal planning directives including the National Development Plan for Ivan Duque's administration, the District's Development Plan under Victor Vidal's administration, and the upcoming *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (POT; a land-use plan executed every 12-years by the Department of National Planning). The thematic committees provide the structure for civic governance to source from within the territory community assets and knowledge, develop proposals and link these to development projects at the State-level.

CIVIC GOVERNANCE AS A LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR MIXED-MANAGEMENT

Mixed-management, national government and civil society, structure to oversee an autonomous fund

That a civic strike, an act of civil disobedience, or protest result in an agreement that promises millions of pesos of investments for the development of the Colombian Pacific is not a new story- but there are key differences between those times and the agreement that occurred as a result of the *Paro Cívico* of 2017. To mark this distinction, a closer look at how the movement inserts civic governance in its agreements is necessary. In this final section, an analysis of the agreement reached on June 6th highlights aspects of the legal framework where the *Movimiento Cívico* strengthens civil society's role in governance over the territory.

Paro Cívico 2017 Agreement

Recall, on June 6, 2017, a two-part agreement was reached between the *Movimiento Cívico* and the national government to end the 22-day strike. The first part of this agreement is a Matrix of Public Work Priorities, which includes investments in public works and priorities as negotiated by each working group with an allocated 1.5 billion Colombian pesos (approximately half a million USD). The second part is the creation of an

autonomous fund to oversee the financing and development of a 10-year special development plan for Buenaventura (PIEDB). The overarching goals of this plan are stipulated within the agreement:

- Guarantee access to public health care from basic to emergency services
- 100% coverage and access to potable water and sewage
- 100% coverage and access to education
- Reduce unemployment to 1-digit percent through local economic and food sovereignty. This includes reactivation of ancestral economic activities such as fishing, sustainable forestry, artisanal manufacturing, ancestral mining, local commerce, local agriculture, and creation of a port zone and road infrastructure connected to the interior of the Colombian Pacific
- Overcome the housing deficit in the urban and rural zones

Within this agreement, five projects from the Matrix of Public Work Priorities are specified to receive immediate sources of financing: these include a small hospital unit, the first phase of an urban sewage system and rural aqueduct system, the Intensive Care Unit for the local hospital, a resource hub for the local-fishing sector, and a dock for cabotage. It is important to remember that this agreement ended the civic strike, but it did not end the movement's strategy to ensure compliance from the national government.

Image 7 Direct broadcasting of *Paro Civico* 2017 negotiations, *Comite Ejecutivo Paro Civico*'s Victor Hugo Vidal (bottom) and Narcilo Rosero (top) speaking

Source: (*Emisión en directo de TeleMar Buenaventura*, n.d.)

Decreto 1402 y 1812

To ensure compliance, soon after signing the agreement, a group of the *Comité Ejecutivo* traveled to Bogota, the nation's capital, to seek that the accords be legally formalized. On August 2017, Decree 1402 was issued by the Juan Manuel Santos, incumbent President of the Republic, to create the Commission for the Follow-up and Monitoring of the Accords of the Civic Strike) (Comisión de Seguimiento al Acuerdo Del Paro Cívico de Buenaventura Para Vivir Con Dignidad y Paz En El Territorio, 2017). *Seguimiento*, compliance, has been a crucial part of maintaining the agreements alive. The decree legally establishes a committee structure with voting power that includes a mix of government and community officials. These include:

1. Minister of Interior or a delegate
2. Minister of Health and Social Protection or a delegate
3. Minister of National Education or a delegate
4. Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development or a delegate
5. Minister of Housing, City and Territory, or a delegate
6. High Ranking Advisor to the President, or a delegate
7. Director of the Plan Todos Somos PAZcifico, or a delegate
8. Governor of the Valle del Cauca Department or a delegate
9. The Mayor of Buenaventura or a delegate
10. Seven representative of the *Movimiento Cívico**

*The total number of community representatives first allotted was 1, this was amended in November 2017 to include 7 community representatives from the *Movimiento Cívico.*

The committee is tasked with directing the compliance of the agreements reached by the *Paro Cívico*, informing citizens and promoting civic and community participation in the process, creating an ad hoc committee to study the structural problems of the city and agreeing on metrics by which to measure the compliance of agreements. These meetings take place in Bogota, Cali, and Buenaventura, depending on the situation, and they have become an extension of negotiation talks, an ongoing process of engaging with the highest officials of the nation to hold them accountable to the agreement. As a result of the work of this committee, by November 2018, the Nation's Congress signs Law 1872 titled "Fund for the Development of the Special District of Buenaventura and Efforts to Promote the

Comprehensive Development of Buenaventura Delegated as a Special, Industrial, Biodiverse, and Eco-touristic District", which cements the legal framework for an autonomous fund to finance the development plan.

Ley 1872 de 2017: FONBUENAVENTURA

The fund, known as FONBUENVENTURA, is to be managed by a Board of Directors made up of *Movimiento Cívico* representatives and government officials, under the following governance structure:

1. Minister of Housing and Public Credit
2. Minister of Housing, City and Territory
3. Minister of the Interior
4. Director of the National Planning Department
5. Three members designed by the President of the Nation
6. Governor of the Valle del Cauca Department
7. The Mayor of Buenaventura
8. Five elected representatives of the *Movimiento Cívico*

The five representatives of the *Movimiento Cívico* are to be elected through democratic mediums, guaranteeing the participation of representatives from indigenous and black communities, as well as the Juntas de Acción Communal in Buenaventura. The *Movimiento Cívico* developed its own framework internally, Resolution N001, to outline how elections would take place. First, to run as a representative requires a nomination and each of the five persons elected must be members of the *Moviemiento Cívico* who, if elected, will also serve on the *Comité Ejecutivo* of the movement. Votes are allocated as 1 vote for every organization that is a member of the *Movimiento Cívico*, 1 vote to every thematic committees, and 1 vote for a group of 10 individuals who are independents and thus are not part of a member organization (Resolución N001, 2018). Elections for the fund took place one year after the *Paro Cívico*, on June 18, 2018. Given that one of the most complex issues facing Buenaventura includes political corruption that has diverted public infrastructure funds towards illicit economic activity and personal gain, the insertion of representatives of the *Movimiento Cívico* is a mechanism for compliance of the agreement and

accountability over the political system. The vision of the *Movimiento Cívico* is to continue strengthening this oversight of government, Henry Tobar remarks:

> "El tema integral porque hemos mirado nuestra historia y los antecedentes y hemos aprendido de los antecedentes... Los gobernantes de turno han gobernado de tal manera que pareciera que no quisieran la tierra, el territorio, y a sus habitantes. Han permitido la corrupción y todo lo demás. De nada nos sirve que el gobierno nacional continúe enviando recursos cuando se dilatan, no se invierten como se aprueban. A la par con eso, fortalecer e informar la gente en mecanismos de control social, veeduría ciudadana, vigilancia de los servicios públicos y todo lo demás. El tema de gobernanza para que vigilen que esos recursos se inviertan correctamente. Igualmente, de que se formen para participar en los espacios de toma de decisiones como los consejos, las juntas, las comisiones donde hay representantes elegidos y también designados por sus organizaciones que representan, pero que lleguen personas idóneas a tomar esas decisiones, que los recursos se inviertan bien y que se direccionen las políticas públicas en cada sector para que se puedan beneficiar, impactar de una forma significativa a la población objeto de beneficio."
>
> "It's a holistic concept because we have looked at our history and what has happened before and we have learned from those moments of the past. Incumbent politicians have governed in a way that appears as if they don't love the land, the territory, and our people. They have allowed corruption and all else. It does us no good for the national government to continue to send resources when they are postponed and not invested as they are approved. At the same time, we need to inform people of mechanisms for oversight, a citizen's watchdog approach, to oversee public services and everything else. This is topic of governance, so that they can oversee that resources are invested correctly, but also, that they can prepare themselves to be able to participate in the spaces of decision-making like the *consejos [comunitarios]*, *juntas*, and commissions where they are elected to represent or appointed by their organizations so that we can have the best people in these positions to make the decisions about how to invest resources and to create public policy that will benefit and impact in a significant way the people it is meant to benefit."
>
> (H. H. Tobar Otero, personal communication, January 21, 2020)

The movement's focus beyond the insertion of community participation into formal, legal spaces of participation comes from an awareness that State-sanctioned spaces of inclusion often extend State-control, furthering corruption and pursuit of individual interests. The community-level of participation in the board of directors for FONBUENAVENTURA is a legal framework that allows the movement to oversee financing for the 10-year

development plan, but, it is part of a larger framework the movement is pursuing to build civic participation such that community members are prepared to serve the public interest and hold government accountable beyond the 10-year development plan.

As a last point, it is also fundamental to consider that while the community participation in the board of directors of FONBUENAVENTRA is a significant legal inclusion in development, the movement is working within and beyond the legal agreement to extend the meaning of community participation in development. Law 1812 of 2018 articulates that the plan, known as the Plan Integral Especial de Desarrollo para Buenaventura (PIEDB), will be generated with the appropriate technical help of the nation's ministers and the National Planning Department and with successful community participation, including community, economic and institutional stakeholders. Article 7 denotes that the board of directors will vote on the budget of the plan and approve it by majority vote. It tasks the board of directors with the implementation of the plan for 10 years with the primary objective of closing the gap of inequality between the region and the interior of the nation. In interviews with the leaders, many pointed to the thematic committees' framework as the ongoing form of community participation that will recommend projects and priorities of the PIEDB. Benjamin Mosquera Rodriguez, one of the members elected to the fund notes its inextricable tie to the future development and ultimately, governance of Buenaventura:

> "Somos 14 personas que vamos a estar en la junta directiva de ese fondo donde se van a discutir los proyectos que van a dinamizar el desarrollo de ese plan y que tengan impacto real en la transformación de la vida de la gente de nuestro territorio… Creemos que ese plan de desarrollo, que tiene una dinámica muy particular que es la que realmente va cambiar el sistema de gobernar en el territorio, y es que va a ser un plan de desarrollo construido con toda la comunidad de Buenaventura"
>
> "We are 14 people who will make up the board of directors for the fund where we will discuss the projects that will materialize the development plan and that will have a real impact in the transformation of life for people of our territory… We believe that the development plan, which has a very particular dynamic, is what will truly change the governance system of our territory, and that is that it will be a plan for development constructed with all of Buenaventura's community"
>
> (B. Mosquera Rodriguez, personal communication, January 27, 2020)

The movement is skilled in its social and political capacity, operating within the legal framework of the State to create spaces for inclusion that is tied to material redistribution and the oversight of funds to this end. As such, the legal mechanisms of citizen participation demonstrate the movement's own way, *forma propia*, of operationalizing substantial citizenship inclusion, yet, substantial citizenship does not stop at the level of State-sanctioned spaces. Instead, the strategy within the legal framework is fluid, entirely tied to an insurgent citizenship practice that builds civic governance through its thematic committees to manage the public infrastructure needs of the territory and mechanisms to continue strengthening civic society's role governance over the territory.

Table 1 Legislative Agreements Resulting from *Paro Cívico* 2017

Legislation	**Financing**	**Governance**
Paro Cívico Acuerdo: Declaración de Compromiso de Fondo Autónomo Y Obras Prioritarias Civic Strike Agreement: Declaration of Compromise for Autonomous Fund and Matrix of Priority Public Works Issued: June 6, 2017	Initial pledge of tariff-based financing and an initial credit line of 76 million USD for a total commitment of 1.5 billion pesos (~500 million USD) Fund will continue procurement of financing for 10-year development plan	Set up an ad hoc committee in charge of drafting a law for the autonomous fund and 10-year development plan
Decreto 1402 de 2017: Comisión de Seguimiento Decree 1402 of 2017: Comission for Compliance Issued: August 2017	NA	Establishes metrics for compliance with accord Establishes a Commission with 1 representative* of the *Movimiento Cívico* to oversee compliance of Paro *Cívico* agreements
Decree 1812 of 2017 Issued: November 2017	NA	*Expands community participation on the commission for compliance by increasing 1 representative of the *Movimiento Cívico* to 7
Law 1872 of 2017 Issued: December 2017	Establishes FONBUENAVENTURA and assigns sources of financing including: 1. National, regional, and district Budgets 2. Credit from national banks and international organizations 3. Donations 4. Grants, international cooperation 5. Tariffs	Establishes a board of directors that includes 5 elected representatives of the *Movimiento Cívico* and 8 government officials. This board will elect and oversee the fund's executive director.

CHAPTER 4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE *MOVIMIENTO CÍVICO* TO INSURGENT PLANNING

> "*En menos de tres años suceden dos cosas extraordinarias: Un Paro Cívico que le cambia la lógica, la dinámica, la autoestima de un pueblo y pone a un país entero a ver hacia acá, de manera positiva. Y en menos de tres años, un pueblo logra elegir popularmente*, popularmente *a su nuevo alcalde.*
> *Eso solo pasa en Buenaventura porque Dios vive aquí.*"
>
> "In less than three years, two extraordinary events have occurred: a *Paro Cívico* that changes the logic, the dynamic, the self-esteem of a people and puts an entire country to look towards us, in a positive way. And in less than 3 years, *un pueblo* are successful in electing by popular vote, *popular vote*, a new mayor. This can only happen in Buenaventura, because God lives here."
>
> Mayor Victor Hugo Vidal Piedrahíta Vidal,
> leader of the *Comité Ejecutivo* of the Paro *Cívico* 2017,
> Inauguration Speech January 1, 2020 [14]

The forms of civic governance embodied by the *Movimiento Cívico* are insurgent planning practices that link knowledge to collective action from below for social transformation, a transformation towards a long-term vision for a territory that reflects the worldviews of its people. As an insurgent planning practice, the movement recognizes the State-sanctioned spaces from previous negotiations can remain *invited* spaces, where participation in decision-making is limited and results in promises made and not fulfilled. As a result, the process of collective learning and sourcing knowledge from the cultural identity of the ethnic territory is accompanied by a political strategy that builds power within the nation-state. The movement does this by generating *invented* spaces, for example, the thematic committees which are reliant on a mobilized civic society as part of the mechanisms that confront authority and create alternatives to the dominant models. Nonetheless, as Miraftab (2009) notes, "these two sorts of spaces stand in a mutually constituted, interacting relationship, not a binary one. They are not mutually exclusive, nor is either necessarily affiliated with a fixed set of individuals or groups or with a particular kind of civil society"(Miraftab, 2009, p. 39). This is also true for the *Movimiento Cívico*'s forms of civic governance where the thematic committees transgress the notion of

[14] Benlínea, "Victor Hugo Vidal se posesionó como Alcalde distrital de Buenaventura."

invented or invited, in fact, this is their strength. They are able to engage civic society in a planning process as much as they are structures that can access formal spaces by informing the negotiation with the national government or the legal planning mechanisms with the national government. The movement is skilled at functioning and operating within its alternative practice yet, utilizing these methodologies to build power that destabilizes the State's governance of the territory. Another example can be seen in the method of civil disobedience, the prolonged broad-based civic strike made possible by the daily practice of taking care of eachother: Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities held the front-line of the terrestrial transportation routes while community members brought food, music, and resources to sustain the barricade. This practice, sustained for 22 days put pressure on the financial interests of the elite, an invented space utilized to draw the national government's delegates to the port city in order to address the demands of the ethnic territory. This contributed to setting the table at the negotiation with the national government with the power of civic society as leverage to make the vision of planning from the vision of the territory a more attainable possibility. Nonetheless, the negotiations are a place of struggle for autonomy, including material re-distribution and substantive citizenship. Since agreements reached in this space can dissipate into promises that aren't realized once actors leave the negotiation table, the movement's strategy towards autonomy necessitates strengthening the role of civic society not only within mobilizations and negotiations, but in political accountability and legalization of agreements. As such, the eight thematic committees are invented spaces, foils to their state-counterparts, that gather community-level visions and strategies for development. These however, can only access financing and operationalization in a mixed-management approach with the national, regional, and local government. Therefore, the movement pursues legal mechanisms and within these legal frameworks institutes accountability measures that allow it to access decision-making and economic power. This is the example of the board of directors for FONBUEANVENTURA, which is tasked with the 10-year development plan and its financing. The plan itself is sourced from invented spaces but the movement fought for and won a seat at the level of formal, legal structures to ensure that the latter can be realized. As the struggle continues, the movement has built stronger measures for civil society to govern governance and the market, and this can further be witnessed by the civic movement's most recent move towards a political campaign.

In summer of 2019, Victor Vidal, one of the most visible leaders during the negotiations with the national government was nominated by the general assembly of the *Movimiento Cívico* to run for mayor and so ensued a strategy for political mobilization. In October 2019, the people of Buenaventura elected Vidal as their mayor, accessing another formal structure of government. As leaders indicated in our interviews, their choice to enter local politics became clear after struggling to get the Mayor Eliecer Arboleda Torres and his administration to collaborate with the movement in order for the *Paro Cívico* agreements to materialize. Having a movement's own delegate in the Mayoral seat could be a step towards tackling the political corruption that limits financing from reaching public infrastructure projects as well as lead towards smoother cooperation and alignment between the national, regional, local government, and the *Movimiento Cívico*. Furthermore, in the FONBUENAVENTURA, the mayor holds a seat that will now add another voice of the movement to the decision-making and financing process for the PIEBD. Ultimately, for the *Movimiento Cívico*, *formas propias de gobernanza* are counterhegemonic, transgressive, and epistemologically grounded practices that emerge from a civic society that embodies and restores the values and identity of the ethnic-territory.

FUTURE RESEARCH

In this final closing, I offer thoughts on future research that can continue to inform the theory of social transformation from the Western epistemology towards a world of many worlds, or pluriverse (Escobar, 2018). The first question that future research should look to is the debate within planning discipline on outcome versus process, namely, how does an insurgent planning practice lead to different outcomes? The second question, which is interrelated asks how do *formas propias*, our own ways, relate to a conceptual framework for self-determination?

Within insurgent planning practice, as Beard (2003) and Sandercock (1998), quote, social change is a process of "A thousand tiny empowerments." In Beard's research, a community overcomes the fear of an authoritative government and picks up the skills and experience to organize against a powerful repressive force, contributing an example of a radical planning process that begins with seemingly insignificant acts that over time build up a sense of collective agency. Sandercock points towards communicative acts of

rationality as processes of collective learning that can create tiny empowerments, providing examples such as popular education mechanisms that allow diverse coalitions of groups to both develop and understanding of the structural forces of oppression as well as allow groups to build solidarity across differences within their group. Insurgent planning practices of the *Movimiento Cívico* are built upon a community asset, a network of grassroots processes grounded in ethnic-territorial identity, to weave a comprehensive understanding of "*problemas de fondo*", structural and systemic problems. Drawing from decades of government promises never realized, the movement drew lessons from a thousand tiny empowerments, concluding with the need for a comprehensive strategy, and organized a multisector coalition where each of civic society's sectors leveraged their social and political capital on behalf of the collective.

> "*Los que están aquí no van a representar un sector sino van a representar a una cuidad.*"
>
> "Those who are part of the movement aren't going to represent one sector, they are going to represent a city."
>
> (H. H. Tobar Otero, personal communication, January 21, 2020)

Henry Tobar's reflections speaks to the creation of a collective consciousness, a shift from thinking from the individualistic model of self-interest, the logic that occupies the territory, and towards a restoration of the collective values that come from ancestral and traditional practices of the ethnic territory. This was evident when we explored the possibilities for what types of programs were being proposed from the thematic table of employment and productivity. Before answering with specifics, Tobar began with a link to consciousness which he links to a shift in how government manages public resources, and ultimately, to how that strengthens the cultural practices of the territory.

> *"Tenemos que quitarnos ese* INRI, *ese estigma de que somos corruptos, de que somos perezosos, de que no somos inteligentes, de que no somos capaces. Por eso, el poder político que direcciona las políticas tienen que llevar a nuevas personas que en realidad pongan el recurso público al servicio de la comunidad y desde ahí impulsar ese desarrollo económico. Y articularse al tema del bien común, el tema del cooperativismo, de la minga, de la mano cambiada, esas cosas tradicionales que teníamos, volverlas a recuperar."*

> "We have to remove that INRI, that stigmatization, the stigma that we are corrupt, that we are lazy, that we aren't intelligent, that we aren't capable. That is why a political power that creates political policy needs to have people that actually service the public, the community, and from there we can push for economic development. And we will do so from the common good, with the theme of cooperation, of *la minga*, of those traditional things which we had, to restore them."
>
> (H. H. Tobar Otero, personal communication, January 21, 2020)

La minga is an ancestral practice with roots in the indigenous traditions of the Colombian Pacific and originally referred to tending to the land collectively; today it also refers to working through challenges via cooperation. Recovering cooperation and *la minga* is to restore "*Esas cosas tradicionales que teniamos*", that we used to have, which recalls the political ontological nature of struggle and can be considered as a simultaneously decolonizing and regenerative practice. Cultural and identity-based practices, *formas propias*, counteract what Escobar (2017) posits as an occupation of territory done by " a particular ontology, that of individuals, expert knowledge, markets, and the economy" (Escobar, 2018, p. 68). As people are displaced, conflicted with trauma, and living in a context of inequality, the link to belonging to the territory and to eachother is severed, as is the ability to see one's self as an agent of different possibilities. The existence of *formas propias* suggests that a complete ontological, political, and economic occupation of the territory is incomplete. Yet, the reality of struggle remains in insurgent planning practices and self-determination, the ability for the ethnic-territory to make decisions over their destiny, remains an incomplete practice. Thus, insurgent practices are a pathway towards the long-term goal of *autodeterminación* or self-determination. In this pathway, the alternatives proposed by the *Movimiento Cívico* are grounded in a practice of building solidarity that restores the collective identity of ethnic territory and contributes to building collective agency. Here, the *Movimiento Cívico* contributes an example of creating a civic governance that recaptures ethnic-territorial values of cooperation, the common good, or as it said in the Colombian Pacific, *la minga.* Insurgent planning practices are based on agency, practices that contradict the imposed structures by tapping into individual and collective agency that generates alternatives. As we point towards a conceptual framework for self-determination beyond the oppositional practices of insurgent planning, I believe that *formas propias de gobernanza*, must continue to build

political and economic power across the Global South. “A thousand tiny empowerments”, the billions of insurgent planning practices across the Global South have the ability to lead to different outcomes if these processes don’t operate in isolation from eachother. Given the global interconnectedness of structures of inequality and violence, tiny empowerments offer necessary alternative practices built on agency that have the radical potential for different outcomes when they too are interconnected.

To conclude, I leave you with a vision from Harrington Valencia Riveros, of the world we know is not only needed, but possible.

> “Yo *sueño con que en algún día seamos capaces de poder concretar condiciones que … le permitan a la gente gozar de manera plena de esos recursos, pero también con que seamos capaces de fortalecer un proyecto de vida colectivo que hemos venido concertando ya. Y poder, en esa situación, fortalecer el Movimiento Cívico, fortalecer la reinicio social y comunitaria en torno a ese proyecto de vida colectivo… Y ese proyecto de vida colectivo se va concretar en lo que es el Plan Desarrollo Especial para Buenaventura a 10 años, esperamos que haya un proceso de retroalimentación muy amplio qué posibilita una participación efectiva de las diferentes comunidades, sectores gremios, organizaciones, civiles, comunitarias, étnicas de tal suerte que se constituye ese plan con un proyecto que logre consensuar las diferentes miradas que se tienen en el territorio… y sobre todo que seamos capaces de conducir nuestro propio destino. Hemos dados un paso importante pero todavía falta consolidar ese proceso.*”
>
> “I dream that one day we will be able to solidify conditions for us that will permit people to fully enjoy our resources but that we will also have the capacity to strengthen our collective life project, the one we have been working towards. And to be able to, in that situation, strengthen the *Movimiento Cívico*, strengthen social and community participation to support our collective life project. This project will come to fruition through the Comprehensive Development Plan for Buenaventura [PIEBD] in the length of ten years. We hope that there is a strong mechanism for feedback and participation from different communities, business sectors, civic organizations, community organizations, ethnic communities, so that we can come together from our differences, under concensus, to constitute a collective plan for the territory…. And above all, that we are capable of driving our own destiny. We have taken an important step, but we are still consolidating this process.”

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Interviews

Brayan Montaño Payan	*Líder de la Organización Pro y Paz* *Integrante del Movimiento Cívico* Leader of a grassroots organization, Pro y Paz Member of the *Movimiento Cívico* on behalf of his organization
Benjamin Mosquera Rodríguez	*Líder del Comité Ejecutivo* *Miembro de la Mesa de Educación* *Representante del Movimiento Cívico en* FONBUENVENATURA Leader on the *Comité Ejecutivo* Member of the Table for Education Representative on behalf of *Movimiento Cívico* for FONBUENAVENTURA
Edwin Steven Solarte Cuero	Integrante del *Movimiento Cívico* y Mesa de Productividad y Empleo Participante del MIT CoLab Laboratorio de Innovacion Territorial Member of the *Movimiento Cívico* and Table for Productivity and Employment Participant of MIT CoLab Territorial Innovation Lab
Gersain Diaz Osorio	*Comunicaciones del Comité Ejecutivo* Communications for the *Comité Ejecutivo*
Harrington Valencia Riveros	Integrante del *Movimiento Cívico* y en la Mesa de Educacion Member of the *Movimiento Cívico* and Table for Education
Henry Hercilio Tobar Otero	Líder del *Comité Ejecutivo* Miembro de la Mesa de Educación Representante del *Movimiento Cívico* en FONBUENVENATURA Leader on the *Comité Ejecutivo* Member of the Table for Education Representative on behalf of *Movimiento Cívico* for FONBUENAVENTURA

Jhon Fredy Medina Montaño	*Integrante del Movimiento Cívico* *Participante del MIT CoLab Laboratorio de Innovación Territorial* Member of the *Movimiento Cívico* Participant of MIT CoLab Territorial Innovation Lab
Lino Herminsul Tobar Otero	*Participante en la Mesa de Productividad y Empleo durante negociaciones* *Director de la Secretaria de Recursos Humanos en la Administración de Victor Vidal* Participant in the Table for Productivity and Employment during negotiations Director of the Department of Human Resources for the Administration of Victor Vidal
Padre John Reina Ramírez	Líder del *Comité Ejecutivo* Leader on the *Comité Ejecutivo*
Yolanda Echevarría Gomez	Secretaria Técnica del *Comité Ejecutivo* Technical Secretary for the *Comité Ejecutivo*

Appendix B: List of Signatories to the Paro Cívico 2017
Source: (Comité del Paro Cívico, 2017)

Asociación de Transportadores Marítimo y Fluvial del Pacífico
Comité Del Agua Y La Vida.
Pastoral Social De La Diócesis De Buenaventura.
Pastoral Afro
Asociación de Comerciantes Unidos de Buenaventura
Asociación Colombiana de Industriales y Armadores Pesqueros
Asociación Nacional de Pescadores Artesanales.
Sindicato de Trabajadores del Municipio de Buenaventura
Proceso de Comunidades Negras
Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Educación del Valle (Sutev)
Sindicato de Trabajadores del Hospital Luis Ablanque de La Plata
Universidad del Pacífico
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores
Sindicato de Trabajadores de Buenaventura Medio Ambiente
Sindicato de Hidropacífico
Palenque Regional El Congal
Madres Comunitarias
Sindicato de Trabajadores de Energia Electrica de Colombia
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Transporte Terrestre
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Las Universidades de Colombia Subdiretiva Valle
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Las Universidades de Colombia Subdiretiva Del Pacífico
Asociación Nacional de Trabajadores de Hospitales y Clínicas
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Transporte
Asociación de Volqueteros
Asociación de Paleros
Ciudadela San Antonio
Asociación Nacional de Profesores Universitarios de Colombia
Juntas de Acción Comunal de La Comuna 7
Ediles de La Localidad 1
Ediles de La Localidad 2
FUNDESCODES
Barrio Nueva Colombia
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Citronela
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de La Caucana.
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Córdoba
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Alto y Medio Dagua
Cabildo Indígena Nasakiwe
Corporación para el Mejoramiento de La Calidad Educativa de Los Colegios Privados de Buenaventura

Junta de Acción Comunal del Barrio El Capricho
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras del Calima
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Yurumangui
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Raposo
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Mayorquin
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de la Gloria
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Naya
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Cajambre
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de Malaga
Asociación de Terrenos Ganados al Mar
Comité Interorganizacional
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras Guaimia
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras Agua Clara
Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras Mayor de Anchicaya
Asociación de Juntas de Acción Comunal
Juntas Administradoras Locales
Sindicato de Etnoeducadores
Asociación de Técnicos y Tecnólogos de Tránsito y Transporte
Asociación de Agentes de Transito
Juntas de Acción Comunal de La Comuna 5
Ecomadera
Asociación Gremial Financiera Colombiana En Buenaventura
Junta De Acción Comunal Barrio El Capricho